FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME IV, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TRADE POLICIES, 1969–1972 Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume IV Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972 United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IV) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations Persons Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972 Foreign Assistance Policy, 1969-1972 (Documents 1-105) International Development Policy, 1969-1972 (Documents 106-147) Expropriation Policy, 1969-1972 (Documents 148-180) Trade and Commerce, 1969-1972 (Documents 181-287) East-West Trade, 1969-1972 (Documents 288-359) Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, 1969-1972 (Documents 360-387) Commodities and Strategic Materials, 1969-1972 (Documents 388-446) Index Sources Sources Sources for the Foreign Relations Series The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Many of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration. The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969-1976 period, those that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records, including tape recordings of conversations with key U.S. and foreign officials. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at Archives II include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (P.L. 93-526; 88 Stat. 1695) and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon estate. There are no transcripts of tape recordings in this volume. Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The Nixon Presidential Materials Staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume IV In preparing this volume, the editor made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. The bulk of the foreign policy records at the Nixon Project are in the National Security Council Files. Within the National Security Council Files, the Agency, Country, and Subject Files proved to be of particular value. The records of the Department of State were another important source. The Department’s central files contain the cable traffic recording U.S. economic relations with Japan and major Latin American and West European countries; memoranda of diplomatic conversations; and memoranda proposing action or providing information. Many important documents are found only in the Department’s lot files. The conference files maintained by the Executive Secretariat contain briefing materials as well as records of conversations. Documentation on initiatives that were not approved is often found only in desk or bureau files. Department of State historians also have access to records of the Office of the Special Trade Representative at the National Archives and Records Administration, as well as to the records of the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, and the Agency for International Development at the Washington National Records Center. Many of these records have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred to Archives II. Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and many of those records are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Orders 12958 and 13142, under which all records over 25 years old, except file series exemptions requested by agencies and approved by the President, should be reviewed for declassification by 2003. Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files . See Record Group 59 under National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files . See Record Group 59 under National Archives and Records Administration below. Memoranda of Interviews . Conducted by the Staff of the Office of the Historian. C. Fred Bergsten, August 25, 1997 Richard N. Cooper, November 14, 1997 Viron P. Vaky, January 20, 1998 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, January 22, 1998 Herbert Stein, April 1998 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files E 1: General economic policy, plans E 1 US: General U.S. economic policy and plans FN 10: Foreign exchange FN 10 FR, Foreign exchange, France FN 10 IMF: Foreign exchange, IMF FN 10 EEC: Foreign exchange, EEC FN 10-1: Exchange rates FN 12 GER W: Balance of payments, West Germany FN 12 US: Balance of payments, U.S. FN 13: Capital movements FN 16 GATT: Revenue, taxation, GATT FN 16 US: U.S. revenue and taxation FN 17: Money, currency FN 17 UK: Monetary policy, United Kingdom FN 17 US: Money, currency, U.S. FN 17-1: Monetary policy and reform FN 19: Gold POL UK-US: General policy between the U.K. and the U.S. POL 7 US/VOLCKER: Visits, Meetings of Paul A. Volcker Lot Files E/CBA/REP Files: Lot 73 D 270 1970-1972, Current Economic Developments Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication Current Economic Developments for 1945-1969, maintained in the Bureau of Economic Affairs S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175 National Security Council and Senior Review Group meetings, 1969-1970 S/S Files: Lot 72 D 220 Briefing books, fact books, President’s and Secretary’s visits and conference books, Secretary’s and Under Secretary’s appearances before Congressional committees, 1969-1971 S/S Files: Lot 73 D 153 Daily and afternoon summaries of incoming and outgoing cables concerning crisis information and foreign policy, 1969-1971 S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288 Cabinet, National Security Council, National Security Council Under Secretaries, and Senior Review Group miscellaneous memoranda, 1969-1972 S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164 President’s evening reading items and Secretary-President luncheon meetings, 1964-1969, and Kissinger-Irwin meetings, 1970-1972 S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212 National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and related papers, 1969-1976 S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee study memoranda, 1969-1976 S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126 National Security Council, Council on International Economic Policy, and Under Secretaries Committee Miscellaneous Files, 1969-1977 S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276 National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee memoranda, 1969-1977 S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305 National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), 1969-1976 Record Group 364, Records of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Lot 78 B 1 Nixon Presidential Materials Project National Security Council Files Agency Files Back Channel Files Country Files Name Files Presidential/HAK Memcons President’s Trip Files Subject Files VIP Visits Transitional Task Force Reports White House Central Files President’s Daily Diary President’s Office Files Federal Government Organizations White House Special Files Haldeman’s Notes National Security Council National Security Council Institutional Files Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 56, Records of the Department of the Treasury Office of the Secretary of the Treasury: FRC 74 A 4 Secretary Connally’s Correspondence, 1971-1972 Office of the Secretary of the Treasury: FRC 80 A 1 Records of Secretary Shultz, 1972-1974 Office of the Secretary of the Treasury: FRC 74 A 7 Memoranda and Correspondence, 1966-1970 Office of the Secretary of the Treasury: FRC 74 A 17 Secretary’s Memoranda, 1971 Office of the Under Secretary of the Treasury: FRC 79 A 14 Files of Frederick L. Deming and Paul A. Volcker, 1963-1969 Office of the Under Secretary of the Treasury: FRC 79 A 15 Files of Under Secretary Volcker, 1969-1974 Office of International Monetary Affairs: FRC 77 A 68 Records of the Office of International Monetary Affairs, 1970-1975 Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs: FRC 83 A 26 Files of the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary, and Secretary of the International Monetary Group, 1947-1977 Record Group 286, Records of the Agency for International Development AID Administrator Files: FRC 75 A 13 Executive Secretariat files, 1968-1973 Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan Arthur Burns Papers Selected Published Sources The Economic Report of the President, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1975) Haldeman, H.R., The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the White House (New York: G.P. Putnam Sons, 1994) ———, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, the Complete Multimedia Edition (Santa Monica, CA: Sony Electronic Publishing, 1994) Kissinger, Henry, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979) ———, Years of Upheaval (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1982) Nixon, Richard M., RN, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978) Peterson, Peter G., The United States in a Changing World Economy , 2 Volumes (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972). Safire, William, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre Watergate White House (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975) Shultz, George P. and Kenneth W. Dam, Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977) Solomon, Robert, The International Monetary System, 1945-1976: An Insider’s View (New York: Harper and Row, 1976) United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970, 1971, 1972: A Report of the Secretary of State (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971, 1972, 1973) U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin , 1969-1972. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon , February 18, 1970 U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Building For Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon , February 25, 1971 U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon , February 9, 1972 U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Shaping a Durable Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon , May 3, 1973 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973) Abbreviations Abbreviations ADB, Asian Development Bank AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFDB, African Development Bank AID, Agency for International Development ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ASP, American Selling Price BOB, Bureau of the Budget BOP, balance of payments BTA, border tax adjustment BTN, Brussels Tariff Nomenclature C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State C-20, Committee of 20 (committee of the International Monetary Fund to develop proposals on international monetary reform) CAP, Common Agricultural Policy CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation CEA, Council of Economic Advisers CECLA, Special Committee for Latin American Coordination CESC, Conference on European Security and Cooperation CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CIAP, Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy CIEPDM, CIEP Decision Memorandum CIEPSM, CIEP Study Memorandum COCOM, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls CRA, Continuing Resolution Authority CY, calendar year D, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs DAC, Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development DC, developing country DCI, Director of Central Intelligence DISC, Domestic International Sales Corporation DOC, Department of Commerce DOD, Department of Defense E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State EAP, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State EC, European Community ECAT, Emergency Committee for American Trade ECONCOM, U.S.-Japan Economic Committee EDIP, European Defense Improvement Program EEC, European Economic Community EFTA, European Free Trade Association EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State FAA, Foreign Assistance Act FAC, Food Aid Convention FAC, Foreign Asset Control FDIP, Foreign Direct Investment Program FMCS, Foreign Military Credit Sales FMS, Foreign Military Sales FOB, free on board FonOff, Foreign Office FRB, Federal Reserve Board FRC, Federal Records Center FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FSO, Fund for Special Operations (IDB) FY, fiscal year G-10, Group of Ten (United States, Canada, Japan, UK, France, Netherlands, Belgium, the FRG, Italy, Sweden, plus Switzerland as an observer) GAB, General Agreement to Borrow GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GNP, Gross National Product GOB, Government of Bolivia GOJ, Government of Japan GOP, Government of Peru GRC, Government of the Republic of China GSA, General Services Administration GSP, Generalized System of Preferences H, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, Department of State HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee HLG, High-Level Group (OECD) IADB, Inter-American Development Bank IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) IC, integrated circuit IDA, International Development Association IDB, Inter-American Development Bank IET, Interest Equalization Tax IFI, International Financial Institution IGA, International Grains Arrangement IMF, International Monetary Fund IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IPC, International Petroleum Company IPIAC, International Private Investment Advisory Council J, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State LDC, less-developed country LOS, Law of the Sea LTA, Long-Term Agreement on Textiles MAP, Military Assistance Program MASF, Military Assistance Service Funded MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction MITI, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan) MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies NAFTA, North Atlantic Free Trade Association NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NSC, National Security Council NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum NTB, Non-Tariff Barrier OAS, Organization of American States OASIA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness OIN, Office of Industrial Nations, Department of the Treasury OMB, Office of Management and Budget OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation OPRED, Operation Reduction OST, Office of Science and Technology PADM, Policy Analysis Decision Memorandum PAHO, Pan American Health Organization PARA, Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation PASM, Policy Analysis Study Memorandum PC, Participating Country PL, Public Law PRC, People’s Republic of China QR, Quantitative Restriction REDCOSTE, Reduction of Costs in Europe RG, Record Group ROC, Republic of China SA, Supporting Assistance SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SCCN, Special Committee for Consultation and Negotiation SDP, Social Democratic Party (Germany) SDR, Special Drawing Rights SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee SLN, Société Le Nickel SOFA, Status of Forces Agreement SPCC, Southern Peru Copper Company SRG, NSC Senior Review Group STR, Special Trade Representative or Special Representative for Trade Negotiations S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State TA, Technical Assistance TEA, Trade Expansion Act TFID, Task Force on International Development (Peterson Task Force) U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UN, United Nations UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP, UN Development Program UNGA, United Nations General Assembly USC, NSC Under Secretaries Committee USDA, United States Department of Agriculture USEC, United States Mission to the European Economic Communities in Brussels USIA, United States Information Agency USOECD, United States Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations in New York WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group Persons Persons Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States, January 1969-October 1973 Aichi, Kiichi, Japanese Foreign Minister until July 1971 Allen, Richard, Deputy Director, Council on International Economic Policy, from 1971 Armstrong, Willis C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, February 1972-April 1974 Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from March 1970 Barre, Raymond, Vice President for Financial Affairs, Commission of the European Communities Bergsten, C. Fred, Member, National Security Council Staff, 1969-1971 Berlin, Lawrence H., Deputy Associate Assistant Administrator for Development Finance, Agency for International Development Brandt, Willy, West German Foreign Minister, December 1966-October 1969; thereafter Chancellor Brunthaver, Carroll G., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, 1969-1973; thereafter President, Commodity Credit Corporation Burns, Arthur F., Counselor to the President, January 1969-January 1970; thereafter Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Butz, Earl L., Secretary of Agriculture from December 1971 Carli, Guido, Governor for Italy, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Cohen, Edwin S., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, 1971; Under Secretary of the Treasury from 1972 Colman, John C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Colombo, Emilo, Italian Treasury Minister to 1970, Premier, August 1970-January 1972 Connally, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, February 1971-May 1972 Cooper, Richard N., Member, National Security Council Staff, 1969-1970 Daane, Dewey, Member, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Board Dahrendorf, Ralf G., Commissioner of the European Community in charge of external relations, May 1970-September 1974 Dale, William B., U.S. Executive Director, International Monetary Fund Dam, Kenneth W., Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget Davis, Jeanne W., Director, NSC Staff Secretariat, 1970-1971 Davis, Kenneth, Assistant Secretary of Commerce De Gaulle, Charles, President of France until April 1969 Debre, Michel, French Foreign Minister until June 1969 Eberle, William D., Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, November 1971-1975; also Member, Council on International Economic Policy, from 1971 Ehrlichman, John D., Counsel to the President, January-November 1969; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, November 1969-May 1973 Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State, August 1969-September 1973; thereafter Ambassador to Afghanistan Enders, Thomas O., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, until August 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission in Belgrade, August 1969-December 1970; Deputy Chief of Mission in Phnom Penh from January 1971 Flanigan, Peter M., Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, 1969-1972; thereafter Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy Freeman, John, British Ambassador to the United States, March 1969-January 1971 Fukuda, Takeo, Japanese Foreign Minister, July 1971-July 1972 Gates, Theodore R., Assistant Special Representative for Industry and Labor, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Gilbert, Carl J., Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 1969-1971 Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, French Economics and Finance Minister, 1969-1974 Greenwald, Joseph A., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, February-July 1969; Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris, July 1969-October 1972; thereafter Representative to the European Communities in Brussels Haig, Major General Alexander M., Jr., Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 1969-June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, June 1970-January 1973; thereafter Assistant to the President Haldeman, H. R., Assistant to the President, January 1969-April 1973 Hannah, John A., Director, Agency for International Development, April 1969-October 1973 Hardin, Clifford M., Secretary of Agriculture, January 1969-December 1971 Harlow, Bryce N., Assistant to the President, January 1969-January 1970; thereafter Counselor to the President Hartman, Arthur A., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Staff Director for the NSC Under Secretaries Committee Heath, Edward, British Prime Minister, June 1970-March 1974 Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973 Hillenbrand, Martin J., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, February 1969-April 1972; Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, June 1972-October 1976 Hinton, Deane, Assistant Director, Council on International Economic Policy, 1971-1973; thereafter Deputy Director Hirschtritt, Ralph, Director, Office of Balance of Payments Policy, Options and Strategy, Department of the Treasury; Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Financial and Economic Affairs Hodgson, James D., Secretary of Labor, July 1970-February 1973 Holdridge, John, Member, National Security Council Staff, 1970-1972 Hormats, Robert, Member, National Security Council Staff, 1970-1972 Houthakker, Hendrik, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, January 1969-June 1971 Ingersoll, Robert S., Ambassador to Japan, April 1972-November 1973 Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State, September 1970-July 1972; Deputy Secretary of State, July 1972-February 1973 Jenkins, Roy, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, November 1967-June 1970 Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States until January 20, 1969 Johnson, U. Alexis, Ambassador to Japan until January 1969; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, February 1969-February 1973 Johnston, Ernest, Member, National Security Council Staff Katz, Abraham, Director, Office of Regional and Political Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, August 1967-January 1974 Katz, Julius L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, July 1968-July 1974 Kearns, Henry, President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank, 1969-1973 Kennedy, David M., Secretary of the Treasury, January 1969-January 1971; Ambassador at Large for Foreign Economic Development, February 1971-March 1973; also Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 1972-February 1973 Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969 Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense, January 1969-January 1973 Lucet, Charles, French Ambassador to the United States until April 1972 Malfatti, Franco Mario, President of the Commission of the European Communities, 1971 Mansholt, Sicco, President of the European Commission, 1972 Martin, William McChesney, Jr., Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board until January 1970 Mayo, Robert P., Director, Bureau of the Budget, January 1969-July 1970; Counselor to the President, July 1970-1972 McCracken, Paul W., Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, January 1969-November 1971 Meyer, Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, April 1969-March 1973 Mills, Bradford, President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation Mills, Wilbur, Member of the House of Representatives from Arkansas Mizuta, Mikio, Japanese Finance Minister from July 1971 Mondale, Walter, Senator from Minnesota Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Muskie, Edmund S., Senator from Maine Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States, January 1969-August 1974 Ohira, Masayoshi, Japanese Foreign Minister from July 1972 Ortiz Mena, Antonio, President of the Inter-American Development Bank Palmby, Clarence D., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Pearce, William R., Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Pedersen, Richard F., Counselor of the Department of State, January 1969-July 1973 Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy, 1971-January 1972; Secretary of Commerce, January 1972-January 1973 Petty, John R., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, May 1968-February 1972 Poats, Rutherford, Assistant Administrator, Agency for International Development, until 1971; thereafter Vice President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation Pompidou, Georges, President of France from June 1969 Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State, until February 1969 Rey, Jean, President of the Commission of the European Communities, July 1967-July 1970 Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State, January 1969-June 1970; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, June 1970-January 1973; Secretary of Defense, January-May 1973; Attorney General, May-October 1973 Ritchie, A. Edgar, Canadian Ambassador to the United States until January 1970 Rogers, William P., Secretary of State from January 1969 Ruggiero, Renato, Chef de Cabinet to EC Commission President Malfatti Rush, Kenneth, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, July 1969-February 1972; Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 1972-January 1973; Deputy Secretary of State, February 1973-May 1974 Samuels, Nathaniel, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, April 1969-April 1972 Sato, Eisaku, Japanese Prime Minister until July 1972 Schaetzel, J. Robert, Ambassador to the European Communities until October 1972 Schumann, Maurice, French Foreign Minister, June 1969-April 1973 Scott, Harold B., Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business Sharp, Mitchell, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs until August 1974 Shultz, George P., Secretary of Labor, January 1969-June 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget, June 1970-May 1972; Secretary of the Treasury, and also Assistant to the President, May 1972-May 1974; also head of the Council on Economic Policy from December 1972 Siciliano, Rocco C., Under Secretary of Commerce, 1969-1971 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, Member, National Security Council Staff, January 1969-January 1974 Springsteen, George S., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until June 1972; Acting Assistant Secretary, June 1972-August 1973; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Stans, Maurice, Secretary of Commerce, January 1969-January 1972 Stein, Herbert, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, January 1969-November 1971; Chairman, January 1972-July 1974 Strauss, Franz Josef, West German Finance Minister until October 1969 Tanaka, Kakeui, Japanese Prime Minister, July 1972-December 1974 Tarr, Curtis, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance from May 1972 Train, Russell, Under Secretary of Interior, 1969-1970; thereafter Director, Council on Environmental Quality Trezise, Philip H., Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, until July 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, July 1969-November 1971 Trudeau, Pierre-Elliott, Canadian Prime Minister Ushiba, Nobuhiko, Japanese Ambassador to the United States from February 1971 Vaky, Viron Peter, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until April 1969; thereafter Member, National Security Council Staff Volcker, Paul A., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, January 1969-June 1974 Walker, Charls E., Under Secretary of the Treasury, January 1969-January 1972; Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, January-December 1972 Webster, Donald A., Senior Staff Member, Council on International Economic Policy Weinberger, Caspar W., Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, July 1970-May 1972; Director, May 1972-January 1973 Weintraub, Sidney, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, October 1969-May 1970; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development Wheeler, General Earle G., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1970 Whitaker, John C., Secretary to the Cabinet, 1969-1970 Willis, George H., Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Monetary Affairs, 1969-1973 Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister until June 1970 Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972 Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972 Contents Foreign Assistance Policy, 1969-1972 Foreign Assistance Policy, 1969-1972 1. Editorial Note 2. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon Washington, February 20, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury Volume I. Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of a February 20 memorandum from Kissinger reminding the President that Treasury Secretary Kennedy had already raised this issue with him and he had indicated his assent. Kissinger noted that both bills moved in the “desired direction of channeling our foreign aid through multilateral agencies” and warranted the President’s approval, although action on the ADB Special Fund could be delayed until after the NSC review (see Document 1). Kennedy’s memorandum was returned to Kissinger under cover of a March 3 memorandum from Kenneth Cole indicating the President had approved the IDA proposal and was not opposed to the ADB proposal but thought a firm commitment at that time would be premature. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury Volume I) Bergsten informed Secretary Kennedy’s office of the President’s decision on March 3. (Ibid.) 3. Memorandum From the Science Adviser to the President (DuBridge) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) Washington, March 13, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 4. No classification marking. 4. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, March 25, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 4. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas O. Enders (E/IMA) and cleared by Sisco (IO), Macomber (H), Barnett (EA), Dantzer (ARA, except for paragraph 6), Westerfield (AF), Clark (AID), and Poats (AID). The memorandum was also addressed to the Under Secretary. 5. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Schedule of NSC Meetings, Box 83, 3/26/69 NSC Meeting-Foreign Aid. Confidential. This memorandum is the lead item in the President’s briefing book for the March 26 NSC meeting. 6. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 3, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, Box 129, 26 March NSC Meeting. Confidential; Eyes Only. On April 1 Kissinger sent the President a memorandum to which he attached the list of actions pursuant to the March 26 NSC meeting that had been “coordinated on an ÔEyes Only’ basis with the principals and has been agreed to by them.” Kissinger added that “your decisions to develop proposals for an outside study commission and continuation of our internal study of aid will be formalized by written follow-up Study Memoranda.” He concluded: “I do not believe an NSDM should be promulgated on these issues because the formal dissemination of such a memorandum could generate problems if it were leaked to legislators. Additionally, I believe you will wish to retain some flexibility on this issue as the FY 70 AID program crystallizes.” The President initialed his approval. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Volume I 1969) 7. National Security Decision Memorandum 10 Washington, April 11, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 10. Limited Official Use. On February 19 Kissinger had circulated to the same addressees an earlier draft of this NSDM for their comment by March 3. A copy is attached to an April 4 memorandum from Poats to Hannah suggesting that Hannah take up with Rogers the key role of the Secretary of State in moving forward the foreign assistance papers. (Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, IPS 7-1 NSC FY 69 April 1-30, 1969) A copy of Kissinger’s February 19 memorandum and the earlier draft of NSDM 10 is also attached to a February 25 memorandum from Raymond J. Albright to Hirschtritt and Petty at Treasury requesting their action. Albright also attached a copy of NSDM 4, which requested, on the President’s direction, preparation of a series of program analyses for designated countries and regions (none designated) to be used by the NSC as the basis for discussion and decision on policy and program issues. (Ibid., Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, AID-Secret) 8. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, May 20, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Volume I 1969. Secret. 9. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Burns) to President Nixon Washington, May 22, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID Volume III 8/11/70-9/10/70. No classification marking. This memorandum is Tab E to Document 31. Another copy of the memorandum, without the President’s written decisions, is attached to an undated handwritten note from Haig to Kissinger informing Kissinger that “all has been taken care of.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID Volume I 1969) 10. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, May 22, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, President’s Foreign Aid Program. Secret. A handwritten note, with a May 27 date, reads: “Pres has seen.” This memorandum is attached to a May 21 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger recommending that Kissinger “urgently” send the attached package to the President and that no specific reference to Latin America be added to the draft message to Congress. A note on Bergsten’s memorandum reads: “Retd from HAK 5/22.” 11. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, May 23, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Confidential. On May 23 Haig sent Kissinger a memorandum in which this was the first item for Kissinger to discuss with the President that day. (Ibid., Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 2/5-7/14/69) Kissinger met with the President at 9:30 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 12. Editorial Note 13. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) and Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, November 15, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. No classification marking. Attached, together with an October 30 memorandum from Hannah to President Nixon, to a November 18 memorandum from Bergsten and Nachmanoff to Kissinger recommending direct Presidential intervention to avoid cuts beyond the $500 million already made in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the foreign assistance bill. According to the Daily Diary, the President did not make any calls to the House Congressional leadership on November 18 or 19. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 14. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon Washington, November 21, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. No classification marking. 15. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 2, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Confidential. 16. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Assistant (Harlow) Washington, December 9, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Kissinger and Haig on December 8. 17. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of the Treasury Walker to President Nixon Washington, December 10, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the President 9-12/69. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Petty on December 9. In a December 9 memorandum to Walker, Petty recommended he sign the memorandum and indicated that Kennedy and Volcker asked that the President be informed of the pending replenishment. (Ibid.) 18. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs (Weintraub) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) Washington, December 15, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 10 IMF. No classification marking. Drafted by Weintraub and Frank Vaznaugh (E/OMA/FOD). 19. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President Nixon Washington, December 24, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense, Volume V 12/1/69-1/31/70. Secret. 20. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Mayo) to President Nixon Washington, December 26, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 206, Bureau of the Budget, Volume I. Confidential. Attached to a January 5, 1970, memorandum from John Campbell to Tod Hullin indicating that the President had seen the memorandum during a discussion with Mayo. President Nixon met with Mayo and Ehrlichman at the White House on December 30, and with Mayo, Ehrlichman, and Kissinger in San Clemente on January 3, 1970. Mayo’s memorandum presumably was reviewed by the President at one of these meetings. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) The Washington Post reported on January 4 that, in a brief meeting with the press immediately following the January 3 meeting, the President said all the major decisions for the forthcoming budget had been made. 21. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, January 12, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense, Volume V 12/1/69-1/31/70. Secret. 22. Editorial Note 23. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon Washington, March 4, 1970. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, IDA. Confidential. Attached to a March 4 memorandum from Kennedy to the President that deals with the level of funding if the President preferred something other than a $1 billion U.S. contribution over 3 years. 24. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of the Treasury Volcker to President Nixon Washington, March 19, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume I. Confidential. Another copy of this memorandum is attached to a March 17 memorandum from Petty to Secretary Kennedy recommending it to be sent to the President to alert him to the need to generate high-level political support in France and Germany for a large IDA replenishment. Petty specifically wanted the President to take it up with Chancellor Brandt in early April. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the President—Jan-April 1970) 25. Editorial Note 26. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, June 16, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. No classification marking. 27. Editorial Note 28. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 3, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70. Secret. Copies were sent to Laird and Harlow. Attached is the typescript of a July 3 memorandum from Kennedy, Lehman, and Saunders to Haig and Kissinger alerting them to the dangers the Cooper-Church amendment posed for the Foreign Military Sales bill, and the difficulty the President would have in meeting commitments to Iran, Israel, and others if the bill died. They noted that the FMS program went hand in hand with the Nixon Doctrine and was designed to help allies defend themselves by providing credits as well as equipment to ease the financial strain of modern defense establishments. The Cooper-Church Amendment, which went through a number of iterations, aimed at restricting U.S. involvement in Cambodia. Several memoranda from May 1970 regarding its politics and potential impact are ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 318, Cooper-Church Amendment. 29. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 7, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. Secret. Cleared by Lynn, Holdridge, Kennedy, Saunders, and Vaky. Attached to a July 7 note from Bergsten to Haig identifying it as a memorandum Haig had requested for Kissinger summarizing the problems faced by the Military Assistance Program. Bergsten noted that Kennedy thought Kissinger would want to read it before the July 8 WSAG meeting on Cambodia (postponed to July 17) since “Cambodia MAP will be discussed at that time and the memo flags the real problems involved with any new burden on the program.” 30. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, August 4, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. Confidential. According to an August 3 memorandum from Spiers to the Secretary, the memorandum was prepared at the Secretary’s request. The original memorandum with Secretary Rogers’ signature is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70, attached to an August 5 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger that reads: “Since your memorandum on the issue is already with the President, and since on balance you support Secretary Rogers’ position, I send this to you only for information. Nevertheless, if the President has not yet made his decision on the issue, you may wish to mention it to him or have it included in his package.” Kissinger’s memorandum on the issue is Document 135. 31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant (Flanigan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 26, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume III 8/11/70-9/10/70. No classification marking. 32. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 11, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. Secret. Attached to a September 19 memorandum from K. Wayne Smith to Kissinger indicating he had discussed Laird’s letter with Johnson, Packard, Moorer, and Helms at an SRG meeting on September 15. Smith’s analysis of Laird’s recommendations concluded that they could be rejected on their merits, and he suggested that if it was decided to seek a supplemental “now,” it should be because the timing was propitious and not because essential objectives could not be accomplished without the supplemental. Smith also called Kissinger’s attention to a September 16 memorandum from Under Secretary Johnson who voted that since most of the appropriations would be to the State Department and/or AID, Secretary Rogers should be consulted before any decisions were made, if the President accepted Laird’s point of view. 33. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) Washington, September 16, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. Secret. Copies were sent to Laird and Kissinger. 34. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Schlesinger) to C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff Washington, September 17, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. No classification marking. 35. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to President Nixon Washington, September 26, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. Secret. Attached to an October 5 memorandum from K. Wayne Smith to Kissinger, which indicated that a September 27 summary of Weinberger’s memorandum, along with the memorandum, went forward to the President on October 6. The September 27 memorandum has not been found. 36. Memorandum From Hendrik S. Houthakker of the Council of Economic Advisers to C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff Washington, October 2, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Box 30, Houthakker-Foreign Aid Policy. No classification marking. 37. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, October 6, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. Top Secret. Drafted by K. Wayne Smith who forwarded an earlier draft to Kissinger under cover of a September 27 memorandum that reviewed the issues. 38. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID, 10/7/70-12/31/70. No classification marking. Attached to an October 5 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger, in which Bergsten noted that Option 1 was the best option to minimize foreign policy problems and recommended that Kissinger sign the memorandum to the President. On Bergsten’s October 5 memorandum Kissinger wrote a note to Haig: “Al: If we can’t move it by Monday [October 12] might approve Option 1 for P. in my name.” 39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, October 14, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. Secret. Attached to an October 16 memorandum from K. Wayne Smith to Kissinger suggesting the Cambodia recommendations were high but otherwise supporting the requests. 40. Editorial Note 41. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. Secret. Drafted by J.M. Frey on November 5. Attached to a November 6 memorandum from K. Wayne Smith to Kissinger, which indicated the memorandum was from Shultz. None of the options in the memorandum is checked. 42. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 18, 1970, 3:40 p.m. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. Confidential. There is no drafting information on the memorandum, which was transmitted to Kissinger under cover of a November 20 memorandum from Bergsten, along with two other memoranda of conversation covering the discussion of “US/Soviet Military Capabilities and their Political Consequences” and “The Cuba Situation.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 4:33 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 43. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Walker) to President Nixon Washington, December 12, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, FN 10 IMF. No classification marking. Attached to a December 15 memorandum from Secretary Rogers to the President endorsing Walker’s request that the President call Senator Mansfield in an effort to bring the legislation up for a vote. 44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, December 15, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume I. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” 45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 318, Cooper-Church Amendment. No classification marking. The NSC Correspondence Profile sheet indicates the memorandum was logged in on December 21. 46. Action Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 4, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Top Secret; Sensitive; Urgent. 47. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 4, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the message was sent to Kissinger telegraphically. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Kissinger was in San Clemente. The President traveled to San Clemente on January 5. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 48. Action Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) San Clemente, California, January 7, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 196, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Top Secret; Sensitive; Urgent. This copy of Kennedy’s memorandum is on White House stationery, but Kissinger and Kennedy were both in San Clemente, as was OMB Director Shultz. 49. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, February 19, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. Secret. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers (PM) on February 18 and forwarded to Rogers under cover of a February 19 memorandum from Under Secretary Irwin indicating that the memorandum had been prepared at Rogers’ suggestion. (Ibid.) 50. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 2, 1971, 11 a.m. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Confidential. According to attached routing memoranda, Bergsten drafted the memorandum of conversation on March 3, based on Rudolph Peterson’s report of the meeting. A copy for the President’s record was sent by Houdek to Jon Huntsman on April 26. 51. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 5. No classification marking. Drafted by Paul H. Boeker (E/IFD/ODF) on March 5; cleared by Weintraub (E/IFD), in substance by Carter (L) and Schnee (H), and by Arthur Hartman (S/PC). 52. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs (Abshire) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, March 8, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. Confidential. Drafted by Schnee (H). Copies were sent to interested officials in the State Department and AID, to MacGregor at the White House, and to Bergsten at the NSC. 53. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon Washington, March 9, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. No classification marking. 54. Editorial Note 55. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 12, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/21/71. No classification marking. Kissinger wrote at the top of the page: “What a fanatic.” 56. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 17, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to Schlesinger on March 22, without the President’s comments (see footnote 5 below). This memorandum is attached to a March 19 memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger calling his attention to Shultz’ concern about Secretary Laird’s Congressional testimony on March 24 before the foreign assistance legislation went to Congress. On the back of his memorandum Kennedy wrote the following note on March 20: “Schlesinger called to say that they have agreed to have Laird testify but only as to content of FY 72 budget. No mention will be made of organizational arrangements. If asked about new legislation answer is to be that it will be submitted in a few days.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71) 57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon Washington, March 30, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Confidential. Attached to an April 1 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger that reviewed Peterson’s options. Bergsten recommended Option 4 rather than Option 3. 58. CIEP Decision Memorandum No. 2 Washington, April 5, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, Box 5197, CIEP Decision Memoranda. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; the CEA Chairman; the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs; the Executive Director of the Domestic Council, and the Special Trade Representative. 59. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, April 9, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume III 12/70-6/71. Secret. A stamped notation reads: “The President has seen.” Attached to a May 4 memorandum from Kissinger to the President summarizing Laird’s points and noting that Kissinger had sent a brief reply to Laird that indicated that the President’s interest in Laird’s study that would be used as the basis for re-examining military sales policy. On Kissinger’s memorandum to the President, Nixon wrote: “K—I agree totally with Laird’s concern—The foreign service types will of course disagree—I don’t want a leisurely study of this made. I want action—soonest possible to reverse this trend. Inform Connally of my concern. He shares it.” A May 6 memorandum from Haig to Bergsten informed him of the President’s reaction to Laird’s memorandum and asked Bergsten to monitor closely the progress on Laird’s study. (Ibid.) In a May 15 memorandum, Haig also asked Bergsten to provide a memorandum from Kissinger to Connally. (Ibid., Box 226, Department of Defense, Volume XI 2/24/71-5/15/71) 60. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon Washington, April 13, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Kissinger, Shultz, MacGregor, Ziegler, and Klein. The memorandum is attached to an April 15 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger concerning Kissinger’s subsequent decision not to participate in the April 20 Congressional briefings and the press briefing. Bergsten pointed out that the package would have a “rough time” with Congress and asked Kissinger to reconsider. Kissinger declined and designated Schlesinger instead. 61. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, August 9, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” 62. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) Washington, September 17, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). Limited Official Use. A copy was sent to Kissinger. Beginning with an August 16 memorandum from Acting AID Administrator Roderic O’Connor to Under Secretary Johnson, AID persistently called attention to the need for decisions on how the foreign assistance reduction was to be handled. Was the reduction to be in outlays, new obligations, or budget authority? Were supporting assistance and programs dealing with refugee assistance in India and Pakistan exempt as they were not “foreign economic aid in the regular sense”? O’Connor’s August 16 memorandum and a number of others on the same subject are in the Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 75 A 13, Chron Files for August and September, 1971. 63. Draft Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 228, Department of Defense, XIII 8-11/71. Secret. Attached to a September 18 memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot to General Pursley providing Laird with a copy of a letter with 5-year MAP projections that Rogers reportedly had discussed with Laird by phone on September 14. Eliot noted that Irwin had informed Laird’s office the previous day that Rogers would like to have the letter available for a meeting with Fulbright at 10 a.m. on September 20. Copies of Eliot’s memorandum were sent to Kissinger and Dean. Eliot also provided a draft letter to Senator Proxmire. Secretary Rogers and David Abshire met with Senator Fulbright on September 20 from 9:48-11:45 a.m. (Ibid., Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) No other record of the meeting has been found. 64. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 20, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 228, Department of Defense, XIII 8-11/71. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to an undated, handwritten note from Kennedy to Haig that reads: “Al: A hold was put on Rogers. Defense is doing a new draft which will be sent to State (and to us). John [illegible word] is sitting on top of this.” 65. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon Washington, September 20, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. No classification marking. Attached to a September 22 memorandum from Rogers to the President informing him that Hannah had requested that he forward the letter. 66. Letter From the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) Washington, September 20, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). No classification marking. At the top of the page, Irwin wrote: “Talked with HAK on tel. on 9/21/71 pointing out problem of $222 which apparently includes $66 Supp-Ass’t.” 67. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) Washington, September 27, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). No classification marking. A copy was sent to Kissinger. 68. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon Washington, October 15, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Limited Official Use. Attached to an October 21 letter from Shultz to Haig, which confirmed OMB’s concurrence (with minor revisions) with Hannah’s proposed statement at the OECD. Also attached is an October 28 memorandum from Hormats to Haig indicating that Hannah’s letter had had the effect of “smoking out a decision” on whether the 10 percent reduction in foreign aid (from $1,840 to $1,653 million) would be handled administratively (i.e., frozen) or through legislation (see footnote 4 below). Hormats’ memorandum indicates that the letter did not go forward to the President. 69. Editorial Note 70. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) Washington, October 30, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. No classification marking. Routed by Haig to Kissinger who wrote: “Reassure VN urgently.” 71. Note From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 1, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/21/71. No classification marking. Concurred in by MacGregor and Kissinger. 72. Editorial Note 73. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, November 3, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. Secret. A handwritten note by Haig reads “HAK—our friend explaineth all!” This Evening Report was included in the President’s morning briefing material on November 4. (Ibid., President’s Daily Briefings, Boxes 1-61) During late 1971, in the run-up to final Congressional action on the foreign assistance authorizing legislation and a continuing resolution on December 17 (see Document 78), the Evening Reports were included more frequently in the morning briefing material because they included reporting on legislative progress. 74. Editorial Note 75. Memorandum for President Nixon Washington, November 9, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: “Orig. handed to Pres. by Ziegler 11/9/71.” 76. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) Washington, November 9, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). Confidential. Drafted by W.H. Lewis (PM/PA) on November 4 and cleared by Leahy (H) and O’Connor (CO/SA). The letter was forwarded to Secretary Rogers through Irwin under cover of a November 4 memorandum from Spiers recommending that the Secretary sign the letter. 77. Information Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Robert D. Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 6, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 229, Department of Defense, XIV 11-12/71. Confidential; Urgent. John Lehman concurred in the memorandum. 78. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, December 17, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Briefings, Box 37, December 17-December 31, 1971. Secret. 79. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. Secret. Attached is a December 27 memorandum from Kennedy and Hormats to Kissinger recommending that he forward this memorandum and the attached December 23 memorandum from Shultz to the President. Kennedy and Hormats expressed a concern that Shultz was recommending only $50 million for the Contingency Fund instead of agency requests for $130 million. They agreed that “prospective uncertainties” warranted $100 million. On the December 27 Kennedy-Hormats memorandum, Haig wrote: “Dick, I’ll OK for HAK for Pres.” 80. Editorial Note 81. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, January 20, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). No classification marking. 82. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) Washington, January 26, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). Confidential. Drafted by J.K. Wilhelm (S/PC) on January 22 and forwarded to Irwin under cover of a January 24 memorandum from Arthur Hartman, which noted that Hannah’s reform package had already gone to the Secretary and Congress and included four sets of comments received from within the Department to help guide the Under Secretary’s decision. 83. Memorandum From the Office of Management and Budget to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, AID, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Attached as Tab B to a February 7 memorandum from Kissinger to the President summarizing briefly the Foreign Aid Authorization bill, which the President had signed that morning, and recommending that he approve a signing statement that would set the stage for efforts to restore the program through a supplemental or a budget amendment later in the year. The President initialed his approval. The February 7 signing statement is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972, pp. 166-167. 84. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 10, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Attached to a February 16 summary memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger recommending that Kissinger and Shultz approve Irwin’s recommendations, which Kennedy characterized as a “reasonable division of the limited funds we can anticipate will be appropriated.” Also attached is a February 17 memorandum from Kissinger to Irwin noting that Irwin’s recommendations were a sound basis for implementing programming actions. Kissinger understood the $385 million of supporting assistance for Vietnam was part of a total support plan of $680 million and that supplementary actions to fulfill the Vietnam program would be addressed shortly. He cautioned that other supporting assistance allocations should be a guide for actions but only urgent obligations should be made until the appropriations bills were completed. 85. Information Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 15, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, AID, Volume II 1972. Confidential. 86. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 6, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Attached to a March 20 memorandum from Kissinger to Irwin informing him that he and Shultz agreed that the allocations along the lines of Irwin’s March 6 memorandum were “the most effective and least disruptive means of adjusting to the funding limits in the appropriations bill.” 87. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, March 14, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. Attached to Document 91. An advance copy of Rogers’ memorandum, which was not cleared by the Secretary, was provided to the NSC under cover of a March 14 memorandum from Deputy Executive Secretary Curran to Davis. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 286, State Volume 16) 88. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, March 17, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a March 14 memorandum from Kennedy and Lehman, who noted that “if we allow Laird’s interpretation to become the common wisdom then we will pay a heavy bureaucratic price in the future” and recommended Kissinger sign the memorandum to Laird. Also attached is a March 17 memorandum from Haig to General Pursley transmitting the memorandum. 89. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 18, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. The notation “The President Has Seen” is stamped on the memorandum, which is attached to an undated, handwritten note from Haig to Kissinger that reads: “This is the hot Laird issue on the supplemental.” Kissinger wrote on the note: “Make sure he understands what I recommended.” 90. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon Washington, March 27, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. Attached to a March 28 memorandum from Kennedy and Lehman to Kissinger summarizing the change in the State Department position and recommending he sign a memorandum to the President, Document 91. 91. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 30, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. The notation “The President has seen” is stamped on the memorandum. 92. Letter From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, July 21, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Attached to an August 14 memorandum from Kissinger to the President agreeing with Laird’s position that the FY 1974 security assistance ceilings were too low. See footnote 1, Document 95. 93. Paper Prepared by the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1972-1973. No classification marking. Attached to a July 25 memorandum from Hannah to Flanigan and Haig sent to them after Hannah’s July 25 meeting with the President (see Document 94). Hannah noted that he prepared this informal paper for that meeting and that since both Flanigan and Haig had taken notes during the meeting, it might help them understand what he was trying to say. 94. Memorandum for President Nixon’s File Washington, July 25, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1972-1973. No classification marking. Prepared by Haig. Kissinger’s July 24 briefing memorandum for this meeting emphasized that Hannah had done a fine job under difficult circumstances, especially Congressional efforts to frustrate major portions of the President’s foreign assistance program. (Ibid.) Kissinger noted that he and Flanigan would also attend the meeting with Hannah. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 3:04 to 3:37 p.m., and Flanigan and Haig were present. (Ibid., White House Central Files) See Document 93 for Hannah’s intended remarks at the meeting. 95. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, August 4, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of an August 14 memorandum from Kissinger. In an August 9 memorandum, Kennedy reminded Kissinger he had discussed Laird’s concern with Weinberger and Laird on August 7, and they had “agreed that programs would be developed to meet our essential security needs following which consideration will be given to what adjustments in the ceilings would be necessary.” Kennedy recommended that Kissinger sign a memorandum to the President informing him of Laird’s concern and that programs to meet security needs would be developed within the basic limits of the Defense expenditure ceiling. (Ibid.) Regarding the August 7 meeting, see Document 96. The August 14 memorandum to the President noted that Laird and Rogers would develop programs within the limits of the Defense Department expenditure ceilings and concurred with Laird’s view that the Security Assistance ceilings were too low. The memorandum indicated that Laird and Weinberger would make recommendations on adjusting the expenditure levels. 96. Information Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 5, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 230, Department of Defense, Volume 18 8-12/72. Secret. Concurred in by Philip Odeen. 97. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 15, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Attached to an August 16 memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger suggesting the memorandum was a follow-up to Kissinger’s budget discussion with Laird. Kennedy called Kissinger’s attention to Weinberger’s focus on the total level of the program and noted that some countries could not afford additional debt and that most had limited abilities to replace MAP grants with FMS loans. He thought the increase in FMS at the expense of MAP could be problematic and also doubted that the unusually large recoupments and reimbursements in MAP and private credit in FMS could be realized. Regarding Kissinger’s budget discussion with Laird, see footnote 1, Document 95 and Document 96. 98. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, October 27, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. 99. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Tarr) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 14, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret; Exdis. Attached to Document 104. The position of Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance was authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 that President Nixon signed on February 7, 1972. Curtis Tarr, the first to encumber the position, entered on duty on May 2, 1972. 100. Editorial Note 101. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, November 28, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. Attached to a January 4, 1973, memorandum from Kissinger to Laird informing him that the President had decided not to pursue Laird’s proposal to transfer security assistance to the Defense Department budget at that time. 102. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Shultz to President Nixon Washington, December 1, 1972. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, IFIs. No classification marking. Drafted by E.J. Finkel. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Discussed in IDA IV mtg w/PAV et al. 12/1.” According to notes by the Deputy to Assistant Treasury Secretary Hennessy, George H. Willis, the December 1 meeting was an internal Treasury meeting attended by Volcker, Hennessy, Finkel, Hirschtritt, and several others. Willis’ notes deal only with the IDA-share issue. (Ibid.) 103. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, December 14, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Attached to a January 4, 1973, memorandum from Kissinger to Laird (see footnote 1, Document 101). 104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Tarr) Washington, December 26, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a December 29 memorandum from Kennedy with the recommendation that, based on a review by his senior staff who agreed that Tarr’s proposal was the most reasonable distribution of the insufficient resources provided by the continuing resolution, he sign the memorandum to Tarr. Kennedy also provided a tabulation on security assistance continuing resolution funding through February 28 enacted by Congress just before adjournment. He concluded that the continuing resolution was $550 million below the President’s request, necessitating drastic cuts in many key programs, noted that the worst-case scenario would be extension of the continuing resolution at current levels through the remainder of FY 1973, and proposed a few areas where additional funds might become available. 105. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, December 27, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of a December 22 memorandum from Kennedy that summarized the issues. 1. Editorial Note 1. Editorial Note On January 21, 1969, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, sent National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 4 to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the AID Administrator, and the President of the Export-Import Bank informing them the President had mandated preparation of a paper on U.S. foreign aid policy for NSC consideration. The paper was to be prepared by an Ad Hoc Working Group chaired by Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Nathaniel Samuels and was to include senior officials from the aforementioned agencies and institutions, as well as Treasury, Agriculture, and NSC Staff. The Chairman could include representatives from other agencies as appropriate. He was to forward his report to the NSC Review Group by March 15, 1969. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 4) At the Council of Economic Advisers, Courtenay Slater on January 22 sent to Council members Paul McCracken, Henrik Houthakker, and Herbert Stein a memorandum alerting them to foreign aid and LDC trade issues facing the new administration. Slater apprised them of the Javits Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which required the President to make a comprehensive reappraisal of U.S. foreign assistance programs, with an interim report to Congress by July 1, 1969, and a final report by March 1970. She noted the recently completed Perkins Commission Report, which she thought would be valuable background for the Javits Amendment reappraisal, and asserted the need to establish an appropriate interagency process for the reappraisal. She cited a January 2 New York Times report that the President was expected to establish a special committee on foreign aid shortly after his inauguration and noted the trend that would lead to the enactment of legislation to establish the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the need for International Development Association and Asian Development Bank authorizing legislation for FY 1969 and FY 1970, the initiative of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the UN Conference on Trade and Development on tariff preferences for developing countries, and commodity initiatives for developing countries. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Box 30, Houthakker-Foreign Aid Policy) For documentation on the Perkins Commission Report, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume IX, Documents 69 , 79 – 81 , and 84 . The NSC Review Group was scheduled to meet on March 21 to consider a draft response to NSSM 4 prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group. See footnote 3, Document 4 . In preparation for the March 21 meeting, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Greenwald sent Counselor Richard Pedersen a March 20 memorandum indicating that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a major problem with the paper, although the NSC Staff and Treasury would probably have only drafting changes. He attached an undated memorandum from Philip J. Farley that described the Defense Department view that the paper was not responsive to the NSSM 4 directive, did not adequately address alternative strategies, and did not analyze the political aspects of aid. More fundamentally, Farley objected that the paper was seriously deficient in defining the first objective of “foreign assistance” as the assurance of the military security of “exposed allies” rather than U.S. national security. He noted that “Americans are basically agreed on the need to spend for our allies’ security,” but asserted: “The Foreign Assistance Act is introduced by a statement of policy which explicitly relates our assistance programs—both economic and military—to the national security of the United States.” He pointed out that that week the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee had written Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird to remind them that his “support for the foreign assistance program has been based on the belief that the programs authorized by the FAA were essential to the security of the United States.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, 21 March Review Group Meeting) On March 25 Richard Pedersen sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers reporting on the Review Group meeting. Pedersen wrote that as a result of the Defense objections the paper would focus only on economic assistance, and military assistance would be the subject of a later study. Pedersen reported that the agreed main issues for NSC consideration would be 1) the objectives of economic assistance; 2) alternative future aid levels; 3) the degree by which multilateral assistance should be increased; 4) the current AID budget, in particular whether or not to trim the $2.3 billion Johnson administration request or support the full amount with a request for a separate technical assistance bureau and the creation of a private investment corporation; and 5) the possibility of supporting tariff preferences for developing countries, which it was agreed were of little economic importance but might be politically valuable in light of the importance attached to preferences by developing countries. (Ibid., NSSM 4) 2. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon 2. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 20, 1969. The House Banking and Currency and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees are asking my view on last year’s unfinished business of authorizing U.S. participation in an internationally negotiated package for the second replenishment of the International Development Association. IDA was established as a World Bank affiliate for lending on concessionary repayment terms following the initiative of then Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson under President Eisenhower’s leadership. The pending legislation author-izes our participation with a 40 percent share of the total. We would provide $160 million in each of three years, starting in FY 1969. I believe it should have this Administration’s strong and early support. The Secretary of State concurs in this view. It would be helpful if I could know of your support for this legislation before your European trip 2 so that I might be in a position to testify positively should the House Banking and Currency Committee call a hearing next week as they now seem to contemplate. 3 I do not recommend any other specific action on this by you at this time, but will inform you of any further actions that might be necessary as legislative consideration progresses. I should add that all the European countries you will be visiting approved the IDA replenishment agreement last year, and a number of them have made advance contributions to this replenishment pending our action. In addition to responding to a request for hearings, there are a number of advantages to my taking early action to urge Congressional approval of the IDA replenishment. First, it will demonstrate this Administration’s support for the multilateral approach. It will concentrate this support on legislation that has a reasonable chance of passage, where the previous Administration did not succeed in securing approval. Second, it would help return bargaining power to the U.S. vis-a-vis Europe for such multilateral endeavors, a position which was eroded by last year’s failure to obtain U.S. ratification. Finally, while it will not be easy, there is at least a fair chance to obtain legislative action before foreign aid and other major issues divert Congressional attention. A sufficient number of other contributors to IDA have completed their actions to make the international agreement on the IDA second replenishment effective as of the date the United States acts. Unless we do act the agreement cannot become effective. While the amount of each country’s contribution is increased over the last replenishment, our share of IDA has been reduced from 43 percent when it was established to 40 percent in the current proposal. This compares with about a 60 percent share of world-wide bilateral assistance. The agreement provides for specific protection of the U.S. balance of payments by providing for others to accelerate their actual payments through FY 1971 should the U.S. balance of payments require it. While President Johnson’s budget makes provisions for this contribution, the actual additional budgetary costs will be substantially below the three annual contributions of $160 million each we would make in FY 1969, 1970 and 1971. We can be reasonably assured that IDA funds will be used effectively because IDA is administered by the World Bank, and we know that the funds are needed urgently because IDA’s existing resources are almost fully committed. I would also hope to be in a position to indicate our support for a U.S. contribution to the Asian Bank Special Funds. A U.S. contribution of $200 million over a four-year period was recommended by the last Administration, particularly on the advice of Eugene Black. While there is not an internationally negotiated package, the legislative proposal would limit our contribution to a minority share and to pay for U.S. goods and services only. President Johnson’s budget provided for $25 million in each of the first two years. Authorizing legislation did not get as far in the Senate legislative process as the IDA proposal, but it is a worthwhile multilateral endeavor. Among other donors, the Japanese and Canadians have shown a tangible interest by unilaterally pledging contributions, but the major Europeans have been slow in coming forward. I would prefer to deal only with IDA legislatively at the outset, and then deal with the Asian Bank specifically, as soon as IDA is adequately on the legislative track. If you agree with the above, I will proceed accordingly. 4 David M. Kennedy 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury Volume I. Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of a February 20 memorandum from Kissinger reminding the President that Treasury Secretary Kennedy had already raised this issue with him and he had indicated his assent. Kissinger noted that both bills moved in the “desired direction of channeling our foreign aid through multilateral agencies” and warranted the President’s approval, although action on the ADB Special Fund could be delayed until after the NSC review (see Document 1 ). Kennedy’s memorandum was returned to Kissinger under cover of a March 3 memorandum from Kenneth Cole indicating the President had approved the IDA proposal and was not opposed to the ADB proposal but thought a firm commitment at that time would be premature. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury Volume I) Bergsten informed Secretary Kennedy’s office of the President’s decision on March 3. (Ibid.) 2 President Nixon traveled to Europe February 22-March 2. 3 Secretary Kennedy testified before the House Committee on Banking and Currency regarding IDA replenishment on March 4. His remarks are in Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1969 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 315-317. 4 President Nixon initialed his approval. 3. Memorandum From the Science Adviser to the President (DuBridge) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) 3. Memorandum From the Science Adviser to the President (DuBridge) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) 1 Washington, March 13, 1969. SUBJECT NSSM 4: AID Policy I have reviewed the draft response to NSSM 4 which you will consider at your meeting Friday afternoon at 2:30. 2 The chapter on Technical Assistance seems to me to be seriously deficient. This is a matter on which the World Food Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee placed particular emphasis. 3 Another panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee devoted eighteen months to a review of technical assistance. Recently other reports from committees such as that chaired by Dr. Hannah have been issued on this subject. All of these reports agree that 1. Technical assistance is crucially important for dealing effectively with the pressing problems of population, food production, education and industrial development, and indeed sustained progress cannot be made in these areas without technical assistance. 2. The most effective and enduring contribution to human resource development is through the building of indigenous institutional capacity in research and higher education which will enable a nation to help itself by educating its own people to enter and sustain themselves in the modern world. 3. The United States has a great resource in this field due to the experience we have gained and the institutions we have built at great cost within this country, particularly in the past decade. However, it is an error to assume that these talents are available on the shelf to be requisitioned on the basis of widely scattered and ill-formulated requests from all parts of the globe. Up to the present, AID has failed to find a way effectively to draw on this resource. 4. Technical assistance under present arrangements in AID is inadequate and leaves a gap. This gap must be filled if capital assistance is not to be proved largely ineffectual. The new Administration has the freedom and the opportunity at this time to advocate a new and reinvigorated technical assistance program, with a new institutional approach and with new funds which will find the means effectively to draw upon the resources of our scientific, technical and professional people and institutions. The reorganization of AID under the Kennedy Administration broke up the technical assist-ance central staffs that existed at that time, and distributed the fragments among the regional bureaus. The consequence as stated in the PSAC World Food report (p. 5) was: “The original emphasis upon technical assistance has been so diluted that it is almost correct to say that this form of aid, indispensable to the accomplishment of increases in food production, now receives little more than lip service”. The weakness of the draft response to NSSM 4 is that while it gives a tepid endorsement of technical assistance, it states that there is no justification available which would warrant an expansion of this form of aid. Conceding that there may be grounds for an institutional change which would improve the quality and style of technical assistance, the draft advances two options: on the one hand, a nongovernmental foundation to administer technical assistance, which the paper admits is unrealistic if appropriations in the order of $400 million annually are to be obtained from the Congress, and on the other, reshuffling of responsibilities within AID, retaining the present dominance of the regional bureaus with technical assistance still subordinated to capital development. Neither option offers the new Administration an attractive alternative. It is understandable that the present quality of AID technical assistance programs in general does not inspire confidence that additional funds devoted to this purpose would be effectively used. Yet, I cannot agree that new funds are not justified to carry out the programs advocated as essential by the PSAC reports and by Dr. Hannah’s group and by others in the professional, scientific and technical community. There would of course, be no justification for increasing technical assistance funds unless necessary institutional changes in the administration of technical assistance are made. The new Administration is not burdened with the errors of the past. It can boldly admit that technical assistance as presently administered needs to be revitalized and given professional direction, taking into account the factors so ably identified in Dr. Hannah’s report. In my view, $100 million in addition to the amount proposed for technical assistance in the FY 1970 budget would provide a significant start toward closing the gap in the present technical assistance program and would merit priority over capital assistance. In order to effectively bring about a new leadership and direction in technical assistance, two options need to be included in the paper, neither of which is present in the existing draft: Option 1: A new Technical Assistance Agency separate from AID but within the Government . Comment: This is the proposal advanced in the report of Dr. Hannah. Option 2: A separate and equal Technical Assistance Department within AID. 4 Comment: Unlike Option 3 in the draft memorandum, this proposal contemplates that the new Technical Assistance Bureau will have full responsibility for justifying its budget to the Congress and for the administration of its funds. 5 The present regional bureaus would continue with responsibility for capital assistance in its different forms. Although this would lack certain of the advantages of option 1 above, it would make coordination between capital assistance and technical assistance easier, being within the same agency, at the same time making possible more effective coordination with technical assistance programs of the multilateral agencies than has been done in the past. I believe strongly that Technical Assistance offers the new Administration the best opportunity to make a significant advance in our foreign assistance program within existing budgetary constraints. I believe we would be ill-advised not to take this opportunity to repair a critical weakness in our foreign assistance program. I would appreciate it if you would allow Mr. Daniel Margolies of my Office to attend your meeting Friday to enlarge on these remarks as may be desired and to assist in any drafting requirements that may arise. 6 Lee A. DuBridge 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 4. No classification marking. 2 March 14. Regarding NSSM 4, see Document 1 . According to a March 13 memorandum from Assistant Secretary Greenwald to Under Secretary Richardson, the March 14 meeting would be the only meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group prior to the March 21 NSC Review Group meeting on the NSSM 4 response and the March 26 NSC meeting on foreign assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 4) 3 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. IX, Document 139, footnote 4 . 4 In a March 18 memorandum to Under Secretary Richardson, Director of the Office of Scientific Affairs Herman Pollack recommended creation of a “second deputy to the Director of AID for Technical Assistance with authority extending throughout the entire AID organization.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 4) 5 On March 14 Edward Wenk, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, sent a memorandum to Richardson asking to be associated with DuBridge’s views. Wenk noted, however, that “Option 3 which retains technical assistance subordinate to capital development, would do little to foster more meaningful technical assistance programs in the marine field.” (Ibid.) 6 A handwritten notation in the margin reads: “Invited.” 4. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Secretary of State Rogers 4. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, March 25, 1969. SUBJECT NSSM 4—Choices in Foreign Aid You have the response to NSSM 4 at Tab A. 2 It starts with objectives of foreign aid, runs through alternative budget levels and alternative techniques to the decisions required this spring. Let me take it in a different order in giving my recommendations: 1. The key is of course the budget . Normally a single year’s aid budget would not be critical for our foreign relations. The pipeline provides a cushion, and the relationship between our aid inputs and the internal politics and external orientation of most aid receivers is indirect. However the President’s first budget request is a signal of his approach to development assistance. Another very small AID appropriation in FY 1970—on the order of the $1.3 billion passed last year—would mean that the actual aid resource flow—still about $2.0 billion in FY 1969—would be set on a downward trend which could not be reversed until late in this Presidential term. 2. AID appropriations stabilizing at $1.3 billion over the next four years would fundamentally change both the prospects for the third world, and our role in it . In specific this means: —A major U.S. withdrawal from participation in the third world’s efforts to develop; —That the Alliance for Progress link would cease to be credible to the Latins, as we are forced to cut back an effort which they now regard as a minimum Congress forced on the Executive last year; —Economic frustration in India/Pakistan, as we pass up the opportunity created by past aid (particularly in agriculture) for a true breakthrough; —Undermining other rich countries’ aid efforts, as we fail to pick up our share. 3. I do not regard such a medium-term outcome as acceptable , nor do I think the Administration should. This is one point to nail down at the NSC meeting. 4. The problem is how to avoid it . There are two immediate choices to be made: —Should the President’s asking figure for AID in FY 1970 be close to last year’s (say $2.2 billion) or significantly less (say $1.8 billion)? (This is the range under debate at BOB.) —Should the President establish a distinctive style and approach to aid in this year’s budget—or should he put the whole question into a Special Commission and defer decision for a year? 5. There is no way to say for sure that we would come out with higher appropriations than last year if we start at $2.2 billion. The request of course is only the first stop in a major Congressional effort, and Passman says that we can’t get more than last year no matter where we start. But I believe the asking figure makes a crucial difference this year, for it establishes what the new President thinks we ought to be spending on foreign assistance . This is a second point to determine at the NSC. 6. If the President decides to go for the $2.2 billion, he can improve his chances of coming reasonably close if he establishes his own style and direction for aid . This he can do by including in the package the private investment corporation, more multilateral aid (but basically within the burden sharing formulas), and sharper emphasis on technical assistance. These are all sound ideas, ready to go, and together they make a defensible new Administration program. This combination ($2.2 billion budget request, plus new directions) is Package A on page 31 of the report. I strongly prefer it; so do John Hannah, Rud Poats, and the regional Assistant Secretaries. This is a third point to determine at the NSC. 7. If the President decides to go for the $1.8 billion , I think he would do well to hold off on new directions—and instead throw the question to a Commission: Deferral serves two purposes: (i) it reserves something attractive to put into a higher budget request next year, and (ii) it recognizes that the program of new departures won’t help much if the President gives an uncertain signal on his intentions for aid by coming in with the lower budget request. 8. No matter what the budget decision, I believe we should establish generalized preferences (page 26) as U.S. policy (but in a trade policy context and at a different time). They have a big political payout (except possibly in Africa) for relatively little economic input. We should also see whether we can persuade Congress to let us give easier terms on PL 480 (page 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] ). As a result of a meeting chaired by Under Secretary Richardson, 3 there is interagency agreement we should not shift MAP out of the Foreign Assistance Act this year. 9. One lesser issue the NSC should settle tomorrow is the U.S. contribution to the Special Funds of the ADB . The President has told Marshall Green he favors it, but we need a formal decision. Tab B gives details. 4 10. Finally, I suggest you emphasize development as a valid, long-term objective of this program. In the past we have emphasized near-term political and security benefits of aid. The security objective remains real in many cases—and is a significant basis for support of the program by the House Foreign Affairs Committee and conservative Congressmen in general. But in the future we will have to establish the development objective in Congress and gain greater recognition of longer-run political benefits of participating in the third world’s development. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 4. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas O. Enders (E/IMA) and cleared by Sisco (IO), Macomber (H), Barnett (EA), Dantzer (ARA, except for paragraph 6), Westerfield (AF), Clark (AID), and Poats (AID). The memorandum was also addressed to the Under Secretary. 2 Not printed; entitled “The Choices in Foreign Aid,” March 24, prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group. Regarding an earlier draft of the paper, see Document 1 . 3 Presumably the meeting held on March 14; see footnote 2, Document 3 . An NSC Review Group meeting on foreign assistance was also scheduled for March 21. According to Kissinger’s decision on a March 19 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis regarding scheduling, the meeting was to be chaired by Halperin in Kissinger’s absence. (National Security Council, Secretariat, Senior Review Group Meeting Folders, Box 90, 3/21/69 Review Group Meeting-Foreign Aid) There is no indication that the meeting was held. 4 Tab B, not printed, is a paper entitled “U.S. Contribution to the Special Funds of the ADB.” 5. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 5. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT NSC Meeting on Foreign Aid 2 The U.S. foreign aid program is in major crisis. Public support has virtually disappeared and President Johnson’s last two budget requests were cut by 25 and 50 percent. We have fallen behind most other developed countries in the percentage of GNP provided in aid. Our aid objectives are uncertain and have been poorly articulated. The problem cannot be blamed solely on Vietnam and our budgetary stringencies. Aid is central to our relations particularly with key regions and countries such as Latin America and India. It is also central to our leadership in the industrialized world, which will not move decisively to bridge the North-South gap unless we show the way. The basic requirement is to reverse the sharply downward trend of appropriations for AID. They fell to $1.2 billion last year—the lowest since World War II, at a time when our GNP was growing rapidly. President Johnson asked for $2.2 billion for FY 1970. Given budget pressures, you may not be able to avoid some cut in his proposal. At the same time, a cut in your AID request greater than the cut for most other agencies would be interpreted as a further deceleration of U.S. interest in the less developed world. But if you were prepared to support vigorously a request of $2.0 billion—holding the inevitable cuts to $0.2-$0.3 billion—and announce an intention to increase your requests in the future as budgetary pressures eased, you would reverse the trend. You would have both reduced the Johnson proposal and gained a larger appropriation—a major achievement that would serve both domestic and foreign policy objectives. The organizational chances discussed in the paper are of marginal usefulness, at best, in a substantive sense. Economic development will occur only through hard work on the part of the LDCs and resource transfer on our part. However, there is widespread feeling that these changes will help you buy budget figures along the lines proposed above. And all agree that almost any budget request you make will be emasculated without them. At the heart of the problem is a need for clear articulation of our aid objectives and strong Presidential leadership in implementing them. A constituency for aid must be built and it will take time and your personal direction to do so. We will not know much more about the problem a year or two into the future. So I recommend that we start now. Attachment 3 NSC Meeting 26 March 1969 Aid Analytic Summary and Issues for Decision The attached paper 4 provides alternatives for the Administration’s approach to foreign aid for the next four years and for the aid submission to Congress for FY 1970. The paper is divided into four parts: the objectives of U.S. aid, budget levels, organization of our economic assistance program, and supplements to our main-line Governmental efforts. Its main focus is on economic assistance; military assistance levels will be covered primarily in the budget review. The final section presents two illustrative packages for submission to Congress this year. Decisions on all major aspects of the FY 1970 program are needed within a few days after the NSC meeting and the parallel budget review if the Administration is to submit legislation by the early May deadline “set” by Congress. Time must be left for Congressional consultations, however, after your initial decisions and before final preparation of the bill. Decisions must be made on the issues listed below. My recommendations follow in parentheses. 1. Objectives Four major objectives which the U.S. seeks through aid are listed: maintenance of military security for countries around the rim of the communist world, achievement of short-run political leverage through extending and withholding aid in response to others’ policies towards the United States, continued participation in the longer-run development effort of selected countries, and a sharp acceleration of growth in these countries. There may often be conflicts among these objectives and they can be accorded different priorities within any given aid level. All of them are under serious attack from some segments of American public opinion. (Announce that your Administration’s aid program will concentrate on speeding long-term economic development, consistent with the self-help efforts of the LDCs, while continuing to support the security requirements of U.S. allies in exposed positions. You will seek to move forward together with the other major industrialized countries and will not use aid primarily as a lever for short-term political gain, although we will probably have to continue to use supporting assistance for overtly political purposes.) 2. Aid Levels Aid levels relate closely to our choice of objectives. The following alternatives relate to the longer-term aspects of Administration policy. The numbers refer to actual appropriations and do not address the tactical question of how much to ask for in order to achieve them. A minimal program—around $1.2 billion per year in budget authority for AID, the level appropriated by Congress for FY 1969, and $0.5 billion for multilateral institutions—could assure security around the rim and a minimum U.S. contribution to development efforts in the major countries. A request for this level would create widespread foreign policy problems and would seriously undermine our efforts to get other donor countries to raise their contributions. Such a program would require sharp cutbacks in our lending to Latin America and India-Pakistan and would preclude a major reconstruction effort in Southeast Asia after the war. Only a major program—moving toward $3 billion for AID and $1.2 billion for multilateral institutions—would enable the U.S. to again provide decisive leadership to the economic development process and achieve a resource transfer relative to GNP equal to our contribution prior to 1963 and equal to that of most other industrialized countries. It would make virtually certain economic progress in the Subcontinent, enhance greatly the Alliance for Progress, assure a major Southeast Asia postwar development program, and give you flexibility to respond to new opportunities in Africa. A medium program—around $2-$2.3 billion annually for AID and $0.5-$0.8 billion for multilateral institutions, about what was sought in the last Johnson budget—would enable us to maintain our present flow of public resources to the less developed countries (LDCs) and hence retain our participation in the development process. It would relegate us to a middle position among donors and hence weaken our position of leadership. It would provide sufficient resources to make continued growth in South Asia likely, maintain our present involvement in Latin America and Africa, and enable us to exercise a choice among several options in postwar Southeast Asia. (a) Decision for FY 1970 . Could range from a “low option” of around $1.3 billion, as was appropriated in FY 1969, to the “medium option” of about $2.2 billion, the highest realistic possibility. (Propose $2.0 billion and support it wholeheartedly. Congress will make some cuts in any event and $1.8 billion at most—still a decisive improvement over FY 1969—will probably emerge. See my memorandum to you for rationale.) (b) Decision for beyond FY 1970 . Could indicate your intention to seek increased U.S. contributions, perhaps linked to the conclusion of the war and other budgetary factors. Absence of such indication, or at least of a call not to reduce the flow of resources, could be read as an implicit decision to let the level fall. (Express intent to raise the level toward internationally accepted targets and thereby to reassume U.S. leadership in the economic development process.) 3. Organization of U.S. Economic Assistance There are four major parts of our economic assistance program which could be reorganized. The proposals run from complete dismemberment of AID to maintaining or even strengthening the role of the central agency. All of the proposed organizational changes would satisfy, and meet the expectations of, some segments of Congress and the informed public. The benefits are essentially cosmetic and may even be purchased at some cost to some of our objectives. —A public corporation could be created to promote U.S. private investments in the LDCs and take over all AID programs in this area. It would do so primarily through expanded use of specific and extended risk guarantees but would also lend to U.S. firms and carry out some promotional activities. Such a proposal is widely expected on the Hill and would reflect a decision to give greater emphasis to private sector participation in our aid effort. However, there is no assurance that it will, even over time, increase the flow of private resources or provide any other concrete benefits. Issue for Decision: Creation of a public Private Investment Corporation. (Propose such a corporation, essentially for cosmetic reasons.) —Technical assistance could also be separated from AID with a publicly supported foundation created to handle all, or an important part, of it. Or AID could be reorganized to give greater weight to technical assistance. All agree that this aspect of aid is crucial through its role in upgrading the capabilities of the poor countries themselves—the major requirement for long-term development. A new emphasis on technical assistance, through either of these routes, would reflect an underlying decision to focus on real development and self-help by recipient countries. One problem in the U.S. is attracting top flight people to participate in technical assistance programs. It is probable that either change would help meet this problem at least marginally. However, we honestly do not know the full effects of changing the level of our programs or organizing them differently. Issue for Decision: Creation of a foundation for technical assistance or a separate bureau within AID to handle the subject. (Announce creation of a new AID bureau to dramatize a new emphasis on technical assistance.) —An increasing share of our capital assistance could over time be channeled through multilateral institutions, especially the IBRD/IDA and regional development banks, either on the present burden-sharing formula with other donors or without regard to this criterion. Such an approach would reflect a basic decision to focus on the objective of long-term economic development and to seek less short-term political payoff for our aid money. Issue for Decision: Shift of capital assistance to multilateral channels, with or without requirement of similar increases in multilateral contributions by other donors. (Announce full support for the present multilateral contributions bill now pending. Announce intent to expand such contributions in the future. Propose authority to shift a sizable part of U.S. capital assistance to these institutions without increasing the U.S. share in each—except perhaps in Latin America.) —The remainder of military assistance could be transferred from the Foreign Assistance Act to either the Defense Department budget or into a new act combining grant military assistance and military sales. (Grant military aid to Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand is already in the DOD budget.) The resultant separation of military from economic assistance, while artificial to some extent in some countries, would be a logical delineation of functions and more rationally treat our military assistance alongside other defense costs. However, the change could reduce foreign policy and budgetary control over military assistance. Issue for Decision: Shift of military assistance to DOD budget or creation of a new Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act. (All agree that creation of the latter is desirable, but Congressional consultations suggest that it is infeasible this year.) 4. Supplements to Basic Economic Assistance Program There are numerous programs outside AID which the U.S. could undertake or support, which would contribute to economic development and meet some of the most vocal interests of the LDCs. —We could liberalize the operations of our own PL-480 and Export-Import Bank programs, or at least reverse the hardened trend of PL-480. —We could actively promote increased U.S. private investment in the LDCs, by providing tax incentives or removing some of the constraints of existing Government programs. (This is a separate issue from creating the private investment corporation.) —We could take the initiative to seek international programs to boost export earnings of the LDCs, e.g. by tariff preferences for their products or commodity agreements to stabilize prices of their major foreign exchange earners. The LDCs have a major political interest in preferences but the economic payoff is likely to be small. —We could take steps to meet the coming critical problem of LDC debts to the industrialized world. Rising debt burdens are becoming a major burden and will reach 25 percent of export earnings for numerous major LDCs within a decade. There are several ways to meet the problem, such as liberalizing our own loan terms, but the most direct approach is to encourage reschedulings for specific major countries. Issues for Decision (a) Trade preferences for LDCs. (Await outcome of NSC meeting on trade policy on April 9 before making decision.) (b) New commodity agreements. (Await outcome of NSC meeting on trade policy on April 9 before making decision.) (c) Debt reschedulings. (Be ready to deal with it on a country-by-country basis as problems arise.) (d) Private investment. (Do nothing new beyond proposing creation of the Private Investment Corporation, but indicate hope that it will lead to increased private flows to LDCs. Also announce that the liberalization of U.S. balance of payments controls will contribute to this objective and express hope that the new Corporation will relax the present tying requirements of extended risk guarantees.) Packages In conclusion, the paper presents two illustrative packages for FY 1970. The first would include $2-$2.2 billion for AID and $0.5 billion for multilateral institutions, to reverse the trend of last year and maintain the flow of U.S. public resources at previous levels, and an expression of intent to increase the level in the future. On the organizational side, it would establish a private investment corporation, reorganize technical assistance within AID and propose a sharp increase in our contribution to the UN technical assistance effort, express an intent to expand our contributions to multilateral agencies as other donors do so, and shift the rest of military assistance to a new Military Assistance and Sales Act. It would also include Administration support for trade preferences. The organizational innovations are logically separate from the budget level, but are deemed necessary by most observers to purchase the larger amounts of money. The second package would defer any major organizational changes until next year, establish a high-level commission to recommend what those changes should be, and trim the budget request close to what was actually appropriated in fiscal year 1969 ($1.5 billion). (My recommendations on each of these issues are listed above. Taken together they closely approximate the first package. However, the possibility of modification for Latin America should remain open until the NSC meeting on Latin America and Governor Rockefeller reports on his mission.) 1 Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Schedule of NSC Meetings, Box 83, 3/26/69 NSC Meeting-Foreign Aid. Confidential. This memorandum is the lead item in the President’s briefing book for the March 26 NSC meeting. 2 The March 26 NSC meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from 10:05 to 11:58 a.m. Appendix A of the President’s Daily Diary lists the following attendees: Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Kennedy, Lincoln, Wheeler, Helms, Kissinger, Richardson, Hannah, Poats, Mayo, DuBridge, Goodpaster, Bergsten, and Haig. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) 3 Confidential. This paper is the fourth item in the President’s briefing book for the NSC meeting; the second and third items are talking points for the President’s use and talking points for Kissinger’s use. 4 “The Choices in Foreign Aid”; see Document 4 and footnote 2 thereto. 6. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 6. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 3, 1969. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of State The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness The Director, Bureau of the Budget Acting Administrator, Agency for International Development Administrator-Designate, Agency for International Development The Director, Office of Science and Technology SUBJECT NSC Meeting of March 26, 1969, on Foreign Aid Attached is the list of actions resulting from the meeting of the National Security Council on AID held on March 26, 1969, which has been approved by the President. Because of the sensitive nature of the guidance contained therein, a formal NSDM will not be circulated. Rather, an “Eyes Only” copy is furnished for the retention and guidance of the principals who attended the meeting on this subject. No reproduction or circulation of this document is authorized. Henry A. Kissinger Attachment List of Actions Resulting From Meeting of the National Security Council on March 26, 1969 [March 26, 1969] 1. The President indicated his continuing support for a foreign assist-ance program. However, since Congressional sentiment tends to be increasingly isolationist, it will be necessary to justify new programs in a more meaningful way. The humanitarian aspect should be emphasized in justifying economic aid (other than war-related programs in Southeast Asia); the long-run economic benefit to the U.S. of a higher level of economic development elsewhere is also important. The aid effort should not be built on expectations of immediate political returns to the United States. 2. The President decided that the requested authorization for foreign assistance in FY 1970 should be on the generous side, as an early reflection of the Administration’s attitude toward foreign assistance and of the likelihood that pressures on expenditures will be eased in subsequent years. Some Congressional reductions should be anticipated, and technical assistance should be increased, if possible. An effort should be made to reduce foreign assistance expenditures in FY 1970, recognizing that post-1970 expenditures will probably be easier to support. Accordingly, Budget Director Mayo, Secretary Kennedy, and Messrs. Hannah and Poats are to produce specific recommendations concerning both the requested authorization and expenditure levels for FY 1970. 3. The President indicated his support for a U.S. contribution to the proposed Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank, 2 but desires a larger contribution from other nations, especially Japan. 4. It was agreed that the forthcoming proposal should: (a) give greater emphasis to transferring American technological know-how to the less developed countries thus giving greater emphasis to technical assistance 3 (especially in the area of food production); (b) give AID a clearer mandate to emphasize private enterprise in the recipient countries; (c) set up a private investment corporation; d) permit continuing technical assistance to recipient countries no longer in need of development loans; and (e) retain the Military Assistance Program as part of the foreign assistance program. 5. The President directed that consideration be given to the establishment of a non-governmental commission which would review the foreign aid program during early FY 1970 4 and provide a basis for the President’s consideration of further changes in U.S. programs, especially contributions to multilateral agencies, during the 1970’s. The Commission’s report would be drawn upon in making the final response to the Javits amendment due March 1, 1970. Concurrently, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was directed to initiate a governmental study effort designed to examine the relationship between foreign assistance and U.S. national security objectives. 5 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, Box 129, 26 March NSC Meeting. Confidential; Eyes Only. On April 1 Kissinger sent the President a memorandum to which he attached the list of actions pursuant to the March 26 NSC meeting that had been “coordinated on an ÔEyes Only’ basis with the principals and has been agreed to by them.” Kissinger added that “your decisions to develop proposals for an outside study commission and continuation of our internal study of aid will be formalized by written follow-up Study Memoranda.” He concluded: “I do not believe an NSDM should be promulgated on these issues because the formal dissemination of such a memorandum could generate problems if it were leaked to legislators. Additionally, I believe you will wish to retain some flexibility on this issue as the FY 70 AID program crystallizes.” The President initialed his approval. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Volume I 1969) 2 See footnote 1, Document 2 . 3 See Document 3 . 4 Reference is to the Task Force on International Development; see Documents 119 and 120 . 5 Not further identified. 7. National Security Decision Memorandum 10 7. National Security Decision Memorandum 10 1 Washington, April 11, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture Director, Bureau of the Budget Administrator, Agency for International Development SUBJECT AID and PL 480 Commitments The President has directed the Secretary of State to submit for approval a country memorandum setting forth the total economic assistance program, including AID and PL 480, for each of the major countries indicated by him. The memorandum should be initiated by the Administrator of AID, and should incorporate the views of the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Treasury. It should be submitted through the Bureau of the Budget for inclusion of its views, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs prior to the first major commitment of funds in each fiscal year. The memorandum should set forth the proposed program for the period under consideration (normally one year) and its implications for the longer run. It should discuss the underlying foreign and domestic policy considerations for the United States, and the relation of the program to specific U.S. objectives in the country. It should also specify the related actions we expect the recipient country to take and the strategy proposed to negotiate and carry out the program. The memorandum should indicate how economic and PL 480 assistance will be coordinated to assure the best use of both resources and effective self-help efforts. It should include the effects of the program on the U.S. economy and balance of payments. Alternative possibilities for both the program itself and negotiating strategy should be presented where appropriate. The memoranda directed by this decision will be coordinated with the overall country studies directed by NSDM 4 for countries covered by that memorandum. The countries for which programs will be submitted to the President will at present include Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Nigeria. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and other interested agencies, shall request the Administrator of AID to initiate other country programs involving issues or matters of concern to the President. Following the same procedure, he shall also request re-submission to the President of country programs already decided in the event of significant changes in circumstances or where original decisions could not be carried out. If the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the other addressees of this memorandum, determine that the President has already considered the major issues involved in a country program, they may decide not to submit that program to the President under this directive. (Programs already negotiated for this year need not be re-submitted.) All other country programs will be determined through normal interagency procedures. These procedures should not delay necessary obligations for continuing activities in Technical Assistance or urgent requirements during the Continuing Resolution period if presentation of a full-year program is impossible. The present procedure, by which the President must approve all PL 480 agreements, all AID project loans exceeding $10 million, and all AID program loans exceeding $5 million, is hereby rescinded. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 10. Limited Official Use. On February 19 Kissinger had circulated to the same addressees an earlier draft of this NSDM for their comment by March 3. A copy is attached to an April 4 memorandum from Poats to Hannah suggesting that Hannah take up with Rogers the key role of the Secretary of State in moving forward the foreign assistance papers. (Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, IPS 7-1 NSC FY 69 April 1-30, 1969) A copy of Kissinger’s February 19 memorandum and the earlier draft of NSDM 10 is also attached to a February 25 memorandum from Raymond J. Albright to Hirschtritt and Petty at Treasury requesting their action. Albright also attached a copy of NSDM 4, which requested, on the President’s direction, preparation of a series of program analyses for designated countries and regions (none designated) to be used by the NSC as the basis for discussion and decision on policy and program issues. (Ibid., Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, AID-Secret) 8. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 8. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, May 20, 1969. SUBJECT Aid Issues Your meeting this morning with the President I suggest that you make the following points to the President at this morning’s briefing: 2 1. Arthur Burns raised several points yesterday on the new aid legislation, 3 which will be ready for you to send to Congress in a few days. (FYI: After you left last night, Richardson and Harlow decided to seek a meeting between the President and the Congressional leadership later this week to avoid having to postpone the hearings which start next Monday. I think we are in good enough shape to give the President an adequate briefing if the meeting is held no earlier than Thursday.) 4 2. Most of his points are minor matters and have been agreed upon by all agencies. (FYI: They dealt with specific features of the proposed Overseas Private Investment Corporation.) 3. Only one point which he raised requires your personal attention and it had already been flagged in a memorandum to you from Bob Mayo on the bill. 5 (FYI: This is the proposed removal of a long series of country restrictions written into the aid legislation by Congress over the past eight years. They are explained in the “background” section of this memorandum.) 4. I will be getting to you later a package of papers on the aid legislation including: (a) briefing material for your discussion of aid with the Congressional leadership; 6 (b) the final draft of your aid message to the Congress, which will transmit the bill; 7 (c) recommendations on the several issues in the bill which require your personal decisions. (FYI: They are the formation of a commission, how to handle the Hickenlooper amendment, the omission of the country restrictions, and Secretary Laird’s proposal to add $108 million of military assistance for Korea to the request.) Background Arthur Burns has two objectives in his memorandum of last night to the President on aid: 8 1. To take credit for achieving minor changes in the Overseas Private Investment Corporation section of the bill. All agencies agreed with his points so they are not an issue. 2. To warn the President against seeking removal of the series of country prohibitions (“barnacles”) in the present Foreign Assistance Act. This is the only substantive issue raised by Burns and it was already raised by Bob Mayo in his memorandum to the President on the overall legislation. 9 Attached is an analysis of the provisions whose omission from the new bill is proposed. 10 (Five of the present restrictions would be retained—Hickenlooper, a revised Conte-Symington concerning LDC military expenditures, and those on aid to Communist countries and to countries with whom we do not have diplomatic relations.) Of the thirteen provisions whose omission is proposed, four are encompassed in other laws and the other nine have not been applied anyway. This led Burns to compare the risk of Congressional demagoguery against what appeared to him as small gains of omitting them. It is true that a request for omission could be portrayed as an effort by the Administration to eliminate laws which “protect the interests of the United States” against Communist countries, welchers on debts, military adventurers, countries permitting mob action against U.S. embassies, seizures of U.S. property, etc. The main arguments for omission are: 1. The restrictions can pose problems for the administration of the program without providing any benefits for overall U.S. interests. 2. They shift exercise of foreign policy prerogatives from the President to the Congress and can reduce the President’s flexibility in specific cases. 3. The new Administration has a chance to get rid of them now but will probably forfeit that chance forever if it endorses them in its first aid bill. Conclusion and Recommendation In my view it is a close issue. Removal of the “barnacles” is clearly desirable but is not of high priority. I know of no specific aid loan or country program which has been seriously handicapped by any of the restrictions which would be dropped. On the other hand, the risk is probably not too high either. Every change has been cleared with its Congressional sponsors (except where they are no longer in Congress). It must be admitted, however, that other Congressmen eager for an issue could raise trouble. I therefore recommend that we propose omission of the restrictions in the new legislation but retreat if significant Congressional opposition develops. The probable result is that some will be omitted and a few retained, with a net gain for aid. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Volume I 1969. Secret. 2 This meeting has not been identified. 3 Not further identified, but see footnote 8 below. 4 May 22. Earlier, under cover of a May 16 memorandum, Kissinger forwarded to the President Under Secretary Richardson’s May 2 and May 13 memoranda with recommendations for launching the new foreign assistance program, with the President’s message slated for May 23. The President rejected a briefing on May 19 and requested a “memo instead.” Regarding the recommendation that he meet with senior Republicans on the four committees handling the AID bill on May 20 and the bipartisan Congressional leadership on May 21, the President checked the “Disapprove” and “Speak to me” options. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid Message) 5 This may be a reference to a May 14 memorandum from Mayo to the President, which included discussion of the “barnacles,” restrictions contained in Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act, many of which Mayo wanted to revise or repeal. (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 206, Bureau of the Budget) It may also be a reference to a May 20 memorandum from Mayo to the President regarding the barnacles, which was attached to Kissinger’s May 22 memorandum to the President, Document 10 . 6 The President, along with Vice President Agnew, Under Secretary Richardson, AID Administrator Hannah, and others, met with bipartisan Congressional leaders from 5:14 to 6:36 p.m. on May 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 7 The President sent his Foreign Assistance Message to Congress on May 28. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon , 1969, pp. 441-447. 8 No May 19 memorandum from Burns to the President was found, but see Document 9 . 9 See footnote 5 above. 10 Not found. 9. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Burns) to President Nixon 9. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Burns) to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 22, 1969. SUBJECT Foreign Aid Bill I interested myself in the Foreign Aid Bill originally because of certain questionable features in the proposed Overseas Private Investment Corporation. These matters have now been straightened out. In the course of my study I became concerned, also, about certain non-financial proposals. I have discussed these with Henry Kissinger, and I feel he has put the issues fairly and objectively before you. I think, nevertheless, that the political dimension merits emphasis, and that you will want to ponder carefully the following facts. The prohibition section of the Foreign Assistance Act (Section 620) has been drastically changed in the proposed bill. Specifically, this bill repeals a number of present restrictions on distribution of foreign aid. Some of the changes include: (1) Repeal of the prohibition of assistance to countries which permit shipping to or from Cuba, or of assistance to countries which trade with or permit shipping to or from North Vietnam. 2 (2) Repeal of the prohibition against assistance to countries engaging in or preparing for military aggression against the U.S. or any aid recipient. (3) Repeal of the prohibition against assistance to a country in default on debt owed to U.S. citizens. (4) Repeal of prohibition against aid to be used to compensate owners of expropriated or nationalized property. 3 (5) Repeal of discouragement of assistance to countries failing to prevent mob action against U.S. property. Such changes appear to go directly contrary to your campaign policy statements and to the general foreign policy enunciated by the Republican Party. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID Volume III 8/11/70-9/10/70. No classification marking. This memorandum is Tab E to Document 31 . Another copy of the memorandum, without the President’s written decisions, is attached to an undated handwritten note from Haig to Kissinger informing Kissinger that “all has been taken care of.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID Volume I 1969) 2 Next to this paragraph in the left margin the President wrote, “No.” Haig made a checkmark over the President’s note. 3 Next to both paragraphs 3 and 4 in the left margin the President wrote, “No.” Haig made a single checkmark over both notes. 10. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 10. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 22, 1969. SUBJECT Your Foreign Aid Program Issues Attached are six items on the FY 1970 aid program which require your early attention. Congressional hearings on aid begin next Monday and you are scheduled to brief the Congressional leadership on Thursday. 2 Two items on which there is disagreement require your decision: 1. A proposal to eliminate some of the country prohibitions contained in the present AID legislation. (Budget Bureau memorandum at Tab A.) 2. A proposal to include an additional $108 million of military assistance for Korea in your budget request. (Separate package at Tab B.) 3 There are two items agreed by all relevant parties on which your decision is also needed: 3. A proposal that you announce in the message the formation of a Presidential Commission or Task Force on aid. (AID memo at Tab C.) 4. A proposal that you announce in the message a decision to launch a special study of the Hickenlooper Amendment. (State Department memo at Tab D.) Also attached are two items for your presentation of the aid program: 5. A draft of your message to Congress transmitting the new legislation (Tab E), (which ought to go up on Friday). 6. Talking points for your meeting with the Congressional leadership, a briefing paper on the program itself, and a set of questions and suggested answers on the program (Tab F). Disagreed Issues 1. The proposed bill omits or changes, in substance or in form, a number of restrictions on the aid program written into the law by Congress over the years. These are mainly prohibitions on aid to countries taking specific actions against the United States. (For example, defaulting on debt to U.S. citizens or preparing for military aggression against us.) Only two of the changes are of substantive importance to the program. The Budget Bureau memorandum (Tab A) analyzes each proposed modification in detail. All but one agency agrees and the other is neutral that you should seek all of these changes. The major arguments for doing so are: 1. The restrictions shift exercise of foreign policy prerogatives from the President to the Congress and reduce the President’s flexibility in specific cases. 2. The new Administration has a chance to get rid of them now but will have a reduced opportunity to do so in the future if it does not seek to change them in its first aid bill. 3. The changes would simplify administration of aid. An effort to get all of the changes, however, would cause domestic political problems. The request could be interpreted, both in the Congress and by the public, as an Administration effort to eliminate laws which protect the interests of the United States. And, in practice, the restrictions have had little effect on the actual operation of the aid program. Arthur Burns and I have discussed this issue (and the other issues of concern to him on the bill, all of which have been satisfactorily resolved). We agree that it weighs a marginal gain against a risk which is also probably marginal but could turn out to be serious. Recommendation On balance, I think it would be a good idea to rid ourselves of these restrictions. However, if you think there is any political price, I agree with Arthur Burns that we should not take the risk. This is a political judgment. Seek modifications Not seek modifications 4 2. Attached at Tab B is a detailed analysis of Secretary Laird’s proposal to add $108 million of military assistance (in addition to the already programmed $139 million) for Korea to your aid request. Budget Bureau and State oppose this additional amount, arguing inter alia that: 1) it will run into substantial Congressional opposition; 2) there is already some $230 million in the pipeline; 3) the items programmed under the increase do not really relate to the threat posed by the EC-121 incident. 5 Laird argues that an increase would: 1) be an unequivocal response to the EC-121 shootdown, (Kissinger note: particularly in light of the delay in reinitiating reconnaissance flights); 2) reassure the South Koreans; 3) the equipment is needed. On balance, I slightly favor the Laird proposal. Recommendation That you approve adding $108 million to the FY 1970 aid request. Approve addition 6 Disapprove addition Issues Agreed But Requiring Your Decision 3. AID’s memorandum at Tab C proposes that you appoint a Commission or Task Force to conduct a thorough appraisal of the U.S. aid program. At a meeting on Monday, there was general agreement that it would be preferable to set up a Task Force or Study Group, rather than a Commission, on the grounds that a report from such a group would be less likely to commit you to a particular course of action. The most important suggestions made in the AID memorandum are as follows (my comments are in parentheses): (a) The report should focus on both the objectives of the aid program and the scale and form of assistance necessary to achieve those objectives. (The relationship to foreign policy is clearly articulated. The memorandum also envisages a number of fairly detailed specific tasks for the study, however, which could easily dilute its focus on objectives and make it appear to duplicate the many reports already completed on specifics. The focus should be on basic objectives and foreign policy.) (b) The Commission or Task Force should not include representatives from either the legislative or executive branches of the Government. (Ross Adair has personally made the same suggestion to my staff.) (c) Several possibilities are mentioned for the chairmanship, most prominently J. Irwin Miller, President of the Cummins Engine Company of Indiana. He chaired President Johnson’s Commission on East-West Trade in 1965 and is by all accounts an exceptionally able individual. Other AID suggestions are Dan Parker, Arjay Miller, Bill Blackie, Rudolph Peterson, and Bill Scranton. (An interagency group comprising State, Commerce, Agriculture, STR, and my staff suggests Irwin Miller as the best man to chair the Commission on Trade Policy, which you decided upon at the NSC meeting on trade policy, 7 so I suggest we turn to one of the other names for this one.) (d) The staff should be based at Brookings, although organized specifically for this task with a staff director and members drawn from all over the country. Secretary Laird opposes even this link to Brookings. (I, too, have doubts about Brookings. More work is needed before we can decide on the staffing.) 8 Recommendations That you announce in the Aid Message that you have decided to appoint a Presidential Task Force to study the future of the U.S. aid program. (If you wish to enhance the prestige of the study and your personal commitment to its findings, you could label the group a Commission.) Approve Task Force 9 Approve Commission Disapprove both That I inform AID that your approval of the Task Force (or Commission) does not imply approval of every specific suggestion in their memorandum; that you wish to make the final decisions yourself on the terms of reference, membership, and staff; and that they should submit alternatives on each aspect shortly. Approve 10 Disapprove 4. Secretary Rogers feels strongly that we should make no effort now to amend the Hickenlooper Amendment because such an effort would complicate the Peru crisis, appear as a surrender to Peruvian intransigence, and because no substantial weakening could get Congressional support at this time. 11 At the same time, the State Department does not wish to imply that the Administration favors Hickenlooper. Under Secretary Johnson thus recommends (at Tab D) that you indicate in your Foreign Aid Message an intention to order a special study of the Hickenlooper problem and, specifically, a willingness to entertain changes if they are recommended to you. I agree that a special study of Hickenlooper would make sense. However, whether you should mention it in the message depends largely on how you want to proceed on Peru. If you want to follow State’s recommendation to continue to defer a confrontation, mentioning the Hickenlooper study would be helpful in establishing a climate for doing so. Moreover, it would demonstrate your open-minded approach to the Latins and win some points with liberal Senators. On the other hand, if you are not willing to continue to defer a confrontation, mentioning the Hickenlooper study would weaken your position. Recommendation That you order a study of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Approve 12 Disapprove Depending on how you want to proceed on Peru, 1. That you mention the Hickenlooper study in the message 2. That you do not mention the Hickenlooper study 13 The message and the briefing material for the Congressional consultations focus on the changes in the program which you directed at the NSC meeting on aid: 14 a new emphasis on private sector participation, including a proposal for an Overseas Private Investment Corporation; increased emphasis on technical assistance with a new AID bureau to operate it; further emphasis on greater participation by other advanced countries; a functional emphasis on the food-population equation; and a frank recognition that we need to know more about aid, with a Presidential Commission or Task Force appointed to help in that effort. The proposed talking points, briefing memo, and set of questions and answers appended at Tab F give you the necessary background on these issues. I think the message contains enough new rhetoric to be saleable. However, we must recognize that the program being proposed does not differ very much from the past. We thus need to stress our continuing review of aid but must be careful not to diminish support for the present bill by playing that theme too hard. Recommendation That you approve the proposed Foreign Aid Message to Congress (Tab E), subject to amendment based on your decisions on the issues listed above. Approve 15 Approve with changes as noted See me 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, President’s Foreign Aid Program. Secret. A handwritten note, with a May 27 date, reads: “Pres has seen.” This memorandum is attached to a May 21 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger recommending that Kissinger “urgently” send the attached package to the President and that no specific reference to Latin America be added to the draft message to Congress. A note on Bergsten’s memorandum reads: “Retd from HAK 5/22.” 2 The meeting with the Congressional leadership took place on Tuesday, May 27; see footnote 6, Document 8 . None of the tabs is printed. 3 In the left margin next to item 2, the President wrote, “for.” 4 President Nixon initialed this option. 5 On April 14 a Navy EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft flying from Japan to the Republic of Korea was shot down by North Korea off the Korean coast. 6 President Nixon initialed this option. 7 Reference is to the April 9 NSC meeting; see Document 192 . 8 On November 8, 1972, Haig sent a memorandum to President Nixon stating that “as a result of long standing instructions, we have prohibited out-of-house contract work related to national security affairs with the Brookings Institution.” Haig noted, however, that Rumsfeld had informed him that as a result of a recent meeting between the President and Brookings President Kermit Gordon some contracting would be permitted. Haig indicated there was pending with ACDA an arms control issue on which Brookings was particularly qualified, and requested permission for ACDA to contract with Brookings. Haldeman initialed the “Disapprove” option and wrote, “P. has ordered that the long-standing instruction still stand.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 309, Brookings Institution) 9 President Nixon initialed this option. 10 President Nixon initialed this option. 11 For documentation on the investment dispute with Peru and the debate over application of the Hickenlooper Amendment, see Documents 148 ff. 12 President Nixon initialed this option. 13 President Nixon initialed this option. No mention of such a study is in the March 28 message to Congress. 14 Reference is to the March 26 NSC meeting; see Documents 5 and 6 . 15 President Nixon initialed this option. His message was sent to Congress on May 28; see footnote 7, Document 8 . 11. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 11. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 23, 1969. SUBJECT Amendments to the Foreign Aid Bill The memorandum which you approved yesterday on the Aid Bill dealt only with areas in which your advisors or the relevant agencies were in disagreement. It did not make clear, in the discussion of possible removal of Section 620 restrictions in the Foreign Assistance Act, that there are two restrictions which, unlike the others, are of substantial importance, and that all parties, including Arthur Burns, agree that we should seek their removal. These are the Symington Amendment (and the closely related Conte-Long Amendment) and the Church Amendment. The Symington Amendment requires termination of assistance (including PL 480) to any country with excessive military expenditures, and prohibits Presidential waiver of this requirement. The Conte-Long Amendment requires a reduction in assistance in an amount equal to any amount spent by a recipient country on sophisticated weapons systems. The new draft bill, by agreement with the sponsors, would soften these provisions substantially, by providing only that the President “take into account” certain military expenditures by recipient countries in determining the level of our assistance. It would also totally exclude technical assistance and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation from this provision. (Also by agreement, we would expect the Congress to strengthen these restrictions somewhat.) Symington and Conte-Long presently are largely ineffective, unduly limit Presidential action, and insert the United States into internal defense decisions in other countries. The Church Amendment prohibits grant assistance—be it economic or military—to any economically developed nation, subject to Presidential waiver. Even if such a waiver is authorized, there is an absolute limit of $50 million for military assistance. The draft bill would increase the amounts available for military assistance under Presidential waiver. This change is essential to permit the U.S. to provide Spain with military assistance in exchange for bases, estimated at $55 million for FY 1970. Recommendation That you approve the two proposed changes to the present Foreign Assistance Act indicated above. 2 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Confidential. On May 23 Haig sent Kissinger a memorandum in which this was the first item for Kissinger to discuss with the President that day. (Ibid., Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 2/5-7/14/69) Kissinger met with the President at 9:30 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 2 The President initialed the Approve option. Later in the day Kissinger sent a memorandum to the Secretaries of Defense and State, the AID Administrator, and the Budget Director informing them of the President’s decisions on May 22 (see Document 10 ) and May 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 206, Bureau of the Budget Volume I) 12. Editorial Note 12. Editorial Note In the summer and fall of 1969, the Nixon administration began to look closely at military assistance programs to Latin America. An apparent catalyst for this investigation was the meeting of President Lleras Restrepo of Colombia with President Nixon in Washington on June 12 and 13, 1969, following which Henry Kissinger sent a June 13 memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense informing them of Lleras’ interest in F-5 aircraft and requesting their recommendation on how this might be handled. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 838, NSC/USC) The NSC Interdepartmental Group for Latin America and the NSC Under Secretaries Committee took up the study of the sale of jet military aircraft to Colombia and the implications of such a sale for other Latin American countries, particularly Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and eventually Venezuela. In this study Elliot Richardson, Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, reported that Congressional restrictions, such as the Conte Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, inhibited the ability of the U.S. Government to provide F-5-type fighter aircraft to meet Latin American nations’ minimum modernization goals. In their frustration to get firm U.S. commitments for the sale of F-5s, the committee reported, Latin American governments were beginning to purchase French Mirage jets, which the Nixon administration could not prevent. Richardson reported that his committee was trying to achieve some modification to the Conte Amendment so that the administration could respond “more satisfactorily in the future to purchase requests for modest numbers of weapons like jet military aircraft,” and the committee recommended specific steps in dealing with the requests of Colombia, Brazil, and Chile. (Memorandum from Richardson to President Nixon, August 13; ibid.) On October 3 Richardson approved the recommendations of a State-AID-DOD Congressional Liaison Task Force to push for revisions of the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act in the pending mark-up of the foreign assistance bill in the House Foreign Affairs Committee (and later in the Senate); not to press at that time for changes in the Conte-Long Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act; but to be prepared where appropriate to use the Presidential waiver, which allowed the sales if “important to the national security.” (Memorandum from the State-AID-DOD Congressional Liaison Task Force to Acting Secretary Richardson, September 22; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC/U-DM 15) Following an NSC meeting on October 15, at which President Nixon said that he “wanted the United States to continue to provide [military] assistance and work carefully with the Latin American military, but in ways which would reduce or lower our profile,” Kissinger asked the Under Secretaries Committee to take this factor into consideration during its current study of military missions in Latin America. (Memorandum from Kissinger to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee, October 20; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, Box 130, NSC/Mtg 10/15/69) Regarding the October 15 NSC meeting, at which the participants discussed the report of Nelson Rockefeller, then Governor of New York, on his trip to Latin America, see Document 122 . Subsequently, in an October 29 letter to General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rockefeller clarified the recommendation in his report for a change in Latin America to the “concept of mobile military missions from the permanent mission concept.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense, Volume V 12/l/69-1/31/70) Another Latin American question related to debt service, and Rockefeller’s report recommended the use of local currency payments in lieu of dollar payments. At the October 15 NSC meeting, President Nixon asked Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to consult with George Woods, former President of the World Bank, Nathaniel Samuels, and John Hannah, and then give him his views on the recommendation. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Kennedy, October 20; ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM-15) In an October 29 memorandum to Kissinger, Kennedy reported the views of Woods, Samuels, and Hannah, and suggested, among other things, that the Rockefeller recommendations were much too specific and that “it would be much better to bring these matters up at a later time with the individual countries involved.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume I) In NSDM 31, November 5, Kissinger reported that the President wanted to adopt the Rockefeller recommendation on debt service, directed Secretaries Rogers and Kennedy to consult with Woods in implementing it, and indicated that on November 10 when the Rockefeller report was released, President Nixon would announce that he had “directed an immediate study of this recommendation with a view to its adoption as may appear appropriate.” (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM-31) Despite Secretary Kennedy’s caution, as expressed in a November 6 memorandum, President Nixon made these announcements on November 10. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume I) For text of the President’s announcement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pages 921-922. 13. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) and Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 13. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) and Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 15, 1969. SUBJECT Presidential Support for Foreign Assistance Bill (HR 14580) This year’s Foreign Assistance authorization bill (HR 14580) was reported out of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 6, 1969, and will reach the floor early in the week of November 17. The Bill submitted by the Committee recommends an authorization of $2.18 million, roughly $500 million below your request of $2.63 million. We understand that proposals for further cuts will be made on the House floor, and that the adherents of the Bill, primarily Democrats, are unwilling to resist these further cuts, or to attempt restoring the cuts already made, unless you strongly indicate your support for the Bill. 2 Also, Republican opposition is likely to remain strong unless party leadership effectively dampens it down. The Senate has not yet acted on the Authorization Bill either in Committee or on the floor and most importantly, the Appropriation Committees in both Houses have yet to act. Further damaging reductions could be made at any or all of these further stages. The House Committee cuts, and those we can expect from the floor, have particular significance for Latin America. The Committee, which is generally sympathetic to the Hemispheric program, cut $100 million from the requested new obligational lending authority of $437.5 million and $16 million from the technical assistance request of $116.0 million. Following up on your Latin American address of October 31, 1969, 3 and together with the November 17 commencement of the IA-ECOSOC meeting in Washington, 4 our Latin American partners and interested sectors of domestic opinion will be closely watching Congressional action on the foreign assistance program and the efforts of the Administration to obtain a favorable result. The credibility of your commitment of October 31 to continue strong U.S. support and assistance for development in the Hemisphere will be weighed by those two groups in terms of Congressional action on the Foreign Assistance Bill. The amounts recommended for authorization by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in other parts of the A.I.D. program also were sharply reduced. The $100 million reduction in Supporting Assistance will so limit our ability to help the Vietnamese Government finance the costs of Vietnamization of the war that we risk being charged with bad faith. Any further substantial reduction in Supporting Assistance would almost certainly require seeking a supplemental appropriation early next year. The $200 million reduction in Development Loan funds will perpetuate the recent failure to do our fair share in several international development consortia, particularly those programs seeking to capitalize on the agricultural breakthrough in Southern Asia. Recommendations: (1) That you consider a public reiteration of your support for the full foreign assistance budget request as well as direct appeals to the Congressional leadership for their active support in at least holding the levels proposed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. (2) That Assistant Secretary Meyer be authorized to emphasize your strong support for the Foreign Assistance Bill in his remarks to the IA-ECOSOC conference which starts here next Monday. 5 J.A.H. WPR 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. No classification marking. Attached, together with an October 30 memorandum from Hannah to President Nixon, to a November 18 memorandum from Bergsten and Nachmanoff to Kissinger recommending direct Presidential intervention to avoid cuts beyond the $500 million already made in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the foreign assistance bill. According to the Daily Diary, the President did not make any calls to the House Congressional leadership on November 18 or 19. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 2 Hannah was actively working to raise the levels of funding. Attached to an undated handwritten note from Hannah to Kissinger is a paper entitled “Non-Military Aid—FY 1970,” dated November 17. The paper indicated that the House Foreign Affairs Committee the previous year had authorized $1,975 million for non-military aid and asserted that “the minimum HFAC authorization” for 1969 should be $1,947.7 million. (Ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969) Hannah’s handwritten note to Kissinger reads: “Henry: Attached is a copy of paper left with Adair and Morgan. Bergsten has a copy. In event you have not seen this, it will give you background on where we are. Sec. Rogers has called Adair and Morgan—but there is no substitute for a direct word to them from the President.” 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pp. 893-901. 4 See Document 122 . 5 There is no indication of the President’s decision on the recommendations. 14. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon 14. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 21, 1969. Dear Mr. President: Many weeks ago in discussing prospects for the AID appropriation for Fiscal 1970, you indicated that you had one “chit” that you might be able to cash with Otto Passman when the time was ripe and the stakes sufficiently high. It was agreed that when that critical time came I would call upon you. The time is now—today or tomorrow. 2 We are deeply appreciative of your timely letters yesterday to the Speaker and Jerry Ford. 3 They helped immeasurably. The House approved the authorization bill last evening. Had it not been for an amendment offered from the floor adding some $50 million of military aid to Taiwan that was violently opposed by many friends of non-military aid, the vote would have been much more favorable. After this addition many of our supporters voted against the amended bill. The non-military authorization level in the House passed bill is at $1,739 million. I visited with Mr. Passman for the better part of an hour yesterday morning. He repeated again what he has told me at least a half-dozen times in recent months of his great respect and admiration for you, and of the fact that he supported you in the election and intends to continue to do so. He showed me a copy of a speech he recently made in Louisiana completely endorsing your Vietnam speech. 4 He went on to say that he was inclined to want to talk to President Nixon before we begin to talk about marking up the appropriation bill. He made his usual critical speeches about spigots pouring out the taxpayer’s money all over the world, etc., and about his role in protecting the American taxpayer against communism, socialism, liberals, dreamers and others who want to destroy our country through bankruptcy, etc., etc., etc. Mr. Passman was one of the sponsors of the Taiwan military assistance amendment last evening. I suspect he was more interested in cutting support for the total bill than in jets for Taiwan. Mr. President, it is my conviction that a call from you to Otto Passman today or tomorrow emphasizing the importance of an adequate AID appropriation will produce the desired result as nothing else will. If Otto wants to talk about specifics, there are only two soft spots in it. The $40 million put in by the Committee to provide part of the cost of a water desalter for Israel. You know the reasons why this one is impractical and unwarranted. There are some little projects for schools and hospitals in Israel inserted by the Committee but in total they are relatively insignificant ($8.5 million) and to oppose them we buy opposition from many of our friends and in my judgment the gain isn’t worth the struggle. If Passman insists on further cuts out of the muscle of the bill there is only one place that the cuts can be made and that is in Development Loans. The Committee has already reduced Development Loans by $300 million, $200 million worldwide, $100 million Latin America. The House yesterday reduced this item an additional $50 million. If we have to take further cuts the need is softer in Latin America than in the rest of the world largely due to the current high prices of copper, tin, and coffee that make it more difficult than in the past to justify large loans to Chile and Colombia. If we are to keep the commitments already made, including the increasing AID costs in Vietnam as the U.S. military presence is reduced and the raised expectations in Latin America, the rock-bottom, no-recede-from figure for non-military aid has to be an increase of at least $200 million over the 1969 figure or a minimum total of $1,585 million and it should be $100 million more than that ($1,685 million). It is agreed that Passman and I will get together alone Monday morning at 8:00 a.m. in his office. I hope to get this pretty well settled before I leave Tuesday morning for the annual High-Level DAC meeting in Paris, followed by six days in Niger, Nigeria, and Ghana. I am sorry it is necessary to call upon you with such urgency. Respectfully, John A. Hannah 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. No classification marking. 2 In a November 21 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten noted that Dwight Chapin confirmed that the President was willing to make the call and recommended that Kissinger send talking points to the President. A handwritten note from Haig to Bergsten, dated November 22, reads: “Fred—(thru Bill Watts) I sent up phone chit Sat. a.m. in HAK’s absence—please inform Hannah that Pres. has dope—” (Both ibid.) No call to Passman is logged in the President’s Daily Diary during this time, but the President did meet with Passman at the White House from 4:21 to 4:45 p.m. on November 24. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 3 On November 19 Bergsten sent a memorandum to Kissinger informing him of Bryce Harlow’s belief that the President should write Speaker McCormack and Gerald Ford. Harlow pointed out the widespread perception in the House that the President did not care about the foreign assistance bill because there had been no Presidential intervention this year, emboldening House members to make cuts if the President did not act. Bergsten’s memorandum noted that cuts jeopardized Vietnamization and the new Latin American policy. (Ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969—Limited Official Use) No copies of the President’s letters have been found. 4 Possibly a reference to the President’s address to the Nation on November 3; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pp. 901-909. 15. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 15. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 2, 1969. SUBJECT AID Proposes Further Presidential Calls on AID Bill AID Administrator Hannah has requested that the President follow up his letters to Speaker McCormack and Gerald Ford, and his talk with Otto Passman, 2 by calling Chairman Mahon of the House Appropriations Committee and Congressman Garner Shriver, the ranking Republican on the Passman Subcommittee, to ask their support in minimizing further cuts in the AID bill (Tab B). 3 Passman’s Subcommittee is scheduled to take up the bill on December 3. Bill Timmons, who sat in on the meeting between the President and Passman, reports that Passman said he planned to cut a further $400 million from the level authorized by the House last week. Passman also said that he would give the President “anything he really wanted”, but the President reportedly did not ask him to minimize the cuts. For obvious morale reasons, I did not convey the latter to AID—which may therefore be operating on some faulty assumptions about the President’s willingness to enter the fray personally. Nevertheless, an additional cut of $400 million would seriously jeopardize three important parts of the AID bill: supporting assistance to finance Vietnamization of the war, our aid level to Latin America and hence our overall Latin policy, and technical assistance. AID hopes to hold Passman’s cuts to about $100 million, including $40 million for an Israeli desalter already opposed by the Administration. AID’s proposed tactic is to end-run Passman by working on the Chairman of the whole Appropriations Committee (Mahon) of which Passman’s Subcommittee is a part, and on the ranking Republican of the Subcommittee (Shriver). Both, however, have already indicated to Hannah their strong sympathy for the Administration’s position; Shriver has specifically said that he would try to hold Passman’s cuts to $140 million. In addition, Acting Secretary Richardson plans to call them to reaffirm our desire to minimize any further cuts. And any doubts about White House support for the bill were dissipated by the President’s letters. I therefore see no need for the President to put his own position on the line any further by calls at this point, particularly since Fulbright is now posing major problems for the bill and Presidential intervention on the Senate side may become more critical. Recommendation: That the President not make any further calls on the AID bill at this time. (If you prefer that he make calls, the memorandum at Tab A recommends that he do so.) 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Confidential. 2 See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 14 . 3 Tab B, a November 26 memorandum from Acting AID Administrator Poats to Bergsten regarding Hannah’s phone conversation with Bergsten on November 24, is not printed. 4 Not printed. Kissinger initialed his approval of the recommendation. At the top of Bergsten’s memorandum, he wrote a note to Haig: “I spoke to Mahon on the phone re the $100 million for VN & he urged me to call Passman. Please get me quick memo from Bergsten (Monday AM) with precise issues.” An attached December 8 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger forwarded talking points for his call to Passman. Kissinger made the call on December 8 and sent a memorandum to Bryce Harlow reporting on that conversation on December 9; see Document 16 . 16. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Assistant (Harlow) 16. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Assistant (Harlow) 1 Washington, December 9, 1969. SUBJECT Foreign Aid Bill I had a discussion with Congressman Passman on the telephone concerning the Foreign Aid Bill on Monday afternoon, December 8 at 5:00 p.m. 2 Passman complained that there had been all kinds of end runs on this subject and he had decided that no one would get around him on it. He did indicate, however, that he wished to support the President nevertheless. I emphasized that the $115 million cut in Passman’s Committee for Vietnam posed a most difficult problem and apologized that I had not had an opportunity to talk to him earlier about it. Passman recalled that they had appropriated $375 million last year only to find that merely $240 million were needed. However, he confirmed that he would restore whatever was necessary in conference and expressed a willingness to go up an additional $75 million for Vietnam in conference. Passman also indicated that he would make an exception this year for President Nixon and move up on Latin America but that it is important that his assistance be very closely held. I am getting the necessary figures on Latin America which I will furnish to Passman tomorrow or the next day. Please hold this information very closely since I assured Passman we would not compromise him on it. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Kissinger and Haig on December 8. 2 See footnote 4, Document 15 . 17. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of the Treasury Walker to President Nixon 17. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of the Treasury Walker to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 10, 1969. SUBJECT IDA Replenishment III World Bank President McNamara is commencing discussions next week on the Third Replenishment of IDA (International Development Association). This first session among the donor developed countries will lay the groundwork for negotiations which McNamara hopes to have completed by mid-summer, well in time for legislation for fiscal year 1972. IDA is the concessionary lending affiliate of the World Bank and has been replenished at three-year intervals. This spring, as one of the first activities on the legislative calendar, you obtained a three-year authorization for the Second Replenishment of IDA at $480 million as the United States’ 40 percent share of a total $1.2 billion replenishment. This covers fiscal years 1969 through 1971 at $160 million per annum. This forthcoming replenishment of IDA is complicated by the fact that the management of the World Bank would like to increase the capital of the World Bank. First, they expect increases in Bank capital corresponding to the upward adjustments of relative quotas within the International Monetary Fund. This is customary. Since, for the first time, we are asking for a quota increase at the Fund, we would be expected to go along on a selective capital increase for the United States in the Bank. In addition—and the complicating factor—President McNamara is raising the question of whether the capital of the World Bank should be further augmented by a general increase. It is not possible to increase the contributions to one member of the World Bank Group without raising the question of a “trade-off”, i.e., does a general capital increase for the Bank decrease the amount of the next replenishment of IDA? Secretary Kennedy has already raised the replenishment and capital increase issues with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies. It is under study there, and recommendations will be made to you as they become timely. Treasury, in addition, has alerted Mr. Peterson of this pending matter; and we discussed the issues when we appeared before the Peterson Task Force. 2 At both the NAC and the Peterson Task Force there seemed to be a general view that the World Bank Group is a very important multilateral aid-giving intermediary and the United States should make every effort to expand the resources made available to this Group and to IDA in particular. At the preliminary meeting of the donor countries next week, it is premature for the United States to indicate more than that we strongly favor a considerable increase in the resources of IDA at the next replenishment and that we will be working with the Bank and the other donor countries to determine how this end might best be achieved. At the same time we can indicate our willingness to take a selective capital increase in the Bank, but withhold judgment on the issue of a general capital increase. The Bank’s need for usable capital requires further study and, also, we must get a better feel for the “trade-off” of the capital increase and the IDA replenishment. Contributions to IDA, negotiated multilaterally to assure burden-sharing arrangements make it necessary to consider carefully the attitude of other donors. Finally, Congressional contacts are being pursued in order that the pertinent Congressional committees can be kept informed as we proceed. The attached tables give some of the numbers involved in the World Bank capital issue and the past history of the fundings of IDA. Charls E. Walker 3 Attachment 4 IBRD CAPITAL INCREASE ($ millions) Present Capital Structure Paid-in Callable Total Total subscriptions 2,304 20,732 23,036 U.S. subscription 635 5,715 6,350 Proposed Selective Increases Paid-in Callable Total Increase in total subscriptions 273 2,459 2,732 Increase in U.S. subscription 31 276 307 25% General Increase Paid-in 1 Callable Total Increase in total subscriptions 1,153 4,614 5,767 Increase in U.S. subscription 317 1,270 1,587 Paid-in Callable Total U.S. Percentage Share (%) Capital Subscription Voting Power At present 27.5 24.6 After proposed selective increases 25.8 23.4 After both selective increases and 25% general increase 26.1 24.1 Attachment 5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF CONVERTIBLE FUNDS TO IDA ($ millions) U.S. Total Total Per Annum U.S. Share From Industrialized Countries Initial Subscriptions (FY 61-65) 743 320 64 43.1% First Replenishment (FY 66-68) 750 312 104 41.6% Second Replenishment (FY 69-71) 1,200 480 160 40.0% Voluntary Contributions 69 — — From Developing Countries Subscriptions 42 — — Total 2,804 1,112 39.7% Note: In addition IDA has received a total of $385 million of net earnings transferred from the IBRD over the period 1964-69. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the President 9-12/69. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Petty on December 9. In a December 9 memorandum to Walker, Petty recommended he sign the memorandum and indicated that Kennedy and Volcker asked that the President be informed of the pending replenishment. (Ibid.) 2 The Task Force on International Development was chaired by Rudolph Peterson; see Documents 119 ff. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Walker signed the original. 4 No classification marking. 1 The Bank management has suggested payments might be made over a five year period. This would mean an annual payment of $63.4 million for the U.S. 5 No classification marking. 18. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs (Weintraub) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) 18. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs (Weintraub) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) 1 Washington, December 15, 1969. SUBJECT Meeting of study group on SDR-Aid link, December 16 We have put together some comments—brief, since you know the issue—on the questions circulated by Brookings 2 for discussion on SDR-Aid link proposals. I also have attached a copy of the paper we did for Ambassador Korry. 3 1. Would the link of SDRs to development finance impair their usefulness as an international reserve? —The extent to which a donor country would incur permanent loss of liquidity would depend on its share of procurement from SDR-generated aid. Countries with recurring inflation and balance of payments deficits might want the right to “opt-out” from a link agreement. —Threat of over-creation of SDRs because of LDC pressure does not seem to us to be very serious, but there is concern among various rich countries about overissue; and this could slow down consideration of establishing a link. —It is clearly the feeling of a good many developed countries and that of the U.S. Treasury as well, that we should go slowly on the link until the SDRs do prove themselves. We do not see why this need be so; but since it is a strongly felt position of many, it does have considerable force. 2. Is it proper for the President to ask Congress for authority to provide U.S. resources to the developing countries without going through the appropriation process? —One might rephrase this question to ask if it is realistic to ask Congress for such authority. Aid based on SDRs would still involve transfers of real resources or net payments outflows and I doubt that Congress would take a more relaxed view of this kind of aid than it does on direct contributions to international development institutions. I doubt that the Fried approach of seeking Congressional authority before negotiating with other countries would be successful. 3. Would a link lead to a net addition to total aid or would it merely substitute for other forms of aid? —Part of the answer to this is the judgment of how much aid would be forthcoming without the link—a diminishing amount we think. If this judgment is accurate, a link might permit more regular aid flows and in the long run might result in considerable additionality in spite of a large element of substitution. —If there were international agreement for an informal link, I think the same consideration that pertains to us would pertain to other developed countries. My own overall guess is that a link would probably result in more total aid from all sources than is likely to be the case without a link. —The experience of the Third IDA Replenishment negotiation will be a telling factor in considering eventual adoption of SDR-aid linkage, and also in reaching some judgment of Congressional support for aid via multilateral institutions. 4. Would other industrial countries agree? —Bill Dale and some people at Treasury feel strongly that rejection of an organic link during SDR negotiations was quite important for the EEC countries and that most, if not all, are still opposed. We will have an opportunity to test European attitudes over the next year or so in such places as UNCTAD, where the question of a link will receive increasing attention. —Burden sharing based on IMF quotas would more closely approximate our present view of aid-giving capacity than rough formulations such as the 40-60 sharing that we now have in IDA. —A link might complicate future decisions on SDR creation and may make it more difficult to get agreement on the amounts we think necessary for liquidity purposes—but we doubt this will be overly serious. —The main attraction of a link is that it would institutionalize a particular method for multilateral aid-giving within the structure of a working system with the rules of procedure and participation already set up by the prospective donor countries. —Getting an agreement to amend IMF articles for an organic link would be far more difficult than negotiating a voluntary link with other IDA Part I countries; but it might be that only a formal link would establish a permanent mechanism for IDA replenishment. This is no moment, however, to seek a formal link even if we later might wish one. —Unilateral implementation of a link is certainly possible, but we doubt that it is the best way to proceed at this point. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 10 IMF. No classification marking. Drafted by Weintraub and Frank Vaznaugh (E/OMA/FOD). 2 Not further identified. 3 Not printed. Entitled “A Link Between SDRs and Aid,” undated. For documentation on SDR activation, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 119 ff. Edward M. Korry, Ambassador to Chile, had been tapped by Under Secretary Richardson for temporary duty in Washington to prepare an in-house assessment of U.S. foreign assistance programs. See Document 124 . 19. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President Nixon 19. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President Nixon 1 Washington, December 24, 1969. SUBJECT FY 1971 Military Assistance Recently you approved a Military Assistance Program authorization request for FY 1971 of $400 million. The two-year (FY 1970-71) authorization bill subsequently passed by Congress, however, contains an authorization of $350 million for each year. The Departments of State and Defense recommend that, despite the current authorization limit, the budget request remain at $400 million. We reaffirm our belief that a level of $400 million is barely enough to maintain the MAP in a viable state until the FY 1972 programs can be formulated to implement the “Nixon Doctrine” 2 on a comprehensive basis. We consider this amount essential to insure our ability to implement such courses of action as may emerge from your decisions on NSC studies currently underway. The FY 1970-71 authorization level of $350 million does not take into account our need to anticipate an upswing in MAP if we are to find a way to accomplish major U.S. defense savings by judicious and timely reductions in our forces overseas. It may raise serious doubts among our more exposed allies as to the aims and real intentions of this Administration’s foreign policy. U.S. reductions must be balanced by modest but effective and believable military assistance programs for those allied forces which are to assume an increased defense role. Service long supply and excess stocks and the Foreign Military Sales Program cannot compensate in the major MAP countries for an excessively low $350 million level. In Greece, Turkey and Korea, force modernization on a major scale is necessary and even a $400 million figure will barely start to meet these needs; because of inadequate MAP levels over the past several years, the forces of these countries have slipped slowly into obsolescence. In some countries, access to bases important to U.S. strategy has been and continues to be placed in jeopardy. Finally, the need continues for grant military assistance to developing countries in order to help them improve, without undue adverse effect on economic growth, forces sufficient to maintain internal stability, and thus providing an environment for orderly economic and social progress. An adequate military assistance program is necessary if we are to reduce our presence, retain our allies, and maintain a foreign policy that is understandable and supported by them. I therefore recommend that you retain the $400 million MAP level for FY 1971 with the knowledge that, as our foreign policy requirements unfold, it probably will be necessary to support an even larger request. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense, Volume V 12/1/69-1/31/70. Secret. 2 See Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. I, Documents 29 and 30 . 20. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Mayo) to President Nixon 20. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Mayo) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 26, 1969. SUBJECT FY 1971 Military Assistance Budget Since we discussed the MAP FY 1971 budget, the Congress has enacted a two-year authorization for military assistance as well as economic assistance. 2 The authorization for grant military assistance contained in the enrolled Foreign Aid Bill is $350 million for both FY 1970 and FY 1971. You have approved $400 million in grant military assistance for FY 1971, $50 million above the congressional authorization, but $50 million below the budget level originally recommended by State and Defense. Your decision on economic aid for FY 1971 was based on accepting, where possible, the second year FY 1971 authorization level . John Hannah and I have now agreed upon an economic aid total of $1,844 million in budget authority which conforms to the authorization level, except for $100 million in additional supporting assistance in Vietnam which is essential to the Vietnamization policy. The rationale for accepting a lower total for economic aid (State/AID and the Budget Bureau had proposed $2.0 billion to you) was to reduce the legislative load on the Foreign Affairs/Relations Committees next year. This would provide time to focus on the report of the Peterson Task Force and your new aid proposals. The Administration should also consider extending this approach to military assistance —reducing the MAP FY 1971 request to $350 million—on the following basis: — Congress, when it completes work on FY 1970 aid appropriations in January, will probably provide only $350 million , the amount authorized for MAP. The Senate opposition to the $54 million earmarked for Taiwan will probably prevail. — Prospects for persuading Congress to increase the FY 1971 MAP authorization by $50 million are poor . The controversy over jets for Taiwan has produced strong feelings in both the House and the Senate, as exemplified by Senator Aiken’s remarks that the foreign aid program has become “a diplomatic pork barrel and a subsidy to American industry.” —A $350 million MAP level for FY 1971 would be very tight, requiring reductions in all the major country programs but credit sales and expected increases in excess stocks would at least partially offset these reductions. Defense and State recommend that the FY 1971 MAP budget request not be reduced below $400 million. 3 They would prefer to try to obtain the increase in authorization on the grounds that $350 million would not meet the critical defense needs of the major recipient countries like Korea, Turkey, and Spain, and fund the remaining programs at levels adequate to serve U.S. foreign policy. John Hannah is concerned about the effect a MAP authorization increase would have on congressional consideration of new foreign aid proposals next year. For reasons of congressional tactics, you may want to consider the option of a 1971 MAP budget of $350 million and seek the views of Bryce Harlow and Henry Kissinger on the question. Robert S. Mayo 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 206, Bureau of the Budget, Volume I. Confidential. Attached to a January 5, 1970, memorandum from John Campbell to Tod Hullin indicating that the President had seen the memorandum during a discussion with Mayo. President Nixon met with Mayo and Ehrlichman at the White House on December 30, and with Mayo, Ehrlichman, and Kissinger in San Clemente on January 3, 1970. Mayo’s memorandum presumably was reviewed by the President at one of these meetings. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) The Washington Post reported on January 4 that, in a brief meeting with the press immediately following the January 3 meeting, the President said all the major decisions for the forthcoming budget had been made. 2 In his signing statement on December 31, the President noted with satisfaction that the legislation authorized the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. He also recognized a widespread feeling that a far-reaching renovation of the foreign assistance program was required and that the 2-year authorization provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 would give ample time to make such recommendations based on the forthcoming report of the Task Force on International Development. For text of his statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon , 1969, pp. 1047-1048. 3 See Document 19 . 21. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 21. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 12, 1970. SUBJECT FY 1970 Military Assistance Program In mid-December 1969, we discussed FY 1971 funding requirements for military assistance (MAP) and you decided that $400 million would be included in the budget request for this purpose. 2 I was quite surprised to learn informally last week that the Bureau of the Budget, with no Department of Defense representative present to discuss implications, succeeded in lowering this figure to $350 million. 3 I do not question the decision which, I am sure, resulted from overriding budgetary pressures as well as the legislative situation. I am, however, concerned that the Bureau’s procedure, if followed in the future, might result in defense decisions that do not take fully into account all pertinent considerations and implications. I wish to reaffirm my belief that a level of $350 million takes the Military Assistance Program too low for you to have the flexibility and options you will need in FY 1971 to take the initial steps in implementing the “Nixon Doctrine.” I am convinced that steps in this direction must be taken before we formulate our FY 1972 programs on the basis of new strategy. A marked increase in MAP must be assumed if we are to proceed with major U.S. defense savings by selected reductions in our overseas forces. If our strategy is to remain credible, U.S. force reductions must be counterbalanced by effective military assistance programs for certain allied forces which would assume an increased defense role. It seems clear to me that we must start laying the groundwork now for an FY 1971 supplemental MAP authorization and appropriation. We are also examining the possible need for a supplemental request in FY 1970 but we do not yet have a fully fleshed-out rationale and supporting detail upon which it might be justified. A supplemental for FY 1971 would, on the other hand, embody those NSC decisions that would have been made, would provide a more thorough and orderly evaluation of important requirements, could include such recommendations from the “Peterson Committee” as may be necessary, and hopefully would be more acceptable to the Congress. To set the stage with Congress, the public, and other elements of the Executive Branch, I recommend that you include in your forthcoming budget message a brief statement of your intent to seek a supplemental MAP appropriation for FY 1971 together with the reasons why this will be necessary. A suggested statement is attached. 4 The Department of State concurs in my views as indicated above. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense, Volume V 12/1/69-1/31/70. Secret. 2 The mid-December discussion and the President’s decision have not been further identified. 3 See Document 20 . 4 Not printed. Also attached is a January 22 note from William Watts to Kissinger indicating that alternative language was forwarded to cover Laird’s request and that a fuller, explanatory memorandum would be coming (not found). The President’s remarks in his message to Congress fell short of sending a clear signal that he would request a supplemental. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 60-61. 22. Editorial Note 22. Editorial Note Among the recommendations in the Rockefeller Report on Latin America, November 10, 1969, was a proposal on debt repayment. Regarding the Nixon administration’s initial reactions to this proposal, which recommended the use of local currency payments in lieu of dollars, see Document 12 . A few months later Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy reported to President Nixon that he and George Woods had met several times and agreed on some general considerations, the first of which (as summarized by Kennedy) was: “We are dealing with the most sensitive subject in the financial field I can imagine.” They also opposed the term “debt rescheduling,” which “connotes a credit and balance of payments crisis and a bail-out,” and instead suggested using the term “amortization assistance,” which would “associate the scheme with development assistance.” Kennedy continued that because of the large number of creditors and different kinds of indebtedness, he and Woods believed the amortization assistance would have to be done multilaterally and on an individual per country basis. Moreover, if an amortization scheme resulted in cutbacks by the donor countries, other capital sources, and U.S. bilateral assistance, “an increased net inflow of capital to Latin American countries, which is the basic purpose behind the scheme, will not be achieved.” Kennedy and Woods also recommended some next steps, most immediately to obtain Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) agreement to have the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) and the World Bank jointly study the problem. Kennedy further noted that the use of local currency payments “has many attractions and I do not consider this an especially troublesome area. The application of the technique will have wide variation from country to country.” (Memorandum from Kennedy to President Nixon, January 17, 1970; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury Volume I) The Department of State generally agreed with Kennedy’s memorandum but added a few comments and suggested more specific initiatives to take to the IA-ECOSOC meeting. (Memorandum from Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Department of State Executive Secretary, to Kissinger, January 23; ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 41) In National Security Decision Memorandum 41, February 18, President Nixon directed the creation of an interagency Special Task Force, chaired by Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Paul Volcker, to study the debt service problem in Latin America and other developing nations, initiate an action program involving close cooperation with CIAP, the IDB, and other creditor nations and international agencies, and implement the action program “on a priority basis, including recommending to me such legislation as may be required.” The President also noted that he had authorized the U.S. delegation to the IA-ECOSOC to announce that he was prepared to appoint a special representative to work closely with CIAP and the IDB on the issue. He requested the first status report by March 15. (Ibid.) In his first monthly status report, Paul Volcker stated, among other things, that the working premises of the Task Force were that the approach had to be multilateral, could not be limited to Latin America, and had to be implemented on a case-by-case basis. (Memorandum to President Nixon, March l3; Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, IPS 7-1 FY 70 Feb-June 1970) 23. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon 23. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 4, 1970. SUBJECT IDA Replenishment III In our memorandum of December 10, 2 we alerted you to the commencement of discussions on the Third Replenishment of IDA (International Development Association) resources. In addition, we pointed out that an increase of the capital resources of the World Bank was also under consideration. This second matter is now dormant. The Part I IDA donor countries will continue negotiations in London on March 9 and the United States needs to have a view at that time on a specific amount if the meeting is to progress well. The outlook is that Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Canada, joined probably by other small countries such as Denmark and Norway, are prepared to suggest and endorse a figure involving an annual replenishment of $1 billion for each of three years (U.S. share about $400 million), up from the present $400 million annual level (U.S. share $160 million). We do not anticipate any clear statement of position from four major countries: Germany, France, Italy and Japan who are probably thinking of a lower amount and may so influence the final outcome. The management of the World Bank is pushing quietly but strongly for a $1 billion replenishment and they urge that our delegation be prepared to endorse that number. The Pearson Commission Report 3 recommends that contributions to IDA should reach the order of $1 billion annually in 1972 and $1.5 billion by 1975. I discussed the matter with Rudy Peterson in November and again with his full Commission in December. I indicated to them that I believe we should go for a substantial IDA increase and that the United States may have to declare itself on an amount prior to the completion of the Commission’s Report. I was encouraged by them to press ahead and get as large a replenishment as possible and that we should not be concerned about making our position known before the Peterson Report is completed. We have recently coordinated our thinking with the Peterson Commission via its staff and have been assured that a $1 billion replenishment is in full accord with the position they will be recommending. 4 In your recent foreign policy statement you indicated your readiness “to respond positively” to proposals for the replenishment of IDA. 5 This has been coordinated through the National Advisory Council, expanded to include representation of AID, Bureau of the Budget and the National Security Council staff. We recommend to you that the U.S. delegation be authorized to indicate that the U.S. Governor would recommend to the President that the United States support a $1 billion IDA replenishment . Expressed this way in private, you would still be left the opportunity to support the figure publicly in your mid-April Economic Assistance message. From a negotiating point of view, that may also prove to be a desirable sequence. There are several reasons for taking this step now: 1. It furthers your objective of increasing the role of multilateral development institutions in the provision of aid. 2. With the United States declaring itself at the London meeting, we can improve considerably the World Bank’s chances of achieving the IDA replenishment goal. On the other hand, failure to move now would increase the possibility that the ultimate consensus would develop nearer the lowest rather than the highest common denominator. 3. In IDA we get very favorable burden sharing, with other donors putting up $3 of soft term aid for every $2 we do. We do not believe that budgetary considerations should keep us from supporting an over-all replenishment of $1 billion in view of our priority for multilateral economic assistance and our preference for IDA as an aid-giving institution. The three $400 million per year U.S. contributions would be paid by letters of credit, and budget outlays would occur only as cash drawings were made. These would be spread out over a period of up to 8-10 years. Congressionally , the amount will not be easy. We are talking FY 1972, 1973 and 1974. You obtained ratification of IDA Replenishment II early in the last legislative year (covering appropriations in FY 69-71). We will have to work hard to do as well for FY 1972, but I believe we can. The inherent Congressional strength of IDA is that 18 countries join together to contribute resources to the lesser developed world and the multiplier effect we receive on our funds is a compelling argument on the Hill. Alternative Amounts A replenishment of $800 million (double the present size) would only reduce the United States annual appropriation from $400 million to $320 million. On an expenditure basis, in view of the lengthy disbursal period, the savings to our annual expenditure budget would only be in the neighborhood of $25 million average. Moreover, it is not clear that dropping the replenishment from $1 billion to $800 million would give us additional support on the Hill: those who oppose foreign aid would be just as strong against the lower figure as the higher. Another alternative is to step up the annual amount from $800 million the first year to $900 million the second and $1 billion the third. An advantage of this proposal is that it would show an upward thrust, but it might be more difficult to negotiate with some other donor countries. Also it might be more difficult for us legislatively because it would break the established precedent for IDA of three-year authorizations with equal annual payments and create an implication of progressively higher contributions in subsequent years. Besides, the over-all amount by this method is 10 percent less than the total we recommend. It might nevertheless be considered as a fall back position if one should become necessary. Should the United States recommend a replenishment of $1.2 billion per annum ? While the lesser developed countries would be able to use resources at this volume, we do not consider this figure to be negotiable within the established burden-sharing formula of the donor countries. Recommending it would raise U.S. visibility at the negotiations which we do not believe to be consistent with your approach to international negotiations or with your concept of partnership. If the United States were to raise its share of IDA contributions above 40 percent to achieve a larger replenishment, it would, I believe, grievously impair chances of legislative ratification and also seriously compromise the burden-sharing and partnership approach we are seeking. In our earlier memorandum, we indicated that the World Bank was considering a capital increase of about 25 percent. The Bank has decided to withdraw this idea—because it seriously complicates the IDA replenishment negotiations and would probably require a lower level of replenishment. While this issue may resurrect itself at a later time, it is no longer part of our considerations in the present exercise. You have already approved a small selective capital increase in the World Bank as a normal counterpart to the IMF quota increase, but this selective increase has no implications for the IDA replenishment. Balance of payments safeguards We do not recommend that the United States require the same balance of payments safeguards for the Third Replenishment which we have at present. These permit immediate disbursement only against U.S. procurement, with the balance of our contribution disbursed on a “last-in basis”. To be sure these safeguards were very helpful—if not critical—in obtaining Congressional support. However, they did complicate the last negotiations, and they do represent a privilege available to the United States which other donors do not have. I fear this negotiating complication outweighs the balance of payments and Congressional advantages. At the same time we must be aware of the substantial balance of payments cost. We contribute 40 cents of each IDA dollar and currently receive in U.S. procurement about 14 cents on the dollar (over the whole period of IDA operations this figure is 19 cents on the dollar). This means the total balance of payments cost to the U.S. of the Third Replenishment of IDA will be between $630-780 million during the calendar 1972-1980 period. I think we must recognize that with the U.S. providing 40 or 50 percent of the world’s official aid, and our share of the goods imported by the LDCs around 15-25 percent in general, the difference between our share of total official aid and our share of LDC imports is a good rule of thumb guide to the balance of payments cost. It may not be necessary to take a definitive position on balance of payments safeguards at this round of talks, but I believe they will have to be dropped in the interest of multilateral cooperation; and this should be recognized and accepted as a cost of aid-giving through IDA. In conclusion , I recommend, with the concurrence of State, AID, Commerce, Eximbank, BOB and NSC Staff, your approval for the U.S. delegation (headed by Treasury Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Petty) to support a $1 billion annual IDA replenishment (U.S. share about $400 million) at the March 9 London meeting. 6 David M. Kennedy 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, IDA. Confidential. Attached to a March 4 memorandum from Kennedy to the President that deals with the level of funding if the President preferred something other than a $1 billion U.S. contribution over 3 years. 2 Document 17 . 3 The Pearson Commission on International Development was established by World Bank President Robert McNamara to stimulate public and governmental interest in foreign aid. Its Chairman, former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson, and its U.S. member, former Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, called on Secretary Rogers on July 17, 1969. In his July 16 briefing memorandum to the Secretary for that meeting, Assistant Secretary Trezise noted that the Commission’s final report might contain a strong recommendation for a larger IDA III. In the attached talking points for the Secretary, the Pearson Commission was viewed as a key element in the U.S. aid strategy that could set the stage for the renewal and recasting of the U.S. aid effort, which would have to be done by the spring of 1970 if a significant U.S. program were to continue. Secretary Rogers was to say that targets were useful only if they could be met but that a “strong push for IDA will be very helpful as we go into the start of negotiations for a further IDA replenishment.” (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, IDA) 4 The Task Force report was released on March 5; see Document 128 . 5 U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s—A New Strategy for Peace: A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 18, 1970 , p. 102. The report is also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 116-190. 6 In a March 17 memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury, Kissinger informed him that the President had approved this recommendation. Kissinger also informed the Secretary that the President had agreed not to seek balance-of-payments safeguards for the replenishment. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 839, NSC/Misc) 24. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of the Treasury Volcker to President Nixon 24. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of the Treasury Volcker to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 19, 1970. SUBJECT Third Replenishment of the International Development Association The meeting of donor countries last week ended as anticipated with the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Finland joining us in support of an annual replenishment of $1 billion for each of three years (United States share about $400 million) and France, Germany, Japan, Belgium and Australia talking about a lower amount. If agreement is to be reached on a $1 billion per annum replenishment, or something reasonably approaching it, it will be crucial that Germany and France raise their sights. To achieve this, it will be essential that top political support for a high figure be generated in each of these countries. They both are experiencing severe budgetary pressures, and have long-range budgetary plans which probably would not allow them to take their appropriate share in a $1 billion per annum replenishment (present level is $400 million) without cutting back bilateral programs or raising internal ceilings at the expense of domestic programs. World Bank President McNamara put in a strong pitch for a $1 billion replenishment when he saw President Pompidou on March 16. We understand that he feels there is “give” in their position. France has been talking $500 million and probably had in mind going to $600 million if pressed. It is clear that it is necessary to get beyond the Finance Ministry if French support for a higher figure is to be obtained. Chancellor Brandt is the next key as it is clear Germany will have to raise her sights if there is to be real hope for the French to come along. Indications are that the Germans are thinking of something around $600 million (although internally their aid ministry has suggested $800 million). The size of the replenishment came up at an EEC Finance Ministers’ meeting a couple of weeks ago, at which it appeared that $500 million was the highest figure all could support. At the Deputies’ meeting in London last week, 2 however, the Dutch supported $1 billion and the Italians indicated privately that they probably would have also, had it not been for the lower amounts favored by the Germans and French at the EEC Finance Ministers’ meeting. Treasury Assistant Secretary Petty, who is the Deputy in these negotiations, believes that perhaps the only (and certainly the best) chance of achieving the $1 billion objective would be for you to stress the importance we see in a replenishment of this magnitude to Chancellor Brandt during your meeting with him in early April. 3 Secretary Kennedy believes this judgment is correct. Secretary Kennedy will also have an opportunity to discuss this directly with the Japanese in early April 4 and with the French Finance Minister, Giscard d’Estaing, in early May. 5 Paul A. Volcker 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume I. Confidential. Another copy of this memorandum is attached to a March 17 memorandum from Petty to Secretary Kennedy recommending it to be sent to the President to alert him to the need to generate high-level political support in France and Germany for a large IDA replenishment. Petty specifically wanted the President to take it up with Chancellor Brandt in early April. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the President—Jan-April 1970) 2 Not further identified. 3 The President met with Chancellor Brandt in Washington on April 10. In an April 10 memorandum to Kissinger on IDA replenishment, Bergsten reported that in talks with the World Bank, German Finance Minister Moeller was thinking of a lesser IDA replenishment than the United States wanted. He noted that the IDA replenishment was the first element in the administration’s new approach to focus on the multilateralization of economic assistance, so it was especially important for the President to get Brandt’s agreement. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 683, Germany, Volume V 4/10/40-7/31/70) In an April 14 follow-up memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten asked if the President had raised the IDA replenishment with Brandt; on April 20 Kissinger replied: “not that I know.” (Both ibid.) 4 Secretary Kennedy attended the Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Seoul, and called on Prime Minister Sato in Tokyo. No record of a discussion of IDA replenishment was found. 5 Secretary Kennedy and Finance Minister Giscard d’Estaing met at Camp David May 3-5, and IDA replenishment was one of the topics they discussed. See Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 146 . 25. Editorial Note 25. Editorial Note In early 1970 the Nixon administration began to focus intensively on the question of replenishment of the resources of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In a March 13, 1970, memorandum to President Nixon, Secretary Kennedy outlined the points on IDB replenishment he would be discussing with the Latin Americans but did not yet require Presidential decision. In his memorandum he referred to the President’s message to the IA-ECOSOC meeting in Caracas (read by Assistant Secretary Meyer on February 4), which indicated that a substantial amount of the $540 million FY 1971 expanded multilateral assistance account would be available for IDB replenishment. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, President—January-April 1970) For text of the President’s message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , page 80. The Department of State provided its suggestions on IDB replenishment in a March 19 memorandum from Under Secretary Samuels to Secretary Kennedy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (IDB) 9) In a follow-up memorandum to the President on April 3, Kennedy presented issues on IDB replenishment for comment and approval before his departure on April 17 for the IDB Governors’ meeting in Uruguay (April 20-24). Among other things, he proposed a U.S. contribution of $1.725 billion (broken down in various forms). (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memos to the President—January-April 1970) In an April 13 memorandum to Kissinger, Vaky and Bergsten recommended that the President approve Kennedy’s proposal. On this memorandum Haig wrote that Kissinger might want to clear for the President, and Kissinger wrote, “I signed off.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM-54) In National Security Decision Memorandum 54, April 16, Kissinger noted that the President had approved Kennedy’s proposal for the U.S. financial contribution (including the component figures) over 3 years to the replenishment of the IDB resources and authorized Kennedy to support this position, subject to legislative authority, at the meeting of the IDB Governors. President Nixon also approved positions on three policy issues (the one on performance conditions required no decision): use of soft-loan resources, broadening of IDB membership, and level of Latin American countries’ contributions to the Fund for Special Operations (FSO). (Ibid.) Kennedy reported that, at the IDB Governors’ meeting, most of the Latin Americans refused to accept the U.S. position of an increase in their contribution to the FSO from $300 million to $450 million when the United States wanted to keep its own contribution at $300 million. Believing the impasse on the question would likely prevent agreement on IDB replenishment, Kennedy requested the President’s approval to increase the U.S. contribution to $1 billion in return for a Latin American increase to $500 million. (Telegram 711 from Montevideo, April 22; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, IADB) In an April 22 memorandum to Kissinger, Vaky argued that the revised U.S. position would still achieve the same 2:1 ratio the delegation was seeking, and the marginal U.S. increase “would not adversely affect the prospects for Congressional approval if we can achieve a substantial increase in the Latin contribution to $500 million.” On the basis of an earlier conversation with Kissinger after which Kissinger had concurred in the U.S. increase, Vaky cabled Kennedy, in White House telegram 535 to Montevideo, April 22, the authority to negotiate the increase while reserving the option of deferring partial payment until the fourth year. (Both ibid.) In telegram 742 from Montevideo, April 24, Kennedy reported that the IDB Governors had agreed to the U.S. terms on the replenishment of the IDB’s ordinary capital and had also acceded to the FSO contribution on the revised $1 billion/$500 million basis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (IDB) 9) On April 25 Kissinger signed a memorandum to President Nixon indicating that he had approved the U.S. negotiating position at the IDB meeting and that Kennedy would report to the President more fully on the highly satisfactory outcome of the meeting upon his return to Washington. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, IADB) 26. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 26. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 16, 1970. SUBJECT United States Position in the United Nations on Aid Targets Recommendation: That you approve a United States statement in the United Nations, along the lines below, reaffirming the international aid target of 1% of GNP. 2 Discussion: In my memorandum to you of April 17, 1970, 3 I recommended that the United States reaffirm the 1% of GNP target for public plus private resource flows to LDCs which we have consistently supported since 1965. The course of United Nations work on a Second Development Decade Declaration, 4 in which the aid target question has become a major issue, makes it desirable that you act on this now since silence is not an available option. Given the symbolic importance of the target for LDCs, its acceptance by all other non-communist aid donors and its usefulness to them in dealing with their parliaments, and long-standing United States support for it, a reversal of our position now, however put, would be taken as a retreat from our concern with development. Failure to reaffirm the existing target could thus poison the atmosphere this fall at the 25th Anniversary General Assembly where the focus will be on development. This would be particularly unfortunate if you should decide to appear there personally. At the same time we must be forthright about the prospects of our meeting the 1% objective. (Our aid and investment flows to LDCs last year were only 0.5% of GNP, placing us sixteenth among the sixteen members of the Development Assistance Committee.) To meet these competing requirements I propose a statement in the United Nations as follows. 5 The United States faces staggering domestic needs which have given rise to a national debate, still unresolved, on how to apply limited public and private resources to seemingly limitless requirements. The combination of these internal requirements and of the enormous burdens carried by us externally, plus the frustrations, as well as the successes, of nation-building in the developing world have brought a profound reexamination of aid policy in the United States and the best means for conducting it in the future. We are thus unable now to say when the United States may meet the 1% aid objective, or even whether our efforts towards this objective will be successful. At the same time it is important to bear in mind that while the flow of official resources requires Congressional action in our country, the flow of private resources is expandable without such action and is, of course, likely to be responsive to mutually beneficial investment policies in the developing countries. We are prepared to make our best efforts to increase both official and private flows and we hope we can be successful in moving closer to the aid objective. It is in this spirit that we are willing to join in international reaffirmation of the aid target. Such a position will be short of that other donors are ready to take. Most others, including France, 6 Germany, and Japan, are willing to accept a specific deadline (1972 for some, 1975 for others) for their meeting the 1% target. Germany and several others will also accept a sub-target of 0.7% of GNP for public aid. I think we must make it clear in the United Nations at a stage earlier than the coming General Assembly, which you may address, that we cannot go beyond reaffirmation of the existing target, but that we will not back away from it either. The best opportunity would be the meeting of the Economic and Social Council in July. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. No classification marking. 2 There is no indication of the President’s approval or disapproval of the recommendation. 3 Document 133 . 4 In telegram 1028 from USUN, May 25, regarding the Second Development Decade, Ambassador Yost stressed “the crucial importance of a clear reaffirmation of the one per cent aid target” and noted that the timing of meeting that target was of less importance than the commitment to meeting the target in principle. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70) In a May 28 memorandum, Bergsten brought Yost’s telegram to Kissinger’s attention, reminded him the President had already rejected committing to setting unattainable targets, and noted the Peterson report only recommended a commitment to a reversal in the downward trend of U.S. assistance. He concluded that there was no need to bring Yost’s telegram to the President’s attention. (Ibid.) Yost also discussed the one percent target in an April 3 letter to Richardson. (Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, OCM (Peterson Task Force) FY 70 April 1970) 5 On October 13 Jeanne Davis at the NSC Secretariat sent a memorandum to Executive Secretary of the Department of State Eliot informing him the President had approved Rogers’ proposed statement. Davis repeated Rogers’ text in her October 13 memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 839, NSC/Misc.) 6 Telegram 8079 from USOECD, June 19 (repeated to USUN), reported that at the July 2-3 DAC meeting France would propose a target for official assistance of 0.6 to 0.7 percent of GNP by 1973, and reaffirmation of the one percent target for total flows. The OECD Mission speculated that the French objective was to sidetrack attention in the DAC from U.S. initiatives on untying and indebtedness, which France opposed, and attempt to focus the DAC on the volume target instead. (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, AID 1) 27. Editorial Note 27. Editorial Note In the first half of 1970, the Nixon administration continued to consider the sale of jet aircraft to Latin American countries. Regarding the administration’s deliberations on this issue in 1969, see Document 12 . In response to a request by Argentina in September 1969 to purchase 32 subsonic, reconditioned A-4B Skyhawks, the Nixon administration agreed to sell 16 such planes. It was believed that the Argentine Government had the financial resources to purchase these planes for about $5 million, but if credit became an important issue, the administration would agree to finance the sale under the Military Assistance Program. The administration also authorized the sale of F-5 and A-4 aircraft to Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, if and when the governments requested them, and, as necessary, the provision of credit up to the legislative limit of $75 million for grants and sales of military equipment to individual Latin American countries. (Memorandum from Richardson to Nixon, February 2, 1970; NSDM 42, February 19; and memorandum from Richardson to Kissinger, February 20; all in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 837, NSC/USC Memo) In NSDM 46, March 5, President Nixon also agreed to waive the aid penalty provision in Section 119 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act if Chile, Colombia, or Brazil decided to purchase A-4 or F-5 aircraft. NSDM 46 further asked the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to consult with Congress on the additional step of waiving the credit restrictions in the Foreign Military Sales Act, “to plan for and undertake a major effort to amend both Conte provisions appropriately so as to provide a permanent solution to the problems continually being raised by the restrictions,” and “to keep the President informed of what is being done.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 363, NSDMs 1-50) The Committee reported nearly 4 months later that the consulted Senators and Congressmen generally approved the Argentine sale and agreed on sales with waivers to Colombia and Chile, but expressed “considerable concern” regarding possible sales to Brazil, which seemed interested in buying more modern, Mach-2 generation aircraft. Furthermore, “those who disapproved of a waiver for credit equally opposed the aid deduction waiver,” and conversely “those who favored or did not object to one waiver took the same attitude toward both.” (Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Chairman, to President Nixon, June 29; ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 43) Peter Vaky of the NSC Staff had earlier argued that the sale of modern planes such as F-4s to any single Latin American country would cause serious problems with Congress, which had objected to such modern weapons sales to Latin America on the grounds the sales would stimulate an arms race and would be destabilizing. (Memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger, March 18; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 338, HAK/ELR Meetings 1/70-3/70) 28. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 28. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 3, 1970. SUBJECT Foreign Military Sales Act I had a meeting Wednesday with DOD, including DOD and State Congressional people, on the foregoing subject. Unfortunately Mr. Timmons was not able to attend, but Mr. Abshire has now talked to Bryce Harlow. From this, as I see it, the following issues emerge with respect to the Administration’s attitude as the bill goes to conference. Naturally this is a subject in which I am sure the President will want to make his own decisions, and I offer the following for any possible help in this regard. Chairman Morgan of the House Committee is very cooperative and is waiting to hear our views. The major issue is whether it would be possible to achieve the complete deletion of both Cooper-Church and sections 9 and 10 of the Act. This would obviously be the ideal. The question is whether the Senate has painted itself into such a corner that insistence on this by the House will result in such an impasse that no FMS legislation is passed this year. The consequences of no legislation would be inability to fulfill our commitment to finance $100 million in both 1970 and 1971 for Iran and $44 million in 1970 and $75 million in 1971 for Israel; and to carry out planned programs of $20 million in 1970 for Greece, $15 million in both 1970 and 1971 for Jordan, $35 million for Taiwan in 1971, $15 million for Korea in 1971, and $48 million for four Latin American countries in 1970. These countries are by law unable to obtain credits from the Exim Bank. If the House should compromise by exchanging deletion of Cooper-Church for retention of sections 9 and 10 as they now stand, the practical effect would be virtually to nullify all of our major MAP programs. This is because our major programs are based upon the use of both MAP appropriations and excess stocks, and the necessity under section 9 of charging excess stocks against MAP appropriations virtually wipes out one or the other. In addition, the requirement under section 10 for recipient countries to deposit counterpart funds against both MAP and excess equipment that they receive is clearly unmanageable in the budgets of such major recipients as Korea and Turkey. In this connection it is the judgment of State and Defense that we could accept section 9 if amended to raise the present limitation of $35 million to $150 million and reduce the valuation basis from 50% to 30%. With respect to section 10, the entire concept is unsound, and the section should be deleted. However, if this is entirely out of the question, obviously the lower the percentage of counterpart, the less harmful it is. The present 50% figure is entirely unrealistic and if it is not possible to obtain deletion of this section, we should seek to obtain a nominal figure, such as 5%. Putting aside the domestic and international political factors of Cooper-Church, from an administrative point of view DOD and State feel that we could live with it if paragraph 4 were amended by the insertion of “United States” before “combat” so as not to prohibit our support of Vietnamese and Thai Air Forces in Cambodia. Legislative history indicates that such an amendment should not present serious difficulty. With respect to other objectionable concepts of the bill we would hope to be successful in deleting the section cutting off economic aid to Korea unless the President certified that they are “not fishing for salmon east of 175° west.” We would also hope to deal with the “gas amendment” by having the conference report interpret “the United States” as used therein as applying only to the 50 states; thus, protecting our plans to move gas from Okinawa to Johnston Island. UAJ 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70. Secret. Copies were sent to Laird and Harlow. Attached is the typescript of a July 3 memorandum from Kennedy, Lehman, and Saunders to Haig and Kissinger alerting them to the dangers the Cooper-Church amendment posed for the Foreign Military Sales bill, and the difficulty the President would have in meeting commitments to Iran, Israel, and others if the bill died. They noted that the FMS program went hand in hand with the Nixon Doctrine and was designed to help allies defend themselves by providing credits as well as equipment to ease the financial strain of modern defense establishments. The Cooper-Church Amendment, which went through a number of iterations, aimed at restricting U.S. involvement in Cambodia. Several memoranda from May 1970 regarding its politics and potential impact are ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 318, Cooper-Church Amendment. 29. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 29. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 7, 1970. SUBJECT Problems Facing Military Assistance Program for FY 1971 Issue A number of extremely serious issues confront our military assistance program for FY 1971, not to mention the longer run: 2 —Cambodia will probably require at least $50 million, and perhaps much more, which was of course not anticipated when the present $350 million level was authorized last January. (You will recall that MAP for Vietnam, Laos and Thailand is now in the DOD budget.) —As much as $150 million more than now programmed may be desirable to implement the President’s Korea decisions to persuade Park to undertake the necessary force modernizations. —The President’s Indonesia decision will require an extra $10 million, and the Indonesians want more. —“Recoupments” (unused authority from previous years) now look about $15 million less than earlier estimated. —Our transfers of excess U.S. military stocks, which have provided a vital supplement (not requiring appropriations) to MAP in the past, could be severely limited by Congressional action. The acquisition cost of the stocks transferred in FY 1970 was $500 million, and some estimates suggest that the amount could go up to $1 billion this year. A Senate amendment to the foreign military sales bill, however, would limit transfers to $70 million in FY 1971. The countries most hurt by the restrictions would be the GRC, Korea, Turkey and Greece. —Failure to get a foreign military sales bill could further increase the pressure on MAP, since credit sales (the proposed level is $350 million) 3 are an alternative to MAP in some countries. This would be especially true in the Eastern Mediterranean, since about two-thirds of the sales bill is for that area; Presidential commitments to Israel and Iran are involved. Options I have made no attempt to develop detailed options in this quick summary. The Under Secretaries Committee is supposedly doing so right now, and should have them available in a few weeks. 4 However, the options in broad terms seem to be as follows (they could of course be adopted in combination): —Request a supplemental MAP authorization, for all or part, (e.g., Korea only, Cambodia only) of the $200-$250 million shortfall now anticipated. The obvious problem is Congress. —Cut our MAP programs in the other countries to make room for at least part of the new needs. Funding Cambodia and Indonesia alone would require further sharp cutbacks for Turkey, Greece and the GRC and smaller cuts for Latin America and the Philippines (see attached table). All of these cutbacks would of course cause problems, especially in the eastern Mediterranean when the Soviet presence is increasing dramatically. This option could not provide much if any additional MAP for Korea without severe cutbacks in some countries and/or complete elimination of MAP in many. —Defer some of the “new” programs, particularly Korea. —Make a major effort to avoid Congressional restrictions on excess stocks, and utilize them as much as possible to relieve the strains on MAP. This can apparently be done on a substantial basis, though by no means as a dollar for dollar substitute. It appears to be a particularly strong possibility in Korea and Cambodia. —In addition to any of the other options, make a major effort to get authority for military credit sales at the proposed $350 million level. If Cooper-Church derails the present bill permanently, we might have to submit separate country bills; this could help with some countries (Israel, Iran) but would meet strong opposition for others (Greece, Turkey). Procedures Within a day or two, State will submit a proposal for about $40 million for new Cambodian MAP, with cutbacks in other programs to make room. 5 There is apparently great urgency because the $8.9 million already authorized is running out. Budget will present, as an alternative, a much smaller amount to get us through a few months and enable us to put the total Cambodian requirement in the overall context outlined in this memorandum. Within a few weeks, the Under Secretaries Committee will present recommendations on the entire FY 1971 program. It will include options on MAP levels for Korea and Cambodia, with options for providing these levels either via a supplemental or cutbacks for the other countries. Attachment PRESENT MAP LEVELS FOR FY 1971 AND POSSIBLE CHANGES TO PROVIDE $40 MILLION FOR CAMBODIA (AND $10 MILLION MORE FOR INDONESIA) * (Millions of Dollars) Approved Possible Changes East Asia and Pacific $ 183.2 $ 215.0 Cambodia — 40.0 China 20.0 6.4 Indonesia 5.0 15.0 Korea 140.8 140.0 Philippines 17.0 13.2 Near East and South Asia 124.0 89.4 Greece 20.0 10.4 Iran 2.4 2.4 Saudi Arabia .7 .7 Turkey 100.0 75.0 Europe 26.1 26.1 Spain 25.0 25.0 Africa 18.6 15.4 Ethiopia 12.0 10.0 Tunisia 3.3 3.3 Latin America 16.2 7.7 Non-Regional 23.9 23.9 Total Program 392.0 377.0 Less: Recoupments -31.0 -16.0 Reimbursement -6.0 -6.0 Reappropriation -5.0 -5.0 New Budgetary Authority 350.0 350.0 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. Secret. Cleared by Lynn, Holdridge, Kennedy, Saunders, and Vaky. Attached to a July 7 note from Bergsten to Haig identifying it as a memorandum Haig had requested for Kissinger summarizing the problems faced by the Military Assistance Program. Bergsten noted that Kennedy thought Kissinger would want to read it before the July 8 WSAG meeting on Cambodia (postponed to July 17) since “Cambodia MAP will be discussed at that time and the memo flags the real problems involved with any new burden on the program.” 2 In late 1969 Congress had authorized a $350 million program for both FY 1970 and 1971; see Document 20 . 3 The $350 million FMS legislation that was currently before Congress was separate from the $350 million MAP authorization at the end of the first session; see footnote 2 above. 4 At the top of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote, “I want to be present at the Undersecretaries Meeting.” 5 Not found. * Items do not add to totals because small country programs are omitted. 30. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 30. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, August 4, 1970. SUBJECT State Department Position on Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales I understand that Secretary Laird, in a recent memorandum to you commenting on the Peterson Task Force Report, 2 takes issue with the proposal that all security assistance be funded in a single International Security Cooperation Act. Secretary Laird recommends that the Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales portions of security assistance be funded within the Defense Department. He also proposes that exploratory consultations be initiated with Congressional leaders to determine their receptivity to this approach. I have reservations concerning Secretary Laird’s funding recommendation and urge that no Congressional consultations be launched at this time. The intent of the Peterson Task Force recommendations was to create an integrated approach to security assistance. To this end the Task Force felt it desirable that all security assistance be funded in a single International Security Cooperation Act, that such security assistance be tied firmly to our foreign policy objectives and priorities, and that, in line with the Secretary of State’s responsibility for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of the US Government’s activities overseas, the responsibility for setting our security assistance policies and directing and coordinating these programs be assigned to the Department of State. As you know, I believe that these recommendations are right. In a period of change, when we shall want to look closely at the allocation of our national resources and in any event must expect continued Congressional scrutiny of all foreign aid programs, it becomes a matter of considerable importance to be able to develop a coherent rationale for these programs. We must make an effort to integrate all aspects of security assistance into a comprehensive plan for each recipient country. 3 This is the one way, I believe, we shall be able to make a strong case for Congressional support and to insure coordination between foreign policy and its implementation. To fund the Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs in the Defense budget would run counter to such an effort and undoubtedly make the foreign policy direction and coordination of these programs quite difficult. The principal reason advanced by Secretary Laird in support of the proposal to separate MAP and FMS from other security assistance is that by so doing it would be possible to gain Congressional support for eliminating the plethora of legislative restrictions attached to MAP and FMS. 4 I agree with Secretary Laird that it would be highly desirable to eliminate these restrictions, but I wonder if the proposed separation might not have the opposite effect. Indeed, it seems clear that the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees are likely to resist the funding transfer proposal. 5 These two Committees have in the past amply indicated their strong determination to maintain jurisdiction over Foreign Aid programs. If overridden, they should be expected to provide formidable opposition to these programs, and perhaps attach even more restrictive legislation. For the preceding reasons I continue to believe that the recommendation which I made last April supporting the Peterson Task Force proposal for combining MAP, FMS, Public Safety and supporting assistance in one budget program remains our soundest course of action. 6 William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. Confidential. According to an August 3 memorandum from Spiers to the Secretary, the memorandum was prepared at the Secretary’s request. The original memorandum with Secretary Rogers’ signature is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70, attached to an August 5 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger that reads: “Since your memorandum on the issue is already with the President, and since on balance you support Secretary Rogers’ position, I send this to you only for information. Nevertheless, if the President has not yet made his decision on the issue, you may wish to mention it to him or have it included in his package.” Kissinger’s memorandum on the issue is Document 135 . 2 Presumably a reference to Laird’s May 6 memorandum to the President; see footnote 11, Document 134 . See also Document 135 . For the Peterson Report, see Document 128 . 3 See NSDM 10, April 11, 1969, Document 7 . 4 Reference is to the so-called “barnacles.” See Documents 8 , 9 , 31 , and 135 . 5 Rogers wrote in the margin: “Doc Morgan will fight it vigorously.” Thomas “Doc” Morgan was Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 6 See Document 133 . 31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant (Flanigan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant (Flanigan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 26, 1970. The President’s message on Foreign Aid is being drafted on the basis of National Security Decision Memorandum 76 (Tab A) 2 which sets forth a number of agreed new approaches to the subject. Among these new approaches are 6(d) and (e), which repeal the restrictions relating to the Hickenlooper Amendment and the “barnacles” provisions (i.e., aiding countries that assist countries unfriendly to the U.S.) and replace them with provisions directing the President to “take into account” certain actions by AID recipients. NSDM 76 is based on the July 14 Memorandum to the President attached at Tab B. 3 While this covers a large number of the points in NSDM 76 it does not refer to the Hickenlooper Amendment or the “barnacles” restrictions. The July 14 memorandum is apparently based on a July 13 memorandum to Dr. Kissinger numbered 11208 (attached at Tab C) 4 and an undated memorandum to Dr. Kissinger numbered 11208A (attached at Tab D). 5 In 11208 decisions by Dr. Kissinger are indicated on all issues except the Hickenlooper Amendment and the barnacles provision, while in 11208A the decision that is set forth in NSDM 76 is indicated, presumably by Dr. Kissinger. In May of 1969 the Hickenlooper and barnacles provision were also under attack, and Dr. Burns brought them to the President’s attention (in the memorandum attached at Tab E). 6 When focusing directly on these problems at that time, the President determined not to repeal them (as opposed to repealing the provisions and having “the President take into account”). As Burns points out, repeal would be contrary to the President’s campaign policy statements and to the general foreign policy enunciated by the Republican Party. At that time a discussion with Ross Adair indicated that he felt the restrictions were essential to any AID legislation. After the meeting on the Trade Message I discussed with Mr. Harlow the proposed new approach to the Hickenlooper Amendment and the barnacles provision. His immediate response was that “this is very poor politics. It could become extraordinarily controversial on the Hill and poison the whole package.” By their nature “AID bills become hotter than trade bills.” Based on the above, I recommend that: (1) You be entirely satisfied that the President has focused on these two issues. He should be fully aware that he is reversing his previous position. The fact that he must “take into account” (as he obviously would anyway) will not alter the fact that he is repealing the Hickenlooper Amendment and the barnacles provisions; and (2) If the President wants to go forward with these changes, they be fully discussed with Senator Aiken and Congressmen Adair and Frelinghuysen before the Message is sent to the Hill. These are only two relatively minor provisions among a long list of major new initiatives. It may be that it will be decided not to endanger the whole package for these two changes. One final consideration, though perhaps not major, is the predictable reaction among the business community. However unsophisticated they may be in this area, businessmen generally feel the government gives them no help in their efforts abroad. They deplore the lack of support when their properties are nationalized. If the President repeals the Hickenlooper Amendment and the barnacles provision, their enthusiasm for AID will be even further diminished and their support for this Administration somewhat impaired. 7 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume III 8/11/70-9/10/70. No classification marking. 2 Document 136 . 3 Document 134 . 4 Not printed. 5 Document 135 . 6 Document 9 . 7 The message that went to Congress on September 15 did not address these issues. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 745-756. 32. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 32. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 11, 1970. Introduction We are involved in a real crisis in our key programs for grant military assistance (MAP), Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Supporting Assistance (SA). In the first place, the resources currently available and being requested from Congress are inadequate to support ongoing implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and to assist in maintaining adequate balances of power throughout the world. Requirements continue to mount which have led—and continue to lead—to overcommitment of limited available funds in the basic security assistance programs. The only possible result, without supplemental help, is that Defense is unable to achieve specified national security goals. In the second place, the time to make the request for additional resources is now . The necessary action has not been forthcoming. I am convinced the only viable solution to the current MAP/FMS crisis is to ask for more resources. I know the Executive Branch has preferred not to seek supplementary FY 1971 funds from Congress until much later in the year. The on-rush of events in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Korea will not, however, afford us the luxury of waiting. The failure to move now for a supplemental is contributing to the current MAP/FMS crisis. The irony is that the present circumstances are favorable for receiving favorable Congressional consideration of a supplemental request. The corollary is that future circumstances almost certainly will not be as favorable. In the following paragraphs, I would like to outline in more detail our current situation. Military Assistance We have urgent additional MAP requirements for at least $260 million. A summary breakout of the MAP supplemental needs is as follows: Republic of Korea $150 million Cambodia 60 Turkey 25 Republic of China 15 Greece 10 Total Grant Aid MAP Supplemental $260 million The $150 million for the Republic of Korea is needed to initiate a balanced force modernization. This modernization is essential to compensate, in part, for ongoing U.S. troop withdrawals. The Cambodian situation presents a no-less-urgent requirement. Currently, $48.9 million is available to cover the outlays for both FY 1970 and FY 1971 ($8.9 million in FY 70 and $40.0 million in FY 71). All except $13 million of the $48.9 million has already been obligated. In the meantime, estimates of FY 1971 Cambodian requirements are $100.0 million, i.e., $60 million more than is currently at hand. Without a supplemental, our alternatives are (1) to restructure further an overall MAP pool of funds which is insufficient to achieve U.S. goals, or (2) to design a military strategy in Cambodia within the confines of the existing funds, a course which may likewise lead to failure to achieve stated U.S. objectives. Obviously, both of the currently available alternatives are undesirable. In addition to the additional ROK and Cambodian needs, there is an urgent requirement for $50 million to restore Turkey, the Republic of China, and Greece to the pre-existing FY 1971 MAP levels. Foreign Military Sales Drastic reductions in grant aid make the need for credit sales more important than ever. Authorizing legislation for FY 1970 and FY 1971 Credit Sales, however, remains in joint Senate-House Conference, and we cannot offer even this sort of help to foreign countries. With respect to credit, we have a particularly serious situation in Israel. That nation’s military orders placed with us are mounting rapidly and, in the absence of FMS credit, we are compelled to request payment from Israel on a cash basis. Payment requirements for approved sales total $297.7 million for the current fiscal year—a level beyond Israel’s ability to pay without great hardship. Additional firm orders now under review, most of which we cannot refuse, will increase the FY 1971 payment requirements to about $390 million. Adding $40 million in repayments due on past FMS credit transactions brings total FY 1971 payments due to the U.S. up to $430 million, a level clearly requiring extraordinary measures. Unless we can provide additional credit, Israel faces a grave financial situation and might be forced to default on payments due this year, the first such default in the history of Foreign Military Sales. If this should occur, the Military Departments may not be reimbursed for many millions of dollars in costs already incurred, ongoing contracts may be canceled at considerable cost, and Israel might not receive equipment it expects and urgently needs. A chaotic situation would prevail until the problem is resolved. Supporting Assistance During this period of continuing U.S. troop redeployments from Southeast Asia and concurrent Vietnamization, we must do what we can to assure that the South Vietnamese Government survives. The economy of South Vietnam is strained by the demands of Vietnamization, and as anticipated in defending the Foreign Aid Bill before Congress, additional supporting assistance, estimated at about $100.0 million, will be needed. Similarly, there is a pressing requirement for about $130.0 million in Supporting Assistance for Cambodia. Funds are immediately needed to assist the Cambodian Government to pay and support its growing forces and limit the impact of this action upon its fragile and underdeveloped economy. Supporting Assistance is required for both these programs now. Failure to supply such assistance could seriously jeopardize Vietnamization and/or contribute to Cambodia’s fall. Our already significant investment, both in terms of military equipment and prestige, could be lost. Timing of Supplemental Request Now is the time to make the supplemental request. There is general approval for our initiation of U.S. troop redeployments from the Republic of Korea. Likewise, the situation in Cambodia is more stable than we may expect after the North Vietnamese have had time to infiltrate new men and supplies. The time to make the request for a MAP supplemental is when patterns and trends are going reasonably well from our standpoint. Congress will act, in my judgment, to keep the situation going well. To delay asking for the MAP Supplemental is to risk making the request at a much less propitious time. In my judgment, if we do not request a MAP Supplemental within 30 days, there will be no chance of obtaining the added—and critical—MAP funds. Likewise, the time to move on the FMS situation is now. The Middle East situation is such that favorable consideration could be expected on the Israeli-equipment funding. More pragmatically, if the Defense Department does not obtain relief on the funding, the military departments will literally have to take major funding increments out of their hide—and that at a time when our available resources for our own needs are only marginally sufficient to meet our major strategy objectives. Furthermore, we may now expect Congress to work towards a mid-October adjournment. If we do not press now for MAP/FMS action, we shall lose the opportunity for relief until February 1971 at the earliest. That presents a clearly intolerable situation. Summary I consider our programs for Military Assistance and Credit Sales to be of highest priority and essential to U.S. foreign policy objectives. We have done our best to design our assistance programs in a fashion that will minimize the need for stationing U.S. forces overseas and, at the same time, give us reasonable assurance that our interests abroad are protected. We cannot succeed unless we are provided with the resources requisite to the job. We should take immediate and forceful action to obtain: —The FY 1971 appropriations requested for military assistance. —The FY 1970 and FY 1971 Foreign Military Credit Sales appropriations. —The requisite supplemental funds for each of our assistance programs, viz, —MAP supplemental of $260 million. —An amendment to the DoD Procurement Appropriations request to fund credit military sales to Israel amounting to $390 million. —Supporting Assistance supplement of $230 million. These steps are essential if the United States is to carry out programs which are essential—and on which actions have already been taken—in the Far East, in Southeast Asia, and in the Middle East. I strongly urge immediate action. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. Secret. Attached to a September 19 memorandum from K. Wayne Smith to Kissinger indicating he had discussed Laird’s letter with Johnson, Packard, Moorer, and Helms at an SRG meeting on September 15. Smith’s analysis of Laird’s recommendations concluded that they could be rejected on their merits, and he suggested that if it was decided to seek a supplemental “now,” it should be because the timing was propitious and not because essential objectives could not be accomplished without the supplemental. Smith also called Kissinger’s attention to a September 16 memorandum from Under Secretary Johnson who voted that since most of the appropriations would be to the State Department and/or AID, Secretary Rogers should be consulted before any decisions were made, if the President accepted Laird’s point of view. 33. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) 33. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) 1 Washington, September 16, 1970. Dear George: As you probably are aware, we have been working very closely with the Department of Defense concerning their grant military assistance (MAP), foreign military sales (FMS), and supporting assistance (SA) programs. Considerable difficulty is being encountered with Congress concerning the funding of these programs. We do believe that the Defense Department’s budgetary situation, coupled with the crucial developments occurring in those parts of the world related to these programs warrant immediate consideration. We, therefore, concur in the Defense Department’s request that we seek supplementary FY 1971 funds from Congress as soon as possible. 2 Specifically, we believe action should be taken to obtain supplemental funds for MAP in the amount of $260 million; an amendment to the DOD procurement request to fund credit military sales to Israel amounting to $390 million. Additionally, we should seek a supporting assistance supplemental in the amount of $230 million. There should also be a major effort given toward obtaining the basic appropriations for FY 71 covering military assistance and the foreign military credit sales appropriation for both FY 70 and 71. In our opinion, these programs warrant a high priority in order to implement the foreign policy objectives as enunciated in the “Nixon doctrine” and the budgetary problems being encountered by the Department of Defense. I would appreciate any assistance you can give this matter. If there is any additional specific help we can provide, please give me a call. With best wishes. Sincerely, David 3 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. Secret. Copies were sent to Laird and Kissinger. 2 See Document 32 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the letter. 34. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Schlesinger) to C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff 34. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Schlesinger) to C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, September 17, 1970. SUBJECT U.S. Position on Aid Targets Your memorandum of September 15 asked for our views on the State Department proposal on a U.S. position in the United Nations on aid targets. 2 It is our understanding that the President has consistently opposed any pledge on aid targets. NSDM No. 76 3 stated “the U.S. will avoid any pledges to meet the international targets relating foreign assistance to GNP but will seek to minimize damaging their usefulness to other donor countries.” It seems to us that State’s modest proposal goes beyond the bounds of that statement. For example, the last sentence of their proposed statement reads, “it is in this spirit that we are willing to join in the reaffirmation of the aid target.” Moreover, you will recall that during the meeting in his office on the evening of September 10 4 Dr. Kissinger stated quite firmly that we should not take a position establishing any specific percentage as an aid target. His view was that foreign assistance, like national defense and other programs, must compete each year in the total process of resource allocation. In view of his statements that evening it would not seem to us advisable to send this memorandum forward. James R. Schlesinger 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. No classification marking. 2 The September 15 memorandum was not found. The State Department proposals are in Document 26 . 3 Document 136 . 4 Not further identified. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 35. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to President Nixon 35. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, September 26, 1970. SUBJECT Possible supplementals for Military and Economic Assistance With the exception of military credit sales to Israel, Secretary Laird’s proposal to proceed immediately with supplemental appropriation requests for military and economic assistance raises serious problems of both timing and amounts. 2 Timing of requests The severe constraints on the availability of budget resources to meet new and pressing requirements, particularly in Cambodia, argue for proceeding at an early date to seek necessary supplementals. The longer we wait to seek additional funds the greater the risk that this Congress will not act, requiring us to start all over again with the new Congress. Such a delay would open a gap in meeting the needs in Cambodia that would have to be filled by reprogramming funds away from other countries with the political costs that such action would entail. However, there are persuasive reasons not to proceed until after the November election: 1. New legislation to authorize appropriations will be necessary before the appropriations process can begin. Military credits for Israel are the only exception. This means hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which almost surely would rekindle the debate over our policy in Southeast Asia. Such a debate might well induce the very delay in action we wish to avoid. 2. The request as proposed by Secretary Laird, including $500 million for military credits for Israel, would total almost $1 billion at a time when you have been urging restraint upon the Congress in acting upon your budget requests and backing up those urgings with vetoes of excessive domestic appropriation bills. 3. In any event, since the Congress will recess in just a few days, it would not be able to start action on the authorizing legislation until it reconvenes after the election. 4. As outlined below, the executive branch is not yet in a position to set forth a convincing justification for specific levels of aid for Cambodia. Korea MAP . Secretary Laird proposes an additional $150 million in grant military assistance to Korea and a special two-year authorization to turn over to Korea equipment of withdrawing U.S. forces (estimated value $117 million in FY 1971). Korea also will probably receive substantial material from Defense excess stocks. Thus, total 1971 grant military aid to Korea would be approximately $450 million, estimated as follows: $ millions Regular MAP 140 Supplemental MAP 150 Equipment of withdrawing U.S. forces 117 Excess stocks 50 457 The proposed level of military aid would represent a substantial “front-end loading” of the $1.5 billion five-year modernization program you recently approved subject to a funding ceiling of $1.25 billion. We believe that a “front-end loading” approach would not be desirable for the following reasons: —It could lead to unrealistic Korean expectations for future aid levels. —The funding requirement for ROK Air Force modernization may increase in the later years of the five-year period since the proposed aircraft may not be available until 1973 or 1974. —Congressional receptivity to additional aid to Korea at this time may suffer from the recent Symington subcommittee report on the cost of Korean forces in Vietnam as well as the advertisement of the ROK Minister of Defense in the September 25 Washington Post urging more U.S. military aid and postponement of planned withdrawals of U.S. troops. We recommend seeking $177 million in authority from the Congress, to enhance the Korea package, consisting of a supplemental request of $60 million and authority to turn over equipment worth about $117 million. This would provide total 1971 grant military aid of about $367 million. Cambodia MAP . Estimates of Cambodia’s military assistance requirements are uncertain. Based on the initial NSSM 99 3 estimate that $125 million in additional MAP will be needed beyond the $40 million already allocated, the $60 million proposed supplemental probably would not be sufficient to support the strategy favored by the Senior Review Group. On the other hand, there is doubt about the level of Cambodian forces that it will be feasible to organize and train during this fiscal year. These uncertainties should be sufficiently resolved by the end of October to permit a more accurate estimate of requirements. We believe $100 million is a better current estimate than the proposed $60 million. Economic Aid to Vietnam . Secretary Laird is recommending a $100 million supplemental for this purpose. NSDM 80, 4 which you approved on August 13, 1970, established a target input level for Vietnam of $750 million to be financed by a combination of AID funds, PL 480, and U.S. purchases of piasters by Defense. NSDM 80, based on thorough analysis, concluded that no supplemental would be required to meet this level. Nothing has occurred since then to suggest that a supplemental would now be needed to carry out that decision. Economic Aid to Cambodia . Secretary Laird recommends a supplemental of $130 million for this purpose. Lack of basic information, however, precludes accurate calculation of economic support requirements for Cambodia at this time. The best current estimate, by the NSSM 99 study group, is that Cambodia may need roughly $180 million in FY 1971 to finance needed imports during that period and to build the necessary pipeline for FY 1972, in order to meet military related needs and prevent a serious deterioration in standards of living. After using other sources of import financing estimated to be readily available (Cambodian foreign exchange holdings, PL 480 food aid, third country aid, and a portion of the AID contingency fund), the Cambodians may need roughly $75 million in Supporting Assistance to meet this total import target. Since AID has some flexibility on reprogramming current funds, a supplemental request of more than $75 million would be difficult to justify at this time. Even this amount is speculative and is subject to considerable revision. Recommendation On balance, we believe that the odds for favorable congressional action will be considerably better if we wait until after the elections to send forward supplemental foreign aid requests. If, however, you decide that it is better to proceed now, we recommend the following levels: —$100 million for Cambodia MAP, as compared to the $60 million proposed by Secretary Laird. —$60 million for Korean MAP (compared to the $150 million proposed), together with authority to turn over equipment worth about $117 million. —$50 million for MAP for other countries, as proposed. —$75 million for Cambodia Supporting Assistance, compared to $130 million proposed. —No supplemental for Vietnam Supporting Assistance. Consideration is now being given to military assistance of $30 million for Jordan. If we proceed now with supplemental requests, it is important to include all identifiable requirements at one time. Caspar W. Weinberger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume IV 9/11/70-10/6/70. Secret. Attached to an October 5 memorandum from K. Wayne Smith to Kissinger, which indicated that a September 27 summary of Weinberger’s memorandum, along with the memorandum, went forward to the President on October 6. The September 27 memorandum has not been found. 2 Reference is presumably to Laird’s September 11 memorandum to Kissinger, Document 32 . 3 Entitled “U.S. Strategy for Southeast Asia,” dated August 17, 1970. 4 Entitled “Vietnam Economic Policy,” dated August 13, 1970. 36. Memorandum From Hendrik S. Houthakker of the Council of Economic Advisers to C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff 36. Memorandum From Hendrik S. Houthakker of the Council of Economic Advisers to C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, October 2, 1970. SUBJECT U.S. Position on Aid Targets We oppose options (1) and (2). 2 Regarding option 1, we believe that: (1) The statement on the 1 percent target is so weak as to be worthless, and this will be clearly recognized by the LDC’s. (2) Certainly, we should not emphasize our “staggering domestic needs.” To any outside observer these will appear trivial compared to the needs of starving millions in the third world. Regarding option 2: This is subject to misinterpretation. The LDC’s may misjudge the President’s influence with Congress on this issue and may feel betrayed when Congress rejects the request, which it is quite likely to do. We favor a variant of option 3, but one which would place primary emphasis on the positive aspects of the President’s Foreign Aid Message. 3 In making his statement the President might first note that although some less developed countries have made efficient use of our aid, elsewhere much aid has been dissipated in waste and corruption. This mixed record, combined with instances in which countries receiving American aid have expropriated U.S. firms and condoned anti-American demonstrations, has created widespread disillusionment with aid on the part of the American public. The result has been a steady fall relative to GNP in the amounts of aid appropriated by the U.S. Congress. Unless the effectiveness of aid is made more visible, a significant quantitative increase in U.S. aid can hardly be expected in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is essential that both the donor and the recipient countries focus on improving the effectiveness per dollar of aid. The American people are ready to help those less fortunate, but they like to see results. The President’s Foreign Aid Message places high priority on greater effectiveness. The proposal to untie aid would alone make each aid dollar at least 20 percent more effective, according to the conservative estimates of the Pearson Commission (p. 172). This estimate covers only the direct costs of tying and does not include a variety of indirect costs. For example, tied aid sometimes prevents funds from being used for the projects of highest priority to the LDC. The proposal to channel aid through multilateral institutions will result in a greater coordination of the U.S. efforts with those of other nations and thereby improve effectiveness. As a complement to aid reform, the President has proposed that tariff preferences be granted to the manufactured exports of the lower income countries. The economic benefits which would accrue to the LDC’s from such a system of generalized preferences are equivalent to a substantial increase in the flow of aid. In summary, we urge that the President’s statement avoid mentioning (either positively or negatively) quantitative formulations of any kind and should focus on our efforts to improve the quality of aid. This approach may also have a favorable impact on domestic opinion. H.S. Houthakker 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Box 30, Houthakker-Foreign Aid Policy. No classification marking. 2 Reference is to options in a September 30 memorandum from Bergsten to Flanigan, Timmons, Houthakker, Schlesinger, and Martin Anderson, which transmitted a draft of Document 38 . 3 For text of the President’s September 15 message to Congress on foreign assistance reorganization, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 745-758. 37. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 37. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 6, 1970. SUBJECT Supplemental FY 1971 Foreign Aid Requests Secretary Laird has sent you a memorandum (Tab A) which refers to your decision to proceed immediately with supplemental FY 1971 Foreign Aid requests. 2 Secretary Laird proposes a supplemental request of $990 million broken out as follows: — Military Assistance: Korea $150 million Cambodia 60 million Turkey 25 million Republic of China 15 million Greece 10 million $260 million —Supporting Assistance: Vietnam $100 million Cambodia 130 million $230 million —Credit Sales for Israel: $500 million There is disagreement both with some of the amounts he proposes and with the inclusion of some countries in the justification for the request. I believe, however, that all of the issues relating to the composition are minor and can be resolved providing we can resolve the tactical issue of when the request should be submitted . The State Department’s position is that the request should be submitted after the elections when the Congress reconvenes. Since we will have to request new authorization through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we face a new round of debate on your foreign policy which could well have an adverse impact on the election if the request is submitted immediately. Moreover, the Foreign Aid appropriation is still before the Congress and requesting a supplemental now could well affect its outcome. Bill Timmons also opposes making the request immediately for essentially the same domestic political and pending legislation reasons outlined above. Timmons also points out that Congress is scheduled to adjourn on October 15 and we would face an extremely tight schedule even if little opposition was expected. The Office of Management and Budget also believes that submission should be delayed both because of timing and because OMB has some difficulties with the current composition of the request. (Weinberger’s memorandum is at Tab B.) 3 My own view is that the risks in requesting a supplemental at this time are quite high. It is almost certain that we will get considerable criticism both on the issue of military spending and, as mentioned previously, on your foreign policy. While these criticisms will be leveled whenever we make the request, their intensity (and political effect) will be less after the elections. Finally, our analysis indicates that we can carry out our essential program without an immediate supplemental. 4 Recommendation: That you discuss the issue of timing of the request with Secretary Laird and Secretary Rogers and myself at your first convenience. When that issue is resolved, we can move to resolve the issues regarding composition and implement your decision. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. Top Secret. Drafted by K. Wayne Smith who forwarded an earlier draft to Kissinger under cover of a September 27 memorandum that reviewed the issues. 2 In his September 21 memorandum, not printed, Laird referred back to his September 11 memorandum to Kissinger ( Document 32 ). He wrote at the bottom: “Mr. President, I have included the Cambodian MAP at my 11 Sept. Memo level in accordance with my understanding of your tentative decision. If the later decision of the Senior Review Group is adopted an increase would be required.” An SRG meeting on Cambodia was held September 15. The President’s decision to proceed immediately with a supplemental request has not been further identified. 3 Document 35 . 4 In reference to the italicized text, which is underscored on the source text, the President wrote, “I agree,” below which is the handwritten date of October 8. The President also crossed through the Recommendation section and the Approve and Disapprove options. 38. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 38. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT U.S. Position in the United Nations on Aid Targets We must take a position in the UN on aid targets by October 13, when the General Assembly is to vote on the “strategy” for the Second Development Decade. Targets are the major issue in the strategy. There are three options: Option 1: U.S. “reaffirmation” of the international aid target (public and private flows) under which industrialized countries endeavor to extend one percent of their GNP in foreign assistance . State has proposed a statement to do so (Tab A). 2 However, it would not be much of an affirmation. It would: —Emphasize our “staggering domestic needs” for public and private resources and our “enormous” external burdens. —Note that we are unable to say when we may meet the one percent aid objective, or whether our efforts to meet it will be successful at all. —Conclude that we are prepared to make our “best efforts to increase both official and private flows and hope we can be successful in moving closer to the aid objectives.” The statement would create no illusions about our reaching one percent. It would imply that the world should not expect us to attain that target in the foreseeable future—or perhaps ever. However, it would not completely negate the target, which is of great political importance to developing countries and apparently provides some assistance to other governments in getting Parliamentary support for aid appropriations. Its main drawback is that its weakness would expose us to major criticism in the UN from the lower income countries. No stronger position, however, seems consistent with budgetary and Congressional realities. Option 2: A commitment to seek from Congress a 10 percent annual increase in official U.S. aid expenditures, multilateral and bilateral . Senior AID officials (Tab B) 3 have suggested this new approach, which would: —Let bygones be bygones, frankly recognizing that we are so far below the one percent target that it would be unrealistic to expect to reach it in the foreseeable future even if we wanted to. —Be recognized by other countries as an important step forward, since it would add concreteness to the general statement in your Aid Message “that the downward trend of U.S. contributions to the development process should be reversed.” —Focus on official aid, which governments can control, and thus avoid one of the many major weaknesses of the one percent target (which lumps together official aid and private capital, making Switzerland the top “donor” in some years). This option would help shift attention away from the one percent target, which is both intellectually indefensible and wholly unrealistic for the United States. (There is growing sentiment among other donor countries to back away from one percent, and we could expect a sizable following if we were to take the lead in doing so.) In addition, such a commitment would provide a better basis for long-range planning in the developing countries, which our new aid program will stress, than a vague “affirmation” of the one percent target. There are three major drawbacks: it would represent a commitment to ask Congress for annual increments (about $200-$250 million at present levels) for a particular program; it would not satisfy the foreign policy community as much as a U.S. endorsement—probably however vague—of one percent; and it could even be misleading to the foreigners by appearing to promise more than it really could. Option 3: No commitment beyond the statement in your recent Aid Message that the downward trend should be reversed, noting however that (a) we were seeking an increase this year, (b) would expect to be able to seek further increases in the future, and (c) emphasizing our efforts to improve the qualitative and non-financial aspects of our own program (through untying, tariff preferences, multilateral coordination, etc. ) This would probably be the most honest indication of our budgetary situation and new approach to foreign assistance, with its focus on quality and non-financial programs. It would avoid raising unrealistic hopes among the foreigners, and might even help the program domestically. However, State feels strongly that overt reversal of our long-standing support for the one percent target would be read as a U.S. retreat from concern with development and “could poison the atmosphere” at the 25th Anniversary General Assembly. This is so particularly because the U.S. now ranks last among the sixteen OECD donor countries, having contributed last year only 0.5 percent of our GNP to development through official and private channels (though we still contribute much more than any other donor in absolute terms). All other industrialized countries pay at least lip service to one percent, and the U.S. would be completely isolated if we opposed it. Conclusion The problem is to balance our aversion to targetry with the foreign policy importance of avoiding a negative stance toward the Second UN Development Decade, and on aid levels in general. I think that State’s proposed “reaffirmation” of the one percent target (Option 1) achieves this objective without committing us to anything new. However, all of your domestic advisers—OMB, CEA, Peter Flanigan, Bill Timmons, and Martin Anderson—recommend that we make no commitment beyond the general statement in your recent Aid Message (Option 3). Recommendation: That you adopt Option 1: the statement “reaffirming” the one percent target proposed by State. Approve 4 Disapprove, prefer Option 2: a commitment to ask Congress each year for annual increments of 10 percent in U.S. official aid expenditures Disapprove, prefer Option 3: no new commitment on aid levels, recommended by OMB, CEA, Flanigan, Timmons, and Anderson 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID, 10/7/70-12/31/70. No classification marking. Attached to an October 5 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger, in which Bergsten noted that Option 1 was the best option to minimize foreign policy problems and recommended that Kissinger sign the memorandum to the President. On Bergsten’s October 5 memorandum Kissinger wrote a note to Haig: “Al: If we can’t move it by Monday [October 12] might approve Option 1 for P. in my name.” 2 Document 26 . 3 Not printed. Tab B is a September 24 paper entitled “International Targets for the Transfer of Resources to Developing Countries,” prepared by Ernest Stern. Earlier in the year, on May 12 Stern sent a memorandum to Samuels regarding the 1 percent resource target. He noted that the 1 percent target was not arbitrary, but instead reflected the best estimates available of the LDCs’ resource requirements during the coming decade. (Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, OCM (Peterson Task Force) FY70 April 1970) 4 This option is checked, and Haig wrote: “Haig for HAK for Pres,” followed by the stamped date of October 12. A note indicates the State Department was notified orally and written confirmation was sent from Davis to Eliot on October 13 (see footnote 5, Document 26 ). (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70) 39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 14, 1970. SUBJECT FY 1971 Requirements for Supplemental Funds Recommendation: That you request supplemental funds in the amount of $380 million for Military Assistance and $185 million for Supporting Assistance. That in order to have any hope of obtaining these supplemental funds in this session of Congress, you personally present the request to the Congressional leadership. 2 Discussion: On the question of going forward in this session of Congress to seek economic and military assistance, there are two issues involved on which we need your decision: one of magnitude, and the other of timing. This Memorandum only addresses the first issue; the second we would like to discuss directly with you. Magnitude Requirements for supplementary funds are as follows: I. Cambodia—Military Assistance $125 million This is a tentative figure, developed in NSSM-99, 3 which is under study by the Senior Review Group. It would be in addition to the $40 million already provided and it does not include funding of ARVN and other third country operations under consideration in NSSM-99. 4 Supporting Assistance $120 million Based on NSSM-99 strategies and our best present estimates pending review of the IMF study which may shed further light in the coming weeks. [ sic ] This level presumes temporarily untying AID funds on an emergency basis (for Cambodia only) for world-wide procurement and includes $40 million in forward funding of FY 1972 requirements in order to avoid a break in the pipeline. If a Cambodian initiative to organize an international Consultative Group of donor countries is successful, requirements for U.S. assistance may be reduced. II. Military Assistance Program (General)—$70 million This amount is needed to compensate for the diversions made from the originally planned world-wide MAP to meet the Cambodian emergency ($40 million); to increase the Indonesian program ($13 million) and to make up for a shortfall on past years recoupments ($17 million). These diversions have caused serious problems for certain allies, (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Taiwan), created severe difficulties in finding even $.8 million to assist Uruguay and Guatemala and raised anxious questions regarding the direction of American policy. III. Korea—$150 million Inclusion of funds for Korea in a supplemental to Congress would publicly reassure the Koreans of our intentions concerning modernization, and would have a highly beneficial impact on our joint planning for U.S. troop reductions. In addition, we shall be providing Korea with considerable assistance in 1971: $140 million in regular MAP, plus $117 million of equipment of U.S. troops to be withdrawn, plus perhaps $30 million in long-supply stocks. IV. Jordan—Military Assistance $30 million In July 1970 we signed a sales agreement with Jordan on an arms package of some $53 million. It was assumed that Jordan could obtain the necessary funds from subsidies from Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia, and $30 million from credits we had planned to provide it in FY 1970 and 1971. As the Foreign Military Sales bill remains stranded in the House-Senate Conference, we have no funds for credits and, following the events of this month, Kuwait and Libya have discontinued payments. At the same time, Embassy Amman is sending long lists of requirements. We are flying to Jordan some of the ammunition that is now urgently needed and plan to ask the Embassy to establish priorities on the undelivered balance of the arms package. What is being provided now is necessarily on a sales basis. We expect that Jordan will require substantial additional amounts of equipment for which it will be unable to pay. We have found no way of providing credits. Therefore, to give substance to the assurances of support you have given King Hussein, we recommend requesting $30 million in grant military assistance for which we are preparing an illustrative program. V. Lebanon—Military Assistance $5 million Available facts do not permit the formulation of a specific list of requirements for the Lebanese armed forces. However, the maintenance of a stable, moderate regime in Lebanon is in the interest of the United States. The major threat to this stability and to Lebanon’s continued economic development stem from fedayeen activities within Lebanon, fedayeen incursions into Israel (with resultant retaliations from Israel) and the presence of Syrian forces on the Lebanese border with the capability to intervene at any time to assist the fedayeens, as with the case in recent fighting in Jordan. To bolster Lebanon, we believe that we should request funds amounting to $5 million for grant assistance to Lebanon. Not only is credit not available, but we also believe that grant aid would have both a greater political impact in Lebanon and better serve notice to the Syrians and other parties that the U.S. intends to give strong support to the maintenance of the Lebanese government. VI. Israel—Credit $500 million A Memorandum has been sent to you recommending $500 million of credits be offered Israel under the Jackson Amendment to the Defense Procurement Act. 5 The first $350 million is to be on concessional terms (5 year grace period, 20 year repayment period and 3% rate of interest) and the balance of $150 million on regular FMS terms (10 year repayment at the cost of money to the U.S. Government). VII. Vietnam—Supporting Assistance $65 million An additional $65 million of Supporting Assistance funds are needed for Vietnam, for the following purposes: $50 million for additional funds for the Commodity Import Program (CIP), which provides for the tied procurement of commercial imports. While NSDM-80 provided for a minimum level of economic support for FY 1971, this additional amount will establish a more adequate pipeline for FY 1972 funding when DOD expenditures will be declining rapidly. $15 million for additional support to the Land Reform Program. Present funds for land reform provide U.S. payments to be made at the time that the GVN makes payments to land owners for the purchase of their property. The additional request would provide payments to the GVN at the time titles are issued to the new land owners, as an extra incentive to the GVN to make rapid distribution of titles. This request would be responsive to widespread Congressional support for land reform, including Congressional suggestions that U.S. financial support be increased and consistent with your earlier indication to Congress that a Vietnam Supplement might be required. William P. Rogers Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. Secret. Attached to an October 16 memorandum from K. Wayne Smith to Kissinger suggesting the Cambodia recommendations were high but otherwise supporting the requests. 2 There is no indication if the President approved or disapproved the recommendations. In his October 16 memorandum, Smith noted that he thought it clear from the President’s October 8 decision (see footnote 4, Document 37 ), that the President wanted the message to go forward after the election. Smith attached draft memoranda to the President and agencies setting in motion actions to develop a message to Congress. All this was attached to a handwritten October 17 note from Haig to Kissinger that read: “HAK—I am generally in agreement with this pkg. You may wish to call Laird personally on his latest memo, Tab F. Meeting on this should be before Oct 26 in my view.” On Haig’s note Kissinger wrote: “Memos to Agencies should say SRG will review. Have signed all memos except to P. Send all others.” Tab F, not printed, was an October 14 memorandum from Laird to Kissinger recalling the urgency in Laird’s September 11 memorandum ( Document 32 ). In a handwritten postscript, Laird suggested that the Israel package be placed first in the message to Congress. 3 See footnote 3, Document 35 . 4 The basic difficulty is that U.S. funding for South Vietnamese and Thai operations, as contemplated in NSSM-99, is precluded under the terms of pending DOD authorizing legislation. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 This memorandum has not been found. 40. Editorial Note 40. Editorial Note National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 76 (Document 136) provided for a small office in the White House to manage the transition to the new foreign aid program that the President outlined to the Congress in his September 15 message. Rudolph Peterson, Chairman of the Task Force on International Development, whose report had stimulated the new proposals, was invited to head the office. On October 27, 1970, C. Fred Bergsten sent a memorandum to Henry Kissinger informing him that Peterson might be unable to head the temporary White House office, and suggesting some alternatives. As Bergsten recommended, on October 30 Kissinger sent a memorandum to the President suggesting he call Peterson, using attached talking points, to try to recruit him for the position. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70) On Kissinger’s memorandum to the President, Haldeman crossed out the October 30 date and wrote, “Re-raised Nov 18, 1970.” At the end of the memorandum, the President wrote: “H—I don’t want to use my prestige on this one—Have Pete [Flanigan] or someone else who knows him do it on my behalf.” On November 24 Bergsten sent a memorandum to Kissinger noting that Flanigan did not know Peterson well and a call from Kissinger would carry more weight. He pointed out that, since the new legislation would not be ready to go to Congress until the new Congress convened in January, the position would be of shorter duration and Peterson might reconsider. (Ibid.) Peterson did reconsider, and in early 1971 he was taking soundings in Congress on the impending submission of the Nixon administration’s aid reform proposals. (Memorandum of conversation, March 2, 1971; ibid., AID 1/1/71-12/31/71) 41. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon 41. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Supplemental Requests for Foreign Aid As you know, Secretaries Rogers and Laird, in their October 14 memorandum to you, proposed supplemental appropriations for 1971 for foreign aid totaling $1,065 million, as follows: 2 ($ millions) Israel Military Credits 500 Military Assistance (MAP) 380 Korea 150 Cambodia 125 Jordan 30 Lebanon 5 Other countries 70 Supporting Assistance 185 Cambodia 120 Vietnam 65 Total 1,065 Decisions on these amounts depend on an assessment of various factors: —the receptivity of the lameduck session of the Congress to the proposals; —the relative urgency of the items proposed; —the relative firmness of the estimated requirements; and —the possible effect of the total amount proposed on congressional action on other pending appropriations, particularly in those cases where you vetoed an appropriation bill containing excessive amounts. Three basic alternative approaches are available: 1. A supplemental package which would represent the minimum needs for only the most urgent items. Such a theme would be the clearest and least difficult to present to the Congress. However, because of the inherent uncertainty in the estimates of some of the requirements—e.g., Cambodia—and the fact that the Congress is likely to cut any request, this approach has major risks. 2. A somewhat larger and more balanced package which could be accurately characterized as urgent and would not be regarded by the Congress as excessive, but which would be large enough to accommodate the uncertainties and to provide “cut insurance” against the risk of congressional reductions. 3. A large supplemental package incorporating the maximum estimates of needs not only for the most urgent items but also for others where the need and urgency are less readily apparent. This would be the most difficult to justify and to sell and runs the greatest risk of severe and indiscriminate congressional cuts. The risks of generating this response appears greatest in the case of military assistance. The proposed MAP supplemental of $380 million will be perceived by the Congress as more than doubling the $350 million included in the 1971 budget, even though that figure was a ceiling imposed by the Congress and was lower than the Administration wanted. In addition, since the countries involved are recipients of substantial amounts of excess stocks, a large supplemental could stimulate renewed congressional attempts to impose tight restrictions on the amounts of such stocks that can be used for military aid. I believe the second alternative is preferable. You have already approved $500 million for military credits for Israel , 3 urgently needed to enable Israel to pay for military equipment already delivered or on order. Similarly, there is general agreement on inclusion of the proposed amounts for military assistance to Jordan and Lebanon . With respect to the other items, there are a range of possibilities. Cambodia MAP and Supporting Assistance . These items are of great urgency. The proposed amounts totaling $245 million—$125 million for MAP and $120 million for Supporting Assistance—exceed the estimated supplemental requirements of $205 million set forth in the recently completed NSSM 99 study on Cambodia—$115 million for MAP supplemental (plus $10 million in excess DOD stocks) and $90 million for Supporting Assistance (plus P.L. 480 sales of $30 million). Some of these funds would be used to replace diversions to Cambodia from other country programs. The higher State-Defense figures reflect the uncertainty of both the requirement and congressional reaction. State is now considering reducing the proposed $245 million by $30 million. I would concur. Supplementals totaling $245 million with a possible reduction of $30 million Supplementals totaling $205 million Other MAP . The State-Defense proposal of $70 million would restore all MAP country programs—principally Greece, Turkey, and Taiwan—to 1971 budget levels. Those levels have had to be reduced because of diversions to Cambodia and Indonesia and because of shortfalls in recoveries of prior-year obligations. Failure to restore those programs would cause irritation in our relationships, particularly with Taiwan. Greece, however, will benefit from the release of the $56 million in major items of MAP equipment withheld since the 1968 military coup, will receive excess stocks of about $30 million, and is reported to be purchasing an estimated $20-40 million in tanks and patrol boats from France. Similarly, Turkey and Taiwan will receive substantial amounts of excess stocks. There are two options lower than the proposed $70 million supplemental: (a) $45 million, which would be sufficient to restore the Taiwan and Turkey programs to their 1971 budget levels and provide $10 million for other high priority country programs; and (b) $40 million, the amount diverted to Cambodia, which might be the easiest to justify to the Congress. Supplemental of $70 million Supplemental of $45 million Supplemental of $40 million Vietnam Supporting Assistance . The NSDM 80 4 directive on Vietnam outlines a program which would finance commercial imports of $750 million to Vietnam in 1971. Current estimates suggest that sufficient funds will become available to meet this target without a supplemental. Since the $50 million additional funding recommended by State and Defense for the commercial import program is not likely to be used in 1971, it would be difficult to justify the request to the Congress as part of a package of urgent requirements. The remaining $15 million of the proposed $65 million supplemental would be for the Vietnam land reform program. These funds are not likely to be needed to carry out U.S. plans for support of that program. The basic rationale for the proposed amount is that it might gain congressional support for other parts of the supplemental package among those who are interested in the land reform program (e.g., Senators Muskie and Magnuson and Representative Moss). Supplemental of $65 million No supplemental Korea Military Assistance. You have decided on a 5-year modernization program for the Korean forces totaling $1.5 billion in U.S. aid, of which not more than $1.25 billion should be funded by MAP grants or military credit sales. 5 The proposed $150 million supplemental would mean a total 1971 military aid program for Korea, approximately as follows: ($ millions) Currently programmed MAP 140 Proposed supplemental 150 Subtotal, MAP funding 290 Equipment of withdrawing U.S. forces 117 Excess stocks (valued at 50% of acquisition cost) 75 Total 482 Korea may also receive $15-30 million in additional grant materiel if the ROKG agrees to pick up the costs of certain consumable items available on the local economy but now provided by MAP. Thus, both the total program for 1971 as well as the funded portion substantially exceed one-fifth of the maximum amount approved for the 5-year program. This might help reassure the Koreans of our commitments to them as we carry out planned U.S. force reductions. However, it might also unrealistically raise Korean expectations for the future. In addition, since the costs of Korean Air Force modernization are likely to rise in subsequent years, a large first-year program might make it difficult to stay within the overall limits on the 5-year program. There are two alternative levels which you might consider: (a) a $110 million supplemental, and (b) a $60 million supplemental. Supplemental of $150 million (total 1971 program of $482 million) Supplemental of $110 million (total 1971 program of $442 million) Supplemental of $60 million (total 1971 program of $392 million) Summary and Recommendations. My recommendations are below, as compared to the State-Defense proposal and to estimated minimum requirements. I do not recommend the latter because it does not provide adequate margin against congressional cuts; nor does it take care of the uncertainties. I believe my recommendation does provide such a margin. 6 State-DOD OMB Minimum requirements ($ millions) Israel Military Credits 500 500 500 Military Assistance 380 315 250 Korea 150 110 60 Cambodia 125* 125* 115 Jordan and Lebanon 35 35 35 Other countries 70 45 40 Supporting Assistance 185 120 90 Cambodia 120* 120* 90 Vietnam 65 -0- -0- Total 1,065* 935* 840 * Subject to reductions totaling $30 million Director 7 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. Secret. Drafted by J.M. Frey on November 5. Attached to a November 6 memorandum from K. Wayne Smith to Kissinger, which indicated the memorandum was from Shultz. None of the options in the memorandum is checked. 2 Document 39 . 3 This decision has not been identified. 4 See footnote 4, Document 35 . 5 This decision has not been identified. 6 The request that eventually went to Congress on November 18 was for $1,035 million, less than the $1,065 million proposed by Rogers and Laird and more than the $935 million proposed by Shultz. For text of the message to Congress, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 1074-1079. In his November 6 memorandum (see footnote 1 above), Smith agreed with Shultz that the chances of passage would rise if the request were for less than $1 billion, but he noted that endorsing Shultz’ view would anger Rogers and Laird. He recommended that Kissinger privately support Shultz’ recommendations with the President but take no formal, open action. According to an October 12 memorandum from Smith to Kissinger entitled “Improving Relations with OMB,” there were interpersonal and procedural issues as well. Smith referred to “fundamental elements” in the relationship among the President, Kissinger, Shultz, and Laird “that only the individuals involved and time can resolve.” He recommended OMB representation on the Senior Review Group and improved distribution of Presidential and NSC documents of interest to OMB. Kissinger wrote on Smith’s memorandum: “No, let’s decide from case to case. Kennedy to raise with me.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 206, BOB, Volume I) 7 Printed from an unsigned copy. 42. Memorandum of Conversation 42. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 18, 1970, 3:40 p.m. PARTICIPANTS The President Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Dr. Kissinger Bill Timmons Ron Ziegler C. Fred Bergsten Senator Mansfield Senator Scott Senator Russell SUBJECT Foreign Aid Supplemental Request The President began the meeting by noting that the house leadership, who had also been invited to this meeting, were unable to attend because of the floor debate on the Trade Bill. 2 He hoped to see them at a different time to discuss the Foreign Aid Supplemental which he was submitting to the Congress later in the afternoon. 3 The President noted that he was asking about $1 billion in supplementary aid funds for FY 1971, and listed the countries included in the request. In the Middle East, the additional aid to Israel, Jordan and Lebanon was necessary to make viable the present ceasefire arrangement. In Asia, the funds were necessary to implement the Nixon Doctrine, both in Korea and to guarantee complete US withdrawal from Vietnam. Senator Mansfield asked whether the quid for the aid was a reduction in US forces. The President responded that this was correct. In the Middle East of course it would enable us to stay out. In Asia, we wanted to continue our withdrawals in Korea and to continue our Vietnamization program. At the President’s request, Secretary Rogers elaborated on the proposal. He noted that US foreign policy was now highly esteemed around the world. For the first time, hopeful signs had developed in the Middle East where there had been no fighting for over 100 days. The UAR was thinking of its own problems for a change. Jordan and King Hussein are now stronger, and we had told him that we would help. We had also told Lebanon that we would help it control its guerrilla problem. The President interjected that the Congress would no doubt provide support for Israel. If Jordan and Lebanon came apart, however, the possibility of a flare-up in the Middle East would increase greatly. Secretary Rogers added that the request for Israel would not itself cause any flare-up, since the amounts were already known. The President made clear that domestic US politics were not the justification for seeking new aid to Israel. 4 The aid was essential to maintain Israel’s confidence, so that Israel would be willing and able to negotiate. The aid will thus help induce Israel to talk, which would be impossible without such help. The $500 million is necessary to assure ratification of the ceasefire violations—there will not be a rollback on the Egyptian side. Secretary Laird added that DOD had been financing the military sales to Israel through its normal 180-day credit mechanism. These had been rolled over to the maximum permitted by law, so Israel now must pay the bill. Secretary Rogers concluded by expressing optimism that the negotiations could get started again, and indicated that he would be seeing Eban on the subject shortly. On Korea, Secretary Rogers indicated that here we were implementing the Nixon Doctrine. Secretary Laird said that we were saving $185 million in the FY 1971 budget already on direct US troop costs there. Even with the additional $150 million of assistance, there would be a net saving of $35 million already in the FY 1971 budget due to the Nixon Doctrine. The savings would be much greater over the course of the five-year plan for modernizing Korea’s forces. Secretary Rogers then indicated that new aid for Vietnam and Cambodia were all part of Vietnamization and necessary to continue that program, which was working well. In addition, we wanted $13 million for Indonesia. Secretary Laird added the detailed figures that we were seeking for Southeast Asia and noted that the diversion of North Vietnamese troops to Cambodia is much cheaper for us to handle than if they remained in South Vietnam. Senator Russell interjected that he would certainly support such a request if it enabled other countries to take on the burden of their defense themselves. The President replied that, in the Indonesian case, the issue was internal security. Suharto was thinking of Indonesian needs, and rejected any notions of foreign adventures. In response to the President’s question whether the Indonesian aid was in line with Indonesia’s request, Secretaries Rogers and Laird answered affirmatively. The President then noted that Cambodia was the part of the package that would trouble some people. There will be fears of new US involvement, that we are trying to bail out of a situation which we should not have entered in the first place. Our Cambodian action, however, now appears to be enormously in the US interests. For example, it has choked off the enormous supply of equipment through Sihanoukville which had been the mainstay of the North Vietnamese supplies in South Vietnam. The President continued that the Southeast Asian/Korean package is part of the Nixon Doctrine. We wanted to let others do the job themselves; we wanted to get out ourselves. But we must remember the assistance part of the Doctrine. These countries are not going to be building up military machines of their own. We hope that Vietnam and Cambodia will become lesser burdens over time to us. We now see this as the best road in that area. Senator Scott asked whether Cambodia was not developing a war machine. The President replied that in fact Cambodia’s military operation was rather lean. Secretary Laird concurred, and added that we were proposing a reasonable investment in Cambodia’s military. They were making an all-out effort, and had done well so far. The aid will go for ammunition, small arms, trucks, and the like. It will provide no aircraft, helicopters, or other heavy equipment. Concerning the restoration of funds to programs from which money was borrowed for urgent need in Cambodia and elsewhere, Secretary Laird noted that we should honor our commitments. We had told the recipient countries about the size of their programs, and thus needed to restore funds to implement them. Senator Scott added that this also was a Congressional commitment, because Congress had voted the country funds too. Secretary Laird then suggested that Korea would not be as controversial. There we would have to anticipate Korean military needs to permit US withdrawals. The Koreans had asked for $350 million of additional assistance, but the $150 million request is as far as we should go. Secretary Rogers added that some would ask why we did not wait to submit our request. One answer was that the South Koreans were very jittery about North Korea and that it was psychologically important for them that we move quickly. Secretary Laird said we should supply the assistance as we withdraw; Secretary Rogers commented that the withdrawals and assistance go hand in hand. The Koreans are terribly upset by our withdrawals. Secretary Laird noted that this was our first cutback there in at least 10 years, and that a 20,000 man reduction is a pretty good cut from a ceiling of 65,000. Secretary Laird then noted that no authorization was needed for Israel; it had been obtained in the Defense Procurement Act. However, we should keep both parts of the appropriation in the same bill. This would be easier to handle than two separate supplemental appropriations. We would, however, need authorization for the other parts of the package. Senator Scott agreed that it would be easier to hold the package together in view of the time pressure of the present session. Senator Mansfield also appeared to agree. Senator Mansfield then asked about the total cost of the package. Secretary Laird replied that it was $1,035 million. It included $195 million for economic assistance, $340 million for military assistance, and a $500 million credit for Israel. The objectives were to keep us out of the Middle East and compensate for our withdrawals in Asia. The President added that it was to assure the withdrawals. Senator Mansfield responded “just so long as there is a quid”. Secretary Laird noted that military assistance to Vietnam could be handled in the DOD budget. However, we could not handle Cambodia there. Senator Mansfield asked whether the request would to the Armed Services Committee. Secretary Laird said he was afraid not; it would go to the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Russell then twitted Senator Mansfield about moving it to the Foreign Relations Committee after he (Russell) had left the Armed Services Committee. Secretary Laird said that the Armed Services Committee had taken jurisdiction on Israel, and could take this although he assumed it would not. The President then said that he did not like to bring up such a request at the end of a Congressional session. He had found it was necessary to do so, however, so was now bringing it to the leadership. He would do the same with the House leadership, when they were out of the Trade Bill discussion. The package was essential. He was not seeking a Congressional fight. Secretary Laird said that the shopping lists for the countries were well worked out. However, they were too detailed to go into now. The President noted that three or four Senators probably would want to look at them. Secretary Rogers injected that the foreign policy of this Government was now extremely well regarded. He hoped this request would not disturb that regard. We were getting praise everywhere for our approach in the Middle East 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. Confidential. There is no drafting information on the memorandum, which was transmitted to Kissinger under cover of a November 20 memorandum from Bergsten, along with two other memoranda of conversation covering the discussion of “US/Soviet Military Capabilities and their Political Consequences” and “The Cuba Situation.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 4:33 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 2 The President had, however, met earlier in the day with Representative Otto Passman regarding the Supplemental. (Ibid.) An undated briefing memorandum from Timmons to the President for his meeting with Passman is ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 10/7/70-12/31/70. 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1970 , pp. 1074-1079. A November 10 memorandum to the President from Under Secretary of State Irwin indicates that the request for a supplemental was the outgrowth of the October 14 memorandum from Rogers and Laird ( Document 39 ) to which the President had indicated agreement in principle. Irwin attached to his memorandum a November 5 Department of State paper for the Under Secretaries Committee on the Congressional Presentation Scenario and a draft message to Congress. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 85A) The supplemental legislation was enacted by Congress on January 5, 1971. For text of the President’s January 6 statement commending the Congress for its prompt action, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , p. 26. 4 On February 22, 1969, President Nixon had initialed a memorandum to Rogers and Kissinger, which read in part: “Under no circumstances will domestic political considerations have any bearing on the decisions I make with regard to the Mideast. The only considerations which will affect my decisions on this policy will be the security interests of the United States. In the future, I want no reference to domestic political considerations to be included in any papers and I do not want the subject of domestic political considerations to be brought up in discussions of this subject.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 835, NSC Review Group) 43. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Walker) to President Nixon 43. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Walker) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 12, 1970. Senator Gore is successfully filibustering the authorization bill for a U.S. quota increase in the International Monetary Fund, and contributions to the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. As is indicated in the attached excellent article from today’s Washington Post , 2 all efforts to obtain a vote have failed. These efforts are likely to continue to fail. If so, such failure would constitute at least a temporary—and perhaps a longer lasting— setback to your policy of shifting toward multilateral aid (i.e., as in the Peterson Report). The only courses of action now open seem to be: (1) A call from you to Senator Mansfield urging him to put the pressure on Gore—through long sessions, suasion, or perhaps cloture—to allow a vote on the merits. (Yesterday’s procedural vote on recommittal indicates strong Senate sentiment for passage of legislation intact.) (2) Acceptance of a Gore amendment to hold back the “soft loan” authorizations for IDB and ADB, so that the IMF quota increase, and a nominal rise in our World Bank capital, could pass this session. Only you can judge the drawbacks of your approaching Mansfield as suggested. He might or might not be cooperative. If cooperative, there would be a fairly good chance that he could beat Gore. But it seems to me that there is much more at stake here than mere passage of this bill at this time. It seems to me that Mansfield should understand clearly that weak leadership efforts on his part on Administration legislation—especially legislation with which he fully concurs—will not go unnoticed at the highest level. As I have stated in other memoranda to you, I am convinced the coming two sessions of Congress are going to be most difficult from our standpoint, and I think Mansfield should understand that we are going to fight hard for our programs. The advantages of moving on the IMF and World Bank portions are strong: we would save $130 million in “special drawing rights” which we must claim, through the authorization legislation, before January 1, 1971. But the disadvantages are also important: With the third replenishment of the International Development Authority (soft loan window of the World Bank) coming up, we would be presenting to Congress next year requests for total “soft loan” funds amounting to a whopping $2.1 billion ($1 billion for IDA, $100 million for ADB, and $1 billion for IDB). This would be in addition to any large foreign aid request the Administration may forward to the Hill next year. Although passage of so large a measure would not be impossible, it would certainly be difficult—especially in view of the fact that our Republicans in the House, who responded loyally to your requests in this session on this legislation, would have to vote for the same measure all over again. The other great disadvantage of splitting the bill is clearly described in the Post article—the blow to our prestige in Latin America, especially in view of the fact that our friends to the South view the IDB capital increase as our major contribution to your new “mature partnership” in Latin America. The timing is especially unfortunate in the light of the announcement that Ortiz Mena will head the IDB. 3 Recommendation: That you call Senator Mansfield requesting him to use all of his persuasion and powers of leadership to bring the measure, intact, to a vote in this session. Charly (Secretary Kennedy, who is out of town, strongly supports the above recommendation.) 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, FN 10 IMF. No classification marking. Attached to a December 15 memorandum from Secretary Rogers to the President endorsing Walker’s request that the President call Senator Mansfield in an effort to bring the legislation up for a vote. 2 Not printed. 3 Antonio Ortiz Mena, who until August 1970 was Mexico’s Minister of Finance, had been elected with U.S. support as President of the Inter-American Development Bank at a special meeting of the IDB’s Board on November 27. Argentina and Venezuela had also put forward candidates for the position, apparently with some support elsewhere in Latin America, and the election had been contentious. Secretary Kennedy summarized the issues in a December 10 memorandum to President Nixon. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the President—September-December 1970) 44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 15, 1970. SUBJECT Need for Your Intervention on International Financial Institutions Legislation Our International Financial Institutions Bill (IFI) is in deep trouble, and Treasury recommends (Tab B) 2 that your personal intervention is needed to make its passage possible during this session. Secretary Rogers endorses Walker’s recommendation (Tab C). 3 The IFI bill includes authorizations for continued US participation in the Inter-American Bank and the Asian Development Bank. It also provides for our share in the expansion of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Senator Gore is using this legislation as the vehicle for his swan song vendetta against the Administration. The bill will pass easily if brought to a vote on the Senate floor, but Gore has succeeded twice in talking it off the calendar. It appears that only your strong personal intervention may be sufficient to induce Senator Mansfield to shut off Gore, with long sessions, persuasion, and a cloture vote if necessary. The bill is crucial to our foreign policy in several respects, and I therefore urge you to intervene with Mansfield: —The sharp increase in our Inter-American Development Bank contribution is the most important concrete demonstration of our deep interest in development in Latin America and is regarded by the Latins as our major contribution to the new “mature partnership” with them. It is particularly crucial now as we attempt to prevent Chile from mobilizing hemispheric support against us. —The Asian Development Bank is the only concrete evidence of our interest in supporting Asian regionalism. —The IMF quota increase must be passed if we are to get our proportional share of the next allocation of Special Drawing Rights. Failure of this legislation would cause us to lose $130 million in essentially free international reserves. The authorization bill has already passed the House. Senate author-ization is needed now if the appropriations are to be available early next year, when they are needed. More important, postponement into next year may delay the authorization significantly because the committee may then wait to see your whole new aid proposal before voting on it. In addition, early next year we must submit legislation authorizing our share in the doubling of the resources of the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank, which is the most important single component of our multilateral aid theme. Linking that proposal with the other IFIs would present such a large sum of money that the Congress might balk. If we don’t get this legislation now, it will thus probably be much harder to get the larger package next session. It would be tragic to let a single lame duck Senator stop legislation which constitutes a major element of your foreign policy. Senator Mansfield, however, has so far been very reluctant to stand firm against Gore. It is not certain that your intervention would succeed in getting him to do so, but it seems that nothing else has a chance. Recommendation: That you call Senator Mansfield urgently to try to persuade him to bring the IFI bill to an early vote on the Senate floor, using the talking points at Tab A. State and Treasury strongly support your making such a call. Bill Timmons opposes, on the grounds that Ken BeLieu has already spoken to Mansfield about the issue three times and that a further call is unlikely to change the situation, in view of the availability to Gore of further delaying tactics. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume I. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” 2 Document 43 . 3 Not printed; see footnote 1, Document 43 . 4 The President wrote “no” below the last paragraph. No additional documentation on this legislation was found but a compromise apparently was reached and the impasse broken. According to the President’s signing statement on December 31, the soft loan funds for the Asian Development Bank were dropped from the legislation and only a down-payment was authorized for the Fund for Special Operations in the Inter-American Development Bank. The President promised legislation to restore his requests early in the new Congress. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 1164-1165. That request was sent to Congress on January 26, 1971; see ibid., 1971, p. 72. 45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Supplemental —The Supplemental is being held up by Senator Fulbright through the device of refusing to convene a conference with House conferees. —Senator Church has pledged to break the impasse if Secretary Rogers will give him a letter which in effect will express the Administration intention to conform to the restrictions on ground troops or advisors in Cambodia contained in Section 6 of the appropriation bill (at Tab B). 2 —Church and Fulbright fear the Administration will take advantage of the broader language contained in the DOD appropriations bill (at Tab C). 3 —Assistant Secretary Abshire believes such a letter is essential to passage of the Supplemental. (Draft language at Tab A.) 4 —Bill Timmons believes it may be essential. —It is State’s position that such a letter merely confirms what you told Senator Church at the reception last Tuesday, and what you stated at your press conference. 5 —The colloquy referred to in the letter (at Tab D) 6 contains the following “concerns”: —That you would seek congressional consent before undertaking a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. —That the President’s powers and responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief not be interfered with. —That an “incursion” would be within the President’s power to act without Congress. —That an incursion on the scale undertaken last spring would be prohibited under the new language. Decision The draft language is approved 7 The draft language is disapproved 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 318, Cooper-Church Amendment. No classification marking. The NSC Correspondence Profile sheet indicates the memorandum was logged in on December 21. 2 Not printed. The Cooper-Church Amendment would restrict U.S. military activities in Cambodia. See Document 28 . 3 Not printed. 4 The draft language, dated December 19, reads as follows: “Dear Senator Church: Confirming Assistant Secretary Abshire’s conversation with you, I should like to affirm that the Administration’s programs, policies and intentions in Cambodia in no way conflict with Section 6 of HR 19911, or with the concerns expressed in the colloquy on the floor of the Senate on 15th December.” 5 Not further identified. 6 Not found. 7 The President initialed this option. The correspondence profile sheet contains a December 28 notation from Lehman that reads: “Language OKd by Pres, sent by Rogers to Cooper & Church, deal made. Supplemental sprung from Conf and passed Senate Wednesday 23rd. Hurrah!” 46. Action Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 46. Action Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 4, 1971. SUBJECT FY 1972 Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Credit Dave Packard has sent the President a memo (Tab A) appealing some of the tentative budget decisions made by OMB regarding the FY 72 military assistance program. 2 Packard argues that the recommended changes “are necessary if we are to maintain military assistance and credit sales as the essential instruments with which we will continue to implement the Nixon Doctrine.” I understand he also called you to express his concerns. 3 The Packard memo makes the following procedural points: —For the second year in a row OMB obtained decisions on budget requests for military assistance without a Department of Defense representative being present to express his views. —The levels jointly recommended by Defense and State were not used as the basis for decision. The memo specifically appeals to the President to raise the MAP amounts budgeted for: —Taiwan (from $15 to $25 million) —Greece (from $15 to $25 million) —Turkey (from $90 to $130 million) —Jordan (from $30 to $50 million) The memo makes the observation that: —the amount budgeted for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit is based on an assumption that such credit in the amount of $250 million will be available in FY 71 and, if necessary to obtain it, a supplemental request will be made in January to the new Congress. Finally, the memo recommends that: —FMS credit for Israel in FY 72 be budgeted at $100 million and that any additional requirement be met through the Jackson Amendment, —a dedicated MAP Contingency Fund of $25 million be established. This is the kind of memo that will eventually drive me to drink. But let me try to sort out the issues and non-issues. Procedures Packard is right in saying that the levels jointly recommended by Defense and State were not used as the basis for a decision. The reason is simply that the joint Defense/State recommendations were not available at the time the decisions were made. As I understand it, State’s and Defense’s recommendations regarding MAP and FMS were due in early December. After daily appeals by OMB, they were made available (separately from State and Defense) at the staff level, around the middle of December. When State and Defense learned of OMB’s tentative decisions, they apparently logrolled a new joint position which was forwarded in a memo to OMB, dated December 23, 1970. 4 The original agency requests that I saw (shown in the table at Tab B), 5 discussed at Shultz’s request with OMB, used in my memo to you dated December 18, 1970 (Tab C), 5 and later discussed at length with you, differ from the December 23 requests in several ways. (You will recall that in our discussion you agreed to the NSC/OMB figures except you asked for another $100 million in import financing for Vietnam and another $50 million in the President’s contingency fund.) These differences are summarized below together with the initial OMB recommendations and the agreed OMB/NSC figures based on the earlier agency requests. Agency Request December 18 Agency Request December 23 OMB Recommendation Based on Earlier Request OMB/NSC Agreed Based on Earlier Request Cambodia $220.0 $205.2 $170.0 $200.0 Greece 20.0 30.0 15.0 15.0 Jordan 30.0 50.0 15.0 30.0 Latin America 16.0 11.0 16.0 16.0 MAP Contingency Fund 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 President’s Contingency Fund 0.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 I think it is apparent from the above table that I drove a relatively hard bargain with OMB based on the earlier agency requests—though it looks less hard in light of the later higher requests. As to Packard’s point regarding representation, representatives from the agencies are never allowed at OMB’s “Director’s Review” sessions. These are internal OMB staff sessions with the Director to prepare him for later discussions with the President and with representatives of the agencies. On occasion, White House personnel are invited to attend these sessions as Ed David and I were this year. Packard’s assertion that a new procedure has been adopted over the past two years is simply untrue. The agencies have ample opportunities to make their views known as his memo attests. Taiwan Packard states that the proposed MAP level of $15 million “is not consistent with our objectives of upgrading the air defense and reorganizing the Chinese Armed Forces” and should be raised to $25 million. It should be pointed out that the total MAP and FMS funds budgeted by OMB for Taiwan is $65 million. This is the same as the total amount requested by Defense/State. The OMB figure contains $10 million more for FMS because they believe countries with large cash reserves such as Taiwan should rely somewhat more on FMS and thus free up more MAP funds for countries without large reserves. Greece and Turkey The Packard memo notes that “these two countries occupy key strategic positions with respect to the critical Middle East situation,” that Secretary Laird’s recent trip to the area “convinced us that they are doing a fine military job with limited resources, but both are badly in need of new and relatively expensive equipment,” and that “now is certainly not the time to reduce military assistance to these countries.” To begin with, military assistance to Greece and Turkey is not being reduced. MAP assistance to Greece in FY 71 is $17.7 million and to Turkey $92.1 million. OMB’s FY 72 recommendations are $15 million in MAP and $45 million in FMS for Greece and $90 million in MAP and $8 million in FMS for Turkey. In both cases, the totals are larger than for FY 71. Moreover, in the case of Greece, the issue again is more one of composition of MAP and FMS than the total. Greece has more than ample cash reserves, some of which could be used for FMS purchases. In regard to Turkey, OMB has serious doubts about Turkey’s ability to absorb more than $100 million in MAP. Jordan According to Packard, “the Senior Review Group is considering a three-year program estimated at $140 million and it appears to be generally agreed that at least the FY 1972 increment will have to be grant aid. If so, $50 million will be required and I recommend this amount.” All of this is news to OMB (and to me). 7 The earlier request for Jordan was $30 million which I convinced OMB was necessary. I believe OMB is prepared to raise the MAP amount for Jordan if you so desire. (Purely as an aside, has anyone looked into what impact such an expenditure would have on the Jordanian economy?) Israel State requested and the OMB mark provides $300 million in FMS credit. Defense requested $100 million in FMS for Israel and the Packard memo appears to be appealing the OMB mark downward . The rationale is not clear, particularly since, if the Defense recommendation were followed, the budget would understate the need. Presumably Defense would propose seeking an additional $200 million later under the Jackson Amendment. The OMB mark would reserve the Jackson Amendment as a fallback if the funds are not provided by Congress under the Foreign Military Credit Sales Act. This would seem to be the more sensible strategy. Contingency Fund The OMB mark is $100 million for foreign aid contingencies, whether military or economic assistance or disaster relief. This is several times larger than the fund has been in recent years ($12-15 million). It was increased by OMB from $25 to $50 million specifically at my request and from $50 to $100 million at your request. Defense wants a separate earmarked military assistance contingency fund of $25 million instead of the amount being part of the President’s contingency fund. In my judgment this would reduce Presidential flexibility. Moreover, if the $25 million MAP contingency fund sought by Defense should prove to be inadequate, it is questionable whether the President’s fund could then be used for that purpose. Foreign Military Sales Defense is not appealing the OMB mark, which is higher than Defense requested. Defense seems merely to be going on the record to the effect that if the Congress does not appropriate funds for an FMS program in 1971, a later upward amendment to the 1972 budget amount may be needed. There is no disagreement on this point. My Views Except for Vietnam and Cambodia, there is no analysis to support any of these numbers. We are all groping in the dark, relying on precedent and intuition, and guessing at levels and composition. I have no analytical basis for knowing whether the MAP and FMS amounts for the countries concerned should be increased or decreased or should remain the same; neither does State/Defense or OMB. My inclination is to ask for more based on the principles of having cut insurance with the Congress and having too much rather than too little. We badly need some analysis in this important area. The only thing that is clear is the overall trend of our assistance programs. The trend is clearly up—and up substantially. Even without any more increases, the total MAP program in FY 72 will be $688 million. This compares to a total program of $391 million in FY 70 and $436 million in FY 71 ($776 million if the $340 million in the supplemental is included). In addition, we are planning on a $100 million contingency fund in FY 72 (compared to $15 million in FY 71) and Foreign Military Credit Sales of $602 million compared to $70 million in FY 70 and $250 million in FY 71. Finally, the supporting assistance program for FY 72 will be $818 million, up $205 million from FY 71 and $304 million from FY 70. Next Steps As a result of discussion between the two of you in San Clemente last summer regarding memos to the President dealing with budgetary items, 8 Shultz believes that OMB should have the action on this memo. He has already asked Schlesinger to discuss the issues with Defense/State. From my conversations with Schlesinger, I know that he is willing to raise Taiwan from $15 to $20 million, Turkey from $90 to $100 million, and Jordan from $30 to $40 million simply on the basis of the new requests alone. He will probably go even higher if you support the Defense/State requests. Recommendations 9 I recommend: —(1) That you make your views known to Shultz regarding the MAP requests for Taiwan, Greece, Turkey, and Jordan. —(2) Alternatively, that you make your views known to me and I will relay them to Schlesinger. State/Defense MAP Request OMB Recommendation HAK Recommendation Taiwan $25 $20 Greece 25 15 Turkey 130 100 Jordan 50 40 —(3) That you forget about the issues of procedures, a separate MAP Contingency Fund, budget strategies for obtaining FMS credit for Israel, and the assumptions underlying the FY 71 Foreign Military Credit Sales Act. —(4) That action on answering the Packard memo be formally given to OMB. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Top Secret; Sensitive; Urgent. 2 Dated December 30, 1970; not printed. 3 See also Document 47 . 4 Identified in Packard’s December 30 memorandum as a letter from Irwin to Shultz; not found. Secretary Rogers on December 31 sent a memorandum to President Nixon with an appeal, similar to Packard’s, of the OMB-recommended funding levels. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 226, Department of Defense 12/1/70-2/23/71) 5 Not printed. 5 Not printed. 7 Senior Review Group meetings on October 9 and December 17, 1970, dealt with Jordan but no record of subsequent meetings was found, although Jordan may have been discussed in broader meetings on the Middle East. (National Security Council, Secretariat, Record of NSC and Related Meetings 1/20/69-12/31/72) 8 Not further identified. 9 No record of Kissinger’s action on these recommendations was found, and the column for his recommendations in the table below is blank, but see Documents 47 and 48 . 47. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 47. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 4, 1971. Henry: This is the memo which Dave Packard called you on. 2 I think it is important that you do not get caught in the middle between OMB and Defense and there is something to be said for both sides. I agree with Wayne 3 that you should permit OMB to answer Packard’s memo and to establish the final mark on each assistance program. After telling Shultz that he should raise Taiwan from 15 to 20, Turkey from 90 to 100 and Jordan from 30 to 40, Defense’s proposal on Israel is a disaster and OMB should be sustained at $300 million in foreign military sales credit versus the $100 million suggested by Defense. I also believe that the contingency fund directed by you should be sustained. In short, I recommend that we inform Packard’s office of the increases for Taiwan, Greece, Turkey and Jordan and then tell Shultz that we anticipate that he will make these increases and let OMB handle the balance being sure that Smith tells them to hold firm on the contingency fund and the FMS credit for Israel. Al 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the message was sent to Kissinger telegraphically. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Kissinger was in San Clemente. The President traveled to San Clemente on January 5. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 2 See footnote 2, Document 46 . 3 K. Wayne Smith. See Document 46 . 48. Action Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 48. Action Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 San Clemente, California, January 7, 1971. SUBJECT MAP and FMS, 1972 Wayne Smith called to give you the latest status on the OMB budget recommendations. Referring to page 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] of his memorandum attached, 2 the revised figures are as shown: State/Defense MAP Request Original OMB Recommendation Revised OMB HAK Recommendation 3 Taiwan $25 $15 $20 $25 Greece 25 15 15 25 Turkey 130 90 100 100 Jordan 50 30 45 45 Indonesia 13 13 25 25 Ethiopia 13 12 13 13 The rationale for the OMB recommendations (with which Smith agrees subject to your approval) is as follows: 4 Taiwan . State urges the additional funds because of the possible foreign policy problems which may arise. OMB has raised its original recommendation by $5 million. The total of MAP and FMS is equal to the total of $65 million requested by State and Defense. OMB adds $5 million to FMS and reduces MAP by $5 million because Taiwan is flush with cash reserves and in a position to buy. 5 Greece . Again the total MAP and FMS equals the $60 million requested by State and Defense. OMB however puts more in FMS and less in MAP because Greece is flush with cash reserves and can buy (they cite purchases of aircraft from France, for example). Turkey . For the past five years MAP for Turkey has run between $90 and $95 million. OMB and Smith believe Turkey cannot absorb more than $100 million in MAP. There also is $10 million in FMS (for a total of $110 million). Jordan . State and DOD originally requested $30 million. OMB agreed to this level. The latest State-Defense request is $50 million. There is no definitive estimate on which this is based. OMB is willing to increase from $30 to a total of $45 million. Ethiopia . OMB agrees with State’s strong request for a total of $13 million. Indonesia . OMB has put in $25 million per our request. If you wish any changes we should get them to OMB today since Budget is going to press tonight. Smith believes the latest OMB proposals (the revised OMB column) will do the job. You might wish to talk to Mr. Packard about this to be sure that no wires are crossed. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 196, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Top Secret; Sensitive; Urgent. This copy of Kennedy’s memorandum is on White House stationery, but Kissinger and Kennedy were both in San Clemente, as was OMB Director Shultz. 2 Document 46 . 3 Kissinger wrote in the figures in this column. Above the column, Kennedy wrote on January 7: “Called to Wayne Smith.” See also footnote 5 below. 4 At the end of the memorandum Kennedy wrote on January 8: “I subsequently mentioned to HAK the fact that MAP contingency fund request had been raised from $15 to $100 million—thus the levels were not frozen should needs arise later in the year. HAK said he wants to hold firm on the $25 million for Taiwan and prefers $25 million for Greece though would not fight to the death on the Greece figure.” 5 At the bottom of the first page of the memorandum, Haig (presumably at some later date in Washington) wrote: “Haig/HAK Shultz 8 Jan phoncon,” drew a line to the Taiwan and Greece rows in the table, and wrote to the right of Kissinger’s “$25” entries, “Now 20.” 49. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 49. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 19, 1971. SUBJECT International Security Assistance The report of the Under Secretaries Committee on the new International Security Assistance Program was transmitted to you on February 5. 2 Since that time the Office of Management and Budget has been working with an Interdepartmental Group on the preparation of the implementing legislation. There appear still to be major points of disagreement between ourselves and the Department of Defense on some of the key issues involved. Because these issues go to the heart of the way responsibilities are handled in the foreign policy field, I wish to give you my views on them, supplementing those I sent you on August 4 of last year. 3 The position of the Department of Defense, as I understand it, is that all elements of security assistance should be funded in the DOD budget, and, accordingly, that jurisdiction over the program should reside in the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate. Originally the Department of Defense desired a change in the pres-ent statutory authorities to give the Secretary of Defense more and the Secretary of State less authority over policy. Now Defense apparently believes that if the new program were shifted to the Defense Department budget it would not press for change in the present division of statutory authority between the Secretaries of State and Defense. Defense appears not to have made a judgment as to whether the responsibility for the administration of supporting assistance (presently administered by AID) should be placed in Defense or State, or in some new body outside the jurisdiction of either. State and Defense concur that the basic guidance for program planning should continue to come from an annual State-Defense memorandum. The major rationale expressed by the Department of Defense for its position is that security assistance finds its primary justification as a “trade off” for the maintenance of U.S. forces overseas. Thus, its approach to the Nixon Doctrine stresses higher local force improvement goals and accelerated local force modernization. These are viewed as replacements for U.S. forces which would be withdrawn or as ways to decrease U.S. base line forces to the virtual exclusion of the other significant military-security, political and economic considerations. In this, I believe, lies the heart of our difference. I believe that there should be no change in the present division of statutory authority between the Secretaries of State and Defense and that there should be no change in the present Congressional Committee jurisdiction for the new program. In my view, security assistance is primarily an instrument of our foreign policy. As I stated in my memorandum of August 4, it should be “tied firmly to our foreign policy objectives and priorities.” I have no differences with Mel Laird over the use of this program to build up self-reliant security forces for our allies, but I believe that the program must be broadly enough conceived, directed, and administered to ensure that the necessary technical capability and economic underpinning are available to our allies to support the security forces required and at the same time to allow our allies to continue on the road toward healthy economic development. The guidance which you have provided for the Nixon Doctrine in your speeches and statements has always drawn a careful balance between the strengthening of local force capabilities and political and economic considerations. The Nixon Doctrine has not been and should not be presented in exclusively military terms—a course which would impair its acceptance by significant sections of the Congress and the public and would erode its great potential for providing the basis of a new consensus on America’s role in the world. Of course, the military portion of the program and its contribution to the security of ourselves and our allies will remain a principal factor in establishing our broad foreign policy objectives under the Nixon Doctrine. For the bulk of the security assistance recipients, the “trade off” is not the principal consideration, and linkages to U.S. defense programs are of secondary importance. Only in Vietnam, which would remain in the Defense budget as at present and would not be incorporated in the new Security Assistance Program, is the “trade off” for U.S. forces a principal consideration. While it is true to a lesser degree in Thailand and Korea that U.S. forces can be withdrawn through replacement by local forces built up through the new Security Assistance Program, even in these two instances such foreign policy considerations as the economic viability of the country concerned and its technical capability to undertake the defense program required are at least of equal importance with the question of the “trade off” for U.S. forces. In all other cases, from Latin America, through Liberia and Ethiopia, to Turkey, Greece and Taiwan, “trade offs” between security assistance and the presence of U.S. forces are either negligible or nil. Accordingly, I believe that the “trade off” rationale will not be persuasive with the Congress, whose full support will be required if we are to initiate the reforms embodied in the new Security Assistance Program approach. An important new element in the Security Assistance Program is the integration of military and economic assistance. It is important that the various facets of the new program be developed together and in a manner that is mutually supporting. There now exist the materials for a freshly conceived International Security Assistance Program, distinct in purpose and organization, as announced in your September 15 message on foreign aid in the seventies. The new program, for the first time, will bring together in a separate framework foreign aid with a predominant rationale related to our overall foreign and security policy objectives, thus providing a basis for a better public understanding of these programs. As regards the issue of Committee jurisdiction, I understand the Defense Department arguments in favor of transferring the security assistance programs to the DOD budget and Armed Services Committee jurisdiction. I personally do not agree with the reasoning. Moreover, it appears that this is not a practical suggestion. It is my judgment that there is no way to achieve a change in Committee jurisdiction at an acceptable political cost. This view is apparently shared by all agencies except Defense, and Defense itself has not been able to suggest a practical means for making the change. In sum, I believe it essential to retain the present language of the Foreign Assistance Act (Sections 622 and 623) as it governs the respective jurisdiction of the Secretaries of State and Defense. As stated above, I am also in favor of using the annual joint State-Defense memorandum as the basic policy document in this field. The administration of supporting assistance should be located within the State Department because this will be largely civilian staffed and will in effect handle residual functions of AID. The administration of military assistance and sales should remain in Defense. We should not attempt to change Congressional Committee jurisdictions and the funds for the Security Assistance Program should be appropriated to the President, as at present, not to the Department of Defense. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. Secret. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers (PM) on February 18 and forwarded to Rogers under cover of a February 19 memorandum from Under Secretary Irwin indicating that the memorandum had been prepared at Rogers’ suggestion. (Ibid.) 2 Not found. 3 Document 30 . 50. Memorandum of Conversation 50. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 2, 1971, 11 a.m. THOSE PRESENT The President, Rudolph Peterson, Dr. Kissinger 2 Peter G. Peterson, Clark MacGregor Rudolph Peterson outlined the soundings he had already been taking on the Hill to prepare the way for submission of the President’s aid reform proposals. He indicated that support was growing for the idea of delaying it for another year. The idea is to move the FY ′72 appropriations quickly on the present AID basis, and then devote the rest of this Congress to deliberate consideration of the organizational reforms for the future. The President replied that this program had already been delayed for two years. It was time to move and we should avoid any further delays. The reform legislation should be submitted immediately. Rudolph Peterson then indicated that there was increased Congressional concern over the need for a single person to speak for the Administration on development assistance issues under the proposed new structure. They wanted someone who was operationally involved, and would not be satisfied to hear from the regional Assistant Secretaries of State. There was agreement that the Congress was entitled to have such a person to look to, and that one must be found. Peter Peterson seemed to be the most logical candidate, since he would be coordinating the new aid structure. There was of course a major problem with his appearing before the Congress, however, so further thought needed to be given to the problem. Finally, Rudolph Peterson asked whether the President would be willing himself to sit down with the Congressional leadership to help kick off the new program. The President responded affirmatively and would look to Mr. MacGregor and Rudolph Peterson to tell him when the time was right. There was also some discussion regarding the organization of the new security assistance program. Rudolph Peterson strongly urged that State maintain its present responsibilities in this area. Dr. Kissinger noted that a decision was needed shortly and that it would be up to the President to make his judgment. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Confidential. According to attached routing memoranda, Bergsten drafted the memorandum of conversation on March 3, based on Rudolph Peterson’s report of the meeting. A copy for the President’s record was sent by Houdek to Jon Huntsman on April 26. 2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Haig attended the meeting instead of Kissinger. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 51. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to Secretary of State Rogers 51. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Your Authority under New Aid Legislation Problem I see an opportunity for you now to influence the President’s decisions on aid reorganization in a way that may spare his new program from a possible Congressional rebuff and will also strengthen your grip on foreign aid policy. This opportunity arises in the form of two issues the President must shortly decide. First, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will raise again with the President the issue of what basic form the new aid legislation should take. 2 The choice is between an act by which Congress authorizes specific new institutions, or a briefer, general bill which leaves all powers in the President to delegate as he sees fit to existing or new institutions created by executive order. The principals of the agencies concerned with aid reorganization, State, AID, Treasury, OMB, NSC, have been requested to state their views on this issue. Second, Rudolf Peterson has told the President that his consultations indicate a very strong desire among key Congressmen that the President’s proposals provide a coordination locus, in the form of a single man concerned with both operations and policy whom the Congress can look to on all foreign assistance issues. 3 Discussion Issue of Legislative Form At the March 4 meeting of the interagency Steering Group headed by OMB, 4 Assistant Director Schlesinger stated that OMB feels the new aid act should not create institutions, but merely authorize programs—capital assistance, technical assistance, etc.—and appropriate funds to the President. The President would then delegate his authority to new institutions created by executive order. These institutions could to some extent reflect the institutional structure proposed in the Peterson Report but several basic features would lapse. For example, the capital lending institution could not be incorporated nor have a board of directors, as such. OMB claims that last December the President did state a preference for having all powers left with the President, although at that time he probably did not understand that this precluded setting up an International Development Corporation. OMB favors this approach because it believes this leaves the President full control over foreign assistance, whereas the alternative, independent institutions authorized by Congress, gives the Presidents and Boards of these institutions significant authority in an important area of foreign policy. The NSC and AID representatives in the Steering Group took the view that the new legislation should take the form of Congressional authorization of the specific new institutions, including the major features of their structures and modes of operation. The NSC representative stressed that the President in his Foreign Assistance Message last September, based on NSDM 76, 5 publicly stated his decision to create an International Development Corporation. Also, virtually all the work done on reorganization so far presupposes new institutions created by law. If the President wants to undertake a meaningful reform of foreign assistance, he should be strongly inclined to this latter option and against the OMB approach. The basic newness of his proposals is their institutional reform and unless he places this before the Congress, the result is likely to be no meaningful reform. The type of act OMB desires is basically the structure of the present Foreign Assistance Act with all the administrative and foreign policy restrictions removed. But if asked to give the President such broad authority, the Congress is likely to concentrate on restricting his use of it, leading to an end-result that may differ very little from the current Act and may even further restrict his foreign policy flexibility. Rudolf Peterson apparently received the impression that the President does want meaningful reform along the lines of the Peterson Report and that he is willing to give his proposals a strong kick-off and follow-up in terms of Congressional contacts. The President also told Peterson that he had rejected totally the tactic of seeking an FY 72 aid appropriation on the old basis—a possibility which Peterson told the President some Congressmen had heard about. Issue of Coordination The Steering Group, March 4, was briefed on Rudolf Peterson’s report to the President that Congress wants a single man who is responsible for aid coordination and responsive to Congressional queries. 6 The NSC representative argued that this man should logically be Peter Peterson, although he recognized that the problem of executive privilege will require that someone else do the testifying. James Schlesinger stated that the Congress should be told that it is not going to get one man but 7 or 8 (the heads of IDC, IDI, OPIC, ISDI, people from State in charge of humanitarian and UN programs, etc.). We stated that State should play an important role in coordination and that we would have specific suggestions to put forward shortly. I feel strongly that neither the Peter Peterson nor multi-headed approach are responsive to the Congressional concern or realistic in terms of the foreign policy coordination problems involved in foreign aid. The strong Congressional reaction which Peterson reported to the President confirms our view that the President’s proposals will be imperiled unless he provides a foreign policy coordination point, responsive to Congress. Congress, like OMB, has a legitimate concern that an array of new independent agencies not operate without policy and operational coordination with other foreign affairs interests. The Congress also feels strongly that this coordinator should be one to whom it can turn on all foreign assistance issues, security as well as development. This can only be the Secretary of State, given your responsibility for foreign affairs, your role in both security and economic assistance, your position in both the NSC and the International Economic Policy Council, and your position vis-a-vis the Congress. There are various ways you could mold the structure of the Department to support you in this role as coordinator of foreign assistance. You should consider the alternatives here at an early date. It is clear, however, that the Department can gear up to provide this coordination and do so in a way that focuses on the role of development in our longer-term foreign policy interests—the point the Peterson Report considered so important. To be in a position to exercise this coordinating responsibility, we will need a strong section in the new aid legislation making you responsible for coordination and creating the new institutions subject to your policy guidance. In carrying out our coordinating role we could use the International Economic Policy Council as a vehicle for consideration of major issues of policy coordination, the Council’s Operations Group for coordination of country program issues and our board memberships in the new institutions to facilitate oversight of operations. We could look at foreign policy as a whole and not disparate elements unmeaningfully forced into a single context. Recommendations I, therefore, recommend that you: 1. Support establishment of the new aid institutions by law, as appears necessary to follow through on the President’s commitment to a new approach along the lines of the Peterson Report. 2. Urge the President to have the legislation on development aid designate the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, as responsible for coordination of all economic aid agencies to the extent required to assure the consistency of their operations with the foreign policy of the U.S. (This modification of the legislation will meet Congress’s concern about coordination and thereby greatly improve prospects for passage. It will also meet the sense of OMB’s objection to legislative creation of the new institutions, because the President’s control over these institutions is assured through you. This approach does not conflict with Peter Peterson’s role because the Council on International Economic Policy is a creature of the President, under whose direction you serve, and because you, as Vice Chairman of the Council, and the Department as head of the Operations Group will use the Council as a vehicle for your coordination.) 3. Request the President to have the legislation create each new institution under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State, the language used in OPIC’s statute. 4. Inform the President that the Department promptly can be structured and staffed to carry out this role. These recommendations have been discussed with the Under Secretary who agrees with them. 7 Attached at Tab A is a memorandum to the President which incorporates these four points. 8 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 5. No classification marking. Drafted by Paul H. Boeker (E/IFD/ODF) on March 5; cleared by Weintraub (E/IFD), in substance by Carter (L) and Schnee (H), and by Arthur Hartman (S/PC). 2 See Document 53 . 3 See Documents 50 and 52 . 4 This meeting has not been further identified. 5 NSDM 76 is Document 136 . The September 15, 1970, message to Congress is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970, pp. 745-758. 6 For the Peterson Report, see Document 128 . 7 None of the Approve/Disapprove options under the recommendations is checked. 8 Tab A, a March 5 memorandum from Secretary Rogers to President Nixon, urged the President to designate the Secretary of State as the focal point for coordinating U.S. economic assistance policies and agencies. The memorandum assured the President that this approach would not conflict with Peter Peterson’s role on the Council on International Economic Policy. 52. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs (Abshire) to Secretary of State Rogers 52. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs (Abshire) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, March 8, 1971. SUBJECT Congressional Consultations on New Foreign Assistance Legislation by Rudolph Peterson—Chairman of the President’s Task Force on International Development Last week Rudolph Peterson participated in a dozen meetings on the new foreign assistance proposals. The message is that Congress will not vote to abolish what it considers to be its effective oversight function over foreign assistance and will insist that there be a central coordinating authority accountable to the Congress. Mr. Peterson’s meetings included one with the President and his principal White House staff, 2 a lunch with Jack Irwin and Congressman Mailliard, and nine-calls on the Hill attended by sixteen of the Chairmen and senior members of the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committees. Clark MacGregor participated in two of the meetings on the Hill. A complete list of Members consulted is attached. 3 General Views . At this stage there is certainly no enthusiasm for new foreign assistance legislation. The malaise which has characterized Congressional attitudes on foreign assistance is believed to continue, accentuated by the disaffection of former supporters disenchanted by the war and/or by what they consider to be competing domestic requirements. However, the general philosophy behind the new concepts as presented by Mr. Peterson was invariably well received. Chairman Morgan said that without a new rationale he wasn’t sure there would be another aid bill. Nevertheless, there are serious, probably crucial, reservations concerning specific aspects of the new approach. The principal issues which arose during the discussions on the Hill are set forth below. Congressional Oversight . Crucial to the entire program from the Congressional viewpoint is the issue of whether the new legislation will provide what key Members consider to be effective Congressional oversight of the new development assistance programs. The President recognizes this and at the White House meeting instructed Clark MacGregor to come up with the answer. Central Point of Coordination and Accountability . Essential to effective Congressional oversight but also advocated because all Members consulted feel very strongly there must be such coordination, including in particular foreign policy guidance, at the operating level. Coordination and Accountability Provided by Statute . To assure adequate Congressional leverage, most Members consulted advocate the creation of the coordinating unit by statute at the agency level, i.e. not in the White House. They expect the heads of the individual agencies to be accountable to the Congress but this is not enough. They want a meaningful overall connection at the operating level. New Spigots Not New Barrels . Motivated strongly but not exclusively by their concern for effective centralized leverage, every Member consulted advocates the retention or creation of an overall body in which all of the development assistance agencies—OPIC, IDC, IDI, ISDI—could be located. Some Members, Senator Fulbright in particular, don’t understand why all the changes contemplated couldn’t be achieved within the present AID organization. Most find the new plan providing for proliferation instead of a retraction as advocated in the Congress. Others may be more concerned with the prospect of a Republican regime abolishing one agency (established in its present form by the Democrats) and creating in its place three or four new ones. Members of the Foreign Relations Committee asked whether the new setup would strengthen the State Department’s role in foreign assistance. Every Member consulted evidenced deep concern that the new units be established by statute rather than by Executive Order. Multilateral Institutions . In general the House Members were cool to the concept of greater reliance on international financial institutions as channels for development assistance, but this change was welcomed by Senators consulted. Senator Fulbright thinks this is the best way to expend whatever funds we allocate to this purpose but has reservations regarding the level of funding. Passman and Moss (not consulted this trip) lead the opposition in the House. Once again, Congressional oversight is a basic element in the reaction of the critics. Multi-Year Funding . Some opposition as fallout from general concern that Congressional oversight over foreign assistance is threatened, but Morgan would welcome three or four-year authorizations. Separation of Security and Development Assistance . All Foreign Affairs Committee Members consulted and Chairman Mahon (House Appropriations) are convinced that the separation will result in a loss of votes for Development Assistance, a prospect they consider dangerous in the light of recent votes wherein four or five switches would have prevented passage of the AID authorization bill. (We believe the Speaker shares this view.) Chairman Morgan has no objection to the Administration sending up two bills, recalling that the Committee combined them when a previous Administration sent up economic and military assistance bills. Morgan, Fulbright and all other Members of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees are concerned that the separation of the two bills might result in their Committees losing jurisdiction over Security Assistance. However, once they were assured on this point—Mr. Peterson said he strongly advocates that the present division be retained and that he is supported by influential advisors to the President—the Senators had no objection to separation. Advance Funding . Mailliard and his Republican colleagues on Foreign Affairs and Otto Passman strongly advocate that the Administration move promptly for a simple annual authorization on the basis of the present legislation and then send up the reorganization proposals. Passman warned that Congress was reluctant to enact continuing resolutions which would provide funds not regularly appropriated beyond sine die adjournment. No Senator raised this point, nor did Doc Morgan who said he would be ready and willing to move on the new legislation as soon as it is sent up. As Passman indicated, advocates of this unusual procedure appear to want to reduce pressure to get the new bills through in this session. Consultation . There is a strong feeling in both Committees (HFAC and SFRC) that the Administration has reneged on a promise made by Mr. Kissinger when he briefed the leadership after the President’s aid message last September and assured them that there would be complete consultations before the new legislation is sent up. This issue did not arise during the Peterson conversations but surfaced in other conversations before, after and during the Peterson visit. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. Confidential. Drafted by Schnee (H). Copies were sent to interested officials in the State Department and AID, to MacGregor at the White House, and to Bergsten at the NSC. 2 See Document 50 . 3 Not found. 53. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon 53. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 9, 1971. SUBJECT Presidential authorities under the proposed “International Development Assistance Act” In the preparation of the new foreign assistance legislation, a policy issue has arisen which needs decision before further drafting can proceed. That issue is the extent of statutory Presidential authorities over foreign aid. In the case of security assistance (military aid and supporting assistance) and the President’s foreign assistance contingency fund, there is no issue—the basic authorities will be in the President as they are now. The issue does relate to the proposed International Development Corporation and International Development Institute. There are two choices: — Option A . The Corporation and the Institute would be created by the new International Development Assistance Act, which would include appropriate details on their structure and management. The basic authorities would be vested by the Act in the boards of the two organizations. The principal Presidential authority specified in the Act would be for the appointment of the boards and other key officers. — Option B . The Act would vest all basic powers and functions in the President, and would include whatever authority is needed to permit the President to create the Corporation and Institute by Executive action as well as to make appointments. The intention to create those organizations would be restated in your message to the Congress, and testimony of Administration officials would include detailed explanation of the new organization. Arguments for Option A: 1. Both the Peterson report and your foreign aid message of September 15, 1970, 2 emphasized new directions for the decade of the 1970’s and these new directions will be symbolized by the new organizations. Creation by statute of the Corporation and Institute would reinforce the concept of their “independence,” business-like management, and fresh approach to foreign aid. If they are not created by statute, the argument might be made that the new legislation is a “warmed-over” Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. In this connection, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which assumed some of AID’s functions, was created by statute, as proposed by this Administration. 2. The success of new organizations will depend to some extent on obtaining flexibility for their management in carrying out the new programs in a business-like way. This will require persuading the Congress to refrain from applying to the Corporation and the Institute various limitations and restrictions that have burdened AID. Creation of the Corporation and Institute by statute might give greater assurance to the Congress that their management will be sounder than if they were created by executive action. Creation by statute also would give a greater impression of permanence and continuity. (Some would view this as a disadvantage.) 3. The President’s appointment power and the fact that government officials, including the Secretary of State, will serve on both boards—and will constitute a majority of the Corporation’s board—represent sufficient Presidential influence over the policies and operations of the Corporation and the Institute. 4. Option A might reinforce the intent that the two organizations will be free of short-term foreign policy considerations. (This implies, however, a narrow interpretation of Presidential interest, and the presence of the Secretary of State on the boards weakens this point.) Arguments for Option B: 1. Currently, and generally throughout the history of our foreign aid programs, the basic authorities have been placed in the President by statute and delegated by him, through Executive order, to appropriate agencies. The logic underlying this practice is that foreign aid, as a major element in our relations with other countries, is preeminently a Presidential function and that, therefore, the President’s direct control over the administering agencies should not be diluted by authorities vested by statute in those agencies. Option B would provide a more certain basis for Presidential control over foreign aid. Experience has shown that multi-headed agencies, as a practical matter, are more independent of Presidential influence than are single-headed agencies. Creation of the two organizations by statute might further attenuate that influence. 2. It would permit a shorter and simpler bill with a minimum of organizational specifics and, therefore, would present less of an opportunity for the Congress to legislate management and organizational detail which could hamstring the new agencies and lessen Presidential influence; e.g., by specifying staggered terms for members of the boards. (There could be, however, some adverse congressional reaction to the absence of organizational provisions in the legislation.) 3. Option B would preserve greater executive branch flexibility in two respects: (a) in the timing of an orderly transition from AID to the new institutions and the way it is carried out, and (b) in possible subsequent reassignments of functions that actual operating experience might suggest desirable. 4. The new directions for foreign aid are principally those of policy and program. To put the new organizations in statute might focus congressional attention unduly on organizational details at the expense of those new direction. Secretary Rogers favors Option A, 3 and John Hannah would probably favor it. In addition, Rudy Peterson in his consultations with members of the Congress has indicated that the Corporation and Institute will be established by statue. 4 There is some legal dispute as to whether or not the Congress may constitutionally delegate the legislative power to create a Government corporation, although there is a precedent for this in the Rubber Act of 1948. The bill drafters are preparing both Option A and Option B, and then we will ask for the views of the Justice Department on this question. If the conclusion should be negative, Option B may require a type of agency other than a “corporation” for the development lending program. While I believe that Option A has merit, my chief concern is Presidential influence over development assistance programs. Therefore, subject to satisfactory resolution of the legal issue, I prefer Option B. George P. Shultz Approve: 5 Option A Option B See me: 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. No classification marking. 2 For the Peterson Report, see Document 128 . For text of the September 15, 1970, message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 745-758. 3 Document 51 and footnote 8 thereto. 4 See Document 50 . 5 None of the options is checked. 54. Editorial Note 54. Editorial Note A draft of George Shultz’ March 9, 1971, memorandum to the President (Document 53) was sent to the NSC on March 5 by James Schlesinger with a request for Alexander Haig’s comments. No record of Haig’s response to Schlesinger was found, but attached to the OMB draft is the following handwritten note by Richard Kennedy: “Al— Argument 2 for option A is hardly an argument at all. Merely organizing by statute will not persuade ‘Congress to refrain from applying to the Corporation and Institute various limitations and restrictions that have burdened AID.’ Congress will have to put up the money and Congress will put such restrictions on the use of the money and how it is administered as Congress believes the situation demands. “Moreover, organizing by statute will not give greater assurance to Congress that their management will be sounder than if created by executive action. This is fatuous—the people appointed to the Boards and the executive management and the way they perform will be the basis for Congress’ judgment on this issue—not whether they are organized by statute or executive order. “The most important reason for going with option B is only alluded to in my view. Whatever the importance of our Development Goals (which the Corporation and Institute are to serve) they cannot be developed or pursued in a vacuum—they are an important if not essential ingredient of our foreign policy posture. They cannot be pursued without careful integration with our foreign policy machinery—total independence which option A suggests would lead inevitably to serious conflicts within the Government and Congress not the President would be the body to resolve them. As creatures of Congress (under option A) the Corporation and Institute would have the opportunity to pursue courses at variance with our basic objectives. This may be unlikely but it is not impossible. Even with AID in the Executive Branch and subject to State, the level of independence was often a source of concern. “There is no question in my mind but that we should go with option B.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971) 55. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 55. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 12, 1971. SUBJECT Presidential Authority or Direct Congressional Authorization of the New Aid Institutions? You indicated yesterday that you agree with George Shultz that the new development assistance institutions should be created via delegation of authority to the President, rather than directly by statute. 2 I fully understand the reason for your judgment. However, I disagree with it and am not sure that you have considered all aspects of the issue. 3 A paramount question is whether the Shultz option is legally possible. His own memo to the President indicates that he prefers the Presidential route “subject to satisfactory resolution of the legal issue”. The AID lawyers argue that it is impossible for Congress to delegate power to create a Government corporation. On the other hand, the Treasury lawyers feel that it can be done. Since this issue is crucial, and in fact determines whether Shultz would even stick by his own recommendation, I have sought a legal opinion from the Department of Justice. It would obviously be extremely embarrassing to attempt the Presidential route and be faced later with a legal impossibility of carrying out our own intent. I will therefore hold off giving you a memorandum to submit to the President on the issue until we get the opinion from Justice early next week. My guess is that Justice will support the Shultz view that it is possible to go the Presidential authority route. Even with the legal hurdle out of the way, however, I feel that our trying to do so would be a major mistake—if only because it will almost certainly not work. Numerous Congressional leaders raised the issue with Rudy Peterson during his recent consultations. Dave Abshire’s report to Secretary Rogers on the consultations (Tab A) 4 indicates “every member consulted evidenced deep concern that the new units be established by statute rather than by Executive Order.” Peterson met with the Chairmen and sixteen senior members of the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Appropriations Committees. The Shultz option thus looks like a non-starter. This is especially true since there is widespread feeling on the Hill that we have not lived up to your commitment last September for thorough consultations on the new aid program. 5 If we stonewall their clear and unanimous views on an issue like this, we will obviously jeopardize the legislative chances of the whole program. In response to these Congressional views, in addition, Peterson indicated institutions would be established by statute. To whatever extent we regard Peterson as our spokesman, he has therefore already committed us to that course of action. And his role as our spokesman would obviously be compromised if we repudiate him by going the other way. 6 If we do decide to try the Presidential authority route, despite the considerations cited here and the others mentioned in my earlier memo, I would certainly hope that we would be prepared to switch gears gracefully—and accept the creation of the institutions by statute—in response to the Congressional insistence on doing so which is virtually certain to emerge. How could we refuse without raising serious doubts about our sincerity in creating “independent” institutions? I fully share your objective of retaining effective Presidential control over development assistance, but feel that a better way to do so is to minimize suspicion of our intent by avoiding such a line of questions. In short, why butt our heads against a stone wall and exacerbate Congressional suspicion of the Executive in the process? I urge you to re-consider your position on the issue before you have to make a firm recommendation on it. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/21/71. No classification marking. Kissinger wrote at the top of the page: “What a fanatic.” 2 Kissinger’s comments are not further identified. Shultz’ opinion is in Document 53 . 3 In a March 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten had strongly argued that the International Development Corporation and the International Development Institute should be created by statute rather than by the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID, 1/1/71-12/31/71) 4 Document 52 . 5 In his September 15, 1970, statement, the President said: “I look forward to consultations with the Congress on our aid objectives and the ways in which we can achieve them, as a solid foundation for the legislative proposals which I shall submit next year.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970, p. 757) 6 Kissinger wrote in the margin next to the paragraph: “Not decisive.” 56. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 56. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 17, 1971. SUBJECT New Security Assistance Program Your new “security assistance” program will comprise grant military aid (MAP), foreign military sales (FMS), supporting economic assistance—which requires a home due to the dissolution of AID—service-funded military assistance (MASF), the public safety program and the contingency fund. In FY 1971 these amounted to $5.6 billion of which $3.4 billion go to Southeast Asia. At Tab C is the report of the Under Secretaries Committee on the program. 2 At present, State has legislative responsibility for providing policy guidance for all security assistance programs except military assistance for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, which are in the Defense Department budget. AID presently administers the public safety and supporting assistance programs. Defense administers MAP and foreign military sales and, in fact, if not by law, has a large measure of policy control over both. All security assistance legislation, except that funded in the military budgets, goes through the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees. There are two major organizational issues which must be decided for the new program: —Whether State or Defense will administer supporting economic assistance (now administered by AID under general policy direction of State). —Whether State will retain its statutory authority to provide policy guidance and program direction for all aspects of security assistance. The decision on these issues will affect a third issue—which committees of the Congress will have responsibility for processing annual authorizations. Option 1: Give DOD Policy Primacy Defense wants to take over State’s present responsibilities for providing policy guidance and program direction for all security assistance, and wants to administer all aspects of security assistance including supporting economic assistance. 3 This implies a shift of Congressional responsibility from the Foreign Affairs to the Armed Services Committees. Option 2: Maintain State Policy Primacy State wants to maintain its responsibility for providing policy guidance and program direction for all aspects of security assistance. It also wants to assume AID’s present responsibilities for the management of supporting economic assistance. 4 Defense would continue to administer military assistance and exercise the same functions it does at present. This implies continued Foreign Affairs Committee responsibility in the Congress. Assessment The choice among the options turns on the following issues: 1. The role of political and economic considerations in determining military and supporting economic assistance, versus the role of defense tradeoffs between friendly and U.S. forces. Secretary Rogers contends that, in most countries, political considerations such as the possible role of military assistance in maintaining the power balance within a country (e.g. Brazil) or strengthening an alliance (e.g. Turkey) and economic considerations (e.g. the desire to achieve economic stability in Indonesia) should be weighed heavily in determining our security assistance. Secretary Laird, on the other hand, believes that in implementing the Nixon Doctrine DOD should have primacy in security assistance to enable DOD planning to emphasize the tradeoffs between U.S. forces and friendly forces. Secretary Rogers is correct in contending that force tradeoffs are of major concern in only a few countries, whereas political and economic considerations bear most heavily on our policy choices in most countries. Moreover, DOD already has control over the MASF program (over half of our entire security assistance effort) for the Southeast Asian countries where the U.S./friendly force tradeoff issue is most important. These considerations argue against Option 1 (DOD primacy). 2. Congressional and Public Acceptability Secretary Rogers, OMB, and your own legislative experts believe that you would be risking a major and futile confrontation with the Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committees if you sought to shift security assistance authorizing responsibility to the Armed Services Committees. They point out that, despite problems with Senator Fulbright, passage of last year’s supplemental showed that Congress (particularly the House) is willing to fund the Nixon Doctrine. Secretary Laird, however, disagrees. He believes the Armed Services Committees will be more forthcoming and that, therefore, you should seek such a transfer and urge Senator Stennis to accept the additional responsibility he has indicated he does not want. 3. Presidential Flexibility One of the strong points of our current program is that it gives you the option in most countries of relying on either Defense or State/AID funding for local forces. In Cambodia last year, it was of vital importance that we could use supporting assistance to fund the military assistance program before passage of the supplemental—and as a fall-back position in case the supplemental failed. Option 2 would preserve more flexibility for individual countries than any of the others, by maintaining the present division of authority between State and Defense. These considerations on balance favor Option 2 (State primacy); only the force tradeoff issue supports DOD primacy (Option 1). The remote chance of shifting Congressional jurisdiction away from the Foreign Affairs Committees, and the high cost of even trying to do so, is perhaps the overriding point. You need to decide now on the organization of security assistance for FY 1972, to be incorporated in the new aid legislation which will go up shortly. However, this need not be a decision for all time. I recommend that you authorize Option 2, with State picking up for now the supporting economic assistance and public safety programs handled at present by AID. Based on an assessment over the coming year of State’s effectiveness in handling these responsibilities, and of possible Congressional receptivity to a later shift from the Foreign Relations to Armed Services Committees, you can then decide whether to continue this arrangement in the future or shift partial or full responsibility to Defense. Making this decision in effect a tentative one may in fact serve as an incentive to State to develop the needed analytical capacity to effectively discharge its responsibilities, and to the Foreign Relations Committees to give your programs better support. We could not of course indicate publicly that the decision was temporary, but conveying the word informally would achieve these objectives. Recommendation: Subject to reservation covering the duration of the decision, I support Secretary Rogers’ proposal of Option 2: State primacy over security assistance policy and administrative responsibility for supporting economic assistance. OMB concurs. Approve 5 Disapprove, prefer Option 1: DOD primacy as proposed by Secretary Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to Schlesinger on March 22, without the President’s comments (see footnote 5 below). This memorandum is attached to a March 19 memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger calling his attention to Shultz’ concern about Secretary Laird’s Congressional testimony on March 24 before the foreign assistance legislation went to Congress. On the back of his memorandum Kennedy wrote the following note on March 20: “Schlesinger called to say that they have agreed to have Laird testify but only as to content of FY 72 budget. No mention will be made of organizational arrangements. If asked about new legislation answer is to be that it will be submitted in a few days.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71) 2 Not found. 3 See Documents 134 and 135 . 4 See Documents 30 and 49 . 5 President Nixon initialed this option and wrote at the bottom of the page: “The major concern is the political storm which would be raised in Congress if we changed—just isn’t worth it. I agree with MacGregor it would be a futile fight.” 57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 30, 1971. SUBECT Coordination of the Reorganized Foreign Assistance Agencies Summary The reorganization of A.I.D. will result in several new bilateral development agencies —International Development Corporation, to administer the bilateral loan program. —International Development Institute, to handle the revamped technical assistance program. —Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to administer foreign investment guarantees. This poses complex issues of coordination within the Executive Branch, including how we keep down the number of independent agency heads reporting directly to you, and has created concern in the Congress. You will recall that Rudy Peterson reported widespread Congressional interest in having a single coordinator for foreign assistance operationally responsible for the program and accountable to the Congress. We have four choices: 1. Establish independent agencies—policy coordination through the Council on International Economic Policy. 2. Establish independent agencies—coordination in the Department of State. 3. Establish a U.S. Development Administrator, who would be Chairman of the Board of all three institutions. Each agency would have a President; the three Presidents would constitute an Executive Committee, chaired by the Administrator, to assure operational coordination. 4. Establish independent agencies—coordinated through a U.S. International Development Board, established by statute, in the Executive Office. (The Board would consist of the heads of the aid agencies plus representatives from State, Treasury and Agriculture.) Under any of the options foreign policy guidance will come from the National Security Council, foreign policy coordination will be assured by having a representative of the Department of State on the Board of each agency, and foreign economic policy coordination will take place through the Council on International Economic Policy. The advantages and disadvantages of these choices are spelled out in the attached memorandum. 2 After extensive discussion I have concluded that Option 3 best meets your objectives and Congressional requirements. George Shultz concurs. We have reviewed Option 3 with Rudy Peterson, and after checking it with three of his task force members, he said they all feel it is “an ingenious response to the Congressional concern.” He feels strongly, however, that the Administrator (i.e., the joint Chairman) should become a full member of the Council on International Economic Policy, instead of being invited to participate only when development issues are being discussed. We can consider this question later, and I promised Rudy he would have a full hearing when it is necessary to face this issue. The Secretary of State prefers Option 2. The Secretary’s memorandum is attached at Tab A, of the detailed memorandum. 3 I recommend you approve Option 3. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Confidential. Attached to an April 1 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger that reviewed Peterson’s options. Bergsten recommended Option 4 rather than Option 3. 2 Dated March 30; not printed. 3 See footnote 8, Document 51 . 4 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked, but see Document 58 . 58. CIEP Decision Memorandum No. 2 58. CIEP Decision Memorandum No. 2 1 Washington, April 5, 1971. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, Office of Management and Budget SUBJECT Coordination of Bilateral Development Assistance Agencies The President has carefully considered the issue of how we might best coordinate the bilateral development assistance agencies which we will propose to the Congress in the new aid legislation as raised in the memorandum of the Secretary of State, dated March 5, 1971, 2 both to assure efficient operation and adequate accountability to the Congress. In view of the previous decision to establish three separate, independent agencies, 3 the President has decided that coordination can best be assured by his appointing a coordinator, responsible to him, for U.S. development assistance, who would be Chairman of the Board of the proposed International Development Corporation, the proposed International Development Institute, and the existing Overseas Private Investment Corporation. In the latter case, he would assume the responsibility which is now discharged by the Administrator, A.I.D. To assure effective operational coordination he will chair, in addition to his other duties as Chairman of the three boards, an Executive Committee consisting of the Presidents of these three organizations. While it is desirable to avoid duplication of service functions between these three agencies, providing the coordinator a large number of central functions may undermine the functional specialization of these agencies. The common service functions, therefore, will be kept to the minimum feasible. Peter G. Peterson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, Box 5197, CIEP Decision Memoranda. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; the CEA Chairman; the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs; the Executive Director of the Domestic Council, and the Special Trade Representative. 2 See footnote 8, Document 51 . 3 See Document 136 . 59. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 59. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 9, 1971. SUBJECT US Posture and Practice on Military Exports Armistead Selden’s 26 March letter to Dr. Kissinger outlined the vigorous military sales activities of the United Kingdom and France in Latin American countries—and our serious doubts about the wisdom of US statutory sales ceilings in that region. 2 Our problem is, I believe, broader than Latin America and statutory ceilings. Remembering the 1967 Congressional concern about the validity of arms sales, this Administration adopted a low profile approach to such transactions—agreeing to honor obviously valid purchase requests arising at the initiative of friends and allies but taking no initiatives ourselves. This new policy on US sales has coincided with substantial progress in the technological ability of industrial European countries to develop and produce such equipment for themselves and for sale to others—and has encouraged them to enter the free world market. They have been quite successful: Even as of a year ago, the US share of the free world defense market (details in attached tables) 3 had dropped from virtual monopoly to 51% as the French share increased to 22%, the British to 13%, the German to 5% and the Italian and Canadian to 4% each. The trend is worsening. During FY 1970, British and French military export orders worldwide totaled about $1.88 billion (not even counting minor equipment and support) while US orders (counting everything) declined to $1.5 billion. Moreover, our competition is taking over in the large number of developing countries where we, in the absence of grant aid, want to maintain that influence that now can come only or largely from the relationship of dependable supplier of defense equipment. During FY 1970, British and French orders from Latin America totaled an incredible $760 million while the US total was $46 million. In our own backyard during that year we had less than 6% of the market. While our data are quite incomplete, it appears that the Soviet is also trying to move into the free world defense market. Soviet sales deliveries (we understand most if not all Soviet “assistance” is on terms of sale with long repayment periods and low interest) totaled $890 million during 1970—more than double the $434 million of 1968 and $305 million in 1969. Major recipients were Iran ($150 million), Iraq ($25 million), Libya ($40 million), the United Arab Republic ($650 million), and Somalia ($10 million). India was a large recipient in 1969 ($153 million). A $50 million transaction (terms unknown) also occurred in 1969 between Communist China and Pakistan. Clearly, the Communist world views military exports as a significant element of its foreign policy relationship with friends and potential friends. In regard to competition in the free world defense market, we must not assume that the current US disadvantage is redressable solely by US policy. It increasingly occurs that US equipment is too sophisticated for some countries. Small British frigates and submarines sold to Brazil simply have no US equivalent. In the absence of the International Fighter now starting development, the US, similarly, would not have a small, inexpensive, easy-to-maintain, and easy-to-operate air defense fighter that is needed (against the MIG-21) by many of the developing countries. Of course, there are some purchase requests that we simply should not honor whatever the merits of the industrial/financial consequences may be. There are desires for acquisition of first-line equipment by less-developed countries that we do not want to accommodate—for reasons of arms races, imprudent expenditure or provocation to neighbors. There are releases of technology that we do not want to approve for reasons of security. But within such limitations, I believe there is much that we can do within current authority to bring about a US posture and practice in regard to arms sales which are more consistent with overall US interests. One such major US interest is achievement of the Nixon Doctrine—the orderly transition from US responsibility for free world defense to a more equitably shared responsibility. It is, I believe, indefensible to anticipate greater needs for US grant aid to develop a maximum self support capability throughout the free world without anticipating an equivalently expanding sales relationship with those friends and allies already able to pay their own way. I am setting in motion a review of possible modifications in our military sales posture and practice. First, in regard to legislative authority, we might present to the Congress —the merits of avoiding regional ceilings which add an arbitrary and unnecessary restraint to our normal case-by-case assessment of the validity of specific arms sales; —the need for and the practicability of removing such other arbitrary restraints as the Conte (sophistication), Symington (diversion of resources), Reuss (dictators) and Pelly (fishing rights) Amendments; —the continuing need for adequate credit appropriations to accelerate the transition from grant to sales. Second, in regard to Executive Branch teamwork in this matter, we will consult with —State on the features of security assistance legislation which promise greater and more effective reliance on sales; —Treasury on the adoption of more attractive credit terms and conditions; —Commerce on more effective DOD participation in the National Export Expansion Council; —Office of Management and Budget on budgetary and fiscal aspects. Third, within DOD, we will review the possibilities and merits of —improving the effectiveness of our efforts to assist US industry and the banking community in their export efforts; —further relaxation of our restraints on the releasability of technology; —modifying or abandoning our policy of placing a nonrecurring cost recovery surcharge on our military export sales prices; —relaxing DOD unwillingness to make “offset” procurement arrangements with governments that procure from us; —using our “fixed price” statutory authority to assign a portion of the normal sales prices to the US mobilization base interest for selected equipments or, alternatively, to assign a portion to grant aid; —modifying or abandoning our 50% “gold flow rule” under which we have effectively excluded foreign ability to sell to us, and, consequently, reduced their desire to buy from us. I will come back to you on the results of this review. 4 Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume III 12/70-6/71. Secret. A stamped notation reads: “The President has seen.” Attached to a May 4 memorandum from Kissinger to the President summarizing Laird’s points and noting that Kissinger had sent a brief reply to Laird that indicated that the President’s interest in Laird’s study that would be used as the basis for re-examining military sales policy. On Kissinger’s memorandum to the President, Nixon wrote: “K—I agree totally with Laird’s concern—The foreign service types will of course disagree—I don’t want a leisurely study of this made. I want action—soonest possible to reverse this trend. Inform Connally of my concern. He shares it.” A May 6 memorandum from Haig to Bergsten informed him of the President’s reaction to Laird’s memorandum and asked Bergsten to monitor closely the progress on Laird’s study. (Ibid.) In a May 15 memorandum, Haig also asked Bergsten to provide a memorandum from Kissinger to Connally. (Ibid., Box 226, Department of Defense, Volume XI 2/24/71-5/15/71) 2 Not found. 3 Not printed. 4 No report from the Department of Defense on this subject was found. 60. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 60. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 13, 1971. SUBJECT Submission of Aid Reorganization Legislation The legislation for the new foreign assistance program is now ready and I list below the major actions we propose to take to advise Congress and the public about the new program. Considerable time has elapsed since your September message on the subject 2 and it is therefore most important that you personally participate in advising the leadership of Congress about the importance you attach to this reorganization. The legislation will be ready for submission after the Easter recess. I recommend we submit the legislation on April 21 . This is right after the Easter recess and allows sufficient time for advance briefing of Congressional leadership. About April 15, we will brief the senior staff members of the appropriate committees. I recommend that you devote part of your regular Republican leadership meeting on Tuesday, April 20 to a briefing on the new aid legislation. 3 In addition you should invite the leadership of the relevant committees to a briefing on the reorganization on April 20. I suggest you hold this briefing at 9:00 a.m.—right after the Republican leadership meeting. 4 Attached at Tab A is a suggested list of members of Congress to be invited to the bipartisan briefing with you. 5 On the day the legislation goes forward (April 21) there will be a press briefing covering both security and development assistance. We would invite White House, State, Treasury and DOD correspondents. I recommend we start the briefing at 10:00 a.m. and arrange it so that there will be an opportunity for you to make a short (one to two minutes) statement at the outset which the TV could tape and release later that day. The briefing would be handled by Kissinger and myself with appropriate staff to field detailed questions. We are planning a series of separate briefings including briefing for select foreign government representatives and non-governmental organizations. We are also arranging for a series of informal discussions and briefings with select members of Congress and their staffs just before and following the submission of the legislation. These briefings will be done by the various agencies We have contacted Rudy Peterson. He will participate in the advance briefings and be available for the hearings. His schedule does not permit him to be in Washington on April 21. Recommendation I recommend you approve the above scenario. Scenario Approved 6 Scenario Disapproved Scenario Approved as Amended Messrs. MacGregor, Shultz, Kissinger, Ziegler, and Klein have been consulted and concur in the proposed arrangements. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Kissinger, Shultz, MacGregor, Ziegler, and Klein. The memorandum is attached to an April 15 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger concerning Kissinger’s subsequent decision not to participate in the April 20 Congressional briefings and the press briefing. Bergsten pointed out that the package would have a “rough time” with Congress and asked Kissinger to reconsider. Kissinger declined and designated Schlesinger instead. 2 Reference is to the September 15, 1970, Presidential statement. See footnote 2, Document 53 . 3 The President met with the Republican Congressional Leadership in the Cabinet Room in the morning of April 20. The list of attendees includes Schlesinger but not Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 4 The meeting was not held. (Ibid.) On April 16 Bergsten sent a memorandum to Kissinger suggesting that the President’s participation in the bipartisan Congressional briefing would be a “serious error.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71) 5 Not found. 6 None of the options is checked. 61. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 61. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, August 9, 1971. SUBJECT Foreign Assistance Figures Below are the figures on foreign assistance which you requested. 2 They are reflected in two categories—(1) bilateral U.S. aid, both non-military and MAP, and (2) aid provided through multilateral organizations. The breakdowns include approved obligations for FY 1971 and requests for FY 1972 as separate entries. (In billions) Bilateral U.S. Aid Non-Military MAP Total End W.W. II through FY 1970 $96.3 $40.2 $136.5 FY 1971 3.9 1.8 5.7 FY 1972 request 5.7 1.3 7.0 Totals $105.9 $43.3 $149.2 U.S. Aid through Multilateral Organizations End W.W. II through FY 1970 $3.654 FY 1971 .455 FY 1972 request 1.353 Total $5.462 TOTAL U.S. AID Non-Military MAP Total End W. W. II through FY 1970 $99.954 $40.2 $140.154 FY 1971 4.355 1.8 6.155 FY 1972 request 7.053 1.3 8.353 GRAND TOTALS $111.362 $43.3 $154.662 At Tab A is a breakout of the specific components of the bilateral U.S. aid. At Tab B is a breakout of the specific components of the multilateral aid. Tab A I. Bilateral U.S. Aid (In billions) Formal bilateral aid extended by AID and its predecessor ag encies: $52.0 End W.W. II through FY 1970 $48.2 FY 1971 1.6 FY 1972 request 2.2 Food for Peace 20.9 End W.W. II through FY 1970 18.6 FY 1971 1.2 FY 1972 request 1.1 Eximbank loans 15.8 End W.W. II through FY 1970 12.3 FY 1971 1.1 FY 1972 request 2.4 Post-War Relief 17.2 TOTAL $105.9 MAP 43.3 End W. W. II through FY 1970 40.2 FY 1971 1.8 FY 1972 request 1.3 GRAND TOTAL $149.2 Tab B II. U.S. Aid Extended through Multilateral Organizations Includes contributions to the UN, International Development Association, IBRD, Asian Development Bank, International Financial Corporation & Inter-American Development Bank. A breakdown by agency is available only through FY 1970 except as footnoted. From W.W. II through FY 1970 $3.654 IDA .952 IBRD .635 ADB .80 IFC .35 IDB 1.950 UN .0017 FY 1971 .455 * FY 1972 request 1.353 ** TOTAL $ 5.462 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” 2 The request has not been further identified. A similar request was made on February 19, 1972, on the President’s behalf, in a telephone call from Haldeman to Haig, requesting that the data be disaggregated to reflect the totals for Europe and developing nations. Haig replied in White House telegram 20335 (Tohak 52) to Kissinger in Guam, February 20. (Ibid., Volume II 1972) On February 21 the President traveled from Guam to Beijing. * Includes $275 million for IDB ** Includes $173 million for UN assistance 62. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) 62. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) 1 Washington, September 17, 1971. SUBJECT Reductions in Foreign Aid The Department and A.I.D. are deeply concerned that there is not yet a decision on the details of the foreign assistance expenditure cut announced by the President one month ago on August 15. 2 We are in an increasingly difficult position with the Congress and beginning to be in an embarrassing position with foreign governments. Recently the Secretary of State and the A.I.D. Administrator each had to testify before the Congress that details of the cut were not yet available. We continue to make a similar response to the many requests for information that we receive from foreign governments. The recent announcement that the cut will not apply to Latin America, 3 while helpful to us in Latin America, increases our problems with governments in other parts of the world and complicated further our position with the Congress. The problem, we believe, can be made simple. The published estimated outlays for FY 1972 for bilateral economic assistance are $1,842 million; a 10 percent reduction amounts to $184 million. If Supporting Assistance is excluded, as we believe it was intended to be and should be, the reduction is $118 million. If it is not excluded, we will have severe additional difficulty in Southeast Asia (not to mention elsewhere), added to an already difficult economic and financial situation. What is needed is an OMB decision establishing a new expenditure ceiling , so that we can advise the Congress. There seems no reason why the affected agencies should not be relied upon to manage their resources within the new outlay ceiling, as they were expected to do under the published ceiling. The longer we delay the decision, the more difficult the cutting job becomes. I stress that while we can absorb the required expenditure cuts with difficulty, any reduction in the foreign assistance appropriations request now before the Congress would be disastrous. This is true for all accounts but particularly for Supporting Assistance. You are fully familiar with the current negative attitudes of the Congress toward foreign assistance—particularly the attitude of the Senate toward Supporting Assistance which is a key element in support of the Nixon Doctrine. If the Administration proposes reductions in its FY 1972 appropriations request—which are only slightly above the FY 71 request which was the lowest since 1958—the Congress will simply begin from a lower base its normal practice of making deep cuts in the President’s request. The Congress will not stand idly by and allow the President to make the cuts instead. It is essential, therefore, that we be allowed to effect the 10 percent foreign assistance expenditure cut through administrative measures rather than linking them to reductions in requested budget authority. In the unlikely event the Congress does not cut appropriations in its usual way, we would of course be prepared to take further administrative actions to insure that expenditure savings in FY 1972 did not result in increased expenditure pressure in FY 1973. In summary, we believe it imperative to reach a decision quickly and that the decision be directed to 1972 expenditures, not appropriations, and exclude Supporting Assistance. I will be happy to discuss this with you if you wish John N. Irwin II 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). Limited Official Use. A copy was sent to Kissinger. Beginning with an August 16 memorandum from Acting AID Administrator Roderic O’Connor to Under Secretary Johnson, AID persistently called attention to the need for decisions on how the foreign assistance reduction was to be handled. Was the reduction to be in outlays, new obligations, or budget authority? Were supporting assistance and programs dealing with refugee assistance in India and Pakistan exempt as they were not “foreign economic aid in the regular sense”? O’Connor’s August 16 memorandum and a number of others on the same subject are in the Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 75 A 13, Chron Files for August and September, 1971. 2 The New Economic Policy announced on August 15 called, inter alia, for a reduction of 10 percent in foreign assistance expenditures. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , p. 887. 3 Kissinger informed Rogers, Connally, Shultz, and Hannah in a September 10 memorandum that “in view of our special interest in assisting Latin American economic and social development” the President had decided to exempt the Latin American aid program from the 10 percent reduction in foreign aid that was part of the New Economic Policy. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, Latin America) 63. Draft Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) 63. Draft Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) 1 Washington, undated. Dear Mr. Chairman: In Mr. Abshire’s letter to you of September 3, 1971, 2 he indicated that consonant with the President’s memorandum, we would be prepared to provide the Committee with planning material and factors relating to the military assistance program. This letter contains that material. In providing this information, I want to be as responsive as possible to the Committee’s interests. We recognize that the Congress, in dealing with the Administration’s request for military assistance, wishes to know how these programs may develop over a number of years in the future. I note too that you appreciate that there are serious limitations to our ability to make useful projections five years into the future. We have been working for the last year to improve the capability in both the Department of State and the Department of Defense to plan our military assistance grant and credit programs. The new planning system which we are establishing to be effective in making projections must treat directly with a number of problems and issues. It must deal with all of our Security’s Assistance Programs on an integrated basis; we are beginning by handling grant and credit programs as a single planning problem. It must seek to relate resource transfers for military purposes to U.S interests and objectives in a given country and region. It must determine whether our interests and objectives are both realistic and attainable within budget parameters which for future years are not clearly defined. Finally, we must develop alternatives that provide clear choices for decision-makers in setting program goals. This planning approach is intended to point our programs in a general direction. We cannot predict where and how, over the next five years, crises will occur. We know of no analytical method, as I made clear in my testimony, to pin-point trouble spots over an extended period. We are thereby handicapped in developing accurate five-year projections of U.S. interests and programs. The process is further complicated because our own interests will shift from time to time. In future year planning we can only provide very tentative views on what our future interests will be; the reality will depend upon a broad range of considerations, including: —the outcome of major international negotiations, such as those with the Soviet Union on Berlin, SALT and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. —U.S. efforts to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China. —the future impact of current international balance of payments and monetary discussions. —the outcome of our efforts to develop a more coherent multilateral approach to international trade and investment questions, and to international development programs. —the willingness of the parties to disputes to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations. —the degree of success in reaching regional arms control arrangements. —our allies’ willingness to increase their share of the security burden. —continuing requirements for our friends and allies to maintain security forces. —the situation that finally emerges in such areas as the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. All of the above imponderables and variables bear some relationship to military assistance planning; because our expectations in each case could be seriously mistaken, I must emphasize this caveat in regard to the figures we provide. In preparing the figures for you, I have asked my staff to consider a number of basic principles in their planning effort. These principles include the following: 1. Selectivity . The focus of our security assistance is on clearly designated countries of significant importance to our own security given the limited resources that are likely to be available. In the case of grant military assistance, for example, the principal recipients would be: Korea, Cambodia, and Turkey. In the case of FMS credit, Israel is a major recipient. 2. Total Resources . We give due weight to the resources of recipient countries as well as to the full range of possible U.S. aid contributions. The primary U.S. resources are grant military assistance, excess defense articles, and foreign military sales (credit); directly related to and supportive of such military assistance is economic supporting assistance. We look carefully at the recipient’s allocation of its own resources along with those which may be provided by third countries. Recipient country resource allocations reveal how that country views its own problems; third-country contributions reflect regional concerns. 3. Local Military Planning . More must be done to encourage recipient countries to do their own planning, establish their own priorities, and regulate their own domestic budgets. The United States in the past has made many of the basic determinations of the amount and kind of equipment which countries receive. 4. Self-Sufficiency . We expect allied and friendly countries to assume a larger share of their defense burden. To assist them towards this objective, we plan to help them develop local defense-related production capabilities, and as their economies develop, to shift our military assistance from grants to cash and credit sales. This shift will be more gradual in some cases than in others. For instance, Turkey is expected to have continuing foreign exchange problems over the five-year period which will inhibit its meeting its defense needs fully through purchases. Nevertheless, we assume that Turkey will be able to absorb increasing amounts of credit. Korea, if it continues its present rate of economic development, might take on a larger share of its defense requirements than originally planned. As we shift from grant to sales, we must continue to measure with care the impact of this shift on the economies of our allies. 5. Force Modernization . While there is a natural desire of recipients to improve the level of sophistication of their equipment, in many cases this is just not economic or efficient. Hard choices have to be made between modernizing and maintaining force structure, keeping up maintenance, and providing adequate logistics support. Modernization in most cases should have a lesser priority than the development of these latter factors. 6. Maintenance and Operations Costs . These costs should be transferred to the host country on a phased basis. Modernization should be planned so that, wherever possible, operations and maintenance costs should not become an unduly onerous and long-term burden to the recipient country or to the United States. 7. Excess Defense Articles . Planning should utilize, and take carefully into account, the significant amount of excess defense materiel and equipment now becoming available. But mere availability of excess stocks should not become a rationale for their transfer to countries whose domestic resources are required for higher priority needs. The provision of excess must be carefully justified by military requirements, economic benefits to the recipient and savings in U.S. funded programs. With these planning factors in mind, the Department of State and the Department of Defense have developed tentative levels for U.S. military assistance grant aid and foreign military credit sales for the period fiscal year 1973 through 1977. In the light of the above planning factors and with the caveat about our inability to predict accurately particular developments in the future, there follows a discussion of these figures on a region-by-region basis. East Asia and Pacific . The East Asia and Pacific area throughout the next five years will probably continue to receive the largest amount of security assistance. In FY 1973 it will be projected to receive about $700 million, 3 roughly divided $600 million in grant MAP and around $100 million in FMS credit. (These figures do not include Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos which are in the Military Assistance Service Funded Programs and the figures will have to be increased accordingly when these programs are returned to the Military Assistance Program.) The principal countries supported will be Cambodia and Korea at levels somewhat above FY 1972 requests and together they will absorb about five-sixths of the East Asia grant program. Projecting over the five years in the East Asia and Pacific area, we envisage the MAP grant program being reduced to about the $250 million level in FY 1977, with the FMS credit program increasing to about $125 million. The total program for East Asia and Pacific thus will decline more or less on a straightline basis over the next five years from about $700 million per year to about $375 million per year. Cambodia is projected to receive about $125 million in grant aid in FY 1977, but here again I want to emphasize that any aid to this country will depend on the outcome of the situation in Southeast Asia. The other principal recipient, Korea, is projected to receive about $75.0 million in FY 1977. Table I provides illustrative figures for programs in this area. 4 Near East and South Asia . This is the next largest area program. For FY 1973 we project a level of about $200 million in grant military assistance and up to $450 million in foreign military sales credits. These projections reflect a continuing large foreign military sales credit program for Israel and maintaining the grant MAP program for Turkey at about the $100 million floor level for FY 1973. In addition Jordan and Greece will be recipients of grant and credit assistance. Assistance to Jordan is projected for mainly grant aid while Greece is projected for about $75 million, two-thirds of which is credit. Our projections for the period five years hence, FY 1977, show a total program of about $350 million, about $75 million of which is projected in grant assistance and $275 million in credits. Israel would continue to be a major recipient of credit with Turkey and Greece also receiving respectively about $25 million and $55 million in credit. Over 90% of the grant program in FY 1977 would be supplied to Turkey. Table II contains figures for projections in this area. Europe, Africa, Latin America and Non-Regional Programs . These programs, already small, would continue to decline. Grant assistance for Europe would move from just over $10 million in FY 1973 to just over a million dollars in FY 1977. African programs would decline from $20 million in grant assistance and $18 million in credit in FY 1973 to $15 million and $12 million respectively in FY 1977. The Latin American program total is projected at about $10 million in grant and $75 million in credit throughout the five-year period. In addition to the above there will be non-regional programs which will require about $20 million in grant MAP over the five years. Table III summarizes this information. Totals . Looking at the total obligational authority requirements for the grant and credit program in our five-year projections for the period 1973 to 1977, we envisage the grant program moving on a roughly straightline basis in FY 1973 from between $820 and $850 million to about $370 million in 1977. We project the FMS credit program for FY 1973 at between $525 and $625 million moving again on a rough straightline basis to a projected program for FY 1977 of $450 to $480 million. These latter ranges reflect a number of areas of uncertainty in some of our program predictions within the various regions and emphasize again the very tentative nature of our projections for the next five years. Table IV provides this information. I have offered this material in the realization that these are very generalized and tentative projections. We are working to improve the quality of our planning, and I expect that future year budget submissions will reflect the improvements which we are now making. I hope that the information in this letter is responsive to the request which you have made and that it will provide a basis for moving forward in your consideration of the FY 1972 requests under the Foreign Assistance Act. Sincerely, William P. Rogers 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 228, Department of Defense, XIII 8-11/71. Secret. Attached to a September 18 memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot to General Pursley providing Laird with a copy of a letter with 5-year MAP projections that Rogers reportedly had discussed with Laird by phone on September 14. Eliot noted that Irwin had informed Laird’s office the previous day that Rogers would like to have the letter available for a meeting with Fulbright at 10 a.m. on September 20. Copies of Eliot’s memorandum were sent to Kissinger and Dean. Eliot also provided a draft letter to Senator Proxmire. Secretary Rogers and David Abshire met with Senator Fulbright on September 20 from 9:48-11:45 a.m. (Ibid., Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) No other record of the meeting has been found. 2 Not found. 3 These and the following projections are given in current dollars. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 None of the tables is printed. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 64. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 64. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 20, 1971. SUBJECT Five-Year Military Assistance Program (MAP) In extension of our Monday morning telephone conversation, I offer the following observations on State’s (or anyone’s) proposed submission on MAP to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 2 I have no objection to, in fact, I favor, a substantive dialogue on MAP with the appropriate Congressional committees. I believe, however, the dialogue should be positive, consistent with the President’s foreign policy objectives and policies, and consonant with the best estimates of world-wide economic and political facts of life. In my judgment, the letter and table State proposed to give Senator Fulbright complied with none of those criteria. The Nixon Doctrine is a positive program. Built on the three pillars of strength, partnership, and willingness to negotiate, it offers a hopeful prescription for security, peace, and Free World burden-sharing. Moreover, the President’s February 25, 1971 Report to Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s said: “The Nixon Doctrine requires a strong program of security assistance. “But it is not simply a matter of helping friends and allies do more for themselves. Particularly in the areas of the world where we are reducing our manpower, we must make resources available to help them make the transition with us. In some cases this will require substantial assistance during the period of adjustment. This is central to our new approach to American foreign policy in the 1970’s.” 3 In contrast to these positive and explicit Presidential statements, the proposed State letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (a) does not mention the Nixon Doctrine at all and (b) delineates substantially declining security assistance levels in the aggregate, for each region addressed, and for almost each nation included. It is not clear to me the proposed letter is consistent with the Secretary of State’s March 26, 1971 report on United States Foreign Policy. 4 In that report, State says: “As a basis for our assistance and advice to major recipient countries, we are attempting to develop total force planning goals that reflect balanced consideration of such factors as threats, risks, costs, resource constraints, and manpower limitations.” I see no evidence in the proposed State letter of balanced consideration of the many factors involved. I believe if there were such consideration, the MAP levels would look markedly different—in aggregate terms, as well as for particular regions and nations. The March 15, 1971 Defense Report observed: 5 “… Changes in the forces of our friends and allies cannot take place overnight, and just as is the case for the long leadtimes required to develop new defense weapon systems, there is leadtime associated with a shifting of the burdens of security.” Proposed cuts during a brief five-year span of more than 50 percent in MAP and more than 25 percent in FMS credits do not reflect the leadtime reality, much less the other realities for security assistance planning. In addition to the points made above, I would add two more diverse observations. First, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in my judgment, is interested primarily in selected key areas. Among those would be Greece and Cambodia, of course, which are included in the proposed State tables. Of equal, or perhaps more interest, are those nations (Republic of Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos) for which aid is supplied through Military Assistance Service Funding (MASF). The State letter does not provide much MASF data, but opens that door tantalizingly to the Committee. Second, as an administrative matter within the Executive Branch, I believe we need to be consistent and mutually supporting in our approach to the Congress. It is anathema to both branches of Government to have Executive Branch decisions (such as executive privilege on MAP planning) announced one day and to have separate Departments go a different way the next. Also, as an administrative matter, we should recognize that Department approval of planning data should never be implied until the Secretary or his designated representative has signed off on the material. I have not given my approval to the tables in the proposed State submission. In fact, I heartily non-concur in both the intent and substance of much of that submission. 6 I have talked with Bill Rogers and have given him the essence of the remarks in this memorandum. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 228, Department of Defense, XIII 8-11/71. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to an undated, handwritten note from Kennedy to Haig that reads: “Al: A hold was put on Rogers. Defense is doing a new draft which will be sent to State (and to us). John [illegible word] is sitting on top of this.” 2 Presumably a reference to Rogers’ draft letter to Fulbright, Document 63 . 3 U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Building for Peace—A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 25, 1971 . The quoted passages are on pages 183 and 184. It is also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971, pp. 219-345. 4 United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970: A Report of the Secretary of State . The quoted text is on pp. 167-168. 5 Not further identified. 6 Laird had previously taken issue with the State Department on military assistance. In a May 10 letter to Rogers he had objected to an April 22 circular airgram to all posts that implied the State Department was now directing military assistance planning, and to the short notice the Defense Department was being given to comment on proposed security assistance testimony by Spiers before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 11. Laird noted that Spiers’ proposed statement set out a State Department role that was at variance with the President’s decisions. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 226, Department of Defense XI 2/24/71-5/15/71) Regarding Laird’s letter, Haig informed Kissinger in a May 10 note that he had “drastically altered State’s testimony in a way which I think more than met Defense’s concern.” Haig indicated that “we are going to be in a refereeing role continually on the Security Assistance issue … the outlook is bleak because of the lackluster testimony given by Irwin and old pork barrel reservations on the Hill.” (Ibid.) 65. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon 65. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon 1 Washington, September 20, 1971. Dear Mr. President: I am pleased to be able to report that A.I.D. has made solid progress in moving in the direction of your new foreign assistance concepts and approaches. Despite the uncertain fate of the legislative proposals submitted to the Congress earlier this year, 2 we are—within the constraints of existing legislation—moving to translate your announced policy objectives into effective operation. The attached summary highlights the results of our more significant transitional efforts. 3 We have —separated economic security assistance from development programs within the A.I.D. structure; —substantially reduced A.I.D. direct-hire American staffs abroad; —implemented promptly your decision to untie aid financing for procurement in the developing countries 4 and materially simplified A.I.D.’s procurement policies and procedures; —made substantial progress in concentrating our technical assistance programs in priority sectors, eliminating weak projects, and achieving further reductions in related staffs abroad; and —moved in the direction of centralizing our lending operations in Washington. They have been spread around the world in our country missions. We are well along with a number of special studies in other areas designed to further streamline operations and to improve our responsiveness to development requirements abroad. There is every prospect that these studies will produce equally encouraging results in advancing your foreign aid policies. Finally, Mr. President, I am pleased to be able to assure you that our A.I.D. staff, both here and abroad, are working toward these objectives with a dedication and creativity I find gratifying. Respectfully yours, John A. Hannah 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. No classification marking. Attached to a September 22 memorandum from Rogers to the President informing him that Hannah had requested that he forward the letter. 2 The foreign assistance reorganization legislation submitted to Congress on April 21 (see Document 60 ) was not enacted. 3 Not printed. 4 See Document 136 . 66. Letter From the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 66. Letter From the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 1 Washington, September 20, 1971. Dear Jack: 2 Your memorandum of September 17, 1971, 3 expressed concern over the delay in deciding the details of the foreign assistance outlay reduction. I can appreciate your desire to communicate the details to the Congress and to foreign governments and am hopeful that the President will reach a decision on the reduction in the near future. A memorandum on the subject is before the President now 4 and as soon as we have a decision, we will notify you promptly. The magnitude of the reduction is somewhat larger than your memorandum implied. Estimated outlays for 1972 budget as amended for bilateral and multilateral economic assistance are $2,218 million; a 10 percent reduction amounts to $222 million. Sincerely, Cap 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). No classification marking. At the top of the page, Irwin wrote: “Talked with HAK on tel. on 9/21/71 pointing out problem of $222 which apparently includes $66 Supp-Ass’t.” 2 Through the typed “Mr. Irwin,” Weinberger wrote “Jack”. 3 Document 62 . 4 Not found. 67. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) 67. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) 1 Washington, September 27, 1971. Dear Cap: Thank you for your reply of September 20, 1971 to my letter concerning the reduction of foreign assistance by ten percent. 2 It is very helpful to have your confirmation that the reduction will be made in expenditures rather than appropriation requests. This will permit us to plan the implementation of these measures on a more orderly basis. We are uncertain, however, with respect to the $222 million figure. The $118 figure I had used was related only to AID development activities and did not include either supporting assistance or our contributions to international lending institutions. It has been our understanding that a ten percent reduction, amounting to $38 million, would be made in our contributions to the multilateral agencies. On the other hand, we have always been of the view (since the briefing at the White House in the afternoon of August 15) that there would (and should) be no reduction in supporting assistance expenditures. However, AID believes that the only way we can reach the figure of $222 million is to include a cut of $66 million in supporting assistance. A cut in supporting assistance as I wrote earlier will cause major difficulty in funding for Southeast Asia. Our supporting assistance requirements are mounting and the situation could be tight toward the end of the year. The prospect is that requirements will be even greater next year. It would thus not appear feasible even to postpone expenditures from this year until next. Please let me know when you would like to discuss this issue. Sincerely, Jack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). No classification marking. A copy was sent to Kissinger. 2 Documents 66 and 62 , respectively. 68. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon 68. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 15, 1971. Dear Mr. President: Next Thursday 2 the annual High Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development convenes in Paris. The meeting is at the Ministerial level. I will be heading the United States delegation. The Development Assistance Committee is composed of 16 aid-giving countries. It meets regularly to discuss matters of mutual concern relating to the provision of development assistance to the low-income countries. The other donor nations have expressed much interest in the 10 percent cut in foreign economic assistance expenditures that you announced on August 15. 3 They are deeply concerned as to its meaning, particularly from the standpoint of the longer term U.S. interest in the development process. I believe they are attaching too much weight to what is essentially a short-term adjustment to an immediate U.S. need. But I find myself unable to allay their fears because we still have no guidance on how the cut is to be handled some two months after your announcement. I believe that if I—as head of a Ministerial-level delegation—am unable to provide details on the cut at next week’s meeting, a major ruckus will develop that will be embarrassing to the United States and damaging to our foreign policy interests. I do not believe we should let this happen. Accordingly, I plan to make the following four points at the meeting unless you instruct me otherwise: —Expenditures for regular development assistance programs were $1.194 billion in the President’s FY 1972 budget. These will be reduced to $1.076 billion, a cut of $118 million or about 10 percent. —Expenditures for U.S. contributions to the International Financial Institutions were $352 million in the President’s FY 1972 budget. These will be reduced to $314 million, a cut of $38 million or about 10 percent. Our contributions to the International Development Association and the Inter-American Development Bank will not be affected. —Expenditures for Supporting Assistance were $648 million in the President’s FY 1972 budget. The amount of the cut, if any, remains to be decided. 4 —The proposed cuts are in expenditures. We have not reduced our requests for New Obligational Authority to the Congress and are strongly supporting the amounts originally requested. Naturally, if past experience is a guide, we can expect Congress to cut our requests by 10 percent or more. 5 The proposed cuts in expenditure for regular development assist-ance programs and the International Financial Institutions present no problem. We have explained in detail to the Office of Management and Budget on several occasions how we would accomplish them. A cut in Supporting Assistance expenditures would present a more difficult problem. Because of the rapid growth of cash grants and similar fast-disbursing arrangements associated with several new Supporting Assistance activities proposed for FY 1972, the original budget estimate—which previously looked comfortable—now appears very tight. We must keep in mind that unless we wish to alter significantly the nature of these new programs—which fall primarily in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Jordan—we may have to equal or exceed the FY 1972 budget figure. We need to give this careful thought before making final decisions. I believe the proposals I have outlined above are responsive to your announcement of August 15 which I fully support. If I am able to inform the other donor nations of the four points listed above, I believe we can head off a highly undesirable situation. I have discussed this matter with the Under Secretary of State. He fully shares my concern and supports the proposal outlined above. Respectfully yours, John A. Hannah 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Limited Official Use. Attached to an October 21 letter from Shultz to Haig, which confirmed OMB’s concurrence (with minor revisions) with Hannah’s proposed statement at the OECD. Also attached is an October 28 memorandum from Hormats to Haig indicating that Hannah’s letter had had the effect of “smoking out a decision” on whether the 10 percent reduction in foreign aid (from $1,840 to $1,653 million) would be handled administratively (i.e., frozen) or through legislation (see footnote 4 below). Hormats’ memorandum indicates that the letter did not go forward to the President. 2 October 21. 3 See footnote 2, Document 62 . 4 In an October 19 memorandum to Shultz, attached to Hannah’s letter, Haig wrote: “As to Hannah’s expressed concern over the cut in Supporting Assistance, he was unaware when he wrote his letter that the decision to administratively freeze 10 percent had been taken. He has since been informed by Weinberger. In any event, his prepared statement to the effect that the amount of the cut is undecided is a reasonable one—we do not want to get into a discussion in OECD of our Security Assistance Program.” 5 In an October 20 memorandum, which Shultz attached to his October 21 memorandum to Haig (see footnote 1 above), Weinberger wrote: “The Committee action apparently will be generally consistent with the President’s proposed 10 percent cut in foreign aid, even though we do not formally recommend a budget amendment in that amount.” The reference is presumably to action by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; see Document 69 . 69. Editorial Note 69. Editorial Note In October 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered the foreign assistance authorization bill for FY 1972. In an October 14 memorandum, John Lehman, a member of the National Security Council Staff, informed Henry Kissinger that the Committee had cut development assistance 20 percent, reduced MAP from $705 to $565 million and supporting assistance from $768 to $614.4 million, and limited MAP for Latin America to $10 million. He also noted that $250 million was approved for Pakistan and $85 million in supporting assistance had been added for Israel. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971) In an October 27 memorandum to Kissinger, Lehman wrote that a vote on the bill was imminent and that the Senate version was a “horror,” and he recommended vetoing the bill if the administration proposals were not included. Lehman noted that 16 amendments would be required to make the bill acceptable, and he provided brief summaries of the three most objectionable provisions with talking points for use at a breakfast with Congressional leaders on October 28. He provided a paper from Richard Kennedy on maintaining foreign assistance under a continuing resolution if the bill were vetoed. He suggested that Kissinger avoid detailed discussion of the objectionable provisions, emphasize the success of the President’s Asia policy, and raise the possibility of a Presidential veto if Congress were to undermine the President. (Ibid.) The paper by Kennedy, dated October 27, entitled “Effects of Operating on Continuing Resolution Authority,” reads as follows: “OMB has examined all of our foreign assistance programs and concludes that if we were to remain on Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA), we can do so without any major detriment to our ongoing programs up to March 30, 1972. All of our ongoing programs could continue . We might have to postpone our contributions to international financial institutions (due December 30) but we have done so before. Exim would have to delay some commitments. But the longer it extends, the tighter the situation becomes. There would be considerable uncertainty, of course, and it would be difficult for the Agencies to plan not knowing what the ultimate total authorization for the year would be. “If we were to go beyond March 30, however, we would have serious problems. There would be a major shortfall in supporting assistance seriously affecting our Southeast Asia programs and we would have no funds for India-Pakistan relief. We have been borrowing from other accounts to support the India/Pakistan effort up to now and if we are to mount a major effort as is planned, we need a new appropriation—since there was no such program last year there is no Continuing Resolution on which we can base the program this year. Also, we would have to default on subscriptions to the international financial institutions and Exim would have to close its loan and guarantee windows for the last quarter of the year. “The Continuing Resolution Authority could be relied on only so long as there are other appropriations not yet passed (the present CRA expires November 15, 1971, and presumably will be extended for some period, probably 30 days, and then if necessary could be extended again).” The Senate rejected the foreign assistance authorization legislation on October 29 by a vote of 41 to 27. Secretary of State Rogers, AID Administrator Hannah, Ron Ziegler on the President’s behalf, and Secretary of Defense Laird promptly expressed the administration’s dismay and the need for a continuing resolution and/or the introduction of new legislation. (Department of State Bulletin , November 22, 1971, pages 577-586) 70. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 70. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 1 Washington, October 30, 1971. SUBJECT Foreign Assistance Enclosed is a quick summary of the effects of having no foreign aid bill or of having to operate on a continuing resolution authority. 2 There also are enclosed a series of tables which show the current status of our programs. 3 It is important to note that the obligation levels are in many cases far below the estimated requirements for the year. If we conclude that we may not be able to get a continuing resolution and that the aid bill also is dead for this year, we could push hard to get as much money obligated as possible between now and the time when the current continuing resolution expires (November 15 or December 1). This would have the obvious side effect, however, of seriously irritating some important powers on the Hill and thus might make any effort later to get a new bill more difficult. In any event, the foreign military sales obligations could not be significantly improved—the time required to get agreement with the recipient countries simply precludes any rapid action. I also would emphasize that the biggest single problem with operating on a continuing resolution would be the Pakistan/India relief. The President is committed to increase our participation. We have borrowed from other accounts up to now to carry the program because, since there was no appropriation for this purpose last year, there is no existing continuing resolution authority specifically for it now. Thus we would be faced both with the problem of being unable to finance it further and also the serious effects on other programs (both development assistance and supporting assistance) from which funds already have been borrowed. Two brief summary statements being used by Dr. Hannah as background for his press conference are attached also. 4 Attachment FOREIGN AID REQUESTS FY 72 ($ million) FY 1972 Economic S/A MAP/FMS Total * Latin America 572 6 80 658 Africa 281 6 36 324 Greece — — 80 80 India 415 — 5 420 Turkey 71 — 100 171 Cambodia 20 110 200 330 China (Taiwan) 4 — 65 69 Indonesia 239 — 25 264 Korea 130 — 254 384 Laos 2 50 — 52 Philippines 64 1 17 82 Thailand 22 40 — 62 Vietnam 82 565 — 647 Foreign Assistance Obligations ($ Millions) 1971 (Actual) 1972 (Planned) 1972 (Est. to Date) Supporting Assistance (Total) 573 803 248 Vietnam 377 555 174 Cambodia 70 110 20 Laos 49 51 11 Jordan 6 5 30 Other 71 82 13 Development Assistance (Total) 1288 1642 198 Indonesia 79 107 22 India 206 230 4 Pakistan 7 118 1 Turkey 54 44 16 Colombia 84 78 2 Other 858 1065 153 MAP and FMS Obligations ($ Millions) 1971 (Actual) 1972 (Planned) 1972 (Actual as of 29 Sept. ′71) Grant MAP (Total) 792 732 280 Korea 288 239 83 Cambodia 185 200 65 Turkey 100 100 30 Jordan 30 45 38 Greece 20 20 6 Indonesia 17 25 7 Taiwan 20 20 10 Philippines 17 17 6 Spain 25 13 11 Ethiopia 12 13 6 Other 78 40 18 FMS Credit (Total) 734 * 582 30 Israel 545 * 300 0 Greece 18 60 0 Taiwan 41 45 20 Saudi Arabia 4 35 0 Brazil 9 20 0 Korea 15 15 10 Morocco 15 15 0 Argentina 16 15 0 Venezuela 7 15 0 Jordan 30 10 0 Other 33 52 0 FOREIGN AID Authorizations/Appropriations FY 69-71 ($ billions) FY 1969 FY 1970 FY 1971 Request Cong. Action Request Cong. Action Request Cong. Action Economic Assistance (includes S/A) Authorization 2.6 1.6 2.2 1.6 2.1 2.1 Appropriation 2.5 1.4 2.2 1.4 2.0 1.7 Military Assistance * .350 Auth. (MAP/FMS credit) .716 .671 .700 .420 Appr. .962 (.890 (.500 ** 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. No classification marking. Routed by Haig to Kissinger who wrote: “Reassure VN urgently.” 2 Not printed. Enclosed was a 4-page paper entitled “Examples of impact if we have no continuing resolution authority.” The paper includes one paragraph each on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, Jordan, India, Turkey, Colombia, Taiwan, Korea, Pakistan, Latin America, Thailand, Morocco and Ethiopia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Israel. 3 Four of the five tables are printed. The table not printed is an eight-column tabulation, with 20 footnotes, that shows the 1971 authorizations and appropriations, by category, the FY 1972 appropriation request, and where prospective funding levels stood in three pieces of foreign assistance legislation in the House and the Senate. 4 Not printed. * May not total because of rounding. * Includes $500 Jackson Amendment. * Includes $500 Jackson Amendment. * Authorizations and Appropriation Requests are the same. ** Jackson Amendment added $500 million for Israel FMS. 71. Note From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 71. Note From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 1, 1971. Henry— Attached is the strategy which the House leadership is anxious to pursue in sandbagging Fulbright. There are two aspects of it that are worth considering: One is it keeps a low White House profile which means we will have to turn Scali and the maniacs off, and second it would be a bitter repudiation of Fulbright if it succeeds. I am inclined to think that it is simple enough to work providing we can get lots of drumbeat going without direct White House involvement. We have had a reaction today of considerable magnitude from those on the Hill who do not like to be considered irresponsible. Timmons hopes to get your clearance on this tonight at the initialing tab. Al Haig 2 Attachment Washington, November 1, 1971. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons) to President Nixon SUBJECT Foreign Assistance Legislation A four-step strategy to restore foreign aid is recommended: House 1. Continuing Resolution to Adjournment Sine Die . This continuing appropriation can probably be before the House late this week or early next, containing continuing authority for all unfunded programs (including foreign aid) till adjournment. The current authority expires November 15th. 2. Defense Appropriations could be on House floor early the week of November 15. It will contain security assistance provisions of foreign aid. Since this is funding for unauthorized programs a special rule waiving points of order will be sought. There will be minor cuts in the program. 3. Foreign Operations Appropriations could be out of House committee and on House floor the week of November 15th. This contains the economic and so-called “humanitarian” provisions of foreign aid. Like the Defense bill, this too would contain unauthorized funds and a special rule required. There will be major cuts in the program. 4. Continuing Resolution to March 1, 1972 . Should either Defense or Foreign Operations money bills be defeated or filibustered by the Senate, House Leaders expect to pass another continuing resolution just before adjournment funding unauthorized programs to a date certain, probably March 1, 1972. 5. Foreign Assistance Authorization. The House Leaders and ranking members of the Foreign Affairs Committee have no desire to pass a new authorization. They feel that since the Senate defeated the House-passed bill they should not be required to create a new program, patterned after Fulbright’s dictates. Also time works against any new measure clearing both Houses before adjournment. Senate 1. Continuing Resolution to Adjournment Sine Die . Since this has to originate in the House there is nothing that can be done yet in Senate. However, most Senators now recognize the need to have a temporary continuing resolution. 2. Military and Foreign Operations Appropriations . The Senate Parliamentarian tells us no points of order can be made against these money bills, if passed by the House, even though funds are unauthorized. Undoubtedly, Chairman Fulbright and others will complain on grounds of usurpation of jurisdiction and fact the Senate had defeated foreign aid authorization. While these measures will be difficult to pass, the military bill should have strong support from conservatives and the foreign operations staunch backing from liberals. A tough fight in Senate. 3. Continuing Resolution to March 1, 1972 . This resolution will not be necessary if the defense and foreign operations appropriations are enacted. It should be considered as a fall-back however. 4. Foreign Assistance Authorization . The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is conducting meetings to get a consensus for some new aid package. There is a likelihood Fulbright will call Rogers, Laird and Hannah to testify. 3 Should the Committee report a bill, it probably will strip away vital parts of security assistance and also may contain the Mansfield and Cooper-Church amendments. Since the bill would also have to pass the House, there is little possibility of enacting an acceptable foreign aid authorization this year. Recommendations 4 1. That as a tactic we try to avoid a new authorization. This will require a delay of the Foreign Relations Committee’s consideration of a new bill. 2. That we privately urge the House to pass the military and foreign operations appropriations, although unauthorized, and try to win sufficient votes in Senate. We will work closely with GOP House leaders on funding levels. 3. Since foreign aid is unpopular with the American people, the White House should adopt a low profile on efforts to restore the program. Loyal Senators, columnists and outside groups should keep heat on Senate’s irresponsibility. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/21/71. No classification marking. Concurred in by MacGregor and Kissinger. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 3 Rogers and Hannah testified on November 3; see Document 73 . 4 None of the Approve or Disapprove options is checked or initialed. 72. Editorial Note 72. Editorial Note In a November 2, 1971, memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers, Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore Eliot noted that the “initial world reaction to the Senate’s rejection of the aid legislation has been one of stunned concern.” Eliot included a sampling of reactions, including “disastrous consequences for the Southern Flank of NATO.” He attached a copy of telegram 6432 from Lima, November 1, which set out country reactions by delegates to the G-77 Ministerial meeting in Peru. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 5) On November 3 OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza Lasso, CIAP Chairman Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, and Patricio Rojas, Chairman of the Permanent Executive Committee of the IA-ECOSOC, sent a joint letter to President Nixon expressing their concern. The opening paragraph reads: “The United States Senate’s rejection of the Foreign Assistance authorization bill is a source of dismay to all those in Latin America who believe in the reciprocal benefits of international and inter-American cooperation for development. The action comes shortly after the imposition by the United States Government of a 10 percent surcharge and nullifies the effect of your action to exempt Latin America from the 10 percent aid cut. In this context, the Senate action cannot but give the impression of a weakening or abandonment by the United States of its special relationship with Latin America.” (Ibid.) Regarding the exemption for Latin America from the 10 percent aid cut, see footnote 3, Document 62 . President Nixon answered the joint letter in a November 29 letter to Plaza Lasso. He stated his continuing commitment to providing assist-ance to developing countries. He added that the recent setback in no way diminished his determination to sustain assistance efforts and noted with satisfaction “that the Senate has begun to reverse the effect of its earlier action and has already approved at least a substantial part of the assistance funds which were originally requested.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 5) 73. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 73. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 3, 1971. Evening Report [Omitted here is item 1 on the prospective visit of the First Lady to Liberia for President Tolbert’s inauguration.] 2. Senate Foreign Relations Committee—Foreign Aid —Dr. Hannah and I appeared this morning for two hours before the full membership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at their invitation to discuss the future of foreign assistance. I think the discussion was useful. We were able to avoid any discussions of a piecemeal program of foreign assistance. In large part this was due to the Chairman’s and other members’ efforts to focus attention on Southeast Asian policy. In addition the discussion also gave me a chance to reassert the Administration’s strong belief that a reduced program was not in the national interest. A number of Senators, including Cooper, Aiken, Spong and McGee, stated their view that reductions in program levels below the 20% cut levied by the Foreign Relations Committee on the last bill were possible ways of achieving a compromise. I was able to make clear that the figure reported out by the House ($3.2 billion) for the whole program was a figure which the Administration felt it was necessary to have. Similarly, on the question of restrictive amendments, through the extensive discussions of Southeast Asia we made clear that amendments which constricted or restrained Presidentially-proposed programs would not be acceptable. Senator Symington in particular asked about his compromise with Senator Stennis on providing a $341 million ceiling for the Cambodian program, revised upward from the $250 million proposed by the Committee. I indicated, following the Laos ceiling pattern in the Defense Procurement Program, that a ceiling which provided for your full program would be acceptable. As you know, Symington on the floor re-endorsed on Thursday, October 28, your receiving the full authorization and appropriation for Cambodia. The essence of the compromise was that we are willing, in return for getting the full money required, to accept the idea of later going back to the Congress should additional funds be required. In any event this is quite close to the situation as it existed in last year’s Foreign Assistance Act where any additions to the Cambodia program would be subject to 30 day Congressional notice. On the question of ceilings, I took the opportunity to clear up for the Committee the mistaken impression they had that the Administration would not respect a ceiling and believed that Congress did not have the right to impose one. I indicated that in our view ceilings were not advisable, but that Congress had the right, should it wish to do so, to impose them. Senator Case indicated strong concern over our involvement in Cambodia and stated that in his view acceptance of the Cooper-Church Amendment would be the price for the passage of the bill. Senator Cooper did not appear to endorse this view. Senator Javits asked for a commitment that no U.S. ground or air forces would be engaged for the next year in Cambodia or Laos and an “assurance” that we would not be going down the same road as in Vietnam in those two countries. I told Javits that we had already made clear that our ground combat forces would not be involved in Cambodia or Laos, but that our air power had an important interdiction role to play in both countries. I was asked about the Administration’s views on foreign aid reform. I replied that after long study involving the Peterson Task Force, the Administration had submitted its own reform legislation. 2 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had held no hearings on that legislation. I said that the Administration was ready to cooperate in having hearings in order to have the President’s new program receive full consideration in the Senate. We had in the interim accepted the House judgment that a move to a new approach this year would not be possible, and that is the reason why the Administration, and we assume the Committee, had previously accepted the House proposed bill. Senator Symington during the course of discussion left the room and then returned to say that the Conference on the Defense Procurement bill was now agreed on money amounts. What remained to be settled was strong House opposition to the Mansfield Amendment (on Indo-China). He asked if the Administration was going to continue to oppose the Mansfield Amendment and what would be the fate of an aid bill with the Mansfield Amendment attached. I replied that we are strongly opposed to this Amendment and had made that position clear to the Congress. In sum, among the members of the Committee who spoke, Church and Spong appeared to endorse the Fulbright-Mansfield-Symington strong opposition to the present aid bill. Among the others who spoke there was support in one degree or another for most of our development and humanitarian programs and acceptance of the necessity for some security and military programs. I believe this group may support a Continuing Resolution Authority for foreign assistance to get us past the present November 15 deadline. David Passage 3 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. Secret. A handwritten note by Haig reads “HAK—our friend explaineth all!” This Evening Report was included in the President’s morning briefing material on November 4. (Ibid., President’s Daily Briefings, Boxes 1-61) During late 1971, in the run-up to final Congressional action on the foreign assistance authorizing legislation and a continuing resolution on December 17 (see Document 78 ), the Evening Reports were included more frequently in the morning briefing material because they included reporting on legislative progress. 2 The legislation was submitted on April 21, 1971; see Document 60 . 3 Passage signed for Secretary Rogers above Rogers’ typed signature. 74. Editorial Note 74. Editorial Note On November 4, 1971, at 12:05 p.m., Special Assistant to the President Eugene S. Cowen sent a memorandum to Clark MacGregor and Henry Kissinger informing them that at about noon that day Senator Fulbright would introduce three foreign assistance bills in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: bilateral economic aid, $640 million; humanitarian and multilateral aid, $445.9 million; and military and related aid, $1 billion. Cowen added that the three bills would total $2.1 billion, $850 million less than the bill that was defeated in the Senate on October 29 and far below the administration’s request for $3.5 billion. Cowen noted that appropriations in FY 1970 had been $1.9 billion. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971) At 1:30 p.m. on November 4 Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs David Abshire sent a memorandum to Alexander Haig informing him that he and Under Secretary Irwin had just met with Senators Cooper, Javits, and Case who together would be offering a one-bill Javits substitute for the Fulbright three-bill approach and that they thought they had the votes. (Ibid.) On November 4 Cowen sent another memorandum to Henry Kissinger and MacGregor informing them that the Foreign Relations Committee was likely to report a foreign aid bill that day. He added that Senator Scott had told him that he thought Javits and Cooper had the votes to report out the Javits bill. Cowen provided details on the Javits bill, by categories of assistance, and noted that the total was $2,914.8 million, the same amount in the bill defeated by the Senate on October 29. (Ibid.) In his November 4 Evening Report to the President, Secretary of State Rogers reported that by a unanimous vote the Foreign Relations Committee had voted out two foreign assistance bills, the first covering bilateral economic assistance ($695 million) and humanitarian and multilateral assistance ($449 million), and the second providing $1,185 million in military and related assistance. Rogers noted that the total, $2,329 million, was about $600 million less than in the bill the Senate rejected on October 29 and $900 million less than the Committee’s original recommendation. He pointed out that the bill approved by the House had provided $3,443 million. He reported that the Cooper-Church Amendment was out but that the Mansfield and Symington Amendments remained. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Briefings, Box 37, November 1-16, 1971) 75. Memorandum for President Nixon 75. Memorandum for President Nixon 1 Washington, November 9, 1971. FROM Clark MacGregor, Bill Timmons, Ron Ziegler, Dick Moore and Henry Kissinger SUBJECT Foreign Aid The Continuing Resolution to sine die adjournment covering all unfunded programs, including foreign aid, is on the House Floor tomorrow. Also on Wednesday, the Senate takes up the two new foreign aid authorizations: one on economic-humanitarian assistance and another on military-supporting aid. 2 Our position is to pass the Continuing Resolution as a stop gap and to increase funding levels through Floor amendments in the supporting and military assistance portions of the Senate authorization. Vote projections are extremely tight. A strong Presidential statement, preferably in person, would be helpful in winning votes and also will stop critics claiming you did little to save the program. From a press standpoint, the most effective platform for influencing these critical votes would be for you to make a comment in New York at the Republican dinner tonight. It is felt in addition to the good press play that would result that such a step would throw both our critics and the press off balance. Attached is a suggested addition to your New York remarks. 3 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: “Orig. handed to Pres. by Ziegler 11/9/71.” 2 Regarding the two foreign assistance bills reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 4, see Document 74 . 3 Not printed. Although the President did not use the attached text, he made strong remarks in support of foreign assistance at a dinner at the American Hotel in New York. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , p. 1088. 76. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) 76. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) 1 Washington, November 9, 1971. Dear George: In my letter to you dated October 29, 1971, submitting our security assistance budget request for FY 1973, I made reference to a special Security Assistance Contingency Fund. 2 The budget requirement for this fund—$100 million—will be additional to the FY 1973 program for Economic Supporting Assistance (SA) and the Military Assistance Program (MAP). I should like to explain the purposes of the proposed Contingency Fund. As you recall, the President, in his Message to the Congress of April 21, 1971, transmitting draft legislation on foreign aid, requested authority for $100 million for the President’s Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund for FY 1972. The Fund was intended to permit the Administration, with due notification to the Congress, to meet worldwide contingencies in ways compatible with our national interests. The President made clear that he sought unprogrammed funds for use, on short notice, when sudden crises in the international community required us to act promptly. Congress has in recent years appropriated only very limited funds for unprogrammed contingencies. Moreover, various amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act and substantial reductions in FAA appropriations have limited the Administration’s ability to meet unexpected problems rapidly and effectively. As a result, we have frequently been compelled to reallocate funds to meet new contingencies by transferring monies from programs previously justified to the Congress as highly important to the U.S. This practice has encountered Congressional resentment and has created major programming problems for the Executive Branch. I believe that a new approach is required—one which assures the Administration adequate flexibility to meet unforeseen crises and is at the same time forthright with the Congress. I therefore propose a $100 million Contingency Fund for Security Assistance in FY 1973, to be utilized for Military Assistance and Economic Supporting Assistance purposes. This Contingency Fund would be appropriated to the President and apportioned to the Secretary of State who would maintain control over its use. Inclusion of a Security Assistance Contingency Fund in our FY 1973 budget request will require certain adjustments in the FY 1973 budget requests related to the Foreign Assistance Act, already submitted to you, as follows: First, additional FY 1973 New Obligational Authority of $100 million for the Security Assistance Contingency Fund, and a related increase in the FY 1973 outlay ceiling of $30 million. Second, a reduction in the Supporting Assistance request of $50 million in New Obligational Authority and $14 million in outlays, bringing the Supporting Assistance totals to $880 million and $811 million respectively. The undistributed $50 million of Economic Supporting Assistance which was requested in Dr. Hannah’s FY 1973 submission to you of October 12, 1971, will no longer be required since the Security Assistance Contingency Fund would cover such needs. A.I.D.’s contingency fund of $30 million in FY 1973 requested by Dr. Hannah on October 12, 1971, would be apportioned to the A.I.D. Administrator and would be limited to Development Assistance categories, primarily disaster relief. The latter fact could be made clear through legislative history. I recognize the difficulty of preparing a persuasive brief for the Security Assistance Contingency Fund before the Congress. However, I am confident that, with adequate advance preparation, we will be able to secure general support on the Hill for this approach. Before completing the FY 1973 Congressional Presentation, we would consult with the Congressional leadership and appropriate Congressional Committee members to ascertain likely Congressional reactions. If these consultations should show Congressional hostility to the idea, which might in turn provoke further restrictions on the Administration’s flexibility in using FAA funds, we would need to reconsider the whole approach. I would welcome your support in establishing the proposed Security Assistance Contingency Fund. If you have any comments, my staff would be happy to meet with your representatives. Sincerely, William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). Confidential. Drafted by W.H. Lewis (PM/PA) on November 4 and cleared by Leahy (H) and O’Connor (CO/SA). The letter was forwarded to Secretary Rogers through Irwin under cover of a November 4 memorandum from Spiers recommending that the Secretary sign the letter. 2 The October 29 letter transmitted estimates for FY 1973 security assistance and projections for FY 1974-1977. Rogers indicated he would shortly send his proposal for about $100 million in Contingency Fund Security Assistance for FY 1973. (Ibid.) 77. Information Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Robert D. Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 77. Information Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Robert D. Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 6, 1971. SUBJECT Funding Security Assistance Programs On November 24, 1971, Secretary Laird wrote Director Shultz recommending that “Security Assistance, including FMS requests for FY 73, be restructured as Defense Authorization and Appropriation bills,” (Tab A). 2 Thus the Secretary has reopened the thorny question of the most desirable arrangement for security assistance programs. The difficulty of the problem derives from its several interlocking facets: managerial, bureaucratic, and political. George Shultz will be wanting to discuss this with you. Managerial Considerations Our security assistance effort has long been criticized for diffuse management and consequent lack of control. The number of possible arrangements designed to address those problems is extensive, but the following three seem to be the range of reasonable options. 1. The DOD budget could be expanded to include MAP, FMS credit, all Supporting Assistance, and the Public Safety program. State/AID would not have any security assistance appropriations but would provide policy direction and manage the public safety and supporting assistance programs. 2. The Defense appropriation could cover MAP, FMS credit, and security-related (SEA and Jordan) Supporting Assistance. The State/AID appropriation would include Public Safety, Economic (non-security) Supporting Assistance, and the Contingency Fund. 3. Some lesser change such as (a) moving only Cambodia to MASF or (b) moving MAP and Supporting Assistance for all the forward defense MAP countries (Greece, Turkey, Cambodia, Taiwan, and Korea) to the Defense budget. — Evaluation . —The first option would bring together all security assistance funding in a single budget and centralize control in Defense. Regardless of legal provisions, in practical terms State’s role would be considerably reduced. Also, DOD would fund for economic programs not related to security assistance and for Public Safety, which has at most a marginal relationship to security assistance. A similar proposal was earlier rejected in decisions leading up to the Administration’s April 1971 proposal based upon a judgment that we probably could not succeed in an effort to move all MAP, FMS, or supporting assistance into the Defense budget. Today the situation may be different. —The second alternative leaves Public Safety and non-security economic Supporting Assistance under State/AID. Thus it would not saddle DOD with ancillary programs of little interest to it, would preserve a more active State/AID role, and would still provide a meaningful basis for the Nixon Doctrine’s rationale of a trade-off between (a) allied efforts with U.S. support and (b) direct U.S. security efforts. Some might object that by taking Security Assistance out of the Foreign Assistance Act the existing flexibility between Development Assistance and Supporting Assistance would be lost. But by moving all security-related programs to the Defense budget, the flexibility to shift between Supporting Assistance and MAP would be preserved and with careful drafting substantial additional flexibility could be assured within the Defense budget—including reliance on the Service budgets for long lead-time support. —The third choice would be essentially a half-measure which would still give the HFAC/SFRC a slice of the pie and would leave funding for Latin American and African internal security programs under State/AID. Funding would be badly split, and the advantages of moving one or a few country programs would not compensate for the adverse Congressional reactions. Moreover, this would provide a wedge in both the bureaucracy and the Congress for moving items piecemeal to the State side and would leave management of security assistance programs divided. — Problem . Moving all security assistance programs to the DOD budget would mean that the total Security Assistance budget under Defense would approximate $4.5 billion. Consequently, those who seek increases in the regular Defense budget might find the increases received illusory since an additional $2 billion in costs would have been accepted. Bureaucratic Considerations Structural decisions regarding budgetary legislation have obvious impacts upon the roles of the agencies concerned. Any of the above alternatives would reduce the basis for charges that security assistance is diffuse and uncontrolled; however, they would produce anguished cries of increased DOD influence and downgrading the State Department. This would, of course, be true. Provisions of law notwithstanding, any of the above would decrease State’s policy influence in security assistance. The Congressional Problem Regardless of all the possible debate about good management, the crux of the matter lies in the Executive-Legislative relationship and the impact of any attempt to change committee jurisdictions upon security assistance funding, restrictions on the President’s flexibility, the DOD budget, and even on domestic programs. —If a change of jurisdiction could be achieved without rousing resentment, there is no doubt it would be desirable. But this may not be possible. The GOP members of the HFAC and Chairman Morgan wrote President Nixon expressing strong opposition to any such move last December and January. 3 Thus we might manage to shift jurisdiction only to find that on the floor we faced more intensive opposition on aid, and the war and foreign policy powers of the Executive Branch. —Therefore, the major question is whether the inevitable resentment of and major risks attendant upon the attempt are outweighed by the probability of success and potential benefits if successful. The judgment is subjective; no one can answer with assurance. —Additional considerations: —The Executive cannot control committee jurisdictions. The Congress could extract security assistance from the DOD budget and place it before the HFAC and SFRC. However, this could be prevented to a large extent by intermingling security assistance funds within the Defense budget. —Personalities come and go and change. We could find we had taken the lumps of making shift, only a year or so later to find the HFAC/SFRC the preferable forum. (One wonders, for example, whether an Armed Services Committee chaired by Senator Symington would be helpful to our security assistance program.) Ways to Mitigate Resentment Presumably we would attempt to reduce criticism, if the President decides to make the change. One way could be to acknowledge Congressional concern, cast the effort in terms of cancelling old programs and introducing new ones, emphasize managerial/control reasons for the change, maintain that altering committee jurisdiction was not our purpose, and structure the security assistance position of the Defense budget so that it could easily be broken out for separate committee attention. The disadvantageous possibility is that the Congress might take us up on it, especially if security assistance items were not intermingled in the DOD budget, and keep security assistance before the HFAC/SFRC. The primary advantage would be that this course leaves the decision more clearly up to Congress and appeals more to the self-interest of the Armed Services Committees. Any struggle would be more (not entirely) intralegislative rather than completely executive vs. legislative. Burying security assistance funds within the Defense budget could make it extremely hard to pull supporting assistance out to place it under the HFAC/SFRC for authorization. On the other hand, such obscuration would weaken our stance that a change of jurisdiction was not our primary purpose. Conclusion In short, this change is feasible, and there are advantages even beyond the possibility of friendlier forums on the Hill. Defense is now developing alternative methods for making such a move of supporting assistance funds as well as for dealing structurally in the budget with some of the strategy questions which will arise in the presentation. But they have not yet completed this effort. What we need now is an assessment from the congressional side of the prospects for success. This should be first undertaken by Secretary Laird, but if the President elects to go in this direction, given the nature of the committee prerogatives involved, the President himself should discuss the effort with Senator Stennis. Tabs A conception for putting security assistance in the Defense budget is at Tab B. This is generally in accord with planning now underway in Defense. A paper prepared for Director Shultz by the OMB staff outlining their reservations, which hinge almost entirely on congressional considerations, is at Tab C, covered by a brief summary we have prepared. An internal State memo, which also focuses on congressional reactions, is at Tab D. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 229, Department of Defense, XIV 11-12/71. Confidential; Urgent. John Lehman concurred in the memorandum. 2 None of the tabs is printed. 3 Not further identified. 78. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 78. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 17, 1971. Evening Report Foreign Aid —After coming to an agreement on the Conference Report on the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill and the Continuing Resolution late Thursday night, the House and Senate acted quickly this morning to conclude legislative action for this session. The Senate passed the Authorization Conference with no debate by a roll-call vote of 33-21. The total authorization figure is $2.752 billion with $1.234 billion for economic assistance and $1.518 billion for security assistance. A further breakdown of the security assistance authorization figures shows MAP funded at $500 million, security assistance at $618 million, with $50 million for Israel, and foreign military credit sales at $400 million with $300 million earmarked for Israel. Doc Morgan said the House would take up the Authorization Conference Report after they reconvened in mid-January. 2 Immediately after the passage of the Authorization Conference Report, the Senate passed by a roll-call vote of 45-9 H.J. Res. 1005, a Continuing Resolution Authorization for foreign aid and other related programs. This resolution would expire on February 22, 1972. A breakdown shows $1.252 billion for economic assistance and $1.572 billion for security assistance. Security assistance includes $522.5 million for MAP, $649.7 million for supporting assistance with $50 million for Israel, and $400 million for foreign military credit sales with $300 million earmarked for Israel. This brings the total appropriation for the Continuing Resolution up to $3.238 billion, excluding funds for the Export-Import Bank. The Continuing Resolution figures are slightly higher than the Authorization Bill because they show some previously authorized but not appropriated funds. The Continuing Resolution passed the House unamended by a voice vote. Shortly after this action both Houses formally adjourned for the session. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Briefings, Box 37, December 17-December 31, 1971. Secret. 2 President Nixon signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 on February 7, 1972. In his signing statement he referred to it as a great disappointment because funding was below minimum acceptable levels, it did not include the reform proposals sent to Congress on April 21, and it had reached his desk more than half way through the fiscal year. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 , pp. 166-167. 79. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 79. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Foreign Aid Budget for 1973 The memorandum from George Shultz at Tab 1 summarizes OMB’s FY 73 budget recommendations for foreign aid, both security and development. In brief, the recommended FY 73 program is tight but adequate to support our foreign policy objectives. The following table highlights the new obligational authority changes from the 1972 budget and current estimate (based on the conference and Senate-passed authorization bill). ($ millions) 72 Budget 72 Estimate 73 Recommendation Security Assistance 1,978 1,518 2,048 Development and Humanitarian Assistance 2,808 2,516 2,657 Contingency Fund 100 30 50 Total, Foreign Assistance 4,886 4,064 4,755 (A more detailed table is at Tab 2) 2 Your security assistance request will be slightly above that requested and 25 percent above what we anticipate the Congress will give us for FY 72. Your economic assistance request will be about $150M less than you sought, and about an equal amount more than we expect Congress to provide, for FY 72. Significant items include the following: The $60M Thai program has been transferred from the Defense budget to MAP in conformity with the pending aid authorization bill. The increase in supporting assistance from $763 to $811M results from the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam and the consequent need to supplement GVN foreign exchange earnings. The Indonesian program includes $25M in MAP and $115M in development loans, reflecting your recent decision on the U.S. pledge to Indonesia. South Asian relief needs are highly uncertain; therefore, we recommend $100M be included in the budget with an indication that a supplemental appropriation may be needed later. George Shultz’ recommendation is that we only go for $50M for the Contingency Fund. His rationale is that the Congress has in the past been reluctant to approve our requests. Indeed, there is only $30M in the current authorization bill, and the appropriation is likely to be reduced even further. Congress looks with suspicion on what it sees as an uncontrolled amount. The uncertainties which we can expect, in particular those associated with relief for South Asia and possible additional security needs in Southeast Asia, warrant our asking for a larger amount. I recommend you request $100M for the 1973 Contingency Fund rather than the $50M George has proposed. Recommendation: 3 That you approve the proposals as submitted by George Shultz with an addition of $50M to the Contingency Fund, making a total of $100M. Tab 1 Washington, December 23, 1971. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon SUBJECT Foreign Aid Budget for 1973 This memorandum summarizes our 1973 Budget recommendations for foreign aid, both security and development. 4 In brief, our recommendations for foreign assistance in 1973 total $4,755 million in budget authority and $3,177 million in outlays. The 1972 Budget request was $4,886 million in budget authority and $3,482 million in outlays. The 1972 current estimate figures contained in the following tables are based, where applicable, on the amounts that would be authorized by the foreign assistance authorization bill which has been agreed to by the conferees and passed by the Senate. Those figures, which we propose be carried in the Budget rather than the original request, total $4,064 million in budget authority and $3,101 in outlays. (See attached table for a detailed summary, Tab A.) 5 Security Assistance 1972 1973 Budget Current Est. Agency Reg. OMB Recom. ($ millions) Military Assistance— grants and credit sales: Program level 1,314 1,095 1,458 1,429 Budget authority 1,215 900 1,343 1,237 Outlays 1,090 941 895 877 Our recommendation would be adequate to support our foreign policy objectives, but would require some restraint in using resources to meet those objectives or new requirements. The grant program is higher than the level requested for 1972, reflecting principally the funding of the Thailand program in the regular military assistance grant program rather than in the Defense budget; this change would be required under the pending foreign assistance authorization bill. The chances of obtaining a repeal of that requirement would be very small. The appropriation which would be requested for grants would be about the same as for 1972 in order to reflect the availability of excess defense materiel and encourage its use to reduce the need for appropriated funds. The recommended total budget authority for grants and credits is close to the level requested for 1972 but considerably more than the Congress is likely to provide this year. The bulk of the grant funds would be for Cambodia ($225 million), Korea ($220 million), Turkey ($100 million), Thailand ($60 million), Jordan ($45 million), and Indonesia ($25 million). The amount for credit sales would include $300 million for Israel, $75 million for Latin America, $60 million for Greece, and $55 million for Taiwan. (See attached tables for country detail, Tabs B and C.) Economic Supporting Assistance: Program level 806 733 915 890 Budget authority 763 618 880 811 Outlays 648 584 811 796 The increase in economic supporting assistance is largely due to the need to replace declining South Vietnamese foreign exchange earnings resulting from the withdrawal of American forces. The increase would permit continued financing of imports into Vietnam at about $750 million annually. Of the total supporting assistance program of $890 million, $633 million would be for South Vietnam, $90 million for Cambodia, $50 million for Laos, $40 million for Jordan, and $26 million for Thailand. (See attached table for country detail, Tab D.) Development Assistance 1972 1973 Budget Current Est. Agency Reg. OMB Recom. ($ millions) Bilateral Assistance: Program level 1,389 1,151 1,526 1,365 Budget authority 1,012 737 1,154 1,002 Outlays 1,011 883 884 697 The recommendation includes development loans, technical assistance and related activities, AID administrative expenses, and the Inter-American Social Development Institute. The amount for development loans would be adequate for a program for South Asia of at least $300 million without specifically identifying the division between India and Pakistan. In addition, the recommended amount includes $115 million for Indonesia, reflecting your recent decision on the U.S. pledge. (See attached table for illustrative country and regional detail, Tab E.) Voluntary Contributions to International Organizations: Budget authority 168 166 203 173 Outlays 143 172 178 178 This category includes contributions to such organizations as the U.N. Drug Abuse Control Fund, the U.N. Children’s Fund, and the U.N. Fund for Population. The principal contribution is to the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). In each of the last three years the Budget included $100 million for the UNDP. The agency 1973 request for the UNDP is $105 million; our recommendation of $86 million is the same level as that which the Congress provided in 1970 and 1971. South Asia Relief: Budget authority 250 250 200 100 Outlays 175 175 200 138 Costs in 1973 for relief of refugees in India and East Pakistan are highly uncertain. For this reason we recommend that $100 million be included in the Budget as a tangible recognition of a certain humanitarian need and that we indicate that a supplemental appropriation may be needed later. Provision for such a supplemental would be made in the Budget’s allowance for contingencies; we would handle food aid under P.L. 480 in the same manner. Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Budget authority 25 25 290 85 Outlays -8 -12 -1 -1 The agency requests an increase in its reserves sufficient to cover total potential claims against insurance on U.S. investments in Chile. Our recommendation, together with existing reserves and anticipated income, would be sufficient to pay highly probable claims during calendar year 1972 without the need to seek an appropriation clearly labeled “Chile.” However, we would indicate in the Budget the possibility of a later supplemental appropriation if the expropriation situation in Chile should require. International Financial Institutions: Budget authority 1,353 1,338 1,297 1,297 Outlays 377 335 460 460 The agency request and our recommendation are principally for contributions to international financial institutions to which the United States is fully committed—the second and third installments for the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank Special Fund. In addition, the recommendation includes $100 million in budget authority representing the first of three installments of a contribution to the Asian Development Bank’s ordinary capital, to which the U.S. Director of the Bank has agreed. President’s Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund 1972 1973 Budget Current Est. Agency Reg. OMB Recom. ($ millions) Contingency Fund: Budget authority 100 30 130 50 Outlays 46 23 56 32 The agency request is for two contingency funds: $100 million for security assistance and $30 million for other foreign aid contingencies, principally disaster relief needs. We recommend continuation of one fund to preserve maximum Presidential flexibility. Our recommendation of $50 million reflects a judgment that the Congress is unlikely to appropriate even that much, as recent experience indicates. George P. Shultz 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 323, Foreign Aid, Volume I 7/70-1971. Secret. Attached is a December 27 memorandum from Kennedy and Hormats to Kissinger recommending that he forward this memorandum and the attached December 23 memorandum from Shultz to the President. Kennedy and Hormats expressed a concern that Shultz was recommending only $50 million for the Contingency Fund instead of agency requests for $130 million. They agreed that “prospective uncertainties” warranted $100 million. On the December 27 Kennedy-Hormats memorandum, Haig wrote: “Dick, I’ll OK for HAK for Pres.” 2 Not printed. 3 Haig checked the Approve option and wrote: “Haig for HAK for Pres.” An attached December 30 memorandum for the record by Kennedy indicates that he notified Kenneth Dam of the approval and the preference for an additional $50 million for the Contingency Fund. Dam reportedly indicated that the additional $50 million would be put in the Contingency Fund. 4 Following further refinement of the numbers, the Foreign Assistance legislation for FY 1973 was sent to Congress on March 14, 1972. In his transmittal message the President recalled the delay and low level of funding of his FY 1972 request (see footnote 2, Document 78 ) and urged prompt action to authorize and appropriate the full amount of the FY 1973 request. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 , pp. 412-413. He also urged action on his foreign assistance reform proposals of April 21, 1971, legislation that was never enacted. Nevertheless, in his September 19, 1972, message to Congress transmitting the “Report on the Foreign Assistance Program for FY 71,” the President continued to hope the April 21, 1971, proposals would “provide the basis for a discussion with the Congress on ways in which we can structure our programs to increase their effectiveness.” See ibid., p. 877. 5 None of the attached tables is printed. 80. Editorial Note 80. Editorial Note On January 4, 1972, Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird sent separate memoranda to the President requesting his reconsideration of the MAP levels he approved in the closing days of 1971 (see Document 79 ). Laird sought the full amount of the original Defense Department request ($847.8 million compared to the $710.0 million that was approved), but Rogers was less ambitious. Laird also sought restoration of funds for the Korea program and took exception to a “financial legerdemain” that reduced new obligational authority by $50 million and which he thought might raise questions in Congress. Richard Kennedy summarized the Secretaries’ reclamas in a January 4 memorandum to Henry Kissinger to which he attached their memoranda. In his covering memorandum Kennedy agreed with Rogers that the financial sleight of hand might cause difficulties with Congress and that the request for new obligational authority should be increased accordingly, along with another $5 million in MAP for Indonesia that Kissinger had requested. Kennedy recommended that Kissinger tell OMB Director Shultz that the NOA figure should be increased by $55 million but that, with the exception of Indonesia levels, other country programs should remain as approved. (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 230, Department of Defense, Volume 15 1/72) Kissinger accompanied the President on his flight to California on January 3, preparatory to the Summit with Prime Minister Sato on January 6. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Kennedy’s January 4 memorandum was brought to Kissinger’s attention, and on January 5 Kennedy wrote on it: “HAK approved except that $15 million was added to Korea. This was passed to OMB—Dam/Shultz and Defense—Pursley. OMB confirmed that changes were made per this instruction.” 81. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to Secretary of State Rogers 81. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, January 20, 1972. As you know, we have been engaged for a period of many months in a thoughtful and comprehensive study looking toward reorganizing and redirecting A.I.D. to better achieve objectives attuned to the present and the future and within existing legislation. 2 We have completed this effort and are about to proceed with it. I have kept Under Secretary Irwin informed as each step has been taken. This morning I am personally hand-delivering copies of the material attached to this memorandum to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Foreign Relations Committee and Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate, and to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Appropriations Subcommittee of the House. A copy of one of the letters accompanying this material is also attached for your information. You will note that I am not asking for approval, but providing an opportunity for them to point out anything they feel to be unwise or undesirable before the last steps are taken. There will be general distribution of the overall document with an accompanying memorandum to A.I.D. employees in Washington on Monday. Copies of this material are also being forwarded to the President, Henry Kissinger, Clark MacGregor, George Shultz and Cap Weinberger. I am sure you do not have time to read the longer document. The briefing paper on reorganization will give you the thrust of it. J.A.H Attachment Washington, January 20, 1972. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) Dear Mr. Chairman: As you know from our previous conversations, we have been engaged for a period of many months in a thoughtful and comprehensive study looking toward reorganizing and redirecting A.I.D. to better achieve its objectives attuned to the present and the future and within existing legislation. We have completed this effort and are about to proceed with it. It seems appropriate that I should give you a copy of what is contemplated before it is distributed within the agency and give you an opportunity to look at it and give me the benefit of your judgment as to whatever you see in it that seems unwise or undesirable. Because experience has taught me that within the bureaucracy any distribution soon becomes public, and that a request for approval provides an incentive for disapproval, I am delivering in person, if possible, or if that is not possible through Matt Harvey, copies of this mate-rial only to the Chairmen and ranking Minority Members of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate, and to the Chairmen and ranking Minority Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Appropriations Subcommittee of the House. I am not asking you to approve it or ratify it. Unless there are substantial objections, I plan to distribute it to A.I.D. employees the first of next week and will move to implement it as rapidly as possible beginning on February first. To achieve the staff reductions contemplated will require legislation permitting early retirement of a substantial number of people and the retention of the most competent and able. The material attached includes: 3 1. Briefing paper on Reorganization 2. Memorandum to A.I.D. Employees with attachment, “Reform of U.S. Economic Assistance Programs” 3. Copy of proposed legislation to accomplish early retirement of A.I.D. personnel I will appreciate your advice or any comments you care to offer. Sincerely, John A. Hannah Attachment 1 Washington, January 20, 1972. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BRIEFING PAPER ON REORGANIZATION The Agency for International Development is undertaking a comprehensive self-reorganization, designed to —emphasize humanitarian and economic aspects of U.S. development assistance; —adjust traditional techniques and policies to changed development needs and resources in the world’s poorer countries; —coordinate more effectively U.S. development assistance within multilateral and consortia channels; —further emphasize the participation of private organizations in assistance; —focus U.S. development resources on a sector basis; and —reduce the size and complexity of the A.I.D. structure. The new organizational plan is in keeping with President Nixon’s call for a more efficient and modernized U.S. foreign assistance program and is consistent with the philosophy of legislative proposals presently under review by the Congress. It also reflects many of the suggestions for program improvements previously expressed by the Congress. In recent years a number of steps have been taken to modernize U.S. assistance strategy and techniques. The establishment of an Auditor General has improved program management. The sector approach has been introduced into many country programs. More participation by private U.S. organizations has been achieved. Administration of Supporting Assistance has been placed within a separate bureau. 4 A.I.D. staff has already been reduced by nearly a third in the past three years. These and other steps have produced good results in terms of program efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless, basic A.I.D. structure and many A.I.D. procedures continue to reflect development needs and conditions of a decade or more ago when the U.S. played a predominant, nearly exclusive, role in providing development resources and guidance to the poor countries. Since then, other advanced nations have greatly increased their national contributions to the world’s development programs, international lending institutions have expanded their resources and administrative capacities, the underdeveloped nations have gained perspective and understanding of their own problems and begun to develop their own plans and their own human resources to deal with them. And those problems have been seen to be more complex and intractable, requiring remedies more highly sophisticated and innovative than was originally recognized. All this compels new approaches, including —a more collaborative style of assistance which places the developing countries at the center of the development process; —greater application of U.S. scientific and technical advances on research and development of new and innovative techniques for development problems; —broader participation of American private groups in the practical work of development. To achieve these ends the Agency is undertaking the following changes within the framework of existing legislation. 1. A new Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance will incorporate all elements of the Agency’s programs and research in population and family planning, the grant “Food for Peace” program, disaster relief, and support for 82 U.S. voluntary agencies engaged in overseas assistance. Disaster relief capability will be upgraded and strengthened. Problems of exploding population growth and birth control will receive the highest priority. 2. The Bureau for Technical Assistance will provide Agency leadership in technical assistance policy, program development and research focused on basic human problems, where American technology and experience can make distinctive contributions. Coordinating A.I.D.’s resources in research and institutional grants to undertake major pilot programs stressing innovative techniques for adaptation of modern technology will be a major task of this bureau. 3. Regional Bureaus established on geographical lines, which have been semi-autonomous and equipped to undertake detailed individual country analysis and programming will continue, but will rely increasingly on outside sources, including private organizations and recipient nations themselves, to do more of the programming and project management. 4. All program support and administrative service functions, including personnel, accounting, contracting, procurement, training, data systems and management analysis, will be consolidated in a new Bureau for Program Services . The new arrangement is designed for greater flexibility, speed, policy consistency, procedural simplifications and more efficient use of manpower. 5. Economic supporting assistance, sometimes called security assistance, will continue to be administered, for now, by a separate bureau within A.I.D., and will be subject to general policy changes of the Agency. We hope these programs will ultimately be transferred to the Department of State. 6. An Administrator’s Advisory Council , composed of senior officers, will be formed to assist the Administrator in the redirection of the Agency’s program and to strengthen central policy direction. When this reorganization is completed, the Agency expects to do its work better with fewer people. If (but only if) necessary Congressional authorities, previously urged, are obtained, the Agency is confident it can assure improved effectiveness and achieve further personnel savings of a magnitude approaching 25 percent of present American staff. These authorities include incentives for selective retirement of eligible personnel and permitting better utilization of the Agency’s solid bedrock of highly skilled and dedicated staff. Alternative methods of staff reduction could not achieve this. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). No classification marking. 2 See Document 65 . 3 Attachment 1 is printed below. Attachments 2 and 3 were not found. 4 In the attachment (not printed) to his September 20 letter ( Document 65 ), Hannah discussed the separation of security from development assistance as follows: “A.I.D. has centralized its Supporting Assistance programs into a new Supporting Assistance Bureau. This Bureau is now responsible for managing all economic security programs in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Jordan. In its recent report (No. 92-380 of July 26, 1971), the House Foreign Affairs Committee acknowledged A.I.D.’s intention of creating the new Supporting Assistance Bureau and noted that this ‘should facilitate the eventual transition of these functions to the Department of State.’” 82. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) 82. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) 1 Washington, January 26, 1972. SUBJECT Your program for reform of the U.S. Economic Assistance Program 2 Your reform program goes a long way toward implementing the thoughts which both we and the Administration have expressed in recent years on economic assistance. It is impressive in both scope and content. As I understand your program, it does not affect the relationships which currently exist between the Department of State and the Agency for International Development. The new organization does, however, suggest that in the near future the appropriate officers from State and AID should review our coordinating mechanisms in order to ascertain what adjustments if any should be made in them. For example, we may wish to consider a more formal link between State and AID by assigning a senior State officer to sit on your Administrator’s Advisory Council. I have also received comments and suggestions from officers in the Department of State with reference to supporting assistance, public safety, humanitarian assistance, and our population programs. There is general agreement that a concerted effort should be made to gain enactment of the International Security Assistance Act as rapidly as possible, although not at the expense of a prolonged delay in obtaining a FY ′73 security assistance authorization. David Abshire is exploring this question and will report back to us in the near future. In the meantime, I would recommend delay in the full integration of the Supporting Assistance Bureau into the reorganized Agency for International Development. 3 Even if we are unable to obtain passage of a bill formally transferring supporting assistance to State, I believe that serious consideration should be given to a delegation of authority under which the Supporting Assistance function would have a clear chain of command from the Under Secretary and the Coordinator for Security Assistance. I also believe that we should have a thorough review of the relationship between Public Safety and Supporting Assistance to determine the ultimate placement of public safety programs. As you know, the President in his message to Congress on April 21, 1971 on the reorganization of foreign assistance expressed his desire to create a Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance within the Department of State and included such a proposal in his draft legislation on International Development and Humanitarian Assistance. It is my understanding that the organizational changes contemplated for AID in no way preclude the future creation of such a bureau in State. This point should be made in any discussions with Congress and outside interested groups. Because of the substantial interest both in the Department of State and within the Congress in our various population programs, I would like to suggest that you consider the establishment of a Population Assistance Bureau, or a Bureau of Human Resources Development as an alternative to the placement of population programs in the Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance. 4 A possible grouping of functions in a Bureau for Human Resources Development could include manpower, health, education, and housing as well as population programs. In the event that neither of these arrangements should prove feasible, we would stress our understanding that population programs will continue to be treated as an essential element of economic development, and that the coordination of population programs will be such as to make them mutually reinforcing with education, health and nutrition, and manpower employment programs. Finally, I would like to stress the necessity of treating our bilateral assistance programs as an integral part of our overall foreign policy effort. There should be no implication in our presentation of these administrative improvements that there has been change in the Administration’s policy as expressed by the President in his message to Congress on April 21, 1971 where he states that these programs are “… of major importance in promoting the national security and foreign policy of the United States …”. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US). Confidential. Drafted by J.K. Wilhelm (S/PC) on January 22 and forwarded to Irwin under cover of a January 24 memorandum from Arthur Hartman, which noted that Hannah’s reform package had already gone to the Secretary and Congress and included four sets of comments received from within the Department to help guide the Under Secretary’s decision. 2 Reference is presumably to the program outlined in Document 81 , a copy of which was attached. 3 Issues related to the Supporting Assistance Bureau were raised in January 21 memoranda to Hartman from Thomas Stern (S/PC) and Thomas Pickering (PM), attached to the January 24 memorandum from Hartman (see footnote 1 above). 4 Issues related to population and humanitarian assistance were raised in January 21 memoranda to Hartman from Philander Claxton (S/PM) and Frank Kellogg (S/R), attached to the January 24 memorandum from Hartman (see footnote 1 above). 83. Memorandum From the Office of Management and Budget to President Nixon 83. Memorandum From the Office of Management and Budget to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Enrolled Bill S. 2819—Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 Sponsor—Sen. Fulbright (D) Arkansas Last Day for Action February 7, 1972—Monday (recommend action on the last day) Purpose (a) Authorizes appropriations for foreign assistance for fiscal year 1972 of $2,752 million, of which $1,204 million is for Development Assistance, $1,518 million is for Security Assistance, and $30 million is for the President’s Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund; (b) authorizes appropriations for 1973 of $984 million, of which $954 million is for Development Assistance and $30 million is for the Contingency Fund; (c) adds restrictions and limitations to the foreign assistance programs; (d) requires release of certain impounded domestic funds before foreign aid funds can be used; (e) requires periodic appropriation authorizations for the Department of State and the United States Information Agency; and (f) requires State to keep the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees “fully and currently informed” on matters within their jurisdiction. Agency Recommendations Office of Management and Budget: Approval (Signing statement attached) 2 Department of State: Approval Agency for International Development: Approval Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Approval National Security Council: Approval (informally) United States Information Agency: Does not recommend disapproval Department of Defense: Let bill become law without signature Department of Agriculture: No recommendation Department of the Treasury: No objection Department of Justice: Defers to other agencies Inter-American Social Development Institute: No comment Council on International Economic Policy: No comment (informally) Discussion The total authorization provided in S. 2819 for 1972 is $802 million less than that requested by the Administration and $484 million below the authorization provided in 1971. The major reductions in the request are: —$178 million in development lending from the $635 million requested; —$99 million in technical assistance from the $363 million requested; —$147 million in economic supporting assistance from the $765 million requested; —$205 million in military assistance grants from the $705 million requested; —$110 million in foreign military sales from the $510 million requested; and —$70 million in the President’s Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund from the $100 million requested. Details of the reductions are contained in the attached table. In addition to the substantially reduced authorization levels, the 1972 appropriations will be even lower. The House-passed appropriation bill is $115 million below the authorization levels contained in the enrolled bill, while the unenacted Senate committee bill is $604 million below the authorization levels. The bulk of these additional reductions is in supporting assistance and military assistance. The Administration had proposed a major organizational restructuring of the foreign assistance programs and separate authorizing bills for security assistance and development assistance. 3 In addition, the Administration proposed deletion of a number of restrictive amendments. With some exceptions (e.g., provision of an Executive Level III in the State Department for a Security Assistance Coordinator), the bill passed by the Congress does not respond to these recommendations, continues the basic authorities contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and adds a long list of new restrictive amendments, discussed below. The Administration also proposed new provisions dealing with international narcotics control; the enrolled provisions differ somewhat from those proposed but in intent and effect are basically the same. The new provisions (section 109, page 4): (1) Authorize the President (a) to enter into agreements with other countries for the control of illicit trafficking in narcotics, and (b) to furnish assistance for this purpose to countries and international organizations, using any foreign assistance funds available. (2) Require suspension of foreign aid to a country which the President determines has not taken adequate steps to prevent narcotics from illegally entering the United States, and permit lifting the suspension when the President determines that such steps have been taken. The only significant substantive changes from or additions to the Administration proposal pertaining only to development assistance are (a) denial of requested authority to use approximately $60 million in dollar receipts from loans made by AID’s predecessor agencies for relending to less developed countries, and (b) a statement that the President should reduce the amount of development loans to a level of $100 million by 1975. (Section 101 (c) (2), page 1) Significant substantive changes from or additions to the Administration proposal pertaining to security assistance are: (1) A requirement that by September 30, 1972, the numbers of U.S. military personnel assigned to military assistance advisory groups or military missions abroad (excluding South Vietnam) be reduced at least 15% from the levels of September 30, 1971. This requirement is coupled with an expression of congressional intent that every effort should be made to effect a 25% reduction. (Section 201(f), page 5) (2) A requirement that military grants to Thailand be financed under the Foreign Assistance Act rather than in the Defense budget under the Defense Procurement Act as has been the case since 1968. The 1973 Budget provides for this shift in funding. (Section 201(f), page 5) (3) A requirement that any government receiving grant military assistance and excess defense articles deposit local currency equal to 10% of such assistance, such deposit to be used by the United States to pay its official costs payable in the local currency. Certain exceptions are provided: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, countries where the United States holds local currencies in excess of its needs, and countries to which military assistance is explicitly given in return for base rights (Spain). This requirement, where applicable, will have the effect of converting a portion (10%) of grant military aid into a local currency sales program. It will also result in some budgetary and balance-of-payments savings to the United States. (Section 201(f), page 6) (4) A prohibition on military and economic assistance to Greece, subject to a Presidential waiver (and report to the Congress) on grounds of overriding requirements of national security, and an annual ceiling on assistance equal to that provided in 1971 (about $73 million). The ceiling will permit adequate levels of military grants and sales, should the prohibition be waived. Greece does not receive economic assistance. (Section 301, page 7) (5) An increase from $75 million to $100 million in the ceiling on military assistance to Latin America, including sales but excluding training, with a Presidential waiver up to $150 million on grounds of overriding requirements of national security. The Administration requested an increase in the ceiling to $150 million, with a waiver unlimited in amount. The $150 million maximum should be sufficient to meet all sales requests unless the Latin Americans wish to buy substantial numbers of high cost items such as aircraft. (Section 401(c) and (d), page 12) In addition to the preceding, the bill contains a number of general provisions pertaining both to development and security assistance: (1) A suspension of all assistance, except humanitarian, to Pakistan until the President reports to the Congress that Pakistan is “cooperating fully in allowing the situation in East Pakistan to return to stability and that refugees from East Pakistan in India have been allowed” to return to their homes. Because Pakistan is no longer in a position to facilitate or impede stability in East Pakistan and the return of refugees, the practical effect of this provision is unclear. (Section 301, pages 7-8) (2) A requirement that the President notify the Congress prior to the use of certain authorities to transfer funds or waive statutory restrictions. Current law permits notification of the Congress after such transfers or waivers. (Section 304(a), page 8) (3) A requirement that the President furnish Congress a list of recipients to which the United States intends to furnish assistance, and the amounts of such assistance, 30 days after the effective date of any foreign assistance appropriation. In the case of countries receiving military or support assistance, the amendment prohibits an increase in the level of assistance in excess of 10% of the levels reported. Waiver authorities contained elsewhere in the Act may not be used to exceed the 10% limitation; however, it may be waived pursuant to (a) Presidential determination that the increase is in the “security interests of the United States,” and (b) a report to the Congress on each such determination and the justification for it at least 10 days prior to the effective date of the increase. (Section 304(b), page 8) (4) A requirement that in any case in which the President is required to make a report to Congress concerning a finding or determination under this Act, the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act, the finding or determination must be (a) reduced to writing and signed by the President, (b) acted upon only after it has been reduced to writing and signed, and (c) published in the Federal Register in full, unless the President concludes that such publication would be harmful to national security, in which case only a statement that a determination has been made and the Act under which it was made need be published. Additionally, this provision states that no committee or officer of Congress shall be denied requested information relating to any such Presidential finding or determination even though the request is made prior to the time the President is legally required to make the appropriate report to the Congress. (The President, of course, retains his right to claim executive privilege.) (Section 304(b), page 9) (5) A ceiling of $341 million on obligations for all U.S. assistance to Cambodia (except for U.S. Air Force and South Vietnamese operations) and ceilings on U S.-paid U.S. citizens of 200 and U.S.-paid third-country nationals of 85 inside Cambodia. These limitations do not now constitute a practical constraint. (Section 304(b), page 9) Finally, the bill contains provisions not directly related to foreign assistance: (1) A prohibition on the use of any funds appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act until the Comptroller General certifies that all funds appropriated but impounded during fiscal year 1971 for programs of the Departments of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, and Health, Education, and Welfare have been released. The deadline for release of these funds is April 30, 1972. Because of the inappropriateness of this rider, we have included a critical comment on it in our signing statement. (2) A requirement for periodic authorizations of appropriations for the State Department and the United States Information Agency. With minor exceptions, the appropriations for these agencies have been provided under permanent authorization since their inception. The process of annual authorization review is time-consuming and burdensome both to Congress and the executive agencies and tends to delay timely appropriation of funds. The amendment gives Congress discretion in determining whether to require annual or multiyear authorizations. Because annual authorizations should be discouraged, we have incorporated explicit mention of this amendment in our draft signing statement, urging cautious application of this requirement. (Section 407(a), (c), and (d), page 15) (3) A requirement that the State Department keep the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees “fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and responsibilities within the jurisdiction of these committees.” This amendment raises a fundamental issue regarding separation of powers and the prerogative of the President to conduct foreign affairs without premature disclosure of privileged information to Congress. Because of the ambiguity of the language of the amendment, we have included in our draft signing statement a clarification which reiterates the basic policy of keeping Congress informed but which reserves the right to withhold information which would impair the effective functioning of the executive branch. (Section 407(b), page 15) (4) A statement urging the President to undertake negotiations to implement the Lodge Commission recommendation that the U.S. share of assessed costs of the United Nations be reduced to 25%. (Section 410, page 16) Although the bill severely cuts the appropriation authorizations requested and adds a large number of objectionable amendments, we recommend approval of the bill as necessary to permit completion of appropriation action by the Congress, thus insuring continuation of the foreign assistance programs through the remainder of this fiscal year. The alternatives—disapproval of the bill and a request for reconsideration or disapproval coupled with a request for extension of the continuing resolution through the reminder of this fiscal year—are not, in our opinion, viable and could, in addition, compromise your budget request for 1973. The Departments of State and Defense recommend that the bill become law at the latest possible time (i.e., Monday, February 7) in order to delay as long as possible the effective dates of several restrictive provisions, in particular the requirement that countries receiving military assistance grants agree to deposit to the credit of the United States local currency equal in value to 10 percent of the assistance. Attachment FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1971 Analysis of Congressional Changes (dollars in millions) Authorization Request 1 Enrolled Bill Difference Development Assistance Development Loans 635.0 1 456.5 -178.5 Technical Cooperation 362.6 263.5 -99.1 International Organizations and Programs 156.0 2 154.0 -2.0 American Schools and Hospitals 10.2 30.0 -19.8 Administrative Expenses 60.2 3 50.0 -10.2 Refugee Relief Assistance 250.0 250.0 — Total Development Assis. 4 1,474.0 1,204.0 -270.0 Security Assistance Economic Supporting Assistance 764.6 618.0 -146.6 of which Israel (—) (50.0) (150.0) Military Assistance 705.0 500.0 -205.0 Foreign Military Sales 510.0 400.0 -110.0 Total Security Assistance 1,979.6 1,518.0 -461.6 President’s Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund 100.0 30.0 -70.0 Total 1972 Authorization 3,553.6 2,752.0 -801.6 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, AID, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Attached as Tab B to a February 7 memorandum from Kissinger to the President summarizing briefly the Foreign Aid Authorization bill, which the President had signed that morning, and recommending that he approve a signing statement that would set the stage for efforts to restore the program through a supplemental or a budget amendment later in the year. The President initialed his approval. The February 7 signing statement is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 , pp. 166-167. 2 Not printed. 3 Reference is to the President’s April 21, 1971, message to Congress. 1 Excludes $1 billion borrowing authority over the period 1972, 1974. 2 Excludes Indus loans authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. 3 Excludes Administrative expenses, State, which has permanent authorization of necessary amounts. 4 In addition, the Act authorizes appropriation of amounts as may be necessary for reserves of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 84. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 84. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 10, 1972. SUBJECT Security Assistance, Country Allocations for FY 1972 At my direction, an ad hoc Steering Group of the Security Assistance Program Review Committee has been looking into the best possible distribution of grant military and security supporting assistance funds for fiscal year 1972. The Group has used the amount authorized by the Congress of $500 million NOA for military assistance and $575 million voted by the House of Representatives for supporting assistance to guide the obligations under Congressional Resolution Authority. I approve the figures set forth in the attached tables as the basis of implementing programming actions to be taken by the administering agencies within the funds available to them under the CRA. I am also sending a copy of my approval to Mr. Shultz. John N. Irwin II Attachment 1 FY 1972 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MILITARY ASSISTANCE (MAP) AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) ($ in millions) MAP FMS East Asia Cambodia 179.7 — Indonesia 18.0 — Korea 150.0 15.0 Philippines 14.0 — Taiwan 10.9 45.0 Regional/Other .3 8.0 Near East/South Asia Greece 9.9 45.0 Iran .9 — Israel — 300.0 Jordan 38.0 10.0 Lebanon .2 10.0 Saudi Arabia .5 22.0 Turkey 60.0 15.0 Regional/other .7 — Europe Portugal 1.0 — Spain 11.2 — Regional/Other .2 — Africa Ethiopia 9.0 — Tunisia 1.8 — Morocco .9 15.0 Zaire .5 2.0 Regional/Other .6 — Latin America 15.1 63.0 Non Regional 20.9 — TOA 544.3 550.0 NOA 500.0 400.0 Attachment 2 FY 1972 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ($ in millions) Congressional Presentation Current Estimates Fund Availabilities Supporting Assistance 821.4 605.4 NOA 778.0 575.0 Recoveries 47.0 34.0 Transfers -3.6 -3.6 Contingency Fund Use 0 24.5 Development Loan Fund Use 0 22.4 Total 821.4 652.3 Program Requirements Vietnam 555.0 385.0 Cambodia 110.0 47.5 Laos 50.6 47.0 Thailand 40.0 15.0 Jordan 30.0 45.0 Israel 0 50.0 Malta 0 9.5 Nigeria 4.1 3.8 Haiti 3.0 3.0 Public Safety 5.4 0 Narcotics Control 0 19.0 UNFICYP 4.8 2.4 EA Regional 1.4 0.3 South African Refugees 0.3 0.3 Central AID Costs 16.8 24.4 Administrative Expense (10.0) (.0) Interregional Costs (6.8) (23.3) January 1972 Pay Increase (.0) (1.1) Total 821.4 652.2 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Attached to a February 16 summary memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger recommending that Kissinger and Shultz approve Irwin’s recommendations, which Kennedy characterized as a “reasonable division of the limited funds we can anticipate will be appropriated.” Also attached is a February 17 memorandum from Kissinger to Irwin noting that Irwin’s recommendations were a sound basis for implementing programming actions. Kissinger understood the $385 million of supporting assistance for Vietnam was part of a total support plan of $680 million and that supplementary actions to fulfill the Vietnam program would be addressed shortly. He cautioned that other supporting assistance allocations should be a guide for actions but only urgent obligations should be made until the appropriations bills were completed. 85. Information Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 85. Information Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 15, 1972. SUBJECT Foreign Assistance Act, Deposit Requirement Section 514 of the recently signed fiscal 72 foreign assistance authorizing legislation prohibits any grant military aid under this act unless the recipient country agrees to deposit 10 percent of the value of the assistance in a special account for the official foreign currency use of the USG. (The Administration fought this but was unsuccessful in attempts to have it deleted in conference.) —The President may waive this requirement if the U.S. can pay all its official costs without having to spend dollars to purchase the local currency. (Covers Tunisia, Morocco, India, Pakistan, and Burma, at present.) —The section does not apply where grant aid is provided under an agreement in exchange for base rights (applies to Spain; the Philippines and Ethiopia may also qualify). —No deposits are required from the service funded countries: Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos. —The term “under this act” also excludes (1) Thailand for fiscal 72, but would include Thailand beginning with fiscal 73, and (2) Korean forces in Vietnam. —No country must deposit more than $20M in any one year. The President may waive the deposit under section 614 (which permits use of FAA authorized funds without regard to the requirements of the Act, if the President determines such use is important to U.S. security). However, Congress imposed two new limitations on 614 in this bill (Congress must be informed in writing of any waiver, its justification, and its extent; and the President must notify Congress ten days before changing any country or organization’s allocation by more than 10 percent). If the waiver prerogative were used too freely, new restrictions or even deletion of section 614 could result. Most Embassies have reacted predictably by pointing to the serious consequences of approaching aid-recipient governments with the unhappy news. Section 514 was among the provisions of the Senate bill to which we objected most strongly. We provided House conferees an explanation of its serious impact and of our objections; however, we could not get it deleted, though it was softened substantially. Going into conference the Senate bill provided for 25 percent deposits, applied to all countries, and contained no maximum deposit provisions. In conference these were reduced to 10 percent deposits, MASF countries were excluded, and a $20M maximum was inserted. For minor returns from 10 percent deposits, this provision could cause several states (Philippines, Thailand, Turkey)—which provide us extremely important bases without a specific quid pro quo—to begin charging for them. Such costs could readily amount to very large figures indeed. In small MAP programs in politically sensitive states (for example, Mexico), mistrustful governments may take offense and cancel our programs altogether, ending important contacts and channels of influence. No single solution seems feasible. Where major base rights are involved, it may be possible to justify MAP as a de facto reimbursement and so exempt a few highly critical states. In a few of the most sensitive countries where our programs are entirely training and very small, a congressional waiver may be possible. Finally, in some cases we may wish to consider presidential waivers. The preferable solution, of course, is repeal of this provision. Prospects, however, are not bright. Senator Fulbright will probably fight hard for retaining section 514. He had proposed it twice previously and feels he has softened it considerably. Both State and Defense are reviewing the foreign assistance authorization act carefully in order to document fully our opposition to its most objectionable features. (The Authorization Act this year carried an extraordinarily large number of restrictive provisions.) The section 514 deposit requirement is high on the list for deletion from the law. We will keep you informed as the situation progresses. No action is necessary at present. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, AID, Volume II 1972. Confidential. 86. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 86. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 6, 1972. SUBJECT Security Assistance Program: Country Allocations for FY 1972 In my letter of February 10, 1972, 2 I forwarded to you two tables showing the distribution of FY 1972 military and supporting assistance funds approved as the basis for programming actions under the Continuing Resolution Authority. With the enactment of the appropriation bill for foreign assistance, we have now reviewed those distributions in light of the actual funds appropriated by Congress. In the case of military assistance there is no need to alter the distribution earlier approved and made available to you. On security supporting assistance, the Congress appropriated $25 million less than the amount that was used for the February 10 program distribution. Consequently I have approved a revised distribution for the use of supporting assistance funds based on Congressional appropriation action. I am also sending a copy of the revised program to Mr. Shultz. John N. Irwin II Enclosure FY 1972 SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ($ in millions) Congressional Presentation February 10 Estimates Current Estimates Fund Availabilities Supporting Assistance 821.4 605.4 583.1 NOA (778.0) (575.0) (550.0) Recoveries (47.0) (34.0) (35.5) Transfers, net (-3.6) (-3.6) (-2.4) Contingency Fund Use 0 24.5 24.5 Development Loan Fund Use 0 22.4 19.0 Total 821.4 652.3 626.6 Program Requirements Vietnam 555.0 385.0 385.0 Cambodia 110.0 47.5 37.1 Laos 50.6 47.0 47.0 Thailand 40.0 15.0 15.0 Jordan 30.0 45.0 45.0 Israel 0 50.0 50.0 Malta 0 9.5 9.5 Nigeria 4.1 3.8 3.4* Haiti 3.0 3.0 0 * Public Safety 5.4 0 0 Narcotics Control 0 19.0 19.0 UNFICYP 4.8 2.4 2.4 EA Regional 1.4 0.3 0.3 South African Refugees 0.3 0.3 0.3 Central AID Costs 16.8 24.4 12.6 Administrative Expense (10.0) (.0) (0.0) Interregional Costs (6.8) (23.3) (12.6) ** January 1972 Pay Increase (.0) (1.1) (.0) ** Total 821.4 652.2 626.6 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Attached to a March 20 memorandum from Kissinger to Irwin informing him that he and Shultz agreed that the allocations along the lines of Irwin’s March 6 memorandum were “the most effective and least disruptive means of adjusting to the funding limits in the appropriations bill.” 2 Document 84 . * Worldwide technical assistance funds will finance TA activities in the amount of $3.0 million in Haiti and $0.4 million in Nigeria. ** New SA Contribution to worldwide fund to finance central program support costs. 87. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 87. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 14, 1972. SUBJECT FY 1972 Military Assistance Funds Shortfall The Congress has severely reduced appropriations for FY 1972 grant military assistance and foreign military sales and, in so doing, has affected the credibility of both the program and the Nixon Doctrine. This Congressional action has compelled us to place budgetary and program constraints on most military assistance recipients, a number of which have received your personal assurances that the United States would do everything possible to bolster their self-defense capabilities. The principal countries affected are: (a) Turkey—reduced from $99.8 million to $60 million; and (b) the Republic of Korea—reduced from $239.4 million to $150 million. In addition, program levels for the Philippines, the Republic of China, and other countries have suffered significant reduction. Our allies will be seriously disturbed by these actions. You have asked that we provide you by March 10 with information on the major issues that are likely to arise during the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Erim. 2 We have clear indications that the Prime Minister is concerned principally with the proposed reduction of our grant military assistance to Turkey. A cut of 40 percent will likely be regarded by Erim as a weakening of United States support for Turkey’s role in NATO; it also threatens to erode support in Turkey for the opium ban. As you recall, in your statement of June 30, 1971, in praise of the Turkish announcement on opium, 3 you included, at the request of Prime Minister Erim, a statement of continued United States support for Turkey’s defense efforts. Since Erim will probably raise the question of the level of U.S. military assistance, you will wish to be in a position to advise him of your intentions. The proposed allocation for Korea falls $90 million short of the amount requested from the Congress, and is commensurate with funding levels prior to our agreement to support a five-year modernization program for Korea’s armed forces. Coming at the time of your China initiative and United States force reductions in this region, this reduction has been greeted with deep disappointment and concern by the Government of President Park, and only a restoration of the funding levels will serve to allay the uncertainties in Seoul. Our efforts in behalf of the Republic of Korea also could influence its future posture on the stationing of Korean forces in Vietnam. To meet the situation that has resulted from Congressional action, we have four courses of action available to us. They are: a. FY 1972 Supplemental: The Department of Defense feels that this would be the most appropriate and direct means for dramatizing our needs. Defense would seek an across the board restoration, which would involve a request for approximately $200 million in additional funding for grant aid and $75 million for credit sales. Since this would involve both the Congressional authorization and appropriation committees, the Department of State feels that this approach would seriously prejudice our efforts to expedite Congressional action on the FY 1973 security assistance request and could provoke Congress to introduce crippling amendments. b. Section 506 Action: Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides special authority, if you determine it to be “vital to the security of the United States,” to order the use of Defense Department stocks and services not to exceed $300 million for grant military assistance, with subsequent reimbursement through a request for supplementary funds. It is possible that a portion of the more urgent requirements for Turkey and Korea could be met by the use of this authority. The State Department believes this to be the preferable course in that: (a) early relief, including a positive statement to Prime Minister Erim, could be provided; (b) reimbursement for the Defense Department would be limited to the appropriation process since Section 506 contains authorization for such reimbursement; and (c) it would provide dramatic underscoring to your statement that the FY 1972 funds voted were below acceptable minimum levels. The Defense Department, however, noting that Section 506 is intended to enable you to meet contingencies that arise from unpredictable events that occur from time-to-time and to provide flexibility in meeting Communist pressure, believes that it should not be invoked. The Defense Department also believes this course could lead the Congress to deduct these funds from the FY 1973 request and to eliminate Section 506 from future legislation. If Section 506 authority is used for Korea and Turkey, it is possible that the Congress will reduce the FY 1973 appropriations by the amount drawn down for these countries. In addition, we understand that Congressional Committee staff members, in their initial redraft of the basic foreign aid legislation, are dropping Section 506 on the grounds that the Section grants too much authority to the President. 4 c. Amendment of the FY 1973 Authorization: This approach would amend during this session of Congress the FY 1973 security assistance budget request to increase the overall amount for military assistance. It would simplify the process during this session, an important consideration in view of the tight legislative calendar resulting from an election year, and would enable us to seek the funds we need to fulfill our commitments. The principal deficiencies of this approach are that they do not meet the urgent political needs posed by the Erim visit and our commitment to the five-year Korean force modernization program. d. No Action at this Time: In view of the high priority assigned to early Congressional passage of the FY 1973 security assistance budget request, it might prove more prudent at this time not to press for relief to meet the FY 1972 reductions during this session of Congress. Instead, the Administration, through its witnesses appearing before Congressional Committees on the FY 1973 program, would stress problems resulting from FY 1972 funding and underline the essentiality of Congressional support for the full FY 1973 program. Depending on the outcome of Congressional action on the FY 1973 fund request, consideration would then be given to seeking supplemental funds later this year or in the January session to offset combined shortfalls in the FY 1972-3 programs. This approach does not meet the foreign policy problems previously described. The Defense Department supports option (a). The State Department favors option (b). Both agree that the Congress must be consulted and that you should take a strong lead in implementing any decision with the Congress. Recommendation: I recommend that you meet on an urgent basis with the Congressional leadership to discuss the problem and to decide on the most appropriate course to be followed. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. Attached to Document 91 . An advance copy of Rogers’ memorandum, which was not cleared by the Secretary, was provided to the NSC under cover of a March 14 memorandum from Deputy Executive Secretary Curran to Davis. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 286, State Volume 16) 2 Erim visited March 21-22. The March 10 request has not been further identified. 3 Printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , pp. 788-789. 4 This paragraph was not in the advance copy that Curran sent to Davis (see footnote 1 above). 88. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird 88. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, March 17, 1972. SUBJECT Transfer of Security Assistance to the Defense Budget In checking further on the matter that you raised last Thursday 2 I find that the facts appear to be as follows: During the protracted struggle over the Foreign Assistance Bill in October and November ′71, members of the NSC staff encouraged General Counsel OSD, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (L.A.) and OASD/ISA to reexamine the option of a shift in funding of security assistance to the Defense bill. They were subsequently informed that actual legislation was being drafted to achieve that shift by the DOD General Counsel. Your letter of 24 November to Director Shultz proposing the shift was shortly followed by negative recommendations from the Department of State and OMB. 3 Both expressed reservations over the possible loss of management control over the program and a diminution of State’s foreign policy role in the program. NSC staff then convened a series of meetings in December attended by the DOD General Counsel and OMB to consider the effects of such a switch on management control. It was concluded from that analysis that management control would be enhanced by the shift and that the foreign policy role of State would be fully protected. Your memorandum for the President of 23 December was presented to him with the comments of State, OMB and the NSC staff. 4 During the period following 23 December, General Counsel, OASD/ISA, and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (L.A.) were informed that a decision was pending and no action should be taken until the President acted. On 31 January the President approved your recommendation in principle and directed Clark MacGregor to consult Congressional leadership. On 4 February Chairman Hebert told MacGregor he strongly supported the shift and would fight for it. On 7 February Bill Timmons and Tom Korologos met with Senator Stennis to enlist his support. 5 He advised them that a shift would now require a separate amendment since DOD had already sent up the procurement bill on 22 January and it had been introduced. He felt that in those circumstances he should not take on the added burden. Timmons and Korologos had gone to the meeting believing that a hold remained on the DOD bill pending the President’s decision, and they apologized for their being so ill-informed. There being no possibility of making the shift without Stennis, the matter was therefore dropped. Throughout the period described above the attitude of the NSC staff toward the shift was favorable 6 and this was reflected in all White House contacts on the Hill. In retrospect there seems to have been a regrettable breakdown in communications between the White House and OSD during the month of January. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a March 14 memorandum from Kennedy and Lehman, who noted that “if we allow Laird’s interpretation to become the common wisdom then we will pay a heavy bureaucratic price in the future” and recommended Kissinger sign the memorandum to Laird. Also attached is a March 17 memorandum from Haig to General Pursley transmitting the memorandum. 2 Presumably March 9. In their March 14 memorandum (see footnote 1 above), Kennedy and Lehman provided Kissinger with a copy of a March 3 memorandum from Laird to Kissinger on “Statutory Restraints on Security Assistance,” on which, they noted, Laird “scribbled a dig implying that the White House was responsible for the failure of his attempt to shift security assistance to the DOD budget.” Laird’s handwritten note on his March 3 memorandum reads: “Henry—Regret my recommendations could not be accepted to remove limitations and change administration of MAP and Military Credit Sales—.” 3 See Document 77 . 4 Not found, but see Document 80 . 5 A February 7 memorandum from Timmons to the President reports on this meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972) 6 In their March 14 memorandum to Kissinger (see footnote 1 above), Kennedy and Lehman noted that everyone at the White House except Shultz favored the shift and that all contacts on the Hill with members and staff had been favorable. In a February 3 memorandum to Kissinger for a February 4 meeting with Irwin, NSC Staff Secretary Davis reminded him of the State Department opposition and the cogent arguments in its favor. If Irwin raised the issue, she suggested that Kissinger point out that the reorganization might be the only way to get favorable treatment of the security assistance program on the Hill and protect the policy roles of the President and Secretary of State. (Ibid., Box 40, HAK/Irwin mtgs October 70) 89. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 89. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 18, 1972. SUBJECT FY 1972 Security Assistance Shortfall Congressional action cut your FY 1972 Security Assistance requests by $205 million for MAP and $75 million for credit sales. We have had to cut back our security assistance programs accordingly. This action has had an especially unfavorable impact given our emphasis on the need for increased self-reliance by our friends and allies and our commitment to help them achieve it. Of special concern are a $90 million shortfall in funds for our Korea program under the Five Year Modernization Program (Korea will get $150 million rather than the $239 million requested) and a $40 million shortfall in our MAP program for Turkey ($60 million available rather than $100 million requested). We have had clear indications of Turkish concern at this 40% cut. Secretary Rogers has submitted a memorandum (Tab A) 2 presenting four options for dealing with the shortfall: — FY 72 Supplemental . Request for $200 million in MAP grant aid and $75 million for credit sales. —A Presidential determination under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act that it is “vital to the security of the United States” for you to use up to $300 million of DOD stocks and services for MAP, with reimbursement by a supplemental later. —Amendment of the FY 73 request. —FY 73 Supplemental later. There is no question about the need for more security assistance funds. The issue is how best to obtain them. We have been pushing hard to move the FY 73 authorization and appropriations bills quickly and have support on the Hill for this. We want to complete action, if possible, before the summer recess and to minimize the chance of a major confrontation in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in this politically charged year. The pros and cons are as follows: 1. FY 72 Supplemental . Secretary Laird strongly favors this course on the grounds that it would be the most appropriate and direct means of dramatizing to both the Congress and our allies our determination to press for an adequate program. He further argues that if we do not request an FY 72 supplemental, it will be charged that we have simply included amounts in your FY 73 request to offset the FY 72 cuts. State opposes because this would involve going back again to both Congressional authorization and appropriation committees, thereby running the risk of damage to our FY 73 request, and increasing the risk of crippling amendments. An FY 72 supplemental would be my preference if it were not for the serious risks in having two bills before the SFRC at the same time. Bill Timmons points out that Fulbright could use the supplemental as an excuse to delay action on our FY 73 request. George Shultz expresses no opinion on legislative strategy but would agree to an FY 72 supplemental only if Defense can guarantee (as it says it can) to manage outlays in a way which would not affect your FY 73 expenditure ceiling. 2. Section 506 Action . State favors this approach on the grounds that it would provide immediate relief from the shortfall, avoid going through the authorization committees, and dramatize your commitment to adequate security assistance. Defense strongly opposes, and I agree, on the grounds that Section 506 was not designed for this purpose and its use to make up past Congressional cuts could provoke Congress to deduct the funds from our FY 73 request, and even to eliminate Section 506 authority altogether from future legislation. Moreover, it would merely be borrowing against the future. 3. Amendment of the FY 73 Request . You could seek an amendment increasing your FY 73 request at an appropriate time during this session of Congress. This tactic would avoid straining a tight legislative calendar and enable us to press hard for quick and affirmative action on your FY 73 request. However, it would offer no immediate relief in the Turkey and Korea contexts, and it would—like an FY 72 supplemental—break the expenditure ceiling unless compensating reductions were made elsewhere. 4. FY 73 Supplemental Later . We could plan to request an FY 73 supplemental later (either just after the November elections or early in January), to make up the combined FY 72-73 shortfalls. This strategy would enhance the likelihood of early favorable action on your FY 73 request. The difference between this and the preceding option is principally in timing—the supplemental request would come later. Either approach would be fully consistent with the legislative strategy of moving the FY 73 legislation as quickly as possible. You could keep open the choice between them until the Congressional climate can be better measured. On the other hand , neither approach would meet Secretary Laird’s argument that Congressional critics may act on the assumption that our FY 73 request compensates for the 1972 shortfall. Moreover, neither offers immediate relief in the Turkish and Korean contexts. Bill Timmons favors either an FY 73 amendment or a supplemental. George Shultz prefers that, if you choose this course, you make no commitment as to timing, composition, or amounts at this time, but wait to see how the FY 73 bill fares and what the Congressional climate is later in the year before deciding how to proceed. Your decisions is between approving Secretary Laird’s FY 72 supplemental proposal now or attempting to get the FY 73 program increased later either by a budget amendment or a supplemental. Secretary Rogers and all of your Congressional Relations staff are opposed to Secretary Laird’s FY 1972 supplemental proposal. Nevertheless, I am reluctant to recommend that you decide against Mr. Laird’s judgment of the realities on the Hill. I believe that before deciding you should convene the Republican leadership to test their reactions. Secretary Rogers recommends that you do this in any event, and George Shultz and Bill Timmons agree. You also should discuss this in your meeting with Senator Stennis. Recommendation: That this issue be put on top of your agenda for the next meeting with the Republican leadership, and discussed in your meeting with Stennis. 3 Approve (discuss with leadership before making decision—Secretary Rogers, Bill Timmons, and my recommendation) 4 Prefer an FY 1972 supplemental now (Secretary Laird’s recommendation) Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. The notation “The President Has Seen” is stamped on the memorandum, which is attached to an undated, handwritten note from Haig to Kissinger that reads: “This is the hot Laird issue on the supplemental.” Kissinger wrote on the note: “Make sure he understands what I recommended.” 2 Document 87 . 3 The President met with the Republican Congressional leadership to discuss current legislation on the morning of March 28. No officials from State, Defense, or AID participated; among those present were Shultz, MacGregor, Timmons, and Stein. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion was found. 4 The President signed this option and wrote: “Inform Laird—Possibly—if they agree we go his way.” 90. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon 90. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 27, 1972. SUBJECT FY 1972 Military Assistance Fund Shortfall I refer to Secretary Rogers’ memorandum of March 14, 1972, presenting four alternative courses of action with respect to FY 1972 MAP shortfall. 2 At that time, the Department of State expressed a preference for the utilization of Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act as the best early solution to the problem of meeting the shortfall for Turkey and Korea, particularly in view of the imminent arrival of Turkish Prime Minister Erim. Under current circumstances, the Department believes that there are only two alternatives for dealing with the MAP shortfall problem: (1) an FY 1972 MAP supplemental; or (2) focus our efforts to obtain our full FY 1973 MAP budget request. There is attached a memorandum summarizing the pros and cons of proceeding with an FY 1972 MAP supplemental, 3 which I understand is the preferred course of action of Secretary Laird. The choice is difficult. Within this Department there is support for both alternatives. On balance, however, I recommend that we should not submit an FY 1972 supplemental to the Congress. Instead, I prefer the strategy of maximum effort to secure earliest possible passage of the FY 1973 Security Assistance legislation at the fund levels requested. Following the enactment of the appropriations, we would then consider with Defense the impact of the total fund situation for MAP on our programs and our relationships with our Allies and would then determine whether the shortfall for FY 1972 and FY 1973 justified the submission of an FY 1973 supplemental for MAP to the next session of Congress. 4 John N. Irwin II 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. Attached to a March 28 memorandum from Kennedy and Lehman to Kissinger summarizing the change in the State Department position and recommending he sign a memorandum to the President, Document 91 . 2 Document 87 . 3 Undated paper entitled “FY 1972 Supplemental for MAP,” not printed. 4 On May 17 NSC Staff Secretary Davis sent a memorandum to Executive Secretary of the Department of State Eliot, in reference to this memorandum and the March 14 memorandum from Rogers, confirming her phone message that the President had decided to take no further action on the subject at that time. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972) 91. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 91. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 30, 1972. SUBJECT FY 1972 Security Assistance Shortfall In my memorandum of March 18, 1972, I discussed alternatives for addressing the problem of the shortfall in Security Assistance funds resulting from the serious congressional cuts in your FY 1972 requests. 2 The options were: (1) an FY 72 supplemental request now (Secretary Laird’s preference); (2) use of Defense funds under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act (State’s recommendation); 3 or (3) an FY 73 supplemental or budget amendment later (the preference of your congressional relations staff). Acting Secretary Irwin now advises that State has reconsidered its position (Tab A). 4 State continues to oppose an FY 72 supplemental because of the serious risks of adverse impact upon your FY 73 requests now before Congress but no longer favors the use of Defense funds. The Acting Secretary now favors a maximum effort to secure the earliest possible passage of the FY 1973 Security Assistance legislation at the levels requested. Following enactment of the FY 73 appropriations, he recommends we consider submitting an FY 73 supplemental covering both the 1972 and 1973 shortfalls. As Secretary Irwin points out and as I noted in my March 18 memorandum, the choice is a difficult one and rests on a judgment as to the approach likely to produce the most favorable results on the Hill. 5 You have agreed to discuss this issue with the Republican leadership and Senator Stennis in your next meetings with them. 6 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. The notation “The President has seen” is stamped on the memorandum. 2 Document 89 . 3 See Document 87 . 4 See Document 90 . 5 In reference to this, the President wrote: “MacGregor’s advice is critical.” 6 See footnotes 3 and 4 , Document 89 . Presumably the President did not take it up during his meeting with the Republican leadership on March 28. According to the President’s Daily Diary, he did not meet with the Republican leadership or Senator Stennis during the week before that decision was made. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) 92. Letter From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to Secretary of State Rogers 92. Letter From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, July 21, 1972. Dear Bill: This letter provides policy guidance for the preparation of the fiscal year 1974 budget submission for the International Security Assistance Program. The President has spoken at the Cabinet meeting of July 20 of the critical budget situation facing us and emphasized the need for rigorous fiscal restraint, effective program development, and strong agency management in the fiscal year 1974 and the years to follow. 2 The Administration will continue to apply creative solutions to national problems. However, we simply cannot afford to consider new proposals or enriched programs that are not accompanied by offsetting reductions. Rather, it will be necessary to terminate some ongoing activities, to curtail others severely, to reduce some operations to a Spartan level, and to institute management improvements that will increase productivity and promote greater efficiency and effectiveness in agency activities. The choices that have to be made will be extremely difficult; it may even seem painful. Of course, the priorities and effective innovations of our Administration should be protected to the maximum extent possible. We stand ready to meet with you and consult on these matters if you would like our help. As you know, the Administration is actively seeking enactment of a rigid ceiling on 1973 outlays. Firm efforts must therefore be made to hold down 1973 obligations and outlays. Postponements and stretch-outs of 1973 commitments are especially encouraged if they lead to reductions in 1974 outlays. On the other hand, program deferrals in 1973 that lead to increased outlays in 1974 obviously are not acceptable, because they will exacerbate an already difficult 1974 problem. Enclosed are the specific planning ceilings for budget authority and outlays for the International Security Assistance Program to guide you in developing your 1974 budget submission. The President’s decisions on the budget totals require that you submit your budget at or below those figures . Each of us must adhere strictly to the ceiling totals provided, both in the initial submissions and throughout the budget process. It should be understood, however, that subsequent developments may necessitate reducing these planning ceiling amounts; thus, there is no assurance that your final budget allowance will remain at this level. We will shortly give you the date for an initial submission of budget materials. It is of course essential that this initial submission be carefully prepared, and on time (whether or not congressional action has been completed on the current request), in order to provide the President sufficient time to consider the issues and to transmit the 1974 budget promptly to the next Congress. I recognize that the task assigned by this letter will be difficult to carry out. But as the President said in Cabinet, it is absolutely essential that we prevent the higher prices and higher taxes that inevitably will result if we do not make severe cuts in Federal spending. 3 Sincerely, Cap Weinberger Enclosure PLANNING CEILINGS FOR 1974 BUDGET International Security Assistance Programs (in millions) Budget Authority Outlays Security Assistance-Military Federal Funds Gross Amounts Grant Military Assistance 580 671 Foreign Military Credit Sales 570 407 Liquidation of Foreign Military Sales — -20 Deductions—proprietary receipts -183 -183 Total, Federal Funds 967 875 Trust Funds (Net) (cash sales) 650 -100 Security Assistance-Economic Federal Funds Security Supporting Assistance 663 682 Total, Net 2,280 1,457 These figures will be adjusted for changes in the trust fund, liquidation of foreign military sales account estimates, or proprietary receipts. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Attached to an August 14 memorandum from Kissinger to the President agreeing with Laird’s position that the FY 1974 security assistance ceilings were too low. See footnote 1, Document 95 . 2 There is no record of a Cabinet meeting on July 20. The Cabinet had a breakfast meeting with the Republican Congressional leadership on July 21 and then met separately in the Cabinet Room. Rogers, Laird, and Weinberger attended both these meetings. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 3 On September 19 Deputy Secretary Irwin wrote Weinberger regarding this letter. Irwin noted that the planning ceilings, even if fully authorized by Congress, would require a cutback on projected program requirements for FY 1974. He indicated that Under Secretary Tarr was conducting an interagency review of the security assistance program that would provide the basis for the budget submission in October. (Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 75 A 13, Supporting Assistance FY73) 93. Paper Prepared by the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) 93. Paper Prepared by the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) 1 Washington, undated. Three and one-half years ago, I found myself talking to you in company with Secretary Rogers about the possibility of becoming your Administrator of U.S. A.I.D. 2 You indicated support for the basic concept of foreign assistance for the third world and expressed the conviction that to gain the Congressional and public support required to finance it, there needed to be a new or different image for A.I.D. I think we all recognized that it would be a difficult assignment. It has been. I thought then that it was important, and would be worth the effort that would be required. I still think so. It was agreed early that in answer to the Congressional mandate calling upon the President for a comprehensive study of foreign assistance in all its parts, with recommendations at an early date to the President and the Congress, that we would go the route of what eventually was the Peterson Task Force—its study and its recommendations. 3 As this operation proceeded it soon became clear to me that, pending the final result, my principal responsibility was a “holding operation” to carry out the various Missions of A.I.D. in Vietnam, in Disaster Relief, in encouraging development in the third world and to keep together as much of the able and competent staff in A.I.D. with as much morale as possible for whatever kind of program would come from this total effort—Peterson Task Force—White House Study—Congressional actions, etc. If there was time it might be useful to go into detail about what U.S. A.I.D. was like in the Spring of 1969, and how it got that way. But that is another story. After the Peterson Report there was a very long delay in developing the legislative package and Congressional Message of April 21, 1971. Having committed myself to you in February 1969, I intended to make an all out effort to help convince the Congress it should approve our recommendations and then depart. We will jump over the delays and awkwardness in much of this operation and come to last October 30, when after a week of acrimonious debate—having very little to do with Development Assistance—the Senate by a decisive vote killed, at least temporarily, U.S. A.I.D. 4 Until that event, A.I.D. and our people were always on the periphery while others talked, planned, and made the decisions as to what the A.I.D. future was to be. At that point, in general, the rest of the Executive end of Government backed out of the whole matter—and in essence by their actions said, “Here, you take it and see what you can salvage.” After 31 months as Administrator of A.I.D. for the first time the untrammeled opportunity to plan whatever future A.I.D. was to be was in our hands. With good help from you, Secretary Rogers, OMB and others—in spite of the Fulbright/Proxmire axis and their colleagues—we salvaged a 1972 appropriation. Since that Congressional action we have moved vigorously to redirect an A.I.D. program adequate to world conditions as they are now and are likely to be in the future. We are at mid-passage in the first major reform of A.I.D.’s philosophy and practice since the Agency’s inception as A.I.D. in 1961. Our efforts add up to: (1) a program which responds more effectively to the basic human needs of the developing countries—hunger, overpopulation, illiteracy, unemployment, and ill health; (2) a program which is lower profile and less interventionist; (3) a program which is better integrated with multilateral institutions and other donors; (4) a program which will produce results with fewer staff and less bureaucracy; (5) a program which will truly engage the best scientific and technical institutions, universities and corporations in our country. We are building a program which will better contribute to the U.S. long-term international interests: (a) the building of self-reliant societies in the developing world; (b) an expanding world economy; (c) trade and access to resources from which all benefit; (d) improved prospects for world peace. This program is directed to basic human needs, is less interventionist, involves important domestic constituencies, and better meets U.S. interests. We believe it will attract increased support from Congress and the American people. Our reform program has four goals: (a) Concentrate A.I.D.’s resources—and the best U.S. scientific and technical talent—on a limited group of basic human development problems; (b) improve administration and lower the U.S. profile abroad; (c) develop more collaborative operations with developing countries and other donors; and (d) give greater emphasis to humanitarian assistance. I will submit to you within a few days a report on where we are as we move into Fiscal Year 1973. 5 We will have this redirection pretty well completed by the end of this calendar year. We have reduced our overseas staff by a total of 5,281 persons or 37%—from 14,101 to 8,820. We have problems in reducing our Washington staff, most of whom have long tenure with Civil Service or the Foreign Service. Our total reduction here is from 3,468 to 2,899—a reduction of 569 or 16%. An amendment now approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Authorization Bill to be reported in a few days will help if we can get Senate approval. 6 We would like to reduce our Washington staff over a reasonable period of time by another 800 to 1,000 employees. For these past three-and-a-half years we have made every effort to keep out of the public eye, to avoid visibility, and public controversy. The replacement of Senator McGee by Senator Proxmire as Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has required me to spend an inordinate amount of time with Otto Passman and a few others—but it has been worth the effort. I think in the end we will survive in viable form for Fiscal 1973—provided we can get action before the August 18 recess, which is still possible. Now—why am I here. The answer is, “What do you want me to do.” The following eight points are in keeping with your fine statement “The Real Road to Peace” in a recent issue of U.S. News: 7 1. After November 7 you will have a clear new mandate to concentrate the energies and leadership of your administration on a few already identified goals. The accomplishment of these goals will be of critical importance to our country and the world and a distinguished and enduring tribute to your stewardship. 2. Foremost among these is the development of international relationships and circumstances which can provide a generation of peace , and a world environment in which the United States (its people, its institutions, and its values) can endure and prosper . Your trips to China and Moscow , your leadership in the Middle East and negotiations with N. Vietnam have already opened dramatic new avenues to this goal. 3. Further progress requires an increasing measure of realistic hope for the two thirds of the world’s people who are impoverished almost below U.S. standards of calculation. Their condition is often desperate and their frustrations are great. Those poor must see in the peaceful structure of the world we seek for our country and our children some clear benefits for their own. If not, any domestic gains we garner to ourselves will avail us little and not for long . 4. That extra measure of hope requires, in turn, increased sharing by the world’s wealthy with the world’s poor—not as sterile charity, but as a productive investment of funds and confidence in their abilities, their energies, and their determination for advancement. — a partnership for peace — hope for a better future (when some look at the long road we have walked with the LDC’s, they say, “It is enough. Let us put this burden down.” But it is not a burden we carry, it is our passport to a better future.) 5. While it is proper that other advantaged nations share increasingly in this imperative for survival , the U.S. must maintain a role of leadership — — U.S. constancy and sense of equity are necessary as an incentive and a standard for others; —U.S. share of the action will always bulk large; —U.S. moral precepts will impel us to leadership; —in any realistic examination of alternatives , the benefiting countries will prefer it that way. 6. An important instrument of U.S. leadership is bilateral assistance. While the U.S. should continue energetic support to the growth and capacity of multilateral organizations , the two channels of assistance have never stood in an either/or relationship. Both are useful and will continue to be needed for our national purposes. Because of its uniquely American attributes and visibility, its flexibility for more selective determination of development priorities, and its role at the cutting edge of U.S. foreign policy, bilateral assistance merits special concern . Apart from its direct focus on basic human problems and needs, it also serves other purposes of valid U.S. interest, including —creation or expansion of markets for U.S. exports; — enhancement of U.S. access to non-US resources. Not least, AID has assembled and trained over long years the most competent and experienced cadre of development experts in the world . They represent, together, a critical national resource that can be fully utilized in no other way. 7. So that bilateral assistance will accord more clearly with the President’s guidelines, we have taken the steps previously referred to: —to concentrate our resources on a limited range of common human problems where the U.S. can support programs of the developing countries with special U.S. competence; —to give highest priority to population and humanitarian programs designed to help peoples in the disadvantaged countries help themselves in reducing poverty, hunger and illiteracy; —to respond more effectively to human disasters wherever they occur; —to expand the participation of private American organizations , universities, voluntary agencies, and businesses in our programs; —to engage more effectively the best U.S. scientific technical talent in the solution of chronic development programs; —to continue staff reductions , lowering of U.S. profile abroad, and general improvement in the administrative efficiency of the Agency; — to increase public understanding and support of our aid programs through more responsive public information efforts. 8. Certain additional changes, requiring Presidential and, in some cases, Congressional authority would, in our opinion, further enhance the effectiveness of bilateral aid programs in pursuing your peace objectives. —provide a more realistic time frame for meaningful development performance through multi-year authorization and appropriate legislation. A time frame of 4 years would coincide with the term of your Administration . This would remove the “payday-to-payday” climate which has historically hampered AID purposes and would assure a long-needed stability and continuity on which developing countries could base long range plans for action; —minimize or eliminate those legislative restrictions (so-called “barnacles”) which accomplish little of their own purposes, while seriously hobbling ours. It is important to avoid any new proposals for more external studies of foreign assistance—but rather that we concentrate in transforming what we have to something much better than it has been. And that we build on the best of what we have and make U.S. A.I.D. a program the third world can regard as a Partnership for Peace program. If you think well of the idea, we will continue to think along these lines using our own resources and in consultation with State, OMB, NSC, Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce and others. I would like someday to be able to turn over to my successor a better A.I.D. program than we inherited so that the good foundation that is here can become something adequate to the better world you are wisely helping to lead. Secretary Rogers knows of this conference and of the points I am raising with you. My purpose here today is to seek your advice and counsel. “What do you want me to do.” 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1972-1973. No classification marking. Attached to a July 25 memorandum from Hannah to Flanigan and Haig sent to them after Hannah’s July 25 meeting with the President (see Document 94 ). Hannah noted that he prepared this informal paper for that meeting and that since both Flanigan and Haig had taken notes during the meeting, it might help them understand what he was trying to say. 2 Presumably a reference to a meeting on February 6, 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Hannah’s nomination as AID Administrator was announced that day. 3 Reference is to the Javits Amendment, which required a report to Congress by March 31, 1970. Regarding the Peterson Report, see Documents 119 ff. 4 See Document 69 . 5 Not further identified. 6 See footnote 2, Document 94 . 7 Richard M. Nixon, “The Real Road to Peace.” U.S. News and World Report , June 26, 1972, pp. 32-41. 94. Memorandum for President Nixon’s File 94. Memorandum for President Nixon’s File 1 Washington, July 25, 1972. SUBJECT Meeting between the President, AID Director John Hannah, Secretary of Commerce, Peter Peterson and General Alexander M. Haig DATE Tuesday, July 25, 1972–3:00 p.m. Director Hannah opened the meeting by informing the President that he had requested the appointment for a brief exchange of views before the November elections. He had several points that he wished to cover and knew that time between now and November would be at a premium. The President responded that he welcomed the opportunity for a brief discussion with Director Hannah and wanted to emphasize that while their contact at some times had been indirect, nevertheless he was very much aware of AID’s problems. As the two men had discussed at the outset of the Administration, Director Hannah had assumed his responsibilities at a point in history when foreign aid was more unpopular than ever. Consequently, Dr. Hannah’s tasks were much more complicated than they had been during any earlier period of U.S. history. 2 Nevertheless, the President was well aware of the remarkable record of achievement that Dr. Hannah had accumulated, and he was very grateful for the splendid job Dr. Hannah had done. Dr. Hannah remarked that the task was difficult primarily because AID’s position in the bureaucracy was a complex one, with supervision being provided by the Department of State and an excess of policy guidance from middle level bureaucrats in that Department. The problem was further complicated by the host of studies which had been conducted on foreign aid and the excess of free advice and policy guidance that had emerged from all sources. This had been a severe hindrance to him as Director and consequently only after the Peterson report recommendations ran amiss did he finally take hold and take his own counsel, especially on the Hill. This had proven to be the most successful course and for this reason Dr. Hannah had requested the appointment to see the President to emphasize his view that during the campaign no commitments should be made calling for additional studies of an area which had been studied to death. Dr. Hannah continued by noting that the Peterson recommendations called for increased multilateralism. President Nixon interrupted and stated that that was no longer his view and that in fact our approach to foreign assistance should be concentrated on bilateral arrangements for which the U.S. would receive specific credit and obtain leverage in order to meet its own vital interests. Experience now confirmed that multilateralism frequently deprived us of any credit from the recipient states and in fact frequently found us in an isolated position with other states who were doing less, forcing us to adhere to policy lines which were not consistent with our views. The President’s discussions with foreign leaders tended to confirm this in almost every case. For this reason multilateralism was no longer the policy and a major effort should be concentrated on bilateral arrangements. Dr. Hannah agreed, recalling that the World Bank and Mr. McNamara were frequently involved in incentives which ran counter to our policy toward India. Dr. Hannah then noted that an additional problem he was experiencing involved personnel matters. During the period of his tenure he had reduced AID’s overseas complement 37%, but in the U.S. he was still forced to carry some 3,000 AID personnel, many of whom were foreign service officers. Were they working in State they could be retired at the age of 60, but because of current personnel regulations when they were detailed to AID, they were not eligible for retirement until age 70. For this reason he had pressed for new regulations which would provide for parallelism in State personnel regulations, just as they had been broadened to USIA in earlier legislation. This would enable him to reach a new reduction goal of 1,000 additional cuts in the U.S. Dr. Hannah then again stated that he agreed completely with the President’s view on multilateral aid. The President asked General Haig to talk to Congressman Passman about cutting 30% from the UNDP request for FY 72. Dr. Hannah remarked that World Bank operations frequently proceeded without our Ambassadors even knowing what McNamara and Company were doing. He recalled the case of our Ambassador to Jamaica who could not recite to his host government what the U.S. was doing for Jamaica although we were picking up most of the World Bank tab. 3 President Nixon then stated that he wanted to emphasize several things with respect to aid in the future. First, he did not want to short the military assistance program in Latin America or elsewhere. Secondly, he wanted emphasis shifted from multi to bilateral assistance. In this way we would deal laterally with recipient countries and apply the kind of political leverage necessary to achieve our foreign policy objectives. The President concluded by reassuring Dr. Hannah that he would not launch another study effort of our foreign assistance program but instead expected the Director to conduct a study of his own. He should bring his recommendations to the President after November and hopefully in time for the next budget. Dr. Hannah is in effect the new task force. In preparing the study Dr. Hannah should discuss the approach with John Connally and above all the programs should be designed to achieve our own interests. Dr. Hannah thanked the President for this mandate and added that the PL 480 program which totaled nearly a billion a year was an excellent case in point. Greater coordination was needed and specific policy guidance should be provided to AID in a clearer way. Many times, legislative breakdowns occurred because State legislative liaison people tended to fight for every desk officer’s objective and Congressional leaders could only be approached so many times. The trouble with multilateralism was that other nations decided how to spend our money. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1972-1973. No classification marking. Prepared by Haig. Kissinger’s July 24 briefing memorandum for this meeting emphasized that Hannah had done a fine job under difficult circumstances, especially Congressional efforts to frustrate major portions of the President’s foreign assistance program. (Ibid.) Kissinger noted that he and Flanigan would also attend the meeting with Hannah. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 3:04 to 3:37 p.m., and Flanigan and Haig were present. (Ibid., White House Central Files) See Document 93 for Hannah’s intended remarks at the meeting. 2 A supplementary note attached to Kissinger’s July 24 briefing memorandum (see footnote 1 above) reads: “After a 49 to 46 roll call vote in favor of an end-the-war amendment, the Senate yesterday voted 48 to 42 against the FY 73 authorization bill for Security Assistance, FMS, and MAP. A continuing resolution, however, is in effect through August 18. In the House, Doc Morgan is completing the mark-up, and will report the bill out next week. A determined effort must be made to avoid a similar amendment in the House. If this is successful, the bill can then be sent to the Senate for new consideration.” 3 The Ambassador to Jamaica was Vincent de Roulet. His remarks have not been further identified. 95. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 95. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, August 4, 1972. SUBJECT Planning Guidance for the FY74 Security Assistance Program Cap Weinberger has sent me a copy of his letter to Bill Rogers giving planning ceilings for the 1974 Budget for Security Assistance Programs. 2 He has stated that your decisions on the budget totals require that the budget for the Military Assistance Program and Foreign Military Sales Program be at or below $580M and $570M respectively. In combination with the low level of Congressional appropriations for FY72 and the levels which can be realistically expected from the Congress for FY73, a FY74 budget for MAP/FMS at the levels prescribed by the Director, OMB, would severely impede the transition of our friends and allies toward greater self-reliance against internal and sub-theater conventional military threats. We could not meet the objectives of the bilaterally established Korean Modernization Program and the objectives of the Cambodian and Thai programs, nor could we provide essential assistance to Turkey or sustain, within the OMB ceiling, other smaller but vitally important programs such as Indonesia and Jordan, in a manner consistent with your previous decisions. With respect to Foreign Military Sales Credits, we will be constrained in satisfying adequately the requirements of several countries in the Middle East where an arms balance is essential; in providing funds for several Latin American countries where modernization of obsolete equipment is needed; and in providing funds for those countries like Turkey and Taiwan that are transitioning from military grant aid to more self-supporting sales basis. If we are not able to be forthcoming with FMS credit, which is paid back in full plus interest, it will certainly not be to the overall U.S. interest, particularly from a national security and economic point of view. As you are aware, the FY72 appropriations for MAP and FMS were $500M and $400M NOA, which was $205M and $110M below your budget The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has recommended cuts of $180M for MAP and $127M for FMS credit. The levels given by the OMB for FY74 MAP are comparable to the very low levels appropriated by the Congress in FY72. levels given by the OMB for FY74 MAP are comparable to the very low levels appropriated by the Congress in FY72. Unless you direct otherwise, I intend, in consultation with Bill Rogers, to recommend a MAP and FMS budget for FY74 at levels derived in consideration of the total allied and U.S. efforts necessary to maintain the security of the United States and sustain the foreign policy and collective security objectives of the Nixon Doctrine. I would expect to fund the MAP and FMS levels within the FY74 budget levels you ultimately establish for the Department of Defense after full consideration of the necessary balance between Military Assistance and Military Functions Programs. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of an August 14 memorandum from Kissinger. In an August 9 memorandum, Kennedy reminded Kissinger he had discussed Laird’s concern with Weinberger and Laird on August 7, and they had “agreed that programs would be developed to meet our essential security needs following which consideration will be given to what adjustments in the ceilings would be necessary.” Kennedy recommended that Kissinger sign a memorandum to the President informing him of Laird’s concern and that programs to meet security needs would be developed within the basic limits of the Defense expenditure ceiling. (Ibid.) Regarding the August 7 meeting, see Document 96 . The August 14 memorandum to the President noted that Laird and Rogers would develop programs within the limits of the Defense Department expenditure ceilings and concurred with Laird’s view that the Security Assistance ceilings were too low. The memorandum indicated that Laird and Weinberger would make recommendations on adjusting the expenditure levels. 2 Document 92 . Weinberger’s letter to Laird providing a copy of the letter to Rogers is also dated July 21. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972) 96. Information Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 96. Information Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 5, 1972. SUBJECT Your Meeting with Secretary Laird and Mr. Weinberger on the Defense Budget Monday, August 7, 1972 In addition to the subjects raised in Phil Odeen’s memo, OMB’s Security Assistance ceilings for FY 74 should be raised. 2 Secretary Laird has protested that the OMB ceiling on FY 74 Security Assistance requests is inadequate (Tab A). 3 The ceilings were announced by Weinberger in a letter to Secretary Rogers immediately after the July 20th Cabinet meeting on the budget (Tab B). 4 The ceilings were never discussed with the NSC staff nor were we aware of the letter until after it had been sent. We share Mr. Laird’s view. The ceilings are entirely too low and approach the low levels of congressional appropriations of FY 1972 which the President is on record as considering insufficient to meet our security needs. 5 Comparison of the OMB FY 74 ceilings with previous years is as follows: FY 74 OMB FY 73 Request FY 72 Approp. FY 72 Request MAP 580 780 500 705 FMS 570 527 400 510 Supporting Assistance 663 844 601 763 Total 1813 2151 1501 1978 The cuts we know will be made by Congress in the FY 73 requests will compound the problems caused by the deep FY 72 cuts. We have planned to look at a supplemental after November to restore some of the combined FY 72-73 cuts. The OMB FY 74 levels would merely perpetuate the problem and invite even deeper cuts by Congress. They are inconsistent with the thrust of the Nixon doctrine. The OMB FY 74 levels would require major cuts in the Cambodia, Turkey, and Korea programs and would not enable us to meet our minimum supporting assistance needs. Moreover, they are predicated on a more rapid shift from grant MAP to FMS than we believe is either possible or desirable for most of our key recipients. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 230, Department of Defense, Volume 18 8-12/72. Secret. Concurred in by Philip Odeen. 2 Odeen’s memorandum has not been identified. For the OMB’s ceilings, see Document 92 . 3 See Document 95 . 4 See Document 92 and footnote 2 thereto. 5 The President’s June 10 letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott regarding the Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill are printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972, pp. 669-670. 97. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 97. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 15, 1972. SUBJECT 1974 Planning Ceiling for Military Assistance I believe it useful to remove any misunderstanding about the 1974 planning ceiling for the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS). Mel Laird refers to the budget authority amounts of $580 million for MAP and $570 million for FMS as inadequate. 2 The appropriate measure is program level; budget authority is a derivative number arrived at by subtracting from the program level estimates of financing items such as receipts, reimbursements, and recoupments of prior-year obligations. Program level figures were not transmitted officially to State and Defense along with the figures for budget authority and outlays. Using the proper measure of program level gives this picture: 1973 1972 1974 Budget Ceiling ($ millions) MAP 552 820 658 FMS 550 629 773 Total 1102 1449 1431 A total program level in 1974 which is $329 million higher than the actual level in 1972 and about the same as that in the President’s 1973 Budget is not, on the face of it, inadequate. Moreover, the implication in Mel Laird’s August 4 memorandum to the President that amounts equal to prior congressional cuts should be added to budget requests for future years is a novel, not to say disturbing, approach to budgeting. Whether or not the planning ceiling, and more particularly the allocation between MAP and FMS, will meet the President’s foreign policy needs will best be determined during this fall’s budget review process. Obviously, much depends on the situation and prospects in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. As I am sure you know, Curtis Tarr will be conducting detailed and extensive country-by-country reviews during September and early October, in which Defense, AID, and NSC and OMB staffs will be involved. Full participation and cooperation by Defense will be essential, for these reviews will form the basis of the Secretary of State’s budget recommendations for the 1974 Security Assistance programs. Cap 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Attached to an August 16 memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger suggesting the memorandum was a follow-up to Kissinger’s budget discussion with Laird. Kennedy called Kissinger’s attention to Weinberger’s focus on the total level of the program and noted that some countries could not afford additional debt and that most had limited abilities to replace MAP grants with FMS loans. He thought the increase in FMS at the expense of MAP could be problematic and also doubted that the unusually large recoupments and reimbursements in MAP and private credit in FMS could be realized. Regarding Kissinger’s budget discussion with Laird, see footnote 1, Document 95 and Document 96 . 2 Document 95 . 98. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 98. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 27, 1972. SUBJECT Security Assistance Today I forwarded to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, my recommendations for the FY 1974 Security Assistance budget as well as certain proposals on the reorganization and restructuring of that program. 2 These proposals support the Security Assistance legislation that you transmitted to the Congress in April, 1971. Narrow victories and the frustration of indecision in the Congress this year have convinced me that we must make fundamental changes in the Security Assistance Program or the Congress may fail to reenact it. In order to rally new support, I propose three rather dramatic changes in the FY 1974 program. First, I recommend legislation to place our Military Education and Training Program on a permanent basis and apart from regular grant military assistance. This legislation, the “International Military Education and Training Program,” would be a separate chapter of the Foreign Assistance Act. Heretofore we have financed training through our grant military assistance program. Nearly fifty nations participate, and only half of these also receive materiel grants; yet when we place both types of assistance in one military grant category, Members of Congress and the public gain the impression that we are providing materiel support to many more nations than in fact we do. This new legislation should remove the chance for misunderstanding while it places military training on the same legislative basis as its civilian counterpart, the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. Second, I propose to reduce the number of nations currently receiving materiel grants. Consistently we have justified this assistance on the logic that we give help to friendly nations which do not have the economic resources to support their own defense requirements. By the same reasoning, we no longer should provide grant materiel support to a nation whose economy has grown to the point where grant assistance no longer is required. Greece and the Republic of China are the two most important nations that I propose to eliminate from the grant program. Both have made gratifying economic progress, and our military materiel contributions to their defense costs are small. In FY 1972, after Congressional cuts, we provided $11 million to the Republic of China and $10 million to Greece. We probably will not be able to do as well in FY 1973 because of the constraints imposed by the continuing resolution authority. The Department of Defense has reservations about abruptly terminating materiel aid to Greece, notwithstanding the reasons presented above, because of the potential impact on home-porting arrangements now being negotiated by the United States Navy. I believe, however, that adverse impact can be avoided through careful diplomatic preparation for the announcement, and by expanding the credit arrangements we make available to Greece for the purchase of military equipment, which we estimate will be $70 million in FY 1974. Likewise the Department of Defense would rather not terminate abruptly our grant military assistance to the Republic of China in FY 1974 because of the psychological blows that these, our friends, have received of late, the assistance they have given to our military forces, and the essential role the Republic of China plays in our western Pacific and Asian strategy. These are valid arguments. But I believe we can explain to the Republic of China through careful diplomatic consultation that our action does not represent any change in policy toward them but is dictated by Congressional considerations that affect the Security Assistance Program as a whole. We would provide greater credits for the sale of military equipment, estimated to be $75 million in FY 1974, continue to help them with the assembly on Taiwan of military equipment that they purchase from us, and give evidence of interest and co-operation such as we expressed recently in the transfer of two training submarines and as we contemplate in the transfer of a rather large number of medium tanks. Furthermore, we will continue to offer education and training programs to military people from both Greece and Taiwan on a grant basis, and we also will make available to them excess military equipment. I propose further to terminate the military aid program to Liberia and to six Latin American nations. Each program involves less than a million dollars; in all cases we propose to continue training and excess defense article transfers. In Latin America we would continue to provide grant military assistance to Bolivia, Guatemala, Panama, and Uruguay, and we would establish a small regional fund to furnish emergency assistance to the other Latin American nations. I feel certain that this reduction in the number of nations to which we would give grant military assistance will encourage Congressional support for the FY 1974 program. Finally, I recommend that we eliminate Spain and Portugal from the grant military aid program. In both cases our grant assistance is justified not because of the economic necessity to help either nation finance its defense expenditures, but as a consequence of a defense base right requirement. Congressional leaders often criticize us for not explaining these programs as a payment for our right to use certain bases, but if we do so then we bring into question the logic of grant programs in general. It appears to me that the more reasonable alternative is to let the Department of Defense finance such rent. The Secretary of Defense concurs in doing so. We both recognize difficulties that may result. This action would transfer consideration of authorizations to other committees, and we must work with key committee chairmen in Congress to explain what we seek to do, particularly before public announcement of such a proposal. We also would invite questioning about other nations, particularly Ethiopia, where our aid partly is compensation for a defense base right requirement and partly a more traditional kind of military assistance. I feel we can handle these difficulties and thereby defend the program more easily than we do now. I seek your support for these recommendations. I would welcome an opportunity for Curtis Tarr and myself to discuss the FY 1974 Security Assistance Program and these proposals with you. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. 2 Not found. 99. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Tarr) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 99. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Tarr) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 14, 1972. Dear Dr. Kissinger, Attached are the country allocations of funds under PL 92-571 for the several components of the Security Assistance Programs, which I have approved following interagency discussions. 2 In arriving at these allocations, the following major considerations were taken into account: (a) Presidential commitments and assurances, including those for Indonesia, Jordan and Turkey; (b) combat and economic requirements such as those that exist in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; (c) Congressional intentions, specifically those covering Israel and the Philippines; (d) force modernization plans of our allies which we have undertaken to support, such as the Republic of Korea; and (e) financing, as an emergency measure, the costs involved in providing on an urgent basis certain equipment and services to strengthen the armed forces of the GVN. On the last point, I have set up a special fund allocation in MAP to meet certain costs we foresee for Vietnam transfers (Tab A). 3 I expect that further requirements for equipment and services will develop that will have to be satisfied on an urgent basis. As a temporary financing measure, we plan to use MAP funds for these purposes. We will have to consider in the very near future the ultimate means of financing these “ceasefire” requirements and to effect reimbursement to MAP. The attached country allocations should enable us to meet minimal grant military assistance requirements and essential needs for supporting assistance. As you are aware, new FY 1973 programs, such as Malta and Thailand which were previously funded from other appropriations, are now being funded from security assistance funds. While the funding I have approved for FY 1973 is to permit orderly programming, I have asked DOD and AID to assure that actual expenditures are made on a quarterly basis in accordance with OMB instructions. Finally, because of the fluid situation in Southeast Asia and other uncertainties which could have a bearing on Security Assistance Programs, I plan to keep the country allocations under continuing review and will advise you should any significant changes be made. I am sending a letter and the attachments reflecting the foregoing to Mr. Weinberger for his attention and to the appropriate agencies for action. 4 Sincerely, Curtis W. Tarr 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret; Exdis. Attached to Document 104 . The position of Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance was authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 that President Nixon signed on February 7, 1972. Curtis Tarr, the first to encumber the position, entered on duty on May 2, 1972. 2 Nine pages of tables giving actual levels for FY 1972, proposed levels in the FY 1973 Congressional Presentation, and Tarr’s proposals under the continuing resolution are not printed. Two pages of text summarizing by country anticipated difficulties under the funding limits are also not printed. 3 Not printed. 4 None of these letters has been found. 100. Editorial Note 100. Editorial Note The Nixon administration had agreed in April 1970 to contribute $1 billion over 3 years ($100 million in 1971, and $450 million each of the following two years) to replenish the funds of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Regarding this decision, see Document 25 . The administration submitted legislation to authorize the $1 billion in 1970, but this was cut to $100 million. The administration requested the appropriation of the initial $100 million authorized by Congress, but in May 1971 Congress reduced the appropriation to $50 million. After Congress passed legislation authorizing the remaining $900 million in March 1972, the administration requested $450 million for the second installment. The Senate approved the full amount, but the House approved only one-half of it. When conferees were unable to reach agreement on the 1973 Foreign Aid Authorization bill, the Appropriations Committee passed a Continuing Resolution (to expire on February 28, 1973), which limited payments to the IDB’s Fund for Special Operations (FSO) to $225 million. The IDB proposed that members make commitments to a replenishment resolution by December 31, 1972, and that the first two installments ($550 million for the United States) be made by that date. By late 1972 it was reported that funds for the FSO would run out by the end of 1972 without further payment by the United States. A summary of these developments, as well as possible options that would allow the United States to meet its commitments to the IDB, is in a memorandum from Under Secretary of the Treasury Charls Walker to Secretary of the Treasury Shultz, November 22, 1972. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, Inter-American Development Bank) An earlier report is in a memorandum from Hormats to Haig, October 10. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, IADB) Secretary Shultz discussed these problems with Ortiz Mena, IDB President, on November 28. At the conclusion of their frank discussion, Shultz commented that “the efforts of the Treasury and the Bank staffs should be aimed at finding the means to minimize and dampen any adverse psychological reactions to a postponement by the U.S. of the replenishment. He recognized that there was a cost in terms presented by Mr. Ortiz Mena, but that the Bank should continue to operate, recognizing that the U.S. had $275 million available. Final U.S. action would be based on the completion of the Congressional process.” (Memorandum of conversation; Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, Inter-American Development Bank) Following Congressional consultations by Treasury officials in mid-December 1972, Gene A. Knorr in the Treasury Department recommended that Shultz call Congressman Passman and tell him that the President wanted to adhere to the $1 billion IDB replenishment and that the administration would agree to the replenishment resolution, subject to appropriations, and pay in $162.5 million of the available $275 million. Knorr further proposed that after talking to Passman, Shultz or Volcker should discuss the matter with Chairman Mahon on December 18 or 19 for transmittal of the U.S. position to the meeting of the IDB Executive Directors on December 21. (Memorandum from Knorr to Shultz, December 18; ibid.) These additional Congressional consultations apparently took place, but no record of them has been found. On December 20 Shultz signed a letter to President Ortiz Mena informing him of the U.S. payment into a special account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of $275 million for the IDB. He assured him of his best efforts to obtain the additional appropriations. (Ibid.) No further decisions on IDB replenishment were made during 1972. 101. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 101. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 28, 1972. SUBJECT Security Assistance The Secretary of State has forwarded to you a memorandum outlining certain proposals to reorganize and restructure the Security Assistance Program in FY 1974. 2 The purpose of these initiatives is to strengthen the rationale for the program and to permit Congress to concentrate on priority Security Assistance requirements. I support the Secretary of State in his objectives. I am convinced, however, that more sweeping changes are required in order to carry out the concepts of the new course in foreign policy upon which we have embarked under your leadership. I remain convinced of the need to transfer Security Assistance to the Defense Budget and consider that now is the time to act. Our experience with the 1973 program is further evidence of the continued hostility in Congress to this program, particularly in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I believe that we must make the attempt to change the initial referral of the authorizing legislation to the Armed Services Committee and place the burden to change the initial referral on the Foreign Relations Committee. I refer you to my memorandum of 23 December 1971 which outlines the details and rationale of my proposed approach. 3 In the event of a negotiated settlement in Southeast Asia, Congress has clearly indicated the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) for Southeast Asian countries will not be authorized beyond FY 1973. This makes it even more critical to secure an adequate level of funding and a more flexible Security Assistance Program in the next few years. A piecemeal approach, such as moving two of the most controversial elements—aid to Spain and Portugal—to the Defense Budget as proposed by the Secretary of State, will probably incur as much opposition as a total reformation of the program. The potential for successfully moving and restructuring Security Assistance is better in the coming Congressional session than it would appear to be in subsequent years of your Administration. The Secretary of State proposes to reduce the number of nations receiving grant military aid. I cannot agree that our grant aid programs to Greece and the Republic of China should be terminated as of FY 1974. Neither can I agree with the proposal to strike six of ten recommended recipients in Latin America. The abruptness of terminating materiel grant aid in FY 1974 could cause the Chinese severe problems for support of their armed forces and could well endanger our military relationships with the Chinese, thus affecting our military posture in the Western Pacific. Greek reaction to the abrupt elimination of grant aid could imperil support of our CVA home-porting initiatives in Greece, as well as overflight and base rights in that country. Further, in consideration of Greek contributions to NATO and Greek assistance to the maintenance of our military posture in the Mediterranean, I feel that we will need to continue a modest grant aid program to Greece for the next several years. Similarly, in Latin America I believe that we should continue to provide modest programs consistent with your decision concerning FY 1972 grant materiel assistance and the considerations raised in the Military Presence Study of which you are aware. Such programs advance our ability to pre-empt third power military influence in Latin America and, by establishment of contact with important military leaders, favorably influence achievement of US foreign policy objectives. I have forwarded to Cap Weinberger my proposals for continued assistance to Greece and the Republic of China, together with other specific recommendations on the funding levels for various recipients of Security Assistance during FY 1974. 4 I have also recommended to him that we restructure the FY 1974 Security Assistance Program into the Defense Appropriations Bill and that we include a request for increased Security Assistance funds in an FY 1973 Defense supplemental appropriations request. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Secret. Attached to a January 4, 1973, memorandum from Kissinger to Laird informing him that the President had decided not to pursue Laird’s proposal to transfer security assistance to the Defense Department budget at that time. 2 Document 98 . 3 See Document 88 for the disposition of Laird’s earlier proposal. 4 Not found. 102. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Shultz to President Nixon 102. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Shultz to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 1, 1972. SUBJECT Multilateral Economic Development Assistance We urgently need to assess where we stand with multilateral development aid, and to decide anew where we are going with it. In 1970, after the Pearson Commission’s work and Rudolph Peterson’s review of U.S. aid policy, we announced a shift to greater emphasis on multilateral development assistance, and the overhaul of our bilateral aid structure, with the express idea of phasing the latter down over time. 2 Beginning at about the time of that announcement, we have been experiencing increasing congressional delays in funding the international lending institutions at the levels we thought appropriate and committed ourselves to internationally. On the bilateral side, Congress has rejected the reorganization proposals and continued to reduce funding levels. 3 We have made some noteworthy progress on multilateral programs already before the Congress, e.g., replenishment of IDA, but decisions cannot be postponed much longer on further replenishment of some existing multilateral programs and on some new ones. There are a number of contributing factors to our recent problems with Congress over funding the multilateral institutions. The focus of these problems is in the House Appropriations Committee; our author-izing legislation has enjoyed substantial margins on the floor of both Houses, and the Senate Appropriations Committee is currently providing all we have asked for. Among the operative factors are: (1) The feeling that Congress can exercise less scrutiny and control over multilateral than bilateral programs, and that the Appropriations Committees are being asked to rubber-stamp programs already negotiated internationally. (2) The jurisdictional impact in the House of the shift from bilateral to multilateral aid, as between the Foreign Affairs and Banking and Currency Committees. (3) The general international economic situation which makes it difficult to argue for increased amounts of assistance in any form, as well as our over-all budgetary stringency. (4) Our own tendency to place a higher priority on obtaining security assistance funding when we have had to make such trade-off decisions on the Hill. (5) A number of special cases where loans to countries which had expropriated United States interests or were taking other actions which we felt were contrary to U.S. interests still went forward in international institutions, since we do not hold a veto except over the soft loan window of the Inter-American Development Bank. Notwithstanding the Congressional delays we have experienced, I believe the reasons which gave rise to our decision to provide an increased emphasis on multilateral aid, as opposed to bilateral are to a great extent still true. —Multilateral cooperation for development is an integral part of a broader cooperative world system. The multilateral institutions channel European efforts and resources that might otherwise be directed toward a Europe-oriented regionalism vis-a-vis the Third World. These institutions can be part of a fabric of stability that is important as international economic matters move to the foreground and security matters recede. —The international institutions have already shown a capacity to work constructively with diverse economic systems and have considerable potential in a period of improving East-West relations. —The overriding concern of Third World nations is with their own development. For these nations, the international lending agencies, with their established expertise in the problems of development, are a preferred instrument which they value, identify with and respond to more willingly on matters of policy. One element in this preference may be the fact that the multilateral agencies operate without large overseas staffs, whereas our bilateral programs entail a major U.S. presence in recipient countries. —The international institutions are our most important vehicle for financial burden-sharing in the aid field. We expect, for example, a substantial reduction—six percentage points or more—in our share of future IDA replenishments, 4 and we are well advanced in the process of bringing others in to share the costs of the Inter-American Bank, which we have borne almost alone. But there are some real problems and some limitations involved in our primary reliance on the multilateral institutions that must not be overlooked in any candid appraisal. Particularly with the World Bank, there may be a danger of sheer bigness and a resulting tendency to move too far beyond the control of its major shareholder governments. Moreover, we cannot look to the international bodies to be responsive to our foreign policy objectives in particular countries of key interest to us. For such situations, bilateral aid, particularly security assistance, is a much more flexible instrument which we should continue to use in the future. We also are unable, under the international competitive bidding procedures of the multilateral agencies, to tie procurement as we can with our bilateral aid. As our international competitiveness improves, however, we should be able to regain some of the ground lost in recent years. At present, we have pending before the Congress fully authorized appropriations requests for IDA, the Inter-American Bank (hard and soft windows) and the Asian Bank’s soft window. The pattern of appropriations over recent years, as well as projections for the period ahead and a comparison with bilateral levels, are shown in the attached table. 5 Different institutions serve our interests in different ways, and this has to be taken into account in planning for the future. IDA, for example, lends 40 percent of its funds to India, another 20 percent to Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and very little to Latin America. The World Bank, on the other hand is a major lender to Latin America. At the regional level, the Asian Development Bank is still small, but concentrates on providing funds to countries which have been key to us in the East in the past, such as Taiwan and Korea. It is seen by most people in the area as an alternative to strict Japanese dominance to the whole aid process in that area of the world. The Inter-American Development Bank which is funded by ourselves and to a small extent by Canada is seen by the Latins as the major expression of our degree of commitment to that hemisphere. The Bank lends an amount about equal to the World Bank’s Latin American lending on an annual basis but much more of this is on a concessional or soft basis. Looking at the next four years, I believe shifts of priorities in our funding of the various institutions should take place. I would think that the major emphasis should be holding growth in our present $320 million annual participation in IDA to a minimum; if other countries feel the need or desire to increase IDA activities, they could put in an increasing share. In any case, we plan on reducing the U.S. participation of 40 percent down to about one-third during the next three-year replenishment period beginning in 1974. At the same time we would keep our average annual level of commitments to the Inter-American Development Bank somewhere around $350 million in soft funds and around $200 million in hard funds over the same period. Although IDA has steadily increased its activities in Africa, a modest participation at the regional level through the African Development Bank is indicated. Finally our level of commitment to the Asian Development Bank will have to be augmented, with the understanding that a large portion of this may go to helping in the reconstruction of Southeast Asia. In this respect, I believe the international institutions do have a special role to play in Indo-China and we are in consultation with the National Security Council staff to try to work out what seems to be a coordinated package on this. For example, the IDA and the ADB between them should be able to build up within a relatively short period of time to loans of $150 million a year to the area. This would allow us to obtain the support of other donor nations, so that the reconstruction effort would be seen as a joint multilateral one. The program I have outlined for our multilateral development assistance must, of course, be closely coordinated with our planning for bilateral assistance, for this is where the Congress will compel us to consider trade-offs. At present, taking bilateral development lending alone, our main emphasis is clearly on multilateral channels of financing by about 2:1. But defining bilateral aid more broadly to include security assistance, we have a more balanced total program, and in my judgment we should keep the over-all mix about where it is during the next four years, without a dramatic phasing down of bilateral aid or a corresponding dramatic increase in multilateral aid. I will be glad to cooperate and play any role you wish me to in the important process of achieving an integrated and coordinated approach to our total assistance program, multilateral and bilateral. Even after we have fully satisfied ourselves as to the appropriate multilateral-bilateral mix, however, it will still take a major effort with the Congress to put our program across. As I have indicated in my separate memorandum to you on our special problem in the IDB, 6 your personal support and involvement on behalf of our multilateral programs is the key to success. Efforts limited to the departmental level, even with the full cooperation of State and NSC, can only be partially successful, and partial success is inadequate in meeting internationally negotiated commitments. Specifically, Congressman Passman and key congressional leadership figures will have to be informed that you consider these international institutions to be responsive to our long-run economic interests, that you regard our support of them as an integral part of your foreign economic policy aimed at a peaceful and stable world order, and that you desire to see them funded in accordance with the international understandings negotiated under your instructions. Such a stance means, of course, that it will be necessary to resist the various trade-offs that Mr. Passman or others may seek to impose. I would hope that, in addition to your response to my other memorandum, I could have an indication of your agreement that we should adhere to the original game plan of placing major reliance in our development assistance policy on the international lending agencies. It is also important for me to know at this juncture that you are prepared to make the game plan work by applying the weight of your office when and where it is required in the Congress this coming spring. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, IFIs. No classification marking. Drafted by E.J. Finkel. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Discussed in IDA IV mtg w/PAV et al. 12/1.” According to notes by the Deputy to Assistant Treasury Secretary Hennessy, George H. Willis, the December 1 meeting was an internal Treasury meeting attended by Volcker, Hennessy, Finkel, Hirschtritt, and several others. Willis’ notes deal only with the IDA-share issue. (Ibid.) 2 Reference is to the President’s September 15, 1970, message to Congress, printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 745-756. 3 The legislation was sent to Congress on April 21, 1971, but it never came to the floor for a vote. 4 A November 30 memorandum from Hennessy to Volcker on “IDA IV Replenishment,” deals with proposed guidelines for a December 14-15 Paris meeting (DAC) on the IDA IV replenishment. Item 6 reads: “We will indicate that a substantial reduction in the U.S. share is a sine qua non of U.S. participation [and] without giving any assurance that it will prove acceptable in the congressional consultations … should be understood to mean to not more than 30 percent.” (Ibid.) In a November 6 conversation with IBRD Vice President Sir Denis Rickett on the IDA replenishment, Volcker said that in order to get anything from Congress, it would be necessary to reduce the U.S. percentage share from 40 percent to between 20 and 30 percent. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, IFIs) 5 Not found. 6 Not found. 103. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 103. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 14, 1972. SUBJECT Moving Security Assistance to the Defense Budget Secretary Laird has written to you proposing again this year that the funding of the Security Assistance program be transferred from the Foreign Assistance Act to the Defense Department Authorization and Appropriations bills. 2 I believe the problem is sufficiently serious for me again to convey to you directly my strong opposition to the proposal. The most significant problems with Secretary Laird’s proposal will be with the Congress. An attempt to shift jurisdiction for this program from the traditional committees would be opposed by some of the most helpful and most crucial supporters of our foreign policy on the Hill. The Republican members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee continue strongly to support Chairman Morgan who is firmly committed against giving up jurisdiction on the one important substantive bill handled each year by his committee. Senator Stennis does not wish to handle the authorization of military assistance in his committee and is strongly opposed to attempts to alter jurisdictional responsibilities in the Senate in an effort to circumvent committees which now have jurisdiction. He made this point clearly and publicly in the recent Senate debates on the Jackson Amendment for Israel when he strongly opposed any shift in jurisdiction (Statement attached). 3 We have been working hard at putting together a new set of Congressional supporters for development aid and Security Assistance. This requires moving many House and Senate conservatives formerly opposed to “foreign aid” to support the Security Assistance legislation. We believe that we have made progress in building a new coalition favoring Security Assistance and that this effort should not be jeopardized by a proposal for circumventing established committee jurisdictions. Shifting Security Assistance funding to the Defense Department budget will not help to avoid the principal problems which we have had in the past—the determination of the Senate to add crippling amendments and to cut funds for Security Assistance. Rather I believe our effort to seek new support for Security Assistance is the best answer to the problem of cuts. Also a shift to the Defense budget will provide Administration critics in the Senate with a single and more vulnerable focal point to which to attach the kinds of crippling amendments which in the past they have tried to fix to the Foreign Assistance Act. Secretary Laird has stated that moving Security Assistance would facilitate Defense Department planning to integrate support for allied forces with that for our own. However, it is foreign policy rather than force planning which has increasingly come to dominate our thinking about Security Assistance. This is certainly true with our major programs in Asia and the Middle East in such countries as Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Greece, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and even to a considerable extent in Korea. I cannot agree to transfer control over these important foreign policy matters to the Defense Department. With the increasing prospects for a settlement in Indo-China, we should be considering now, how and under what conditions we should move Laos and Vietnam from the Defense budget into the Security Assistance program, rather than contemplating a move in the opposite direction. Secretary Laird makes clear in his memorandum to you on this subject that: “In the event of a negotiated settlement in Southeast Asia, Congress has clearly indicated that Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) for Southeast Asian countries will not be authorized beyond FY 1973”. I share his judgment on this point and believe it rules out a shift of Security Assistance to the Defense budget (MASF). Curtis Tarr as Under Secretary for Security Assistance has been in the State Department for six months working on this program. I recently sent to you recommendations for the FY 1974 budget which he prepared after extensive study of the program designed to insure the broadest possible Congressional support. 4 I believe we should give these recommendations a chance to work to gain the wide support which we need and should have in the Congress. Now is not the time to reverse the direction you have selected or the new steps we have already taken or propose to take. I believe our present direction is right and is the best course to find the necessary funding to insure that the approach of the Nixon Doctrine succeeds. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Attached to a January 4, 1973, memorandum from Kissinger to Laird (see footnote 1, Document 101 ). 2 Document 101 . 3 Not attached. In a list at the end of the memorandum, it is identified as an excerpt from the Congressional Record, July 31, 1972. 4 Not found, but see Document 99 . 104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Tarr) 104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger) to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Tarr) 1 Washington, December 26, 1972. SUBJECT Security Assistance Country Allocations for 1973 We agree that the allocations of 1973 security assistance funds set forth in your letters of November 14, 1972, 2 provide an adequate interim basis for proceeding under the current continuing resolution consistent with the President’s program, given various uncertainties, including those in Southeast Asia. In connection with the commitment to the F-5E co-production program for Taiwan of funds available under the continuing resolution, we are proceeding with an independent review of that issue based on your memorandum of November 24. 3 We also agree that the allocations should be kept under continuing review so that they can be adjusted to meet changing circumstances and reflect further congressional action. In this connection, since it appears likely that recoupments and reimbursements under the Military Assistance Program be larger than you have estimated, the additional availabilities should be taken into account for high priority country programs. At such time as additional resources become available, it would be desirable to reexamine the allocations in the light of circumstances then obtaining before those additional resources are committed. This would permit consideration, for example, of a further allocation to the program to allow Greece some increase in the small materiel component of the presently approved program under the CRA. Henry A. Kissinger Caspar W. Weinberger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. No classification marking. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a December 29 memorandum from Kennedy with the recommendation that, based on a review by his senior staff who agreed that Tarr’s proposal was the most reasonable distribution of the insufficient resources provided by the continuing resolution, he sign the memorandum to Tarr. Kennedy also provided a tabulation on security assistance continuing resolution funding through February 28 enacted by Congress just before adjournment. He concluded that the continuing resolution was $550 million below the President’s request, necessitating drastic cuts in many key programs, noted that the worst-case scenario would be extension of the continuing resolution at current levels through the remainder of FY 1973, and proposed a few areas where additional funds might become available. 2 Document 99 . 3 Not found. 105. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 105. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 27, 1972. SUBJECT Security Assistance Legislation Secretary Laird has recommended again that we transfer Security Assistance—now carried in the Foreign Assistance Act—to the Defense budget (Tab B). 2 As you know, we have believed that this has considerable merit. If such transfer could be effected, it would change committee jurisdiction to the more favorably disposed Armed Services Committees from Foreign Relations/Foreign Affairs. The result would probably be fewer restrictive amendments and higher funding levels. Secretary Rogers believes the shift is neither feasible nor desirable: not feasible because Congress would not accept it, and not desirable because it would transfer control of important foreign policy matters to Defense (Tab C). 3 Whatever the merits, it is clear that the attempt would cause a major jurisdictional dispute on the Hill. Senator Fulbright would resist, and Morgan in the House is diametrically opposed. Your congressional relations staff has contacted Senator Stennis whose support would be crucial. Stennis adamantly opposes and indicated he would not support or fight for the shift. Without his support there is no chance for success. Unless we could be assured of success, attempting the transfer could cost us dearly. Our difficulties with the Foreign Aid bill would be compounded by all those members who saw this as an unsuccessful end run. Moreover, even some of the supporters would have expended capital in a losing proposition. Consequently, we believe that, however desirable the transfer might be, we have little or no chance of success and should not go forward with the proposal. I recommend, therefore, that we inform Secretary Laird that we should not attempt the proposed shift of Security Assistance to the Defense budget at this time. 4 Bill Timmons and Ken Dam of OMB concur. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972. Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of a December 22 memorandum from Kennedy that summarized the issues. 2 Document 101 . 3 Document 103 . 4 President Nixon initialed the “Approve” option, and Kissinger informed Laird in a January 4, 1973, memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, Foreign Aid, Volume II 1972) International Development Policy, 1969-1972 International Development Policy, 1969-1972 106. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, February 13, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. No classification marking. Attached to an undated memorandum from Secretary Rogers to AID Administrator Hannah and Assistant Secretary Greenwald asking that they prepare the analysis requested by the President. 107. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Stans to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, March 12, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 6-1. No classification marking. Attached to an April 3 letter from Rogers to Stans stating that many of the Commerce Department’s reactions were similar to those in the Department of State/AID analysis. Rogers enclosed a copy of Richardson’s March 25 memorandum to the President and its attachments (Document 108). 108. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to President Nixon Washington, March 25, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. No classification marking. 109. Letter From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, April 12, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 279, State, Volume II. Secret. Drafted by Morton Halperin of the NSC Staff who forwarded it to Kissinger under cover of a March 26 memorandum to which he also attached a copy of a May 23, 1968, paper on “United States Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries,” which had been approved by the Senior Interdepartmental Group during the Johnson administration. (Ibid.) The letter was forwarded to the President for his signature under cover of an April 11 memorandum from Kissinger. (Ibid.) Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the AID Administrator, the USIA Director, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Notes indicate the letter related to NSSM 3, January 20, regarding “U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power.” (Ibid.) The Johnson administration paper is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. X, Document 204. 110. Information Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 17, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Secret. 111. National Security Study Memorandum 45 Washington, April 21, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45. Limited Official Use. 112. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) Washington, May 22, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Files: FRC 56 76 A 108, US/3/500 BOP Problem, Aid and Development Programs, Volume 4, 1966-1971. Confidential. 113. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, May 28, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Confidential. 114. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy Washington, June 9, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 10. Limited Official Use. 115. Memorandum From Hendrik S. Houthakker of the Council of Economic Advisers to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) Washington, June 10, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 215, Council of Economic Advisers. Confidential. 116. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 13, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 117. Editorial Note 118. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, June 18, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 10. Confidential. Copies were sent to Kissinger and Kennedy. 119. Editorial Note 120. Memorandum of Conversation San Clemente, September 2, 1969, 11:45 a.m. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, June to December 1969. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Western White House. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 12:45 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 121. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 16, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, June to December 1969. Confidential. 122. Editorial Note 123. Editorial Note 124. Draft Summary of Korry Report on Foreign Assistance Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, President’s Foreign Aid Program. Confidential. Marked “Second Draft,” the summary is attached to a December 9 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger (see Document 123) which identifies it as the second draft of the summary of Ambassador Korry’s report on foreign assistance undertaken at Under Secretary Richardson’s request pursuant to NSSM 45. 125. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 11, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1023, Nixon-Peterson, et al. 2/11/70. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bergsten. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 10:07 to 10:55 a.m.; Fried is not listed as one of the attendees. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 126. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to the Chairman of the President’s Task Force on International Development (Peterson) Washington, February 17, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. No classification marking. 127. Editorial Note 128. Memorandum From President Nixon Washington, March 5, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 129. Editorial Note 130. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 19, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Task Forces on AID. Confidential. Attached to a March 20 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger with Bergsten’s additional recommendations for the Under Secretaries Committee meeting that day. 131. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon Washington, March 25, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45. Confidential. Attached to a March 27 memorandum from NSC Secretariat Director Jeanne Davis to the members of the NSC informing them the paper would be the basis for discussion at the NSC meeting on foreign assistance on April 8. The meeting was ultimately canceled. 132. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (DuBridge) to President Nixon Washington, March 26, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Task Forces on AID. No classification marking. According to a note by Kissinger on an attached April 1 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger, this memorandum did not go forward to the President. 133. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, April 17, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45. Confidential. Attached to an April 20 memorandum from Arthur Hartman (S/PC) providing copies to interested State Department offices and informing them that the NSC meeting scheduled for April 21 had been postponed indefinitely. The State Department’s views on the foreign assistance program were not sent to the President until mid-July; see Document 134. 134. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 14, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70. Confidential. 135. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, August 4, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70. No classification marking. The date is handwritten on the memorandum. 136. National Security Decision Memorandum 76 Washington, August 10, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 76. Confidential. 137. Editorial Note 138. Editorial Note 139. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Petty) to Secretary of the Treasury Connally Washington, May 20, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos: FRC 56 74 A 17, Memo to the President 5-8/71. No classification marking. Sent through Under Secretary Volcker. 140. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon Washington, June 9, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID, 1/1/71-12/31/71. No classification marking. Another copy of this memorandum bears a handwritten note that reads: “Sent via Special Messenger 6/9/71–11:30 am.” (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos: FRC 56 74 A 17, Memo to the President May-August 1971) 141. Information Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 14, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume II, 1971. No classification marking. The memorandum is Tab A to a June 14 memorandum from Johnston to Kissinger suggesting items he discuss with Connally at lunch the next day. Johnston recommended that Kissinger “tell Connally that the decision to proceed with the OECD exercise and to expand aid untying is one which the President has strongly endorsed in a number of public statements. To attempt now to undercut the OECD exercise would be a serious public reversal in the President’s development program. We look upon the OECD exercise as a means of increasing the benefits to the developing countries of a given amount of aid. We would concur in an OECD agreement only if we were sure that we would make a fair share of the aid shipments under other countries’ development programs.” Other items Johnston suggested Kissinger take up with Connally were Connally’s tough statements on trade policy, offset with Germany, IFI legislation, and next steps in the international monetary field. 142. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 19, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Confidential; Sensitive. 143. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon Washington, September 23, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 306, IBRD/IMF. Confidential. 144. Editorial Note 145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia Washington, February 16, 1972, 2004Z. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 3 CECLA. Confidential. Drafted by R.M. Ogden (E/OT/GCP), cleared in ARA and IO, and approved by J.C. Leary (E/OT/GCP). Repeated to the Mission in Geneva, USUN, and USOECD in Paris. 146. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council on International Economic Policy Operations Group (Samuels) to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) Washington, March 3, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 835, CIEPSM 16. Confidential. 147. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (De Palma) Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, PADM 56. Secret. Attached to an October 5 memorandum from Claus Ruser (S/PC) to the Deputy Secretary advising him that the Policy Analysis Decision Memorandum (PADM) stemmed from a PARA review that Ruser chaired on September 8. Ruser recommended that the draft memorandum be sent to the Secretary for his review and approval considering his “deep interest and involvement in UN matters.” There is no indication that the memorandum was sent to Secretary Rogers. The Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) process was internal to the Department of State and did not include clearances from other agencies. 106. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers 106. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, February 13, 1969. The International Private Investment Advisory Council has proposed the creation of a federally chartered corporation for the purpose of promoting private capital investment in the developing nations. (See item XVIII-2 in the report from Arthur Burns’ group) 2 I will need your analysis of this proposal by March 12, 1969. In preparing your report, you should consult Mr. Kennedy regarding the budgetary and balance-of-payments implications of the plan. When you submit your report to me, please send a copy to Arthur Burns. RN Attachment 3 2. Foreign Aid During the course of the campaign you urged that “we ought to turn our foreign aid programs more in the direction of stimulating private ise, less in the direction of financing government enterprise.” One possible means of accomplishing this has just been suggested by the International Private Investment Advisory Council. 4 This Council was created under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 to advise the Agency for International Development. The Council has proposed a new federally-chartered corporation for the purpose of promoting private capital investment in the less developed countries. Newspaper accounts indicate that a number of Republican legislators are favorably inclined toward the proposal, and it thus seems likely that you will be asked to support it. The proposed corporation would take over AID’s present investment-guarantee program, which insures investors in developing countries against loss from certain risks of a political and business nature. Besides its investment-guarantee activities, the corporation would have authority to make loans to private parties either in dollars or in local currencies. The corporation could issue its own securities with principle and interest guaranteed by the U.S. government, and it would also have the right to borrow directly from the Treasury. Some features of the proposal are soundly conceived. Importantly, the principle of co-insurance is honored and safeguards are provided against direct loans that would compete with wholly private financing. There are numerous features which need to be clarified, however, and it would seem advisable for you to ask the Secretary of the Treasury and the new head of the Agency for International Development to explore the proposal. Whatever its technical merits, there are both budgetary and balance-of-payments reasons for moving cautiously toward the establishment of the proposed corporation. The proposal does not contemplate a substitution of private capital investment in underdeveloped countries for present government-to-government foreign aid. Instead, the new corporation would complement foreign-aid programs, and it would be specifically aimed at an expansion of total private investment activities. This would not be a desirable development at a time such as the present, when the resources available for use in this country are under strain and when our balance-of-payments position is precarious. Moreover, the corporation’s authority to borrow directly from the Treasury may constitute an additional burden on the Federal budget. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. No classification marking. Attached to an undated memorandum from Secretary Rogers to AID Administrator Hannah and Assistant Secretary Greenwald asking that they prepare the analysis requested by the President. 2 Arthur Burns, in his capacity as Chairman of the Program Coordination Group, sent the President-elect the Group’s report under cover of a January 18 letter. Entitled “Recommendations for Early Action or Consideration,” the 117-page report dealt primarily with domestic issues, but Section XVIII, the final section, is entitled “International Economic Relations.” In his January 18 letter Burns noted that the report was an enlarged version of “the tentative report” that he had submitted to the President-elect on January 6. The letter is on the stationery of the Office of President-elect Richard M. Nixon with a New York address. (Ford Library, Arthur Burns Papers, Box A18, Report to President Elect Nixon) 3 No classification marking. The attachment comprises pages 109–110 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 46 ] of the Burns Group report. 4 The Council’s report, entitled “The Case for a U.S. Overseas Private Enterprise Development Corporation,” is dated December 1968. A copy is attached to a January 8 memorandum from AID Deputy Administrator Poats to Salzman apprising him of a January 7 meeting at which the report was discussed. (Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, LGP 3 Private Enterprise FY1969) 107. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Stans to Secretary of State Rogers 107. Letter From Secretary of Commerce Stans to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, March 12, 1969. Dear Mr. Secretary: The President has asked me to transmit to you this Department’s views on the proposal for a Federally-chartered private enterprise corporation to promote private investment in the developing countries. I have accordingly asked my staff to review the proposal presented in the Report of the International Private Investment Advisory Council (IPIAC) entitled “The Case for a U.S. Overseas Private Enterprise Development Corporation.” 2 I understand that the IPIAC proposal is essentially the same as the one advanced by Senator Javits and included in the draft proposal for creating a Department of Peace. 3 I am transmitting a copy of the staff review with this letter and hope you will find it of interest. 4 My preliminary judgment is that there is scant evidence that the proposed corporation will help significantly to stimulate new private activity in the developing countries or impart a new direction to U.S. foreign assistance programs. These objectives, I believe, are paramount in any consideration of a change in U.S. foreign assistance machinery. Moreover, I can foresee some possible disadvantages in creating an independent corporation to carry on some current assistance activities. Present coordination of relevant Government programs in the commercial and balance of payments areas, necessary to help meet broader national objectives, might be lost by the proposed change. I would also expect some adverse repercussions from any attempt to set up a new entity outside usual budgetary controls and to invest it with borrowing authority. On balance and given the weight of other relevant considerations, I would not favor creation of a private enterprise corporation on the basis of the case made in the IPIAC proposal. I would, however, want to state clearly that I am in favor of a fresh, private enterprise approach to meeting developing country problems and would support a U.S. private development corporation that would overcome the problems and objections outlined above. Sincerely yours, Maurice H. Stans 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 6-1. No classification marking. Attached to an April 3 letter from Rogers to Stans stating that many of the Commerce Department’s reactions were similar to those in the Department of State/AID analysis. Rogers enclosed a copy of Richardson’s March 25 memorandum to the President and its attachments ( Document 108 ). 2 See Document 106 . 3 Not further identified. 4 Not printed. 108. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to President Nixon 108. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 25, 1969. SUBJECT Proposal for Corporation to Promote Private Investment in Developing Nations In response to your memorandum of February 13 to Secretary Rogers, 2 there is enclosed the State/AID analysis of the International Private Investment Advisory Council proposal to establish a specialized U.S. Government Corporation to promote U.S. private investment in the growth of private enterprise in developing nations. 3 Our conclusions are that adopting the IPIAC proposal, modified to provide for more effective policy coordination and to limit balance-of-payments and budgetary costs, accompanied by a strong new emphasis in official aid programs on developing local private enterprise, has several strong advantages: —The concept of such a corporation is strongly supported by prominent business interests and members of Congress, including both supporters and critics of foreign aid. —A corporation could operate investment insurance, guaranty and promotion programs in a more business-like way than is possible under present arrangements. Against These advantages could largely be realized even if, for balance-of-payments and budgetary reasons, the corporation were not now given significant new authority to provide financial assistance to investors. Against these advantages you will have to weigh the following disadvantages: —The possibility that a more visible U.S. investment promotion effort, even though accompanied by a new emphasis in official aid on local private enterprise will increase host country fears of economic domination by the U.S., adversely affecting our political relations (particularly with Latin America). —The risk that the Congress and the public will conclude—wrongly—that doing more for private investment means we can now do less in development aid. —A balance-of-payments cost, up to $40 million annually. We have consulted with the Treasury Department regarding the budgetary and balance-of-payments implications of the proposal and Secretary Kennedy believes these considerations can be adequately taken care of if it is decided to go forward with such a corporation. There is enclosed an outline of the proposal prepared by AID, which has been revised to reflect the modifications which we believe to be desirable. 4 Your final decision can best be made in the context of your decisions on the aid program in general, following the overall review of aid policy now being prepared for the National Security Council. Dr. Hannah and Secretary Rogers will have recommendations for you at that time. Secretary Kennedy may have broader comments as well. Elliot L. Richardson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. No classification marking. 2 Document 106 . 3 Not printed; entitled “State/AID Analysis of IPIAC Proposal for a U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation,” dated March 14. 4 Not printed; entitled “Outline for a U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation,” undated. 109. Letter From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers 109. Letter From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, April 12, 1969. Dear Bill: I believe we need to give very serious and careful thought to our relation to countries in the developing world. I do not believe we understand very clearly how our aid programs and our policies, in general, actually affect the political and economic development of these countries and their orientation on foreign policy matters of concern to us. A study of the impact of our aid programs in an effort to develop a clearer understanding of what they can and cannot accomplish is needed and we are issuing terms of reference for this study. 2 In the meantime, I wanted you and your colleagues to understand my basic approach on this question. I do not believe we should put ourselves in the position of being blackmailed by countries which threaten to go Communist, or even to increase their economic ties with Communist countries, if we do not provide them with the level of economic or military assistance that they think they require. I doubt very much that any country will deliberately subordinate itself to the Soviet Union or to Communist China simply because they are dissatisfied with our policy. Moreover, the record of the last decade does not, I believe, lead to the conclusion that greater economic intercourse with the Soviet Union or China leads a developing country necessarily to change either its domestic policies or its foreign policy. Obviously, we must be concerned about Soviet-Chinese actions which may affect our security, but we need to examine each case on its own merits and not permit ourselves to be forced into actions which are undesirable or expensive simply because we are told that otherwise the countries will move into the Soviet or Chinese sphere of influence. It would seem to me axiomatic that we must not be put into the position where a government can pretend that it is worse for us than for it if it goes Communist or pro-Communist. We need to understand much better than we do what, in fact, increases the appeal of Communism in particular countries and what drives nations closer to the Soviet Union or Communist China. I am also concerned about the tendency of our aid programs and, indeed, of the activities of our personnel overseas, in general, to draw us into a deep involvement in the domestic politics of developing countries. Our concern, I believe, should be primarily with their foreign policies, insofar as they affect our own interests. We should be concerned with the domestic affairs of other countries only as they may affect their foreign policies in ways of critical importance to us, or as they affect the way in which the recipients are likely to use assistance which we give them. Sincerely, RN 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 279, State, Volume II. Secret. Drafted by Morton Halperin of the NSC Staff who forwarded it to Kissinger under cover of a March 26 memorandum to which he also attached a copy of a May 23, 1968, paper on “United States Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries,” which had been approved by the Senior Interdepartmental Group during the Johnson administration. (Ibid.) The letter was forwarded to the President for his signature under cover of an April 11 memorandum from Kissinger. (Ibid.) Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the AID Administrator, the USIA Director, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Notes indicate the letter related to NSSM 3, January 20, regarding “U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power.” (Ibid.) The Johnson administration paper is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. X, Document 204 . 2 See Document 111 . 110. Information Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 110. Information Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 17, 1969. SUBJECT President’s Letter to Secretary Rogers on Criteria for US Foreign Aid Policy I am disturbed by certain implications in the President’s letter, which I saw for the first time today (copy attached). 2 There can obviously be no quarrel with the dictum that we need to examine each case on its own merits, although I trust that those “merits” will not be artificially confined to the one country concerned. Plainly, what we do or do not do with respect to a particular country can have impact on others as well. The “merits” we examine would, I hope, continue to fit into a broad conception of our interests. More baffling, however, is the proposition that we should not “permit ourselves to be forced into actions which are undesirable … simply because we are told that otherwise the countries will move into the Soviet or Chinese sphere …” Of course much depends on who is “we” and who does the “telling.” Surely, there must be cases where our government tells itself that unless we take a certain course of action there is palpable risk of a shift in the orientation of a country. There may even be cases where “simply” that kind of a conclusion is all that is required to dictate action on our part. I agree of course that we should “not permit ourselves to be forced” into “undesirable” actions. But even a government as capably staffed as ours may sometimes find events creating certain imperatives. And what criteria govern what is “undesirable” when we perceive a vital interest at stake? Nor, says the letter, should we be forced into “expensive” actions simply because a country may go Communist. Do we really want to make expense the overriding criterion in these cases? Obviously not—viz. our recent assurances to the Europeans that our expensive troops are there solely for security reasons. Presumably, this means that they are there “simply because we are told that otherwise the countries will move into the Soviet sphere of influence.” At least I can think of no other security reason than that one. Then there is the “axiom” that we must not be put into a position where a government “can pretend that it is worse for us than for it if it goes Communist or pro-Communist.” Let us leave aside whether governments can “pretend” that sort of thing in 1969; and let us also for the moment not argue whether at this late date we can or need be put in any position at all by what some other government “pretends.” But is it really so axiomatic that just because a country may suffer more than we because it gets taken over by Communists our interests may not also be adversely affected? No doubt it would have been “worse for” France, or Italy, or Greece or Turkey, or Iran 20 years ago if they had “gone” Communist than it would have been for us. But are you really arguing that we should not on that account have taken “expensive” or perhaps even otherwise “undesirable” actions to prevent it, or that we should not do so now in similar circumstances? If on the other hand the burden of that sentence in the letter is to be carried wholly by the word “pretend,” then I think you are stating an “axiom” that is a straw man. And then there is the notion that governments “go Communist” of their own volition. Admittedly, one or two have turned that trick (e.g., Castro’s self-proclaimed transformation). Usually, however, the problem is that a government may be replaced by Communists, including by the use of force. Thus, a government may make its plea for aid not on the grounds that it will change colors but that others of a different color will displace it. I would hope that that is the risk we will consider in determining our commitments rather than the possibility (remote in most cases at present) that one and the same government will one morning call itself Communist. The same point applies to the earlier portion of the letter which warns against our being blackmailed by countries which threaten to go Communist. “Threaten” has a transitive and an intransitive meaning. What if there is a threat that a country will “go Communist?” That does rather confront us with a choice of some magnitude in certain cases—whether you call the situation one of “blackmail” or not. And, again, the idea of countries “deliberately subordinating” themselves to the Soviet Union or China. Has there yet been such a case? Why merely “doubt very much” that this might happen. But why not address the real problem: that countries may indeed find themselves drifting gradually, because they cannot stop it by their own means, into a state of subordination to the USSR or China. That, indeed, seems to be the problem you pose at the top of page 2 of the letter. I very much hope that the addressees will come to grips with it, as well as with the implication that lurks beneath much of the letter; that even if that is their fate it may make no difference to us. But what I find most baffling in a letter apparently intended to get away from a single rationale for our aid programs is that in the end you do no more than ask this one concrete question: what is it that drives countries closer to the Soviet Union or China? (Incidentally, is this synonymous with the “appeal of Communism?”) I had thought that what you would want to ask in 1969—and what most people concerned with aid policy in the Executive and the Congress have long since learned to ask—is what factors, apart from the Communist danger, may make it desirable for us to assist or otherwise cooperate with other countries. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Secret. 2 Not attached, but printed as Document 109 . 111. National Security Study Memorandum 45 111. National Security Study Memorandum 45 1 Washington, April 21, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture Director of the Bureau of the Budget Administrator of the Agency for International Development President of the Export-Import Bank SUBJECT U.S. Foreign Aid The President has directed the preparation of a paper on the objectives of the U.S. economic assistance program and its relationship to overall U.S. foreign policy. 2 The paper should re-examine all of the basic assumptions underlying our aid effort, particularly the relationships among aid, economic development, and political stability. It should analyze the effectiveness of past and present U.S. programs in achieving objectives of interest to the United States, such as: economic development, evolution of democratic and pluralistic societies, attitudes toward the United States, positions on foreign policy issues of concern to us, impact on U.S. national security, commercial gains to the United States. Finally, the paper should explore the implications of its findings for the budget level and organization of our aid effort, and methods of presenting the program publicly. The findings of the paper will represent a major input, along with that of the outside commission being set up at the President’s direction, to the final Administration response to the Javits Amendment. 3 The President has directed that the Ad Hoc Working Group created by NSSM 4 and chaired by the Under Secretary of State be responsible for the preparation of this paper. 4 Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45. Limited Official Use. 2 See Document 109 . 3 The Javits Amendment to Section 501 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 required a thorough assessment of the overall foreign assistance program and a report to Congress by March 31, 1970. 4 Regarding the Ad Hoc Working Group, see Document 1 . On September 19 Under Secretary Richardson sent a memorandum to members of the Under Secretaries Committee informing them that with the appointment of the Peterson Task Force (see Document 119 ) he wished to proceed with the internal review of foreign aid issues as directed in NSSM 45. He also informed the Committee he had designated the Ambassador to Chile, Edward M. Korry, to assist him with the study. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45) 112. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) 112. Letter From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) 1 Washington, May 22, 1969. Dear Mr. Volcker: I am delighted to learn that you have constituted a staff group to review present policies designed to reduce balance-of-payments outflows due to U.S. Government expenditures. 2 We are very anxious to rationalize and relax the stringent additionality measures which have been instituted, over and above aid tying, since 1965. Our economists estimate that these additionality measures, designed to reduce the substitution of aid-financed for commercial U.S. exports, have probably saved an average of only $35 million a year over the last four years. Even if perfect additionality were achieved, the maximum saving would be only $70 million. Our net direct expenditure of dollars outside the U.S. (the gold budget) was down to $178 million in FY 1968, out of total A.I.D. expenditures of about $2.0 billion, and will be less than that in FY 1969. In comparison to this achievement, attributable to aid tying, the additionality savings are pretty small. To achieve these savings, we have had to apply quite onerous controls on the use of our development loans. These have forced aid recipients to intervene in the free market, contrary to our advice to them on general economic policy, in order to divert trade to the U.S. The restrictions have also reduced the effective amount of aid by making aid-purchased goods more expensive to recipients, and have made it more difficult for recipients to draw down our loans and put the aid resources to use as scheduled. Our additionality policies have become a constant source of irritation between the U.S. and host governments. A.I.D. officials must spend time, energy, and good will negotiating additionality measures, which detracts from their ability to press for better development policies. Moreover, because additionality measures, by their nature, frequently force recipients to purchase more expensive and less satisfactory U.S. exports, we may be prejudicing our ability to build commercial markets for the longer run. Ultimately, our export prospects in poor countries depend on their accelerated development, which is the basic aim of our aid program. Our precise proposals for ameliorating additionality policies, and the reasons for them, are explained in the enclosed papers. 3 I hope very much that the enlarged Volcker Group dealing with balance-of-payments issues will be able to consider and make an early response to these proposals, without waiting for consideration of other balance-of-payments policies affecting all government expenditures. My concern for an early Administration decision is two-fold. First, additionality measures are making it increasingly difficult to administer the aid program. The sooner we can ease these restrictive policies, the further we can stretch our reduced aid budget. Second, in the middle of June we will be discussing aid policies in two important international forums: The Development Assistance Committee’s review of the U.S. aid program and the sixth meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. In both meetings we expect intensive criticism of our additionality policies. If, as I hope, we are going to ameliorate our aid-related balance-of-payments policies, this would be an opportune time to announce it. This step would have important benefits for U.S. relations with the less developed countries. 4 Sincerely yours, John A. Hannah 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Files: FRC 56 76 A 108, US/3/500 BOP Problem, Aid and Development Programs, Volume 4, 1966-1971. Confidential. 2 A May 2 memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John C. Colman to Volcker indicates that in response to Volcker’s request Colman had convened on May 1 an interagency group to review the balance-of-payment effects of U.S. Government expenditures (State and NSC representatives had been unable to attend). Colman noted that AID would prepare a paper on “additionality” which would recognize that Treasury and perhaps OMB might oppose AID’s “expressed desire to ameliorate present tying practices.” Other agencies would also prepare papers. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 4 In a May 29 reply to Hannah, Volcker noted that he shared Hannah’s concern with reducing the political and administrative impact of additionality measures provided the adverse balance-of-payment impact of foreign assistance would be reduced to a reasonable minimum. Volcker doubted that it would be possible to reach interagency agreement on the additionality issues by mid-June. In a May 26 memorandum Volcker indicated to Colman that, aside from substance, the timing of any announcement would have to take account of the current balance-of-payment, special drawing rights negotiations, among other things, and mid-June appeared to be impossible. (All in Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Files: FRC 56 76 A 108, US/3/500 BOP Problem, Aid and Development Programs, Volume 4, 1966-1971) 113. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 113. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 28, 1969. SUBJECT Application of A.I.D. Country Restrictions to New Overseas Private Investment Corporation An issue has arisen with reference to the Aid Bill. It is whether all the country prohibitions which now apply to A.I.D.’s own operations should also apply to the proposed Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). A.I.D. and all other agencies take the position that only the restrictions applying to Communist countries, countries to which the U.S. has no diplomatic relations and the Hickenlooper Amendment should apply to the corporation. (Hannah’s memorandum to you on this is at Tab A.) Arthur Burns feels that all the other restrictions should apply to the corporation as well. The arguments for limiting the number of prohibitions applying to the OPIC are: —The major new feature of your aid program for FY 1970 is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The main objective of the corporation is to induce increased participation by private enterprise in the development process by reducing government interference and bureaucratic red tape from their activities. —The application of all of the country restrictions would run directly counter to that objective. —Under these restrictions, U.S. firms could not be sure that their OPIC guarantees and insurance would not be withdrawn as a result of such (for them) fortuitous events as mob attacks on U.S. embassies, delinquencies of payment of UN dues, and non-repayment of debts owed to the U.S. Government or U.S. private citizens by the government of the country involved. Furthermore, the tightened provisions which prohibit aid to countries trading with Cuba, as well as those shipping to Cuba, could circumscribe seriously the area of potential U.S. private investments. —At present, application of these restrictions would prohibit extension of guarantees or insurance only to a few relatively minor countries. The main problem is their potential extension to numerous developing countries, such as Guinea (on repayment of A.I.D. loans), Ecuador (on government debts to private citizens) and even Mexico (due to trading with Cuba). The Burns arguments are (Tab B): 2 —The OPIC is, in effect, a Government agency with virtually the same lending authority as AID. To exempt the Corporation from the restrictions would be the same as exempting that part of the AID program that will be transferred to the OPIC. —The political risks that apply to trying to reduce or remove the restrictions on AID in Section 620 would be the same should you decide to remove them from the OPIC. On balance, I think Hannah is right on this issue. Apply all country prohibitions to the OPIC 3 Limit the application of country prohibitions as proposed by AID Tab A Washington, May 28, 1969. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to President Nixon 4 SUBJECT Exemption of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation from some of the political proscriptions of the Foreign Assistance Act Recommendation No. 1: That the Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs be subject to the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act requiring withholding or termination of the Corporation’s programs in countries which are found in violation of the Hickenlooper Amendment, countries with which we do not have diplomatic relations and Communist countries. 5 Recommendation No. 2: That the Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs be exempted from all other proscriptive paragraphs of Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act in the same way that programs of the Peace Corps, the Export-Import Bank and the State Department Cultural Exchange programs are exempt. 6 Discussion: There has been some dispute as to the interpretation of your wishes on this issue because the matter of exemption of the Private Investment Corporation from some of the political proscriptions was not separately posed as an issue in the Budget Director’s memorandum which you considered on May 22. 7 It was my understanding, endorsed by some members of your immediate staff, that you agreed with our desire to make the operations and public image of the Private Investment Corporation as “private” as possible and to give the Corporation’s management a charter permitting them to enter into long-term undertakings with U.S. private investors. Consequently, we have concluded that the Corporation (like the Export-Import Bank and Peace Corps) should not be required by law to back off of pending investment guarantees covering joint undertakings of private U.S. and foreign businessmen and banks, when the government of the less developed country concerned commits any of these Section 620 offenses against the U.S. Government: (1) Fails to prevent ships under its registry from calling at Cuban or North Vietnamese ports or sells any goods to those countries; (2) Fails to pay government debts to U.S. private citizens; (3) Attends an international conference planning aggression or subversion; (4) Is more than six months in default on A.I.D. loans. The foregoing are the mandatory Section 620 proscriptions from which we propose to exempt the Private Investment Corporation. The purpose of these proscriptions was to use the threat of withholding U.S. aid to obtain favorable action by governments of less developed countries. We do not believe that U.S. private investment should be used as a tool of political leverage in such cases. To do so subjects a U.S. private investor who has at considerable time and expense worked up a project with local private interests to the risk of loss, uncertainty and embarrassing identification as an instrument of U.S. political policy. One of our concerns in promoting through a government corporation program U.S. private investment in less developed countries has been the vulnerability of such investment to the charge of “dollar imperialism”; these political strings would compound the problem by associating private investment with unrelated U.S. Government policy considerations. Congressman Adair, starting from the opposite point of view, has come around to our view on this issue. The minor change in the present law which we propose can be accomplished by adding to Section 638 the underlined words in the following provision: 8 “Sec. 638. Peace Corps Assistance.—No provision of this Act shall be construed to prohibit assistance to any country pursuant to the Peace Corps Act, as amended; the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended; or the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, or with the exception of sections 620(b), (e), (f), and (t), pursuant to Chapter 3, Title II, Part I . This change also would relieve the Corporation of having to “take into account”, in a non-mandatory sense, a variety of other political matters such as the failure of a less developed country government to keep up-to-date on its UN dues or to prevent mob action against U.S. Government property or to respect the 12-mile limit rule on fishing rights. The Acting Secretary of State concurs in these recommendations. John A. Hannah 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume I 1969. Confidential. 2 Not found, but see Document 9 . 3 This option was checked, apparently by Kissinger. A marginal notation indicates that AID was notified on May 29 at 3 p.m. 4 Limited Official Use. 5 President Nixon signed the Approved option. 6 The President signed the Disapproved option. 7 See footnote 5, Document 8 , and Document 10 . 8 Printed here in italics. 114. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy 114. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy 1 Washington, June 9, 1969. Dear David: If anyone had told me a few months ago when I came into this job that I would be writing to the Secretary of Treasury about “additionality,” I would have said that such esoteric practices seemed far indeed from what ought to be the concern of an Acting Secretary of State for the foreign policy of the United States. I now find that foreign policy is indeed quite closely and adversely affected by these procedures. One of the great strengths of our system with its regular, peaceful changes of leadership, is that we are able on occasion to pull policies up by their roots and examine them free from past commitment and bureaucratic position. I know from my own experience that governments often head down particular paths for perfectly good reasons and end up in quite ludicrous situations without knowing quite how to turn back. My brief exposure to the question of “additionality” leads me to believe that this is one deadend from which we should withdraw. I want first to assure you that I and this Department fully share Treasury’s genuine concern for our balance of payments problem. The comments I make here are given in full appreciation of the necessity for dealing with our adverse balance. But my review of the “additionality” problem leads me to believe that for practically no balance of payments gain we buy bad policies, bad relations and particularly bad precedents. While recognizing that the reactions I have are strictly those of a layman, let me just briefly summarize my impressions after examining the arguments of experts: 1. On April 4 the President announced in a message steeped in refreshing Republicanism that with respect to capital controls “fundamental economics call for … ultimate dismantling of the network of direct controls which may seem useful in the short-run but are self-defeating in the long-run.” 2 I assume that this principle applied to private capital controls ought also to apply to Government operations more generally. 2. In order to improve our balance of payments situation and avoid the replacement of possible direct American exports by our aid shipments, we have instituted an elaborate program of negotiated “additionality” agreements which result in a small gross gain to the balance of payments. And at what cost? 3. Our balance of payments surplus with Latin America amounts to $300 million annually while at the same time the Latin Americans run a good healthy surplus with Europe and Japan. To further improve our balance of payments situation, we negotiate additionality agreements with those countries to further divert their import demand to US suppliers by encouraging those governments to engage in the most illiberal actions: a. In the case of Colombia, the IMF, the IBRD and AID have all tried to persuade that Government to liberalize its exchange and import regime because we believe this is sound economic sense and will lead to self-sustaining economic growth. We turn around and insist that the Government of Colombia make sure that 39 percent of their commercial imports come from the United States. To accomplish this onerous directive, controls must be imposed. How do we convince Colombian legislators that controls are not good for their economic development but they are good for forcing them to buy what are, by definition, uncompetitive US products? b. In the case of Chile we not only encourage them to go against all the best economic advice we and others have been giving them but we even go so far as to encourage them to initiate a preferential tariff system—what amounts to a reverse preference. I understand we have argued vehemently that reverse preferences are bad and they should be eliminated entirely from the Common Market/African Yaounde Convention. c. Bolivia was advised by the IMF to follow a stringent stabilization plan and to institute a series of reform measures. Many of these were adopted by the Bolivian Government. They included reorganization of its customs service, institution of controls over fiscal performance of independent public agencies, cuts in government expenditures, etc. We could not proceed with a loan to back these reforms because of an inability to reach agreement on additionality which would have taken the form of tying AID credits to a positive list of imports to be financed by its free exchange resources. 4. Let me just list some of the other practices we have encouraged besides preferential tariff rates/positive lists—the sale of exchange at preferential exchange rates for AID imports (Indonesia and Costa Rica), reduction of tax surcharges for AID imports (Uruguay), preferential credit and reduced interest for goods coming from America (Ghana), low cash deposits on imports (Chile and Colombia), special exchange guarantees (Brazil), and special payment delays for AID goods (Brazil). All of these laborious, and—from our economic-system point of view—by definition distasteful negotiations reduce the limited leverage we have to use our assistance to promote sound economic policies in the developing world, to say nothing of their deleterious effect on our foreign relations as such. There is no reason for me, as a non-expert, to continue long in this vein but I felt that it was important for me to bring to your personal attention the anomalies of this situation to be certain that you had focused on this problem. John Hannah has previously written a letter to Paul Volcker, and I now see that Paul has replied saying that his committee will indeed look at this problem. I am a little disturbed, however, by the third paragraph in that letter which indicates a certain lack of zeal because it appears to condition our changing this policy on favorable developments in the balance of payments, negotiations for the activation of special drawing rights, and legislation relating to bilateral and multilateral assistance. 3 Why not add, for good measure, a winning streak of ten games for the Washington Senators? With kindest personal regards, Sincerely, Elliot 4 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 10. Limited Official Use. 2 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , p. 266. 3 See Document 112 and footnote 4 thereto. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Richardson signed the original. 115. Memorandum From Hendrik S. Houthakker of the Council of Economic Advisers to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) 115. Memorandum From Hendrik S. Houthakker of the Council of Economic Advisers to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) 1 Washington, June 10, 1969. SUBJECT Additionality in Foreign Aid In its letter of May 22 addressed to you the Agency for International Development has suggested the relaxation of certain policies introduced by the previous Administration to insure that AID financed purchases are additional to normal commercial purchases of U.S. goods. 2 This presents an excellent opportunity for a review of these policies and for the adoption of changes which will increase the efficiency of our foreign aid program. While we cannot vouchsafe for the accuracy of their estimates, AID’s suggested changes seem to us to go in the right direction, and we would like them to be considered sympathetically. The U.S. should also be exploring with other developed countries, through the Development Assistance Committee or other appropriate forum, other measures which might be adopted jointly to reduce the economic inefficiencies involved in aid-tying. While “additionality” has been of some short-run benefit to the U.S. balance of payments, artificial inducements to buy U.S. goods which are not internationally competitive seem at least as likely to damage as to improve our longer-run trade outlook. For one thing, our products are thus given a stigma of undesirability. For another, our long-run export growth, as well as our political interests, can best be advanced by promoting rapid economic growth in the less developed countries. Additionality requirements have necessitated such interferences with sound development policy as the maintenance of exchange controls which might otherwise have been removed, the violation of credit ceilings, and increases in the procurement costs of public corporations. The costs of these interferences have been compounded by major delays in the disbursement of AID funds and by the irritation and resentment caused by our policies, particularly in Latin America. In general insistence on additionality is inconsistent with the liberal image the present Administration hopes to present to the world at large. Since budgetary stringencies and Congressional pressures do not permit any immediate expansion of our foreign aid program (indeed the latter may impose further reductions), we ought at least to insure that the aid funds we do have available are utilized with maximum efficiency. Although the structure of our balance of payments still leaves much to be desired, it is important to continue the effort at liberalization which we started in the direct investment program. The idea that we can improve our balance of payments by piling restrictions upon restrictions has by now proved to be illusory. H.S. Houthakker 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 215, Council of Economic Advisers. Confidential. 2 Document 112 . 116. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 116. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 13, 1969. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury Administrator of the Agency for International Development SUBJECT Additionality The President is anxious to make a positive gesture toward Latin America during the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting next week. 2 He believes that the elimination of additionality requirements from our economic assistance programs would be a very helpful step which we could easily take. To this end, he has directed that such action be taken in time for the decision to be announced at the IA-ECOSOC meeting June 18. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 2 The Sixth Annual Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting was held in Trinidad June 18-23, 1969. In his Ministerial address on June 20, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Meyer announced that, effective immediately, additionality requirements in U.S. aid were discontinued. Current Economic Developments , Issue No. 834, June 24, 1969, pp. 1-6, contains a report on the IA-ECOSOC meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, E/CBA/REP Files: Lot 70 D 467) Abolition of the additionality requirements was one plank in the Consensus of Vina del Mar presented by Chilean Foreign Minister Valdes to President Nixon on June 11. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc.) 117. Editorial Note 117. Editorial Note As a result of conversations with Colombian President Lleras Restrepo on June 12 and 13, 1969 (see Document 12 ), President Nixon decided to help finance construction of the last major unfinished section of the Pan American Highway through the Darien Gap in southern Panama and northern Colombia. The President’s interest in this highway reflected his personal bias on development projects. He wrote on a May 7 memorandum to him from Henry Kissinger summarizing an AID paper opposing a shift of AID funds from housing to the highway sector: “In all our Latin programs I want to turn away from housing and other welfare handouts—and toward highways, etc.—which produce wealth and where we know our money does something tangible.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files—Latin America, Box 797, LA General, Volume I 1-7/69) The total cost of the Darien Gap road was estimated to be about $150 million, $90 million for the Panamanian section and $60 million for the Colombian portion. The Departments of State, Transportation, and the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Export-Import Bank reviewed the issue and offered their views and recommendations. All these Executive agencies saw serious drawbacks in going forward with the project under any financing formula. Nevertheless, Kissinger believed that “it would be desirable on foreign policy grounds for the United States to assist in the completion of the Pan American Highway.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, October 2; ibid., Volume II Sept-Oct 1969) On November 24 President Nixon wrote President Lleras informing him that he was seeking legislative authority for the U.S. Government to assist in financing the Darien Gap Highway. In his December 1 response, President Lleras reconfirmed Colombia’s readiness to assume one-third of the cost of the Colombia portion and to work with Colombia’s neighbors to assure the greatest possible freedom of transit and cooperation on health and customs matters and to provide for adequate maintenance of the highway. (Both letters ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320) In a status report as of July 15, 1972, to President Nixon, John N. Irwin, Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries’ Committee, noted that the U.S. Congress authorized $100 million in grants for the highway in 1970, and appropriated $5 million in FY 1971 and $15 million in FY 1972. (Undated memorandum; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 100E) On May 6, 1971, Secretary of Transportation John Volpe, Panamanian Minister of Public Works Fabrega, and Colombian Minister of Public Works Duran signed an agreement that would enable the governments “to begin construction of the last major section—the Darien Gap—needed to link together existing sections of the Pan American Highway System.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , pages 622-623) Henry Kissinger followed with National Security Decision Memorandum 109, dated May 25, 1971, to Secretaries Rogers, Laird, and Volpe, indicating that the President had directed that priority attention be given to accelerating construction of the Darien Gap Highway, that the State Department undertake consultations with the Governments of Colombia and Panama to obtain their approval for and cooperation in the accelerated schedule, and that the State and Transportation Departments consult with Congressional Appropriations Committees to obtain their cooperation in expediting action on pending and future appropriations requests for the project. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 109) In 1971 and 1972 the Nixon administration became increasingly concerned about the possible spread of hoof-and-mouth disease from Colombia northward into Central America with the construction of the Darien Gap Highway. When efforts at the diplomatic and technical levels to get the Colombian Government to adopt an effective control program had failed by the fall of 1972, President Nixon sent a letter to Misael Pastrana Borrero, President of Colombia, on November 7, 1972, indicating that he was instructing Ambassador Saccio “to discuss with you the seriousness with which I view this danger and the measures my Government considers essential to its prevention,” and offering to assist with the difficulties and costs in carrying out some of the required measures. (Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries’ Committee, to President Nixon, October 23, 1972; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 100G, and letter from President Nixon to President Pastrana; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, USC Miscellaneous Memoranda) Additional documentation is in the Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7. 118. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to Secretary of State Rogers 118. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, June 18, 1969. SUBJECT Additionality Two actions are being taken to implement the President’s decision of June 13, 1969 that additionality requirements should be eliminated from our economic assistance programs. 2 1. The Assistant Secretary and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, Mr. Meyer, is making the following statement in his address to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 3 “I should like to announce that we have already decided upon action in one area that happens to be subject to immediate action by the Executive Branch. The President has authorized me to say that, effective immediately, the present practice of applying so-called “additionality” requirements to U.S. economic assistance programs will be discontinued. This action represents the earnest desire of the President and his Administration to improve the effectiveness of our assistance in doing what it is supposed to do: promote development.” 2. I have drafted the following Policy Determination to send to all A.I.D. overseas missions announcing the President’s decision and defining the specific changes in A.I.D. procedures to put it into effect: Policy Determination: Elimination of “Additionality” Requirements The President has directed that “additionality” requirements be eliminated from our economic assistance programs. “Additionality” measures are conditions attached to some types of A.I.D. assistance which narrowly restrict commodities eligible for A.I.D.-financing and require imposition of discriminatory or regressive exchange, import or credit arrangements for the purpose of ensuring that A.I.D.-financed exports are without exception additional to U.S. commercial sales. A.I.D. will henceforth: 1. Make eligible for procurement a broad range of U.S. goods important to the development of the aid-receiving country, in accordance with existing A.I.D. procurement regulations governing commodity eligibility, which will continue in force. 2. Refrain from seeking discriminatory tariff, credit, exchange and import controls, government-controlled procurement, or other special arrangements for the purpose of attaining additionality of exports beyond the requirements and effects of A.I.D.’s regular tying and procurement procedures. 3. Consider adjustment of existing obligations whose additionality requirements are creating serious difficulties. John A. Hannah 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 10. Confidential. Copies were sent to Kissinger and Kennedy. 2 See Document 116 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 116 . 119. Editorial Note 119. Editorial Note In the President’s May 28, 1969, message to Congress transmitting his foreign assistance legislation, he announced his intention to establish a Task Force to review the entire foreign assistance program. The Task Force was to be made up of experts from outside government. Internally, a parallel review process had been set in motion by NSSM 45 ( Document 111 ) to examine the objectives of U.S. economic assistance in relationship to overall U.S. foreign policy. Regarding the President’s May 28 message, see footnote 7, Document 8 . On June 18 AID Administrator Hannah, through Secretary of State Rogers, sent President Nixon a memorandum suggesting Terms of Reference for the Task Force and possible lists of candidates for its chairman and members. Hannah and Rogers recommended Pennsylvania Governor Scranton for chairman, with J. Irwin Miller, President of Cummins Engineering, as their alternate choice. William Blackie (Caterpillar) or Walter B. Wriston (First National City Bank) were other possibilities. Rudolph Peterson, President of Bank of America, was one of six persons from the banking sector on their list of candidates for members of the Task Force. They noted that Peterson had been a member of the Perkins Commission, which had reported to President Johnson on foreign assistance in the final months of his administration. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45) Regarding the Perkins Commission Report, see Document 1 . On June 23 Hannah and Henry Kissinger met with the President to discuss the Task Force, and the President asked for their recommendations on a chairman and other members. As a result Hannah prepared a memorandum to the President on June 26 with, in order of preference, his and Kissinger’s recommendations for chairman: Ernest C. Arbuckle, Chairman of Wells Fargo Bank (also on the list of six banking candidates in Hannah’s June 19 memorandum); Rudolph Peterson; Arjay Miller, former President of Ford Motor Company and Dean-designate of the Stanford University Graduate School of Business; and J. Irwin Miller of Cummins Engineering. Hannah (and Kissinger) also included two lists of preferred and alternate prospective members and noted that Secretary Rogers concurred in their recommendations. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Task Forces on AID) On July 14 C. Fred Bergsten sent a memorandum to Kissinger to which he attached a memorandum for the President regarding the chairman and members of the Task Force. Bergsten noted that the memorandum reflected a consensus on Gabriel Hauge for chairman worked out with Arthur Burns, Peter Flanigan, the State Department, and AID. Hauge, President of Manufacturers Hanover Trust, had been suggested by Burns. The July 14 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger is attached to a July 21 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger forwarding for his signature a memorandum to the President regarding the Task Force, “incorporating the changes you instructed this morning. It recommends Hauge for the Chairmanship and Arbuckle as the second choice.” (Ibid.) According to memoranda Bergsten prepared for Kissinger and the President reporting that Rudolph Peterson had accepted the post of Chairman of the Task Force on International Development, Under Secretary Richardson was responsible for recruiting Peterson. (Ibid.) On July 31 Peterson called Richardson from Panama with several questions about the Task Force. Richardson assured him that his membership on the Perkins Commission would not be an obstacle and that the chairman would have a substantial voice in selecting the other members of the Task Force and its staff. Richardson noted that the December 1 due date for the Task Force’s report was driven by the preparation of the FY 1971 budget submission and could be flexible; a firmer deadline was the Javits Amendment report due at the end of March. With these assurances, Peterson accepted the chairmanship. A transcript of their conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, LEG 6 Presidential Task Force FY69. Richardson wrote Peterson later on July 31, expressing his and Hannah’s delight with Peterson’s decision, which he was sure the President would share, and providing him with materials, including the interagency Working Group paper prepared for the March 26 NSC meeting on foreign assistance (see footnote 2, Document 4 ). (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Task Forces on Aid) In an August 5 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten reminded Kissinger that the internal aid study needed to be staffed. He reminded him that in the 3 months since NSSM 45 had been issued, Richardson had not convened a meeting despite Bergsten’s reminders. In a July 16 memorandum Bergsten had suggested that the “entrenched bureaucracy” was unlikely to produce the kind of study the administration wanted, and AID would be mainly concerned with defending its existence. Bergsten recommended that the Ambassador to Chile, Edward M. Korry, be given the job with the freedom to select officials to work with him to provide him with the flexibility to recommend whatever he wished. Bergsten recommended that Kissinger respond enthusiastically to any State Department proposal to have Korry head up the internal aid study. The objective was to launch the Task Force as soon as possible and to have it readied for announcement when the President met with Peterson in San Clemente. Bergsten indicated his willingness to meet with Peterson, perhaps as early as the next week when he expected to be in San Clemente for a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy. (Ibid.) No record of a private meeting between Bergsten and Peterson in San Clemente has been found, but see Document 120 . See also footnote 4, Document 111 . On September 12 Bergsten sent a memorandum to Kissinger informing him that Richardson had “sequestered” Korry for the internal aid study mandated by NSSM 45. Bergsten added that “Korry is a rather unusual ambassador. For example, he explicitly says that neither Chile nor South America as a whole is important to U.S. national security. He is agnostic about the whole State Department line on virtually every conceivable subject, which is one reason why he should be ideal for the aid study.” On Bergsten’s memorandum, Kissinger noted that he agreed with Bergsten’s recommendation to meet with Korry on the aid-foreign policy link. On September 2 the White House Press Secretary announced that Peterson would be Chairman of the Task Force, and on September 24 the Press Office released the full membership. Peterson wanted Anthony Solomon to be the Executive Director, but Solomon declined. On October 2 Bergsten informed Kissinger that Edward Fried, a career Foreign Service officer, had accepted Peterson’s invitation to be Executive Director. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Task Forces on AID) In an October 6 memorandum to Peterson, Kissinger noted the high priority the President attached to the Task Force and his direction that agencies cooperate with it and provide requested assistance. (Ibid.) Kissinger agreed to meet with the Task Force during its meeting on October 16; see Document 121 . 120. Memorandum of Conversation 120. Memorandum of Conversation 1 San Clemente, September 2, 1969, 11:45 a.m. SUBJECT President’s Task Force on Foreign Aid PARTICIPANTS The President Rudolph Peterson, Chairman of the President’s Task Force on International Development Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs C. Fred Bergsten, Senior Staff, NSC The President began the meeting by speaking bluntly about the objectives of the Task Force. It would not be like the earlier Task Forces on aid chaired by General Clay and others. 2 This group must come up with a truly new approach to foreign aid or the U.S. aid program will die. AID’s presentation to the National Security Council was the worst it had had this year. (This is not due to Dr. Hannah, who was new at the time and had not yet been able to effect any changes.) The State Department wants to give aid to every country in the world and the result is lots of “Mickey Mouse programs.” The President does not believe in this approach. Foreign aid is not an abject failure, the President continued. There are numerous success stories. In all of them, however, there were additional key factors beyond aid, such as U.S. military expenditures or impressive natural resources. Mr. Peterson can expect to hear from the State Department that government-to-government aid is best because State likes to use aid to stroke its clients. They believe in aid to socialist countries and enterprises and are not worried by such events as India’s nationalization of the banking system. The President asserted that we need to get away from government-to-government aid and from aiding countries who are headed toward adoption of totalitarian socialist systems. This is not because of ideology. It is because aid simply will not be effective in such environments. The success stories to date have occurred mainly in environments where the private sector played a major role. He had told Mrs. Gandhi, for example, that public aid was not expandable—only private investment was. Latin America is a disaster, the President continued. State and AID like to provide aid to consumer/social enterprises for purposes such as health and housing. This is wrong. We must help countries help themselves through supporting industries which have multiplier effects throughout the economy. We must help them increase their GNPs so they can build the needed infrastructure themselves. The way to help poor people is to help increase the size of the pie from which they can get a slice. 3 The President stated that there has been no really new thought in the foreign aid field in twenty years. There are always references to “trade and aid” and increasing private investment but we have added nothing really new. Everybody is caught in the Marshall Plan syndrome, which unfortunately could not work outside Europe and Japan. The President did not pretend to have the answer himself. He did feel, however, that our program was far too fragmented. We do not need to aid every country. For example, some of the former metropoles should bear the responsibility for their ex-colonies. The U.S. should only aid countries where there is a major U.S. interest. We should not attempt to dictate the type of political system maintained in foreign countries, although many of the Task Force members will probably espouse socialist approaches and repeat many of the old tired ideas. The President concluded that Congress will not provide money to do what is needed in the aid field unless we have a new name and a new approach to the program. He stressed the importance of getting an exceptionally able staff for the Task Force and that the group must not be on the defensive about the aid effort. Dr. Kissinger, at the President’s request, added that the whole U.S. approach to aid has been exceedingly defensive because of the lack of a new concept. The bias has been that foreign aid is good and the only job is to sell it. Another problem is that aid has fallen into the hands of economists, which was all right in Europe where the need was essentially technical and the requisite private energy and political structures existed, but which will not work where political structures do not exist as is the case in many LDCs. There is no necessary progression from economic growth to political stability, Dr. Kissinger continued. In fact, there must be a political structure or else economic growth will not occur. We therefore need an explicit consideration of the link between political and economic frameworks in particular countries. Dr. Kissinger added that Mr. Peterson will hear that leftist totalitarian approaches are completely acceptable but that the U.S. should oppose rightist approaches. This is particularly strange because we do not know what democracy means in a less developed country. This is another conceptual problem which must be tackled. He was afraid that his academic colleagues were not very fertile in answering it. The President suggested that our effort should appear publicly as aid without strings but that in practice it, of course, could not be. On the issue of bilateral versus multilateral aid, he noted that many foreigners prefer bilateral assistance from the U.S. Indonesia, for example, was uneasy about multilateral aid because they felt it let the Japanese get additional leverage through the use of U.S. money—they feel it is not truly multilateral. The President also noted that Indonesia was very high on his list—the State Department disagreed, but the President thought Indonesia was one country which could make it. The President stressed that Japan and Western Europe must increase their aid efforts, however. The President continued that the U.S. should use its aid for humanitarian purposes in particular circumstances. Furthermore, we should not simply help those who meet our ideas of proper political organization. The key is to help those who follow economic approaches, particularly reliance on the private sector, which we consider feasible in leading to real development. He would not be worried about the politics of the leaders of particular countries but rather about the climate for investment and other major economic approaches. The President further stressed that population control is a must. He urged Mr. Peterson to read his message to the Congress on population 4 and to work closely with the White House staff involved in this effort. Population control must go hand in hand with aid. The U.S. has finally bitten the bullet on this issue and made it a top priority national policy. Trade is another key area, and he urged Mr. Peterson to speak with Ambassador Gilbert, Secretary Stans and others involved in U.S. trade policy. We will probably want to try some new initiatives in this area. Linkage among trade, aid and population control may be the necessary new approach. On military aid, the President warned that many of the panelists will probably oppose it completely. He agrees that we should not supply exotic weapons to countries which do not need them. However, State/AID is wrong to not want to help Indonesia militarily; they must have sufficient military assistance to maintain internal security. More broadly, the military may be the most stable force in most countries. He would therefore hope that Mr. Peterson would have no preconceptions that the military or rightist leaders are villains. Mr. Peterson agreed that there is a new breed of military men around the world, especially in Latin America. The President summarized that we should follow an aid approach that will work. Otherwise we should forget it. A banker’s approach, especially that of the Bank of America with its record of innovative financing, is good for this problem. In response to Mr. Peterson’s question about the thrust of overall U.S. foreign policy, the President said that Congress will not buy any aid program not directly related to U.S. foreign policy objectives, except perhaps for a few clear humanitarian cases. He felt that our long term foreign policy interests will be well served by broad, generous foreign assistance programs. Because of the growing gulf between our wealth and that of most countries, and the shrinking of the world through modern communications, people in the LDCs will not stand for continuation of the status quo. It will develop like our own urban problems. For the next five years, however, our efforts will be limited by budgetary restrictions. We must thus bore in where it really counts with what we have. In the longer term, we must think of broader approaches. The President stated his strong conviction that aid won’t work unless and until recipient countries develop political stability. He agrees with Dr. Kissinger that aid does not necessarily lead to political stability. He would use our limited resources in areas where some stability already exists. We need some success stories. In the Pakistan/India situation, for example, Pakistan comes out way ahead in terms of likely progress, partly because India is headed down the road toward becoming a socialist state. Latin America is an exceptionally difficult case and we will send Mr. Peterson a copy of the Rockefeller report when it is received. Dr. Kissinger added that individual success stories in given regions could spread out through the region by galvanizing others into action. We need to move toward greater self-reliance on the part of other countries. This is the thrust of our overall foreign policy—to get others to shoulder a greater share of the burden. Dr. Kissinger continued that we must get away from abstract notions. Our policy must relate to concrete objectives of mutual interest between the U.S. and other countries. Earlier U.S. aid efforts were relatively easy technical problems. We now have the problem of developing a world order in which the U.S. does not have to carry the entire burden. This means relating individual countries to others in their regions and then relating them to the U.S. We are in for some troubled years ahead, especially in Latin America. The President reiterated that his foreign policy approach is based on pragmatism. The test of a particular policy is how well it will work. We must get away from ideological battles. In response to a question from Mr. Peterson, he affirmed that he was not terribly concerned with electoral systems in other countries. Dr. Kissinger added that we must look at their foreign policy as it affects us. Concerning the plethora of small U.S. programs in Africa, the President said he was not impressed by the argument that the Communists will pour in aid if we don’t. We need not react every time to such a threat. The question is whether U.S. interests in the particular countries are vital. We must not let other countries shake us down, even though some of our friends are among those who do so. The President reiterated that we should not pour money down ratholes. We should test a specific program by asking whether it will work. The Task Force should look into all the international lending organizations and the trade area, where we must consider preferential arrangements. In general, the Task Force should take a broad view of its mandate. Mr. Peterson asked who would be his main point of contact with the Administration. The President replied that Dr. Kissinger, or anyone he might designate, would be that point. The Task Force should of course get input from Dr. Hannah, who is very able and will be developing some new ideas as he gets new people. The President also noted that we probably have too many Americans abroad, a point on which he probably differs with Dr. Hannah. Point IV was great in its time, but the U.S. generally has the wrong people overseas. We should not assume that the best possible world is one in which many Americans are helping out overseas. In fact, the Task Force must assume that our present aid program is not full of good administrators. Many of our people are dedicated but many are incompetent, partly because AID is short of money and is a resting place for persons nearing retirement. American businessmen abroad are not so good either, because the best businessmen do not view foreign assignments as the road to success. However, the President suggested that Mr. Peterson seek the views of a thousand U.S. businessmen overseas on our aid program, perhaps through getting the top 25-30 companies to canvass their people and pass their ideas on to us. The President concluded that Mr. Peterson faced an extremely difficult job. The effort had been tried before and failed. In addition, many people disagreed with the views that the President had been spelling out. What he did know, however, was that the effort of the past will not sell even if it is right. And Dr. Kissinger added that with the loss of purpose in aid the annual appropriation process had become an end in itself. The President instructed Mr. Peterson to take both a short-term and a long-term look at the problem. What kind of a world do we want in the future? How much can and will others do? He did not have an answer to these questions. He did know that it was ridiculous to simply compare the percentages of different countries’ GNPs which are spent on aid, in view of the burden assumed by the U.S. in the military area. Dr. Kissinger added that it was also irrelevant to compare percentages when the magnitudes differed so sharply. The President also instructed Mr. Peterson to look at the personnel and organization of our aid effort. Mr. Peterson concluded that his effort must be to decide upon a new approach and also recommend how to implement it. The President concurred and stressed that the whole program must be reorganized. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, June to December 1969. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Western White House. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 12:45 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 2 Presumably a reference to the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World chaired by General Lucius D. Clay, established by President Kennedy in December 1962. See Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. IX, Document 161 . Regarding the Perkins Commission Report in the closing months of the Johnson administration, see Document 1 . 3 See also Document 117 . 4 The President’s July 18 message to Congress on population growth is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pp. 521-530. 121. Memorandum of Conversation 121. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 16, 1969. PARTICIPANTS Members and Staff of the Peterson Task Force on Aid Dr. Henry A. Kissinger C. Fred Bergsten SUBJECT U.S. Foreign Policy and Aid Dr. Kissinger spoke informally with the Task Force on overall U.S. foreign policy and its possible relationship to the future of our aid program. He first described the procedures followed by the new Administration on foreign policy. He asked where we wanted to be in four or five years and then worked back to present policy. Dr. Kissinger noted that one of the toughest aspects of this approach is to get Government agencies to submit valid choices to the President rather than only their own preferences. This process was based on a willingness to look at fundamentals. The President’s forthcoming speech on Latin America, for example, would reflect such a willingness. By contrast, Vietnam was not now a major conceptual issue—the problem was whether we should just get out unilaterally or seek a reasonable settlement. All else was demagoguery and there was nothing in present policy to warrant the type of demonstrations seen yesterday. Vietnam takes much less time, for example, than our preparations for strategic arms limitation talks—even though they are not presently taking place. In that case, we have developed building blocks upon which to base a response to any conceivable position taken by the USSR. The same approach has been adopted regarding Latin America: philosophy first with specifics following. Turning more specifically to foreign aid, Dr. Kissinger commented that we were near the end of the Marshall Plan period in which the rest of the world could be shaped by U.S. programs. During this period, our contribution to progress had been our energy and our detailed proposals. President Nixon had already begun to express a new direction for aid in his round-the-world trip, particularly in Asia. 2 His thrust was that others should begin to assume an increasing share in shaping their own progress, especially in terms of its intellectual foundations. The United States would certainly contribute where it could help. We would encourage regional groupings. We would seek to reduce the military component of the U.S. role, especially with regard to internal subversion and even with respect to external aggression. Even in the 1950s, we had the erroneous view that U.S. commitments could be expressed legally. In fact, our policy is determined by U.S. interests based on our perceptions of what is required for international stability. No precise legal framework can catch this. The key to the new approach is the degree of cooperative relationship that can be developed between the U.S. and the LDCs. Both have a stake in world order and organization. It is not necessary or even best to express this relationship legally. Dr. Kissinger recalled that the President had spoken to Mr. Peterson at great length in San Clemente, far beyond the time budgeted for the meeting. 3 He had noted that groups such as this one often begin on the assumption that foreign aid is good and then seek to justify the present program. This Administration also assumes that foreign assistance is desirable but recognizes that the case for aid made in the 50s and 60s is no longer relevant. Simple comparison of the share of aid in national GNPs is irrelevant, for example, if a majority cannot be persuaded that any aid program is in the national interest. We thus need a rationale in which we ourselves can believe and thus be able to sell to the Congress. The President feels that the present approach leads only to a rearguard action whose goal is to minimize budget cuts and whose only issue is the tactics used to that end. Our aid rationale must relate to the U.S. national interest, for example, in a peaceful and developing world. The President has a major interest in this program as he told Mr. Peterson and he plans to meet with the Task Force at an early occasion. His primary objective is to achieve a rationale for aid related to broad U.S. foreign policy goals and to political stability if, in fact, we can define that illusory term. Dr. Kissinger assured the group that the President was a great reader and would address their report with great interest. Mr. Peterson asked Dr. Kissinger to comment on whether the President was interested in regionalism among developing countries. Dr. Kissinger replied that this relates to the issue of concentrating our aid effort. He noted that our preference is in favor of concentrating and against dribbling out small amounts to many countries without making significant differences in them. We felt that we could let other industrialized countries take care of particular LDCs where they have strong historical interests. Mr. Fried asked about the multilateral-bilateral issue and whether increased multilateral aid was politically feasible and/or useful. Dr. Kissinger replied that there had been no occasion yet requiring a general decision on this issue. Where specific issues have come up, the President had opted for the multilateral approach in contrast to the entrenched bias in favor of bilateralism. He thought the bias would in general be toward increased multilateralism. Mr. Countryman asked whether this bias would lead to a reduction in U.S. aid to Latin America. Dr. Kissinger replied that multilateralism was a way to express our interest in Latin America. We would certainly not intend for Latin America to suffer from such a shift. On the contrary, a definite effort was underway to give effect to a special relationship with Latin America. The U.S. interest in the area was definitely ascending. Mr. Haas asked about the relationship between trade and aid. He observed that protectionism was increasing and that the Administration seemed receptive to such pressure in cases such as textiles and steel. Dr. Kissinger replied that the textile industry had a special history with respect to this Administration. The President had made a firm campaign commitment which put it into a special category. 4 No one should generalize from this case. We wanted to avoid taking on trade issues one at a time and preferred to wrap trade up more generally. He expected modest progress on trade liberalization, saw a good possibility to continue that trend, and noted that we will send up a trade message soon. Professor Mason noted that the White House had dragged its feet in getting this Task Force underway. There was thus no chance to get out a rounded report to meet its deadline. Would the President be satisfied if the Committee limited itself to specific issues and the analysis of the possibilities for each? Dr. Kissinger replied that the President prefers sharp statements of conflicting views rather than a waffled consensus. He suggested that the group cover the most important issue first. We could then see if the life of the group should be extended. A good statement on the key issues was the most urgent need. Ex-Congressman Curtis raised the issue of lack of coordination of aid-related programs, both in the Administration and in Congress. Dr. Kissinger fully agreed with the need to pull aid-related programs together. He thought it was important for the Task Force to call attention to this issue. It would be desirable for the group to evaluate each program although it might not have time to do so in view of its deadline. He also noted that the NSC staff was, for the first time anywhere in the Government, putting together program budgets for key countries to try to effect just such coordination of programs. Professor Huntington asked whether the group should focus on economic development, which would imply consideration of more than just AID-type programs, or whether it should focus on the U.S. foreign assistance program, which would include military assistance in addition to economic assistance. Dr. Kissinger leaned toward the latter. As he saw it, the question was one of balance between our various types of assistance activities. What was the purpose of our various development programs: stability, pliability, pure development? Mr. Fried asked to what extent the President looked toward this report for next year as opposed to the decade ahead. Dr. Kissinger replied that ideally it should be ready for next year’s program although the old approach could stagger through one more time. If a choice must be made, the report should be geared to the next five years. It should provide a charter for the middle run future. Mr. Peterson asked Dr. Kissinger whether we should extend aid to countries which have political stability or whether our aid should seek to create political stability. Dr. Kissinger replied that the President would like to have an answer to that question. Perhaps we should help where it exists and try to create it if, in fact, we can define stability. Dr. Kissinger concluded that the group might wish to agree on two or three different basic approaches which would then affect specific decisions in different ways. We do not need a presentation of complete opposites and there is no need to include an option of a complete abolition of our aid effort. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1026, June to December 1969. Confidential. 2 President Nixon traveled to Asia July 25-August 1 before continuing on to Europe. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pp. 543-603, for his remarks, particularly his meeting with the press on Guam on July 25, pp. 544-556. 3 See Document 120 . 4 See Document 184 . 122. Editorial Note 122. Editorial Note During the first months of his administration, President Nixon devoted considerable attention to Latin American issues, including development assistance. As early as January 22, 1969, Henry Kissinger sent President Nixon a memorandum reporting that on January 21, at the President’s request, he had phoned Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, to ask him to visit Latin America as the President’s special representative. Rockefeller reportedly was interested. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Latin America, Box 797, LA General, Volume I 1-7/69) President Nixon spoke on the telephone with Governor Rockefeller at 5:40 p.m. on January 22, and Governor Rockefeller called on the President from 3 to 3:40 p.m. on February 12. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) On February 17 the President announced the Rockefeller Mission to Latin America, a series of trips to develop joint programs to accelerate the pace of economic and social development in the hemisphere. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pages 106-107. On February 3 Kissinger sent National Security Study Memorandum 15, requesting a review of U.S. policy toward Latin America, to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury; the AID Administrator; and the Director of Central Intelligence. NSSM 15 requested five papers, including an assessment of regional security requirements and “the purpose and nature of military assistance programs in the light thereof; Development assistance strategy, the Alliance for Progress and the U.S. role in it; [and] Trade and Investment Policy [and] regional economic integration.” The NSC Interdepartmental Group for Latin America was to prepare those papers by March 31, to be followed by an overall statement of U.S. policy toward Latin America by May 15. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 15) The National Security Council met on July 9. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to an undated briefing memorandum for the President, Kissinger noted that the meeting would be an opportunity for “NSC members to brief themselves on the current situation and problems in Latin America and to discuss some of the major conceptual choices that face us. This will be useful preparation and backdrop for later consideration of Governor Rockefeller’s report.” He added that since the meeting would not make decisions on the issues, he had not included decision recommendations. (National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 84, 7/9/69 NSC Meeting on Latin America) No record of the July 9 meeting has been found. Although the report of the Rockefeller Mission would not be formally released until November 10, copies of the report were circulated internally under cover of a September 17 memorandum from Kissinger to the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (with copies to many other agency heads), indicating that it, NSSM 15, and other related materials would be the documentation for an NSC review of U.S. policy toward Latin America, tentatively scheduled for a Review Group meeting and a National Security Council meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc.) The agenda for the NSC meeting on October 15 began: “The NSC Meeting on Latin America is intended to consider major lines of policy toward the region. To provide some manageable structure to this wide-ranging topic, it is proposed to concentrate on a few specific issues, drawn from the Rockefeller Report and the position being developed for the IA-ECOSOC meetings.” Item I dealt with Trade and the specific issue of tariff preferences. Item II dealt with Development Assistance and had three components: A. Sharing responsibility with others in the Hemisphere for planning, allocating and administering US-provided assistance; B. Untying of Aid; and C. Debt Rescheduling. Items III and IV dealt with political/diplomatic and security/military issues, respectively. (National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 119, NSC Meetings, 10/15/69 NSC Meeting on Latin America) According to the transcript of the October 15 NSC meeting, the President wanted to offer something of substance to the Latin American nations in an upcoming speech scheduled for October 31. (Ibid.) Regarding the discussion at this NSC meeting on recommendations of the Rockefeller Report on military assistance and debt service, see Document 12 . Following the NSC meeting, Kissinger sent Secretary of State Rogers an October 22 memorandum requesting the views of the State Department and other agencies on 13 of the Rockefeller Report recommendations. Three were requested by October 29 for the President’s October 31 speech, and the remainder by November 15. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 15) Secretary Rogers responded in memoranda of October 31 and November 22. (Both ibid.) At Camp David on September 27 President Nixon had met with Governor Rockefeller, Kissinger, Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer, and NSC Staff Member Peter Vaky. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of their discussions has been found, but according to an October 21 memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger, which refers to the President’s remarks at Camp David, President Nixon wanted, among other things, to create a new Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, which would upgrade the Assistant Secretary position and oversee Canadian affairs as well. (Ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 280, State, Volume IV) On October 27 the President signed a memorandum to Secretary Rogers mandating the new Under Secretary position, and on the same day Kissinger sent a memorandum to Secretary Rogers, Robert Mayo, and John Hannah requesting a Bureau of the Budget memorandum by October 29 on the advantages and disadvantages of a new organization, separate from AID, to administer U.S. Development Assistance in the Western Hemisphere. (Ibid.) In his address to the Inter-American Press Association in Washington on October 31, the President announced changes in his administration’s approach to economic development in the hemisphere. He also indicated his intention to seek legislation to create the new Under Secretary position and mentioned the possibility of a new agency to administer development assistance in Latin America. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pages 893-901. 123. Editorial Note 123. Editorial Note NSSM 45 ( Document 111 ) directed a study of the objectives of the U.S. economic assistance program and its relationship to overall U.S. foreign policy. On September 19, 1969, Under Secretary of State Richardson had informed members of the Under Secretaries Committee that Edward Korry, Ambassador to Chile, would assist him with the study. Oliver Troxel, Ambassador to Zambia, also joined the study. On December 8, 1969, Korry met with Henry Kissinger, and Fred Bergsten followed up on December 9 with a memorandum to Kissinger providing him with a second draft of the summary to Korry’s report ( Document 124 ). Bergsten told Kissinger that Richardson had been so impressed with the work to date that he had circulated copies within the State Department and elsewhere in the government to begin moving toward a government-wide position on foreign assistance rationale. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, President’s Foreign Aid Program) On January 15, 1970, Treasury Assistant Secretary Petty sent a letter to Arthur Hartman, Deputy Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff at the State Department, providing Treasury’s comments on a December 17 draft of the Korry Report. Treasury saw many positive elements in the draft. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, AID) Following completion of the December draft, Ambassador Korry returned to Santiago, but he and Ambassador Troxel returned to Washington in mid-January and, following a meeting with Rogers, continued drafting their report under Nathaniel Samuels’ direction. No final Korry Report in response to NSSM 45 has been found. On January 29 Bergsten sent a memorandum to Kissinger informing him of a major feud within the State Department on reform of foreign aid that included a strong disagreement between Rogers and Richardson. Bergsten said the “donnybrook” arose when Rogers learned that Korry proposed that development lending be administered by a government corporation outside the Department of State. Reportedly, Rogers had already held two 2-hour meetings to work out a State position and another was scheduled that afternoon. Rogers reportedly had committed to two principles: “aid is wholly an arm of U.S. foreign policy, and that foreign policy must therefore be an operational responsibility of the State Department.” Bergsten reported that Rogers had “thrown out” Korry’s organizational approach and reminded Kissinger that Korry’s paper was prepared at Richardson’s request and that Richardson had approved its contents and authorized its transmittal to the Peterson Task Force, “which specifically displeased the Secretary.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 338, HAK/ELR Meetings 1/70-3/70) On March 8, the same day the Peterson Task Force Report was released in Key Biscayne (see Documents 128 and 129 ), a front-page story in The New York Times , with the headline “Report to Rogers Terms Aid Policy Self-Defeating,” dealt with the Korry Report, printing extensive excerpts. The Times reported that the report had so angered Secretary Rogers that he had ordered its major conclusions to be ignored. On March 9 Ambassador Korry sent an Eyes Only telegram to Secretary Rogers expressing his distress over the Times article, which he had learned of from telegraphic press inquiries. Korry was distressed “that disclosure of a comparatively insignificant and incomplete document” might embarrass Rogers and the Department and was angered that “a maliciously timed and phrased article” would give an inaccurate and unfair account of his assignment and its status. Korry said he had discussed his project with no one outside government and with only very few outside the State Department. Korry closed by repeating his distress that “a first draft” had been used to embarrass State and sabotage the Peterson group. (Telegram 885 from Santiago; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1) 124. Draft Summary of Korry Report on Foreign Assistance 124. Draft Summary of Korry Report on Foreign Assistance 1 Washington, undated. SUMMARY 1. We have worked out a redefinition of the national interest in foreign aid, have developed some broad operational criteria for foreign economic policy toward the less developed world, and recommend organizational changes to match. 2. We arrived at our recommendations after examining and rejecting five lingering myths about development: —That the U.S. has essentially the same development objectives in all LDCs. —That if the U.S. provides the right kind of resources, we can develop almost any country in a reasonable time. —That development assistance provided directly by the U.S. should secure political support for the U.S. on current issues. —That economic development is almost exclusively the concern of aid agencies and international financial institutions. —That the key relationship in development is between the donor and recipient nation. 3. We found, nevertheless, that there are good reasons for the U.S. and other developed nations to transfer some of their resources to less developed countries (LDCs). We distinguish three broad purposes for doing so, and suggest appropriate techniques and tools for each. —First, we argue that there is a particular national interest in promoting economic development in certain circumstances, where it can produce a thrust toward self-sustaining growth. In sufficient quantity, and applied judiciously, resources can help to strengthen—even create—economic and eventually political structures compatible with our own society and with the kind of world order the U.S. is trying to establish. —Second, we recognize the need to devote some resources as well to countries not yet ready for a major development effort, and we suggest ways to assist them to work their way toward creating the conditions for growth and a decent life—perhaps for a major development effort at a later date. —Third, we also see the need for aid to achieve specific political ends, but we are persuaded that U.S. resources can be employed most effectively if there is a clear division between political purposes and development activities, and the resources devoted to each. 4. We discuss the first purpose at greatest length, since there are some novel elements in the argumentation. It takes its premise from our conviction that the economic structure most compatible with the world we seek, and historically most conducive to human freedom, is one that relies on incentives rather than coercion, on some form of market system rather than on prices determined by political authority, and on decentralized decision-making rather than centralized control. In the course of this study, an interesting phenomenon came to light. A statistical analysis was made of the relationship between foreign exchange position and private investment in ten major LDCs for which data were available. There was a significant correlation between improvements in reserves and increases in fixed private investment. This tends to confirm the judgment of experience as to the important role of resources in maintaining, or developing, economic pluralism. 5. We propose a set of standards, both political and economic, to be met before we decide to participate in a major economic development program in an LDC. While these standards would restrict the number of countries in which we make a major effort, it would also, we feel, substantially improve efficiency in the use of funds. Moreover, it would permit us to rely much more heavily on the LDC for both planning and performance. We are impressed with the arguments used by the Pearson Commission 2 and others as to the desirability of using international institutions to set up economic criteria for aid and to check on performance, and we propose some steps in that direction. 6. We found that the development process in the LDCs encompasses political, social, and cultural changes that are inseparable from economic performance. We conclude that a major development effort should be undertaken only after a clear-minded assessment is made of the actual and potential resources available to and in the country, and of the capacity and determination of its political leadership. 7. We found, too, that the scope and pace of development is to a very large extent dependent upon relationships among industrialized countries. These determine trade opportunities, money rates, liquidity, investment flows, the terms of debt rescheduling, and other economic factors that, cumulatively, at least equal in impact the inputs of aid. We are persuaded that the complexity of internal and external factors affecting LDCs calls for a continuing effort to bring greater coherence to these relationships and to the international institutions that embody them. 8. The task is thus not only to set up an improved framework for economic assistance but to create a new pattern of foreign economic relations that is consistent with our foreign policy objectives. These objectives, in the last analysis, are world-wide, as befits the U.S. as the one truly universal power. Our economic objectives must similarly be world-wide, having as their ultimate goal a world of shared interests and responsibilities, in which no nation or group of nations is the exclusive preoccupation of any other. A world without client states, for example, is a world without trade preferences. We recognize that many industrialized countries, including our own, will continue for many years to have special interests and concerns deriving from history and geography. But we also use the Latin American example to show the possibilities for new economic links that are more consistent with our national interest in the world of the future. 9. This task calls for a number of organizational innovations, both U.S. and international. We do not find within the U.S. Government at present the means to think through the myriad of interrelated problems in our foreign economic relations, to work out the guidance required, and to coordinate action. Yet we face a new polycentricity in the world, an increasing diversity in our interests, and the growth of many novel economic instruments—SDRs, the Eurodollar, the multinational corporation, and specialized arrangements on commodities and satellite communications, to name only a few. By their very nature, they force new functional responsibilities on many departments and many independent agencies. 10. We recommend, therefore, a reorganization of the U.S. Government along the following lines: —An Office (or a Council or a Coordinator) for Foreign Economic Relations, with broad powers over all those policy areas that relate to the less developed world. Its placement and, to some extent, its role might be analogous to that of the Council of Economic Advisors. The Office would have no operational responsibilities but would be charged with developing and coordinating the policies and reviewing the activities of the following entities: —An Overseas Development Bank or Fund, capitalized by the Congress, operating in accordance with criteria that we detail. It would be authorized to loan or grant funds to LDCs or to international institutions for development purpose. It would, for the most part, operate without field missions. We assume that Congress would retain direct appropriating authority for replenishing IDA and for subscriptions to international or regional banks. This successor to AID would serve as the U.S. agent for the transfer of financial resources for development purposes, and for dealings with the World Bank Group and other development institutions. —An autonomous Technical Assistance Foundation, perhaps also capitalized by the Congress, whose principal tasks would be to identify and enroll U.S. experts, negotiate the terms of their contracts with foreign countries, serve as liaison with other contributors of technical personnel, and provide a repository for information concerning both U.S. and foreign technical assistance. —An Office, probably located in the Department of State, whose charge would be to allocate resources, be they of a military, economic, technical assistance, or security nature, for the purpose of achieving political ends. Resources for these activities would be requested annually of the Congress. —An Overseas Private Investment Corporation along the lines already approved by the House of Representatives. —An Office of the Special Trade Representative, with substantially the same functions as the present entity. —Other agencies and offices to the extent that their decisions and activities affect development in the LDCs. Similarly, international institutions have lagged organizationally behind the demands of the modern world, except where there has been a critical requirement (as for liquidity) or a particular need to coordinate aid activities in an individual country. We are persuaded by the arguments for moving toward providing a larger proportion of our development assistance through multilateral institutions, and we propose that the U.S. urge the World Bank Group to build on its experience with consortia and consultative groups to deal with other countries, regions, and even functional problems. We urge that the U.S. press for setting up an International Advisory Council on Development under the aegis of the World Bank, and making use of the World Bank staff. We make some recommendations as to the composition and structure of the Council, and we suggest some specific areas in which it could work toward developing common standards and norms. 12. The foreign policy implications of these proposals include: a. By providing a conceptual bridge heretofore lacking between certain of our political and our economic foreign policy goals, the proposals could facilitate decision-making in foreign policy generally. b. By demonstrating more clearly that the traditional American humanitarian desire to build a better world for everyone also creates an environment of greater security for the U.S., they could provide a new dimension to our foreign policy. c. By proposing to tie aid, trade, foreign investment, and other foreign economic activities much more closely together, they could make them mutually reinforcing in our negotiations and operations abroad. d. By setting up specific foreign policy objectives for the U.S. with respect to international development institutions, the proposals could encourage these institutions to contribute more effectively to our long-range goals. e. By giving international institutions a greater role, both in the process of consultation and in checking development performance, they would provide a basis for striking a new balance in the use of multilateral institutions in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives. f. By moving our relationships with other developed nations toward a sounder basis of shared responsibility with respect to the LDCs, they could improve the prospects for sharing the burden equitably. g. By requiring that LDCs receiving major development assistance meet certain minimum standards as to political leadership and the availability of resources, and by placing much more reliance on them for performance, the proposals would make it much easier for the U.S. to avoid involving itself in their domestic political concerns—an involvement that flies in the face of contemporary trends throughout the world and is counter-productive in terms of encouraging economic self-reliance. h. In that connection, by recognizing that the long-range prospects for human freedom and a sound world order are best served by plural economic institutions, and working in that direction, they could enable the U.S. to take a more relaxed attitude toward the political systems of the LDCs. i. By maintaining a posture of reduced involvement in the domestic affairs of the LDCs, they could lead to a significant reduction in the number of Americans in our aid missions abroad—and in backstopping them at home. j. By removing our major economic development effort from the political arena, they could enable us to avoid laying ourselves open to blackmail. k. By insisting on economic criteria for a major development effort, they could reduce the political embarrassment of aroused expectations, help keep our relations on a business-like basis and speed our responses to LDC needs. l. By separating the longer-term development objectives from our shorter-term politico-military requirements in the LDCs, the costs of foreign policy tasks can be calculated more precisely and thus compete more rationally in the allocation of total USG resources. m. By employing a consistent theme—the theme of shared responsibility we are adopting in our national life—they would enable the U.S. to project a more coherent image to the world at large. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 324, President’s Foreign Aid Program. Confidential. Marked “Second Draft,” the summary is attached to a December 9 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger (see Document 123 ) which identifies it as the second draft of the summary of Ambassador Korry’s report on foreign assistance undertaken at Under Secretary Richardson’s request pursuant to NSSM 45. 2 World Bank President Robert McNamara created the Pearson Commission on International Development to stimulate public and governmental interest in foreign aid. Its chairman, Lester Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada, and its U.S. member, C. Douglas Dillon, former Secretary of the Treasury, called on Secretary Rogers on July 17, 1969. Assistant Secretary Trezise prepared a July 16 briefing memorandum for the Secretary for that meeting. The attached talking points for the Secretary viewed the Pearson Commission as a key element in the U.S. aid strategy that could set the stage for renewal and recasting of the U.S. aid effort. Secretary Rogers was to say that targets were useful only if they could be met but that a “strong push for IDA will be very helpful as we go into the start of negotiations for a further IDA replenishment.” (Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, PRM 7-2 (DAC) FY70 7/69-6/70) 125. Memorandum of Conversation 125. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 11, 1970. SUBJECT Status Report of Peterson Task Force on International Development PARTICIPANTS The President Rudolph A. Peterson, Chairman of the President’s Task Force on International Development Edward R. Fried, Executive Director of the Task Force Henry A. Kissinger C. Fred Bergsten At the President’s invitation, Mr. Peterson began the meeting by describing where the Task Force stood at the present time. They had met with a wide cross-section of the American people, including—they hoped—all groups in the country which had a serious interest in foreign aid. They had spent considerable time on the Hill to get Congressional views. Many experts had furnished helpful papers and thoughtful suggestions. The Task Force had now had several two-day sessions. They were still some distance away from their final conclusions, but sufficiently advanced that Mr. Peterson welcomed the opportunity to outline to the President the direction in which they were headed. Objectives of US Aid Program On the objectives of the US aid program, they had taken their cue from some of the President’s own statements. We sought a stable world in which we share both the benefits and the responsibilities of international cooperation. We will not live in the kind of world which we want in 10-15 years unless we are prepared to take action now. A collective world effort is needed to deal with pollution, the reduction of poverty, and increases in standards of living. These problems are not limited by national boundaries. And it is inconceivable that the United States, given its role in the world, would not share a portion of its wealth in these activities. Our aid effort today must be conceived much differently than it was even ten years ago, let alone the period of the Marshall Plan. We need a completely different approach to the effort. The US has had three different aid programs: security assistance, including military assistance and supporting assistance; humanitarian assistance, to meet emergency situations; and long-term development assistance, through loans and technical assistance. The three have been rolled together, but their objectives are quite different. Security assistance is an integral part of foreign policy, with shorter term objectives. The humanitarian programs, by their nature, meet short term needs. These both contrast with the long-term implications of development lending. Multilateralization It is apparent that there is wide support in the country—and despite some reports to the contrary, in Congress—for increasing our emphasis on multilateralization of aid. This view is generally shared by the members of the Task Force and should represent a major thrust of our policy in extending our longer-term forms of aid. (He did not refer here to security or humanitarian assistance, which must remain bilateral.) Mr. Peterson added that he saw a very important role for multilateralization of our bilateral program almost immediately. The international financial institutions had developed a high degree of competence, especially in the World Bank group. They can make critical analyses of countries better than can bilateral donors. The institutions have made clear to him their willingness to accelerate their capabilities and to play a rather broad role in the development process. US Bilateral Program On the US bilateral program, security assistance should remain organizationally about where it is now, in State and DOD. The Task Force may recommend a different focus for military assistance, however. They feel that history plays too big a role in MAP levels. Perhaps we should seek a phase-out of MAP, assisting countries toward that objective rather than objectives which are beyond the reach of the LDCs themselves or which commit us to help them in perpetuity. Our humanitarian assistance, which obviously must meet day-to-day assistance, is alright in the State Department. Our long term development lending is not as large in dollar amounts as these other categories at present. It could become as important, however, if placed in a position to stand on its own feet. To do so, a completely new approach is needed. Our development lending should be put under an independent Government corporation. It might be called a “fund” or “corporation”, and would have its own board of directors and management. It would function as a bank, judging the worthiness of the recipients of benefits. It should be staffed by competent judges of investment, many of whom would hopefully come from the private sector, who know where to seek advice as well as how to give it themselves. We could dismantle our overseas missions. The institution needs continuity, la the Export-Import Bank, since it will be developing long term programs. Its role might some day be taken over completely by the international lending institutions. Mr. Peterson sees a tremendous role for another new Government corporation, this one functioning as a foundation. It would focus on research on development problems, including research in the LDCs themselves. It would be run by top professionals and seek multiplier effects, especially through using residents of LDCs themselves in a major role. This institution would probably never outlive its usefulness, especially on such issues as population control. Its creation would be a major step and could have a tremendous impact on the world, which we could develop into something of tremendous national pride. Thirdly, we already have the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to assist the private sector. The Task Force has ideas for expanding its role, beyond what is now envisaged, to engage the private sector in an even greater role. Mr. Peterson then noted that the $64 question was the great need for much greater coordination of all US overseas economic activities. (The President amended that this was the $64 billion question.) These three new institutions must be coordinated, along with other aid-related programs, and he would suggest a “Chairman of Overseas Development” to run a board comprised of the heads of all relevant agencies and institutions. The chairman should sit in the White House and report directly to the President. The President asked whether military assistance should be included in the board. Mr. Peterson replied that he would leave it out, since the board would coordinate our long term development assistance activities and not our short term security programs. The President assumed that it would also leave the humanitarian assistance out, although if high-quality people were available in the new institution, it might be good to use them on an ad hoc basis. The President added that he was intrigued by the concept of such a chairman and asked Mr. Peterson to proceed. Mr. Peterson added that the chairman would have a vital role in representing the President on developmental matters. With that stature, he could accomplish a great deal by coordinating all of our assistance efforts, including trade, Export-Import Bank, etc. (Mr. Fried added that PL 480 would also be so coordinated.) He would naturally keep in close touch with the key operating agencies. Mr. Peterson saw a lack of focus to all these related activities at pres-ent. There are needless frictions; perhaps they cannot be eliminated, but they can be reduced. With a board sitting around the table regularly, you could get understanding and policy direction as we have never had before. The President replied that these ideas were very good. He asked about timing and Mr. Peterson indicated that he hoped to present the report by mid-March. The President noted that the Task Force would find it difficult to get agreement in this area. They would get screams from State, Treasury and all the other vested interests, as had occurred on some of the other Government reorganization measures which are under consideration. The difference here is that it is a question of life or death for the US economic role in the world. We will simply not get adequate support for our program unless it is completely new. He was in no position to judge the merits of specific corporations or the board, at this time, but did know that we must get rid of our present annual aid exercises. The President noted that most earlier task forces had simply said that we should do better what we were already doing. This task force must do better than that. It was hard to say whether State or Treasury would raise the most difficulties, to which Mr. Peterson replied that State was more active at present. Dr. Kissinger indicated that State wants to use aid as an arm of foreign policy, whereas Mr. Peterson wants to put it on a long term basis and reduce its susceptibility to short term tactical considerations. We must abolish AID, whose personnel are simply too weak. (The President firmly agreed.) The President noted that he had always been a strong supporter of aid. One of his most frustrating experiences, in his numerous foreign travels, was to see how AID or its predecessors operate abroad. This is partly because they have always been on a temporary basis and therefore cannot get good people. He would hope Mr. Peterson would move in the direction of more, rather than less, revolutionary proposals. The President added that several things proposed by Mr. Peterson appealed to him. The issue of central coordination is tricky. The State Department would oppose any such institution, as a rival, but it is definitely needed and would work in view of the new NSC system. The bank makes all sorts of sense. The foundation, which he assumed would handle technical assistance-type operations, would work; it should be put on a career basis and get the Point IV program onto the basis where it should always have been. Dr. Kissinger noted that he was greatly impressed by the work of the Task Force. (He later told Mr. Peterson that it was the most imaginative task force report he had yet seen.) It tries to move away from day-to-day foreign policy concerns. A foundation would not be expected to make foreign policy judgments, so the LDCs could accept advice or help from it. As long as aid is given on a political level, we are merely trading favors for political reasons. The proposed program would help the State Department over the long term. The President agreed that the State Department should buy the approach. Otherwise foreign aid is dead; he anticipated trouble this year even in getting modest appropriations. On the issue of coordination, the President agreed that it should be in the White House since it was so close to foreign policy. Dr. Kissinger noted that this could cause problems; the coordinator could be set up autonomously, and run through the NSC system, but it was clear that the coordinator could not be a departmental figure. The President agreed, since the coordinator would then be fighting with the other departments; he must be more than one among equals. Dr. Kissinger reaffirmed that this was a very imaginative approach. It was the only way to save foreign aid. He could approve the proposals, since he had nothing to do with their formulation. Implementation The President asked what to do next to implement the ideas. The key problem was the competence of people, though this organizational approach would help solve it. The President asked about the competence of the staffs at the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank, to which Mr. Peterson replied that the World Bank group had very imaginative people. (Mr. Fried added that IDA would be key to this whole operation.) The President added that, in addition to clearing up the organizational morass, the key was getting good people. Mr. Peterson replied that a man with professional pride would not go into the present aid organization, given its lack of morale and continuity and the discrediting of the program. Mr. Fried said that the international institutions could take on major responsibilities. They could work with individual LDCs and take the heat off our bilateral relations. The United States is now in a position to step back and support their activities, which would be a basic change in our world role. The President cautioned that many countries say they would prefer bilateral aid—since they can put more pressure on us directly. Dr. Kissinger said we would seem to retain the bilateral option under the proposed program. Mr. Peterson agreed, but noted that we could put 2/3 of our development assistance into multilateral channels now. Dr. Kissinger noted that this would take us out of the line of fire, since the international institutions can take criticism more easily. Mr. Fried added that this approach means fewer people, and different kinds of people, in the US program. Mr. Peterson noted that he had been mindful of the President’s warning that his proposals must work. He had therefore disregarded targets for aid based on proportions of GNP. We, along with other donors, should provide whatever money increases are needed to increase the role of international institutions. Beyond that, he would not seek more money now. After a year or two of experience with the new institutions, we can come to Congress with intelligent estimates of the needs. The President agreed, adding that this report would have been forgotten and derided if it had focused on amounts of aid. Instead, its proposals will fit into our reassessment of our over-all approach to foreign policy and its institutions, many of which were set up over twenty years ago. For the first time, we might be able to set up permanent institutions. AID had been seen for far too long as a temporary institution; Mr. Peterson added that continuity was necessary—the job could not be done in two or three years. Dr. Kissinger added that AID’s presentation to Congress of aid as a percentage of GNP was a disaster. Mr. Peterson’s proposals, on the other hand, would provide a framework for a durable assistance program. The President suggested that Mr. Peterson indicate, early in the report, that he was offering a reform of our institutions; that times have changed, so our programs must change; that he was deliberately not getting into amounts of aid; and that we can make judgments on amounts at a later time when our new institutions are in place. The President directed Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Bergsten to incorporate some of these themes in the appropriate section of his forthcoming Foreign Policy Review. Finally, Dr. Kissinger urged Mr. Peterson to say what he thinks, rather than what would be bureaucratically acceptable. The President urged him to get out in front. Many will say his approach won’t work, but nothing will occur unless the Task Force takes the lead. They should be controversial and then they will attract attention. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1023, Nixon-Peterson, et al. 2/11/70. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bergsten. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 10:07 to 10:55 a.m.; Fried is not listed as one of the attendees. (Ibid., White House Central Files) 126. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to the Chairman of the President’s Task Force on International Development (Peterson) 126. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to the Chairman of the President’s Task Force on International Development (Peterson) 1 Washington, February 17, 1970. Dear Rudy: I appreciated your coming in to see me on Tuesday last. Nat Samuels and I were very glad to have an opportunity to talk with you and Ed Fried about certain aspects of aid policy, and we welcomed the opportunity to elaborate further on the views which Secretary Rogers had previously expressed to you. I thought it might be useful briefly to recapitulate our views. The major task confronting about 70% of mankind and over 100 countries is economic development; therefore, US foreign policy must be directed toward a significant and vigorous assistance to developing countries. The decision on our part to undertake development aid is a political act intended to assist developing countries by economic means to carry through their often painful tasks of nation-building. Development aid is an instrument in our search for an orderly evolution in the world’s continuing processes of change, and simultaneously is a manifestation of our own system of moral values. We must persist in it for external reasons and as an expression of our inner moral compulsions. When our people are sometimes excessively critical of aid, it is often a consequence of their impatience with the frustrations of nation-building rather than with aid itself or the means of implementing it. In carrying out an aid policy, both multilateral and bilateral instrumentalities are important. The World Bank and the IMF dispose of large funds, trained and professional personnel, accumulated experience and international prestige. The same is true of certain other multilateral organizations. We should take maximum advantage of these assets by increasingly directing our assistance through appropriate multilateral channels. At the same time a bilateral assistance program is an element in US foreign policy. The Secretary of State has the principal responsibility for carrying out the President’s foreign policy, of which aid to the less-developed countries is an important element, and thus he must be able to coordinate foreign policy and development assistance. Moreover, our less-developed country relationships are increasingly involved with our developed country relationships as we try to harmonize our trade policy, private capital flows and development policy with those of other industrialized countries. We agree, however, that the administration of development assistance in a separate, identifiable entity is feasible as long as there is a direct link between the operating entity and the Secretary’s policy direction. Supporting assistance and military assistance programs, as distinct from long-term development aid, have short-term political aims although they often contain elements of long-term economic value. The United States is reducing its overseas military involvements and its political/security presence in developing countries and, in fact, supporting and military assistance programs today pertain largely to South Viet-Nam, South Korea, Laos and Thailand. These programs should be administered separately from the long-term aid entity, with policy direction also in State. On one other point, that of technical assistance, our AID people are convinced that it is undesirable to separate the administration of technical assistance from capital aid. It is their strong view that the US experience and that of other bilateral donors, and that of the World Bank group and UN assistance systems, lend support to the case for greater, rather than lesser, integration of capital and technical assistance. 2 I hope that the above comments will be useful to you and the task force. We undoubtedly agree on a great deal but probably approach some coordination and organizational concepts somewhat differently. I can assure you that our views are offered after much reflection and derive from the Department’s accumulated experience during a quarter of a century with aid policy and its implementation through various organizational forms. The Secretary and I are both confident that your task force report will be a major contribution to our renewed aid policy. I know that the Secretary hopes to be in touch with you on his return from Africa. 3 With best wishes to you and your colleagues, Sincerely, Elliot 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1. No classification marking. 2 On February 19 AID Administrator Hannah wrote Peterson to expand on Richardson’s “brief reference” to separating the administration of capital and technical assistance. Hannah described how a separation had been tried in the United States in the 1950s, the resulting decision to consolidate the functions, and how other donors were designing their assistance programs along the lines of the U.S. model. He noted that, with the possible exception of a “narrow range of scientific specialists,” separation risked losing some of the best foreign assistance managers, who often had broader interests than either a technical assistance foundation or a development bank would accommodate. (Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 75 A 13, Chrons February 17-February 27, 1970) 3 Secretary Rogers traveled to Africa February 7-22. His itinerary included six sub-Saharan countries, the first such visit by a Secretary of State. 127. Editorial Note 127. Editorial Note On February 25, 1970, Henry Kissinger sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy, and AID Administrator Hannah requesting a study of worldwide untying of aid. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70) The genesis of Kissinger’s memorandum was a January 29 memorandum from Acting AID Administrator Poats to Kissinger proposing that a January 16 memorandum from Kissinger mandating a study of untying program loans to Indonesia be broadened to include untying for all counties. In his February 25 memorandum Kissinger instructed that the study should be regarded as a follow-on to the President’s October 31 Latin American speech, which he quoted: “I am ordering that all other onerous conditions and restrictions on U.S. assistance loans be reviewed, with the objective or modifying or eliminating them.” Kissinger also noted that the study should consider the recommendations of the Peterson Task Force (see Document 128 ) and a preliminary report should be submitted by March 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70) On April 15 Elliot Richardson, in his capacity as Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, sent a memorandum to President Nixon informing him that the untying issue had been summarized in his March 25 memorandum on foreign assistance ( Document 131 ), but that he was now providing a more detailed staff study of this issue. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45) This April 15 untying study reviewed the emergence of tying practices between 1960 and 1969, which had arisen partly in recognition of balance-of-payments difficulties and partly to bolster lagging Congressional support for the program. The report suggested that if the balance of payments could be liberalized, other restrictions such as the foreign investment program could also be considered. The study looked at complete untying on a free world basis, in concert with other donor countries, and examined several options for untying with respect to procurement in developing countries only. With respect to the latter, the study estimated the balance-of-payments loss would be from $50 million to $125 million for the four options for which statistical estimates were made. (Ibid.) 128. Memorandum From President Nixon 128. Memorandum From President Nixon 1 Washington, March 5, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers The Administrator, Agency for International Development The President, Export-Import Bank The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations SUBJECT Review of U.S. Foreign Assistance Program I received today the Report of my Task Force on International Development chaired by Rudolph Peterson, and hereby transmit a copy of it to you. 2 The Report will be released publicly on Sunday. 3 I regard the Peterson Report as an extremely creative and exciting document, and urge you to read it. The Report provides a sound foundation on which to base a new U.S. foreign assistance program, which I expect to be one of our major foreign policy initiatives in the years ahead. I am particularly intrigued by the Report’s proposals for clear separation of the different aspects of our assistance program, new institutions to implement these different aspects most effectively, and a coordinating mechanism to fuse all of our efforts which relate to international development. I have directed the Under Secretaries Committee to staff the Peterson Report. 4 The Committee should prepare a paper on the issues raised in the Report, and elsewhere, concerning the future of the U.S. foreign assistance program: 1. Our overall approach to foreign assistance in the 1970s a. The objectives of our program b. Its relationship to overall U.S. foreign policy c. The mix between multilateral and bilateral channels for assistance d. The basis for determining our levels of foreign assistance, including various proposals for specific targets e. Staffing 2. Specific multilateral programs a. U.S. contributions to the International Development Association, Inter-American Development Bank, and International Finance Corporation b. Multilateral untying of bilateral assistance c. Debt rescheduling policy d. International insurance and guarantees of private investment e. Family planning programs 3. The bilateral U.S. program a. Separation of programs to pursue separate objectives b. Proposed U.S. International Development Bank, including proposals for flexible lending terms and guarantee authority c. Proposed U.S. International Development Institute, including its relationship to the (Fascell) Inter-American Social Development Institute d. Proposed combination of military and supporting assistance and related programs e. Proposed U.S. International Development Council f. Increased administrative flexibility for all programs g. Unilateral untying h. Hickenlooper Amendment i. Balance of payments controls on investment in LDCs j. Trade issues, including generalized preferences proposal The paper should be submitted to me by March 25, prior to consideration of the subject by the National Security Council. 5 I plan to announce my proposals for reform of our assistance program in my response to the Javits Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, which requires me to reappraise the present program and propose changes for the future. Taking into account the discussion which will follow my announcement, particularly including close consultations with the Congress, I plan to submit legislation to implement my new proposals in January 1971. I would hope that our new program could become effective for FY 1972. The Peterson Task Force, after its intensive examination of the role of the United States in providing assistance to the developing countries, concluded that “The United States has a profound national interest in cooperating with developing countries in their efforts to improve conditions of life in their society.” I agree wholeheartedly, and intend for this report to provide the basis for a new and viable U.S. assistance program for the future, to enable us to effectively pursue that profound national interest. Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2 U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970s: A New Approach—Report to the President From the Task Force on International Development . See also Department of State Bulletin , April 6, 1970, pp. 447-467, for text of the report, dated March 4, 1970. 3 March 8. On March 3 Under Secretary of State Richardson had sent a memorandum to Kissinger requesting a short delay in the public release of the Peterson Report so that AID Administrator Hannah would have time to review it and inform his staff and overseas missions of its contents. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Task Forces on AID) Telegram 33825 to all posts, March 6, summarized the report’s main conclusions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1) A Presidential statement announcing release of the report to the public was issued in Key Biscayne on Sunday, March 8. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon , 1970, pp. 253-254) 4 See Documents 129 and 130 . 5 See Document 131 . The NSC meeting, originally scheduled for April 1, was postponed several times and was never held. 129. Editorial Note 129. Editorial Note The Peterson Task Force Report (see Document 128 ) became the basis of the Nixon administration’s new foreign assistance strategy. The Peterson Report, not the study mandated in NSSM 45 ( Document 111 ) fulfilled the Javits Amendment reporting requirement to Congress (see Document 1 ). At the National Security Council, Fred Bergsten had the lead in staffing the report. Documentation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Task Forces on AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70. Much of the documentation relating to the actual drafting of the September 15 Report to Congress is ibid., Box 194, AID, Volume III 8/11/70-9/10/70. On January 15, 1970, Bergsten had sent a memorandum to Kissinger informing him of how the Peterson Task Force was coming out on the issues. Bergsten noted that an NSC meeting would be required in late March to get Presidential decisions on the basic aspects of the new foreign assistance program, and thought the Javits Amendment report to Congress might be delayed into April. That same day Peter Vaky sent a memorandum to Kissinger noting that Bergsten’s scenario and the prospective Task Force Report took no account of the Rockefeller Report and the need “to do things now for Latin America.” (Ibid., AID Task Forces on AID) The NSC meeting on aid was scheduled for April 1, postponed several times, and finally scheduled for April 27. A briefing book assembled for the President’s use at this meeting included, among other things, a detailed “Issues for Decision” paper prepared by the NSC Staff for the President. (National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 86, 4/27/70 NSC Meeting—US Assistance Program, (Peterson Report)) On April 27 Bergsten sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him that the NSC meeting had been canceled. He also set out a schema for meeting the Javits Amendment reporting requirement and Congressional hearings on the President’s aid proposals, which had been set for May 13 but postponed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70) During an August 25, 1997, interview with the editor of this volume, Bergsten recalled that the feeling was that the invasion of Cambodia in late April 1970 had so poisoned the foreign affairs climate in Congress that it would be fruitless to send forward foreign assistance reform legislation at that time. In a May 12 memorandum, Bergsten informed Kissinger that he had not sent Richardson a copy of the draft foreign assistance message because it was not complete and assumed several Presidential decisions contrary to the State Department’s recommendations. Kissinger approved Bergsten’s not providing the draft at that time. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70) On July 23 Bergsten sent a memorandum to Kissinger informing him that AID Administrator Hannah sought a copy of the draft aid message in order to know the direction of the President’s thinking. Bergsten reported Hannah’s comments that the State Department had also “grumbled” about the delay. Bergsten thought it would be a mistake to circulate the draft before the basic policy decisions had been made and, referring to Kissinger’s instruction on his May 12 memorandum, indicated that he would not circulate the draft foreign assistance message until the decisions were made. (Ibid.) 130. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 130. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 19, 1970. SUBJECT Staffing of Peterson Proposals on Aid: Under Secretaries Committee Meeting on March 20 at 3:00 p.m. The Under Secretaries Committee will have two papers before it at the March 20 meeting: 2 —A draft memorandum for the President which treats the fundamental issues underlying the entire approach proposed by the Peterson Report. This will be the focus of the meeting. —A long issues paper, detailing the options on the fifty-two specific issues raised by Peterson and others, responding to the President’s directive which transmitted the Peterson Report to the agencies. 3 We have tried to clear away all comments on it separately, but a few parochial interests may come up at the USC because this is some agencies’ only shot at the process. Present Situation Before I outline the basic issues, you should have the following background: —All agencies have been fully on board the President’s approach, based on Peterson’s proposals, throughout the staffing process. State, AID, and Treasury have been particularly cooperative. —Three problems may arise at the Cabinet level, however: Secretary Rogers may fight to put the new International Development Council in State instead of the White House, although he may no longer fight separation of the basic lending institutions from State; Secretary Laird may want the proposed new Office of Security Assistance, which will run all security-related programs, in Defense instead of in State; and Secretary Kennedy may resist some of the financial innovations proposed for the new U.S. Development Bank (guarantees for LDC borrowings in DC capital markets) and some of the proposals which would hurt our balance of payments (partial unilateral untying, relaxation of restrictions on private U.S. investment in LDCs). —All agencies assume there will be an NSC meeting and the NSC paper urges that it be held. I have told no one that there is any doubt about the April 1 date, although you rejected my recommendation to firm it up. An early deadline is necessary to keep up the pressure on the agencies. More basically, failure to have an NSC meeting would cause problems because of the possibility of Cabinet-level dissent just noted and because we plan to keep open all options through the USC meeting, to preserve full flexibility for the President’s decisions. 4 If the USC learned that there would be no NSC meeting, they would probably want to make recommendations instead of present options; in any event, no NSC meeting would mean that we would have to get agency positions somehow—and the three Secretaries might feel strongly enough to want to present them orally anyway. —The only other problem is that some agencies may want to delay decisions which affect them. It is true that we have set a killing pace for this exercise, but we must maintain it (a) to avoid slipping the President’s message too far beyond the March 31 legislative deadline 5 and (b) to button up most of the specifics so that the agencies cannot subsequently gut the new approach. —The issues paper is unmanageable for the President, and we will have to staff it as we did the IA-ECOSOC memorandum. Most of the fifty-two issues must be decided now, however, so that (a) the President can make his proposals sufficiently comprehensive, and (b) we will be in a position to answer when asked about the specifics behind any proposals which he may leave general in his message. (At State’s request, I circulated a purely personal draft—attached at Tab A 6 —outlining my views on what might be included in the President’s message. No one has challenged its comprehensiveness, though as noted above some agencies may try to delay decisions affecting them.) —Jim Keogh has been working on the draft of the President’s statement since Monday, when I talked to him after you approved my recommendation to do so. Herb Klein’s people, with whom I have also talked, are working out a publicity scenario—featuring Peterson and other members of the Task Force, on the assumption that the President’s proposals will largely encompass their recommendations. Specific Issues The USC draft first summarizes the general conclusions of the Peterson Task Force , and recommends that the NSC endorse them: 1. The U.S. has a profound national interest in cooperating with the LDCs for development purposes. 2. We must clearly define the rationale and objectives of our assistance program. 3. We should seek an international development effort involving (a) true partnership with the LDCs, (b) greater responsibility for the international organizations, and (c) other DCs. 4. The downward trend in U.S. appropriations for development should be reversed. 5. Our increased resources should be primarily channeled through international institutions. 6. The U.S. should provide a fair share of the international resources aimed at development. 7. Our assistance program should broaden the use of private initiative. 8. Development is more than economic growth; popular participation and equitable income distribution are equally important. 9. We should continue to provide security assistance to help individual countries and move them toward greater self-reliance. The USC draft then flags the major issues on which it recommends that the NSC focus its primary attention: —Whether we should clearly distinguish among our security, humanitarian and development programs. —Whether we should turn over primary responsibility to international organizations. —How to reconcile the development focus of our residual bilateral program and the basic foreign policy objectives, which prompt us to retain a bilateral effort. (My answer here is that our bilateral program would select countries and programs—such as Latin American and agricultural development—in light of our unique national interests, but avoid political influence determining their short-run operation.) —Whether and how to pull all of our security assistance program under one roof. (This was the weakest part of the Peterson Report and the internal staffing is not much better so far. You may wish to look particularly at the options under issue 8 on pages 25–28 [ Pgs. 25–28 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] of the long paper. —Whether we should decide on annual aid levels or leave the issue open la Peterson. This relates closely to whether we should endorse the targets for assistance previously agreed and recommended by the Pearson Commission. (The President has really rejected targetry already, but State rightly notes that such rejection will cause foreign policy problems for us. It must thus be aired at the NSC although I think it can be quickly disposed of.) —How to coordinate the separate aspects of the new development approach. (This issue is critical for the President and for us, and I analyze it separately in the next section.) —How to relate the Peterson program to our Latin American policy. (The Peterson approach is completely global and provides nothing special for Latin America. It may thus raise questions about whether we are still serious about a “special relationship” in the Hemisphere.) —Organizational recommendations for the new International Development Bank, International Development Institute, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (already legislated), Office of Security Affairs in State, and International Development Council. (The basic decisions on these flow from the fundamental decision on separation of rationales, and you need not bother about the details.) Coordinating Council There is one issue on which I particularly need your approval on the specifics of my approach, or guidance to do otherwise: how to set up the International Development Council recommended by Peterson. The Council is a crucial part of the Peterson proposals. It would pull together, for the first time, all U.S. government programs relating to economic development. It would thereby implement a key aspect of the new approach: integration of all U.S. economic policies which affect the LDCs. The creation of a White House coordinator, to chair the Council, would also bring new stature to our over-all aid effort and provide for Presidential leadership of the program. The President agreed, at the meeting with Peterson, 7 that the coordinator should be located in the White House. This raises the issue of how the Council relates to the NSC, and makes the issue particularly delicate for us. And Secretary Rogers may push hard to coordinate it from State. The long issues paper lists six options (pages 72–79 [ Pgs. 72–79 include portions of Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] ). I strongly prefer Option 1 (page 75), as recommended by Peterson: —the coordinator in the White House; —chairing a Cabinet-level Council; —not formally integrated into the NSC system. In practice, the coordinator would be closely linked to you (I use “you” as shorthand for your position). Under the present regime, recommendations would go to the President through you—as do memoranda from other Presidential assistants, such as the Special Trade Representative and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (on international matters). Close staff cooperation would provide daily coordination and prevent conflicts from developing. In short, I see no problems if it is played properly and the people are chosen carefully. I recommend that we choose this option. The other options all have serious flaws: —Option 2 would have a White House coordinator chair the Council as an NSC subcommittee at the Under Secretary level, like the present USC. This would probably preclude getting a coordinator of the stature needed to both do the job effectively and portray the desired new image; by linking the Council formally to the NSC, it would also blur the disaggregation between our development and security assistance programs, which is fundamental to the new approach. —Option 3 would have the Under Secretary of State chair an NSC Subcommittee, which would simply be the present USC discussing development. It would gain nothing, conveying precisely the political overtones for development assistance which the new approach tries to eliminate and failing to eliminate the need for Presidential reconciliation of agency difference. —Options 4-6 would give the coordination responsibilities to the new Development Bank or State. Any of them would essentially replicate AID and the entire status quo. Recommendations: (for points to raise or support during USC discussion) 1. That you be ready to comment on the certainty and date of an NSC meeting to consider this issue. (Our schedule still carries an April 1 date as tentative.) 2. That you strongly support the USC draft’s support of the overall Peterson approach, mentioning if appropriate that the President greatly appreciates the cooperative vein in which the agencies have been carrying forward his wishes. 3. That you help blunt any effort to slow down the momentum of staffing these issues, in view of the President’s commitment to announce his new assistance program comprehensively in his response to the Javits Amendment. (The Javits Amendment sets a March 31 deadline, and at best we will slip that by a couple of weeks. The Congressional people feel strongly that we should not slip more than that.) 4. Blunt any efforts to keep the detailed issues of the longer paper from being submitted at this time, because many of them are needed to round out the President’s initial statement and many more are needed to provide backup for questions that will immediately be raised on issues which he treats generally in his statement. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Task Forces on AID. Confidential. Attached to a March 20 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger with Bergsten’s additional recommendations for the Under Secretaries Committee meeting that day. 2 See Document 131 . 3 Document 128 . 4 No NSC meeting on the foreign assistance program was held. 5 The Javits Amendment to Section 501 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 required a comprehensive review of U.S. foreign assistance programs and a report to Congress by March 31, 1970. 6 Not printed; entitled “Minimum Components of Presidential Proposals in Response to Javits Amendment.” 7 See Document 125 . 131. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon 131. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 25, 1970. SUBJECT Foreign Aid Review—Issues for the NSC Meeting The Peterson Task Force Report sketches a new basis for U.S. participation in the international development effort. It sets out a general goal for the United States to: “Take up the challenge of international development in a way that adds a new dimension to U.S. foreign policy and creates a broad and hopeful vision of the world and its future. Americans, young and old, can then take renewed pride in playing a constructive world role and in meeting the obligations of global citizenship.” A reassessment of our aid policy is called for because a new national commitment must be forged if we are to protect our basic national interest and if the United States is to participate in full partnership with other nations—rich and poor. Both the public and the Congress must participate in this process. In order to create a national consensus the Task Force recommends that we define our obligations clearly and recognize the changes in the international environment which have occurred in the past decade, brought about in part by our assistance efforts. Among the changes noted by the Task Force are: —The security situation in the world has changed substantially and while threats to peace will continue to exist, the sharply divided world of direct confrontation which existed in the 1950’s and early 1960’s has given way to increasing opportunities for cooperation. Security measures and assistance programs must take this into account. —The growing capacities in a number of developing countries to establish their own development priorities, to mobilize their investment resources and to implement efficient development programs . —The substantial economic progress of many developing countries which now makes the ability to export as important to them as obtaining aid financing. This requires a willingness by the industrial countries to facilitate imports of manufactured goods from the developing nations. Their economic progress also requires the development of more sophisticated and mature private sectors, with adequate financial institutions. An integrated approach to the problems of aid, trade and investment is deemed essential. —The rapid expansion of the assistance efforts of other countries so that today their combined official development assistance is equal to that of the United States. —The growth of international development organizations, most of which we have helped to create, which now account for an increasing share of development lending and technical assistance and have gained great competence in assessing and organizing development activities. Based on their analysis of this changed world context, the Peterson Task Force reaches certain fundamental conclusions, which the Under Secretaries Committee believes the NSC should endorse : 1. The United States has a profound national interest in cooperating with developing countries in their efforts to improve conditions of life in their societies. 2. We should clearly define the rationale and objectives of our foreign assistance programs. 3. This country should not look for specific short-term foreign policy gains from our participation in international development programs. 4. The United States should help to create an international development effort which involves true partnership with the developing countries, assigns greater responsibility to the international organizations and joins with other donor countries to provide the resources necessary to make the development effort a success. 5. The downward trend in U.S. development assistance appropriations should be reversed. 6. Additional resources should be provided, primarily in support of international lending institutions. 7. The United States should provide a fair share of resources in the international development effort. 8. The United States assistance program should broaden the use of private initiative, skills and resources, both in providing assistance and in the developing countries. 9. We should recognize that development is more than economic growth. Popular participation and equitable income distribution are as important as increases in total productive capacity. 10. We should continue to provide security assistance on a selective basis to help countries assure their own security and move them toward greater self-reliance. The Task Force also makes a series of recommendations on detailed objectives and organization, the general thrust of which is intended: —to demonstrate a new approach—with new institutions—adapted to current problems; —to delineate U.S. purposes more clearly; and —to provide a platform from which the President can initiate discussions to seek a new Congressional commitment and renewed public support. The Under Secretaries Committee strongly recommends that the issues—described below—be thoroughly aired in the NSC to provide you with the best judgment of your Cabinet officers . Your message to the Congress will launch consultations with the Congress, and discussions in public forums, on the course of the U.S. assistance effort in the 1970’s. Effective consultation is crucial to changing Congressional attitudes before the new aid legislation is submitted in January 1971. There will be strong views in the Congress on the means suggested by the Task Force to achieve our new objectives and thus the consultation effort may fail in its greater purpose if we give too much emphasis at this stage to the details of organization. Your message should provide: —the rationale and operating style for our assistance program, and —the general organizational framework to carry it out. The refinement of national objectives and the details of legislative and organizational means to achieve them should be the focus of the consultations. There will also be a need for detailed follow-up planning within the Executive branch, and we suggest that the Under Secretaries Committee be instructed to do this. An illustrative list of such matters for further study is given on page 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] of this memorandum. Basic Issues for NSC Discussion Separate Rationale (Issues 1-8, pages 3–17 [ Pgs. 3–17 include portions of Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , and Doc. 6 ] ) 2 The Peterson Report distinguishes between U.S. security, development and humanitarian objectives and recommends separate institutions for pursuing each. The Task Force believes that this creates a more logical framework and thus provides a more effective basis for seeking public support. This approach—and the new institutions implicit in it—could provide a clearer rationale for the public and the Congress in support of foreign assistance programs, an opportunity to put development assistance on a more rational multi-year funding basis, and possibly a more efficient development assistance program free of short-term policy constraints. However, there are also some drawbacks: —Separate organizations and legislative authority substantially reduce the present flexibility of the Executive to respond to changing foreign policy interests in particular regions and countries. —In Southeast Asia, for example, we are moving away from security assistance toward economic assistance but we would have lost valuable flexibility if our programs are fragmented according to particular objectives. —There is likely to be substantial opposition in Congress, particularly in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Appropriations Sub-Committee. The latter will be concerned with the multiplication of aid “spigots,” the former with the real possibility that bilateral development legislation cannot by itself obtain enough votes for passage. Multilateral Responsibility (II, B, pp. 5-10 plus Issues 26-29, pp. 65-71) The Report places great responsibility on international and regional organizations (principally IBRD/IDA and the IDB but also eventually the UNDP). While taking into account their expanded capacity and intention to expand further, the Report recognizes their present limitations to play this larger role and points out that a U.S. decision to turn over responsibilities to these organizations would spur their growth into this role. We should endorse this objective—as you already have in the case of Latin America—but recognize that: —it may take some time for the international development institutions to seize fully the larger role envisaged for them; —the increasing role for international organizations requires support by other major donors, and not all of them are enthusiastic; —the United States must be prepared to play an active role—while avoiding an appearance of domination—to get the international agencies to assume these increased responsibilities; —there may be considerable Congressional opposition to increasing substantially funds to international organizations which reduces Congressional control over purposes and expenditures. Bilateral Program and Foreign Policy Interests (Issues 3-4, pp. 7-9) The Report suggests that the bilateral program should support international agency programs and, within that framework, focus on countries in which the United States has special interests. The Report thus recognizes that while economic development criteria must be predominant in our bilateral assistance program, it must also reflect certain U.S. assistance priorities. The Report recommends, however, that our bilateral program should take its lead from the multilateral institutions and programs in arriving at economic assessments. There may be practical limits to this approach, for example: —while development loans should be made on economic criteria, the U.S. may wish to apply a geographic formula for the distribution of aid resources which may not be reflected in the plans of international organizations; —it may not be realistic in terms of foreign policy objectives and Congressional interests to subordinate our analytical and decision making, process to that of international organizations; —bilateral programs serving specific national objectives of other donors will almost surely continue, and we may wish to recognize our own interests; —many LDC’s have argued that their interests are best served by having a balanced system of international and bilateral aid programs, because they fear an excessively centralized system. This will require expanding the present role and resources of the international agencies while retaining significant national programs. Economic and Financial Policy (Issue 24, pp. 49-58) The Peterson Report by its very nature gives particular emphasis to development issues within overall economic and financial policy. However, consideration of the Report’s proposals for an integrated approach to economic development policy requires consideration of the interaction of development policy with our international economic policies generally. There are economic trade-offs and economic costs associated with the pursuit of various courses of action that must be appraised. Furthermore, the ways in which we help developing countries—in subsidizing housing, providing incentives for investments, financing health and education, etc.—can have an impact on desirable or undesirable proposals in similar fields domestically in the United States. Particular development policies involving local procurement preferences, preferential trade and investment privileges may conflict with our broader multilateral objectives of non-discriminatory freer trade and investment. Our tax policies, investment guidelines, and balance of payments policies could follow one set of rules if our objectives were solely or even principally developmental. There may be practical limits, however, to the extent to which complete focus can be applied to development programs in contrast to the general international economic programs and on fusing the coordination mechanism for emphasizing the former. Security Programs (Issues 6-8, pp. 13-17) The Report recognizes the essential part that security assistance programs have played in U.S. foreign policy over the last two decades. To strengthen these programs, it proposes to link them in one piece of legislation—an International Security Cooperation Act. The Task Force would have the Department of State continue to set policy for all security assistance programs and to administer Supporting Assistance, Public Safety and the Contingency Fund; the Defense Department would continue to administer Military Assistance and Sales. 3 The Report supports the need for the kind of comprehensive country program analysis being developed within the NSC system. It also stresses the need for each nation to decide for itself what it is prepared to do and recommends that the United States should support these efforts in such a way as to enhance self-reliance and promote self-sufficiency. The separation of development and security-related programs has much to recommend it. However: —Once security assistance is considered as a separate category, the need to obtain adequate funds for the programs becomes a major consideration. The Task Force did not recommend specific security assistance levels. If the security programs are not to be considered a temporary expedient by the Congress, there must be a coherent plan and justification based on the Administration’s new approach to indigenous efforts to become self-reliant. Security assistance should not simply be a combination of existing programs with a heavy focus on Southeast Asia. —Inclusion of $2.2 billion Vietnam and Laos military assistance now funded by Defense would, in FY-1969, have resulted in an inflated security program of $3.4 billion worldwide and a total foreign assistance program of $6.3 billion. To the extent the Congress looks at these programs in their totality—as the appropriations committees are likely to do—there would be considerable temptation to cut the development program sharply in order to reduce the overall total. —A basic issue is the advisability of linking the various security assistance activities in a single piece of legislation. There are also advantages and disadvantages in dividing the program in two pieces of legislation—one for supporting assistance, public safety and the contingency fund, the other for military assistance and foreign military sales. This is discussed on pp. 11–17 [ Pgs. 11–17 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] of the annexed issues paper. Aid Levels (Issue 2, p. 4; Issue 3, p. 7; Issues 26-28, pp. 65-68) The Report is silent on annual aid levels. We believe this tactically wise at this time. However, the Peterson Group does conclude unequivocally that the downward trend in our contributions of development assistance should be reversed, principally through contributions to international financial institutions. This is important for establishing the credibility of the U.S. commitment to development, both toward LDCs and other donors, and in such contexts as the Second UN Development Decade, UNCTAD, etc. The major component is the $1 billion replenishment of IDA, which you have endorsed. Given opposition to this scale of replenishment from some key European donors and Japan, a strong U.S. effort will be needed to get agreement on a replenishment of this general magnitude. If we cannot reach the international flows suggested by the Task Force and if we do indeed wish “to reverse the downward trend” of our efforts, we may have to consider whether to support temporarily higher bilateral levels to accomplish our overall objective. Targets (Issue 3, pp. 7-8) The Report does not endorse any aid targets. We believe that the Peterson approach, with its emphasis on need and LDC performance, is the only feasible one with the Congress. Nonetheless, our failure to endorse a target would raise serious political problems in the U.N. and may be used as a justification for less support by other donors. We should accordingly consider whether it is feasible for us to support the principle of a global aid target while at the same time indicating that we could not subscribe to any specific date for attaining it. Alternatively, we may wish to accept the implicit Peterson approach and emphasize our intent to seek higher levels but not subscribe to unattainable targets. This would be pleasing domestically to some in Congress and demonstrate a realistic policy to other countries that we are moving away from promises we cannot fill. Coordination (Issue 4, p. 9; Issue 13, p. 26; Issue 24, pp. 49-58) The separate organizations which are proposed create two separate problems of coordination—within the U.S. Government and between the U.S. program and those of international agencies. The Report recommends giving basic responsibility for achieving effective policy coordination to a U.S. International Development Council. Certain points require further discussion: —there will be need for close coordination with other aspects of U.S. foreign policy since economic and assistance issues are at the core of our political relationship with most LDCs; —policies toward LDCs in aid, trade and investment are inextricably linked to our policies in these respects toward the developed countries; —there is a link between what we do internationally and certain domestic economic policies; e.g. parallel domestic pressures for special investment tax treatment, aid to education, etc. These pressures must be taken into account when deciding on similar international programs. —effective coordination will entail both general policy guidance and operational coordination, to mesh the activities of the separate U.S. organizations and U.S. programs with those of the international agencies; —development and security programs must be related to each other in countries where, as is the usual case, we pursue both objectives; —it is unclear how the cabinet-level International Development Council and its supporting staff would relate to the National Security Council; —if the White House Coordinator is to be more than an advisory coordinator and strategist, is it intended that he have decision-making power in the areas of responsibility of the Secretaries of State and Treasury. Relationship to Latin American Policy (Issue 24, pp. 49-58) The U.S. economic assistance relationship to Latin America will be the most important expression of U.S. policy in the hemisphere in the years ahead. While the substantive policy thrust of the Task Force Report is consistent with your Latin American initiatives, its organizational proposals may create problems with: —the “one-window” policy you have stressed as the framework for our hemisphere relationships, including the role of the new Under Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs; 4 —effective administration of a U.S. bilateral assistance effort geared to the special Alliance for Progress relationship; —more effective U.S. efforts toward strengthening the already substantial inter-American multilateral assistance machinery. Organizational Recommendations If the rationale for separate institutions, discussed above, is accepted, there remain certain subsidiary but important issues of organization. These are outlined below and discussed in more detail in the NSC Issues Paper. A. The U.S. International Development Bank (Issues 9-17, pp. 18-37) The Development Bank proposal reflects the Task Force belief that development lending should be separated from current political issues although it does recognize that the United States has a strong foreign policy interest in the geographic distribution of aid. We believe that the suggested framework for the Bank has merit and could be an important element in focusing public support on the development aspects of our foreign assistance program. The advantages of a “banking approach” are: —multiyear authority and programming; —a clearer image of strict economic criteria; —a structure that would more readily accompany the shift of LDC’s themselves and multilateral institutions to the center of the development process. There are important questions of technique, appropriation and budget treatment. While a bank can be proposed without resolving all these questions, these issues are likely to be of great interest to the Congress. Problems relating to the management and financial structure suggested by the Task Force are spelled out in the issues paper. One particular problem is that a “bank” might indicate Banking and Currency Committee jurisdiction in the House and a bypassing of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 5 A number of issues center on whether an institution with a “banking” focus is a flexible enough instrument to accomplish the broad development purposes of a bilateral development program. Changes are suggested in the annex to correct these deficiencies. For example, some technical assistance grant funds—limited in amount and for clearly defined purposes—might be needed in the Bank. Any moves away from the banking approach for development purposes might mean a loss of public appeal and Congressional support for the “new approach” to deal with the “new situation” of the 1970s. On the other hand, strict adherence to the “banking approach” might limit the Bank’s ability to respond to LDC development needs. If the banking approach is followed, it will be important to draw a clear distinction between the developmental, concessionary lending of the new bank and the harder-term, export financing performed by the Export-Import Bank. While EX-IM activities in developing countries related to U.S. exports contribute to development, efforts would have to be made to avoid any overlap or confusion by emphasizing the concessionary terms of the Development Bank. B. The U.S. International Development Institute (Issues 18-23, pp. 38-48) If it is accepted that an adequate technical assistance function is incorporated in the Bank, 6 there is little debate on the validity of a separate Development Institute, particularly if it is focused on scientific, technological and professional sectors. The Institute should operate along the lines of the National Science Foundation. The Institute should focus on research and training activities in the United States and abroad and on social development programs, including family planning. It would operate principally through grants to private organizations in the United States and abroad, and include similar current programs such as grants to American schools and hospitals abroad. It would also handle technical cooperation activities with countries not requiring concessional assistance. Significant issues relate to appropriate coordination with other bilateral and multilateral technical assistance (UNDP) programs, Congressional vulnerability of the Peterson suggestion for “endowing” the Institute, and the role it should play in supporting social development projects designed to assure popular participation. C. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation The Peterson Task Force endorses this Corporation, authorized by Congress in the FY-1970 Foreign Assistance Act as an effective instrument in encouraging U.S. private investment activities in developing countries. There are no major issues on the organization of OPIC. D. Security Affairs, Department of State (Issues 6-8, pp. 13-17) The Peterson Task Force proposes that the Department of State provide policy guidance and coordinate all security assistance programs, including military grants, military credit sales, public safety, supporting assistance programs and the Contingency Fund. The Department would administer the last three; DOD the first two. The major problems are flagged on page 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] and relate to formulating a coherent defensible “new” program. The remaining issues are in the area of coordination and operational effectiveness. These are subsidiary to the crucial question of obtaining Congressional support for a long-term, flexible security program. E. U.S. International Development Council (Issue 24, pp. 49-58) This Council is intended to provide a focus for development concerns and interrelated aid, trade and investment policies. It would assure consistency among U.S. development programs, and between U.S. programs and positions taken in international forums. The Chairman of the Council would be appointed by the President, served by a small staff, and located in the White House. However, as discussed on page 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] , the proposal fails to relate these development concerns closely to other aspects of domestic economic and foreign policy and does not meet the need for relating security and development programs to each other, even though in most countries where we pursue security objectives we pursue development objectives as well. Alternative coordinating arrangements are discussed on pages 49–58 [ Pgs. 49–58 include portions of Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , and Doc. 25 ] of the annexed issues paper. Other Issues In addition to these major conceptual and organizational issues the NSC might wish to discuss some additional items for possible inclusion in your aid message. These might include the following: 1. Population. The Task Force recommends that we call for an international study of the population problem, led by the UN Fund for Population, to define assistance requirements in this area more clearly. There is no dissent from that recommendation. However, it is not certain that UN institutions can make this survey when many members still oppose population programs. 2. Debt Relief. (Issue 48, pp. 94-95) The Task Force suggests international action to devise a strategy for long-term debt relief for countries likely to have a serious debt service problem in the next decade. NSDM 41 7 established a group under Treasury leadership. While their report to you may turn up interagency disagreements on details, there is general agreement with the main thrust of the Peterson suggestion, namely that the debt service problem should be treated as a part of total development strategy, be approached multilaterally, but undoubtedly will need to be applied on a case-by-case basis. 3. Aid Untying. (Issues 46 and 47, pp. 90-93) The Peterson Group suggests that we initiate multilateral action for general untying, unilaterally permit LDC’s to participate in providing goods and services under U.S. development loans (as was recently done for Latin America) and remove procurement restrictions in the U.S. investment guarantee program. The issue is the trade-off between U.S. balance of payments considerations and the advantages of using our assistance programs for development purposes (not for export promotion). There is the subsidiary issue of tactics and how we should encourage multilateral untying. 4. Administrative Flexibility . (Issues 38-41, pp. 81-85) While many administrative restrictions can be removed when new legislation is prepared, the Peterson Task Force specifically mentions that (a) the Hickenlooper Amendment has outlived its usefulness and (b) the provisions relating to penalties for the purchase of sophisticated military equipment are unduly rigid and not consistent with your concept of a mature partnership. There is virtually no dissent among agencies that these “barnacles” should be lopped off and further encrustations resisted. Those who criticize what they consider to be the arrogant use of U.S. power are often responsible for the arrogant use of our foreign assistance program to impose a particular U.S. point of view. Illustrative List of Follow-Up Studies It is suggested that the USC be instructed to initiate studies along the following lines: 1. Financial Implications (appropriation levels for bilateral and multilateral development assistance; projected funding for security and other programs). 2. Security Assistance (implications of separate rationale and organization). 3. Development Bank (management and financial structure, functions, method of operation). 4. Development Institute (management, financing, functions, method of operation). 5. Financing of International Programs (UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, etc.). 6. Legislative Implications (Hickenlooper and other restrictive amendments; relation to FMCS, PL-480). 7. Assistance to the Private Sector (III A, ownership, U.S. investment restraints, tax incentives, guarantees). 8. Untying . 9. Debt . 10. PL -480 (terms, export flexibility). 11. Latin American Policy (the new assistance organization and cohesive country programming, a possible distinctive organizational arrangement for Latin America, the effect on hemispheric multilateral assistance mechanisms, the consequences for the existing separate Alliance for Progress). 12. Role of the Inspector General . Elliot 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45. Confidential. Attached to a March 27 memorandum from NSC Secretariat Director Jeanne Davis to the members of the NSC informing them the paper would be the basis for discussion at the NSC meeting on foreign assistance on April 8. The meeting was ultimately canceled. 2 Numbers in parentheses refer to the issues and pages in the annexed NSC Issues Paper. [Footnote in the source text. The 101-page NSC Issues Paper is not printed.] 3 The Export-Import Bank would also wish consideration to be given to having DOD assume full responsibility for financing the sale of military items to the developed as well as the developing countries. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 Expressed in the President’s address on Latin American policy on October 31, 1969. See Document 122 . 5 International development bank bills in the Senate now go to the Foreign Relations Committee for authorization. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 This might include retaining the means for conducting technical assistance programs where they now exist, even though we may later choose to cut back some of these programs as suggested by Peterson. Having this facility in the Bank could ease adjustments in areas such as Africa where our technical assistance efforts are often the only visible sign of U.S. interest in development. [Footnote in the source text.] 7 Entitled “Debt Service,” dated February 18, 1970. 132. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (DuBridge) to President Nixon 132. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (DuBridge) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 26, 1970. SUBJECT The Peterson Report As you know I have long been interested in our technical assistance programs overseas. I strongly supported the recent establishment of a separate Technical Assistance Bureau within AID. 2 I have examined with keen interest the report of Mr. Peterson’s Task Force on International Development. I found it an illuminating and constructive document for which the authors deserve great praise. The analysis of technical assistance is of particular value. As the report points out, the United States is no longer the principal source of foreign assistance and other developed countries can be expected to continue to increase their efforts in the future. As our share of capital assistance declines, it is all the more important that the quality of our technical assistance measures up to our position of world leadership in the areas of science, technology and research. The past and present mechanisms in AID have not produced the desired result. We have not been able to tap the vast resources of highly trained scientists available in this country for foreign assistance. A move to place technical assistance in an institution where it can receive the full-time, top-level professional and managerial attention it requires is long overdue. Such was the conclusion of an extensive study made by the President’s Science Advisory Committee in 1968. The proposed U.S. International Development Institute is well-conceived and should be established. It is timely in view of the pressing need to raise the technical capabilities of the developing countries to cope with the problems arising from population pressures and the resulting strains on the world food supply and the environment. I fully support the contention that “the United States should seek to operate these programs more as a private foundation would.” I concur that the International Development Institute should base its programs on agreements with participating countries on specific goals, cost-sharing arrangements and on plans for the country to eventually take over total program responsibilities. To accomplish these objectives, the Institute should be a professionally competent management organization that develops agreements, and arranges for the initiation and performance of broad assistance programs by industry, universities or appropriate Federal agencies. This arrangement is in contrast to the project-oriented system that characterizes many of our technical assistance efforts currently. Another recommendation of the Peterson Report calls for changing the current practice of terminating technical assistance to a country whenever concessional development loans end. This was agreed in principle at the National Security Council meeting on foreign assistance a year ago. 3 Dr. Hannah has developed an interim program within AID for dealing with this problem within existing resources. The new Institute proposed by Mr. Peterson would provide a long-term solution. In the meantime, it would be desirable to make United States technical competence more readily available on a reimbursable basis to the developing countries that can afford to pay. There appear to be many countries where such possibilities exist and where the results can profoundly influence national development. I have discussed this with Secretary Rogers and recommendations for a practical program to this end will be ready soon for your consideration. In an even broader context, the Institute (I prefer a broader name such as the United States Institute for International Cooperation and Development) could also become the principal focus for other programs currently outside the economic aid sphere such as exchange activities sponsored or supported by the Government. The Department of State, as well as other agencies, has had increasing difficulty in securing funds from the Congress for these purposes, and the resulting decrease in our international exchanges is, I believe, not in the best interest of this country. The movement of professors, researchers, teachers, students and important leaders in any field between the United States and other countries is all part of a single process of constructive United States interaction with changing societies abroad, regardless of the precise stage of development of those societies. It is as valid for our relations with Germany and Japan as for West Africa. The key to more effective technical assistance and more effective exchanges is better management. The Institute offers promise, if properly established and staffed, of providing that broad management capability. You have frequently spoken to me of your desire to further cooperative relationships in science and technology with other countries. This Institute could fill the institutional gap in the Government for managing these relationships. An important aspect will be the ability to draw on competence in the private sector—universities, industries and professional societies. The proposed institutional form is appropriate to this task. As you said in your February 18 statement on foreign policy, 4 we need “new forms of international cooperation.” The Institute proposed by the Peterson Report, particularly in the broadened context, responds to your challenge in a forthright, imaginative and exciting manner. Lee A. DuBridge 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Task Forces on AID. No classification marking. According to a note by Kissinger on an attached April 1 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger, this memorandum did not go forward to the President. 2 On January 8 AID Administrator Hannah sent Secretary Rogers a note informing him the Technical Assistance Bureau had been established on September 22, 1969. He attached a report summarizing its first 3 months of operation. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 8) 3 Reference is to the March 26, 1969, NSC meeting; see Document 5 . 4 See footnote 5, Document 23 . 133. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 133. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 17, 1970. SUBJECT State Department Position on Foreign Assistance Review We have studied the many issues involved in the reappraisal of our foreign assistance programs. I welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters with you and my NSC colleagues in our meeting on April 21. I feel it would be useful, however, if I set out very briefly in written form the details of my position on what our new foreign assistance program should be. A. Policy Guidelines 1. The United States should commit itself to a continued foreign assistance program for LDC’s on a higher scale than now prevailing. 2. The U.S. has previously supported a level of aid target of 1 per cent of GNP for public plus private flows. For tactical reasons, we should not reverse this position but, in supporting the target, we should stress that recipient as well as donor countries have important responsibilities for achieving higher levels of development progress. 3. Foreign policy and practical reasons dictate the maintenance of an important bilateral program while at the same time we give support to an increasing utilization of multilateral agencies for aid purposes. B. Organization of Development Assistance 1. We should organize our long-term development assistance programs in a bank-type institution. The Bank should be responsible for technical assistance related to its lending, and for certain categories of grant technical assistance to other governments. 2. Coordination of development aid with other foreign affairs activities of the U.S. Government should be achieved by virtue of the Board membership of the Bank. Such representation should include the appropriate Departments and Agencies, with the Secretary of State as Chairman in order to ensure foreign policy guidance, coordination with security assistance, and coordination in field implementation. 3. We should create a separate International Scientific and Social Development Institute. This Institute would keep some distance from the more operational foreign assistance programs and concentrate on research directed toward the transfer of scientific and technological knowledge to LDC’s and on social development activities (Title IX, among others). Relations between the Institute and the LDC’s would be, insofar as possible, on a non-governmental plane: foundations, universities, private research organizations, etc. 4. OPIC should be continued in its present form as an independent entity in encouraging private investment flows to the LDC’s. C. Security Assistance There should be established under State Department authority in a single piece of legislation a single security program to include MAP, military sales (administered by DOD) and the present supporting assistance and public safety program (administered by State). Coordination between development assistance, as carried out in the proposed Bank, and security assistance would be achieved through State chairmanship of the Bank Board and State policy and operational control over the security assistance program. D. Contingency Fund A substantial Contingency Fund should be available for varied foreign policy uses, such as emergency disaster assistance, unforeseen public order or military assistance requirements. This Fund would be appropriated to you and then assigned to the Secretary of State for such other disposition as appropriate. E. Latin America The above views are not entirely consistent with the “one window” concept for Latin America enunciated in your October 31 speech. 2 This difference can be reconciled by providing for a sub-committee of the NSC (parallel to the Under Secretaries Committee) to deal with all Latin American matters and by the Assistant Secretary (or new Under Secretary for Hemisphere Affairs) sitting as a member of the Bank Board when Latin American matters are discussed. F. Relation to Peterson Committee Recommendations The above position is by and large consistent with the Peterson recommendations, except on four important points: 1. On targets, Peterson proposes that we scrap our support of the 1 per cent of GNP target which the United States Government has consistently supported since 1965. I see nothing to be gained, and much to lose, in this suggested departure, particularly in the UN context. The 1 per cent target contains no specific timetable and thus is not a definite commitment for U.S. action. It is, however, considered helpful by other donor countries in terms of their public opinion and, of course, it has a great symbolic importance to the LDC’s. 3 2. The Peterson recommendation tends to treat bilateral development assistance as a diminishing and residual part of our contribution to international development programs. I strongly disagree. It seems to me that the United States has special foreign policy interests and relationships (for example, in Latin America, Indonesia, Southeast Asia) or special functional interests (private sector promotion, population, agricultural productivity, etc.) which can only be supported by an effective bilateral effort. Peterson appears to recognize this when he suggests setting up a development bank but I believe that the rationale has got to be presented in a much more straight-forward and convincing fashion. We need a bilateral development program as an integral part of our foreign affairs establishment. There is no other way of assuring that vital U.S. foreign policy and security interests can be met through the use of a development tool. 3. I have suggested that the Bank take on most of the government-to-government technical assistance activities and leave to the Institute the more innovative, and perhaps more risky from a foreign policy point of view, people-to-people programs suggested by Peterson. I agree with most of our development experts who feel very strongly that development lending and technical assistance to other governments should not be separated. I accept, however, the need for an institution oriented toward problem-solving, research and technology along the lines of the Fascell Institute now incorporated in our foreign assistance legislation. 4. Finally, on the subject of coordination, Peterson recommends a White House Coordinator and a Development Council. I do not believe that such a structure would serve your purposes well. If we have learned anything over the last twenty years, it is that there should not be a fragmentation and proliferation of programs and controls but rather a firm coordination, both here in Washington and in our missions in the field. We have adequate means through the NSC and the NAC to bring policy issues and differences to you for decision without adding a whole new structure of machinery. I have suggested that the Bank Board under State chairmanship is the way to assure the coordination and unity of purpose that you wish to see in our development efforts and in our more general foreign policy and security programs. If you feel that it is desirable to have additional independent advice on development matters, I suggest that you may wish to consider the establishment of an Advisory Council on Development Assistance in the Executive Offices. Such a council could be made up, for example, of three distinguished citizens who could provide advice on aid policies generally and report directly to you. But this body should have no operational responsibilities. G. Your Message to the Congress As we all recognize, the Congress will play a crucial role in the final shaping of our new program. I recommend that your message focus clearly on new directions and operating principles, while leaving some flexibility with respect to the specifics of institutions. These specifics, which we will be embodying in a piece of legislation next fall, may look very different to us after reflecting on our Congressional consultations. The important thing is to obtain, through discussion with the appropriate Congressional Committees and among the general public, a new American commitment to development and security programs for the 70’s. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45. Confidential. Attached to an April 20 memorandum from Arthur Hartman (S/PC) providing copies to interested State Department offices and informing them that the NSC meeting scheduled for April 21 had been postponed indefinitely. The State Department’s views on the foreign assistance program were not sent to the President until mid-July; see Document 134 . 2 See Document 122 . 3 Regarding these targets, see Documents 26 and 38 . 134. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 134. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 14, 1970. SUBJECT The New U.S. Foreign Aid Program Issue Your message to Congress outlining your new foreign aid program will be ready for submission shortly. 2 Your decisions are therefore needed now on several issues which are disagreed among the agencies. Peterson Program All agencies agree that our new foreign assistance program should incorporate most of the recommendations of the Peterson Task Force (summary at Tab A) including: —Clear separation of our program into its three component parts: security assistance, to promote our short-run political objectives; humanitarian assistance; and assistance to economic and social development, to promote our long-term interest in a more peaceful world. —A new aid role for the U.S., in which we support the initiatives of others rather than seek to dominate the international development process. —Maximum possible freedom of our development assistance from short-term political objectives, mainly through increasing our use of multilateral channels. —Creation of a U.S. Development Bank and a U.S. Development Institute, replacing AID, to carry out the new thrusts of our bilateral development assistance program. —Emphasis on non-financial programs as an integral part of our development assistance: tariff preferences for LDC exports and other trade measures; untying of aid, to improve its quality and reduce political frictions; debt rescheduling; family planning; and concrete steps to promote private enterprise in the LDCs. Extent of Multilateralization The key substantive issue is the extent to which we should seek to multilateralize our development assistance. Peterson recommends that we multilateralize as much as possible immediately, to pursue the new international thrust of our development effort and to divorce our development aid from short-term political objectives. Peterson takes no explicit position on the eventual extent of multilateralization. However, he recommends that our remaining bilateral program be regarded as a diminishing residual. His logic thus points to complete multilateralization when the international institutions and the other donor countries are ready for it. There are three variants on this theme which you could announce in your message: —A target of complete multilateralization by a fixed date, probably 1975. —A target of complete multilateralization with no date. —A target of complete multilateralization of development assistance appropriations by 1975, retaining the option of a bilateral lending program thereafter with repayments on old loans and the other authorities to use non-appropriated funds recommended by Peterson for the new Development Bank. State recommends (Tab B) 3 that we retain an important bilateral development assistance program indefinitely while supporting an increasing use of the multilateral agencies. They feel that we will always need a strong bilateral program to pursue our special regional and functional interests. I recommend that you set 1975 as a target date for complete multilateralization of all U.S. development assistance appropriations. This approach would achieve the Peterson objective of internationalizing our aid effort, while also meeting State’s position by retaining a significant bilateral development assistance effort as well as a strong bilateral security assistance program: —We have already multilateralized about 50 percent of our development aid appropriations. It is thus impossible to multilateralize much further and retain a sizable bilateral program from appropriated funds, unless Congress were to increase total aid appropriations far beyond present (and anticipated) levels. —An indication that we intend to completely multilateralize our aid appropriations, if not our total development assistance, thus becomes virtually necessary to set a truly new course. Anything less would imply a slowdown of the multilateral shift, raising serious doubts about our efforts to depoliticize development lending and jeopardizing the image of newness of the entire program. —Setting such a target is the best way to galvanize the international institutions to gear up to play the leadership role we want them to assume. —We could still promote our regional interests readily, by altering our contributions among the various international institutions: the Inter-American Development Bank for Latin America, the Asian Development Bank for Southeast Asia, etc. —We could still promote our special functional interests readily, through our other bilateral institutions: the Overseas Private Investment Corporation for private enterprise, the new Development Institute for family planning and agriculture, etc. —Over-all Congressional support would probably be maximized by maximizing multilateralization, though some key Congressmen in the aid area will oppose it vigorously. —By retaining the option of a bilateral lending capacity with non-appropriated funds, this approach retains a great deal of flexibility. We would, of course, always retain a sizable bilateral program of security assistance. Recommendation: That you indicate that the U.S. hopes to be able to channel all of its appropriated funds for development assistance through multilateral institutions by 1975. Bill Timmons concurs. Approve 4 Disapprove, prefer objective of complete multilateralization but with no target date. 5 Disapprove, prefer no statement on eventual extent of multilateralization. Management of U.S. Development Aid Effort There is agency disagreement on two aspects of the organizational structure of our new development assistance program. Peterson , supported by Budget and Dr. Hannah personally, 6 recommends that: —The new U.S. Development Bank, which all agencies agree should replace AID, be managed by an independent president reporting directly to you and by a Board of Directors comprising Government officials and private citizens. —We create an International Development Council, chaired by a new Presidential Assistant in the White House, to plan our overall development strategy and coordinate the numerous programs involved in it (Treasury for the multilateral lending institutions, the Special Trade Representative and Commerce for trade matters, Agriculture for PL-480, the Export-Import Bank for debt rescheduling, the Peace Corps, and the three new institutions—OPIC, the Development Bank, and the Development Institute). State recommends that you install the Secretary of State as Chairman of the Board of the Development Bank. 7 They would coordinate all development activities through the Bank, obviating the need for a Development Council. Treasury supports the Peterson proposals, except for recommending that the President chair the Development Council himself with operational coordination run through existing Treasury-chaired committees. 8 The Ash Council will shortly recommend that you create a new coordinating council for all foreign economic policy, including foreign assistance, chaired by a Presidential Assistant in the White House. 9 It would pursue the same objectives as the Peterson proposal, but link foreign assistance with trade and monetary policy in a broader coordinating body. I recommend that you adopt the Peterson and Ash proposals to create a Coordinating Council chaired by a new Presidential Assistant in the White House. It would operate at the Under Secretary level and receive its general policy guidance on aid issues from the National Security Council. I recommend that you leave open whether the Council coordinate development assistance alone or over-all foreign economic policy until you can consider the recommendations of the Ash Council. Whatever your decisions on the Ash proposals, it is clear that aid issues badly need coordination and the Peterson-Ash approach would give us an organization parallel to the NSC to provide it. The State approach would essentially replicate AID, jeopardizing the depoliticization of the new lending institutions and thus jeopardizing the image of newness of the whole program. Recommendations (The Ash Council concurs): 1. That the new Development Bank be run by an independent President, reporting directly to you; 2. That its Board of Directors include private citizens as well as Government officials; 3. That a new coordinating council, chaired by a Presidential Assistant in the White House, be created to coordinate the various facets of our development assistance program—either alone or with the rest of foreign economic policy, pending the Ash Council recommendations. It would operate under the general policy guidance of the National Security Council on aid issues. The Ash Council concurs. Approve 10 Prefer State approach: the Secretary of State to chair an all-Government board of directors for the Bank, with no Development Council Prefer Treasury approach: President to chair Council, with operations coordinated through Treasury Management of Security Assistance Program Peterson , supported by State, recommends that we set up a single security assistance program including MAP, military credit sales (FMCS), disposal of surplus military stocks, our economic assistance for security-related programs (“supporting assistance”), perhaps the public safety program, and the contingency fund. State would set policy for the program and coordinate its operation. Administration of MAP, FMCS and surplus disposal would be left with Defense. Defense recommends that MAP and FMCS be located completely in Defense. 11 Their objective is to avoid the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which would have authority over a combined security assistance program but would not, of course, over DOD’s own budget. The other aspects of security assistance would then be distributed among the other agencies. I have talked to Secretary Laird, who thinks we could win a battle to get MAP/FMCS out of Foreign Relations. Bill Timmons thinks the outcome would be uncertain. Everyone agrees that such a proposal would touch off a furious fight—especially in Foreign Relations but also in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which have commitments to get back the military assistance now in the Defense budget (Vietnam, Laos, Thailand) and would vigorously resist the loss of jurisdiction. Our making the proposal might therefore jeopardize the whole new foreign assistance effort, like the Taiwan jets did on a smaller scale last year, although Timmons doubts that Fulbright could block the whole program and is less concerned about the House. Putting MAP/FMCS in Defense would preclude the extremely desirable Peterson-proposed effort to better coordinate all aspects of our security assistance via a single security assistance program; leave supporting assistance to stand alone in State, which would raise major problems in getting Congressional support for it; and shift to Defense the present major authority now given the Secretary of State for MAP. However, our requests for MAP/FMCS would clearly fare better in the Armed Services Committee; if successful, this approach would obviate our having to move Southeast Asia MAP back to Foreign Relations/Foreign Affairs; and the approach could lead to better developed tradeoffs between MAP/FMCS and our own overseas military expenditures. Recommendation: The choice on this issue rests on whether we are willing to touch off a major battle on the Hill in an effort to get better receptivity for our MAP/FMCS requests, recognizing that the effort might not succeed and that there could be serious costs for the rest of the new assistance program whether or not it does. Include MAP/FMCS in a new security assistance program comprising all related programs, under the policy guidance of State and with DOD continuing to administer both, as proposed by Peterson and supported by State and Budget. Propose to Congress that MAP/FMCS be included in the Defense budget with other security assistance programs divided among the other agencies, as proposed by DOD. 12 Implementation of New Program Finally, we must decide how to put the new program into effect: —To work out the myriad of details involved and get them into legislative form; —To handle Congressional consultations prior to, and following, the submission of legislation next January. There are four alternatives: —AID. Dr. Hannah has asked to be given the mandate, has now got some good people, and will have to be relied upon for many of the details anyway. However, it would be extremely curious for AID to preside over its own burial, and its interests and expertise are neither sufficiently widespread to handle the non-financial issues (trade, debt rescheduling, etc.) nor very sensitive to foreign policy considerations. —State. This would assure foreign policy control. However, it would risk the credibility of the new, depoliticized nature of the development part of the program and State is not staffed sufficiently to do the job alone anyway. —The Budget Bureau. They have a fair amount of expertise but are distant from foreign policy and do not feel adequate to do the job alone. —A special White House operation, using individuals from the agencies (and some people from outside) and calling in an outsider such as Peterson to head it up. This would assure foreign policy direction, White House leadership, and hence the talent to do the job. Recommendation: That we create a temporary White House operation to manage the creation of the new program, asking Peterson to head it up. Budget and Bill Timmons agree. Approve 13 Prefer AID Prefer State Prefer Budget Bureau Tab A 14 Summary of the Peterson Report Recommendations 1. The Report recommends a clear separation of the U.S. assistance program into three component parts to reflect the three different objectives we seek to promote through aid: —our short-term political and security interests, —our humanitarian interests, and —our interests in long-term economic development of less developed countries. 2. Our security assistance program should include military assist-ance, military credit sales, supporting assistance, and the contingency fund. The State Department should set policy for, direct, and coordinate the security assistance program, but administration of military grants, sales, and surplus disposal should be left with the Defense Department. 3. LDC development is in the U.S. national interest and our foreign assistance program should be as effective and efficient as possible in promoting this interest. It should not be influenced by short-term political goals. 4. Multilateral lending institutions, which are expanding in capacity and capability, should become the major channel for U.S. development assistance. At present, however, the U.S. should retain a bilateral program because other developed countries are not yet willing to multilateralize sufficiently and the institutions themselves cannot yet utilize the total amount of resources which this country provides. 5. In order to increase emphasis on the multilateral approach, the Report recommends that the U.S. take the lead in supporting an increase in the level of contributions to IDA from its present $400 million annually to $1 billion a year by 1972 and $1.5 billion by 1975. It also recommends that the U.S. support an increase in resources for the Inter-American Development Bank and an increase in capital in the International Finance Corporation. 6. To carry out our bilateral development program, Peterson recommends establishment of a new U.S. Development Bank, managed by a full-time President doubling as Chairman of a Board of Directors, which would include private citizens as well as public officials. The Bank should make loans for projects, sector programs, and general import requirements; finance related preinvestment and feasibility studies, and technical assistance activities related to its program. 7. The Bank should, in order to have bank-like autonomy, seek a $2 billion multi-year authorization and appropriation, be authorized to borrow $2 billion from the public to support its appropriated funds, (use receipts from old loans to subsidize the interest rate on these borrowed funds), and be authorized to guarantee foreign official borrowing on international capital markets as a transitional device to help countries to become independent of U.S. concessional lending. 8. The U.S. should place emphasis on the quality, structure, and style of its lending program as a major supplement to financial flows and should be free of legislative and administrative restrictions which make the administration of U.S. assistance inefficient. 9. The Peterson Report calls for international joint action to devise and implement a strategy for long-term solutions to the debt service problem over the next decade. 10. It recommends that all industrial countries should begin working toward an agreement to completely untie bilateral lending; until then, the U.S. should unilaterally permit goods and services financed under U.S. development loans to be purchased in all developing countries as well as in the U.S. 11. It recommends also elimination of the Hickenlooper Amendment, the Conte-Long restrictions concerning LDC arms purchases, all political restrictions on U.S. development assistance, and the administrative restrictions and political requirements which unnecessarily encumber the assistance program. 12. A U.S. International Development Institute should be set up as an independent government agency to bring U.S. science and technology to bear on the problems of development and help LDCs develop their own scientific and research capabilities. It should have a $1 billion authorization. 13. The report also recommends increased assistance to the private sector. The U.S. should seek to bring into operation the proposed International Investment Insurance Agency, as soon as the minimum number of countries agree; use OPIC’s guarantee programs, in combination with those of other countries, to encourage international joint ventures; and eliminate restraints on U.S. direct private investment in developing countries. 14. The report recommends that U.S. economic policies toward the LDCs be coordinated by a White House Coordinator, chairing a Cabinet-level International Development Council. The Council and Coordinator would formulate overall U.S. development strategies and assert the importance of the development objective in the formulation of all U.S. policies affecting LDCs. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70. Confidential. 2 The message went to Congress on September 15; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 745-756. 3 See Document 133 . 4 Next to this option the President wrote: “no I’m not so sure—a target date might not be in our interests.” 5 The President initialed this option. 6 In an April 22 memorandum to the President on AID’s position on foreign assistance renewal, Hannah proposed that the Bank be headed by a President under the general supervision of a Board of Directors chaired by the Secretary of State. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID Volume II 1/70-8/10/70) Hannah’s memorandum is attached to a May 23 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon regarding the latter’s meeting with Hannah on May 25. According to Kissinger, Hannah strongly supported using the Peterson Report to stimulate a fundamental reappraisal of foreign assistance and he was “particularly firm on the need for independence —from State Department control—of the new Development Bank [but was] circumscribed in saying so openly because of AID’s present location in State.” Kissinger and Hannah met with President Nixon on May 25. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 7 See Document 133 . 8 On March 31 Volcker sent Secretary Kennedy a memorandum on “Peterson Report Matters” that supported this position. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the President, January-April 1970) Volcker’s memorandum is attached to an April 3 memorandum from Kennedy to the President fully endorsing Volcker’s views and cautioning against any weakening of Treasury Department responsibilities. 9 The President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization, know as the Ash Council after its chairman Roy Ash, was appointed by President Nixon on April 5, 1969, to review the organization of the Executive Branch. The Council proposed major changes in the organization of the Executive Office of the President, including the establishment of OMB, which were instituted in Reorganization Plan 2 of 1970, effective July 1, 1970. Documentation on the Council’s activities is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ehrlichman Files, Box 32, Executive Office Reorganization. 10 The President initialed this option. 11 This position is set out in a May 6 memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to the President. Laird supported the Peterson recommendation that security assistance be legislatively separated from development and humanitarian assistance, and believed there was a reasonable chance to obtain Congressional approval for putting MAP and FMS into the Defense Department budget. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70) 12 The President initialed both options. 13 The President initialed this option. 14 No classification marking. 135. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 135. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, August 4, 1970. SUBJECT Additional Issues on New Foreign Aid Program There are several additional issues which you need to decide for your forthcoming message to the Congress on our new foreign aid program. The message is scheduled for submission before the House recess begins on August 14. 2 Management of Security Assistance Program Peterson , supported by State 3 and Budget, recommends that we set up a single security assistance program to include military assistance (MAP), foreign military credit sales (FMCS), disposal of surplus military stocks, our economic assistance for security-related programs (“supporting assistance”), perhaps the public safety program, and the contingency fund. State would set policy for the program and coordinate its operation. Administration of MAP, FMCS and surplus disposal would be left with Defense. Defense recommends an alternative arrangement: that MAP and FMCS be located completely in Defense. Their objective is to avoid the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which would have authority over a combined security assistance program but would not, of course, over DOD’s own budget. The other aspects of security assistance would then be distributed among the other agencies. The Peterson/State/Budget proposal approach for a single security assistance program would: —Enable us to better coordinate all aspects of our security assistance, trading off military and supporting assistance in countries such as Korea. —Avoid shifting to Defense the major authority presently held by the Secretary of State for MAP. —Avoid leaving supporting assistance standing alone in State, raising major problems in getting Congressional support for this program, which is extremely important in Vietnam and other trouble spots. The Defense proposal to move MAP/FMCS into the Defense budget, if successful , would: —Improve the likelihood of getting favorable Congressional response to future requests for MAP funding. —Avoid the risk of eventually having to move Southeast Asia MAP back into the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committee. (Military assistance to Vietnam, Laos and Thailand is now in the DOD budget, but the shift was based on an agreement to return it to regular MAP as soon as possible.) —Lead to better development of tradeoffs between MAP/FMCS and our own overseas military expenditures. I have talked to Secretary Laird, who thinks we could win a battle to get MAP/FMCS out of Foreign Relations. Bill Timmons thinks the outcome would be uncertain. Everyone agrees that such a proposal would touch off a furious fight—especially in Foreign Relations but also in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which have commitments to get back the military assistance now in the Defense budget (Vietnam, Laos, Thailand) and would vigorously resist the loss of jurisdiction. Our making the proposal might therefore jeopardize the whole new foreign assistance effort, like the Taiwan jets did on a smaller scale last year, although Timmons doubts that Fulbright could block the whole program and is less concerned about the House. The choice on this issue rests on whether we are willing to touch off a major battle on the Hill in an effort to get better receptivity for our MAP/FMCS requests in the future, recognizing that the effort might not succeed and that there could be serious costs for the rest of the new assistance program whether or not it does. Recommendation: On balance, I recommend that we include MAP/FMCS in a new Security Assistance Act comprising all assistance programs pursuing U.S. security objectives, under the policy guidance of State and with DOD continuing to administer both, as proposed by Peterson and supported by State and Budget. This would leave them in the Foreign Relations/Foreign Affairs Committees. Approve 4 Disapprove, prefer to propose to Congress that MAP/FMCS be included in the Defense budget, with the other security assistance programs divided among other agencies, as proposed by DOD. 5 Balance of Payments Restraints on U.S. Investment in LDCs Peterson , supported by Commerce and CEA, recommends elimination of the current restraints on flows of private U.S. investment to the less developed countries, which were imposed in 1968 in an effort to protect the U.S. balance of payments. The move would take effect in 1971. Treasury and the Federal Reserve strongly oppose it at this time. 6 Under the present program, each U.S. firm can transfer U.S. funds abroad for investment in less developed countries at a rate no greater than 10 percent above its rate of transfers in 1965-1966. There is no limitation on the amount of actual investment, only on transfers of funds from the United States —firms can invest any amount which they can finance with foreign borrowings. Elimination of the direct investment controls: —Would be the best possible indication to the U.S. business community of our desire for U.S. private investment to play a major role in the development process. (This desire will be one of the major features of our new aid program.) —Might elicit some additional investment, since some firms may be (a) unable to borrow abroad or (b) unwilling to pay the higher interest costs of doing so, and (c) since the red tape of the present program would be removed. —Would be a significant step toward your stated objective of eliminating the capital controls program altogether. —In strongly opposing elimination of the controls at this time, Treasury and the Federal Reserve argue that: —Elimination would adversely affect our balance of payments by several hundred million dollars annually, because U.S. outflows would replace borrowings abroad which would occur otherwise, in addition to a one-time cost as previous foreign borrowings of $1.6 billion are paid off over time. —In view of the present large deficit in our balance of payments, such a step would seriously undermine foreign confidence in our resolve to solve our payments problem. Foreign monetary authorities might become unwilling to finance our deficit by holding dollars. In addition, their unwillingness to support our efforts to further reform the monetary system (and help our own payments position), through increased flexibility of exchange rates, might be increased. —It would be possible to limit the balance of payments loss, but doing so would require maintaining or even increasing the amount of red tape under the program, thereby obviating one of the major pros of taking the step. —The step would probably not promote any significant increase in private investment in the LDCs, since most firms can borrow abroad to pursue virtually all of their desired investments. Both the pros and cons of the proposed action are largely psychological. Elimination of the controls would clearly signal your intent to promote private investment as an integral part of our development assistance. On the other hand, foreign monetary authorities might regard the step as “further proof” that the U.S. had no intention of attempting to control its balance of payments deficits. In real terms, it is unlikely that the measure would significantly increase either U.S. private investment in the LDCs or the magnitude of our balance of payments problem. Recommendation: That you not make any decision now to eliminate the balance of payments controls on U.S. direct investment outflows for 1971. Treasury, State, and the Federal Reserve recommend this position. Approve 7 Disapprove, prefer to announce now that we will eliminate the controls in 1971, as recommended by Peterson and supported by Commerce and CEA Overseas Staffing of New Development Bank Peterson recommends that the new Development Bank should operate with a “minimum of field representatives.” His report, however, did not define “minimum” or indicate what functions should be centralized in Washington. There are essentially three alternatives: —Centralize all operations in Washington, as now done by the Export-Import Bank, with field visits by Washington personnel when necessary to help prepare project proposals. This would permit a major reduction of overseas U.S. personnel and place desirable pressure on borrowing countries to assume more responsibility for preparing their own projects, perhaps at the cost of reducing the quality of these project proposals for a while. —Centralize loan operations in Washington but station technical advisers overseas to help develop projects, as necessary, on the grounds that the LDCs and international organizations cannot yet do the whole job themselves. This would still permit significant reductions of our overseas staffing but phase out our advisory functions more gradually. —Have the Bank retain the same functions as present AID personnel, though reducing their numbers. AID supports this approach, which would maintain a major U.S. assistance capacity within the LDCs and prevent any major reduction in overseas personnel, thus detracting from our basic thrust of shifting responsibility to the LDCs themselves. Recommendation: That you approve centralization of all operations of the new Development Bank in Washington, with technical advisors supplied only via field visits. This is the option most consistent with the Peterson recommendation. Approve 8 Prefer to centralize most operations in Washington but station advisers overseas for project development as needed. Prefer to retain the present AID approach, on a reduced scale, as proposed by AID. Hickenlooper Amendment Peterson , supported by State, recommends that our new aid legislation exclude the Hickenlooper amendment. Instead, we would work actively to find and utilize international forums to resolve expropriation disputes. The presentation of completely new aid legislation provides a unique opportunity to eliminate the Hickenlooper amendment without seeking its elimination from existing legislation. Avoiding it in the future would: —Increase our flexibility to deal with expropriation disputes, which of course always includes the possibility of cutting off aid. —Would be of major political significance to the LDCs, particularly in Latin America where it is widely regarded as the economic version of a “big stick” U.S. policy. —Would further improve our relations with Peru, and perhaps make it easier for the GOP to eventually settle the IPC issue. —Encourage our seeking multilateral means to resolve expropriation disputes. The disadvantages of the move would be: —Some feeling in the business community that we were weakening our resolve to protect U.S. private investment. —Some Congressional opposition, on similar grounds. —An apparent backdown in the IPC dispute with Peru (though there has been no pressure from Congress or Jersey Standard to apply Hickenlooper in the case). The Hickenlooper amendment has certainly not helped us protect U.S. private investment in the past, and it may have even made settlement of disputes more difficult by representing a heavy-handed U.S. threat. Its image as a weapon of U.S. economic imperialism is widespread. If strong Congressional opposition to its complete elimination were to develop, however, we could still eliminate most of its present problems by falling back to (a) elimination of its present mandatory six-month time limit for application of sanctions and to (b) simply requiring the President “to take into account” expropriations when determining U.S. aid levels. Recommendation: I therefore recommend that our new aid legislation (a) exclude the Hickenlooper amendment, (b) if major Congressional opposition develops, that we fall back to a Hickenlooper-type amendment which would require the President “to take into account” any foreign expropriations in determining U.S. aid levels but not include a mandatory time limit for sanctions. Bill Timmons concurs. Approve 9 Disapprove, prefer a middle course of originally proposing the fallback language—requiring the President “to take into account” the effect of expropriations on U.S. aid levels but with no mandatory time limit for sanctions 10 Disapprove, prefer to include Hickenlooper Amendment in new legislation Other Political “Barnacles” Over the years, Congress has written numerous restrictions into our foreign aid legislation. They include prohibitions on aid to unfriendly countries, countries assisting unfriendly countries, countries taking actions unfriendly to U.S. nationals, specific types of projects, and a wide range of miscellaneous prohibitions on aid to countries for various reasons. (A complete list of these “barnacles” is attached (Tab A).) 11 Peterson , reported by State, recommends that we include none of these limitations in our new aid legislation. I agree that most of the “barnacles” serve no positive purpose and represent an irritant in our relations with countries affected. However, some of them are consistent with our basic foreign policy objectives; none of them have provided serious practical problems; and all have at least some Congressional support. Recommendation: I therefore recommend that our new legislation eliminate all of the specific “barnacles” accumulated over the years, substituting for them a general provision authorizing the President to “take into account” the actions of other countries in determining which of them shall be eligible for U.S. assistance. Bill Timmons suggested this as the best way to meet the potential Congressional problem while avoiding substantive difficulties, and I agree. Approve 12 Disapprove, prefer to propose that present “barnacles” remain but that President “take account” of them rather than be required to apply them 13 Disapprove, prefer to propose continuation of the restrictions in present mandatory form (not simply requiring the President “to take account” of them) Other 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 193, AID, Volume II 1/70-8/10/70. No classification marking. The date is handwritten on the memorandum. 2 See footnote 2, Document 134 . 3 See Document 133 . Rogers sent another memorandum to the President on this subject on August 4, reaffirming his previous recommendation; see Document 30 . 4 The President wrote “no” next to this option. 5 The President wrote “yes” next to this option and added: “It is too dangerous to risk putting this under the Foreign Relations Committee. When we have a change in the Senate I shall reconsider.” This addressed the President’s earlier contradictory decision; see footnote 12, Document 134 . 6 This issue was discussed in a July 2 memorandum from Volcker to Secretaries Kennedy, Rogers, and Stans; Arthur Burns; Henry Kissinger; Paul McCracken; and George Shultz. Volcker noted that the matter was discussed in the Volcker Group on June 19 and there was a strong consensus that it would be undesirable at that time to make such an announcement. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, OASIA Central Files, World Files: FRC 56 86 A 24, World/1/544-555) 7 The President initialed this option. For additional documentation on foreign investment controls, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 31 , 33 , and 54 . 8 The President initialed this option and wrote “no” through the other two. 9 The President wrote “no” next to this option. 10 The President wrote “OK” next to this option. See also Document 31 and Documents 148 ff. 11 Not printed, but see Documents 9 – 11 and 31 . 12 The President wrote “no” next to this option. 13 The President wrote “yes” next to this option. 136. National Security Decision Memorandum 76 136. National Security Decision Memorandum 76 1 Washington, August 10, 1970. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Special Trade Representative The Director, Peace Corps The Director, U.S. Information Agency The Director, Office of Science and Technology The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness The President, Export-Import Bank SUBJECT The New U.S. Foreign Assistance Program Based on the recommendations contained in the report of the Peterson Task Force, the issues paper submitted by the Under Secretaries Committee, 2 and the memoranda submitted by several of you, 3 the President has made the following decisions concerning his new foreign assistance program. 1. General Philosophy a. The United States has a profound national interest in the social and economic development of the lower income countries. b. The new U.S. foreign assistance program should be separated clearly both in terms of objectives and organizations, into its three component parts: security assistance, humanitarian assistance, and development assistance. c. The United States, through its assistance programs, should henceforth seek to support the initiatives of other countries and the international development institutions rather than seek to dominate the development process. d. The levels and forms of U.S. development assistance should be determined by the needs of the lower income countries and the most effective ways in which we can help meet them. e. Our development assistance should be divorced from short-term U.S. foreign policy objectives. 2. Security Assistance a. The President has decided to consider further the rationale and organization of our security-related assistance programs before making a final decision on them. b. The Under Secretaries Committee should therefore study the alternatives available for using our security-related assistance programs in support of the Nixon Doctrine. It should also study the alternative organizational arrangements for military assistance, foreign military credit sales, disposal of excess military stocks, supporting assistance and the contingency fund. A paper developing options and recommendations on both issues should be submitted to the President by October 1. c. The Committee should also submit recommendations on whether the public safety program should be treated as a “security-related assistance program” and how it should be administered in the new assistance program. 3. Humanitarian Assistance a. U.S. assistance programs which seek to promote our humanitarian interests—child feeding, maternal feeding, disaster and emergency relief, and refugee relief—should be combined in an International Humanitarian Assistance Act. b. The Department of State should manage these programs, which should continue to rely heavily for their implementation on private organizations. 4. Development Assistance Policy a. The United States should seek to channel all of its development assistance through multilateral institutions as soon as practicable, in light of the capabilities of the institutions and without raising the U.S. share in them. b. The downward trend in the level of U.S. development assistance should be reversed, and the present level should be raised substantially. The U.S. will avoid any pledges to meet the international targets relating foreign assistance to GNP, but will seek to minimize damaging their usefulness to other donor countries. 5. Development Assistance Organization a. A. U.S. Development Corporation should be established as an independent government agency to carry out the U.S. bilateral development lending program. —The main criterion for use of Corporation resources should be their effectiveness in promoting development. There should be no attempt to relate Bank loans to short-term foreign policy considerations. —The Corporation should rely heavily on the efforts of the international institutions to provide the broad framework and country programs within which it considers individual loans. —The Corporation’s Board of Directors should include public officials and private citizens. The Corporation should have a full-time President, serving also as Chairman of the Board, who reports directly to the President. The Secretaries of State and Treasury should be ex-officio members of the Board. —The Corporation’s loan functions should be supplemented with authority to provide grant-financed technical assistance only for projects closely related to the Corporation’s lending operations. —The Corporation should be equipped with authority to borrow directly from the public to supplement its appropriated funds and to subsidize, with reflows from existing foreign assistance loans, interest rates on loans financed from its borrowed capital. —The Corporation should be authorized to guarantee foreign officials borrowing on international capital markets as a transitional device to help countries become independent of U.S. concessional lending. —The Corporation should seek authorizations on a multi-year basis, subject to annual appropriations. —The Corporation should centralize all of its loan operations in Washington, with technical advisors supplied only via field visits. b. A U.S. Development Institute should be established as an independent government agency to concentrate on bringing U.S. science and technology to bear on the problems of developing nations, help develop research capacity in the lower income countries, and help finance projects of private institutes working on social and economic problems in these areas. —The Institute should have primary responsibility for administering U.S. technical assistance programs abroad. —The Institute’s Board of Directors should include public officials and private citizens. It should be headed by an independent director, serving also as Chairman of the Board, who reports directly to the President. The Secretary of State should be an ex-officio member of the Board. —The Institute should seek authorizations on a multi-year basis, subject to annual appropriations. c. U.S. economic policies toward the lower income countries should be coordinated by an interagency Council or committee, at the Under Secretary level, chaired by a Presidential Assistant in the White House. The Council or committee should formulate and coordinate over-all U.S. development strategy, under the general policy guidance of the National Security Council. The President will make more specific decisions in the near future on the organization of this committee. A Western Hemisphere subcommittee should be established and chaired by the new Under Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, 4 inter alia to recommend a guideline for the approximate share of resources of the U.S. development institutions that would go to Latin America. 6. Other Issues a. The U.S. should henceforth permit goods and services financed under U.S. development loans to be purchased in any non-European lower income country (defined as any country with per capita income of less than $1000) eligible to receive U.S. assistance, as well as in the United States. —Such purchases should be permitted for any eligible product for which at least 50 percent of the components originates in the U.S. or other eligible country. —AID should henceforth use untied dollars, instead of dollar credits, to purchase local currencies where local currency financing is necessary. b. All procurement restrictions under the U.S. Extended Risk Guarantee Program should be removed. c. The U.S. should seek to bring into operation the proposed International Investment Insurance Agency as soon as the minimum number of countries agree to do so. d. We should propose that the Hickenlooper-type amendment in the new foreign assistance legislation: (i) avoid any mandatory time limit for application of sanctions and (ii) require only that the President “take into account” expropriations in determining country eligibility for U.S. assistance. e. The new legislation should require only that the President “take into account” the specific “political” restrictions in the present law, rather than be required to apply them. f. The new legislation should exclude procedural requirements which encumber the administration of the assistance program and reduce its flexibility, except for the 50-50 shipping requirement, the restrictions on sourcing of iron and steel products for Vietnam, and the limitations on the number and rank of Presidential appointees to the new institutions. Administrators will be accountable for achieving program objectives. g. The U.S. should continue to press for the establishment of a generalized system of tariff preferences in the markets of the industrialized countries for exports of lower income countries, as directed in NSDM 29 and NSDM 65. 5 h. The U.S. should recommend that the UN Fund for Population Activities undertake a study of world population problems and measures required to deal with them, as a top priority item in the Second Development Decade. 7. To manage the transition from present arrangements to the new program, a temporary office will be created in the White House. The office will be responsible for directing the preparation of the implementing legislation, which is to be submitted in January 1971, and for directing Congressional consultations on the new program. The President had directed that addressees give their full support to this office, and that they make personnel available to it as requested. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 76. Confidential. 2 See Document 131 . 3 See Documents 134 and 135 . 4 This was proposed in a memorandum from Charles A. Meyer to Richardson, March 12. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 45) The position of Under Secretary was not established. See also Document 122 . 5 Documents 218 and 234 . 137. Editorial Note 137. Editorial Note On August 10, 1970, Henry Kissinger sent a draft of the President’s message to Congress on foreign aid, scheduled for delivery before Congress adjourned on August 14, to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense; the OMB Director; and the AID Administrator. Kissinger noted that the decisions indicated in the draft had already been communicated in NSDM 76 ( Document 136 ). He requested comments on the draft by August 13, but acknowledged that the timing of the message could slip past the House recess. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 76) On August 12 AID Administrator Hannah sent his comments to Kissinger on the draft foreign aid message, noting that there was sharp disagreement about the future of bilateral assistance, of which the President should be aware, and he asked for reconsideration of decision 4a of NSDM 76. Hannah indicated that some continued bilateral involvement in development efforts was in the national interest and that Secretary of State Rogers joined in his recommendation. (Ibid.) Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Paul McCracken, in an August 12 memorandum to Kissinger, commented that, after reviewing the draft message, the CEA believed additional interagency discussion of major substantive issues was required, which would almost certainly require postponing the message to Congress. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume III 8/11/70-9/10/70) On August 13 C. Fred Bergsten prepared a memorandum to Kissinger regarding that day’s 4 p.m. meeting on the foreign aid message, during which a revised draft was circulated. He argued that there were only a few substantive concerns, but noted that the State and Treasury Departments and AID had all expressed satisfaction with the draft and were prepared to go ahead that day. Bergsten continued: “You should know that there is an absolutely overriding bureaucratic aspect to all this . I understand the President has already approved the formation of a Foreign Economic Policy Committee to be chaired by Treasury. I have strong sympathy for the need for such a coordinating mechanism, as you know. But the economic types want to handle foreign aid, as well as monetary policy and trade, and thus lift the issue out of the NSC machinery. I believe this factor—not substance—lies at the root of the last minute in-house backfire on the aid message. To be sure, we gave them opportunity by not having an NSC meeting and by the long delay in getting the decisions on the message.” Bergsten urged Kissinger’s strong leadership to keep foreign aid policy within the NSC framework and his making clear that the NSDM 76 decisions were firm, although minor changes in the details were possible. (Ibid.) No record of the 4 p.m. meeting has been found. On August 13 Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore Eliot sent a memorandum to various State Department offices with an interest in the aid message informing them that the White House had decided to delay the message to Congress until after Labor Day. Eliot requested that all copies of the draft message be returned and that the contents be closely held. He emphasized the importance that the contents not be leaked. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 76) In an August 14 memorandum, Bergsten informed Kissinger that James Schlesinger was amending the aid message and a revised draft would be available early the following week. Bergsten suggested there would be changes in the substance of the message, including possible modifications in the decision on the Development Council. Bergsten continued that September 15 would be the ideal date for the message because the House would probably pass a $3.7 billion authorization bill on September 14, to which the President could refer. The IMF/IBRD annual meetings would begin in Copenhagen on September 20, and the message would provide momentum to the U.S. delegation. In addition, the high-level meeting of the OECD Development Assistance Committee was to convene in Tokyo on September 15 and delivery that day would maximize its impact “when all the top aid types are meeting together.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 194, AID, Volume III 8/11/70-9/10/70) Additional documentation on finalizing the text of the message, including significant differences between Bergsten and Schlesinger on a number of substantive points and Kissinger’s comments, is ibid. In his special message to Congress on September 15, President Nixon proposed “a set of fundamental and sweeping reforms to overhaul completely our entire foreign assistance operation to make it fit a new foreign policy.” His message outlined six reform proposals: the creation of “separate organizational arrangements” for security assistance, humanitarian assistance, and development assistance; “a freshly conceived International Security Assistance Program” in support of the Nixon Doctrine unveiled at Guam in 1969, which had called for other countries to assume responsibility for their own defense; channeling “an increasing share of development assistance through the multilateral institutions as quickly as possible” with the remaining bilateral assistance “provided largely within a framework established by the international institutions;” the creation of two new and independent institutions, the U.S. International Development Corporation and the U.S. International Development Institute, to phase out the Agency for International Development and to reduce significantly the number of overseas U.S. Government personnel working on development programs; negotiation of a treaty with all nations that “would permit the utilization of the vast resources of the seabeds to promote economic development;” and the redirection of other policies bearing on development—the initiation of tariff preferences and in concert with other donor countries the complete untying of foreign aid, for example—“to assure that they reinforce the new approach.” In his message the President referred to the March 1970 report by the Peterson Task Force, which provided the basis for the President’s proposals. He also indicated that the proposals in his message “in fact were foreshadowed by a number of policy changes and program innovations” already instituted in assistance programs for Latin America in response to the earlier Rockefeller Report. His message went on to provide additional details on the proposed reforms. For text of the message along with an accompanying Presidential statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon , 1970, pages 745-757. 138. Editorial Note 138. Editorial Note One aspect of the foreign assistance policy discussions in 1970 was a general, multilateral untying of foreign assistance. NSDM 76 ( Document 136 ), which contained many of the proposals put forward in the President’s September 15 foreign assistance message to Congress, provided for untying of U.S. assistance for worldwide procurement in low income countries, but did not address general, multilateral untying of assistance by all donors for worldwide procurement. In his September 15 message, the President proposed “that all donor countries end the requirement that foreign aid be used to purchase goods and services produced in the nation providing the aid.” He continued: “Complete untying of aid is a step that must be taken in concert with other nations and we have begun talks to that end with the other members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , page 754) Telegraphic reporting on the untying initiative at DAC meetings and during bilateral consultations in OECD capitals is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID 1. A number of donors, including the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, adopted sympathetic positions on the issue, but France was a notable holdout. Despite France’s position, there was some hope that the June 1971 OECD Ministerial might reach agreement on the issue. To that end the U.S. Mission to OECD on May 11 sent the Department of State some text regarding multilateral contributions in the Untying Agreement that had been proposed by the Secretariat following a May 6 DAC discussion. The Mission saw some merit to the formulation and sought approval or suggestions for alternative language. (Telegram 7656 from USOECD; ibid.) In Washington, the Department of the Treasury raised concerns about moving ahead rapidly with the issue at that time; see Document 139 . 139. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Petty) to Secretary of the Treasury Connally 139. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Petty) to Secretary of the Treasury Connally 1 Washington, May 20, 1971. SUBJECT Aid Untying An effort is being made to push the OECD aid untying exercise to a conclusion shortly after the OECD Ministerial meeting in June. I think we should postpone for some time any attempts to reach a final agreement. 2 The Congressional atmosphere is very hostile to untying. An agreement now would significantly jeopardize our chances of obtaining action on various pieces of multilateral aid legislation as well as on the bilateral program. There are also serious questions about the legal basis for entering into an aid untying agreement without the approval of Congress. Congress has neither provided express authority through legislation nor through ratification of the OECD Convention to enter into such an agreement. On the other hand, questions would be raised by reliance exclusively on powers of the President under the Constitution as a basis for this agreement since conditions on use of aid funds is a subject clearly within the jurisdiction of Congress. In the present atmosphere, if an agreement were made on the basis of this authority, citing it as a reason for staying the hand of Congress will surely result in claims of infringement of Congressional prerogatives and would be unlikely to deter Congressional action, thus putting the U.S. in violation of an OECD commitment. During the hearings on accession to the OECD Convention, Executive Branch witnesses gave assurances that no international arrangement would be made within the OECD which would put the Congress in the awkward position of either repudiating a given commitment or unhappily supporting one on the basis that to do otherwise would embarrass our foreign relations. A clause providing for withdrawal on short notice might mitigate conflicts with Congress in case of subsequent contrary legislation and would be essential for avoiding violation of the agreement. I find it difficult, however, to see how we could enter, in good faith, into an untying agreement while insisting on such a withdrawal clause—one that may have to be used within a short time. Attached is a memorandum to the President registering your concerns on the political and legal issues and recommending delay in entering into an agreement until the legal and legislative problems are worked out. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to the President. 3 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos: FRC 56 74 A 17, Memo to the President 5-8/71. No classification marking. Sent through Under Secretary Volcker. 2 In a May 20 note to Connally, attached to this memorandum, Volcker noted: “I have thought this whole exercise misguided from the start. However, the President has repeatedly expressed an opinion otherwise. Whether you want to get the President to go slow on this point, at the risk of torpedoing the entire exercise at this late date, is a nice question you will have to resolve in terms of your over-all strategy vis-a-vis foreign economic policy currently. In any event, our negotiators do need some warning about promising too much, in the light of Congressional sentiment.” On Volcker’s note, Under Secretary Walker wrote: “I strongly support sending the memo—unless you want to do it orally.” 3 Not attached. Reference is presumably to Document 140 . 140. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon 140. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 9, 1971. SUBJECT Aid Untying A year ago you approved an initiative to negotiate a multilateral agreement on untying of bilateral and multilateral development assistance. 2 An effort is being made to push the negotiations to a point where an agreement can be reached shortly after the OECD Ministerial meeting in June. I realize that we have gone quite a ways toward an agreement. However, my reading of the mood of Congress is that it would be most unwise to rush into final agreement on aid untying. To do so would mean taking serious political risks for our multilateral and bilateral aid legislation. We may also be entering into an agreement which Congress may force us to breach in the not too distant future. Several events this month have led me to this conclusion: First, Treasury’s Congressional sounding on the multilateral institutions indicates that balance of payments safeguards on the IDA legislation (which I recently transmitted to Congress) will become a major issue. Second, for the first time ever Congress has failed to appropriate authorized contributions to the multilateral lending institutions—clearly a sign of Congressional malaise in this area. Third, the proposals for reorganization of the bilateral aid program have not been well received on the Hill. Fourth, the foregoing three problems have been intensified by the mounting Congressional concern about our international position, accelerated by the recent international monetary disturbances. Furthermore, there are complex legal and legislative questions arising from entering into a multilateral untying agreement without Congressional approval. We were promised that deep Congressional soundings would take place before making international agreements in this area. I understand that little if anything has been done to take the Congressional pulse on the proposed agreement. 3 The legal questions and their political implications should be clarified. Consideration might be given to a request for an Attorney General’s opinion. In the meantime, our negotiators should receive very clear instructions that we are re-examining those aspects of the untying exercise that have to do with the authority and the timing for implementing an agreement. John B. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID, 1/1/71-12/31/71. No classification marking. Another copy of this memorandum bears a handwritten note that reads: “Sent via Special Messenger 6/9/71–11:30 am.” (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos: FRC 56 74 A 17, Memo to the President May-August 1971) 2 Not further identified. 3 The President marked this paragraph (the last one on the first page) and wrote below it: “Peterson & K—I believe the changed Congressional mood bears out the need to slow down this [illegible] Latins won’t like [illegible].” In a June 16 memorandum to Kissinger and Peterson, transmitting a copy of Connally’s June 9 memorandum, Jon M. Huntsman wrote: “With reference to the last paragraph on the first page, it was suggested that the changed Congressional mood bears out the need to slow down this initiative. It was recognized that the Latins would not like such a move, but it was pointed out that they are doing little for the Administration.” On Huntsman’s memorandum Kissinger wrote: “Ernie [Johnston]—is that feasible? HK.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71) 141. Information Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 141. Information Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 14, 1971. SUBJECT Connally Attempts to Back-Up on Aid Untying Secretary Connally has written a memorandum to the President, which was sent in on June 11 suggesting that we go slow in our OECD negotiations on multilateral aid untying (Tab A). 2 Connally argues that completion of the untying negotiations is likely to cause us serious Congressional problems in regard to our total aid efforts. The President, however, has made a number of public commitments on this issue. His Aid Message of September 15, 1970, the Foreign Policy Message on February 1971 and the April 1971 Message transmitting aid legislation to Congress all endorsed a multilateral aid untying agreement. 3 (In fact, the negotiations are not going very fast now because of French opposition.) Should the President accept Connally’s suggestions, which went to the President without any White House staffing, this would mean a major reversal in U.S. aid policy. I have cleared in your name a memorandum which Peterson is sending to the President this morning asking the President not to make any decisions on the basis of the Connally memorandum until Peterson has had a chance to report to the President on the status of the issue. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume II, 1971. No classification marking. The memorandum is Tab A to a June 14 memorandum from Johnston to Kissinger suggesting items he discuss with Connally at lunch the next day. Johnston recommended that Kissinger “tell Connally that the decision to proceed with the OECD exercise and to expand aid untying is one which the President has strongly endorsed in a number of public statements. To attempt now to undercut the OECD exercise would be a serious public reversal in the President’s development program. We look upon the OECD exercise as a means of increasing the benefits to the developing countries of a given amount of aid. We would concur in an OECD agreement only if we were sure that we would make a fair share of the aid shipments under other countries’ development programs.” Other items Johnston suggested Kissinger take up with Connally were Connally’s tough statements on trade policy, offset with Germany, IFI legislation, and next steps in the international monetary field. 2 Document 140 . 3 The September 15 address and the April 1971 message are printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 745-756, and ibid., 1971, pp. 564-578, respectively. The February 1971 message was released as U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace, A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 25, 1971 . It is also printed ibid., pp. 219-345. 4 The memorandum was not found. 142. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 142. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 19, 1971. SUBJECT Aid Untying On June 9 Secretary Connally sent the President a memorandum (Tab A) 2 stating that “the changed Congressional mood bears out the need to slow down” our aid untying initiative in the OECD. In response to this the President indicated (Tab B) 3 that he agreed that we should “slow down this initiative” recognizing that the Latins “would not like such a move” but “are doing little for the Administration.” On that you asked Ernie Johnston whether such a move was possible. Both Ernie and I agree that it is possible, though it would be costly in foreign policy terms. The main point, however, is that it is not necessary at this time . 4 Pete Peterson, who insisted that he have complete charge of this subject, has neither directed the bureaucracy to “slow down” nor sent a memorandum to the President urging against our doing so now. I have been promised by his staff that he would do the latter, but he has been sitting on a draft memorandum from his staff, in which I concurred, for over two weeks. Unless Peterson decides on one of the two above-mentioned courses in the next week, I shall propose that you suggest that he respond to the President’s note. Even should we wish to go slow, no U.S. reversal is called for now, since at present untying negotiations in the OECD are moving very slowly—with a number of nations, led by France, remaining quite negative. No one expects an untying scheme to be worked out within the next few months. 5 We therefore have time to study the Congressional and legal implications raised by Secretary Connally before changing our negotiating strategy. Moreover, a public “slowing down” gesture by us would mean our backing down from an important initiative which we have taken in conjunction with the Europeans and Japanese, and add further to the doubts of the lower income countries, especially in Latin America, that we are planning to do anything for them in the economic area. (Multilateral untying will increase the value of aid by twenty percent or more to many lower income countries as well as reduce political friction caused by tying. The Latins, Pakistanis, Indians, and Indonesians would particularly benefit from this.) Thus, without questioning Connally’s assertion that there is strong feeling in certain quarters of the American business community and Congress against our untying aid, it is not now necessary to change our negotiating strategy. An examination of the legal and legislative questions arising from our entry into a multilateral aid untying agreement could be made within the next month, and a report sent to the President so that he may direct a change in our negotiating strategy at that time if he so desires. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 195, AID 1/1/71-12/31/71. Confidential; Sensitive. 2 Document 140 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 140 . 4 At the top of Hormats’ memorandum Kissinger wrote: “I agree that no move is necessary. It is our job to slow down Presidential hip shooting by emphasizing consequences of hasty notes.” 5 On July 22 the Department of State sent a message to the Mission to OECD regarding aid untying that referred to the negligible chances of agreement during the current negotiating session. The telegram informed the Mission that the U.S. position concerning multilateral agencies was under interagency review and requested that DAC Chairman Martin be informed privately that some revisions might be required when talks resumed in September. The telegram concluded that since negotiations were not completed and were at a delicate stage, discretion was especially called for. (Telegram 133107; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID 1) 143. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon 143. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon 1 Washington, September 23, 1971. SUBJECT Reappointment of Robert S. McNamara as President of the World Bank The Board of the World Bank has recently voted informally to reappoint Robert S. McNamara as its President. 2 His term is scheduled to terminate in April, 1973 with the new term running for five years from that date. Mr. McNamara will not accept reappointment unless he is confident that his acceptance would meet with your complete endorsement. It would be most desirable if you would meet briefly with Mr. McNamara and urge him to accept the reappointment. 3 As President of the Bank, Mr. McNamara has been of invaluable assistance to the Administration. He has meticulously followed our advice even on occasions when that advice did not necessarily parallel his own personal convictions as is the case with our assistance efforts associated with the East Pakistan situation. As a former member of the Democratic Administration, he has remained absolutely steady and supportive of your policies on Vietnam although he has undoubtedly been under a great deal of pressure to bolt. Perhaps more importantly, Mr. McNamara has been a most efficient and capable President of the Bank whose reputation and competence has added a great deal to the effectiveness and prestige of that organization. Recommendation That you endorse the reappointment of Robert S. McNamara for an additional term as President of the World Bank and that you meet with him briefly to assure him that you look with favor on his accepting reappointment. 4 Henry A. Kissinger John B. Connally 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 306, IBRD/IMF. Confidential. 2 As early as July 14, Samuels sent Secretary Rogers an information memorandum advising him that McNamara’s term expired in 1973. Noting that a decision would be required no later than the Annual Meeting in September 1972, Samuels commented that Canada had already begun to line up support for McNamara’s reappointment and that the Bank would soon be requesting the views of the Executive Directors. Samuels noted that, due to retirements among the Bank’s senior officials, whoever served as President would have considerable influence on the Bank’s future management. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (IBRD) 9) 3 In a September 15 memorandum to Kissinger regarding a meeting with McNamara scheduled for the next day, Staff Secretary Davis included McNamara’s tenure as IBRD President as an item for discussion. Davis commented that McNamara might raise the rumor that the President wanted him removed when his term expired in 1973. She suggested that Kissinger indicate he had no evidence to that effect. She added, parenthetically, that if the rumor were true, it might be Connally’s doing, and suggested that Kissinger pursue the matter with him. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 306, IBRD/IMF) 4 The President underscored “you meet with him briefly to assure him” and initialed the “Approve” option. At the top of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “Set up appointment soonest. I need to attend.” On October 14 Kissinger sent the President a briefing memorandum for his October 15 meeting with McNamara. One of the suggested talking points read: “You would personally consider it a benefit and a service to the United States and to the international community if McNamara were to accept a second term as President of the World Bank.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 306, IBRD/IMF) The President met with McNamara from 10:08 to 10:37 a.m. on October 15; Connally and Kissinger also attended the meeting. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion was found. McNamara was elected to a second term in 1973. 144. Editorial Note 144. Editorial Note The third UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD III) was held in Santiago, Chile, April 13-May 19, 1972. In preparation for this meeting, Under Secretary of State John Irwin, on October 18, 1971, sent a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Philip Trezise (Policy Analysis Study Memorandum (PASM) 3) requesting the Bureau of Economic Affairs to conduct a review of U.S. objectives and strategy for UNCTAD III. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, PADM 11) Deputy Under Secretary Samuels conducted a review of the issues on January 13, 1972, and on February 14 Irwin sent a memorandum to Julius Katz (E) and Charles Meyer (ARA) (Policy Analysis Decision Memorandum (PADM) 11), which set out the recommended approach the Department of State should take in preparation for the Conference. The State Department approach was that the United States should adopt a low profile at UNCTAD III, but support new initiatives that had merit and were consistent with U.S. political and economic interests, in the context of UNCTAD as a consultative rather than a negotiating or decisionmaking mechanism. The issues the State Department proposed to support were sufficient in number and importance to make the U.S. image a mildly positive one. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, Box 5195, PADM 11) On October 19, 1971, CIEP Chairman Peter Peterson sent CIEP Study Memorandum 16 to the Chairman of the CIEP Operations Group regarding the UNCTAD III in Santiago. The Operations Group was asked to recommend by January 15, 1972, U.S. positions on the issues on the UNCTAD agenda. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, CIEP Study Memoranda) For the paper prepared by the Operations Group, see Document 146 . The Latin American nations were also concerned about UNCTAD III. On January 27, 1972, the Embassy in Bogota informed the Department of State that Colombia had called for a special CECLA meeting in March in Bogota because of its unhappiness with the outcome of a G-77 meeting in October-November 1971 in Lima, where the Afro-Asian bloc was seen as taking positions contrary to Latin American interests. (Telegram 526 from Bogota; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 2 CECLA) See Document 145 for the Department’s guidance on the CECLA meeting. In a March 23, 1972, memorandum, Secretary of State Rogers informed President Nixon that Under Secretary Irwin would head the U.S. delegation for the first few days of the UNCTAD conference, when many countries would be represented at the Ministerial level. Bernard Zagorin, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Economic and Social Council, would succeed him for the full 5 weeks of the conference. The delegation would include representatives from the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor. Rogers also informed the President that inter-agency discussions were progressing to work out detailed U.S. positions, but the conference would be difficult because the United States had little to offer the developing world and the venue posed a special problem because of sensitive U.S.-Chile relations. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 286, State, Volume 16) 145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia 145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia 1 Washington, February 16, 1972, 2004Z. 27096. Subject: Colombia Calls CECLA Meeting. Ref: Bogota 0528. 2 1. The following points may be helpful to Embassy in discussions with Foreign Office prior CECLA meeting. Background material on Lima Ministerial and general developments pouched separately. 3 For Embassy Background: (1) US planning low key approach to Conference. We hope to avoid confrontation and keep focus on economic issues. While we are seeking to make US posture forthcoming, no dramatic new initiatives now planned. (2) US positions on individual agenda items currently in process of preparation. Consequently, not much specific information can be given. (3) LDCs naturally desire draw out DCs prior to Conference on positions. Developed countries in Geneva and US have been careful to avoid commitment to detailed discussions which likely create misunderstanding, arouse false expectations, and serve as signal to LDCs for more pressure at Conference in certain areas. Nevertheless, we wish to be cooperative and have no objections Embassy’s participation in general and informal discussions of type proposed by Colombians. (4) Major new development at Lima Ministerial was 77 split between Latins and Afro Asians over issues such as: 1) special measures for least developed, 2) relative power and influence in international organizations, 3) benefits commodity agreements and 4) negotiating tactics with DCs. US very interested this development but wishes remain neutral and uninvolved. Embassy should be careful to avoid any action which later construed as US effort widen LDC split. (5) Colombian initiative interesting, particularly since Colombia has not played active role in UNCTAD recently. Would appreciate Embassy assessment of primary motives for Colombian move, i.e. 1) opportunity to re-open idea of LA regional preferences, 2) increased interest in UNCTAD, 3) concern over coffee agreement, 4) effort to increase influence in LA regional context. 2. Points for Colombians (1) The US is giving active and careful consideration to all issues on the UNCTAD III agenda. We are seeking to make US posture forthcoming, but there are many restraints on our flexibility; in any case, the LDCs should be realistic in their expectations. (2) We plan to cooperate fully in examination of key economic issues. We hope confrontation at the Conference can be avoided. (3) We share LA concerns about European preferential arrangements that may adversely affect western hemisphere exports. We have consistently pointed out the ill effects of such arrangements. (4) We do not believe the solution to this problem is western hemisphere regional preferential arrangement. Although submission of our generalized preferences legislation has been delayed, we continue to believe that proper approach is a global system of tariff preferences for all LDCs. (5) We agree that UNCTAD should not be involved in the operations of international commodity arrangements such as the coffee agreement. Problems should be resolved in the framework of the Agreements, not at international Conferences. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 3 CECLA. Confidential. Drafted by R.M. Ogden (E/OT/GCP), cleared in ARA and IO, and approved by J.C. Leary (E/OT/GCP). Repeated to the Mission in Geneva, USUN, and USOECD in Paris. 2 Dated January 27. (Ibid.) See also Document 144 . 3 Not found. 146. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council on International Economic Policy Operations Group (Samuels) to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) 146. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council on International Economic Policy Operations Group (Samuels) to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) 1 Washington, March 3, 1972. SUBJECT CIEP Study Memorandum 16 UNCTAD III The third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD III) is scheduled for April 13-May 19 in Santiago, Chile. It will be an important event in the evolution of DC-LDC relations. Attached is the general strategy and position paper for that Conference requested in CIEP Study Memorandum No. 16. There is general inter-agency agreement on U.S. positions to be taken on all major UNCTAD III issues except debt relief and an interest equalization fund where Treasury has expressed opposition. 2 The dissenting Treasury positions on these two issues are spelled out in the paper. The study calls for a generally forthcoming but low key approach to the Conference. We are not proposing major new initiatives on behalf of the LDCs, but plan to support LDC requests when these are reasonable and consistent with U.S. economic and political objectives. The proposed position is designed to make the best of a difficult situation in which demands of the LDCs are excessive and the prospects for new DC measures are not promising. Our general approach appears to be consistent with the strategy which other developed countries will follow at the Conference. At UNCTAD III, we can expect the LDCs to press the U.S. hard on a number of issues: aid volumes, LDC participation in monetary reform, the SDR link, negotiation of a cocoa agreement, improved market access for LDC exports, investment problems, etc. What the U.S. does or does not do on GSP will have a particularly important impact on our posture and image at the Conference. Significant U.S. positions contained in the attached paper are as follows: 1. SDR Link —In parallel with other DCs, the U.S. should indicate at UNCTAD III support for a study in the IMF of the relevance and desirability of a link between the creation of new reserve assets and development finance within the context of international monetary reform. 2. Debt Relief —The U.S. should be prepared to support further IBRD work on general guidelines for debt relief so as to make it as consistent as possible with development needs if this is sought by the developing countries, it being understood that such guidelines are not intended to indicate a broad policy of debt rescheduling. (Treasury does not support this position.) 3. Adjustment Assistance —The U.S. can accept recommendations at UNCTAD III, couched in general terms, that developed countries should seek to develop programs for adjustments to deal with the problems caused by increasing imports from the developing countries. 4. Export Development —As part of our planning for the Conference, the U.S. is exploring opportunities for expanding technical and financial assistance for export development. However, the U.S. would oppose recommendations which call on DC Governments to develop domestic programs designed specifically to encourage and promote the sale of imports from developing countries. 5. Foreign Private Investment —Without highlighting private investment as an issue in the UNCTAD forum, we should make clear the contribution of private investment to the development process. 6. AID Untying —We have indicated the current international trade and monetary situation must be clarified before negotiating a final untying agreement. Under present circumstances we cannot be forthcoming on this issue at the Conference. 7. Multilateral Interest Equalization Fund —The U.S. should oppose resolutions calling for the establishment of a multilateral Interest Equalization Scheme. However the U.S. could support an LDC initiated and supported resolution calling for the IBRD to study the feasibility of establishing a modest fund to subsidize interest-cost differentials. (Treasury supports the first but not the second position.) 8. Institutional —The U.S. should continue to recognize and support UNCTAD as an institution for discussion and consultation on problems and policies connected with trade and development. We should firmly resist pressures to make it more operational and a forum for negotiations. 9. Least developed —The U.S. should be willing to assist the least developed countries in terms of program proposals and to consider financial contributions possibly through the UNDP, the regional banks, or through bilateral programs Nathaniel Samuels Attachment CIEP STUDY MEMORANDUM 16—UNCTAD III I. Situation 1) UNCTAD III (April 13-May 19 in Santiago, Chile) will be one of the longest and largest international economic Conferences of recent years. Like UNCTAD I in 1964 and UNCTAD II in 1968, it will be a major event in the evolving dialogue between developed and developing countries. The LDCs have a long list of grievances and demands to present which were agreed to in November, 1971 at the LDC Ministerial level preparatory meeting in Lima. 3 They have prepared carefully for UNCTAD III, attach great importance to it, and will press hard for new DC actions. 2) We do not expect major new agreements to be reached at the Conference to relieve the economic frustrations which now exist in the developing world. The developed countries generally do not appear prepared to undertake important new development commitments at this time of uncertainty and transition—over future aid levels, trade arrangements, the new monetary system, etc. Many LDCs understand the situation and have adopted realistic expectations for the Conference. However, some LDCs will adopt a very hard line with many of their sharpest attacks directed against the United States. There is a possibility that the Conference will be marked by confrontation between rich and poor along the lines proposed by the radical LDCs. We hope this situation can be avoided. With appropriate co-operation by all members, the Conference can make a constructive contribution to the development process. 3) The developed countries have been co-ordinating their positions for the Conference in the OECD and at Geneva. It is clear that they are not prepared to take major new initiatives for the LDCs, although certain DCs could propose surprise concessions at Santiago. Most DCs are prepared to be forthcoming on a number of relatively less important issues (least developed, export development) where they can demonstrate good will at little cost, but this clearly will not be enough to satisfy the LDCs. Cooperation among developed countries has been good. In contrast, the Group of 77 is widely split over issues such as special measures for the least developed, tactics for the Conference, and influence in international organizations such as UNCTAD. In general, US preparations and proposed positions are in step with those or other major developed countries. However, we can expect some criticism from other developed countries over our failure to implement GSP and our role in cocoa negotiations. We also can expect sharply divergent views on commodity issues; the US favors a commodity by commodity approach emphasizing market access whereas the Europeans, and particularly the French, support commodity arrangements to stabilize and raise prices. 4) The August 15 action by the President imposing the import surcharge and the ten percent aid cut drew criticism from the LDCs. The negotiations in the Group of Ten leading up the December 18 currency realignment decision brought forth LDC demands for greater participation in the decision making process affecting the international monetary order. The lifting of the surcharge and Secretary Rogers’ announcement of our intention to submit GSP legislation to Congress early in 1972 have improved the atmosphere somewhat. 4 What the US does or does not do on GSP will have a particularly important impact on our posture and image at the Conference. In any event, we expect the LDCs will press the US hard on a number of difficult issues: aid volumes, GSP, cocoa, investment problems, the SDR-link, participation in monetary reform, etc. 5) Although currency realignment is a positive development, the mood of the country and Congress is not favorable to new trade and aid measures for the developing countries at this time. This general climate, together with the timing and site of the Conference and other economic policy considerations, will make it especially difficult for the United States to adopt, and later defend, forthcoming positions in response to LDC requests. We believe our participation at the Conference will have a significant, if short term, impact on our relations with the developing world. We should keep in mind that UNCTAD III is partly a Latin American event, and consequently the nature of our participation will have repercussions on our hemispheric economic and political relations. II. General Strategy The US should adopt a generally forthcoming but low key approach to UNCTAD III. We should carefully examine the issues and support new initiatives that have merit and are consistent with US political and economic interests. We should continue to seek a unified Group B position on major conference issues and cooperate in the OECD to achieve this objective. At the Conference, the US should avoid confrontation with radical LDCs where possible and seek to win the cooperation and support of moderate elements. US statements at UNCTAD should be low keyed, emphasizing the economic merits of issues, and avoiding political polemics. Where there are reasonable grounds for LDC requests, we should support these. We should not highlight the private foreign investment issue in this forum, but should make clear the contribution of private investment to the development process. In addition to responding to LDC initiatives, we should be prepared to offer sound initiatives of our own and to encourage other DCs to be forthcoming. An important US objective should be increased UNCTAD and LDC attention to LDC trade and development policies to promote their trade and development. This would be in accord with the self-help principle and their recognition in the Lima Declaration that the primary responsibility for the economic development of the developing countries rests upon themselves. Other important objectives should be to keep political attacks against the US out of the UNCTAD forum when possible, and to appropriately underscore our many past contributions to the welfare of the LDCs. To the extent possible, we should continue to recognize and support UNCTAD as an institution for discussion and consultation on problems and policies connected with LDC trade and development, while at the same time firmly resisting pressures to make it more operational and a forum for negotiations. The proposed US position is designed to face the realities of a difficult situation since it is neither politically nor economically feasible to satisfy most of the LDC demands. However, if we demonstrate we are prepared to consider and discuss reasonable proposals and where possible to take action to support these, our posture will be defensible and in addition will make some contribution to development. Such an approach may discourage some polemics and acrimony; it should at least encourage constructive discussion of the issues and possibly even some atmosphere of good will. As part of our preparation for the Conference, we believe the Administration should press for prompt and favorable Congressional action on International Financial Institutions (IFI) legislation including the IDA replenishment, Special Funds for the ADB and ordinary capital as well as the Fund for Special Operations (FSO) of the IDB. Approval of these requests would fulfill past and current US commitments to IFIs and reduce LDC criticism of US assistance levels. [Omitted here are Section III, “Conference Issues,” and three attachments: an 8-page “Item by Item Review of UNCTAD III Agenda,” an 11-page paper entitled “UNCTAD III—Group of 77—Declaracion de Lima,” and a 3-page paper summarizing UNCTAD I (Geneva, 1964) and UNCTAD II (New Delhi, 1968).] 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 835, CIEPSM 16. Confidential. 2 According to a March 27 memorandum from Flanigan, the CIEP Review Group was scheduled to meet on March 29 to discuss debt relief and interest equalization issues, which needed further interagency discussion. Flanigan also suggested other issues the Group might take up. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, CIEP Study Memoranda) 3 Reference is to the G-77 meeting in Lima October-November 1971. 4 Following the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 (see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 221 ), President Nixon announced the lifting of the 10 percent import surcharge during his Summit meeting with Prime Minister Heath in Bermuda on December 20, 1971. See Department of State Bulletin , January 17, 1972, p. 63. Secretary Rogers, at his press conference on December 23, 1971, expressed satisfaction with “the measures we have been able to take this week which will benefit the developing nations, especially those of Latin America. I refer to the lifting of the 10-percent surcharge and the President’s decision to present legislation to the next Congress establishing generalized trade preferences.” (Ibid., p. 49) 147. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (De Palma) 147. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (De Palma) 1 Washington, undated. PADM 56 SUBJECT PARA Review on UN Prospects, Opportunities and Problems Over the Next Five Years The following is a summary of the conclusions reached at the review on the five-year prospects of the UN system chaired by the Deputy Secretary on September 8, 1972. 2 It is intended to serve as basic policy guidance to the Bureau of International Organizations and the United States Mission to the United Nations. Part I—Guidance The UN five years hence probably will not be substantially different from the UN of today. —Much of what the UN does is not directly relevant to the primary interests of the United States. Nevertheless, the facilitative and supportive functions of the UN system have become part of the essential infrastructure of the international community, including the United States. The importance of the UN as international manager of a multiplicity of social, economic and technical services will grow over the next five years. —The political-security dimension of the UN will remain distinctly secondary to the economic-social-technical work of the UN. Although there may be improvement in the Security Council’s peacekeeping and peacemaking ability, this will be slow in coming. —The confrontation will sharpen between the undeveloped majority, who see the UN primarily as a means of obtaining developmental and trade advantages, and the affluent minority. African “liberation”, colonialism and apartheid will be an increasing focus of General Assembly attention. —UN budgets in the Ô70s will continue to rise, but at a slower rate than in the Ô60s. Given this forecast, our basic policy toward the UN should be oriented along the following lines: 1. We should concentrate our efforts on the technical, scientific and social areas, working to establish international regimes on matters such as seabeds, drug control, hijacking, environmental pollution, etc. This is the area in which the UN has been most successful to date, and in which we can further real interests of our own. 2. While maintaining bilateral aid programs, we should contribute our fair share to UNDP and allied programs. For dollar inputs that are small in comparison with our bilateral aid total, we reap a significant political payoff. We must be careful, however, to keep the international financial institutions well insulated from third world political pressures. [Omitted here are 3 paragraphs unrelated to development issues.] Part II—Discussion We and our European allies who founded the United Nations in 1945 saw it preeminently as an organization to provide political security. Although the UN did have an economic and social dimension from the outset, our principal concern was the creation of an organization which would prevent the rise of a state bent on international hegemony, la Nazi Germany. Additionally, we expected the five major powers who formed the permanent membership of the Security Council to cooperate in settling disputes among lesser powers so that such disputes would not reach the point of open warfare. During the Cold War years, we found the UN useful as a forum in which to denounce Soviet ambitions and actions. But the massive influx of newly independent states in the 1960s ended the almost automatic pro-US majority in the General Assembly and a more moderate Soviet stance enabled them to work successfully with the new majority on many political issues. The “third world” countries which now form the overwhelming majority in the Assembly see the UN primarily as a means to obtain a transfer of skills and resources from the developed world. And the political issues debated in the Assembly are those which seize the attention of undeveloped Asia and Africa: colonialism, white minority rule and apartheid. With political and security functions dependent upon cooperation among the five permanent members—and therefore spasmodic and uncertain—the economic and social dimension has become predominant. In 1971, about 94% of UN expenditures went for economic, social and human rights activities; only 6% went for political and security functions. We are substantially wealthier and militarily stronger than the bulk of the UN membership, and therefore our concerns and needs are quite different from those countries. Because we are so different, and because we have only one vote in the Assembly, we find our concerns often untreated and our views frequently ignored. And because we pay so substantial a proportion of the UN’s bills, we instinctively find this situation anomalous. We have thus come to see the UN system as a whole as a rather uncomfortable environment for the US. However, this is because we fail to perceive that the world itself has changed. In its priorities, the UN does reflect the concerns of a majority of the world community. Looking ahead five years, we have little reason to expect any basic change in UN orientation. As long as the interests of the Big Five remain divergent, peacekeeping will remain uncertain, though it is possible that more can be done through good offices and fact-finding missions to prevent disputes among minor powers from reaching the boiling point. The confrontation between the undeveloped majority and the affluent minority over economic and trade questions will, if anything, sharpen. And the demand will grow for action against South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia, and for UN assistance to African “liberation groups.” On these latter issues, the prospects are that by 1977, the UN will be voting substantial sums to assist “liberation groups” and that, as the UK integrates her foreign policies more closely with her EC partners, the US will increasingly find itself isolated on African issues. Given this prospect, what orientation should the US adopt toward the UN? We begin with the assumption that despite petty annoyances, we will continue to be able to prevent the UN from taking actions which would go directly against vital US interests; that while many UN actions and programs will not be directly relevant to our primary concerns, we have a real interest in the success of most of the economic, social and technical work of the UN system. The facilitative and supportive functions of the UN and its specialized agencies have become part of the essential infrastructure of the international community, including the US. The UN will thus have usefulness for us as it manages a multiplicity of social, economic and technical services. This combination of no threat, a lack of relevance in certain areas but also growing and essential benefits for us in others, dictates that we remain engaged in the UN system. We also have an interest in preserving and fostering the UN’s potential for action in the political-security area. Indeed, if we believed the UN to be useful or necessary at the peak of our relative power and influence, it would be strange to find the UN unnecessary at a time when our ability to control international military and economic situations unilaterally has diminished. Given present realities and our forecasts for the next five years, however, we should take a fresh look at the role we will wish to play in the UN system. —We should concentrate efforts on using the UN system to establish international regimes on matters such as law of the sea and seabeds, drug control, hijacking, environmental protection, telecommunications, epidemic control, etc. That is, we should recognize that it is the scientific, technical and social areas in which the UN has been most successful to date, and that we can use this area to further real interests of our own. The LDCs will cooperate, but their major interest in programs affecting their economic development will have to be taken into account. —The UN Development Program (UNDP) is and will remain the UN activity most important to the majority of the UN membership. Its performance has improved recently, and though high quality is hardly uniform, the same may be said of our own aid programs. For political reasons, we certainly will wish to maintain our bilateral aid operations. Moreover, we will always find some UNDP projects far from our liking in conception or administration. Nevertheless, we should recognize that (1) UNDP and allied programs play an essential role in convincing the undeveloped majority of our willingness to provide the UN with at least the minimum resources needed to deal with economic and technical needs; and (2) our dollar inputs amount to little more than 5% of our (now reduced) bilateral aid total. In short, with relatively modest inputs we derive certain political and public relations benefits stemming from the fact that UNDP is the most important UN activity to most of the membership. We must be careful, however, to keep the international financial institutions well insulated from third world political pressures. —We must recognize that UNDP and allied programs, even though inexpensive in terms of our total aid commitment still involve appropriation of substantial funds. It will be necessary to educate the Congress and the public on the point that our own interest dictates such programs be adequately funded, requiring an increase in the level of our contribution if we are to pay our fair share. —We should substantially lower our profile in the General Assembly on matters which do not affect our vital interests, particularly on African issues. Resolutions that we would consider unwise or extreme will continue to be offered in the Assembly and will continue to pass by large majorities. Our general approach should be that, rather than attempting to improve bad resolutions—for example on African issues—we either abstain or vote against as interests and circumstances dictate. As a rule, however, we should avoid a vote against such resolutions if in doing so we would find ourselves in the company of only South Africa and Portugal. If some matter of principle is involved, our position should be succinctly explained for the record. Certainly we should attempt to end the US public impression and concern that in the General Assembly we are constantly arrayed against the rest of the world. [Omitted here is a paragraph on UN peacekeeping.] William P. Rogers 3 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, PADM 56. Secret. Attached to an October 5 memorandum from Claus Ruser (S/PC) to the Deputy Secretary advising him that the Policy Analysis Decision Memorandum (PADM) stemmed from a PARA review that Ruser chaired on September 8. Ruser recommended that the draft memorandum be sent to the Secretary for his review and approval considering his “deep interest and involvement in UN matters.” There is no indication that the memorandum was sent to Secretary Rogers. The Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) process was internal to the Department of State and did not include clearances from other agencies. 2 A 25-page paper entitled “PARA on the United Nations,” dated August 28, is attached but not printed. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Expropriation Policy, 1969-1972 Expropriation Policy, 1969-1972 148. Editorial Note 149. Editorial Note 150. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Special Counsel (Mollenhoff) Washington, April 6, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 281, State, Volume VI. Confidential. Drafted on April 2 by Peter Rodman. 151. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 8, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, FM 10-1. Confidential. Drafted by M.B. Feldman (L/ARA). 152. Editorial Note 153. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon Washington, May 8, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 284, State, Volume XI. Confidential. 154. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon Washington, June 11, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos: FRC 56 74 A 17, Memo to the President 5-8/71. No classification marking. The date is handwritten. A handwritten note reads: “Mr. Petty’s secy says the Secretary discussed this with the President on 6/11 but did not give him the original memo.” Connally and Kissinger met with the President from 2:05 to 2:38 p.m. on June 11. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 155. National Security Study Memorandum 131 Washington, June 23, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An earlier draft of this NSSM is attached to a June 16 memorandum for the record by Deputy Executive Secretary Brewster indicating that the study stemmed from a direct Presidential order originating in part from several discussions with Connally, and that Kissinger had already discussed the draft with Irwin by phone. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Expropriation NSSM, NSC Misc. Memos) 156. Draft Memorandum From the Department of the Treasury to President Nixon Washington, July 13, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, NSC. Confidential. Drafted by M. Bradfield and J.R. Petty on July 13. Forwarded to Volcker under cover of a July 14 routing note from Petty who noted it would “take care of some of your problems.” No final version of the memorandum was found. 157. Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group Washington, July 31, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131. Confidential. Circulated under cover of an August 2 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Davis to members of the SRG informing them the paper would be considered by the Group at its meeting on August 4. A July 28 Department of State memorandum, which forwarded the paper to Kissinger and Peterson, indicated it had been prepared by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson, with wide representation from other interested agencies. (Ibid.) The paper was discussed by the SRG on August 4. Briefing materials for Kissinger’s use at that meeting, including a 13-page Analytical Summary of the paper and Issues for Decision, are in National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 98, 8/4/71 SRG Meeting—Expropriations (NSSM 131). 158. Memorandum From the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Aldrich) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) Washington, August 3, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131. Confidential. Drafted by Aldrich on August 3; cleared in draft by Eaton (S/PC) and Weintraub (E). The SRG meeting was held on August 4 and a resulting NSDM was issued on October 8 (Document 169). Irwin, Samuels, Weintraub, and Aldrich attended the SRG meeting for the State Department. 159. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) Washington, August 4, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131. Confidential. Drafted by Crimmins on August 4. Copies were sent to Samuels, Trezise, Aldrich, Weintraub, and Newsom. 160. Memorandum From the Executive Vice President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Salzman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 4, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, NAC. Confidential. Copies were sent to Samuels, Hannah, and Volcker. 161. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development (Jonnes) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) Washington, August 5, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 75 A 13, Chron, August 1971. Confidential. 162. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Walker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 6, 1971. Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 98, 8/4/71 SRG Meeting-Expropriations (NSSM 131). Confidential. Walker and Petty were the Treasury attendees at the SRG meeting on August 4 (see Document 161). This memorandum was prepared to describe further the Treasury Department position. 163. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 20, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 75 A 13, Box 8, IPS 7-1 8/6/71-8/31/71 FY72. Confidential. 164. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Policy (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 16, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Confidential. 165. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume II 1971. Confidential. Attached to an October 4 memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger. 166. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Petty) to Secretary of the Treasury Connally Washington, September 22, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, NAC. Confidential. Drafted by Bradfield and cleared by Hennessy. Sent through Under Secretary Walker, who wrote at the top of the memorandum: “JBC—I strongly concur with this cover memo and urge you to go directly to Pres & [illegible].” This memorandum was a covering memorandum for a copy of Document 167. 167. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon Washington, September 25, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, NAC. Confidential. 168. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume II 1971. Confidential. Drafted by Hormats on September 28 and October 4. Attached to an October 4 memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger that indicated that the memorandum to the President had been revised, with Connally’s views included, and recommended Kissinger send it forward, giving “the President another crack at decisions.” An earlier draft of this memorandum, which does not include the Recommendation section, is ibid. It is attached to a September 28 memorandum to Kissinger in which Hormats noted that the memorandum to the President explained Kissinger’s and Connally’s differing views on expropriation policy. 169. National Security Decision Memorandum 136 Washington, October 8, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 136. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. 170. Editorial Note 171. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, January 14, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 148. Confidential. Drafted by Samuels and rewritten by Rogers. 172. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon Washington, January 14, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to a January 17 memorandum from Hormats to Haig, which reported Kissinger’s agreement with the recommendation that the statement be issued by the President very soon. Hormats recommended Haig forward Peterson’s memorandum to the President. 173. National Security Decision Memorandum 148 Washington, January 18, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 148. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. 174. Editorial Note 175. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) Washington, March 8, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. A copy was sent to Kissinger. 176. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon Washington, March 9, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. No classification marking. 177. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 12, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. On another copy of this memorandum, attached to a May 12 memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger, Kissinger wrote: “Let me check Haldeman’s understanding of what Connally has been promised.” (Ibid.) 178. Information Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) Washington, June 23, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. 179. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) Washington, June 27, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 1 US. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Shultz, Kissinger, and Weinberger. 180. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of the Treasury Shultz Washington, July 6, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 1 US. No classification marking. Except as noted below, the language in the text printed here is identical to that proposed by OMB on April 10, and at variance with what Hormats recommended to Kissinger on April 12. See Document 177. 148. Editorial Note 148. Editorial Note The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 required that the United States terminate foreign assistance programs in countries that had expropriated U.S. citizens’ (corporate and personal) property without conforming to standards of international law, that is, without providing prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, submitting the dispute to binding international arbitration, or returning the property within 6 months. This amendment also required the United States to vote against loans from the international financial institutions (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), Inter-American Development Bank, and Asian Development Bank) to countries that had expropriated U.S. property. In the case of the Inter-American Development Bank, a negative U.S. vote would block the loan. The Hickenlooper Amendment was one of a number of “barnacles” in the Foreign Assistance Act taken up in the administration’s overall approach to foreign assistance policy. On October 9, 1968, the Government of Peru expropriated assets of the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a U.S. entity, and administratively took over the remainder of IPC’s assets on January 28, 1969. The expropriation occurred in the context of a military coup that brought General Juan Velasco to power. The Sugar Act of 1948 also required suspension of the U.S. sugar import quota for countries that had expropriated U.S. citizen assets, and this act would apply to Peru. If the Peruvian Government did not pay compensation or otherwise resolve the dispute, termination of foreign assistance and suspension of the Peruvian sugar quota were imminent in April 1969. In its closing weeks the Johnson administration was unable to resolve the issue and the Peruvian expropriation was one of the items on the agenda for the Nixon administration. On January 29, 1969, Henry Kissinger forwarded to the President a January 28 memorandum from the Department of State to Kissinger apprising him of the Peruvian/IPC situation. The section on “Consequences for U.S. Relations” in the State Department memorandum reads in part as follows: “Up to now we have apprised the GOP quietly but forcefully of the existence in US law of the Hickenlooper amendments. We have sought to avoid confrontations so far, so as to give the Government room to maneuver and find a graceful way out. Unfortunately, the GOP’s reaction to our approaches has been truculent rejection of the sanctions as an intrusion in internal affairs. “What has made the situation so tragic is the mandatory requirement of the US law. Were it not for that, the US would have more flexibility, more options, and greater time to handle the problem, and without the need to appear to ‘punish’ which makes the present confrontation so serious. “Aside from the expectable consequences already noted, application of US sanctions will surely precipitate widespread and vehement criticism of the US throughout Latin America. The larger Latin American countries especially would view such action as ‘intervention’, and would see the power to sanction in this way as threatening to themselves. In short, it would almost surely provide impetus toward unifying the now fractionated anti-US sentiment that exists in the region.” In his covering memorandum Kissinger told the President that the Latin American Interdepartmental Group had been asked to develop contingency plans should the “crisis” worsen. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Latin America, Box 794, Peru-Hickenlooper Amendment, Volume I 1/21-3/31/69) At the end of January U.S. Ambassador to Peru J. Wesley Jones was called back to Washington for consultations. In the following weeks the Nixon administration attempted several initiatives to resolve the IPC situation with Peru, including discussions with World Bank President Robert McNamara, the dispatch of a special emissary to negotiate with high-level officials in the Peruvian Government, and economic pressures on Peru short of what might be considered overt economic aggression. In the meantime, because the Hickenlooper Amendment required sanctions if the expropriating government failed within 6 months to take “appropriate steps … to discharge its obligations under international law toward such citizen or entity, including speedy compensation for such property,” the administration argued that negotiations with Peru over the expropriation constituted “appropriate steps” and deferred application of the amendment. When little movement resulted from these efforts, the Nixon administration introduced an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that would allow the President to waive application of the Hickenlooper sanctions when he found the waiver in the national interest. Administration officials held talks with a Peruvian commission in Washington and considered other measures to delay application of Hickenlooper sanctions against Peru. At the same time, new bilateral development loans to Peru were withheld, one of the requirements of formal application of the Hickenlooper Amendment. A severe earthquake struck Peru on May 31, 1970; up to 30,000 people were killed and 200,000 were left homeless. While the IPC case and other contentious issues in U.S.-Peruvian relations persisted, the need for reconstruction assistance dominated the relationship. Unusually heavy rains in Peru in the early spring of 1972 caused extensive economic damage to the agricultural northern coastal plain and the neighboring mountains, again raising the question of reconstruction assistance and detracting attention from the IPC matter. A further complication arose when, despite the administration’s opposition, Congress passed the Gonzalez Amendment on March 10, 1972 (Section 21 of the Inter-American Development Bank Act, P.L. 92-246; Section 12 of the International Development Association Act, P.L. 92-247; and Section 18 of the Asian Development Bank Act, P.L. 92-245). This amendment required the President to instruct his representatives to vote against any foreign loans to countries that expropriated U.S. investment without compensation and was even more restrictive in its exceptions than the Hickenlooper Amendment by substituting specific requirements, such as good faith negotiations, for the concept of “appropriate steps.” As the first Nixon administration ended, its officials were considering whether the Gonzalez Amendment also applied to the IPC expropriation, which had taken place before its enactment. Documentation on the Peruvian situation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Latin America, Peru, Boxes 792 and 793, Peru-Hickenlooper Amendment, Box 794, and Peru-IPC-Hickenlooper Amendment, Box 795; ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, IADB, Box 333; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) and AID (US) 5; ibid., Central Files 1970-73, AID (US), AID (IBRD) 9 PERU, and AID (IDB) 9 PERU; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 18, NSSM 42, and NSSM 158; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Review Group; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 11, NSDM 21, and NSDM 199; National Security Council, Secretariat, Boxes 90 and 91; and Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 158, LEG 6 Foreign Assistance Act. 149. Editorial Note 149. Editorial Note In addition to the expropriation by the Government of Peru of the assets of the International Petroleum Company, U.S. officials were faced with the prospect of expropriation of U.S. private copper companies operating in Chile. In a May 4, 1969, letter to President Nixon, President Eduardo Frei of Chile wrote that he would soon present an austere economic program for Chile to try to control inflation and revive a depressed agriculture resulting from a severe drought the previous year. While expressing his desire for continued good relations with the United States, he warned: “To present this plan and to exclude from these sacrifices the copper producing companies is politically and morally impossible.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, Chile: Frei to Nixon) President Frei informed the U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, Edward M. Korry, that he had to make changes in two areas of the 1967 agreements which would affect two U.S. companies, Kennecott and Anaconda: link the tax rate to the price of copper instead of a 53-54 percent rate regardless of the price, and “Chileanize” Anaconda, which was still entirely U.S.-owned, either by getting Anaconda to sell some of its stock to Chile or, if necessary, by expropriation. (Memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon, May 6; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Latin America, Chile, Volume I 1969, Box 773) Because Kennecott was already 51 percent-owned by the Government of Chile, it was not a candidate for expropriation. President Frei informed the American copper companies of his goals on May 9. (Memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger, May 19; ibid.) Intense negotiations began on June 2 and concluded with an agreement with Anaconda on June 26. Although the negotiations were conducted directly between the Chilean Government and the companies, Ambassador Korry played an important role in mediating between the parties. In effect, the parties worked out a formula by which Chile would buy the entire company. The details of the agreement and its implications for future U.S.-Chilean relations as well as for prospects for expropriation initiatives by other countries were spelled out in a memorandum (with enclosures) from Department of State Acting Executive Secretary John P. Walsh to Kissinger, July 1. (Ibid.) The Chilean elections in September 1970 brought to power the Socialist candidate, Salvador Allende, who had pledged during the campaign to submit legislation to the Chilean Congress covering nationalization of the major copper producers in Chile. In the following months, Nixon administration officials considered a broad range of political, diplomatic, and economic responses to prevent the consolidation of the Allende government, to try to limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests, and at the same time to avoid precipitous actions that might allow the Allende government to rally support or blame the United States. The economic pressures against Chile included ending or cutting back further the U.S. Government’s bilateral loans, as well as its financial assistance or guarantees for U.S. private investment, and persuading international lending institutions to limit financial assistance. Because copper accounted for about 80 percent of Chile’s foreign exchange earnings, measures were also considered that might affect the marketing of Chilean copper. As Allende sought enabling legislation and constitutional amendments from the Chilean legislature to nationalize major industries, especially the American-owned copper mines, Nixon administration officials agreed that if expropriation occurred without just compensation, the United States would use the 6-month waiting period in the Hickenlooper Amendment to explore prospects for working out settlements. When Chile seemed receptive to some kind of pragmatic compromise with the copper companies, the Nixon administration avoided a direct confrontation with the Allende government and approved or deferred some loans and FMS credits instead of cancelling them. A July 16, 1971, amendment to the Chilean Constitution effectively nationalized the three largest copper companies in Chile (Anaconda, Kennecott, and Cerro), and the Government of Chile announced on October 10, 1971, that there would be no compensation for Anaconda and Kennecott and only $13 million for Cerro. Meanwhile, President Nixon had issued National Security Decision Memorandum 136 on October 8 ( Document 169 ), which set forth the administration’s expropriation policy. The Nixon administration intensified its economic pressures on the Allende government: when Chile stopped paying its foreign debts, most of which were owed to U.S. companies or the U.S. Government, and sought multilateral rescheduling of them, the administration took a hard line that would include Chile’s prompt and adequate compensation for its expropriation of U.S. properties. U.S.-Chilean relations were further complicated when Allende announced on April 18, 1972, that he would send legislation to the Chilean legislature requesting the nationalization of the International Telephone and Telecommunications Company (ITT). On the following day a multilateral rescheduling agreement between Chile and its creditors was reached in Paris. As 1972 ended, the Allende government faced serious economic dislocation and political instability. The Nixon administration was still considering whether to sign the rescheduling accord; and its policymakers were engaged in bilateral talks with Chilean representatives, with the U.S. side emphasizing debt repudiation and compensation for expropriated property and the Chilean representatives stressing access to U.S. and U.S.-influenced financing. A national interest waiver announced by Secretary of State Rogers on November 17, 1972, allowed the U.S. Government to remain engaged with the Chileans pending resolution of the issues. Documentation on the Chilean situation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Treasury, Box 290; ibid., Country Files-Latin America, Chile, Boxes 773-778; ibid., Subject Files, Box 336; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US)(CHILE), POL CHILE-US, and POL 1 CHILE-US; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, Chile; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 97; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Files, NSC Miscellaneous Memos, NSC Meetings, SRG Meetings, and SRG Miscellaneous Memoranda; ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 93; National Security Council, Secretariat, NSC and SRG Meetings, Boxes 86 and 119; and Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos: FRC 56 74 A 17; ibid., Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, Latin America, and NAC; and ibid., Agency for International Development, AID Administrator’s Files: FRC 286 75 A 13. 150. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Special Counsel (Mollenhoff) 150. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Special Counsel (Mollenhoff) 1 Washington, April 6, 1970. SUBJECT Your Memorandum of March 28 on Protection of American Property in Foreign Countries 2 The document in your possession is, I believe, part of a larger study being prepared by a working group in the State Department at the Secretary’s request. 3 The project is in the early stages of drafting, and the end product will likely consist of more than one paper. The subject is the general one of “economic nationalism” in developing countries and its implications for U.S. investment. The papers will consider specific cases of expropriations or disputes which have arisen in a series of countries, including most of the ones you list in your memorandum. The difficulties vary from case to case, but all cases, as you can imagine, involve delicate matters of negotiation. The principal purpose of this study is to develop specific recommendations for improving our handling of these cases. It will deal with such topics as ways of promoting new U.S. investment in a manner consistent with the preferences and priorities of the host countries, ways of protecting existing U.S. investments, means and strategies for settling disputes with host countries, ways of improving cooperation between the U.S. Government and U.S. investors, and so forth. Any recommendations for new policies or possibly new legislation will most likely be matters for Presidential decision. In short, I can assure you that the entire exercise is intended to address the concerns which you express. The study will be, of course, a classified document. If you receive any further inquiries, I recommend that you state simply that the entire subject is being studied carefully, that these concerns are being addressed, and the matter will likely receive Presidential attention. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 281, State, Volume VI. Confidential. Drafted on April 2 by Peter Rodman. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 151. Memorandum of Conversation 151. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 8, 1970. SUBJECT Encouragement and Protection of Investment PARTICIPANTS Nathaniel Samuels, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Charles Meyer, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Herbert Salzman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Private Resources David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser Eugene Braderman—E/CBA Sidney Weintraub—E/IFD Robert Smith—AF/W Joseph Mintzes—IN The Working Group on Protection of U.S. Private Investment Abroad 2 met with Mr. Samuels this morning to discuss the paper prepared by L on the “Encouragement and Protection of Investment in Africa, Asia and Latin America.” 3 Mr. Stevenson reported that there appeared to be general support for a more selective approach to the encouragement of U.S. direct investment in the developing countries, and that there also appeared to be considerable support for a policy of avoiding coercion in the solution of investment disputes. Mr. Samuels then asked whether the U.S. should continue to encourage U.S. private investment abroad through such direct and tangible means as the investment guaranty program. He wished to know the extent to which that program actually contributes to the flow of investment funds to developing countries and what impact it has on our relations with those countries. What effect would the curtailment of the program have on investment? Mr. Salzman indicated that, given the fact that we have had an investment guaranty program for many years, the termination of the program would have wide repercussions. In his view, countries such as Indonesia would be hurt, and it would be particularly difficult to induce flows of debt investment to LDC’s without guaranties. In general, investors would demand a higher rate of return. AID has considered the possibility of placing a ceiling on the amount of guaranties in certain countries where AID exposure is very great and it has decided to gradually wean some countries such as Korea from the investment guaranty program. AID has a guaranty exposure commitment in Korea of approximately one billion with another 500 million in the pipeline. Although it is not possible to estimate the amount of investment that might be lost if guaranties are not forthcoming, the percentage would be significant. Mr. Salzman emphasized that there are many other aspects to U.S. encouragement of investment than the guaranty program including information, advisory assistance, and protection policies, and he stated that a judgment on the investment guaranty program should be accompanied by a review of measures for the protection of U.S. investment abroad more detailed than that in the draft paper. There was also discussion of the implications of the guaranty program for U.S. Government involvement in investment disputes with foreign governments. Although it was pointed out that the U.S. Government cannot expect completely to avoid involvement as long as it follows the traditional practice of diplomatic espousal of claims, an investment guaranty may involve the United States Government at an early stage of the dispute as U.S. Government responsibility under an investment guaranty contract may come into play before the host government’s decision on compensation is determined. On the other hand, AID guaranty contracts with investors contain their own definition of expropriation and compensation formulas which may differ from the obligation of the host government under international law. Mr. Samuels indicated that he was leaning towards not encouraging investment where it is not wanted. He suggested it might be best to encourage the developing countries to determine how much they wish to encourage foreign private investment and to establish the necessary incentives. U.S. investors could rely upon tax write-offs for losses from foreign expropriations. Mr. Braderman mentioned three considerations other than foreign policy consequences that argue against an investment guaranty program. (a) It is questionable whether unilateral programs such as guaranties improve the investment climate; (b) U.S. labor is concerned about the creation of competitive export industries in other countries; and (c) there is some opinion that foreign investment diverts resources that are needed at home. Mr. Weintraub and Mr. Salzman emphasized the development objectives of the investment guaranty program and the increasing importance of transfers of private resources as U.S. public assistance for developing countries declines, at least in relative terms. Mr. Newsom suggested the importance of distinguishing between Africa where investment guaranties are needed to channel investment into new areas and other regions with a history of investment disputes. In Africa, U.S. influence depends upon association with the transfer of private resources, which transfer may or may not depend upon guaranties. Further, Africa holds large supplies of important minerals and it is in the national interest to secure access to these supplies through U.S. private investment. Mr. Newsom stated that in Africa in the last 10 years there have been no expropriations without compensation except in Algeria, 4 and he urged that we maintain perspective on the few problems we have had in comparison with the total magnitude of investment. In this regard, it was recalled that AID has paid claims under political risk guaranties of approximately $3,000,000. Mr. Meyer said that the U.S. Government should determine that it is in the national interest to ensure sources of certain important minerals. There are many techniques for encouraging investment in those sectors. Noting that protection will present problems, he observed that we cannot hope to have a policy that will be completely free from problems. In conclusion, Mr. Stevenson suggested that the group seemed to be agreed on a policy of selective encouragement of investment in the developing countries. No one supported a policy of general encouragement of all investment. With respect to protection policy, there may be some difference of emphasis, but there seems to be agreement that we do not need the Hickenlooper Amendment. Mr. Samuels asked if there were any new ideas on measures to encourage governments to respect their agreements with investors. Mr. Stevenson expressed the view that perhaps further guidance could be sent to our posts abroad to be alert to investment disputes and to advise the Department more fully at an earlier stage. At the close of the meeting, Mr. Samuels reviewed the specific suggestions in Mr. Stevenson’s memorandum of August 11 and expressed the following views. (a) AID should administer the investment guaranty program selectively. In addition to the actions taken to date, consideration should be given to maintaining an investment guaranty program only in those countries that are prepared to conclude agreements containing adequate assurances for the settlement of investment disputes. Others at the meeting expressed reservations on this point. (b) The U.S. Government is now supporting a multilateral investment insurance scheme with participation of the LDC’s in some form. We might be prepared to forego that participation, but four or five donor countries will not. (c) The U.S. Government already encourages investors to accept local capital participation to some extent, but the outstanding guidance to our posts calls for a neutral position on this matter. Perhaps the Embassies should be given new guidance indicating U.S. Government support for the concept of local capital participation but not making such participation a condition for U.S. Government support. (d) At the first opportunity, the Hickenlooper Amendment should be revised to afford the President greater flexibility. The Administration AID bill to be submitted to the 92nd Congress may be the best opportunity. (e) The guidance to U.S. posts with respect to the encouragement of U.S. private investment and the avoidance of investment disputes should be revised and brought up to date. (f) Additional measures to encourage acceptance of impartial procedures in the settlement of investment disputes should be considered in the light of the comments to be submitted on the L memorandum on that subject. (g) No decision was taken on the desirability of a statement by the Secretary on U.S. policy towards investment. However, subsequently Mr. Samuels asked Mr. Stevenson to revise the paper in light of this meeting omitting the options rejected and presenting recommendations to the Secretary. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, FM 10-1. Confidential. Drafted by M.B. Feldman (L/ARA). 2 Presumably the working group referred to in Document 150 . 3 Not found. 4 Accommodations were reached in investment disputes with Zambia and the Central African Republic. Zambia had assumed 51 percent of an American mining company and the Central African Republic had seized American-owned diamond mines. 152. Editorial Note 152. Editorial Note In addition to the problems of expropriation of U.S. properties in Peru and Chile (see Documents 148 and 149 ), by late 1970 Nixon administration officials were becoming increasingly apprehensive about the general problem of growing investment disputes of U.S. companies in foreign countries and the expropriation of U.S. companies by foreign governments (see Documents 150 and 151 ). The documentation printed here details the administration’s increased attention given to the problem and its efforts to develop a comprehensive policy that could be applied to specific cases. This compilation does not attempt to document in detail the Nixon administration’s responses to the many nationalizations by foreign governments of U.S. companies or companies with U.S. shareholders’ participation. Readers interested in the U.S. response to specific expropriations should consult the compilation covering the country in the appropriate Foreign Relations volume. 153. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon 153. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 8, 1971. SUBJECT Pending Expropriation Cases Involving United States Property Abroad A National Security Council memorandum of May 4 states that you have been informed that there are “200 expropriation cases pending involving U.S. business abroad,” and that you wish an individual report on each of these cases. 2 Our records of expropriations and nationalizations indicate that there are currently pending 56 corporate cases, of postwar origin, in 16 non-Communist countries. 3 This figure is based on a broad definition of “expropriation” to cover even cases where host country pressure falls short of nationalization of majority ownership of the affected corporations. We have consulted with the Department of Commerce, the source of the original report, 4 and have reviewed with them the 200 cases cited. The vast majority of these cases stem from trade complaints. They cover a variety of foreign governmental actions during 1970 which in some way—either actual or potential—affect adversely U.S. economic interests. Individual and other known claims also are included in the attachment. 5 There are also thousands of unsettled claims in Communist countries, which are summarized in the attachment. Most of the 56 actual pending expropriation cases involve disputes now under negotiation or litigation. The only significant non-Communist corporate case with little present prospects for settlement involves the International Petroleum Company in Peru. In addition to that one, we anticipate that the compensation negotiations over the nationalization of United States-owned copper mines in Chile may also pose difficult issues, although the Allende Government has stated publicly its intention to negotiate with the companies. 6 While every expropriation by a foreign government is a potential problem, the majority of such cases are small and are settled without United States Government intervention. Others are significant due to size and to their significant impact on our overall relations with the host country. The 56 current cases in which U.S. interests have been seized but for which compensation arrangements have not been implemented have an aggregate book value of $875 million, of which about $575 million is in Chilean copper mines. To put these 56 cases in perspective, it should be noted that over a dozen cases have been settled since the beginning of 1970. For example, five cases were settled in Algeria alone, involving Mobil, Atlantic Richfield, Dresser Industries, Esso and Newmont Mining. Settlements on significant expropriation actions were also reached in Chile and Zambia—involving South American Power, a Boise Cascade subsidiary, and the 80 percent US-owned Roan Selection Trust. Finally, the enclosed list of 56 cases includes some—most notably Gulf Oil in Bolivia and Bethlehem Steel in Chile—for which settlements have been reached but have not yet been fully implemented. John N. Irwin II 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 284, State, Volume XI. Confidential. 2 Not found. 3 On May 13, pursuant to Irwin’s request, the Department of State provided Kissinger a breakdown of the 56 cases, separated into four categories by country and company. (Memorandum from Nicholas Platt to Kissinger; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 284, State, Volume XI) 4 Not further identified. 5 Entitled “Pending Expropriations and Other Takings of United States-Owned Property Abroad”; not printed. The attachment provided one or two paragraphs on individual cases; Section II included summary paragraphs of extant or possible claims in non-Communist countries. 6 The May 13 Department of State memorandum noted: “as a technical point, it should be noted that the properties of the five U.S. copper companies concerned have not yet been nationalized, strictly speaking—although the legal process in Chile leading towards a nationalization is under way and the companies themselves are quite certain that the process of expropriation is irreversible. Thus, in a de jure sense, there are at present 51 pending cases with a book value of about $300 million.” 154. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon 154. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 11, 1971. SUBJECT Expropriations in Latin America We are facing a situation of snowballing expropriations of the property of American investors in Latin America and the Caribbean. We are facing a serious situation in Bolivia, Chile, Guyana and Jamaica. If we allow these actions to go forward without showing our serious concern by imposing financial penalties, we can expect other countries to take similar expropriatory action. Loss of international credit standing will be an important deterrent to future expropriations. We must act to —protect American business overseas; —eliminate the very substantial risk that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has on expropriation insurance issued to American businessmen in Latin America by assuring full compensation where expropriations take place. OPIC potential expropriation risk in Bolivia and Chile amounts to about $350 million and for Latin America as a whole to about $1.5 billion; —support the moderate political elements in Latin America and the Caribbean against the demands of the radical Left for further expropriations. (1) In Bolivia , Gulf Oil was expropriated in October 1969 and a compensation settlement has been worked out satisfactory to Gulf. However, in January the International Metals Processing Company (IMPC) was expropriated, and at the end of April, on the day after we made a P.L. 480 agreement with Bolivia, another American company was expropriated. Although compensation has been promised, no meaningful discussions have taken place in either of these two cases. (2) In Chile , the Allende Government has engaged in a broad program of nationalization of foreign investment. Allende is accomplishing his objective through a gradual step-by-step process utilizing technically legal means, but with the ultimate objective of communizing the whole country. While some companies have been compensated satisfactorily, the negotiations for compensation of the copper companies are just beginning. OPIC has undisputed expropriation coverage of $300 million to American companies and a further $200 million of such coverage which is in dispute. OPIC President Mills, and I am told Ambassador Korry, feel strongly that we should use financial pressure to assure satisfactory settlements in the copper compensation negotiations. I agree with them. (3) In Guyana , legislation has been enacted to take over the bauxite facilities of ALCAN. The problem in Guyana has ramifications for the whole Caribbean area. Jamaica is carefully watching the situation in Guyana and if Guyana succeeds against ALCAN and eventually against Reynolds, an American company, they will be under great pressure from their radical Left to move against American bauxite operations there. The United States has large investments in the Caribbean with $732 million of OPIC expropriation coverage, of which $465 million relates to bauxite. I would propose that bilateral assistance to expropriating countries be halted. For example, our bilateral aid program has gone forward in Guyana. We should follow a similar policy in the multilateral lending institutions. I am seriously considering an instruction to our representatives in the World Bank and Inter-American Bank to vote against loans to Bolivia and Guyana. These two Banks will shortly be considering loans to Bolivia, the proceeds of which will be used to finance a gas pipeline to Argentina. Part of the profits from the pipeline will be used to compensate Gulf. Our negative vote against the pipeline could upset the Gulf expropriation settlement. But we cannot let the interests of one company affect our whole posture in Latin America. The World Bank will also be considering a loan to Guyana of $5.4 million for anti-flood works. Even though the company is nominally Canadian (approximately 50% U.S. owned) and Canada is not opposed to the loan, I would again draw the line in this case. A loan to Guyana would be a signal that they can nationalize American property without penalty. It would similarly be a signal to the radical Left in Jamaica, which the moderates would find hard to resist, for further nationalizations there. This situation can no longer be handled in a piecemeal fashion. It requires a decision on your part to set a strong policy of both bilateral and multilateral financial pressure on expropriating governments to both assure compensation and deter future expropriation actions. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos: FRC 56 74 A 17, Memo to the President 5-8/71. No classification marking. The date is handwritten. A handwritten note reads: “Mr. Petty’s secy says the Secretary discussed this with the President on 6/11 but did not give him the original memo.” Connally and Kissinger met with the President from 2:05 to 2:38 p.m. on June 11. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 155. National Security Study Memorandum 131 155. National Security Study Memorandum 131 1 Washington, June 23, 1971. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs SUBJECT U.S. Policy in Cases of Expropriation The President has directed that a study be undertaken on an urgent basis of United States policy in connection with expropriation without fair, effective and adequate compensation by foreign governments of properties owned by U.S. citizens, or in which U.S. citizens have a substantial interest. The study should address issues arising in our relations with such foreign governments as a result of expropriations of U.S. privately owned property. It should assess the options open to the U.S. in dealing with expropriation actions in terms of effecting fair and prompt compensation. The legal, economic and foreign policy implications of these options should be discussed, and should be considered in relation to the totality of U.S. interests. The proposed policy options should cover the full range of relationships—including diplomatic, economic and military assistance, Export-Import Bank financing, and such special areas of interest as tariff preferences and sugar quotas. The study should review our experience with foreign governments which in the past have expropriated U.S. privately owned property or which may be engaged in such an action, including an assessment of the role of the guarantee program in negotiations, and the efficacy of U.S. actions taken. The study should be performed by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and representatives of OPIC, the Export-Import Bank and the NSC staff and should be chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. A CIEP memorandum is being issued simultaneously providing guidance on the economic aspects of the study. 2 The study will be submitted concurrently to the CIEP Review Group for consideration of the economic issues, and to the NSC Senior Review Group for consideration of the foreign policy issues. The Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs will participate as a member of the Senior Review Group in its consideration of this study. The study should be submitted not later than July 12, 1971. Until the study has been completed and reviewed by the President, all loan and guarantee applications to U.S. agencies pertaining to countries which have expropriated private business owned by U.S. citizens or in which U.S. citizens have a substantial interest, or are currently in the process of expropriating such property, without a compensation agreement having been reached, should be held in abeyance unless specifically approved by the President. 3 The previously approved loans for India and Peru may be processed without referral. Any other loans which need to be authorized before the end of the current fiscal year should be submitted to the President for approval. During this period, we should also seek to defer consideration of such loans by multilateral financial institutions of which the U.S. is a member. If it is not possible to defer, all factors should be considered before the decision is made to vote for, against or to abstain. If there is disagreement among interested agencies, the matter should be referred to the President for a decision. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An earlier draft of this NSSM is attached to a June 16 memorandum for the record by Deputy Executive Secretary Brewster indicating that the study stemmed from a direct Presidential order originating in part from several discussions with Connally, and that Kissinger had already discussed the draft with Irwin by phone. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Expropriation NSSM, NSC Misc. Memos) 2 CIEPSM No. 6, entitled “U.S. Policy in Cases of Expropriation,” was circulated by Peter Peterson on June 24. Peterson noted that the study paper should focus on the economic rather than national security dimensions of expropriation policy and would be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group under the direction of Ernest Stern of the CIEP staff. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, Box 5195, CIEP Study Memoranda) A paper prepared in OPIC was circulated by OPIC President Bradford Mills on June 25. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131) For the response to NSSM 131, see Document 157 . 3 A July 14 memorandum from Henry Kearns, President of the Export-Import Bank, reviewed policy in restricted countries. Kearns concurred with continuance of the NSSM clearance procedures for Bolivia, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, Ecuador, Guinea, Iraq, Libya, Peru, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Zambia, but questioned its continued application in Algeria, India, Indonesia, and Mexico. In an attachment on Algeria, it was argued that “the Algerian government, as a result of firm Eximbank policy of refusing to consider major cases until all U.S. expropriation claims had been settled, did effect settlement of all U.S. cases and is well along in achieving settlements of French cases.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131) 156. Draft Memorandum From the Department of the Treasury to President Nixon 156. Draft Memorandum From the Department of the Treasury to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 13, 1971. SUBJECT U.S. Expropriation Policy I. The Problem The expanding number of expropriations of United States-owned property overseas presents us with a major threat to our foreign interests. The continuation of further expropriation action against our companies abroad will deepen the erosion of public support for our foreign political and economic policies. This will lead to additional Congressional limitations on Presidential prerogatives and even greater difficulty in pursuing our foreign objectives. The problem is urgent because the expropriation trend abroad is accelerating. (Nearly 70 expropriations against U.S. investors in 17 less developed countries have taken place since 1968, almost double the number in the preceding eight years.) It is not only the frequency which has brought the issue to a head. We are faced with a rash of subtle, legally correct actions. We encounter “interventions”, not “expropriations”; assertions of a vague acceptance of the principle of compensation and not an outright rejection, as in Cuba. Today, the indirect expropriation technique is more exportable and pernicious, more threatening to the world order than the past outright actions. II. U.S. Interests It is in our political as well as economic interest to discourage less developed countries from pursuing actions which are inimical to increasing private capital flows and which create a bias towards the public sector at the expense of the private sector. Development is in our economic, political, and security interest, but it cannot be accomplished without private capital. Moreover, development totally dependent upon statist regimes threatens all our interests. Finally, the expropriation issue extends beyond its impact on our relations with LDC’s. A continued permissive attitude toward expropriations could have carryover effects in developed countries. The stakes are enormous. III. U.S. Policy Options It is a false dichotomy to present the issue as one involving protection of either our political-security or economic interests. Only by enhancing our long-term economic interests can we assure ourselves of the wherewithal to maintain a strong voice in international military and political affairs. The policy for the future must reflect this fact. There are basically four policy options open to the U.S.: (1) a passive approach; (2) an ad hoc approach; (3) a policy of deterrence based on withdrawal of economic preferences; (4) a policy of reprisals based on the imposition of economic sanctions. Neither our national interests nor the political environment tolerate a passive approach. While the existing ad hoc posture has allowed each case to be treated individually, it has not worked to deter expropriatory actions; its administrative flexibility without a strong policy framework has developed a bias in the direction of limiting even the covert pressure we might bring to bear. Our analysis suggests that a firm policy of deterrence is needed. However, a policy of strong economic sanctions would deny us the allies we must obtain to make our policy effective. IV. Experience under Our Present Ad Hoc Policy There is not now a U.S. expropriation policy. Each case is handled on an individual basis and policy is formulated ad hoc at the time the act occurs. In a number of cases not requiring Presidential attention, but still important, no coherent response is adopted. Perhaps because they are aware of the weak and uncoordinated response the U.S. will probably make, several LDC leaders have embarked on the politically popular course of expropriation: they believe that they can carry it through with little or no cost imposed from overseas and with substantial gains at home. It is relatively easy for LDC leaders to paint themselves into a corner from which the United States must retreat or face a major political confrontation. We provide no support for moderate elements, as exist in Jamaica, to resist extremists’ demands for expropriation and no incentives for self restraint. The impression of our unwillingness to impose costs in terms of withdrawal of preferential benefits has snowballed from the Peruvian experience where the overall image was projected of the United States unable or backing away from support of an American investor overseas. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the growing trend toward expropriations can almost be dated from the IPC expropriation in 1968. Surely there is some relationship between our lack of action in Peru and the Bolivian and Chilean expropriations. If present lack of policy has not positively led to the acceleration in expropriation, it surely has in no way tended to deter or slow down the growth in the number of expropriations. The defenders of the current policy make no pretensions of effecting deterrence. As I understand it, they assume that it is not possible to deter—or would not risk deterrence—because they believe it would jeopardize what they consider to be more vital political interests. The present ad hoc response policy is said to have the advantage of avoiding confrontation with other governments, preserving other U.S. interests from countervailing attack and preventing U.S. policy from being controlled by an unreasonable and unfair United States investor. I believe this defense is wrong both in its basic assumptions and objectives. V. Deterrence is Feasible There are several reasons why a policy aimed at deterrence of expropriations will be successful in protecting these interests at acceptable costs. (1) Expropriations are often deterrable if we indicate a clear policy response in advance. If political leaders know the costs of pursuing expropriations (and if the costs are significant), they will avoid putting themselves in a position where they will have to pay these costs. Even more important, there are moderates in developing countries who, if supported by a firm U.S. stand plus a clear identification of the economic cost to the host countries, would create a counterpressure to the domestic radical nationalistic groups which push for expropriation. Political realities abroad are such that it is impossible to claim that with a new policy of deterrence no expropriations will take place. However, an atmosphere will be created which should reverse the trend of increasing expropriations and serve to assure prompt, adequate and effective compensation when nationalization does take place. In many cases more constructive outlets will be found for the deep-seated nationalistic impulses that cause expropriations. In those few cases where no substitute is found, those nations should just have to forego the receipt of preferential benefits. (2) Less developed countries have been permitted to regard their receipt of preferential benefits such as foreign assistance as a right— resulting from an “obligation” of the rich countries to donate. We have allowed a distortion of economic reasoning to develop. Initially, we will have to offset this attitude. A strong U.S. position, not based on threats, but on the proposition that only countries that respect international practices with respect to investment are entitled to future preferential benefits will become respected as a reasonable exercise of our own self interest. Much depends upon style. A policy can be formulated that will deter, without threats and without provocations. The Hickenlooper amendment generates a violent reaction because it threatens public retaliation for failure to provide compensation within a fixed time limit. This pitfall can be avoided. A tough policy will not mean that every expropriation will mean a major confrontation or that American investors will hold the keys to U.S. policy in their hands. We have a policy option which will deter without provocation and with full U.S. control over the development of our policy in specific cases. (3) We must also face the cold facts of relative power. Less developed countries are, in general, more economically dependent on relations with the U.S., and, in particular, on the preferential economic treatment which we give them, than we are on them. Even in the short term, political relations and security concerns are not paramount in Bolivia or Chile, for example. Where they are important, the overall U.S. national interests can be maximized through that necessary degree of flexibility contained in the recommended option. (4) It is simplistic to assume that less developed countries act as a group, that is, economic action against one is necessarily action against all. Whatever initial expressions the LDCs may make, over the long run they will not act is a group when their self interest is at stake. Moreover, a well articulated and understood policy should not permit a clear U.S. policy to be viewed as an attack on a region. VI. A New Policy Proposal A clear general policy position against uncompensated expropriation would be announced by the President regarding future situations and divorced from any specific expropriation case. It would be based on the policy framework that uncompensated expropriations of foreign property are inimical to sound development policy, to continued U.S. support for foreign assistance and to our national interests, including legitimate U.S. economic interests. The following steps would be taken to implement this policy: (a) If a significant United States interest is expropriated, the United States would suspend granting new preferential benefits (e.g., bilateral assistance., P.L. 480, tariff, quota preferences) to the expropriating country. (b) The U.S. would seek to defer new loans from multilateral institutions and could vote against them if necessary. The U.S. would need to develop support from other developed countries for its position. (c) The United States would take an active role in judging whether reasonable steps had been taken. Submission of a dispute for settlement under international arbitration procedures would automatically be considered as reasonable steps to settlement of a dispute. (d) Preferential programs would not be resumed until the country had taken reasonable steps to assure prompt, adequate and effective compensation. (e) All of the foregoing general policy would be publicly announced. However, when an expropriation actually took place the United States would make no public announcements of cutoffs of foreign assistance or other preferential benefits. Press briefings would reiterate our general policy and the facts of the particular situation. (f) An administrative policy group—perhaps headed by the CIEP or Commerce—would be formed to (i) recommend to the President on those instances where the withdrawal of benefits is not to occur immediately, (ii) determine when reasonable steps had been taken so as to justify restoration of preferential benefits, (iii) monitor emerging nationalization policy, and (iv) coordinate agency actions. I see major advantages for this proposal: 1. It would provide an unequivocal indication of the United States position on expropriations and clearly establish the consequences for a developing country for such action. In contrast with present ad hoc covert pressure policy, it would provide a substantial chance of deterring the rising trend of nationalization of foreign property. 2. It would provide a strong support to moderates in many countries who wished to resist expropriations but are unable to do so because present ad hoc policy does not give them support. 3. It provides deterrence without provocation as foreign reaction would be minimized through the prior announcement of our policy divorced from any particular expropriation case. Restoration of assistance becomes a carrot for rewarding responsible behavior and, in doing so, we reverse the present distorted situation in which assistance is regarded as a right. Hickenlooper threats of retaliation would not occur. No ultimatums would be given. It would be clear in advance that the U.S. bilateral assistance program would cease until reasonable steps had been made to effect compensation. Not only would the President get something from his policy of deterrence but the President would have great flexibility , including the ability to regard a particular expropriation as not significant, allow continued humanitarian assistance, or narrow the scope of the cutoff of new preferential benefits as the situation required. 4. It would be strongly supported by United States business leaders. While particular individuals in particular situations may wish to soft pedal U.S. actions, the overwhelming general view of U.S. business is that a tougher line is needed. 5. There would be strong Congressional support. In fact, the present trend can only lead to mandatory expropriation legislation going beyond Hickenlooper. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, NSC. Confidential. Drafted by M. Bradfield and J.R. Petty on July 13. Forwarded to Volcker under cover of a July 14 routing note from Petty who noted it would “take care of some of your problems.” No final version of the memorandum was found. 157. Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group 157. Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group 1 Washington, July 31, 1971. The U.S. Response to Expropriations of U.S. Private Investment in Developing Countries—NSSM 131 The Problem Expropriation of American-owned business in the developing countries, which is a result of economic nationalism, increasingly presents the United States with both domestic and foreign problems. This is the case for a number of reasons: 1. The number of expropriations is increasing, and this trend is likely to continue. As indicated in a recent CIA study annexed at Tab A, 2 economic nationalism stems from deep rooted political, economic, and social trends and a desire to assert independence and sovereignty. It is likely to develop further and to affect additional investment sectors in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Some agencies believe that this trend can be countered or channeled along more constructive lines by a firm U.S. policy against expropriation. Other agencies believe that a firm U.S. policy aimed at deterrence cannot modify the basic elements of economic nationalism and that we must be careful to avoid aggravating the problem by precipitating confrontations. 2. This increasing trend is not limited to expropriation and economic nationalism is often being asserted in more sophisticated ways than in the past, including legislated participations, investment codes (e.g., Andean Code), mandatory joint-venturing of new projects, and pricing confrontations (e.g. OPEC). 3. The United States has significant economic, political, and security interests in this problem, which are diverse and in some cases mutually incompatible. These interests are discussed in the following section. Present U.S. Policy 1. Present U.S. policy (Tab B) 3 is to rely primarily on diplomatic and non-overt economic pressures to deter expropriations to the extent possible and, when expropriations occur, to assist U.S. investors to obtain prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. This policy has avoided confrontations and has been effective in achieving compensation in some cases and not in others. Illustrative case studies are included in Tab B, and a list of pending cases is at Tab C. 4 2. Some agencies believe there is an urgent need to change the present United States expropriation policy. They believe that there is, in fact, no overall expropriation policy and that each case is handled on an individual basis and policy is formulated ad hoc in response to expropriations. These agencies assert that, in a number of cases not requiring Presidential attention, but still important, no coherent response has been adopted. They suggest that the leaders of some developing countries have been encouraged to embark on the politically popular course of expropriation by the knowledge that the United States will probably make a weak and uncoordinated response. On the other hand, these agencies assert that the United States policy has provided no support for moderate elements within the developing countries to resist expropriation demands and that the present U.S. policy has not deterred or slowed down the trend toward increasing expropriation of American-owned business. Other agencies believe that present policy has been consistent and represents a proper balance of U.S. interests. These agencies believe that it is prudent to avoid a belligerent stance by the United States in cases where other U.S. interests are at stake, and our leverage is limited. U.S. Interests in the Developing Countries 1. The United States has an interest in the preservation of an international community composed of a predominance of independent self-sustaining countries reasonably well disposed to the United States. Although few developing countries are now significant powers, some are much more important than others, and as a group they constitute a significant political force. Some of them occupy or border upon areas of strategic importance to the security of the United States. Others are of considerable economic importance. Political developments in the developing countries can vitally affect U.S. relations with the major powers, both friendly and hostile. Ultimately, the character of the international community, through political, psychological and economic pressures as well as direct security threats, can fundamentally affect the well-being of the United States and the character of our national life. 2. The United States Government has a significant financial stake in the expropriation question. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation has a total of $2.5 billion outstanding in expropriation risk insurance. While it is quite unlikely that all or even a major part of our liability will be called, the costs could be very substantial, especially if the current trend continues. For example, our exposure in Chile alone amounts to $312 million. Expropriations are also costly to Treasury tax revenues. 3. The United States has an interest in maintaining access at a reasonable price to natural resources located in the developing countries. Although the U.S. is a major producer of raw materials, we presently import 15% of our requirements. Among important crude materials, we import 10-15% of both crude oil and copper, 25% of iron ore, and over 80% of bauxite needs. While we are self-sufficient in coal and zinc, we must import iron ore, most of our tin, natural rubber, nickel and chromium. As good-quality, indigenous resources are depleted, we find it cheaper to turn to higher grade foreign sources—the development of which will require substantial amounts of foreign capital. Long-range projections indicate that by the year 2000 we will import 30% or more of our requirements. This growing U.S. dependence on foreign raw material resources means a greater U.S. impact on world raw material markets, as well as increased competition amongst the developed countries for those resources found in the developing countries. 4. The United States has an interest in maintaining and expanding the market for U.S. exports in the developing countries—particularly with Latin America. In 1970, U.S. exports to LDCs were $13.2 billion and U.S. imports were $10.8 billion, for a favorable trade balance of $2.4 billion. 5. U.S. private investment (book value) in the LDCs totals $20 billion ($8 billion petroleum), of which $13.8 billion ($3.7 billion petroleum) is in Latin America. U.S. investors repatriated some $3.3 billion of income in 1969, of which $2.3 billion came from the petroleum sector. Net U.S. direct investment (including retained earnings less liquidations) in less-developed countries increased by some $1.2 billion annually in the five years 1965-69, the great bulk of these new investments going to Latin America. From a peak of $1.6 billion in 1968, the net annual increase in direct U.S. investment declined to the level of $1.3 billion in 1969, and $1.7 billion estimated in 1970. OPIC insurance against expropriation totaled some $2.5 billion, of which $1.5 billion is in Latin America. 6. For the above reasons, and on humanitarian grounds, the United States will continue to have an important interest in the economic, social and political development of the countries, in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Relationships of U.S. Investment in the Developing Countries to U.S. Interests There 1. Foreign private capital and management skills, in some form, will continue to be necessary for the development of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and may well be of increasing relative importance depending on the levels of capital flows. Private investment is not only an important source of capital, but it is a major contributing source of needed technology and managerial skills. 2. U.S. investment abroad also increases profit and export opportunities for U.S. industry, and in the past has helped to secure supplies of needed commodities. 3. The net effect on the U.S. balance of payments is beneficial over the long term. 4. Expropriations will not only tend to cut off the flow of private capital but could also result in reduced Congressional support for foreign assistance and in amendments limiting Presidential discretion in giving assistance. The Senate version of the Sugar Act already demonstrates this trend as well as lack of confidence in the Executive Branch to carry out Congressional expropriation policy in good faith. 5 5. At the present time, the political implications of U.S. foreign investment are both positive and negative. Over the years, private investment has contributed greatly to the U.S. presence in the developing world, particularly in Latin America. In the present context, that presence has sometimes been a factor in the growth of nationalism adversely affecting U.S. relations with developing countries. The relative importance of U.S. relations with a developing country in the balance of total U.S. interests in that country is a matter on which not all agencies agree. Some believe that U.S. interests can best be served by taking a forceful attitude toward protection of U.S. investors abroad; others believe that investment interests, however important, must be weighed with respect to each country against all other relevant economic, political, and security interests. U.S. Objectives U.S. policy has traditionally focused on fostering a hospitable investment climate abroad for private capital, while recognizing that every country has the sovereign right to expropriate private property within its territory provided reasonable provision is made for payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. The U.S. has two distinct and related protection objectives: (1) to deter expropriation to the extent possible and feasible, and (2) to insure that the investors’ rights under international law and practice are protected when expropriation takes place. U.S. Influence and Protection Policy The ability of the United States to deter expropriations and to encourage payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation will necessarily vary from case to case. Some statistics relevant to this question of leverage are set forth at Tab D. 6 The following conclusions on U.S. influence and protection policy seem warranted: 1. U.S. bilateral influence to deter expropriations has decreased, but it is still significant (although not with all countries), particularly if exercised in concert with other capital-exporting countries. When expropriations take place, U.S. influence can be helpful to investor efforts to achieve compensations settlements in some but not all cases. 2. Inter-governmental confrontations arising out of investment disputes can adversely affect important U.S. interests—including other American-owned investments. 3. Active and firm U.S. protection efforts can be helpful in many situations, particularly if steps can be taken to prevent a dispute from ripening into a confrontation. Our policy should avoid unnecessary confrontations. However, some agencies believe that in the few cases where developing countries seek confrontations the United States has a strong interest in not backing down. 4. Firm action to protect an investment as part of a clear investment policy can have a deterrent effect in some other countries even if it is not effective in the particular case. The announcement of a clear policy on expropriations is an important element in deterrence. Such an announcement would assure that governments contemplating expropriation would know in advance the probable costs and would help to promote the view that developing countries do not have a right to foreign assistance and other preferential benefits. 5. Decisions on measures to protect investment must take into account all relevant U.S. interests and the costs and benefits of any U.S. response. Therefore, U.S. protection policy must retain flexibility. However, some agencies believe that the present policy, which has emphasized flexibility, has little, if any, deterrent effect and results in practice in a minimum covert response. They believe that a tougher general policy, which would require a positive decision if economic benefits were not to be suspended in response to expropriation would, in fact, provide more flexibility to the President, since it would make suspension of benefits more feasible by making it more common and part of a general policy, thus avoiding singling out any one country. Other agencies believe that U.S. interests other than investor interests will continue to require case-by-case flexibility, both as to the action to be taken and the timing, and that flexibility and deterrence are not mutually incompatible. 6. The effectiveness of U.S. policy on expropriation will be enhanced if it is in an international framework. 7. We need a policy that guides our actions in international lending organizations as well as our bilateral actions. Basic Options Presented Generally speaking, the U.S. Government has five basic options open to it in dealing with significant expropriation of American investments abroad by foreign governments. 7 They are: 1. In each significant case of expropriation new foreign assistance, guarantees, and other benefits would be withheld and existing benefits suspended immediately upon expropriation until reasonable provision for just compensation is made or an impartial arbitration or adjudication procedure is agreed on by the parties to the dispute, unless the United States makes a positive determination to make an exception to this policy. Such a determination would have to overcome a presumption that benefits should not be continued, except where suspension would violate U.S. legal obligations. This policy would be announced as a new general policy but no announcement would normally be volunteered of the withholding or suspension of benefits in any particular case. 2. In each significant case of expropriation new foreign assistance, guarantees, and other benefits would be withheld and existing benefits suspended on a fixed deadline, e.g., six months under the Hickenlooper Amendment, after the expropriation, unless appropriate steps are taken to provide just compensation. 3. In each significant case of expropriation a determination would be made whether and to what degree to extend new foreign assistance guarantees, and other benefits or to suspend existing benefits. That determination would be made taking into account all United States interests involved and what would be the best means of promoting a satisfactory solution of the expropriation situation. This policy would be implemented with flexibility required to respond to changing circumstances in the expropriation situation or U.S. relations with the expropriating government. This option has three sub-options: a. Pending the determination, no new commitments would be made unless otherwise decided. A general statement would be made in advance announcing this policy and characterizing it as a new and harder U.S. policy on expropriation of U.S. investments. b. Pending the determination, the U.S. coordinating mechanism would make an urgent examination to decide what measures would be appropriate in the interim. A general statement would be made announcing this policy, emphasizing that the United States would make a close and critical evaluation of expropriation actions. c. Pending the determination, new commitments would be made in due course unless otherwise decided. A general statement could be made indicating a relationship between United States foreign economic programs and the treatment of U.S. investment in accordance with international law. 4. Withholding of new selected foreign assistance and other economic benefits, but only after a determination (1) that the withholding takes into account all U.S. interests in the expropriating country, (2) that, except in clearly flagrant cases, a reasonable time has elapsed during which the U.S. has ascertained that appropriate remedies, legal or administrative, are either not available or have been exhausted, and (3) that withholding will contribute to a satisfactory resolution of the dispute. 5. Traditional diplomatic protection, including formal espousal of claims, but no use of economic pressure (though there may be some reduction in U.S. willingness to assist in the future). Complicating Factors These relatively simple options are complicated, however, by several factors which flow from the varied nature of the economic benefits the United States could conceivably withhold or terminate. (See fuller discussion at Tab E.) 8 1. U.S. assistance subject to the cut-off falls into two categories—already committed or contracted, and prospective or future. The withholding of future commitments is the denial of a carrot, whereas the cut-off of assistance already contracted and in the “pipeline” amounts to a sanction. The former is an understandable (and less visible) exercise of U.S. sovereignty, whereas the latter will be seen by the foreign government as retaliatory and presents it with a challenge from which it cannot easily back down. Doubtless developing countries will see both as punitive and coercive, but reactions will be stronger to the latter. Some agencies suggest that the reaction of developing countries is caused in part by a distortion of reasoning whereby they have come to regard preferential benefits as a right. These agencies assert that a clear policy of withdrawing preferential benefits would, in time, become respected as a reasonable measure to protect recognized rights. Other agencies, on the contrary, believe that increasing condemnation of the United States would be more likely, particularly where the withdrawal of benefits precedes violations of law by the expropriating country. 2. U.S. assistance to developing countries is provided both bilaterally and multilaterally. The bilateral assistance is theoretically controllable by the U.S. Government, whereas the multilateral is not. The multilateral institutions involve third countries, requiring support of other members if U.S. efforts are to result in denial of loans. Nevertheless, U.S. abstention on loans to Bolivia and Guyana have succeeded in impressing on the managements of the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank the seriousness with which the United States regards the expropriation problem. An effective U.S. policy needs to cover both bilateral and multilateral assistance, and separate options are presented on the question of voting in the international financial institutions. Agreed Further Steps Apart from the options presented in this paper, there is general agreement among the agencies that certain steps should be taken forthwith: 1. There should be an appropriate public statement announcing the policy adopted by the United States to respond to expropriations. 9 2. Consultation should be initiated with other developed countries to explore the possibilities for improving coordination of positions and developing a common strategy on expropriation questions, particularly in the international agencies. It is desirable to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. policy against expropriation by encouraging other developed countries to take a similar position in their bilateral programs and in the international financial institutions. 3. The U.S. should also take the lead in seeking to strengthen the existing international mechanisms for dealing with expropriations, such as the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and in creating additional devices such as the proposed International Investment Insurance Agency. The agencies were all in agreement on the desirability of stepping up the U.S. effort to bring the IIIA into being. (See discussion of impartial dispute settlement at Tab F.) 10 The agencies also agreed that the United States should seek ways and means to expand the present functions of ICSID so that it will be able to render useful service. 4. Efforts should be made to improve inter-agency coordination on foreign investment issues, and a procedure should be established for prompt resolution of inter-agency differences on operating questions, particularly those related to actual and prospective expropriation. The Secretary of State has designated Deputy Under Secretary Samuels to coordinate the U.S. response to expropriation problems and has asked the heads of the other concerned agencies to appoint representatives to work with Mr. Samuels. 11 Other possible coordinating mechanisms would be the CIEP Operations Group and the NAC. Any coordinating group should include representatives from State, Treasury, Ex-Im Bank, Commerce, DOD, OPIC, Agriculture, AID, and CIA. The Group would have responsibility for assuring: —inter-agency coordination of political and economic policies involved in expropriation problems; —alerting all agencies to possible expropriations and recommending measures to prevent them from occurring; —determining or recommending appropriate measures to be taken in the cases of expropriation or threat of expropriation. 5. Further measures should be taken to improve communication with the business community to ensure that it is aware of the actions taken by the Administration to assist business and to facilitate the exchange of views on related issues. Additional Studies Required In response to the specific terms of NSSM 131, this memorandum presents options open to the United States in dealing with expropriations. However, the problem presented by economic nationalism is much broader than that. A number of other basic issues should be addressed, such as: (1) U.S. trade, investment, and assistance policy toward the developing countries, including a consideration of U.S. objectives and an assessment of the roles that foreign investment and government aid can play in development in an environment of increasing economic nationalism; (2) the meaning and extent of this Administration’s emphasis on multilateral institutions as a vehicle for assistance in a context in which the lending policies of multilateral institutions may not accord with U.S. views (The Department of the Treasury dissents and believes no such study is necessary); (3) the proper role of investment insurance in U.S. policy toward economic nationalism; and (4) the role that the U.S. Government can or should play to help avoid investment disputes by influencing the character and terms of U.S. investments abroad and maintaining continuing good offices with host governments. Without delaying decisions on the options presented in this paper, studies on these issues should be undertaken as soon as possible and the options presented in this paper reviewed when these further studies have been completed. It is estimated that at least three months will be required to complete the above studies. [Omitted here are pages 14–27 [ Pgs. 14–27 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , and Doc. 10 ] : “Discussion of the Options.”] B. Options with respect to USG action in international financial institutions in the event of proposed loans to expropriating governments 1. Agreed Actions a. To Promote Constructive Policies It was agreed by all agencies that the USG should use its voice in management and capital replenishment to induce the IBRD effectively to apply its traditional policy on compensation and to seek to persuade other institutions to adopt a similar policy on withholding assistance to countries not taking reasonable steps to meet compensation obligations. 12 Such a policy on expropriation by the international financial institutions could be most useful in providing a multilateral “sanction” against uncompensated expropriations. It was recognized that adoption of such a policy would not of itself result in withholding loans in all cases of interest to the USG, since implementation of the policy necessarily involves subjective determinations. In addition, discussion of such a policy within the IDB should proceed on a low key, since most Latin American countries would be unlikely to publicly agree to such an expropriation policy for the Bank. “The Bank has taken a similar position in the case of those member countries whose credit is impaired by the existence of a dispute over a default on their foreign debt or over compensation for expropriated property formerly owned by foreigners. The Bank is charged, under its Articles of Agreement, to encourage international investment. It has, therefore, a direct interest in the creation and maintenance of satisfactory relations between member countries and their external creditors. Accordingly, the normal practice is to inform governments who are involved in such disputes that the Bank or IDA will not assist them unless and until they make appropriate efforts to reach a fair and equitable settlement.” [Footnote in the source text.] b. To Defer Loans It was also agreed that intervention with the management of these institutions with a view of having management suspend consideration of a loan until reasonable steps to arrive at fair compensation had been taken would be a normal first step in any event where we decided to defer or withhold new bilateral assistance. 2. Voting Options When the Board of an international financial institution decides upon a loan to a government which has expropriated significant U.S. business interests, the United States is faced with a choice of actions—to support the loan, to abstain, or to oppose the loan. Under all of the basic policy options, except for the last, this question will arise. Except in the case of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank, a negative vote by the United States is not by itself sufficient to block a loan. In cases where a loan is approved over our objection, as occurred in two recent instances, a negative vote or abstention by the U.S. does not result in a denial of a real economic benefit. Thus, it would not appear to be a particularly credible or effective means of exerting influence, beyond perhaps its symbolic value as a public expression of our attitude. On the other hand, to the extent that we are successful in promoting a harder policy on expropriations within the institutions and in obtaining voting support from other contributing countries, negative votes will become more effective. However, since this effort with the institutions and the other contributors will take time and is of uncertain outcome, decision is required on our voting policy under present circumstances where we are likely to be relatively isolated in negative votes and abstentions. Under these circumstances, three basic options are presented: (1) to express our disapproval in all cases (by negative votes or abstentions); (2) to determine our vote on a case-by-case basis in the light of all relevant U.S. interests; and (3) to abjure the use of negative votes or abstentions by the United States, on loans in these institutions as responses to expropriations until such time as such votes or abstentions would be in support of an expropriation policy endorsed by the institution and would receive significant support from other contributors. One agency believes that including separate options on multilateral voting procedures is unnecessary. That agency suggests that there should be no separate policy for U.S. voting on loans by international financial institutions and that decisions on such voting should be made under the same policy formula as applied to bilateral programs. The demurring agency believes that the premise upon which the three voting options are based is incorrect—that there will be a period of time in which the United States will not have succeeded in persuading either management or other countries to support our position and that voting differences therefore will have to come up in the Board. That agency asserts that lack of a firm U.S. stance has encouraged the IFI managements and directors to believe that the U.S. would take a relaxed view on lending to expropriating countries. That agency further believes that recent abstentions by the United States on several loans have had the effect of moving World Bank and IDB management views in the direction we desire and that adoption of a firm U.S. policy applicable equally to bilateral and multilateral assistance should further this trend and consolidate support from both management and directors. Other agencies differ in their assessment of the effects of the recent abstentions and consider this view unrealistic, particularly with respect to the regional banks. They believe that the United States will have to work hard over a period of time in order to induce the institutions and the other contributors to share our views, and even then the outcome is uncertain. [Omitted here are pages 31–33 [ Pgs. 31–33 include portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] : “Discussion of the Options.”] 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131. Confidential. Circulated under cover of an August 2 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Davis to members of the SRG informing them the paper would be considered by the Group at its meeting on August 4. A July 28 Department of State memorandum, which forwarded the paper to Kissinger and Peterson, indicated it had been prepared by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson, with wide representation from other interested agencies. (Ibid.) The paper was discussed by the SRG on August 4. Briefing materials for Kissinger’s use at that meeting, including a 13-page Analytical Summary of the paper and Issues for Decision, are in National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 98, 8/4/71 SRG Meeting—Expropriations (NSSM 131). 2 None of the seven tabs (A-G) is printed. Tab A is “Implications of Economic Nationalism in the Poor Countries,” June 29. 3 Entitled “Present U.S. Policy on Expropriations,” undated. 4 Entitled “Current Situations in Noncommunist Countries Involving Expropriation or Negotiation Sale of Property in Which U.S. Corporations Have a Direct or Indirect Interest,” undated. 5 The Senate Sugar Bill provides for a mandatory cutoff of the sugar quota of a country expropriating without compensation, a tax on the prorated quota to be used for compensating the victims of expropriations and a determination by the Tariff Commission on whether there has been an uncompensating expropriation as well as the amount of adequate compensation. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 Entitled “Statistics on Leverage,” undated. 7 The options are, of course, circumscribed to some extent by the provisions of United States law, in particular, the Hickenlooper Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act (sec 620 (e), 22 USC 2370 (e)) and to the Sugar Act (7 USC 1158 (c)). Some options would require changes in those laws or modification to accommodate those laws. [Footnote in the source text.] 8 “Benefits Which Might Be Withheld or Withdrawn in Response to Expropriations,” undated. 9 Such a statement was issued on January 19, 1972. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 , pp. 31-34. 10 Entitled “Third Party Dispute Settlement,” undated. Proposals to establish an International Investment Insurance Agency (IIIA) under IBRD auspices were not successful. 11 See footnote 3, Document 160 . 12 The World Bank’s policy is stated as follows: 158. Memorandum From the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Aldrich) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 158. Memorandum From the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Aldrich) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 1 Washington, August 3, 1971. NSSM 131—Issues for SRG Meeting The response to NSSM 131 2 did not include statements of agency preferences among the options, principally because most agencies had not yet made their decisions. Whether agencies will state their preferences at the Senior Review Group Meeting or by separate memorandum, I do not know. My understanding is that you decided at the briefing last Wednesday that the Department of State prefers Option 3C among the basic options (although coupled with a stronger public statement) and Option 2 among the multilateral voting options. On the basis of my conversations with staff members of the key agencies, I would expect Treasury to support Option 1, with a fall-back to Option 3A and perhaps a further fall-back to 3B. Commerce will probably favor either Option 1 or 2 (we have retained Option 2—Hickenlooper—in the paper primarily because Commerce likes it) with a fall-back to 3A and perhaps to 3B. Commerce will also emphasize the importance of the United States not denying benefits in cases where the affected U.S. business does not want it (see the footnote on page 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] ). Defense is tending toward 3B, but no firm decision has yet been made. Officially stated agency positions are as follows: OPIC prefers Option 3B. The Export-Import Bank prefers 3C. AID prefers Option 4, with a fall-back to 3C. All agencies that have commented prefer Option 2 of the multilateral voting options. Treasury at the staff level believes there should be no multilateral voting options and that our policy should be the same for both bilateral and multilateral benefits. Aside from the preferences on the options, the most important issue is the composition and powers of the coordinating mechanism. The possibilities are discussed on pages 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] and 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] of the response of the NSSM. I would expect some agencies to support the CIEP Operations Group but Treasury will probably fight hard for the NAC or perhaps a new group chaired by the CIEP staff. I understand the NSC staff now tends to favor the CIEP Review Group. From our point of view a most important issue is mentioned briefly on page 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 11 ] of the response in the description of Option 2 of the multilateral voting options, where it says that negative votes or abstentions in the international financial institutions as responses to expropriations should require the concurrence of the Secretaries of State and of the Treasury. I would expect Treasury to take issue with that conclusion and argue that such votes should be normal responses to expropriations and therefore not questions of unusual sensitivity. It may be useful to point out that the area of agreement among the agencies is quite substantial, as described on pages 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] and 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] of the response. A public statement of policy, consultations with other developed countries, the strengthening of international mechanisms for dealing with expropriations, and a new U.S. coordinating mechanism are all important actions, and they are agreed, at least in general terms. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131. Confidential. Drafted by Aldrich on August 3; cleared in draft by Eaton (S/PC) and Weintraub (E). The SRG meeting was held on August 4 and a resulting NSDM was issued on October 8 ( Document 169 ). Irwin, Samuels, Weintraub, and Aldrich attended the SRG meeting for the State Department. 2 NSSM 131 is Document 155 . The response is Document 157 . 159. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 159. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 1 Washington, August 4, 1971. NSSM 131 Having read the final (and to my mind retrograde) version of the response to NSSM 131, 2 having been told that Treasury intends to pursue its so-called “hard line” vigorously in the SRG meeting this afternoon, 3 and having much in mind my responsibilities in the execution of our policy toward the countries of Latin America, I am obliged to ask you to consider the following observations in your approach to that meeting: 1. We should be clear that we are not simply discussing USG policy on expropriations. We are really talking about a frontal attack on the basic concepts that gave rise to the President’s policies laid down in October 1969 and reaffirmed in his foreign policy messages of February 1970 and 1971 and in the Secretary’s report to Congress of March 1971. These basic concepts were examined exhaustively in connection with NSSM 108 earlier this year. 4 That inter-agency examination confirmed their validity as the most appropriate and effective means of serving our interests—all our interests—in Latin America. Indeed, the adoption of any option above 3/3b will prejudice seriously, if not render futile, any serious consideration of NSSM 108 by the SRG. 2. The basic judgment in 1969, reconfirmed earlier this year, was that our interests were endangered by the “hegemonic” posture of the past and that the realities required that we seek an easier, more flexible, less directive association with the countries of Latin America. While it was recognized that, given the fundamental forces at work in Latin America, the new policy was damage-limiting and that our interests would suffer some additional impairment while a new equilibrium in our relationship was being reached, it was explicitly and carefully decided that a “harder” or “softer” policy would cause greater damage to our interests. 3. Particularly in light of our present inability or unwillingness to meet our positive commitments given in 1969, the adoption of a “hard line”—whether naked or flimsily veiled—on investment issues (with its play-out into the trade and development assistance sectors), when coupled with the post-Chilean election emphasis on military associations, will give our policy a distinct coercive, repressive cast. Aside from the fact that in present-day Latin America such an approach is destructive of our interests—all our interests—are we not obliged to counsel the President about the costs, abroad and at home, of such an image? 4. Considerable attention is paid in the NSSM 131 paper to the domestic advantages of a stronger line on expropriation. This presumably refers to the points to be made with some important sectors of the investing community. No attention is given to the countervailing fact that the US electorate and the US Congress contain important—and vocal—sectors which would find the path which the Treasury and some others wish to take the Administration down to be disastrous, not to say repugnant. 5. There is still, apparently, attractiveness for some in the thesis that “if you get tough with the Latins, they may not like you but, by God, they respect you and shape up.” I should have thought that this thesis, always of the most doubtful validity, would have been destroyed by the Dominican intervention, 5 the most direct application of US authority in the recent history of our relations with Latin America, the most superficially successful exercise of that authority, and one of the most destructive in terms of our broad interests. 6. In the same vein, I am very disturbed by suggestions that we have to get “tougher” with Latin America because they are not grateful for or appreciative of what we have done and are doing for them. Leaving aside the questions of who is doing what for or to whom, what forms we expect gratitude or appreciation should take, or the big philosophical debate on the responsibilities of the rich to the poor, I think we should keep in mind the basic purpose of our development assistance and other economic benefits we direct or say we want to direct toward Latin America. Those benefits are not intended as Lady Bountiful largesse. They are intended to serve our calculated national interests. We usually remember that; the Latins never forget it. 7. I am also concerned by the implied adoption, particularly evident in the final version of NSSM 131, of a defensive attitude concerning the Department’s handling of expropriation problems. There is shot through the paper intimations that the Department has been indifferent or supine or that it has not given the expropriation issue proper weight in the calculus of our interests. As you well know, this is simply and demonstrably untrue. It is certain that in dealing with the cases the Department has deliberately chosen to follow the President’s policy prescription of “negotiation not confrontation,” to exert pressures and influence behind the scenes and not from the roof tops, and to relate our real concerns about uncompensated expropriation to the totality of our interests. Such a posture, such techniques are, I submit, marks of a responsible institution charged with the execution of foreign policy—a foreign policy viewed as the pursuit of an intricate composite of interests, not a series of artificially isolatable interests or events. In the face of simplistic, even primitive attacks, this should be a source of pride, not of weak-kneed apology. 6 8. Does anyone with even the most superficial knowledge of the psychological drives and the economic and political imperatives of the developing countries seriously believe that the invocation of Hickenlooper in Peru would have produced compensation for IPC or have prevented Velasco from taking any other restrictive measures or deterred Allende from expropriating copper or kept the OPEC countries from moving against the oil companies? 7 Does one seriously believe that we would have seen the limited but positive developments, carefully and painfully nurtured, in our relations with Peru—so important in terms of our broad policy concerns in Chile—if we had shouted threats at Peru and publicly flaunted our economic pressures against the Velasco Government? 9. I am convinced that the “hard” or “quasi-hard” line will, at best, provide us a few quick, cheap victories over some of the weaker Latin American countries, with the costs in terms of intensified economic nationalism, wider anti-Americanism and increased opportunities for the Soviets and their friends throughout the Hemisphere to follow almost immediately. 10. We must bear clearly in mind that the prosecution of a “hard line” is an invitation—even a request—to well-known sectors of Congress to load impossibly restrictive provisions on legislation that by any stretch of the imagination might confer “benefits” on the less-developed countries. Is that what the Administration wants? Do we want, for example, an anti-expropriation amendment on the generalized preferences bill? How could we, with consistency, argue against a flood of such measures? 11. If Secretary Connally really said: “The US can afford to be tough with Latin Americans because we have no friends left there any more”—and there has been no repudiation of the attribution—he has demonstrated only that he is a master of the self-fulfilling prophecy. 8 12. In sum, I believe it essential that we turn back the onslaught of Treasury and its allies which is directed not only against the basics of the President’s policy toward Latin America but also against the primacy of the Department in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Our objective should be to preserve the maximum flexibility in handling expropriation cases so that all our national interests can be assessed and so that we can consider, as we must if we are to be responsible, not only the short-term but also the middle and long-term play of those interests. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 131. Confidential. Drafted by Crimmins on August 4. Copies were sent to Samuels, Trezise, Aldrich, Weintraub, and Newsom. 2 Document 157 . 3 In a July 21 briefing memorandum to Kissinger for a meeting with Connally later in the day, Ernest Johnston noted that Connally had “very strong views” about expropriations and advocated a “hard line” such as pressing for abstentions or negative votes in the IBRD and IDB on loans for Guyana and Bolivia. Johnston recommended that if Connally raised the question, Kissinger should indicate he shared Connally’s “concern that we determine the most effective methods of protecting U.S. economic interests abroad; but that we must not lose sight of the broader foreign policy considerations. While there are important domestic imperatives in protecting the interests of U.S. investors in these countries, there are foreign policy and perhaps strategic costs to our actions which should be considered.” Johnston further recommended that Kissinger “emphasize the leverage we have … in shaping the overall policies of (the IFIs) and point out that not only are they keenly aware of the political problems faced by the USG with regard to expropriations, but are willing to work closely with us to develop a policy which meets some of our concerns. It may be that the multilateral framework will ultimately provide stronger leverage than U. S. unilateral actions for settling the expropriation problem.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume II 1971) 4 Entitled “Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” dated January 10, 1970. 5 In the margin next to this paragraph, Irwin’s Executive Assistant, B. Scott Custer, wrote: “Also Cuba?” He also underscored the last phrase in the paragraph with an exclamation point in the margin. 6 Custer wrote in the margin: “JNI: I think this is a point which really should be made at the SRG meeting.” 7 Libya and several other oil-exporting countries had acted against U.S. and foreign oil companies in 1970 and 1971. 8 Connally made this statement in Business Week, July 10, 1971, p. 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 28 ] . In the margin next to this paragraph, Custer wrote: “JNI—Connally denied he said this or anything like it (per Ken Langley who met with Connally with other WH fellows).” 160. Memorandum From the Executive Vice President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Salzman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 160. Memorandum From the Executive Vice President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Salzman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 4, 1971. SUBJECT OPIC Views on Response to NSSM-131 As the USG agency whose function is the encouragement and protection of U.S. private investment in less-developed countries, OPIC offers the following recommendations on NSSM-131: 2 1. The paramount objective should be to establish a mechanism to enable the U.S. Government to act as a coherent entity, promptly and with full consideration of all factors, in both the deterrence and resolution of expropriation cases. If the right mechanism for determining and executing policy is established, there is less need for finely drawn, advance determination by the President of a fixed policy line for dealing with the great variety of trends and events which will arise. 2. We applaud the Secretary of State’s initiative in establishing an office, insulated from parochial geographic biases, that will deal solely with investment protection problems and an interagency working group chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. 3 In our view, the latter group should report to a higher level interagency body centered in the White House and be assured of prompt consideration and decisions on its recommendations as to both bilateral and multilateral assistance. OPIC should be a member of both of these interagency organs. 3. If such an interagency mechanism is established, OPIC’s preferences among the options presented in the subject paper are: Option 3(A) under “Basic Options for United States Policy”, revised as follows: 3 (as stated) Suboption (A): Pending the determination, the U.S. coordinating mechanism would make an urgent examination to decide what measures would be appropriate in the interim; during this interim period the USG would quietly defer making substantial new commitments. A general statement would be made now announcing a regular U.S. procedure of urgently reviewing each expropriation case as it arises with a view to determining U.S. assistance policy toward the expropriating country . Option 2 under “Options with Respect to USG Action in International Financial Institutions in the Event of Proposed Loans to Expropriating Governments”, supplemented by the following: Announce now, as part of the public statement to be made under Basic U.S. Policy Option 3, U.S. support for firmly upholding the traditional World Bank policy quoted on page 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] above, and seek similar expressions by other major contributors to the Bank . In addition to the four “Additional Studies Required” on pp. 12–13 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , there should be a study by the Samuels’ Working Group to establish better conceptual benchmarks for determining what constitutes “adequate” compensation for an expropriation, i.e., what we mean in today’s real world when we declare a policy of insisting upon “prompt, adequate and effective compensation”. Herbert Salzman 4 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, NAC. Confidential. Copies were sent to Samuels, Hannah, and Volcker. 2 Salzman’s remarks are directed at the NSSM 131 response, Document 157 . 3 On July 26 Rogers sent Connally a letter regarding the problems created by the rising tide of economic nationalism in developing countries and the need more expeditiously to respond to individual cases of actual or possible expropriation. Rogers said he had designated Deputy Under Secretary Samuels to be in charge of “developing and implementing the United States response to potential and actual expropriation problems” and that Samuels would be supported in this task by a new Office of Investment Affairs, which was being established in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Rogers invited Connally to designate an appropriate Treasury official to work with Samuels to coordinate policy within the government, with industry, and with the Embassies abroad pending a more formal interagency mechanism growing out of the NSSM 131 exercise. Rogers indicated he had also advised the President of these actions. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, NAC) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 161. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development (Jonnes) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) 161. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development (Jonnes) to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah) 1 Washington, August 5, 1971. SUBJECT SRG Meeting—NSSM 131—U.S. Policy in Cases of Expropriation I attended the SRG meeting yesterday at which the study on our policy toward expropriation of U.S. private investment by less developed countries was discussed. Dr. Kissinger turned immediately to consideration of the options which, you will recall, were five-fold. Broadly stated, these were: 1. To suspend economic benefits in each significant case of expropriation, immediately upon expropriation, until reasonable provision for compensation or arbitration is agreed, unless the U.S. determines otherwise. 2. To suspend economic benefits in each significant case of expropriation against a fixed deadline—say six months. 3. To determine in each significant case of expropriation whether or to what degree economic benefits would be suspended. This had three sub-options— a. No new commitments made pending the determination. b. An interim determination of how to move in the interim would be made pending the determination. c. New commitments would be made pending determination. 4. Withholding economic benefits, but only after a determination of what course all U.S. interests in the country would dictate, allowing reasonable time to elapse to permit the expropriating country to purge itself and ensuring that withholding would be effective. 5. Traditional diplomatic protection. He quickly eliminated option 5 as being unrealistic. He also eliminated option 2, arguing that basically this is the Hickenlooper approach which we have already decided should be reversed. In the discussion of the options, Mr. Irwin argued most persuasively that of course the U.S. has a variety of interests which would in effect be prejudiced if there were a general presumption that in each case of expropriation, the economic benefits would be forfeited. Mr. Walker of Treasury moved away from the first option, which Treasury had at one time espoused, suggesting that while indeed there should be a presumption that benefits not be accorded to the expropriator, they would not make this an automatic action. Rather the situation should be reviewed immediately by whatever group is established to handle these questions. This discussion, then, left basically two options, cast in terms of whether we should examine expropriation actions with a presumption that we would withhold preferential benefits in any case or whether we should approach the individual case without this presumption. Mr. Packard suggested that in the real world it seems very unlikely to him that any kind of statement of action which the U.S. proposes to take vis-a-vis countries that expropriate would deter significantly these actions. Moreover, he noted that the U.S. policy should hardly be designed to restrain expropriation for we recognize this right in international law assuming that fair compensation be paid. It developed, however, from Treasury remarks and those by Mr. Peterson that in their judgment a tough line on expropriation action would be justified more in terms of the impact upon the domestic scene than upon the restraints it would exercise upon countries involve. The discussion of the international lending agencies was not particularly clear for the amount of information available on past efforts to arouse an international consensus among the developed countries on actions which they might take jointly was limited. It was agreed that we should explore possibilities of joint action with other developed nations. Under Secretary Irwin needed no particular help in defending his view. It would, however, be useful for you to send a note to Dr. Kissinger on this subject along the lines of the attached. 2 It seems important to me that we help to nail down the arguments made by Mr. Irwin. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 75 A 13, Chron, August 1971. Confidential. 2 Memorandum from Hannah to Kissinger, August 6, endorsing the approach to expropriation cases that Irwin had espoused at the August 4 SRG meeting; not printed. 162. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Walker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 162. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Walker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 6, 1971. SUBJECT Policy Towards Expropriation I thought it would be useful if I wrote down the Treasury policy option which I described and you identified as one of the three from which the President would be asked to choose. (It is neither option 1 nor 3(a) of the State paper.) 2 What I call the “presumption option” has the following elements: (a) There would be a presumption that if a significant United States interest is expropriated, new preferential benefits to the expropriating country would be suspended. This presumption would be applied to suspend such benefits unless it was determined that the expropriating country was taking reasonable steps to provide compensation or that the presumption was overcome by major factors requiring continuance of all or part of these benefits. (b) New loans from multilateral institutions would be deferred and we could vote against them if necessary. (c) The United States would take an active role in judging whether reasonable steps had been taken. (d) Preferential programs would not be resumed until the expropriating country had taken reasonable steps to assure prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. (e) While this general policy would be publicly announced, when an expropriation actually took place no public announcements of cutoffs of foreign assistance or other preferential benefits would be made. The major thrust of this option is to put governmental decision making on expropriation into a policy framework where it is possible to take decisions to protect our overseas economic interests. This is done by the presumption that preferential benefits would not be continued unless this presumption was overcome by overwhelming other factors. Other options without this presumption make the cutoff extremely unlikely and thus limit the President’s ability to respond to expropriation problems. Yet the presumption which is the vital element of the option I have outlined retains flexibility to react to difficult situations. There are several points that should be mentioned. First, the presumption of suspension of assistance would apply to new preferential benefits; existing benefits would not be cut off pending a decision on suspension of them. This avoids confrontations with governments in the interim period before a decision is made on whether or not there are sufficient factors present in the case to overcome the presumption of suspension. Second, the policy applies only to significant cases of expropriation. It could be decided, as we have done in Indonesia, that no significant U.S. interest is affected. Third, the policy applies unless reasonable steps have been taken to provide compensation. This gives two important elements of flexibility: (a) It would allow a decision from the very outset that a country had taken reasonable steps to effect compensation. If a country had a history of adequate compensation and made specific provisions for compensation in its law, the policy on expropriation would not have to be applied. (b) It would assure that the U.S. Government maintained control over policy and was not helpless in the hands of a difficult American investor who demands unreasonable compensation. Although most U.S. investors need U.S. Government protection in order to have adequate bargaining leverage against a foreign government, in the case of an unreasonable U.S. investor the U.S. Government could determine that the host government was taking reasonable steps and resume assistance to that country. Finally, in making decisions in the light of the presumption that preferential benefits would be suspended, the President would have the options to, for example, (a) allow all assistance to continue (b) narrow the scope of the cutoff of preferential benefits (c) allow continued humanitarian assistance. Because of this flexibility, the presumption option has none of the disadvantages which the State options paper ascribes to options 1 and 3(a). This option, together with new decision-making machinery, should contribute in a major way to curbing the rising trend of expropriations and restore the President’s ability to take initiatives which are denied to him under present machinery and policies. Charly 1 Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 98, 8/4/71 SRG Meeting-Expropriations (NSSM 131). Confidential. Walker and Petty were the Treasury attendees at the SRG meeting on August 4 (see Document 161 ). This memorandum was prepared to describe further the Treasury Department position. 2 Document 157 . 163. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 163. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 20, 1971. SUBJECT Expropriation Policy At the SRG meeting on NSSM-131 on August 4, 2 I supported the issuance of an expropriation policy statement. This statement, however, should be one that does not: (a) get the United States into a confrontation situation with the developing world; (b) ignore the inherent rights of countries (including our own) to expropriate as long as prompt, effective, and adequate compensation is paid; (c) denigrate our past efforts to obtain fair compensation. Confrontation with one country may, of course, have a deterrent effect on others with respect to future expropriation. However, expropriations usually flow from internal political, economic and psychological conditions, so that it seems unrealistic to expect too great a deterrent effect on one country from action taken in another. We should have a policy which makes it clear that expropriation is not riskless, in order to have deterrent effect. Each case, of course, has its own characteristics, and should be examined in the context of all our interests in that country, including other financial interests which often limit our leverage. We should, of course, weigh carefully in any decision the deterrent (or other) effect a confrontation in one country might have elsewhere. Once an act of expropriation occurs, however, confrontation generally will not be useful in reaching a settlement in the particular situation. Confrontation can best be avoided by forward looking actions as early as possible. Multilateral institutions constitute a special case. Our pursuit in them of unilateral policy objectives make less credible the President’s advocacy of multilateralism. We should consult with other developed countries to determine common ground on expropriation policy, and how best to carry out our policy in an effective way. If we decide enough ahead of time how we are going to vote, we may be able to obtain support and avoid appearing isolated and possibly defeated. We should also pursue the point which you raised of the foreign policy implications of, and the role of the Secretary of State in, instructions to vote negatively or abstain on particular projects in the multilateral institutions. Attached is a draft statement that the President or the Secretary of State might issue on United States Government policy toward expropriation. 3 It may be preferable for the Secretary to issue it in order not to involve the President until we see how the statement is received domestically and internationally. You might consider the usefulness of having the President at the same time or later reiterate his view that the Hickenlooper Amendment should be repealed. Such a statement might reinforce our position that the Executive Branch needs maximum flexibility in coping with these expropriation problems. John N. Irwin II 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 75 A 13, Box 8, IPS 7-1 8/6/71-8/31/71 FY72. Confidential. 2 See Document 161 . 3 Not printed. 164. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Policy (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 164. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Policy (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 16, 1971. SUBJECT U.S. Policy in Cases of Expropriation I. General U.S. Policy Of the three options presented in your memorandum, 2 my recommendation would be for a combination of Options 1 and 2. The third option does not strike me as a practical approach since whatever positive impact withholding new benefits can have, the advantage would be defused if the response does not closely follow the expropriation act. Option 2, as stated, does not in my opinion, afford the new, tougher policy approach which is needed for both foreign and domestic consumption, and which we have in fact been following for the past two months. Operationally, it would be more difficult to manage than Option 1 since ad hoc decisions would have to be reached in regard to each expropriation issue and each new commitment before any action were possible. Option 1, with an appropriate public policy announcement, would signal a tougher U.S. stance in expropriations matters, although in reality, if applied primarily to new loan obligations, it would merely formalize the policy we have recently been following. Since, the presumption of withholding pertains only to new commitments, Option 1 would not entail the rigidity or danger inherent in a policy of automatically suspending existing agreements (although cut-off of the latter is not precluded). Option 1 would, however, provide an effective interim policy pending settlement of an expropriation issue as well as the flexibility to waive the withholding and proceed with further new commitments, if appropriate. In recommending Option 1, however, I would suggest that the presumption of withholding should be applied only to significant new loan commitments. For minor changes in existing loans, grant assistance and operations of a quasi-commercial nature, the reverse presumption of Option 2 appears more suitable. This need could be accommodated in Option 1 by addition of a de minimus provision with delegation of authority to operating agencies, thus eliminating the time-consuming process of inter-agency review for grant assistance and for minor matters, the withholding of which would represent a petty irritant or more injury to U.S. commercial interests than to those of the expropriating country. 3 Obviously the inter-agency group dealing with expropriation cases could decide to reduce or eliminate grant assistance, etc. just as in some circumstances it might decide to proceed with a certain loan. A suggested draft decision memorandum to illustrate this approach is attached. 4 2. Multilateral Institutions Of the three voting options presented, I would recommend the second. However, this should not be followed in isolation from bilateral policy. In general, I think the same presumption should apply to multilateral institutions as recommended for bilateral programs, that is, abstention or negative vote unless the circumstances of the particular loan warrant otherwise. On both bilateral and multilateral, if there is inter-agency disagreement, review of the case could be considered by my office and, if necessary, the decision be made by the President. At that point, I would send you a copy of whatever was going to the President and seek your counsel and concurrence. Incidentally, I’d like a guy on the inter-agency group who reviews these cases so I can be kept up to date on impending problems. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Confidential. 2 Not found. 3 This approach seems to have been adopted. See NSDM 136, Document 169 . 4 Not printed. 165. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 165. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT U.S. Expropriation Policy in Multilateral Institutions In a separate memorandum you considered the issue of general U.S. policy toward expropriations. 2 A second issue relates to what policy the U.S. should take on the expropriation question in the multilateral development institutions. There are two options: Option 1: Adopt a policy of voting against any loan to a country that has expropriated a significant U.S. business interest without taking reasonable steps toward compensation or submitting the dispute to an impartial arbitration process. (There would thus be a presumption in favor of negative votes or abstentions unless decided otherwise.) —This would put expropriating governments on notice that the U.S. would make it more difficult for them to obtain multilateral financing and reinforce USG efforts to strengthen the expropriation policy of the multilateral institutions. —However, for the most part, our negative votes or abstentions merely annoy expropriating countries without having any economic effect on them; the overt nature of negative votes or abstentions could harden the expropriating country’s position; and by pursuing this policy the U.S. would, on numerous occasions, be voted down and isolated in the Boards of the institutions, thus diminishing the significance attached by other nations to our votes. (Only in the soft loan window of the Inter-American Development Bank would a U.S. negative vote or abstention block a loan.) Option 2: United States votes would be decided on a case-by-case basis . We would not abstain or vote negatively unless it is determined that it would promote the payments of satisfactory compensation and the effects of such action on other USG interests are fully considered. There would not be a presumption to abstain or vote against loans to these countries . —This would preserve the greatest flexibility to consider various U.S. interests, and enable us to use our votes in the multilateral institutions as leverage when bilateral leverage seems insufficient, respect to a greater degree the multilateral character of these institutions, and, except for the soft window of the IDB, our negative votes or abstentions do not prevent loans from being approved anyway. —However, it might accentuate the difference between our bilateral actions and our actions in multilateral institutions if bilateral loans were cut off and we vote in favor of multilateral institution loans. All agencies agree that abstentions or negative votes are appropriate levers. However, Treasury and Commerce would like to have a presumption which would allow them to be used frequently in cases of expropriation and favors Option 1. Pete Peterson concurs. 3 State argues for deciding votes in the multilateral institutions on a case-by-case basis with no presumptions (Option 2). There is also a subsidiary question of whether the Secretary of State should have concurrence in instructions to our Directors on the Boards of these Banks to vote negatively or abstain. Under present arrangements, U.S. Directors are instructed on how to vote by the Secretary of the Treasury—with advice from the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policy (NAC). Treasury is not required to follow the foreign policy advice of State, which sits on the NAC, although traditionally it has done so; and Secretary Connally on one occasion authorized a U.S. Director to vote in a manner to which the Secretary of State was opposed. State believes that because of the major foreign policy importance of negative votes or abstentions it should have the right to concur in all such votes, 4 with interagency differences brought to you for decision, and argues that this is consistent with the National Advisory Council Executive Order—which states that “nothing in this Order shall be deemed to derogate from the responsibilities of the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the U.S.” Treasury wants no change in the present arrangement. Recommendation: Because of political friction caused by public abstentions and negative votes in the multilateral development institutions, and the negligible economic effects of such votes on the expropriating nation, I do not believe that they constitute an effective lever against expropriations. However, there will be times when such votes will be a logical complement to our bilateral economic sanctions. Option 2 provides enough flexibility so that negative votes or abstentions in multilateral institutions can be considered in light of the full range of U.S. interests. No policy would be announced, but decisions would be made, without any presumptions, based on the circumstances of each loan. Approve 5 Prefer Option 1 On the subsidiary question of State concurrence, I recommend that, because of the foreign policy effect of U.S. votes, the Secretary of State be permitted to concur in negative votes or abstentions. (This could be handled delicately by indicating in the Decision Memorandum that the NAC continues to have responsibility for advising the Secretary of the Treasury on instructions for U.S. Directors, but it is understood that the Secretary of the Treasury will seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State on votes which will have a major foreign policy effect.) I therefore recommend that you approve Option 2, with the stipulation that the Secretary of State concur in negative votes or abstentions. Approve Prefer no State concurrence. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume II 1971. Confidential. Attached to an October 4 memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger. 2 Not found. 3 See Document 164 . 4 See Document 158 . 5 None of the options is checked or initialed. 166. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Petty) to Secretary of the Treasury Connally 166. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Petty) to Secretary of the Treasury Connally 1 Washington, September 22, 1971. SUBJECT Expropriation Policy Henry Kissinger has forwarded his memo to the President setting forth the options on expropriation policy. 2 The paper contains two basic options: 1. The Treasury option—There would be a presumption of a cut off of assistance to countries that expropriate without compensation unless it was decided that the country was taking reasonable steps to provide compensation or that there were major economic, political, or military factors which require continuance of benefits. 2. The State Department option—This would assume continuance of benefits to an expropriating country unless at some subsequent time it was decided to cut them off. Moreover we understand that the Kissinger memo contains three options directed exclusively towards multilateral institutions: Option 1—always vote no in the case of loans to countries that expropriate without compensation; Option 2—decide on a case-by-case basis; and Option 3—always vote yes. 3 In addition, the President is requested to decide whether the Secretary of State should be required to concur in all decisions on voting no in multilateral lending. The multilateral options and the option on the Secretary of State’s concurrence went to the President over our strong protest. We argued that the multilateral options were not needed since we should follow the same policy multilaterally as we would bilaterally and that there should be no changes in the institutional arrangements for instructing the U.S. Executive Directors to the multilateral institutions. You may wish to contact the President on this matter. Attached is a memorandum which you could send to the President 4 or use as talking points in your conversation with him. There are three procedural points which should be emphasized: 1. That the President should make a policy statement. This is an essential feature of achieving a framework for deterrence. 2. That decision making should be in the CIEP framework with operations carried out either by utilizing the NAC as an arm of the CIEP or through a CIEP-chaired interagency group; and 3. That there should be no change, formal or informal, in the arrangements for instructing the U.S. Executive Directors to the multilateral financial institutions. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, NAC. Confidential. Drafted by Bradfield and cleared by Hennessy. Sent through Under Secretary Walker, who wrote at the top of the memorandum: “JBC—I strongly concur with this cover memo and urge you to go directly to Pres & [illegible].” This memorandum was a covering memorandum for a copy of Document 167 . 2 Not found. 3 No other reference to this Option 3 has been found. 4 Document 167 . 167. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon 167. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon 1 Washington, September 25, 1971. SUBJECT Expropriation Policy We are all agreed that a clear and firmer policy is urgently needed and that continuation of the present expanding trend of expropriations presents us with a major threat to our foreign interests. A policy is needed that will help deter expropriations. This is the reason why we have all concurred in the recommendation that you make a public statement on the new policy. The NSC options paper 2 lists the Treasury as being in favor of Option 1—what I call the “presumption option.” I strongly favor this option because I believe it gives us the best chance of deterring future expropriations and achieving compensation where expropriations do occur. I firmly believe that deterrence is feasible and can be accomplished without confrontation. In fact, we owe it to the LDCs to tell them that there are economic costs involved in expropriation without compensation and they should know it before they get too far out on any political limb at home. The World Bank has successfully implemented what I would call a presumption policy of immediately cutting off new loans on the occasion of expropriations for many years without causing confrontations with host governments. However, the central element involved is the framework for implementing expropriation policy. There must be a presumption that aid will be cut off on the occasion of an expropriation unless the reasons of continuing aid are clearly overwhelming. If preferential benefits are to be automatically continued—as Option 2 would have it—unless a decision is made otherwise, I fear that it will be very difficult to make decisions to protect our interests overseas. Moreover, by adopting a clear and firm bilateral policy we will be in a better position to obtain support from other developed countries in multilateral forums. Adopting the presumption policy will restore your option to act clearly (but carefully) in expropriation cases rather than continually postpone actions thus having circumstances narrow your options. The new policy would provide a firm foundation for action against expropriations while giving you full flexibility, for example, to regard a particular expropriation as not significant, allow continued humanitarian assistance, or otherwise narrow the scope of the cutoff of new preferential benefits. This restores Presidential options for action that are now—in effect—foreclosed. I attach great importance to the fact that this policy would be strongly supported by the Congress, by United States business leaders and by the general public. Indeed, it would also be supported by many—and respected by all—factions in the LDCs. The present trend can only lead to mandatory expropriation legislation going beyond Hickenlooper and to complete loss of support for aid programs. The clearer, stronger policy I suggest would be complementary to your new economic policy overseas. Foreign countries have thus far restrained their response to this policy because they realize the basic equity of our position. I would expect the same results from a new expropriation policy. I would like to register my strong opposition to one aspect of the NSC paper. That paper poses several options for voting on multilateral loans to expropriating countries. 3 I do not believe it is feasible to have a separate multilateral expropriation policy. It is not viable from a Congressional viewpoint in the long term to let loans go forward to expropriating countries when we deny them bilaterally; and it is not viable internationally to expect to withhold loans multinationally while allowing them to go forward bilaterally. The presumption policy can and should be applied to both bilateral and multilateral programs. I also strongly object to proposals to require the formal concurrence of the Secretary of State on voting “no” in multilateral institutions. 4 As you well know, the Secretary of State has ample opportunity both through the National Advisory Council and in direct contacts with the President to make his views known on these issues. Moreover, the multilateral institutions have been regarded as essentially financial institutions and a requirement of concurrence by the Secretary of State would seem to inject a political element which would be inconsistent with your emphasis on multilateral institutions as the major vehicle for foreign assistance in the future. John B. Connally 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, NAC. Confidential. 2 Not found, but see Document 166 . 3 See Document 165 . 4 See Documents 158 and 165 . 168. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 168. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Expropriation Policy Secretary Connally (Tab A) has written to re-emphasize his strong feelings about the expropriation issue, on which I sent you two memoranda last week. 2 On the question of general U.S. policy toward expropriations, Connally supports the recommendation of my memorandum for a presumption that the U.S. would suspend granting new economic benefits to expropriating countries unless and until it was determined that the country was taking reasonable steps to provide compensation, or that there were major factors which required continuance of all or part of these benefits. On the question of U.S. expropriation policy in multilateral development institutions the recommendations of my original memorandum (Tab B) differ from those of Secretary Connally. Connally does not believe it is feasible to have a separate multilateral expropriation policy and argues that there should be a presumption in favor of negative votes or abstentions on loans to expropriating countries unless decided otherwise (Option I in my memorandum). He also argues against requiring the formal concurrence of the Secretary of State for negative votes in the multilateral institutions on the grounds that they are essentially financial in nature and a requirement of concurrence by the Secretary of State would inject a political element. There is, however, a significant difference between our bilateral policy on this question and our policy in multilateral institutions. If a country expropriates without adequate compensation, we could delay providing new bilateral development assistance for several months without calling public attention to our actions although privately the expropriating government would be aware of our reasons. If, on the other hand, a loan to an expropriating nation came up for a vote in the Board of a multilateral institution soon after an expropriation had taken place, a negative presumption would mean that, unless a quick decision were taken to do otherwise (which would be difficult given the bureaucratic problems in moving on such questions), we would cast a negative vote. This would immediately focus a great deal of publicity on our act, raise the level of emotion in the expropriating country, and thereby make it more difficult for the expropriating nation, in a face-saving way, to compensate us even if it had every intention of doing so. In addition, for the most part negative votes have no economic effect on the expropriating nation. (Only in the soft loan window of the Inter-American Development Bank would a U.S. negative vote or abstention block a loan.) Option 2, which my memorandum recommends, calls for deciding votes on a case-by-case basis with no negative presumption . There would be no abstentions or negative vote unless it is determined that it would promote the payment of satisfactory compensation and the effects of such action on other U.S. interests are fully considered. If Secretary Connally, who as Secretary of the Treasury is charged with instructing our Executive Directors in the multilateral institutions, believes a negative vote is in order he is in a strong position to determine what our vote should be. On the subsidiary issue of the Secretary of State’s role, my memorandum recommends that, because of the significant foreign policy effect of U.S. votes, the Secretary of State be permitted to concur in negative votes or abstentions. However, I have also pointed out that this need not be stated in the formal manner to which Secretary Connally objects. The Decision Memorandum could indicate that it is “understood that the Secretary of the Treasury will seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State on votes which will have a major foreign policy effect.” Differences would be brought to you for decision. Recommendation: Should you wish to reconsider this question in light of Secretary Connally’s memorandum, I continue to recommend Option 2—deciding votes on a case-by-case basis with no negative presumption. 3 Approve Prefer Option 1 On the subsidiary issue of the Secretary of State’s role, I continue to recommend that, because of the foreign policy effects of U.S. votes, the Secretary of State be permitted to concur in negative votes or abstentions. Approve Prefer no State concurrence 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume II 1971. Confidential. Drafted by Hormats on September 28 and October 4. Attached to an October 4 memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger that indicated that the memorandum to the President had been revised, with Connally’s views included, and recommended Kissinger send it forward, giving “the President another crack at decisions.” An earlier draft of this memorandum, which does not include the Recommendation section, is ibid. It is attached to a September 28 memorandum to Kissinger in which Hormats noted that the memorandum to the President explained Kissinger’s and Connally’s differing views on expropriation policy. 2 Tab A is Document 167 , Document 165 is attached as Tab B and is presumably one of the memoranda Kissinger sent the President. The other has not been found. 3 None of the options is checked or initialed. 169. National Security Decision Memorandum 136 169. National Security Decision Memorandum 136 1 Washington, October 8, 1971. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury SUBJECT Policy in Cases of Expropriation The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 131 2 and the views expressed during the Senior Review Group meeting on August 4, 1971, 3 concerning U.S. policy with regard to expropriations by foreign governments of property owned by U.S. citizens. The President has decided that: —In each case of an expropriation of a significant U.S. interest there will be the presumption that the U.S. will suspend new bilateral economic benefits to the expropriating country unless and until it is determined that the country is taking reasonable steps to provide compensation or that there are major factors which require continuance of all or part of these benefits. The presumption will not apply to humanitarian assistance, PL-480 humanitarian food aid, quasi-commercial CCC and Export-Import Bank operations, and small scale technical assistance within FY 1971 country funding levels. —A mechanism should be established under the Council for International Economic Policy to coordinate interagency policies on expropriation questions and recommend to the President appropriate measures for dealing with specific problems. —The U.S. should take the lead in promoting the use of international mechanisms for settling investment disputes. The Secretary of the Treasury in coordination with the Secretary of State should work to strengthen and promote greater use of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and increase efforts to bring about early establishment of the International Investment Insurance Agency. —The Secretary of State in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury should initiate consultations with other developed countries to explore the possibilities for improving coordination of positions and developing a common strategy on expropriation questions, particularly in the international agencies. —Further measures should be taken by the Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce to improve communication with the business community to ensure that it is aware of the actions taken by the Administration to assist business and to facilitate the exchange of views on this subject. The President also has directed that the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, in coordination with the Secretaries of State and Treasury, draft for his consideration a public statement announcing the foregoing policy on expropriation. 4 A separate NSDM will be issued conveying the President’s decision covering the position which the United States will take in multilateral institutions in cases of expropriation. 5 Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 136. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. 2 See Documents 155 and 157 . 3 No record of the meeting was found, but see Documents 158 and 161 – 163 . 4 The statement was released on January 19, 1972 (see footnote 9, Document 157 ), following the issuance of NSDM 148 on January 18 which dealt with expropriation policy in the IFIs. 5 NSDM 148, Document 173 . 170. Editorial Note 170. Editorial Note Pursuant to NSDM 136 ( Document 169 ), Peter Peterson on October 14, 1971, sent a letter to Secretary of State Rogers indicating that the expropriation policy statement would be announced shortly and requesting his recommendations for a draft statement by October 21. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 136) On November 9 Nathaniel Samuels sent a memorandum to Peterson forwarding a draft statement that the Department of State recommended be issued by the Secretary. Samuels noted that the draft statement had been written “in a form and manner intended to be generally acceptable to developing countries” and expressed the concern that if it were issued by the President it might polarize the issue with those few governments that had expropriated without compensation and might result in confrontation, not only with the expropriators but with more responsible governments as well. (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, FN 9) On November 15 Peterson sent Samuels a note thanking him for the draft expropriation statement and providing a copy of a Treasury Department draft from Charls Walker. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 136) Anticipating Secretary of the Treasury Connally’s return from Asia, Walker sent him a memorandum on November 12 informing him of the receipt of the State Department’s proposed draft statement, which was substantially different from a draft prepared in the Treasury Department. Walker called Connally’s attention to the Treasury Department’s strong view that to be credible the statement must be released by either the President or Connally, rather than Rogers, and that the policy on multilateral institutions still awaited resolution. Walker informed Connally that Kissinger wanted to discuss the issue with him. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos: FRC 56 74 A 17, Memo to Secretary 11-12/71) On January 14, 1972, Robert Hormats sent Henry Kissinger a memorandum summarizing the issues surrounding the issuance of the expropriation statement and noting that the section in the statement dealing with multilateral institutions was still unresolved pending Kissinger’s discussion with Connally. Hormats disagreed with Connally and Peterson that the President should issue the statement. Hormats recommended that Kissinger support Option 3 in Peterson’s memorandum ( Document 172 ). At the top of the memorandum is the handwritten note: “Peterson’s office says HAK advice received orally by Peterson 15 Jan 72.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP) The President chose Option 1; see footnote 4, Document 172 . 171. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 171. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 14, 1972. SUBJECT Expropriation Policy A statement of U.S. policy on expropriation, which has been worked out in an interagency group under Pete Peterson’s direction, will shortly be forwarded to you. 2 A proposed National Security Decision Memorandum on our policy in the international financial institutions with respect to this subject is also before you or will shortly be so and will be incorporated into the statement. I wish to convey my views on three points that remain to be resolved: 1. Who Should Issue the Proposed Statement of Policy. In order to achieve the maximum impact I recommend that you issue the statement. However because expropriation is such a sensitive subject with the less-developed countries generally, particularly the Latin American countries, you may decide that you would rather not issue it in your name. I am of the opinion that, if you decide not to issue the statement, it should be issued by the Secretary of State in order to emphasize the fact that our policy on expropriation is to be an important part and parcel of U.S. foreign policy. 2. Policy in the International Financial Institutions. The proposed expropriation statement contains a presumption set forth in National Security Decision Memorandum 136 3 to the effect that we will not accord new bilateral economic benefits to expropriating countries unless we specifically determine in the national interest to do otherwise. The question as to whether we should adopt a parallel policy with respect to multilateral assistance, i.e., how we will vote on loans in these international institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, is before you. I recommend that we do adopt a parallel policy. I believe we should make a presumption on our votes in the international institutions on proposed loans to expropriating countries similar to the presumption we will make on bilateral assistance. However, because of the strong foreign policy impact of a refusal in the international institutions to support loans to particular countries, it is essential that each case be carefully considered by State and Treasury. Therefore I believe that any instructions to our Executive Directors of these institutions in this regard be coordinated by State and Treasury and resolved by the President in the unlikely event of a disagreement. 3. Interagency Mechanism to Deal with Expropriation Cases. Because of the foreign policy impact, I believe that operational responsibility for dealing with expropriation matters as they arise should be in the Operations Group of the Council on International Economic Policy as presently constituted. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 148. Confidential. Drafted by Samuels and rewritten by Rogers. 2 See Document 172 . 3 Document 169 . 172. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 172. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 14, 1972. SUBJECT Policy Statement on Expropriations The policy statement—attached for your review 2 —on expropriations required by NSDM 136 has been formulated by an interagency committee of Treasury, State, NSC and the Council on International Economic Policy. The views of others, both within and without the Government, have also been taken into account. Dick Allen chaired the committee. There are two issues which will require Presidential determination: 1. who makes the statement, and 2. when the statement should be made. 1. Who should make the Statement Treasury, and specifically John Connally, believes you should make the statement. Treasury feels that the importance of the expropriation issue, reflected by the rising concern of American foreign investors, merits a Presidential announcement. John Connally believes the statement will be very advantageous for you in domestic political terms. John also feels that it would be a serious error if Secretary Rogers were to make it, not only because you get less credit, but because the State Department is a far less credible source for this kind of policy statement. If you were to choose not to make the announcement, he would find it more acceptable if I were to make it in your behalf, though he clearly prefers your making the statement in your own behalf. Secretary Rogers, while quite agreeable to your issuing the statement, believes that you would be better protected against both foreseeable adverse reactions, particularly in Latin America, and possible unforeseeable reactions here and abroad if he were to issue the statement. 3 He further argues that it is essentially a foreign policy issue on which he should take the heat for you. He would object to my making the statement on your behalf on the grounds that he, as the senior U.S. spokesman for foreign policy should do so. My first recommendation is that you read the statement before making any decision. I believe it has enough in it that supports development abroad that the domestic political benefits probably outweigh the foreign policy costs. Very important, John Connally feels so strongly about this that you will want to consider whether it is worth taking a course of action he opposes. It is not as “Presidential” a kind of statement as I would like but given the total situation, including Connally’s strong views, I think you should make it. Henry Kissinger agrees. As to the method of making this announcement, I would prefer it be issued in your behalf through Ron Ziegler’s office but not with any strong personal involvement on your part which might, on balance, not be in keeping with your Presidential peacemaker role. 4 Then, Connally, I and others can see to it that you get credit for the decision with the domestic interests. I recommend 5 Option 1 —The Statement be made by the President. Option 2 —The Statement be made by the Secretary of State. Option 3 —The Statement be made by a White House spokesman, perhaps Pete Peterson, on the President’s behalf. 2. When the Statement Should be Made Treasury identifies an urgency to make the statement very soon, before Congress reconvenes, since passage of legislation covering replenishment of funds for international finance institutions may be affected. The legislation will probably be considered by the House quite soon after Congress reconvenes. Furthermore, the draft legislation currently before Congress includes the Gonzalez amendment, 6 unpalatable to Secretary Connally and others, which would require the U.S. to withhold support for multilateral loans in the case of uncompensated expropriations. Early issuance of the statement would strengthen the Administration in opposing this amendment. State and NSC have no objection to an early statement; I also believe it should be made now. Make announcement very soon, before Congress reconvenes 7 Make announcement later 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to a January 17 memorandum from Hormats to Haig, which reported Kissinger’s agreement with the recommendation that the statement be issued by the President very soon. Hormats recommended Haig forward Peterson’s memorandum to the President. 2 Not printed. The Presidential statement was issued on January 19; see footnote 9, Document 157 . 3 See Document 171 . 4 On January 18 Peterson sent a memorandum to Rogers, Connally, and Stans informing them the President had directed the immediate release of the statement on his behalf by the White House Press Secretary. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP) 5 None of the Approve/Disapprove options under the Options listed below is checked or initialed. 6 Legislation containing the Gonzalez Amendment, which required negative votes in the IFIs for assistance to countries that had expropriated U.S. property, was signed into law on March 10, 1972. See also Document 176 . 7 Neither of these options is checked or initialed. 173. National Security Decision Memorandum 148 173. National Security Decision Memorandum 148 1 Washington, January 18, 1972. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury SUBJECT Expropriation Policy in the Multilateral Development Institutions The President has reviewed the response to NSDM 131 2 and the views expressed during the Senior Review Group meeting on August 4, 1971, 3 concerning U.S. policy in multilateral development institutions in case of expropriations. The President has decided that: —The Secretary of Treasury should use the influence of the United States with the management of the World Bank to induce the Bank to effectively apply its stated policy on compensation and to seek to persuade other institutions to adopt a similar policy on withholding assistance to countries not taking reasonable steps to meet compensation obligations in cases of expropriation. —In each case of an expropriation of a significant U.S. interest there will be the presumption that, unless and until it is determined that the expropriating country is taking reasonable steps to provide compensation or that there are major factors requiring us to do otherwise, the United States will attempt to have new loans deferred in the multilateral institutions and if a vote is necessary will abstain or vote negatively. The provisions of this directive do not imply any change in the procedures established by Executive Order 11269 pertaining to the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies. 4 Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 148. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. 2 A January 19 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Davis to the recipients of NSDM 148 informed them the reference to NSDM 131 in the first line should read NSSM 131. (Ibid.) 3 See Documents 158 and 161 – 163 . 4 Dated February 14, 1966. The Executive Order provided the authorities for the NAC to give guidance on voting in the IFIs, Eximbank lending, and other matters related to international lending policy. 174. Editorial Note 174. Editorial Note On January 24, 1972, Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore Eliot sent a memorandum to Henry Kissinger reporting only limited foreign reaction to the President’s January 19 expropriation statement. Chile and Venezuela were generally antagonistic, and the British Embassy in Washington had referred back to President Nixon’s meeting with Prime Minister Heath in Bermuda in December 1971 and requested U.S. support to oppose on expropriatory grounds a $10.5 million IDA loan for Tanzania that was slated to come to the IDA Board on January 25. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 285, State, Volume 14) On February 1 the Department of State sent a telegram to the Embassies in Tokyo and 10 Western European capitals instructing them to provide copies of the expropriation statement to officials of their host governments and solicit their views, including those on the prospects for multilateral cooperation on expropriation issues. The telegram also informed the Embassy in London that the IDA loan for Tanzania had been withdrawn by IBRD staff before the United States had to state a position. (Telegram 17872; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 1/1/72) The Embassy in Tokyo reported that Japan shared the basic U.S. position on expropriations, i.e., for a public purpose and upon payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, but saw no need for a public statement of policy beyond the clauses it had included in its bilateral trade and investment agreements with a number of developing counties. Japan was concerned that the strong U.S. view would make it more difficult to work out a multilateral approach if expropriation were posed as a U.S. issue. The Embassy’s interlocutor cautioned, in a personal capacity, that if the United States was interested in a major cooperative initiative in the expropriation field, it should take a very low profile and leave the initiatives to the multilateral organizations. (Telegram 1831 from Tokyo, February 23; ibid.) The Embassy in Bonn reported that Germany was prepared to participate in an exchange of views in the DAC, if other OECD members were willing, but did not share U.S. views on dealing with expropriation issues on a multilateral basis. German officials carefully answered the U.S. initiative with an official aide-memoire that set out the investment protection principles in German treaties with a number of developing countries. In presenting the aide-memoire, the Embassy’s German interlocutor said it was not the policy of the Federal Republic to link new assistance to compensation for expropriated property, and that even in the case of Chile German participation in the debt rescheduling would not be contingent on compensation. (Telegram 2933 from Bonn, March 2; ibid.) The Embassy in Bern reported Swiss pessimism regarding multilateral cooperation on investment protection. The Embassy’s interlocutor said the nature of the investments from capital exporting countries were so divergent that he could not envisage coordination of policy. He said the Swiss Government did not regard it as the role of government either to encourage or to discourage investment, and the Swiss had no legal basis, such as the Hickenlooper Amendment, to exert pressure on governments that had expropriated Swiss investments. (Telegram 741 from Bern, March 17; ibid.) The United Kingdom, by contrast, agreed to a series of bilateral consultations with the United States on approaches to expropriations. British officials agreed with the United States on some linkage among debt repudiation, expropriation, and debt rescheduling but as of March 28 had not decided on the British position at the April meeting of the Paris Club when the Chilean debt rescheduling would come up. (Telegram 2767 from London, March 28; ibid.) 175. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) 175. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) 1 Washington, March 8, 1972. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce SUBJECT Policy Implementation on Expropriation Questions NSDM 136, NSDM 148, and the President’s January 19, 1972 public policy statement concerning Economic Assistance and Investment Security in Developing Nations require establishment under the Council on International Economic Policy of a special interagency coordinating mechanism on expropriation questions. Accordingly, a CIEP interagency staff coordinating group, to include representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce is established. The Secretary of State should designate a senior officer, who will also be responsible to the Executive Director of the CIEP to chair the group. 2 Provision should be made by the Chairman for NSC and CIEP staff participation, as well as of other agencies on appropriate occasions. The functions of the group will be: —to keep under continuing review all potential and active expropriation cases; compiling relevant facts and analyses, to include information concerning economic benefits subject to potential U.S. action; —to make a finding in each case for purposes of policy implementation that an expropriation affecting a significant U.S. interest has, or has not, occurred; and, if so, whether reasonable provision has been made for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; —to recommend courses of action for the United States Government, consistent with the President’s January 19 expropriation policy statement, and —to coordinate policy implementation. The group, upon request of any member, is expeditiously to deal, within its terms of reference, with any alleged expropriation problems. In case of interagency disagreement, the Chairman—if urgent efforts to resolve the issue fail—will promptly submit a report to the CIEP Executive Director setting forth the issue or issues, the conflicting views, the options proposed, and a reasoned statement of advantages and disadvantages of each course of action under consideration. Each Department may, at its option, request the Executive Director to review a case to attempt to resolve the issue or, if necessary, to submit it for Presidential decision. The provisions of this memorandum do not imply any change in the procedures established by Executive Order 11269 pertaining to the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. A copy was sent to Kissinger. 2 In a March 20 memorandum, Executive Secretary Eliot informed Flanigan that Secretary Rogers had designated Assistant Secretary Willis Armstrong to chair the Interagency Group with Deputy Assistant Secretary Sidney Weintraub as his alternate. The Office of Investment Affairs would provide staff support for the Group. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 1 US) 176. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon 176. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 9, 1972. SUBJECT Enrolled Bills S. 748, S. 749 and S. 2010—Contributions to International Financial Institutions Sponsor—Sen. Fulbright (D) Arkansas Last Day for Action March 14, 1972—Tuesday Purpose Authorizes U.S. participation in, and appropriations for U.S. contributions to, capital increases for three international financial institutions as follows: Institution Amount in $ millions S. 748—Inter-American Development Bank, Fund for Special Operations 900 S. 749—Asian Development Bank, Consolidated Special Funds 100 S. 2010—International Development Association 960 Agency Recommendations Office of Management and Budget Approval Department of the Treasury Approval Department of State Approval (signing statement attached) 2 Council on International Economic Policy Approval (informal) National Security Council Approval Agency for International Development Approval Export-Import Bank Approval Department of Commerce Approval Federal Reserve Board Approval Department of Justice No objection Council of Economic Advisers No objection Discussion These bills authorize the full amount requested by the Administration for the U.S. share of the capital increases of the three institutions. The contributions are to be paid in installments over several-year periods. Appropriations for U.S. installments, as provided in the 1973 budget or projected for 1974, are as follows: (in millions of dollars) FY 72 FY 73 FY 74 Inter-American Development Bank — 450 450 Asian Development Bank 60 40 — International Development Assoc. 320 320 320 Total 380 810 770 This will be the United States’ first contribution to the Asian Development Bank’s Special Funds. Accordingly, S. 749 contains a number of customary administrative provisions concerning loan terms, procurement policy, and burden-sharing as proposed by the Administration. The House Banking and Currency Committee added two amendments which were enacted into each of the three bills. The first would require the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States Executive Directors to these institutions to cast a negative vote on assistance to any country which the President determines has failed to take adequate steps to prevent illegal entry of narcotics into the U.S. or to prevent sales of narcotics to U.S. employees and their families abroad. 3 It provides for removal of this requirement when the President determines that these steps have been taken. This amendment parallels a similar provision, applicable to U.S. bilateral foreign aid which was recently added to the Foreign Assistance Act at the Administration’s request. The second amendment would require the President to instruct the U.S. Executive Directors to vote against any loan or other aid by the institutions to any country which expropriates property owned by U.S. citizens or takes other action equivalent to expropriation. 4 This requirement does not apply, however, if the President determines that appropriate arrangements have been, or are being made to provide for adequate compensation. This amendment provides less Presidential discretion on two respects than that in your January 19, 1972, statement on expropriation policy. That statement (1) permitted the United States to abstain as well as vote against loans in international institutions and (2) allowed “major factors affecting U.S. interests” as a reason for not withholding support for loans in an expropriation situation. In its letter on the enrolled bills, Justice states: “The form of the bills is unusual in that they instruct the President as to how to cast votes in carrying out an aspect of United States foreign policy. We do not believe, however, that the bills sufficiently encroach on Executive power so as to present a substantial constitutional issue. It is relevant that the instruction is not absolute since the President does not have to follow it if he finds that an arrangement has been made for compensation, if the matter has been submitted to arbitration, or if negotiations are proceeding in good faith. Moreover, the Committee reports indicate that the amendment is consistent with the existing policy of the executive branch in this area.” With respect to this amendment, the Treasury Department has suggested that you provide the Secretary of the Treasury with a memorandum making it clear that Executive Order No. 11269 of February 14, 1966, which delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury authority then vested in the President to instruct U.S. representatives to international financial institutions, applies to the President’s functions under this expropriation amendment. 5 However, your January 19 statement set up interagency machinery under the Council on International Economic Policy to advise you on questions of terminating foreign assistance in expropriation situations. In view of the sensitivity of expropriation issues and their many implications for foreign policy, a single policy-setting and decision-making mechanism for both bilateral and multilateral assistance seems advisable to avoid confusion and embarrassment. We think that the apparent contradiction between these two positions can be satisfactorily resolved by (1) having the President make the determinations upon advice from the Council on International Economic Policy and (2) having the Secretary of the Treasury convey those determinations to the U.S. Executive Directors of the designated international financial institutions. We will provide a memorandum along these lines for you to send the Secretary of the Treasury at an early date. The Department of State has proposed a signing statement for your consideration. We understand that the staffs of the National Security Council and the Council on International Economic Policy are working on the question of a signing statement and, if appropriate, its content. Geo. P. Shultz 6 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. No classification marking. 2 Not found. For text of President Nixon’s March 10 signing statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon , 1972, pp. 410-411. 3 Reference is to the Rangel Amendment. 4 Reference is to the Gonzalez Amendment; see footnote 5, Document 172 . 5 See Document 180 . 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Shultz signed the original. 177. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 177. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 12, 1972. SUBJECT Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of the Treasury on Instructing U.S. Representatives to the International Financial Institutions in Expropriation Situations George Shultz (Tab B) recommends that the President sign a memorandum (Tab C) instructing the Secretary of the Treasury on the method of handling instructions to U.S. representatives to the international financial institutions in expropriation situations. 2 From your point of view, the memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury is totally unacceptable . According to all previous interagency agreements, the authorization bills for the multilateral development institutions, and Pete Peterson’s directive to the agencies of February 7 (Tab D) 3 final authority for making determinations on whether or not appropriate arrangements have been, or are being, made to provide for adequate compensation resides with the President. While the Secretary of the Treasury clearly has authority to instruct U.S. executive directors in the multilateral development institutions under Executive Order 11269, 4 nowhere—prior to this—has it been decided that the Secretary of Treasury would also make the determination on the compensation question. It had been agreed that the President—with advice from CIEP— would determine whether compensation was being carried out in an appropriate manner . Indeed, the Administration’s position in dealing with the authorization bills for the multilateral institutions was to assure that the legislation vested authority to make this determination in the President not the Secretary of the Treasury. In my view it is especially important that the President himself retain this power since the judgment involved in making this determination obviously requires consideration of foreign policy questions—which do not fall under the purview of the Secretary of the Treasury. [FYI: Peter Flanigan, who concurred in this memorandum, is giving away a good bit of his own authority by moving the determination decision from the White House (under CIEP) to the Treasury, and he is certainly compromising yours.] 5 Recommendation: That you call Peter Flanigan and George Shultz as soon as possible and make known to them your strong objections to delegating the Presidential power to make these determinations to the Secretary of the Treasury. My suggestion for revising the President’s memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury is at Tab A. Tab A 6 I should like to make it clear that consistent with the delegated authority contained in Section 3(a)(1) of Executive Order 11269 dated February 14, 1966, the Secretary of the Treasury, in accordance with Presidential determinations reached upon the advice of the Council on International Economic Policy, should give instructions to the representatives of the United States to the respective organizations pursuant to Section 21 of the Inter-American Development Bank Act, Section 18 of the Asian Development Act, and Section 12 of the International Development Association Act. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. On another copy of this memorandum, attached to a May 12 memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger, Kissinger wrote: “Let me check Haldeman’s understanding of what Connally has been promised.” (Ibid.) 2 Neither tab is printed. Shultz’ April 10 memorandum, Tab B, referred to his March 9 memorandum, Document 176 . The final sentence of the memorandum that Shultz recommended the President send to Connally (Tab C) reads: “In the exercise of this authority the Secretary shall take into account the recommendations of the Council on Economic Policy staff coordinating group on expropriation questions.” In his May 12 memorandum to Kissinger (see footnote 1 above), Hormats noted that Shultz’ April 10 formulation vested too much authority with the Secretary and did not allow sufficient attention to foreign policy considerations. On Hormats’ May 12 memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “Let me discuss with Shultz.” For the memorandum finally sent to Secretary of the Treasury Shultz, see Document 180 . 3 Reference is to an early draft of Document 175 . 4 Dated February 14, 1966; see footnote 4, Document 173 . 5 Brackets in the source text. 6 No classification marking. 178. Information Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 178. Information Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 1 Washington, June 23, 1972. SUBJECT Expropriation Policy Flanigan may speak to you about this today . As you will recall, the question of handling instructions to US representatives to the international financial institutions in expropriation situations has not yet been resolved. Attached is an earlier memorandum which I sent to HAK on this subject recommending that he indicate to Flanigan and Shultz his objection to delegating to the Secretary of the Treasury the Presidential power to make determinations on whether or not appropriate compensation was being paid. 2 I do not know whether HAK pursued this with Shultz and Flanigan but I have no indication that he did. I do know, however, that Shultz and Irwin have discussed this. 3 Recently, precipitated by discussion of what policy the US should pursue with regard to a loan to Panama—which had intervened in an American company but has since agreed to amicably settle the issue, thereby obviating the necessity for us to vote negatively—before the Board of the Inter-American Development Bank, 4 there has been renewed interest in getting out a memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury. If my antennae serve me well, Flanigan is attempting to resolve this problem and may speak to you about it in the near future. If he does, I still feel that the President—not the Secretary of the Treasury—should have the final say on whether we vote negatively or not since there is an obvious foreign policy component in any such decision. And for purposes of consistency it is important that we not pursue one policy in the multilateral institutions and another with respect to bilateral aid. Giving the Secretary of the Treasury power to make this determination on votes in multilateral institutions runs this risk. Flanigan, however, may feel that in order to avoid putting the direct pressure on the President to make determinations in expropriation situations it is preferable to delegate this power to the Secretary of the Treasury. And Shultz would be reluctant to cease fighting for authority to make this determination—since Connally and the Treasury bureaucracy have fought hard to get this authority. 5 If this is the case, you might try to work an agreement whereby: —The determination power would be given to the Secretary of the Treasury. —Secretary Shultz would give private oral assurances to the Secretary of State that he will consult with him prior to directing our representatives to these institutions to cast a negative vote or abstain. —If the Secretary of State differs from the Secretary of the Treasury, the matter would be brought to the President for resolution. (At that time, HAK would have his say.) This would take direct pressure off of the President, allow Shultz to work out a modus vivendi with Rogers without having to formally back down from Connally’s tough position, and allow HAK an input when State and Treasury differ (which, historically, is on about every major case). 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. 2 Document 177 . 3 Not further identified. 4 On June 20 Carl F. Salans in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the State Department sent a memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Armstrong informing him that on June 19 the CIEP Interagency Coordinating Group had concluded it was not possible at that time to determine whether good faith negotiations were in process to permit the United States to support a pending loan for Panama in the IDB. It was not clear if the Gonzalez Amendment was even applicable to the Panama dispute, as the U.S. company was not seeking compensation as a remedy for the taking. The Legal Adviser’s view was that even if the Gonzalez Amendment were applicable, sanctions were not appropriate under the “good faith negotiations” test or under the “reasonable steps” criteria in the President’s January 19 policy statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (IDB) 9 NAC) 5 A June 7 briefing memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Davis to Kissinger for his June 8 meeting with Shultz included a section on General Expropriation Policy. It referred to Shultz’ April recommendation (see footnote 2, Document 177 ) that the Secretary of the Treasury make the determination that “appropriate” compensation arrangements had been made or were in process. The briefing memorandum argued that it was preferable to vest the authority with the President when there was interagency disagreement. The briefing memorandum also had a section on Peru/IPC, which asserted the Treasury Department’s intention to vote against loans to Peru in the IDB and to cut off U.S. humanitarian assistance. The memorandum cited the dangers in overt actions against Peru and suggested Kissinger remind Shultz of the foreign policy importance of not raising the emotional level of the IPC issue. It was also pointed out that the President had specifically directed that humanitarian assistance not be cut off under the same presumption that applied to bilateral assistance and IFI loans. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 290, Treasury, Volume III) 179. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) 179. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) 1 Washington, June 27, 1972. Dear Peter: Thank you for responding so quickly to my telephone request last Friday 2 and sending over for our comments the draft Presidential memorandum with respect to delegations of authority under the Gonzalez Amendment. 3 It was not entirely clear to me from what you said whether this draft language has already been approved by the President. As you know, this is the first time that I or, to my knowledge, anyone else in State has had a chance to review the language or to comment on it, although I had called George Shultz to ask about it two weeks ago. If the President has already approved it, so that it is impossible to consider a substantial revision, I would like to suggest as a minimum the addition of the following sentence at the end of your draft language. “When the Secretary of the Treasury intends not to follow the recommendations reached through these CIEP review procedures, he shall give sufficient prior notice of this intent to the agencies participating in the CIEP review to allow the issue to be brought to the attention of the President in appropriate cases.” This addition is intended to allow time for further discussion with the Secretary of the Treasury and, where appropriate, reference to the White House, whenever a decision reached in the CIEP process is not going to be followed by the Secretary of the Treasury. As we understand it, the Secretary would be empowered under the language of the draft memorandum to make his own “determinations” and to issue instructions in disregard of the CIEP recommendations if he saw fit. If, on the other hand, your draft language has not yet been approved by the President, or if it seemed to you advisable to go back to the President on this issue, we would prefer a more substantial revision of the draft memorandum along the lines of the attachment to this letter. 4 There are two types of Presidential powers involved in the Gonzalez Amendment. The first is the power of the President to instruct the United States representatives to the international financial institutions. The second is the power of the President to make various determinations on which these instructions must, under the terms of the Amendment, be based. These include determinations, first, as to whether nationalization, expropriation, repudiation of contracts or the imposition of discriminatory taxes has taken place, and, second, if so, whether an arrangement for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation has been made, whether the parties have submitted the issue to international arbitration or whether good faith negotiations are in progress. The first type of power, the power to instruct representatives, already has been delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury under Section 3(a) (1) of Executive Order 11269. We agree that it is useful to confirm that this delegation applies to instructions under the Gonzalez Amendment. At the same time, subsection (c) of Section 3 provides “Nothing in this section shall be deemed to derogate from the responsibilities of the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United States.” The question we have is whether the second type of power, the power to make the determinations referred to above, can be delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury without causing just such a derogation. You will recall that the Gonzalez Amendment as originally drafted provided that the Secretary of the Treasury would make all such determinations. The House-Senate Conference Committee, in considering the bill, changed the language in order to make clear that it is the President who has this power. The Department of State had argued forcefully for this change in order to preserve the prerogatives of the President and the foreign relations responsibilities of the Secretary of State. All of the determinations called for under the Gonzalez Amendment rest essentially upon interpretations and applications of international law. Whether nationalization, expropriation, repudiation of contracts, or the imposition of discriminatory taxes have taken place, as well as what constitutes prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, are questions which can be answered only by reference to international law. The Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, referred to in the Gonzalez Amendment, is an international treaty whose interpretation and application depend upon international law. Clause (C) of the Gonzalez Amendment explicitly refers to “applicable principles of international law” for purposes of defining what is prompt, adequate and effective compensation towards which “good faith negotiations” are to be aimed. Primary responsibility and expertise for questions of international law have always rested with the Department of State and specifically with the Legal Adviser’s Office. No other government agency has this authority with respect to questions of international law. Moreover, these questions bear directly upon the overall foreign policy of the United States. For these reasons, we consider that delegation of exclusive authority to make determinations under the Gonzalez Amendment to any agency or body in which the Secretary of State or his representative does not fully participate would be inconsistent with Subsection 3(c) of Executive Order 11269. There is a further point to be made with respect to the Secretary of State’s responsibility. It is the settled policy of this Administration, as evidenced in the President’s policy statement of January 19 1972, that the invocation of any sanctions in cases of expropriations be weighed against our overall national interest. Because the necessary flexibility in this area was not provided for, the Gonzalez Amendment was opposed by the Administration. Even in the absence of a national interest exception, however, it is inevitable that interpretations of the facts in close cases will be influenced to some degree by concern for critical national interests. These interests involve considerations of general foreign relations, of defense and national security, of the financial and banking integrity of the multilateral financial institutions and of general commercial and investment policy. Given the variety of interests which are likely to be involved in these close cases—and we are already seeing a number of such cases—we believe the perceptions, not of just one agency, but of all concerned agencies, should be brought to bear on the “determinations” which must be made under the Gonzalez Amendment. Your memorandum of March 8 established the CIEP interagency staff coordination group to review expropriation cases, make findings for purposes of policy implementation, and recommend courses of action for the United States Government. The matters for its determination, governing bilateral as well as multilateral assistance, are precisely the same as those set forth in the Gonzalez Amendment. We consider, therefore, that the CIEP interagency mechanism offers the most comprehensive means of reconciling the furtherance of our many national interests with the requirements of the Amendment. This mechanism can also assure that our approach to bilateral assistance issues remains as parallel as possible with our approach to multilateral assistance issues. Finally, there is the question of maintaining an effective method for resolution of differences between interested agencies. At the heart of the CIEP arrangements set up by your memorandum of March 8 is the appeal mechanism through you to the President. Under the proposed draft memorandum there seems to us the danger that the time for such an appeal might not be available in cases where the original CIEP review did not involve a Presidential decision. Our preferred redraft would take care of this problem automatically, since the determinations required by the Gonzalez Amendment would be made through the CIEP procedures. If our preferred redraft is not acceptable, we would at least urge the addition of language such as I suggested at the outset of this letter, to preserve an effective right of appeal to the President. With best regards, Sincerely, Jack 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 1 US. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Shultz, Kissinger, and Weinberger. 2 June 23. Attached is a June 23 memorandum from B. Scott Custer to Executive Secretary Eliot indicating that Irwin had just called Flanigan and explaining Irwin’s efforts to get hold of the draft directive and Shultz’ reportedly less than forthcoming response. 3 Flanigan’s draft was sent under cover of a June 23 memorandum from Deane Hinton to Irwin, which is attached to Irwin’s letter. The final sentence reads in part: “the Secretary of the Treasury, after taking into account the recommendations reached through the CIEP expropriation policy coordination and review procedures, is to make determinations and to give instructions to the representatives of the United States to (the IFIs pursuant to the applicable sections of the legislation).” 4 Not printed. The State Department’s proposed language indicated that, in the event of disagreements, the “provisions of Mr. Flanigan’s memorandum of March 8, 1972 will apply.” See Document 175 . 180. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of the Treasury Shultz 180. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of the Treasury Shultz 1 Washington, July 6, 1972. SUBJECT Instructions to U.S. Representatives to Certain International Financial Institutions I recently approved enrolled bills S. 748, S. 749, and S. 2010, 2 92nd Congress, relating to U.S. participation in increases of the Inter-American Development Bank’s Consolidated Special Funds, 3 and the International Development Association. I should like to make it clear that as part of the delegated authority contained in Section 3(a) (1) of Executive Order No. 11269, dated February 14, 1966, the Secretary of The Treasury, after taking into account any advice received as a result of CIEP expropriation policy coordination and review procedures, 4 is to make determinations and to give instructions to the representatives of the United States to the respective organizations pursuant to Section 21 of the Inter-American Development Bank Act, Section 18 of the Asian Development Bank Act, and Section 12 of the International Development Association Act. If the instruction of the Secretary of The Treasury is contrary to advice received as a result of the CIEP review procedures, he shall so advise the agencies participating in the CIEP review prior to giving such instruction. 5 Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 1 US. No classification marking. Except as noted below, the language in the text printed here is identical to that proposed by OMB on April 10, and at variance with what Hormats recommended to Kissinger on April 12. See Document 177 . 2 See Document 176 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 The Consolidated Special Funds pertains to the Asian Development Bank, not the IDB. The following language was in the April 10 OMB draft and was apparently omitted here: “Fund for Special Operations, the Asian Development Bank’s.” 4 This phrase was not in April 10 OMB draft. It is a modification and repositioning of the final sentence in the OMB draft. 5 This final sentence was not in the OMB draft. An October 19 memorandum for the record by B. Scott Custer explained that, in response to Irwin’s June 27 letter to Flanigan ( Document 179 ), Flanigan met with Irwin and they agreed on language “substantially similar” to what Irwin had proposed at the outset of his letter. The July 6 Presidential memorandum contained “the language Mr. Irwin had asked for and agreed to.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, E 1 US) Trade and Commerce, 1969-1972 Trade and Commerce, 1969-1972 181. Report of the Task Force on Foreign Trade Policy Washington, January 31, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume I. No classification marking. Attached to a February 7 memorandum from Arthur F. Burns to Kissinger informing him that the report of the Task Force, chaired by Alan Greenspan, should be treated on a confidential basis. The Task Force has not been further identified, but it was presumably part of the Nixon transition team; see footnote 2, Document 185. 182. National Security Study Memorandum 16 Washington, February 5, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Limited Official Use. 183. Paper Prepared in the Department of Agriculture Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 196, Agriculture Volume I 69-70. No classification marking. Attached to a February 13 memorandum from Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin to Kissinger indicating the paper was for the President’s information and use during discussions during his forthcoming trip to Europe (February 23-March 2). A 7-page paper of talking points on trade issues, prepared by the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations for the President’s European trip, February 14, is ibid., RG 364, Transition Papers, 1968-1969, Box 1. 184. Editorial Note 185. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, February 21, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume I. No classification marking. 186. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 4, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the STR. Limited Official Use. 187. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon Washington, March 20, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Commerce, Office of the Secretary of Commerce: FRC 40 77 A 84, White House (Misc.). No classification marking. The date is handwritten. 188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, March 24, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Misc. No classification marking. Attached is a March 10 transmittal memorandum from Greenwald to Secretary Rogers recommending that he sign the memorandum to the President. 189. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Limited Official Use. Attached to an April 5 covering memorandum from Jeanne W. Davis of the NSC Secretariat to the Offices of the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of Emergency Preparedness indicating that the paper would be distributed on April 7 for discussion at the April 9 NSC meeting. Davis sent an earlier version of the summary on April 5 to the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, JCS, and the Office of Emergency Preparedness, noting that the summary reflected the discussion at the NSC Review Group meeting on April 4. (Ibid.) 190. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) Washington, April 8, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Limited Official Use. Sent through Pedersen and Samuels. Drafted by H.L. Worthington (E/OT) on April 7 and concurred in by A. Katz (EUR/RPE) and Schnee (H). 191. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Economics, Department of the Treasury (Pelikan) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) Washington, April 8, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the Secretary March-April 1969. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Pelikan on April 8. 192. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff Washington, undated. Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 83, 4/9/69 NSC Meeting-US Trade Policy. Limited Official Use. Prepared by the NSC Staff for the President’s use at the April 9 NSC meeting on trade policy. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from 10:08 to 11:53 a.m. Attendees were Nixon, Agnew, Laird, Lincoln, Richardson, Wheeler, Helms, Kissinger, Hardin, Stans, Volcker, Samuels, McCracken, Gates, Haig, Bergsten, and Cooper. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 193. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Westerfield) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) Washington, April 10, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Limited Official Use. Drafted by W.H. Drew (AF/I) on April 10. Copies were sent to Palmer (AF), Hadsel (AF/I), and Pedersen (C). 194. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, April 11, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 215, CEA. No classification marking. The date is handwritten. 195. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, April 15, 1969. Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 83, 4/9/69 NSC Meeting-US Trade Policy. Confidential. 196. Information Memorandum From Richard N. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 22, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Trade: Preferences for LDCs. Limited Official Use. 197. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 23, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative. Limited Official Use. 198. National Security Study Memorandum 48 Washington, April 24, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 48. Limited Official Use. 199. National Security Study Memorandum 49 Washington, April 24, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 49. Limited Official Use. 200. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, April 24, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Trade: Preferences for LDCs. No classification marking. The memorandum is attached to an April 22 memorandum from Bergsten recommending that Kissinger send it to the President, and a stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “The President has seen.” 201. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 28, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume I 1970. Confidential. Drafted by Bergsten. The meeting was held in the Oval Office from 4:36 to 5:15 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A copy of Secretary Stans’ written report to the President on his European trip were attached but are not printed. Bergsten forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Kissinger under cover of an April 29 memorandum. (Ibid.) Kissinger approved it and a copy was sent to the Department of State on May 9. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16) 202. Editorial Note 203. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, May 19, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I 1970. Limited Official Use. “The President has seen” is stamped at the top of the page. The President met with Stans and Kissinger from 11:15 to 11:37 a.m. on May 19. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the conversation was found. 204. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations-Designate (Gilbert) to President Nixon Washington, June 5, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. No classification marking. 205. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, June 24, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. No classification marking. 206. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations-Designate (Gilbert) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 10, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the STR. Personal. 207. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 14, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 49. No classification marking. Drafted by Ewing (E/OT/TA) on July 7 and cleared by Hollis (L/E), Trezise (E), and Howard L. Worthington (E/OT). 208. Editorial Note 209. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Poats) to Curtis Farrar of the Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development Washington, September 4, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, ECF 4 International Trade FY 70 September 1969. Limited Official Use. 210. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) Washington, September 20, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 48. Limited Official Use. Drafted by W.H. Drew (AF/I) on September 19. Copies were sent to Witman (AF/I) and Trezise. Newsom sent a longer version of this memorandum to Samuels on December 17. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29) 211. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 23, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume I. Confidential. 212. Letter From the Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission (Sutton) to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) Washington, September 29, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, Nonrubber Footwear—Options Papers by Agencies Other Than STR. No classification marking. 213. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, October 8, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the STR. Limited Official Use. The date is handwritten. 214. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon Washington, October 8, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 19c. Confidential. Drafts of this memorandum, dated September 18, 23, and 26, are ibid. An earlier draft was circulated by Staff Director Hartman on September 13 to members of the Under Secretaries Committee, informing them it would be discussed at a Working Group meeting on September 15 to prepare general guidelines for U.S. negotiators and to work out any remaining differences in agency views for Presidential review. (Ibid., NSC-U/DM 17) NSSM 48 is Document 198. 215. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon Washington, October 9, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Trade Preferences for LDCs. Confidential. 216. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) to President Nixon Washington, October 9, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Trade Preferences for LDCs. Confidential. 217. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Assistant (Harlow) Washington, October 23, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Bergsten presumably before October 20 since it refers to the GATT meeting on that date. 218. National Security Decision Memorandum 29 Washington, October 31, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Administrator of AID, and Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 219. Editorial Note 220. Editorial Note 221. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, December 23, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 46. Confidential. Sent through Trezise, who forwarded it to the Secretary under cover of a December 31 memorandum that expressed the hope that consideration of policy toward Spain could be deferred until the administration had adopted a position on EC preferential trading relationships. A copy of Gilbert’s memorandum was sent to Kissinger. 222. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff Washington, undated. Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 92, 1/16/70 Review Group Meeting-Spain. Secret. The text printed here comprises pages 9–15 of the Analytical Summary of the NSSM 46 Response paper, prepared as part of the briefing material for Kissinger’s use at the January 16 NSC Review Group Meeting. The paper is attached to a January 5, 1970, covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt which informs Kissinger that Lynn, Bergsten, and Kennedy collaborated in assembling the briefing book. See Document 224. 223. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 16, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I 1970. Secret. A January 16 transmittal memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger highlighted the main points. 224. Editorial Note 225. Editorial Note 226. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 48. Confidential. A typed note on the memorandum reads: “UnSec handed original to WH/Kissinger at luncheon 2/26/70 per Mel Levitsky.” It was forwarded to Richardson under cover of a February 25 memorandum from Trezise, Hillenbrand, and Sisco. (Ibid.) 227. National Security Decision Memorandum 45 Washington, March 2, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 45. Secret. 228. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 11, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 338, HAK/ELR Meetings 1/70-3/70. Secret. Drafted by Bergsten and concurred in by Sonnenfeldt. This memorandum and its attachments form Tab A to a March 13 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, regarding his lunch with Richardson that day. No record of the luncheon discussion was found. 229. Editorial Note 230. Editorial Note 231. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 399, Textiles Volume II. No classification marking. A handwritten note by Butterfield reads: “K—The President signed the letter to Mills (Tab C)—& letter taken to Hill at 9:50 am May 11.” See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970, pp. 427-430, for the text of the letter, which outlines the President’s trade plans but does not address the textile quota issue. A June 5 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger concerning an industry-Congressional meeting with the President on June 8 regarding textiles is attached. Regarding the meeting, see Document 233. 232. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon Washington, May 14, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 837, NSC/USC Memos. Confidential. Drafted by Leary (E/ITP), and cleared in E, S/PC, and D and in Commerce, Treasury, CEA, Interior, Labor, STR, and USDA. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a May 14 memorandum from Richardson informing him it pertained to the OECD Ministerial of May 20-22, at which the Secretary General would press for a resolution of the issue. Richardson urged Kissinger to obtain a Presidential decision by May 20. 233. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons) and the President’s Special Counsel (Dent) to President Nixon Washington, June 4, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 335, Items to Discuss with the President 5/1/70-6/15/70. No classification marking. 234. National Security Decision Memorandum 65 Washington, June 12, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 65. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the CEA Chairman, the AID Administrator, and the Budget Director. On May 21 the Department of State sent a telegram to Samuels at the OECD informing him of the substance of the soon-to-be-issued NSDM. AID Deputy Administrator Poats sent a copy of the telegram to Bergsten under cover of a May 22 note: “Cheers! You deserve a medal, which your anonymous role will deny you, for this.” (Telegram 77562 to USOECD; Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, ECF 4 International Trade FY 1970 October 1969-April 1970) 235. Editorial Note 236. Statement Issued by the White House Washington, June 24, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, Nonrubber Footwear-White House Press Release, June 24, 1970. No classification marking. Issued by the Office of the White House Press Secretary. 237. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 8, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Confidential. A note by the President, written under the date, reads: “Right after vote.” 238. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 9, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume II 4/70-12/70. Confidential. Drafted by Bergsten on July 11. The meeting was held in the Oval Office from 4:40 to 6:02 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 239. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 14, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Secret; Exdis. 240. Editorial Note 241. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, August 3, 1970, 1710Z. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 684, Germany, Volume VII 8/1/70-11/70. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Ottawa, Rome, Tokyo, and Geneva and to the Missions to the EC, OECD, and NATO. 242. Editorial Note 243. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 7, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Secret; Limdis. A stamped notation, dated August 11, reads: “HAK has seen.” 244. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon Washington, August 28, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29. Confidential. 245. National Security Decision Memorandum 86 Washington, October 14, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 86. Confidential. 246. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon Washington, October 28, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 86. Confidential. Drafted by E. M. Cronk (E/ITP) and J. R. Matz (E/OT/GCP) on October 27. 247. Editorial Note 248. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 29, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume III 12/70-6/71. No classification marking. Haig wrote: “Agree” at the top of the page and Kissinger wrote: “Fred: Talk to me soon” at the bottom. 249. Editorial Note 250. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, January 2, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 196, Agriculture, Volume II 1971-. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a December 18, 1970, memorandum from Bergsten, which indicated a memorandum similar to Hardin’s (at Tab A below) had been provided to the President in preparation for his meeting with Prime Minister Heath on December 17. (Ibid., Volume I 1969-1970) 251. Editorial Note 252. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) to President Nixon Washington, April 2, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, STR Reading: March/April 1971, Box 44. Confidential. Attached to an April 2 memorandum from Eberle to Peterson reminding Peterson that the attached options paper had been sent to Peterson’s staff for review, along with a background paper that STR had not tried to clear with the agencies because “our experience indicates such an effort would be very time-consuming and would add little except occasional restatements of agency views.” 253. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, April 9, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume III 12/70-6/71. Confidential. 254. Editorial Note 255. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, April 21, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Confidential. 256. Editorial Note 257. CIEP Study Memorandum No. 8 Washington, August 9, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, CIEP Study Memoranda. Confidential. 258. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, November 22, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 45. Confidential. A copy of the memorandum was forwarded to Haig under cover of a November 23 memorandum from Davis reporting that the State Department had requested that the memorandum be staffed by the NSC and not automatically be passed to Peterson. Davis reported that Peterson was aware of the memorandum, and she recommended passing it to the CIEP for action. Haig initialed an attached memorandum to Huntsman, dated November 26, transferring action to Peterson and calling his attention to the important political implications that caused the State Department to want Kissinger’s comments on staffing the issue for the President. Both memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71. 259. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle) to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) Washington, December 10, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Records of Secretary Shultz: FRC 56 80 A 1, CIEP (Peterson Executive Director). No classification marking. 260. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon Washington, December 10, 1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Records of Secretary Shultz: FRC 56 80 A 1, CIEP (Peterson Executive Director). Confidential. Attached to a December 10 note from Peterson to Connally requesting Connally’s concurrence; Connally wrote: “Noted by JBC” at the top of Peterson’s memorandum. 261. Telegram From the Mission to the European Community to the Department of State Brussels, December 12, 1971, 1600Z. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 153, Morning Summaries August 25-December 31, 1971, December 13, 1971. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, Stockholm, and Vienna. 262. Editorial Note 263. Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy (Peterson) Washington, December 28,1971. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, National Advisory Committee. No classification marking. 264. Paper Prepared in the Council on International Economic Policy Washington, undated. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, National Advisory Committee. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the paper, which is attached to a December 29 memorandum from Peterson to members of the CIEP informing them it was background for the CIEP meeting on January 3, 1972. 265. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council on International Economic Policy Operations Group (Samuels) to the Executive Director of the Council (Peterson) Washington, January 5, 1972. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, CIEP Meetings. Confidential. Circulated to members of the CIEP Review Group under cover of a January 6 memorandum from Peterson informing them it would be the basis for the Review Group discussion on January 7. Peterson indicated he planned to focus the discussion on the substantive issues and options rather than on questions of legislative timing and packaging. See Document 264. 266. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, January 11, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 230, DOD, Volume 15 1/72. Confidential. 267. Memorandum From the Assistant Special Representative for Industry and Labor, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gates) to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle) Washington, January 12, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, STR Reading: January/February 1972, Box 44. Confidential. 268. Joint Statement Issued by the Governments of the United States and Japan Washington, February 9, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, STR Reading: January/February 1972. No classification marking. This joint statement was issued by Eberle and Japanese Ambassador Ushiba. It is also printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 3, 1972, pp. 512-515. 269. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle) to the Japanese Ambassador (Ushiba) Washington, February 9, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, STR Reading: January/February 1972. No classification marking. Another copy of the letter indicates that it was drafted by James A. McNamara of STR. (Ibid.) 270. Paper Prepared in the Council on International Economic Policy Washington, February 9, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. The paper was circulated to members of the CIEP Review Group under cover of a February 9 memorandum from Flanigan informing them that the OECD High Level Group would meet starting on February 14 and inviting them to a February 11 meeting in the Cabinet Room to discuss strategy with Eberle. This paper is one of three papers Flanigan provided for the meeting. 271. Editorial Note 272. Editorial Note 273. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon Washington, May 11, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73. Confidential. 274. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 17, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, Nonrubber Footwear-Telegrams, Congressional Correspondence. Limited Official Use. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Theodore R. Gates on May 19. (Ibid.) Copies were sent to J.B. Loken, Stanley Nehmer, B. Ascher, H. Blackman, and J. O’Mahoney. 275. Memorandum of Conversation Tokyo, July 29, 1972, 11 a.m.-noon. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Commerce, Office of the Secretary of Commerce: FRC 40 77 A 85, Under Secretary File. No classification marking. Drafted on August 1, but no drafting officer is identified. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister’s office. 276. Editorial Note 277. CIEP Decision Memorandum No. 14 Washington, September 25, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, and Commerce; the CEA Chairman; and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs. This memorandum is Tab D to Document 281. An earlier version of this language comprises a memorandum from Flanigan to Eberle, September 12. (Ibid.) 278. Editorial Note 279. Editorial Note 280. Memorandum From the Assistant General Counsel, Department of the Treasury (Bradfield) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Trade and Investment Policy (Worthington) to the Council on International Economic Policy’s Legislative and Negotiating Steering Groups Washington, October 11, 1972. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, October 13, 1972, Flanigan Working Lunch. No classification marking. 281. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats, Harold Saunders, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 14, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Secret. The signed original of this memorandum is attached to Document 282. On that original Haig wrote: “Flanigan has asked that this be returned for reconsideration.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73) 282. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 322, European Common Market, Volume IV 10/72-7/73. Confidential. This memorandum is a revision of Flanigin’s draft memorandum to President Nixon; see Document 281 and footnote 8 thereto. It is attached to a November 29 memorandum from Flanigan to Kissinger which reads: “The attached has been prepared in cooperation with your staff. It is agreed that you and I should discuss the appropriateness of this course of action at this time. Hormats feels the course of action outlined need not result in confrontation. Sonnenfeldt apparently feels that we should continue endless delay with regard to the EC preferential agreement until after the situation in the Middle East is clarified and the European study is completed. Please call me regarding this matter at your earliest convenience.” In the margin next to the reference to Sonnenfeldt’s view on delay, Haig wrote: “baloney.” A copy of Flanigan’s package is attached to an undated, handwritten note to Haig which reads: “Bob Hormats called to say this latest Flanigan memo is somewhat of a disaster. He is doing memo.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP) See Document 283. 283. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 1, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 322, European Common Market, Volume IV 10/72-7/73. Secret. Attached to an April 30, 1973, memorandum from Scowcroft to Dam. At the top of the page Kissinger wrote: “[illegible] Sonnenfeldt—please explain just what this implies operationally.” Hormats, Sonnenfeldt, and Saunders replied in a January 3, 1973, memorandum. They suggested that Kissinger contact Flanigan to indicate: 1) he agreed the United States must tell the EC, Spain, and Israel it would not accept preferential trade arrangements damaging to its legitimate economic interests, and would demand compensation; 2) the EC, Spain, and Israel might consider the proposed $750 million compensation claim so extreme as to jeopardize the U.S. negotiating position; 3) he agreed that at the onset of Article XXIII consultations Eberle and someone from the State Department should call on the three to explain U.S. objectives; and 4) most importantly, he recommend to Flanigan that the United States not present its views to the EC, Spain, and Israel until the President made his decisions on how he wanted to handle U.S.-European political, economic, and security relationships and relations with Israel. (Ibid.) 284. Editorial Note 285. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 14, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73. Secret. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt. Attached to a 6 p.m. December 14 note from Hormats to Haig informing him that the subject would likely be discussed the following afternoon and that it was urgent that Haig or Kissinger give Shultz and Flanigan their views within the next 18 hours. Also attached is a December 15 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger informing him that Shultz had stopped by that morning to discuss the broad approach to trade legislation, which would be taken up at a 6 p.m. meeting that day of interested Cabinet officers and Flanigan. Shultz reportedly wanted the most senior member of Kissinger’s staff to participate and since he (Haig) would be leaving shortly, he recommended Sonnenfeldt attend. Shultz would report to Kissinger the next day on the meeting. 286. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 15, 1972, 6 p.m. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 290, Treasury, Volume III. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Shultz’ office. Drafted by Hormats and forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a December 18 memorandum, in which Hormats noted: “The consensus of the meeting was that we should go forward with a comprehensive trade bill giving the President the authority to implement tariff reductions. The dissent from the consensus was Volcker (Treasury) and Shultz tilted towards his position. Timing of submission will depend in large part on the timing of the President’s foreign policy initiatives—specifically the ÔYear of Europe’.” Earlier on December 15 Sonnenfeldt and Hormats sent Kissinger a memorandum marked “urgent action” regarding that evening’s meeting, indicating their understanding that Shultz might be inclined not only to forego enabling legislation, but also to postpone trade negotiations for at least a year. Hormats and Sonnenfeldt thought Kissinger should give Shultz political input on the importance of moving ahead in 1973 with negotiations based on a firm legislative mandate. (Ibid.) Kissinger apparently was unable to attend the meeting and Hormats attended for the National Security Council. 287. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 19, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 290, Treasury, Volume III. Secret. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt. 181. Report of the Task Force on Foreign Trade Policy 181. Report of the Task Force on Foreign Trade Policy 1 Washington, January 31, 1969. A new administration wants to put its own stamp on things even if it wishes to continue the main lines of a previous administration’s policy. Sometimes this fresh start makes it possible to pursue the goal more effectively because one can get rid of the mortgages and barnacles that any administration or policy accumulates. A “fresh approach” sounds better than “no change in policy.” Unfortunately, a “fresh” approach in trade policy is likely to suggest to the rest of the world an abandonment of, or at least substantial departure from, the policy of trade liberalization. In spite of the fact that the United States has led the world in the reduction of trade barriers for a third of a century, there is still a tendency to regard us as a protectionist country. The post-Kennedy Round wave of proposals for quotas, plus our performance in certain fields, lends support to the stereotype. It is, therefore, very important to make clear that the main lines of policy have not changed. This is doubly important if there is to be some initial emphasis on exceptions to liberalization as in textiles and steel. The new administration will have to give close attention to how it conveys the essence of its policy and the combination of continuity and change. This is true not only of the initial statements by the President but of the way specific measures are explained and of the maintenance of a uniform tone in pronouncements by all members of the new administration. The new administration will, of course, want to re-examine all, or many, aspects of foreign economic policy. It would be a mistake, though, to do this in a way that seriously delays the statement of policy, formulation of new approaches, or taking of action on matters that require it. Not the least of the disadvantages in mounting a large-scale formal re-examination is that the results will seem disappointing if they do not amount to a “grand design” of foreign economic policy (and therefore of the world economy), and it seems unlikely that a great new pattern is going to be found in the next year or so. Moreover, it is not a good idea for the United States to get up steam for a complex series of proposals and make the necessary domestic compromises to support them without having explored the field with other countries. We have done that often in the past, but that time is over. What is really called for is a continuing re-examination of foreign economic policy inside the government. We have to recognize that this is a difficult period for further reducing impediments to trade and capital movement. This is partly because we lack a great new goal at the same time that domestic pressures for protection are strong. The balance of payments makes it difficult to be as liberal as would be desirable in the treatment of imports. Inflation here and in other countries builds up resistance to the removal of trade barriers. Domestic preoccupations all over the world lead to a lack of interest in foreign economic policy. At the same time, the problems with which trade policy has to deal are becoming more complex and difficult. As this report points out below, new issues confront us that cannot be dealt with by familiar techniques and trade policy has to be more closely linked than before with financial, monetary, and investment policy. The combination of these factors results in not just a lack of drive to do great deeds but also the danger that short-run steps will be done in ways that create long-run damage. We have never known a world in which the United States was not taking a fairly strong lead in trade policy, and it may turn out to be a rather dangerous kind of world in which it is even difficult to retain the gains already made. It is not a bad thing to ask for European initiative in these matters, but that is no substitute for developing policies of our own. Main Lines of Approach In spite of these difficulties, there are opportunities to assert American leadership, take concrete initiatives, and pursue an active and constructive trade policy. But it will not be easy. The five numbered points that follow give the main lines of a trade policy through which the new administration can actively pursue the aim of further removing barriers to international trade. A comment on some of their implications follows and then recommendations on specific issues. (1) The need for an attack on nontariff barriers is widely accepted and gives a good base for both a general initiative and specific proposals. To embark on this road, one must understand that results are not likely to be rapid, many of them will be piecemeal, sooner or later awkward questions about “domestic” policy and behavior will arise, and we cannot get without giving. (2) The tariffs that remain in this and other countries are not negligible and for some products constitute the chief barriers to trade. The application by stages of the reductions agreed on in the Kennedy Round gives time to consider how best to deal with tariffs in the future. Careful thought should be given to new approaches including further broad reductions by stages, the harmonization of tariff levels among countries, and concentration on specific industries. In many cases tariff reductions will have to be linked with the removal of nontariff barriers. (3) In spite of the importance of the tariffs and other trade barriers that remain, a good case can be made for the view that the problems of trade among industrial countries are no longer those that we were used to in the past. National economies are more open to one another and more intermingled so that new kinds of trade policy problems arise and issues not normally thought of as falling into trade policy have to be considered part of it. National economies are involved in complex processes of adjustment to the new situation. Each must consider its own balance of payments, but they have to work together to find a satisfactory pattern of international adjustment, a process that involves trade as well as monetary and financial matters. Industries, too are involved in domestic adjustment and also a kind of international readjustment of their own. Specialization increasingly takes place within industries. The relation of investment to trade, the development of the multinational corporation, the impact of tax systems, and in general the problems of the coordination (or lack of it) between national economic policies are all further examples of issues that have to be looked at together under this approach. (4) Trade policy toward the less developed countries is more talked about than acted on. If we are not seriously prepared to do something, we had better mind what we say. If we are prepared to do something, one line of approach would be to circumvent the crabbed discussion of preferences and look instead at products for which we and other developed countries could encourage larger imports from the LDCs by simply giving them freer access to our markets. This will sometimes require domestic adjustment which will not be easy to accept, though experience has shown that the United States can absorb increasing amounts of manufactured goods from LDCs without major domestic disturbance, for example, components for finished products made in this country. Special attention should be given to the removal of import barriers that hamper efforts by the LDCs to process their own raw materials and agricultural products. Although there are advantages in common action by the developed countries to help the less developed ones, a good bit of past stagnation has been related to the belief that developed countries all have to act together. Therefore, it would be desirable to devise ways of putting the United States in the position to remove barriers to imports from LDCs independently of what Europe or Japan does. Fuller consideration of trade policy toward the LDCs should be combined with an examination of policies affecting aid and private investment which are outside this task force’s terms of reference. (5) American trade policy should recognize the value of keeping GATT strong and effective. While changing conditions make revision of some GATT provisions desirable, support for its basic principles and procedures is advantageous to the United States and important to the building of open and orderly international trade relations. By adopting the approach summarized above, the new administration can pursue an active policy concerning foreign trade barriers that stand in the way of American exports and foreign export practices that put imported goods in the American market on unfair terms. There is no need to have an international agreement on nontariff barriers to object to foreign barriers or other practices that impede American sales. One can even move without being sure that the practices involved are true trade barriers, for example, border taxes. On the import side the threat of countervailing duties can be used to raise questions about foreign export subsidies and tax practices that are in some respects the equivalent of subsidies. The new international antidumping code gives the opportunity to ventilate pricing practices that bring goods into this market at artificially low prices. All these things are examples of the problems of open societies living more closely together with lower trade barriers. While one must be careful about the use of the words “fair competition,” the fact is we have to be more concerned than in the past with the conditions of competition. Activity of this sort would constitute government support for legitimate complaints and aspirations of American business and would have as a motif giving true competitiveness a chance to make itself felt. It is hard to say how effective an approach of this sort would be in removing foreign trade barriers. It could curb imports and on that score one would have to be careful not to act in ways that would lead to foreign retaliation. Raising questions about foreign trade practices, pricing, taxes, export credit policies, etc., is bound to lead to extensive international discussions and negotiations. We should welcome this and press for such discussions and the understandings they can lead to on even rough rules of equity. It will often be a matter of nice judgment whether to postpone national protective action to see what the results of the international discussions are or to take the action in the expectation that it will improve the results of the discussion. We will have to be prepared to make changes in our own practices and remove some of our own nontariff barriers if useful agreements are to be reached. There is occasion here for American leadership of a very responsible sort. In short, even without a grand design for a new trade policy, we can have a very active period during which some things might well be accomplished and certainly the groundwork would be laid for future international cooperation on a range of difficult and complicated problems. Among the advantages of this approach are: (a) It deals with real problems. (b) It gives time to think about how to deal with complicated issues. (c) The process of negotiating will itself be educational since the fact of the matter is that we are short of good workable ideas about how to deal with any number of nontariff barriers or practices that in one way or another distort trade. (d) It provides a basis for holding off domestic pressures for protection since the administration would manifestly be pursuing lines of action advantageous to American business which would be jeopardized by unilateral restraints. (e) The demonstrations of other peoples’ iniquities may provide a temporary cover for some less than admirable measures of our own which may be forced on the administration by Congressional or business pressures. This last remark is, of course, also a warning of the danger that the kind of course we are suggesting can be abused. The task force also considered one proposal for a “grand design” in trade policy that has been widely discussed, that for a North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA) or some variant of it. We recommend against making NAFTA an objective of American policy, at least at present. Affecting as it does American relations with Europe, Canada, and Japan, as well as Britain’s relation to the Continent, NAFTA has to be judged basically in terms of foreign policy as a whole, not trade policy. On trade policy grounds alone it falls short of being the most desirable objective and entails a large number of difficulties—not least in relation to the less developed countries—which may be better dealt with by other means or which would not even arise if alternative courses of action are followed. Specific Recommendations We are concerned here with a number of concrete issues that will arise—or ought to be acted on—in the first six or eight months of the new administration. (1) The President should soon make a strong statement of his determination to pursue a policy of removing barriers to international trade. This is a prerequisite for the other things we are recommending. It might well be accompanied by a general statement of some of the points made above about the growing scope and complexity of trade policy, the problems of managing adjustment, and the need to relate trade policy to other parts of foreign economic policy. In particular, there could be a recognition of the links between trade and investment and the desirability of freeing the international movement of capital as well as of goods; what can be said specifically on the latter point depends, of course, on what decisions are made about the future of existing American controls on investment as part of balance of payments policy. (2) The administration should vigorously oppose the quota bills and similar proposals for trade restriction that will be put forward in the new Congress. Their enactment would result in prompt retaliation by our major trading partners to the detriment of our own exports and could lead to a spiraling of trade restrictions with serious consequences for world economic stability. (3) The administration should press strongly for Congressional action to eliminate the American Selling Price method of customs valuations (ASP). Already agreed-on European reductions of barriers to American exports would follow. More important, elimination of ASP is an essential precondition to any meaningful negotiation for the further removal of nontariff barriers. ASP has become a symbol in European eyes of American protectionism going far beyond the real importance of the practice in trade terms. To the extent that any serious problems result for sections of the American economy, they should be dealt with by measures aimed at specific situations and not by trade restrictions. (4) The President should have housekeeping authority to adjust tariffs; this could be obtained by extending the unused authority of the Trade Expansion Act for two years on the understanding that it would not be used for major new tariff reduction. Without such power it will be difficult to make adjustments except by increasing barriers. For example, if the United States had to raise a duty as a result of escape clause action and was not able to compensate foreign countries with some other kind of concession, the result would be an increase in foreign barriers to American exports. Without this authority it might also prove impossible to make bargains on some nontariff matters. (5) To assist firms and workers in adjusting to changing competitive conditions, the Adjustment Assistance Act should be broadened so that its provisions are more readily applicable in cases of real injury. Failure to do this may increase the number of appeals for the use of the escape clause and reduce the administration’s ability to prepare constructive alternatives. Although existing adjustment assistance legislation has proved unusable it rests on a sound principle. We should not go back to the earlier idea that tariffs should not be reduced if that might threaten to injure domestic producers; instead administrative changes in the adjustment law should be made that will give meaning to the principle that the burden of adjustment to new circumstances should be shared by the economy as a whole. The principle is particularly important since a liberalization of the terms of adjustment assistance is almost certain to be accompanied by a loosening of the definition of “injury” in the escape clause which might lead to its being revived as a serious impediment to imports and a source of uncertainty among foreigners about American intentions in trade policy. If any use is made of the escape clause it should be for a limited period during which adjustment takes place. (6) While any important steps in East-West trade depend on foreign policy decisions, it would be desirable to have legislation giving the President more flexibility than he now has. Such a step would also help to resist Congressional efforts to manipulate trade with the Communist countries for political purposes in ways that would damage our long-run interests and policies. (7) The United States should continue to discuss with European countries their border taxes and to take part in the re-examination of GATT rules about these matters. Decisions about a value-added tax in the United States should be made in terms of domestic economic requirements, not those of trade policy. The majority of the task force is not favorably disposed to the use of border taxes or comparable import surcharges for balance of payments purposes when compensation for domestic taxes is not involved, but some members felt that the subject merits more detailed exploration. (8) There should be a vigorous attack on freight rate disparities which in effect serve as additional tariff barriers to the export of American goods. Other Issues The task force discussed the future of the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations but makes no recommendation about it on the ground that a decision should be based on a more general consideration of governmental arrangements for the handling of foreign economic policy. Some members of the task force favor strong steps for improving American export credit arrangements, but the group as a whole makes no recommendation on this matter because time did not permit a thorough discussion and some members have reservations on a number of points. There is no doubt that the subject should be thoroughly examined. Although the task force spent some time discussing oil, steel, textiles, and agriculture, it has decided to refrain from including in this report any recommendations on specific industries. It did not have adequate data before it to make a full appraisal of complex situations. It believes, however, that whenever possible adjustments should be made without the restriction of imports. If it is judged necessary to restrict imports in some fashion—either for political reasons or because there is real economic difficulty in an industry—the restriction should be temporary and should be accompanied by measures of adjustment in the industry that will make protection unnecessary in the future. Serious dangers to the long-run trade policy objectives of the United States are inherent in resort to such measures; within limits they can be reduced by international agreement, which is generally preferable to unilateral action. The prospect that some restrictions will be sought adds to the importance of an early strong and clear statement of the administration’s trade policy aims. If, however, the only concrete action that accompanies the statement is restrictive, it will be difficult to get widespread acceptance of the administration’s good faith. Consequently, action on a series of issues, all moving in a trade-liberalizing direction, may prove to be of decisive importance. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume I. No classification marking. Attached to a February 7 memorandum from Arthur F. Burns to Kissinger informing him that the report of the Task Force, chaired by Alan Greenspan, should be treated on a confidential basis. The Task Force has not been further identified, but it was presumably part of the Nixon transition team; see footnote 2, Document 185 . 182. National Security Study Memorandum 16 182. National Security Study Memorandum 16 1 Washington, February 5, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury The Secretary of Interior The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Director of the Bureau of the Budget The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations SUBJECT U.S. Trade Policy The President has directed the preparation of a paper on U.S. trade policy for consideration by the National Security Council. The paper should deal with over-all U.S. trade policy, including the need for new legislation this year, and specific issues such as East-West trade, trade preferences for less developed countries, regulation of oil imports, major industry problems such as textiles and steel and the future administration of U.S. trade policy. It should present all of the alternatives available to the United States and the costs and benefits of each. The paper should be submitted by March 31. To prepare the paper, the President has directed the creation of a NSC Ad Hoc Group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State. 2 The members of the group will be the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Mineral Resources, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, a representative of the Bureau of the Budget, a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and/or their alternates. The Chairman may invite representatives of other agencies to attend particular meetings. He may also create subcommittees, chaired by whomever he may appoint, to deal with any or all of the specific issues to be studied. Henry Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Limited Official Use. 2 A February 12 memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to Joseph Greenwald designated the latter as the Secretary’s representative to chair the NSC Ad Hoc Group. Rogers instructed Greenwald to prepare a paper for him recommending the policy position he should take in the meeting of the National Security Council. (Ibid.) See Document 192 . 183. Paper Prepared in the Department of Agriculture 183. Paper Prepared in the Department of Agriculture 1 Washington, undated. EEC AGRICULTURE AND U.S. TRADE We are headed for a major confrontation with the European Community regarding its agricultural trade policy. This confrontation will certainly be ignited if the Community applies the proposed taxes on oilseed products. We have been building up to this confrontation for some time, and unless the Community agricultural policies change, these issues will flare into open trade warfare. The root of the problem is that the Community has spent the last eight years perfecting an agricultural policy which is completely insular, and consequently incompatible with the objectives of expanding world trade. It is a policy which does not recognize the principle that the most efficient producers should be the dominant suppliers in international trade. On the contrary, it is a policy that has sought to solve the social and economic problems of its agriculture through high price supports, the encouragement of unlimited production of any product that can be cultivated in the Community and the reservation of its home market for domestic production to the exclusion of outside suppliers. In short, it is a policy of self-sufficiency. Not only that, but it also assumes the right to export their surpluses in world commerce through heavy subsidization. Up to the present time, the Community has failed to take international trade interests into account in framing its policies and programs. On the contrary, it has sought to influence trading arrangements to accommodate their domestic policy. As a consequence, there were only very limited negotiations in agriculture between the EC and the U.S. and other countries in the Kennedy Round. Moreover, the influence of the highly protective variable levy scheme employed by the EC is spreading to other countries. Time and again where we have sought the removal of quota restrictions against U.S. exports, we succeeded only to have them replaced by equally protective variable levy systems. The U.K., a major market for U.S. agricultural exports, has already adopted a minimum import price scheme for grains and is currently discussing an extension of this system to other sectors of agriculture to replace its support system of deficiency payments. The EC is the largest dollar market for U.S. farm products. In 1967 our exports were valued at $1,460 million. With some important exceptions, our agricultural exports have held up well despite the trade restrictive provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy. This was due primarily to an increase of our exports of oilseeds, protein meal, feedgrains, tobacco and fruits and vegetables. These products are normally in deficit supply in the Community and some of them such as oilseeds and oil cake are subject to duty-free treatment. This situation is not expected to continue. The outlook is particularly uncertain for oilseeds (soybeans and soybean products), feedgrains, tobacco and canned fruits. These products make up over 60% of our total agricultural exports to the EEC in 1967. The Community has under active consideration a plan to place a tax of $60 per metric ton on vegetable and marine oils, and $30 per ton on meals. Oilseeds and high-protein meals now enter duty-free without restriction pursuant to the trade agreement between the U.S. and the EC. This trade concession is the one bright spot in the limited number of trade concessions in agriculture that we have been able to obtain in two major trade negotiations over the last ten years. Under this concession, we have built up a trade of nearly $500 million and it should expand. Impairment of this concession would have a serious impact on farm incomes and on the U.S. balance of payments. We consider this proposed action to pose the most serious trade problem that has arisen in agriculture between the U.S. and the EC. If implemented, it could lead to a most serious trade policy confrontation between the Community and the U.S. with commercial and political implications extending beyond agriculture. Our grain trade is constantly threatened under the EC system of varying the support levels and the corresponding import levies which already are subject to daily changes. The plain facts are that the EC grain price structure is too high and is encouraging uneconomic production in the Community. The adverse impact on imports, and especially on U.S. trade with the Community, are now beginning to appear more clearly. The Community has successively increased its guaranteed price to its producers on grain, especially for corn and feedgrains. They have not only expanded their own production, thus reducing imports, but have given unusually heavy subsidies to their exports. Now the Community is talking about more protection on imported dehydrated alfalfa because its use has been increasing as a result of high feedgrain prices in the Community. Further, they have a subsidy on barley exports to Japan that is greater than our farmers get for producing barley. They have succeeded in knocking us out of the Japanese market. The Commission is considering a proposal for a common agricultural policy for tobacco which includes market guarantees and price incentives for Community producers, export subsidies and advance deposit systems and provisions for the suspension of imports. If implemented, it could adversely affect U.S. tobacco exports to the Community valued at $149 million last year. They are talking about a minimum import price system on fruit and vegetable products because apparently they do not get enough protection from fixed tariffs bound in the negotiations with the U.S. This will also hurt our exports. In the process of extending and perfecting this self-centered system for agriculture, the Community has not only become self-sufficient, but has indiscriminately dumped its surpluses on world markets to the detriment of U.S. trade and trade interests of other major exporters of farm products. The United States is the most efficient producer of broilers in the world. Yet, because of that self-sufficiency policy, we have not only lost our market for broilers in the EC, we have suffered severe damage to our trade interests in third markets because of Community subsidies. This has not only hurt us, but Denmark as well. We used to have a large market in the Community, especially West Germany, for lard and pork bellies. Today, we have not only lost that market, but the Community is paying heavy subsidies on lard exports to our major historical market, the United Kingdom. Again we have suffered heavily in that third market. We used to have a small but important commercial market for flour in Holland. That is now gone. And we are faced with the competition of heavily subsidized EC flour all over the world. But that is only the beginning. Subsidy has been piled on top of subsidy as one bad action breeds another. The French and the Italians put export subsidies on tomato products into European and U.S. markets. Countervailing duty action was required by our Treasury Department. The Community put heavy subsidies on canned ham exports to the United States. They did it not because the subsidies are needed to compete with U.S. production, but in order to compete with hams coming from other countries, like Denmark. Here again, countervailing duties may be necessary at some point. They complain about the low price of edible oil in the world, but with their dumping of lard and butter on the world markets, they have led the way in depressing oil prices. At the same time the USDA is faced with cutting the support price on soybeans because the present level is too high. In order to shore up the weak parts of their highly protective trade system, they want to put taxes on oilseed products like soybean meal and soybean oil. They say they want to raise the price of meal to encourage the use of their own grain. They say they want to raise the price of oil in order to encourage the consumption of their own butter. Actually, they want to raise the price of oil to build up funds to support their own costly agricultural program, particularly for olive oil and rapeseed. What they are saying in total is, if the price of your soybeans were higher, we’d like it better. So would we. But the world market says the price of soybeans is already too high. It is only low in their eyes because all their prices are too high. But this is how their crazyquilt system works. Beginning three years ago, the Community started to increase the internal price of corn in relation to other grains. This action has not only increased the Community production of corn, but it has discouraged the use of imported corn. Because the internal price of corn was sheltered from import competition by a variable levy while other feed materials were not so protected from import competition, the use of the unprotected feed materials tended to increase. Among these are such feed as sugar beet pulp, dehydrated alfalfa and soybean meal. We can export soybean meal to Europe and have it compete with and be substituted for corn in the feeding ration. This is a most distorted situation. In the U.S., soybean meal generally sells from 50% to 60% more per ton than corn. The Community would complete its crazy quilt by raising the price of meal through a tax. The rational solution would be to reduce the price of corn. Neither the U.S. nor its trading partners can afford the economic price the Community is asking them to pay to support its agricultural policy. It is a policy which fails to recognize that Europe’s advantage does not lie in agricultural expansion but in industrial expansion. It is a policy which says, if we produce a surplus, let’s dump it on our neighbors at whatever price it will bring. It is policy which today is becoming bankrupt—even in European eyes. The United States has a tremendous advantage in the use of machinery in agriculture. It can produce feedgrains, soybeans, poultry, tobacco and rice at a much lower cost than the Community. We have tried to persuade our farmers that in the end, a market-oriented economy—that is, one where farmers produce at world market prices—will bring rewards in the way of increased trade. The Community policy rejects that thesis. If the acceptance of that thesis does not bring rewards to the American farmers, then we will have a massive confrontation. And in order to have the Europeans understand what it is all about, our target will have to be European industry which, in many areas, has an advantage over U.S. industry. In this way, the burden of supporting the present EC agricultural policy will be shifted from outside suppliers to the Community industries. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 196, Agriculture Volume I 69-70. No classification marking. Attached to a February 13 memorandum from Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin to Kissinger indicating the paper was for the President’s information and use during discussions during his forthcoming trip to Europe (February 23-March 2). A 7-page paper of talking points on trade issues, prepared by the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations for the President’s European trip, February 14, is ibid., RG 364, Transition Papers, 1968-1969, Box 1. 184. Editorial Note 184. Editorial Note During the 1968 Presidential campaign, Richard Nixon, the Republican Party nominee, on August 21, 1968, sent a telegram to some House and Senate Republicans. Nixon said in part: “As President, my policy will be … to assure prompt action to effectively administer the existing Long-Term International Cotton Textile Arrangement. Also, I will promptly take the steps necessary to extend the concept of international trade agreements to all other textile articles involving wool, man-made fibers and blends.” (Attached to a February 21 memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten to Henry Kissinger; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Far East, Japan Volume I) At a press conference on February 6, 1969, President Nixon was asked about his campaign promise to limit the import of certain textiles. The President took a dim view of quotas and said the United States would best be served by moving toward freer trade, but that textiles were a special problem and that exploratory talks were underway with major countries to see if textiles could be handled on a voluntary basis rather than having to enact quota legislation that would turn back the objective of trying to achieve freer trade. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pages 74-75) On February 19 President Nixon met with a number of his advisers in the Cabinet Room from 3:07 to 5:30 p.m. for a briefing on several aspects of his upcoming February 23-March 2 trip to Europe. The Vatican, France, and international trade were on the agenda. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) In his February 21 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten reported that during the briefing on trade, the President said he did not want to discuss textiles during his European trip. Regarding a proposed letter to Japanese Prime Minster Sato on textiles, he said he did not want his first communication with Sato to be a letter attempting to subsume the textile issue under the general trade policy review underway pursuant to NSSM 16 ( Document 182 ). 185. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers 185. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, February 21, 1969. As pointed out in the report from Arthur Burns’ group (See item XVIII-4), 2 major trade and tariff problems will have to be dealt with this year. I would like to have from you by March 12, 1969, a memorandum expressing your reactions to this section of the report, as well as your recommendations for legislative or administrative action in this area. I am sending a similar memorandum to the Secretary of Commerce. When you send me your report, please submit a copy to Arthur Burns. RN 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume I. No classification marking. 2 Under cover of a January 18 letter to President-elect Nixon, Arthur Burns, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Program Coordination Group, forwarded the Group’s report entitled “Recommendations for Early Action or Consideration.” The 117-page report dealt primarily with domestic issues, but Section XVIII, the final section, is entitled “International Economic Relations.” In his letter, Burns said the report was an enlarged version of “the tentative report” that he had submitted to the President-elect on January 6. The letter is on stationery of the Office of the President-elect with a New York address. (Ford Library, Arthur Burns Papers, Box A18, Report to President Elect Nixon) Section XVIII-4 (pages 112-115) of the Burns Group report, entitled “Tariffs and Other Trade Barriers,” begins with the following paragraph: “To counter the political response to the new or impending limitation of steel and textile imports, it is important that you concurrently stress your commitment to a liberal trade policy. Without that, it will be extremely difficult to get other nations to enter into meaningful negotiations for the removal of existing obstacles to our exports.” The report then lists six policy initiatives to implement this objective, noting that the policy suggestions, “despite their reasonable ring, raise difficult political questions.” For the State Department position, see Document 188 . 186. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 186. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 4, 1969. SUBJECT U.S. Trade Policy Arthur Burns has included, in his report to the President, proposals for new trade legislation. 2 He has asked the State and Commerce Departments to comment on them by March 12. The proposals are fine substantively, but raise jurisdictional questions in view of the NSC Trade Study which is due on March 31 (for an NSC meeting on April 16). 3 I have talked to Dr. Burns about the conflict but he does not wish to relax his deadline. He also questions the appropriateness of NSC consideration of trade policy, but will make no effort to derail our present study. (I assured him that we by no means view the NSC as the decision-making body in this area, and that its discussions would be only one input to the President’s final decisions.) The President has, however, specifically asked Dr. Burns for comments on Secretary Stans’ proposal to move the Office of the Special Trade Representative from the White House to the Commerce Department. 4 Our NSC study includes the general question of the future management of trade policy, under which the Stans proposal is one option. Dr. Burns has therefore asked to be invited to participate in this phase of our study. (The President also asked Budget Director Mayo for his opinion on the Stans proposal. Mayo replied that the NSC was studying the matter and “strongly recommended” that any decision await our results.) Substantively, Dr. Burns leans towards giving STR to Commerce rather than State, if it is not continued as an independent office within the White House. Dr. Burns has thus raised fundamental questions about U.S. trade policy decision-making and hence about trade policy itself. The subject matter cuts across foreign policy and domestic grounds so a legitimate question is involved. The U.S. has traditionally viewed trade in a foreign policy framework, and hence State and the NSC staff, within the White House, have taken the lead. The creation of STR in 1962, however, was an effort—which has proved successful—to reconcile the foreign policy and domestic business viewpoints. Any further shift from our present organizational approach, especially toward Commerce Department control, would be interpreted abroad as a clear signal that the U.S. was going protectionist. It is thus extremely important that the NSC continue to play a role, although by no means an exclusive one, in trade policy formulation. I recommend that you take any available opportunity to make that point to Dr. Burns. At the same time, it would be prudent to include him in at least the trade management aspect of our study and probably the rest of it as well. Despite the awkwardness of having two White House representatives appear at a single meeting, I recommend that you sign the attached invitation to Dr. Burns—unless you feel that the principle involved is sufficiently important to try personally to talk him out of it. Recommendation: That you sign the invitation at Tab A. 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the STR. Limited Official Use. 2 See Document 185 . 3 See Document 182 . The NSC meeting was held on April 9; see Document 192 . 4 Stans’ proposal was not found. In a March 21 memorandum to Robert Ellsworth, the President’s Assistant, Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy expressed his strong opinion that the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations be maintained as a separate agency within the Executive Office of the President. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, White House Jan-Aug 1969) On March 22 Under Secretary of State Richardson sent a paper to Ellsworth that stated the State Department position of retaining the office in the White House. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc) Documentation on Secretary Stans’ proposal to move the Office of the Special Trade Representative to the Department of Commerce is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972. 5 Attached but not printed is a memorandum from Kissinger to Burns inviting Burns to participate in a study of the future administration of U.S. trade policy, which would be part of the larger paper on U.S. trade policy being prepared by the NSC Ad Hoc Group created by NSSM 16. 187. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon 187. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 20, 1969. SUBJECT Trade Policy Discussions in Japan It has been suggested that I go to Japan, either as an extension of my forthcoming trip to Europe, or shortly after my return from Europe. 2 As with my trip to Europe, I plan to discuss trade matters with Japanese Government officials and Japanese participation in a meeting on textiles under GATT auspices. We have major trade policy issues with the Japanese as we do with the Europeans. These include the Japanese import quotas, which have been a major irritant to us, and the U.S. textile import problem. In addition, in Japan I wish to take up their stringent limitations on American private investment. According to James Linen of Time-Life, who recently headed up a businessman’s mission to Japan, the Japanese at the highest levels of government now seem really concerned about the desirability of lowering their trade and investment barriers to counter the rising protectionist sentiment in the United States. 3 Now is the time to be speaking with the Japanese on their trade and investment barriers. I am also concerned that if we are to be successful in resolving the textile import problem we need to do this as early as possible. The longer we wait, the greater will be the difficulty of achieving a reasonable international settlement of this issue. The Japanese, who are our major supplier of textiles, are concerned about my trip to Europe. They may feel that the Europeans and we will be joining together in action on the textile import problem to the detriment of the Japanese. Advising the Japanese now that I would be willing to discuss trade policy matters with them, including the textile issue, shortly after my return from Europe, would alleviate their concern. Secretary Rogers and Mr. Ellsworth concur in the foregoing as do representatives of the Labor Department, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the National Security Council. They also feel that if a trip is made to Japan, I should also include brief stops in Korea and Taiwan. If you concur, I would plan to return from Europe, spend approximately one week here, and then make a one-week trip to the Far East. Maury 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Commerce, Office of the Secretary of Commerce: FRC 40 77 A 84, White House (Misc.). No classification marking. The date is handwritten. 2 Stans visited Europe in April; see Document 201 . Regarding his trip to Asia in May, see Document 203 . 3 Linen’s report has not been further identified. 188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 188. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 24, 1969. SUBJECT Your Request for Comments on Item XVIII-4 of the Burns Report—Tariffs and Other Trade Barriers As you requested, I am giving my reactions to Item XVIII-4 of Arthur Burns’ report and my recommendations for action in this area. 2 You have already stressed your support for a liberal trade policy. I agree thoroughly with Dr. Burns about the importance of such a commitment. Stressing freer trade will partially offset negative reactions to our textile move and will also help —to cast off the pall of protectionism that is enveloping international economic relations; —to conserve the benefits of a 35-year effort to develop a more open trading system; and, —to focus attention once again on forward economic movement in the western world. The U.S. in the past has been virtually the sole source of initiative in foreign trade liberalization. It would be comfortable to think we can now relax and await initiatives from others but we cannot. This gives us an opportunity and imposes an obligation to reassert our leadership. I am giving my recommendations first followed by specific comments keyed to the Burns Report. Recommendations: The ground has not been adequately prepared at home or abroad for a major push for bold new trade legislation this year. Further consultation is required—both internationally and domestically—to identify and analyze remaining trade barriers before any concerted attack on them can be planned. At least a year’s intensive exploration of specific questions seems needed. Nevertheless, some legislation is needed urgently, and not all of it is of the type which would be welcomed by foreigners. Changes in the escape clause may be regarded with some skepticism. In this situation, the approach commending itself to us is a combination package involving a request to the Congress in the next few months for: (1) modest legislation restoring your authority to make small “housekeeping” cuts in tariffs needed to meet our obligations under various provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; (2) repeal of the American Selling Price (ASP); (3) liberalization of the escape clause and adjustment assistance; plus a simultaneous announcement, perhaps in a transmittal message, that you believe a major international effort must be made to further liberalize trade in the areas of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), tariffs, and agriculture and that you intend to submit such a proposal to a subsequent session of Congress after further consultations with American producers and consumers and our trading partners. This Year’s Legislation 1. Immediate Tariff Negotiating Authority A simple extension of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act (TEA) would be of little value because most of the tariff cutting authority contained in it has already been used. Consequently, it would be preferable to request interim authority which would allow immediate cuts by amounts not greater than 25% of the final Kennedy Round rates. You could assure the Congress that this authority would not be used for any major negotiation. 2. Repeal of ASP The reasons for recommending this step are covered in my comments on point 4D of the Burns report. 3. Liberalization of Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance (a) Escape Clause The present TEA criteria on eligibility of an industry for tariff relief (Sec. 301-b) should be made usable by eliminating the requirement that increased imports be causally linked to past tariff concessions. Since many concessions go back as far as 30 years, the conclusive demonstration of a major causal relationship may be impossible and, in any event, seems unduly burdensome. Tariff relief in the case of bound duties would require that the U.S. either (1) pay compensation of comparable trade value by reducing duties on other items or (2) accept foreign retaliation in the form of increased restrictions on U.S. exports. We should, therefore, retain a strong injury test. At present, increased imports must be “the major factor” behind injury. This language has been interpreted by the Tariff Commission to mean the cause greater than all other causes combined and has thus constituted an impossible standard for applicants to meet. A workable test which would still be consistent with liberal trade policy objectives would be a showing that imports are the “primary” cause of serious injury. This should be defined as the cause greater than any other single significant factor. (b) Adjustment Assistance In order to deal realistically with the hardships some individual firms and groups of workers have undoubtedly faced as a result of increased imports, the requirement that such imports be caused by a trade concession should be dropped, as proposed above for escape clause relief for an industry. However, since smaller groups are normally involved and the remedies do not have adverse impact on other domestic groups or on our commercial relations abroad (because no new trade barriers are raised), the criteria for adjustment assistance should require that increased imports be no more than a “substantial” cause of serious injury to the petitioners, rather than “the major cause” as at present or “the primary cause” proposed for escape clause cases. Present adjustment assistance provisions require that an entire firm be injured, whereas the injury from imports could be severe but not extend to all of its component establishments. This is an anomaly since individual establishments, rather than firms, are the units used for determining injury under the escape clause provisions. To make adjustment assistance directly available to those seriously harmed by stiffer import competition, the individual establishments should be allowed to petition for help under the same criteria as would be applied for firms. Escape clause relief and adjustment assistance should be clearly understood as temporary measures to give industries or firms time to adjust to import competition. Therefore, there should be built-in time limitations and a requirement for action programs to make the special measures unnecessary. 4. Support for the Package If it is to succeed, the foregoing package will need strong backing in the form of counter-pressures to offset the protectionist sentiment at large in the country. Consequently, you should direct your staff immediately to begin drafting the interim trade legislation and formulating plans for building support for it in the Congress and with the public. At the same time, your trade policy officials should continue working to develop a consensus on the next major step in trade liberalization through consultations with key public and Congressional figures at home and with our trading partners abroad. Reaction to Item XVIII-4 of Arthur Burns’ Report: Section 4(a)—Non-Tariff Barrier Initiative Non-tariff barriers must form part of our next major effort at trade liberalization. Public attention has focused on this area, and action is expected. The work presently underway in this field should continue. But it probably will not be possible to mount a negotiation on non-tariff barriers alone. Chances of success are better in the context of a broad negotiation which also includes tariffs and agricultural trade liberalization. The principal non-tariff barriers effectively restricting U.S. exports are quotas and variable levies on agricultural products. We have just begun work seeking new approaches to agricultural trade liberalization with a series of special studies in the GATT, the establishment of a policy group in the OECD and the initiation of a series of high-level bilateral consultations with the European Community and others. The potential advantages to the U.S. from forward progress in this area are very high, but achieving this progress is likely to be one of our most difficult trade problems. In most countries the trade barriers are an integral part of domestic agricultural programs, which will not be easily changed. Developed countries continue to maintain a few effective quotas on industrial products, particularly fuels. Developing countries make much wider use of quotas on the whole range of traded goods, but they are justified on balance-of-payments grounds. In addition, American companies have specifically singled out for complaint foreign countries’ government procurement practices, border tax adjustments, heavy specific taxes on products such as large cars, motion picture screen time quotas and some sanitary and safety regulations. To make progress in this field, we shall have to be willing to reduce our own non-tariff barriers, many of which will be difficult to put on the negotiating table. Most foreign complaints against our barriers have focused on: The American Selling Price system, our countervailing duty law, valuation provisions of the Tariff Act, U.S. marks of origin and labeling requirements, our wine gallon method of assessing taxes on whiskies, state and federal procurement regulations favoring domestic producers, and the manufacturing clause of the copyright law limiting the importation of English language books printed abroad. Legislation would be required to change most if not all of these practices and they have long resisted all previous challenges. Congress would certainly not consent to amending them without receiving very rich plums in return from other countries, and it is far from certain that these plums can be obtained. Section 4(b)—Tariff Negotiating Authority Modest new authority is needed now in order to offer compensation should the U.S. increase a tariff rate bound under the GATT. This could happen because of an escape clause action, a customs court case or a law changing any particular tariff rate. In the absence of means to compensate, countries affected by the duty increase have the right to retaliate by raising their rates on U.S. exports. This legislation could be an extension of the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which lapsed in 1967. However, there is not much tariff cutting authority left over in this Act. Most of it was used up in the Kennedy Round. What is left applies mainly to sensitive items, where we might wish to avoid making duty reductions, or to items supplied mainly by countries to which we have no tariff obligations. Section 4(c)—Border Tax Adjustments Border tax adjustments (BTAs) have become an important issue. A number of U.S. companies assert that the adjustments made by most European countries have the same effect as increased tariffs. This is a very complicated issue, and the impact of border tax adjustments remains unclear in spite of all the international work done on it. We have argued that the existence of full border adjustments for high European sales or value added taxes harms the trade of countries such as the U.S. that rely less heavily on such taxes. There is no agreement on this point. However, a stronger case can be made that increases in border adjustments do damage trade when not accompanied by equal increases in domestic taxation. The Europeans have been bringing their border taxes up to the level of their domestic rates. No matter how justified Europeans may claim these increases are on the basis of equity, they mean that our exports are competing on a less favorable basis than previously. However, there are knotty theoretical problems in quantifying any damage. The most significant increase, which was made by Germany a year ago, was more than reversed in a November change made for balance of payments purposes. I do not agree, however, that the answer to this problem is for us to make a unilateral increase in our border adjustments. We now make full border adjustments for the direct effect of our own excise and state and local sales taxes. We could go slightly further on grounds that our adjustments do not fully provide for the secondary effects of these taxes, e.g. calculating and adjusting for the expense to our exporting firms of the gasoline tax they pay to keep their trucks running. If we should make such a case, which might allow our border adjustments to be some 2% higher than currently, some other countries could easily make similar higher adjustments based on the same grounds, with little or no net gain for us. The previous Administration considered such a move but decided against it on the ground that we would gain little from it in trade terms. We are now well into a U.S. initiated GATT examination of BTA practices and their effects on trade. We are trying to persuade other countries that the present system is inequitable and that border adjustments must be more strictly controlled. So far we have not found much support even among countries with taxation systems similar to ours for changes in the rules, though some foreign officials have indicated we do have a point. Should the GATT effort not improve the situation we will have to consider whether taking unilateral action is a satisfactory substitute. Such a move at this time, however, is premature. Section 4(d)—American Selling Price It is important that we make a vigorous effort to get legislation to permit the United States to eliminate the American Selling Price method of determining value for customs purposes. The Europeans, and to a lesser extent Japan, continue to place major importance on our removing this barrier, applied principally to certain chemical imports. These countries consider action on ASP a test of U.S. willingness to relax non-tariff barriers. Continued failure to implement the conditional agreement worked out on chemicals during the Kennedy Round will make it difficult to negotiate in the trade field. In a Kennedy Round conditional agreement, the United States undertook to shift from ASP to the normal basis of valuation (export value) in exchange for significant concessions by the Europeans on chemicals duties and on some non-tariff barriers. These concessions would provide substantial export opportunities for U.S. industry. The new U.S. rates of duty on chemicals would still be substantially above those in other countries and would provide adequate protection for our producers who are a strong and efficient industry with a demonstrated record of international competitive ability. Authorization to implement the U.S. undertaking on ASP was included in the principal trade bill submitted by the previous Administration to the last Congress. Hearings were held by the Ways and Means Committee but no further action was taken on any part of the bill. The domestic chemical industry is almost totally opposed to losing ASP protection and questions the value to it of lower duties abroad. Section 4(e)—Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance The escape clause provisions of existing law do need liberalizing. U.S. trade legislation has for years incorporated the principle that the cost of injury resulting from our trade policy should be shared by the nation’s economy as a whole. The existing provisions, however, have proven patently ineffective. Under the escape clause, Title III of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, not a single industry has been able to satisfy the eligibility criteria for tariff relief. Similarly, no firm or group of workers has succeeded in obtaining from the Tariff Commission an affirmative finding of existing or threatened serious injury, which is required before adjustment assistance can be given. With Title III a dead letter, business and labor have turned to Congress for relief. Members of Congress who might otherwise be reluctant to support quota bills have found it difficult to resist the pressures in the absence of other meaningful alternatives. There has been substantial public discussion of the need to liberalize both the escape clause and adjustment assistance criteria and, in principle, no serious opposition is apt to arise. Soundings taken last year when interim trade legislation was sent to Congress bear out this expectation. The problem we may well face in this area is a protectionist end run to loosen the escape clause criteria to a degree that would damage rather than strengthen our ability to secure international cooperation in moving toward freer trade. Foreigners would have little incentive to negotiate with us if our concessions could be revoked under an easy test of injury, and relations would be strained by the ensuing retaliation. With regard to adjustment assistance, generous criteria would not have an adverse impact in the trade field. Such criteria, however, will involve budgetary costs. Liberalization of Title III criteria would bring back to the ranks some members of Congress who have recently supported restrictive bills because no administrative relief for injury from imports was in fact available. We also stand to win back some labor groups if adjustment assistance becomes workable. We should not fool ourselves, however, that we will make serious inroads on hard-core protectionists, whose basic philosophy and objectives seek to contain foreign competition on a broad front, not merely to provide remedies for the occasional cases of real injury from an otherwise sound trade policy. Section 4(f)—Quota Bills I agree fully that there is real danger to our exports from enactment of quota legislation and that it should be strongly opposed. Despite strong domestic pressures for such controls, the U.S. record in avoiding new restrictions on imports has so far been good. We have, it is true, persuaded others to restrain their exports of cotton textiles and a few other minor products and more recently steel and meat. We have done this and so far managed to escape retaliation. The situation would change drastically, however, if the threat of quota legislation should become a reality. A year and a half of keeping our partners on tenterhooks about the prospects of quotas has created a good deal of friction in the trade field. Uncertainty over the U.S. commitment to liberal trade has frayed their nerves and they would rapidly boil over if quota laws were enacted. It would be quite difficult to restrain a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation possibly leading to a trade war that could undercut our major political interests in Europe. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Misc. No classification marking. Attached is a March 10 transmittal memorandum from Greenwald to Secretary Rogers recommending that he sign the memorandum to the President. 2 See Document 185 . 189. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff 189. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, undated. NSC MEETING 9 April 1969 Trade Summary Paper on Major Issues for Decision in Trade Policy Several decisions in the area of trade policy must be taken in the near future. These concern new legislation for 1969, the American Selling Price (ASP) method of customs valuation, textiles, and tariff preferences toward less developed countries. In all these cases domestic and foreign audiences are looking for indications of the Administration’s tone in trade policy for both the short and longer runs, matters about which there is considerable speculation. In addition, agricultural exports to Europe may well face serious difficulties as a result of forthcoming European decisions, and the question of border tax adjustments and non-tariff barriers continues to plague U.S. trading relations with other countries. Neither of these issues requires a Presidential decision at this time, and an interim report on our agricultural trade policy with Europe is on the agenda of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy for April 10. This summary therefore addresses only the four major issues for decision (page references are to pros and cons in the basic NSC paper). 2 New Legislation (pp. 7-10) Whether to introduce trade legislation in 1969 depends in part on the substantive decisions on ASP and textiles (see below). The Administration now lacks even modest tariff-reducing authority, such as would be necessary to compensate countries for any restrictions imposed on their textile exports by U.S. legislation or for other escape clause action. A modest trade bill for 1969 might include: (1) limited tariff-reducing authority for “housekeeping” purposes, (2) relaxation of the unduly stringent requirements for escape clause action and adjustment assistance presently in force, and (3) elimination of ASP. The risk of even a modest Administration trade bill is that it may be laden with restrictive amendments by a protectionist-minded Congress. On the other hand, failure to attempt to remove ASP will be interpreted by our trading partners as lack of serious willingness to reduce “non-tariff barriers” to trade. Thus the realistic options this year are: —introduce new trade legislation with modest objectives; —introduce no new legislation. In the longer run, of course, more efforts are possible. ASP (pp. 8-9) The ASP technique of valuation requires U.S. market prices to be used as the basis for calculating import tariffs, and by so doing greatly increases the protection provided by tariffs on the limited range of goods, mostly benzenoid chemicals, to which ASP applies. The Europeans regard it as the most egregious symbol of U.S. “non-tariff barrier” to trade, and as such it has taken on in foreign eyes a symbolic importance with respect to U.S. willingness to negotiate seriously on non-tariff barriers to trade. Under the last round of trade negotiations, the U.S. Administration agreed to attempt to eliminate the ASP method of valuing imports in exchange for tariff cuts and reductions in non-tariff barriers by other major nations. A bill to that end was introduced but failed to pass Congress, partly because of protectionist opposition by the chemical industry and partly because the bill was introduced late in the session. The options are: —make no effort to repeal ASP; —exert Presidential leadership to repeal the ASP method of valuation. Textiles (pp. 12-13) Here the question is how best to restrain the growth in imports of woolen and synthetic textiles into the United States, within the framework of a liberal trade policy and in accordance with previous Administration statements on the subject. The options are: —secure an agreement similar to the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement, providing a multilateral framework under which restraints are negotiated bilaterally with exporting countries. This is the approach Secretary Stans proposes to take in his forthcoming trip. —negotiate bilateral restraints with exporting countries without a multilateral framework. —take administrative action on grounds of injury to domestic industry, and negotiate compensation bilaterally with the countries injured by U.S. action. To be effective in restraining textile imports, this would require some statutory relaxation of the present criteria for escape clause action and further tariff-cutting authority. —take no Administration action on this issue at the present time. Tariff Preferences (pp. 11-12, 31-34) The less developed countries are pressing hard for improved access to the markets of the developed countries, and in particular for preferential tariff treatment for their semi-manufactured and manufactured products. The Johnson Administration agreed to explore generalized tariff preference arrangements sympathetically, subject to their being temporary (up to ten years) and to the elimination of preferred access of certain developed countries (e.g. Britain, France) to the markets of some less developed countries, mostly former colonies. Exploration by the major developed countries in the OECD has now reached an advanced state. The Administration must decide soon whether to continue in these discussions, and with what degree of implied willingness to adopt a tariff preference system. International work has been delayed six weeks, pending completion of the U.S. policy review. The less developed countries have elevated the preference question to a major political issue between them and the developed countries, although they have not carefully examined the merits of any particular scheme. The U.S. has encouraged poor countries to industrialize, and this process will result in increasing efforts by developing countries to export their manufactured products. Most other developed countries seem willing to grant some form of trade preferences, and if the United States withdrew from the current discussions it would bear considerable political onus, at least in the short run. On the other hand, little is now known about the magnitude or distribution of benefits to the less developed countries arising from particular preference arrangements; and because the products of greatest interest to the less developed countries are among the most sensitive in terms of foreign competition, considerable domestic political resistance to a broadly based arrangement can be expected. Little consultation has been done with Congress on this issue. Thus the options are: —delay the ongoing international discussions for several months to provide the Administration time to (1) assess the real costs and benefits of alternative preference arrangements, and (2) sound out key Congressmen on the feasibility of such arrangements. —continue participating in the present international discussions while at the same time (1) assessing the real costs and benefits of alternative schemes, and (2) sounding out key Congressmen. This option would require the early submission of an illustrative list (or lists) of commodities on which we could not give tariff preferences, thereby implying the particular products on which we would be willing to give preferences and a reaffirmation of our commitment which might prove difficult to abandon. —decide that we are willing to grant tariff preferences and announce this, subject to the removal of reverse preferences and to satisfactory Congressional consultations. —announce its rejection of a tariff preference as a matter of policy, perhaps coupling with the rejection an announcement of efforts to seek other trade measures of value to the developing countries. The Future of Trade Policy (pp. 10-11) Foreign and U.S. observers alike are watching for signals about the nature and tone of the Administration’s trade policy. Every move will be read as a trend toward trade liberalization or protectionism. The Administration might forestall over-interpretation of its modest moves this year by announcing its intention to engage in early discussions with its major trading partners on future trade liberalization moves. Alternatively or in addition, it could form a blue-ribbon Presidential commission, with or without Congressional representation, to undertake a broad review of ways to expand world trade in the future and the types of negotiation and new trade legislation required to achieve this objective, postponing any major new initiative to a later date but simultaneously signaling its intent to move forward decisively toward freer trade. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Limited Official Use. Attached to an April 5 covering memorandum from Jeanne W. Davis of the NSC Secretariat to the Offices of the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of Emergency Preparedness indicating that the paper would be distributed on April 7 for discussion at the April 9 NSC meeting. Davis sent an earlier version of the summary on April 5 to the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, JCS, and the Office of Emergency Preparedness, noting that the summary reflected the discussion at the NSC Review Group meeting on April 4. (Ibid.) 2 Reference is to an undated, 41-page paper entitled “NSSM-16 Trade Policy Issues,” which was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an April 7 memorandum from Greenwald that informed him the paper incorporated the comments at the April 4 NSC Review Group meeting. (Ibid.) An earlier, 36-page version had been sent to Kissinger under cover of a March 28 memorandum from Greenwald in his capacity as Chairman of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on U.S. Trade Policy, pursuant to the request in NSSM 16 ( Document 182 ). (National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 90, 4/4/69 Review Group Meeting-NSSM 16-Trade Policy) 190. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) 190. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) 1 Washington, April 8, 1969. SUBJECT NSSM 16, Trade Policy Issues The documents for the National Security Council meeting April 9 on trade policy issues are a summary of major issues for decision (Tab A), and a basic paper (Tab B). 2 The study covers the immediate issues more fully and discusses several other issues which are not yet ready for decision. Recommendation That you seek the following decisions: 1. To move ahead with a modest trade bill this year. The legislation would include repeal of the American Selling Price (ASP) valuation system, “housekeeping” tariff cutting authority of 25%, relaxation of the escape clause and adjustment assistance criteria. 2. To ensure that our approach on textiles at the present time (Secretary Stans’ trips) be cast in terms of exploration and consultation. 3. To continue working toward a generalized preference scheme with submission of our illustrative lists to the OECD as soon as possible. To have a prompt Presidential announcement of our intention to engage in early trade liberalization talks with other countries at the same time as a “blue ribbon” commission is studying ways to expand world trade. Discussion 1. New Trade Legislation In the review group there seemed to be agreement that modest trade legislation (including ASP) was a must for this year. In the face of our textile initiative, we need action to convince our trading partners we mean what we say about moving toward freer trade. Only a serious attempt to repeal ASP will convince the Europeans. Also, we need authority to cut some of our tariffs to pay for the unavoidable increases in our tariffs. For example, we already have a case where compensation may be required because of legislation which raised duties on wool textiles. If we can’t compensate, others are allowed to retaliate against our export interests. The adjustment assistance and escape clause provisions in the Trade Expansion Act are inoperative as now written. They should be liberalized. Domestic industries must have a chance to obtain relief if they demonstrate injury. There may be proposals to add other items to the proposed legislative package. The job of considering the details of a bill should be done by an inter-agency task force, not by the NSC. 2. Textiles and Secretary Stans’ Trips The textile issue was included by Kissinger. He is nervous about the whole project and particularly about how Stans will handle it. He said in the review group that the President has tended to pull back each time he gets close to the textile question. Except for Commerce and Labor (who have been pushing for wider textile restraints for years), everyone is uneasy about the new Administration’s first move in the trade policy field being a restrictive one. The purpose in having a textile discussion at the NSC is to give Stans some guidance for his European and Asian trips. 3 He should be made aware of the possible costs and risks in pressing for a textile agreement on woolens and synthetics. To the greatest extent possible, Stans’ discussions should be exploratory and consultative, with no effort at this stage to sell any specific solution. Stans will probably resist this approach because he feels the President is already committed and because Stans is already on record with the objective of his trips being to convene a GATT meeting to negotiate a new multilateral agreement covering woolens and synthetics. 3. The Generalized Preference Scheme You will find opposition to preferences on three grounds: —fear of increased imports from LDCs (particularly Commerce and Agriculture), —concern over Congressional and industry reaction, and —dislike of departure from our traditional MFN policy. The answer to the first argument is that any scheme will have safeguards to protect domestic industry from injury (other developed countries will take the same position). Secondly, Congressional and industry resistance is present in any attempt to reduce protection. On the third point, a generalized preference scheme is designed to get us back closer to a true MFN world by stopping the proliferation of special arrangements, particularly with the European Communities. The real risks and objections are: —The Congress may look upon preferences as a substitute for, instead of a supplement to, aid; —The safeguards (and exceptions) may be so broad as to make the preference scheme meaningless in trade terms and leave the LDCs sourer than ever; and —The preference scheme may result in additional administrative complications (e.g. certificates of origin) contrary to our drive toward removal of such encumbrances. Against these risks, we must weigh the political costs of being the only industrial country not willing to go alone with generalized preferences. Also, the LDCs will be extremely unhappy about our textile initiative and our agreement to preferences (even if not as liberal as they might want) would help to offset the restrictive move. The opponents may press for a decision against preferences as a matter of policy. Or they may settle for the delaying option involving an assessment of costs and Congressional sentiment before any further steps forward are taken. Our recommendation is that we continue to participate in the international discussions while we also proceed internally. This will avoid our taking the onus for holding things up internationally and still not leave us any more committed to an eventual scheme than we already are. Also, we need to get down to specifics of lists both internally and internationally in order to make any useful cost/benefit analyses or have intelligent consultations with the Congress. 4. The President’s Announcement and the Blue Ribbon Commission In the review committee there was general agreement that the modest trade legislation package should be coupled with a bolder, more forward-looking move toward freer trade. This becomes even more important if we decide to go ahead with the negotiation of the textile agreement. There should be an announcement of our intention to engage in early talks with our trading partners coupled with the creation of a blue ribbon Presidential Commission to look into ways to expand world trade. There may be a tendency, particularly on the part of the NSC staff, to argue for fairly “neutral” terms of reference for such a commission. We would not want to give the impression that the U.S. is embarking on another broad “pro and con” study of trade policy. This would more likely alarm people than reassure them. The mandate for the commission should be in terms of the best way to get ahead with trade liberalization. There is a question whether this commission should include Congressional representatives. We think it should not, particularly if it is going to recommend legislation. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Limited Official Use. Sent through Pedersen and Samuels. Drafted by H.L. Worthington (E/OT) on April 7 and concurred in by A. Katz (EUR/RPE) and Schnee (H). 2 See Document 189 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 See Documents 187 , 201 , and 203 . 191. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Economics, Department of the Treasury (Pelikan) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) 191. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Economics, Department of the Treasury (Pelikan) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) 1 Washington, April 8, 1969. SUBJECT Briefing for NSC Meeting on NSSM-16: U.S. Trade Policy Date and Time: April 9, 1969; 10:30 a.m. Place: Cabinet Room On February 15 [ 5 ] the President directed the preparation of a paper on U.S. trade policy for consideration by the National Security Council. 2 The attached response to that request deals with: overall U.S. trade policy, including the need for new legislation this year; and specific issues, such as preferences for less-developed countries, border tax adjustments, liberalization of agricultural trade, non-tariff barriers, and safeguards for domestic industry. 3 The NSC meeting of April 9 will be to review the trade policy paper. The group will, however, concentrate on the attached summary of the paper which reviews issues which require urgent decisions. 4 These are: (a) should the U.S. introduce a trade legislation package in 1969, if so, what kind and what should be included; (b) should the U.S. join in a multilateral scheme to grant trade preferences to the less-developed countries; and (c) how should we deal with the textile problem? New Trade Legislation —Secretary Kennedy has already informed the President that he favors a limited trade legislation package for 1969 which would: grant authority to the President for modest housekeeping tariff reductions; eliminate the American selling price valuation technique for certain imports; relax the criteria for adjustments assistance and escape clause action. 5 All agencies appear to believe that if legislation is put forward it should be of the limited nature which Secretary Kennedy has advocated. The question is therefore not what kind of legislation but whether or not the political risks of fighting for new legislation in the trade field are too great. There are two dangers: (1) that the Congress would defeat any legislation of a liberal nature and (2) that it might tack on to such legislation restrictive measures which we would find unacceptable. Inclusion of easier criteria for adjustment assistance and escape clause relief should make the Congressional route much easier. Preferences —The key question for NSC decision is whether or not the United States should, in concert with the other developed countries, grant temporary tariff preferences to the less-developed countries. The State Department is the outspoken and major advocate of such preferences. Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture and STR have not been enthusiastic supporters of the concept of preferences. We have gone along with the State Department as constructive critics with the aim of assuring that U.S. economic interests are kept in mind. The State Department will argue that failure to go forward with preferences would be disastrous to the foreign policy of the United States; we would be isolated and the other developed countries would go forward without us. We believe these arguments are overdrawn, although we can expect that initially the LDC’s will make very loud noises. If there is as little benefit from preferences as we suspect, the LDC’s will be upset in any event. This disillusionment may be more disastrous for U.S. foreign policy in the long run than their short-term reaction. We suggest that you take an initial position opposing preferences but agree to delaying definitive action until the fall, to allow time for an interagency study on the impact of preferences on the U.S. and the LDC’s. There would also have to be an assessment of: Congressional reaction; and European willingness to give up existing selective preferential arrangements and reverse preferences. If there is a delay, you should oppose submission of lists since such action, even though labeled tentative or preliminary, raises the expectations of the LDC’s and makes it more difficult to decide not to grant preferences. Textiles —The President has publicly announced his intention to seek a multilateral agreement to restrain exports of wool and man-made fibers. Secretary Kennedy has advocated that we settle this issue quickly and effectively in order to proceed with other trade negotiations. He warned however against “paying a price in trade terms for a textile agreement.” Border Tax Adjustments —There is interagency agreement at the staff level that a change in the GATT rules concerning border tax adjustment should be pursued by the U.S. Government. There is disagreement on the nature of the change which will be necessary. The State Department is backing a soft approach which would cause the least problems for the EEC. They advocate a change in the GATT rules which would allow temporary border tax adjustments during times of balance of payments difficulties, i.e., the use of BTA’s to assist the adjustment process. They do not want to push for substantive change in the GATT rules which would eliminate the discrimination against countries which rely more heavily on direct taxes than indirect taxes. The Treasury Department has been the major force within the U.S. Government advocating substantial changes in the GATT rules on border tax adjustments. As no decision is being requested of the President at this time, the border tax adjustment problem may not be discussed. Non-Tariff Barriers and EEC Protectionism for Agriculture —Both these issues are treated in the basic paper but as there are no pending decisions by the President they may not be taken up during the meeting. Attached is: a talking point paper for your use during the meeting, 6 a copy of the trade policy study, and the summary of that study which will be discussed at the NSC meeting. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the Secretary March-April 1969. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Pelikan on April 8. 2 See Document 182 . 3 The paper was not attached, but see footnote 2, Document 189 . 4 The summary is printed as Document 189 . 5 Secretary Kennedy’s communication has not been identified. 6 Not printed. 192. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff 192. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, undated. NSC MEETING 9 April 1969 Trade Analytical Summary and Issues for Decision The paper in the next section of the book, prepared by an interagency working group, describes and analyzes the Administration’s trade policy options. 2 A summary of the major issues for decisions raised in the paper, also prepared by the working group, precedes it. 3 Their point of departure is your announced commitment to free trade and their main focus is how to turn that commitment into policy. After setting the trade policy context, the paper summarizes the major issues which need immediate attention, describes the alternative approaches to general trade liberalization, and discusses five key specific problems. This memorandum highlights the issues for decision; my recommendations follow in parentheses. My recommendations also appear in parentheses in each section of the summary paper which precedes the basic paper. Present Context Four major factors underlie the trade policy issues. First, protectionist forces at home have launched a major challenge to our historical policy of freer trade. Second, protectionist forces abroad, especially in Europe, are seriously threatening a significant volume of U.S. exports. Taken together, those forces raise the spectre of a possible trade war between major allies. Third, your decision to seek relief for U.S. textile imports has heightened foreign fears of U.S. protectionism and could well increase the strength of foreign protectionist action. Finally, each of these developments could spill over from the trade field and damage our over-all foreign policy since trade is a major foreign policy issue to virtually every country in the world. New Legislation The paper presents three trade policy packages. The first is for a major liberalizing initiative in this session of Congress covering tariffs, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), agriculture, safeguards and tariff preferences for less developed countries (LDCs). It would clearly demonstrate your commitment to freer trade, put our textile request in the best possible light (and maximize its chances for success), and minimize the possibility of a trade war and broader foreign policy difficulties arising from trade problems. But we (and the world) do not really know enough to launch the major parts of it (NTBs, agriculture) and it is hard to envisage sufficient domestic and foreign support developing for a new major push at this time. The second package rejects the idea of new legislation and calls simply for continuation of the present GATT and OECD studies of the whole range of trade issues. It recognizes the go-slow mood both at home and abroad but in so doing would risk major protectionist successes in both places. The third package is an intermediate approach which would include some or all of the following: legislation this year including limited tariff-cutting authority, elimination of ASP, and relaxation of the criteria for escape clause relief and adjustment assistance; announcement of an intent to submit broader legislation covering both tariffs and non-tariff barriers to a subsequent session; and commencement of intensive domestic and international efforts, including appointment of a blue-ribbon commission, to prepare for that broader approach. Depending on how much was included, this package could provide sufficient liberalizing initiative to effectively combat domestic protectionism and to assure foreign countries of our commitment to freer trade. On the con side, passage of its legislative component might not be easy—particularly in the context of an announced intent to do more in the future—and it would be criticized as both insufficient and too far reaching. It would be similar to the 1968 proposal of the Johnson Administration. (My recommendations on each of the specific issues included in these packages are listed below. Taken together, they closely approximate the most complete version of the third package and include all of the elements suggested for possible inclusion in it.) Tariffs There are two broad areas of trade barriers: tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The relative importance of NTBs has grown sharply as tariffs have been progressively reduced, although some significant tariff levels remain. At present you have no legislative authority to reduce tariffs. This exposes us to retaliation if we were to raise any of our duties, as a result of escape clause action, for example, since we could not extend compensation by reducing tariffs on other products. The alternatives are: (1) Simply accept the present situation and seek no new authority; (2) Request modest “housekeeping” authority to permit compensation if necessary; (3) Seek major authority with a view toward a major liberalization effort. Only this approach would represent a decisive liberalizing move but neither the bureaucracy, the Congress, nor our major trading partners are ready for it. Issue for decision: What if any tariff-cutting legislative authority should we seek? (Seek modest “housekeeping” authority this year and announce your intention to seek major authority at a later time, when the tariff reductions of the Kennedy Round are nearer to completion.) 4 NTBs NTBs are much more difficult conceptually and practically. They cover a wide range of practices including voluntary export restraints, border tax adjustments (BTAs), Government procurement policies, safety and health regulations, state trading monopolies, and a few remaining quantitative restrictions. Many NTBs are intimately tied to domestic policies, particularly in agriculture. We do not yet have any reliable analysis of their trade effects on us or on others, although a major effort to this end is now underway in GATT. The U.S. NTB which attracts most foreign reaction is our American Selling Price system of customs valuation (ASP). Our Kennedy Round commitment to such legislative authority to eliminate it was met by the Johnson Administration but that commitment, and the European offer of tariff and non-tariff cuts to reciprocate for its implementation, were renewed late last year. Its repeal would provide us not only with the equal foreign concessions already negotiated but would remove the most egregious symbol of U.S. protectionism. Our options are: (1) Simply press forward on the present GATT work, to provide a factual and analytical basis for future negotiations; (2) Attempt to force the elimination of other countries’ barriers by threatening to retaliate against them; (3) Negotiate reciprocal reductions—on individual barriers where international balancing is possible (e.g., Government procurement), on a variety of NTBs in order to achieve greater scope for reciprocity, or on a package deal including tariffs and perhaps agriculture to provide the maximum scope for reciprocity and hence coverage. Issue for decision: What approach to take on NTBs generally and ASP specifically? (Press forward with the GATT study of NTBs and their effects. Launch an intensive U.S. Government study to pave the way for a later initiative to coincide with the major tariff-cutting initiative recommended above, and announce your intent to move in this direction. Ask Congress to eliminate ASP, to complete the Kennedy Round package and clearly signal our commitment to freer trade and interest in reducing NTBs in general.) 5 Textiles The question here is how best to pursue your commitment to the industry, within the context of a liberal trade policy. The immediate issue is the approach to be taken by Secretary Stans on his forthcoming European and Far Eastern trips. The options are: —Seek a multilateral agreement in the GATT under which bilateral restraints are negotiated. —Seek to negotiate bilateral restraints without a multilateral umbrella. —Act administratively on grounds of domestic injury, after achieving relaxation of our escape clause legislation and renewed tariff-cutting authority, to restrict imports and compensate exporting countries bilaterally; —Take no action at present, but consult with our trading partners on how best to proceed on the issue. Issue for decision: Instruction to Secretary Stans concerning textiles for his forthcoming foreign trips. (Consult with the governments he visits concerning the best way to deal with the problem. I urge that he make no specific proposals on these visits because it would be his only specific proposal, because he will not be in a position to offer anything in return, and because we have not yet implemented your consultations pledge in this area, the first in which you are asking something concrete from the Europeans, Japanese, and several less developed countries.) 6 Agriculture Agriculture presents a special range of NTBs, all of them closely tied to domestic policies. It is the main area of current and pending EEC restrictions on U.S. exports. The U.S. has a major interest in freeing international agricultural trade in view of our tremendous comparative advantage in this area. U.S.-European agricultural trade is also being studied by a task force set up under Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy. The options are: (1) Intensify our present exhortations to others to liberalize; (2) Seek a fundamental review by all major trading countries of all major agricultural policies, domestic and international, with a view toward bringing agricultural trade under GATT control and then to liberalize in accord with its rules; and/or (3) Get all agricultural restrictions converted to tariffs. No Presidential decision is required at this time . (My tentative view is that we are prepared only to seek international agreement to launch an intensified study of domestic and international agricultural policies. Specific recommendations on this subject will be developed by a Task Force of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy.) Border Tax Adjustments There are two aspects to the border tax issue and they are usually confused. First, there is a structural problem in the GATT rules: indirect taxes (such as excise taxes and taxes on value-added) can be rebated on exports and imposed on imports while direct taxes (such as corporate and personal income taxes) cannot. The trade balances of countries with relatively heavier use of indirect taxes are thus in principle favored. As with other NTBs, however, there is no agreed analysis of these effects in practice. The clearest effect occurs when countries increase their border adjustments without changing their internal tax rates, usually in connection with a shift in their method of taxation. Second, there is the possibility of using uniform border taxes as a temporary device to help countries adjust their balance of payments positions. Such measures could be legalized without changing the structural rules. The import surcharges used by Canada in 1962 and the UK in 1964-1966 are examples. The Johnson Administration seriously considered such an approach last year. We could address ourselves to either or both of these problems. The balance of payments aspect is best considered in that context, however, and this trade discussion should be limited to the structural aspects. The options are: (1) Increase our own border taxes unilaterally, either legally and in small amounts to adjust for U.S. indirect taxes not now rebated, or illegally and in larger amounts to cover some of our direct taxes; (2) Apply countervailing duties against foreign rebates on their exports and subsidize our exports to countries which apply border taxes; (3) Propose changes in the GATT rules to allow for border adjustment for direct taxes; (4) Propose undercompensation of indirect taxes by countries which rely heavily on them; (5) Seek agreement that countries will not increase their adjustments even when they change their domestic tax rates, without international consultation. No Presidential decision is required at this time . (My tentative view is that we should seek agreement only on changes in adjustments as per last-mentioned option, since any of the unilateral approaches would probably generate foreign retaliation and launch a trade war, and intensify international and internal study of the effects of BTAs as part of the over-all effort on NTBs outlined above, with a view toward including them in a major trade negotiation in a year or so. We can gain very little from negotiating on BTAs alone since we have nothing to offer in return for foreign concessions.) Trade Preferences for Less Developed Countries (LDCs) At the UNCTAD meeting in 1968, the U.S. accepted a moral commitment to proceed toward the establishment of a system of trade preferences for the LDCs and to settle the details of the scheme in 1969. Discussions in the OECD have been held up for six weeks pending determination of the policy of your Administration. There is tremendous interest in preferences throughout the underdeveloped world and our responsiveness carries important political implications. The fact is, however, that the economic gains for any LDC are likely to be small even under an ideal preference scheme—and any scheme which emerges from negotiations among the industrialized countries could be far from ideal. Furthermore, the LDC gains which do result are likely to be focused in a small number of the most developed of them such as Hong Kong, Israel, and Mexico. However, we do not yet have adequate analyses of any of these effects and little consultation with Congress has taken place. Our options are to: —Announce a decision to grant preferences, subject to certain conditions, through either a meaningful approach in which exceptions are kept to a minimum and unlimited access at a zero preference rate is accorded, or with a more circumscribed scheme; —Continue the ongoing international discussions but reserve final judgment; —Delay further participation until we can reach a definitive judgment on whether to support or abandon the approach. —Abandon the approach. Issue for decision: U.S. position toward the discussions currently underway in the OECD on trade preferences for LDCs. (Delay U.S. participation in the OECD discussions until we can complete an analysis of the probable effects of a preference scheme on us and on the LDCs, and consult meaningfully with Congress. Such action could be completed in 2-3 months, if kept under strong pressure. We will take some political heat by thus delaying, but we would need at least one month to prepare our contribution to the ongoing talks anyway. I recommend this course because we simply do not have enough information to proceed intelligently.) 7 Safeguards for Domestic Industry A major trade issue is how to safeguard domestic industry and labor against the transitional effects of trade liberalization, when these effects cause justifiable difficulties. The basic principle is that the economy as a whole should share the cost of any such problem since trade liberalization promotes the general welfare. Safeguards have generally been limited to transitional problems and have not sought to provide ongoing protection. Effective devices are a necessary condition for defusing pressure for protectionist legislation. The options are: (1) Legislated quotas. (2) Voluntary restraints by foreign suppliers. (3) Improvement in the escape clause for industries, which has been inoperative since 1962 since its requirements are too rigid. (4) Relaxation of the criteria for extension of adjustment assistance to individual firms and workers, which has also been inoperative for the same reasons. Issue for decision: How to provide adequate but non-protectionist safeguards against damage from imports? (Seek legislation relaxing the criteria for escape clause relief and adjustment assistance.)7 1 Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 83, 4/9/69 NSC Meeting-US Trade Policy. Limited Official Use. Prepared by the NSC Staff for the President’s use at the April 9 NSC meeting on trade policy. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from 10:08 to 11:53 a.m. Attendees were Nixon, Agnew, Laird, Lincoln, Richardson, Wheeler, Helms, Kissinger, Hardin, Stans, Volcker, Samuels, McCracken, Gates, Haig, Bergsten, and Cooper. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 2 See footnote 2, Document 189 . 3 Document 189 . 4 Next to this paragraph is the handwritten notation: “HK Recommendation.” 5 Next to this paragraph is the handwritten notation: “HK Recommendation.” 6 Next to this paragraph is the handwritten notation: “HK Recommendation.” A final sentence to the paragraph, which reads: “See my separate memo on this subject to you, a copy of which is attached,” has been crossed out. 7 Next to this paragraph is the handwritten notation: “HK Recommendation.” 193. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Westerfield) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) 193. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Westerfield) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) 1 Washington, April 10, 1969. SUBJECT U.S. Trade Policy—NSSM 16: Tariff Preferences for LDCs We are concerned that the paper which went to the NSC Review Group on April 7 does not reflect the views on tariff preferences for LDCs which we have repeatedly stated and which were partly accommodated in the revised draft paper you circulated on March 28. 2 The essential point which was lost in the paper which went forward is that reaffirmation of the U.S. position on preferences for LDCs would cause problems for U.S. relations with African countries associated with the EC. For example, the revised draft stated (p. 27, paragraph 2), “If some LDCs continued to extend preferences to other DCs, our relations with those LDCs, which would not receive U.S. preferences, would undoubtedly be strained.” This was weakened in the final paper (p. 12, paragraph 1) to read, “The immediate and certain foreign policy gains from a decision to move ahead might be offset in the longer run by strains arising from, for example, … the withholding of preferences from some LDCs because they continue to extend reverse preferences.” As I noted in my memorandum of March 27, 3 implementation of generalized preferences would mean calling on Africans to pay what they regard as a stiff price for something of little or no value to them. The African associates of the EC depend on exports of primary products and are not in a position to sell manufactured goods to developed countries, even with preferences. If they participate in the generalized arrangement envisaged, they would not lose preferential access to the EC market for their primary products, but would risk losing EC and French aid, which they are convinced is predicated on reverse preferences. If they should decide to hold on to their present benefits and refuse to participate in generalized preferences, they would be denied entry into the U.S. market on the same terms as other LDCs. As a result, the associates would probably reinforce their special ties with the EC, especially since the U.S. has phased out bilateral aid to most of them. The end result could well be further insulation of a European-African trade and aid area, with inevitable unfavorable effects on U.S.-African relations. We believe that the NSC Review Group should be aware of the damage which option B-2 would be likely to cause to U.S. relations with very underdeveloped countries with special ties to selected developed countries. The Review Group should also understand that this difficulty could probably be avoided if the U.S. made it clear in reaffirming support for generalized preferences that it expected that the arrangement would be designed so that no individual LDC would suffer a net loss from participating in it. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Limited Official Use. Drafted by W.H. Drew (AF/I) on April 10. Copies were sent to Palmer (AF), Hadsel (AF/I), and Pedersen (C). 2 See footnote 2, Document 189 . 3 Not further identified. 194. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 194. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 11, 1969. SUBJECT CEA Views on Trade Policy Attached are recommendations from Paul McCracken on U.S. Trade Policy, keyed to the paper prepared for yesterday’s NSC discussion of the subject. His strongest views are in favor of seeking repeal of ASP this year and to delay making a final decision on tariff preferences for the less developed countries until we can take Congressional soundings and explore the possible alternative approaches in greater detail. 2 I share Dr. McCracken’s views on both subjects. In general his views closely parallel my own, which I conveyed to you prior to the NSC meeting. Attachment Washington, April 8, 1969. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 3 SUBJECT Trade Policy (NSSM 16) The basic issue before you is how strongly to push for further trade liberalization at this time. The strong protectionist sentiment in Congress indicates that a strong new legislative program for trade liberalization would face extremely tough going. On the other hand, it is extremely important to preserve the present forward momentum in trade liberalization around the world. This suggests that the best move may be to introduce limited trade liberalization legislation at the pres-ent time, coupled with an announcement of intention to engage in early discussion with our trading partners on future trade liberalization. This might be combined with the formation of a Presidential commission on this subject. Two important decisions affecting the future of U.S. trade policy which must be made soon, and which are of considerable interest abroad, concern the American Selling Price (ASP) method of customs valuation and tariff preferences toward less developed countries. Each has taken on symbolic value to our trading partners which exceeds its actual economic importance. During the Kennedy Round conditional agreement was reached that if the United States eliminated the American Selling Price provision, further reduction in the tariff on chemicals and in certain nontariff barriers would be undertaken by our trading partners. Failure to eliminate the ASP provision would not only kill these already negotiated benefits, but would also seriously dampen foreign willingness to seriously explore avenues for further reduction in tariff and nontariff barriers. Thus, I strongly feel that repeal of the ASP provision should be an important component of any proposed legislative program for limited trade liberalization. This could well be combined with relaxation of the unduly stringent requirements for adjustment assistance which exist under our present legislation and, if Congressional opposition does not appear too great, with limited authority for tariff reduction to allow some maneuvering room for minor negotiations and compensatory tariff reductions in cases where U.S. actions impair our concessions to foreigners. It would be good to announce a positive decision on ASP legislation in time for Secretary Stans’ trip to Europe, where it would add considerably to the credibility of his free trade posture. On the second question, the less developed countries attach major political importance to obtaining access for their exports, particularly of semi-manufactured and manufactured products, in the markets of the developed countries. While it is not clear that the less developed countries would achieve as much benefit from trade preferences as they apparently believe, most other developed countries seem willing to grant some type of preferential treatment. International exploration of the question has progressed to an advanced state and has now paused, pending completion of the U.S. policy review. While the United States does have the option of announcing its rejection of tariff preferences as a matter of policy, such action would bear a considerable political stigma unless coupled with the announcement of important alternative measures to aid the less developed countries. On the other hand, there is almost certain to be strong domestic resistance to preferences and it is likely that preferences would prove a source of long-run disappointment to the less developed countries. If it can be done without making the U.S. stand out as a foot dragger in the eyes of other countries, we should delay the ongoing international discussions for a short period to sound out the feelings of key Congressmen and to explore the possibilities of various programs of market access for LDC’s. It has long been our policy to aid the industrialization of the less developed countries, and they will feel cheated if we now deny them access to our markets. But we should not grant them something that may turn out to be of no value. Paul W. McCracken 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 215, CEA. No classification marking. The date is handwritten. 2 The President underscored “favor seeking repeal of ASP” and wrote “1” in the left margin. He also underscored “the less developed countries” and wrote “2” in the left margin. He drew a line to the bottom of the page and wrote: “I agree on 1—except I want more urgency on 2. N.R. will certainly press on it on his return from S.A.” Reference is to Nelson Rockefeller’s forthcoming mission to Latin America; see Document 122 . 3 No classification marking. 4 Houthakker signed for McCracken. 195. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 195. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 15, 1969. SUBJECT Actions Resulting from National Security Council Meeting of April 9, 1969 At Tab A is a list of actions indicated during the NSC meeting of April 9 on U.S. Trade Policy. The list of actions has been coordinated on an “Eyes Only” basis with the principals and has been agreed to by them. It will be retained for record purposes. At Tab B is an NSSM reflecting your decision to continue our internal study of trade. 2 At Tab C is an NSSM providing for further study of the proposal for generalized tariff preferences for less developed countries. 3 Since the steps to implement the remaining actions contained in Tab A will be accomplished through the submission of a legislative program, preparation of which is under way, I do not believe a formal Decision Memorandum should be promulgated, especially since you will wish to retain some flexibility as to details of the legislative program. Recommendation Recommend approval of: 4 1. the list of actions at Tab A, 2. the NSSM on the internal study of trade, 3. the NSSM providing for further study of the proposal for generalized tariff preferences for less developed countries. Tab A 5 Actions Resulting From the NSC Meeting on Trade, April 9, 1969 The President reiterated his commitment to free trade and decided that new trade legislation in 1969 should provide him with limited authority to reduce tariffs, should liberalize the escape clause, should liberalize the conditions required for adjustment assistance to businesses and workers dislocated by imports, and should eliminate the American Selling Price (ASP) method of valuation for imposing tariffs. The legislation is to be ready for submission this Spring. The President also decided that a commission would be created to review the entire range of trade and production relationships among countries. The terms of reference for the commission should be considerably broader than for any such study in the past. It should report its findings and policy recommendations six to twelve months after its appointment. The President indicated that the commission should have a strong staff and a prominent chairman who was not unduly identified with a particular point of view. The formation of the commission should be announced this spring, perhaps in conjunction with the announcement of the new legislative package. In discussing the position Secretary Stans would take in his upcoming trip to Europe, the President assented to his raising in low key with the Europeans the possibility of convening a meeting in June, under GATT auspices, to discuss the problems of world trade in synthetic and woolen textiles and methods of restraining the growth of such textile imports into the United States. Secretary Stans should emphasize the political difficulties a sharp growth in textile imports is causing in the United States, and the threat it poses to the liberal trade policy the Administration wants to pursue. The President indicated the desirability of drawing public attention to the strong sentiments for protection now prevailing in Congress, either through featured articles or through a publicized meeting of Congressmen with Secretary Stans. As an indication of his desire to move in the direction of more liberal trade, the President authorized Secretary Stans to assure the Europeans, without publicity, of the intention of the Administration soon after his return to submit new interim trade legislation and to create a blue-ribbon commission to review the future of U.S. trade and production relations with its major trading partners. On the question of tariff preferences to developing countries, the President instructed Stans to indicate, when asked, that his Administration maintains an open-minded position although it will not be able to make any firm commitments until further study is completed. The scheme would appear to have a small effect on the U.S. but could mean a great deal in our political relations with the less developed countries. The Secretary should seek to avoid letting the Europeans reject the approach and should seek to keep it open. The President also asked Secretary Stans to listen attentively to the European position on East-West trade and indicate that the U.S. is re-examining its position on the matter. His own disposition is that some of our present restrictions are outmoded but he wants to save any relaxation for possible bargaining with the Soviet Union in a broader political context. The President indicated that the Administration should take greater cognizance of the problems of U.S. businessmen and their concerns abroad, even when ultimately they may have to be over-ridden by foreign policy considerations. The business community should be convinced that its interests are adequately represented by the Government. 1 Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 83, 4/9/69 NSC Meeting-US Trade Policy. Confidential. 2 Not found, but presumably a draft of NSSM 49, Document 199 . 3 Not printed; it is a draft of NSSM 48, Document 198 . 4 The President initialed approval of all three recommendations. 5 Confidential; Eyes Only. The text is virtually identical to that circulated under cover of an April 10 memorandum from Kissinger to Laird, Stans, Hardin, Rogers, Wheeler, Helms, Lincoln, Volcker, McCracken, and Gates. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, April 9 NSC Meeting) 196. Information Memorandum From Richard N. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 196. Information Memorandum From Richard N. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 22, 1969. SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries The tariff preferences issue will come to a head this year, and we do not want to be caught off guard. Earlier this week David Rockefeller came under heavy pressure on the question in Mexico. 2 Secretary General Perez Guerrero of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has been circulating in Washington during the past week and saying that tariff preferences are at the top of UNCTAD priorities. Nelson Rockefeller will hear a lot about preferences during his trip to Latin America next month. 3 At the NSC meeting on trade (April 9) the President indicated that he had an open mind on the question, and seemed sympathetic to tariff preferences as a gesture to the less developed countries—without, however, reaching a firm decision. 4 We have instructed the agencies to study the question quickly and thoroughly via NSSM. In the meantime, international discussions in the OECD have been stalled and everyone is waiting to see what the U.S. will do. 5 The European Community and all other major industrialized countries have in specific proposals, and the burden for further delay falls on the United States for so far failing to put in its hypothetical list of “exceptions” not to be covered by a tariff preference scheme. Fred Bergsten and I agree that we should go ahead and submit some hypothetical exceptions list. But the further we discuss the question of tariff preferences in detail, the more difficult it will be to retreat. I have two major objections to the granting of tariff preferences, and I thought you should be made aware of them, particularly in view of the President’s favorable disposition. First, the benefits accruing to the less developed countries in the best of circumstances will be both small and badly distributed among countries. Quantitative estimates are always difficult. But all of the reasonable ones show the stimulus to LDC exports at less than $1 billion. And most of this stimulus will go to Hong Kong, Mexico and a few other countries who are already in a position to market extensively. Second, we cannot achieve the best of circumstances at a time when the pressure is very strong to restrict textile imports, especially those from low-wage countries. I find it inconceivable that we will turn around and give preferred access of precisely those products, which are the ones where the LDCs could best utilize preferences, to the U.S. market. Other commodities in which the less developed countries have potential export capabilities are also of special sensitivity in the U.S. market, e.g., leather products, plywood, etc. Therefore, I believe that if any proposed scheme were to emerge from Congress at all in the next few years, it would be badly cut up and largely devoid of real value to the LDCs. The State Department is inclined to respond favorably to what is admittedly a very strong desire by the less developed countries for tariff preferences. They are in the process of making it a symbol of true U.S. and European intentions regarding their welfare and State would like to make a sympathetic political gesture. My view, given the two points mentioned above, is that such a gesture will backfire very strongly. Because the actual efforts even of a broadly based scheme are likely to be small, it will result in disappointment and induce cause for further special treatment—especially for those many countries not benefiting from the scheme. Because a broadly based scheme is not likely to pass through Congress, we will be charged with cutting the whole idea, and the bitterness will be all the greater. In short, the political gains from granting the tariff preferences will be short lived at best. These are negative comments and do not help, and do not offer objective ways to maintain or improve our relations with the LDCs. But there are other ways to do that than tariff preferences, not least a forward-looking foreign assistance program and assured market access for their growing volume of manufacturers even at existing tariff levels. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Trade: Preferences for LDCs. Limited Official Use. 2 Not further identified. 3 Regarding the Rockefeller mission to Latin America, see Document 122 . 4 See Tab A to Document 195 . 5 See footnote 3, Document 200 . 197. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 197. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 23, 1969. SUBJECT The STR Decision—A Pyrrhic Victory? I am still seriously concerned about the future administration of U.S. trade policy. The President’s decision to retain the appearance of an independent STR 2 already appears to be undercut in substance by the way in which the decision was implemented and subsequent developments: 1. The Secretary of Commerce, not the President, offered the position to Carl Gilbert. 2. The President gave the Secretary of Commerce the option to locate STR physically within Commerce. 3. Gilbert accepted the position without any conditions concerning direct access to the President or his relationship with other agencies. His well-known eagerness for the position suggested in advance that this would be his response. 4. On the present trade mission to Europe, Gilbert has been excluded from private meetings between Stans and key foreigners such as Kiesinger and Strauss. The result, particularly if STR is physically located within Commerce, will be a clear undermining of STR’s leadership role in U.S. trade policy. Such a result would adversely affect the President in the following ways: 1. The widespread kudos he has received for retaining an independ-ent STR will disappear. Another massive campaign on the subject would probably develop since the groups involved are all interested in substance rather than appearance. 2. Our trade legislation, both this year and in the future, will face increased difficulty on the Hill because of the widespread desire in Congress (including such key people as Wilbur Mills and John Byrnes) for STR leadership. Our legislative proposals will face enough problems without adding this one. 3. The foreign policy consequences which were avoided for the moment by the decision to retain STR will appear all over again. They would be even worse now because the protectionist image of Commerce has been greatly intensified by the Stans approach on textiles. 4. STR will be severely handicapped in regaining the top-quality staff which is needed somewhere in the Government if we are to make substantive progress on trade policy generally and move toward a far reaching Nixon Round, the rationale for the appointment of our blue ribbon commission and intensified internal study per NSSM 49, during this Administration. Such a staff will never develop through the State system or be attracted by Commerce. At least three things need to be done soon to give substance to the apparent STR decision. First, the President should invite Gilbert along with Stans to report to him on the European trip and to discuss plans for the coming Far East trip. This would enable Gilbert to meet the President and enhance his stature both internally and publicly, particularly if the White House announced their meeting. Second, STR should remain physically in its present location. This will require either that Stans be convinced not to exercise his option to move STR into the Commerce building (essentially on the grounds that it would avoid major Congressional problems and keep the State and Agriculture Departments and foreign emissaries off his neck) or that the President instruct Stans that he has reconsidered his decision and prefers that STR remain in its present location. 3 Third, STR’s substantive leadership needs to be asserted. Our NSSM which places STR in the chair of our long-term internal study accomplishes that. In addition, it would be desirable if the President could praise STR or Gilbert personally in a public statement, perhaps in his trade message to the Congress next month. Recommendation: I recommend that: 1. You urge the President to (a) invite Gilbert, along with Stans, to report to him on the European trip and on plans for the Far East trip in early May, with a White House announcement of their meeting; (b) inform Stans that he has decided that STR should remain physically in its present location; (c) take any opportunity that might arise to publicly praise STR and/or Gilbert personally and affirm their leadership of U.S. trade policy. 2. If you have not already done so, sign the proposed NSSM directing a far-reaching internal study of U.S. trade policy as agreed at the NSC meeting on April 9 to be chaired by STR. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the Special Trade Representative. Limited Official Use. 2 Additional documentation on the President’s decision to keep the Office of the Special Trade Representative in the Executive Office of the President is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972. 3 On May 19 Kissinger initialed a memorandum to the President with the recommendation: “That STR remain physically, as well as legally, within the Executive Office of the President.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Eberle) In a May 21 memorandum, Haldeman told Flanigan that “the President would like you to make clear to Secretary Stans that he does not want the office itself moved. As the Secretary knows, the President will look to Stans for overall supervision of this office, but he feels it should not be moved from its present location and that any attempt to do so would create serious problems on the Hill, among other things.” (Ibid.) The May 19 memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972. 4 At the end of this paragraph Haig wrote: “Done” (see Document 199 ) and added the following decision paragraph with “yes” and “no” options: “Bergsten to do memo to Pres. along above lines.” The “yes” option is checked, presumably by Kissinger. The May 19 memorandum to the President (see footnote 3 above) is apparently the memorandum. 198. National Security Study Memorandum 48 198. National Security Study Memorandum 48 1 Washington, April 24, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Director of the Bureau of the Budget The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations The Administrator of the Agency for International Development SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries The President has directed the preparation of a paper on U.S. policy toward generalized tariff preferences for the less developed countries (LDCs). The paper should deal with their economic costs and benefits to the LDCs, their economic costs and benefits to the U.S. and to the other countries extending preferences, and to their effects on political relations among the U.S., the other industrialized countries, and the LDCs in both the short and longer terms. The economic analyses should take account of different durations of time during which preferences might be in effect and should also take account of the possible development of new export products in LDCs as well as increases in their exports of products already being sold abroad. These analyses should be done in terms of various possible preference arrangements, ranging from a comprehensive scheme with no or few derogations from the basic principle to a quite restrictive package which would fully reflect the domestic sensitivity of various industries in both the U.S. and other industrialized countries. The economic and political analyses should also cover the effects on the LDCs, on the U.S., and on the other countries extending preferences of changes in present practices which the U.S. or others might insist upon in moving to a generalized preferences scheme, such as preferences extended by certain LDCs to certain industrialized countries (reverse preferences) and preferences extended selectively by certain industrialized countries to certain LDCs. The President has directed that the paper be prepared by the NSC Ad Hoc Group created by NSSM 16. 2 It should be submitted by June 1. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 48. Limited Official Use. 2 Document 182 . 199. National Security Study Memorandum 49 199. National Security Study Memorandum 49 1 Washington, April 24, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations SUBJECT U.S. Trade Policy in the 1970’s The President has directed the preparation of a study on U.S. trade policy over the next several years which: a. includes a discussion of trade issues in the broad context of U.S. foreign policy objectives, b. considers the relationship of trade to United States objectives vis-a-vis both the developed and the less developed countries, c. examines alternative possible evolutions in broad patterns of international trade in the absence of major U.S. initiatives, and d. considers possible alternative U.S. approaches. The paper should also: a. explore the whole range of problems which must be faced during that period including: (1) tariffs, (2) non-tariff barriers, (3) agriculture, and (4) foreign production by U.S. corporations. b. consider the alternative responses to those problems and include the economic and political costs and benefits to the United States involved in both the overall approaches which might be conceived and the specific components of those approaches; c. deal with the methods, both domestic and international, through which the various approaches could be pursued as well as the substance of the approaches; and d. include the domestic and political aspects of the problem. To prepare the paper, the President has directed the creation of an NSC Ad Hoc Group chaired by the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations and including representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman may invite representatives of other agencies to attend particular meetings. He may also create subcommittees, chaired by whomever he may appoint, to deal with any or all of the specific issues to be studied. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 49. Limited Official Use. 200. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 200. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 24, 1969. SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Rogers 2 recommending that: 1) The US submit, to the OECD Working Group on Preferences, several illustrative lists of items to which generalized tariff preferences from the United States to the less developed countries might apply if such a scheme were adopted globally. 3 2) State be authorized to initiate consultations on the preferences issues with key Congressmen. Both steps would be undertaken with the clear understanding that the US has made no final decision on whether to participate in a preference scheme. The US is the only major country not to have submitted its illustrative product lists to the Working Group, which is studying the variety of complex issues which would be involved in any preference scheme. We held off pending our review of over-all US trade and aid policies, now completed. As a result, a number of LDCs have complained about our slowing down the work program. It will still take a week or two to prepare the lists, but a decision now to proceed would enable us to maximize the political payoff by announcing our decision at UNCTAD beginning on April 28. (Paul McCracken disagrees. He argues at Tab B that we should go ahead with interagency preparation of the lists, but believes we should make no official announcement because the LDCs would take it as a statement of US intention to work for a preference scheme.) 4 You have indicated that you want to see the results of the study directed by NSSM 48 5 before deciding whether the US should support a preference system but that you wish the work on it to proceed urgently. Submission of our lists and initiation of Congressional consultations are necessary prerequisites to a final judgment. There is some risk, as McCracken says, that our submission of lists will imply a commitment to ultimately proceed with a scheme and increase the political repercussions if we eventually back away, but the submission of multiple lists instead of a single list and a clear statement that we have not yet made up our minds should keep the record straight. Recommendation: That you approve Secretary Rogers’ proposals. 6 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Trade: Preferences for LDCs. No classification marking. The memorandum is attached to an April 22 memorandum from Bergsten recommending that Kissinger send it to the President, and a stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “The President has seen.” 2 Rogers’ April 19 memorandum is not printed. 3 In the attached memorandum, Rogers explained that in 1968 the OECD had established an ad hoc Working Group to study the issues related to preferences, and that the Working Group had agreed that all potential donors would table illustrative lists of products which might be covered or excluded from a preference scheme. 4 McCracken’s April 24 memorandum is not printed. 5 Document 198 . 6 The President initialed his approval. Below his initials is the handwritten note: “State Secretariat has been notified per Houdek 4/2969.” 201. Memorandum of Conversation 201. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 28, 1969. PARTICIPANTS The President Maurice H. Stans, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Kissinger Carl Gilbert, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations C. Fred Bergsten SUBJECT Report on Trade Mission to Europe The President began the meeting by welcoming Mr. Gilbert to the Administration and asking whether he planned to accompany Secretary Stans on the forthcoming trade mission to the Far East. Mr. Gilbert replied that he was uncertain, given the need to remain in Washington to obtain Senate confirmation of his appointment. In view of this factor, and also to enable Mr. Gilbert to retain more running room in the future, the President decided that it would be better for him not to take this trip. (After the meeting, Secretary Stans asked Mr. Gilbert whether he could speed his hearings so that he could make the trip after all.) Secretary Stans then reported on the European trip. Five major areas were discussed: the economic policy of the Nixon Administration; its trade policy; his “open table” proposal for examination of non-tariff barriers to trade; U.S. concern over agricultural protectionism in Europe; and textiles. The Secretary reported that the Europeans greatly appreciated the fact that the trip had occurred and had made numerous favorable comments on the President’s own visit. 2 The President affirmed his view that such contacts were highly desirable. Dr. Kissinger agreed. The Secretary reported that the Europeans welcomed the U.S. commitment to freer trade. They stated that only the U.S. could take major initiatives in this area and stressed the need for the U.S. to repeal ASP. The Secretary also felt that progress had been made in conveying to the Europeans the depth of our political and economic concern over threats to our agricultural exports. Mr. Gilbert noted that the European Finance Ministers opposed the EEC farm policy, but the integrationists would not abandon it lightly in view of its effect on European unity. A discussion of agricultural problems ensued and the President reiterated his interest in rationalizing agricultural policy around the world. He noted that agriculture was our greatest domestic success and the Point IV program one of our greatest foreign policy failures. The Secretary reported that Prime Minister Wilson had told him that the proposed commercial arrangement between the UK and the EEC was dead. On textiles, Secretary Stans explained in detail his proposal for a GATT meeting to consider a multilateral agreement and listed the nine arguments against that approach voiced in Europe. 3 He reported that Belgium has since agreed “to support us” (sic: Belgium has agreed to a meeting but has made clear that it may oppose us on substance) and that he received sympathetic responses from the three Prime Ministers (in Germany, Italy, and the UK) with whom he discussed the subject. The President noted that Kiesinger should be responsive since textiles were really the only request we were making of Germany. The President then noted that we should keep open the option of approaching the textile problem on a bilateral basis. Other items, including purely political ones, will have to be included if we are to achieve help in meeting our problem. Dr. Kissinger commented that, if the textile request were to be our only trade initiative, we would probably succeed only through bilateral approaches linking the issue to other non-trade matters. On the other hand, we might confine the negotiations to trade if textiles are subsumed in a broader U.S. trade initiative. Secretary Stans preferred the multilateral approach since it would provide us with a lever against countries which did not agree to bilateral restraints. Mr. Gilbert noted that the bilateral approach would enable other countries to claim compensation from the U.S., whereas no such compensation would be required under a multilateral arrangement and emphasized that the GATT organization wished to avoid deterioration into a debating society a la UNCTAD. The President decided that a full meeting of the NSC, attended by the members of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, 4 should be devoted to the trade issue before the mission to the Far East. He noted that foreign policy was basic to the over-all problem. Secretary Stans should report to the group on the European trip, and the meeting should then focus on Japan. The trade issue must be considered in the context of our over-all relations with Japan, which Dr. Kissinger noted are currently before the NSC. It was agreed that the NSC meeting on May 7 would be devoted to trade and that Okinawa would be considered on April 30. The President also stated that, with the demise of de Gaulle, the U.S. should take the initiative on trade policy. The U.S. does have an obligation to lead and the French political change may push us toward doing so. We should see if Europe will unite now, as so many people have said would occur if only de Gaulle were not present. Finally, Secretary Stans mentioned the desirability of reversing the recent decline in commercial personnel in our foreign posts. He also repeated his recommendation that the U.S. send the C 5-A to the Paris air show; 5 the President directed Dr. Kissinger to look into the matter with the Defense Department. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume I 1970. Confidential. Drafted by Bergsten. The meeting was held in the Oval Office from 4:36 to 5:15 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A copy of Secretary Stans’ written report to the President on his European trip were attached but are not printed. Bergsten forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Kissinger under cover of an April 29 memorandum. (Ibid.) Kissinger approved it and a copy was sent to the Department of State on May 9. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16) 2 The President traveled to Europe February 23-March 2. For talking papers prepared for his visit, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 115 and 116 . 3 In an April 28 briefing memorandum to the President for this meeting, Kissinger called the President’s attention to this multilateral GATT proposal, which had attracted the most attention during Stans’ trip. “No country agreed to attend the proposed GATT meeting but none fully rejected the possibility. Several suggested alternative U.S. approaches; the European Commission asked for a detailed study justifying the existence of an economic problem, and the Germans proposed a GATT fact-finding study as a starter. All the Europeans stressed that our proposal would pit the U.S. and Europe against Japan and a few Asian LDCs, the political effects of which could be highly damaging.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume I 1970) 4 Regarding this Cabinet Committee, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 9 . 5 Kissinger flagged this “peripheral item” for the President in his April 28 briefing memorandum. While in Paris Stans sent a telegram to the President stressing the importance of getting the C5-A and the Boeing 747 to the Paris Air Show. (Telegram 5866 from Paris, April 24; ibid.) Kissinger told the President he supported Laird’s consistent disapproval of Ambassador Shriver’s request because, inter alia, the C5-A was not yet configured for overseas flights. 202. Editorial Note 202. Editorial Note In Spring 1969 the Nixon administration was considering its overall approach to U.S.-Japan relations in the context of NSSM 5, “Japan Policy,” January 21, 1969. In late April 1969 it was decided that the security aspects of the relationship would be discussed by the National Security Council on April 30, and the economic aspects on May 7 on the eve of Commerce Secretary Stans’ mission to the Far East. See Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III, Document 20 . On May 1 NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis distributed a paper entitled “U.S. Trade Mission to the Far East” for consideration at a meeting of the Review Group on May 2. She noted that the subject was also on the agenda for the May 7 NSC meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, 5/7 NSC Meeting) On May 2 Joseph Greenwald sent Richard Pedersen a memorandum for his use at the Review Group meeting. Greenwald noted that the background and trade sections of the NSC paper had been “lifted completely from NSSM 5.” “The section on textiles resembles the discussion in NSSM 16 on trade policy. The section on foreign investment is new.” Greenwald commented that the issues the paper raised did not require decision prior to Stans’ mission to the Far East. He thought the options on textiles were not realistic and that it was not necessary at that time to decide on a multilateral versus a bilateral approach. Greenwald believed that Stans should make clear that the textile problem was serious, but should not push so hard on the preferred multilateral approach that it would be difficult to pursue alternatives if it proved impossible to negotiate the multilateral approach. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16) No record of the May 2 Review Group meeting has been found, but a May 2 memorandum from Pedersen to John Irwin and Nathaniel Samuels reported on the meeting. Pederson noted that a slightly revised paper would be available for the May 7 NSC meeting. On the issues, he reported: “The sharpest sparks still arise on the textile quotas which are clearly unpopular among most of the economists except the Commerce people,” but there seemed to be “general agreement that the Japanese are not doing their share in the U.S.-Japanese economic relationship in general.” Pedersen commented that it was agreed that Stans should indicate a preference for the multilateral approach, but not pursue it too hard, and that no decisions on next steps were required before Stans’ trip. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, 5/7 NSC Meeting) On May 3 Staff Secretary Davis distributed a revised paper for the May 7 NSC meeting under cover of a May 3 memorandum to the Offices of the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and Director of Emergency Preparedness (with copies to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, the Special Trade Representative, and other agency heads). (National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 84, 5/7/69 Joint NSC/Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy Meeting-FE Trade Mission) On May 5 John Petty sent Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy a briefing memorandum for the May 7 NSC meeting. Petty commented that “the paper does not adequately reflect the basic difference between the factors which influence U.S. and Japanese policies regarding their trade relationship. Military and political objectives predominate in the formation of U.S. policies while economic and financial factors primarily determine Japanese policies… . you might say that the present allocation of costs and benefits of our relationship with Japan is not viable from the U.S. side. The present large and growing U.S. trade deficit with Japan, in the context of Japan’s flagrant restrictions on imports of manufactured goods and undervalued exchange rate is simply unacceptable.” Regarding textiles, Petty endorsed a preference for a multilateral solution, but preserving a bilateral option. He noted that “the only viable position that we have with regard to textiles is that it is basically a political problem. Unless an international solution can be found, the Congress will enact restrictive legislation. Such legislation would undoubtedly be more restrictive than a multilateral agreement. Once the dam is broken, there is also the danger that sentiment for protectionist legislation will snowball and result in additional import restrictions.” Petty concluded that there was no need for a final decision on U.S.-Japan relations prior to Stans’ trip. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the Secretary May-June 1969) In a May 6 memorandum to President Nixon, Kissinger briefed the President on the upcoming NSC meeting. Among other things Kissinger wrote: “The basic issue is that we cannot expect Japan to meet all of our requests fully and quickly, since we are not offering them anything on the economic front,” unless the administration overtly threatened Japan with harsh economic sanctions if it refused, which would “seriously damage” the overall relationship. “We could enhance the likelihood of Japanese cooperation by providing concrete evidence of our commitment to further trade liberalization, e.g., by early submission of the trade legislation already decided perhaps sweetened with additional concessions tailored to specific Japanese interests.” He believed, however, that the administration was not yet to the point where its priorities among economic requests from Japan had to be determined, and he suggested that “any position taken now should leave us complete flexibility in setting those priorities in the future. A low-key exploratory approach by Secretary Stans on his trip would be most consistent with this conclusion.” Attached to this memorandum is an “Analytical Summary” of the NSC paper and an “Issues for Decision” paper. (National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 84, 5/7/69 Joint NSC/Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy Meeting-FE Trade Mission) The National Security Council met with the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy on May 7 from 11:16 a.m. to noon. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found beyond Alexander Haig’s handwritten notes. (National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 84, 5/7/69 Joint NSC/Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy Meeting-FE Trade Mission) 203. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 203. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 19, 1969. SUBJECT Your Meeting at 11:00 a.m. with Secretary Stans Secretary Stans will report to you on his Asian trip, from which he has just returned. He visited Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The major result of the trip was the unanimous rebuff to our textile request from the Asians. All flatly refused even to attend a GATT meeting to discuss a multilateral arrangement to cover voluntary controls by textile exporters. 2 The main issue is thus how we should pursue the textile issue. You may wish to ask the Secretary for his views on this subject. The Japanese also made it clear that they related our textile request to our requests that they liberalize their treatment of imports from the U.S. and U.S. investment in Japan. We thus made no progress on these other issues either. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I 1970. Limited Official Use. “The President has seen” is stamped at the top of the page. The President met with Stans and Kissinger from 11:15 to 11:37 a.m. on May 19. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the conversation was found. 2 See also footnote 2, Document 201 . 204. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations-Designate (Gilbert) to President Nixon 204. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations-Designate (Gilbert) to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 5, 1969. SUBJECT Minimum Trade Legislation Package The drafting process for new trade legislation, the responsibility for which has been assigned to this office, is proceeding well. My participation in this process thus far, not having been aboard when the decision was made on the contents of a “bare minimum” package, 2 leads me to urge the consideration and inclusion of three further matters. 3 These are: 1. Authorization for NTB-Type Negotiations In view of the fact that the United States has laid such great emphasis on the importance of nontariff barriers (NTBs) here at home, in Secretary Stans’ two missions, and in the GATT, I believe it would be a mistake not to seek some form of negotiating authority to deal with NTBs in this legislation. Any Administration proposals at this time which do not include some provisions in this area, moreover, will face Congressional criticism, there being many on the Hill who feel this is the principal area for future trade liberalization. Failure to seek authority to negotiate or in some other way to begin to pave the way for future efforts would indicate both at home and abroad that we are less concerned about NTBs than our previous action and talk have indicated. Moreover, coming to grips with this problem rather than putting it off indefinitely would be a clear affirmation of your own determination to move ahead toward freer trade. Finally, it is conceivable that a “minimum” package might be the only feasible trade legislation which could be obtained during the first term of your Administration. As such, it should be adequate to carry out your policies over this period. As a practical matter, authority of some sort should also be easier to obtain in a package bill appealing to a wide variety of interests than as a separate bill. We could determine the specific form of authority to be sought only after consultation with Ways and Means Committee and Finance Committee leaders. It could involve, for example, legislative agreement that the Executive should negotiate for reduction or elimination of nontariff barriers on an ad referendum basis, or it could involve a delegation of power to enter into agreements subject to legislative veto. I have already mentioned to Chairman Mills and to Senators Long and Talmadge that this problem of legislative authority to negotiate on matters other than tariffs would eventually be a problem on which I would like to return to them for advice. This issue, while posed in the NSC background paper on trade policy, was not in the end put before you when trade legislation was reviewed. I recommend that it be reconsidered and that I be authorized to consult with key Congressmen with a view of developing a legislative proposal. 2. Limitation on Use of Proposed Tariff-Cutting Authority I find that your earlier decision on tariff-cutting authority is now generally interpreted that any new authority would be limited to providing compensation when required. I visualize the possibility that limited use of this authority for other purposes could prove to be invaluable, e.g., to round off reciprocity in an NTB negotiation. I, therefore, believe it would be wise to limit the use of the authority sought only by a provision that it was not to be employed as authority for a general, multilateral negotiation. I see no need to further limit your options in advance in this area. I recommend that this limitation be clarified or reconsidered in the light of the above comments. 3. Authority to the President to Withhold MFN in Whole or in Part to a Country or Countries Which the President Found Had Failed Fully to Participate in a Reciprocal Negotiation It has always troubled me that the President had no power to withhold MFN and that our trading partners knew this to be the case. I understand that the Japanese took advantage of this situation along toward the close of the Kennedy Round. The exercise of the power by the President might require a GATT waiver and certainly would be exercised only with restraint but to leave the President’s hands tied so that he had no power to withhold MFN has seemed to be a mistake. Incidentally, I believe that a provision of this sort would also add some political appeal to the legislative package. I recommend that the inclusion of such a provision in the trade bill be considered by the NSC task force preparing the proposed legislation. Carl J. Gilbert 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. No classification marking. 2 The decision was made at the April 9 NSC meeting; see Tab A to Document 195 . 3 Attached is a June 24 memorandum from Burns to the President that reads: “I have finally reviewed Carl Gilbert’s proposed additions to the pending trade legislation, and I find each of them desirable.” 205. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 205. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 24, 1969. SUBJECT Request for Recommendations on Carl Gilbert’s Memorandum of June 5, 1969—Minimum Trade Legislation Package Recommendation: That the Administration submit promptly a message requesting minimum foreign trade legislation for “housekeeping” purposes and establishing a “blue ribbon” commission to make recommendations with respect to longer-term policies and legislation. 2 Discussion: Carl Gilbert has suggested that the minimum foreign trade legislation package be modified to include (1) non-tariff barrier negotiating authority, (2) permission to cut tariffs for other than “housekeeping” purposes, and (3) authority to withhold most favored nation (MFN) treatment from countries which fail to participate fully in reciprocal negotiations. 3 In my view, the best course of action is to proceed expeditiously with the package agreed in the NSC: minimum tariff authority to pay compensation for increases in our duties; relaxation of the escape clause and adjustment assistance provisions of the present Trade Expansion Act; authority to eliminate the American Selling Price system of valuation; and establishment of a “blue ribbon” commission to study foreign trade policy including non-tariff barriers and the relation of trade to production and investment. 4 I believe that this program will demonstrate, both at home and abroad, your commitment to move toward freer trade with a modest short-term program and a longer-term, broad examination of foreign trade policy. For the following reasons, I believe the proposals put forward by Carl Gilbert are neither necessary nor desirable: 1. Authorization for Negotiations on Non-Tariff Barriers Everyone agrees that non-tariff barriers can be a significant impediment to trade and that they have not been adequately covered in previous negotiations. But these trade barriers are much more difficult to deal with than tariffs and we do not yet know enough about them to tell the Congress exactly what kind of negotiating authority we need. The study of non-tariff barriers is going forward within the U.S. Government as well as internationally. Stimulated by Secretary Stans’ visit to Europe, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is currently accelerating its preparation for serious international discussion of non-tariff barriers. In Washington this week, Olivier Long, GATT Director General, estimated that the proper preparation for the next round of trade negotiations, including non-tariff barriers, will not be completed until the end of 1970. In these circumstances, it seems premature to be asking the Congress for negotiating authority. At the same time, I do not think we can or should play down the non-tariff barrier issue. I would urge the inclusion in the message transmitting the proposed “housekeeping” legislation of a major section on the work being done to clarify the non-tariff barrier question and to lay a sound foundation for future negotiations in this field. I would hope that the importance of negotiating successfully on non-tariff barriers would also be reflected in the Congressional Committee reports. But at this stage, I do not think we are in a position to present a non-tariff barrier negotiating program to the Congress and, in the present state of knowledge and understanding, there is a real risk that the legislation itself or the legislative history will lay down requirements for non-tariff barrier negotiations which we will find we cannot comply with when the domestic and international studies have been completed. We have run into difficulty in the past by obtaining Congressional authority before having adequate consultations with our trading partners. Moreover the President has broad constitutional authority to conduct negotiations, as distinguished from his general inability to put into effect agreements modifying United States law, and any discussions with the Congress should be careful not to imply that Congressional authorization is legally necessary for the negotiation of agreements relating to non-tariff barriers. As far as our international posture is concerned, the best evidence of our desire to move ahead in the non-tariff barrier field will be Congressional authority to carry out the chemical agreement left over from the Kennedy Round by eliminating the American Selling Price system. The Europeans in particular look upon American Selling Price as the test of our good will with respect to non-tariff barriers. 2. Use of Proposed Tariff Cutting Authority When presenting our request for a modest extension of authority to reduce tariffs, the Administration should, in my view, commit itself to use that authority only to pay compensation or make minor adjustments in cases involving escape clause actions or other tariff modifications. We should also make clear that the authority will not be used for any broader negotiations. Carl Gilbert’s suggestion that we not foreclose the possibility of using the tariff reducing authority in non-tariff barrier negotiations seems to me likely to be unacceptable to the Congress. I am sure the present view on the Hill is that other people have more non-tariff barriers than we do. In these circumstances, they are certain to ask why we would have to be paying tariff concessions for the reduction or elimination of other people’s non-tariff barriers. The reasoning behind this suggestion is probably right: that we will not be able to mount a successful negotiation limited only to non-tariff barriers. But the conclusion I draw is that the entire question of non-tariff barrier negotiating authority and the broader use of tariff cutting authority should be left over for the next major trade negotiation which will follow the “blue ribbon” commission report and international preparation, both of which should be finished in the course of 1970. This timetable would envisage our major trade legislation request being presented to the Congress in 1971. 3. Authority to Withhold Most Favored Nation Treatment 5 This recommendation appears to be relevant only in the context of a major trade negotiation. And Carl Gilbert himself does not propose such a negotiation at this time. Since 1778 most-favored-nation treatment has been the cornerstone of our trade policy, particularly since 1923 in its unconditional form, and it is a basic principle of the GATT. Furthermore, MFN has been one of the fundamental rules of all the post-war negotiations. I do not think we should abandon this policy of non-discrimination without very careful consideration. Therefore, I believe that Carl Gilbert’s third suggestion should be put on the agenda of the “blue ribbon” commission. Another factor which should be taken into account is that the granting of this authority would place us under substantial additional pressure from the Congress to use it in a wide variety of circumstances and that the net effect might be the providing of the restrictionist forces with another weapon. WPR 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. No classification marking. 2 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove options is checked or initialed. 3 See Document 204 . 4 After the April 9 NSC meeting when this package was agreed, Greenwald on April 18 sent a memorandum to Samuels informing him that he had discussed the Presidential Commission with Bergsten and Cooper. Greenwald set out proposed terms of reference for the Commission and made suggestions regarding its membership. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc.) No other record of the April 18 meeting was found. 5 Attached to this memorandum are a June 11 letter to the President from Donald M. Kendall, President and CEO of Pepsico, and a May 19 memorandum to the President that Kendall had signed in his capacity as Chairman of the Emergency Committee for American Trade. The ECAT proposed that the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 be amended to extend authority to retaliate against discriminatory treatment of U.S. agricultural exports to all classes of exports, and to deny or withhold trade concessions from countries that restricted U.S. investments with the effect of impairing or nullifying trade concessions accorded to American products. On June 20 Secretary Stans sent a memorandum to the President concurring with the objectives of the ECAT proposal but advising caution on the proposal concerning investment. In a June 20 memorandum to the President, McCracken commented that the Trade Executive Committee had already agreed to recommend ECAT’s first proposal but opposed the second because “to broaden our use of retaliatory trade restrictions could prove the opening wedge for pressures to use trade restrictions as retaliation against a variety of economic and political actions by other countries. A major achievement of international cooperation in the postwar period has been to move trade matters out of politics.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I) In a June 25 memorandum for the NSC Staff Secretary, Arthur Burns expressed his belief that Kendall’s memorandum made “good sense” but cautioned that “a major change in our philosophy of trade is involved, and we should therefore proceed very carefully.” (Ibid.) 206. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations-Designate (Gilbert) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 206. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations-Designate (Gilbert) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 10, 1969. Dear Henry: This is a follow-up to our hasty conversation of Monday afternoon on the subject of the sought-after voluntary international arrangement to limit manmade and woolen textile imports. I see little prospect of success in this effort by proceeding further along the present route. The key to success, of course, lies in cooperation by the four principal exporting countries in the Far East—Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea. An unfortunate result of Secretary Stans’ European visit was that in each of the Far Eastern countries subsequently visited, the public, the industry and governments were completely forewarned as to his purposes through the press, industry sources, and diplomatic sources. Thus forewarned, positions were taken before his arrival (as by the Japanese Diet) from which the governments could not withdraw in the face of U.S. threats (the Mills telegram) 2 and pressure. There is no reason to expect this situation to change absent a change in approach by the United States. Furthermore, an inflexible resolve to proceed on the present course also seems to involve a tacit decision to proceed irrespective of the costs both direct to U.S. trade and indirectly to U.S. policy. These costs do not appear to me to have been considered or weighed in the choice of methods of achieving the President’s purposes. In Europe, the national governments and international institutions were unenthusiastic (to put it mildly) about the proposal for an international textile conference under GATT auspices for a variety of reasons. They were reluctant on principle to see the GATT used as a purely trade restrictionist vehicle. For practical reasons, they were reluctant to participate in a GATT effort of this sort to which they did not attribute any substantial chance of success. They identified the problem as a U.S.-Far Eastern problem (as did Secretary Stans) and repeatedly asked why they should be involved at all in such a problem. The enclosed Memorandum of Conversation with Minister Yoshino of the Japanese Embassy, Washington, is, I think, very interesting. 3 (No copies have been made or circulated other than the one enclosed.) From informal conversations with EEC Commissioners I have the clear impression that if the United States were to arrange suitable bilateral agreements with the four Far Eastern countries and were then to suggest an international conference under GATT auspices for the purpose of bringing the various bilaterals together into an international arrangement to operate under GATT surveillance, we would then find Europeans receptive to such a conference. A similar suggestion has been made unofficially by the British. To follow this proposed route would require a selective approach as to the products to be covered. There would also have to be a provision in each of the agreements for periodic review of the U.S. market for such textiles and consultations looking toward inclusion by agreement of the parties of any other products the market for which in the United States should show similar disruption. Negotiations for such bilaterals between the United States and the Far Eastern countries, if they are to be successful, must be conducted without fanfare or publicity. We should use high-level influence only to the extent necessary to convince the countries involved, particularly Japan, of the seriousness of the U.S. determination to find a solution. We should advise them that the President will shortly be sending a trusted emissary to open negotiations. 4 Pretty clearly, Japan should not be approached again on the subject of textiles except in the broadest terms until after agreement had been reached with the other three (the effectiveness of each agreement could well be conditioned on execution of similar agreements with the other three). At the Joint U.S.-Japanese Ministerial meeting in Japan the latter part of this month 5 it would seem to me wise (a) to exclude textiles from discussion at the plenary sessions, and (b) to include textiles among the other items of importance which concern the United States because they contribute to the unacceptable level of the current, adverse trade balance in U.S.-Japan trade. It seems clearly predictable that textiles will be the subject of press inquiries in Tokyo and a uniform answer to such inquiries should be determined in advance—one which does not minimize the importance of the problem but which does not put textiles as the number one problem. The multilateral discussions under GATT auspices to which I have referred as a second step could eventually be consolidated with the efforts due to commence in the autumn looking toward a renewal of the Long Term Textile Arrangement, which expires in 1970. In short, I believe that there is a basis for genuine hope that a major step toward accomplishing the President’s objective can be achieved by quiet negotiation with the Far Eastern countries concerned, and that conclusion of this first step can reasonably be expected to pave the way for further broadening of the arrangements by multilateral discussion at a later date. I doubt that this route would produce the watertight restrictions which Secretary Stans has been contemplating, but I am inclined to believe that enough can be accomplished via this route to satisfy the President’s commitment. The present course of action seems destined to lead into quota legislation as its inevitable end and no one can predict or control how broad a field such legislation would cover—shoes, steel, electronics, etc. Somehow or other I find it hard to believe that the President’s commitment to the textile industry 6 is such that he could contemplate being responsible for dismantling the entire pattern of trade agreements built up over the past 30 years or so. Sincerely, Carl J. Gilbert 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the STR. Personal. 2 Not further identified. 3 Not printed. The meeting on June 27 covered a number of topics. 4 Not further identified. Bergsten began a July 18 memorandum to Kissinger as follows: “The President has asked Arthur Burns to ‘handle the textile issue’. It is not fully clear whether this means just within the White House of as a full takeover from Secretary Stans, although I think the former is much more likely.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 399, Textiles, Volume I) 5 Secretaries Rogers and Stans attended the meeting in Tokyo July 29-31; see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 23 . 6 See Document 184 . 207. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 207. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 14, 1969. SUBJECT Request for Recommendations on Emergency Committee for American Trade Memorandum of May 19, 1969—Amendment of Section 252 of Trade Expansion Act The following are the Department’s comments on the ECAT proposal that the President seek authority to impose discriminatory restrictions against imports from a country which restricts foreign direct investment: 2 1. While we agree that restrictions on foreign investment affect the flow of trade and that we should seek to reduce barriers confronting both trade and investment, we believe that the relationship between investment abroad and U.S. imports and exports varies greatly from country to country and industry to industry. We think the entire investment-trade relationship is an important matter for careful study by the “blue ribbon” commission being established to make recommendations on our long-range policy and trade legislation. 2. We do not believe enough is yet known to justify proposing at this time such a highly controversial and important amendment of the Trade Expansion Act. Labor and agriculture are particularly sensitive to U.S. investment abroad which sometimes directly results in increased imports into this country. For example, Mexico has given incentives for establishing assembly plants along the border to take advantage of a special provision of our tariff. The AFL/CIO has attacked such industrialization as constituting an export of American jobs. 3 Similarly, melons, tomatoes and strawberries grown on U.S.-financed farms in Mexico have been protested by agricultural interests in California, Florida, and Oregon. The Automotive Products Agreement with Canada contains measures which encouraged expansion of Canadian operations. Our automotive exports to Canada have increased since 1965 but imports are up even more sharply resulting in a diminution of our net favorable auto trade surplus with Canada. Europe has been generally open to American investment for many years. In the case of the automotive industry, an example cited in the ECAT memorandum, imports from Europe of automotive products in 1968 totaled over $1.3 billion compared with U.S. exports of only $160 million. A fair amount of our current textile import problem stems from investments abroad by U.S. interests. These examples suggest, we believe, that a proposal to use trade retaliation as a club to secure liberalization of investment restrictions by others would be a source of intense conflict in the Congress. 3. Furthermore, other countries’ attitude toward U.S. investment is ambivalent. While the need for and usefulness of U.S. investment is widely recognized, there is also resentment of the economic control that supposedly results from heavy U.S. investment in a country. Fear of the “American challenge” would increase if the U.S. Government were to sponsor and protect U.S. foreign investment in the way proposed by the ECAT memorandum. 4. There would also be serious problems with such a provision in terms of international agreements. The GATT deals almost exclusively with the treatment to be accorded to goods rather than persons. When tariff concessions are negotiated under its provisions there is no guarantee, implicit or otherwise, that nationals or companies of the country concerned will be permitted to establish themselves inside a foreign market. We consider it extremely doubtful that the GATT Contracting Parties would agree with ECAT’s rationale on GATT Article XXIII and that it would be virtually impossible to win a case on that basis. 5. The proposal if adopted could also probably have the effect of inhibiting further U.S. trade negotiations. Before negotiating with us on trade matters foreign countries might want some kind of guarantee that the proposed amendment would not be invoked against them to force changes in their domestic laws regarding investment and the right generally of aliens to do business in their country. Alternatively, they could quite properly take the position that they are willing to negotiate only on trade matters. 6. We agree with the ECAT proposal to delete the limiting references to agriculture from Section 252(a) thereby permitting use of its provisions in the case of unjustified foreign restrictions against either U.S. agricultural or industrial products. However, this amendment is already included in the draft trade bill now under interagency consideration. Dirk Gleysteen 4 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 49. No classification marking. Drafted by Ewing (E/OT/TA) on July 7 and cleared by Hollis (L/E), Trezise (E), and Howard L. Worthington (E/OT). 2 See footnote 5, Document 205 . 3 On July 28 Bergsten sent a memorandum to Kissinger recommending he forward to the President a recommendation from the Acting Secretary of State for a Tariff Commission study of the tariff law that allegedly encouraged companies to move assembly operations to Mexico. Bergsten noted that Stans, Shultz, Kennedy, and Gilbert had agreed to the request. On Bergsten’s memorandum is a notation that the President had asked the Tariff Commission for such a study. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I) 4 Dirk Gleysteen signed for Walsh above Walsh’s typed signature. 208. Editorial Note 208. Editorial Note Pursuant to the President’s authorization for submission of illustrative tariff preference lists to the OECD Working Group on Preferences (see Document 200 ), the Department of State sought to get interagency concurrence for the submission. In a July 17, 1969, memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State, Philip Trezise and Charles Meyer reported that they had been unable to conclude the lists because “Commerce has been unwilling to do other than put in impossibly long exceptions lists.” They recommended that Elliot Richardson convene a meeting with the Under Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury; Kissinger or Bergsten; and Gilbert to argue the case that the Commerce Department position was politically unacceptable and to obtain agreement on a submission. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 48) The submissions were expected before the end of July, and Richardson convened a meeting on July 25. In a memorandum to the Acting Secretary, with the handwritten date “c. 7/24/69,” Trezise reported there had been opposition in all the agencies but the primary problem was with the Commerce Department. (Ibid.) No record of the July 25 meeting has been found, but on the July 17 memorandum to Richardson is the notation by Hartman: “Mtg. took place July 25 and position agreed. E is preparing transmittal to OECD.” On August 1 John C. Leary (E/OT/GCP) sent representatives in interested agencies a memorandum to which he attached the U.S. submission on preferences which had been delivered to the OECD Secretariat on July 31. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I) In an August 26 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten set out his ideas on options for a scheduled September 3 meeting of the Under Secretaries Committee and his strategy for steering the Committee on a course that would pose the issues clearly for a Presidential decision. (Ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 270, Tariff Commission) A note by Kissinger questioned why the issues had to be so polarized, and another note suggested that Kissinger discuss the strategy with Bergsten before he “steers” the Under Secretaries. On August 29 Trezise sent Richardson a memorandum regarding the Under Secretaries meeting, which was finally held on September 4. Trezise proposed that Richardson press for a recommendation to approve going ahead with the preference initiative, and that the President instruct the Committee “to put together the most liberal preference scheme possible… . Nothing short of a nuclear explosion could blast a truly liberal scheme out of the EEC, and Japan is hardly better in this respect. If the U.S. enters the negotiations with a restrictive scheme the result will certainly be little more than a ‘political gesture’.” (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 48) 209. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Poats) to Curtis Farrar of the Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development 209. Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Poats) to Curtis Farrar of the Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development 1 Washington, September 4, 1969. SUBJECT Under Secretary’s Committee Meeting on Tariff Preferences for LDC’s The meeting resulted in the following decisions: 2 1. Unanimous recommendation to the President that the United States participate with other OECD countries in offering tariff preferences to LDC’s. 2. The President will not be asked to decide on either such ambiguous policy guidance as “a very liberal” or “very restrictive” scheme or, on the other hand such explicit guidance as the selection of one or more of the alternative detailed schemes presented in the draft NSSM-48. Rather, the President should be given a list of essential criteria or guidelines of an equitably shared OECD offer to the LDC’s. On the basis of this formulation and Presidential endorsement of it, interagency negotiating instructions could then be developed without returning to the President. 3. A working group organized by State E will attempt promptly to draft this brief statement of criteria and, to the extent possible, indicate the orders of magnitudes of impact on U.S. industries and of benefits to LDC’s. During the meeting, the Commerce Department gave assurances that it would not press for a very restricted scheme and would consider sympathetically a set of protection mechanisms which would obviate the need for many—or perhaps any—commodity exceptions. Before the meeting, Nat Samuels and I hastily drafted a list of criteria, which we did not recite at the Under Secretary’s Committee meeting, which included: 1. Equitable sharing among DC’s of the import impact. 2. Uniform treatment of all LDC’s, in effect creating a separate most favored national group. 3. Uniform 100% tariff concession on all manufactured goods, i.e., no exception list, but without prejudice to existing QR’s. 4. Severe initial quantitative protections with provision for steady growth along the lines of the EEC tariff quota proposal. 5. Limitations on the opportunities for any single LDC to unreasonably exploit advantages, along the lines of the “competitive need” scheme. 6. A time limit on duration long enough to encourage LDC’s to gear up for exports but short enough to permit reconsideration of the scheme, its coverage or eligible LDC countries, so as to head off any near term demands for changing it. I don’t know whether Nat would agree to all these hastily enumerated ideas on further reflection, or whether they are all sound. But any opportunities we have to participate in work with Worthington 3 in the formulation of the paper, these may be helpful to Mike Roemer 4 as suggestions for consideration. It seems to me that what we want to do is to get the principle of tariff preferences established and a program started and to build into that program both assurances to the LDC’s of growing trade opportunities and assurance to U.S. industry of controls on the in-flow of cheap goods both as to quantities and timeframe of the U.S. market adjustment. No scheme which makes a big psychological splash with the LDC’s will get through the EEC or the U.S. Congress. No scheme which pretends to offer major economic benefits to the LDC’s will in fact sustain this illusion very long. The best approach is to make clear from the outset that this is only a modest stimulus to the LDC’s development and a modest contribution by affected industries in the developed countries. There was a general agreement at the meeting that the United States should not be in the headlines as the leading champion of the plan or as a source of publicity creating false expectations among the LDC’s. Rutherford M. Poats 5 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, AID Administrator Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, ECF 4 International Trade FY 70 September 1969. Limited Official Use. 2 The meeting was held on September 4; see Document 208 . 3 Presumably Howard L. Worthington (E/OT). 4 Assistant Chief, Program Policy Division, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 210. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) 210. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) 1 Washington, September 20, 1969. SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries Discussion: The revised draft memorandum on tariff preferences, 2 in our view, conceals difficult problems this proposal will raise for us in our relations with most of the forty LDCs in Africa. This approach surprises us because Mr. Westerfield raised these issues in the Under Secretary’s meeting on September 4 and understood that the proposal would reflect our views. 3 We received the revised draft only a few minutes before the meeting and advised E by telephone that we had reservations and would give you a memorandum explaining them. Serious problems for U.S. relations with most African countries would result if we set as conditions for a generalized scheme the elimination of special preferences and reverse preferences. The 25 African countries which enjoy or have negotiated special preferences with the EC would resist fiercely any generalized preference scheme which was conditioned on the abandonment of special preferences. As post-colonial countries whose export crops were built up on the basis of preferences in the metropole, they still depend on preferential access to Europe, although the level of EC preferences has been dropping. In addition, 18 of these countries receive substantial aid from the EC as such (over $918 million is to be provided between now and 1975). These are real advantages which no conceivable generalized system can match, since most African products would not be covered by a generalized scheme. The Africans would almost certainly also regard as unacceptable a U.S. requirement that to qualify for generalized preferences they would have to abandon reverse preferences. They consider these reverse preferences as the price they pay for preferences in the EC, and if compelled to choose between upsetting the special preferences on tropical products and qualifying for generalized preferences on goods which they do not produce they would opt for the former, and resent being forced to do so. The difficult policy problems of special preferences and reverse preferences have no apparent ready solution, but possibly with time and imagination formulas can be worked out which would protect our interests in Africa without impairing the elaboration of a forthcoming generalized preferences scheme. Recommendation: We believe that the President should be aware of the problems for Africa when he considers recommendations for generalized preferences, and to that end we propose the following two changes in the draft memorandum. [Omitted here are two specific drafting suggestions geared to insertions or deletions in the September 18 draft memorandum to the President.] 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 48. Limited Official Use. Drafted by W.H. Drew (AF/I) on September 19. Copies were sent to Witman (AF/I) and Trezise. Newsom sent a longer version of this memorandum to Samuels on December 17. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29) 2 Reference is to a September 18 draft of Richardson’s October 8 memorandum to the President; see footnote 1, Document 214 . 3 See also Document 193 . 211. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 211. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 23, 1969. SUBJECT Mounting Bureaucratic Problems on Foreign Economic Policy I have learned from Al Haig and Ken Cole that there is great unhappiness in some quarters about your and my key roles in foreign economic policy: 1. From Arthur Burns, most recently because we are handling the trade bill and message—at Ken Cole’s request, which I confirmed last night, and which implements decisions taken at NSC meeting in April. 2 (The trade package came in from STR late Friday night and I have not yet moved it because (a) the message is terrible, (b) we do not yet have President’s response to your memo of August 13 on the subject, 3 and (c) I have not gotten Burns’ comments. I am working on the message but I am not likely to get substantive views from Burns without your intervention.) 2. From Secretary Kennedy, with regard to international monetary policy. (I reported to you yesterday on his latest and most blatant effort to end-run you.) 4 3. From Secretary Stans, with regard to textiles. These three have apparently discussed the issue together and the situation is obviously unhealthy—especially for me since I am more vulnerable than you. I would guess that their problems are largely (solely in Kennedy’s case) bureaucratic but also partly substantive. I assure you, however, that I have absolutely no second thoughts about the way I have handled any issue, with a limited caveat on the AID bill where I let Burns turn the minor substantive issue of administrative “barnacles” on the program into a major bureaucratic fracas. And I have no qualms about carrying on as heretofore. I did want you to know, however, that the issue could involve you at some point. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to Arthur Burns (and Peter Flanigan) requesting their views on the proposed trade bill and message. 5 (This should take care of the only “substantive” problem which exists at the moment.) 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume I. Confidential. 2 See Tab A to Document 195 . 3 Kissinger’s memorandum requested Presidential decisions on issues raised by Gilbert and Stans, and Don Kendall in the private sector. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I) 4 Not further identified. 5 Attached are identical September 26 memoranda from Kissinger to Flanigan and Burns; neither printed. 212. Letter From the Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission (Sutton) to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) 212. Letter From the Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission (Sutton) to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) 1 Washington, September 29, 1969. Dear Mr. Gilbert: I have your letter of September 18, 1969, requesting the U.S. Tariff Commission to undertake the work of updating its report on non-rubber footwear made to former President Lyndon B. Johnson in January 1969 under section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 2 You state that the additional information is needed not later than November 3, 1969, for the use of a Task Force on Non-Rubber Footwear, consisting of senior officials of four agencies under the chairmanship of your office, which has the assignment of making recommendations to the President later this fall. 3 You also request that this Task Force “be given access to certain financial and other data on selected individual firms which the Commission may have assembled in its initial section 332 investigation”. You state that, “These data would be made available to the Office of the Special Trade Representative and, through it to the senior members of the Task Force to assist in preparing the report to the President,” and that “The confidential nature of such data would be respected and disclosure or access would not be granted to unauthorized persons in accord with 18 U.S.C. 1905”. The fulfillment of your request by the Commission raises certain problems which the Commission desires to call to your attention with a view toward avoiding any possible embarrassment to you and to the President. The problems arise by reason of the provisions of law governing (1) the Commission’s expenditure of its appropriated funds, and (2) the release by the Commission to other Federal agencies of confidential business data obtained by the Commission in its investigatory work. With respect to (1) above, it will be noted that each appropriation law enacted for the Commission beginning with fiscal year 1955 has included the proviso that— … no part of the foregoing appropriation shall be used for making any special study, investigation, or report at the request of any other agency of the executive branch of the Government unless reimbursement is made for the cost thereof. The assistance you request is a special Commission investigation and report for which reimbursement is required by the foregoing proviso. The situation would be different, however, if the investigation and report were to be requested by the President. The proviso has no application to requests from the President under section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930 since Commission compliance with such requests is mandatory under the law. With respect to (2) above, the Commission’s obligations in regard to its handling of business confidential data are prescribed in 18 U.S.C. 1905, which provides as follows: Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment. This provision merits comment on two points: (1) It does not constitute an absolute prohibition against disclosure—only disclosures “not authorized by law” are made actionable; and (2) it refers in terms to disclosures by an “officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof”. The Commission believes that the penal sanctions specified in section 1905 would apply to individual Commissioners participating in an official Commission decision to disclose confidential business information, regardless of the source of the request, unless such disclosure, as required by the statute, is “authorized by law”. As far as the Commission is aware, the only general authority in law for the Commission to release business confidential data to another Federal agency is found in the Federal Reports Act (44 U.S.C. secs. 421-427). This Act, however, relates only to disclosure of information obtained by questionnaire from 10 or more persons and is otherwise circumscribed in its application. In this connection, section 4(b) (44 U.S.C. 423(b)) provides: Information obtained by a Federal agency from any person or persons may, pursuant to this chapter, be released to any other Federal agency only if (1) the information shall be released in the form of statistical totals or summaries; or (2) the information as supplied by persons to a Federal agency shall not, at the time of collection, have been declared by that agency or by any superior authority to be confidential; or (3) the persons supplying the information shall consent to the release of it to a second agency by the agency to which the information was originally supplied; or (4) the Federal agency to which another Federal agency shall release the information has authority to collect the information itself and such authority is supported by legal provision for criminal penalties against persons failing to supply such information. These severe limitations on disclosure of information, the Commission believes, eliminate any possibility that the Federal Reports Act may be used as authority for the Commission to disclose to your agency the business confidential data you have requested. Again, as with the matter of appropriations, the limitations on disclosure of information do not apply when in individual cases the President requests the Commission to provide such information to him under authority of section 332(g). Section 332(g) provides in pertinent part that— The Commission shall put at the disposal of the President of the United States, … whenever requested, all information and its command, and shall make such … investigations and reports as may be requested by the President … . The Commission regards this language as sufficiently broad to include the furnishing to the President of any confidential business data which he might request. In other words, a disclosure of such information to the President would be “authorized by law” and therefore not prohibited by the penal sanctions of 18 U.S.C. 1905. In addition to the legal questions involved in the disclosure of confidential information, the Commission through the years has been keenly aware of the practical considerations involved in making such disclosures. In conducting its investigatory functions, the Commission has enjoyed the confidence of the many business interests with whom it comes in contact, by scrupulously fulfilling its obligations to protect from disclosure business data received from them. In view of the foregoing, I am certain you can appreciate the reasons which require the U.S. Tariff Commission to deny your request as contained in your letter of September 18, 1969. Sincerely yours, Glenn. W. Sutton 1 Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, Nonrubber Footwear—Options Papers by Agencies Other Than STR. No classification marking. 2 The September 18 letter is ibid. The report to President Johnson has not been further identified. See also footnote 3, Document 236 . 3 The four agencies were the Departments of Labor, Commerce, Treasury, and State. Background on the creation of the Presidential Task Force on Footwear is in a memorandum for the record, September 3. (National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, Submissions, Views on Nonrubber Footwear Study) 213. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 213. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 8, 1969. SUBJECT 1969 Trade Bill and Presidential Message Issue Ambassador Carl Gilbert, with the support of all relevant agencies, proposes at Tab A that you approve the trade legislation at Tab C for Presidential submission to Congress under cover of the Presidential trade message at Tab B. 2 He reports broad Congressional support for the proposed package. The bill embodies your April 9 NSC decisions. 3 (The delay in submitting the bill to you was due to Gilbert’s long confirmation delay 4 and the need to consult with Congress after the summer recess.) The message states your trade policy, explains the provisions of the bill, and announces that you will appoint a Commission on World Trade to devise a trade program for the seventies. I have checked the bill and message with Arthur Burns, Peter Flanigan, and Bryce Harlow. Harlow wants to submit the bill by November 18. 5 Provisions of the Bill The bill contains the following provisions, which you decided at the NSC: 1. Modest tariff cutting authority of 20 percent or 2 percentage points, whichever is greater, to be exercised primarily to compensate for any U.S. tariff increases. Your presentation would make clear that the authority would not be used for major tariff negotiations. 2. Relaxation of the escape clause, which has been inoperative since 1962 and has forced injured industries to seek quota legislation. The new law would permit U.S. tariff increases when imports are the “primary cause” of injury to domestic industry, rather than the “major cause” as at present. There would no longer be a need to attribute the increased imports to a previous tariff concession. 3. Relaxation of adjustment assistance for firms and groups of workers, which provide them with direct payments and tax benefits to move into other endeavors. The present rules have also been virtually inoperative. Determinations of injury, previously made by the Tariff Commission, will now be made for your disposal by an interagency board. 4. Repeal of the American Selling Price system of customs valuation on benzenoid chemicals and a few minor items. Repeal would implement the supplementary Kennedy Round chemical agreement, under which the U.S. would gain substantial tariff reductions on chemicals and plastics and some important non-tariff barrier concessions. Elimination of ASP will also permit us to start negotiating on other non-tariff barriers, since the Europeans regard implementation of the supplementary Kennedy Round agreement as the key symbol of our real interest in moving ahead. Because ASP will be the most contentious element of the 1969 bill, Gilbert has prepared an amendment to meet industry objections, if necessary, by allowing an especially lenient transitional escape clause on ASP items. 5. In addition to the items decided earlier, the draft bill, with full interagency concurrence, provides specific Congressional authorization for U.S. contributions to the GATT. These have previously come from State Department travel and conference funds. Presidential Trade Message A trade message worked out by Ray Price and my staff, which has been cleared with all interested parties, is at Tab B. It explains the provisions of the bill and sets forth the main elements of your trade policy: —that the U.S. remains committed to freer trade; —but that new features of the world economy justify thorough investigation by a Commission on World Trade before the U.S. decides on any broad new trade policy for the 1970s; —that our trade policy must be in our own interest—defined as our larger interest and not a cover for special interests; —that our reduced trade surplus heightens the need to move toward freer trade; —that textiles are a special problem, which should not deflect us from our larger goals. The bill contains no request for authority to negotiate on non-tariff barriers (NTBs), but the message calls for a clear statement of Congressional intent to support U.S. efforts to reduce them. Gilbert has discussed this with key members of Congress and has prepared a draft joint resolution, which will be offered by a member. NTBs are the next obvious area for trade negotiations, and Gilbert —along with Secretary Stans and all other relevant officials—believes that business concern forces us to make an effort to get Congressional support to pursue the matter. Issues for Decision and Recommendations Two further provisions of the draft bill go beyond your earlier decisions. The agencies disagree and your decision is needed. First, your present retaliatory powers are extremely broad against unjustified foreign barriers to our agricultural exports but are less explicit on barriers to our industrial exports. Gilbert, with the concurrence of Commerce, Labor, Interior and CEA recommends that you propose an increase in your retaliatory power on industrial products to make it as broad as your power on agricultural products. They argue that this would give you the same power enjoyed by other heads of state and would add to U.S. credibility in trade disputes. Their main argument, however, is that it will generate support for the overall bill. State and Treasury argue that such a proposal could lead Congress to pass mandatory legislation which would encourage trade wars and which may conflict with our international obligations. Burns, Flanigan and I believe that State and Treasury are too cautious on this measure, which has attracted much business support. Recommendation: That you approve inclusion of the proposal to increase your powers to retaliate against foreign barriers to our industrial exports. Approve 6 Disapprove 2. Gilbert also recommends that you ask for powers to raise our own import barriers to retaliate against countries whose subsidies damage our exports in third markets. Gilbert’s support and arguments are similar to those above, especially that it will help get the bill passed. The State-Treasury objections, in addition to the above, are that the measure has been insufficiently studied and that our own agricultural export subsidies mean we might lose from the trade conflict which could be encouraged. They recommend that the Commission on World Trade consider this thoroughly before we seek legislation. There is greater risk in this proposal than in the one above. However, the objections are based mainly on use of the authority whereas we would only be seeking the authority to bolster our negotiating strength. It would indicate more clearly than any other part of the bill that your Administration plans to pursue a tougher trade policy than did its predecessors—within the continued context of a policy of freer trade. Burns, Flanigan, and I therefore recommend that you approve Gilbert’s proposal. Approve 7 Disapprove 3. I recommend that you approve the bill at Tab C, subject to the above decisions, for submission from the White House. It is important that the bill and message go from the White House, as the first general statement of your trade policy. Approve 8 prefer submission by Gilbert No submission at this time 4. I recommend that you approve the Presidential message at Tab B, which will be edited to conform to your decisions at 1 and 2 above. Approve 9 Disapprove—resubmit with suggested revisions Disapprove—no Presidential message 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 403, Office of the STR. Limited Official Use. The date is handwritten. 2 None of the tabs is printed. The message was sent to Congress on November 18. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pp. 940-946. 3 See Tab A to Document 195 . 4 In an August 7 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten reported that Gilbert had been confirmed by a 61-30 vote the week of July 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I) 5 See also Document 217 . 6 The President initialed this option. 7 The President initialed this option. 8 The President initialed this option. 9 The President initialed this option. Below the final decision section is the handwritten date of November 15. 214. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon 214. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 8, 1969. SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries (NSSM 48) CHAIRMAN’S SUMMARY I. The Problem Tariff preferences have become a major issue in the relations between less developed (LDCs) and developed countries (DCs). LDCs see such preferences as a major step DCs should take to assist them in promoting their exports and economic growth. For some years, they have engaged in a concerted and mounting campaign to that end. At the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (New Delhi, 1968) the United States made a moral commitment to join in “… the early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences …” The details of the system were to be settled this year. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been studying various preference plans and has agreed to complete a report on the DCs’ position later this year. Your negotiators need instructions on the general approach they should follow. This is urgently needed for an OECD meeting of October 13. The preference issue will also be a major topic at the November meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, which is to lay the groundwork for a “new policy to strengthen hemispheric cooperation.” Latin Americans are giving top priority to a system of generalized preferences, and expect a statement at that meeting as to our intentions to carry out our UNCTAD commitment. Therefore, it is important that you now decide: —Whether the United States should formally declare its intent to negotiate and participate in a system of generalized tariff preferences (depending, of course, on the scheme’s ultimate acceptability and Congressional approval); —If so, what sort of guidelines should govern the work of our negotiators. II. The Political Issues While the substance is economic, the basic issues are political—domestic and foreign. At home there exists qualified support for preferences from business, labor and Congressional leaders. But many will oppose preferences because of a fear that their jobs or profits—or those of their constituents—would be adversely affected through increased low-wage imports and “run-away” plants. Support will come from those who see it as a means to help the LDCs and as a supplement to foreign aid, as well as from those companies and internationally minded groups which see the advantages to U.S. exports and foreign investment. Few will see that preferences help the American consumer by permitting lower prices. (A more detailed discussion of these domestic aspects is contained in Annex A.) 2 Abroad, the political issues are even sharper: —The LDCs, especially the Latin Americans, definitely expect some kind of arrangement. Were we to refuse our participation now, their reaction would be one of anger and shock. In Latin America, a negative decision would be viewed as a severe blow to hemispheric cooperation. —Generalized preferences are a realistic way of assisting Latin American exports to the United States and Europe. Without a world-wide scheme, the major European countries would maintain, and possibly expand, their present preferences which discriminate against Latin American and U.S. exports. —Possibly excepting Canada and Japan, other DCs might well go ahead on generalized preference without us. We would be isolated. III. The Economic Issues The economic issues are also clear: —The export expectations of LDCs are, by and large, in manufactured and semi-manufactured goods—the commodities which would be covered by a preference scheme. The LDCs’ traditional exports—raw materials and agricultural products—have been lagging and have only limited growth potential. —Preferences will stimulate LDC exports—initially, perhaps, on the order of $1 billion a year to all DCs under a liberal scheme. While modest in terms of the LDCs’ total foreign exchange needs, this is significant in terms of their exports of manufactures (currently some $5 billion annually). —The over-all economic “burden” on the U.S. would be small. Preferences might mean additional imports of up to $300 million a year initially, depending on the liberality of the scheme. At present total U.S. imports are at a rate of over $30,000 million annually. —Problems might be created for individual American industries. Also, additional low-cost imports from low-wage countries may stimulate protectionist pressures. —The principal beneficiaries would be initially the larger, more advanced LDCs—such as Mexico, India, Brazil. IV. Recommendations The NSC Under Secretaries Committee, in accordance with your directive of August 16, 3 has reviewed this issue and recommends: 1. That the United States now declare its intent to participate in a system of generalized tariff preferences. 2. That, in pursuing agreement with other DCs on a preference scheme, our negotiators be guided by the following principles: —All the major developed countries must be participants and do their fair share. (A common scheme would be the most desirable.) —Preferences would be accorded, in principle, on manufactured and semi-manufactured products and on a selective list of agricultural and fishery products. —There should be adequate safeguards to avoid significant damage to domestic industry as a result of preferential imports. —Preferences should be temporary, i.e., no longer than 10 years. —Preferences would be entirely voluntary, i.e., we would have the unilateral right to deny preferential access to any product or country. —To the extent feasible, all LDCs should have equal access to DC markets. (This would benefit Latin American exports to Western Europe.) —The United States should have access to all LDC markets on equal terms with other DC suppliers. (This implies a phased elimination of existing discriminatory “reverse” preferences granted by some former European colonies to the Common Market and British Commonwealth and may create serious problems with almost all the African countries, as well as with some LDCs in other parts of the world. More particularly, the Africans might consider our position as inconsistent with a policy under which we encourage them to rely on their former metropoles as the primary source of development aid. In the past, the Western Europeans frequently have insisted on reverse preferences as a condition of such aid. It would be anomalous for us to require the elimination of reverse preferences, if this would cost them their primary source of aid, while refusing to provide substitute aid ourselves.) 4 V. Unresolved Issues: Decisions Required The agencies were unable to reach agreement on the specific proposal the United States should support in the international negotiations. The differences focused on the kind of safeguards needed to protect American industry against injurious import competition. Implicit was a more basic difference among the agencies: —Some wanted to be forthcoming both for foreign policy reasons, and because the benefits to the LDCs would at best be modest and possible injury to U.S. producers correspondingly small. These agencies also started with the presumption that increased imports are beneficial and not harmful to the American economy. —Other agencies accepted the principle of preferences, but were concerned about possible damage to domestic industry and Congressional reaction to such threats. To resolve these agency differences, we need your guidance on the following interrelated questions: 1. To what extent should sensitive commodities be excluded from any preference scheme? 2. What other safeguards should there be to protect domestic industry? 3. How responsive should the United States be to LDC desires? 1. Exceptions: The issue is whether some manufactured or semi-manufactured goods should be exempted altogether from the preference scheme. From a foreign relations standpoint, no exceptions would be best. Furthermore, it can be argued that no exceptions are needed even for sensitive commodities like cotton textiles and petroleum, since these commodities are already subject to quantitative limitation and preferences would have no effect on U.S. imports. Nevertheless, it might be difficult to get a bill through Congress unless certain sensitive items were excluded from the preference scheme. But the longer the list is, the more individual Congressmen will be under pressure to add to it products produced in their districts. State, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Budget Bureau, STR, Treasury, and AID favor providing for few exceptions, if any. For STR and Treasury, this is based on the assumption that more automatic safeguards, discussed below, will make exceptions unnecessary. The Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, and Interior Departments prefer excepting a more extensive list of commodities. The actual number would depend on the type of other safeguards used. What should the Administration try to achieve: a) no exceptions, or an exceptions list limited to those commodities, like cotton, wool, and synthetic textiles, already recognized by the Administration as requiring special protection; b) a more extensive exceptions list. 2. Safeguards: There are two general types of safeguards. One is an escape clause (which would withdraw the preference if a U.S. industry is hurt) and adjustment assistance for injured parties. These provisions operate only when there is evidence of injury. They are now in the U.S. law and are expected to be made more effective by the proposed trade legislation. Moreover, they could be further strengthened to deal with market disruption caused by preferential imports. The second type of safeguard would limit the quantity of imports accorded preferential treatment. This type of safeguard would operate before injury is felt by the American producer. It would not require an administrative determination, but would require administrative machinery. State and CEA favor reliance on a strengthened escape clause and adjustment assistance. They consider that these safeguards: —would be sufficient to deal with any significant threat to domestic industry; —would represent no basic policy departure; —would avoid the considerable political and administrative problems inherent in other safeguard mechanisms. These agencies fear that once an administrative apparatus to control the importation of LDC manufactures has been established, it will be difficult to resist pressures to apply the apparatus to all imports. Commerce, Labor, STR, AID, Agriculture, and Interior, however, favor an “automatic”—i.e., built-in, quantitative—limit on the amount of imports which could enter at preferential duties, in addition to an escape clause and/or adjustment assistance. These agencies feel that: —there will be some American firms and industries which will be injured by competition from LDC exports of manufactured goods; —the escape clause and adjustment assistance have not worked well in the past, and can not work well in the future because they operate only after damage is done; —additional safeguards which set a limit on the quantity of imports receiving preferential treatment, and therefore prevent injury from developing, are required; —the public and Congress will demand such additional safeguards; —the LDCs should be helped to make their exports competitive; but where they are—or become—competitive such assistance should be terminated. The international negotiating situation has a bearing on the choice of safeguards. The European Communities (EC), having reached agreement among the six member countries, are firmly committed to a scheme with built-in, automatic safeguards (a tariff quota plan). The other key DCs are keeping their options open and looking to the U.S. for guidance. They would probably accept the EC approach if we did, but would be prepared to support us if we opt for the escape clause approach. Agreement on a common scheme would be desirable, not necessarily as an end in itself, but because it would be strong prima facie evidence of equitable burden-sharing and would facilitate Congressional acceptance of preferences. Indeed, some agencies feel that a common scheme is an absolute necessity. Given the EC’s inflexibility, adoption of automatic safeguards appears to offer the only real possibility of negotiating agreement on a common scheme. The alternative is to accept two preference systems (the EC with automatic safeguards; the U.S. and others without them) and try to arrive at comparable results by adjusting other elements, such as the depth of the preferential tariff cut. In the light of all these considerations, we should: a) use only an escape clause and/or adjustment assistance; b) use automatic safeguards (such as the “competitive need” formula or the “tariff quota” described in Annex B, 5 which set quantitative limits on the amount of imports eligible for preferential treatment) in addition to an escape clause and/or adjustment assistance. 3. The Potential Trade Benefit: The final issue is how forthcoming we should be to the LDCs. As noted earlier, preferences might result in additional U.S. imports of at most $300 million a year initially. The result could well be considerably less, depending on the liberality of the scheme. Even so, the gap between the feasible maximum and minimum is quite small. The choice is, therefore, less an economic one and more a political-psychological one. Leaving aside the technicalities, any preference scheme can be made to yield somewhat larger or somewhat smaller trade benefits by altering the depth of the tariff cut and the restrictiveness or liberality of an automatic safeguard formula, if there is one. There are, furthermore, a number of advantages to eliminating all duties on LDC exports of commodities receiving preferences: —it would meet LDC desires for zero duties; —it would leave no room for further demands for reduction in duties; —it would facilitate the elimination of the discrimination against Latin America and others left out of existing preferential schemes. State favors seeking the upper range of the feasible benefits. A meaningful offer is essential in terms of the Administration’s new Latin America policy. The overall adverse impact on U.S. industry would be small, and might be more than offset by the benefits of more trade. Moreover, there would also be protection against excessive imports in any given sector by the safeguards used. The Scandinavian countries, Canada, and the United Kingdom also favor a program providing generous benefits to the LDCs. Commerce, Labor, STR, and some other departments believe that the amount of benefits to the LDCs is not an issue, but that automatic safeguards for U.S. industry from low-wage foreign competition are needed in order to get Congressional approval. Nevertheless, the specific formulas these agencies currently advocate might result in very limited benefits to the LDCs. Commerce’s “competitive need” formula would exclude from the outset over three-quarters of all U.S. imports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from LDCs—on grounds that these LDC suppliers have already achieved competitive positions in the U.S. market or that the products involved are too sensitive. The bulk of imports of manufactures from such countries as Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines would have to be excluded as a result. The United States should seek to attain: —the upper range of benefits; —the lower range of benefits. A more comprehensive interagency report, prepared in response to NSSM 48, is attached (Annex C). 6 This memorandum represents the Chairman’s summary of the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations. In addition to the Committee’s regular members, the following departments and agencies participated in the discussion: Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, Labor, Council of Economic Advisors, the Special Trade Representative, Agency for International Development, United States Information Agency, and Bureau of the Budget. ELR 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 19c. Confidential. Drafts of this memorandum, dated September 18, 23, and 26, are ibid. An earlier draft was circulated by Staff Director Hartman on September 13 to members of the Under Secretaries Committee, informing them it would be discussed at a Working Group meeting on September 15 to prepare general guidelines for U.S. negotiators and to work out any remaining differences in agency views for Presidential review. (Ibid., NSC-U/DM 17) NSSM 48 is Document 198 . 2 Undated; not printed. 3 Memorandum from Kissinger to Richardson, in his capacity as Chairman, August 16. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 48) 4 None of the Approve or Disapprove options in the paper is checked or initialed. 5 Undated; not printed. 6 Dated September 13; not printed. 215. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon 215. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 9, 1969. SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries (NSSM-48) I have just received Under Secretary Richardson’s memorandum of October 8, submitting to you a summary of the views of the Under Secretaries Committee on the preference issue. 2 Commerce, without reservation, supported the recommendation that the U.S. should match other major developed countries in participating in a system of generalized preferences. However, I feel I must provide you some additional comments on the “Unresolved Issues” section of the summary because it does not fully reflect our views. First, the subsection on “The Potential Trade Benefit” (pp. 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] ) characterizes Commerce’s “competitive need” safeguard formula as one which would give LDCs “the lower range of benefits”. From this, it might be inferred that the escape clause or tariff quota safeguards would yield “the upper range of benefits”, and therefore should merit your support. Each of the three basic types of safeguards can be made to yield similar results by varying the product coverage, the depth of tariff cut and the exceptions. We believe that there are overriding advantages to the “competitive need” approach and want to be sure that it will continue to receive full consideration. The competitive need safeguard would only withhold preferences on those products from an LDC where it has proved by capturing a fair share of our imports that it can compete successfully without preferences. Withholding preferences on such products does not, in our view, take away any benefits from LDCs if the purpose of preferences is to help them where help is needed. It would be very difficult to justify to American producers and the Congress why we are giving any country an additional and unnecessary advantage in our market on products that they can export to us successfully without preferences. Hong Kong is a good case in point. It is significant that one-third of our imports from LDCs that would be excluded by the competitive need formula comes from Hong Kong. My general feeling about the subsection on “Safeguards” (pp. 7–10 [ Pgs. 7–10 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , and Doc. 5 ] ) is that State’s proposal to use only the escape clause and adjustment assistance is not negotiable with the EEC and, even if it were, would not be acceptable to American industry or the Congress, given their increasing concern about import competition. I am convinced that the only prospect for reaching agreement on a common system, or at least similar (but not identical) systems, which the Congress will accept, is to incorporate automatic safeguards, such as the competitive need formula, tariff quotas, or some combination of the two. Finally, with respect to the subsection on “Exceptions” (pp. 6–7 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] ), I think we all understand that you will want the U.S. list of exceptions to be kept as short as possible. How short it can be kept, however, is directly related to the need to provide adequate protection to American industry and to share the burden of preferences equally with other countries. This in turn will depend in large part on the safeguards that are selected and the depth of tariff reductions that are made by the U.S. and other countries. Thus we believe that your decision on the U.S. exceptions list should be made in terms of a general principle rather than the specific alternatives contained in the memorandum. I therefore recommend that: (a) On the selection of exceptions (page 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] ), rather than direct us to try to achieve: “no exceptions/limited exceptions” or “a more extensive exceptions list,” you direct us to keep the U.S. list of exceptions as short as possible, consistent with the principles of equal burden sharing and adequate protection for American industry . (b) On the selection of safeguards (page 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] ), you approve the use of automatic safeguards . (c) On the selection of a range of benefits (page 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] ), rather than select an upper or lower range of benefits, you direct us to seek to maximize benefits for LDCs, consistent with the principles of equal burden sharing and adequate protection for American industry . Maurice H. Stans 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Trade Preferences for LDCs. Confidential. 2 Document 214 . 216. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) to President Nixon 216. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 9, 1969. SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries (NSSM 48) REF NSC Under Secretaries Committee—Memorandum to the President—Chairman’s Summary—October 8, 1969 I have just seen the final version of the Memorandum (Chairman’s Summary) under reference. 2 Two points which I have made are not, I feel, reflected in the memorandum with sufficient clarity and force: 1. There must be United States access to less developed country markets on equal terms with other developed countries as a prerequisite to United States participation with other developed countries in a preference scheme. The United States should make it clear that it would not give preferences to other countries which discriminate against U.S. exports in favor of other developed countries. It is costly for developing countries to buy from preferred suppliers rather than from those which are most competitive. It is not reasonable for the United States to defer to the principle and practice of those West Europeans which have in the past insisted on preferences for their products as a condition for their aid. There is now an opportunity to negotiate an end to these “reverse preferences,” to the mutual benefit of the developing countries and of the developed countries (including the United States, Japan, Switzerland, etc.) now suffering net disadvantage from discrimination. Switzerland and the Nordic countries have made their preference offers conditional on a satisfactory solution to this problem. The United States can hardly fail to do the same. Above all, the Administration should recognize in advance the extreme difficulty—if not the impossibility—of obtaining Congressional approval for preferential reduction of United States tariff duties in favor of countries which themselves practice systematic tariff discrimination against United States exports . 2. As a second United States prerequisite to participation in a preference scheme, all LDC’s should have equal access to DC markets for all preferential imports under the scheme . Since the UK, the EEC and the Nordic countries have proposed to extend duty-free treatment to all LDC’s for all or nearly all products included in a general scheme, United States agreement to accord zero-duty preferential entry would contribute an important common element to the scheme. Duty-free entry for LDC products would meet the LDC’s request for the elimination of tariff handicaps in DC markets, would leave no room for further LDC requests for duty reductions, and would tend to limit tariff discrimination against Latin Americans and others excluded from British Commonwealth and EEC preferential arrangements. I do not advocate a zero-duty preferential scheme in the belief that it would give greater trade benefits to LDC’s than some other scheme. It might or might not do so, depending upon the trade-restrictive effects of initial exclusions and of other measures applied to safeguard American industry. (Here it is important to take into account the trade and investment effects of preferences and the probable aggravation of the “runaway plant” problem with Mexico.) I consider that it will be important for the Administration to be able eventually to go to the Congress with a scheme that can be advocated not only as conferring benefit on LDC’s but also as —a common effort by DC’s to coordinate and rationalize their trade relationships with LDC’s; —an internationally accepted decision to eliminate discrimination against the United States and other developed countries in many LDC markets for manufactures and semi-manufactures; and —a common effort to reduce discrimination by DC’s and groups of DC’s against LDC’s not associated with them in special preferential relationships. I make these two points here because I feel that the policy recommendations expressed in Section IV (pp. 4-5) of the Chairman’s Summary do not express the two principles in the form in which your decision should ultimately guide our negotiators and be presented by them to other governments. Carl J. Gilbert 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Trade Preferences for LDCs. Confidential. 2 Document 214 . 217. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Assistant (Harlow) 217. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Assistant (Harlow) 1 Washington, October 23, 1969. SUBJECT Timing on Submission of the Trade Bill In my memorandum of October 8 to the President on the trade bill, 2 I said that after his decision on substance you wished to consult with Congress on timing. I understand that you wish to delay submission until after the New Jersey gubernatorial election because of the effect on the chemical industry of our asking for elimination of ASP. 3 I cannot of course make a judgment on that election, but I urge early Presidential submission of the bill for the following reasons: 1. We have not gotten far on textile restraints. Much of the foreign opposition lies in fear that textiles is only the beginning of our restraint efforts and that other products will soon follow. The bill and the message will dispel that as no diplomatic statements can, and will thus make a major contribution to getting a textile agreement. In addition, the message will make crystal clear that the President is serious on textiles. Sato meets the President in November and our best chance to line up the Japanese is between now and then. 2. Business is angry over foreign non-tariff barriers. This Administration must show that it takes this issue seriously. The message does that. More important to the timing issue, we have now brought GATT consideration to a head. If at the October 20 GATT meeting on NTB’s we cannot show that the U.S. intends to move on this, momentum will be lost and our position will lose all credibility. 3. The ASP agreement will lapse unless we get foreign concurrence before January 1 for its further extension. If the bill is not submitted well before that time—and we are already within three months of the deadline—our arguments for getting this extension will be weak, since it will not look as though the Administration is serious. This is the most serious U.S. trade barrier in foreign eyes and would seriously hurt our overall foreign policy, especially in Europe. A collapse of ASP will also wreck our NTB efforts. 4. Early this spring, Secretary Stans promised European leaders that the President would be submitting a bill soon. The President instructed the Secretary to do so at the NSC meeting on trade. Our credibility with the European Governments is thus at stake. Continued delay is also allowing European protectionists to argue effectively that this country is lapsing into protectionism so Europe may as well move in the same direction. We must reverse that direction soon, or moves and counter moves in trade will jeopardize our exports, especially of agricultural products, and poison our relations with a number of countries. 5. Delay in forming a Trade Study Commission to work on our future trade policy will delay its report. We cannot move on this until the President announces it in his message. UK accession to the Common Market and basic changes in the Market’s protectionist Common Agricultural Policy may require U.S. decision in the late spring. These have major foreign policy implications. Without a Commission report and a decision on how we are to take advantage of these changes, the U.S. also stands to lose heavily in its exports—again, especially in agriculture. 6. The President and the Congress have no credible response to quota pressures until submission of this bill proves that the Administration intends to relax the escape clause and adjustment assistance. The resultant pressures for quotas jeopardize our foreign relations with numerous key countries in Europe, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc. 7. The new retaliatory provisions in the bill will give strong public evidence that this Administration will adopt a new and tougher stance in defense of our trade rights. We need this now to retain business and labor confidence. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Bergsten presumably before October 20 since it refers to the GATT meeting on that date. 2 Document 213 . 3 On October 18 Harlow sent a memorandum to the NSC Staff Secretary reporting that Chairman Wilbur Mills and John Byrnes, senior Republican on the Ways and Means Committee, who were both favorable to the trade legislation, strongly recommended that the legislation be postponed, possibly until after the State of the Union address in the new year. They thought there was no prospect for Committee action during 1969, and were concerned about lobbying pressure if it were sent forward and allowed to languish for 3-4 months. Harlow recommended delaying the legislation at least until November 10, and then consulting with Mills and Byrnes on timing. In the meantime he recommended Kissinger send the NTB themes to U.S. representatives in Geneva as a basis for their October 20 discussions at GATT. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I) 218. National Security Decision Memorandum 29 218. National Security Decision Memorandum 29 1 Washington, October 31, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries The President has approved U.S. participation in a system of tariff preferences for developing countries, subject to Congressional approval. The President has made the following decisions on the U.S. position on preferences, to supplement the Under Secretaries’ guidance to our negotiators: 2 1. The scheme should be liberal, conferring the maximum range of benefits on the developing countries suggested by the Under Secretaries. Preferential duties should be set at zero. 2. For manufactured and semi-manufactured products, the scheme should except from preferential treatment only textiles, shoes, and petroleum and petroleum products. 3. The scheme should be simple, relying on the standard escape clause and adjustment assistance as safeguards for domestic industry. 4. All major developed countries must adopt a common scheme. 5. If duty-free treatment cannot be achieved, we should exclude from our preferences countries which receive selective preferences in developed country markets for products covered by the scheme. 6. Developing countries should eliminate reverse preferences which discriminate against the United States to become beneficiaries of U.S. tariff preferences. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Administrator of AID, and Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 2 See Document 214 . The Under Secretaries’ recommendations and the comments of Stans and Gilbert ( Documents 215 and 216 ) were presented to the President in an October 28 memorandum from Kissinger, which summarized the issues for decision into three options. Kissinger added that he had not “burdened” the President with the memoranda from Richardson, Stans, and Gilbert, which presumably were not forwarded to the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 404, Trade Preferences for LDCs) 219. Editorial Note 219. Editorial Note During meetings in Washington November 19-21, 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon discussed a wide range of matters of mutual concern, including bilateral trade and textiles. See Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III, Document 30 . Additional documentation on the Summit is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations . 220. Editorial Note 220. Editorial Note Pursuant to NSDM 29 ( Document 218 ), during the week of November 3, 1969, the United States presented its preference proposal in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In a November 13 memorandum reporting on that initiative to Under Secretary of State Richardson, Philip Trezise noted that the U.S. proposal was far more liberal than others had expected. He indicated that the Trade Committee Report, with the U.S. and other proposals, would be delivered to the UNCTAD Secretariat on November 15, and the United States would release its proposal in Washington at the same time. Trezise reported that there would be a high-level meeting at the OECD in early December to attempt to reconcile divergent views. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29) On November 28 Trezise sent a memorandum to Nathaniel Samuels recommending that he discuss the U.S. preference proposal with EC Ambassadors in Washington. A notation on this memorandum suggests that Samuels approved a luncheon meeting on December 18. (Ibid.) In his December 12 Weekly Activities Report to Secretary Rogers, Elliot Richardson, Alexis Johnson, and Samuels, Trezise noted that Ambassador Greenwald at the OECD reported some progress toward a common preference scheme at an informal meeting on December 11, and that a supplementary paper reflecting common ground would be prepared for UNCTAD. (Ibid., E Files: Lot 71 D 164, December 12, 1969) He also reported that Samuels would lunch with the EC Ambassadors the coming week. No record of that luncheon meeting was found. The proposed “U.S. Illustrative Generalized Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries,” revised November 3, which was tabled in the OECD Trade Committee the week of November 3, reads as follows: “The U.S. is prepared to participate, subject to Congressional approval, in a system of tariff preferences for developing countries, which should be liberal and should confer the maximum range of benefits on the developing countries. We consider that all the major developed countries must participate in the system and do their fair share. “The U.S. proposal contains the following elements: “1. Preferential duties set at zero. “2. Preferences granted on manufactured and semi-manufactured products in BTN Chapters 25-99, excepting only textiles, shoes, and petroleum and petroleum products. Preferences also granted on a selective list of agriculture and fishery products. “3. A simple scheme, without ceilings on preferential imports, relying on the standard escape clause and adjustment assistance as safeguards for domestic industry. “4. A temporary scheme, i.e. not more than ten years, which would not constitute a binding commitment and would not impede future tariff reductions on a most-favored-nation basis. “5. A common scheme to be adopted by all major developed countries. “6. Developing countries which receive special preferences in developed country markets for products covered by the scheme would be excluded from preferences. “7. Developing countries which grant reverse preferences to developed countries would be excluded from preferences. “8. The U.S. has reached no judgment regarding beneficiary countries. In general, preferences to be granted to all developing countries. “9. With respect to agricultural and fisheries products in Chapters 1 to 24 of the Brussels Nomenclature, preferences would apply to a positive list of items. The final identification of the items to be included in the positive list will be influenced by the nature of the agricultural provisions of the preference scheme to be adopted and can only be determined after further international discussion and domestic consideration. An illustrative positive list of agricultural and fishery products is attached.” (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29) 221. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) to Secretary of State Rogers 221. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, December 23, 1969. SUBJECT New Preferential Trade Agreements Between the EC and Other Countries Summary The purpose of this memorandum is to call to your attention the serious attrition that is taking place in the observance of most-favored-nation treatment by some of our major trading partners and the threat that this poses to the postwar international trading system. By deciding global trade policy issues solely in the context of bilateral negotiations with such countries as Spain, we run the danger of accelerating that attrition. Since its formation, the European Communities have, through association agreements, progressively departed from the GATT rules prohibiting discrimination. The EC, in its plans for negotiations with Spain and Israel, clearly are planning a selective exchange of preferences that are explicitly proscribed by the GATT. Our attitude toward these agreements needs urgent examination before precedents are established which may make future resistance impossible and which may lead to the dissolution of the GATT. Action Proposed 1. The general question of the proliferation of reciprocal preferential trade arrangements should be raised with our major trading partners bilaterally at the highest political levels and multilaterally in the GATT. Our concern and our intention to act if further preferential arrangements are concluded could be conveyed to the EC in a letter from President Nixon to the President of the Commission of the European Communities, Jean Rey, and to the Chiefs of State or of Governments of the six EC countries. Such a letter could stress that the United States has been and is willing to accept limited economic disadvantages stemming from preferential arrangements among EC member states because of the offsetting political advantages to it from European unity, but that such a balance cannot be expected to accompany preferential arrangements with Spain, Israel and other countries. 2. Agreement among the agencies concerned should be obtained before consideration of NSSM 46 2 so that the decisions with regard to Spain will be consistent with overall United States trade policy on this question. Discussion The postwar international trading system has been constructed on a basic rule—unconditional most-favored-nation treatment (MFN). Applied to the member countries of the GATT, any advantage granted by one country to products from another country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to similar products from all member countries. The two most important exceptions to this principle are preferential arrangements in effect at the time the GATT was negotiated (1947) and preferential arrangements granted by members of a customs union or free trade area to each other. The six major multilateral rounds of tariff negotiations in the postwar period were based on the MFN rule, as is the network of rights and obligations of each GATT member state. Preferential arrangements in effect at the time of establishment of the European Economic Community between some of its member states (principally France) and their colonies or former colonies in Africa were incorporated and expanded to all EEC countries in the Yaounde Convention between the EEC and 18 African countries. The United States expressed its opposition to this Agreement as inconsistent with the GATT rules but took no action to make the opposition effective. The EEC also concluded association agreements with Greece (1961) and Turkey (1963) providing for reciprocal preferential arrangements but, unlike the Yaounde Convention, these agreements anticipate eventual full accession to the EEC after a long transitional period. Preferential trade agreements between the European Communities (EC) and Morocco and the EC and Tunisia went into effect earlier this year. A Working Party has been established in the GATT to examine the consistency of these agreements with GATT rules. In an effort to diminish the discriminatory effects of the agreements with Morocco and Tunisia on some of the other major citrus suppliers, the EC granted further discriminatory preferential treatment to Spain and Israel, for certain citrus fruit. In the face of vigorous opposition and announcement of intention to retaliate by the United States, and a clear indication that the EC’s request for a GATT waiver would be denied, the EC has announced its intention to withdraw the citrus preferences for Spain and Israel. Two observations on this series of events are relevant here: First, discriminatory trade agreements will lead to further discriminatory agreements; and Second, to the surprise of many, the EC cannot necessarily count on the support either of the EFTA countries requesting entry or some of the potential beneficiaries of preferential agreements for support when the basic MFN rule is violated in such a gross manner. The EC has also concluded other preferential trade agreements, which are not yet in effect, with East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) and with Nigeria. Under a mandate from the EC Council, the EC Commission is currently negotiating preferential trade agreements with Spain and Israel. The Council has authorized exploratory preferential trade agreement discussions with Lebanon and the UAR, and similar discussions can be expected in the near future with Austria, Yugoslavia and several other European and Mediterranean countries. While the United States has objected to certain features of these arrangements and has occasionally expressed its opposition in principle, it has not thus far energetically opposed the trend. Our policy was expressed in 1967 as follows: “consistent with overall U.S. policy objectives, we intend to oppose all new EC associations except those with European countries leading to full EC membership within a reasonable period of time and which will result in internal free trade in both industry and agriculture, adoption of a common external tariff and joining in common agricultural systems. We cannot therefore condone any association arrangement whose purpose is principally a preferential trading relationship.” (CA-5638, Jan. 30, 1967) 3 This has been a good statement of policy, but in the absence of some countervailing action it has apparently been ineffective. The Commission’s negotiating mandate for Spain indicates that the prospective agreement will not aim at full EC membership (because of Dutch and Belgian political objections to entry of Franco’s Spain) and that a preferential trading relationship will be formed. The same pattern is likely in future agreements with other countries and may be accelerated by the forthcoming U.K. entry negotiations. In the case of Austria, for example, the neutrality obligations under the State Treaty suggest that a tie with the EC may result in no more than a preferential trade agreement. Other historic neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland would likely follow suit. The United States would have to expect that virtually all of Western Europe, Africa and much of the Middle East and Asia would be involved in a vast network discriminating against the United States. Even parts of Latin America could be drawn in as evidenced by Argentina’s recent overtures to the EC for some kind of trade agreement providing guaranteed access of certain Argentine products to EC markets. United States trade and prospects for improving our balance of payments would be severely affected. Congressional reaction to any increase in discrimination against U.S. products could involve significantly increased protectionism which in turn would likely disrupt the framework for global cooperation with Europe in the political, economic, financial and military areas. This issue is raised by the draft NSC paper “U.S. Policy Toward Spain—NSSM 46.” The paper considers certain trade policies the U.S. might adopt toward Spain in an effort to maintain the most extensive base rights possible or alternatively to maintain a lesser military capability. These include acquiescence in a preferential trade agreement between the EC and Spain. Although this draft paper recognizes that such policies would affect U.S. trade interests worldwide, the discussion is presented largely only in terms of U.S. policy toward Spain. I understand a similar paper on U.S. policy toward Israel is in the early stages of preparation. If the European Communities conclude preferential trade agreements with Spain and Israel, the Administration would have no choice but to react vigorously. Otherwise, in the face of the political reaction that can be expected in the United States, it would have great difficulty in continuing our own adherence to the postwar trading system, including MFN. The trade coverage of the preferential agreements is likely to be so broad, and the damage to U.S. trade interests so extensive, that an offer by the EC (and Spain) to make compensatory tariff reductions could hardly compensate for the damage done. The United States should make it clear now that it opposes such agreements, that it is prepared to act—unilaterally if necessary—if such agreements go into effect, that the wholesale violation of the most basic GATT rule is noncompensable, and that the EC would bear the major burden of any retaliatory action by the United States. In taking action against the spread of preferential arrangements, the U.S. would probably incur the displeasure of some LDC’s. However, implementation of a generalized preference system should assist them in achieving their objective of expanded export earnings and would not be at the cost of exports from other LDC’s who have not concluded preferential arrangements with the EC. The United States has made it clear that the elimination of existing reverse preferences (preferences granted by an LDC to products of certain developed countries) would be a sine qua non for an LDC to obtain beneficiary status in the U.S. under a generalized preferences scheme 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 46. Confidential. Sent through Trezise, who forwarded it to the Secretary under cover of a December 31 memorandum that expressed the hope that consideration of policy toward Spain could be deferred until the administration had adopted a position on EC preferential trading relationships. A copy of Gilbert’s memorandum was sent to Kissinger. 2 See Document 224 . 3 Not printed. 222. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff 222. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, undated. [Omitted here are Parts I and II of the Analytical Summary, with prefatory material and discussion of the military bases issues.] III. Issue: What posture should the U.S. adopt with respect to the forthcoming Spain-EC negotiations? The European Communities Council of Ministers has agreed to negotiate with Spain for reciprocal trade preferences (both industrial and agricultural goods). Spain is willing to accept such an arrangement as advancing its objective of closer ties with Europe and an agreement is possible by mid-1970. At present, the EC has offered a weighted average tariff reduction of about 60 percent to Spain, and Spain has offered a reduction of about 21 percent to the Community (whereas the Community has asked for 40 percent). Spain might see our objection to such preferential arrangements as a block to closer Spanish relations with Europe. Our objections could adversely affect US-Spain relations possibly jeopardizing our base rights and resulting in Spanish retaliation against US economic interests. Our objections, however, are based on our established policy seeking to develop a multilateral system of trade and payments based on non-discrimination. This is the basic element of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A preferential agreement between the EC and Spain would encourage proliferation of such agreements which would be inimical to our economic interests and would severely damage the multilateral system of trade which has been built up. The proposed Spain-EC agreement would be contrary to the GATT (Article 24) which provides for an exception only for arrangements leading, under a definite time schedule, to a free trade area or custom union covering substantially all trade between the participants. The options are: Option I—Remain silent. —This would eliminate the major irritant in US-Spanish relations, but would (a) encourage proliferation of such agreements possibly leading to a vast preferential trading bloc, (2) by condoning a clear violation of the GATT make it impossible for us to oppose other such arrangements. Option 2—Raise proforma objection; reserve right to take the matter to the GATT. —This might avoid prejudicing our economic and other interests in Spain and would avoid condoning a violation of GATT, but would not deter Spain-EC agreement or subsequent proliferation of such agreements against our interests. Option 3—Oppose the arrangement making clear our intention to challenge in GATT and consider US action against the EC to restore trade balance. —This might dissuade the EC (but not Spain) from making the arrangement and give us a basis to argue that our action is directed at EC and not at Spain, but Spain probably still will consider our action as interference with their attempt at closer European ties and retaliate against our interests in Spain. Moreover, any US action against the EC alone not authorized by GATT would risk EC retaliation. Option 4—Do not object to EC granting preference to Spain but ask the EC either (1) to forego preferences for EC goods in Spain or (2) to compensate US and others by tariff reductions; selectively retaliate against the EC if it does not agree. —This would (1) strengthen our argument that our action is directed at the EC violation of GATT and not at Spain, thereby lessening danger of Spanish retaliation against us and (2) generate some support from other GATT members who would benefit from lower tariffs; but the EC is unlikely to accept our proposal and Spain may still see our action as interference; moreover, some US exports (e.g. citrus) to the EC would be adversely affected. Option 5—Seek EC modification of agreement with Spain to make it consistent with GATT (Article 24) . —This would maintain integrity of GATT and—even if unsuccessful—support our argument that the EC, not the US, is the barrier to full Spanish integration and provide basis for US counter action against the EC; but (1) might result in an agreement not genuinely consistent with GATT but which others will accept, (2) could be interpreted as US willingness to agree to any EC agreement consistent with Article 24 whether leading to full membership in the EC or not, and (3) effects on our trade would be uncertain. The United States has historically championed the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle as a guiding principle to govern international trade. We have done so because our global political interests (a) make it difficult for us to favor one nation over another in our own trading relationships, and (b) prompt us to discourage regional blocs elsewhere. Because we have avoided giving preferential treatment, most non-MFN deals are likely to develop among other countries—and thus hurt US trade. Our economic and foreign policy interests thus have dovetailed to convince administrations of both parties and the Congress to adhere strongly to MFN. The MFN rule is the basis of the GATT structure which has governed international trading relationships in the postwar period. The one permissible exception to the MFN rule is for customs unions or free trade areas, on the grounds that countries which wish to harmonize their economic policies extensively should be permitted to do so. The MFN principle has come under great stress in the past few years, however, mainly due to the spate of preferential arrangements already developed by the EC. All of them so far have been with LDCs—the former French and Belgian colonies, Nigeria, the former British colonies in East Africa, Tunisia and Morocco. (Greece and Turkey also have gotten preferences but they are first steps in eventual full membership after a 22-year transition period.) The arrangements obviously help their economic development and the trade effects on outsiders have been small, so it has been both difficult and relatively unimportant to oppose them. Now, however, the Community is negotiating preferential arrangements with several much more important countries—not only Spain but Israel, Austria, Yugoslavia, the UAR, Lebanon, and even Argentina. Many other non-EC members, including Switzerland and Sweden, seek preferences as well. And it is quite possible that the United Kingdom and other applicants for full membership in the EC will seek “associate status” and hence trade preferences if their bids for full membership bog down. The United States is not completely clean when it comes to implementation of the MFN rule. We do not extend such treatment to the Communist countries, except for Yugoslavia and Poland, but this departure has a security rationale. We continue to give special preferences to the Philippines, although these are being phased out. Our most important departure is that we have now joined the other industrialized countries in offering trade preferences to all LDCs; however, a major reason for doing so is to redefine the MFN rule rationally by retaining it for trade among the industrialized countries and apply similar preferences on all LDC exports to all industrialized countries. Options 1 and 2 in effect acquiesce in the agreement. But there are strong reasons why the United States should not acquiesce and should continue to champion the MFN principle, redefined to include generalized preferences for the LDCs: —A continuing series of EC preferential arrangements will significantly hurt our trade—by hundreds of millions of dollars if they were eventually to cover all of the countries cited above. —No single preferential deal will damage our trade severely but it is already clear that one deal begets many more, often because any given deal hurts the legitimate interests of other countries. —Congressional criticism of both our overall policy toward Europe and our generally liberal trade policy will clearly intensify if we do not vigorously oppose the proliferation of special preferences by the EC. They will rightly point to the complete illegality of such arrangements under the GATT and claim that we have failed to defend our legitimate interests. —It therefore will become increasingly difficult to maintain a political basis for our support for expansion of the EC. —A degeneration of international trading relationships between the United States and Europe will also poison our political relations in due time. The Spanish deal alone would probably not have all of these dire effects if we could hold the line on further deals. But it would be virtually impossible to do so in the future if we do not do so now. Israel is the next case and it will be difficult enough to oppose anyway. Austria feels that it cannot seek full membership in the EC because of the State Treaty. We want to help Yugoslavia move westward and it would even be difficult to oppose UK association. US opposition to the EC-Spain deal ( Option 3 ) probably would succeed. We just succeeded in blocking EC preferences to Spain and Israel on citrus fruits alone and it is doubtful that the EC wants to help Spain so badly that it would jeopardize its trade with the United States and other GATT members to do so. But Spain probably would see our opposition as a block to closer Spain-EC relationships with resulting adverse effects on our political, security and economic relationships. We obviously need to reconcile our overall trade policy with our overall interests in Spain in this case. If the EC relationship issue cannot be dissociated from our political and security relationships, the two considerations could be reconciled if we: —Inform the EC and Spain that we cannot condone their present plans and will retaliate against both if they pursue them. The preferential arrangement they are considering is illegal under GATT. It would jeopardize our trade. It would set an unacceptable precedent and its political effects are uncertain. —However, we could condone a more ambitious scheme which would amount to a “free trade area” between the EC and Spain and hence be legal under GATT. ( Option 5. ) (This would mean freeing the bulk of industrial and agricultural trade between EC and Spain rather than partial tariff cutting on industrial products only as presently contemplated.) Such an arrangement might have economic advantages for us—such as an attraction for US investment and greater economic growth leading to increased Spanish imports from us—which might even offset the economic drawbacks over time. More importantly, it would imply a much greater political association between the EC and Spain, which we support. And it would not represent an unfortunate precedent because there are obviously fewer candidates for such an arrangement than for ad-hoc preferential deals. It would be difficult for either Spain or the EC to oppose such a US position. We would appear to be promoting Spain’s desire to “enter Europe” which they have repeatedly asked us to do. It would have the rules of GATT on its side and would therefore be difficult for the EC to oppose—this is particularly true because the main EC opponents of full Spanish membership are the Dutch and Belgians, who are generally the staunchest defenders of GATT (for good reasons, given their economic reliance on international trade). And if the EC and Spain could not agree to go this route, it would be much easier for us to oppose ( as per Option 3 ) the more limited type of arrangement they are contemplating. In short, it would be a positive position which would provide the basis for a negative one if it failed. There are two additional steps we could take, either in addition to the foregoing or as alternatives in case we decided to be completely negative toward the preferential agreement at the outset: —We could inform Spain that we would support its eligibility for tariff preferences under the generalized preferences scheme now being negotiated. Spain wants badly to be treated as an LDC for this purpose but we have never indicated that we agree. In fact, Spain would not be eligible under the conditions we have announced if it extended “reverse preferences” to the EC, as it now plans. Spain would probably come out about as well economically from the global preferences (which would of course include some preferences in the EC) as from the special deal with the EC. However, this would eliminate any “special” move toward Europe and would not have the political benefits envisaged by the Spanish government. (This is probably the overriding drawback to Option 4, which would have us condone EC preferences to Spain now as an “advance” on the generalized scheme but oppose Spain’s preferences to EC goods. State, however, probably supports Option 4.) —We could give Spain better treatment under our program for controlling foreign direct investment by US firms—which they have repeatedly sought. (Spain is now treated like the rest of Western Europe.) It is undesirable to let political considerations affect this program, and Treasury will vigorously oppose doing so. But the program is being phased out anyway and the damage would be limited. Treasury and Commerce strongly oppose acquiescence in the preferential agreement or the granting of relief from restraints on US foreign investment for Spain (Annex D, NSSM 46). They support Option 3 . 1 Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 92, 1/16/70 Review Group Meeting-Spain. Secret. The text printed here comprises pages 9–15 [ Pgs. 9–15 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] of the Analytical Summary of the NSSM 46 Response paper, prepared as part of the briefing material for Kissinger’s use at the January 16 NSC Review Group Meeting. The paper is attached to a January 5, 1970, covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt which informs Kissinger that Lynn, Bergsten, and Kennedy collaborated in assembling the briefing book. See Document 224 . 223. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 223. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 16, 1970. SUBJECT U.S. Policy Towards a Preferential Trading Arrangement Between the European Community and Spain I am deeply concerned that the NSC, at its forthcoming meeting on NSSM 46, 2 may reach a decision on Spain’s proposed preferential trading arrangement with the European Community (EC) which will make it all but impossible for us to oppose successfully preferential arrangements between the EC and other countries. In this connection, we sent Under Secretary of State Richardson a memorandum on January 6, 3 urging that a decision on the Spain-EC Association Agreement be deferred until an overall assessment is made of our global policy towards preferential trading arrangements rather than solely in the context of NSSM 46. Under Secretary of State Johnson has now advised us that for pressing political reasons a decision can not be delayed and the issue will be considered by the NSC on January 16. 4 He suggested, however, that we might wish to express our concern directly to you. Commerce has reviewed the coverage of our trade with both Spain and the EC which would be affected by the proposed preferential agreement. We conclude that it would adversely affect a substantial part of our exports to Spain, and have some adverse impact on our trade with the EC. If this were the only damage to our trade that would result from acquiescing in the EC-Spanish arrangement, we could possibly balance it against the political gain. Unfortunately, the EC is already discussing preferential arrangements with Israel and Austria, and a number of other countries are seeking to negotiate with the EC in order to improve their terms of trade with the EC. I am convinced that we cannot afford to have these preferential trading arrangements proliferate, and that it will not be possible to oppose proliferation successfully if we acquiesce in the EC-Spanish arrangement. It was for this reason that we proposed several weeks ago, through the interagency trade organization, that the European Community, Spain and Israel be notified that the United States strongly opposes preferential trade arrangements and, should they enter into such arrangements, the U.S. would take action to restore the balance of GATT benefits and tariff concessions with them (preferably by compensation, but by retaliation if necessary). While there was strong interagency support for some action to reverse the trend towards preferential trading arrangements, agreement has not yet been reached on the specific steps to be taken to that end. A current proposal, which we support, calls for a high-level meeting with the European Community to express our serious concern and seek a solution to the problem posed by the EC policy on preferential trading arrangements, such as the agreement with Spain, which fall well short of full scale association agreements. 5 If the European Community concludes a preferential trade agreement with Spain, and with United States acquiescence or with only token U.S. opposition, the most-favored-nation principle of GATT—the cornerstone of our trade policy—will have suffered very significant and possibly irreparable damage. We can then look towards increasing numbers of preferential trade agreements, and the United States, in defense of its trade interests, will be forced to participate actively or seek alternatives in the trade field. One such alternative would be for the U.S. to discriminate on the import side against countries which discriminate against our exports. I would prefer that we not be faced with that alternative. Thus I believe that our fundamental trade policy interests are at stake and urge that we oppose this arrangement. Acquiescence would tie our hands, and make far more difficult any effective resistance to the dangerous trend toward a preferential trading world. However, if the European Community elects to conclude a preferential arrangement in the face of clear United States opposition, damage to the MFN principle may be moderated and we will have done what we can to protect our legitimate trade interests. Maurice H. Stans 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I 1970. Secret. A January 16 transmittal memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger highlighted the main points. 2 The NSC Review Group met on January 16; see Document 224 . 3 Reference is to a memorandum from Acting Secretary of Commerce Siciliano on which Richardson highlighted: “Commerce believes that the U.S. decision about the specific Spanish-EC problem should be deferred until a general review of U.S. global policy toward preferential trading arrangements can be made.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 46) 4 Johnson’s recommendation was not further identified. 5 In his transmittal memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten wrote: “The Secretary also implies, however, that he could support ‘full scale association agreements’ between the EC and other countries. He could therefore presumably accept Option 5 in the NSSM 46 paper, under which we would indicate our opposition to the present proposal but our acquiescence in a more ambitious ‘free trade area’ approach which would be legal under GATT and thereby minimize the political costs with Spain of the complete (albeit justified) negativism of Option 3.” The options are set out in Document 222 . 224. Editorial Note 224. Editorial Note NSSM 46, “U.S. Policy Toward Spain,” dated April 21, 1969, called for a study of policy toward Spain that would look beyond the negotiation of the renewal of the agreement on U.S. military bases in Spain. In addition to the issue of military assistance to Spain were the issues of the Spanish desire to be accorded developing country status to qualify for whatever tariff preferences the United States accorded developing countries, and the preferential trading arrangement Spain was negotiating with the European Community (see also Documents 221 – 223 ). These issues, often considered as a quid pro quo for the base renewal negotiations, were highlighted in a December 29, 1969, memorandum from Martin Hillenbrand to Elliot Richardson. Hillenbrand noted that there were two issues on which early decisions were needed: the future of the U.S. military presence in Spain, and U.S. policy on Spanish association with the Community. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 46) On January 20, 1970, William I. Cargo (S/PC) sent a memorandum to Richardson informing him of the results of the January 16 NSC Review Group meeting on Spain. Cargo reported that the State Department, in cooperation with the Defense Department, would prepare an issues paper for use by the President in setting policy regarding the base negotiations and the impending preferential trade arrangement. (Ibid.) Hillenbrand forwarded the joint State-Defense paper to Secretary of State Rogers on January 26, and Rogers sent the President the State Department’s views on January 27. (Both ibid.) On February 20 Kissinger issued NSDM 43 with the President’s decision to seek to retain as many of existing military rights and facilities in Spain “as are possible within the limits of a sustainable quid pro quo” and to reach “prompt agreement … within the Government on a quid pro quo that can be offered in the negotiations, sustained over the term of the agreement, and which will avoid an impasse with Congress.” (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 43) Regarding the Spanish preferential trade agreement with the European Community, see Document 227 . 225. Editorial Note 225. Editorial Note President Nixon met with Senator Strom Thurmond and Deputy Counsel Henry Dent from 10:21 to 10:49 a.m. on February 19, 1970. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Fred Bergsten reported on the meeting in a February 23 memorandum to Henry Kissinger. Reportedly, Thurmond said that at the American Textile Association convention that would begin on March 17 the producers, perhaps in alliance with the shoe and other interests, would press for quota legislation if a solution had not been worked out by that time. Dent thought the producers would not back off after such a decision, and the President would have to support quota legislation to uphold his campaign commitment (see Document 184 ). The President reportedly reaffirmed his commitment and wondered if Stans should go immediately to Tokyo. Bergsten added a paragraph at the end of his memorandum reporting that on February 18 Japanese Prime Minister Sato had told the Diet, in what was his first public indication he had given a commitment to the President, that at their November summit (see Document 219 ), he and the President had agreed to solve the textile question as soon as possible to avoid damage to bilateral relations. Sato reportedly said there had been no agreement on how to solve the problem. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 399, Textiles Volume I) Bergsten revisited the quota question in a March 12 memorandum to Kissinger, noting that unless there were shortly to be a textile agreement with Japan, the President would come under “tremendous pressure” to support or lead an effort for quota legislation. Bergsten cautioned that foreigners could retaliate against a like value of U.S exports, that foreign governments would have difficulty holding their own protectionists at bay, and that many other U.S. industries, in greater difficulty than textiles, would also seek quotas. A full-scale trade war was possible, and Bergsten expressed the opinion that the President would have to take the lead to protect the free trade principle and the administration’s new focus on trade with the LDCs, especially in Latin America, to supplement aid. Following his return from the Asian Development Bank annual meeting in Sydney, Secretary Kennedy sent a brief memorandum to the President reporting on the meeting and several bilateral stops in the region. Kennedy reported that “Prime Minister Sato asked me to convey to you his deep regrets at not having been able to resolve the textile issue during the time span he had pledged, and he reiterated his determination to achieve a solution that would be helpful to you.” (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the President Jan-Feb 1970) 226. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 226. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT EC Preferential Trade Arrangements The European Community is on the verge of concluding preferential trade arrangements with Israel and Spain. It has completed agreements with Morocco and Tunisia and it will soon be discussing an agreement with Austria. It also intends to negotiate trade deals with Lebanon, the United Arab Republic, and Malta. With the possible exception of Austria none of these agreements is in accordance with GATT rules and, in the aggregate, they would have a significant adverse impact on our trade. We limited ourselves to opposing in principle the Community’s earlier preferential trade agreements—the Yaounde Convention, signed with 18 former French and Belgian African colonies, and the association agreements with Greece and Turkey—because of political considerations. Where we tried to oppose such arrangements more actively, as in the case of the EC-Nigerian agreement, we were unsuccessful in marshaling support (the Nigerian and East African agreements were never ratified for other reasons). The current crop of Community arrangements is more clearly in violation of the GATT than these earlier arrangements and several of them are much more important in trade terms. It is disturbing that the Community appears to have no clear overall idea on what it wants to achieve. Each agreement is negotiated for its own political/economic reasons and represents a compromise among the member countries at the expense of the world trading rules. We expect that once the Community is enlarged to include the UK, then the African and possibly the Caribbean Commonwealth countries and dependencies will most likely come in under the enlarged Community’s association scheme. And if Israel and the UAR, why not Iraq, Iran and all of the countries of the Middle East and South Asia? Our concern with these preferential arrangements is twofold. If, as is true in most cases, these arrangements do not qualify under Article XXIV of the GATT as legitimate customs unions or free trade areas, the principle of non-discrimination, which is fundamental to the GATT system, is further eroded. Secondly, our trade interests may be adversely affected by these preferential arrangements. While there is no way to measure the trade impact accurately, it is clear that preferences cause some diversion of trade at the expense of third parties and that, as the volume and variety of goods available within the preferential trading bloc increases, the diversion also increases. In the case of the Israel-EC arrangement, for example, the preference to be given to Israeli citrus will almost certainly cause some reduction in our citrus sales to the Community. The same is true of the Spanish arrangement. You will recall that as part of NSSM 46, we submitted to the President a number of policy options dealing with Spain’s impending agreement with the European Community. Israel-EC relations are touched on in the study on U.S. Economic Assistance Policy toward Israel (NSSM 82). 2 Israel-EC relations pose for U.S. policy the same dilemmas which Spain-EC relations pose, i.e., a conflict between our political interests and our trade and commercial policy. The two agreements are also linked economically since Spain and Israel are competitors in providing citrus to the EC. For both countries citrus exports are the largest single export commodity to the EC. Ambassador Schaetzel has suggested that both France and The Netherlands, for differing reasons, consider the Spain and Israel agreements linked. A decision on Spain, therefore, undoubtedly has implications for Israel and vice versa. It is therefore important that our posture towards both be roughly comparable. We must also take into account the agreements with Morocco and Tunisia which are in effect and to which we have objected in the GATT. Both these countries as well as France have resented our stand. The Tunisian Foreign Minister complained to the Secretary about our position. The Community has also begun negotiations with Lebanon, and intends to begin talking to the UAR. We are not sanguine about getting the Community at this stage in their negotiations with the various countries to disown their agreements. This could only be done by threatening massive trade retaliation which is politically undesirable and economically difficult. It seems to us the only practical course we have is quietly to explore the possibilities of making these agreements somewhat more palatable to us by suggesting a variety of alternatives as set forth below. EC Commissioner Deniau will be here on March 2 and 3. Shortly after this visit, we propose to send Deputy Under Secretary Samuels to Western Europe, possibly accompanied by Ambassador Gilbert, to discuss this problem with senior officials of the Commission and EC governments. 3 During the Deniau visit and in the course of Mr. Samuels’ tour he would like to explore the following possibilities for dealing with the problem: —by bringing the agreements into accord with the GATT, i.e., by providing a plan and schedule leading to free trade areas or customs unions; —by agreeing on an interim basis to treat the countries as beneficiaries under the generalized preference scheme and not demand reverse preferences from them; —by obtaining adjustments or compensation in those sectors where our trade interests would be significantly affected. He would explore with the Community their intentions with respect to future agreements in the hope of getting them to impose a limit on their proliferation. In the course of Mr. Samuels’ visit on the above subject, he will also carry out his original intention in visiting Europe at this time; namely, to discuss the U.S. generalized preference proposal for the less developed countries with the EC Commission and the member governments. His intention is to explore fully various possible ways of bridging the differences between the U.S. and the EC on the generalized preference question. Elliot L. Richardson 4 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 48. Confidential. A typed note on the memorandum reads: “UnSec handed original to WH/Kissinger at luncheon 2/26/70 per Mel Levitsky.” It was forwarded to Richardson under cover of a February 25 memorandum from Trezise, Hillenbrand, and Sisco. (Ibid.) 2 Regarding NSSM 46, see Document 224 . NSSM 82 is dated November 6, 1969. 3 In a March 27 memorandum Kissinger responded to Richardson’s memorandum. Referring to the proposed travel of Samuels and Gilbert to Europe, Kissinger indicated he had discussed the matter with the President, who fully shared Richardson’s concerns but did not want any such travel until the administration had adopted a position on the proposed preferential arrangements. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 227. National Security Decision Memorandum 45 227. National Security Decision Memorandum 45 1 Washington, March 2, 1970. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Agriculture The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations SUBJECT U.S. Policy Toward Spain: Proposed Spanish Trade Agreement with the European Community The President has decided that the United States will oppose the Spain-European Community trade agreement as presently proposed, in the context of opposition to all preferential arrangements illegal under the international trading rules of the GATT. We would, however, indicate our acceptance of any arrangement consistent with the GATT rules which Spain and the EC might work out, such as one which provides a definite plan and schedule for the formation of a free trade area within a reasonable length of time. The United States would not seek compensation in return for accepting such a legal arrangement, nor would it seek exception of particular items from the arrangement. The President also decided that there was no need for any decision on a fallback position at this time. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 45. Secret. 228. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 228. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 11, 1970. SUBJECT Possible Reversal of Decision on EC-Spain Preferential Trade Arrangement; And Broader Issue of U.S. Policy on All Such Arrangements Spain-EC Arrangement Per our discussion of this morning, at Tab I is a memorandum for the President on the Spain-EC trade arrangement. 2 Before you sign it, I think you should know fully the sequence of events on the issue. After the President decided over the weekend to reverse his earlier decision, to give Spain and the EC time to bring their arrangement into conformity with the international trading rules of GATT, 3 State decided to soften the effects of its end-run by clearing the new position with the bureaucracy. Two major problems resulted from the whole affair. First, the bureaucratic. STR Gilbert, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture were initially extremely unhappy with the change: substantively (see next paragraph), because they had no role in it, and because their clearly expressed views were completely overridden. They could not understand how the President made one decision when presented the full range of options and agency views but then, despite no change in the situation and on the basis of one agency’s informal advice, reversed himself and chose a course that had previously been almost unanimously rejected by the agencies, including State. Second, the substantive. The revised decision was originally interpreted by our trade policy community as a complete reversal of the earlier position, and they were right. A three-year moratorium on adverse U.S. reaction to the deal, while it technically reserves our rights, in practice permits the arrangement to get so far along that it will be impossible to stop it. The decision was thus Option 1 of the original Review Group paper: only pro forma U.S. opposition to the deal. 4 This option was rejected by all agencies, except Defense, in the decision-making process. However, State then added two caveats to pacify the trade people: their proposed cable would have allowed us to seek specific changes in the deal to mitigate the trade impact on the United States, and they would require Spain and the EC to get a GATT waiver to proceed with the illegal deal in the interim period. This combination gives the trade agencies a hunting license to nitpick Spain and the EC to death, and even to try to gut the substance of the deal—which they could do, for example, by trying to reduce or even eliminate any EC preference on Spanish citrus. Except for Agriculture, they are thus now willing to buy the modified State position. Their acquiescence reflects precisely the resultant problem which we now face. Originally, we were to stand on principle and bar haggling on specifics. Now, State would have us cave on principle but permit haggling on specifics. It is by no means clear that we would get more points with Spain with the change. But the main result is confusion. Treasury and Agriculture have raised legitimate questions about what the decision means in practice. It would certainly be interpreted differently by different agencies. At a minimum, this approach should be examined much more carefully before we sally forth with it as the U.S. position. (Samuels told me that the three-year moratorium, which was his idea, was completely spontaneous and he has not yet thought it through.) Even more basically, this decision is being made through negotiation of cable language—precisely the way which our system was designed to eliminate. It would be impossible to retain the credibility of the NSC process in the eyes of the economic agencies if we proceed that way. State now realizes this, and suggests—after you passed on my appraisal of their present position to Richardson today 5 —that we overrule the economic agencies by issuing a NSDM which guts the caveats negotiated by State! I would personally prefer a reaffirmation of the President’s original decision, both substantively, and to maintain the integrity of our process. However, I gather that the President may prefer a softer position. To achieve that end in the best way and to re-regularize the process, I therefore recommend that you recommend that the President defer any decision on Spain now, rolling the issue into a general review of our policy on EC preferential trade arrangements. 6 Such a review should be triggered in any event, as I indicate below, and could be done in about two weeks: —The delay would get everybody operating on one wave length and, at the same time, preserve our process. —The ultimate decision for a softer position could then still come out precisely as you worked out over the weekend. —Promulgation now of the decision reached over the weekend would doubly incense the economic agencies, not only bypassing them in the first place but overriding the changes which subsequently pacified them—and we would be blamed for overriding the caveats accepted by State. —There is no real urgency in conveying a soft U.S. position, since it will not affect the EC-Spain outcome. (In fact, Alex Johnson thinks it would be better for the base talks to hold off any softening of our position on the EC arrangement.) —The one problem is that we would not be able to discuss our position with Lopez Bravo when he is here next week, and he has indicated that he wishes to talk about the EC deal with us; however, there are plenty of other things to talk about and we can justify such a stance by noting that we only learned the details of his proposed arrangement a few days earlier (probably March 12 or 13). Proposed Samuels/Gilbert Trip to Europe Under Secretary Richardson, almost simultaneously, has proposed a Samuels/Gilbert trip to Europe to discuss the overall issue of EC preferential deals (and to try to line up European support for our generalized preferences plan) (Tab II). 7 The Under Secretary correctly notes that we will face the Spain-EC problem all over again on a host of other deals: Israel, Austria, UAR, Lebanon, etc. In each case, our political and commercial interests will cut in opposite ways. In addition, it will be extremely difficult to dissuade the Community from proceeding on each. The Under Secretary therefore proposes Samuels and Gilbert explore, with the Community, three possibilities for dealing with the problem: —Making the deals consistent with GATT; —Having the EC treat the countries as “advance” beneficiaries under the generalized preferences plan, not demanding reverse preferences from them; —Seeking to obtain adjustments in the specifics of the arrangements to minimize adverse trade effects on the United States. I think it would be a serious mistake to let Samuels and Gilbert go to Europe on such a mission without clear policy guidance. Neither of them, particularly Gilbert, is sensitive to the President’s overall European policy. They even disagree with each other on the issues. We have no general policy on EC preferential deals. And Samuels also wants to discuss a modified position on generalized preferences, which has not yet been mentioned to the agencies and would require Presidential decision. (Samuels is now preparing a paper, on which he will seek agency approval for his changes and then submit to the President.) 8 I therefore recommend that you recommend to the President that any such trip be deferred. If he approves, you could sign the memorandum for Richardson at Tab III, 9 indicating that the President does not think the time is right for a Samuels/Gilbert mission on these trade issues, and issue a new NSSM (Tab IV), calling for options in the preferential deals to supplement the NSSM 79 (Tab V) work on UK accession. 10 (Both Tabs III and IV assume that you approve my proposal on deferring any decision on Spain. If you reject my proposal, I will need to do a slight rewrite of them.) Recommendations: 1. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I, recommending (a) that he defer any decision on the Spain-EC preferential trade arrangement until it can be considered, along with all such proposed preferential arrangements, in about two weeks and (b) that there be no mission to Europe before we reach a policy decision on the overall issue. 2. That, if the President approves, you inform Under Secretary Richardson that the President does not think the time is right for a Samuels/Gilbert trip to Europe on the issue of these preferential arrangements, partly because we have no overall position on them, by signing the memorandum at Tab III and the new NSSM (to get a position) at Tab IV. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 338, HAK/ELR Meetings 1/70-3/70. Secret. Drafted by Bergsten and concurred in by Sonnenfeldt. This memorandum and its attachments form Tab A to a March 13 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, regarding his lunch with Richardson that day. No record of the luncheon discussion was found. 2 Drafted by Bergsten on March 11; not printed. No evidence has been found that the memorandum went to the President. It reported a State Department proposal for reconsideration of NSDM 45 ( Document 227 ), specifically to give Spain and the EC a 3-year window to bring their preferential trade agreement into conformity with GATT rules. 3 March 7-8. Reference is to NSDM 45. 4 See Document 222 . 5 Not further identified. 6 NSDM 68, “Policy Towards the Economic Community,” July 3, 1970, is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305. See also Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 42 – 47 . 7 Document 226 . 8 Not further identified. 9 Not printed. A memorandum with much the same substance was sent on March 27; see footnote 2, Document 226 . 10 Neither printed. 229. Editorial Note 229. Editorial Note At the NSC meeting on April 9, 1969, the President had decided to establish a Commission to “review the entire range of trade and production relationships among countries” (see Tab A to Document 195 ). In his November 18, 1969, trade message to Congress the President publicly announced that intent (see footnote 2, Document 213 ). On March 4, 1970, Henry Kissinger sent the President a memorandum informing him that the Commerce Department, the Office of the Special Trade Representative, and other agencies, including the State Department, favored Honeywell Board Chairman James Binger as Chairman of the Commission. Kissinger added that they recommended former IBM President Albert Williams if Binger could not accept. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume I) On March 9 the President initialed his approval of Binger as Chairman and Williams as a back-up candidate. Williams and Bergsten met with the President from 11:48 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. on April 6. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) In an April 8 memorandum, Fred Bergsten provided Kissinger with a memorandum of the President’s April 6 conversation with Albert Williams, whose appointment as Chairman of the Trade Commission had been announced on April 7. Bergsten included a roster of possible members of the Commission. (Ibid.) For the April 7 announcement of Williams’ appointment as Chairman of the President’s Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , 1970, page 500, and Department of State Bulletin , June 1, 1970, page 699. Regarding the membership of the Commission see ibid., June 15, 1970, pages 752-753. 230. Editorial Note 230. Editorial Note On May 11, 1970, Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee began hearings on foreign trade. Among the matters before the Committee were the administration’s trade proposals sent to Congress November 18, 1969 (see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pages 940-946), and proposals for shoe and textile quotas, the Mills Bill. Six administration witnesses were scheduled for the first week, beginning with Gilbert on May 11 and Stans on May 12. A series of memoranda dated from May 6 to 12, from Fred Bergsten to Henry Kissinger, some with attachments from the principals setting forth their positions, briefed Kissinger and reminded him of the need for decisions. (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 399, Textiles Volume II) On May 7 Bergsten reported to Kissinger that Paul McCracken had convened a meeting that day at which all agencies agreed that the administration should oppose shoe quotas. The unresolved issue was textile quotas, and Peter Flanigan and Bergsten were preparing an options paper for the President. The Commerce and possibly Agriculture Departments recommended against opposing textile quotas on the grounds that opposition would undercut the ongoing negotiations with Japan, but other agencies, including the State and Labor Departments, favored opposing textile quotas at that time, stressing the preference for a voluntary solution, which they expected to achieve. On May 6 Bergsten had reminded Kissinger that he had agreed to develop a position on shoes, and set out four options: 1) support the Mills Bill, with sharp cutbacks on imports, which the Commerce Department supported to maintain pressure on the Japanese negotiations, but which the State Department opposed on foreign policy grounds, believing that Sato’s commitment and not the fear of legislation was the only hope of agreement with the Japanese; 2) submit the administration’s own quota bill with more moderate restraints; 3) take no position pending the outcome of the Japanese negotiations; and 4) oppose quotas, as proposed by the State Department. On May 11 Bergsten informed Kissinger that Under Secretary Richardson would be calling him shortly to protest an addition to the textile quota position Kissinger had worked out with Flanigan and Stans: the President would not veto a textile quota bill if Congress passed one. The Department of State feared that a Commerce Department amendment that would limit quotas only to Asian countries would be doubly damaging to relations with Japan. Bergsten informed Kissinger that Richardson would recommend that Secretary Rogers call the President if Kissinger would not agree to a change. (Ibid.) The President did call Richardson the morning of May 11. He had earlier called and talked briefly to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs William Sullivan; no record of those discussions has been found. Kissinger did not see the President until later that morning. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) On May 12 Bergsten reported to Kissinger that Stans had read to the House Ways and Means Committee the statement that Kissinger and Flanigan had agreed on: “Recent action, which I cannot detail, leads us to believe more strongly than ever that such agreements can be successfully concluded in the next several weeks. Therefore, the Administration requests the Congress to defer consideration of the textile portion of the Mills Bill for several weeks. If at the end of this period our expectations prove to be wrong and we are unsuccessful in negotiating voluntary agreements, we will at that time consider the matter with Congress.” Stans told the Committee he expected at least one successful agreement by the second week of June when the hearings were scheduled to end, and Bergsten expressed his opinion that that was the deadline for getting at least a voluntary agreement with the Japanese. He also informed Kissinger that both Gilbert and Stans had stated the administration would oppose shoe quotas and would propose a domestic action program for that industry instead. 231. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 231. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Trade Hearings and Textiles Quota Legislation Textile Quota Legislation: Background Administration witnesses will testify next week before the Ways and Means Committee on trade legislation. 2 Their main effort will be in support of the trade bill which you submitted last November. However, they will also have to take positions on the bill submitted by Chairman Mills. The agencies have agreed positions on all aspects of the Mills bill except one: its provision for immediate implementation of quotas on imports of woolen and synthetic textiles. Under the Mills bill the quota for 1970 would equal the average of 1967-68 imports, which would reduce imports from current levels by an annual rate of about $330 million. The quota, however, would be superseded by any voluntary agreements which might subsequently be negotiated. All agencies continue to prefer voluntary agreements. The difference between the three options is essentially tactical. However, there are significant differences between the policy implications of the three options. Option 1. Oppose the mandatory textile quotas included in the Mills bill at this time, indicating a clear preference for voluntary agreements and indicating that we expect our negotiations to be successful. If voluntary agreements cannot be negotiated, we will consult with the Congress on appropriate means to deal with the textile problem. This position is supported by State, Labor, Budget, CEA and STR Gilbert. PROS: —Avoids basic reversal of your (and traditional U.S.) trade policy, which has consistently opposed quota restrictions. —Thereby avoids major foreign policy problems, especially with Europe and Japan. —Since a quota bill will probably pass if the Administration supports it, foreigners could legally cut off up to $330 million of U.S. exports if all countries chose to retaliate instead of negotiate. It could thereby cause us major political problems with our exporters (especially in agriculture, since the Europeans would welcome an excuse to restrict our soybean exports and the Japanese could easily cut off our wheat sales to them). —Administration support for textile quotas risks Congressional passage of quota bills for additional industries, which would be politically difficult for us to oppose because some have stronger economic cases than does the textile industry. (This would be particularly true for shoes, which are included for quota protection in the Mills bill but which all agencies have agreed to oppose.) —Textile quotas would diminish our chances for reductions in Japanese barriers against U.S. exports. —Administration has other levers to use in negotiations for voluntary agreements. CONS: —Will provide charges of bad faith from the textile and apparel industry in view of your commitments to them and the failure thus far of our negotiating efforts. —Will therefore hurt the Administration in some areas in the coming campaign. —Commerce argues that it would virtually eliminate our leverage in our efforts to seek voluntary restraint agreements. State argues that it would not significantly reduce our leverage, because we would indicate explicitly that we will consult with Congress on a solution to the textile problem if our negotiations fail. —Risks losing Administration leverage to influence specifics of the legislation if Congress were to proceed anyway. Option 2. Defer at this time consideration of the mandatory textile quotas in the Mills bill, indicating a clear preference for voluntary agreements and indicating that we expect our negotiations to be successful. If voluntary agreements cannot be negotiated in the next few months, we will consider this matter with the Congress. This position is supported by Treasury and Agriculture. PROS and CONS are similar to Option 1 with the exception that the language will provide somewhat more leverage on the Japanese to negotiate a solution and also provide somewhat more reassurance to the textile industry as to the Administration’s intentions. In addition, it conforms to your commitment to support legislation if negotiations fail. Option 3. While reaffirming our preference for voluntary agreements and indicating that we continue to believe that a negotiated solution may be possible, note that such a solution cannot now be assured and that the Administration therefore does not oppose the textile quota legislation proposed by Mills, which authorizes voluntary agreements to supersede mandatory quotas. We would seek inclusion of an amendment to give us flexibility to waive quotas on non-disruptive imports, which would permit us to exempt imports from Canada and Europe. Commerce, Attorney General Mitchell, Bryce Harlow, Harry Dent, and Bill Timmons support this position. Separate memoranda from Secretary Stans and Harry Dent, supporting Option 3 and elaborating on the political consequences of not choosing it, are attached at Tabs A and B. 3 PROS: —Would satisfy the textile and apparel industry, cotton and wool growers, and labor unions in the industry. —Maximizes our negotiating leverage with the foreigners to get voluntary agreements, increasing our chance to avoid quotas. —Administration might well be able to stop the bill, later in the legislative process, when voluntary agreements are concluded. —Proposed amendment would permit limiting the quotas to countries with whom we are now negotiating, thereby reducing the retaliation problem. (Japan would be the main possibility, but it also is subject to retaliation by us due to its many illegal quota restrictions.) [CONS?] —Causes major foreign policy problems, which would be greatly magnified in Asia by actual application of quotas only against Asian countries. —Risks domestic political problems with U.S. exporters fearing harm from foreign retaliation. —Gives us little defense against efforts by additional industries to get quota protection, which is likely to ensue in Congressional deliberations. —Could lead to your facing a “Christmas tree” bill including quotas on shoes, electronics, and numerous other items. —The 1967-1968 base for quotas in the Mills bill runs counter to our stated objective of limiting the growth of, but not rolling back, textile imports. —Quotas would make the fight against domestic inflation more difficult. Recommendation: That you choose Option 2. The Administration’s preference is to defer at this time consideration of the mandatory textile quota provision of the Mills bill, but with a clear commitment to consider this matter with the Congress if voluntary agreements cannot be negotiated in the next few months. Peter Flanigan joins me in this recommendation, as do Treasury and Agriculture. State, Labor, Budget, CEA and STR Gilbert recommend Option 1. You should note that Secretary Stans, Attorney General Mitchell, Bryce Harlow, Harry Dent, and Bill Timmons strongly recommend Option 3. Approve Option 1 Approve Option 2 4 Approve Option 3 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 399, Textiles Volume II. No classification marking. A handwritten note by Butterfield reads: “K—The President signed the letter to Mills (Tab C)—& letter taken to Hill at 9:50 am May 11.” See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , pp. 427-430, for the text of the letter, which outlines the President’s trade plans but does not address the textile quota issue. A June 5 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger concerning an industry-Congressional meeting with the President on June 8 regarding textiles is attached. Regarding the meeting, see Document 233 . 2 The Congressional hearings began on May 11; see Document 230 . 3 Not attached. 4 The President initialed this option, and the date of May 11 is handwritten next to it. 5 Another copy of this memorandum is attached to an undated, handwritten note from Butterfield to Haldeman that reads: “This is a 2-part action paper. The President saw and acted on the 1st part—but missed the page bearing ‘clip’. Flanigan needs signed letter to Wilbur Mills by 10 AM.” At the bottom is typed: “The letter should bear the date of: May 11, 1970 and returned to C.F. Bergsten (NSC) for hand delivery.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 399, Textiles, Volume II) See footnote 1 above. 232. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon 232. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 14, 1970. SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries—Chairman’s Report NSDM 29 of October 31, 1969 2 recorded your decision that the U.S. participate in a system of tariff preferences for developing countries, subject to Congressional approval. The decision in NSDM 29 set forth the following conditions to govern U.S. participation: 1. The scheme should be liberal, conferring the maximum range of benefits on the developing countries. Preferential duties should be set at zero. 2. For manufactured and semi-manufactured products, the scheme should except from preferential treatment only textiles, shoes, and petroleum and petroleum products. 3. The scheme should be simple, relying on the standard escape clause and adjustment assistance as safeguards for domestic industry. 4. All major developed countries must adopt a common scheme. 5. If duty-free treatment cannot be achieved, we should exclude from our preferences countries which receive selective preferences in developed country markets for products covered by the scheme. 6. Developing countries should eliminate reverse preferences which discriminate against the United States to become beneficiaries of U.S. preferences. In your speech on Latin America last October 31, 3 you announced your support for granting generalized preferences to the less developed countries. Subsequently, we have engaged in discussions with the European Community (EC) and other major developed countries in an effort to persuade them to adopt a common scheme incorporating the major elements of our proposal. We have concentrated our effort largely on the EC, since what we and they do is likely to set the pattern for the other donor countries. The EC has proposed a tariff-quota (or “preferential ceiling”) scheme providing for duty-free treatment of manufactured and semi-manufactured products without exceptions but with an annual ceiling on the quantity of any item that may be imported at the preferential rates. Beyond the ceilings MFN rates would apply. The EC has told us informally that it intends to administer its system flexibly, i.e., the ceilings would be applied from the outset only on a list of sensitive products and would be applied on other products only when preferential imports cause or threaten injury to domestic producers. It is unwilling, however, to consider changing the basic framework of its scheme and adopting a non-ceiling type approach—on the grounds that in the circumstances of the Community, its scheme is the one best calculated to be administered in a liberal fashion. Japan has adopted a more rigid ceiling-type approach and seems firmly committed to it. We have concluded, therefore, that we will be unable to achieve our goal of adoption by all major donors of a common scheme along the lines of the U.S. proposal. The LDCs tend to favor our non-ceiling approach but are not inclined to oppose openly the EC proposal. In general, the LDCs are urging donors to liberalize their respective proposals, to implement them promptly, and to rely on review procedures to determine any desired modifications in the light of operating experience. This appears to be the view of some of the major developed countries as well. In view of this situation, a working group under Deputy Under Secretary Samuels’ chairmanship has reviewed possible courses of action. 4 The agencies differ as to the course we should follow. The two basic options are: Option 1 . Obtain agreement among the donors to permit those who wish to do so to proceed with their individual schemes and simultaneously to set up review machinery in the OECD which will ascertain whether the various schemes are achieving in practice an equitable sharing of burdens. Under this option, we would maintain the essential elements of our present proposal, except for commonality, as the basis for an approach to the Congress. (State, STR, and CEA favor this option.) Option 2 . Seek adoption by all major donors of a liberalized version of the EC scheme through a more generous formula for calculation of the preferential ceilings. Our basic exceptions list would be retained but its contents might be reduced because of the safeguard provided by the availability of the preferential ceilings. These ceilings would be invoked automatically only on sensitive products, with the escape clause being used to invoke the ceilings on other commodities. If it were not possible to secure a liberalized ceiling formula, we would nevertheless accept the EC’s basic preferential ceiling approach. (Treasury, Interior, Commerce, and Labor favor this option.) In supporting Option 1, State, STR, and CEA believe that you should adhere to your previous decision to adopt a liberal scheme without ceilings but should give up the requirement for adoption of a common scheme by all major donors—a position strongly supported by the Peterson Task Force. In the view of these agencies: —There is a serious risk of dissipating the good will of the LDCs if we hold up the implementation of a generalized preference system by continuing to insist on commonality. —A common scheme is not attainable in any event. The U.S. could not accept the EC scheme and it is unlikely the Japanese would liberalize their scheme sufficiently to meet the criterion of commonality. Some of the other donors have serious reservations about the tariff quota approach. —The Administration is effectively barred by domestic political considerations from abandoning our exceptions list and escape clause procedures. Thus, the only realistic alternative we have to maintaining our present non-ceiling proposal is to add quantitative ceilings to our other safeguards (our exceptions list and escape clause procedures)—thereby moving from our present proposal to a position more restrictive than that of the EC. —If we should now move to a more restrictive position, we would have no leverage to persuade other donors such as the EC and Japan to liberalize their schemes. We would also risk bearing the onus for a generally more restrictive preference system if the EC should use the U.S. action as an excuse to add an exceptions list to its present scheme. —For the United States to move to a more restrictive scheme by embracing tariff quotas would cause sharp disappointment among LDCs, notably in Latin America, and would be viewed as a retreat from our role of leadership on this issue. —The arguments that were put forward against the tariff quota approach last fall are still persuasive. In particular, it would be dangerous for the Administration to lend support to the concept of tariff quotas as a useful trade policy device by advocating a preference system based on them. —The U.S. scheme will require Congressional approval and the Administration is therefore unable to give other donors assurances that any commitments we might enter into will be carried out. Furthermore, Congress would undoubtedly be extremely critical of any international agreement negotiated in advance without Congressional authorization. —Adoption of Option 1 would not preclude the possibility of reconsidering Option 2 at a later date if this were essential to securing Congressional approval of a generalized preference scheme. —Congress is likely to look closely at the question of burden sharing. In this connection, a common approach may have presentational value but it would not ensure equitable burden sharing. It is not possible to estimate with any precision in advance the actual trade impact on individual donors. The EC scheme, if administered flexibly, as EC officials indicate they intend, may well yield results roughly comparable to our own. The proposed OECD review procedures would enable us to observe over time the strengths and weaknesses of each system and to draw conclusions about the desirability of continuing in this framework. —The Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) will meet in Paris on May 20-22 and preferences will be one of the major topics on the agenda. The Secretary-General and some of the LDCs are urging the donors to announce a policy decision on implementation of generalized preferences at this meeting. It would be highly desirable for our representative to announce at that meeting (a) that we are prepared to support the idea of early implementation of individual schemes and do not insist on commonality, and (b) that we intend to consult with Congress at the earliest appropriate time on a legislative proposal based on our present non-ceiling approach. In supporting Option 2, Treasury, Interior, Commerce , and Labor believe that we should now strive for adoption by all major donors of a liberalized version of the EC preferential ceiling approach. They would indicate to the EC and other OECD countries that the United States is prepared to consider adopting the EC scheme. In so doing, they would favor exploring the possibilities of agreement with the EC and Japan to liberalize the formula for determining the preferential ceiling. Under this plan it is proposed that ceilings on preferential imports would be automatically invoked only for a limited number of sensitive U.S. commodities; the escape clause would be used to invoke the ceilings on the other commodities. However, it should be noted that the EC method of merely accepting any EC country’s claim of injury in imposing a ceiling is not so rigorous as the U.S. escape clause. With respect to exceptions, they believe that although we cannot allow unlimited preferential access for textiles, shoes, petroleum and petroleum products, it may be possible to reduce the contents of our present exceptions list through application of the ceiling safeguard. In the case of textiles many items will have to be excepted from a U.S. scheme. On the other hand, crude petroleum could be excluded from the scheme as a primary product, and shoes and petroleum products, as well as certain textile items, might be handled by placement on the sensitive list. There are also other possibilities for liberalizing within the context of an EC-type scheme so as to offset the need for an extensive exceptions list. In any event, the EC is unlikely under any circumstance to add an exceptions list to its proposal. In the view of these agencies: —A common scheme along these lines is attainable. There is little doubt that if the United States were to adopt the EC scheme or some variation on it, the other major donor countries would quickly go along. —A decision to adopt this approach would improve the prospects for persuading the EC and Japan to liberalize their schemes. Total benefits to the LDC would be greater from universal adoption of a liberalized EC scheme than from adoption of the individual schemes currently contemplated by major donors. While the LDCs would undoubtedly have preferred adoption of a common scheme based on the U.S. proposal, you would nevertheless be applauded by the LDCs for achieving liberalization of the EC scheme. —Reduction of the contents of our basic exceptions list would also be acclaimed by the LDCs. —A common scheme is essential to alleviate Congressional and public concern about burden sharing. The Administration would be accused of playing a “numbers game” if we tried to justify equitable burden sharing under two completely different types of schemes by references to trade impact data. —Congressional rejection or substantial modification of an individual U.S. scheme would create significant LDC disappointment and embarrassment—a risk not worth taking. —The availability of a mechanism to trigger preferential ceilings automatically on sensitive products would substantially improve the changes of favorable Congressional action with a minimum of delay. —Ceilings on preferential imports of sensitive items would avoid, to a large extent, difficult political decisions required in ad hoc escape clause cases. —Once different national schemes are put into effect, there will be little real chance of obtaining changes necessary to equalize burden sharing. Agriculture does not feel called upon to take a position on these options since, in general, agricultural commodities would be given separate and special treatment under all schemes. All agencies agree that we should continue to insist on the elimination of reverse preferences but, if necessary, we could agree to the phasing out of these preferences over the life of the Yaounde Convention, which terminates in 1975. (Our preferential arrangements with the Philippines under the Laurel-Langley Agreement terminates in 1974.) Action Requested 5 A. Basic Approach: Approve Option 1 Approve Option 2 B. Reverse Preferences: May U.S. negotiators, while continuing to insist on the elimination of reverse preferences, concede reasonable phase-out periods not to extend beyond 1975 to achieve this goal? Approve Disapprove ELR 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 837, NSC/USC Memos. Confidential. Drafted by Leary (E/ITP), and cleared in E, S/PC, and D and in Commerce, Treasury, CEA, Interior, Labor, STR, and USDA. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a May 14 memorandum from Richardson informing him it pertained to the OECD Ministerial of May 20-22, at which the Secretary General would press for a resolution of the issue. Richardson urged Kissinger to obtain a Presidential decision by May 20. 2 Document 218 . 3 Reference is to the President’s speech to the annual meeting of the Inter-American Press Association. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 , pp. 893-901. 4 A draft of a paper prepared pursuant to this review had been circulated to members of the Working Group under cover of a May 8 memorandum from Samuels informing them he planned to submit it to the President on May 12. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSSM 29) 5 None of the options is checked, but a cover note indicates that Davis informed R.L. Brown that on May 20 the President approved Option I under A. Basic Approach and B. Reverse Preferences. She noted that appropriate White House documentation would follow; see Document 234 . 233. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons) and the President’s Special Counsel (Dent) to President Nixon 233. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons) and the President’s Special Counsel (Dent) to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 4, 1970. SUBJECT Textile Meeting Monday, June 8, 1970 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, Cabinet Room 2 Political Background A. In August 1968, the President met with key textile leaders at Mission Bay and agreed, in a subsequently published telegram, 3 to better enforce the long-term cotton textile agreement brought about under President Kennedy’s Administration and to extend the same concept of voluntary agreements with foreign countries to man-made and woolen textile product imports. We have enforced the cotton agreement very well and just negotiated a three-year extension of the cotton agreement. B. Textile industry leaders raised a considerable sum which was used to run a special operation in key Southern states, all of which were carried except Georgia. C. This Administration has held approximately 150 conferences with foreign officials seeking a solution. In the meantime, Congressman Mills has introduced a textile-apparel-footwear trade bill to limit imports of textiles and shoes. The bill has 250 House sponsors. Sixteen of the 21 Chairmen of the House Standing Committees are sponsors, as are 14 of the 24 members of the Ways and Means Committee. Hearings are now being held, and Secretary Stans is scheduled to return by the middle of June to complete the testimony for the Administration. The industry is committed to stick with the legislation. 4 D. The legislation places emphasis on encouraging negotiated agreements by imposing specific import limitations only on those nations which do not enter into negotiated agreements with the U.S. Present agreements and any negotiated before and after the bill is passed will be honored. So, the negotiating job we do will determine, in effect, what kind of limitations the textile people have. E. All of the people present for the meeting are supporters of this Administration. Speaking principally for the industry will be Roger Milliken, the foremost Republican among them. F. The textile question is important in the Northeastern states, the wool-growing states of the West, and particularly in the Southeast (Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama). From a political standpoint, the lack of concrete results is being used by the Democrats against the Administration and GOP candidates. 5 William E. Timmons Harry S. Dent 6 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 335, Items to Discuss with the President 5/1/70-6/15/70. No classification marking. 2 The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from 11:12 a.m. to 12:38 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has been found. 3 Not further identified. 4 See Document 230 . 5 In a June 8 memorandum for the President’s use in the meeting, Kissinger noted that Stans would again testify on June 18, and Timmons and Dent believed he should say that if no agreement were reached by that date, he should “testify then that the Administration would not oppose quota legislation and it would not be vetoed under certain circumstances.” Kissinger suggested that the President, if pressed, follow this guidance: “if we are not able to reach a suitable agreement in the very near future, the Administration would not oppose such legislation. By June 18 we should either have an agreement or know definitively if one is about to be concluded. If neither is the case, Secretary Stans would testify that the Administration no longer opposes quota legislation providing it is strictly limited to textiles.” “The President has seen” is stamped on this memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 399, Textiles, Volume II) 6 Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures. 234. National Security Decision Memorandum 65 234. National Security Decision Memorandum 65 1 Washington, June 12, 1970. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries The President has decided to amend NSDM 29 as follows: 2 1. The United States will no longer insist that all major developed countries adopt a common scheme as a condition of U.S. participation in a system of generalized tariff preferences for the developing countries, subject to Congressional approval. This decision amends numbered paragraph 4 of NSDM 29. We will, of course, continue to insist on equitable burden sharing among the donor countries. 2. The elimination of reverse preferences which the U.S. will require of developing countries in order for them to benefit from U.S. tariff preferences may be phased out over a reasonable period of time, not to extend beyond 1975. This amends numbered paragraph 6 of NSDM 29. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 65. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the CEA Chairman, the AID Administrator, and the Budget Director. On May 21 the Department of State sent a telegram to Samuels at the OECD informing him of the substance of the soon-to-be-issued NSDM. AID Deputy Administrator Poats sent a copy of the telegram to Bergsten under cover of a May 22 note: “Cheers! You deserve a medal, which your anonymous role will deny you, for this.” (Telegram 77562 to USOECD; Washington National Records Center, Agency for International Development, Executive Secretariat Files: FRC 286 73 A 518, ECF 4 International Trade FY 1970 October 1969-April 1970) 2 Document 218 . The amendments are pursuant to recommendations in Document 232 . 235. Editorial Note 235. Editorial Note The Japanese Foreign and Trade Ministers were in Washington June 22-24, 1970, to review a number of items of mutual concern with their U.S. counterparts, including textiles. As reported in the June 24 joint statement at the conclusion of the talks, they were unable to reach agreement on textile imports to the United States. The principals recognized the importance of the issue, and expressed a desire to continue the discussions at an appropriate time in an effort to resolve the problem. (Department of State Bulletin , July 13, 1970, page 34) On that day the President also announced a program for assistance to the footwear industry, pursuant to Gilbert’s and Stans’ testimony on May 11 and May 12. (Ibid., July 20, 1970, pages 91-93) Regarding their testimony, see Document 230 . On June 24, June 29, and July 2 Fred Bergsten sent memoranda to Henry Kissinger warning him of the dangers of a protectionist outcome, and suggesting that the President meet with Congressmen Mills and Byrnes to limit the bill that the House Ways and Means Committee would report out. On July 2 he also informed Kissinger that Mills had recently adjourned the hearings until July 7. The June 24 memorandum is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 399, Textiles Volume II; the other two are ibid., Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. On July 2 Bergsten sent a separate memorandum to Kissinger informing him that senior European Community officials had visited Washington July 1-2 to consult on trade legislation. The EC officials were concerned about quota legislation on textiles and possibly other items, which they feared, as quoted by Bergsten, “could lead to a new trend in world trade policy.” The Community requested and the U.S. side agreed to unofficial quadripartite consultations with Great Britain and Japan under GATT auspices in Geneva, a proposal the United States had rejected 3 weeks earlier in order not to jeopardize negotiations with Japan. Bergsten added that Mills had concurred when informed of the forthcoming consultations, and the EC had agreed the agenda was open for U.S. grievances against other participants as well. (Ibid., Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70) In a July 2 memorandum to President Nixon, Kissinger requested a decision on resolving agency differences on textile quota legislation: “The agencies agree that we should seek an amendment to the pending textile quota legislation, which we support, to give the President flexibility to waive the quotas for imports which are not disruptive. However, they differ on how the amendment should read. Commerce wants authority to waive quotas both by product category and country, while State wants to limit the authority to product categories in order to avoid pressures to use a broader authority for country discrimination.” Kissinger was particularly concerned about retaliatory steps and a trade war if quotas were applied against Europe. Kissinger recommended (and indicated Flanigan and Timmons concurred) the Commerce Department approach, and he initialed the President’s approval on the memorandum. (Ibid., Box 399, Textiles, Volume II) 236. Statement Issued by the White House 236. Statement Issued by the White House 1 Washington, June 24, 1970. The President today announced a program of assistance to non-rubber footwear firms and workers in the United States. The program has three major components: —Initiation by the President of an investigation by the Tariff Commission, under the escape clause provision of the Trade Expansion Act, of the impact of increased imports on the men’s and women’s leather footwear industry. 2 —A series of domestic Government measures to deal directly with the various problems faced by some footwear firms and workers. —Authority for the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Commerce to proceed on each of the six adjustment assistance cases on which the Tariff Commission recently completed investigations. The President’s program was developed from the findings of an inter-agency task force organized to make an extensive study of the footwear problem with particular attention to the impact of import competition. The study is being released today. 3 This study concludes that many producers are able to meet competition but that some face problems from a number of sources. One of these has been the recent, rising volume of imported footwear. Other problems were found to include technological, organizational and marketing changes, shifts in the location of production away from traditional manufacturing areas, and rapid changes in the demand for footwear, with increasing emphasis upon style. Some firms, the task force found, now need to modernize, rationalize their production, possibly change their product lines, and otherwise improve their competitive ability. It reported that such firms would be in difficulty from existing domestic competition regardless of the level of imports. The task force reported that the facts and information available to it did not demonstrate a case of overall import injury. However, the task force also noted its concern that, if all the necessary information were available, there might well be injury to the men’s and women’s leather footwear industry which has experienced a sharp increase in import competition. It pointed out that an investigation such as the Tariff Commission is authorized to conduct—with powers of subpoena, access to confidential business data, and public hearings—would provide a more comprehensive basis for judgment than was available to the task force. On the basis of the findings of the task force, the President has decided that import restraints are not the answer to the footwear problem. The Administration has therefore opposed legislated quotas on shoe imports. However, an investigation by the Tariff Commission under section 301(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 could provide a more comprehensive basis for judging the extent of any injury. The President is therefore requesting that the Commission investigate whether imports are causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the domestic men’s and women’s leather footwear industry. He hopes that the Tariff Commission, in light of the information assembled by the task force and its own two earlier section 332 investigations of non-rubber footwear, will expedite its report with a view to an early finding. This is the first occasion on which any President has asked for an escape clause investigation since the beginning of the trade agreements program in 1934. An affirmative finding under section 301 could make available to men’s and women’s leather footwear industry, its firms, and its workers the variety of forms of relief and assistance prescribed by the Congress in the 1962 Act. If the President’s proposed Trade Bill of 1969 is enacted by the Congress during the Tariff Commission’s investigation, its more liberal escape clause and adjustment assistance criteria will apply in this instance. The President also concluded that, notwithstanding the Tariff Commission investigation, Government measures are necessary to help certain footwear producers and workers, and the communities where footwear is an important source of income and employment. The President has accordingly directed the Secretary of Commerce to assume responsibility for a footwear program, in coordination with the other Cabinet officers who are members of the Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board or whose departments will be involved in this program. The President has directed that these federal agencies take action to improve the employability of footwear workers, to develop jobs for those displaced by the many changes now occurring within the domestic industry, to assist in the revitalization of the communities adversely affected, and to provide special assistance for affected firms. Among the programs to be undertaken will be the following: 1. The Department of Labor and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare will develop and provide special footwear programs within the framework of existing manpower retraining and development legislation, and will urge the individual States concerned to provide special attention in their own manpower programs. These efforts will seek to meet the special problems of footwear workers, taking into account the composition of the labor force in terms of age, sex, skill levels, and mobility. In areas where the problem is primarily one of shortages of skilled footwear workers, the objective will be to provide additional training opportunities; where unemployment is the primary problem, the objective will be retraining and adjustment to other jobs. 2. The Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce will develop programs to attract other industries to the communities heavily dependent upon shoe production. These programs will be developed in cooperation with the affected communities. The Economic Development Administration will also give consideration to requests for financing necessary public services to support new or expanding industries and to make loans directly to new businesses in these areas. 3. The Department of Transportation, when local authorities request its assistance, will provide financial assistance in establishing the commuter facilities authorized by the urban mass transportation program to provide or improve transportation facilities between areas of substantial unemployment and neighboring areas where job opportunities exist. 4. The Small Business Administration will expedite consideration of loan and other assistance requests from small shoe firms to help them in their adjustment problems. 5. The Secretary of Commerce, with the assistance of other members of the Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board, will undertake consultations with the footwear industry to develop any further measures of assistance found to be necessary. On the advice of the Department of Justice, the President has also concluded that he has the authority in the case of split decisions by the Tariff Commission in adjustment assistance cases to act on the findings of either group of Commissioners. He is, therefore, informing the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce that the decisions of the Tariff Commission in six recent cases are affirmative findings and that the Secretaries are authorized to consider certifications of the firms and workers involved under the terms of section 302(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, Nonrubber Footwear-White House Press Release, June 24, 1970. No classification marking. Issued by the Office of the White House Press Secretary. 2 See Document 212 . 3 The study has not been found. Documentation on the work of this task force is in the National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, Nonrubber Footwear, Financial Data. 237. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 237. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 8, 1970. SUBJECT Possible Crisis in Trade Policy Paul McCracken indicates at Tab B 2 that he fears we may be on the verge of a trade war with Europe and Japan, as a result of our decision to impose quotas on textile imports. 3 He notes that the Common Market has already implied the possibility of retaliation against our soybean exports, and that our wheat sales to Japan are also extremely vulnerable. Dr. McCracken also suggests that we make a concerted effort to set out a clear course for our foreign economic policy in view of the imminent trade problem, and expresses the hope that he will be able to discuss that suggestion with you shortly. (The Ash Council will shortly be making recommendations to you on our organization of foreign economic policy. I suggest that you defer any discussions on this topic until you receive their views.) 4 I fully agree with the substance of Dr. McCracken’s memorandum. Textile quotas alone will cause us serious foreign policy problems, and may lead to retaliation. If we can limit the quota legislation to textiles, however, we will sharply limit these risks. But there are strong Congressional pressures for broader protection. This is partly due to the normal protectionist effort, heightened in an election year; partly due to widespread feelings that other countries are cheating on the international trading rules; partly due to the slowdown of the domestic economy and the effects of inflation in stimulating imports; and partly due to feelings that textiles should not be singled out for favored treatment. The strongest candidate for quota protection beyond textiles is shoes, the only industry besides textiles in the Mills quota bill. We have opposed shoe quotas vigorously and announced an alternative program, but Mills has just reaffirmed that his bill will include them. The result would be: —A major confrontation with the European Community, which would probably retaliate on over $200 million of U.S. exports (probably in agriculture) even if we offered to provide compensation through other tariff reductions. —A possible blowup of our base negotiations with Spain, since shoes are Spain’s leading export to the U.S. and the Mills quotas would roll them back by about sixty percent. —New gains for the Communists in Italy, since shoe (and textile) production is centered in the “red belt” and our quotas (which would roll back Italian shoe exports to us by thirty percent) would clearly create serious new unemployment there—which would be blamed on the U.S. It is uncertain at this point whether the Ways and Means Committee will report out a bill including quotas on other industries, and/or an “orderly marketing” bill which would place limits on any imports which met certain statistical tests (growth rate of imports, imports as a percentage of domestic consumption, etc.). It is highly likely that the Senate will vote such a bill. Since the Ways and Means bill can only become more protectionist later in the legislative process, it is vital that it do a minimum amount of damage—to provide a basis for an acceptable compromise in conference. Broad-scale protectionist legislation would effectively destroy the free trade presumption of both U.S. policy and the international trading system. We would undoubtedly suffer massive retaliation in return. More importantly, the rest of the world would regard such a step as the most concrete possible sign of U.S. isolationism, replicating our policies of the 1930s. Its impact on our overall foreign policy would be devastating—in Europe, Japan and the less developed world. It is therefore essential to minimize the restrictiveness of the legislation which emerges from the Ways and Means Committee. Wilbur Mills and John Byrnes have been extremely cooperative with all previous Administrations on this score, but they need assurance that the Administration will play an active role in heading off restrictions. I therefore believe that the time has come for you to intervene personally with them, to try to limit the Ways and Means bill to textile quotas plus the Administration’s own trade proposals. Recommendation: That you invite Mills and Byrnes to call on you, to urge them to limit the pending trade bill to textile quotas and the Administration’s own proposals. They will consider the shoe quotas tomorrow, so the call or meeting should come immediately. Bryce Harlow, Peter Flanigan, Bill Timmons, Paul McCracken, and Special Trade Representative Gilbert concur. Talking points are at Tab A. 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Confidential. A note by the President, written under the date, reads: “Right after vote.” 2 McCracken’s July 2 memorandum is not printed. 3 Reference is to pending legislation that the administration decided not to veto; see footnote 3, Document 233 and Document 235 . 4 Regarding the Ash Council, see footnote 9, Document 134 . 5 Not printed. The Approve option is checked, and the President wrote below it: “incl S & K only & T.” 238. Memorandum of Conversation 238. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 9, 1970. President’s Meeting Thursday, July 9, 1970 ATTENDED BY The President Congressman Wilbur Mills Congressman John Byrnes Mr. Harlow Mr. Shultz Mr. McCracken Mr. Timmons Mr. Bergsten The President opened the discussion of pending trade legislation by indicating that he could not accept shoe quotas. They would cause major problems in our relations with Italy and Spain, and trigger retaliation. Chairman Mills replied that the President would have discretionary authority to apply the quotas, depending on whether there was market disruption. He still did not know whether shoes would be in the bill—but Congressman Byrnes interjected that he was sure they would be. Mills added there would also be an effort to legislate steel quotas, which would take effect if the present voluntary restraint agreements were not extended. Mills and Byrnes indicated that the emerging bill would give the President great flexibility. They had accepted every amendment proposed by the Administration. Mills would insist on a time limit for the quotas. Mills said he could pass a bill including textile quotas, shoe quotas, and a general authority to restrict imports in other industries in cases of market disruption. He expressed confidence that the bill would help obtain voluntary agreements on textiles, but admitted that shoe agreements would be difficult—here, though, the President could use the waiver authority to exclude a large portion of the imports. Mills added that he needed help from the Administration in getting rid of ASP and passing DISC, but that he wanted to do so—and in fact wanted to give the President everything he asked for. The President replied that he did want both ASP removal and DISC in the bill. In response, Mills noted that former Assistant Secretary of State Solomon had recommended that Congress send the ASP deal back to the President, and ask for a better package in return. Mr. Harlow asked whether it would be possible to limit the bill’s restrictions to a general authority to limit imports. Mills thought this was not a live option. The President indicated, however, that he would prefer such an approach, which would give him the desired bargaining position with the Japanese, and that the legislative history could indicate that the general authority was to be used within a certain period to deal with textile and shoe imports. He agreed with the Congressmen that Tariff Commission action often took too long to be of help. Mills indicated that there was a problem, since textiles could only show injury in limited areas. (In an aside, he remarked to the President that they had both been fooled by the textile industry, which had no case for overall protection.) Nevertheless, he could get seven or eight Democrats to support the general authority as a substitute for specific quotas. Byrnes indicated, however, that the Republicans would insist on adding the authority to specific quotas for shoes and textiles. Mills added that the law should include a rather restrictive base period for the quotas to help our negotiating position for voluntary agreements. Turning to the specifics of the proposed general authority, Mr. Shultz suggested that restrictions be generally authorized when the growth of imports exceeded some fixed rate, in lieu of any quotas on specific times. In response, Mills indicated his opposition to mathematical formulae and argued that the President should have the widest possible discretion. The Chairman expressed his confidence in the President, in contrast to his feeling that President Johnson would never have used such authority even in legitimate cases. Mills concluded that his Committee would make its decisions in the following week and get the bill out shortly thereafter. He assured the President that he would send up a bill which the President could sign. The President reiterated that he would prefer a general authority to quotas on shoes, textiles or any other specific industries. He noted that the authority must be credible to the domestic industry and the foreigners, but provide him with sufficient flexibility. The President pledged that, if given a general authority to implement quotas by the Committee, the Administration would negotiate extremely hard to get textile restraints and therefore fulfill the commitments made to that industry. At Mills’ request, the President also suggested that Dr. McCracken take part in the hearings on the following day. For the longer term, Mills concluded that we must assess whether traditional U.S. trade policy will work in the future, or indeed has been working since the mid-1960s. The President suggested that the new Productivity Commission might look at the issue. Mr. Bergsten added that the Williams Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy was already doing so. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume II 4/70-12/70. Confidential. Drafted by Bergsten on July 11. The meeting was held in the Oval Office from 4:40 to 6:02 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 239. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 239. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 14, 1970. SUBJECT Next Steps to Deal with Trade Situation Decisions After you left the meeting last night, 2 the group decided to adopt your proposal—to let the trade bill become a “Christmas tree” and veto it. The group also made the necessary corollary decision to take all steps necessary to try to avoid an override of the veto. It was unanimously agreed that there was no real alternative: —It would be impossible to avoid getting any legislation, since the Congressional momentum has gone so far. —No “deal” which we might possibly be able to make, such as accepting a “basket clause,” would be any good, even in place of mandatory quotas on particular items: it would catch too many items and would place the burden completely on the President. —As you said, it would not be possible to delay by starting up the negotiations again. 3 To begin to implement the strategy adopted, the following steps were decided: —A delegation (Stans, Flanigan, McCracken, Bergsten) will visit Congressman Byrnes today to reaffirm the President’s statement of last Thursday 4 that the bill courted veto even before yesterday’s action on ASP; the ASP step moved it closer to veto; 5 and that any additional protectionist amendments to the bill would continue the move in that direction. —Someone (probably Stans) will inform the textile industry that we are shocked by its failure to support our trade position in return for our support for textile quotas, and warn them that unless quota legislation is limited to textiles that they may wind up with no protection at all because of a veto. —Harlow, Flanigan and others will begin immediately to mobilize the free trade groups, retailers, etc. to publicize the disastrous implications of the pending legislation. —At Harlow’s suggestion, we should seek an early occasion for a Presidential statement on the issue: partly to try to head off the bill, but even more to begin preparing the public for a veto. 6 Harlow made two interesting comments after you left: that in his judgment this was the “most Presidential issue” which we now face, and that the eventual Presidential veto should be carried to the nation by television a la the veto of the HEW appropriations bill last January. Comments From the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy, successful implementation of this strategy would undoubtedly be the best outcome. Any bill that passes the present Congress at this time is bound to set back our trade and foreign policy severely. No bill—either by delay or by veto—would clearly be preferable. There are three significant risks to this strategy: —The bill may come in just lacking sufficient protection to justify a veto. —The politics of the situation will make the veto extremely difficult at the moment of decision, however many the items in it, because of textiles and the November election. —The veto may be overridden. You will thus probably have to make a major contribution to the effort to carry out the strategy. Needless to say, the enormous foreign policy implications of the issue justify your doing so. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Secret; Exdis. 2 Not further identified. 3 Presumably a reference to the failed Japanese bilaterals; see Document 235 . 4 July 9; see Document 238 . 5 The Committee apparently dropped repeal of ASP from the legislation, voiding a Kennedy Round commitment; see Document 243 . 6 During his press conference on July 20, the President said quotas were not in the interest of the United States as an exporting nation, but in view of the breakdown of talks with Japan and others on a voluntary textile quota agreement textile quotas would be acceptable; he said he would veto a bill, however, that applied to other sectors as well. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , p. 606) 240. Editorial Note 240. Editorial Note In his July 29, 1970, Evening Report to the President, Secretary of State Rogers reported that Carl Gilbert and Nathaniel Samuels would lead a small delegation to “confidential” quadripartite trade talks in Geneva July 31-August 1. Rogers noted that the meeting would not be a negotiation but a “frank exploration of a wide range of troublesome trade issues.” He also reported that Congressman Mills was fully informed and had no objection. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 64, Box 410, July 29, 1970) See also Document 235 . In his August 4 Evening Report, Rogers reported that Gilbert, Samuels, and Trezise “had unusually frank discussions with representatives of the EC, UK and Japan on a broad range of trade problems… . all the major issues were raised: U.S. legislation, European agricultural policies, Japanese trade and investment restrictions, and the spread of European Community preferential trading agreements… . Plenary discussion of the textile issue was limited, but GATT Director General Long did suggest, with broad support, establishment of a GATT working party to explore possibilities for a multilateral approach to cover all fibers after 1973.” Rogers believed the talks were probably the first in a continuing series of high-level, informal discussions. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 64, Box 410, August 4, 1970) 241. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 241. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, August 3, 1970, 1710Z. 8885. Subj: US Trade Policy. 1. Summary. The present atmosphere of protectionism at home and abroad threatens to lead the West into a serious crisis in trade relations, and thus poses grave dangers for our political and economic objectives in Europe and elsewhere in the world. Moreover, in the absence of new departures in policy, protectionism threatens to increase in intensity. In addition to the wave of protectionism in the US reflected in the House Ways and Means Committee, Japan continues to avoid its trade obligations, and the European Community remains steeped in its highly protective agricultural policies. The Community is pressing ahead with its proliferating system of preferences. The enlargement of the Community, which we favor, will involve trade diversion and also raises the issue of the Community’s trade relations with countries now linked to the applicant countries via preferences. In this context, I am convinced that we can only harm US commercial interests, as well as our broader political and economic interests, by protectionist action. In my view, the policy best designed to protect our interests should include a strong defense of our GATT rights, a renewed commitment to our GATT obligations and the early proposal of a Nixon Round of comprehensive trade negotiations. 2. The President’s reassuring statement regarding US trade policy 2 has been a source of considerable satisfaction in Germany. The Germans, and Europeans generally, hope that the President will be successful in stemming the tide of protectionism. For, as seen from Bonn, the dangers of a marked shift by the United States toward protectionism are of such a magnitude that it is difficult to exaggerate them. 3. German officials have made it clear that the Community would react initially to American quotas on its exports by retaliation, at a heavy cost to US domestic economic and political interests, particularly agriculture. They fear that retaliatory action may not be confined to one or two rounds and that a trade war may result. The adverse economic consequences of a trade war, including the impairment in the efficiency of world production, the reduction in economic growth and employment and the distortion of international trade patterns, need not be dwelt upon. But the adverse effects would not be limited to the economic front. Our political objectives within the Atlantic Alliance and elsewhere would be seriously threatened. 4. For Germany a trade confrontation in the West of such a magnitude would have serious implications for its Eastern policy and for political and security relations in Europe. Greater accommodation of Soviet entreaties would be a possible outcome. The Soviet Union is already pressing its case. As Pravda said on July 25: “Little Europe will be perhaps unable to break free from the American trap if it acts separately from other European countries. It would be quite different if all-European economic cooperation on the scale of the entire continent reached such proportions that would counterbalance the present ‘Atlantic’ orientation of Common Market countries.” 5. A trade confrontation would obviously hurt those dimensions of Atlantic interdependence that have been developed over the past 20 years based on mutual trust and cooperation. The Germans recognize these interdependencies, and over several years have assisted us in dealing with mutual problems. Without German cooperation, several international monetary crises in the recent past could have meant disaster for all. Moreover, protectionism in trade policy would not be without its nationalistic repercussions in industrial policy, balance of payments programs, and policies towards foreign investment. 6. In attempting, from Bonn, to assess the trade situation in which we find ourselves and to recommend courses of action, I hope I do not seem unmindful of the exceedingly difficult pressures in Washington. There is a confluence of forces in America today that provides a stronger impetus, and a seemingly more persuasive logic, to protectionism than we have seen for a long time. Among other factors, evidence of stubborn protectionism abroad has lead many to the conclusion that we should respond with protectionism of our own. 7. There are many present and prospective developments that will seem to support this conclusion. Japan is clearly not carrying its weight in international trade and investment. Canadian tariffs remain high. The EEC is bogged down in a massively expensive, highly protective agricultural system that greatly erodes its own and others’ abilities to take liberal trade policy initiatives. Additionally, the EEC continues to develop a system of preferential trade arrangements in Western Europe and around the Mediterranean basin. The enlargement of the Community, which we favor, will have trade diverting effects and also opens up questions about the nature of the trade relations between the enlarged Community and countries with preferential trade links to the applicant countries. 8. We face therefore an intensification of trade policy problems that will provide aid and comfort to protectionist forces in the United States. The question for US trade policy is how to protect US commercial interests and, thereby, the broader political and economic interests of the United States. I do not see that the answer lies in protectionism. 9. In my view the policy best designed to protect our interests should combine several elements, including the following: A. strong defense of our GATT rights; B. renewed commitment to GATT obligations by ourselves and others; and C. an effort to launch a Nixon Round of trade negotiations encompassing tariffs, non tariff barriers, and specifically agricultural policies. 10. Strong Defense of GATT Rights: Protectionism, and the proliferation of preferential arrangements that impair our GATT rights should continue to be countered by strong reactions by the United States. I favor the use of all legal means at our disposal to maintain, and when appropriate to redress, the balance of concessions in our reciprocal trade arrangements. I have Japan specifically in mind, for I believe that we should have a show-down in the GATT, if necessary, to press the Japanese to live up to their obligations. Similarly, I think we should move against patently discriminatory EC arrangements with, for example, Lebanon, UAR, and Israel. I recognize that the EEC may have sufficient votes to deny us a GATT finding that such arrangements are illegal under GATT Article XXIV. But I think that we must have the courage to press an issue such as this to the point where we would act under GATT Article XXIII to seek satisfaction. We might again try the arbitration panel approach used to settle the “chicken war.” Obviously, political arguments can be made against this general approach and against its application in specific cases. It seems to me, however, that the political disadvantages we now have in the current atmosphere of protectionism and neo-isolationism at home require us to take the political risks of an aggressive defense of our commercial interests. 11. Renewed Commitment to GATT: As a corollary to the above approach we must live up to our own liberal trade commitments. In this connection perhaps the first case to be cited is ASP, which has become a symbol of US protectionism in the eyes of our trading partners; repeal is essential to show our good faith commitment to a liberal trade policy. Above all, we would have to forego actions such as the mandatory, unilateral quotas that the House Ways and Means Committee seeks to impose on our imports. 12. A Nixon Round of Trade Negotiations: An integral, and essential part of any successful program to protect our commercial interests in the environment I have attempted to describe is a judicious, balanced trade policy approach noteworthy for its liberal direction. Otherwise, our efforts to achieve liberal solutions by our trading partners will come to naught. We should begin now to prepare a Nixon Round of trade negotiations. There will be cries that proposals by us for trade negotiations put forward in the course of negotiations for the enlargement of the Community might endanger the latter. We will certainly want to take soundings at the highest level before putting forward our proposal formally. There are other aspects of timing that require consideration. We will have to resolve the immediate textile problem. However, while my proposal is not tied to an immediate initiative on our part, I do not think it should come any later than early 1971. What we are witnessing in the United States today is proof of the thesis that we cannot stand still in US trade policy without substantial backsliding and political cost. Moreover, we cannot expect that any other country will provide the initiative that is required to maintain, on a global scale, the momentum toward international, as opposed to regional, economic integration. 13. I believe that the benefits of such a new initiative would be very substantial in terms of longstanding political and economic objectives we have had vis-a-vis Western Europe. We could look forward to a phased introduction of trade free of customs duties across certain industrial sectors and greatly liberalized trade generally among the developed nations of the Western world. Hopefully, the trading problems of the neutrals and of the countries in the Mediterranean basin could thereby be eased in a worldwide rather than in an exclusively regional context. The resultant enlarged Community would enjoy improved prospects for political integration. I believe the negotiation would reduce the danger that rival, antagonistic trading blocs might develop across the Atlantic. Such a negotiation could provide further benefits to the developing countries and put North-South relations in an improved multilateral context. The resultant trade links would bind us more closely to Western Europe, where our security interests are so intensely engaged. I believe that this is the right course for us to take, and I urge that we begin immediately to turn toward it. Rush 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 684, Germany, Volume VII 8/1/70-11/70. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Ottawa, Rome, Tokyo, and Geneva and to the Missions to the EC, OECD, and NATO. 2 Reference is to the President’s remarks during his news conference on July 20; see footnote 6, Document 239 . 242. Editorial Note 242. Editorial Note During the late summer and fall of 1970, telegrams such as Document 241 , similar messages from other posts, Department of State replies, and trade-related messages pertaining to the Mills Bill, possible trade wars, EC preferences, and agricultural policy, were regularly summarized for Department of State principals in the Daily and Evening Summaries of significant messages. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 153) Secretary of State Rogers also informed the President of significant developments from time to time in his Evening Reports. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164) 243. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 243. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 7, 1970. SUBJECT Trade Situation: Next Steps 1. Following yesterday’s meeting here at the White House, 2 which you attended, Harlow and Flanigan raised again with the President the issue of our posture on the trade bill. 3 The President reaffirmed that he would veto any bill which forced him to apply quotas on shoes or any other product beyond textiles. However, he did authorize efforts to improve the bill on the possibility that he might sign it if his hand was not forced on quotas. 2. Harlow is thus working on the ASP deal which we discussed yesterday, to try to get it back into the bill. George Shultz is doing the same with Labor. Flanigan and Secretary Stans are working on the textile people. The Ways and Means Committee will act on ASP on Monday. 3. On textile negotiations, State is committing GATT Director General Long’s proposal to paper. 4 They will then check it with him, to see if it accurately conveys his ideas. Commerce, State, and we in the White House will then get together to see if it represents a proposal we could accept. Finally, we could then check with the Japanese on the possibility of new talks based on the Long proposals, and decide whether to start negotiations with Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Secret; Limdis. A stamped notation, dated August 11, reads: “HAK has seen.” 2 Not further identified. 3 Harlow and Flanigan met with the President from 3:42 to 4:04 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 4 Presumably a reference to Long’s proposal at the July 31-August 1 quadripartite talks in Geneva; see Document 240 . 244. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon 244. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon 1 Washington, August 28, 1970. SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries (LDCs)—Chairman’s Report 1. The Problem In the next few weeks a series of international meetings will take place to present and discuss the “final” donor country proposals for extending generalized tariff preferences to developing countries. The OECD countries will meet September 7-9 to prepare a report to UNCTAD which will include the “final” offers of the donor countries. The UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences will meet on September 21 to discuss the proposals and to prepare its final report to be submitted to a special session of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board. The UNCTAD Board plans to submit a report to the United Nations General Assembly before the launching of the UN Second Development Decade in connection with the UN’s 25th anniversary celebrations in October. Before the United States can present its definitive proposals at these meetings, several decisions need to be made. The Under Secretaries Committee, under Deputy Under Secretary Samuels’ chairmanship, has reviewed the issues and presents the following recommendations and options for your decision. 2. Beneficiary Countries NSDM-29 of October 31, 1969 2 did not deal with question of which countries would be offered preferences except to specify two conditions whereby otherwise eligible countries would lose the opportunity to benefit from preferences in our market: LDCs that grant reverse preferences or LDCs which benefit from special preferences on products covered by the generalized preference system at other than a duty free rate would be excluded from preferences. In international discussions the United States has joined other developed countries (DCs) in stating that, in general, we accept the “self-election” formula originally developed by the OECD Group of Four in 1967. Under this formula donor countries would in general— subject to an exception for compelling reasons—grant preferences to any country, territory, or area that puts forward a bona fide claim to LDC status. This DC position has sufficient qualifications with respect to any particular LDC. The donors have, by mutual agreement, refrained from discussing the specifics of the question in the OECD meetings and even informal comments have been carefully hedged. There are three “problem areas”: (1) borderline countries such as Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Kuwait and Yugoslavia; (2) dependent and trust territories (the principal question here is Hong Kong); and (3) communist countries (other than Yugoslavia). 3 —Borderline Countries Although there was reluctance on the part of several agencies to continue to support the self-election principle, all agencies agreed that all the borderline countries indicated above should be considered eligible for beneficiary status, subject to the conditions on reverse and special preferences. (Agriculture stated its agreement was based on the assumption that no additional items would be added to the positive list of agriculture items for which preferences would be offered.) 4 —Dependent Territories (Hong Kong) All agencies agreed that we should announce that the United States will exclude Hong Kong from beneficiary status because other major donor countries are not granting Hong Kong beneficiary status. For us to grant preferences to Hong Kong unilaterally would be inconsistent with the burden sharing principle. We would also announce that if the situation should change, i.e. if other major donor countries grant generalized preferences to Hong Kong, we would reconsider our position. (The Commerce Department, although voting for this resolution of the Hong Kong problem, wanted it recorded that it could not conceive of any circumstances under which Hong Kong could be given preferences in the U.S. market. This view was based on the obvious ability of Hong Kong to compete in our market at present tariff levels.) We would grant beneficiary status to other dependent territories on the assumption that other major donors do likewise. —Communist Countries (other than Yugoslavia) All agencies agreed that we should not grant preferences to communist countries, other than Yugoslavia, at the outset. However, this position would be subject to review if additional communist countries are eventually granted MFN treatment by the United States. All agencies agreed that the subject of beneficiaries should be reviewed from time to time and consideration given to the removal from our approved list countries which have reached developed status. In that event, efforts would be made to get such countries to join the donor group. 3. Special Preferences NSDM-29 contains the following condition concerning LDC participation in the U.S. preference system. “If duty free treatment cannot be achieved, we should exclude from our preferences countries which receive selective (special) preferences in developed country markets for products covered by the scheme.” The question is, given the various offers which are now proposed by the prospective donors, does this condition need to be invoked against any LDC? The State Department, AID, and the Council of Economic Advisers, while opposed to special preferences in principle, agree that since the major donors are moving to zero duty on almost all items included in the preference system, the condition quoted above has for all practical purposes been met. State, AID, and CEA believe that if we were to insist on this condition for the very small amount of trade involved we would make the elimination of “reverse preferences” much less likely and might cause some LDCs to opt out of our preference system. It could also cause the European Communities (EC) to reduce the extent of its offer by the elimination of the items in question from its product list. State, AID, and CEA therefore recommend that we not exclude any LDC because of our special preference condition on the understanding that this applies solely to existing special preferences. Alternatively, they would support the recommendation of other agencies that special preferences be phased out, but would recommend in addition that our representatives be authorized to drop the condition if it becomes clear that our insistence on it would jeopardize our objective of eliminating reverse preferences or could cause a reduction in the coverage of preferences of other donors. On the other hand, Commerce, Labor, Treasury, Agriculture, STR, and Interior believe that we should continue to insist on the elimination of special preferences before a country can participate in preferences in our market. Special preferences work not only against our economic interests but those of Latin America in particular. All LDCs should have equal access to developed country markets for products included in the generalized preference system. The mere moving to zero duties would not eliminate special preferences; tariff quotas applicable to some LDCs (including the Latin Americans) but not to others would be discriminatory. In addition, these agencies believe that yielding on the principle of special preferences would make an already difficult task of obtaining Congressional approval of the generalized system even more difficult. We should therefore maintain the position that we will exclude from United States preferences countries which receive any form of special preferential treatment on products covered by any of the various generalized preference systems. It would be acceptable to these agencies to instruct our representatives to make every effort to obtain agreement on the elimination of special preferences on products covered by the generalized preference system, but if it appeared certain that this agreement could not be reached, to suggest the following compromise. The United States would agree to include developing countries now receiving special preferences on products covered by various generalized preference systems from the outset as recipients of United States preferences, provided the countries concerned would agree to the phasing out of these special preferences by 1975; otherwise your original condition would prevail. (This position would parallel your decision on reverse preferences.) 5 1. Supported by State, AID and CEA a. Special preference condition has been met b. Seek phasing-out of special preferences, but withdraw condition if necessary 2. Supported by other agencies a. Insist on elimination of all special preferences b. Continue to require elimination but accept phase-out if necessary 6 4. Special Measures for the Least Developed of the Developing Countries There is intense pressure in international organizations (UNGA, UNCTAD, IA-ECOSOC) for the adoption of special measures to benefit the least developed among the developing countries. In NSDM-37 (January 28, 1970), 7 you authorized the U.S. Delegate to the IA-ECOSOC meeting “… to indicate that we are studying various possibilities for special treatment for ‘least developed countries’ under a generalized preference scheme… .” Based on the report of the interagency study group formed to consider the question, the Under Secretaries Committee agreed that there was little that could be done to assist the least developed countries through generalized preferences. This matter is complicated by the lack of any generally accepted definition of “least developed countries.” Thus, it is difficult to consider special measures when the potential beneficiaries are not determined. All agencies agreed the United States should announce that the different proposals put forward by the LDCs were studied and that, while the United States is sympathetic to the problems of the least developed countries, we concluded that the opportunities for assisting them within a system of generalized preferences are very limited. However, in recognition of their special problems and as an indication of our good faith, (1) the USG is adding to its list of products on which preferences will be granted a limited number of products of special interest to the least developed countries (a number of such items are included in the options contained in the IA-ECOSOC memorandum), and (2) the USG will give priority attention to requests by least developed countries for technical assistance in export promotion and in developing new or improved products for export within the system of generalized preferences. 5. Product Coverage A. Definition of Excepted Petroleum and Petroleum Products The decision to except “petroleum and petroleum products” from our preference submission was intended to cover crude and refinery products subject to import control for national security reasons. We deferred notifying the OECD and UNCTAD of the items included in this exception because the review of oil import policy had not been completed and it was uncertain what changes, if any, might be made in our control list. We now must clarify our position. —In light of the decision on oil import policy, all agencies agreed that our definition of excepted petroleum and petroleum products should include all items under import control. —Benzenoid chemicals (TSUS items 403.02-409.00 inclusive) are petroleum products in that they are based on hydrocarbon molecules found in crude oil but they are not under import control. They are subject to protection by the American Selling Price (ASP) system of customs valuation. If the ASP system is repealed, as the Trade Bill (H.R. 18970) reported out by the House Ways and Means Committee would provide, benzenoid chemicals would lose this protection. Were the Administration to indicate that benzenoid chemicals are to be included in the U.S. preference offer, State, Labor, Interior, Commerce, Treasury, and STR believe the prospect of ASP repeal or the chances for favorable Congressional reaction to an Administration proposal for generalized preferences would be jeopardized. Accordingly, State, Labor, Interior, Commerce, STR, and Treasury recommend that these items also be excepted from the U.S. preference offer as “petroleum and petroleum products.” B. Definition of Primary Products in BTN Chapters 25-99 An interagency working group has drawn up a list of primary products in BTN Chapters 25-99. The list (Annex A) 8 contains a total of 454 items. All agencies agree that this list constitutes an appropriate and defensible definition of primary products. (Note: All other items in BTN Chapters 25-99, except for the items on our exceptions list, would be granted preferences.) C. Positive List of Primary Products in BTN Chapters 25-99 There is no consensus in the OECD on how to treat primary products in BTN Chapters 25-99. Japan will not limit its preference offer to manufactures and semi-manufactures but will grant preferences on all products in BTN Chapters 25-99 except petroleum. The UK and the Nordic countries seem to be leaning in the same direction. The EC has not committed itself. The United States has stated that its proposal does not automatically cover primary products, but that it would consider tabling a positive list of such products on which it would be prepared to grant preferences. The agencies have agreed that, of the 290 dutiable items on the list at Annex A, the 95 items denoted by a double asterisk should be included in a “positive list” for which preferences would be offered. These items are not particularly sensitive domestically and, in many cases, their inclusion on the positive list is considered necessary to offset the disadvantage domestic producers, who use the primary products in their manufacturing process, might face in competing with LDC producers benefiting from our preferences on finished products. Of the 95 items, 14 items are of special interest to the Latin Americans. D. Additions to Positive List Agriculture and Fishery Products in BTN Chapters 1-24 The Latin Americans and other LDCs have requested a substantial number of additions to the positive lists of agriculture and fishery products tabled by the United States and other donor countries last November. The agencies have reviewed these requests to determine those products on which it would be desirable and/or feasible for the United States to respond affirmatively. Recommendations and options on these items are included in the IA-ECOSOC memorandum. In addition to the items of special interest to Latin America, there are 18 items requested by other LDCs. A list of these 18 items is attached at Annex B. No agency objects to adding these items to the positive list if it is decided that the list should be extended. While Agriculture does not take issue with the additional items to be added to our positive list, it does believe that such action is inconsistent with the principle of burden sharing as applied to agriculture. The current U.S. offer is much better than those made by other donors in product coverage and depth of cut. Adding to our list widens the disparity. NS 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29. Confidential. 2 Document 218 . 3 The issues involved in country eligibility for tariff preferences were discussed in a May 21 memorandum from Trezise to Samuels. On that memorandum the Approve option is checked to exclude Communist countries other than Yugoslavia; the Approve option is checked to include Israel (and by extension Kuwait); and the Exclude option is checked regarding Hong Kong. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 29) 4 None of the Approve/Disapprove or other options in the memorandum is checked. For the President’s decisions, see footnote 5 below and Document 245 . 5 See Document 234 . 6 On September 24 Davis sent Executive Secretary Eliot a memorandum informing him the President had disapproved inclusion of countries that still received special preferences. The memorandum indicated that the President wanted their elimination but would permit a 5-year phase-out. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc.) 7 Entitled “U.S. Position for Special Meetings of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.” (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 37) 8 Neither Annex is printed. 245. National Security Decision Memorandum 86 245. National Security Decision Memorandum 86 1 Washington, October 14, 1970. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Secretary of Interior The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers The Special Trade Representative SUBJECT Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries The President has reviewed the recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee in its memorandum of August 28 2 for elaboration of the U.S. position on generalized tariff preferences. The President concurs in the points on which the Under Secretaries made joint recommendations, relating to: —borderline beneficiary countries; —exclusion of Hong Kong; —exclusion of Communist countries except Yugoslavia; —special measures for least developed countries; —definition of excepted petroleum products; —definition and scope of coverage of primary products included in our preference scheme; —addition of eighteen items of interest to the developing countries outside the Western Hemisphere. The President has decided that we should no longer insist that special preferences be fully eliminated over a five-year period for countries to be eligible to receive generalized preferences from the United States. We should make clear that we continue to oppose special preferences, however, and that we will develop criteria which would still render countries ineligible under our generalized preferences if trade under the special preferences on items covered by the scheme grows and assumes significant trade proportions. In addition, if special preferences are maintained by others, we reserve the right to extend special preferences ourselves to the same extent. However, in view of the reaction to our original proposal, and subject to the above, we will permit countries now receiving special preferences to be included as original beneficiaries under our scheme (assuming of course that they otherwise qualify). The President has directed that the Under Secretaries Committee, within two weeks, determine the criteria which would provide for the elimination from our generalized preferences of countries whose special preference trade is significant and growing in items subject to generalized preference schemes. If the issue cannot be resolved by the Committee, a paper presenting alternative possibilities should be submitted within two weeks. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 86. Confidential. 2 Document 244 . 246. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 246. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 28, 1970. SUBJECT Generalized Tariff Preferences: Special Preference Condition—Chairman’s Report Recommendation: The Under Secretaries Committee recommends that you approve the criteria outlined in the enclosure which would provide for the elimination from our generalized preferences of countries whose special preference trade is significant and growing in items subject to generalized preference schemes. 2 Background: NSDM-86 3 directed the Under Secretaries Committee to determine criteria which would provide for the elimination from our generalized preferences of countries whose special preference trade is significant and growing in items subject to generalized preference schemes. The Under Secretaries Committee believes that the enclosed proposed criteria will accomplish our objective of reemphasizing our opposition to special preferences without jeopardizing the prospects for a meaningful system of generalized preferences. The criteria were developed after analyzing as completely as possible the trade data available for the countries concerned. While we would not announce the details of these criteria at international meetings, we would discuss, as appropriate, the criteria in general terms with the countries concerned. For the purposes of dealing with this economic issue, the Under Secretaries Committee did not include representatives from the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Intelligence Agency. John N. Irwin II Attachment TARIFF PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SPECIAL PREFERENCE CRITERIA The President decided that the United States will not insist that special tariff preferences be fully eliminated over a five-year period for countries to be eligible initially to receive generalized preferences. He directed the Under Secretaries Committee to determine criteria which would “provide for the elimination from our generalized preferences of countries whose special preference trade is significant and growing in items subject to generalized preference schemes.” It is proposed that the following criteria be used in carrying out the President’s decision: First, we would interpret “special preference trade … in items subject to generalized preference schemes” to mean trade in: (1) Items included in the generalized preference scheme of the developed country or group of countries (viz. the European Community) for which special preference margins are extended to particular LDCs; and (2) Any items included in the generalized preference scheme which are subject to preference quota ceilings on which over-quota duties are imposed on imports from countries not enjoying special preferences. (In such cases, total trade in such items in any given year would be counted, not only trade which occurs after the over-quota duties are imposed.) Second, we would consider trade of the special preference recipient in products receiving both special and generalized preferences to be “significant” if it totaled more than $10 million per year and constituted ten percent or more of the developed country’s imports of such products from all countries receiving generalized, but not special, preferences. Third, we would interpret the word “growing” to mean that trade of the special preference recipient with the developed country in products subject to special and generalized preferences grows for two consecutive years in total value and as a percent of the developed country’s imports of these products from all countries receiving generalized, but not special, preferences. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 86. Confidential. Drafted by E. M. Cronk (E/ITP) and J. R. Matz (E/OT/GCP) on October 27. 2 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked, but an attached November 27 memorandum from Kissinger to Irwin informed Irwin that the President approved the recommendation. Following Bergsten’s assurances to Kissinger in a November 16 memorandum that no country would be eliminated from the preference scheme unless it met all three criteria set out by the Under Secretaries Committee, Kissinger approved the recommendation for the President. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume II 4/70-2/70) 3 Document 245 . 247. Editorial Note 247. Editorial Note The President met with the Republican Congressional Leadership in the Cabinet Room from 8:10 to 10:07 a.m. on December 1, 1970. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to a December 1 memorandum from Fred Bergsten to Henry Kissinger, among the topics discussed were an aid supplemental and the trade bill. The President reportedly wanted a Social Security, family assistance, and trade bill during the current session, but there was agreement that an omnibus bill that included trade was unlikely to be passed. The President strongly indicated the administration could not be appearing to support separating the trade from the Social Security legislation, as this would kill the trade bill and undercut the Japanese negotiations and create political difficulties in view of his textile commitment. The President’s priority was textile quotas and he would “swallow a lot” to get them, but the leadership should not assume there would be no agreement with the Japanese. Removal of shoe quotas by the Senate Finance Committee the previous day made the bill much more acceptable, but Bergsten added parenthetically that it had been added back in that day, and that, added to the absence of DISC and repeal of ASP, made the bill “very bad.” The President reportedly agreed with Senator Scott that the death of the trade bill by attaching it to Social Security would not be nearly as damaging in terms of negotiations as killing the bill through separation. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70) On December 8 Bergsten forwarded to Kissinger a draft letter from the President to Senator Scott, which included particulars on the features of the bill the administration found most objectionable. Bergsten noted that it was now quite clear there would be no trade legislation in the final days of the Congressional session, but believed that the President’s position should be clearly on the record. Kissinger disapproved sending the letter to Scott and wrote: “Fred—is this still needed?” (Ibid.) Despite Kissinger’s disapproval, on December 10 the President sent Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Minority Leader Scott identical letters, the text of which is unchanged from the draft Bergsten gave to Kissinger on December 8. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 , page 1112. 248. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 248. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 29, 1970. SUBJECT Need for Position on Trade Legislation for 1971 We must develop a position on trade legislation for 1971 by the time the Congress reconvenes, and earlier if possible because of the textile negotiations. I have therefore prepared an options paper (Tab A) and circulated it to interested parties in the White House (Shultz, Flanigan and McCracken) with a recommendation that it be the first order of business of the new International Economic Policy Council, 2 or be discussed at an ad hoc meeting called by one of them. Procedurally, foreign economic policy is now a total mess—and this very important issue may suffer as a result. Our original trade legislation decisions were made via the NSC, 3 and it remains the only mechanism now in place through which such decisions can be made in an orderly way. For all its shortcomings, our mechanism was reasonably effective in obtaining and implementing decisions during the first 18 months of the Administration. Now, however, everybody is sitting around waiting for the new Council to start operating—while the months drag by and nothing happens. As a result, everybody is in the act to some extent, but nobody at a senior level is in charge. And I fear that, without an Executive Director or its own staff, the new Council is not going to solve the problem—it may even make things worse, by simply getting in the way. As noted above, I continue to hope that the new Council will start in time to handle this issue. If not, I hope that Shultz or Flanigan will seize leadership on it. If they do not, I will have to recommend that you call a meeting in early January to get a decision. Tab A TRADE LEGISLATION OPTIONS FOR 1971 We must make a decision on our trade legislation strategy for 1971 by the time that the Congress reconvenes, and earlier if possible in view of the continuing textile negotiations. That decision would be made in the context of our decision on where we want U.S. trade policy to go over the next several years, the options for which were outlined in my paper of December 8, but time may not permit us to do so. The immediate decisions should finally be made only after close consultations with the Congressional leadership, however, though we should of course decide first on what approach we prefer. This paper outlines the options for 1971 which appear feasible at this time, assuming: —No negotiated solution to the textile problem; —An effort to fulfill our international commitment to implement generalized tariff preferences “as early as possible in 1971”; —Receipt of the Williams Commission report on June 1, with legislative proposals based on it impossible before September 1 due to the time needed for internal staffing; —No major trade liberalizing initiative is possible now, due both to domestic reasons (the unresolved textile problem; the need to first establish a tough Administration policy toward foreign restrictions; the need to establish an authoritative Administration spokesman on trade policy; the need to develop new constituencies to support a U.S. free trade policy) and international reasons (the preoccupation of the EC with its expansion negotiations; the continuing adverse impact of the textile problem on our economic relations with Japan). Option 1: Submit a bill including only a textile quotas and tariff compensation authority early in the year, leaving all other trade proposals until we have the recommendations of the Williams Commission. Pros: —The President’s commitment stands and will have to be met; a textiles-only bill might have the best chance to do so. —A textile solution is necessary to clear the way for any major trade legislation; a textiles-only bill could logically be presented as the first step in a two-step package, the second of which will be general trade legislation based on the Williams Commission proposals. —Provides the best international justification for deferring submission of generalized preferences legislation. —Inclusion of compensation authority would enhance the respectability of the legislation in some domestic and foreign eyes, since it would enable us to pay for the textile quotas; it would avoid retaliation in this case, and also increase our flexibility in taking escape clause actions. Cons: —Such a bill would not have a high probability of success. The textile and shoe alliance is unlikely to be broken (though we might defuse the shoe pressure by taking restrictive action ourselves in response to the Tariff Commission finding, which will be in shortly). Byrnes is likely to insist upon his basket clause for “equity” reasons. Introduction of textile quotas alone may thus simply bring back the same battle we faced in 1970. —An Administration quota bill with no free trade features, such as ASP repeal, will be seen at home and abroad as a major protectionist move. Characterizing it as the first of a two-step series, as mentioned above, would mitigate this effect to some extent; so would a strong statement that we would veto any protectionist additions to the bill. —Holding off all other trade proposals until late this year would probably mean their consideration in the President’s election year, which we may wish to avoid. But this would mean no new trade legislation at least until 1973, and (a) the longer we remain without adequate escape clause and adjustment assistance authority, the worse the legislative situation will become; and (b) the ASP deal will certainly expire if we do not even propose its repeal in 1971. Option 2: Resubmit early in the session our modest November 1969 proposals (20% tariff-cutting authority; liberalization of the escape clause and adjustment assistance requirements; ASP repeal and possibly DISC plus textile quotas). Omit preferences at this time, holding it for the broader package which will result from the Williams Commission recommendations. Pros: —All of the proposals would still be helpful in improving our trade policy and making it more flexible. —Would provide a free-trade fig leaf for our textile quotas. —It would be illogical to propose anything grander while we are still waiting for the Williams Commission report. Cons: —As a resubmission of our current proposal, it would have no dramatic appeal and is likely to draw us into precisely the same committee legislation as in 1970—except that time would not kill it in 1971. —Submission of modest legislation now could undermine the more substantial proposals which we might wish to base on the Williams Commission recommendations, since Congress is unlikely to act on two trade bills in one session and since it might not even act on the first proposals by the time we would be ready to submit the second set. —Failure to include preferences would violate our international commitment on that issue, undermining both our credibility with the other industrialized countries (which will all implement their generalized preferences by mid-1971) and the major foreign policy initiative of this Administration toward the lower income countries. Option 3: Add preferences to the Option 2 package, perhaps submitting the package in parallel with the President’s legislative proposals for aid reform of which preferences are a key component. Pros (in addition to those of Option 2): —We are committed to submit preference legislation in 1971, and Mills has said in the past that he wished to consider all trade measures together. —If Congress turns the general trade legislation in a protectionist direction, it may give us closer to what we want on preferences. Cons: —Inclusion of preferences would give extra leverage to the Congress in avoiding a Presidential veto of the bill if it emerged as essentially protectionist. (However, a veto of such a bill would probably be justifiable to the countries which would benefit from preferences, and might even be the only way to avoid preferences without a serious foreign policy cost.) —Tying preferences to general trade legislation will heighten awareness of their non-reciprocal nature, flying in the face of Congressional attitudes and thereby reducing our likelihood of getting preferences (or, perhaps worse, badly distorting their form) or of getting the overall trade legislation which we want. Option 4: Submit no trade legislation now, announcing that we will await the report of the Williams Commission before doing so. Pros: —This would give us time to launch a tough program of defending U.S. trade interests abroad and start developing some new constituencies to support free trade, thereby improving our chances of getting desirable legislation later. —Unemployment should begin to decline by mid-year and the trade balance is likely to be better, reducing protectionist pressures to some extent. —Gives us maximum flexibility. If the Williams report is too grandiose to submit immediately, we could still submit modest and/or preferences proposals in the early summer. —If the Williams Commission recommendations are dramatic, they will lose some of their force if we had first submitted modest trade legislation and gone through a fight on it—especially if they were still pending before the Congress. (Against this lies the probability that, because of the 1972 elections, we may not wish to submit dramatic Williams recommendations to Congress immediately under any circumstances.) Cons: —Might reduce the likelihood of reaching a negotiated settlement on textiles, thus further delaying fulfillment of the President’s commitment—or letting someone else get the credit for doing so. —The overhang of protectionist pressures in textile and other products is so heavy that someone else might seize the legislative initiative, and the Administration would have nothing on the table with which to counter. —Even if the outlook for preferences legislation is not too good, it would look better abroad if the Administration submits them early and fails than if it submits them late and fails. Recommendations: 1. That an authoritative Administration spokesman shortly propose the following to Mills and the other leaders, and that we then pursue the following course if they agree with it. 2. That we submit a bill including only textile quotas and tariff compensation authority early in the session, provided that the leaders believe the legislative chances of passing such a bill are strong. 3. That we characterize this step as the first of a two-part program, indicating that we plan to submit major trade legislation (including preferences) after we get the Williams Commission report. 4. That we make it clear that the President will veto protectionist legislation affecting any products other than textiles in the interim. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume III 12/70-6/71. No classification marking. Haig wrote: “Agree” at the top of the page and Kissinger wrote: “Fred: Talk to me soon” at the bottom. 2 The Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) was established on January 18, 1971; see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 49 , 53 , and 55 . 3 Reference is to the decisions at the NSC meeting on April 9, 1969; see Documents 192 and 195 . 249. Editorial Note 249. Editorial Note During 1969 and 1970 trade policy was systematically considered at the highest levels in the Nixon administration, including NSC, NSC Review Group, and Senior Review Group meetings. There were no NSC and SRG meetings on general trade policy matters during 1971 and 1972, however, and no NSDMs on general trade policy issues. The newly-established CIEP replaced the NSC as a forum for high-level attention to trade issues. By the beginning of 1971, a number of broad decisions on issues such as preferences and the general thrust of trade policy had already been taken. In addition, the Williams Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy was due to submit its report in mid-1971, and many items were on hold pending its recommendation. Trade negotiations were also linked closely to the international monetary policy negotiations that dominated much of the foreign economic policy agenda during the last half of 1971 and 1972. For documentation on U.S. international monetary policy, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III, Documents 109 ff. The trade policy agenda turned to developing legislation that would support far-reaching trade negotiations, an exercise that culminated in the Trade Reform Act of 1973, transmitted to Congress on April 10, 1973. See Department of State Bulletin , April 30, 1973, pages 513-522, and Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1973 , pages 258-270. This message proposed the enabling legislation that permitted the United States to participate in what became known as the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations under GATT auspices (the successor round to the Kennedy Round in the 1960s), and established a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries. Congress completed action on this legislation in December 1974, and President Ford signed the Trade Reform Act of 1974 on January 3, 1975. (P.L. 93-618; 88 Stat. 1978) On textiles, bilateral textile discussions were underway with Japan and other Asian exporters, generally under the tutelage of Ambassador at Large David Kennedy. According to a September 21, 1971, memorandum from Peter Peterson to the President, on August 15, during the New Economic Policy discussions at Camp David August 13-15, the President had decided that if a voluntary textile agreement was not reached by October 15, he would impose a settlement under the Emergency Banking Act Amendment of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Pursuant to that decision, a “preparatory” Balance of Payments Emergency Proclamation was drawn up on August 16. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP) Responding to a question regarding the purported October 15 deadline during his press conference on October 8, 1971, President Nixon said that if there were no agreement or prospects for concluding one by October 15, the United States would act unilaterally. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , page 1036) Kennedy did, in fact, conclude an agreement with Japan on October 15, as well as agreements with Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong on or about that date. These voluntary agreements were announced at a press briefing at the White House on October 15. ( Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, October 19, 1971 , pages 1408-1409) During the briefing Peterson said that the long-term solution to the problems in the apparel industry world-wide was negotiation of an international all-fiber agreement. The focus of the discussion in 1972 and beyond moved into a multilateral context, with renewal of the Long-Term Agreement (LTA) on cotton textiles and negotiation of a multi-fiber agreement. On March 3, 1972, President Nixon issued a directive establishing a Special Working Group of the CIEP, chaired by Ambassador Kennedy, for textile trade policy. Among its duties the Special Working Group was to provide guidance to the Commerce-chaired Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements with respect to U.S. rights and obligations under the LTA regarding cotton textiles, and to develop policy proposals for negotiation of additional bilateral and multilateral textile agreements. (Department of State Bulletin , April 10, 1972, page 545) 250. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 250. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 2, 1971. SUBJECT Secretary Hardin’s Report on His European Trip Secretary Hardin has sent you an abbreviated report on the United Kingdom and European Community portions of his European trip (Tab A). In speaking with the British and Community leaders, the Secretary emphasized that the import barriers of the Community’s Common Agricultural Policy are contributing significantly to protectionism in the United States Congress. Recent Community agricultural policy moves have all been in the wrong direction, instead of encouraging an interdependence of trade that would sustain an open U.S. policy. We have been chagrined by recent EC moves on grain, citrus, and tobacco. Grains are the most serious. A Community increase in its already high grain import levies, which is a real possibility, would further damage our exports; we would pay the price of an unsuccessful EC social program to increase Community farm income levels. Germany, which is the most insistent on high grain prices, claims that grain price reductions are politically impossible. The Secretary believes that we must use all U.S. Government resources to reverse Germany on this question, even at the risk of interfering with the UK-EC negotiations or of creating difficulties for Brandt. Otherwise, the Administration will have serious political problems in Indiana, Illinois, Ohio and Missouri. The Secretary did not believe his trip had the result he wished for a number of reasons: —Authority in the Community is diffuse. —The Community is hypersensitive to criticism of its institutions. —The British dare not use their weight with the Community. —The Community argues that it cannot attempt fundamental changes during its British negotiations. I agree that these are extremely serious issues. They will require us, at some point, to make a tough tradeoff between our direct interests in the EC and UK, on the one hand, and our domestic political interests and interest in maintaining some base for a generally free trade policy, on the other. This should undoubtedly be one of the first issues to be tackled by the new International Economic Policy Committee. 2 Tab A Washington, December 16, 1970. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Hardin to President Nixon 3 SUBJECT Trip to European Community and United Kingdom 1. Purpose . I went to Europe to talk with European and U.K. leaders about the problems we are having because of the highly restrictive policies of the E.C.’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). We pointed out that the unreasonable protectionist features of the CAP have contributed to protectionist thinking in the Congress, that some new initiatives from the E.C. were needed and that all recent actions had been in the wrong direction. On the latter issue we pointed to: a. The new citrus preference arrangements with Mediterranean areas (Spain, Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia). b. A new “buying premium” for users of E.C. tobacco. c. Recent discussions about additional increases in grain prices which will further reduce our trade volume. We emphasized that these programs are harmful to the U.S. export position, and that our new farm law was built on a premise of expanding exports. 2. Difficulties . It is not easy to get through to the Europeans on these points because: a. No one really speaks with authority for the EC. The Commission is an executive body not directly disciplined by budget or parliamentary control. Agricultural ministers of the member countries make the agricultural decisions. b. The EC is unwilling to accept any criticism of its means or instruments. Any mention of the instruments of integration, such as the CAP, is interpreted as an attack on the system and the Commission itself. To some extent, this is tactical rather than real. c. The U.K. continues to be timid with respect to its application for membership. In most of Europe, we found EC members willing and eager to have the U.K. come in. Still, the U.K. feels considerable lack of confidence, and is careful to avoid any action that might be seen as serving U.S. interests. It continues to fear another rebuff from the EC. d. The CAP tries unsuccessfully to be an economic solution to political and social problems. The Europeans argue that change cannot be attempted during negotiations with the U.K.—an argument used in 1962 (when the CAP was harmonized) to our continuing sorrow. 3. Citrus and tobacco . We pushed hard the arguments that the newly initiated citrus and tobacco policies of the EC are harmful to U.S. producers. We insisted that we would make full use of our rights under the GATT, which we are doing. The Europeans argued that the U.S. would not be seriously hurt by their citrus and tobacco policies. They argued that their decisions on these commodities were political and could be justified in that way. Our response was that U.S. farmers should not be made to pay for the EC’s special political arrangements with certain areas and certain countries. 4. Main Issues: Grains. a. Our argument: We contended that the Europeans’ effort to settle economic and social problems through fixed high prices is not working. We pointed out that high grain prices protected by variable levies are slowing the natural growth of livestock and poultry industries in Europe, keeping consumer prices high, and inhibiting consumption. (EC grain prices are about twice as high as those in the U.S.) We argued that lower internal grain prices in the EC would be beneficial to Europeans and traditional grain suppliers, including the U.S. Our exports to the EC of commodities subject to variable levies and high internal prices are down 47% since 1966. Furthermore, the use of large export subsidies to push surpluses created by artificially high prices into world trade, is disruptive of normal trade. b. Germany is the key. When we raised the grain issue in other countries, the finger was pointed at Germany. When we raised the grain issue in Germany, the finger was pointed at Minister of Agriculture Ertl. The Minister wants to raise grain prices in the EC, not lower them. He contends it is not politically possible to lower grain prices. We urged that he deal with his political problems by using direct payments. 5. Conclusions. a. We should continue to press strongly for a reduction in grain prices in the European Community. This issue should not be postponed. b. It appears to me that the only way possible to secure a grain price reduction will be to use all of the resources of our government to push the Germans into such an agreement. It is true that in doing this we may be accused of interfering with EC-U.K. negotiations. We also may find that we are creating difficulties for the Brandt government. But if we do not obtain a lower level of grain prices within the EC, and the UK, our Administration will have serious political problems in such farm states as Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Missouri. c. We should avoid making any commitment to the U.K. at this time with respect to the changes they wish to make in their agricultural trade system because: (1) To do so would undercut efforts to achieve lower grain prices in the European Community; (2) We do not yet know what arrangements the U.K. will have with the Commonwealth countries under its probable new status as an EC member; and (3) There has not been time to analyze the likely effects of these matters on U.S. agricultural experts. d. In closing, may I state a strong conviction, which I also expressed abroad. The European Community is a strong, flourishing economy and a major trading power. It has a responsibility to help foster an expanding system of world trade in the interest of all nations. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 196, Agriculture, Volume II 1971-. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a December 18, 1970, memorandum from Bergsten, which indicated a memorandum similar to Hardin’s (at Tab A below) had been provided to the President in preparation for his meeting with Prime Minister Heath on December 17. (Ibid., Volume I 1969-1970) 2 The President circled “International Economic Policy Committee” and wrote the following note: “1) I agree. 2) But the emphasis must be on U.S. interests. We cannot continue to sell out U.S. interests for State’s ‘foreign policy consideration.’” 3 No classification marking. 251. Editorial Note 251. Editorial Note The U.S. Tariff Commission issued a statement on January 15, 1971, concerning its report to the President on the results of its investigation of the effects of imports of non-rubber footwear on the domestic industry producing similar products. The vote of the Commission was divided (one Commissioner did not participate in the investigation), with two Commissioners finding that the increased quantities of imports as a result of the concessions granted under trade agreements threatened to cause serious injury to domestic industries. Two Commissioners found in the negative. According to the Tariff Commission statement, under the law, the President could consider the findings of either group of Commissioners as the findings of the Commission. (National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 71 B 1, Nonrubber Footwear—Options Papers, Office of the Secretary Press Release) For Carl Gilbert’s recommendation to the President, see Document 252 . 252. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) to President Nixon 252. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gilbert) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 2, 1971. SUBJECT Nonrubber Footwear Escape Clause Action 1. The Problem . On July 15, 1970, you directed the Tariff Commission to make an escape clause investigation of the effect of imports on the U.S. industry producing men’s and women’s leather footwear. 2 The Commission in its report to you of January 15, 1971, 3 divided equally on the question of whether increased imports resulting in major part from trade agreement concessions are causing or threatening to cause serious injury. Under the Tariff Act of 1930, you may, in case of a tie vote, consider the finding of either group as the finding of the Commission. If you accept the negative finding, no further action need be taken. If you accept the affirmative finding, you may, under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, prescribe any one or a combination of the remedies provided in the statute. The remedies considered to be realistic choices in this case are described in the attached paper (Tab A). 4 2. The Recommendation . I recommend that you accept the finding of those Commissioners who found that a threat of injury exists and that you prescribe as remedies adjustment assistance and a temporary tariff increase on imports of competitive footwear over current levels, technically called a “tariff quota” (Option 2A of the attached paper). My recommendation has the support of the Departments of Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, and Defense, although Commerce and Labor differ on some terms of the tariff quota. Commerce would preface establishment of any tariff quota with an effort to negotiate voluntary agreements and Agriculture recommends advance consultations with the principal countries concerned. Interior would initially recommend an import quota (rather than a tariff quota) at levels supplying countries would voluntarily accept and would support my recommendation only as a fall-back position. The Departments of State and Treasury do not support my recommendations. State does not believe, among other things, the evidence supports a finding of threat of injury. If you choose to accept the affirmative finding, it recommends that only adjustment assistance be provided as a remedy. Treasury believes that the statutory tests have not been met and recommends that you do nothing. If you choose to accept a finding of threat of injury, it recommends that you double the present tariff rates on selected categories of imports. The Council of Economic Advisers was also invited to comment and it agrees with State that the attached paper should have included adjustment assistance as a realistic option. The reasons for not doing so are indicated under Option 2A. All agencies commented in writing on the options paper and their views are attached (Tab B). 5 3. Follow-up Action . If you accept the finding of threat of injury and choose to take some form of import-restricting action, it will be necessary to work out the exact details of the scheme. Consequently, I am not submitting a draft proclamation for your signature at this time. It may also be advisable to undertake consultations with other countries in the interim. I would urge, however, that any consultations be expedited. Congressional criticism of the delay in resolving this matter can only be expected to increase. Further, since the receipt of the Tariff Commission’s report, imports have increased sharply. In January and February they were 33 percent above those of the same period of 1970. This trend increases both the pressure on the domestic industry and the level of imports on which any future negotiations or tariff quota might be based. If 1970 is chosen as a base year for a restrictive action, our position that a tariff quota will not require immediate compensation (page 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] of the options paper) becomes weaker as time elapses. If we delay action for a considerable time, we may find ourselves in the position of having to adopt a tariff quota on the basis of imports of the most recent 12 months which promise to be much higher than 1970. Such a base might not be acceptable and the compensation problem would then become a major concern. Carl J. Gilbert 6 1 Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, STR Reading: March/April 1971, Box 44. Confidential. Attached to an April 2 memorandum from Eberle to Peterson reminding Peterson that the attached options paper had been sent to Peterson’s staff for review, along with a background paper that STR had not tried to clear with the agencies because “our experience indicates such an effort would be very time-consuming and would add little except occasional restatements of agency views.” 2 The July 15 directive has not been found, but see Document 236 . 3 See Document 251 . 4 A 1-page options paper; not printed. 5 An 11-page discussion paper of agency comments; not printed. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates that Gilbert signed the original. 253. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 253. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 9, 1971. SUBJECT Generalized Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries The Council of the European Communities approved its generalized tariff preference scheme on March 30 with a target date for implementation of July 1, 1971. The Japanese Diet has approved implementation of its scheme no later than October 1, 1971. Other developed countries are in advanced stages of preparation although some, including Canada, have indicated that they intend to withhold implementation until the United States acts. If we are to maintain the position of leadership in this international effort that we have held since you announced our intentions in your Latin American policy address of October 31, 1969, 2 it is essential that we promptly submit our own preference proposal to the Congress. I can expect to come under pressure at the OAS General Assembly beginning in San Jose, Costa Rica, on April 14 about the timing of our action and hope that I will be able to inform the Latin Americans about our plans in specific terms. Certain press comments have already appeared in Latin America and elsewhere expressing disappointment that whereas other countries have already taken steps to implement their preference systems the United States has not acted. I suggest that we introduce draft tariff preference legislation simultaneously with or shortly after submission of the new foreign assistance legislation, since by so doing we would hope to associate generalized preferences with our policies toward the less developed world rather than with trade issues in general. The message covering the aid bill could refer to the preferences bill and point up its importance as a fundamental part of our new approach to economic development problems. This approach would require preliminary Congressional consultations, and I would therefore propose to undertake to consult with Representatives Mills and Byrnes and Senators Russell Long and Wallace Bennett so as to lay the groundwork for the legislative proposal. Recommendation: That, subject to satisfactory Congressional consultations, we introduce draft legislation for generalized tariff preferences simultaneously with or shortly after submission of the new foreign assistance legislation. 3 The drafting of our legislative proposal is well advanced. However, there are at least two problems which we are working to resolve at the agency level and which will have to be decided before our legislation can go forward. 4 These concern: At the OECD on June 7, Rogers did not address the specific question of preferences during his opening statement, and instead spoke of the balance of responsibilities among the industrial nations which on the trade front would be a liberal and non-discriminatory world trade system. On June 8 Samuels specifically discussed preferences under the agenda item on cooperation with developing countries. He noted the President had indicated that the administration would soon seek legislative authority for preferences, but that the United States continued to be seriously concerned about reverse preferences. For the U.S. statements and the communiqué issued by the June 7-8 OECD Ministerial, see Department of State Bulletin , July 5, 1971, pp. 11-21. 1. Reverse preferences . Some developing countries give so-called “reverse” tariff preferences to certain developed countries. We have taken the position that these developing countries would not be eligible for our preference system unless they agreed to phase out completely reverse preferences by 1975. This position has met with a great deal of resistance from the developing countries concerned. It has created a problem for the Commonwealth countries in general and, in particular, the Caribbean Commonwealth countries, which are now attempting to negotiate preferential treatment in the enlarged Community for such products as sugar and bananas for which they now enjoy special treatment in the British market. We also have problems with Spain and other Mediterranean countries which are moving toward fuller association with the EC, as well as with some African countries. In order to give you flexibility in dealing with these difficult political problems, I believe we should modify our condition on reverse preferences to allow the developing countries involved to participate in our preference scheme from the outset, without requiring agreement in advance to phase out such preferences gradually, but with the understanding that we shall not continue to grant preferences after 1975 to those countries which extend reverse preferences beyond that date. This would relieve the immediate political problem of resistance to our proposal on the part of countries now granting reverse preferences and would allow time to work out transitional arrangements with the Commonwealth and African countries which find themselves in a particularly difficult situation. In drafting legislation, you should be given sufficient flexibility to meet unforeseen circumstances in carrying out this provision. 2. Hong Kong. We had earlier decided to exclude Hong Kong as a beneficiary of preferences because the EC and Japan were also apparently leaning toward exclusion of Hong Kong. We also agreed, however, to reconsider our position if other donor countries did decide to grant preferences to Hong Kong. Since both Japan and the European Communities have now decided to offer limited preferential treatment to Hong Kong, I believe we should also extend preferences to Hong Kong but on a limited basis. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume III 12/70-6/71. Confidential. 2 See footnote 3, Document 232 . 3 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked, but the foreign assistance legislation sent to Congress on April 21 to implement the foreign assistance reforms the President proposed to Congress on September 15, 1970, did not provide for preferences. In the April 10, 1971, message accompanying the legislation, the President merely reported on progress on the issue in the OECD. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , p. 566) 4 A copy of Rogers’ memorandum is attached to an April 16 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger regarding the GSP issue. Bergsten informed Kissinger that the preferences legislation was not yet ready for submission, primarily because of the two issues flagged here by Rogers. Bergsten agreed with Kissinger that the legislation should be submitted before July 1 when the European Community and Japan would implement their preference schemes, but recommended concluding work on the two outstanding issues with the U.S. decision to be announced at the June 7-8 OECD Ministerial to be chaired by Secretary Rogers. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume III 12/70-6/71) 254. Editorial Note 254. Editorial Note Pursuant to Secretary of State Rogers’ April 9, 1971, memorandum to the President ( Document 253 ), on April 15 Peter Peterson sent CIEP Study Memorandum No. 4 to the Chairman of the CIEP Operations Group requesting a paper by May 5 that would provide the President with the full range of choices on reverse preferences and GSP eligibility for Hong Kong. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, CIEP Study Memoranda) Nathaniel Samuels informed the principals of various departments and agencies of the tasking in an undated memorandum that indicated a meeting of the Operations Group would be required. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, CIEP Study Memoranda) The paper prepared in the Operations Group went to Peterson in May, and Ernest Johnston informed Henry Kissinger of its status in a May 20 memorandum, noting the sentiment to fall back from the liberal scheme approved in principle in 1970. Johnston recommended that he inform Peterson that Kissinger wanted the legislation submitted as soon as possible, accompanied by a strong Presidential endorsement for passage, and that Kissinger “adamantly” opposed any retreat from the established position. He also urged Kissinger to make these points when he met with Peterson on May 21. Kissinger checked his approval of these recommendations. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume III 12/70-6/71) Johnston and Arnold Nachmanoff revisited the issue in a May 25 memorandum to Kissinger. They pointed out that Kissinger had not objected to Peterson’s (and Samuels’) suggestion that the CIEP/SRG take up preferences after Samuels returned from Europe in mid-June (following the OECD Ministerial). They recalled the President’s strong public endorsements of a liberal preference scheme, said a late June SRG meeting to review the Operations Group recommendations to the President would delay submission of the legislation beyond the July 1 date when the EC preference scheme came into effect, and expressed their belief that delay only increased the chances that those agencies opposed to preferences would have time to bring pressure to undermine the program. Kissinger on May 27 initialed his approval to their recommendation that he call Peterson to persuade him to submit the Operations Group paper promptly to the President. (Ibid.) No record of Kissinger’s actions or a Presidential decision was found. In a June 28 memorandum to Kissinger with suggestions for topics to discuss during lunch with Peterson the next day, Richard Kennedy and Johnston included the following on preferences: “Peterson wishes to talk with Wilbur Mills before asking for Presidential decisions on the remaining details of our preferences legislation. Peterson is still very nervous about this, and would like to avoid the issue if possible. He gathered the impression from your last conversation that you see no need for rush. Unless you make it clear to Peterson that he should not delay in this exercise, it may well be put off until fall or be seriously crippled by agency attempts to back away from the present Administration proposal. You should urge Peterson to hold his conversation with Mills promptly, to hold together the present Administration scheme and to seek to present legislation to the Congress as soon as possible.” (Ibid.) On July 2 Johnston prepared a memorandum for Kissinger informing him that he (Johnston) had learned from Peterson’s staff that during a meeting earlier in the week, the President told Peterson that preference legislation should be delayed because of the poor atmosphere in Congress. Peterson reportedly anticipated that the Williams Commission report that was expected shortly would not be helpful on preferences. (Ibid., White House Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP) No record of Peterson’s June 29 meeting with the President was found, but on July 2 Johnston informed Alexander Haig in a memorandum that he had just learned the President had decided to delay submitting the preference legislation as a result of the conversation with Peterson. He suggested that Haig should inform Kissinger, who was traveling, so that he would be able to react before meeting with President Nixon in San Clemente. (Ibid.) The President traveled to San Clemente on July 6. On July 13, at 7:14 a.m. PDT, he motored by golf cart to the helipad to greet Kissinger who was returning from a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam, Thailand, India, Pakistan, China, and Paris. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) The preference legislation went to Congress in April 1973; see Document 249 . 255. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 255. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 21, 1971. SUBJECT Proposed Action at June OECD Ministerial Meeting I On June 7 and 8 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development will have its tenth annual Ministerial meeting, which I will be the first American to chair. You will recall that the OECD is the successor to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation set up to administer the Marshall Plan. It is now our principal forum for economic policy coordination among the industrialized countries of the free world. The meeting comes at a time when differences on economic issues are troubling our relations with our major allies. A strong protectionist tide is running in the Congress. Business, labor, and farm groups are uneasy about the economic impact of enlargement of the European Community, and they fear the competitive strength of Japan. There is real danger that growing economic differences may impair the ability and the will of the major industrial countries to continue to cooperate effectively. I think that it would be unwise to let matters drift. The tenth OECD anniversary meeting offers an opportunity for the major countries to begin the process of dealing constructively with the world economy of the 70’s. I have in mind that the Ministers would have the Organization set up a Special Group of high-level government representatives to examine current and prospective international economic problems and to recommend methods and programs for dealing with them. 2 II The OECD is the appropriate place for this effort. Its membership includes all the countries of Western Europe plus Japan and Canada. Australia will soon be a member. We have for over a decade been working together successfully in this forum on the entire range of international economic problems. Furthermore, the OECD gives us maximum flexibility—on composition, timing, publicity, and follow-through. The Special Group would consist of representatives from the United States, the European Community, the United Kingdom, Japan and one or two others. Our representative could be a senior government official or a distinguished private citizen. The Special Group would make its report to a Ministerial meeting at the next regular session in the Spring of ′72 or at a special session. We would give the initiative as much or as little publicity as we might think desirable. Our commitment would be limited: the Special Group would have a mandate to study and recommend, not to negotiate or decide. The action would be timely. It would enable the Administration to demonstrate that it is not marking time in the face of profound changes in Europe and Japan, but is actively preparing for further future initiatives important to our economic interests. III Our overall objective is to have the Special Group develop an agreed international economic strategy for the ′70’s, tailored to the emerging economic power relationships among North America, Europe and Japan. The Group would be expected to identify the major problem areas in the international economy and, after studying various feasible approaches, to recommend procedures and programs to cope with these problems. For our part, we would have certain specific objectives: 1. Agriculture . To prepare the way for a negotiation on agriculture which would increase the opportunities for efficient farmers in the US, Canada, Argentina, and Australia to export their crops to commercial markets. 2. Tariffs . To find agreement on means to reduce the tariff discrimination against us that will follow from an enlarged European Community with special links to the European neutrals. 3. Non-tariff barriers . To reach a consensus on the non-tariff barriers the removal of which we can mutually and profitably negotiate. 4. Preferential trade arrangements . To check the proliferation of special preferential trade arrangements, like those of the European Community with some of the countries of Africa and the Near East; and to move toward a system in which all the rich countries grant all the poor countries the same benefits. 5. Japan . To bring the Japanese economy into a closer relationship with the other industrial powers, and thereby to reduce the unduly large degree to which Japan’s commerce is linked to the United States. 6. Domestic policy coordination . To improve the coordination among the advanced countries of their domestic economic policies, especially with respect to the problem of inflation. 7. Aid . To expand the area of understanding and agreement concerning your initiative for a multilateral emphasis in foreign aid. Obviously, other countries might have further ideas, as, for example, questions about multinational investments. I see no reason why we should not be ready and willing to entertain any serious suggestions from any quarter. The Special Group would be a forum in which we could have a responsible discussion on any important matter. IV The international examination by the Special Group would move in tandem with our internal study of these matters within the CIEP framework. Under Pete Peterson’s direction, the CIEP would define our positions and provide guidance to our representative on the Special Group. He would then feed back into the CIEP process the constraints, concerns, and creative inputs of the Europeans and the Japanese. This is exactly what we did in developing the allied defense strategy for the ′70’s, where studies in the NSC proceeded along with an examination of the same issues by the NATO. The end result of the process would be an action program for the consideration of governments—a program consisting of guidelines for trade negotiations, procedures for policy coordination, and rules of international economic conduct. Governments would make the decisions, with complete flexibility on timing as well as substance throughout the process. V I propose that we begin consultations with our principal allies now so as to assure that the Ministers come to the June meeting prepared to set up the Special Group. 3 And because of rising Congressional concern over foreign economic relations, I intend to involve the Congress from the beginning. I will be in Europe next week for SEATO and could begin the process of consultations at that time. Nat Samuels will be in Europe on other business at the same time. We would follow then with consultations with the Canadians, Japanese and others. On my return from Europe I propose to consult with the Congressional leadership about taking a few key members from each House with me to the OECD. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Confidential. 2 An attached April 27 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger informed him that Peterson endorsed Secretary Rogers’ proposal. Bergsten thought it a good idea in principle, but saw problems: would the EC Commission or individual states be represented; how would Canada and other “middle powers” be represented; and how to deal with the LDCs, which would be represented in GATT where the negotiations would take place and would be resentful of launching such an effort from the OECD “rich man’s club.” Bergsten expressed his opinion that the initiative would not be fruitful and that in any event the next trade initiative should come from Europe or Japan. He noted that the difficulties would quickly become apparent to the State Department, which would retreat from the proposal, but he nonetheless did not oppose Rogers’ proposal. On this memorandum Kissinger initialed his approval for the President. 3 Rogers and Samuels spoke in favor of such a group in their statements at the June 7-8 OECD Ministerial, and the Ministers agreed to establish a high-level group in the OECD to study longer-term trade and related problems and set out options, taking cognizance of work underway in the GATT. See Department of State Bulletin , July 5, 1971, pp. 11-21. On August 5 President Nixon announced the appointment of William D. Eberle as U.S. Representative to the OECD High-Level Trade Group. ( Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, August 9, 1971 , p. 1129) Eberle was also subsequently nominated and confirmed by the Senate on November 3 as the new Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. 256. Editorial Note 256. Editorial Note At the end of July 1971 the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, chaired by Albert L. Williams, completed its 3-volume report to the President, entitled United States International Economic Policy in an Interdependent World (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971). Unlike Governor Rockefeller’s 1969 report on his mission to Latin America (released to the public in November) and the March 1970 Report of the Task Force on International Development (see Documents 122 and 128 ), no particular notice was given to the Williams Commission Report when it was completed. According to the President’s Daily Diary for the last week of July and the month of August, the President met with neither Williams nor the members of his Commission. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Economic policymakers were preoccupied with other matters. Foreign exchange markets were in turmoil, and in early August the stage was set for the announcement on August 15 of the President’s New Economic Policy, which, on the international economic front, suspended the convertibility of the dollar to gold and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on all dutiable imports, setting in process fundamental international monetary reform. See Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III, Documents 109 ff. According to an August 2 memorandum from Ernest Johnston to Henry Kissinger, there were reservations about the report itself. Johnston reported that Peter Peterson was considering whether it should be released, and how much publicity to give it. Johnston believed it would be futile to attempt to suppress the report, and he did not object to some publicity upon release, including a possible presentation to the President, provided there was no endorsement of its substance beyond a neutral statement that the administration would study its recommendations. Kissinger wrote “Agree” next to the suggestion in Johnston’s memorandum that it would be best to down-play publicity and that the report be released as quietly as possible. No record of any White House publicity in connection with the Williams Commission Report was found. On the substance of the 400-page report, Johnston indicated that it sought to bridge fundamental differences among the 28 members of the Commission, and thus contained a number of contradictions. The report recommended continuation of a liberal trade policy and greater exchange rate flexibility, but also contained a number of specific trade recommendations at variance with the liberal trade posture that Johnston feared would be seized upon by protectionists, e.g., greater resort to export restraint agreements under some circumstances, as was being done with shoes and textiles. Johnston also reported that the Commission recommended, if other balance-of-payments measures failed, a temporary, across-the-board surcharge on imports and subsidy to exports as recommended by House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills. Next to this point Kissinger wrote: “Already done.” Johnston added that the report favored tariff preference legislation that was more restrictive than the scheme the administration had under consideration. Johnston’s memorandum bears the stamp “HAK has seen,” above the handwritten date of August 25. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71) 257. CIEP Study Memorandum No. 8 257. CIEP Study Memorandum No. 8 1 Washington, August 9, 1971. MEMORANDUM FOR The Chairman of the Operations Group SUBJECT Generalized Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries The President has directed that before generalized tariff preference legislation is submitted to Congress, the Operations Group should prepare a study reexamining the present proposal in light of the recommendations of the President’s Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy (the Williams Commission) 2 to determine whether there are modifications which should be made. The study should focus on the following issues: 1. How the proposal could be modified to ensure that the distribution of benefits resulting from preferential access to the U.S. market reflects the differences among developing countries in their relative competitiveness and need for preferential treatment. 2. How the present safeguard provisions could be strengthened so that the U.S. is in a position to take appropriate action if the responsibility for markets for LDC products is not being equitably shared by the European Community and Japan. 3. What further modifications would ensure that the overall impact of the U.S. scheme, once in operation, will be comparable to the programs of the European Community and Japan, and that the U.S. scheme neither appears nor is in fact more generous than those of the European Community and Japan. 4. How withdrawal or withholding of tariff preferences can be used as leverage in expropriation cases. 5. An estimate of the trade impact of Generalized Tariff Preferences, including a separate breakout for Latin America. In considering modifications, the study should analyze the advantages and drawbacks entailed by each change in the present scheme. Consideration should also be given to the method of handling each recommended change—whether through inclusion in the legislation itself or by request for additional executive authority to be used if it becomes apparent through trade monitoring that further constraints by product or by country are necessary. The Operations Group’s examination of these issues should be submitted by August 30, 1971. 3 Peter G. Peterson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, CIEP Study Memoranda. Confidential. 2 See Document 256 . 3 See Document 265 . 258. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 258. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 22, 1971. SUBJECT European Community Trade Agreements with Spain and Israel We need further guidance from you on how to proceed with respect to the Common Market’s preferential trade agreements with Spain and Israel. Unless we proceed prudently, we probably will have a major row with the parties to these agreements that will be counterproductive from the point of view of protecting our trade interests and have undesirable political side effects. In accordance with your decision (NSDM 45), 2 we have stated our opposition to these agreements both in the GATT and to the parties. We have also made clear that we would accept any arrangements between the EC and Israel and between the EC and Spain consistent with the GATT rules such as one which provides a definite plan and schedule for the formation of a free trade area or customs union within a reasonable length of time. We have also invoked the procedures of the GATT (Article XXIII:1) on complaints about nullification and impairment of benefits caused by these agreements. Briefly, these procedures provide for consultation by the interested parties on the basis of written proposals. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected, the matter may be referred to the contracting parties who may authorize the aggrieved party to retaliate by withdrawing trade concessions. Spain and Israel resent this action. The Spanish Foreign Minister, upon learning of our action, sharply protested to our Embassy, calling it an “unfriendly act” and stressing that this procedure had never been invoked in the case of other EC agreements (Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Malta and twenty-one black African countries). Spain aims at full EC membership as a fundamental long-term policy objective to promote modernization and to bring Spain into Europe. Israel seeks the closest possible integration with the Community as a means of breaking its isolation and as being important to its continued economic growth. In both cases the Common Market could not agree to commit itself at this stage to providing for full customs union or free trade area relations for political reasons—Belgian and Dutch opposition to France, and French policy towards Israel. Spain and Israel therefore feel the United States should not penalize them for the imperfect nature of their agreements with the Common Market, especially since we have in the past stood still or actually encouraged similar agreements for other countries. The strength of their reaction and that of the Common Market, however, will depend on how we press our case further. The Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture want to use the GATT consultations to attack the agreements in principle, to press Spain, Israel, and the European Community to terminate the agreements, and, failing satisfaction, to demand compensation across the board for all the trade covered by the preferential agreements. Such actions would be regarded as an overt attack on the fundamental foreign policy objectives of the countries concerned. We would immediately be at loggerheads with the EC, Spain and Israel on an issue of vital importance to them. A confrontation on this issue would cause serious problems with the EC, Spain and Israel. —It would worsen our relationship with Europe, already under strain. Rather then be seen as a tough-minded defense of U.S. trade interests, our action would be read as an attack on an important Community interest—its Mediterranean policy—and would coalesce European views against legitimate U.S. trade objectives. The French in particular would see this action as an attack on their vital interests. —Spain would see the US action as an attack on its fundamental objective of Europeanization and contrary to the spirit of the recently signed Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation. Spain might move against specific US economic interests such as our oil companies and might take actions impairing the usefulness to us of our bases in Spain. —The proposed course of action would put an additional strain on US-Israeli relations at a time when our intensive Middle East peace efforts make it essential that we seek to retain to the maximum extent possible Israeli confidence in US friendship and support. It does not make sense at a time when we are seeking Israeli policy changes to compound our problems. If we were to follow the course advocated by the other agencies, the result would be predictable. We would have a nasty series of confrontations in the GATT that could end in a stalemate. Then we would have the worst of both worlds; we would have antagonized friendly countries without effectively having protected our export interests. On the other hand, these agreements do violate the most-favored-nation principle and affect adversely the trade interests of the United States and other third countries although to a limited extent. The State Department considers that the American purpose should be to protect our exports while forwarding our foreign policy objectives. We would do this best by seeking specific adjustments to protect American exports. We propose to do this by identifying those products where American exports are substantial, the preference is significant, and the price differential arising from the preference probably would have a significant impact on trade. With respect to such products, the United States would urge Spain, Israel, and the European Community to make adjustments to eliminate or reduce the discrimination against American exports. If the parties to the arrangements were unwilling to modify the preferences with respect to these products, the United States would seek compensation. Failing to obtain satisfactory compensation, we would have to consider whether to request authority from the GATT Contracting Parties to retaliate. If we applied this formula in a reasonable fashion, making clear that we are protecting our trade interests and not trying to undermine the agreements, Spain, Israel, and the European Community probably would seriously examine our case. The Spaniards have previously told us that they were willing to consult on any specific problems we may have with their agreement with the EC. The Community has demonstrated—in the citrus case—that it is prepared to consider our case with respect to specific problems. In addition to pressing our specific claims, we will be consulting with the Europeans both bilaterally and in the OECD on how we can move together towards a more sensible system of trade relationships with the developing countries. I believe that if we follow this pragmatic course we will more effectively protect our trade interests and mitigate the adverse political consequences of our actions. To attack the agreements themselves by across-the-board demands for compensation or demands for wholesale revision will not succeed, will only aggravate the international economic climate, and will have the unfortunate political consequences mentioned. Recommendation: That we pursue our nullification and impairment action against the EC/Spain and EC/Israel agreements by proposing adjustments or compensation in cases of actual or probable injury to specific American exports. In the GATT Article XXIII:1 consultations with the European Community, Spain, and Israel we should claim that the agreements impair GATT benefits we paid for. We should then identify those products where American exports are substantial, the preference is significant, and the price differential arising from the preference probably would have a significant impact on trade. With respect to such products, the United States would urge Spain, Israel, and the European Community to make adjustments to eliminate or reduce the discrimination against American exports. If the parties to the arrangements were unwilling to modify the preferences with respect to these products, the United States would seek compensation. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 45. Confidential. A copy of the memorandum was forwarded to Haig under cover of a November 23 memorandum from Davis reporting that the State Department had requested that the memorandum be staffed by the NSC and not automatically be passed to Peterson. Davis reported that Peterson was aware of the memorandum, and she recommended passing it to the CIEP for action. Haig initialed an attached memorandum to Huntsman, dated November 26, transferring action to Peterson and calling his attention to the important political implications that caused the State Department to want Kissinger’s comments on staffing the issue for the President. Both memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71. 2 Document 227 . 259. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle) to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) 259. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle) to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) 1 Washington, December 10, 1971. I have been advised by telephone that contents of the Commission’s proposed mandate for the EC Council to consider tomorrow is very limited. I have been assured by Renato Ruggiero 2 this is the best they can do and that we should not be too concerned because the important thing is to get the negotiations started so that they can go back for additional authority. Obviously there is extreme danger in this kind of a situation. As I understand it, the proposed mandate to negotiate includes the following: 1. The overall negotiation must be balanced and reciprocal. 2. The items they want to discuss with the U.S. are: a. Our anti-dumping position b. Our agricultural quotas, particularly dairy c. Tariff increase on certain bound items d. Discriminatory prohibitions on products under the Sugar Act. 3. The mandate provides negotiation for stocking grains only for the ′71-′72 season and not the next season. 4. Other provisions of the mandate are: a. No authority to talk agriculture pricing but negotiation would be considered on limiting restitution payments and subsidy payments on wheat. b. No authority to grant MFN on citrus, but to extend present provisions for the next season subject to U.S. discussing chicken and lard subsidies. c. They see no issue on tobacco as it is not a problem at the present time (the proposed taxes are not imminent). d. Preferences—no authority, but will comply with GATT. e. Negotiation on solving distortions on present preferences—no authority. f. Notification on enlargement—will discuss with Council and advise specifically when notification will be made. g. ′72 negotiations in GATT—authority to proceed. h. Multi-lateral discussions in ′73—authority to approve with some language changes. France has agreed to the limited mandate, reluctantly. Some of these issues may be taken to the Pompidou meeting. 3 W. D. Eberle 4 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Records of Secretary Shultz: FRC 56 80 A 1, CIEP (Peterson Executive Director). No classification marking. 2 Chef de Cabinet of European Community Commission President Malfatti. 3 President Nixon met with President Pompidou in the Azores December 13-14, 1971. Connally provided briefing material for the President at that Summit, including items on the trade negotiations. See Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 219 and 220 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 260. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 260. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 10, 1971. SUBJECT Progress Report—Trade Negotiations in Conjunction with Monetary Talks I believe the US Government apparatus is operating well on this. 2 Treasury, State, Commerce, etc. are all up to date and seem in agreement on both the negotiating positions and the specific people to be involved. Both directly and through Paul Volcker, we have tried to be sure John Connally was fully consulted and informed. Japan 3 US-Japan trade negotiations are continuing with sessions to be held Saturday and Sunday in Honolulu, December 11-12. Both sides know the issues and have indicated a willingness to attempt to agree to a format for resolution at these meetings. The list of issues is long and resolution of all issues is unlikely but substantial progress is expected. It has been difficult getting the Japanese to start negotiating seriously but we are impressed with the quality and size of their Hawaiian delegation. Canada The Trudeau visit did two things for our trade negotiations with Canada: 4 (1) reassured the Canadians on our objectives; and (2) conveyed our determination to get results. While clear progress has been made on most of our requirements, the critical agreement from Canada for complete removal of the important tariff on automobiles is lacking. Another negotiating session is anticipated early next week. I assume Trudeau’s euphoric press conference was for the home audience and to set the stage better for tough trade negotiations and, we hope, concessions. The European Community US-EC trade issues have been fully presented and the EC Commission has submitted to member nations a request for a formal “mandate” to negotiate. Favorable decision expected at Saturday, December 11 Ministerial Meeting, although French could hold up decision. 5 Hopefully, EC negotiations will begin early next week with Bill Eberle in charge. Agriculture issues are high priority, along with tangible evidence of willingness to negotiate certain other trade issues in 1972. These negotiations will be difficult on grain pricing, and on how to protect us against trade discrimination as a result of EFTA neutrals’ association with EC. Also, latest input is that the Europeans have their own list of US discriminations they plan to talk about (sugar quota problems, dairy quotas, etc.). (See Tab A—Bill Eberle’s memo) 6 In short, it is very early to predict likely progress and there are some tough issues. Legislative Reactions I’ve been taking some soundings on the Hill with Ways and Means Committee, Senate Finance Committee, and other international economic groups in an informal series of sessions. Protectionist pressures—stimulated by the heavily restrictionist labor bill (Hartke-Burke Bill)—are strong and Labor is obviously hoping to trade off political support in 1972 for their support of this Bill. At the same time, there is enormous interest in the current monetary and trade negotiations—and an equally enormous lack of understanding, particularly of exchange rates, devaluation, etc. There is a vacuum here that we must all try to fill. I’ve been experimenting with communicating the significance of the monetary negotiations in simple terms legislators are likely to understand, i.e., more US jobs . Here’s how it translates: it is estimated that a 10%-11% exchange rate realignment and the trade concessions we hope to get might over a few years result in an $8-$10 billion favorable trade swing. Various experts estimate 60,000-80,000 jobs per billion dollars of trade, so we could expect a ballpark 500,000 to 750,000 more jobs to result from your actions. Moreover, I’m stressing you seek to solve the imbalance problem by negotiation—not by permanent restrictive measures (like the Hartke Bill) that would reduce trade, encourage retaliation, and could easily reduce US jobs and competitiveness. I’ve talked to John Connally about translating a lot of this whole negotiation into jobs and he seems favorably inclined. As soon as I confirm the estimates, I think he would be an obvious public spokesman on this point. Also, we think we should give your whole new foreign economic legislative package a “More Jobs” orientation. Aside from our export promotion efforts (incentives, East-West trade, etc.), we think we can try to make clear the economic-political equation that with fair exchange rates and your new programs to make US more competitive, less barriers equals more trade and more trade equals more jobs, and better paying jobs. Shortly, we will make a schedule request for a brief meeting of the Council on International Economic Policy to review your legislative-political strategy. 7 My current view is that when and if we get a good monetary settlement, and very importantly, when and if we get a good trade package, you and John Connally will have performed a miracle in converting the Administration’s position from a position of very low credibility and even low awareness of the international economic facts of life to a position of a realistic no-nonsense thrust. In that environment, hopefully by the time of your State of the Union Message, we could be in a position where you could not only point out fundamental negotiating accomplishments, but go on the offensive with your own bold, positive program—a program of trade, investment and US competitiveness (e.g. technology) measures. With negotiating progress and some luck on the domestic economy and particularly the unemployment front—you might be able to go on the offensive and put Labor on the defensive—for supporting the self-serving, inward-looking, defeatist, and non-competitive program that the Hartke Bill is. Perhaps I’m having a fantasy in a Presidential election year, but with some things breaking for us and US voter attitudes turning anti-big union, we might turn the foreign economic issue into another major Nixon initiative and act of forward-looking statesmanship. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Records of Secretary Shultz: FRC 56 80 A 1, CIEP (Peterson Executive Director). Confidential. Attached to a December 10 note from Peterson to Connally requesting Connally’s concurrence; Connally wrote: “Noted by JBC” at the top of Peterson’s memorandum. 2 Documentation on the international monetary negotiations that were being held in conjunction with the trade negotiations is in Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 200 ff. 3 In his December 10 daily briefing memorandum for the President, Kissinger included an item on Prime Minister Sato’s forthcoming visit to San Clemente on January 6-7, 1972. Kissinger reported that Sato’s primary goal would be agreement on a joint statement that Okinawa reversion would take place in April 1972. The President wrote: “K—we should be prepared to go far on Okinawa—in order to get concessions on Economics—Have a meeting with your contact—Tell him—this time it’s cold turkey—They must give on trade, etc.—when we give on Okinawa.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Daily Briefing, Box 37, 12/1-12/16/71) 4 Connally and his Canadian counterpart, Edgar J. Benson, met on December 6; see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 85 . 5 See ibid., Documents 217 and 218 . 6 Document 259 . 7 See Documents 263 and 264 . 261. Telegram From the Mission to the European Community to the Department of State 261. Telegram From the Mission to the European Community to the Department of State 1 Brussels, December 12, 1971, 1600Z. 4126. Pass EUR-Hillenbrand for the Secretary. Pass Treasury for Secy Connally. White House pass Eberle. Subject: EC-US Trade Negotiations. Ref: EC Brussels 4124. 2 1. Summary: Malfatti, President of the EC Commission, called Ambassador in on Sunday noon to give him report on yesterday’s Council meeting. Also present were Ruggiero (Malfatti’s Chef de Cabinet), Hijzen (Acting DG for Foreign Trade), and DCM. Malfatti stressed the political will to arrive at a trade package demonstrated by the Community in its declaration of intent (septel). 3 The PermReps are scheduled to meet on Wednesday, December 15. Negotiations can start no earlier than December 16 and more probably the week of December 20. He advised that Eberle not come until the Commission sets a date. End Summary. 2. Malfatti described the declaration of intent (septel) and stressed the importance of paragraphs eight through twelve which underscore the political will of the Community to enter into negotiations with United States. He also emphasized the significance of the provision in the declaration of intent calling for a report before the end of January by the Commission to the Council on the negotiations. He stressed several times the importance of understanding Community procedures and the fact that the sort of timetable envisaged in the context of the Community denoted great speed and a determination to succeed. In this connection he said that he must frankly inform us that the great American pressure which has been brought to bear upon the Commission and upon the individual member states has been counterproductive. Hijzen added that there had been a unanimous desire not to lose time but an equally unanimous agreement that nobody was ready to negotiate within the time frame proposed by Eberle. 4 3. The PermReps have been charged to prepare a formal mandate and they will meet on Wednesday. 5 The Ambassador asked whether an earlier meeting date might not be possible in order to permit an early start of negotiations. Malfatti, seconded by this two associates, flatly stated that there would be no purpose served in attempting to move up the date of the PermReps meeting. The Commission paper has not yet had time to be digested by member countries and it will take at least Monday and Tuesday for member countries to review their positions and send instructions to their Ambassadors in Brussels. He frankly could not see what purpose a meeting of uninstructed PermReps would serve. The Ambassador nevertheless asked him to convey to Bombassei (Italian PermRep, current Chairman) the US desire to have as early a meeting as possible. Malfatti replied that Bombassei and the PermReps are fully informed of the US wishes in this respect but that he would convey the Ambassador’s request. 4. The Ambassador inquired whether Malfatti had any idea how Schumann was likely to present the outcome of the Council at the Azores meeting. 6 Malfatti replied that Schumann would undoubtedly, as a member of the Council, report to President Nixon on the meeting but that he would not speak in the name of the Community. He repeated that Schumann had no mandate to present any Community view on this subject. 5. The Ambassador inquired on the likely contents of the mandate. Specifically he wondered whether there was any possibility that the mandate could go beyond the Commission report. Malfatti and his colleagues all agreed that the mandate could not possibly go beyond the proposals of the Commission. The Ambassador returned to the subject of the timetable and wondered when Eberle should be coming to Brussels. Malfatti replied that, in any case, a decision on this question must await the outcome of the PermReps meeting and that he would consider it inadvisable for Eberle to come before the Commission sets a date for the negotiations. Schaetzel 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 153, Morning Summaries August 25-December 31, 1971, December 13, 1971. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, Stockholm, and Vienna. 2 Printed in Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 218 . 3 Telegram 4127 from the Mission to the European Community, December 12. (National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, US-EC Talks-1971) 4 See Document 262 . 5 December 15. 6 Presidents Nixon and Pompidou met in the Azores December 13-14. See Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 219 and 220 . 262. Editorial Note 262. Editorial Note During the Rome G-10 Ministerial November 30-December 1, 1971, the Finance Ministers agreed to an immediate launching of trade negotiations to complement the resolution of the international monetary crisis, which was emerging from the Rome discussions. Trade officials did not concur as readily. For late 1971 trade-related documentation in the context of the monetary negotiations, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III . U.S. and EC trade negotiators did meet in Brussels December 21-22 for an exchange of views on the outstanding issues. William Eberle was head of the U.S. delegation; Theodorus Hijzen headed the EC delegation. Eberle reported on the negotiations in telegram 4268 from Brussels, December 22. He set out the U.S. and EC positions on grain storage, citrus, tobacco, and grain trade. Regarding grain trade, the United States wanted the benefits of exchange rate realignments that the CAP variable levies denied. The EC maintained that the variable levies were the cornerstone of the CAP, but that it would negotiate elements of the CAP on a global basis provided the agricultural policies of its negotiating partners were also on the table. In the short term, within the limits of CAP rules, the EC would seek to price its grain exports above the price of U.S. exports to third country markets so as not to create trade diversion. Paragraphs 7-9 of the telegram reported on the discussions of preferential agreements: “7. Preferential agreements: US position—The US and the EC should agree to a mutual standstill on preferential arrangements during a specific time period in which longer term solutions could be negotiated. Membership agreements and generalized preferences would be exempt from the standstill. A special exception would be made for the EFTA neutrals whereby negotiation of the free trade agreements could continue by the EC and EFTA neutrals would agree to protect the US and other third countries from any trade distortions that would result from these arrangements. The EC would consult with us during these negotiations in order to protect the interest of third countries. These consultations would parallel but not impede or slow down the negotiations with the neutrals. This should help to resolve possible trade distortion problems. Any problems of trade distortion that remain upon completion of the EC negotiations with the neutrals would be taken up in subsequent negotiations. EC position—A standstill is out of the question. It would affect basic policies of the EC which are in the process of being carried out, e.g., Mediterranean policy and the construction of Europe. The EC cannot agree to go beyond the procedures of GATT which are adequate to safeguard the interests of third countries. The EC is engaged in negotiations with Cyprus, Egypt and Lebanon and has commitments to the UK Commonwealth countries in Africa and the Caribbean. The EC would hardly admit consultations about ‘trade distortions,’ but the question of consultations can be discussed further. EC refuses to undertake any commitments regarding trade ‘distortion.’ “8. Second phase: 1972 commitment—US position—We reiterated our interest in negotiating promptly in 1972 on specific trade problems resulting from EC enlargement and in having US and EC agreement to support GATT negotiations to resolve all trade problems capable of resolution in 1972 including but not limited to the list of problems identified in GATT. EC position—The EC stated that in accordance with its declaration of December 12 it would notify the accession treaty to the GATT immediately upon signature. It was not in a position to agree to negotiations before ratification by the European parliaments concerned. (Commission officials indicated that preparatory work could begin earlier provided this was done informally and was not construed as ‘negotiations.’) The EC was prepared to negotiate in 1972 on matters now under consideration in GATT committees. The EC declaration of December 12 expresses willingness to negotiate. “9. Third phase: 1973 trade negotiations—US position—The US and EC should agree to proceed in good faith during 1972 to begin to prepare for a full-scale review of the entire trading system, including measures which obstruct and distort agricultural, raw material and industrial trade. Such review would aim for negotiations beginning in early 1973 (subject to any necessary internal authorization). EC position—The EC stressed that on the basis of its declaration of December 12 it was prepared to enter into such a review aimed at preparing for negotiations.” Paragraphs 10-12 covered the discussion of reciprocity, an agreed press statement, and guidance regarding the telegram’s use and follow-up reporting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71, attached to a December 28 memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger) The U.S.-EC trade discussions/negotiations continued in 1972, and on February 11 the two sides signed in Brussels a declaration averring their intention to undertake and actively support multilateral and comprehensive trade negotiations within the GATT framework beginning in 1973. See Department of State Bulletin , April 3, 1972, pages 515-517, for the declaration and the February 11 exchange of letters between Hijzen and Eberle regarding short-term agricultural trade commitments and other matters. 263. Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy (Peterson) 263. Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy (Peterson) 1 Washington, December 28,1971. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor Ambassador-at-Large David M. Kennedy The Director, Office of Management & Budget The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers The Special Representative of Trade Negotiation The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs SUBJECT Council on International Economic Policy Meeting Monday, January 3, 1972, 10:00 A.M. The President has directed that a meeting of the Council on International Economic Policy be held on Monday, January 3, in the Cabinet Room. At this meeting, we shall review trade and investment legislative strategy for 1972; the overall legislative climate; the priorities of other domestic legislation as well as the possible relationship of this other domestic legislation to trade and investment legislation; progress on our work programs that might lead to legislation; and the various substantive and timing options we may have before us. A review group session of the Council on International Economic Policy was held on this subject earlier this month. 2 Prior to the meeting, an agenda discussing some of the issues and options will be sent to you. The meeting will be convened at 10:00 A.M. and is expected to end at 11:00 A.M. The President has directed that, in his absence, 3 Secretary Rogers should chair the meeting. P.P. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, National Advisory Committee. No classification marking. 2 December 10. 3 The President was scheduled to be in San Clemente to prepare for the Summit with Prime Minister Sato. 264. Paper Prepared in the Council on International Economic Policy 264. Paper Prepared in the Council on International Economic Policy 1 Washington, undated. BACKGROUND PAPER—1972 LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY MONDAY, JANUARY 3, 1972 We have several options available as regards a trade and investment legislative program in 1972. Broadly, these are: 1) Defensive . No new Administration bill in 1972. Concentrate on heading off protectionist bills or amendments and continue international negotiations to decide the kind of bill to submit in 1973. 2) Partial . Submit bills on certain high priority issues (e.g., generalized preferences, adjustment assistance, and amendments to existing legislation in order to stop-gap pressure for more radical, protectionist measures in an election year (such as antidumping; tax policy on foreign income of multilateral corporations; amendments to Section 806.30/807.00 on border manufacturing, etc.). Under this option, we would request no new trade liberalizing negotiating authorities at this time. 3) Comprehensive . In addition to those in (2) above, submit a comprehensive bill which could include an export expansion program; a much broader adjustment assistance effort; “See America” tourism; generalized preferences; East-West trade; a comprehensive program to deal with issues involved in international investment and the multinational corporation; and new liberalizing negotiating authority on tariff and non-tariff barriers and agricultural trade in order to give ourselves international credibility and authority to try to open up the trading and investment world. It could be packaged with some of our other domestic initiatives to make America more competitive (e.g., technology incentives) and constructed around the themes of job creation and international prosperity in the ′70’s. Under this last option, we can envisage two strategies: the first is to make it an essential part of the President’s total program for 1972 and send it forward when it is ready, regardless of whether or not there is any likelihood of a vote in the 1972 session. Some argue that the fact that the bill was out in the open would give both the Administration and liberal trade supporters something concrete to use in Congressional and public education and could help in preparing for a vote in 1973. Others argue that an Administration bill would just serve to galvanize the opposition to redouble its efforts to push its own bill … particularly in an Election Year with Presidential aspirants striving to get Labor’s support, and Labor, in turn, tying its support to reciprocal support for their protectionist Burke-Hartke Bill. The second would be to prepare a comprehensive bill now, have the President outline his general intentions about its content in the State of the Union (and perhaps later statements). However, the decision to send it up would be made later as a function of progress on our other high priority domestic legislation, progress on our international trade negotiations, and, most important, only if it looked like hearings were about to begin on protectionist bills like the Burke-Hartke Labor Bill. In this event, we would consult with key Congressmen (including Wilbur Mills, who, it is assumed, prefers liberal trade policies rather than protectionism) to see if they would cooperate in introducing our bill (or something like it) as an alternative on which hearings would occur, and 2) the timing left to developments during the year, with the distant possibility that we not seek to have any bill reported out for a vote in 1972. Both strategies have similar desirable public education aspects. However, the second makes introduction dependent mainly on the tactical situation on the Hill as it evolves during the year and puts a greater emphasis on close consultation with key legislators, recognizing the risks in an election year. It also retains a certain degree of flexibility vis-à-vis our foreign partners, in that it permits us to factor into our bill more specific ideas about what kinds of negotiation may be acceptable to them as we move forward with international consultations. The above options have been formulated after discussion within the government (e.g., an informal session of the CIEP Review Group on December 10) and with outsiders. (On December 20, a meeting attended by White House Congressional liaison people and representatives from various Departments was held with a group of knowledgeable people outside government, virtually all of them sympathetic to liberal trade legislation.) The attached memorandum summarizes the session with outsiders (Tab A) 2 most of whom were supporters of liberal trade policies. The main issue, as they saw it, was whether to submit a bold new bill in 1972 or wait until early 1973. The majority (roughly 7 out of 12) favored a delay on the grounds that an election year risked politicizing the debate excessively and that we should have a better idea about what kind of negotiation our foreign partners would accept before asking for an authority which, in the end, may not fit negotiating realities. The minority favored an Administration bill this year on the grounds that a trade debate was inevitable in 1972, and it was both better substantively that it take place on Administration terrain (rather than on the Burke-Hartke Labor Bill) and tactically necessary for Congressional and public supporters of liberal trade to have something concrete around which to rally. Our tentative soundings on the Hill produced mixed advice, some for and some against an Administration initiative in 1972. Many of those we consulted emphasized their strong belief that there is an enormous potential for disaster to liberal trade policies from Administration trade initiatives in 1972, unless these initiatives are carefully orchestrated and timed. Some believe that, with both Ways and Means and the Senate Finance committees subject to such strong protectionist pressure, “housekeeping” type bills (such as the 1969 bill) run a strong risk of protectionist amendments. Mills has told me earlier that it might be very difficult to insulate isolated proposals (e.g., generalized preferences) from a Christmas Tree approach. Others feel that certain specific bills (absent a comprehensive bill), designed mainly to win back labor support (e.g., new adjustment assistance, guidelines on US investment abroad and foreign taxation) might have a chance. These specific terms could include: a. Generalized Preferences . If we submit only generalized preferences and/or do it at the wrong time, we could end up opening a political Pandora’s box without a positive alternative of our own to the Burke-Hartke Bill. Thus, the issue here is both one of timing and substance. When should we submit a request for generalized preferences? 3 Should it be an independent bill, part of the gold-price request 4 or part of a more comprehensive trade/investment package (or at least included with other “housekeeping” proposals)? Finally, what kind of preference legislation should we request? (We have two proposals in the mill: a modified version of the original idea and a preference arrangement with a tariff quota safeguard like that of the EC. Both need more staff work before a bill could be drafted and sent forward. We are having a CIEP Review Group session on January 7 on this particular subject. 5 b. Adjustment Assistance . Virtually everyone on the Hill and outside thinks we need to overhaul the present system. The rationale for an Adjustment Assistance priority is that it attempts to deal with the undesirable effects of import competition without introducing new trade restrictions—it is trade liberalizing, not trade restrictions. The options are: (a) Submit an independent bill modeled on our CIEP study (or combine it with generalized preferences). This risks the Christmas Tree problem noted above. (b) Work with key Congressmen to attach the more limited Mills Bill adjustment assistance reform to some other legislation, indicating our support but not proposing it outright. This may reduce the protectionist amendments risk, but precludes us from pushing a better bill. and reduces the political credit we might get from our own proposal. (c) Include our version in a new comprehensive Administration package. Timing . The enormous staff work involved in drafting a comprehensive bill means that we could not, in any case, be ready to submit our own legislation before early spring at best. To head off the protectionists in the interim, and to begin constructive public education, we could propose a statement in the State of the Union message in which the President could develop a theme along the following lines: He could recount the recent international economic accomplishments, showing why we are now in a new ball game. Then, capitalizing on the momentum of the monetary settlement (and, perhaps by then, progress toward a settlement of short-term trade issues), the President could present the broad outlines of a comprehensive and outward-looking foreign economic legislative program that would be submitted in the future. Also included would be domestic initiatives to stimulate productivity and competitiveness (technology programs, etc.) and, of course, more and better-paying jobs. In short, a New America in a New World. The issue here is: should the reference to submission of a new trade legislation be specific (e.g., “later this year”) or vague (“in the future”)? The former, while not absolute, is at least an indication of intent to do something this year; the latter preserves the option of waiting until 1973 (or at least until after the November election). Content . Regardless of when we decide to send new legislation forward, virtually everyone we have consulted believes that, to preserve all our options—including that of submitting new legislation next spring—it is essential that we have a bill ready soon. To do this, a very high priority on staff time within the concerned agencies will have to be assigned to the definition of issues involved in new proposals for decision and to the drafting of legislative proposals. Unless the Council believes it would be better to recommend to the President no legislative requests of any kind in 1972, it should, it seems to me, agree to communicate this sense of priority to staff personnel involved in his work. Burke-Hartke Bill . Given the significant pressure on Congress to pass something like this bill, we would be well advised to study it carefully to see whether it contains some elements which we could incorporate in an alternative administration package. Tab B contains specific provisions and rationale as written by the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO. 6 The principal features are: 1) New rules regarding the taxation of foreign income of US firms and the income from technology transfers to “remove special advantages.” (In essence some of these are double taxation proposals.) 2) New controls on the outflow of foreign investment capital and technology transfers. 3) The imposition of mandatory quantitative restrictions on all imports at 1965-1969 average levels with certain specified exceptions. 4) Amendments to the Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Acts, setting time limits for making determinations and making these subject to the Administrative Procedures Act. 5) Organizational changes (mainly the creation of a tripartite “U.S. Foreign Trade and Investment Commission,” made up of representatives from the public, industry and labor groups, abolishing the Tariff Commission and transferring from the President to the new Commission authority over most aspects of US trade policy. 6) Provisions to require that all products containing imported components be clearly labeled as the components and country of origin. 7) Repeals sections 806.30 and 807.00 of the Trade Expansion Act (which reduces the duty on imports if some of the components were made in the United States). Though most of these would presumably, from the Administration’s point of view, be undesirable, elements of some of them need further study. We should decide which of them will require specific counter proposals from the Administration and which we can (perhaps with minor adjustment) accept or build upon. Relationship of Trade-Investment Legislation to Other Legislation . Assuming settlement of short-term trade negotiations in the reasonably near future, we are committed to submission of a bill to change the dollar price of gold. Though this bill need not include any trade issues as such, we should consider whether it should be coupled with any (e.g., generalized preferences). Some argue strongly that we are better able to fend off any trade amendments to this gold price legislation if we ourselves have a “clean bill,” i.e., have not proposed any trade matters and indicate that we will propose such legislation later. Regardless of whether we decide to include such issues, it is virtually inevitable that some in Congress will try to add trade matters to it. We need to devise a strategy for dealing with this contingency, and to consider the relationship between this strategy and the timing and content aspects of a comprehensive Administration trade/investment initiative. Another relationship we need to consider is that between the “external” package (trade, investment, et al.) and our new domestic initiatives (technology incentives, possible new tax proposals, etc.). It would, of course, be best if both programs could be presented as parts of a coherent whole, even if specific legislative proposals to implement them were sent up at different times. Finally, we need to set a system of priorities among any new initiatives and parts of the President’s program still pending in Congress (e.g., revenue sharing, health, welfare reform, pension legislation, environment, etc.) which require Ways and Means Committee consideration. This Committee obviously has a very full plate of other domestic legislation. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, National Advisory Committee. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the paper, which is attached to a December 29 memorandum from Peterson to members of the CIEP informing them it was background for the CIEP meeting on January 3, 1972. 2 Entitled “Meeting with Outside Advisers on Trade Legislation,” December 20, 1971; not printed. 3 During the Summit with Prime Minister Heath in Bermuda on December 20, 1971, Secretary Rogers announced that the President had decided to submit to Congress after it reconvened in January legislation to provide preferences to developing countries. See Department of State Bulletin , January 17, 1972, pp. 64-66. 4 Reference is to a request to raise the official price of gold, devaluing the dollar, as agreed in the ongoing international monetary negotiations. 5 See Document 265 and footnote 1 thereto. 6 Entitled “Summary Fact Sheet of Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972, S-2592; HR-10914,” dated October 4, 1971; not printed. 265. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council on International Economic Policy Operations Group (Samuels) to the Executive Director of the Council (Peterson) 265. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council on International Economic Policy Operations Group (Samuels) to the Executive Director of the Council (Peterson) 1 Washington, January 5, 1972. SUBJECT Generalized Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries The attached paper is in response to CIEP SM No. 8 of August 9, 1971. 2 It requests decisions on the two issues outlined below. We will also need decisions on the issues covered by the Operations Group’s paper of May 17, 1971, 3 before we can finish preparation of our legislative submission. Williams Commission Recommendations Particular consideration is given in the study to the conditions specified by the Williams Commission when it recommended that the President “request from Congress legislative authority to initiate a system of generalized preferences along the lines of the current U.S. proposal.” The two conditions in brief are: (1) developing countries which demonstrate competitiveness in particular products should not receive preferences on those products, and (2) the responsibility for providing improved markets for LDCs should be shared equitably—both with respect to individual products and in overall terms—among the developed countries, especially the European Community and Japan. In the course of considering how best to take account of the Williams Commission recommendations, two different approaches evolved. Guidance is needed on which of these will best serve our interests. Option 1: Preserve the open system of generalized preferences without quotas as previously decided, but with the inclusion of legislative provisions to clarify the President’s discretionary authority to take account of burden sharing, competitive need, and possible market disruption (supported by State, OMB, CEA, DOD, and AID; STR supports preserving the open system and would prefer to submit to Congress the proposal already announced internationally without the specific discretionary authority); or Option 2: Adopt a tariff quota system which would permit limitations to be placed on the volume of preferential imports of individual commodities in any year at levels predetermined under provisions in the authorizing legislation (supported by Commerce, Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, and Labor). Expropriation In considering the possibility of using generalized preferences as leverage in expropriation cases as requested by CIEP SM No. 8, all agencies agreed that the general authority now in the bill to withdraw or suspend preferences would be sufficient for our purposes. However, Treasury and Commerce believe the bill would be improved if the authority were made explicit. Thus there are two options: Option 1: Retain broad authority for the President to suspend or limit preferences for countries which expropriate American investments without compensation, but omit specific reference to this in the bill (supported by State, STR, OMB, CEA, DOD, AID, Interior, Agriculture, and Labor); or Option 2: Make explicit the President’s authority to suspend or limit preferences in expropriation cases (supported by Treasury and Commerce). Nathaniel Samuels 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, CIEP Meetings. Confidential. Circulated to members of the CIEP Review Group under cover of a January 6 memorandum from Peterson informing them it would be the basis for the Review Group discussion on January 7. Peterson indicated he planned to focus the discussion on the substantive issues and options rather than on questions of legislative timing and packaging. See Document 264 . 2 Document 257 . The attached paper is not printed. 3 See Document 254 . 266. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 266. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 11, 1972. SUBJECT EC Trade Agreements with Spain I am concerned that the position the US recently took in the GATT Council with respect to the Spanish-EC preferential trade agreement may result in serious restriction on the freedom of US military operations in Spain if not moderated. The Spanish consider the arrangements they have made with the Economic Community a step in the direction of economic integration with the rest of Europe. Article 24 of the 1970 US-Spanish Agreement makes specific reference to the Spanish aspiration for such integration and the US promises both “sympathetic understanding” and “close contact” in seeking mutually satisfactory solutions for any problems that may arise. I feel it is important that we give serious consideration to this portion of the Agreement, especially in view of Spanish sensitivity involved. At the most recent meeting of the US-Spanish Joint Committee on Defense Matters, Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo called the US intention to request consultation under Article 23 of the GATT an unfriendly action. He has made no secret of his view that the degree of Spanish cooperation in implementing the 1970 agreement, which gives us our military rights, will directly reflect US cooperation with Spain. Under the 1970 Agreement, Spain can apply a variety of counter pressures that would in effect tie us down to an essentially static position in Spain. For example, the Spanish could delay or deny approvals for any change in US force levels or in use of facilities in Spain. In view of the potential for significant damage to US military interests in Spain, I feel we must exercise great care to avoid unduly provoking the Government of Spain in the course of our efforts to advance important US economic and trade interests under the GATT. Towards this end, I strongly support the approach recommended by the Secretary of State in his 22 November memorandum, 2 which would limit our actions to those specific cases where we can demonstrate actual damage to our trade, and seek appropriate compensations if the parties declined to make suitable adjustments. Such a course would adequately protect our economic interests without subjecting our base rights to the risk of political reprisals that would result from a more sweeping, generalized move against the Spain-EC Agreement. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 230, DOD, Volume 15 1/72. Confidential. 2 Document 258 . 267. Memorandum From the Assistant Special Representative for Industry and Labor, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gates) to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle) 267. Memorandum From the Assistant Special Representative for Industry and Labor, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Gates) to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle) 1 Washington, January 12, 1972. SUBJECT Status and Background on Footwear Issue 1. The key points in the chronology are the following: June, 1970 . Following receipt of a Task Force report organized and chaired by STR at White House direction (Tab A), 2 the President requested an escape clause investigation for the first time. He also announced a domestic program to aid this industry from which literally nothing ever came. January, 1971 . Tariff Commission report received. 3 Two Commissioners found a threat of injury existed for certain types of footwear, while two found that the statutory causation factors did not exist. April, 1971 . In accord with TEA procedures, the Special Representative submitted his recommendations to the President (Tab B). 4 They were at least implicitly premised on the assumption that there would be a White House political decision that it was necessary to do something. If so, STR favored the tariff quota device as standing the best chances of minimizing international consequences, including compensation, and of permitting liberal treatment. Tab B, in effect, asked for a decision in principle, with the detailed, time-consuming work elaborating such a scheme and balancing all interests to follow. May, 1971 . The President designated David Kennedy as his personal envoy to seek mutually satisfactory solutions for both textiles and shoes. Kennedy went to both Spain and Italy, but did not go to Brazil, the third country indicated in the initial announcement. June, 1971 . Don Webster 5 and I followed up with more detailed discussion in Spain and Italy. Italy agreed to set up a visa system. Spain promised to be forthcoming soon. August, 1971 . The Spanish answer was negative. October, 1971 . I convened the ad hoc interagency group on footwear to review agency positions and re-appraise the situation in light of developments since the Spring. I then prepared a report, Tab C, which while it was not forwarded to CIEP is worth reading for its other contents. We generally agreed that during the surcharge no restrictive alternative should be pursued. 6 November, 1971 . David Kennedy returned to Spain and generously sweetened the suggested terms of a voluntary restraint. He was subsequently told that Spain did not consider what the Italians were doing to constitute restraint and that they could not consider any agreement unless it includes other suppliers. Spain has never specified who else must be included. During my discussions there in June, only Brazil was mentioned. In November, they referred to virtually all other low-cost suppliers. December, 1971 . Commerce became restive. Nehmer 7 was after me to re-convene the interagency group, and, it seemed apparent, was also stirring up the footwear industry. I held several meetings, largely to assert continued control over the issue and also to give Commerce and its Labor satellite a day in court. Kennedy’s office and Treasury agreed with me that nothing should be pushed until the monetary negotiations were settled. Nehmer wanted to push ahead, develop the details of a tariff quota based on 1970 trade or, alternatively, develop the plans and strategy for a textile-type operation under the thin guise of a section 204 case. 8 I have heard nothing from Commerce in recent weeks and, in the absence of an opportunity to discuss it with you, have felt that my answer to any further pressure would necessarily be that until the bilateral trade negotiations were completed, it would remain inadvisable to begin active work (with the inevitable risk of leaks and rumors) on restrictive alternatives. 2. The Present Status. A. I do not believe an adequate voluntary agreement is negotiable, certainly not without a great expenditure of further time and negotiating chips. Italy would have the looming problem of EC acceptance, there being a clear Council policy against both unilateral trade agreements by individual members as well as one against export quotas. Spain’s terms would be exorbitant and any deal would take a long time to pin down. Although none of us have been to Brazil, our judgment is that it would be as difficult and as painful as Spain—and its present trade is a drop in the bucket. Imports from Japan and Taiwan are really not competitive with American production, and voluntary restraints coming on top of textiles seem to most of us out of the question. B. If we have to take restrictive action, largely for political reasons, our only reasonable prospect continues to be some form of tariff quota. Since virtually everyone but Italy capitalized on our year of consulting, the base is now much higher. I stated at the last interagency meeting the personal view that our only realistic choice now was a 1971 base with a growth factor to be determined annually in the light of events. Most agencies seemed to agree. Commerce, or Nehmer, holds out for a rollback and restrictive other terms which undoubtedly involve real foreign problems. State believes the industry is not injured by imports and no action is required. C. The real pending issue, which is the one on which I adjourned the last meeting, is whether in the context of the Administration’s overall plans and problems for 1972, and especially in the context of meeting the Burke-Hartke menace, there is a political need to do something. Kennedy’s man on my informal committee undertook to start this inquiry. His interim report from conversations with Harry Dent, Timmons, Colson, et al., is that there seem to be some areas where footwear could be an issue in 1972. He agrees, however, that we need more than generalities, and has gone back for more. Taking across-the-board action because of a few districts or States would be on the overkill side. D. I still believe a non-restrictive, constructive solution could be developed. Politically, it may be risky. But from a trade policy and economic policy point of view, this is the only sensible thing to do. We should (1) somehow threaten the Commerce Department into putting life into the President’s footwear program we so carefully worked out 18 months ago, (2) make the full case and stress the beneficial effects of currency adjustment (greater in significant instances than both present footwear tariff rates and the increases we could statutorily add on), (3) a serious effort to make adjustment assistance work, and (4) really coming to grips with the potentials that seem possible in the USM, high-technology approach (now being downgraded by Commerce from the requested meeting between USM’s chairman and Stans to one with Nehmer!). Politically, we could also dig up things to do on a pin-point basis in those districts and States where the White House political experts foresee, but have yet to specify, trouble in 1972. E. The final point that should trouble us is the possible consequences of continued delay and procrastination. Next Saturday the footwear decision will have been before the President for one full year. The decision last Spring was to try for an amicable solution. We cannot seem to obtain one. Legally speaking, our lawyers are somewhat concerned that if the President does not act within one year of receiving a Tariff Commission report, his case for acting becomes progressively weaker—largely under the general principle of timeliness and due diligence. Politically, we are vulnerable for initiating an escape clause, then never deciding what to do about it while, as the attached statistics indicate, the situation has continued to deteriorate, at least on the surface. However, politically we have always faced an undefined problem: most of us who have lived long with the problem are dubious that there is any substantial political force dedicated to footwear. Yet, in conjunction with other protectionist pressures, it is a further element and one we could take care of in non-restrictive ways. The attachments have been hastily assembled and, unfortunately, time has not permitted any summary of their contents. Ted 1 Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, STR Reading: January/February 1972, Box 44. Confidential. 2 Regarding this report, see footnote 3, Document 236 . No tabs to this memorandum were found. 3 See Document 251 . 4 Document 252 . 5 Donald A. Webster, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Trade and Investment Policy. 6 Reference is to the 10 percent import surcharge the President announced on August 15, which was lifted following the successful conclusion of monetary negotiations in late December 1971. 7 Stanley Nehmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Resources. 8 Reference is presumably to Section 204 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1956. 268. Joint Statement Issued by the Governments of the United States and Japan 268. Joint Statement Issued by the Governments of the United States and Japan 1 Washington, February 9, 1972. JOINT STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS Japan and the United States today made the following Declaration and agreed to communicate the declaration to the Director General of the GATT for transmittal to the contracting parties. Other contracting parties are invited to associate themselves with this declaration to the extent and at the time which they would deem appropriate. 2 Japan and the United States recognize the need for proceeding with a comprehensive review of international economic relations with a view to negotiating improvements in it in the light of structural changes which have taken place in recent years. The review shall cover inter alia all elements of trade, including measures which impede or distort agricultural, raw material and industrial trade. Special attention shall be given to the problems of developing countries. Japan and the United States will seek to utilize every opportunity in the GATT for the settlement of trade problems, the removal of which would lessen current trade distortions, and will strive for further progress with respect to those matters now being discussed in the GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products and the GATT Agricultural Committee. Japan and the United States agree that progress in GATT in solving some problems in 1972 could facilitate the way in the GATT for a new major initiative for dealing with longer term trade problems. To this end, they also agree in 1972 to analyze and evaluate in the GATT alternative techniques and modalities for multilateral negotiation of long term problems affecting all elements of world trade. Japan and the United States undertake to initiate and actively support multilateral and comprehensive negotiations in the framework of GATT beginning in 1973 (subject to such internal authorization as may be required) with a view to the expansion and liberalization of world trade, improvement in the international framework for the conduct of commercial relations, and improvements in the standard of living of the people of the world. These multilateral negotiations shall be conducted on the basis of mutual advantage and mutual commitment with overall reciprocity, and shall cover agricultural as well as industrial trade. The negotiations should involve active participation of as many countries as possible. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, STR Reading: January/February 1972. No classification marking. This joint statement was issued by Eberle and Japanese Ambassador Ushiba. It is also printed in Department of State Bulletin , April 3, 1972, pp. 512-515. 2 The Office of the Director-General of GATT issued the statement to the GATT Contracting Parties on February 10 (L/3669). (National Archives. RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, GATT Ministerial, Jonathan Showe) 269. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle) to the Japanese Ambassador (Ushiba) 269. Letter From the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Eberle) to the Japanese Ambassador (Ushiba) 1 Washington, February 9, 1972. Dear Mr. Ambassador: This letter records the substance of the recent discussions between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan with respect to those measures in the field of trade which Japan proposed be taken by the United States. 2 1. Section 402a of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (“Final List”) In response to the Japanese request that the Final List be eliminated, the United States stated that the Administration would be prepared to seek legislation to eliminate the Final List, subject to reciprocity within the multilateral framework of the GATT. 2. American Selling Price System of Customs Valuation (ASP) In response to the Japanese request that the ASP method of customs valuation on certain canned clams and wool knit gloves be eliminated, the United States stated, as agreed in the Kennedy Round of Tariff Negotiations, that it will seek legislative authorization to eliminate ASP on canned clams and wool knit gloves. The United States Government understands that Japan is prepared to carry out its reciprocal commitment. 3. Antidumping The United States agreed to a Japanese proposal for consultation by a technical group composed of representatives from both countries on questions arising out of the Treasury Department’s administration of the Antidumping Act, 1921. 4. Government Procurement In response to a Japanese complaint on “Buy American” laws and regulations, the United States stated that it was prepared, in the context of multilateral discussions on government procurement, to participate in an examination of the relevant laws, regulations and practices of all participating countries. 5. Canned Tuna With regard to the question of the implementation of canned tuna from Japan, the United States Government recognizes that measures are being taken by Japan based on the results of discussions held so far by experts of both countries. The present inspection measures in the United States may be moderated as determined by the effectiveness of the Japanese measures in meeting a U.S. laws and regulations concerning decomposed canned tuna. The United States Government is prepared to hold consultations with the Japanese Government on any matter concerning the importation of canned tuna from Japan. 6. Discussion of Trade Issues The United States Government anticipates that discussions of trade issues with the Government of Japan during the year 1972 would be held within the GATT or other multilateral framework or through normal diplomatic channels. 7. Tariffs on Items of Japanese Export Interest The United States Government notes the requests of the Government of Japan that the United States reduce its tariffs on watches and clocks, projectors, light bulb sets and electric lamps for Christmas trees, portable electric lamps, trucks, and tubes for bicycles. Sincerely, William D. Eberle 3 1 Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, STR Reading: January/February 1972. No classification marking. Another copy of the letter indicates that it was drafted by James A. McNamara of STR. (Ibid.) 2 These discussions took place from December 1971 to early February 1972, and included a Summit meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato in San Clemente in early January. The economic questions discussed during these meetings are summarized in a February 23 memorandum for the files by James McNamara. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Eberle signed the original. 270. Paper Prepared in the Council on International Economic Policy 270. Paper Prepared in the Council on International Economic Policy 1 Washington, February 9, 1972. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION REGARDING THE OECD HIGH LEVEL GROUP The paper circulated by Jean Rey has several shortcomings. 2 However, it is most deficient in its treatment of tariff dismantlement (and the related issues of preferences and safeguard arrangements), agriculture and non-tariff barriers. To prepare for our further work in the Group, it would be helpful if we could discuss and agree upon the substance of what we would want to see in the final report and our strategy for achieving it over the next two months. I. Substance. There is a theme in the Eberle paper of December 3 which it would be highly desirable to see adopted as the unifying concept of the HLG report. This is the idea that the future world trading system should be based on the principle that the costs, damages or other trade distorting effects of agricultural, industrial or commercial policies should be borne, to the maximum extent possible, by those nations (or economic groupings) which determine such policies and should not be transferred to other countries except on terms and to an extent mutually agreed by the interested parties. Implementation of this principle should be the ultimate objective for far reaching, long-range reform of the trading system. The report of the HLG to be of value should define the specific ultimate objectives and suggest, in general terms, the process by which the world can arrive at the goal of “fair trade.” In terms of the issues which are of key concern to us, the principle translates into policy objectives as follows: 1) Tariffs and Preferences . As outlined in the Eberle paper, our objective should be elimination of all industrial tariffs by the major developed countries over a 10 or 15 year period. Ultimately, this assures that countries excluded from the EC preferential system will no longer have to bear the discriminatory cost of this European (and, as applicable, Mediterranean, African and Caribbean) policy. The Rey paper does not define the ultimate objective, limiting itself just to a 50 percent cut to be achieved by 1980. This part-way approach naturally leads him to an irrelevant concern about extra-high duties and how to deal with them. The only satisfactory way to break through a sterile argument about tariff disparities 4 is to accept elimination as the goal from the outset. Only in this context can the disparities issue be disposed of in a way which all must recognize as fair. 2) Safeguards . The Eberle paper outlines a general concept for dealing with necessary exceptions to the free trade principle and safeguards which will be needed. We should consider whether we should press for discussion of an orderly marketing system modeled along the Eberle outline in the HLG report, or some alternative to it. The Rey treatment of this issue (p. 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] of his paper) is very general and vague. 3) Agriculture . The implications of the general principle of non-transfer of costs in the agriculture trade sector are clear. It means, in effect, organizing world trade in agriculture mainly according to factors of comparative advantage. It is also clear that this concept has met with heavy resistance from most of the Europeans in the Group. Rey’s proposed “Code of Good Behavior” contains several elements of a first-stage cut of the problem which go beyond most European thinking to date. The issue here is how hard should we press for full acceptance of the principle now and what, if any, compromises should we consider in the interests of a more unanimous report? As an alternative to compromise, how do we ensure that our viewpoint is adequately expressed in the report and what should we do to get support for it from other members of the Group? 4) Non-Tariff Barriers . The application of the general principle to non-tariff barriers is explicitly discussed in the Eberle paper (p. 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] ). Do we need to be more explicit regarding particular NTB’s or other trade-distortions? Should we try to get the report to identify a list of NTB’s of particularly great importance and suggest specific ways of handling them? Rey’s breakdown of NTB’s seems overly simplified, ignoring the fact that many NTB’s are not susceptible to elimination but only harmonization with a view to reducing their trade-distorting side effects. II. Strategy Against the probability that the Group will remain divided on one or more key issues (e.g., agriculture), we have two general options: 1) To accept the Rey deadline of a final report to the May Ministerial meeting and try to rally as much support as possible within the Group to our views. The Report would thus contain perhaps several majority/minority explicit splits. 2) To seek to postpone submission of a final report until later this year. 5 The choice of options should be determined mainly by our judgment of how the timing and content of the Report is likely to affect our efforts to get public and Congressional acceptance of bold new international trade legislation. We should discuss whether a weak Report in May would be more damaging than a weak one next December or vice-versa. Another strategic consideration which we should discuss is the advantages and disadvantages involved if Bill Eberle were to take a very firm position now (or later) on certain key issues, indicating that he could not subscribe to a report which did not meet certain minimum criteria (e.g., agriculture, tariffs, NTB’s). If this tactic seems desirable, what specific criteria should determine this posture? 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. The paper was circulated to members of the CIEP Review Group under cover of a February 9 memorandum from Flanigan informing them that the OECD High Level Group would meet starting on February 14 and inviting them to a February 11 meeting in the Cabinet Room to discuss strategy with Eberle. This paper is one of three papers Flanigan provided for the meeting. 2 Jean Rey, Chairman of the OECD High Level Trade Group. Rey’s 28-page paper is not printed. 3 The 25-page U.S. paper Eberle submitted to the High Level Group in December is not printed. 4 As the Tokyo Round was launched, the United States and the European Community were thought to have approximately equivalent average tariffs. Establishing the Community’s common external tariff had tended to eliminate the very high and very low tariffs in some product categories of its member states, but the U.S. tariff code had not experienced this “averaging” and contained a few very high tariffs and many very low, even negligible, tariffs. The Community argued that these tariff disparities gave the United States a negotiating advantage, since reducing a negligible tariff by 50 percent was not giving up a protective measure whereas reducing a prohibitive tariff by 50 percent still accorded a substantial measure of protection. 5 The second option was adopted. See Department of State Bulletin , June 10, 1972, p. 836. For President Nixon’s message, the prepared statements of the U.S. delegation, and the communiqué of the May 24-26 OECD Ministerial, see ibid., pp. 827-838. 271. Editorial Note 271. Editorial Note In a March 6, 1972, briefing paper for Henry Kissinger’s March 7 meeting with Treasury Secretary Connally, the NSC Staff noted that the stalled Canadian trade negotiations were not a problem unless the United States undertook unilateral actions to redress the adverse trade balance. The paper suggested that Kissinger tell Connally that mutual retaliatory actions during the President’s April 13-15 visit to Canada would not be helpful. The paper recommended that Kissinger ask Connally to develop a negotiating scenario for after the Canadian elections that spring. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 290, Treasury, Volume III) Kissinger and Connally met for lunch at the Treasury Department on March 7. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-1976, Record of Schedule) No record of their meeting has been found. A March 28 briefing memorandum prepared for Kissinger’s March 29 luncheon meeting with Connally informed Kissinger that the Canadian Government had been taking a hard, critical line on the U.S. stand in the trade negotiations and that Prime Minister Trudeau had criticized the U.S. position on changes in the 1965 automobile pact. Secretary Connally reportedly was working on recommendations for the President’s April 13-15 trip. The paper noted the “passion” Connally evoked in Canada and questioned whether he should accompany the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 290, Treasury, Volume III) Connally was not present on the President’s flights to and from Canada. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) The March 28 briefing memorandum reminded Kissinger that Prime Minister Trudeau hoped President Nixon would announce a “Declaration of Canadian economic independence” during the visit but noted that, in view of the President’s remarks on the state of the trade negotiations during a March 24 press conference ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 , page 496), this was unlikely. Nevertheless, in President Nixon’s April 14 address to a Joint Meeting of the Canadian Parliament, the President said: “Canada is the largest trading partner of the United States. … Our economies have become highly interdependent. But the fact of our mutual interdependence and our mutual desire for independence need not be inconsistent traits. No self-respecting nation can or should accept the proposition that it should always be economically dependent upon any other nation. And so, let us recognize once and for all that the only basis for a sound and healthy relationship between our two proud peoples is to find a pattern of economic interaction which is beneficial to both our countries—and which respects Canada’s right to chart its own economic course.” (Ibid., page 538) 272. Editorial Note 272. Editorial Note On March 27, 1972, Peter Flanigan, in his capacity as Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy, sent a memorandum to the members of the Council informing them that the President had requested that preparatory work for the coming trade negotiations be undertaken, with specific responsibilities assigned to interested agencies. The Special Trade Representative would have overall responsibility for coordinating and reporting to the CIEP on inter-agency activities related to trade negotiations in both the preparatory and negotiating phases, as well as ensuring that the CIEP’s guidance was implemented. Flanigan attached a seven-page paper, “Preparation for 1973 Negotiations,” setting out assignments. Among the tasks assigned were data preparation on trade flows by country and “economic” sector as well as by BTN (Brussels Tariff Nomenclature) and TSUS (Tariff Schedule of the United States) basis, tariff averages, GATT bindings and non-tariff barriers (NTBs); providing for computer requirements; dealing with EC enlargement; setting export and import priorities; and intelligence collection. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, CIEP Study Memoranda) Work on some issues was already underway, pursuant to several Council on International Economic Policy Study Memoranda in 1971. Aside from CIEPSM No. 8 regarding tariff preferences (Document 257), a number of additional Study Memoranda had been issued in October: Adjustment Assistance (CIEPSM No. 9, October 7); Contingency Plan for Possible 1971 (and 1972) Trade and Investment Legislation (CIEPSM No. 10, October 10); U.S. Policies Toward International Agricultural Trade (CIEPSM No. 12, October 12); U.S. Export Expansion (CIEPSM No. 13, October 13); and GATT (CIEPSM No. 15, October 18). (All in National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, CIEP Study Memoranda) The last (No. 15) was to examine the role and effectiveness of GATT as an institution. Two of these items were on the table for the January 3 CIEP meeting: preferences and adjustment assistance; see Document 264 . Preferences were also taken up at a January 7 CIEP Review Group meeting; see Document 265 . Adjustment assistance was slated for a January 12 Review Group meeting, based on a paper provided by Under Secretary of Labor Silberman. (Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, CIEP Meetings) 273. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon 273. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 11, 1972. SUBJECT Trade Negotiation Objectives Attached for your information (Tab A) is a memorandum from Secretary Rogers forwarding a report from Under Secretary Irwin on US-EC consultations in Brussels last month. In his report, Irwin cautions that we not underestimate the serious difficulties ahead with the EC and points to their insistence that the forthcoming trade negotiations involve reciprocal concessions. In this regard, Irwin refers to a draft Treasury memorandum on trade negotiating objectives 2 suggesting a non-reciprocal basis for those negotiations and the possible avoidance of general industrial tariff reductions. Irwin fears that such an approach might jeopardize the present “state of relative calm” in our relations with the Europeans. I am reworking the draft memorandum, based on discussions with Treasury, STR, State and OMB. When we have either reached agreement or narrowed the areas of disagreement I will report to you. Tab A 3 REPORT BY UNDER SECRETARY IRWIN ON US-EEC CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS APRIL 27-28, 1972 Our consultations with the EEC Commission concluded this morning with a discussion of trade relations. We were impressed with the signs of growing strength and sense of purpose on the part of the Community institutions which now feel that the success of the enlargement negotiations has shown that the EEC has the capability of achieving over time the fullest potential. Dahrendorf and others stressed that we should not mistake this sense of accomplishment for greater progress than has really been achieved. The Community—in the fullest sense of political, economic and monetary integration—has a long road to travel, but the members sense they are now well embarked. Both the representatives of member states and Dahrendorf stated that the Community meant what it said in the December declaration of intent when it came out strongly for major trade negotiations beginning in 1973. 4 They want to negotiate trade issues and in the process achieve both liberalization and the alleviation of trade problems for third countries which may flow from the new agreements. As background to our talks on specific issues, I stressed that the Europeans should not underestimate the psychological as well as real effects of their actions on the US, pointing out that, while Community moves toward EFTA neutrals and LDCs might appear justified and commendably motivated to them, their agreements could easily affect adversely the climate in the US despite the basic support the President and the American people generally have for the objectives of European unification. This is particularly true at a time when the US is looking for some sign of sensitivity from Europe to our particular economic concerns. We should not underestimate the serious difficulties ahead. It seems clear that the Europeans expect trade negotiations to cover all outstanding areas including tariffs and that they would oppose negotiations which do not involve reciprocal concessions. This point may be important at the moment because Secretary Connally has drafted a Memorandum for the President which suggests more of a non-reciprocal basis for future negotiations and possibly avoiding tariff cuts. 5 We have the impression on the basis of our talks here that these concepts are so at variance with the thinking of the Europeans and with the preliminary thinking of experts in the Department and, I am told, in other agencies, that they should be carefully considered within the Administration before the President commits himself to proposals which may close some or all of his options in this crucial area. We now have a situation where our political and economic relations with our European allies are in a state of relative calm, largely as a result of the successful conclusion of the Smithsonian Agreements. 6 It would be too bad to jeopardize this development by the adoption of a proposal which had not been adequately discussed and refined. Bill Eberle has asked Peter Flanigan to request that this memorandum be held in abeyance until we can have an opportunity to discuss it. At the same time I talked with Secretary Connally about the Chile debt negotiations and my talk with Allende, 7 we agreed, along with 2 or 3 staff members on each side, to meet and talk about State and Treasury views on the monetary and trade negotiations. I understand this meeting is set for May 3. At that time, I would expect to discuss the issues raised by Treasury’s draft. There obviously are legitimate connections between monetary and trade policy. What we would like to explore is whether these can be dealt with in a way which will both benefit our long-term economic interests and avoid an unnecessary strain on our alliance relationships. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73. Confidential. 2 Neither Connally’s draft memorandum nor a final text was found. On May 16 President Nixon announced that George Shultz would replace Connally as Secretary of the Treasury. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 , pp 593-596. 3 Confidential; Nodis. Rogers’ May 1 covering memorandum to the President is not printed. It reads in part: “our aim is to try to deal with our monetary and trade problems with the enlarged Community, whose ten members generally parallel the Western European membership of NATO, in a manner which will both benefit our long-term economic interests and avoid unnecessary strains in our alliance relationships.” Rogers indicated Irwin would be working with Connally, Eberle, Flanigan, and others with an interest in trade issues on options and policy recommendations for the President’s consideration following his return from his late-May trip to the Soviet Union. 4 See Documents 261 and 262 . 5 See footnote 2 above. 6 Reference is to the agreement on a realignment of exchange rates reached by the G-10 Ministers at their meeting December 17-18, 1971, at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington. For documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 221 ff. 7 Irwin had been in Santiago for the UNCTAD III Ministerial earlier in April. See Document 146 . 274. Memorandum of Conversation 274. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 17, 1972. A delegation of ten footwear industry people visited STR on May 17th. 2 The discussion started on a relatively low key, with their three concerns being stated as hides, suspension by the Price Commission of any further consideration of requests for price increases, and imports. Most of the opening presentations concerned the first two issues. It was only after we pointed out that STR had a minor role in hides, had little if any relation to the Price Commission, and was only directly involved in trade matters, that the delegation began to stress footwear imports. It did not appear that the ten had previously coordinated their position, nor was there any organized effort to present a factual case that imports are causing serious injury. Rather, this fact was alleged in a variety of individual ways by various members. Several members appeared at the outset to favor some restraint arrangement at about current levels of imports and to stress the need for some scheme which, in the future, would prevent sudden changes or disruptions. By way of illustration, however, they referred only to the recent disruption caused by hides prices rather than to any recent import activity. Several stated flatly that they could live with the present degree of import penetration and were concerned primarily with future uncertainties. After we had explored these ideas for a while, several others joined in for the first time to argue that the industry could not possibly live with the present situation. Given this range of views, we attempted to find a consensus by asking the hypothetical question: If hides prices returned to more normal levels and if the Price Commission approved pending price-increase requests, what level of imports could they really live with? From this point on the meeting resembled a negotiating session. Some argued that a 1965 base was necessary. Others allowed that the “industry” had accepted the base period of the Mills Bill. 3 By the end of the meeting no one was voicing any acceptance of something near current levels. If there was any consensus among those still expressing a view, it seemed to be in favor of a 1968-69 base. It also seemed likely that the group was going back to the Association to try to come up with a position. Our efforts to explain that our hypothetical question was not intended to be a request for a position were of little avail. Some seemed shocked, despite the obvious differences aired amongst themselves, at the suggestion that views seemed to differ within the “industry.” Among other points, they stressed the inadequacies of seeking restraint only from Spain, 4 arguing at length that the new countries to which U.S. and other producers would then shift was legion. Much was made, for example, of the attractive terms now being offered U.S. producers in British Honduras. After the possibilities of a tariff quota were rather painstakingly explained, most felt that, given the over-quota rate, it would not be of any value to them. Regarding a rollback, they asserted there would be no trouble whatsoever in quickly replacing the lost imports with domestic-made footwear at comparable prices. The dominant impression was that opinions in this group were diverse and that little coordination or agreement had been reached prior to the meeting. Those whose company situations or policies would permit a larger volume of imports were initially quite outspoken, but pulled in their horns as others in the delegation subsequently voiced different views. The open discussion of acceptable imports levels ended up with those initially admitting to being able to live with higher levels becoming silent. A second dominant impression is that some scheme which provides some assurance for the future, some “orderly sharing” as several put it, is perhaps more important than any other feature of a solution. The “need to be able to plan” was a recurring phrase. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, Nonrubber Footwear-Telegrams, Congressional Correspondence. Limited Official Use. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Theodore R. Gates on May 19. (Ibid.) Copies were sent to J.B. Loken, Stanley Nehmer, B. Ascher, H. Blackman, and J. O’Mahoney. 2 The participants in the conversation are not identified, but they may be the same as those identified in a May 16 memorandum of conversation between a ten-member shoe industry delegation, headed by Mark E. Richardson, President of the American Footwear Industries Association, and Stanley Nehmer and other Department of Commerce officials. Two additional shoe industry officials met with Herbert N. Blackman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for Trade and Adjustment Policy, and other Department of Labor officials on May 16. Memoranda of both May 16 conversations are ibid. 3 Reference is to the Mills-Byrnes bill, which called for quotas on imports of textiles and footwear; see Documents 230 and 233 . More than a year earlier, President Nixon had “strongly” endorsed the textile quota provisions of this bill. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , pp. 423-424. 4 See Document 267 . 275. Memorandum of Conversation 275. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Tokyo, July 29, 1972, 11 a.m.-noon. PARTICIPANTS Japan Honorable Kakuei Tanaka, Prime Minister of Japan Mr. Kiyohiko Tsurumi, Deputy Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Akitano Kiuchi, Secretary to the Prime Minister Mr. Hidetoshi Ukawa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter) United States Ambassador William Eberle, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Ambassador Robert Ingersoll, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mr. T.G. Tsukahira, Political Officer, United States Embassy, Tokyo (Interpreter) Ambassador Eberle congratulated the Prime Minister on his election victory and conveyed a personal message from the President. He also conveyed the importance the United States puts on the Japan-U.S. relationship. Mr. Tanaka after expressing thanks said he had just spoken to MITI Minister Nakasone and understood that the Hakone Talks had achieved about 60 to 70 percent of U.S. expectations. 2 Ambassador Eberle replied it was a most useful meeting. The Japanese team, headed by Mr. Tsurumi, had been most cooperative. Both sides had worked well toward reaching understandings. One serious disappointment was the very limited progress made on the question of resolving the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance. Ambassador Eberle said that he did not want to be in a position of requesting or demanding that certain things be done; he wanted the problem thoroughly understood on both sides, and hoped that Japan would come forth with suggestions on our mutual problem. Mr. Tanaka said that he had made clear from the outset that friendly relations with the United States was a matter of top priority with his administration. If the Hakone Talks had not been as fruitful as hoped he would want to continue to work on the remaining problems in a timely manner. His goal was to see a normal, expanding trade relationship between the United States and Japan. Ambassador Eberle expressed appreciation for this view. The concern of the U.S. side is the trade imbalance. In our judgment, the trade balance is likely to become worse rather than better in the next two years because of structural factors in the Japanese economy. On this the U.S. and Japanese viewpoints differ. However, we do agree that problems remain to be resolved. It is important to deal with them now, and it would be in our mutual interest to find areas of further progress before the meeting in Hawaii on August 31. 3 Mr. Tanaka said that since U.S.-Japanese relations are so very important it is essential not to allow the trade imbalance to increase and Japan would strive to reduce this imbalance and bring about a more normal relationship. However, it may be difficult to do anything significant by August 31. In the series of meetings held since last year—the cabinet level meeting in September, the San Clemente discussions, 4 the Eberle visit in May, and now Hakone—there has been some progress each time. The next meeting (in Hawaii) should also show an advance. Mr. Tanaka said that he intends to see that the trade imbalance does not get worse and has already issued instructions that measures should be taken to reduce the balance below the $3 billion level by the end of this Japan Fiscal Year (March 31, 1973). He would point out, however, that looked at from a multilateral point of view, there is a balance of trade as between the four areas: Japan, Middle East, Oceania or Pacific countries, and the United States. Ambassador Eberle said he completely agreed that the multilateral balance had to be considered, but wanted to stress that the U.S.-Japan imbalance was so great as to constitute a serious distortion of the total market. He said he appreciates the Prime Minister’s commitment to go below the $3 billion level in this Japan Fiscal Year. He urged that working party meetings be set up such as the team meetings agreed on enriched uranium, uranium ore, and related matters, and would hope that these could be decided on prior to August 31. Mr. Tanaka agreed that it was a good idea to expedite meetings in the uranium and aircraft purchase areas. As for other matters, he would encourage maximum opportunities for exchange of views. Meetings between the two Governments should not always be negotiating sessions. Our fundamental aim should be to make the relations between the United States and Japan normal and healthy. Mr. Tanaka said it is fortunate that we have as U.S. Ambassador in Japan such a qualified person as Mr. Ingersoll and he hopes continuous discussion with minimum publicity could be carried on through him and his staff. Ambassador Eberle said that on our side we agreed with the Prime Minister’s high regard for Ambassador Ingersoll. We also agreed with the Prime Minister’s view that there should be quiet talks on a continuing basis. The atmosphere or impression of confrontation is created by the press and is not useful. Ambassador Eberle again stressed that his basic aim had been to avoid a posture where the United States would be making demands and requests. He believed that Japanese side should also be making suggestions for solutions to the problem. It was no longer a matter of confrontations, but rather a matter of finding solutions together to our mutual problems. Mr. Tanaka again said his basic policy was to keep U.S.-Japan relations on good terms and he believed that a continuing series of meetings was essential to deal with problems as they arose. If left too long, as in the case of the Japanese National Railways fare problem with which he is currently faced, problems become bigger, more conspicuous, and politically treacherous. He hopes he could keep continuous contact with Ambassador Ingersoll both official and personal and try to stave off problems before they became too large. Mr. Tanaka suggested that Ambassador Eberle might come to Japan more often, sometimes informally. Once a year visits give the press reason to make a fuss. Normal diplomatic channels should also be used more. Ambassador Eberle agreed. However, depending on the problem, he pointed out that there is also need for technical discussions. Hence he urged the early organization of special teams for talks on uranium and related matters. Experts meetings in the agricultural field, computers, integrated circuits, and the Japanese distribution system are also desired. These are essential to improvement of our mutual difficulties. Mr. Tanaka agreed on the desirability of such talks, and said we should keep in frequent touch. For emergencies, he noted, there is even the hot line linking his office with Washington directly. Ambassador Eberle expressed his great respect for Ambassador Ushiba in Washington and said it would be possible to have continuing communication through him also. He stressed, however, that these normal links should be backed up by technical meetings and political talks on a selective basis as necessary. Mr. Tanaka said both the possibilities for the United States Government and Government of Japan depend on upcoming elections and therefore understanding and support of the people were needed. These continuing discussions help educate the people, and this is essential. He believed that U.S.-Japan problems should be solved by promoting joint understanding rather than by “negotiation”. Ambassador Eberle expressed agreement with this general philosophy but said there is a problem he believes is non-political. This is in the area of agricultural purchases where previously agreed upon percentages of the Japanese market have not been met, and the U.S. share has been unduly reduced. Increasing the U.S. share could conceivably give rise to international concerns but is not likely to be a domestic problem. Mr. Tanaka said he agreed generally and would pursue a policy of increasing agricultural purchases from the United States. He said he understands in particular the orange problem, but pressures from local growers is a particularly serious problem. A good example of farmer pressures is the current problem of the rice price where the rice growers have exerted tremendous pressure on the Government. Mr. Tanaka recalled, however, that 15 years ago when it was proposed that Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola be allowed entry into the Japanese market there was powerful opposition from the cider and beer interests, but he had eventually pushed it through. He therefore believed that given time even these problems can be solved. Ambassador Eberle said that since time was drawing short he would like to raise two final matters. First, he would like to make the point again that increasing the U.S. share of agricultural purchases would not be “abnormal.” (Japan would buy these products from abroad anyway.) The second matter was what should be told to the press. Mr. Tanaka said that the press might be told that he said that the U.S.-Japan relationship is very important and that it was desirable that Japan buy more from the United States. Accordingly, steps would be taken to reestablish normal trading relationships through discussions by specialists in a spirit of common endeavor. He said that the press might be told also that he had noted that the United States had expressed appreciation that Japan had made positive moves at Hakone. A 100 percent solution was not achieved but both countries were constantly working toward a common goal and Japan had agreed to make efforts to improve the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan by increasing purchases to the extent possible and by other measures. Mr. Tanaka added that another point might be that he had mentioned the possibility of taking measures to stimulate the domestic economy so that Japanese imports would increase. Ambassador Eberle said he would like to have it stated that Mr. Tanaka had made a commitment that Japan would work toward bringing the trade balance down. The U.S. press, he pointed out, feels that there is a lack of commitment to do this on the part of the Government of Japan. Mr. Tanaka said to tell the press that his administration would devote its best efforts in that direction. He added, off the record, that he would want Ambassador Eberle to be assured that the Tanaka Government has just begun, but plans to be around for a long time, and it will work to improve the trade balance. He thanked President Nixon for his greetings and said he looked forward to his meeting with the President in Hawaii to renew a ten-year old friendship. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of Commerce, Office of the Secretary of Commerce: FRC 40 77 A 85, Under Secretary File. No classification marking. Drafted on August 1, but no drafting officer is identified. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister’s office. 2 Documentation on the U.S.-Japan trade discussions in Hakone, Japan, July 25-28, is in the National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, US-Japan Economic Discussions. For published documentation, including a memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation on economic issues with Tanaka in Karuizawa on August 19, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 93 – 97 . 3 See Document 276 . 4 President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato met in San Clemente January 6-7, 1972; see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 87 . 276. Editorial Note 276. Editorial Note President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka met in Hawaii August 31-September 1, 1972, to discuss a wide range of topics of mutual concern. In addition to political and security issues, the two leaders exchanged views on monetary, trade, and other economic matters. They reaffirmed, for example, the February 9, 1972, joint statement ( Document 268 ) to begin and support trade negotiations on industry and agriculture in 1973. “In this connection,” the joint statement issued at the end of the Hawaii meeting read, “they noted the need in the forthcoming trade negotiations to lay the basis for further trade expansion through reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers as well as formulations of a multilateral non-discriminatory safeguard mechanism.” The statement also indicated that Prime Minister Tanaka agreed to try to promote U.S. imports and “to reduce the imbalance [of trade] to a more manageable size within a reasonable period of time.” For full text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 , pages 844-846. For documentation on the economic aspects of the Summit, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III, Documents 97 – 99 . 277. CIEP Decision Memorandum No. 14 277. CIEP Decision Memorandum No. 14 1 Washington, September 25, 1972. MEMORANDUM FOR Special Representative for Trade Negotiations FROM Peter M. Flanigan SUBJECT Trade Negotiations with the European Community The President in the light of the discussions in the Council on International Economic Policy of September 11, 1972 relating to your August 21, 1972 memorandum entitled “US Response to Developing US-EC Trade Confrontation” 2 has decided that for the present you should pursue a policy of modified confrontation exerting controlled but mounting pressures on issues involving both our trade interests and the principles of the present system. This should be done bearing in mind the overriding importance of our political relations with Europe and the probability that our trade problems cannot be satisfactorily resolved except in the context of larger policy considerations. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, and Commerce; the CEA Chairman; and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs. This memorandum is Tab D to Document 281 . An earlier version of this language comprises a memorandum from Flanigan to Eberle, September 12. (Ibid.) 2 An account of the September 11 meeting is in Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 100 . The August 21 memorandum was not found. 278. Editorial Note 278. Editorial Note On September 11, 1972, President Nixon met with members of the CIEP Executive Committee to discuss trade issues relating to the European Economic Community. A record of that meeting is printed in Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III, Document 100 . Following that meeting CIEP Executive Director Peter Flanigan sent William Eberle a memorandum on September 12 informing him that, pursuant to the meeting, the President had decided Eberle should pursue a policy of “modified confrontation exerting controlled but mounting pressures on issues involving both our trade interests and the principles of the present system … bearing in mind the overriding importance of our political relations with Europe.” (Ibid., Document 101 ) A copy of Flanigan’s memorandum was sent to Henry Kissinger. Flanigan, using essentially the same language, reissued his September 12 memorandum on September 25 as CIEP Decision Memorandum No. 14, Document 277 . Presumably he had in mind the consultations with the EEC scheduled for early October in Washington, because a copy of the CIEPDM was sent to the Department of State where it would be available to Deputy Secretary of State John Irwin who would head the U.S. delegation to the bilateral consultations with the EEC. The U.S.-EEC consultations were held in Washington October 5-6, 1972. For reports on the results of those consultations, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III, Documents 102 – 104 . A follow-up October 20 memorandum from Irwin to President Nixon regarding European Union Trade Arrangements with Spain and Israel is ibid., Document 105 . Flanigan, in his October 11 report on the consultations to the President (ibid., Document 103 ) and Irwin, in his October 20 recommendation to the President regarding Spain and Israel, essentially repeat the President’s language on the negotiating strategy set out in the CIEP Decision Memorandum. 279. Editorial Note 279. Editorial Note By 1969 the United States, the unipolar economic and military power in the early postwar world, now shared economic power, and to a degree military power, with Western Europe and Japan. The Nixon administration believed, however, that the members of the European Community, Japan, and the other industrial democracies in the G-10 and the OECD were not bearing their share of the responsibility for managing adjustments to economic imbalances and for providing international assistance and international security. In the U.S. view, correcting balance-of-payments imbalances was as much the responsibility of the surplus as the deficit countries. See, for example, Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III, Documents 1 , 2 , 161 , and 236 . Trading practices (e.g., preferences, quotas, the CAP, border tax adjustments), exchange rate adjustments, military expenditures, and foreign assistance programs were all linked and were to be the subject of intense negotiations among the United States, the EEC, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan, and more widely throughout the G-10 and the OECD democracies. This was the foreign economic policy dimension of the Nixon Doctrine whereby the United States should and would remain engaged, but with others taking greater responsibility in economic and military affairs. In view of the close linkage of the balance-of-payments, exchange rate, trade, and military burdensharing issues, the documents in Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III and the documents on trade and commerce policies presented in this volume should be consulted in tandem for a comprehensive overview of the foreign economic policy of the Nixon Doctrine in relations with the industrial democracies. This is the case throughout the 4-year timeframe of the volumes, but is probably most explicit in the documentation dating from the fall of 1971 as negotiations progressed on all fronts on balance-of-payments issues, exchange rate adjustments, trade issues, and military burdensharing. It is not by coincidence, for example, that as new foreign exchange parities were worked out and the surcharge was lifted (see Documents 259 – 263 ) that a new offset agreement was negotiated with the Federal Republic of Germany, a burdensharing agreement was agreed to in NATO, and burdensharing discussions were underway with Japan (see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, volume III, Documents 82 , 84 , and 86 ). Secretary of State Rogers, in a December 2, 1971, memorandum to President Nixon put resolution of the economic issues in the context of other foreign policy issues, particularly the President’s wish for a series of Summit meetings with European and Japanese leaders prior to his visits to the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union in February and May 1972. (See ibid., Document 83 .) Rogers’ memorandum came at the conclusion of the G-10 Ministerial in Rome, where a framework for resolving the economic crisis that fall seemed to be falling into place. (See ibid., Documents 210 - 213 .) C. Fred Bergsten, during a May 13, 2002, seminar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, opined that the foreign leaders would only agree to the Summits if the economic crisis was resolved, a development that gave Henry Kissinger the opening to seize the international economic agenda from Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, and led to Kissinger, not Connally, conducting the monetary and trade agreement negotiations with President Pompidou at the Azores Summit December 13-14, 1971. (See ibid., Document 219 .) 280. Memorandum From the Assistant General Counsel, Department of the Treasury (Bradfield) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Trade and Investment Policy (Worthington) to the Council on International Economic Policy’s Legislative and Negotiating Steering Groups 280. Memorandum From the Assistant General Counsel, Department of the Treasury (Bradfield) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Trade and Investment Policy (Worthington) to the Council on International Economic Policy’s Legislative and Negotiating Steering Groups 1 Washington, October 11, 1972. SUBJECT An Alternative Legislative Approach on Trade Authorities STR proposes to approach the Congress with a package consisting of a request for authority to go to zero duties staged over an extended period of time, authority to negotiate reductions in NTB’s which would be approved by Congress under a veto-type procedure, a mandate to negotiate free trade in grain-feed-livestock, and a combination of liberalized escape clause and adjustment assistance. The possibility that a specific bill along these lines could be passed is founded principally on two considerations: (1) a strong Presidential initiative could put a liberal trade program through Congress, and (2) a liberal trade program will be made economically viable by improvements in the international monetary system. There are grounds for questioning this approach and the Negotiating and Legislative Steering Groups have asked us for a fuller explanation of an alternative approach. It is true that a strong Presidential initiative could have a major impact, but it is worth remembering that the President himself, both on August 15 and in his Fund speech, 2 emphasized the need for fairness in international trade rules. Important segments of Congress are very receptive to the fairness argument and are likely to insist on results in making the rules fair before giving broad authority to reduce U.S. trade barriers. The legislation would be introduced next January against a background of a record United States trade deficit. This background will make it very difficult to obtain liberal trade legislation and reinforce the arguments of those seeking restrictions on imports. Moreover, the Congress is skeptical of the ability of the Executive Branch to negotiate trade agreements advantageous to the United States. This concern is reinforced by a general desire to avoid ceding broad Congressional powers to the Executive. Further, the STR proposal seems to run some very grave tactical risks. While it proposes to get strong negotiating authority in the tariff area, it would only obtain a mandate to negotiate in the NTB and agricultural areas with separate packages in these areas being brought back for Congressional approval. This would give our trading partners a wrong sense of priorities. They may be reluctant to negotiate with the United States in these two important areas of agriculture and NTB’s which are so important to the President’s concept of fairness and may only be willing to negotiate seriously in the areas where we have authority. On the other hand, if all segments of the negotiation were treated equally, there may be a better chance for a successful negotiation in all segments. Judging from the ASP experience, even if we were able to reach agreements there is a high risk that the separate packages will generate a strong reaction from the specific industries affected and could be rejected by Congress. This judgment may also be made by our partners thereby weakening their willingness to negotiate seriously on these issues. The STR proposal opens us up to the serious risk of Congressionally legislated highly restrictive import relief provisions that may vitiate the possibility of fruitful international negotiations. An Alternative Approach Instead of requesting specific authority from Congress for trade negotiations, we could seek a general resolution supporting broad trade negotiations. The basic objectives of reduction of tariffs to zero over a period of years and adequate agreements in the nontariff barrier and agricultural fields as well as on making trade rules fair could be spelled out in an accompanying Presidential message. The Congress would be informed that the results of any negotiations would be brought back as a package—and the package would be negotiated so that Congress would have to accept it or reject it as a whole. This proposal has significant advantages. It would put the Congress on record in favor of major trade negotiations and allow the President a vehicle for expressing his view of how the world should develop in the trade field. It would give maximum leverage to our negotiators to require meaningful agreements not only in the tariff area but also on nontariff barriers and agriculture because any agreement had to be sufficiently attractive to be approved by Congress. If foreign countries refuse to negotiate on this basis, they would take the onus for the failure of the negotiations. It would also provide the greatest leverage for negotiating changes in trade rules. Furthermore, it would assure that the negotiations could begin on schedule in October 1973 and that there would be no long delays due to Congressional unwillingness to enact specific trade legislation. It would also avoid the possibility that trade negotiating authority would be hamstrung by protectionist import restriction legislation. It would avoid the need for the Executive to decide its position on import relief and adjustment assistance. Moreover, it would be likely that the trade package would be brought back in an atmosphere of an improved U.S. trade position and an improved international monetary system. On the other hand, it can be argued that this proposal has major disadvantages. First, there is a problem of the credibility of our negotiators. It can be argued that without explicit Congressional authority to reduce tariffs other countries would not negotiate with us. However, a strong Congressional resolution endorsing trade negotiations plus the provision that the negotiated package had to be accepted or rejected by Congress as a whole would appear to give strong negotiating credentials to our representatives. Moreover, it must be remembered that even under the STR scheme specific authority would be obtained only in the tariff field and a general mandate for NTB’s and agriculture. Finally, our trading partners would probably be reluctant to refuse to negotiate because they would bear the onus of this course of action. Second, it would be argued that the requirement of returning to Congress for approval of the trade package would allow the forces of those who had been injured by tariff and other concessions to mobilize against the bill. Moreover, those who had gained from trade liberalization would not be a strong lobbying force in favor of the bill. Thus, it would be doomed to defeat. On the other hand, it can be argued that the package approach puts great pressure on Congress to accept the negotiated result. Moreover, the President could put the issue as one crucial to the survival of a peaceful Western world. Surely the chances for success in this atmosphere would be very great and would be further strengthened by a background of improved U.S. balance of trade performance and a strengthened international monetary system. Certainly there are great risks in this approach, but they may be more than compensated for by the dangers of asking Congress for trade legislation in 1973. A final criticism is that the resolution approach could also serve as a lightening rod for Congressional provisions to restrict trade. On the other hand, the President could argue forcefully that no restrictions should be legislated until the Congress saw the results of the negotiations which would be brought back to them for approval. Since no specific authority would be given in advance no restrictions should be legislated in advance. To do otherwise would severely impair the ability to negotiate. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker: FRC 56 79 A 15, October 13, 1972, Flanigan Working Lunch. No classification marking. 2 For text of the August 15, 1971, address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , pp. 886-891. The second reference is presumably to the President’s September 25, 1972, remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Governors of the IMF and the IBRD; see ibid., 1972, pp. 907-911. 281. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats, Harold Saunders, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 281. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats, Harold Saunders, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 14, 1972. SUBJECT How to Deal with EC Trade Arrangements with Spain and Israel Flanigan’s staff has submitted for your clearance the memorandum for the President at Tab B proposing a US position for dealing with EC trade agreements with Spain and Israel. This covers Deputy Secretary Irwin’s October 20 memorandum to the President on this subject at Tab C. 2 We urge your attention to this issue since how we handle it will significantly affect our political relationship and our negotiation strategies with Europe, Spain and Israel . The Issue The US has expressed opposition to the EC’s preferential trading arrangements with non-member countries often and forcefully. We have argued that these arrangements are incompatible with the Most-Favored-Nation provisions of the GATT Treaty and fail to qualify for an exemption—which has been granted to customs unions and free trade areas like the EC and the European Free Trade Area—since they allow free trade only in particular products. The agreements also hurt our exporting interests (e.g., citrus, paper products, tobacco). A GATT working group studied the issue in 1971 but made no findings on the consist-ency of the agreements with the GATT Treaty. Our opposition has so far done little good—the EC has made such agreements with the EFTA non-applicant states such as Austria and Sweden and is now doing so with the Mediterranean countries. The economic agencies of the USG have felt for a long time—and especially since the summer of 1971—that it is time to get the EC and the countries involved either to make these agreements conform to the GATT or to compensate us for the impairment of trade benefits which they cause. Last year we stated that we would seek compensation under Article 23(1) of the GATT, which says that when one party believes that a trade benefit accruing to it under the GATT is nullified or impaired by failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations, it may with a view to satisfactory adjustment of the matter make proposals to the party or parties concerned and they must give “sympathetic consideration” to such proposals. Because of a year-long wrangle within the USG, we have not yet taken formal action under Article 23(1), however. Agency Recommendations State (Irwin), Treasury (Volcker), Eberle and the CIEP staff have recently agreed that we should soon make the long overdue approach to the Israelis, Spaniards, and the EC. They believe this is consistent with the President’s recent guidance, contained in CIEPDM No. 14 (at Tab D), 3 which tells Eberle to pursue “for the present” a policy of Ô’modified confrontation” with the EC, exerting pressure on behalf of trading principles and our specific commercial interests but bearing in mind the overriding importance of our political relationship with Europe. Operating under this directive and on the basis of our position that these arrangements are inconsistent with the GATT, the agencies would tell the parties involved that our trade has been impaired by (a) the special preferences which the EC accords to Israeli and Spanish products and (b) the “reverse preferences” which these two countries accord imports from the EC. Flanigan has drafted negotiating instructions (at Tab B with Flanigan’s draft memorandum) which instruct our negotiators to (a) tell the Spaniards and Israelis that their agreements with the EC should either be renegotiated or changed to remove their discriminatory character and (b) ask the three participants for compensatory adjustments (duty reductions) covering approximately $750 million of trade. This is an arbitrary figure. (It does not mean we are paid this amount or that our trade will increase by $750 million, but that tariffs on $750 million worth of US exports going to the EC, Spain, and Israel would be reduced.) All agencies (except perhaps Treasury) recognize that we can never get such a large amount of compensation. But they argue that a claim of this size will impress the three parties with the seriousness of our objections and with the need to change the discriminatory nature of such agreements. They believe that our levying a claim of this magnitude will: —Deter the EC from concluding this type of arrangement with other countries (although most such agreements which the EC intends to conclude are already in place so that there is not much to deter). —Maintain the pressure on the EC in order to show our determination to bring about reform in the rules and practices which discriminate against us (this could be done in the 1973 trade negotiations). —Impress upon the three participants the seriousness of our objections and make it known to the EC that agreements of this nature will entail their paying high compensation to the US to offset their discriminatory aspects. (The agencies feel that unless we take strong measures soon, the EC will doubt that we are serious, since more than a year has elapsed since we first made known our objections in the GATT.) —In the end get some offsetting trade concessions from the three parties. Treasury argues that a successful negotiation with the three parties is “vital” to stopping extension of the EC preference system, which in turn is necessary to constructing a new world economic system, as outlined by the President to the IMF meeting. 4 The Risks Irwin and Flanigan point out in their memoranda that there are political problems and risks involved. As we see them the risks are: — With Israel . If handled in isolation, this will become a negative issue in our broader relationship with Israel, complicate our efforts to work toward an Arab-Israeli peace, and lead to an atmosphere of confrontation which will be interpreted in Israel as a diminution of US support. Also, if handled in isolation, anything we may do to meet Israel’s concerns will gain us no credit in our broader relationship. Finally, we would be throwing away an opportunity to ask Israel to help us on an issue important to us—agreeing to generous compensation arrangements which we can use as a precedent with other countries. If Israel refused, we would have established justification for asking consideration in other areas. — With Spain . Liberal Spaniards regard a closer association with the EC as the key to Spain’s modernization. They will resent what will appear to be an effort to block this trend and as a consequence may prove less cooperative in negotiation with us on base rights. (Ideology apart, it is in fact sensible over the long run to have Spain closely associated with Europe and us.) As in the case of Israel, we should also consider how to fit the EC preference issue with Spain into a broader negotiating strategy. Spanish agreement to compensate us would help our cases with other non-EC countries in Europe; Spanish refusal to do so might conceivably establish an obligation on the part of Madrid to treat us well when base negotiations begin, probably little over a year from now. — With the EC . Member nations may interpret this as a sign of our overall hostility toward the Community. Coming as (a) one of the first post-election acts in the trade field by an Administration which has signaled that it wants to put US-European relationships on a new, more constructive basis, and as (b) one of our first policy reactions to an EC Summit which indicated a willingness to negotiate with us constructively on trade and monetary matters, a claim of this magnitude will be criticized if not derided. The EC will say that rather than attempting to seriously discuss outstanding problems, we are making outrageous demands. It might make the Europeans considerably less cooperative in next year’s negotiations on trade and monetary reform. Irwin thinks that these risks can be reduced by quiet diplomacy, a skillful negotiator, and our falling back when necessary from the three-quarter billion demand. There is a disagreement between State on the one hand and Treasury, Eberle, and Flanigan on the other, concerning a fallback. The latter group does not want to have the President authorize a specific fallback in advance. Thus, Flanigan’s draft memorandum to the President makes no mention of a fallback and requests that he (Flanigan) be designated to coordinate one as necessary. Treasury and Eberle agree. In either case, political considerations as well as economic should enter consideration of when a fallback is authorized and under what conditions. The Political Context Unless this matter is handled carefully, there may be reactions from the EC, Israel, and Spain which will damage the “overriding political relationships” to which the Flanigan CIEPDM refers. 5 On the other hand, we should not delay this too long. Arguments within the bureaucracy have already dragged on for a year. The agencies are all lined up on this one and adduce strong arguments for proceeding. Most importantly, we must demonstrate to the Europeans that we will not hesitate to pursue our legitimate economic interests. To make certain that our political relations are not jeopardized, we should do several things: — Send Eberle with Irwin to the parties involved so that the economic reas-ons for our initiative can be presented in a political context and so that the countries are reassured that this represents an attempt to deal with legitimate US economic interests and is not a hostile political act. 6 Flanigan’s memorandum provides for Irwin to accompany Eberle. In the case of Israel at least, this might be supplemented with a direct general approach from the White House. — Work our integrated approach for use by Irwin and Eberle in the context of our economic, political and security relations with Europe and the other parties involved . This can help make clear that we do not see this as a political confrontation. Also, a well controlled approach would enable us to use a turn down in our request for compensation as an added chip to cash in to get these countries to do something which we want in another area. For instance, if Israel turned down a private request to be helpful in this field that would give us one more claim—if our relationship is to be genuinely reciprocal—on Israel’s consideration of serious US suggestions on the Arab-Israeli front. This also cuts the other way—we could put our request for compensation in the context of a defense of trade principles and our legitimate trading interests, but indicate also that these countries could strengthen our relationship by giving us appropriate compensation. (Flanigan’s memorandum does not provide for a scenario such as this.) Flanigan’s draft memorandum and negotiating instructions are appropriate—but only if we can inject a greater political element. Your chief tasks now are twofold: 1. To get Flanigan to hold off until the President has decided how to deal with the whole range of US, Europe and Israel relations in a political-economic context. 2. To impress on him the view that asking for compensation on $750 million worth of trade—while defensible economically in principle and in terms of negotiating strategy—may be counterproductive in political and perhaps economic terms . All three parties might see this as an outrageous demand, not to be taken seriously. Moreover, were we to back down quickly from such a demand—as we would surely have to—the credibility of our position in next year’s monetary and trade negotiations would be suspect. The memorandum to Flanigan at Tab A makes these two points. 7 Recommendation: That you sign the memorandum for Peter Flanigan at Tab A. Tab B 8 NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS ON EC-SPAIN AND EC-ISRAEL TRADE AGREEMENTS I. Objectives and Strategy The main objective we seek in the GATT Article XXIII consultations with the EC, Spain and Israel concerning their preferential trade agreements are to establish a record of contesting the conclusion of special preferential agreements by the Community which discriminate against our trade and to make it clear that we will acquiesce in interpretations of GATT rules that permit the proliferation of such agreements only if the parties are prepared to pay sufficient compensation to us and thus to serve as a deterrent to the proliferation of such agreements with the EC. While we have made clear for years our opposition to this kind of arrangement, these consultations will mark the first time that we have taken direct action to insist on compensation. We are initiating such action on these two agreements because they were the first to come to a head in GATT after we took the decision in August of 1971 to begin movement toward a major reform of the international economic system. One of our objectives in this reform, over the longer term, is to reach a satisfactory solution which will involve: 1) negotiating new GATT rules governing preferential arrangements and 2) reducing the EC’s external tariff and those of other participants in preferential arrangements. These objectives will most likely only be achieved in the context of the major multilateral negotiations scheduled to begin next year. In the meantime, our strategy is to create and maintain pressure on the EC and its preferential partners, present and prospective, sufficient to impress on each of these parties a sense of both the seriousness with which we view this problem and our determination to bring about reforms of rules and practices which discriminate against us. At the same time, it is not our intention to precipitate a breakdown in the conduct of these consultations or to prevent progress toward finding mutually acceptable solutions to such problems while preserving intact satisfactory overall relations. As part of the latter concern, our negotiator should bear in mind that the U.S. retains substantial security and political interests in the countries concerned, and that these are particularly acute as regards our military bases in Spain and the promotion of an economically viable Israel as an essential ingredient to peace in the Middle East. These two constraints—the need to maintain pressure for change and the need to preserve a climate of cooperation to bring it about—establish the limits within which these specific Article XXIII negotiations must be kept. II. Tactics To meet these strategic requirements, it may be useful to employ tactics which distinguish among the parties with whom we are consulting. For example, in presenting our case to Spain and Israel, we could begin by noting that we are concerned by the issue of principle which the agreements raise and that we intend to make this a major point in our discussions with the EC. However, with Spain and Israel, our main pressure in asking for the consultations is to negotiate satisfactory solutions to our specific trade problems in accordance with GATT rules as laid down in Article XXIII. It is our hope, indeed our intention, that any arrangement we can work out with Spain and Israel will compromise neither their own essential trade interests nor their future commercial or political relations with the European Community. We would indicate our understanding that Spain and Israel were motivated to seek the EC agreements out of concern for their trade positions in the Community, that it is our belief that these positions can be maintained in ways which do not damage the interests of others, and that we would hope that they would understand our trade concerns. With the EC, we would make clear our concern over our trade position as it may result from these agreements which we believe are contrary to GATT rules and to the spirit of MFN. We would stress the point that the Community’s habit of concluding special trade arrangements for so-called “political or historical relationship” reasons is no longer an acceptable basis for organizing the future international economic system. If the EC feels it must pay special attention to certain countries for such reasons, it should seek means other than discriminatory trade arrangements to accomplish this purpose. These include, for example, a general reduction in trade barriers on an MFN basis, an increase in economic assistance, investment, etc. Thus while we intend to negotiate in these consultations for the compensation due to us from such discriminatory arrangements, our main purpose is to begin the process of a common search for more satisfactory ways of dealing with trade problems of both its agreement partners and outsiders, making it clear that our concern extends to all such arrangements, both past and future. Our negotiators should therefore be guided by the consideration that these consultations should be conducted as a preliminary move to lead into the major multilateral negotiations. While we would accept a particular settlement from any one or more of the parties to these arrangements, involving adjustment or compensation which we believe is sufficient to be a deterrent to the further proliferation of such preferential and trade agreements by the EC, we could not expect such results in the short run and anticipate that we will eventually move from these consultations into the multilateral negotiations where the chances of a more satisfactory arrangement may be better. III. U.S. Position With the above objectives and strategy in mind, the U.S. position should be developed as follows: 1. The European Community-Spain Agreement We should continue to make clear in GATT and elsewhere our view that the present Trade Agreement between Spain and the European Community is not compatible with the GATT. We should attempt both to protect our trade interests and reassure Spain concerning our continued “sympathetic understanding of Spain’s objective of full integration” in the European Community. We should, therefore, inform Spain that we would accept an arrangement which Spain and the European Community might work out which in our judgment is consistent with GATT rules for formation of a customs union, on the understanding that such an arrangement would be most nearly compatible with the objective of full integration. However, if it appears that a customs union is not possible for the foreseeable future, we would be prepared to examine without prejudice an arrangement for a free trade area consistent with GATT rules, strictly construed, which could be regarded as an interim step toward the objective of “full integration.” In either case, these rules require a definite plan and schedule for elimination of barriers on substantially all trade between the Community and Spain. We would inform Spain that in keeping with our declaration of “sympathetic understanding” we are prepared, publicly, to indicate that this is our position and, if Spain considers this desirable, to so advise the European Commission and the Member States of the Community in diplomatic conversations. We would make this offer to Spain as an indication of our willingness to carry out both the letter and spirit of our 1970 Agreement for Friendship and Cooperation with the expectation that Spain would reciprocate by consulting with us on trade problems in an equally cooperative manner. In subsequent Article XXIII consultations, we would begin by indicating our belief that the present EC-Spain agreement is not compatible with GATT obligations, and that it should either be renegotiated (as above) or changed by a reasonable date to remove its preferential and discriminatory character. Regardless of whether there was an agreement to change or renegotiate, we would indicate our belief that the U.S. is entitled in principle to adjustment or compensation for impairment of benefits for the total amount of our exports to the parties which are affected during the time the present agreement remains in effect. However, we recognize that reasonable differences of opinion could arise over this claim, particularly as regards some products on which the preferential margin or volume of trade is not significant. Therefore, we are willing to accept a de minimis criterion and drop claims for adjustment or compensation in those cases where the margin of preference is less than 4 percentage points and U.S. exports are less than $50,000. We would suggest adjustments to the preferential rate for certain products where we expect particularly significant problems. To the extent that we do not receive adequate adjustments, we should seek compensation in the form of tariff concessions on other products, or a small across the board reduction of the EC and Spanish tariffs could be an acceptable means of redressing the situation. The negotiator should seek a full examination of our claim by the parties involved, on an item-by-item basis if necessary. If the EC and/or Spain reject either all or part of these claims, the negotiator should request further instructions, indicating where he believes possibilities for action by the EC and Spain may exist as a result of the consultations and his recommendations concerning further instructions. If the negotiations can be successfully concluded on the basis outlined above, they should also be accompanied by a commitment to consult with the United States, once a year or whenever we deemed it necessary, concerning future compensation due for products on which unforeseen trade damage arises because of the de minimis or other exclusion. 2. The European Community-Israel Agreement The United States regards the present agreement as incompatible with the GATT obligations of the parties to the agreement. Accordingly, our basic view is that this agreement should be changed, by reasonable date, to remove its preferential and discriminatory character. In the meantime, pending these changes, the United States in its Article XXIII consultations with the parties should seek adjustment and/or compensation for trade impairment on a basis closely following that outlined above with respect to the Community and Spain. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP. Secret. The signed original of this memorandum is attached to Document 282 . On that original Haig wrote: “Flanigan has asked that this be returned for reconsideration.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73) 2 Document 280 . 3 Document 277 . 4 See footnote 2, Document 280 . 5 Document 277 . 6 This Irwin-Eberle advance mission was proposed in the draft CIEPDM at Tab B; see footnote 8 below. 7 Not printed. There is no record that Kissinger signed the memorandum. 8 Confidential. Flanigan considered this paper, which is double-spaced, a draft and requested that it be returned to him (see footnote 1 above). A draft covering memorandum dated November 1 and an accompanying draft CIEPDM are not printed. For Flanigan’s revised memorandum to the President, see Document 282 . These draft negotiating instructions are almost identical to those that the President approved pursuant to an April 18, 1973, memorandum from Kissinger and Shultz. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 322, European Common Market, Volume IV 10/72-7/73) 282. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon 282. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT EC Trade Agreements with Spain and Israel Attached for your approval (Tab A) is a Decision Memorandum and instructions to our negotiators governing the conduct of the consultations concerning the impairment of trade benefits to us which arises out of the preferential trade agreements now in effect between the European Community on one hand and Spain and Israel on the other. 2 There is inter-agency (State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, CEA, and STR) agreement that we must take positive action to back up our stated opposition in GATT to the Community’s proliferation of these preferential agreements. The consultations will be the first occasion on which we will have presented a specific request for adjustment or compensation to the EC or any of its preferential partners for what we regard as an illegal preferential arrangement. Our strategy is to maintain pressure on the European Community and its preferential partners, present and prospective, sufficient to impress on each a sense both of the seriousness with which we view preferential trading practices and of our determination to bring about reform of the rules and practices involving discrimination against us. This strategy conforms with the interim strategy approved by you at the most recent CIEP meeting. 3 Objectives In the short run, our objective is either to obtain adjustment of the agreements to make them consistent with GATT or to obtain sufficient compensation to serve as a deterrent to the further proliferation of such agreements by the European Community. Over the longer term, our objectives are to negotiate new rules governing preferential arrangements and to reduce the European Community’s trade barriers and those of other participants in preferential arrangements. We recognize that these objectives will most likely only be achieved in the context of the major multilateral trade negotiations scheduled to begin next year. Though all concerned agencies agree to the need for this action, your endorsement is desired in view of the potential domestic and foreign political risks involved. The foreign risks are: 1) A probable adverse reaction in the EC which France in particular is likely to try to exploit to our disadvantage. 2) The possibility of a strongly negative reaction in Israel and Spain. The latter could increase our difficulties in getting better cooperation on our military base problems in Spain. The main domestic risk arises from the possible reaction to an action which Israel might seek to interpret here as unfriendly to Israel’s national interests. While I recognize these potential risks, I believe we are justified in running them in the interests of the credibility of our international economic policy stance of firm opposition to illegal preferences, and to show domestic and Congressional opinion that we are ready to act to defend our legitimate trade interests. Moreover, these risks will be minimized by skillful negotiation which NSC and CIEP will monitor. Henry Kissinger agrees that this is possible and will coordinate with me in preparing our negotiators so that their presentation will be conducted in a way that takes account of our overall strategies concerning Europe and the Middle East. There is also agreement that we will spin out the negotiation rather than move to retaliation, if agreements are not reached. There is disagreement between State and Treasury (Tab B) 4 concerning the need now for fallback positions. State proposes alternative fallbacks which the negotiator would be authorized to accept at his discretion. Treasury opposes such authority now. I believe we should not authorize any specific fallback at this time. When we know exactly the reactions to our initial position, we will be better able to determine the desirability and content of alternative positions than we can in advance. Thus, the instructions are drafted to require the negotiator to report back to me on his conclusions for further review. Recommendation That you approve the attached Decision Memorandum and instruction, and authorize me to coordinate any necessary follow-up action without further reference to you unless there is disagreement among CIEP agencies over a major point. Henry Kissinger concurs. Approve 5 Disapprove See me 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 322, European Common Market, Volume IV 10/72-7/73. Confidential. This memorandum is a revision of Flanigin’s draft memorandum to President Nixon; see Document 281 and footnote 8 thereto. It is attached to a November 29 memorandum from Flanigan to Kissinger which reads: “The attached has been prepared in cooperation with your staff. It is agreed that you and I should discuss the appropriateness of this course of action at this time. Hormats feels the course of action outlined need not result in confrontation. Sonnenfeldt apparently feels that we should continue endless delay with regard to the EC preferential agreement until after the situation in the Middle East is clarified and the European study is completed. Please call me regarding this matter at your earliest convenience.” In the margin next to the reference to Sonnenfeldt’s view on delay, Haig wrote: “baloney.” A copy of Flanigan’s package is attached to an undated, handwritten note to Haig which reads: “Bob Hormats called to say this latest Flanigan memo is somewhat of a disaster. He is doing memo.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 219, CIEP) See Document 283 . 2 Not printed; see the attachment to Document 281 . 3 Presumably a reference to the September 11 CIEP meeting and CIEPDM No. 14; see Document 277 and footnote 2 thereto. 4 At Tab B is an October 20 memorandum from Irwin to the President; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 105 . 5 None of the options is checked. 283. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 283. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 1, 1972. SUBJECT EC Trade Agreement with Spain and Israel Peter Flanigan (Tab A) 2 indicates that “it is agreed” that you and he should discuss the appropriateness of the scenario he outlines for dealing with trade arrangements between Spain, Israel, and the EC. He has prepared a proposed memorandum to the President on this issue which has not yet gone forward. On November 14 we sent you a memorandum containing our views and recommendations on this matter, 3 along with a proposed memorandum from you to Flanigan asking that we reconsider the amount of our claim and attempt to integrate our approach on the EC-Spain and Israel problem with a more total approach to dealing with the whole array of concerns we have with the three parties involved. We believe that if presented properly Flanigan’s scenario need not lead to confrontation. In fact, if handled properly it can be used constructively. However, proper presentation requires that it be explained in a political context and that the parties involved understand that it is not an effort to undermine the political relationship between Spain, Israel, and the Community. Moreover, such an approach on this matter would be more effective if it is part of an overall relationship with these countries and the EC. Our true interests will be served only if we put the proposed approach into the context of our overall interests with these countries, so that we might be able to use a less than adequate response on trade to get them to make progress in other areas of interest to us. Our view, therefore, is that we should delay our approach until we have Presidential decisions on our future overall policy toward Europe, Spain and the Middle East and then handle this economic problem within that context. 4 We are not arguing for interminable delay; we are arguing for putting this issue in a context where both the President’s economic and political policies could be served at the same time. Unless this is done, we could end up with the worst of two worlds. Recommendation: That you meet with Flanigan in the near future to discuss this matter. (Our earlier memorandum, a copy of which is at Tab B, 5 outlines our views in greater detail.) 6 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 322, European Common Market, Volume IV 10/72-7/73. Secret. Attached to an April 30, 1973, memorandum from Scowcroft to Dam. At the top of the page Kissinger wrote: “[illegible] Sonnenfeldt—please explain just what this implies operationally.” Hormats, Sonnenfeldt, and Saunders replied in a January 3, 1973, memorandum. They suggested that Kissinger contact Flanigan to indicate: 1) he agreed the United States must tell the EC, Spain, and Israel it would not accept preferential trade arrangements damaging to its legitimate economic interests, and would demand compensation; 2) the EC, Spain, and Israel might consider the proposed $750 million compensation claim so extreme as to jeopardize the U.S. negotiating position; 3) he agreed that at the onset of Article XXIII consultations Eberle and someone from the State Department should call on the three to explain U.S. objectives; and 4) most importantly, he recommend to Flanigan that the United States not present its views to the EC, Spain, and Israel until the President made his decisions on how he wanted to handle U.S.-European political, economic, and security relationships and relations with Israel. (Ibid.) 2 Not printed, but see footnote 1, Document 282 . 3 Document 281 . 4 Relations with Europe were under review pursuant to NSSM 164, November 18, 1972. See Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Documents 106 and 108 . 5 The November 14 memorandum, Document 281 . 6 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked or initialed. 284. Editorial Note 284. Editorial Note During the final months of 1972, representatives of the footwear industry continued to try to persuade the Nixon administration to support relief for the industry from foreign competition. In a September 13, 1972, memorandum to Special Trade Representative William Eberle, Assistant Special Representative Theodore R. Gates provided background for Eberle’s meeting the following day with a footwear delegation. Gates wrote: “No one seems to know just what they want. My experience has been that this industry seldom agrees,” and he summarized the “confusion” and disagreement among the industry delegation which had come to STR in the spring. Regarding that meeting, see Document 274 . Gates also suggested searching questions on the prices of shoes and hides and the effects of currency revaluations that Eberle might put to the delegation. (National Archives, RG 364, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: Lot 78 B 1, Correspondence 1972) No record of the meeting has been found. Subsequently, in a December 5, memorandum to Peter Flanigan, Secretary of the Treasury Shultz, commenting on a CIEP options paper on shoe imports and hide exports (which has not been found), argued that there was “no convincing economic case for restricting imports” of shoes. He noted, for example, that the yearly rate of import growth was falling and that increased import protection would probably not save the small, inefficient firms but would be a “windfall” for the large ones and be inflationary. He also strongly opposed resubmission of the case to the Tariff Commission, and he agreed with the CIEP study on the hide export issue that “not much can be done aside from quietly urging Japan to reduce its purchases” and suggested that Eberle might take up the issue once again with Japan. (Ibid., Nonrubber Footwear—Options Papers) On December 29 Mark E. Richardson, President of the American Footwear Industries Association, wrote separate letters to Shultz, Eberle, Flanigan, John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, and Congressmen James A. Burke and Wilbur D. Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee urging them to take immediate steps to alleviate the import problem of the shoe industry which affected nearly 300,000 workers. In the absence of supportive action by the administration, he indicated his Association’s support for the pending Burke-Hartke bill providing for import protection. Copies of Richardson’s letters to Shultz, Eberle, Flanigan, and Ehrlichman were forwarded under cover of January 8, 1973, letter, which also presented the case for relief, from Eli G. White, chairman of the Association, to President Nixon. (Ibid.) 285. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 285. Action Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 14, 1972. SUBJECT European Strategy and Trade Legislation The decision on whether or not to submit the trade legislation, and on the character of any legislation we might submit will be made in the near future—probably this weekend. That decision will have a critical effect on our relationship with Europe and Japan and on any Presidential initiatives towards either. It is essential that you discuss this matter with Shultz and Flanigan as soon as possible. The Situation Trade problems have been an extremely divisive element in our relationships with Japan, Canada and Europe. One of the early arguments for comprehensive trade legislation was to enable us to negotiate, in a multilateral context, solutions to many of the trade issues which could not be solved bilaterally after last year’s August 15 decisions. It was also seen as an alternative to the Burke-Hartke protectionist legislation—which will have strong support from the labor unions next year—the passage of which would surely touch off a disastrous trade war. Over the past year the US has provided most of the initiative for an international commitment to major multilateral trade negotiations beginning in 1973. The negotiations would deal with fundamental problems of the world trading system including tariff and non-tariff barriers and preferential trade agreements. They would also aim at developing a new set of trading rules. The President can enter into trade negotiations, but lacks legislative authority to implement their results (i.e., the concessions we commit ourselves to make.) A decision must soon be made as to a) what type of authority will be sought by the President and b) what the timetable for submission will be. The Issue of Authority There are three options: 1. Submit comprehensive trade legislation asking Congress for specific authority to reduce tariffs and for a less specific mandate supporting the reduction of non-tariff barriers, with authority to improve safeguard and domestic adjustment assistance programs to assist firms and workers injured by imports. Pros: —The Presidential authority to cut tariffs strengthens our ability to press other nations to get an extensive negotiating mandate. —Demonstrates the President’s personal commitment to negotiate on trade, which would help to elicit a similar commitment—perhaps at Summit meetings—from the leaders of our trading partners. —Comprehensive negotiations in themselves would serve as a useful counterpoise to the demonstrated tendency of the EC to institute—in its internal bargaining process—policies which insulate Europe’s markets at the expense of its trading partners, and establish a forum for our applying effective pressure against such tendencies. —Allows us to take the highroad for solving particular trade problems and to point to negotiations to counter ad hoc demands of specific domestic interest groups for protection. Cons: —Being too specific and comprehensive may tempt the Congress to temper with the legislative proposals, thereby restricting the President’s flexibility, and to append protectionist alternatives to each of the major sections of the bill. —Greater Presidential effort and a more extensive educational campaign may be necessary to explain and secure passage of comprehensive legislation. 2. Request a joint Congressional resolution endorsing negotiations on trade (giving the President no authority to reduce tariffs), with all negotiations being conducted on an ad referendum basis. (Shultz apparently favors this approach.) Pros : —May require less of a Presidential effort on the Hill. —Minimizes risk of Congressional tampering with specifics. Cons : —The assumption on which this is based—that two or three years hence, after the negotiations are complete, Congress will accept the results as a package—is an extremely doubtful proposition. The Europeans in particular would consider such a very weak mandate. —The weakness of our mandate would give our trading partners the excuse to get a similarly weak mandate and thus mean that negotiations would probably fail to solve the most important trading problems. (This in effect means that the momentum which has been built up would be lost and the possibility of negotiating a resolution of trade issues would be severely diminished.) —Calls into question the seriousness of the President’s commitment to negotiations and thereby damages his credibility in the economic area and in other areas as well. —Weakens our friends in Europe who have pressed very hard for a forthcoming and constructive European response to our initiatives for trade negotiations. —Constrains the President’s ability in whatever Summitry takes place to discuss a resolution of trade issues—the most important source of friction in our relationship with Europe—since he will have no authority to make concessions as a quid pro quo for concessions which he might press others to make. (Thus, the President’s discussion of trade would be substantially limited to our pressing others to make non-reciprocal concessions—which the Europeans would consider unacceptable.) —Gives other heads of state the excuse not to commit themselves personally to resolving trade problems and monetary problems as well. —Means that as the EC develops new arrangements we would be extremely limited in our ability to engage in negotiations aimed at liberalized trade. 3. Request no mandate or Congressional action at this time but begin negotiations and then refer everything back to the Congress when the negotiations are completed. Pros : Considered by some to be the best way to avoid bringing trade to the fore and therefore stimulating a protectionist effort in the Congress. Cons : All of the cons of Option 2. My View We have made considerable progress in securing from our trading partners a commitment to negotiations. The Summit meeting of the European Community 2 constituted a major breakthrough for us in that the Europeans set a timetable for these negotiations and stressed their intent to move quickly. Nearly every European official with whom I spoke—and Ambassadors Hillenbrand and Greenwald 3 —emphasized a) the importance of these trade negotiations as a means of dealing with and managing major trade issues and preventing trade from becoming a divisive force in US-European relations and b) the necessity of our securing authority to cut tariffs if we want the Europeans to get a forthcoming negotiating mandate. Failure to submit, and work hard to secure, comprehensive legislation will make it virtually impossible for us to deal meaningfully on trade with Europe and Japan, damage severely the credibility of the President, render us increasingly vulnerable to protectionist legislation, and virtually eliminate our ability to resolve in the next several years the politically divisive trade issues which confront us and will do so in the future as the EC evolves. It could deal a lethal blow to any Presidential initiatives with Europe and Japan next year. It is therefore essential that the President submit legislation as described in Option 1. Timing As I understand it Flanigan and Shultz intend to talk to Wilbur Mills in the very near future to determine whether he wants to take trade legislation first (as I understand he does) or whether he wants to hold it off until after he considers such other matters as tax reform. After this we will have to make a decision on the timing of submission. — Arguments for early submission: Our trading partners would be given greater incentive to move quickly to prepare for negotiations with the knowledge that the President regards this as a priority item, the results of the November election give impetus to legislation submitted early in the session, gives us a better chance to have authority by September (when negotiations are scheduled to begin), delay might appear to reflect uncertainty or lack of priority trade, failure to take advantage of Mills’ apparent willingness to take this legislation first may cause him to be less cooperative in scheduling hearings later, if we do not move quickly the AFL-CIO Burke-Hartke Bill may capture the initiative on trade issues. — Disadvantages to early submission: Would be insufficient time for the development of broader foreign policy initiatives (which are a necessary backdrop to trade legislation), for consultations with Members of the Congress, and for developing public support, and present levels of trade imbalance and unemployment may harm the bill’s chances. — My Opinion: On balance I lean toward submitting the bill early in the year, if our “Year of Europe” and other foreign policy initiatives are far enough along and visible enough to allow us to put the trade bill in a broader foreign policy context—which is essential for the bill’s success—and if the President makes a strong commitment to it in the State of the Union Message and elsewhere. This would minimize foreign concerns about the President’s commitment to negotiations, give us the domestic initiative, and allow the Congress to see the bill as part of the President’s broader foreign policy strategy. And there is no guarantee that our trade and domestic positions would improve significantly in three-four months. Action Necessary Based on the above considerations I have prepared a set of Talking Points 4 which I recommend you use with Shultz and Flanigan as soon as possible . In your discussion with them, you should be aware that the most important single factor in selling this bill will be the degree to which we can link it to the President’s overall foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis Europe, and to a slightly lesser extent, Japan . In particular, the timing of submission of this legislation will depend in very large part on whether we are far enough along in our foreign policy initiatives to present this legislation at an integral part of those initiatives. If you think that we will be ready by late January, then the legislation should go up at that point. If we will not be sufficiently far down the road by that time, it may be better to wait a few months. My strong preference, however, as noted above, is to submit this legislation as early as possible if we can construct the necessary foreign policy backdrop. If you are not able to discuss this with Shultz and Flanigan in the near future, I recommend that you authorize me to make the points contained in this memorandum to Flanigan and an appropriate member of Shultz’s staff and to indicate that you favor Option 1. With regard to the timing question, however, I will need to get your judgment on whether we will be far enough down the road on our foreign policy approach to submit legislation at the end of January. Recommendation: 1. That you discuss these matters with Shultz and Flanigan using the Talking Points at Tab A. Approve, set up meeting with Shultz and with Flanigan 5 2. If you do not have time to do this, that you authorize me to: (a) Convey the position that you favor Option 1. Approve Prefer Option 2 Prefer Option 3 (b) Indicate whether you think we will be far enough along in the foreign policy area to submit legislation in January. Will be far enough along, submit in January Will not be far enough along, submit later 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73. Secret. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt. Attached to a 6 p.m. December 14 note from Hormats to Haig informing him that the subject would likely be discussed the following afternoon and that it was urgent that Haig or Kissinger give Shultz and Flanigan their views within the next 18 hours. Also attached is a December 15 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger informing him that Shultz had stopped by that morning to discuss the broad approach to trade legislation, which would be taken up at a 6 p.m. meeting that day of interested Cabinet officers and Flanigan. Shultz reportedly wanted the most senior member of Kissinger’s staff to participate and since he (Haig) would be leaving shortly, he recommended Sonnenfeldt attend. Shultz would report to Kissinger the next day on the meeting. 2 October 19-20. In an October 27 memorandum Sonnenfeldt and Hormats informed Kissinger that at the Conference the Community reaffirmed its intent to negotiate trade on the basis of reciprocity and acknowledged that trade and monetary relations were linked. They concluded that the European leaders, unlike the Community’s officials in Brussels, were putting their economic relations with the United States in an overall political context. (Ibid., Box 322, European Common Market, Volume II 1971-72) 3 Hormats traveled to Europe for a special OECD Ministerial December 4-5. He then had bilateral meetings in capitals with European officials. Hormats summarized his conversations in a December 18 memorandum to Kissinger, which is attached to a January 6, 1973, memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger calling it to the latter’s attention. (Ibid., Volume III 10/72-7/73) 4 The talking points are not printed. See Document 287 for the briefing material Hormats provided for Kissinger’s December 20 breakfast meeting with Shultz. 5 None of the options under these two recommendations is checked. 286. Memorandum of Conversation 286. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 15, 1972, 6 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Secretary Shultz, Treasury Secretary Rogers, State Secretary Peterson, Commerce Peter Flanigan, CIEP Ambassador Eberle, STR Under Secretary Volcker, Treasury Under Secretary Casey, State Ken Dam, OMB Chairman Stein, CEA Chairman Burns, FRB Deputy Secretary Simon, Treasury Robert Hormats, NSC Shultz: The purpose of this meeting is to discuss strategy and political considerations for submission and timing of trade legislation. It is to permit an airing of views, but we will not attempt to reach any conclusions. Let’s discuss this today and come back again. Peter Flanigan has done a great deal of work on this, so I shall turn it over to him. Flanigan: The Hill is already aware of this meeting. It appears to be open information, but this is not necessarily bad. Rogers: The Hill knows not only about the meeting but what the views are. Flanigan: The purpose is to get thoughts for you (Shultz) to have when you consider the schedule of legislation before the Ways and Means Committee including the timing of trade legislation. But first we must consider what kind of legislation we want. There are two possibilities: —A full blown trade bill. —A sense of Congress resolution which would not commit Congress to accept what our negotiators agree on. We should focus first on which option is desirable and then we can talk about timing, since the two are interrelated questions. If we want a sense of the Congress resolution we could go up early and hope for a favorable response. We must also consider whatever the President may be thinking about in the foreign policy area. This will be an important component in the “Year of Europe”. We must see if he has any plans and reflect these in whatever proposals we send to Congress. We can submit a sense of Congress resolution alongside of anything we do on the “Year of Europe”. Any trip the President makes will certainly focus on these issues and political issues as well. There are three considerations: —Could we get a detailed bill through the Congress? —Could we have meaningful negotiations without a bill? —Could we realistically expect what is negotiated to be passed by the Congress if we don’t have prior authorization? I have talked generally with the Congress and in particular with Jimmy Burns. He believes that with a very substantial Presidential push we can get the bill through. He feels it is a leadpipe cinch to get a sense of Congress bill through but that it will be difficult to get the Congress to buy in whole the results of the negotiation. Of course, it will also be difficult to get through the Congress what we negotiate on NTBs. The problem abroad is that foreigners would not negotiate based on a sense of Congress resolution. Congressional staffers who went to Europe have reported to me that on this basis we would not have realistic negotiations. The Europeans—who are not enthusiastic about negotiations and are concentrating on completing the work of integrating and developing the institutions of the EC—would like an excuse not to negotiate. However, the US probably could carry on negotiations with just a sense of Congress vote. The fate of the negotiated package is also an important consideration. We will have to submit it to Congress eighteen months to two years after negotiations start and this is an optimistic schedule. This will put the package to the Congress at the time of the ′74 or ′76 elections. That is an inauspicious time. Although, it is true that in any case we will have to go back to the Congress anyhow to bring our NTB and agricultural successes, or hoped-for successes, before the Congress. We should discuss these first and then go to the question of timing. Volcker: The crucial difference seems to be whether you have authority or you don’t. Flanigan: Yes. The sense of Congress resolution could be a detailed bill. Rogers: I believe we have to go get a bill. We have such things as MFN, Preferences, etc., and negotiations will not be meaningful unless the President has authority. This need not necessarily be the same kind of legislation as the Kennedy Round, but authority to make a deal that will stick. The Europeans remember that we did not implement the American Selling Price agreement in the Kennedy Round and say to us that if you are not about to get authority we do not trust you. The Europeans have said that it will be difficult for them to negotiate without authority. We do not have much choice, we must bite the bullet. All Congressional staffers have said that if the President puts his weight behind it we could get this legislation. And this is essential not only for trade matters, but also for foreign policy reasons since we can’t resolve these trade problems with Japan and Europe unless we have these negotiations. We need a comprehensive bill and we should draft it as quickly as possible. We must rally support because the opposition will be tough. Labor will oppose but we can make sure that labor is not too difficult. They have other things they want. Less than a comprehensive bill with authority will not be meaningful and others will not negotiate with us. Eberle: One important fact which should be remembered is that there are a whole series of “housekeeping provisions” which we should put into effect today. They are necessary for the management of our trade program. We do not even have authority to make minor deviations in tariffs. If we had minor authority we could solve some of our trading problems. And a new system of safeguards could allow us to move in and be responsive to particular domestic problems. Also, we will have a fight on the Hill anyway and as long as you have to fight, you may as well go up with your bill and fight for it. I feel strongly that we need authority. It is a question of credibility. Without authority the Europeans will negotiate but will not be serious about negotiating. On the other side, if we have authority, we can implement a whole series of things in the farm area which we can negotiate. General legislation has already given us authority to implement certain things which we negotiate with regard to agriculture. Rogers: Does the President have authority to make changes in the farm field? Eberle: Yes. He can phase out certain farm practices. If we are to manage domestically and resolve our problems with Europe and Japan we need this legislation. We must put these problems in an overall format in which they can be solved. Specific bilateral problems can be solved in a multilateral context. If you do not have authority, no matter what concessions you make, those injured by them will protest. And it could be the next Congress which would receive the package we brought back. Our partners will not negotiate seriously on this basis. The momentum is now with us and we have a good chance. We can also fit this into the “Year of Europe”. Rogers: There is no assurance that the Congress will act at the end of the road. Flanigan: However, even if we do get authority, remember that the last time the Market had to go back and have reviewed what they negotiated. Eberle: With authority we can ask them to get an equivalent mandate. Volcker: You will not get this anyhow. Eberle: You can insist. Peterson: The ability to manage and deal with problems is critical. And, we must improve our credibility abroad. We should have a safeguard system which we can implement which is developed internationally. On labor, they are committed to fighting this, but some negotiations with labor about other things they want and things they want to avoid in Phase III can ameliorate the situation. The President has an enormous foreign policy mandate. We have done great things with the Soviet Union and in SALT. We must show how this bill was part of peace over the next ten years. Trade is small potatoes compared to building the alliance over the next ten years. Consultations with the Congress will be important. They are still mad and they are asking if we are tough enough. Is there a new way of involving the Congress—either a mandate or specific legislation must involve them. Could we set up a group which works with the negotiating groups? Eberle: In July and August I met with the Ways and Means Committee on that subject. They are torn between participating and getting too involved. They would like to be associated but how much further to go is the question. There is no real hope that they will get involved. Volcker: If we need housekeeping legislation, let’s go ahead. The issue is do we have full implementing authority on tariffs or do we want to treat tariffs and NTBs on the same basis—i.e., you have to go back to the Congress. If we get authority on tariffs it is not in our interest. The whole momentum will go in the direction of tariffs. We want at least as much pressure on NTBs as we do on tariffs. We should treat these in parallel recognizing that we cannot get authority outside of the tariff area. Let us put this in Peterson’s setting. We are interested in total reform—the relationship to monetary reform, NTBs, new rules, etc., and look at it in a comprehensive way. The focus that you are trying to create is undercut if you concentrate only on tariffs and you will cause a squabble in Congress over this issue. Other areas—NTBs, agriculture—will be more difficult. Rogers: We should not call this liberalization but an attempt to reduce our disadvantage in trade. Eberle: I see it as attempting to achieve a fair system opening up more markets on a continuous basis. Flanigan: (To Volcker) Asking for authority does not necessarily mean the President has to implement what is decided. The President can say, I won’t implement the reduction in tariffs unless I get what I want some place else. Volcker: In theory you are right but in practice you are wrong. The least obnoxious of barriers are tariffs. The most obnoxious are NTBs. We will make progress in the most benign areas at the expense of the worst barriers. And part of the pressure from reduced tariffs would be to put on NTBs. Eberle: Most people know these are tied together. On the question of tariffs being least obnoxious, we must recognize that tariff lowering is one way of lowering preferences. This cuts the differential down so that we can be more competitive. Dam: On the question of Congress, an up or down vote would be difficult to arrange when you go back. At the beginning it is difficult to see who’s the winner and who’s the loser. When you come back, those who are hurt will complain but exporters not lobby very hard because the benefits they will get are uncertain. On NTBs, we will probably have the same problem and on agriculture we can use the Agricultural Act which can allow us to do something. My point is that if we do want to reduce tariffs, it will be difficult to do so when you come back. Peterson: A lot depends on what the climate is when you come back. Now people say there is nothing you can do to reduce the imbalance. Later, the Monetary Agreement may be in hand and the climate may be better. Rogers: These may take longer than two years. They could be delayed until Ô76, which would be a bad year. Volcker: What if you are defeated? Rogers: Then you can fall back to a sense of Congress resolution. Flanigan: You could get a comprehensive bill without authority. Rogers: In my talks with foreign ministers it is clear that no one will take us seriously if we don’t have authority. Peterson: The Europeans are not excited about negotiations and will use our not getting authority as an excuse for not moving. Rogers: If we want these to succeed the President must convince them we are serious. Volcker: What is your definition of success? Eberle: If the EC is left alone on the economic side, by nature of its decision-making process it will exclude more of our products. We need a forum in which they are required to discuss these things. They need an out. Negotiations can stop further deterioration, and lower some barriers. In addition, we can open up the EC agricultural policy. The French have said that if you can open this up it will be great progress. There is hope for progress. If you don’t have credibility, they will stall and they will stall on the monetary side. Rogers: They want us to take the lead. If we do we will be successful. Volcker: On the question of a definition of success—if it is to get some balance of favor for us and not lose ground on the tariff side that will be difficult. The tendency is to make a deal for net tariff reduction and leave it at that. Peterson: Why do you contemplate not getting anything on agriculture and NTBs? Volcker: Tariff authority gives them a good position. Peterson: Generalized tariff preferences is a built-in way of getting rid of reverse preferences. You have more bite if you have a tariff cutting authority. Eberle: Europeans do not want to put emphasis on cutting tariffs. By legislative history we can show that these things will be tied together. We will have flexibility and negotiating strength. Peterson: On the question of timing, this should be part of our major foreign policy initiatives. They will determine whether you go up in January or take two-three months to get moving. Rogers: It is probably unwise to go up in January, but we should not delay too long. We should think it through. We must do a lot of selling in advance, and discuss this with labor. We must convince them that adjustment assistance means something. We could probably go up in February. Flanigan: That is the earliest we could be ready. We could go up at the end of February. We need an education process if we want to do this. We must take into account the President’s actions. If the President goes abroad early, we should use this and can submit the bill and call for early hearings. Or we could submit the bill and not hold hearings and then the President would report back after his trip to explain the foreign policy significance of the bill. Eberle: We need to be in at the beginning or we will lose control. The first of March through the end of April would be fine. If not, there will be another bill and we will lose momentum. We should submit at the end of February and hold hearings in March, but this depends on whether the President goes to Europe. If we do not submit the bill before he takes his trip, it will weaken the President abroad. Rogers: The President must put himself strongly behind this bill when it is submitted. He must make a strong Presidential commitment. Shultz: Who is optimistic about a satisfactory outcome if we get authority? Rogers: I am. I believe that the Europeans recognize the importance of a satisfactory conclusion. Their security dependency on us is important. Flanigan: I would put this in another way. Who is confident that the results of negotiations will be better if we have authority than if we do not. This is the important point. Burns: It is our business to come out of these negotiations with a clear advantage. We have the cards. They understand the facts of life. They have to be sensible and recognize the facts of life as far as our trade position is concerned. Eberle: We can come out with a net balance, but it will be piecemeal and will come in over time. There are four areas where if we don’t negotiate we will be hurt. If we don’t negotiate we will be hurt by actions which they will take. Rogers. On reverse preferences there is increased opposition to EC policies among their people. Shultz: As I see it, the big problems on trade are: —The Europeans are making things worse—making them more difficult. —Japan has NTBs which they are reluctant to get rid of. —The Canadians have made special deals with us in the past which we now do not like but they are reluctant to do anything to improve them. Lower US tariff barriers are not of great interest to foreigners. They care about our military shield and the fact that they are piling up dollars. The only way they can do something about the latter is to have negotiations to improve the balance so that they will stop accumulating dollars. The question I have is will we get enough in these negotiations to justify the risk that Congress will give the President additional leverage. Remember during the textile negotiations we claimed that we could not impose quotas. The Congress may give the Executive power to impose quotas. We are discussing tariffs, but the things which give problems are not in the tariff areas. Burns: Suppose you put in legislation that US negotiators should attend to NTBs. Volcker: Domestically there are protectionist problems. Dampening these threats would be an achievement. It could be more important than a positive step. The joint resolution could dampen these pressures, and there is more certainty that it would do so. Flanigan: You could take out of the broad bill authority to implement tariff cuts and use that bill against the threat of protectionism here. Negotiations which brought about a lowering of barriers on both sides would be a success. Shultz: That’s right. Flanigan: Even if we didn’t get an advantage, if we got safeguards that would be a success. Shultz: What are the real levers in negotiations? Tariff barriers are not particularly high on the list, yet we are arguing about authority to implement tariff cuts. Flanigan: They are only important in that they allow us to argue for other things. They strengthen our credibility. Burns: Other countries need a handle so that if there is any willingness to make concessions to us they can do so under this. Eberle: That is correct. They will help us in Canada on wheat, etc. Whether authority is 50 percent or is 0, it will allow the Europeans to move on NTBs. They want us to lower our high tariffs. Some of these high tariffs are high on their priority list but low in terms of what it costs us to give them up. Peterson: The security issue is an important lever or carrot. It will be helpful here to get burden sharing and a monetary settlement, etc. We are talking about tariffs before we know the President’s strategy for Europe. Rogers: Japan will be able to reduce NTBs in this process. We have the upper hand. They are nervous about what we might do. They are worried about our position. Flanigan: We have a security lever, and that will be especially important in MBFR discussions. Eberle: We should put this in an interrelated content at the highest levels. We can pull out the economic side but we should recognize the real tradeoffs. We should not focus on any one issue but recognize that a trade package is related to the total package, and should not allow them to come out of context. Rogers: There is no need to tell them about the security relationship. They know it. Burns: That is right. The financial people talked to me about it. The problem is with Congress. Should the President be defensive with respect to Burke-Hartke? It is better to come forward with a positive program. And 1973 will be a good year. The economy is moving forward. Protectionist forces may weaken. This is as good a year as I can visualize. Eberle: We can go in on a composite basis and everything will be with us. Shultz: I am glad to have had your thoughts and we can come back again on this. As I see it, the consensus is that we go forward with a general comprehensive bill with authority to implement. We should push hard to make sure that we are ready to do this at the earliest date and that it contains such things as adjustment assistance. Flanigan: We have done a lot of work but there is much work ahead. The issues must be resolved whether we have a resolution or authority. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 290, Treasury, Volume III. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Shultz’ office. Drafted by Hormats and forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a December 18 memorandum, in which Hormats noted: “The consensus of the meeting was that we should go forward with a comprehensive trade bill giving the President the authority to implement tariff reductions. The dissent from the consensus was Volcker (Treasury) and Shultz tilted towards his position. Timing of submission will depend in large part on the timing of the President’s foreign policy initiatives—specifically the ÔYear of Europe’.” Earlier on December 15 Sonnenfeldt and Hormats sent Kissinger a memorandum marked “urgent action” regarding that evening’s meeting, indicating their understanding that Shultz might be inclined not only to forego enabling legislation, but also to postpone trade negotiations for at least a year. Hormats and Sonnenfeldt thought Kissinger should give Shultz political input on the importance of moving ahead in 1973 with negotiations based on a firm legislative mandate. (Ibid.) Kissinger apparently was unable to attend the meeting and Hormats attended for the National Security Council. 287. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 287. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 19, 1972. SUBJECT Your Breakfast with Secretary Shultz on Wednesday, December 20 2 Trade Legislation I assume the major topic which Shultz will raise is trade legislation and its relationship to your European strategy. My memorandum of December 14 (Tab B) 3 deals in detail with this issue. Essentially there are two issues: a) whether the President’s trade legislation requests authority to reduce tariffs or does not (in which case all negotiations on tariffs would be conducted on an ad referendum basis), and b) when legislation should be submitted. At the meeting on December 15 (minutes at Tab A) 4 Shultz tilted toward requesting no authority and Volcker advocated this course. All others favored seeking authority and going forward early in the year if our foreign policy initiatives are sufficiently advanced. Authority vs. no authority The arguments in favor of the “no authority” position are that it would require less Presidential effort on the Hill than legislation including tariff cutting authority, minimize the risk of Congressional tampering with specifics, and improve our negotiating position to seek removal of non-tariff barriers (which we could not receive prior authority to cut and which are an important barrier to trade) since negotiations would not focus on tariffs at the expense of NTBs. There are a number of problems with this approach: —The assumption on which this is based—that two or three years hence, after the negotiations are complete, Congress will accept the results as a package—is an extremely doubtful proposition. The Europeans (who remember that after the Kennedy Round the Congress did not approve the agreement on the American Selling Price for chemicals) would consider this a very weak mandate. —The weakness of our mandate would give our trading partners the excuse to get a similarly weak mandate and thus mean that negotiations would probably fail to solve the most important trading problems. (This in effect means that the momentum which has been built up would be lost and the possibility of negotiating a resolution of trade issues would be severely diminished.) —Calls into question the seriousness of the President’s commitment to negotiations and thereby damages his credibility in the economic area and in other areas. —Weakens our friends in Europe who have pressed very hard for a forthcoming and constructive European response to our initiatives for trade negotiations. —Constrains the President’s ability in whatever summitry takes place to discuss a resolution of trade issues—the most important source of friction in our relationship with Europe—since we will have no authority to make concessions as a quid pro quo for concessions which he might press others to make. (Thus, the President’s discussion of trade would be substantially limited to our pressing others to make non-reciprocal concessions—which the Europeans would consider unacceptable.) —Gives other heads of state the excuse not to commit themselves personally to resolving trade problems and monetary problems as well. —Means that as the EC develops new arrangements we would be extremely limited in our ability to engage in negotiations aimed at liberalized trade. The argument in favor of requesting legislation with tariff cutting authority is that it is the only basis on which the Europeans will negotiate seriously with us . It also strengthens our ability to press other nations to get an extensive negotiating mandate and demonstrates the President’s personal commitment which in turn will help elicit a similar commitment from other leaders. In addition, the very fact of comprehensive negotiations would serve as a useful counterpoise to the demonstrated tendency of the EC to institute policies which insulate European markets at the expense of its trading partners and establish a forum for our applying effective pressure on such tendencies. The disadvantages to this approach are (in Volcker’s view) that it would focus trade negotiations to a greater degree on tariffs than on non-tariff barriers, we would be causing a stir with the Congress on tariffs which are less important than NTBs, and greater Presidential effort and a more extensive educational campaign may be necessary to explain and secure passage of a bill containing tariff cutting authority. Treasury may also have the view that the more attention focused on the trade problem the more intense the domestic protectionist rhetoric will become and the more of a problem it will be in our relations with Europe. My view of the situation is that the bill set up must contain tariff cutting authority. We have made considerable progress in securing from our trading partners a commitment to negotiations. The summit meetings of the European Community constituted a major breakthrough for us in that the Europeans set a timetable for these negotiations and stressed their intent to move quickly. 5 Nearly every European official with whom I spoke—and Ambassadors Hillenbrand and Greenwald—emphasized a) the importance of these trade negotiations as a means of dealing with and managing major trade issues and preventing trade from becoming a divisive force in US-European relations and b) the necessity of our securing authority to cut tariffs if we want the Europeans to get a forthcoming negotiating mandate. The argument that having authority to cut tariffs would focus negotiations away from NTBs can be countered by ensuring that our negotiators press equally hard on NTBs, and unless we have authority to cut tariffs it is doubtful if we will have a negotiating framework which will permit a negotiated reduction of NTBs or agricultural barriers. And, to argue that we should not focus attention by submitting this legislation ignores the fact that the EC—by its very decision making process—will continue to come up with policies which harm our interests and protectionists in this country will continue to raise issues and press for harsh restrictions. Failure to submit, and work hard to secure, legislation containing tariff cutting authority will make it virtually impossible for us to deal meaningfully on trade with Europe and Japan, damage severely the credibility of the President, render us increasingly vulnerable to protectionist legislation, and virtually eliminate our ability to resolve in the next several years the politically divisive trade issues which confront us and will do so in the future as the EC evolves. It could deal a lethal blow to any Presidential initiatives with Europe and Japan next year. It is therefore essential that the President submit legislation containing tariff cutting authority. Timing What Shultz will need from you is a view on whether we will be far enough along in the “Year of Europe” to put the trade bill in a foreign policy context—which is essential to the bill’s success. There are a number of arguments for early submission: Our trading partners would be given greater incentive to move quickly to prepare for negotiations with the knowledge that the President regards this as a priority item, the results of the November election give impetus to legislation submitted early in the session, give us a better chance to have authority by September (when negotiations are scheduled to begin), delay might appear to reflect uncertainty or lack of priority trade, failure to take advantage of Mills’ apparent willingness to take this legislation first may cause him to be less cooperative in scheduling hearings later, if we do not move quickly the AFL-CIO Burke-Hartke bill may capture the initiative on trade issues. Disadvantages of early submission: Would be insufficient time for the development of broader foreign policy initiatives, for consultations with Members of the Congress, and for developing public support, and present levels of trade imbalance and unemployment may harm the bill’s chances. If Heath comes in early February, and additional summits are announced during February and March, these could—along with suitable statements in the State of the Union and State of the World Messages—provide the backdrop necessary. (The President could formally state his intention to submit this legislation in the Heath communiqué.) If we are far enough along, it is most desirable to submit the bill early to minimize foreign concerns about the President’s commitment to negotiations and give us the domestic initiative. Moreover, there is no guarantee that our trade and domestic positions would improve significantly in three or four months. With regard to future planning for coordinating the economic with the foreign policy scenario, you might suggest setting up a working group within the EOB including Ken Dam (who will be Shultz’ new deputy in the White House), myself and Hal Sonnenfeldt, and Deane Hinton from CIEP. This group could coordinate the range of issues involved and attempt to pull together some of the details as the scenario unfolds. 6 [Omitted here is discussion of the U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission, Gas Group, Polish Commercial Commission, and Peterson’s Trip.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 290, Treasury, Volume III. Secret. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt. 2 No record of the December 20 meeting was found. 3 Document 285 . 4 Document 286 . 5 See footnote 2, Document 285 . 6 Regarding Secretary of the Treasury Shultz’ role at the White House, see Foreign Relations , 1969-1976, vol. III, Document 107 . East-West Trade, 1969-1972 East-West Trade, 1969-1972 288. National Security Study Memorandum 35 Washington, March 28, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 35. Confidential. 289. Letter From the Ambassador to Austria (MacArthur) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) Vienna, April 4, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Confidential. 290. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon Washington, April 9, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I 1970. For Official Use Only. Attached to an April 17 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger that called Kissinger’s attention to the June 30 expiration of the Export Control Act, which governed sales of strategic goods to Communist countries, and noted that Congressional hearings would begin the following week on a bill to dramatically liberalize controls. 291. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) Washington, April 16, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Confidential. Drafted by R.B. Wright (E/ITP/EWT) on April 14 and cleared by Shaw (EUR/RPE). 292. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, 5/2969 NSC Meeting. Confidential. Distributed under cover of a May 12 memorandum from Davis reporting that the paper was a revision of one circulated on May 9, pursuant to an informal meeting of the Review Group that day, and requesting agency comments. The NSC Review Group had met on May 7 to discuss a 35-page NSSM 35 Response paper and a draft of the paper printed here. Briefing materials for Kissinger’s use at that meeting are in National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 90, 5/7/69 Review Group Meeting. NSSM 35 is Document 288. 293. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson Washington, May 14, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 35. Confidential. The date is handwritten. Drafted by R. B. Wright (E/ITP/EWT) on May 13 and cleared by Springsteen (EUR), McHenry (C), Schnee (H), and Neubert (S/P). 294. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon Washington, May 14, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 35. Confidential. Drafted by R. B. Wright (E/ITP/EWT) on May 13 and cleared by Springsteen (EUR), McHenry (C), Greenwald (E), Schnee (H), Neubert (S/P), and Frank (L). Attached as Tab A to Document 293. 295. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon Washington, May 14, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the President 5-8/69. Confidential. 296. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, May 15, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, 5/21/69 NSC Meeting. Confidential. 297. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson Washington, May 19, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, 5/21/69 NSC Meeting. Confidential. 298. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 84, 5/21/69 NSC Meeting-U.S. Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries. Confidential. This memorandum is the covering memorandum on a package of briefing materials for the President’s use at the May 21 NSC meeting. 299. National Security Decision Memorandum 15 Washington, May 28, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 305, NSDM 15. Secret. 300. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 21, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 17. Secret. Attached to a typewritten note, dated June 21, which reads: “Henry: If we are serious about moving quickly we would need something like an NSDM from the President indicating his approval in principle on foreign policy grounds of measures along these lines. Such a directive would also call upon State, Treasury, and Commerce to work out the specific details within a certain time period and for the Department to prepare a scenario for press, congressional, and diplomatic handling. I would see that all this would be prepared immediately if the basic go-ahead could be given. ELR” Another copy of the memorandum with Richardson’s note is attached to Document 301. 301. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, June 23, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 280, State, Volume III. Secret. Attached to a June 26 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger suggesting items for Kissinger to discuss with Richardson. Item 1 pertained to Richardson’s “proposals leading toward an opening with Communist China.” Haig attached Richardson’s June 21 memorandum and note to Kissinger (Document 300) and a draft NSDM reflecting the President’s decisions, and suggested that Kissinger discuss the NSDM “with Eliot to be sure that he is in agreement with it and that it is completely responsive to your combined judgment on how to proceed from here.” Kissinger wrote at the top of Haig’s memorandum: “NSSM—[two illegible words] NSSM—a Sino Soviet split”; presumably a reference to NSSM 63, “US Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences,” July 3. 302. National Security Decision Memorandum 17 Washington, June 26, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 17. Secret; Sensitive; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the JCS. A draft of NSDM 17 was attached to Document 301. 303. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 3, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bergsten and cleared by Sonnenfeldt, Halperin, and L. Grant. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: “Orig not returned from HAK’s ofc, action unknown. Houdek’s ofc.” 304. Editorial Note 305. Editorial Note 306. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 5, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Confidential. 307. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 7, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Limited Official Use. At the top of the page Kissinger wrote: “Let me raise tomorrow morning with Harlow. Nov 12—Also with President.” The President was in Key Biscayne and the Bahamas November 7-9, but talked with Kissinger by phone each day, and the two met daily at the White House November 10-12. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Another handwritten notation at the top of the page indicates that action was completed on December 4. 308. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, December 2, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 17. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. 309. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, December 11, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/ELR Meetings. Secret; Sensitive. Attached to a December 18 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger with items for him to discuss with Richardson on December 18. Haig’s first item was to discuss how the State Department intended to implement the President’s approval of the three steps on China trade. Kissinger indicated he did discuss this item with Richardson. 310. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 24, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I 1970. Limited Official Use. A stamped notation, dated January 12, 1970, reads: “HAK has seen.” 311. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, January 2, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 15. Confidential. Drafted by W.B. Dozier (E/EWT) on December 31, 1969, and cleared by Massey (L/E), Cronk (E/ITP), and Schnee (H). Attached but not printed are excerpts from Sections 3 and 4 of the Export Administration Act of 1969, including the following language from Section 3 (1) and (2): “(1) It is the policy of the United States both (A) to encourage trade with all countries with which we have diplomatic or trading relations … and (B) to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. (2) It is the policy of the United States to use export controls (A) to the extent necessary to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of abnormal foreign demand, (B) to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States … and (C) [to protect] the national security of the United States.” 312. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, January 26, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 15. Secret. Drafted by R. B Wright (E/ITP/EWT) on January 12 and cleared by Dubs and Colbert (EUR/SOV), Lisle (EUR/EE), Hillenbrand (EUR), and Ambassador Beam. Attached but not printed is a January 6 memorandum from Trezise and Hillenbrand to Secretary Rogers informing him of the substance of this memorandum and recommending he find an early opportunity to discuss with the President relaxing the interpretation of NSDM 15. 313. Editorial Note 314. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Ware) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 13, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 224, DOD, Volume VI 2/l/70-4/20/70. Confidential. 315. Editorial Note 316. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 27, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume I 1970. Secret. 317. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, April 9, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Secret. Attached to an April 7 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger, on which Kissinger indicated his approval on April 9 of the Commerce Department’s recommendations on decontrolling additional items for export to Romania only, and approved the disapproval of Commerce’s recommendation for elimination of the special discriminatory category against East Germany. 318. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 23, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 15. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 319. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, August 20, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I. Confidential. Attached to a September 2 memorandum to the Secretary of Commerce reporting the President’s decisions. 320. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon Washington, November 19, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Confidential. Attached to a November 19 memorandum from Stans to Kissinger informing him he had given the memorandum to the President that morning and requesting a meeting. Stans, Siciliano, and Flanigan met with the President from 12:13 to 12:43 p.m. on November 19. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 321. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, November 21, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Confidential. 322. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon Washington, February 23, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC-U/DM 60. Secret; Sensitive. A February 23 transmittal memorandum for this memorandum from Staff Director Hartman to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Under Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture; Deputy Attorney General; and the Special Trade Representative is ibid. 323. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 26, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. No classification marking. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt and Saunders. 324. Memorandum From Curtis W. Kamman of the Planning and Coordination Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) Washington, February 26, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Under Secretaries Miscellaneous Memoranda 1971-1972. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kamman on February 26. At the top of the first page is a handwritten note: “Laird lunch 3/1/71.” On March 1 Kissinger attended “Laird’s lunch on FY 73 fiscal guidance.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-76, Record of Schedule) No other record of the lunch has been found. 325. National Security Decision Memorandum 99 Washington, March 1, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 99. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the President of the Export-Import Bank, the Director of OMB, the Chairman of CEA, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, Peter Peterson, and Clark MacGregor. 326. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 1, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Under Secretaries Committee Miscellaneous Memoranda 1971-1972. Secret. 327. CIEP Study Memorandum No. 2 Washington, March 13, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, CIEP Study Memoranda. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Secretary of Defense. 328. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Commerce Stans Washington, March 15, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. No classification marking. 329. National Security Decision Memorandum 105 Washington, April 13, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 105. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of USIA. The President made a public announcement of these decisions on April 14; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971, pp. 530-531. 330. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 27, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, HAK/RN Memos 1971. No classification marking. Attached to an April 28 memorandum from Haig which reads: “Henry: We got a barrage of these today—all of which I have initiated action on. This one leaves me wondering whether the President reads his mail. I suppose the best bet is to review for him again, in more general and brief terms, the menu of Phase II and III actions that we have on the docket and your belief that they must be carefully orchestrated and the temperature tested every step along the way as we proceed towards the ultimate goal of comparability in our trade with China and the Soviet Union.” Kissinger initialed the “Proceed this way” option on Haig’s memorandum. 331. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon Washington, May 13, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 60B. Secret. Attached to a May 13 transmittal memorandum from Hartman to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the JCS; the Under Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture; the Deputy Attorney General; and the Special Trade Representative. 332. Editorial Note 333. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) Washington, June 9, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Under Secretaries Committee Miscellaneous Memoranda 1971-1972. Secret. The decisions in this memorandum were announced to the public in a June 10 White House Press Release; see Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1971, pp. 815-817. 334. Information Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 18, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Sonnenfeldt. At the top of the page Haig wrote: “Houdek—Tell Jon Huntsman again,” and Houdek wrote: “Done 6/28/71.” 335. Editorial Note 336. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, June 30, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 491, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 6, Part 1. Confidential. Kissinger wrote “Port Security” at the top of the page. Documentation on access of Soviet ships to American ports (and reciprocal access of American ships to Soviet ports) and security procedures to be followed when Soviet ships were in U.S. ports is ibid. 337. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 491, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 6, Part 1. Confidential. The memorandum is Tab B to a June 30 memorandum from Johnston to Kissinger. Tab A is a June 30 memorandum from Hinton (acting for Peterson) to Kissinger providing talking points for Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin that evening. Hinton noted that Peterson had told Kissinger the previous day that “the object of the exercise would be to work toward a situation in which U.S. participation in the Kama River truck plant might be linked to Soviet purchase from us of consumer goods and equipment to manufacture consumer goods.” In suggested talking points Hinton pointed out that Komarov had recognized that such a linkage would help the President fend off criticism from political conservatives. In his covering memorandum, Johnston called Hinton’s talking points “excessively positive” in the absence of a firm decision and took exception to the possible linkage of Kama with additional purchases of non-strategic imports from the United States, which would hinder U.S. firms’ participation in the Kama project because they would face additional obligations not imposed on Western European competitors. Johnston noted that “such an approach would hinder the U.S. commercial opportunities, be less forthcoming with the Soviets, and would open the possibility of a comprehensive trade negotiation with the Russians, which would expose us to exceptional demands and might prove fruitless.” In a June 30 note transmitting the package to Kissinger, Haig noted that “no one was acquainted with your specific requirements as conveyed privately to Peterson” and added that he did not “see anything for your use tonight [with Dobrynin] except for the more general considerations outlined in the strategy paper at Tab B.” 338. Information Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 1, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71. Confidential. 339. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon Washington, July 7, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Confidential. Attached to a July 12 memorandum from Howe to Haig bringing to his attention this memorandum as well as two others from Peterson. On July 27 Huntsman sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him that the President had read this memorandum “with interest” and had requested that a copy be sent to Kissinger for his information. Johnston brought Peterson’s memoranda to Kissinger’s attention under cover of a July 28 memorandum. (Ibid., Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71) 340. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 13, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume II 1971. Confidential. At the top of the page, a note by Kissinger reads: “Why can’t we do nothing”; another by Haig reads: “Ernie call me.” Kissinger arrived in San Clemente the morning of July 13 from a trip to Asia and Paris that had included a trip to Peking. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 341. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 19, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 492, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 7, Part 2. Top Secret. 342. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, July 23, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume II 1971. Limited Official Use. 343. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Confidential. This memorandum is part of Tab A to Document 345. Tab A also includes other memoranda concerning the Mack Truck application: July 27, 28, and 29 memoranda from Johnston to Haig and a draft memorandum from Kissinger to Stans (prepared by Johnston) that is substantively the same as Document 346. 344. Editorial Note 345. Action Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 3, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Secret. 346. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Commerce Stans Washington, August 5, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Defense. A typewritten note at the bottom of the page indicates the memorandum was sent to the outside recipients on August 5 and that copies went to Davis, Kennedy, Hormats, and Sonnenfeldt at the NSC. 347. Editorial Note 348. Editorial Note 349. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, November 20, 1971, 1330Z. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 153, Morning Summaries, August 25-December 31, 1971. Secret; Exdis. 350. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, November 25, 1971, 2010Z. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume II 1971. Secret; Priority; Limdis. The copy of the telegram printed here incorrectly identifies it as telegram 6231; the copy in the Department of State files identifies it as telegram 8778. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/STANS) 351. Information Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 29, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. There is no indication that Kissinger saw the memorandum. 352. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. Confidential. The meeting lasted from 3:12 to 4:15 p.m. and included a brief press opportunity. Kissinger and Ziegler were also present during the closing minutes of the meeting. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A December 6 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger transmitted a briefing paper and talking points for the President’s use in his meeting with Stans. Sonnenfeldt called Kissinger’s attention to the section of the talking points urging the President to restrain Stans’ optimism. A stamp on Kissinger’s December 7 memorandum to the President indicates the President saw it. 353. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Hartman) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) Washington, January 7, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 60D. Secret. Drafted by J.K. Wilhelm (S/PC) and cleared in EA by Ambassador Brown. 354. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon Washington, January 13, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 60D. Secret. A January 13 transmittal memorandum from Hartman to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs; the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, Labor, Transportation, and Agriculture; the Deputy Attorney General; the Director of the U.S. Information Agency; and the Special Trade Representative, is ibid. Regarding the preparation and clearance of Irwin’s memorandum, see Document 353. 355. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 28, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73. Secret. Attached to a February 2 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger; see footnote 1, Document 356. 356. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73. Secret. Attached to a February 2 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger recommending he sign the memorandum to the President. 357. National Security Decision Memorandum 155 Washington, February 17, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 155. Secret. Copies were sent to the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence. 358. National Security Decision Memorandum 188 Washington, August 30, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 60D. Secret; Nodis; Homer. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. 359. National Security Decision Memorandum 195 Washington, October 30, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files, Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 195. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs. 288. National Security Study Memorandum 35 288. National Security Study Memorandum 35 1 Washington, March 28, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations The Director of Central Intelligence The President of Export-Import Bank SUBJECT U.S. Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries The President has directed a review of U.S. Trade Policy toward Communist countries. This subject was originally to be covered in the response to NSSM 16, U.S. Trade Policy , but the President wishes a fuller treatment of these issues than would be possible as part of that overall review. 2 This study should examine policy towards COCOM, U.S. differential controls, trade with Eastern Europe, Asian communist and Cuban trade embargos, and extraterritorial effects of trade controls, by treating the following elements: —the effectiveness of present measures; —the strategic impact of these controls upon communist countries; —relations with our allies; —other relevant factors including U.S. exports, our balance of payments and relations between the U.S. Government, on the one hand, and U.S. business and labor, on the other. The paper should then explore alternative U.S. policies, including legislative changes if necessary, such as continuation of our present course, various means of modifying controls, what countries should be included and possible differentiation among them. Finally, the paper should briefly describe present U.S. government organization for implementing trade control policy and examine possible improvements in this machinery. The President has directed that this study be prepared by an Ad Hoc group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and including representatives from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, Department of Treasury, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the Export-Import Bank, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman may invite other agencies to send representatives as appropriate. This report should be submitted to the Review Group by May 9, 1969. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 35. Confidential. 2 NSSM 10, January 28, called for a study of East-West relations. The NSSM itself, and the response forwarded on February 11 to Kissinger by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John M. Leddy, in his capacity as Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe, did not address trade issues. (Both ibid., NSSM 10) NSSM 16, February 5, is printed as Document 182 . The response papers and the April 9 NSC meeting on trade policy did not discuss East-West trade. Additional documentation on East-West trade is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972. 289. Letter From the Ambassador to Austria (MacArthur) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) 289. Letter From the Ambassador to Austria (MacArthur) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) 1 Vienna, April 4, 1969. Dear Mr. Samuels: I have just received CA-1888 of March 26, 1969, 2 indicating that we are reviewing our East-West trade policy at this time. I am happy to hear this because I think a basic and searching high-level review as to the validity of some of the assumptions under which we have been and are now operating in the field of East-West export controls in peaceful trade is long overdue. Last year I recommended to the previous administration that such a high-level review be conducted not only because I believe our present system is outmoded but also because I think it could have, over a period of time, an important relationship to our very difficult long-term balance of payments problem. Since my arrival here about two years ago I have followed this problem closely, not only because Vienna is a major center of East-West trade but also because a number of U.S. companies handle their trade with the Danubian states through their Vienna offices. My conviction is that a number of the fundamental premises on which our present East-West trade policies and procedures are based are no longer valid and are even contrary to our own long-term interests. At the heart of the problem is the fact that in our East-West trade policy as it relates to peaceful trade we are going it alone. Today only American industry has such heavy bureaucratic governmental licensing requirements and controls for the export of many kinds of peaceful goods to East Europe. If the governments of the European industrial nations of NATO followed a policy similar to ours, it would be one thing. But this is not the case. Not only do they not have the barriers we have unilaterally erected for our own exports of peaceful commodities, but European NATO and other free-world governments are actively supporting their business communities to expand exports to East Europe by assisting in long-term credits, subsidizing exports, encouraging barter arrangements, etc. Fundamental to our policy has been the premise that by limiting or controlling our exports to the East European Communist states we can exert meaningful economic pressures on them or do them economic hurt. This premise is, of course, not valid in a very broad range of peaceful trade and would only be valid if a substantial majority of European and other free-world industrial nations followed a similar course. Our policy of denial in this field denies very little and simply forces the satellite nations to obtain comparable products from Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and other European nations, and Japan at the expense of American business and industry. What is the balance sheet of our present East-West trade policy in nonstrategic items which constitute the bulk of Western exports to the East and what are we accomplishing? We are certainly not denying such exports to the East because while there is often a preference for U.S. products, if they are not readily obtainable, products generally competitive in quality and price can and will be obtained from European NATO and other industrial free-world sources. We are certainly not getting any moral or other credit in East or West Europe for our policies, nor is our image being burnished by them, although Western European businessmen naturally welcome our controls as they tend to inhibit or eliminate American competition for trade with East Europe. And finally we are punishing American business and industry by making it uncompetitive at a time when peaceful trade with Eastern Europe is beginning to open up and we should be getting in on the ground floor and building a solid foundation for winning and holding a permanent part of this market. If we continue on our present course there is danger that we risk being permanently frozen out of a market which although presently not extensive has great potential value in the years ahead, as a Dow-Jones study by some 90 leading foreign businessmen clearly indicated last year. 3 Today we are progressively being considered as an uncertain and unreliable source for peaceful goods by East Europeans and they are turning elsewhere. Business representatives here in Vienna of West European countries make no bones about the fact that they are today laying a solid foundation for permanent and increasing foothold in the presently interesting but potentially very lucrative East European market. They maintain that their governments have no intention of changing their basic policy and cutting back on peaceful East-West trade because of Czechoslovakia. West European industry today is turning out products for export to Eastern Europe which increasingly are highly competitive in quality and price with those we have to offer. However, we do have one important asset. This is not the temporary edge we have in a few sectors but the general belief in East Europe that American products are superior and, therefore, there is willingness in some cases even to pay a premium for them. This asset will be frittered away in a few short years unless American companies can fill orders for peaceful goods in reasonable length of time. Continuing our present policies will simply force American industry out of much of the field over the longer term and result in the loss of this market to West European, Japanese, and other free-world competitors with no corresponding advantage for us. With due respect I suggest that in our East-West trade policies we tend to look backward to the past for our guidelines for the future—back to the war and then post-war period when the concept of economic denial bloomed since we virtually alone had things to export—back to the time when the Communist world appeared a steel-hard monolith—back to the days before Europe and Japan were industrially and economically restored with a major capability for export. The realities of today are vastly different. Europe and Japan are not only restored but are making a major trade drive to the east where the winds of political and economic change are blowing despite Czechoslovakia. And in this connection most qualified observers (both businessmen and officials) agree that the welcome winds of economic change in parts of Eastern Europe have been substantially encouraged by contacts of Western businessmen with East European communist economic and other officials. I, of course, realize that this is a difficult emotional and political problem to deal with in the United States because of the aid the Communist nations of Eastern Europe have extended to Hanoi. It is also clear that Czechoslovak developments will tend to obscure the longer-term picture and evoke calls for economic restraints or sanctions against the five communist nations that raped Czechoslovakia. 4 While some temporary pause may have been indicated and it is indeed useful for us to consult with our NATO allies on this, I would hope that we would go no further in our pause than our NATO allies, some of whose business representatives here are saying that there is no question of any serious cutbacks, delays, or failures to keep pushing for more trade with all the countries of Eastern Europe. For us unilaterally to cut back on trade with East Europe or maintain barriers that no other country observes would seem to accomplish little constructive. It seems to me that a high-level review which lifts the problem from the official bureaucratic level that administers the present system is essential. I have had some people in the “E” area of the Department argue that the Congress will not accept change in our control system. I am inclined to doubt this from talks I have had with many members of the Congress in the past nine months. Furthermore, I note from the Journal of Commerce of March 24, 1969, that Senator Mondale will seek sweeping liberalization of our export control system. How can we best get at this problem? If the judgment should be that we have a serious congressional and public opinion problem, consideration could always be given to establishing a nonpartisan, nongovernmental special commission of highly respected business and other leaders, including members with experience in government (for example, people of the stature of Jack McCloy, Douglas Dillon, David Rockefeller, Henry Ford, etc.) to take a thoroughly objective new look at the entire history and nature of our present controls; their effectiveness in terms of preventing Communist satellites from getting what they want elsewhere in light of the policies of NATO and other free-world countries; the future effect of the present system on our enlightened self-interest and on the ability of American business and industry to lay a basis for future expansion of trade to the East; whether mutually beneficial trade ties and contacts with us do not encourage economic liberalization in East Europe more than the present system; etc. If such a special Blue Ribbon Commission, after a searching study, came up with recommendations for modifying our present system of controls and regulations to bring them more into keeping with reality, it could be of great help with U.S. public and congressional opinion. I apologize for writing you at such length about this matter for I know how desperately busy you are at this time as you take on your new and very heavy responsibilities. However, I do feel that our present system of East-West trade controls not only needs overhaul but over the long term can place certain important sectors of American business and industry in a position which makes it either very difficult or virtually impossible for them to compete with the business and industry of many of our free-world allies with sad consequences for our balance of payments. To conclude, what I am really suggesting is a new and basic look at the entire problem not by people who understandably have certain preconceived ideas because they are also administering the system, but by a broadgauge high-level group. Perhaps my views from Vienna are myopic. If so, such a review would establish that fact. With every good wish and again apologies for the length of this communication, Sincerely, Doug MacArthur II 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Confidential. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, FN 1 EUR E-US) 3 Not further identified. 4 In his February 17 Evening Report to the President, Secretary of State Rogers reported that that day Czech Ambassador Duda had called on Under Secretary Alexis Johnson to press for most-favored-nation treatment for Czechoslovakia. Duda reportedly said that the current attitude in the United States, including the Congress, was sympathetic to Czechoslovakia and that bills on MFN or tariff concessions for Czechoslovakia were being prepared. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, President’s Evening Reading Items) 290. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon 290. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 9, 1969. SUBJECT East-West Trade Relations Here are my general views on East-West trade. They should not be taken as prejudicial to the results of current NSC study on the subject. My views are separately stated for Eastern Europe (including the USSR) and for Communist China and are followed by comment on my proposed handling of East-West trade questions on my European trip. I deal most extensively with the Eastern European part of the problem with emphasis on trade levels and controls, key legislative restrictions on export credit guarantees and most favored nation (MFN) treatment, the need for an Administration policy statement and our attitude toward promoting improved East-West trade. 2 Recent U.S. Trade Position Toward Eastern Europe. By way of background, our two-way direct trade with Eastern Europe has been, and remains, modest. It amounted to less than $420 million last year, divided about equally between exports and imports. This does not include the trade involvement by foreign subsidiaries of American firms, which was probably substantial. Estimates differ as to the potential growth prospects of East-West trade. My own opinion is that, even were conditions made more favorable by the removal of certain existing obstacles, there would be only a modest increase. Our East-West trade is likely to remain in fairly close balance (because the Communists do business on a bilateral, rather than a multilateral basis) and thus make little contribution to the amelioration of our balance of payments problem. From an economic and commercial viewpoint, however, such trade can be quite important to the firms, laborers, and industrial and agricultural communities involved. From a foreign policy viewpoint, also, there are benefits to be derived from extending the trade contracts of American businessmen with these countries. Beginning with the Eisenhower Administration the long-range policy of the Department of Commerce has been to encourage peaceful East-West trade. During the past several years we have urged our businessmen to explore East-West trade possibilities, sent trade missions to Eastern Europe and made continuing efforts to relax our trade controls consistent with our national security and foreign policy requirements. Our promotional approach was interrupted by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Since then no Commerce official, nor any other Executive Branch official, has openly encouraged East-West trade. Businessmen’s Attitude Toward East-West Trade and Trade Controls. I believe the American business community for the most part is prepared to continue to expand its business relations and its trade with Eastern European countries and, at the same time, to abide by whatever reasonable trade controls we feel must be maintained toward these countries for national security and foreign policy reasons. Many businessmen feel that our current controls exceed what is now required and would welcome further relaxation of them and of various other governmental obstacles to trading relations with Eastern Europe. Views on the adverse impact of our trade controls are sometimes highly exaggerated. At the same time, some segments of the American public and the Congress rigorously oppose relaxation of trade controls, particularly while warfare continues in Vietnam. I have asked my staff to explore further whether our continuing efforts to reduce our controls, consistent with our national security and foreign policy interests, can be expedited. Key Legislative Obstacles. Legislative limitations effectively prohibiting Eximbank financing of export transactions to Eastern Europe and the extension of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to imports from Eastern European countries are far more important obstacles to improved trade with Eastern Europe than are trade controls. These limitations directly affect our firms’ ability to increase exports to these countries and the ability of these countries to increase their sales to us. Credit Restrictions. Extensive international trade requires credit. Such credit for East-West trade is readily available in other industrial countries, with appropriate governmental guarantees and facilities. It is not now available here. Without it, our firms cannot compete effectively for increased trade, particularly for the larger and more important transactions. In early 1968 Congress, by prohibiting Eximbank from using its facilities to finance transactions with countries aiding North Vietnam, ruled out such support for U.S. exports to Eastern Europe. There are strong Congressional views on both sides of this issue. I believe we should seek removal of this limitation as quickly as Congressional support can be obtained to do so. Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Restrictions. The trade significance of MFN treatment to Eastern European countries (now extended by the U.S. only to Poland and Yugoslavia among communist countries) can be substantial. 3 The tariff differentials involved are frequently large and become larger as the Kennedy Round tariff cuts are made effective. More importantly, the trade of these countries with the Free World is largely under bilateral agreements that require fairly close balancing. Thus, these countries have only limited leeway to use convertible currency earnings for the purchase of U.S. goods. Their own currencies are not convertible on the world money markets, and, except for the USSR, they have little gold. Therefore, any large increase in imports from the United States must be accompanied by increased exports to the United States. Two-way trade, in its narrowest sense, is therefore essential here until their overall trade bilateralism is significantly modified or abandoned. I believe it is essential that the Executive Branch once again obtain discretion to extend MFN to these countries because of its significance to the growth of such trade and of its leverage potential in commercial and broader foreign policy negotiations with these countries. Such leverage arises not only from the trade importance, but also from the important political and psychological significance these countries attach to obtaining MFN treatment from us—viewed by some as equivalent in importance to the trade value. Need for Administration Policy Statement on East-West Trade. Of equal significance will be the general public posture the Administration will take toward East-West trade relations. The seven-month interval since last August has been without a clear statement of governmental policy on this matter. This has left businessmen unguided following an extensive period of promotional efforts. They are seeking guidance from us. A negative attitude now would further disrupt past favorable trade developments. A merely permissive attitude toward peaceful trade transactions would bring little additional effort from the trade community. A positive and highly promotional approach, on the other hand, would give a substantial boost to the efforts of businessmen, particularly if it is coupled with strong efforts on credits and MFN and is implemented with some of the down-to-earth businesslike programs which this Department has instituted. Attitude toward Promoting East-West Trade. I would favor a positive promotional attitude even now, looking toward obtaining authority for extending Eximbank export credit guarantees and MFN treatment along with bilateral negotiation of other measures to improve East-West trading relations. Our promotional efforts could be tied in scope and intensity to the practical objectives and limitations of the changing East-West trade scene. We have, in Commerce, a number of promotional programs, already used in East-West trade, that could be used more widely and intensively, and others which are susceptible to effective use with such trade. I am prepared to move ahead on a positive program if you decide that this Administration clearly favors the promotion of such trade and expanded trade relations with Eastern Europe. Without such a determination, however, I would prefer not to mount any major promotional program. I recognize that even with favorable conditions and with a full trade promotion program, our East-West trade will grow only to modest levels in the near future. However, there are also foreign policy advantages to be gained from extending our trade contacts with these countries. Even more important may be the foreign policy value of reaffirming a positive position toward East-West trade. I believe that these benefits can be obtained by a positive policy while retaining a high degree of flexibility to meet changing conditions, including a deterioration in the international situation. Whatever East-West trade policy you decide upon following completion of the NSC study will probably find both supporters and objectors among the Congress. Such differences in view were apparent in Congressional exchanges on last years’ Eximbank legislation and in other Congressional hearings on East-West trade. Moreover, both viewpoints on East-West trade will also receive a thorough review during the Congressional hearings on the extension of the Export Control Act of 1949. The first of such hearings is being scheduled by Senator Mondale for April 21. We expect to hear there numerous proposals for liberalizing trade controls and promoting East-West trade, as well as attacks on any such proposals. Of course, increased trade and improved trade relations will not result from U.S. action alone. There is much that the Eastern European countries must do as well. They must be willing to give our exports meaningful treatment that is equivalent in substantive effect to the extension of our MFN treatment to their exports. Among their other needs in this regard must be improvement of their products and their marketing to meet our requirements, the opening up of their own marketing channels more fully to our traders, the providing of better protection for industrial technology and other property rights, and the continuance of their partly-thwarted moves to develop more open economies. Trade Relations with Communist China. With respect to our trade embargoes with Communist China and other Far East Communist areas, the basic issue remains one of foreign policy. It may be some time before that foreign policy problem is resolved. In the interim, I believe it is important that we look forward to the possible reopening of trade with these areas. I am, therefore, planning upon my return from Europe to have my staff explore the nature and extent of existing trade potential for the United States with these areas and the manner in which we might react on the trade front to various possible contingencies in changing relations between the United States and these areas. East-West Trade Relevance to European Trip. On my trip to Western Europe during the next two weeks, I do not plan to raise the subject of East-West trade. If officials of other governments, the foreign press, or businessmen abroad raise East-West trade questions, I plan to respond only in general terms and will in no way commit the Administration to any policy or course of action. I shall note that the matter is even now undergoing policy review within the Administration and that the Export Control Act of 1949 is before the Congress for extension. I shall, of course, listen with an open mind to any comment they may make on East-West trade, including U.S. controls and the multilateral control system, and I shall bring any such comment to your attention upon my return. Maurice H. Stans 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I 1970. For Official Use Only. Attached to an April 17 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger that called Kissinger’s attention to the June 30 expiration of the Export Control Act, which governed sales of strategic goods to Communist countries, and noted that Congressional hearings would begin the following week on a bill to dramatically liberalize controls. 2 On April 12 Arthur Burns initialed the following memorandum to the President: “I have sympathy for Secretary Stans’ recommendations to promote East-West trade. In my judgment, however, this economic problem should be handled in conjunction with our political discussions with the Russians. I doubt the wisdom of asking Congress for special legislation before we make definite progress in our political negotiations.” Burns’ memorandum is also attached to Bergsten’s April 17 memorandum to Kissinger; see footnote 1 above. 3 In his April 22 Evening Report to the President, Secretary Rogers reported that that day Romanian Ambassador Bogdan had met with Samuels to reiterate Romania’s desire for most-favored-nation status. Bogdan reportedly thought the climate was favorable, but had the impression the Congress was awaiting an administration initiative. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, President’s Evening Reading Items) 291. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) 291. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) 1 Washington, April 16, 1969. SUBJECT Your Request for Views on Ambassador MacArthur’s Letter of April 4 and a Reply Thereto The substance of Ambassador MacArthur’s comment 2 is that our export controls on non-strategic trade with Eastern Europe are outmoded, ineffective, and economically damaging to American business. We agree with these findings. They are generally consistent with our analysis of East-West trade controls in the memorandum to the Secretary from Mr. Greenwald on “Strategic Trade Restrictions” that has been sent to you for your review. 3 United States controls that go beyond the multilateral strategic embargo have an impact of close to zero on the economic or military potential of Communist countries. (For special reasons Cuba is an exception.) There may be rare instances in which some specialized American equipment or technology cannot be supplied by another Western country, but the predominating pattern is one of substitutability. Commerce Department export controls are designed to catch the rare case with so wide a margin of safety that they have become unnecessarily cumbersome. Of the categories requiring export licensing on the Commerce control list, about 600 represent items on the international COCOM strategic embargo list. An additional 500 entries represent goods not on the COCOM list but individually licensed for export to Western as well as Communist countries. A further 800 items, not on the COCOM list and not controlled individually to Western countries, nevertheless require individual licensing review for shipment to Eastern European countries. Thus approximately 1300 items, none of them on the international strategic list, are individually controlled. Our rough estimate is that not more than 200 of these items are even remote candidates for effective unilateral U.S. control. The red tape involved in terms of documentation, end-use checks, interdepartmental review, etc. is a drag on trade. It would certainly help our exports to put American businessmen more nearly on equal terms with other Western businessmen. However, to realize the advantages of significantly increased trade that Ambassador MacArthur envisages, a change is needed not only in export controls but in lifting the ban on Export-Import Bank export financing and on most-favored-nation tariff treatment. Even if these actions were taken, there are some purely economic factors that would operate as limitations on the magnitude of trade expansion—bilateral trading patterns between West and East Europe, a tendency of American firms to trade with the East through their West European subsidiaries, and a shortage of attractive products from East European countries. Recommendation That you sign the attached response to Ambassador MacArthur. (Tab A) 4 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 16. Confidential. Drafted by R.B. Wright (E/ITP/EWT) on April 14 and cleared by Shaw (EUR/RPE). 2 Document 289 . 3 Not found. 4 Samuels’ April 17 letter, not printed, noted that the review of East-West trade policy would go beyond non-strategic trade controls and consider limitations on export financing and tariff treatment of imports from Eastern Europe. The expiration of the Export Control Act on June 30 set a timeframe for completion of the review. 292. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff 292. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, undated. U.S. TRADE POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (Excluding China, Cuba and Yugoslavia) (NSSM 35) Summary Paper on Major Issues for Decision There are nine issues on which decisions are needed in the area of East-West trade. The broadest is: 1. Should expansion of U.S. trade with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe be actively and publicly endorsed by the Administration? Three are legislative: 2. Should we favor extension of the Export Control Act in its present form or propose or support amendments that would provide a suitable legislative base for a less restrictive export control policy? 3. Should we seek authority to extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union? 4. Should we seek removal of the barriers to Export-Import Bank financing for Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union? 2 Two relate to the administration of our own export controls: 5. Should the U.S. continue to maintain a control list more restrictive than the international COCOM list? 6. Should the Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, continue to be treated differentially in the application of our export controls? Three relate to specific rules: 3 7. Should we license a U.S. firm to design and install a $26 million system for oil extraction and gathering for the USSR? 8. Should we license U.S. firms to design and install a $60 million engine foundry to expand a Moscow truck factory? 9. Should we change our 50-50 shipping requirement to enable U.S. firms to respond affirmatively to a Soviet request to buy U.S. corn? 4 The decisions taken on these matters and on other issues in East-West trade policy should be seen as part of the total fabric of Western relationships with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. Those relationships involve: —Maintenance of Western deterrent military strength relative to that of the Communist countries; —The President’s desire to move from the period of confrontation to a period of negotiation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries. While our export control policy has rested on a distinction between strategic and non-strategic goods, we must be aware of the fact that this distinction is difficult to define precisely and concretely. It is meaningful primarily from a short-run point of view. In the longer run, since economic resources can be interchanged over a broad range of uses, the difference between so-called strategic and non-strategic goods fades. Decisions on U.S. policy hinge on four major questions of fact: 1. What effect an export control policy has on Communist economic and military capabilities. In order to answer this question, we must assess what would happen in the absence of our export control policy. This is an extremely difficult problem under the best of circumstances, and even more difficult given the ambiguities of data on Communist economies. Moreover, very few detailed studies of the effects of controls have been conducted despite the long period of time over which these controls have been applied. We can be reasonably confident that export controls, particularly as they apply to the transfer of technology critical to the development of advanced weapons systems, have imposed a heavy cost on the Communist countries in special areas such as computer facilities. We can also be reasonably confident that the strictest and broadest export controls could not be expected to impose more than a moderate effect on the Communist economies as a whole, since those economies do not depend heavily on trade with the non-Communist world. Trade controls have had an adverse impact on the quality of economic growth in Communist countries, however, and the cost of the differential controls unilaterally imposed by the United States has added marginally to this impact. It is difficult to be any more precise than these broad generalizations on the basis of studies so far made. 2. What effect the current export control policy has on relations with our allies. The export control policies of the United States and fourteen other allied nations are coordinated through COCOM. Our allies have consistently attached less significance to export controls and more importance to expanded commercial relations with Communist countries than we have. This divergence in views stems in large measure from a realization by both parties that the United States must bear the main responsibility for offsetting such improvements in the Communist strategic posture as may result from expanded commercial relations. As a result of frequent reviews in COCOM, the international embargo list is now somewhat less than half what it was fifteen years ago. The separate U.S. list, although also considerably reduced from its former size, substantially exceeds the COCOM list. The divergence of views between the United States and its COCOM allies on trade controls has generated some friction between U.S. and allied governments, on the one hand, and business firms, on the other hand. It is not clear, however, that friction would be diminished if U.S. and allied firms competed more actively for trade with Communist countries in a regime of generally more relaxed controls although the inter-allied frictions related specifically to the COCOM list would of course diminish. Trade by the COCOM countries with Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, was valued in 1967 at $3.9 billion of exports to the East and $4.2 billion of imports from the East. The United States share of this trade was roughly $200 million each way. 3. What prospects there are for expanded trade if U.S. trade restrictions were relaxed. A relaxation of the restrictions can be expected to have only a moderate effect on expanding trade. This is largely because most Eastern European countries will insist on expanding their sales to us pari passu with expanding their purchases from U.S., and they have very few products which we are likely to buy in large quantity. Trade estimates prepared for this study indicate that, under various optimal conditions including significant relaxation of export controls, extension of MFN, competitive credit arrangements and substantial multilateralization of Eastern European trade with the Free World, but excluding elimination of the 50-50 shipping requirement on grain sales, U.S. exports to European Communist countries might expand from the level of about $200 million in 1967 to around $500-$700 million in 1975. The expanded exports would come in part from an overall increase in trade and in part from trade now conducted with Eastern Europe by our allies. Such anticipated increase in trade would be much more dependent upon removal of the present MFN and credit restrictions than upon further relaxation of export controls. 4. What effect our trade policy has on East-West political relations. There are no simple cause-and-effect relations between the level of our trade with Communist countries and the state of our political relations with them. Under some conditions, expanded U.S. trade could strengthen the power of existing ruling groups; under other conditions, it might gradually weaken that power. Expanded U.S. trade with the countries of Eastern Europe but not with the USSR could encourage their desires for greater independence, but, as a result, could increase U.S.-Soviet tensions and even induce increased Soviet efforts to control the others. The probable effects of relaxed trade restrictions can be assessed only with careful regard to the specific political situation of the time within the relevant Communist countries. ALTERNATIVE POLICY APPROACHES The following are five policy approaches and related patterns of action with respect to trade with the European Communist countries. PACKAGE 1: Continue present policy There would be no modification in our approach in COCOM; export controls and licensing policies would be continued with progressive relaxation as at present; Export Control Act would be renewed without change; there would be no initiative on tariff legislation or removal of Export-Import Bank Act financing limitations; and encouragement of trade with Eastern Europe would remain, but at low key. Pro Would keep all liberalization options open until the direction of Soviet policy and of Vietnam peace talks are clearer; would avoid raising additional opposition from those parts of Congress and the public that are opposed to East-West trade; would tend to maintain present level of COCOM control over strategic goods. Con Within the short-term context, the only flexibility in trade policy available to the President derives from discretionary implementation of export controls; the current level of friction with other COCOM countries would remain; some potential expansion in exports would be denied U.S. business. PACKAGE 2: Adopt more liberalized attitudes without major legislative changes We would develop standby proposals for reducing COCOM lists and procedural frictions; export controls would be reduced as rapidly as feasible under existing ground rules with active steps to encourage East-West trade and with modification of the Export Control Act to provide at least a sense of Congress favoring expansion of non-strategic exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe; no initiative on tariff legislation or Export-Import Bank Act except to support desirable Congressional initiatives. Pro Administration would be in a position to take advantage of possible favorable developments in relations with the USSR or individual Eastern European countries; would be prepared to move toward a scaling down of COCOM effort if desirable. Such steps by the Administration, including amendment of the Export Control Act, would give guidance to American exporters now unsure of future U.S. policy. Con The President would forego the possibility of using accelerated reduction of our controls and active encouragement of non-strategic trade as instruments for political bargaining with the Soviet Union as per Package 5. In addition, the timing of further initiatives towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on tariffs and export financing would be left in the hands of Congress. PACKAGE 3: Adopt more liberalized attitudes and when feasible seek major legislative changes We would develop standby proposals for reducing COCOM lists and procedural friction; reduce the level of unilateral U.S. export controls as rapidly as feasible to those goods and technical data of strategic importance likely to be susceptible of effective U.S. unilateral control; modify Export Control Act to encourage permitted East-West trade, to remove the “economic” impact criterion for denial from the Act; undertake initiative on tariff negotiating legislation and Export-Import Bank Act as soon as Congressional acceptance appears likely and in interim support desirable Congressional initiatives in these fields. Pro Administration would be in a position to take greater (than in Package 2) advantage of possible favorable developments in relations with the Soviet Union or individual Eastern European countries; would be prepared to move toward a scaling down of COCOM effort if desirable. Amendment of the Export Control Act would give guidance to American exporters and support promotion efforts. By eliminating “economic” criterion, amendment would remove point of criticism of the export control program. Prior decision as described on tariff and Export-Import Bank legislation would enable Administration to move quickly to take advantage of favorable Congressional attitudes. Con The President would forego a broader (than in Package 2) set of instruments for political bargaining per Package 5. The further reduction of U.S. controls would elicit stronger reaction from opponents of relaxation. If the sought legislation changes were rebuffed, it would be a major setback to improvement in trade relations and trade levels and subsequent initiatives by the President might lose credibility in the eyes of the Communist countries. PACKAGE 4: Seek broad authority to expand trade We would agree to a maximum defensible reduction in COCOM controls towards the USSR and Eastern Europe; we would reduce the export control list as closely as possible to the COCOM list, support further amendment of the Export Control Act to incorporate a narrow definition of “strategic” and authorize a strong promotional effort on permitted trade, and take a strong stand to this effect; press now for broad tariff negotiation authority and the removal of the ban in the Export-Import Bank Act on financing during the Vietnam war. Pro The President’s negotiating position would be strengthened by the new authority. We would be in the best possible position to increase exports and to reduce friction with our allies over export controls, though the actual commercial effect would be uncertain. We would gain support of those segments of Congress and the public favoring the expansion of East-West trade relations. Con The President would relinquish virtually all the leverage for political bargaining which comes from relaxation and requesting new trade authority. This course could lead to charges of Western weakness. There would be an inevitable strategic cost difficult to measure, but particularly detrimental if East-West relations deteriorated. Moving now in present Congressional climate to obtain tariff and Export-Import Bank credit authority may jeopardize the entire trade program. Seeking such extensive modification of the Export Control Act now could cause a Congressional reaction tightening rather than relaxing. PACKAGE 5: Couple liberalization with negotiation for compensating benefits Any of the liberalizing packages discussed above might be carried out in the context of a quid pro quo negotiating approach to the USSR or other East European countries. There are three separate issues: 1) extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment to the USSR or other Eastern European countries; 2) elimination of the present restrictions on Export-Import Bank financing to these countries; 3) reduction in U.S. export controls. There are also several kinds of bargaining concepts: 1) seeking specific trade concession counterparts; 2) settling specific problems in our relations with a particular country outside the trade field (e.g., settlement of financial claims); 3) as part of a larger understanding on non-trade issues. If the negotiating course were followed, a fallback policy should be prepared for the contingency that negotiations were to prove fruitless. Pro This approach provides an opportunity to implement an era of negotiation in an area not heavily affected by critical strategic problems. In the case of most-favored-nation tariff treatment, the negotiation of equivalent benefits would be involved, although differences in trading systems create difficulties. In case of export controls, to the extent that reduction reaches into the strategic “gray area,” return concessions would help offset the strategic cost to the United States of the relaxation. Moreover, this approach might assist in obtaining Congressional and public support for legislative changes. Relaxation in export control and licensing of many consumer goods might not be considered a valuable concession by the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, but an effort to negotiate on this basis is the only effective way to find out. Con The principal difficulty of this approach is that refusal by the USSR or another Eastern European country to grant the necessary concessions might place the U.S. in an awkward position to take unilateral action if that seemed desirable. (This problem does not arise on the issue on MFN treatment, where we would always insist on reciprocity.) To the extent that export control relaxation relates to goods and technology that the USSR and Eastern European countries do not want or that are available to them from other sources at the same or lower cost, these countries would regard such relaxation as being solely of benefit to U.S. exporters. The degree of U. S. success could be affected by lack of cooperation by our allies, who could (if they do not already) match or exceed our liberalized policies, hence diluting their economic value to the Eastern Europeans and presumably reducing their willingness to make concessions in return. THREE PENDING EXPORT SALES Three pending export opportunities are of such magnitude and hence political sensitivity as to merit NSC attention. They illustrate problems likely to be involved in moving toward increased trade with the USSR. And they are important because the actions taken on them may be construed by business firms, the public and the Congress as signals of the Administration’s policy on East-West trade. Each case would, in principle, be approvable under the current interpretation of existing policy guidelines. However, the U.S. has not heretofore approved transactions of the nature and magnitude of the oil field and truck factory cases. The corn sale transaction cannot be completed as a practical matter without waiving or repealing an executive requirement for 50 percent shipment in American bottoms. Oil Field Gathering System to the USSR The USSR is negotiating for a U.S. firm to design and install a system for oil extraction and gathering that would give the Soviets for the first time a modern, semi-automated oil field. Almost all the project’s $26 million cost would go to either U.S. domestic firms or their foreign subsidiaries. U.S. government agencies have concluded that this transaction would not aid the Soviets militarily or economically in a way detrimental to our interests. Approval of export licenses would, however, constitute the first U.S. government decision to provide the USSR with significant equipment and technology in the petroleum field. Engine Foundry and Gear Cutting Machines for Soviet Truck Factory The USSR is negotiating with U.S. firms to design and install a $60 million engine foundry and to supply $4.5 million of gear-cutting machines to expand and modernize the ZIL truck factory. This is one of the two Soviet plants producing civilian and military heavy duty motor vehicles. (Although U.S. domestic firms may obtain the entire $60 million of business for this foundry, they could end up obtaining only $2.5 million for technology with the equipment sales going to Western Europe because of financing.) U.S. Government agencies have concluded that neither the foundry nor the gear cutters are specially designed nor likely to be used principally, in peacetime, for military purposes, although a significant share of the foundry’s output (probably 25-35 percent) would go to the military. The Soviets can purchase both elsewhere with some delay and added costs. This could be our largest single transaction with any East European country since the late 1940’s except the 1963 wheat deal with the USSR. U.S. export participation in the Fiat small passenger car deal with the Soviets aroused great controversy even though less potentially controversial than this one, which involves a Soviet plant producing trucks for military or civilian use. Because of this sensitivity and the size of the sale, consultation with appropriate Congressional leaders may be politically advisable, following the precedent established on the Fiat and wheat deals. Corn Sales to the USSR The USSR wants to buy about $15 million of corn at world market prices with possible continuing purchases in the future. Substantively, the export of bulk corn offers no export control problems. However, present shipping restrictions require at least 50 percent of such grain to be carried on U.S. ships—compliance with which would price us out of the deal both economically and politically. The present regulations were adopted at the time of the Soviet wheat deal at the urging of the U.S. maritime unions and ship owners. The completion of the proposed transaction would require either a waiver or repeal of the current 50-50 shipping regulations. Commercial advantages must be weighed against the prospect that the maritime unions may still oppose waiver or repeal and may, in any event, refuse to load grain for the USSR. Approaches to the Longshore and Maritime Unions would involve a major Administration effort with no guarantee of success, especially in the light of recent developments in Czechoslovakia. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, 5/2969 NSC Meeting. Confidential. Distributed under cover of a May 12 memorandum from Davis reporting that the paper was a revision of one circulated on May 9, pursuant to an informal meeting of the Review Group that day, and requesting agency comments. The NSC Review Group had met on May 7 to discuss a 35-page NSSM 35 Response paper and a draft of the paper printed here. Briefing materials for Kissinger’s use at that meeting are in National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 90, 5/7/69 Review Group Meeting. NSSM 35 is Document 288 . 2 On April 10 Export-Import Bank President Kearns sent Samuels a memorandum explaining that the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended March 1968, prohibited the Bank from providing its products to a Communist country unless the President determined it was in the national interest. Kearns noted that President Johnson had notified Congress of a national interest determination for Yugoslavia on May 7, 1968, and President Kennedy had made a similar determination. Kearns informed Samuels that the Bank Board had decided the new President should notify his own determination and was prepared to consider some of Yugoslavia’s pending applications if the President determined that export financing for Yugoslavia was in the national interest. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 6 XMB) 3 These three issues, plus Export License Controls for East Germany, had been flagged in a Specific Issues paper Davis circulated on May 6 for the May 7 Review Group meeting. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 35) 4 On April 22 Kissinger circulated a more detailed paper, prepared by the NSC Staff, on the corn sale issue. (Ibid.) 293. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 293. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 1 Washington, May 14, 1969. SUBJECT U.S. Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries (NSSM 35) The paper on East-West trade requested in NSSM 35 has been completed (Tab C). 2 The interested Departments and Agencies have been asked to make their recommendations in memoranda to the President. An NSC meeting on the general subject of East-West trade may be held at a later stage, but will be held before the May 20-21 date for Commerce/State testimony on the renewal of the Export Control Act before the House Banking and Currency Committee only if the memoranda response procedure proves unsatisfactory. The major issues are identified in a summary of the basic paper (Tab B). 3 In the Review Group discussions, Defense (Warren Nutter) has been most reserved about liberalization of trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe. Nutter is probably personally opposed to moving at all, but his line has been that we should not take any step (even public indication of a more favorable attitude, administrative relaxations under existing law, or requests for Presidential authority to negotiate) without trying to get something in return from the Communist countries involved. No one (including the Soviets) would disagree that the granting of better tariff treatment (applying the MFN rates instead of the higher 1930 tariff rates) calls for trade and related concessions on the other side. But Nutter does not draw any distinction between this kind of mutual exchange of benefits and the relaxation of export controls or credit limitations which we impose on our own trade (and the Western Europeans do not). In the latter case we think it is unrealistic to talk about asking for reciprocity except possibly in the broad, atmospheric political context. The President of the Export-Import Bank, Henry Kearns, feels strongly that no attempt should be made to remove the restrictions in the Export-Import Bank Act that bar its participation in financing exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe because he fears that such an attempt might lead to even more serious limitations on the operations of the Export-Import Bank. We believe that despite Mr. Kearns’ concern, it would be logical for the Export-Import Bank to engage in normal export financing as a part of a decision to adopt a policy of encouraging East-West trade. In the attached memorandum to the President, 4 we have restated our view of the major premises and have recommended a policy of actively supporting increased East-West trade for both political and economic reasons. We also recommend that the President seek necessary legislative authority to liberalize export controls, negotiate for extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment, and permit export financing. With these tools, the President will be able to use trade more effectively as an element in our relations with the Soviet Union and each of the Eastern European countries. We recommend approval of the three illustrative export cases. Recommendation That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab A). 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 35. Confidential. The date is handwritten. Drafted by R. B. Wright (E/ITP/EWT) on May 13 and cleared by Springsteen (EUR), McHenry (C), Schnee (H), and Neubert (S/P). 2 NSSM 35 is Document 288 . The 35-page NSSM 35 Response at Tab C is not printed. 3 Document 292 . 4 Document 294 . 294. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon 294. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 14, 1969. SUBJECT U.S. Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries—NSSM 35 My recommendations to you on the issues set forth in this study are based on four major premises: 1. Impact of Strategic Controls We share the CIA judgment 2 that —the cost imposed on Communist military capabilities by the Western strategic trade controls has been some lag in the efficiency of design and production technology in certain areas involving advanced weapons systems. —while there has been no measurable impact upon the economic growth of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the quality of that growth has been adversely affected in some sectors. —the cost of the export controls unilaterally imposed by the United States has added marginally, in the overall, to these impacts. 2. Relations With Our Allies Our allies attach more importance to commercial prospects in Communist countries than does the United States. This fact has put us very much on the defensive in COCOM where we attempt to hold the line on multilateral strategic controls. Although the current COCOM list review can probably be brought to a moderately satisfactory conclusion without a major crisis, friction over COCOM and the extraterritorial impact of our more extensive controls will continue unless the direction of U.S. policy changes. 3. Political Significance In the case of the Soviet Union, good trade relations can be associated with favorable political relations, but increased trade by itself is not a matter that would rank high in importance in influencing basic political attitudes on either side. Increased trade and the removal of obstacles thereto would, however, have some beneficial effect on U.S. bilateral relations with the USSR and individual Eastern European countries. Moreover, in varying degrees, all of these countries actively want closer economic and trade relations with Western Europe and the United States, and modifications in our trade policies towards them could carry a significance beyond the purely commercial. 4. Trade Prospects We accept the estimates that direct trade gains will be modest, but it is hard to make firm predictions in this field. The Western Europeans are certainly trading with the East at a much higher level. In foreign policy terms, U.S. trade policy toward Communist countries is properly a function of the broader U.S, relationship with each of these countries. Our aim is to move toward improvement in these broader relationships as rapidly and effectively as circumstances permit. Hence my recommendations on the issues are as follows: 1. Public Encouragement of Non-Strategic Trade I favor active promotion of such trade because it will help to convey to the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries the direction in which you wish to move in East-West relations. A positive lead by the Administration in this matter is essential because otherwise American business will tend to hold back. We believe this initiative will be welcomed and supported in trade circles and should help to develop support by such interests for the legislative proposals that we recommend below. It will also help our balance of payments. 2. Legislative Program Legislative proposals should constitute a logical set of changes that will give you the basic authority and maximum flexibility to develop constructive relations in the trade area including direct negotiations as appropriate with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. This can be done either by a Presidential submission or by supporting bills already before the Congress which cover all the necessary points. A. Export Control Act The present Act should be amended a) to include a clear statement that we favor trade in peaceful goods, b) to eliminate the ambiguous language that seems to require controls over goods of purely economic (as opposed to military) significance, and c) to include a narrow definition of what constitutes strategic trade so that we can move promptly towards a much shorter control list. B. Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment An essential element in any East-West trade expansion program is flexible authority for you to enter into negotiations for the extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment in bilateral commercial agreements with individual countries (in addition to Poland and Yugoslavia which already have MFN treatment) in return for benefits to the United States. Whether or not we are successful in obtaining the authority, the fact that you would actively seek it would give credibility to our diplomatic posture toward the USSR and the Eastern European countries. C. Export-Import Bank Act Presidential discretionary authority to permit Export-Import Bank financing of East-West trade on a country-by-country basis should be restored removing the Fino amendment 3 that has the effect of an absolute ban for the duration of the Viet-Nam war. This is an important negotiating tool. 3. Administration of U.S. Export Controls A. U.S. Control List The U.S. control list should be reduced to the level of the COCOM list except for those cases where the United States clearly can maintain an effective unilateral control. B. Differential Country Treatment The practice of differentiating in the treatment of the Communist countries should be continued as a logical part of using trade as an element in our relations with individual countries. 4. Pending Export Sales These are all cases whose approval would be consistent with the approach I have recommended and would carry a useful message as to the direction of Administration policy. In the case of the truck engine foundry for the USSR it would be advisable for Commerce to carry out appropriate Congressional consultation before approval. In the case of lifting the 50-50 shipping requirement, there should be consultation not only with the Congress but also with the unions. With respect to the negotiating approach described in Package 5, we would not propose to offer better tariff treatment to the Communist countries except in exchange for trade and other related benefits of importance to the United States. This concept of negotiation, we believe, is accepted by Communist countries. Beyond such a negotiation, however, it is unrealistic to think in terms of obtaining other specific benefits except possibly in the broad atmospheric context. Conclusion The foregoing recommendations constitute an endorsement of Package 4, except that we would, for the present, defer a decision on further initiatives in COCOM. The principal difference between Package 4 and Package 3 relates to the timing of legislative changes. Package 3 assumes that the climate for achieving Congressional action is not present at this time. In making our recommendation for Package 4, we assume that your endorsement of this approach and your support for obtaining these negotiating tools will have a positive effect on the Congressional climate. We believe that Package 4 more clearly reflects your desire to see the beginning of an “era of negotiation” and that flexible negotiating authority in your hands will enhance the chances of developing a broad administration policy toward relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A strong Administration position supporting this approach to East-West trade would provide us with potential diplomatic advantages. ELR 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 35. Confidential. Drafted by R. B. Wright (E/ITP/EWT) on May 13 and cleared by Springsteen (EUR), McHenry (C), Greenwald (E), Schnee (H), Neubert (S/P), and Frank (L). Attached as Tab A to Document 293 . 2 Not further identified. 3 The Fino Amendment banned assistance to countries that provided assistance to North Vietnam. 295. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon 295. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 14, 1969. In general, the summary paper, “Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries” (NSSM: 35) 2 is a fair presentation. It also becomes rather obvious that there is lacking a comprehensive analysis of both the effect of our export control policies relative to Communist countries and the impact which can be expected should we change our policy to either a softer or harder line. In addition to the political questions, there just are not expected to be any big trade benefits with cash or early repayments in the foreseeable future, for Eastern Bloc countries do not have the foreign exchange resources. Thus, it would not appear too profitable to make a big push in this direction, especially when economic return would be modest and political expense could be sizable. The underlying question requiring a decision is: Would sufficient benefits result from liberalizing our trade policies toward the Communist countries of eastern Europe to justify running the domestic political risks of seeking necessary authority? Since liberalizing trade with Communist countries is construed by many in Congress and the public generally as “trading with the enemy” there are political dangers. It is a volatile issue; therefore, approach and timing become all important. A proper environment must be established before requesting legislation. You have already clearly taken the stance that we are entering “an era of negotiation”; thus the use of trade as an instrument of negotiation is both logical and desirable. It seems to me that the major element which would gain you acceptance would be to make it clear that you are seeking some reciprocity. Further, that you distinguish between Communist nations. The most desirable position for you would be to have the various instruments necessary to bargain effectively available—meaning that there should be an extension of your present authority to regulate exports, have the ability to permit Eximbank to guarantee credits, and the authority to offer tariff concessions. On this basis you should: —Take a public stance in favor of increased trade of peaceful goods provided that there is reciprocity in some form. —Support the renewal of the Export Control Act of 1949 without major change, and certainly without crippling restrictions. —Take administrative action to reduce the scope of our controls (COCOM lists) to the internationally agreed level. (In addition continue to try to control strategically significant goods and techniques as it is within our unilateral power to block the export to Communist countries.) Our licensing procedures should be speeded up and simplified. —Request authority to be able to extend tariff concessions to Communist countries in consideration of equivalent trade benefits from them. —An effective tool would be the ability to extend Eximbank guarantees on export credits to Communist countries. However, since the prohibition on such guarantees was only recently enacted, and is tied closely with a prohibition on guarantees to countries trading with North Vietnam, it would be inappropriate to request such repeal at this time. Relative to the three specific pending cases mentioned in the summary paper, it is my understanding that based upon the current interpretation of the regulations, approval would not contravene the terms of the Act. Since these cases are so large and significant, however, caution is suggested. In my view all three could have serious political repercussions. Let me make clear that in my opinion there is insufficient data, at least on the oil and truck factory cases, to give you a recommendation with a very high degree of confidence. Based upon the experience of past Administrations, I would expect that there is a very real possibility the oil and truck factory cases will receive adverse acceptance by the more conservative and right wing elements in the country. In both cases there appears to be directly or indirectly strategic implications. Based upon the data available the extent is not known. With particular reference to the truck factory, we were specifically informed that it would have “significant” military applications. (The sense of the Congress was expressed last year when it amended the Eximbank Act to include a prohibition against guaranteeing, insuring or extending credit, or participating in any extension of credit, for exports to Communist countries—e.g. the Fiat deal.) Your decisions on these three cases will be interpreted as a signal both at home and abroad as to your attitude toward trade with Communist countries. With the Czechoslovakian incident still in peoples’ minds and the recognition that the Soviets are heavily supplying North Vietnam, any favorable decision would require extensive justification by the Administration as well as preparing the Congress and the public for its acceptance. With these qualifications based upon the data available, I would recommend deferring a final decision at this time. Certainly more data is needed as well as a precise assessment of Congressional and public acceptance for these actions. Regarding the corn sales, it is again a political risk with the public and Congress generally but more specifically with the unions and their insistence on 50-50 shipments in American ships. It is my opinion that the unions (and other large sectors in our country), particularly in view of Vietnam, would not readily accept a favorable decision on this transaction. It is not to say that neither the union nor public acceptance cannot be gained but it certainly will take far more direct and specific effort than has been accomplished to date. David M. Kennedy 3 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the President 5-8/69. Confidential. 2 NSSM 35 is Document 288 . The summary paper is Document 292 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 296. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 296. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 15, 1969. SUBJECT US Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries I have been asked to give you my recommendations on nine policy issues listed in the NSSM 35 Summary Paper, 12 May 1969, 2 on the above subject. Before doing so, I think it is essential to give you my recommendations on the general line of trade policy I favor toward Communist countries. I would continue our present policy while undertaking preliminary negotiations with individual Communist countries to explore whether there are reasonable prospects for liberalizing trade on the basis of quid pro quo concessions on both sides. 3 In other words, I favor a combination of packages 1 and 5 of the Summary Paper. To achieve this end, we should first discover what areas of negotiation with the Communist countries are likely to bear fruit and then seek additional Congressional authority as needed. I believe it is neither wise nor necessary to seek broad changes in current laws affecting trade with these countries until we are reasonably sure that specific negotiations on a reciprocal basis can be successful. Congress is likely to take a similar view and be more disposed to grant liberalization authority to you if there is evidence of some reciprocal gain to the US from a specific area of negotiation. The limited amount of study considered for NSSM 35 does not provide evidence for sound decisions on many of the issues on which I have been asked to give my views. However, the issues are not all equally urgent, and action on many can be deferred until more complete analyses are in hand. The one that must be dealt with at this time is the future of the Export Control Act, which expires on 30 June 1969. With respect to this and the other issues, my views are as follows: a. Should expansion of US trade with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe be actively and publicly endorsed by the Administration? Comment: Recognizing the lack of a thorough-going analysis, I would refrain from active and public endorsement of new policies intended to expand trade with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. With or without a restatement of policy, it seems unlikely that US exports to Eastern Europe will grow at rates substantially above those applicable to US exports as a whole. Today the exports to Eastern Europe approximate 1 percent of total US exports. Assuming US exports reach $55 billion to $60 billion by 1975 and exports to European Communist countries reach the $500 million to $700 million projected in the Summary Paper, we are still dealing with an approximate 1 percent figure. Since the economic effects of a revised policy are thus not likely to be significant, the Administration’s active and public endorsement of a more liberal policy should be determined by psychological and political considerations. In the short run, a new policy intended to expand trade would probably afford less leverage with the USSR than with the other East European countries, but in the absence of a detailed study of each situation it is difficult to determine whether the latter leverage would be significant or in the right direction. With respect to our allies, reactions would be mixed, depending, among other things, on the extent to which they regarded our policies as tending to preempt their export markets. Endorsement of major changes in policy at this time could create several disabilities for the Administration. These would involve loss of flexibility both to deal pragmatically with the Congress while acceptable legislation is being evolved and to hold out the prospect of expanded trade for whatever future negotiating advantage it might have. b. Should we favor extension of the Export Control Act in its present form or propose or support amendments that would provide a suitable legislative base for a less restrictive Export Control Act? Comment: I support extension of the Act in its present form. Under its provisions you have considerable flexibility to exercise judgment in the pursuit of trade policies that you perceive to be in the national interest. It has been possible under the present Act to generate an impressive list of commodities that can be freely exported to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Only 2 percent by value of export license applications are currently rejected. Moreover, this list may be expanded or contracted without any change in legislation. Under these circumstances, arguments that amendments to the present Act are required to provide a suitable legislative base for expanded trade do not appear to be well-founded. If subsequent analysis, including assessment of probable Congressional reaction, produces adequate evidence in favor of amending the Act, this could be done next year. c. Should we seek authority to extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union? Comment: I recommend against seeking this authority. The trade-creating effects of MFN would be small, even insignificant in the US perspective. As I have pointed out above, it is my general recommendation that we should first engage in preliminary negotiations with individual Communist countries to discover whether there are reasonable grounds for expecting some reciprocal gains to the US should such authority be obtained in each particular case. Only when such reciprocal gain has been identified should this authority be sought. One of the benefits of negotiating in advance would be to make it easier to obtain favorable Congressional response to a request for additional authority. d. Should we seek removal of the barriers to Export-Import Bank financing for Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union? Comment: I recommend against seeking removal of the barriers to the Ex-Im Bank financing for these countries. In addition to the reasons already given for not seeking general authority to extend most-favored-nation treatment, there are special problems involved in removing restrictions on Ex-Im Bank financing. We have a firmly established policy, enacted into various laws, of prohibiting lending or guaranteeing of loans by the US Government to countries with a record of (a) default of debts, (b) confiscation of property without due compensation, and (c) provision of supplies to countries engaged in hostilities with us. Here again I believe we should not seek to alter this policy until we have some concrete grounds for doing so. e. Should the United States continue to maintain a control list more restrictive than the international COCOM list? Comment: I recommend we maintain control over commodities whose export, by reasonable interpretation, would endanger the security of the United States or be contrary to other vital interests. To the extent possible we should coordinate our policies with our COCOM allies, although it is becoming increasingly difficult to persuade them of the validity of our views, largely because our interests in the international arena are more extensive than theirs. In these circumstances, I think we will find it prudent to remain relatively restrictive. Of course, maintaining a differential should not in itself be considered an objective of our policy. If it is found that our national interests would be best served by bringing US controls closer to those of COCOM, we should do so. f. Should the Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, continue to be treated differentially in the application of our export controls? Comment: I recommend we continue the concept of differentially applied export controls. The notion of differential treatment stems from a recognition of the economic/political differences between countries in the communist sphere. If the notion of differential treatment is abandoned, the opportunity is lost of exploiting the developments in one country vis-a-vis those in another; the mode of response to each nation is reduced to that required for the worst; and, the possibility of using trade as a flexible instrument of foreign policy is forfeited. 9. Should we license a US firm to design and install a $26 million system for oil extraction and gathering for the USSR? Comment: I recommend that, before we approve this transaction, we explore the possibility of using it as a means of gaining compensating benefits for the US from the USSR. While the type of item involved meets current criteria for non-strategic goods, the magnitude of this single transaction introduces an element not sufficiently taken into account in our current guidelines for export controls. h. Engine Foundry and Gear-Cutting Machines for Soviet Truck Factory. Comment: As in the oil extraction case, the $60 million magnitude of this sale places it in a special category. Before being approved, it should be reviewed very carefully for any advantage that can be extracted for the US. CIA has estimated that at least 1/3 of these trucks will be military. My personal belief having studied the back-up support for Soviet army divisions would lead me to believe that this estimate is understated. i. Should we change our 50-50 shipping requirement to enable US firms to respond affirmatively to a Soviet request to buy US corn? Comment: No strategic question is at issue. There is nothing to prevent this transaction except the 50-50 shipping requirement. There is also no reason to waive this requirement in order to consummate this sale, particularly since it is a one-shot affair sought by the USSR in order to tide them over a temporary difficulty. The 50-50 requirement, therefore, should be addressed on its merits. Parenthetically, it may not be wise to engage the labor unions on this matter when they have generally supported our foreign policy. My views on the above subjects are shared by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, 5/21/69 NSC Meeting. Confidential. 2 Document 292 . 3 In a May 19 memorandum to Richardson, Greenwald took strong exception to the Defense Department approach that “would virtually guarantee freezing up the trade channel of our relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Non-strategic East-West trade has been one area where we have some possibilities of moving when we think it would be useful in terms of our own evaluation of the general atmosphere of our relations with the East. The pre-negotiation concept which underlies the Defense approach has no validity when applied to specific trade issues. Relaxation of restraints we have placed on exports which go beyond those agreed with the COCOM countries have not been and will not be looked upon by the Soviets or Eastern Europeans as a subject for quid pro quo negotiations.” Greenwald attached a paper taking exception to 13 specific points in Laird’s memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 35) 297. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 297. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson 1 Washington, May 19, 1969. SUBJECT Arguments for Presidential MFN Authority for Eastern Europe In setting forth the rationale for Presidential authority to extend MFN treatment to those Eastern European countries which do not have it (only Poland and Yugoslavia do), one must begin with the premise that it is desirable to seek improvement of relations between these countries and the United States. If merely standing still or retrogressing is the preferred course of action, then MFN becomes irrelevant. I take it, however, that our present policy is to try to take advantage of such opportunities as exist to move towards better if not completely normal relations with Eastern Europe. On this assumption, arguments for MFN authority for the President may be made on two levels: (a) On the psychological-political level, it is a fact, rightly or wrongly, that US failure to offer MFN has acquired considerable symbolic significance in the minds of Eastern European leaders. They regard it as a significant area in which the United States can evidence the reality of its desire to improve relations with them, even though in their more realistic moments they recognize that the immediate economic benefits will be small. MFN treatment would thus have an effect considerably beyond its intrinsic importance, not only removing one of the standard excuses which these regimes advance for not being able to improve relations with us, but providing real evidence of movement by the United States away from the political aloofness, if not downright hostility, which characterized political relations during the cold war period. If one asks why the United States should take the initiative in the absence of any real gesture of good will from the other side (Romania had already made them), 2 the answer is that we are a great power, hopefully capable of conducting an imaginative and flexible diplomacy. (b) On the economic level, the principal argument is that failure to grant most-favored-nation treatment works to the disadvantage of American exports to Eastern Europe. While one should have no illusions about the potential for such exports (Eastern Europe will always remain a marginal market), countries such as the United States which face a secular problem in balancing their foreign trade accounts cannot afford to scorn even limited export possibilities. Patterns of trade are now being established between Eastern Europe and the West which are working to the detriment of American interests as the countries of Western Europe move into Eastern European markets on a preferential basis. American exports suffer not only from the higher tariffs raised against them in the absence of MFN treatment, but by the negative effects in directing imports which its absence has on economic policy-makers on Eastern Europe. We are likely to wake up one day and find the established patterns of trade so firmly fixed that we will have lost any possibility of significant penetration of the Eastern European market in the face of Western European competition. One final point—in this context it is better to have tried and lost than not to have tried at all. The US executive will be in a better diplomatic posture if the President requests MFN authority and fails to get it from Congress than if the effort is not made. In the latter case, invidious comparisons with the previous Administration will be inevitable. There are definite limits to what one might expect to be able to trade-off with specific countries for most-favored-nation treatment. The most tangible effects are likely to be in the general areas noted above. A country-by-country breakdown follows: Bulgaria: If the President had authority to grant MFN to Bulgaria, we might be in a position to link this position persuasively with such matters as cultural exchanges and VOA jamming. Another possibility would be to speed up the negotiation of a consular convention which we want. Czechoslovakia: In our proposed claims settlement package (on which we will now begin consultations on the Hill), an essential ingredient will be the offer to grant MFN treatment to Czechoslovakia as a quid pro quo for a more generous settlement of US claims. After the initial payment, execution of further payments by the Czechs would be contingent on our extension of MFN. Hungary: Willingness to extend MFN treatment to Hungary could have the effect of breaking the existing log jam in our bilateral relations. It would increase Hungarian willingness to be forthcoming on a range of subjects, including settlement of claims, consular convention, and removal of administrative disabilities imposed on the US Embassy in Budapest. Romania: If we were actually in a position to deliver MFN, which the Romanians now seem to doubt, it would undoubtedly have a positive effect in such matters as reuniting divided families, achievement of a consular convention, and perhaps additional scope for our cultural activities. Soviet Union: While the MFN issue plays a considerably lesser role in our over-all relations with the Soviet Union than with the smaller Eastern European countries, it would undoubtedly have psychological and political effects along the general lines indicated above. Moreover, it might make the Soviets somewhat more forthcoming in their willingness to accept American imports which are competitive with those from other Western sources. MFN might also serve as effective bait to the Soviets as part of an acceptable settlement of the lend-lease debt. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 71 D 175, 5/21/69 NSC Meeting. Confidential. 2 Not further identified. 298. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 298. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT East-West Trade (excluding the Asian Communist countries and Cuba) The NSC meeting on East-West Trade has been rescheduled for May 21. 2 An immediate decision is needed on one issue: our Export Control Act, which establishes the basis for regulating exports to Communist countries, expires on June 30. Commerce, State and Defense will testify early next week on a Muskie-Mondale bill to liberalize the present act. They need a decision on whether you wish to support a simple extension of the present Act, support the liberalizing Muskie bill, or submit an Administration liberalizing bill. Your decision on this issue, however, can best be made in the context of your decisions on our overall approach to East-West trade. The summary paper discusses the issues which underlie all U.S. policy in this area and offers five packages: 3 1. Continuation of the present fairly restrictive policy. 2. Adoption of new liberalizing attitudes but without major legislative changes. 3. Adoption of more liberalized attitudes plus support for Congressional initiatives toward liberalizing legislation and Administration initiatives as soon as Congressional acceptance becomes likely. 4. An immediate liberalizing initiative, including legislative proposals. 5. Linking of any of the liberalization approaches to specific concessions in return from Communist countries. The specific issues, besides the Export Control Act, which could be part of any package and on which you could make decisions now, are listed on the first page of the summary paper and in the issues for decision paper. When the NSC meeting on East-West trade scheduled for May 14 was cancelled, all agencies were asked to submit their recommendations on each issue for decision in writing. 4 These are summarized in the issues for decision paper, which also includes my recommendations, and the replies themselves are at the tab “Agency Views”. 5 The basic options paper is at the last tab. 6 Attachment ISSUES FOR DECISION AND SUMMARY OF AGENCY VIEWS ON POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION All agencies agree that our present East-West trade policy hurts the Communist economies marginally, if at all; is a source of irritation between us and our allies and between us and our business community; and that increased trade could be of some help in improving East-West political relations. But there are three sharply different approaches to liberalizing our present policy: 1. To seek political concessions before we take any forward steps, including requests for Congressional authority to liberalize (Defense view); 2. To request Congressional authority prior to negotiations but then liberalize in the expectation that it will lead to improvement in the political climate (State view); 3. To seek authority but then liberalize in return for purely economic concessions (Commerce view). Defense would prefer to undertake prior negotiations with the Communist countries to determine in advance what political concessions we can get in return for U.S. trade concessions. State advocates an immediate major legislative initiative to liberalize the Export Control Act, seek authority for the President to extend MFN treatment to the Communist community and remove the proscriptions on Export-Import Bank lending. They see this approach as most clearly reflecting your desire to move into an “era of negotiations” and to enhance your bargaining power with the USSR. They assume that your advocacy will help generate the needed public support. Commerce is firmly opposed to any major legislative initiative at this time, fearing Congressional rebuffs and hence a setback to the improvement in trade relations which they foresee under existing law. The other agencies are in between State and Commerce, advocating initiatives on some issues but not on others, but generally leaning more toward Commerce’s caution. I recommend that the Administration take no major legislative initiatives at this time but go along with Congressional liberalizing initiatives. My judgment is based largely on foreign policy considerations, however, and domestic political ramifications must be a major element in your decision. On the specific issues, the agencies’ views and my own recommendations are as follows. My recommendations are confined to the foreign policy aspects of the decisions. 1. Export Control Act The Export Control Act requires the Administration to restrict exports to Communist countries of goods or technical data which would enhance their military or economic potential. Under this authority, exports can only be made if licenses are issued for them. The proposed Muskie-Mondale bill would relax the conditions under which exports could be authorized by eliminating the “economic potential” criterion and liberalizing moderately the “military potential” test. It would also shift the administrative emphasis from requiring permission for exports, as at present, to requiring denial to keep exports from going. The presumption of denial would be replaced by a presumption of permission. State, OEP, Labor and CEA (admitting that its expertise is of limited relevance on the overall subject) recommended that we seek liberalizing amendments. Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, and STR support renewal of the present act (although STR would not rigidly oppose liberalization proposed by others). All are opposed to any tightening. I recommend that we go along with the Muskie-Mondale bill for modest liberalization, subject to Bryce Harlow’s views on Congressional considerations. 2. Public support by the Administration for expanded East-West Trade State and Commerce agree fully on the desirability of active promotion and are supported by Treasury, Agriculture, STR, and USIA. Commerce advocates a Presidential statement as soon as politically possible. Defense, OEP and CEA would hold back, feeling that there is little to gain with Defense arguing that there could actually be some costs in terms of our negotiating leverage with the Communist countries. I recommend that we indicate our support for augmented trade, but in low key with prospects for more as the political situation improves. I recommend against a Presidential statement at this time and would leave most of the public presentation to the Secretary of Commerce. 3. Authority to extend MFN treatment At present, U.S. imports from most Communist countries must pay the tariffs contained in the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act. The sizable tariff reductions made in numerous trade negotiations since then do not apply to them because the President has not had authority to treat them like all other countries. This distinction applies only to Communist countries. State and Treasury recommend that you seek such authority; State feels that there would be a foreign policy payoff even if Congress did not agree. Commerce recommends that you support any Congressional initiatives which emerge. (Senator Magnuson, supported by Senator Fong, may reintroduce the East-West Trade Act proposed by the Johnson Administration in 1966.) But Commerce opposes an Administration initiative since it is convinced that it could not pass and Defense would await assurance of a specific quid pro quo before seeking the authority. (State is indifferent between an Administration proposal and Administration support for Congressional initiatives.) OEP, STR and CEA would also defer any initiative. I recommend against an Administration initiative at this time but would support a Magnuson or other bill to give you MFN authority. 4. Elimination of Restrictions on Export-Import Bank Financing Under the Fino Amendment, the Export-Import Bank may not provide export credits to countries trading with North Vietnam. This of course covers all of the Communist countries. The same views prevail on eliminating this as on MFN except that Treasury is opposed to a request at this time. I recommend no initiative. No Congressional initiative has been taken in this area. 5. Elimination of Differences Between the U.S. and COCOM Control Lists The list of goods and data unilaterally controlled by the United States is much more restrictive than the list maintained multilaterally through COCOM. There is widespread agreement that we are simply losing sales without adversely affecting the Communist countries. Everyone agrees that we should liberalize to the COCOM level except in the very few areas, such as advanced computers, where we can effectively maintain unilateral controls. (Defense makes no specific recommendation on this issue.) This would be a purely administrative decision. I agree with the majority view. 6. Differentiation among the Eastern European Countries under our controls We treat the different Communist countries differently under the Export Control Act, both for political reasons and because there are some cases where we do not think an Eastern European country will transmit data or goods to the Soviet Union. All except OEP favor continuation of the present differentiation approach. USIA is strongly in favor. I agree. Specific Issues There are three specific licensing issues of sufficient magnitude and policy implication that they require your attention, which illustrate the overall policy issues addressed earlier. Your decisions on them will be regarded as a signal of the Administration’s attitude toward trade with Eastern Europe. The cases are: a. USSR negotiations with a U.S. firm to design and install a system for oil extraction and gathering that would give the USSR for the first time a modern, semi-automated oil field. All are in favor of granting the license except Treasury which would defer a decision until we have more information. Defense would seek a specific compensating benefit. I recommend that we issue the license after conducting Congressional consultations. b. USSR negotiations with U.S. firms to design and install a $60 million engine foundry to expand and modernize a Moscow truck factory. All favor except Treasury, which wants more information. But CEA expresses reservations; CIA notes that the factory has a significant military potential; and Defense thinks the military potential may be greater than cited by CIA. State and Commerce counsel prior consultation with Congress before proceeding and Defense would look for “advantages for the U.S.” (presumably beyond the export sale). I recommend that we delay our decisions on these issues, until we can better assess our overall political relations with the USSR. c. Corn sales to the USSR, which would in practice require elimination of the 50-50 shipping rule through negotiations with the unions. State (after Congressional consultation), Agriculture, Commerce, and STR are in favor. CEA and Defense oppose the effort if only a single corn sale is in sight, and CIA concludes that there is no assurance of ongoing sales. In an earlier memorandum to you, the Secretary of Labor concludes that a great deal of effort will be needed to achieve agreement with the unions. Treasury agrees. I recommend no action. The cost of seeking union agreement is too high for a single sale. 1 Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Box 84, 5/21/69 NSC Meeting-U.S. Trade Policy Toward Communist Countries. Confidential. This memorandum is the covering memorandum on a package of briefing materials for the President’s use at the May 21 NSC meeting. 2 The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from 10:26 to 11:30 a.m. Nixon, Agnew, Laird, Lincoln, Richardson, Wheeler, Helms, Kissinger, Kennedy, Hardin, Shultz, Siciliano, Davis, Greenwald, Loomis, McCracken, Gates, Burns, Goodpaster, Haig, and Bergsten attended. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No formal record of this meeting has been found, but see Document 299 . 3 Document 292 . 4 See Document 293 . 5 Not printed, but see Documents 294 , 295 , and 296 . 6 The 35-page NSSM 35 Response is not printed. 299. National Security Decision Memorandum 15 299. National Security Decision Memorandum 15 1 Washington, May 28, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Secretary of Agriculture SUBJECT East-West Trade The President has made the following decisions with regard to the issues discussed at the National Security Council meeting on May 21, 1969: 2 1. Present legislation provides an adequate basis for U.S. trade policy toward the USSR and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe at this time, in view of the status of our overall relations with them. There is thus no current need for the Administration to make any proposals, or support proposals of others, to change the Export Control Act or provide authority for the President to extend most-favored-nation treatment to these countries. 3 Neither is there a need to try to facilitate sales by amendment of these regulations governing shipment to them of agricultural commodities. 2. In view of overall U.S.-USSR relations, we should not now issue licenses for the proposed sales of U.S. equipment and data for a semi-automated oil system and a truck engine foundry. 3. We should be prepared to move generously to liberalize our trade policy toward the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries whenever there is sufficient improvement in our overall relations with them. 4. The United States should continue to liberalize its export control list, within the framework of present legislation. As soon as possible, we should align our controls to the list agreed internationally by COCOM except where the United States can maintain effective unilateral control because the items are not available from non-U.S. sources. The United States should not place pressure on other countries not to pursue trade policies toward Eastern Europe more liberal than our own. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 305, NSDM 15. Secret. 2 See footnote 2, Document 298 . 3 On May 29 Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a memorandum suggesting items to discuss over lunch with Richardson. Item 3 on East-West Trade reads: “Now that a decision memorandum has been issued (though I deplore its contents) it is important to get the Government lined up behind it. For several years, Administration representatives have publicly and privately supported an East-West trade bill and have spoken favorably about the possibility of selective MFN. This must now be changed. I believe you should raise with Richardson the desirability of having the Under Secretaries Committee take on the implementation of the NSDM so that we have a consistent line with Congress; a consistent line in background briefings and public speeches; a consistent line with East European Ambassadors, especially those from Romania and Czechoslovakia; a consistent line for VOA.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/ELR Meetings) 300. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 300. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 21, 1969. SUBJECT Removal of Restrictions on US Trade with China As you know, the United States currently maintains a virtually total embargo on all trade and financial transactions with Communist China, the only significant exception being the licensing of exports and imports of certain publications and educational materials. These controls prevent the export of American goods to China and prohibit the use of US dollars in any transactions involving Chinese Communist interests. Our regulations apply not only to US domestic firms but also to American subsidiaries abroad and to foreign firms insofar as we control resale of American goods and bank use of dollars in business involving Communist China. At your request, 2 I have reviewed these controls in order to identify restrictions which could be lifted without materially assisting the Chinese Communists, while still maintaining the basic regulatory framework. In each of the situations described below, the removal of an existing restriction would, I believe, do more to promote US foreign policy and economic interests than it would benefit the Chinese Communists. 1. Controls on Foreign Subsidiaries . We could modify or completely remove the prohibition on transactions with China that now applies to foreign corporations owned by US interests. Without altering our controls on direct US/Communist China trade or Peking’s access to US dollars, removal of this prohibition would be welcomed by friendly countries which regard our assertion of controls over the trading practices of their US-owned domestic corporations as an objectionable exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction. 2. Bunkering Restrictions . We could remove the restrictions precluding US firms from supplying petroleum products to ships owned or chartered by Communist China or any ship destined for China. As matters now stand, a Norwegian freighter bound for China cannot—without licensing approval from Washington in each case—buy oil in Singapore from an American company but must buy it from a competitor of American companies. The result, of course, is to hurt our oil companies but not in the slightest to bother the Chinese. 3. Liberalization of US Tourist Purchases . We could modify the Foreign Asset Control Regulations prohibiting purchase of Communist Chinese manufactured goods to permit American tourists abroad to purchase Chinese goods in limited quantity. We would by this step eliminate the incessant irritation and annoyance of our tourists with the Government without contributing significantly to Chinese Communist foreign exchange earnings. 4. Selective Reduction of Controlled Items . We could modify the administration of the Foreign Asset Control regulations and Export Control Act to permit a more liberal licensing policy for such items as food grains, agricultural equipment, pharmaceuticals, and chemical fertilizers. (Additionally, if desired, we could link this with a similar licensing policy for certain mainland goods which would allow for a gradual development of trade generally balancing imports and exports.) The Department from time to time has considered these and even more extensive reductions of China trade restrictions. (At the end of last year the Department recommended to the President removal of the extraterritorial controls on US subsidiaries abroad.) 3 The previously foreseen benefits from taking these steps are, I believe, still pertinent: —They remove the irritant which extraterritorial aspects of our present trade controls create in our relations with our allies, particularly those allies, like Canada, where our investment is heavy. —They indicate our desire for increased contacts and a reduction in tension with Communist China and hold open the door for further relaxation of controls if the Chinese respond positively. —They would substantially reduce an irritant to American citizens travelling abroad and simplify cumbersome and expensive administrative procedures. —They remove elements of our policy which have little or no effect on China and would put our China policy on a more rational basis before both the domestic and international publics. Although the GRC (and some of our other Asian allies) could be expected to react somewhat unhappily, the modesty of these measures would soften their impact on the GRC, and I think their reaction would be manageable. In any case, we now have, in my opinion, an important additional reason for taking these measures now. The tense relations between Russia and China make the Soviets extremely sensitive as to our attitude toward China. There is no question that our taking the proposed steps would arouse Soviet curiosity if not concern. The Russians would be reminded that they cannot take us for granted in respect to our relations with China and that we too have options in this area. It would point out to them that better relations with the US are not only in Russian long-term interest but are also a two-way street. And the Russians might thereby be encouraged to show a greater willingness to be helpful on some of the more vexing problems between us. But if we are to obtain the benefits we seek from these moves, it is important they be quickly effected, before Sino-Soviet tensions worsen. This will require fast top-level consideration and direction to preclude their being thrown into the bureaucratic arena where they will be talked and nibbled to death as has occurred in the past. Widespread discussion will also lead to leaks and the diminution of the desired impact on the USSR. Elliot L. Richardson 4 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 17. Secret. Attached to a typewritten note, dated June 21, which reads: “Henry: If we are serious about moving quickly we would need something like an NSDM from the President indicating his approval in principle on foreign policy grounds of measures along these lines. Such a directive would also call upon State, Treasury, and Commerce to work out the specific details within a certain time period and for the Department to prepare a scenario for press, congressional, and diplomatic handling. I would see that all this would be prepared immediately if the basic go-ahead could be given. ELR” Another copy of the memorandum with Richardson’s note is attached to Document 301 . 2 Not further identified. 3 Reference is presumably to Secretary Rusk’s memorandum to President Johnson, January 4, 1969; see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XXX, Document 336 and footnote 2 thereto. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 301. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 301. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 23, 1969. SUBJECT Actions to Indicate a Possible Opening Toward China You asked that I explore what could be done to indicate a possible opening toward China. I discussed this question with Elliot Richardson, who prepared the attached memorandum. 2 He recommends that: 3 1. We could modify or completely remove the prohibition on transactions with China that now applies to foreign corporations owned by U.S. interests . This would not improve Peking’s access to U.S. dollars, and would be welcomed by friendly countries which now object to our assertion of controls over the trading practices of their U.S.-owned domestic corporations. 2. We could remove the restrictions precluding U.S. firms from supplying petroleum products to ships owned or chartered by Communist China or any ship destined for China . This restriction hurts our oil companies through loss of trade far more than it bothers the Chinese. 3. We could modify the Foreign Asset Control regulations prohibiting purchase of Communist Chinese manufactured goods to permit American tourists abroad to buy a limited quantity of such goods . This would not contribute significantly to Communist China’s foreign exchange earnings and would eliminate a source of irritation to our tourists. 4. We could modify the administration of the Foreign Asset Control regulations and the Export Control Act to permit a more liberal licensing policy for agricultural goods and pharmaceuticals . This could be followed by a selective reduction of controlled items which would allow for the gradual development of trade, generally balancing imports and exports. Recommendation: I recommend approval of these proposals. If you approve, we would send out a directive indicating your approval on foreign policy grounds of these measures. Such a directive would also call upon State, Treasury and Commerce to work out specific details within a certain time period. The Undersecretaries Committee could be charged with this task. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 280, State, Volume III. Secret. Attached to a June 26 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger suggesting items for Kissinger to discuss with Richardson. Item 1 pertained to Richardson’s “proposals leading toward an opening with Communist China.” Haig attached Richardson’s June 21 memorandum and note to Kissinger ( Document 300 ) and a draft NSDM reflecting the President’s decisions, and suggested that Kissinger discuss the NSDM “with Eliot to be sure that he is in agreement with it and that it is completely responsive to your combined judgment on how to proceed from here.” Kissinger wrote at the top of Haig’s memorandum: “NSSM—[two illegible words] NSSM—a Sino Soviet split”; presumably a reference to NSSM 63, “US Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences,” July 3. 2 The President’s request has not been identified. The attachment is a copy of Document 300 . 3 The President wrote “OK” in the margin next to recommendations 1, 3, and 4. Next to recommendation 2, he wrote “no.” 4 The President initialed the Approve option and wrote below it “as amended.” 302. National Security Decision Memorandum 17 302. National Security Decision Memorandum 17 1 Washington, June 26, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce SUBJECT Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China The President has decided, on broad foreign policy grounds, to modify certain of our trade controls against China. He has decided, in principle, that we should: (1) Remove the restraints in the Foreign Assets Control regulations upon foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms on transactions with China that are regarded as non-strategic by COCOM. (2) Modify the Foreign Assets Control regulations prohibiting purchase of Communist Chinese goods to permit Americans travelling or resident abroad to purchase Chinese goods in limited quantities for non-commercial import into the U.S. (3) Modify the administration of the Foreign Assets Control regulations and Export Controls to permit general licenses for exports of food, agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizer and pharmaceuticals. (4) Follow these steps, at the earliest appropriate time, by modifying import and export controls in non-strategic goods to permit a gradual development of balanced trade. The President desires early implementation of these decisions. He has, therefore, directed that the Under Secretaries Committee supervise the preparation of the following documents, to be submitted to him by July 7, 1969. (1) Implementing regulations (to be developed by State, Commerce, and Treasury); (2) A press and diplomatic scenario (to be developed by State); (3) A scenario for Congressional consultation (to be developed by State and Treasury). The President has directed that until he decides when and how this decision is to be made public, the Secret/Sensitive classification of this project be strictly observed. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 17. Secret; Sensitive; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the JCS. A draft of NSDM 17 was attached to Document 301 . 303. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 303. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 3, 1969. SUBJECT Possible Desirability of Modifying Administration Tactics on the Export Control Act Five factors make me think that the Administration should consider modifying its tactics on the Export Control Act—from active opposition to any liberalization of the bill to passive opposition. This would essentially mean avoiding a massive campaign to defeat any amendments to the present law, including planted speeches on the Senate floor and intense lobbying with individual Congressmen, as now planned. To avoid changing the message to the Soviets, we could make it clear—perhaps when the President signed the bill—that in practice we would do no more liberalizing under a liberalized act than under the present Act. We are of course liberalizing administratively now, by moving our list of restrictions toward the list maintained by the other COCOM countries. 1. We may not be able to defeat a liberalization of the Act without major expenditures of Presidential prestige. The Committees in both houses are certain to report out liberalized bills. There are no accurate readings yet on the likely floor votes but the Senate leans toward liberalization while the House leans toward simple extension. The worst result for the President, vis-a-vis the Soviets, would seem to be a liberalized bill against which he had fought hard but lost. Domestically, much of the recent overall criticism of the President from liberal quarters is keyed explicitly to his position on the Act. Such criticism would greatly intensify if he were to wage a major battle against its liberalization. There would also be costs in terms of his position on other more important legislation such as the surcharge and the ABM. 2. We could then proceed with the NSDM 17 package of trade liberalization toward China, 2 which will be held up for at least a month if we continue to condition it on passage of the Act. (The likelihood of leaks about our plans for China, which would lead to conservative outcries which may make it difficult to move at all, become more likely as time passes.) Modification of our active opposition to liberalization of the Act would sharply reduce the apparent inconsistency which persuaded the President to postpone announcing the China package until the Act passes. 3. We would be able to prepare a more meaningful package for Romania as requested by your memorandum of June 30. 3 The same contradiction which caused postponement of the China package will affect Romania, although to a lesser extent because Romania is smaller, and less hostile to the United States, and because the Act may be passed by the time the President gets to Bucharest. 4 4. The State Department proposal on settling the gold claims problem with Czechoslovakia, which I sent you earlier this week, 5 could be broadened. One reason I recommended against inclusion of MFN treatment in the package, as proposed by State, was the blatant inconsistency with our position on the Export Control Act. The Czech element is less important than the others but not irrelevant if we sincerely wish a settlement on this issue. 5. We could proceed to reduce our control list administratively with fewer problems of apparent inconsistency with our position on the Act. Such administrative liberalization is required to implement that part of NSDM 15 6 which calls for us to move our control list toward the COCOM list. Bryce Harlow has quite rightly raised the question of whether any administrative liberalization is consistent with active opposition to legislative liberalization. 7 (I have sent you a separate memorandum for an immediate decision needed on this subject.) 8 Conclusion and Recommendations It thus seems to me that the President might (a) avoid the risk of possible significant Congressional losses, and (b) greatly increase his flexibility for dealing with a number of important foreign policy problems, by modifying his stance on the Export Control Act. I fully recognize that he wishes to avoid giving the Soviets anything at this time and that he might interpret the suggested shift as doing so to such a degree that it would override the gains just cited. It seems to me, however, that he could maintain precisely the same posture toward the Soviets by making it clear that, even if Congress forces upon him a “liberalized” Act, we would in practice do no more liberalizing than we would with a simple extension of the Act. We have argued that we can do any liberalizing we want within the present law, which is true, and this approach would simply make the same argument in the obverse way. If you think there is any merit to this analysis, I recommend that you raise the issue with the President as soon as possible so that we could: (a) soften the tone of the Administration’s testimony at the Senate hearings on the Act on July 10, (b) call off the planned campaign to aggressively oppose any amendments to the Act, and thus (c) proceed with the China and Romania packages and the administrative liberalization currently proposed by Commerce under the present Act. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bergsten and cleared by Sonnenfeldt, Halperin, and L. Grant. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: “Orig not returned from HAK’s ofc, action unknown. Houdek’s ofc.” 2 Document 302 . 3 Memorandum from Kissinger to Eliot Richardson as Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Historical Files, U/DM 14) 4 See Document 305 . 5 Memorandum from Rogers to President Nixon, June 20, 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Europe-Czechoslovakia, Vol. 1) It is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972. 6 Document 299 . 7 Possibly a reference to a June 10 memorandum from Harlow to Kissinger bringing to his attention an attached June 9 Department of Commerce memorandum from Sol Mosher to Harlow suggesting a softening of the position against liberalizing the Export Control Act. Harlow requested Kissinger’s guidance, and Kissinger wrote a note that reads: “Bryce: The President has seemed very strong on this. I cannot go back to him. But please feel free to raise it as legislative matter.” A handwritten note at the top of Harlow’s June 10 memorandum indicates Kissinger’s comment was sent to Harlow on June 14. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I) 8 Not found. 304. Editorial Note 304. Editorial Note Pursuant to NSDM 17 ( Document 302 ), Eliot Richardson, in his capacity as Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, on July 8, 1969, sent a memorandum to the President informing him that the Committee had prepared the documents to implement the NSDM. Richardson asked the President’s approval for new regulations and the strategies for Congressional, diplomatic, and press notification of the new policy. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 17) On July 10 Richardson sent a follow-up memorandum to the President recommending that he authorize implementation of NSDM 17 prior to his departure on his July 25-August 3 around-the-world trip, which included a final stop in Romania. Richardson noted that early announcement of a change in China trade controls could be helpful in getting an extension of the Export Control Act by demonstrating the flexibility the President already had in administering trade controls, obviating the need to amend the Act at that time. Richardson voiced concern that action on the Export Control Act might take another 60-90 days, a delay during which the Sino-Soviet border situation could deteriorate, the administration might lose the diplomatic benefits it was seeking, and the likelihood of press leaks would increase. Richardson was also concerned that if the announcement were delayed until after the President’s visit to Romania, it risked being tied to speculation regarding an anti-Soviet purpose to the visit that would give the China trade decision a “too overt anti-Soviet significance.” The Approve option is checked after Richardson’s recommendation to authorize implementation of NSDM 17 prior to the President’s departure and at the top of the first page is the typed note, dated August 11: “The Under Secretary’s office indicates that the President authorized implementation to recommendations related to visits to China. Decision with respect to the rest is held in abeyance. MAbramowitz to RLBrown.” (Ibid.) On July 21 Department of State Press Release No. 211 (Corrected) announced new regulations, effective July 23, to permit American tourists and residents abroad to purchase limited quantities of goods originating in Communist China. In addition, members of Congress, journalists, teachers, college and university students and scholars with postgraduate degrees, scientists and medical doctors, and representatives of the American Red Cross would be eligible for automatic validation of their passports for travel to Communist China. This liberalization of travel was reconsidered, however; Public Notice 314, September 15, stated that “U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel to, in, or through Mainland China unless specifically endorsed for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.” (Department of State Bulletin , October 27, 1969, page 362) On October 6 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green sent Under Secretary Richardson a memorandum on “Next Steps in China Policy.” The portion of Green’s memorandum concerning trade issues reads: “the President has expressed his general interest in modifying our trade policy toward Peking, privately through NSDM 17 … and publicly through our relaxation of tourist purchases of Chinese goods on July 21.” Green indicated that recommendations were being developed to modify Foreign Assets Control regulations regarding extraterritorial aspects of current trade policy toward Communist China, and possibly proposing lifting the ban on importation of Chinese antiques and objets d’art. Green also recommended that all travel restrictions should be dropped as soon as possible. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 17) Concerning Secretary Rogers’ recommendations to implement the remaining measures in NSDM 17, see Document 308 . 305. Editorial Note 305. Editorial Note Following President Nixon’s August 2-3, 1969, visit to Romania, Henry Kissinger stopped in Paris to brief French officials. During his August 4 call on President Pompidou at the ElysZe Palace, Kissinger and Pompidou discussed Asia, Vietnam, Romania, the Middle East, and Nigeria-Biafra. The section of the memorandum of conversation on Romania reads as follows: “Pompidou then asked whether we anticipated any relaxation on East-West trade, and he asked further whether there was any Nixon Administration position or principle concerning the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine. Dr. Kissinger responded that with respect to East-West trade the US wants to deal with each Eastern European country on the basis of their political acts vis-à-vis the US, i.e., we are not adopting generalized positions on East-West trade. Dr. Kissinger added with respect to the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine that the Nixon Administration is not in a position at this time to take any action because of the law which states that any nation trading with or helping North Vietnam cannot receive Most-Favored-Nation treatment. As long, therefore, as the war in Vietnam continues and the East European countries help North Vietnam, the Nixon Administration cannot take any actions with respect to the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine in Eastern Europe. He added that with respect to Romania, we have agreed to review our policy on export licenses; we have agreed to send a scientific team to Romania to improve the exchange of scientific information and personnel. We have also agreed to review the applications already made by Romania to join certain international organizations.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1023, HAK-Pompidou 8/4/69) In his August 6 Evening Report to the President, Acting Secretary Richardson reported that Senator Mondale and Congressman Findley had introduced bills authorizing the President to negotiate a commercial agreement with Romania that would provide MFN treatment to Romania in return for compensating concessions to the United States. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Box 410, President’s Evening Reading Items) 306. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 306. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 5, 1969. SUBJECT Administrative Liberalization of U.S. Export Controls Secretary Stans needs a prompt response to his request for permission to release a liberalized list of export control items. The House-Senate Conference Committee on the Export Control Act meets on Thursday. In response to your telephone request, Secretary Stans has now forwarded three alternative lists (60 items, 100 items, 135 items) (Tab B). Stans’ previous memorandum (Tab C) had agency concurrence for decontrolling the long list in implementation of the President’s NSDM 15 decision (Tab D). 2 In the present memorandum Stans states that adverse press comment and the upcoming Senate-House conference on extension of the Export Control Act make it highly desirable to release now either the 100 item or 135 item list. Commerce and Congressman Widnall believe administrative liberalization will blunt the Senate campaign to liberalize the Act. Bryce Harlow is dubious that any administrative action now will be very helpful. Foreign policy considerations vis-a-vis the Eastern Europeans do not argue for administrative liberalization. However, the new moves of the Brandt government will highlight the appearance of U.S. immobility and with the passage of time our own domestic posture will seem more rigid. From late October 1966 until July 1968 the Johnson Administration liberalized about 500 items, most of them during the early period. 3 For over a year there has been no liberalization and during that time Commerce has worked up the 135 items. By waiting until after the conference before releasing lists we would avoid the appearance of influencing the conference, but unless we delay for a long time the liberals can then claim that the new bill, which will certainly be somewhat more liberal than the current Act, forced the Administration to move. The qualitative differences among Stans’ three lists are not very large. Although the smallest list contains a large number of obviously non-strategic items (soft drink pumps, mops, flashlight batteries) it also has some more sensitive items (carbon steel ingots, alloy steel scrap, ferromolybdenum). The middle list adds other semi-sensitive items (agricultural machines, drill bits, aluminum ingots) as well as obviously non-strategic ones (multitype typewriters, insecticides). The additions making up the longest list contain the same diversity (cotton and synthetic tire cord and cattle stunners as well as trucks, meteorological balloons and non-computerized railway traffic control equipment). It would, of course, be possible to pare down the smaller list so that it is completely innocuous. I would not, however, recommend this for then the list would appear frivolous and would serve mainly as an argument for those who are trying to amend the current law and force the Administration’s hand. Commerce also needs strategy guidance in working with the conferees. Muskie and Mondale, on the Senate side are likely to push hard for the liberal Senate version. Several of the house conferees will not resist too hard unless they are promised a Presidential veto, which, I believe, would blow up the issue unnecessarily. Pro-Administration conferees, Senators Tower and Bennett and Representative Widnall, believe that some Administration compromises may help avoid the Senate version. Assistant Secretary Davis of Commerce has forwarded you a list of acceptable changes (Tab E) 4 which he wishes to propose. These are principally non-substantive though they would accept some of the Senate language. The changes would: —focus controls on goods contributing to the military potential (rather than military and economic potential) of other countries; —state that it is U.S. policy (a) to trade with countries with which we have diplomatic relations unless the President determines it against the national interest and (b) to restrict exports that contribute to the military potential of nations and would prove detrimental to the national security (eliminating much of the cold war language); —state that it is U.S. policy to use trade to further our own economy as well as to further national security. The alternatives are: —to refuse any compromise, with the possibility that the outcome may be more toward the Senate than the House version; —to accept the Commerce compromises in order to bring an outcome that is closer toward the House version. Recommendation: 1. That you agree to release of the middle list of 100 items. Approve Disapprove, prefer 135 items Disapprove, prefer 60 items Disapprove, prefer no liberalization 5 2. That future decontrol be checked with you in advance. Approve 6 Disapprove (The memorandum to Secretary Stans at Tab A4 incorporates these decisions.) 3. That Commerce be allowed to work with Administration supporters in reaching cosmetic compromises that preserve the substance of the House version. Approve 7 Disapprove 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Confidential. 2 Tabs B and C are not printed. Tab D is NSDM 15, Document 299 . 3 For documentation on the liberalization of controls on East-West trade by the Johnson administration, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. IX, Documents 181 – 195 . 4 Not printed. 5 This option is checked, and a note in the right margin reads: “orally 11/5—passed to Commerce by CFB 11/5.” 6 This option is checked. 7 This option is checked, and a date of November 5 is written below. 307. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 307. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 7, 1969. SUBJECT Export Control Act—Administration Position Defeated in Conference A House-Senate conference committee has voted out an Export Control bill which includes the key liberalizing Senate language requiring us to permit export of all items not explicitly controlled, instead of our present authority to control all items not explicitly decontrolled. (The other key provision which I discussed with you on Wednesday 2 was resolved in our favor.) This would put us under heavy pressure to decontrol a wide range of items, both because of the new legal requirement and because this provision is the main manifestation of the Senate’s liberalizing intentions. It would thus represent a signal to the Soviets of significant U.S. liberalization. The conference bill can come to the floors as early as next Wednesday. It cannot be amended on the floor. Thus, the only way to change its language is for at least one house to defeat the bill in its entirety and call for a new conference. Based on our conversation on Wednesday, I assumed that the President continues to strongly oppose any liberalization at this time. I thus held a meeting today of the relevant officials from Commerce, State and Bryce Harlow’s office. The legislative strategists agreed that the best approach was to ask Gerry Ford to send a letter to all members of the House, indicating that the Administration opposed the conference bill. With such a letter, they think there is a good chance to defeat the bill on the House floor. We could then seek changes in the key provision when it returned to conference with a good chance to prevail because of the House rejection of the Senate language. Harlow, however, now tells me that the President told him this week not to make a major effort on this issue. Harlow therefore opposes the plan described here, which would be fairly unusual in that it would seek to override a conference report. His alternative is to try to build some legislative history on the floors which would permit us to go on administering the controls as at present. The success of such an approach is dubious, however, given the long buildup to date to the contrary. An effort to defeat the bill on the House floor would thus be necessary if, contrary to Harlow’s report, the President feels strongly about avoiding any liberalization at this time. Recommendation: If the President wants to strongly oppose any liberalization of the Export Control Act, contrary to Harlow’s report, that you inform Harlow to that effect and enlist him to pursue the legislative tactics outlined above. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Limited Official Use. At the top of the page Kissinger wrote: “Let me raise tomorrow morning with Harlow. Nov 12—Also with President.” The President was in Key Biscayne and the Bahamas November 7-9, but talked with Kissinger by phone each day, and the two met daily at the White House November 10-12. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Another handwritten notation at the top of the page indicates that action was completed on December 4. 2 November 5. The discussion has not been identified. 308. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 308. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 2, 1969. SUBJECT Next Moves in China Policy I believe the time has come to proceed with the remaining measures relaxing economic controls against Communist China, which you approved in principle in June (NSDM 17), 2 as well as to consider other steps we might take toward China. —Talks between the Soviet Union and Communist China began in Peking on October 20. We do not believe that these will result in a fundamental change in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The roots of the ideological dispute will remain, together with a certain level of tension. Although the Sino-Soviet discussions have apparently not gone well thus far, we cannot exclude the possibility of at least a partial rapprochement between the Soviets and the Chinese, which might take the form of some restoration of normalcy in state-to-state relations. —Our moves may introduce an additional complicating factor into the Soviet leadership’s assessment of our intentions towards China—and towards the USSR, as well. Such an effect would also serve our long-term interest of forestalling an eventual more fundamental rapprochement between the USSR and China. —At the same time, this conjunction of Soviet agreement to negotiations both with China and with us on SALT, enables us to maintain our posture of noninvolvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Moves by us at this time in the direction of opening the door towards China a little more can hardly be the object of plausible objections by the Soviet Government when it itself is talking with the Chinese. —Notwithstanding the ups and downs in Chinese propaganda stridency in recent months, there have been signs of moderation in Peking’s foreign policy stance including—in private encounters—toward the U.S. We cannot predict that such steps as I propose would evoke a favorable response from Peking, but the chance that they might now appears to be greater than it has been for some time. Additionally, when the Chinese leadership appears to be in some disarray, we may contribute to a strengthening of those who advocate moderation and thereby continue to move towards a position where we may be able eventually to exert some influence on the Chinese Government in a direction more favorable to our own interests. —Finally, the steps I propose would serve specific U.S. interests. They would also be useful preliminaries to an attempt by us in the near future to revive bilateral discussions with the Chinese and as further signals that we are interested in continuing to move towards more normal relations. The Republic of China will object to such moves, but I do not believe this should deter us. These actions would not affect any vital security interest of Taiwan or diminish in any way our existing treaty commitments. They would be consistent with what I have told ROC leaders about our general approach towards Communist China. If you agree that we should move forward, I would contemplate undertaking the requisite Congressional consultation, preparatory to announcement of changes in regulations. Treasury concurs that all the actions described below can be taken by executive action and approves of the recommendations. Specific Recommendations I have considered the whole range of measures we might take—economic, travel, raising the level of the Warsaw talks, etc.—but at this time recommend the following moves to be implemented in two stages. 3 a. For implementation immediately: 1. Remove Foreign Asset Control (FAC) restraints on foreign subsidiaries of United States firms on transactions with China regarded as non-strategic by COCOM (approved by you in principle in NSDM 17, June 26, 1969); 2. Eliminate the present restrictions on U.S. business participation in third-country trade in presumptive Chinese goods; 3. Modify slightly your approval in June allowing the noncommercial purchase of Chinese Communist goods by Americans traveling or resident abroad by removing the $100 ceiling and the requirements that noncommercial imports from China enter the United States as accompanied baggage. In addition to their political effects on the Chinese and Russians, implementation of these measures would: —remove a substantial licensing burden on Foreign Asset Control and the general public; —relieve a number of difficult problems which our Allies have raised pertaining to United States extraterritorial controls on the activities of American subsidiaries abroad; —not make any commodities available which the Chinese cannot already purchase abroad; —contribute to the competitive strength of American business concerns overseas and respond to strong pressures from foreign branches of U.S. business concerns in several Asian countries to be allowed to compete for third-country business in goods administratively assumed to be of Chinese origin; and —satisfy the desire of tourists, collectors, museums, and universities to import Chinese products for their own account and rid us of administrative headaches. b. For implementation following the resumption of our bilateral Ambassadorial talks with the Chinese: 1. Modify the Department of Commerce export control regulations through a general license for the export of food, agricultural equipment, fertilizers and pharmaceuticals (approved by you in principle in NSDM 17, June 26, 1969). This would —provide an initial opening in the area of non-strategic direct U.S. trade with Peking; —would not enable Peking to obtain commodities they are not already able to purchase elsewhere; —would represent only a modest extension beyond the offers to sell grain and pharmaceuticals on an ad hoc basis to the Chinese made during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations; and —would open up a potential outlet for American farm products (for example, the Chinese Communists have recently expressed interest in purchasing U.S.-produced oilseeds from a large West Coast vegetable oil company through a Hong Kong intermediary). WPR 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 17. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. 2 Document 302 . 3 None of the Approve/Disapprove options is checked, but the President approved the recommendations; see footnote 4, Document 309 . On December 16 Kissinger sent Richardson a memorandum informing him of the President’s approval of the recommendations for immediate implementation. Kissinger noted that “Implementation of the three specific steps should be initiated in a low-key manner so as to minimize public speculation on the implications of these moves.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 17) 309. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 309. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 11, 1969. SUBJECT Proposal on China Policy I have worked out with Elliot Richardson the next steps you might take to further relax economic controls against Communist China. Secretary Rogers has sent over a memorandum outlining these proposals (Tab A) which are in line with NSDM 17 (Tab B). 2 The proposals are: 1. Remove Foreign Asset Control (FAC) restraints on foreign subsidiaries of United States firms on transactions with China regarded as non-strategic by COCOM (approved by you in principle in NSDM 17, June 26, 1969). 2. Eliminate the present restrictions on U.S. business participation in third-country trade in presumptive Chinese goods. (This move is intended to enable American businessmen to deal in goods which, though not of Chinese origin, are on the Chinese “presumptive” list—such as certain Hong Kong-made products.) 3. Modify slightly your approval in June allowing the non-commercial purchase of Chinese Communist goods by Americans traveling or resident abroad by removing the $100 ceiling and the requirement that non-commercial imports from China enter the United States as accompanied baggage. These measures would not make commodities available to the Communists which they cannot already purchase. The actions might lead to objections from the Republic of China, but they are clearly within our China policy as we have described it to GRC leaders, and they would not affect Taiwan’s vital security interests. Treasury concurs and believes that the actions can be taken by executive action. In view of the present situation and the recent moves made by Communist China, I believe this is a good step to take at this time in response to tomorrow’s meeting in Warsaw. The impediment which has led you to defer execution of NSDM 17 was the problem of getting the East-West Trade Act through Congress. The bill is expected to come up next week, and will probably be passed. 3 The actual promulgation of the new rules on China should not be made until that bill is disposed of, one way or another. Recommendation: That you approve the recommendations for the relaxation of certain economic controls toward Communist China, as explained above. That the actual promulgation of these changes be deferred until Congress has acted on the East-West Trade Act. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/ELR Meetings. Secret; Sensitive. Attached to a December 18 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger with items for him to discuss with Richardson on December 18. Haig’s first item was to discuss how the State Department intended to implement the President’s approval of the three steps on China trade. Kissinger indicated he did discuss this item with Richardson. 2 Documents 308 and 302 , respectively. 3 The Export Administration Act of 1969 was enacted December 23; see Document 311 . 4 The President initialed the Approve option and wrote below it: “Depending on Warsaw meeting analysis.” Below that is the handwritten date of December 15. A note by Kissinger at the top of the first page of the memorandum reads: “Al—Let’s move on this. I’ll call Richardson.” 310. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 310. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 24, 1969. SUBJECT Extension of the Export Control Act Commerce’s brinksmanship in encouraging the House to reject the Conference report on the Export Control Bill paid off yesterday, when both Houses passed a bill containing operative provisions which are less forcibly liberalizing than the earlier Conference report. (The risk was that we would get no bill at all.) The agreed bill still requires the Secretary of Commerce to review the control lists and liberalize them “in furtherance of the policy, purposes and provisions of this Act,” and the Secretary must report what he has done in about six months. However, the control regulations may provide for denial of licenses that would prove detrimental to the national security, regardless of foreign availability—although the Secretary of Commerce must report to the Congress when national security considerations do in fact override foreign availability. (There is some debate whether this provision merely means that he must report on specific license denials, or on all items which continue on the control list despite their foreign availability.) Assistant Secretary of Commerce Ken Davis, who did an excellent job as the principal legislative shepherd of the bill, put out a rosy release (attached) 2 stating that the President is gratified at the results since the bill offers the potential of broader trade with the Communist countries while still preserving Presidential prerogatives on deciding the extent and timing of liberalization. Nevertheless, this new Act means that we will be forced to allow extensive liberalization in the near future unless the President wishes to buck hard against the intent of the Congress. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I 1970. Limited Official Use. A stamped notation, dated January 12, 1970, reads: “HAK has seen.” 2 Not printed. 311. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to Secretary of State Rogers 311. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, January 2, 1970. SUBJECT New Export Control Law The Export Administration Act of 1969, which was passed on December 23, 2 contains a strong Congressional endorsement of expanded trade with Eastern Europe. It provides for the denial of exports, apart from foreign policy or short supply reasons, only when it is determined that the export would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. Foreign availability must be taken into account in denying an export application as well as in establishing the export licensing requirement. When export licenses are required on the grounds that considerations of national security override considerations of foreign availability, the reasons for doing so must be reported to Congress. The new Act drops all reference to economic potential as grounds for denying an export. Major changes embodied in the new Act are described below: Declaration of Policy The former Act stressed export control as a means of defense against the Communist threat, as seen in 1949. The new Act declares that it is the policy of the United States to “encourage trade” with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and states that exports will be controlled only to protect the domestic economy, to further the foreign policy and “to the extent necessary to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance to the national security of the United States.” Authority As in the former Act, the President has discretionary authority to regulate exports and to determine the timing of decontrol actions. In the new Act, however, the Secretary of Commerce is directed to review and make necessary revision of the United States export control list, and to make such organizational and procedural changes as required to carry out the policy set forth therein. Commerce is also directed to report to the Congress within six months on the progress made. Senator Muskie stated for purposes of legislative record on December 23 that while the conferees could not agree on an interpretation of the language changes in the Act, they envisioned an orderly transition to the new policy contained therein. He said that the Administration would have the flexibility it needs to review the control list in light of the new policy. As indicated in paragraph 1, the new Act requires that free world availability be taken into account in determining the requirement for an export license as well as in taking action on the license application. The old law did not mention foreign availability. Information to Exporters The new Act stipulates that, insofar as it is consistent with national security, exporters will be informed of the considerations causing their export license requests to be denied or to be subject to lengthy examination. This is new. Termination Date The bill approved by the Senate would have granted authority to control exports for four years. However, the compromise finally adopted grants authority for only 18 months, i.e., until June 30, 1971. The former Act was extended several times over its 20-year validity, usually for two or four year periods. Conclusion The new legislation provides the President with a legislative basis for the policy he has already approved in NSDM-15, 3 which is to bring our export control list more closely in line with the COCOM list. In total there are roughly 1800 items which require validated licenses for export to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These include 600 items on the multilateral COCOM list and 1200 items controlled unilaterally by the U.S. Of the 1200 items, there should be little difficulty in decontrolling for Eastern Europe and the USSR the 700 which do not now require licenses for export to free world countries. For most of these products there has been a presumption for approval for export to Eastern Europe, but the mere requirement of an export license constitutes an obstacle to trade. Of the remaining 500 items on the U.S. list which require export licenses for free world as well as Communist destinations, it is estimated that about 300 are available elsewhere in the free world and thus are additional candidates for decontrol under the new legislation. In sum, our target presumably should be to reduce the present 1200 items under United States unilateral export control to approximately 200. (The 600 items on the COCOM strategic list will not be directly affected by the new Act.) We are in touch with Commerce with respect to the decontrol actions to be taken in pursuance of the policy contained in the new Act and in NSDM-15. It may develop that I will want to ask you to make some suggestions to the White House concerning the extent and timing of these actions. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 15. Confidential. Drafted by W.B. Dozier (E/EWT) on December 31, 1969, and cleared by Massey (L/E), Cronk (E/ITP), and Schnee (H). Attached but not printed are excerpts from Sections 3 and 4 of the Export Administration Act of 1969, including the following language from Section 3 (1) and (2): “(1) It is the policy of the United States both (A) to encourage trade with all countries with which we have diplomatic or trading relations … and (B) to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. (2) It is the policy of the United States to use export controls (A) to the extent necessary to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of abnormal foreign demand, (B) to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States … and (C) [to protect] the national security of the United States.” 2 Signed by President Nixon on December 30, 1969. (P.L. 91-184; 83 Stat. 841) 3 Document 299 . 312. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 312. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 26, 1970. SUBJECT Economic Relations with the USSR The National Security Council in May 1969 decided that Commerce should not issue a license for the sale of a truck foundry to the Soviet Union “in view of overall U.S.-USSR relations.” 2 That decision is being cited as a probable basis for holding up approval of a $20-odd million sale to the USSR of gear making equipment by the Gleason Works of Rochester, New York. Moreover, there may be other possibilities for expanding our economic relations with the Soviets which could be affected by a literal reading of this portion of the National Security Council ruling. Meanwhile, some new factors have entered into the picture: —The Export Control Act (now the Export Administration Act) was liberalized by the Congress. 3 We are now directed to “encourage trade” rather than focus primarily on defense against the communist threat. —The Soviets are showing serious interest in some substantial purchases from the United States. a) The Gleason organization has a firm contract for the gear making machines and hopes for $75 million more in future orders. (The Soviets, by the way, have given a signed statement that the gear equipment would be used only for peaceful production.) b) Ford and Chrysler have had feelers from Soviet officials about taking part in the very large planned expansion of Soviet automobile and truck capacity. c) Cooper-Bessemer, an Ohio manufacturer of valves and compressors, has been in what appear to be serious talks with the Soviets on the development of transmission lines for natural gas from Siberia to Western Russia and Western Europe. The Cooper-Bessemer people talk in terms of an initial $50 million export sale, and there are prospects for cross-licensing of Soviet and American equipment. —Finally, in a different area of economic relations, Pan American tells us that the USSR may be interested in extending our aviation route exchange to give Aeroflot a route to our West Coast in return for a Pan American route east across the USSR to Tokyo or south to South Asia. 4 If so, it would be quite a dramatic step, since the normal high political value attached to air routes would be raised by several powers when United States and Soviet commercial aircraft begin flying across the two continental land masses. We believe that we ought to take a positive view of these prospects. There is nothing to suggest that we could in fact prevent, or even seriously impede, the Soviets from expanding truck capacity or from building a natural gas pipeline. Our producers presumably have some advantages to offer to the USSR, but there is no absence of other suppliers who would be ready to do the business. The international embargo agreement is not applicable. If we do not sell, the Soviets will find other sources readily. Moreover, I believe it is worth giving serious consideration at this juncture to the positive impact on our relations with the USSR provided by the opportunity for favorable action on these important trade transactions. I thus conclude that it is in our interest to reduce controls on our trade with the Soviet Union. Such a positive step, in line with recently expressed Congressional attitudes on East-West trade, would provide tangible benefits to our export interests at a particularly opportune moment and have a favorable impact on our relations with the USSR. It could also have the effect of easing the way for an improvement of our relations with other Eastern European countries, whose Western associations are inevitably a source of apprehension to the Soviets. Recommendation: That in light of the Export Administration Act and the prospect of improving trade relations with the Soviet Union you agree to a broader interpretation of the National Security Council decision on East-West Trade Policy (NSDM-15). 5 WPR 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 15. Secret. Drafted by R. B Wright (E/ITP/EWT) on January 12 and cleared by Dubs and Colbert (EUR/SOV), Lisle (EUR/EE), Hillenbrand (EUR), and Ambassador Beam. Attached but not printed is a January 6 memorandum from Trezise and Hillenbrand to Secretary Rogers informing him of the substance of this memorandum and recommending he find an early opportunity to discuss with the President relaxing the interpretation of NSDM 15. 2 Reference is to NSDM 15, Document 299 . 3 See Document 311 . 4 In his February 20 Evening Report to the President, Elliot Richardson reported that the Soviet Embassy had delivered an aide-memoire proposing negotiations in late March regarding landing rights in cities such as Washington, Chicago, and San Francisco, and onward flight rights across the United States to third countries. The Soviet Union offered to discuss any questions of interest to the United States “on the basis of reciprocity.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Box 410, President’s Evening Reading Items) 5 There is no indication of the President’s approval or disapproval, but a February 6 memorandum from Kissinger to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce reads: “The President has decided that he does not wish to approve the applications for export of Gleason machinery to automotive plants in the USSR.” (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 15) The issue remained active, however, and on September 28 Kissinger again reported the President’s decision in a memorandum to Secretary Stans, which reads: “The President has decided to refuse the application by the Gleason Works for licenses to export 311 gear-making machines to the Soviet Union for truck production.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71) 313. Editorial Note 313. Editorial Note On February 2, 1970, President Nixon met with Secretary Hardin, Don Paarlberg, Bryce Harlow, John Whitaker, and John Ehrlichman from 3:10 to 4:10 p.m. Henry Kissinger and Fred Bergsten joined the meeting at 3:44 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) On February 4 Bergsten sent Kissinger a memorandum for his files recording the discussion. The first item was the meat import program; see Document 424 . The portion of Bergsten’s record of the meeting that deals with P.L. 480 programs for Communist countries reads as follows (Kissinger’s memorandum and the legislation mentioned in the first sentence are not further identified): “The President indicated that he had read Dr. Kissinger’s memorandum on the subject and asked whether we could write language into the bill to provide Presidential authority to waive the present restrictions. He wished to get us into position to have something with which to bargain with the Communist countries. As a practical matter, we cannot make subsidized sales to countries trading with North Vietnam. The present prohibition will thus over-ride until that situation changes, but it certainly could change. “Dr. Kissinger indicated that there were now four restrictions on PL 480 sales to Communist countries. The President could not waive the restriction on sales to countries trading with North Vietnam. He could waive the restriction on countries trading with Cuba. He had no waiver authority on the prohibition on sales to ‘countries controlling the world Communist movement,’ which means the USSR and presumably China. He had no authority to waive the prohibition on local currency sales to Communist countries. “Dr. Kissinger thought that the restriction on sales to countries trading with Vietnam was helpful. It enabled us to blame Congress when the issue comes up, as it did with Romania. However, we might consider seeking a waiver authority on the other prohibitions: those applying to local currency sales and sales to the USSR/China. Our possessing this authority would put pressure on them to help in Vietnam and would signal that we are prepared to deal with them after the war. “The President agreed with Dr. Kissinger’s suggestions. They would give us a better bargaining position. We can tell Congress that there will be a market in those countries in the future. Dr. Kissinger agreed that they would give us an additional foreign policy tool and that we cannot get away from the restriction on Vietnam trading anyway. Secretary Hardin supported the changes. “The President repeated his strong view that the present prohibitions on trading with Communist countries are obsolete. When the Vietnam war is over, we will sell to China if they are able to buy from us. We should not anticipate a huge market but there will be something in it. (Dr. Kissinger clarified that the issue was credits and local currency sales, not dollar sales.) The President directed that waiver authority on the two provisions be included in the proposed PL 480 legislation.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 196, Agriculture, Volume I 1969-1970) 314. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Ware) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 314. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Ware) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 13, 1970. SUBJECT Export Control Guidelines We have reviewed the two memoranda on the above subject, one of which was sent to you by the Department of Commerce on 13 January and the other by the Department of State on 26 January. 2 Although there are some points on which we differ with both papers, the Department of Defense is in general accord with the views outlined by the Department of Commerce. In implementing the Export Administration Act of 1969 it is necessary to note that the language used in the Act as well as the statements of its proponents in both Senate and House are unequivocal in stating that liberalization of controls is not intended to apply to strategic items whose export would prove detrimental to the national security. The formulation in paragraphs A.1 and A.2 of Attachment A to the Department of Commerce memorandum is consistent with this aspect of the legislation and the Department of Defense therefore would support it. By contrast, while correct in observing that the new Act expressly drops “economic potential” as grounds for requiring an export license or denying an export, the Department of State memorandum is in error in equating “economic potential” with the criterion of “military-industrial capability” which the Department of Commerce proposes to continue to apply. The potential contribution of an export to the military-industrial capability of the country of destination has always been one of the tests applied to determine whether the item should be treated as strategic. The criterion of “economic potential” was introduced only in 1962 as an additional and quite distinct ground for controlling exports. Whether this criterion is or is not now discarded has no bearing on the continued use of the test of “military-industrial capability.” We also agree with the Department of Commerce that a prompt review of all presently controlled commodities is required but again we cannot accept the Department of State idea that in making this review the COCOM list be used to determine what items have significance for the national security of the United States. To place an item on the COCOM embargo list requires the unanimous consent of all the NATO nations and Japan. Given this fact and the traditional attitudes of our allies on sharing the burdens of maintaining international security, the COCOM embargo list cannot provide any reliable measure of the significance for U.S. national security of individual commodities. Indeed, the smaller COCOM embargo list is probably indicative of little more than the level of success we have achieved in negotiating these matters with our allies. With regard to the Commerce proposal on items of “emotional” or “public image” significance, we believe these are not a special category and should be dealt with in the framework of “foreign policy” reasons. Certainly the export of jet fuel, to cite one of the examples given, may need to be controlled on occasion to some destinations in terms of the diplomatic consequences which may follow its export from the U.S. As we see it, the chronic difficulty with our export control activities is that they have not been and are not now discriminating enough both as to the commodities placed under control and the countries to which controls have been applied. Accordingly, we are wholly in accord with the idea of a prompt and thorough review of the present control list, but would emphasize that a review based on superficial judgments intended to result in sweeping changes in present controls would not be in accordance with the new legislation and could be detrimental to our national security. In sum, we believe that the differences in basic views which exist between the Department of State on the one hand and the Departments of Commerce and Defense on the other are important enough to make an inter-agency discussion with you worthwhile. If the broad questions involved can be settled, we believe it will be possible to reach prompt decisions on the individual transactions mentioned in the Department of Commerce memorandum. RA Ware 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 224, DOD, Volume VI 2/l/70-4/20/70. Confidential. 2 Neither found, but see Document 315 . 315. Editorial Note 315. Editorial Note On February 6, 1970, Fred Bergsten sent Henry Kissinger a memorandum stating that the Gleason case (see Document 312 ) highlighted the need for establishing guidelines on the new Export Administration Act or “we shall again be faced with ad hoc decisions and wide interagency differences on specific cases.” He added that the Act required a review of export control lists and procedures on licensing requirements. Bergsten reported that the Commerce Department had already put forward a proposal for administering the Act, with recommendations for some relaxation of controls. The State Department position, by contrast, was that the Commerce position exceeded the President’s revised legal authority to restrict exports and desired a more liberal interpretation. The Defense Department, which did not object in principle to the Commerce proposals, wanted a more restrictive interpretation in practice and wanted to bargain with the Soviet Union for some unspecified quid pro quo when deciding on specific licensing cases. Kissinger noted on Bergsten’s memorandum that, rather than meeting with agency representatives to seek a solution, he preferred requesting the agencies to prepare a NSSM-like paper for the President setting out issues and options. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General Volume I) In a February 18 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten proposed sending a memorandum to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce requesting a paper to the President setting forth the options on 1) the extent of liberalization of the existing export control lists; 2) the standards for decisions on particular license applications; and 3) the procedures to be followed on controversial cases, including the need for referral of decisions to the White House. Kissinger wrote on Bergsten’s memorandum: “Chairman of group? (Commerce) Submit to Asst to Pres.” (Ibid.) In a February 27 memorandum Kissinger informed the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce that the President had directed the preparation of an interagency paper setting forth the options open to him under the new Act for administering export controls. Kissinger indicated the paper was to be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Commerce and should be submitted to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs by March 9. (Ibid.) A copy of Kissinger’s February 27 memorandum is attached to the following February 27 typewritten note from Executive Secretary Theodore Eliot to Secretary of State Rogers, which reads: “You will note that the attached memorandum from Henry assigns action on an important foreign economic policy matter to a working group headed by the Commerce Department and would have the working group report to Henry. This is an example of how far we will have to go if we are to put coordinating responsibility for foreign economic policy back in your hands.” (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 839, NSC/MISC) 316. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 316. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 27, 1970. SUBJECT Removal of Validated Export License Controls over Shipments of Selected Commodities to Eastern European Countries (including the USSR) In my memorandum to you of October 21, 1969, on the above subject, 2 I recommended for immediate decontrol to Eastern Europe approximately 135 items on our Commodity Control List. As you know, we have been advised on several occasions by your office to coast before proceeding. Additional review has found 81 more items (Attachment A) 3 that should be decontrolled. State, Defense, Interior, AEC, NASA, and CIA have participated in the reviews of these items, and all agree that they are of no strategic importance. The last time that the Department of Commerce announced any decontrol actions to Eastern Europe was in May 1968. Since that time, the hearings on the Export Control Act and the language of the Export Administration Act of 1969 clearly indicate that Congress wants a reduction in our controls to Eastern Europe. In addition, there are numerous public indications that the business community is eagerly awaiting decontrol actions. In response to your memorandum of February 27, 4 I have submitted to you separately recommendations of the “Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Implementation of Export Administration Act of 1969,” 5 which I chaired. There is unanimous interagency agreement that there would be no inconsistency between now decontrolling the 216 items referred to above and any future decisions made pursuant to above-mentioned broad policy review submitted March 19. Accordingly, unless you have reservations, I propose to decontrol these 216 items March 31 so that such action can be included in the First Quarter 1970 Report on Export Control by the Secretary of Commerce to the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, as required under the Export Administration Act of 1969. By such action, the Administration would be demonstrating responsiveness without compromising national security. Maurice H. Stans 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume I 1970. Secret. 2 Not found. Reference may be to Tab B to Document 306 . 3 Not printed. 4 See Document 315 . 5 Not found. 317. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 317. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, April 9, 1970. SUBJECT Export Controls—Implementation of New Export Administration Act Congress passed a new Export Administration Act late last year, which puts us under heavy pressure (a) to liberalize our present list of controlled items and (b) to set up liberalized guidelines for deciding license requests in the future. 2 Commerce has now submitted a paper, worked out with State and Defense, outlining your options for doing so (Tab A). 3 The new Act makes two basic changes in the law: 1. The old Act required export denial if the items would contribute to either the “military potential” or “economic potential” of a Communist country. The new Act eliminates “economic potential” as a criterion. However, instead of just letting “military potential” stand, it requires denial for “national security” reasons. The implication is that we should not deny on “economic potential” grounds, but neither should we deny solely on “military potential” grounds. It is thus up to us to interpret where to draw the line in between, and this is a major issue to be decided. Defense and Commerce want to control exports which contribute to “military-supporting industrial capabilities”, while State would limit controls to items which contribute “to the development, production or use of military hardware.” 2. The old Act made no reference to “consideration of foreign availability” as a criterion for determining our export controls. The new Act puts heavy emphasis on our permitting the export of items which are available in other non-Communist countries, and requires a report to Congress on any decisions to stop such items. Commerce wants to honor this mandate, while Defense argues against doing so as a general rule. Option 1: Limit the control list to COCOM items plus items which can contribute significantly to the development, production or use of military hardware by the USSR and Eastern Europe, regardless of foreign availability. Our controls would be limited to items contributing directly to Communist military potential. We would decontrol some items not directly related to military hardware, even when their lack of availability elsewhere makes our controls effective. State favors this option as an opportunity to increase trade, to reduce frictions with our allies and to avoid Congressional and Public charges of inadequate liberalization under the Act. Option 2: Would also control, beyond the Option 1 list, material contributing to the military-supporting industrial capabilities of the Communist countries when such material would NOT otherwise be readily available from other countries. This option would maintain our controls on items where we could effectively deny additions to Communist industrial power. It would not be limited to directly military items. It would decontrol items available from other non-Communist countries, however, and would thus remove certain highly visible U.S. goods from the current lists. Commerce favors this option. Option 3: Control all the foregoing, plus items which would contribute significantly to the military-supporting industrial capability of the USSR and Eastern Europe, regardless of foreign availability. This option would be the closest to our current controls. It would continue to control items well beyond those contributing directly to Communist “military potential”, and would not permit exports simply because the items were available in other non-Communist countries. (Even it would mean immediate decontrol of 216 items no longer considered strategic by any agency, with more later as the lists are reviewed.) Defense supports this option on the grounds that our general relations with the Communist countries justify no more open policy. They believe that it is consistent with the new Act. State maintains that it would be contrary to the provisions and intent of the new Act. At a minimum, it would clearly frustrate the expectations of some Congressmen and the business community that the new Act would result in broad liberalization. As a result of the new Act, there is a widespread expectation of some liberalization of our export controls, and your decisions will be judged against those expectations—not against our present control lists. Option 1 would probably be interpreted as a fairly liberal implementation of the Act. Option 3 would be regarded as more restrictive than called for by the Act, because it would restrict (a) non-military items (b) available from other countries. Option 2 would be most in line with expectations and represent the most neutral possible foreign policy signal. Recommendation: That you approve Option 2, as recommended by Commerce that our control lists for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe henceforth comprise: (a) COCOM items; (b) items which contribute significantly to their development, production, or use of military hardware regardless of foreign availability; (c) material contributing to their military-supporting industrial capability, when such material is not otherwise readily available. (This would mean immediate decontrol of 216 items deemed non-strategic by all agencies, which however would also be decontrolled under any other option.) William Timmons concurs. Approve 4 Disapprove, prefer harder Option 3 as proposed by Defense: in addition, control items contributing significantly to the military-supporting industrial capability of the USSR and Eastern Europe regardless of foreign availability Disapprove, prefer softer Option 1 as proposed by State: limit the control lists to COCOM items plus military hardware regardless of foreign availability 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Secret. Attached to an April 7 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger, on which Kissinger indicated his approval on April 9 of the Commerce Department’s recommendations on decontrolling additional items for export to Romania only, and approved the disapproval of Commerce’s recommendation for elimination of the special discriminatory category against East Germany. 2 See Document 311 . 3 See Document 316 and footnote 5 thereto. 4 The President checked this option and crossed out the other two options. The date of April 13 is stamped below the options. Ernest Johnston wrote in the margin next to the President’s approval: “Subsequently canceled by telephone call EJ. Apr 14, 1970.” See Document 318 and footnote 3 thereto. 318. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 318. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 23, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce SUBJECT Export Controls The President has made the following decisions on this subject on the basis of the several memoranda recently submitted by the Secretary of Commerce: 2 1. The list of items and data subject to control for export to the USSR and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe should henceforth be limited to: a. COCOM items b. Those non-COCOM commodities and technical data, which, in the judgment of the U.S., could contribute significantly to the development, production, or use of military hardware, or to the military-supporting industrial capability of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, to the detriment of our national security, regardless of foreign availability. 3 2. Decisions on specific cases should be made as recommended in Section H of the paper prepared by the Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Implementation of the Export Administration Act of 1969, taking into account that Option D was chosen. 4 This would permit denial in exceptional situations of items which would contribute significantly to the military-supporting industrial capability of the USSR and Eastern Europe, notwithstanding foreign availability . 3. Decisions on specific cases should take account of over-all U.S. policy toward the specific country for which the export is destined. At present, this would mean, for example, more liberal treatment for Romania than for other Eastern European states. 5 4. Validated export license controls should be removed on the 216 selected commodities to Eastern European countries including the USSR) which all agencies agree fall outside the definition of paragraph 1. 6 5. The proposed 271 commodity entries should be removed from the list for control to Romania. 6. The special controls on the export of 261 items to East Germany should be retained. 7 However, all new decontrol actions, including that of paragraph 4, should apply to East Germany as well as to all other Eastern European countries. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 15. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 2 See Document 316 . 3 This is Option 3 recommended by the Department of Defense; see Document 317 . President Nixon may have discussed the options and arrived at a decision pursuant to a luncheon meeting with Laird, Packard, Kissinger, and the JCS on April 13; a meeting with Laird, Rogers, Wheeler, and Kissinger (for part of the time) later in the day; and brief phone calls to Rogers and Laird on April 14. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 4 See Document 316 and footnote 5 thereto. 5 See footnote 1, Document 317 . 6 On April 29 Assistant Commerce Secretary Davis sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him that a routine news release on that day would announce that export controls on exports of selected U.S.-origin products to Eastern Europe were being eased. Davis noted that the decontrol announcement for two items, “other iron and steel scrap” and “trucks, truck chassis, and truck tractors,” was being delayed. In the case of iron and steel scrap, there was strong pressure to place it under short supply controls to all destinations. Regarding trucks, Davis expressed concern that decontrol at that time might give the erroneous impression that the action was a direct result of a recent visit of Henry Ford to Eastern Europe. Davis added that a separate Export Control Bulletin regarding the Romanian decontrol action was planned for the following week, pursuant to coordination underway for Congressional clearance and with the Department of State. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I 1970) 7 See footnote 1, Document 317 . 319. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 319. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, August 20, 1970. SUBJECT Export Controls: Refinery Technology for Romania and Poland Issue The Acting Secretary of Commerce has requested permission to issue export licenses for the sale of petroleum refining technology and engineering services to Romania and Poland (Tab A). 2 State and Dr. DuBridge support his proposal. Defense and Interior oppose. Romania The Romanians want a $6 million hydrocracking plant with a capacity of 33,000 barrels per day. We have approved sales of refinery technology to Romania since 1965. State and Commerce urge approval because: —After your trip, we are obliged to show special economic treatment for Romania. 3 —The new plant will not increase Romania’s jet fuel capacity by any significant amount, and will therefore not be detrimental to our national security. Dr. DuBridge agrees. Defense and Interior urge denial because: —The Romanians could produce the products they wish with more conventional and less expensive equipment. —The hydrocracker would allow them to make a fast conversion to jet fuel production in case of a war. —There is no overriding foreign policy reason for approval of the licenses. Poland Poland wants a modern catalytic cracker, worth $8 million and similar to equipment which we sold Romania in 1965. Commerce and State again urge approval: —Despite its fall from the high levels of 1956 liberalization, Poland is still more open in many respects than the other countries of Eastern Europe. —If Poland does not use our technology, she will erect the same refining capacity with less efficient Russian technology. Interior and Defense urge denial for the following reasons: —Neither Poland nor the USSR can now duplicate our catalytic cracking process, which is very efficient. —The equipment could turn out products useful to the Communists in case of war. Conclusions In the case of Romania , whatever minimal strategic costs might exist seem clearly outweighed by your commitment to economic cooperation. This case is particularly important, since we have so far not been able to do much about implementing the commitment. Denial would set back our Romanian effort significantly. In the Polish case, the national security aspects are not sufficient to justify a refusal. Our denial would not prohibit Poland from constructing equivalent capacity to turn out precisely the same products; our technology merely allows them to be more efficient. The Poles claim that the USSR is pressing to have Poland buy Soviet rather than U.S. equipment. The key is the signaling effect. The Poles have made strong pleas for approval, describing the project as an important test case in our relations. It is clear that our decision on the license will be a major signal to them on two levels: (a) U.S. interest in participating in Poland’s new industrialization plans, and (b) our attitude toward overall U.S.-Polish relations. Approval of the license would give a positive signal on both counts. Refusal of the license would be negative on both, particularly if coupled with approval for Romania. Deferral of the decision would be a middle course, which would be read as negative on (a) but leaving (b) essentially open. As long as we base our relations with Poland largely on its attitude toward Vietnam, which has not changed, I do not believe that approval is justified. They could read approval as a relaxation of our concern about their attitude on Vietnam. At the same time, our relations do not require a flat denial. I would therefore prefer to defer the decision, although in fact the Poles have informed the applicant that unless we approve by August 31 they will seek the equipment elsewhere. Bill Timmons recommends that, from a Congressional standpoint, both transactions would raise questions and that neither should be approved before the November elections. Timmons believes, however, that there would be less opposition to the Romanian than to the Polish sale. (Delaying our decisions beyond the election is not an option, because both countries have informed us that they must proceed on their refinery projects—soon whether or not with U.S. equipment.) Peter Flanigan concurs in my recommendations. Recommendations: 1. That you approve the application for export of technology and engineering services for the construction of a hydrocracking plant in Romania (endorsed by State, Commerce, and Dr. DuBridge—opposed by Defense, Interior and Bill Timmons). Approve 4 Disapprove, prefer to deny the application 2. That you defer a decision on the application for export of technology and engineering services for the construction of a catalytic cracking plant in Poland (thus satisfying Defense, Interior, and Timmons—but not State, Commerce, and Dr. DuBridge, who support approval now). Approve 5 Disapprove, prefer to deny application altogether Disapprove, prefer to approve application 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume I. Confidential. Attached to a September 2 memorandum to the Secretary of Commerce reporting the President’s decisions. 2 Not printed. Acting Secretary Siciliano’s memorandum to Kissinger is dated July 8. On August 14 Under Secretary Siciliano sent a follow-up memorandum to Kissinger with additional argumentation in support of the Poland license application. (Ibid.) 3 President traveled to Romania August 2-3, 1969. 4 The President initialed this option. 5 The President initialed this option, and below the options is the handwritten date of August 26. 320. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon 320. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 19, 1970. SUBJECT Expansion of U.S. Commercial Relations with East Europe (Including USSR) I am concerned over the rapid growth of Western Europe’s share of the Eastern Europe market. Japan, starting later, is also increasing its exports rapidly and is already ahead of the United States. Eastern Europe imported $8.5 billion from the free world in 1969. Western Europe’s share was $5.8 billion and Japan’s about $400 million. By contrast, U.S. exports were less than $250 million. This is the case despite the fact that international trade and commercial relations are usually more stable and enduring than international political relations. It should be possible for us to widen our business relationships with Eastern Europe, despite current difficulties in the broader political sphere, and by doing so strengthen the foundation for progress in political relationships. The token level of our current trade with Eastern Europe convinces me that our trade program with Eastern Europe is outdated and not serving either our political or our economic interests. An increase in our business with Eastern Europe would directly benefit our economy. Attachment I, which describes our present limitations on the shipment of automotive production equipment to the Soviet Union, illustrates the kind of benefit U.S. industry could gain if it were given access to the Soviet market. Eastern Europe’s markets are no longer negligible, even by U.S. trade standards, and promise to grow steadily. They have a strong appetite for American industrial equipment and technology. But the Western European and Japanese penetration threaten to impose a pattern which may be insurmountable in the absence of present U.S. action. I believe that the United States should now seek a more realistic share of these markets, consistent, of course, with our national security and foreign policy interests. We accordingly propose to increase our recently initiated drive to enlarge peaceful U.S. trade with East Europe and to encourage the development of joint venture arrangements between American and Eastern European enterprises, along the lines developed by the Scott mission last summer. In the process we will continue our efforts to interest American firms in more active exploration of regional markets, and to encourage the vigorous pursuit of two-way trade opportunities by American exporters and importers. We will simultaneously continue to encourage those countries to identify areas in which they would welcome investment by American manufacturers, and draw these areas to the attention of American firms which might be interested in exploring them. We also plan to raise the number of specialized missions of U.S. industry leaders to develop on-the-spot contacts with potential customers and co-venturers in the region. In cooperation with the U.S. Information Agency, we hope substantially to increase exhibits of U.S. export products through trade fairs in the region. Finally, we intend to work with the State Department to increase the availability of commercial services to U.S. businessmen at our Foreign Service posts in the region. To date these efforts have related primarily to the five countries Mr. Harold B. Scott, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce, visited (Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria). But the Soviet Union, which the group did not visit, represents a market larger than those five combined. For this reason, I believe that we should soon consider sending a group like the Scott mission to the Soviet Union to explore in a similar fashion the opportunities for increased two-way trade and the possible receptivity of the Soviet government to an increase in “joint venture” relationships with American firms. An example of the kind of opportunity now emerging is the reported interest of the U.S.S.R. in forming an international consortium to exploit the very large copper deposits in Siberia. This would reportedly involve heavy purchases of mining and transport equipment, to be offset by long-term contracts for marketing the product. In the export control field, where the Administration has wide freedom of action under present legislation, I believe we should try to put U.S. suppliers on as nearly equal a footing with their Western European and Japanese competitors as security considerations permit. As you know, Congress, in the Export Administration Act of 1969, enjoined the Administration to review and liberalize the list of controlled items, and we are making significant progress in this effort. With regard to our licensing decisions, we are for the most part giving full recognition to the availability abroad of comparable commodities, as the Act calls upon us to do. I believe that we should keep to an absolute minimum the instances in which licenses are denied even though the denial is ineffective by reason of foreign availability. Such denials frequently serve only to switch the order to other countries, or prevent the order coming to the United States. For example, after Camco of Houston was denied a license to supply $3 million of petroleum equipment to a Siberian field, the firm manufactured and shipped the equipment from the United Kingdom. Likewise, some American firms whose foreign subsidiaries hold or expect orders from Eastern Europe would like to transfer such business to their U.S. factories if a U.S. export license is granted. An illustrative case is La Salle Italia which will furnish $30.4 million in automotive equipment to the U.S.S.R. from its U.S. sources instead of from Italy, provided the U.S. issues an export license. In addition to these vigorous trade promotion and export decontrol measures, for which the Administration already has full authority, I feel I should re-emphasize the recommendations in my September 26 memorandum to you. 2 These urged early legislative action to authorize you to extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to U.S. imports from, and Export-Import Bank financial support to U.S. exports to, Eastern Europe. These measures would enable you to remove two major obstacles still impeding expanded economic relationships. Any major long-term growth in our trade with Eastern Europe depends upon their removal, notwithstanding the importance of the other efforts I have listed. Because of the political and economic importance of this matter, I urge your favorable consideration of these recommendations. Maurice H. Stans 3 Attachment I SUBJECT Impact of U.S. Export Controls on Shipments of Automotive Production Equipment for Trucks to the U.S.S.R. Problem The Department of Commerce is not authorized to issue export licenses for shipments of automotive production equipment for trucks to Soviet Russia. Denial of such licenses is not an effective instrument of policy, however, since the same equipment if denied ex U.S., will invariably be produced by the U.S. applicant in foreign countries which do allow such exports. Even if this should not occur, there are alternative sources of supply available to the Soviets from foreign competitors of the U.S. Thus, the Department’s inability to issue these export licenses results in a trade balance reduced by millions of dollars and the loss of hundreds of jobs for Americans, while the purpose of the denial is thwarted. Economic Impact The Department is currently aware of Soviet orders and negotiations for orders of American automotive production equipment and technology for use in truck building facilities valued at $81.7 million. In one case, follow-on orders could run as high as $75 million by 1975. Another firm is responding to Soviet inquiries for technical data valued at $15 million. The potential follow-on sales which could be generated by this sale are significantly higher. If the Department is unable to issue licenses for these potential exports, the U.S. firms involved have indicated their intention to fill these orders through production facilities abroad. In addition to the loss of the balance of payments impact of these sales, the United States stands to lose the jobs which these orders would create. In view of current domestic economic conditions, the U.S. firms involved would naturally prefer to use their domestic production facilities to produce for the Soviet market, but under existing policies are unable to do so. As a result, about 650 men have already been laid off, and the number is likely to grow to 1,150 by March. Recommendation The restriction on the following U.S. exports of production equipment for trucks to the U.S.S.R. should be eliminated: Cross Company of Detroit—Transfer lines for truck wheel hub and brake drum manufacture, $12 million Gleason Works of Rochester—Gearmaking equipment, $24 million LaSalle Company of Detroit—Piston manufacturing transfer line, $30.7 million Swindell-Dressler—Foundry technology, $15 million 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Confidential. Attached to a November 19 memorandum from Stans to Kissinger informing him he had given the memorandum to the President that morning and requesting a meeting. Stans, Siciliano, and Flanigan met with the President from 12:13 to 12:43 p.m. on November 19. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 2 Not found. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Stans signed the original. 4 Attachment II, which details, with case numbers, these $81.7 million of export requests and another $80.7 of requests not on Stans’ list, is not printed. 321. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 321. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, November 21, 1970. SUBJECT Improving Trade Relations with Communist Countries In response to a request by your staff, I am submitting my views on the proposals by Secretaries Rogers and Stans to liberalize East-West trade. 2 Discussion The issue of whether to propose legislation authorizing the President to extend most-favored-nation treatment and Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees to individual Communist countries has already arisen in connection with NSDM 15 (May 28, 1969), 3 the Export Expansion Act of 1969, and the Export Administration Act of 1970 [ 1969 ]. In NSDM 15 you decided that “present legislation provides an adequate basis for US trade policy toward the USSR and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe at this time, in view of the status of our overall relations with them,” and that “we should be prepared to move generously to liberalize our trade policy toward the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries whenever there is sufficient improvement in our overall relations with them.” I recognize that this important issue should be reexamined periodically. However, the first question to reexamine is whether there has been a real improvement in our overall relations with the Soviet Union and specific countries in Eastern Europe. Similarly, the concept of “equivalent benefits” to the US is the key to defining overall US objectives. Equivalent benefits need to be related to our political and national security objectives and to Soviet and Eastern European moves to liberalize their trade arrangements with us, if authority is to be requested from Congress to liberalize our trade arrangements with them. Again, to achieve “equivalent benefits” and to convince Congress that a request for discretionary authority should be granted, we need a plan that states explicitly what is to be expected of the Soviet Union and specific countries in Eastern Europe. This plan should be in the form of potential negotiating packages that link our, and their, interests and objectives with practical moves on both sides. The preconditions of negotiating should include some non-economic quid pro quos, such as a move by the Soviet Union to urge Hanoi to move toward release of US prisoners of war. The trade package itself should require the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to reduce such barriers to East-West trade as import quotas, bilateral trading arrangements, unrealistic exchange rates, inconvertible currencies, and preferential pricing. The Communist countries of Eastern Europe should move toward membership in GATT and the IMF, as some of them are already doing. They should be required to accord nondiscriminatory treatment to our exporters and the same exchange rates that we provide to Communist countries. Above all, we should take no actions that will strengthen the bilateral state-trading system of Communist countries. Rather, we should use the opportunity to negotiate new kinds of multilateral, more direct, and flexible trading arrangements acceptable to both sides. A summary of the rationale for my views on the potential effect of the State and Commerce proposals on total exports and exports of strategic commodities and technology is attached (Tab A). Recommendation I recommend that: a. In accord with NSDM 15, we first determine those cases in which there is sufficient improvement in our overall relations to warrant further liberalizations of our trade policy. b. We take no steps to request discretionary authority from Congress until we have developed a broader plan and specific negotiating packages that spell out how we propose to use it. Mel Laird Tab A IMPROVING TRADE RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES Overall Trade It is an illusion to believe that extending most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment and Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees to individual Communist countries would lead to greatly expanded trade with the US, even if potential “equivalent benefits” are extended to the US. The Communist economies, as presently organized, simply do not produce the types of commodities that will be bought in large quantity in the US. “Equivalent benefits” to the US would include a reduction of Communist barriers to trade with the US as well as nondiscriminatory treatment. They would also include a substantial modification of the rigid bilateral state-trading arrangements and convertibility of Communist currencies. The great problem is to identify specific equivalent benefits to the US and to specify what kind of new trading arrangements might be acceptable to both sides. Discrimination is the very heart of Communist trading practice, and separate terms are set not only for different countries but also for each individual transaction. An overall plan and potential negotiating packages need to be developed before discretionary authority is sought from Congress. Such a plan does not yet exist, even in the case of Romania. A request for broad authority would make sense and have a better chance for a favorable response in Congress if the aims and conditions under which it will be exercised were spelled out in advance. There are special problems involved in removing restrictions on Export-Import Bank financing. There is a firmly established policy, enacted into various laws, of prohibiting the US Government from lending or guaranteeing loans to countries with a record of (a) default of debts, (b) confiscation of property without due compensation, and (c) provision of supplies to countries engaged in hostilities with the US. Before this policy is altered, the grounds for doing so should be clearly established. Strategic Trade US general export policy toward Communist countries is to restrict trade in those goods and technologies that would significantly contribute to their military capabilities, while allowing maximum freedom of trade in peaceful goods. This policy is difficult to implement in the case of goods that can be used for both purposes. The problem in expanding trade is to find an appropriate balance of diplomatic, military, and economic interests and objectives. The quantum of exports to Communist countries (including Yugoslavia) by both the US and its allies has been rising, in part in response to Western economic growth. Japan and Western Europe are much more heavily dependent on external trade than the US, and Communist countries are their natural trading partners in many areas of commerce. As the volume of trade has expanded, controls over the export of technology have been substantially relaxed. As a consequence, the level of advanced Western technology made available to Communist countries has risen significantly. Communist countries can find much to buy in the US under the modest trade controls now in force. Their problem is to find things to sell us in exchange. The only way to achieve a rapid and sizable expansion of US exports is for us to sell on credit. In the absence of fundamental economic reforms in hostile Communist countries, we have no reason to believe that such a temporary spurt in US exports financed by loans would develop into long-term growth in genuine two-way trade. If such a policy were applied to Communist countries whose relations with us have shown few signs of improvement, the benefit would seem to accrue overwhelmingly to them. By financing some of their needed imports, we would help the present governments cope with pressing domestic economic problems and close more quickly the technological gap with the US. We could gain only if improved economic conditions in those countries caused them to improve their political relations with us. I find little in history to support the view that short-term relief of internal economic problems will lead hostile Communist powers to modify their international relations in our favor. On the contrary, it seems to me that relaxation of East-West tensions depends on liberalization of the political and economic orders of those hard-core Communist powers. Such liberalization is more likely to come from the existence of internal economic pressures than from their elimination. Whether or not additional credits are used to expand US trade with the Communist countries, the minimum requirement for national security is that effective strategic trade controls must continue to be maintained. Similarly, any request for discretionary authority from Congress to extend credits to Communist countries should identify the “equivalent benefits” to be achieved by the US. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume II 4/70-12/70. Confidential. 2 See Documents 314 – 316 . 3 Document 299 . 322. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 322. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 23, 1971. SUBJECT Steps Towards Augmentation of Travel and Trade between the People’s Republic of China and the United States You have asked for recommendations for steps to carry out your policy of increasing personal and commercial contacts between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States as a step toward improvement of relations between our two governments. After a review based on NSDM 17 2 and the current studies under way in NSSM 106, 3 the Under Secretaries Committee 4 recommends two steps to facilitate personal contacts by relaxing restrictions on travel by American and PRC citizens, as well as steps in seven areas which would provide the basis for development of more normal commercial relations. All of the recommended steps can be implemented without new legislation. I enclose a study containing a full review of the various issues and action possibilities considered by the Committee. 5 The following is a summary of our action recommendations, with appropriate page references to the full study. Travel In the field of travel, the Committee recommends removal of all passport restrictions on travel to the PRC when they expire on March 15 (Travel, Option B, page 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] ). The Department of Justice opposes this proposal [5 lines of source text not declassified] (see Annex). 6 The remainder of the Committee believe the potential gains outweigh the risks. The Secretary of State, under whose authority the passport regulations are issued, concurs in recommending that controls on the use of passports for travel to the PRC be dropped on March 15, while continuing them on travel to North Viet-Nam, North Korea, and Cuba. This would eliminate the last formal passport barrier on our part to travel by American citizens to the PRC. Because of court decisions, and in keeping with our policy since 1969 of granting exceptions to the passport restrictions on travel to the PRC for broad categories of travelers, the barrier has in any event had little practical effect. 7 Additionally, it appears to us desirable to make a public statement offering to expedite visas for groups of visitors from the People’s Republic of China to the U.S. (Travel, Step 2, page 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] ), in order to establish our willingness to facilitate on a reciprocal basis a flow of persons between the two countries. Justice opposes [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (see Annex). Trade The United States relaxed some of its controls affecting trade between the PRC and third countries in December 1969, in April 1970, and again in August l970 by a minor move on bunkering non-communist ships. The Committee believes that we should now commence relaxation of our controls on direct Sino-US trade , eventually to accord the PRC approximate parity with the Soviet Union. The closer our treatment of trade with the PRC approaches that applied to the Soviet Union, the more seriously our assertions of willingness to improve relations with the PRC will be believed, and the more likely it becomes that Peking will eventually respond favorably to our initiatives. Timing The trade steps could be accomplished separately or in a single package. The single package would probably have the most favorable effect on the PRC, while gradualism runs a greater risk of inviting scornful responses from Peking. However, implementing these measures on a steady phased basis, in an undramatic fashion, would minimize an adverse effect on Taipei in general and on our limited ability to influence the GRC on the sensitive Chirep issue in particular. In fact a first step in this process, if not too dramatic, might well be helpful in making clear to the GRC that while we are anxious to help preserve its position in the UN, our purpose of seeking improved relations with the mainland is still firm and something which it would do well to take seriously. The timing of steps beyond the initial one would depend on a number of considerations, including the climate of US-GRC relations and the evolution of our Chirep position. For these reasons the Committee makes no recommendations on precise timing after the first step. To sum up, therefore, the Committee recommends approval of all the steps described below, in deliberately spaced stages, and in an undramatic fashion, starting in the near future with authorization of direct export trade (Timing, Option A, page 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 12 ] ). The Committee is prepared to supervise the implementation of your decision with the aim of completing the program at or near the end of 1971. Exports The Committee’s objective is ultimately to place exports to the PRC on the same footing as the Soviet Union, but the Committee believes it is necessary to review experience with a more restricted level of exports before moving all the way to that goal. Specifically, therefore, the Committee recommends at this time the authorization of exports to the PRC under general license of all commodities currently under general license to the USSR except those which, after item-by-item interagency review, are deemed to be of strategic significance to the PRC (Exports, Option B, page 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] ). Imports The Committee recommends that later this year direct commercial imports from the PRC be authorized on essentially the same basis as the Soviet Union (Imports, Option A, page 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] ). It is important that this move be correlated with exports, preferably as one of the first steps subsequent to the initial export step. Aircraft Sales A gesture in the trade field which would enhance the political impact of relaxation of export and import controls would be a decision to permit the export to China of used American passenger aircraft not under COCOM restrictions (i.e. of a type which has been operating in normal civil use for more than one year), providing certain strategic equipment on board the aircraft is first removed. We have in the past approved the sale of British-made aircraft containing American-made components, after strategic equipment was removed. A large number of older American aircraft are owned by airlines which would like to sell them to get capital to buy new American aircraft—which would be much welcomed by our industry. A case in point is a proposal by Pakistan International Airlines to sell to the PRC three of its used Boeing 720B passenger aircraft, after certain strategic equipment aboard them is removed (Aircraft Sales, page 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 8 ] ). If the PRC makes a firm offer to PIA, we recommend approval. We would accord the same treatment on a case-by-case basis to proposed transactions concerning similar used passenger aircraft of American manufacture, after certain strategic equipment is removed. Currency Controls The Committee also recommends relaxation later this year of our currency controls to permit Chinese use of dollars (Currency Controls, Option A, page 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] ). This would be important in conjunction with a decision to permit direct trade, especially imports, but could also be put into effect independently. Bunkering An irritation to the PRC and to American oil companies could be removed by changing bunkering controls (including those on petroleum products of US origin) to permit fueling Chinese-owned or chartered carriers—surface as well as air—(except those bound to or from North Viet-Nam, North Korea or Cuba) as well as non-communist and Eastern European carriers bound to or from China (Bunkering, page 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10 ] ). The Committee recommends this relaxation of bunkering controls before the end of this year. (This relaxation would not affect our existing controls on entry of PRC carriers into US ports.) Trade Delegations A step in the trade field which would integrate closely with efforts to spur travel between the U.S. and the PRC would be to propose an exchange of trade delegations if circumstances warrant (e.g. a positive PRC response to our trade relaxation emerges) (Trade delegations, page 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] ). The Committee recommends that this step be authorized as a means of getting the proposal on record with the PRC. (Justice opposes; see Annex). Chinese Port Entry and Cargoes Finally, the Committee recommends adoption of two steps to permit (i) U.S. vessels to carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports and (ii) U.S.-owned foreign flag vessels to call at Chinese ports (Shipping, Options B and C, pages 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] and 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] ). We make no recommendation on amending current regulations to permit U.S. vessels and aircraft to call at Chinese ports at this time. We note, however, that a decision in the export field to permit grain sales to the PRC—a major importer of grain—would raise the question of whether to allow more favorable treatment of the PRC than the USSR by not requiring that 50 percent be shipped in American bottoms. (The Department of Commerce expects shortly to refer a case to the White House involving grain sales to the USSR which is stymied because of the cost of shipping 50 percent in American bottoms.) If we do extend the 50 percent requirement to apply to the PRC as well, we might defeat the purpose of permitting sales of grain to the PRC because of high shipping costs. Moreover, regulations would have to be amended to permit U.S. ships to call at PRC ports. We recommend these steps, not in the expectation of any substantial immediate increases in travel or trade, but because their adoption would be designed to show the genuineness of our desire to improve relations and eventually to develop significant trade. John N. Irwin II 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC-U/DM 60. Secret; Sensitive. A February 23 transmittal memorandum for this memorandum from Staff Director Hartman to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Under Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture; Deputy Attorney General; and the Special Trade Representative is ibid. 2 Document 302 . 3 NSSM 106, November 19, 1970, requested a comprehensive study of U.S.-China policy. 4 The Committee was augmented for the purpose of this study by representatives of the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Justice and Agriculture. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 Entitled “Travel and Trade With Communist China,” February 22 (NSC-U/SM 91); not printed. 6 Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst’s February 12 letter to Hartman is not printed. 7 None of the decision options in this memorandum is checked or initialed. 323. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 323. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 26, 1971. SUBJECT Stans’ Proposals for (a) Another Eastern European Trade Mission, and (b) His Own Trip to Europe and the Near East Eastern Europe Trade Mission Secretary Stans has proposed that his Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Business, Harold B. Scott, lead a U.S. trade and investment mission to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania in June 1971. (Tab B). 2 The mission would consist mainly of senior represent-atives of U.S. firms. Stans believes that the mission is justified in order to demonstrate continued U.S. government interest in expanding trade to Eastern Europe. He says that the State Department has offered planning and staffing support. Scott led a similar mission to Eastern Europe last June, 3 and he has strongly supported increased trade with the Communist European countries in a number of public statements. In fact, with the full backing of Stans, he has tread on the edge of pushing a policy line contrary to the President’s own decisions. For example, on February 4 he told a Boston business group that Commerce and State had suggested that the President seek Most-Favored-Nation treatment for Communist products; this could have been the source of Senator Brooke’s call to you on the subject. 4 Scott also told the group that the President’s decision might be revealed in the State of the World report, for which there was of course absolutely no basis in fact. And he actively agitated for opposition to the President’s policy by saying that “political awareness of the tariff problem can be heightened by agitation by the business community for even broader trade …” Stans himself has often given the same impression. In recent testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, the Journal of Commerce reported that he said that the only area in the world with potential for expanded U.S. exports was Eastern Europe—the obvious implication of which was that the business community should lobby for USG help to do so. The President told Secretary Stans orally sometime back that he would not stand in the way of increased trade with Eastern Europe—apart from the USSR. However, I do not see how our present policy could condone a second trade mission within a year, with its strong implication that we favor expanded East-West trade, particularly in view of the President’s recent decision to defer any Administration initiatives in this area. (I held Stans’ memo until the President made this decision.) 5 Secretary Stans has not specifically asked your permission for Scott to go, but Commerce will undoubtedly follow up to find out if the trade mission can proceed. You could of course let it pass or you could object in the name of the President’s policy. An objection would make it clearer to Stans that Commerce should be more restrained in its East-West trade statement. Stans’ Trip to Europe and the Near East Secretary Stans has also (Tab C) 6 asked for comments on his own planned trip in April and May to Ireland, Spain, Greece, Romania, Iran and Turkey. The only problem is the reaction he can expect in Spain if the President decides to agree with Stans on the need to increase shoe duties in response to the Tariff Commission report. 7 Nevertheless, I see no reason to discourage his trip at this time. Recommendation: That you sign the memorandum for Secretary Stans at Tab A, 8 approving his trip in April and May but suggesting a delay before another trade mission to Eastern Europe (except of course to Romania and Yugoslavia). 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. No classification marking. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt and Saunders. 2 Not found. 3 See Document 320 . 4 Not further identified. 5 Presumably a reference to the decisions in NSDM 99, Document 325 . 6 Not found. 7 See Documents 251 and 252 . 8 Document 328 . 324. Memorandum From Curtis W. Kamman of the Planning and Coordination Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 324. Memorandum From Curtis W. Kamman of the Planning and Coordination Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 1 Washington, February 26, 1971. SUBJECT USC Paper on China Trade and Travel We have received word from Mr. Packard’s staff at Defense that Mr. Packard has looked at the language of the Committee’s recommendation on exports, 2 and feels that he did not agree to identify parity with the Soviet Union even as a goal. All of the State representatives present believe Mr. Packard stated no objection to the goal, but merely to the idea that we should seek approval at this time to move all the way to the goal. The NSC Staff representatives have informally confirmed our understanding of the sense of the meeting on this point. I recommend that you call Mr. Packard to urge that the present language be left intact. The main advantage of the present formulation is that it permits steady progress toward the goal of parity without a series of new decisions by the President. The next decision by the President would not be required until the Committee reaches an impasse over whether the political gain of parity with the Soviets outweighs strategic considerations with respect to the small number of general license items still treated differently for the two countries. If Mr. Packard cannot be persuaded on this point, which we have not been able to resolve with staff-level officials at Defense, you may wish to suggest either that he register his dissent directly with the White House, or that his view be noted in a follow-on memorandum from you as chairman of the Committee. I would be glad to give you any additional oral briefing you may wish before calling Mr. Packard. The language to which Defense objects is underlined on page 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] of the attached copy of the USC study. 3 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Under Secretaries Miscellaneous Memoranda 1971-1972. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kamman on February 26. At the top of the first page is a handwritten note: “Laird lunch 3/1/71.” On March 1 Kissinger attended “Laird’s lunch on FY 73 fiscal guidance.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-76, Record of Schedule) No other record of the lunch has been found. 2 Document 322 . 3 In the attached copy of Document 322 , the language in the section on Exports beginning with “The Committee’s objective” and ending with “Specifically, therefore” is underlined by hand and set off in brackets. 325. National Security Decision Memorandum 99 325. National Security Decision Memorandum 99 1 Washington, March 1, 1971. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce SUBJECT East-West Trade In response to the recent memoranda from the Secretaries of State, Defense and Commerce on possible measures to increase U.S. trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 2 the President has decided to defer any decision on new Administration initiatives to liberalize U.S. trade policy toward the Communist countries in regard to most-favored-nation tariff treatment or Export-Import Bank transactions. The President has also decided, however, that Congressional initiatives in these areas should be opposed only in a very low key way. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 99. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the President of the Export-Import Bank, the Director of OMB, the Chairman of CEA, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, Peter Peterson, and Clark MacGregor. 2 Presumably Documents 314 – 316 and 321 . According to a January 27 memorandum from Veliotes to Irwin, Secretary Rogers had sent a memorandum to the President on October 22, 1970, recommending modifications in the U.S. posture vis-à-vis trade with Communist countries. Veliotes wrote that no response to this proposal nor to related USC initiatives on relaxation of trade controls with respect to Yugoslavia and Romania had been received. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Irwin/Kissinger Meetings 1970-1972) Rogers’ October 22, 1970, memorandum has not been found. 326. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 326. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 1, 1971. Dear Henry: I regret that I must inform you that the Memorandum and Report which the President received from the Under Secretary of State on USM-91 (Travel and Trade with Communist China) 2 was in error. Specifically, the Memorandum states that the Committee agreed that “The Committee’s objective is ultimately to place exports to the PRC on the same footing as the Soviet Union, but the Committee believes it is necessary to review experience with a more restricted level of exports before moving all the way to that goal.” The Department of Defense specifically did not agree to this. In fact, it is the stated goal of Option A which the Committee considered and rejected. It is the Defense Department’s position that the only change in our export policy should be to place individual items under general license for the PRC after interagency review to determine if they are of strategic significance to the PRC but that there should remain a significant differential in the levels of control over strategic items for PRC and the USSR because of their different levels of industrial and technological development. This step is in itself a large and important one. After a year or two of experience, the policy should then be reviewed to determine whether the US national interest could be served by taking further steps to liberalize our export policy toward the PRC. Perhaps at that time we might be in a position to decide that our ultimate goal should be to place these two communist countries on the same footing. I was under the impression that the Commerce and Justice Department’s representatives at the USC meeting of 11 February 1971 took the same position. Sincerely, Dave 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Under Secretaries Committee Miscellaneous Memoranda 1971-1972. Secret. 2 Document 322 . See also Document 324 . 327. CIEP Study Memorandum No. 2 327. CIEP Study Memorandum No. 2 1 Washington, March 13, 1971. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations SUBJECT East-West Trade National Security Decision Memorandum 99 2 recorded the President’s decision to take no policy initiatives with respect to East-West trade at this time. At the present time, there are also major questions about the magnitude and availability of such trade opportunities. Thus, the President believes it would be useful to have a more definitive understanding of the size and nature of trade and investment opportunities in the USSR and Eastern European countries and of any special commercial problems (e.g. financing) should circumstances arise in which a change in policy might be wise. I am, therefore, asking the Secretary of Commerce to designate a senior official to chair an inter-departmental working group to prepare a comprehensive factual and estimative paper on this subject by June 15, 1971. Defense should be invited to participate and perhaps, as well, such other concerned institutions as the Export-Import Bank and the Federal Reserve Board. Mr. Deane R. Hinton will be my representative in the working group. The study should, as a minimum: (1) Describe and analyze the significance of existing levels, product categories, and patterns of trade and investment between Eastern European countries, on the one hand, and the US and our major free world competitors, on the other. (2) Set forth the facts, not only as concerns the US but also, where appropriate, as far as our major allies and international agreements or understandings are involved, concerning: (a) export controls on goods and technology; (b) financial limitations on both trade and investment; (c) import restrictions—both tariffs and NTB’s; (d) shipping limitations; and (e) attitudinal limitations on the part of business, labor, and government. (3) Estimate the potential magnitude of US trade and investment in the USSR and the various Eastern European countries five years from now, assuming expansion-oriented US trade, credit, and investment policies. Peter G. Peterson 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 126, CIEP Study Memoranda. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Secretary of Defense. 2 Document 325 . 328. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Commerce Stans 328. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Commerce Stans 1 Washington, March 15, 1971. SUBJECT Proposed Visit and Trade Mission I would like to confirm our earlier telephone conversation in regard to your two recent memoranda on official travel. 2 The President fully approves your trip to Europe and the Near East during the period April 17 through May 3, 1971. He is particularly pleased at your intention to include Romania in your itinerary. There is doubt, however, about the need for a second trade and investment mission to Eastern Europe, which you raised in your earlier memorandum to me. I do not believe that the status of our relations with these countries, apart from Romania and Yugoslavia of course, justifies a second business mission within a year led by a Deputy-Assistant Secretary. It would be more consonant with the President’s policy, as just conveyed in NSDM 99, 3 to delay for some time before sending another high-level official group to that area. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. No classification marking. 2 See Document 323 . 3 Document 325 . 329. National Security Decision Memorandum 105 329. National Security Decision Memorandum 105 1 Washington, April 13, 1971. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Attorney General SUBJECT Steps Towards Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People’s Republic of China and the United States The President has reviewed the recommendations forwarded by the Under Secretaries Committee on steps to increase personal and commercial contacts between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, 2 and has directed that the following moves be undertaken: —Issuance of a public statement offering to expedite visas for groups of visitors from the People’s Republic of China to the U.S. —Relaxation of currency control to permit Chinese use of dollars. —Ending restrictions on American oil companies providing bunkers except on Chinese owned or chartered carriers bound to or from North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba. This relaxation covers ships as well as planes, but would not affect our existing controls on entry to PRC carriers into U.S. ports. —Granting permission to U.S. vessels to carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports, and for U.S.-owned foreign flag vessels to call at Chinese ports. —Commencement of a relaxation of controls on direct trade between the U.S. and China by placing individual items under general license for direct export to the PRC after item-by-item interagency review to determine if they are of strategic significance. The Under Secretaries Committee is to be charged with the responsibility of determining which items should be placed on general license, and should forward a report within 30 days requesting approval of these determinations. Upon the commencement of these limited direct exports, direct imports from China of a similar and correlated nature will be allowed. The President has also directed that the Under Secretaries Committee review and report to him after a period of four months the results of the steps taken. The report should include an assessment of the reactions to these steps by the PRC and the GRC. The President will then determine whether implementation of additional steps recommended by the Under Secretaries Committee may be warranted. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 105. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of USIA. The President made a public announcement of these decisions on April 14; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 , pp. 530-531. 2 Document 322 . 330. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 330. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, April 27, 1971. I note that the present line with regard to our China initiative is that trade with China should be on the same basis as trade with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. I realize this is our final objective. The question is whether we should consider now the timing of such announcements and whether this might not be a good move to make at an earlier time than we had anticipated for reasons that are obvious. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, HAK/RN Memos 1971. No classification marking. Attached to an April 28 memorandum from Haig which reads: “Henry: We got a barrage of these today—all of which I have initiated action on. This one leaves me wondering whether the President reads his mail. I suppose the best bet is to review for him again, in more general and brief terms, the menu of Phase II and III actions that we have on the docket and your belief that they must be carefully orchestrated and the temperature tested every step along the way as we proceed towards the ultimate goal of comparability in our trade with China and the Soviet Union.” Kissinger initialed the “Proceed this way” option on Haig’s memorandum. 331. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 331. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 1 Washington, May 13, 1971. SUBJECT Trade and Travel with the People’s Republic of China On April 13 you directed that a number of moves be taken to increase personal and commercial contacts between China and the United States. 2 I attach at Tab A this Committee’s report of the actions taken to fulfill your instructions as well as certain proposals for your decision which will complete these first steps. 3 The following is a brief summary of both the major points of decision as well as the actions already taken by appropriate agencies. U.S. Exports to China (pages 1–3 [ Pgs. 1–3 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] of report) As you requested, we have reviewed for strategic significance and prepared for your approval at Tab B a list of non-strategic items to be placed on general license for export to China. In carrying out your instructions, we have attempted to produce a meaningful list, both in trade and political terms. About 95% of the items available to the USSR under general license are on the recommended list for the PRC, and some of the remainder are still under review. Omissions include heavy construction equipment of possible military use, overly broad categories which might include items of strategic significance to the PRC, but not to the USSR, and some atomic energy-connected items. There has been some, relatively minor, disagreement between agencies as to the completeness of this list. The Committee is satisfied, however, that the list at Tab B, with or without the two additions recommended by the Department of State but objected to by the Department of Defense and placed for your decision at the end of the list, will be received as a significant first step in opening trade with China. We therefore recommend that you approve the list (Tab B) of non-strategic items to be placed on general license for export to China, indicating at Tab B your decision concerning the additional items proposed by the Department of State. 4 Special Problem of Wheat Exports (pages 3–6 [ Pgs. 3–6 include portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] ) We, except for the Department of Defense, recommend that you approve inclusion of wheat, other grains and wheat flour in the general license list. While the Department of Agriculture, in particular, feels strongly that this recommendation should be adopted, the Departments of Labor and Commerce do not concur unqualifiedly in this recommendation. The arguments pro and con on this issue appear at pages 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] through 6 of the attached report together with a space for you to indicate your decision on page 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] . Public Announcement, Continuing Review, and Liberalization of Exports (page 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] ) Once you have taken your decision we would plan to orchestrate appropriate agency and/or White House announcements in order to capitalize on and reinforce the thus far most favorable international and domestic reaction which your April 14 announcement has generated. For example, the Department of Commerce will make a public announcement in the Export Control Bulletin , and state that there will be a continuing interagency review of items to be placed under general license to the PRC, the additions to be published from time to time. In addition, agencies will operate under the assumption that if individual export licenses are requested for items not on general license to the PRC, such applications will be considered on their merits. The Department of Defense believes that the entire list of eligible non-strategic items should not be announced on the general list at one time, but should be timed over a period of several months of 50, 25, and 25 percent of the items, contingent on PRC reactions. The rest of this Committee does not agree with such a phasing of this step. Such an approach would be not only impractical and unrealistic, but quite out of keeping with your announced policy of measured but steady movement to open contacts with the PRC wherever possible. U.S. Imports from China (pages 7–11 [ Pgs. 7–11 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , and Doc. 5 ] ) You have stated that upon commencement of direct exports, direct imports from China would be allowed, of “a similar and correlated nature.” In order to emphasize U.S. interest in real, two-way trade, the Committee recommends that you announce an appropriate import regime at the same time the export list is published, making clear, of course, that we are interested in a mutually beneficial trading relationship, one that avoids damage to domestic firms and workers in both countries. We have carefully considered a large number of possible import control systems, given our concern that Chinese imports not damage in any way American manufactures, particularly in such sensitive commercial areas as textiles or shoes. After a study of such factors as historic and present Chinese trade patterns and already existing self-protection devices including non-Most-Favored-Nation treatment under the tariff, anti-dumping regulations, and the Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement, we recommend that you approve the issuance of a general license authorizing all imports (not otherwise restricted by legislation) from the PRC, coupled with an announcement that import restrictions may be imposed in the future if trade developments so dictate (page 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] of the report). The principal advantage of such a policy is that it would permit the maximum amount of trade development and would hopefully elicit the most positive political and commercial response from the PRC. We would, of course, keep a careful watch on imports and be prepared quickly to take remedial action to prevent damage to U.S. concerns. We have listed for your consideration two other options, more restricted in nature, at pages 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] and 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] of the report. Recommendation License all imports from the PRC under a general license subject to possible future dollar quota. Other Implementation Steps (pages 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] and 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] ) We have prepared regulations carrying out your instructions on the following three steps: 1) relaxation of dollar controls; 2) ending of bunkering restrictions; 3) transport of Chinese cargoes by U.S. carriers. The new regulations on these topics were announced on May 7 and no further decisions from you are required on these points. 5 With respect to travel, we feel your public statement on April 14 that “the United States is prepared to expedite visas for visitors or groups of visitors from the PRC to the United States” requires no further supplemental action at this time. 6 Further Review and Coordination (page 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5 ] ) The Committee will continue to coordinate implementation actions in this field and will, as you requested, provide you with an analysis of the results of these initial steps after a trial period of four months—that is, by mid-August 1971. John N. Irwin II 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 60B. Secret. Attached to a May 13 transmittal memorandum from Hartman to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the JCS; the Under Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture; the Deputy Attorney General; and the Special Trade Representative. 2 Document 329 . That NSDM requested a follow-up report within 4 months. On April 19 Kissinger sent NSSM 124 to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence requesting on the President’s behalf a study of “Next Steps Toward the People’s Republic of China.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 124) That NSSM made no specific reference to trade issues, but did call for a Response by May 15, 1971. 3 Neither tab is printed. 4 None of the decision options in the memorandum is checked or initialed. 5 See Department of State Bulletin , May 31, 1971, pp. 702-704. 6 See footnote 1, Document 329 . 332. Editorial Note 332. Editorial Note In mid-May 1971 a Soviet trade delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Komarov visited the United States to meet with U.S. businessmen, members of Congress, and Nixon administration officials. The delegation met with Peter Peterson in New York on May 17 and again on May 19 in Washington. A memorandum of the May 17 meeting is attached to a May 19 memorandum from Peterson to Henry Kissinger regretting any problem he may have caused with the Russians over the trade issue. Peterson thought he had concluded with the Soviets on May 17, agreeing only to give their proposals further thought and discuss them in Washington. He had been surprised to learn that the delegation was on the way to his office on May 19 and apparently even more surprised when Kissinger called to inform him Dobrynin was coming. Peterson continued: “it is an enormous overstatement to say I ‘invited’ the Russian ‘delegation’. Dobrynin’s presence without any notice is further evidence that they are trying to manufacture something much larger out of this than anything I said.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP) According to Peterson’s memorandum of the May 17 meeting, the Soviet delegation outlined the Soviet plans for the Kama River project, which would produce 600,000 trucks per year for use in agriculture and inter-city transport, not to enhance the military power of the Soviet Union. Mack Truck reportedly was interested in supplying equipment for the $1.3 billion project, $850-$900 million of which would go to purchase equipment. The Soviet Union appeared ready to make cash purchases. The Soviet delegation also outlined Soviet interest in purchasing up to $1 billion of equipment to produce non-strategic consumer goods, e.g., electric appliances, home air conditioners, coffee grinders, pencils, flatware, suitcases, etc., over a 2-3 year period. The latter apparently was a “sweetener” for the United States linked to the Kama River project, approval of which the Soviet negotiators regarded as a necessary demonstration of U.S. willingness to cooperate in the trade field. During his first meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin in February 1969, President Nixon had told Dobrynin that matters of particular sensitivity should be taken up first with Kissinger. (The White House Years, page 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 59 ] ) Particularly after the May 20, 1971, announcement of a breakthrough in the SALT talks, trade issues were among the topics discussed in that channel during the latter part of 1971. Numerous memoranda from Kissinger to the President reporting on his meetings with Dobrynin are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Boxes 491 and 492, Dobrynin/HAK 1971. On May 28 Kissinger informed the President of a May 24 meeting with Dobrynin to inform the Ambassador of U.S. relaxation of certain trade restrictions: the President’s decision to authorize the sale of a British computer for the Serpukhov physics laboratory (see Documents 373 and 374 ), the Gleason Gear contract, and the export of some machine tools. Responding to Dobrynin’s query about a decision on the more comprehensive Komarov request by the end of June, Kissinger replied that he would be able to provide an indication of the administration’s general direction by mid-July. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 491, Dobrynin/HAK 1971) On May 26 Ernest Johnston sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him that, pursuant to Kissinger’s direction, Commerce Secretary Stans was resubmitting the Gleason case to the White House along with $30-$50 million of additional export license applications for the Soviet Union. Johnston noted that Stans understood they would be approved and that he should submit additional cases. The Commerce Department reportedly also understood “that it should make no dramatic announcements when these projects are approved and there should be no public linking with any improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. If questioned Commerce will respond that these are old cases which have been reviewed on their merits.” Johnston recommended that Kissinger call Peterson to explain what he and the President were planning on export controls. (Ibid., Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71) 333. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) 333. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) 1 Washington, June 9, 1971. SUBJECT Trade with the People’s Republic of China The President has made the following decisions on the basis of your memorandum of May 13, 1971: 2 —The Department of Commerce should be prepared to release the list of non-strategic items on general license for export to China. —Wheat, other grains and wheat flour should be placed on general license for shipment to the PRC, Eastern Europe and the USSR. —Imports from the PRC should be permitted under a general license subject to possible future import restrictions in the future if trade developments so dictate. —For items not on the general list, individual export licenses should be considered on their merits. —In the course of normal interdepartmental review of further items for open general license to Eastern Europe and the USSR, the agencies may consider placing further items on the China open license list. The China items should, however, be submitted to the President for approval before public announcement. —The Under Secretaries Committee should provide by August 15 3 an analysis of the results of these initial steps along with recommendations on further measures in this field. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC Under Secretaries Committee Miscellaneous Memoranda 1971-1972. Secret. The decisions in this memorandum were announced to the public in a June 10 White House Press Release; see Department of State Bulletin , June 28, 1971, pp. 815-817. 2 Document 331 . 3 The report was finally sent to the President on January 13, 1972; see Documents 353 and 354 . 334. Information Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 334. Information Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 18, 1971. SUBJECT Your Conversation with Peter Peterson on East-West Trade, June 16 Pete Peterson has informed his staff of his conversation with you at lunch on June 16 in which you notified him that you did not wish to send to the President Peterson’s memorandum proposing a telephone call to Henry Ford on possible government considerations of the Kama River project. 2 In addition, Peterson informed his staff that you and he agreed that his small working group on East-West trade should begin preparation of a paper to put to the President specific options for a piecemeal approach to the Kama River project. Peterson has also called for consideration of an alternative approach whereby we might use U.S. approval of the Kama River project as a lever on subsequent Russian purchases from the United States. The Peterson task force will not have a draft until next week. Subsequently, the paper will need ample technical staffing by Commerce and State as well as Defense before it can go to the President. Peterson may also shortly propose to you a cable to go to Moscow in answer to the request put to Peterson in April by Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Komarov for an answer before June 25 on U.S. participation in the Kama River project. 3 That cable will merely inform the Soviets that the U.S. has not come to a decision on this issue. 4 Peterson says that you had decided to convey the same message to Ambassador Dobrynin. 5 Peterson’s task force will also have shortly a proposed memorandum from you and Peterson, as you jointly agreed previously, outlining a list of the actions which the United States could take should we wish to move on the East-West trade front. As I envision it, and Peterson’s staff is in accord, this would merely list for the President a sequence of actions for future decision on which we would ask the agencies to submit issues papers according to a timing worked out subsequently by you and Peterson. Peterson might wish the scenario memorandum to be a vehicle to forward the recent interagency study on East-West trade potential, or he might wish to send the latter separately. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Sonnenfeldt. At the top of the page Haig wrote: “Houdek—Tell Jon Huntsman again,” and Houdek wrote: “Done 6/28/71.” 2 In a June 15 memorandum to Kissinger briefing him for a June 16 lunch with Peterson, Johnston wrote: “Peterson wished to send a memorandum to the President asking permission to inform Henry Ford in advance that we may shortly reconsider American participation in the Soviet Kama River truck project. You indicated that you did not wish to do this at this time, and that future East-West trade questions should be handled by you. Peterson is sure to ask about your reaction to his memorandum.” Johnston’s memorandum continued: “You should discuss with him the timing which you anticipate on future East-West trade moves, and also get his agreement on the mechanism for submitting these issues to the President, i.e. joint memoranda or personal clearance by you of all his memoranda on this subject. Peterson believes that American commercial interests have heretofore been neglected in the East-West trade issues; and he is unlikely to welcome the idea that political considerations be governing.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP) See also footnote 6, Document 318 . 3 Komarov visited Washington in May; see Document 332 . 4 A draft message, prepared by R. B Wright (who had also participated in Peterson’s May 17 meeting with Komarov) on June 7, is attached to Johnston’s June 15 briefing paper for the Peterson luncheon. 5 In the margin next to this and the following paragraph, Kissinger wrote: “There is to be no separate Peterson communication to Soviets. Al, please make sure—The memo must go through me.” 335. Editorial Note 335. Editorial Note Peter Peterson and Ambassador Dobrynin met on June 26, 1971. A handwritten note from Peterson to Kissinger regarding the meeting reads as follows: “June 29—I saw Dobrynin Saturday nite as I am sure Al Haig consulted with you. I decided to say nothing unless he said something. At the very end of the meeting on the way out, he grabbed me rather intensely and said ‘It is very important that you (Peterson) and I get together soon so this trade deal does not blow up because of something you and I do not do.’ I said you would be calling him today and he said ‘that’s fine, but it is still very important that you (Peterson) and I meet soon.’ I said nothing.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 491, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 6, Part 1) The memorandum of Kissinger’s June 28 conversation with Dobrynin reads in part as follows: “I told Dobrynin that I would give him a preliminary reply to the Kama River Project on Wednesday evening, particularly the stages at which it could be accomplished. I told him there was no sense bringing public pressure on us and that we would appreciate it if this pressure would stop. We were moving as fast as possible.” The memorandum of conversation is attached to an undated memorandum from Kissinger to the President informing him of the meeting with Dobrynin. Regarding the Kama River project, Kissinger wrote: “I promised Dobrynin a reply on the Kama River Project in a couple of days and cautioned him not to try to pressure us.” (Ibid.) 336. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 336. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, June 30, 1971. SUBJECT Incremental Approach to the Kama River Project The Soviets plan that the Kama River Truck Project will consist of six main production shops, described in the table below. The table also indicates the degree of technological complexity of each segment as well as Mack Truck Company estimates of costs. Segments of the Project Degree of Technological Mack Truck Estimates of Complexity Cost ($ millions) Forging Plant relatively simple $20 Stamping Plant relatively simple 42 Tooling and Repair Plant Generally not complex, but needs some complex tools 20 Foundry Plant More complex 450 Assembly Plant More complex 250 Engine, gear and transmission plant Most technologically complex 600 At present three U.S. companies have filed applications for licenses and one company has indicated that it will file shortly: Mack Truck—general technical services and equipment—$750 Swindell-Dressler—Foundry design—$13.5 million C.E. Cast—Foundry equipment—$37 million (competitive with the above) Bliss—Forging shop equipment—$23.4 million (application has not yet been filed) It is possible to grant export licenses on an incremental basis, though very difficult to justify. We could for example indicate that we would now grant licenses for specific segments of the project, i.e. those of less technological complexity, but that we would consider later applications relating to the more complex elements. We could not under this approach grant the license for which the Mack Truck Company has now applied, since it covers the entire operation. We could, however, indicate to Mack that we would approve segments of its application relating to the approved parts of the project. The advantages of such an approach would be that it permits a low silhouette for the U.S., allows us to graduate the extent of U.S. participation as the public becomes accustomed, and clearly shows we will at first restrain our cooperation to the less advanced parts of the project. The disadvantages of the piecemeal approach are that: U.S. companies would be hindered from presenting bids for some segments until too late in the Russian plan; the legal national security justification for U.S. participation in one part of this massive truck factory but not in other parts would be weak; and the approach will discriminate against companies interested in the delayed segments. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 491, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 6, Part 1. Confidential. Kissinger wrote “Port Security” at the top of the page. Documentation on access of Soviet ships to American ports (and reciprocal access of American ships to Soviet ports) and security procedures to be followed when Soviet ships were in U.S. ports is ibid. 337. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 337. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Scenario for State East-West Trade Decisions For the past two years the Administration has generally, with a few exceptions, refrained from significant liberalization in our trade relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe. The exceptions have been: —A gradual but relatively unimportant decrease in our export control lists under the review procedure called for by the Export Administration Act of 1969. —A few favorable decisions in the COCOM allowing European countries to ship marginal items to Eastern Europe. —Granting of export licenses in May for the shipment of $86 million of truck manufacturing machinery, including the Gleason application. —Elimination of 50% American shipping requirement on grain sales in the context of our China policy. Now, however, there has been a gradual increase in commercial and Congressional pressure for us to take further steps. In addition over the rest of the year there may be developments in our general relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe justifying further moves. We should now examine what these moves might be and how we can prepare the technical staffing for decisions. Such preparation does not imply approval of these moves, but merely prepares the way for decisions. We already have in hand an interagency study of the trade potential involved in these measures. Because of the variety of our controls on East-West trade, we have a number of fields in which we can take action: —a decrease in the differentiation between the U.S. export controls and those of other Western countries; —a decrease in the level of the international controls; —credits for the Soviet Union; —a decrease in our discrimination against imports from the European Communist countries. This gives us a range of greater or lesser actions we could take in logical sequence. The first actions would be those of least consequence or those in which a time factor is important. As the technical staffing is completed on each of these issues, you could approve the actions, delay decisions, or disapprove the proposals. The agencies would prepare individual papers discussing the domestic, foreign and commercial issues involved in each step. The sequence is as follows: 1. Reconsideration of pending applications by U.S. companies for export licenses to sell U.S. petroleum catalytic cracking refinery plants to Eastern Europe . These are small cases, involving about $8 million, for permission to send primarily to Poland the same type of equipment which we sent to Romania in 1965. You decided to delay issuing these licenses in August 1970, 2 but the American companies claim that time is running out since the Poles can buy this equipment elsewhere. Commerce is now preparing an interagency paper for submission on this issue. 2. Consideration of whether to allow U.S. companies to participate in the Russian construction of a huge new truck factory on the Kama River . A number of U.S. companies have been approached. Henry Ford turned down the project after a negative public statement by Secretary Laird. The Mack Truck Company has pending a $700 million export license application and several other companies have made smaller applications. There are several options available on approaching this question including: —continued delay; —approval of piecemeal U.S. participation only in segments of the proposal; —approval of U.S. participation in all aspects of the proposal; —approval of U.S. participation provided the Russians agree to other commercial purchases from the U.S. Most of the equipment for this project can be obtained from Western Europe and there are no export controls hindering shipment from there. The U.S. still demands specific export licenses for this type of equipment despite the fact that other nations do not do so. The magnitude of the project, well over $1 billion, and the necessity that the Soviets decide quickly argue for your being able to make a decision on this issue shortly should you wish to do so. The agencies are preparing an options paper. 3. A general reduction in unilateral U.S. export controls down to the level prevailing in Western European countries under the International Coordinating Committee (COCOM) . The U.S. requires specific export licenses, and sometimes refuses them, on a number of items which other western countries freely ship to Eastern Europe. By reducing our controls to the international level we would place our firms on a level equal to that of Western European firms and no longer need make decisions in specific cases such as the Kama River project. In so doing we might reduce European eagerness to relax the COCOM restrictions, since they would know we could then compete. 4. Extension of Export-Import Bank loans guarantees and insurance should Congress eliminate the Fino Amendment . The Fino Amendment prohibits Export-Import Bank transactions in countries trading with North Vietnam, i.e. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Despite Administration opposition, the Senate has already passed a bill repealing the amendment and the House may follow. This would give you the discretion of allowing Export-Import Bank transactions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Should Congress pass this legislation early this summer, you would need to decide whether to exercise this discretion. (We could also drop our opposition to the legislation.) The Eastern European Governments have constantly claimed that lack of Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance and loans have inhibited our sales in those markets. 5. A relaxation of the U.S. veto on requests by other Western European countries to export items to Eastern Europe as exceptions to the international COCOM lists . Many Western European countries, as well as the United States, request COCOM to grant exceptions on specific transactions. The United States, however, is the most frequent vetoer of such requests. We could adopt a somewhat less negative posture generally and ourselves seek more exceptions for U.S. exports. 6. A reduction in the international COCOM lists . The COCOM will review its lists in October. Many Western European countries will propose that hitherto forbidden items be allowed to be exported freely to Eastern Europe. The United States will probably be the principal resister to such requests. We could decide to be less negative. In any case, the United States will need a position well before October. 7. Request for, or support of, legislation allowing most-favored-nation treatment for the Eastern European countries . Legislation now requires that we collect Smoot-Hawley tariff rates on imports from most Communist countries. Bills have been introduced in the Congress giving you discretion to reduce those rates to most-favored-nation levels in connection with reciprocal trade agreements with those countries. We oppose those bills, but you have decided that we would not oppose such legislation directed solely at Romania. We could also indicate a more favorable Administration position toward legislation affecting other Eastern European countries. 8. Proposal of legislation to repeal the Johnson Act . The Johnson Act forbids certain kinds of credits to countries which have defaulted on debts due the United States. The effect of the Act is ambiguous, since interpretations now exempt commercial export and Export-Import Bank credits from its restrictions. State is currently preparing a request for a ruling by the Attorney General that would clear up some of these ambiguities, since many businessmen see the Act as a serious obstacle to normal financial and commercial relations. Eventually, however, these ambiguities can only be totally eliminated by repeal of the Act. It may not be possible to follow this sequence completely, but it is a general indication of the order in which steps might be taken. We would not necessarily always use the same bureaucratic mechanism in presenting issues for your decisions, since some of these actions, particularly on unilateral U.S. export controls, would generally come through the Secretary of Commerce and include comments of other agencies, while other issues might be better handled through the Under Secretaries Committee or other mechanism. To avoid a leak about a massive reconsideration of U.S. policy, we propose initiating these papers over a period of time, rather than all at once. The agencies are already preparing issues papers on Steps 1 and 2; and we will shortly send them to you. We would propose initiation of an options paper on some of the next steps shortly, with the others to follow later. Recommendation: That we gradually instruct the agencies over a period of time to prepare options papers on these issues more or less in the order listed above, so that we shall be in a position for decisions should we wish to take action in this field. 3 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 491, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 6, Part 1. Confidential. The memorandum is Tab B to a June 30 memorandum from Johnston to Kissinger. Tab A is a June 30 memorandum from Hinton (acting for Peterson) to Kissinger providing talking points for Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin that evening. Hinton noted that Peterson had told Kissinger the previous day that “the object of the exercise would be to work toward a situation in which U.S. participation in the Kama River truck plant might be linked to Soviet purchase from us of consumer goods and equipment to manufacture consumer goods.” In suggested talking points Hinton pointed out that Komarov had recognized that such a linkage would help the President fend off criticism from political conservatives. In his covering memorandum, Johnston called Hinton’s talking points “excessively positive” in the absence of a firm decision and took exception to the possible linkage of Kama with additional purchases of non-strategic imports from the United States, which would hinder U.S. firms’ participation in the Kama project because they would face additional obligations not imposed on Western European competitors. Johnston noted that “such an approach would hinder the U.S. commercial opportunities, be less forthcoming with the Soviets, and would open the possibility of a comprehensive trade negotiation with the Russians, which would expose us to exceptional demands and might prove fruitless.” In a June 30 note transmitting the package to Kissinger, Haig noted that “no one was acquainted with your specific requirements as conveyed privately to Peterson” and added that he did not “see anything for your use tonight [with Dobrynin] except for the more general considerations outlined in the strategy paper at Tab B.” 2 See footnote 5, Document 319 . 3 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked. 338. Information Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 338. Information Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 1, 1971. SUBJECT Future East-West Trade Measures After the flurry and confusion last night in preparing information we needed for your conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, I fear there may be some misunderstanding between you and Peterson over what he is to do to prepare for future decisions on East-West trade relaxation. You and he have had several conversations. My sole source of information on what went on in those conversations is from Peterson’s staff. Consequently, I hope it will be helpful if I outline to you where the Peterson operation now stands on this subject. Peterson understands that you are in charge of this field. He is now considering the draft of a joint memorandum from you and him to the President which would outline a scenario of future moves. This scenario would merely list the possible actions we could take and would propose that over a period of time you and Peterson would ask the agencies to prepare separate options memoranda on each issue for submission to the President. I had hoped that Peterson would have this draft to you last week, but I presume he will send it forward now shortly. I sent a copy of it to you last night and another copy is at Tab A. 2 On the Kama River Project, Peterson believes that you agreed that Commerce is now to prepare a paper for submission to the President, incorporating the views of State and Defense and listing the precise options that we would have. These options would be as follows: —Denial of U.S. company participation or continued delay in any decision. —A piecemeal approach with several variants similar to the one I outlined in my memorandum of June 30 at Tab B. 3 Any of these piecemeal solutions would indicate some U.S. participation but not blanket acceptance of the entire proposal at this time. —A blanket approval for U.S. company participation in all aspects of the Kama River Project. —A blanket authorization for U.S. participation in the entire project provided the Russians agree to additional commercial purchases from the United States. (The Soviet Trade Delegation under Deputy Trade Minister Komarov had proposed the purchase of pencil sharpener factories, furniture factories, etc. if we agree to Kama.) 4 I am hopeful that Peterson will send a draft of the scenario memorandum to you in the next few days. Commerce will try to submit the memorandum on the Kama River Project by the end of next week. It would be difficult for them to do this earlier if they are to incorporate the views of Defense, although the Commerce draft worked out by Peterson’s ad hoc group is in fairly good shape. After Secretary Laird’s memorandum to the President on June 22, 1971, 5 I do not think that we should go to the President for a decision on this project without incorporating Laird’s views, especially since he took such a strong stand when Henry Ford was involved. I intend to continue cooperating with Peterson’s staff along the lines mentioned above, unless I hear from you that these conflict with your understanding. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71. Confidential. 2 Document 337 . 3 See footnote 1, Document 337 . 4 See Document 332 . 5 Not found. 339. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 339. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 7, 1971. SUBJECT East-West Trade—Between Western Industrialized Countries and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union Our interagency CIEP study assessing potential economic gains for the United States were we to make specified changes in our East-West trade policies is now completed. 2 CIA played an important role in developing these estimates which were agreed on, at staff level, by all agencies that participated. (Chaired by Commerce, with CIA, Defense, State, Labor, Treasury, NSC, FRB, Interior, Ex-Im Bank, Agriculture and OMB.) It is perhaps surprising that the Defense representative, who is opposed on security grounds to relaxing our restrictions on trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe, agreed. The main points made by the study follow: East-West trade in goods grew faster during the sixties than either world or U.S. trade, reaching $15 billion in 1970. 3 At less than $600 million of exports and imports, the U.S. level and share in East-West trade of about 4 percent remained relatively insignificant. Expansion of the U.S. share in East-West trade depends largely on the removal of U.S. legal and administrative restrictions consonant with overall U.S. policy goals. It is estimated that the following effects on U.S. trade by 1975 would result under varying assumptions. (1) The United States continues its present restrictions . Total annual trade of goods would reach $800 million, U.S. exports of $440 million and U.S. imports of $360 million. U.S. trade surplus of $80 million. In addition, a gain of $75 million from sales of technology but a loss of $35 million from tourism would result in a positive balance of payments of $120 million. (2) The U.S. removes the 50/50 shipping requirement on grains . U.S. exports would increase by some $62 million. (This has been done.) (3) The U.S. reduces export controls to the COCOM level . U.S. exports would increase by $260 million. (4) The U.S. removes the embargo on Soviet furs and the prohibition on the use of Federal funds for buying goods from Eastern Europe . U.S. imports of furs could rise to $50 million annually. No benefit to U.S. exports by 1975 of lifting the prohibition on the use of Federal funds; however, possible gains by the East in bidding on some U.S. Government contracts. (5) The U.S. removes the prohibitions on Government credits and credit guarantees (Ex-Im Bank) . U.S. exports would further increase by about $100 million. (6) The U.S. grants Most Favored Nation tariff treatment to all Eastern European countries . U.S. imports would increase by about $90 million. U.S. exports would grow considerably less. (7) The United States removes all unilateral restrictions on trade by the end of 1971; i.e. steps 2-6 made all at once rather than gradually . Total trade of goods would reach $1.6 billion. U.S. exports would reach $1 billion and U.S. imports some $600 million by 1975. Secretary Stans feels these numbers are conservative and the actual U.S. exports would amount to $2.5 billion. To sum up the effect on trade of goods: 1975 Present Level Restriction 1975 If U.S. removes all unilateral trade restrictions by end of 1971 (millions of dollars) Total Trade of Goods $800 1,600 Total Exports 440 1,000 Total Imports 360 600 Surplus or Balance of Trade 80 400 The attached table shows the estimated composition of this $1 billion worth of U.S. exports in 1975. (Tab I) 4 In addition, a gain of $150 million from sales of technology but a loss of $50 million from tourism would result in a total increase in U.S. exports of $950 million and a total positive U.S. balance of payments surplus of $500 million—or about four times the estimated amount under status quo conditions. Thus, for ease of remembering, you might say that more or less complete liberalization would add by 1975 about $1 billion to exports and something like $400 million to our balance of trade as compared to leaving the restrictions where they now stand. The agencies agree that the principal limitation on the overall level of East-West trade in 1975 is the ability of the Eastern countries to earn hard currency foreign exchange. It was assumed that these countries would not expand substantially their credit buying in Western countries. If this assumption is wrong, i.e., if the USSR for example, were to depart from its traditional conservative policy on credit, then total exports from the West would be very considerably higher, as would exports from the United States. You know I’m sure that [sentiment in?] the U.S. business community and the Hill is growing daily to liberalize East-West trade, and our second successive month of trade deficits is being used as another reason. As you know, I am working closely with Henry Kissinger on this whole matter, starting with the Kama River project. My input is essentially that of the economic possibilities. Henry, of course, is handling the contacts with Dobrynin and the linkage to other negotiations with the Russians. Thus, I fully understand the primacy of demonstrated progress on the other negotiations. Accordingly, I am doing what I can to restrain any premature Administration enthusiasm on this subject of East-West trade. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Confidential. Attached to a July 12 memorandum from Howe to Haig bringing to his attention this memorandum as well as two others from Peterson. On July 27 Huntsman sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him that the President had read this memorandum “with interest” and had requested that a copy be sent to Kissinger for his information. Johnston brought Peterson’s memoranda to Kissinger’s attention under cover of a July 28 memorandum. (Ibid., Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71) 2 The study was requested in Document 327 . 3 This becomes $17.2 billion if we include trade between Eastern European countries and less developed countries. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 The one-page table, disaggregated with estimates on food and tobacco ($235 million), crude materials ($150 million), mineral fuels ($50 million), chemicals ($50 million), machinery and equipment ($465 million), and miscellaneous manufactured goods ($50 million), is not printed. 340. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 340. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 13, 1971. SUBJECT Removal of Fino Amendment from Export-Import Bank Legislation Secretary Stans proposes in a memorandum of July 13 (Tab A) that the Administration indicate privately to several key Congressmen that it would accept an Export-Import Bank bill which drops the Fino Amendment. The Fino [Amendment] prohibits Export-Import Bank credits to nations trading with North Vietnam and effectively eliminates Ex-Im transactions with Eastern Europe. Senate and House conferees will meet in the next few days, probably early next week, to reconcile differences in the Export-Import Bank bill. The Senate version dropped the Fino Amendment, the House retained it. (Both versions meet the President’s goal of eliminating Ex-Im from budget constraints.) 2 Secretary Stans maintains that the only reason the House retained the Fino Amendment was because many members had the impression that the Administration was adamantly opposed to deleting it. (The record of the debate indicates a more neutral Administration position.) Bill Widnall, the House Republican conferee, told Secretary Stans that he expects the conference committee to delete Fino, and he wants an indication of how the Administration will react. NSDM 99 3 states that the Administration would oppose Congressional initiatives in the East-West trade field, though “only in a very low key way”. Subsequently you directed that Administration witnesses testify that if the amendment were dropped, over our low key opposition, the Administration would use its authority under the present circumstances only to extend credit to Romania. Stans’ suggestion is that Commerce inform Senate and House conferees as well as the House Republican leadership that the Administration would support a conference bill containing a repeal of Fino. He believes this indication can be given privately and would not contradict the earlier policy but would erase the previous misunderstanding in the House. It is not clear that any Administration action is necessary at this point. The Senate may well prevail over the House, eliminate the Fino Amendment from the conference report; and the House may accept this version. However, there is some risk in a “hands-off” approach. Secretary Stans’ proposal would probably insure repeal of the amendment, but it would also effectively constitute a reversal of the Administration policy. Timmons’ staff thinks we may need to be even clearer against Fino. I do not know your plans for a series of East-West trade moves later this year. If you do expect broad liberalizing changes, we should act now to be able to use Export-Import Bank credits in future dealings with Eastern Europe. Elimination of the Fino Amendment would preserve that option, and the Administration would then be able to extend these credits should it wish to do so. Should it wish not to do so, it would still have the power to withhold these credits. On the other hand, should the House conferees hold firm and the Senate accept retention of the amendment, then the Administration would have lost the option of including Export-Import Bank credits in a package of East-West economic measures. The basic Ex-Im legislation will be renewed at least until 1974, so that repeal of Fino would not be considered before then, except as special legislation. If you do wish to take advantage of this opportunity, I suggest that Secretary Stans’ memorandum be forwarded to the President with a concurring recommendation. Pete Peterson would also concur. However, if the President agrees, rather than leaving the matter wholly in the exuberant hands of the Department of Commerce, I would suggest that you cable the memorandum at Tab B to Secretary Stans and Clark MacGregor jointly. Recommendation: 1. That, if you expect the need for a series of East-West trade moves, you approve preparation of a memo for the President with a positive recommendation. 4 2. That if the President concurs, you send the memorandum at Tab B to Secretary Stans and Clark MacGregor. 5 Tab A Washington, July 13, 1971. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon 6 SUBJECT Removal of Fino Amendment from Export-Import Bank Legislation The Fino Amendment (1968) to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 precludes the use of Eximbank credit facilities in transactions involving exports to any country which engages in armed conflict with the United States; or to any other country which furnishes goods, supplies, military assistance or advisers to a country which engages in armed conflict with the United States. The position of the Administration, as stated in NSDM 99 and an Under Secretaries Committee Memorandum (March 1971), 7 is to oppose in low key any modification of the Fino Amendment. The Memorandum further prescribes that if the Congress should nevertheless enact a repeal, then the President would consider authorizing Eximbank credit facilities for our trade with Romania. The Interdepartmental Study for CIEP, “U.S. Stake in East-West Trade,” demonstrates the need for export credit facilities for Eastern Europe if the United States is to obtain its appropriate share of this market. 8 In April 1971 the Senate passed, by 66-1, a bill which, among other provisions, would repeal the Fino Amendment. The House Banking Committee in June 1971 reported out a bill similar to the Senate version. However, when the bill was considered on the House Floor, Representative Chalmers P. Wylie (R-Ohio) proposed an amendment to preserve the Fino Amendment, and this was adopted on July 8 by a vote of 207 to 153. Indications are that the Wylie Amendment was passed because it was believed that the Administration was adamantly opposed to the removal of the Fino Amendment. The House and Senate bills now go to Conference shortly, but possibly Wednesday, July 14. The Commerce Department’s testimony on the House bill is in accord with NSDM 99, and its legislative comments on both House and Senate bills mildly opposed removal of the Fino Amendment. Assistant Secretary of State Trezise’s testimony on the House bill reflected in addition the Under Secretaries Memorandum which indicated the possibility of extending credit facilities for our trade with Romania. Eximbank President Kearns testified that his agency did not make policy and had no position on the Fino Amendment. Subject to White House agreement, Commerce proposes discussions with the Senate and House Conferees and the House Republican leadership, to give assurances that the Administration would support the Conference bill if the Fino repeal is included. Commerce believes that given the early misunderstanding in the House and the importance of retaining for the President the option of extending Eximbank credit to Communist Countries at his discretion, this action is not only desirable but also, given its low key and private nature, does not contradict earlier policy as set forth in NSDM 99. Henry Kearns, President of Eximbank, concurs with this recommendation. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume II 1971. Confidential. At the top of the page, a note by Kissinger reads: “Why can’t we do nothing”; another by Haig reads: “Ernie call me.” Kissinger arrived in San Clemente the morning of July 13 from a trip to Asia and Paris that had included a trip to Peking. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 2 Congress approved the Export-Import Bank bill without the Fino Amendment, and President Nixon signed it into law on August 17, 1971. (P.L. 92-126; 85 Stat. 345) 3 Document 325 . 4 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked. 5 Not found. 6 No classification marking. Copies were sent to Ehrlichman, Peterson, and Kearns. 7 Presumably a reference to a March 10 memorandum from Staff Director Arthur Hartman to members of the Under Secretaries Committee regarding U.S. economic relations with Romania. Hartman reported the President’s decisions with respect to a December 15, 1970, memorandum from Acting Chairman Samuels. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 14B) The first of the President’s decisions is the substance of NSDM 99. The second was that if the Fino Amendment were repealed over Nixon administration opposition, administration witnesses should testify that Romania was the only country currently covered by the amendment to which Export-Import Bank loans would be extended at that time. Finally, the Commerce Department was instructed to set up a new export control category for Romania to accord it the same status as Yugoslavia on exports of U.S. goods. (Ibid., NSC-U/DM 14A) 8 See Document 339 . 341. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 341. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 19, 1971. SUBJECT Economic Items for Use in Dobrynin Discussions At San Clemente you asked for alternative piecemeal approaches that might be used in your meeting today with Dobrynin. 2 1. Kama River I have pressed very hard again to find a separable item and I think the best possibility we have come up with is the Foundry portion (see Tab A). 3 It is a reasonably discrete element of the total Kama River project. One could argue whether a decision on our part to authorize participation of a foundry is similarly discrete in the minds of U.S. business. In other words, U.S. businessmen would probably have trouble understanding why the foundry was cleared but nothing else. It may be that we should even consider at some point saying that it is mixed in with other non-economic considerations and we don’t therefore expect it to make economic sense. I am presuming the Russians know the linkage in any event. We now have three foundry applications that have an aggregate value of $175 million but there is undoubtedly redundancy here. Thus, in actual practice if all three were accepted, we would probably find the total volume significantly less than this. Even so, if this kind of number bothers you, you can always try getting some Russian purchases of consumer goods and consumer goods manufacturing equipment. You will remember the argument to them might be that anything that appears to U.S. critics to result in a diminution in defense effort (as consumer goods spending might) helps assuage concerns of segments of U.S. public who might feel the Kama River project by itself has too much potential defense content. In case you have any time for more reading, I show in Tab B the current status of the Kama River inter-agency draft you and I agreed we should try to get done soon, including Defense. Also, included is the latest Mack Truck wire to the Soviets which went out Friday indicating the particular questions they have but keeping it open (Tab C). 2. Control Data Computer The other significant pending application is by Control Data Corporation for a Model 6400 computer (quite advanced) for the Institute of High Energy Physics at Yerevan. This involves COCOM clearance and if you decided to go ahead with it, I would assume you would want to impose the same kind of safeguards we imposed on the British on their recent computer deal with Russia (ICL computers). 4 Also, you should know that this is not too far along in the inter-agency process but I suppose this could be speeded up. This strikes me, Henry, as the kind of item you could offer (a) if you were looking for something quite symbolic in the aftermath of the China move, and/or (b) something you could talk about conditionally (i.e. it would take time for example to work out safeguards) in the event you wanted something positive with stalling potential if later it did not seem appropriate. I have talked to Ed David about this and he has written a very brief memo in Tab D that summarizes the situation. Please read it and note he emphasizes inspection safeguards are required but, on balance, he feels it is a reasonable possibility. 3. Petroleum-Hydro-Cracker Technology While we have no specific applications on this, we do know there has been general Soviet interest in U.S. technology in this field in the past. On your desk somewhere, you will probably find a letter for your signature to the President on similar technology to Poland. It might even fit your negotiating plans to offer this to the Russians at the same time or even first, indicating you did not want to appear to be discriminating in favor of the Poles. The difference here, of course, is that the Poles have expressed very specific interest in this technology (to me directly and to Dr. Edward David) whereas the Russian interest has been more general. Thus, its leverage potential with the Russians is conjectural. I hope one or more of these is helpful to you. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 492, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 7, Part 2. Top Secret. 2 Kissinger was in San Clemente July 13-18 and returned to Washington with the President. He met with Dobrynin on July 19; in his July 27 memorandum to the President reporting on the conversation, Kissinger noted that he informed Dobrynin that “we might be able to do the foundry part of the Kama River Project ($175 million worth).” (Ibid.) 3 None of the tabs is printed. 4 See Documents 332 , 373 , and 374 . 342. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 342. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, July 23, 1971. SUBJECT Your Meeting with Secretary Stans at 9:45 a.m. Secretary Stans has asked to speak with you for ten minutes. I am not sure what he wishes to raise, but he may wish to talk about: The Fino Amendment Stans wrote to the President on July 13 asking that he be allowed to inform key Senate and House conferees that the President would soften his already low-key opposition to elimination of the Fino Amendment from the Export-Import Bank Bill. 2 (The Fino Amendment forbids Ex-Im credits to countries trading with North Vietnam.) You correctly foresaw that no Administration change was necessary, but we have not responded to Stans’ memorandum. The conferees voted yesterday to eliminate the amendment. This should answer Stans’ question, but he may still feel that the Administration needs to soften its position to avoid having the House restore the amendment on the floor. He would argue that we now have the opportunity to restore Presidential flexibility with little chance of public exposure. Ex-Im Bank legislation will not come up for consideration again for another four or five years. You might state that you do not wish the Administration to take any action that the Soviets would recognize and interpret as a change of signals on the Vietnam war or in our general relations. The Kama River Project Stans wants the Administration to approve U.S. industrial participation in the Soviet construction of a huge truck factory, the Kama River truck factory. Stans is preparing an options paper to go to the President, but Defense is holding the paper up by not sending him its comments. The Soviets have notified the U.S. firms that the previous June 25 deadline for U.S. Government approval has been extended to July 25. There is no chance that the President will make a decision by that time. Stans may wish to ask that we inform the Russians that they should not hold fast to any deadline since we are still considering the project actively. You might tell Stans that we have so far not found that the Russians have been very serious about these deadlines, particularly on a project so important as Kama River. Though you may not wish to tell Stans any of the details of your conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin, 3 you could tell Stans that the Soviets are perfectly aware that we are still examining the project. In addition, their bargaining leverage has somewhat diminished now that Mack Truck has told them that it wishes to renegotiate the terms of its contract. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume II 1971. Limited Official Use. 2 Tab A to Document 340 . 3 See Document 332 . 343. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 343. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Kama River Project—Applications to Participate in the Foundry Secretary Stans has proposed that you authorize him to approve now three pending applications for U.S. participation in the foundry plant of the Soviet Kama River truck factory (Tab A). 2 The Kama River factory is expected to produce 150,000 three-axle diesel trucks annually by the late 1970s. CIA states that three-axle trucks are not tactical military vehicles, though some could end up in military motor pools. CIA estimates that the Russian expenditures on the entire Kama River project will approximate $3 billion, much of which however will be used to erect factory buildings, workers’ housing, etc. CIA estimates that perhaps $1 billion of the total will be used to procure foreign machinery and technology, of which $200 million might be spent in the United States if we granted blanket permission for U.S. participation. The CIA analysis is at Tab B. 3 The Kama complex will consist of six discrete elements: 1. Foundry plant 2. Forging plant 3. Stamping and pressing plant 4. Engine, gear and transmission plant 5. Assembly plant 6. Tooling and repairing plant Commerce now holds four formal U.S. export applications. The application by Mack Trucks, Inc., of Allentown, Pennsylvania, for $750 million of technical services and equipment is not active, since Mack is re-negotiating its arrangement with Russia. In any case, Secretary Stans doubts that the Mack Truck application is a realistic estimate of what the Soviets would procure from that company. The other three applications are for technology and equipment for only the foundry, one of the first phases of the Kama complex. Stans estimates that the total Russian expenditure on the foundry will be $450 million, only a fraction of which would come from the U.S. The three applications are by: —The Swindell/Dressler Company for $13.5 million of technical services. The company claims it has a firm offer from the Soviets, and it expects a follow-on order for $20 million of equipment. Swindell/Dressler is at Pittsburgh. —The C.E. Cast Division of Combustion Engineering, Inc. for $37 million of automatic molding equipment and core making machines. The Cast Division is at Pittsburgh but Combustion Engineering has plants in Mass., N.J., Texas, Conn., N.Y., Ohio, Kansas, Illinois, Florida, R.I. and Oklahoma. —The Jervis B. Webb Company for $125 million of conveyors and other foundry equipment. Webb is at Detroit, but it also has plants at Avon Lake, Ohio, Cohasset, Mass., and Boyne City, Michigan. These applications are all partially competitive with each other, and consequently if approved would result in exports of less than their total combined value. The applications have been pending for some time. Secretary Stans argues that even if we are not ready to approve U.S. participation in all aspects of the Kama River Project, we should go ahead with these now before the Soviets go elsewhere. I agree with Secretary Stans. The companies have already been unable to meet two deadlines given by the Russians. Though any approval of U.S. participation will be seen as a major signal by the Russians, we can reduce the effect of this if we indicate that we are only approving three specific licenses at this time but are not now giving approval for U.S. participation in all aspects of the project. To keep this matter firmly under the control of the White House I plan to ask Secretary Stans to submit all future Kama applications for your consideration. Recommendation: That you approve Secretary Stans’ request to authorize issuance of the three pending licenses: Swindell/Dressler for $13.5 million, C. E. Cast for $37 million and Jervis B. Webb for $125 million. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Confidential. This memorandum is part of Tab A to Document 345 . Tab A also includes other memoranda concerning the Mack Truck application: July 27, 28, and 29 memoranda from Johnston to Haig and a draft memorandum from Kissinger to Stans (prepared by Johnston) that is substantively the same as Document 346 . 2 In his July 26 memorandum to Kissinger, not printed, Stans noted that it supplemented his July 23 memorandum to the President, which has not been found. 3 Not found. 4 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked. 344. Editorial Note 344. Editorial Note Henry Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on July 29, 1971, in the White House. The memorandum of conversation reads in part: “I opened the meeting by informing Dobrynin of the decisions with respect to the foundry for the Kama River Project. I told him that the decision had been favorable and amounted to about $170 million. Dobrynin asked what that meant for the rest of the Kama River Project, and I replied that we needed another four to six weeks to make up our mind. Dobrynin then said, in the usual ungenerous Soviet way, that he hoped we realized the foundry had already been taken for granted in Moscow. I said that that was their problem; my problem was to inform them of the decisions we had made, and considering that it was a unilateral American gesture for which we didn’t ask reciprocity, it didn’t make any difference whether it had been taken for granted or not. Dobrynin then changed tack and rather effusively thanked us for the very positive steps that had been taken on trade since the SALT agreement.” Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of his July 29 conversation to the President under cover of an August 9 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 492, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 7, Part 2) 345. Action Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 345. Action Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 3, 1971. SUBJECT Your Luncheon Meeting with Peterson—Additional Items We have been advised that Peterson may wish to discuss with you: —The Kama River Project —East-West Trade —Japan 1. Kama River You have a memorandum for the President on the subject (copy attached at Tab A). 2 Secretary Stans has proposed that the President authorize approval of three pending applications for participation in the Foundry Plant in addition to the application of Mack Trucks for participation in the Production Facility. Mack Trucks has informed Commerce that it hopes the US Government will give early favorable consideration to its application ($750 million technical services and equipment). The other three applications for participation in the foundry are: —The Swindell/Dressler Company for $13.5 million of technical services. The company claims it has a firm offer from the Soviets, and it expects a follow-on order for $20 million of equipment. Swindell/Dressler is at Pittsburgh. —The C.E. Cast Division of Combustion Engineering, Inc. for $37 million of automatic molding equipment and core making machines. The Cast Division is at Pittsburgh but Combustion Engineering has plants in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Texas, Connecticut, New York, Ohio, Kansas, Illinois, Florida, Rhode Island and Oklahoma. —The Jervis B. Webb Company for $125 million of conveyors and other foundry equipment. Webb is at Detroit, but it also has plants at Avon Lake, Ohio, Cohasset, Mass., and Boyne City, Michigan. These applications are all partially competitive with each other, and consequently if approved would result in exports of less than their total combined value. If we approve the three licenses for the foundry and not for Mack Truck we will have a public relations problem of “divisional company treatment.” The question is how much can we go ahead and authorize in terms of its effect as a “signal” to the Russians? 2. East-West Trade Peterson may propose asking Commerce to prepare a paper on this subject concerning bringing our unilateral control list down to the international COCOM levels. A talker on this subject is at Tab B. 3 [Omitted here is section 3 with two paragraphs on Japan. The first deals with textiles and possible complications flowing from the China initiative. The second pertains to the August 6 SRG meeting on Japan.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 218, CIEP. Secret. 2 See Document 343 and footnote 1 thereto. 3 Not printed. The paper at Tab B is based on Document 337 and concludes with a long paragraph on COCOM parity and COCOM lists. 346. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Commerce Stans 346. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Commerce Stans 1 Washington, August 5, 1971. The President has decided that you should grant the three pending applications by U.S. firms for participation in the construction of the Kama River truck foundry: Swindell-Dressler for $13.5 million; C.E. Cast for $37 million; and Jervis B. Webb for $125 million. Announcement of the approvals should be made in the usual routine fashion without special fanfare. Questions may be asked on why we have not approved the Mack Truck application, or whether approval of these three foundry licenses signifies blanket government approval of U.S. participation in all aspects of the Kama River project. Government spokesmen should respond that today’s decision does not signify blanket approval of U.S. participation. The decision was made after considering the national security and commercial aspects of each detailed application. Future applications will be considered on the same detailed basis. We have not yet reached a decision on the Mack Truck application, which involves a broader participation in the Kama River project than the three foundry applications approved today. Future U.S. applications for participation in the Kama River proj-ect, including the foundry plant, should be referred to the White House. 2 Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Defense. A typewritten note at the bottom of the page indicates the memorandum was sent to the outside recipients on August 5 and that copies went to Davis, Kennedy, Hormats, and Sonnenfeldt at the NSC. 2 In the July 28 draft of this memorandum by Johnston (see footnote 1, Document 343 ), this read “President” instead of “White House.” In his July 28 memorandum to Haig transmitting his draft, Johnston wrote: “By asking that the President approve each application, we are not just adopting a piecemeal approach but an individual company approach. As soon as our general relations with the USSR allow us to adopt some more abstract definition of our participation, i.e., the foundry, we should do so to reduce the awkwardness of having the President decide on specific firms in particular locations.” 347. Editorial Note 347. Editorial Note Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met with President Nixon in the Oval Office from 3 to 4:30 p.m. on September 29, 1971. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State Rogers and Henry Kissinger; Gromyko by Ambassador Dobrynin. During their discussion the principals touched on trade-related matters. During his opening discussion of bilateral relations, Gromyko said there were certain signs, some barely discernible, that bilateral economic ties were developing favorably. Gromyko said the position of the U.S. Government in this regard was not clear to the Soviet side, and requested the President’s comments on the subject, “being aware, Mr. Gromyko hoped, of its full significance for the relations between our two countries.” In his reply the President said: “With reference to trade, the Foreign Minister would recall that last year the President had said this was an area where there were great possibilities for progress. Just this week he had approved the $200 million Kama River project, a sum that brought the total up to $400 million. It was his view that trade was in the interests of both our countries and when we made efforts to expand it, we were really acting in our own selfish interest. American businessmen were interested in greater trade between us and indeed, this was an area where reduced tensions between us would pay the greatest dividends. It was something the Soviet side wanted and so did we. The Minister would find us receptive to any initiative in this respect.” As the meeting concluded, Gromyko returned to economic relations, noted the President’s remarks, and said he “wanted to propose that the President send some representative he considers appropriate to Moscow for the purpose of exchanging views on this subject.” The President said he had this in mind; there were several officials who wanted to go and he would have to select the right person. The President concluded by saying that one of the obstacles to expanding trade was the war in Southeast Asia, which was winding down. “As it ended, some of the technical and political objections to expanded trade with the Soviet Union which were being raised in this country would be removed. Once the war ended, all sorts of doors would be opened. He did not expect Mr. Gromyko to comment at this time, but wanted him to know the U.S. position.” The 12-page memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 492, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 7, Part 1. Henry Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on October 4 at 3 p.m. in the White House Map Room. His memorandum of the conversation reads in part: “Dobrynin remarked that the Soviet Union was very eager to start the trade negotiations that Gromyko had mentioned to the President. I said we had not yet decided whether to send Secretary Stans or Peter Peterson, but in any event we would send somebody with a very wide charter and with a constructive attitude. It was not clear, however, what the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss. Dobrynin said the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss all the issues, that is, long-range economic policy including possibly Most-Favored-Nation status, and it was prepared to settle some of the outstanding American claims including some going back to World War II. I said we would be in touch with the Soviet Union by the end of October.” (Ibid.) 348. Editorial Note 348. Editorial Note Pursuant to the President’s September 29, 1971, meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko (see Document 347 ), Secretary of Commerce Stans traveled to the Soviet Union in late November 1971, to discuss trade-related matters with Soviet officials. He stopped in Stockholm en route to Moscow and in Warsaw during his return travel to Washington. In preparation for Stans’ trip, on November 11 Helmut Sonnenfeldt sent Henry Kissinger a memorandum regarding Kissinger’s scheduled meeting with Stans the next day, and on November 15 Kissinger sent the President a shorter version and talking points for his meeting with Stans that day. Both Sonnenfeldt’s and Kissinger’s memoranda noted that the purpose of Stans’ visit was to explore the expansion of commercial relations but not to make specific commitments. Concerning Stans’ desire to have approval of pending export license applications related to the Kama River project before departing for the Soviet Union, Sonnenfeldt called Kissinger’s attention to the fact that the Defense Department and the AEC were not objecting to approval. Sonnenfeldt also commented on Stans’ desire to carry Presidential letters to the heads of state in the countries he would visit. Letters for Stans’ visits were prepared, and in his November 15 memorandum to the President, Kissinger characterized the letter to Kosygin as “warm and positive.” Letters for Stans’ visits to Moscow and Warsaw were signed by the President. A letter for Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme was not approved, and the talking point Kissinger provided the President for Stans’ Stockholm stopover noted that “he should avoid political subjects and confine any public statements strictly to economic relations.” The talking point for Warsaw noted: “He can hold out prospect of gradually improving economic relations; Romania should stay well ahead of Poland in our initiatives.” Both memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume II 1971. The President met with Stans, Secretary Rogers, and Alexander Haig from 5:20 to 5:55 p.m. on November 15. The meeting included a brief photo opportunity. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A transcript of a tape recording of this meeting is scheduled publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Moscow Summit, 1971-1972. On November 15 Kissinger sent Stans a memorandum regarding export license applications for the Kama River project. Kissinger indicated that the President had approved the Commerce recommendations, subject to the conditions governing the actual export. Kissinger reminded Stans that for foreign policy reasons future export license applications for the Kama River project should continue to be referred to the White House. (Ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume II 1971) 349. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 349. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, November 20, 1971, 1330Z. 8649. Stansto 05. Department pass to White House, Dept pass Commerce. Subject: Secretary Stans’ meeting with Kosygin, November 20. 1. Major development in full, friendly three-hour twenty minute talk with Kosygin latter expressed strong desire for greatly enlarged commercial relations with US and made expected pleas for end of US “discrimination” against USSR in economic matters. 2 He avoided other contentious matters. No specific political matter mentioned. 2. Stressing that Stans’ visit should leave “notable trace” for President’s visit, Kosygin proposed exchange of aide-memoires in which two sides would envisage setting up four expert working groups to consider elements of a new economic relationship. 3 These would draw up arrangements and propositions in 3 and 4 months which might be signed before or at Summit and announced at that time. Aide-memoires, Kosygin twice stressed, would not imply legal or legislative commitments. 3. Experts would deal with (1) General legal/legislative issues such as MFN. (2) Various financial issues. (3) “Pure trade,” i.e. all commodities other than “equipment,” which presents more complex problems. (Kosygin subsequently clarified that “equipment” also included in trade.) (4) General economic ties such as joint development of Soviet natural resources and major manufacturing projects, also schemes involving third country marketing. 4. Kosygin suggested experts could meet in Soviet Union and US and he himself prepared to meet them from time to time to help move matters along and same might be done on US side. 5. Stans indicated interest but reserved specific response pending further discussions with Patolichev. Indicated desire to work with Patolichev on aide-memoire idea and go as far as we able to at this time. 6. Kosygin later suggested adding experts group on science and technology. 7. Rest of discussion ranged widely over economic issues. Specific item of interest was Kosygin’s reference to Soviet interest in five-year agreement to buy 2-3 million tons of corn per year provided credit available. Also suggested possibility of immediate order for synthetic leather technology. 8. Stans noted interrelationship between progress in political and economic relations and need for US public opinion to be sympathetic to improved economic relations. Kosygin said political relations should be even better by time of Summit. On basis of own experience he thought most political and business circles in US now oppose tensions and confrontations, though some probably will always exist who advocate tension. Kosygin spoke warmly of President’s letter and forthcoming meeting with him. 4 9. Full report follows. 5 Beam 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 153, Morning Summaries, August 25-December 31, 1971. Secret; Exdis. 2 During Kissinger’s dinner conversation with Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy on November 18, the two briefly discussed Stans’ visit. Dobrynin asked if there were any possibility for most-favored-nation treatment. Kissinger replied that MFN might be possible if the May 1972 Summit proved successful. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Box 492, Dobrynin/HAK 1971, Volume 8) 3 In his briefing memorandum for Kissinger’s November 12 meeting with Stans (see Document 348 ), Sonnefeldt suggested that if the Soviets wanted a final communiquZ Kissinger should not object to a general one, but that in keeping with the nature of the visit there should be no effort to develop agreed language on specific issues. 4 On November 20 A. Denis Clift sent Kissinger a memorandum bringing this telegram to his attention and recommending he send an information memorandum to the President that summarized its contents, which he attached. Kissinger signed the memorandum to the President on November 22 and it bears a handwritten notation that it was seen by the President. On Clift’s November 20 memorandum Kissinger wrote: “Instruct Stans to reserve final decisions to Washington.” Pursuant to that instruction, on November 22 Clift sent a memorandum marked “Very Urgent Action” to Haig recommending he send a message to the State Department for transmission to the Embassy in Moscow. On November 26 Haig sent the Department the following message from Kissinger to Stans requesting it be sent to Moscow in response to telegram 8649: “The report of your conversation with Chairman Kosygin has been reviewed by the President with appreciation. As to specifics of program outlined by Kosygin and other proposals Soviets may make during course of your visit, President prefers to reserve final decisions until after you have returned to Washington. He wishes to review substantive findings of your mission in their entirety.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971) 5 Not found. 350. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 350. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, November 25, 1971, 2010Z. 6231. Stansto 14. Dept pass White House and Commerce. Subject: Secy Stans presentation re status of talks as of November 25 at a meeting with Patolichev. Sec Stans summarized his understandings of the Soviet position to Min Patolichev as follows: 1. The Soviet want (A) credit for imports (B) MFN for exports. 2. Question of export controls is for unilateral action by the US and we are moving as rapidly as possible to reduce lists. 3. Soviets want to buy wide range of goods from US if there is credit, including (A) a long list of equipment and technology items supplied by the Ministry of Petroleum and Petrochemicals, and (B) the purchase of two to three million tons of corn a year for 5 years, as mentioned by Kosygin. 4. Soviets want US participation in financing of major projects involving (A) natural resources and (B) manufacturing plants. Natural resources could involve credit for equipment plus long-term contracts. In regard to manufacturing plants, the US would supply equipment, technology, etc., with Soviet payment in products or through credit. 5. Soviet State Committee on Science and Technology is interested in licensing arrangements to acquire US technology and in joint research on scientific and technological matters. 6. Soviet Gov’t is willing to extend credits for sales to the US on reciprocal terms. 7. The Soviets would like to have all relative elements put together in a formal economic agreement. Sec Stans then stated the United States position as follows: 8. There is no reason for participatory investment transactions to be delayed pending government action since they involve private parties. But USG will attempt to interest US firms to do this as soon as Stans returns to Washington. After the first one or two transactions a negotiation pattern will develop that will make later transactions simpler. 9. All Soviet views presented during talks so far are closely interconnected. They all turn on non-discrimination and reciprocity. Consequently instead of the four or five working groups proposed by Kosygin Stans would propose one working group which could from time-to-time be subdivided to deal with various topics. 10. The kinds of discussion concerning science and technology would probably be quite different from trade matters. Consequently it would be desirable later to have a separate group on science and technology. 11. The Soviets should understand that some of the matters under consideration could be worked out directly between the US Commerce Dept and Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry. Others, however, require action by the President or by Congress and this will involve different time frames. 12. An important part of ultimate arrangements is to find ways in the Soviet Union to accommodate the needs of American firms for facilities such as offices, living quarters, communications and travel. 13. In time there could be a reciprocal understanding to create a Soviet bank in the US and perhaps one or more US banks in the Soviet Union to facilitate trade arrangements. 14. Other subjects to be explored from time-to-time could include reduction of travel restriction and resolution of shipping problems such as loading and unloading ships. 15. As part of the elimination of obstacles to trade it will be important to resume negotiations on Lend-Lease. This is essential step in order that US public and Congress will accept the major initiatives we want to pursue. 16. As time goes on we could discuss other cooperative matters and ways of avoiding future differences of opinion in economic matters and consider setting up means for arbitration of disputes. 17. On the basis of the foregoing points Stans intends next Tuesday to present to Patolichev letter or memo reciting above information and proposing creation at this time of a joint working group between Dept of Commerce and Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. This group would deal with trade and investment matters within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce. After his return to Washington Stans would consult with the President and also with other agencies on those matters that fall within their responsibilities and competence, e.g., finance/credit and MFN. 18. Stans concluded presentation by stating that the foregoing followed Kosygin’s suggestions to the extent that Stans has authority at this time while other matters would be brought up upon his return to Washington. 19. Patolichev agreed with Stans’ presentation of the Soviet position and expressed his understanding of the United States position. He said he would be pleased to accept a memorandum along these lines. Beam 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce Volume II 1971. Secret; Priority; Limdis. The copy of the telegram printed here incorrectly identifies it as telegram 6231; the copy in the Department of State files identifies it as telegram 8778. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/STANS) 351. Information Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 351. Information Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 29, 1971. SUBJECT Stans’ Soviet Trip This is a brief account of the way in which Stans’ response to Kosygin’s proposal for the establishment of working groups evolved. It is a good example of what happens to American negotiators under the pressure of atmosphere, the need to be successful and domestic considerations. After Kosygin had first advanced his proposal that the Stans trip leave a “concrete trace” by an exchange of aides-memoires which would set up four working groups to develop “propositions and arrangements” in time for the May summit, 2 I slipped Stans a note with my suggested response. This said that Stans should say (a) Kosygin’s proposal was positive and interesting, and (b) Stans would discuss it with the President upon his return and there would then be a response. When Stans spoke next, he said that Kosygin’s proposal was in the spirit of the mission but that he would like to think about it and delay a response until there had been a chance to explore the detailed implications with Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev the following week. (I felt this was tactically a better line than I had suggested.) Kosygin then hit Stans twice more with his proposal, stressing that the exchange of notes would not in any way constitute a commitment to take legally binding actions. He added as an “afterthought” that there might be a fifth group on science and technology. With a psychological subtlety which he has employed in the past (notably with Harriman in 1965), Kosygin interspersed his pitches with rapid-fire changes of pace of a personal character (how the Russians brew tea in samovars—he would give Stans one as a present—how glorious the climate of Georgia is; how strenuous Stans’ trip must have been; would Stans like to be the first American to sit on the floor of the Supreme Soviet when Kosygin spoke the following Wednesday; incidentally, Kosygin would be seeing 300 Americans from Business International Tuesday after next and tell them exactly what he told Stans). When Stans next spoke he said that he could agree to the idea of exchanging some document at the end of his mission and that he would work with Patolichev as far as he could on setting up the follow-on working groups. At lunch afterwards at Spaso (bugged) just before Stans took off for Leningrad, I told him that we should take the utmost care not to hem in the President on MFN and EXIM credits since these were exclusively in the President’s domain as far as any initiatives were concerned and that Stans should concentrate in Moscow on exploring all the practical problems of increased trade, irrespective of how the mission would be concluded. When Stans got back from his weekend in Leningrad we talked alone in a secure room. I said his objective should be to reassure the Soviets that we were seriously interested in improving trade relations and that they could be sure that after he returned to Washington he would report fully to the President so that we could then move forward in a constructive way. He indicated that he was thinking in terms of offering follow-on activities for which he, as Secretary of Commerce, already had a Charter while leaving other issues to Presidential determination. He also said that he was thinking of writing a personal letter to Patolichev at the end giving his understanding of what had been discussed. I said as long as this was personal and made no operational commitments it might be a good way to finesse the Kosygin proposal for an exchange of notes. The meeting with Patolichev that day was confined to discussion of practical problems. At the next meeting with Patolichev, 3 Stans then made a very orderly presentation reviewing the whole course of the mission up to that point. But he went beyond his script in saying that (a) he would write a letter, (b) that he could agree to a single follow-on group between his Department and the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry to deal with matters within Commerce’s jurisdiction. He also mentioned incidentally that we would be gradually removing the remainder of the items on the export control list (except for purely military items) and that US EXIM credits were not excluded at some point. (He based this last on what he said the President told him before he left. I was not present at that meeting but Al Haig was. 4 Scott had earlier told a group of Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Ministers that the more contracts the Soviets offered American business the greater would be the pressure on the President to move on EXIM credits and this was what we all wanted.) Patolichev said that Stans’ proposal was reasonable, that the Soviets would like to see a draft of the proposed letter and that they in turn would give Stans a brief draft of a public communiqué listing the meetings Stans had had in Moscow and making some general statements about the visit. Stans agreed. On returning to the Embassy, I immediately dictated a summary of Stans’ presentation for cabling back to Washington in the hope that it would elicit an authoritative instruction from here for the last round of Stans’ talks after his return from the Caucasus. This, with some additions by Stans, was sent back here on Friday 5 after Stans had left for Tbilisi. Scott, meanwhile, had dictated a first draft of Stans’ proposed letter and left a copy with Beam. I went over it with Beam and Klosson and told them that they must tell Stans to remove all references in it to the “US Government” and insist that it be written in the first person and sent back here for comment along with the Soviet draft communiqué. Also, before leaving Stans had a one hour backgrounder with the US press. The best version of it appeared in the New York Times on Saturday. 6 I felt it was a good job for the most part but became too specific in disclosing his intentions for the end of the talks. You should know, however, that throughout the stay, Stans was under repeated pressure from Klein’s office to make news. They urged him to have two press conferences (another before he leaves Wednesday) 7 and to arrange for a US TV appearance when he gets back. It must also be said that Stans throughout operated in the keen awareness that US business is extremely anxious for Soviet contracts and that Kosygin’s offer of grain purchases up to 2 billion dollars a year (on credit) could be of crucial political importance on the farm states next year. I think when all is said and done, Stans avoided concretely committing the President; and with one major exception (the “Watershed” comment to the press) 8 confined his remarks to economic matters. On the other hand, his mission has obviously generated enormous momentum to move ahead in trade matters and does create implied commitments—both to the Soviets and the American business community—that (1) we will continue to liberalize export controls, and (2) seriously consider and perhaps grant in the next several months EXIM credits and guarantees. He is also committed to some form of follow-on to his trip, though for now only on matters within the jurisdiction of Commerce; and that this work will produce some concrete results by the time of the summit. He is less committed, though not excluding it, on MFN and on a possible umbrella trade agreement (for which the Soviets are very anxious). He also showed sympathy, but without commitment, to Kirillin’s proposal for a formal agreement on scientific and technological cooperation. Stans did an effective job in impressing on the Soviets the need for better facilities for US businessmen. He also made a cogent statement on the need for trade to be based on a constructive political relationship (no contradiction from the Soviets), but diluted it in public with clichés about how trade will breed understanding which “diplomats” are unable to produce. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. There is no indication that Kissinger saw the memorandum. 2 See Document 349 . 3 Presumably the meeting on November 25; see Document 350 . 4 Stans met with the President on November 15; see Document 348 . 5 November 26. 6 November 27. The story is on the front page. 7 December 1. 8 As quoted in The New York Times, Stans said that his meetings with Kosygin and Soviet Ministers left him with the feeling that “a watershed had been created in relations with the Soviet Union.” The Times story also noted that Stans’ visit was the first by a member of the Nixon Cabinet to the Soviet Union. 352. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 352. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Meeting with Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans, on Tuesday, December 7, 1971, at 3:00 p.m., in the Oval Office PARTICIPANTS The President Maurice H. Stans, Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson, Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs B/Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The President met with Secretary Stans to hear the Secretary’s report on his just-completed visit to the Soviet Union and Poland. Secretary Stans, summarizing his written report, told the President that he had gone to the Soviet Union with the objective of establishing working groups to develop in more detail the means and forms of cooperation with the USSR on trade. His complete report would be forwarded to the President through Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Peterson, 2 but he wished to touch upon the following highlights: —The Soviets anticipate $2 billion of trade with the United States by 1975, and the Polish government anticipates $300 million in the same timeframe. —The Soviets hope to complete a five-year grain arrangement with the United States. —The Secretary highlighted the following impressions of the Soviet economy: (1) a critical shortage of housing; (2) a few shortages of consumer goods; (3) a general impression that the Soviets were a generation behind the United States in industrial advances; (4) a distinct inferiority complex among the Soviet leaders with respect to their industrial development; (5) a Soviet compulsion to play the big-company game in their future industrial development; (6) a distinct “Avis” attitude in the Soviet demeanor. —The Soviets are especially interested in achieving Most-Favored-Nation status with the United States. They are also interested in additional credits, relaxation of export controls, completion of the trade agreement with the United States, and an agreement for scientific and technological cooperation and space cooperation. The Secretary commented at some length on his discussions with Kosygin, whom he described as an intelligent, cordial, and extremely capable bureaucrat. The Secretary emphasized the importance of export-import credits for the Soviet Union, as a means of greatly enhancing our ability to expand US-Soviet trade. President Nixon thanked Secretary Stans for his interesting report and for undertaking his trade mission to the USSR. He pointed out to the Secretary that it was essential that the U.S. attitude with respect to increasing trade with the Soviet Union be governed completely by the state of our political relations. The increasing tensions in South Asia would be an important factor in this respect. He instructed Secretary Stans to provide to General Haig a copy of the proposed talking points which the Secretary would be using in a press conference in the near future covering his impressions of his trip. 3 The Secretary noted that he had already given an interview to U.S. News and World Report . The President instructed General Haig to get a copy of the transcript to insure that it was consistent with the current state of political relations between the two countries. 4 The President again thanked the Secretary for his interesting report, and the meeting concluded. 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971. Confidential. The meeting lasted from 3:12 to 4:15 p.m. and included a brief press opportunity. Kissinger and Ziegler were also present during the closing minutes of the meeting. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) A December 6 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger transmitted a briefing paper and talking points for the President’s use in his meeting with Stans. Sonnenfeldt called Kissinger’s attention to the section of the talking points urging the President to restrain Stans’ optimism. A stamp on Kissinger’s December 7 memorandum to the President indicates the President saw it. 2 No written report on Stans’ visit to the Soviet Union was found. On February 2, 1972, Stans sent Kissinger a copy of a report he had submitted to the Secretary of State on his December 1-3, 1971, visit to Poland. (Ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 214, Commerce, Volume III January-June, 1971) 3 On December 7 Stans sent Haig a memorandum to which he attached the 37-page transcript of his December 6 U.S. News and World Report interview, which he said was indicative of the approach he would take. He would avoid any discussion of political relations, estimates of potential dollar amounts of trade that might materialize, and compliments to the Soviet Government other than for the hospitality accorded him and his party. Stans indicated he would feel free to discuss specific interests of the two countries, including the Soviet interest in MFN treatment and the relaxation of other American discriminations. Among the points in Haig’s December 8 reply was an admonition against accepting the Soviet “discrimination” term (see Document 349 ). Haig noted that “what is involved are measures undertaken in the political circumstances of the past which can be revised as these circumstances change.” Haig continued: “in discussing MFN and Government credit facilities, it should be made clear that these matters must be considered by the President in light of a whole range of factors, including political ones. You should not say anything that creates a presumption of early Presidential decisions or initiatives in these matters.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 213, Commerce, Volume II 1971) 4 An undated note by John Scali on top of his copy of the transcript of Stans’ interview reads: “General Haig: It seems to me that Stans discloses almost everything that the Russians asked for and thus builds up public pressure for acceptance of their positions. I seriously question whether he should in this interview be permitted to spill all of this. I have outlined the sections that I have the most serious questions about but undoubtedly Hal can find even more. I would strongly recommend that we get him to knock out these areas and if U.S. News and World Report objects, tell them to knock out the interview completely.” (Ibid.) On December 8 Haig sent Stans a memorandum to which he attached recommended modifications in the interview. (Ibid.) Stans’ interview is in the December 20, 1971, issue of U.S. News and World Report, pp. 56-63. 5 Documentation on the discussions leading up to, during, and after the U.S.-Soviet Summit held May 22-30, 1972, in Moscow, at which President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev considered a wide range of economic issues, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Moscow Summit, 1971-1972. 353. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Hartman) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 353. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Hartman) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 1 Washington, January 7, 1972. SUBJECT China Trade and Travel REFERENCE The attached Memorandum to the President with transmittal The Memorandum to the President on China trade and travel 2 has been an exceptionally difficult document to prepare. Widely divergent and often parochial viewpoints were expressed and passionately defended. The objective in many cases was to close off certain Presidential options. We had to resist this if we were to respond to the mandate. As the time for the President’s departure to Peking drew closer, it became clear that all of the divergent viewpoints could not be reconciled, and that if a paper was to be presented, a technique would have to be established for the presentation of diverging viewpoints which was accurate and fair. To accomplish this, it was agreed by the drafting committee (with Mr. Mountain from DOD/ISA dissenting) that where there was a dissent the text of the memorandum would reflect the majority viewpoint and the dissent would be noted in a footnote. The dissenting agency was in every instance given full autonomy in the wording of its footnote. This technique was essential because the DOD representative insisted upon incorporating his views at length and showed no disposition whatever to negotiate their wording in order to make them acceptable to the rest of the drafting committee. Mr. Hormats of the NSC Staff was one of the conferees concurring in this approach. Careful consideration has been given to Secretary Laird’s request (Tab B) for the incorporation of the footnotes in the text. 3 I have severe doubts as to our ability to accomplish this. DOD has consistently refused to allow any rewording of its positions, and the other participating agencies have simply found DOD’s wording unacceptable. If we were now to incorporate such wording, we would have to resubmit the entire text to all original addressees for concurrence. I frankly do not believe that such concurrence would be forthcoming, and we would find that we had gone full circle to arrive at our original impasse. Even if the small probability of an agreed text were realized, the delay would mean the text would not reach the White House in time to be useful. The DOD clearance process is exceedingly cumbersome; witness the fact that the current document was sent to them for clearance on December 18, 1971 after DOD had promised to get a clearance by Christmas. The clearance did not in fact arrive until three weeks later. The NSC staff has now requested this paper by January 11. For all of these reasons, I believe this document with all of its esthetic defects and tortured concurrence be forwarded, and that you therefore sign the transmittal at Tab A, and the report at Tab B. 4 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 60D. Secret. Drafted by J.K. Wilhelm (S/PC) and cleared in EA by Ambassador Brown. 2 Not printed; it is an early draft of Document 354 . 3 In his January 4 memorandum to Irwin, not printed, Laird generally concurred with the draft paper but thought placing differing views in footnotes and “further disassociating them from the text by moving them to the end of each section” did “not provide a balanced presentation of opposing views.” He recommended revising the format before submitting the paper to the President. 4 The reference to Tab B is an apparent error, because both Irwin’s transmittal memorandum and the report are at Tab A. Tab B is Secretary Laird’s memorandum. Also attached is a Tab C, an undated memorandum from Under Secretary of Commerce Lynn to Irwin, expressing pleasure at the inclusion in the report of Commerce Department revisions, requesting some further organizational changes, and urging that the United States should “inform the PRC immediately of our LTA [Long-term Textile Agreement] obligations, in order to preclude an unusually large volume of textile imports and the difficult position in which this would place the Administration.” Attached to Lynn’s memorandum is a December 21 memorandum explaining in detail the Commerce Department positions on these matters. 354. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 354. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 13, 1972. SUBJECT Results of Initial Steps Toward Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, and Recommendations for Further Steps to be Taken The memorandum and study appended at Tab A respond to your request of June 9, 1971. 2 They were delayed in preparation, with the agreement of the NSC Staff, to allow further time for assessment of U.S. initiatives vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China, and in part because of the difficulties encountered in the reconciliation of widely divergent viewpoints. The most important problem dealt with is the question of a) whether the PRC should be afforded equality with the USSR in respect to commodities and products of technology available for export to them under general license and b) if so, when these actions should be accomplished. On point a) the majority, including State and Commerce, believes that full equality should be afforded as part of a general process of bringing our trade policies with the PRC and the USSR into alignment. Defense objects on the grounds that different levels of military, industrial and technological development of the PRC require different criteria for decontrolling items for general license export to the PRC until such time as experience provides a basis for bringing our trade policies in closer alignment. On point b) the majority, including Defense and Commerce, believes that the principles of gradualness and reciprocity should be given full weight. The Department of State believes that the earlier and more thoroughly our policies on trade with the PRC are brought into line with those toward the USSR, the greater the likelihood of favorable impact upon US-PRC relations. State therefore favors early implementation of the recommendations in this paper. The recommendations of the Committee are summarized in my report which is attached. They are more fully described with their relative advantages and disadvantages in Annex A to my report. Where different viewpoints occurred, the agency dissenting from the majority viewpoint has in each case presented its position in a footnote. Such footnotes express the view of the author agency only. Because of the desire to allow full expression of dissent, and the inability of the drafting committee to accede unanimously to dissenting viewpoints, I believe that the current format of the memorandum is more responsive to your desire to see all the options than any other practical alternative. Accordingly, the suggestion of Secretary Laird to redraft the memorandum (Tab B) 3 was partly but not wholly accommodated. The concurrence of the Department of Commerce which explains its position more fully is appended at Tab C. 4 John N. Irwin II Tab A Washington, January 13, 1972. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 5 SUBJECT Results of Initial Steps Toward Augmentation of Travel and Trade Between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, and Recommendations for Further Steps to be Taken PART I Results of Initial Steps 1. The political climate of US-PRC relations has improved substantially since you announced relaxation of trade and travel restrictions. While this improvement is not necessarily to be attributed directly to US initiatives in the area of trade and travel, they may have made a contribution. 2. There has, however, been no direct positive response from the PRC to US reduction of restrictions upon trade. Specifically, there has been no reciprocal relaxation of the PRC refusal to conduct direct trade with the US. The GRC has unofficially expressed concern about these reductions but its reaction has been very mild. 3. About 180 non-official Americans traveled to the PRC in 1971 after the removal of restrictions upon use of US passports for travel to the PRC. 6 4. The PRC has refused to trade directly, although it has tacitly permitted exporters in third countries to reexport PRC products to the US. It may have purchased negligible amounts of US manufactured goods through third countries. 5. Indirect imports in 1971 may have approached $2 million by October 10, four months after the President announced imports from the PRC would be permitted. 6. Several foreign subsidiaries of American firms were permitted to send non-American representatives to the Canton Fair, but we know of only one American businessman, as such, who was quietly permitted to attend the Canton Fair. 7 7. We have no information on, nor reason to believe that, changes in regulations on bunkering, remittances, carriage of PRC cargoes, and US-owned foreign-flag ships have had any results. Results of Review for Expansion of the General License List We have been unable to reach interagency agreement on expansion of the already substantial general license list for exports to the PRC. The Department of Defense maintains that it is not possible at this time to determine whether the remaining items considered non-strategic for the USSR are also non-strategic for the PRC, and therefore holds that such additional items should be considered only for export under validated license procedures. Departments of Commerce and State feel that it is possible to determine from available information whether such items create an unacceptable security risk and have favored their inclusion in the general license list. PART II Over-all Options There are three general courses of actions under which the specific further steps recommended below can usefully be grouped. The specific steps recommended are based on our assessment of past results and our estimate of the probable results of further steps. They are: 1. To take no further steps at the present time. 2. To adopt now all or most of the further steps listed below. 3. To adopt some but not all of the steps listed below and to implement them gradually over a period of time. Recommendations for Further Steps The Under Secretaries Committee recommends the following steps for adoption at the appropriate time (dissenting Department’s views are noted): 8 The assessment of the results of initial steps in Part I indicates that the PRC has been less than forthcoming in its response to our initial steps. Thus, it would appear tactically prudent for the US to maintain its bargaining position by exercising an equivalent degree of restraint on further relaxation of controls on trade. Bringing our trade policies with the PRC and the USSR into closer alignment should be our ultimate goal but only after a year or two of experience enables us to determine whether the US national interests would be served by taking further steps to liberalize our export policy toward the PRC. At the present time a differential in levels of control should remain over strategic items for the PRC and the USSR because of their different levels of industrial and technological development. There should be more evidence of PRC willingness to increase travel and trade and to improve US-PRC relations before implementing the additional steps recommended below. One form this should take would be release by the PRC of the remaining US prisoners now held in Communist China. [Footnote in the source text.] 1. With respect to the general license list of non-strategic exports to the PRC: Option A 9 Afford the PRC complete equality with the USSR both in commodities under general license and technical data regulations by placing the PRC in Country Group Y of the Commodity Control List. (Recommended) Option B Afford the PRC complete equality with the USSR with respect to all commodities available under general license but separately consider relaxing restrictions on foreign-made products of technical data. (Under this Option the PRC would not be included under Country Group Y.) (Not Pertinent If Option A Approved) Option C Set the general license list for the PRC at 90% (or some other arbitrary figure) of the present and subsequent general license lists for the USSR. (Not Pertinent If Options A or B approved) Option D 10 In conjunction with Options B or C (above) place controls governing export to the PRC of foreign-made products of US technical data on the same level as those governing such exports to the USSR. (Not Pertinent If Option A Approved) Option E 11 Continue controls on exports to the PRC at current levels, and consider further relaxation only after reciprocal actions by the PRC are in evidence. (Not Pertinent If Options A, B, C or D are approved) 2. Enhance the possibility of sales of US new and used aircraft to the PRC: Option A Issue favorable advisory opinions in writing when requested by exporters, concerning sale of US aircraft for PRC civil use. (Recommended) Option B Continue to inform applicants for advisory opinions that we will only consider requests based on indications of serious interest by the PRC accompanied by necessary data, but that such requests are likely to be approved if the end use is peaceful and the equipment is appropriate. 3. Permit US-flag ships and aircraft to visit the PRC, as well as entry of PRC ships and aircraft into the US. (Recommended) 12 4. Modify Foreign Assets Control regulations applying only to the PRC, but not the USSR: Action A Abolish Foreign Assets Control regulation requiring US firms in COCOM countries to obtain Treasury License in addition to host country license for the export of strategic goods. (Recommended) 13 Action B Abolish additional Foreign Assets Control regulation prohibiting subsidiaries of US firms abroad from exporting foreign technology to the PRC without Treasury License. (Also Recommended)13 5. Inform the PRC of our Long Term Arrangement regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) obligations and possibility of restraint action in the event of actual or threatened market disruption. (Recommended) There are three options as to the timing of informing the PRC, as follows: 14 The Department of State believes that it would be undesirable to contact the PRC on this subject until direct trade relations are established or unless necessitated by substantial shipments which disrupt or threaten market disruption. An earlier approach would simply confuse PRC officials who would probably answer that the PRC does not permit direct shipment of any Chinese goods to the US and cannot therefore bear any responsibility for entry of Chinese textiles into the US. If initiated prematurely, this action might prejudice development of trade in other more desirable fields. The PRC in any case is very well aware of the existence of US restrictions upon the import of textiles from other countries. The trade knows of the possibility that these regulations may be invoked against PRC, since they have been making inquiries. Pending the decision of the President to notify the PRC directly of the LTA restrictions, the Department of State sees no objection to reminding informally the principal trading companies through which trade in cotton textiles is conducted that the restrictions of the LTA will apply to PRC-origin cotton textiles as well. [Footnote in the source text.] Option A 15 Notify the PRC after direct trade relations are established, or if substantial quantities of PRC textiles arrive in the US. Option B 16 Notify the PRC now. Option C 17 Notify the PRC shortly after you return from your trip to the PRC. 6. Promote trade. Action A Quietly extend USG invitations to the PRC to participate in trade fairs. (Recommended) Action B Encourage exchange of non-governmental/industry trade missions. (Also Recommended) Action C Encourage private groups to invite the PRC to technical seminars and colloquia. (Also Recommended) Action D Propose exchange of governmental trade study groups. (Also Recommended) Action E Propose establishment of reciprocal unofficial commercial offices. (Also Recommended) 7. Propose the settlement of US and PRC private claims through negotiations. (Recommended) 8. Propose reciprocal visits of eminent PRC individuals to the US. (Recommended) These recommendations, which are discussed in detail in Annex A, 18 are aimed at bringing our trade policy with the PRC and the USSR into alignment. 19 All options are administrative actions which are within the power of the Executive to approve in accordance with existing law. Annex B lists without recommendation three areas of possible actions to improve trade relations with the PRC, all of which would require legislative action. 20 Timing . A further question arises as to how and when the approved proposals should be implemented. Each proposed action could be undertaken separately. However, in addition to viewing implementation in the context of the President’s visit, we believe that the principles of gradualness and reciprocity should be given full weight. 21 In fact, complete implementation of some proposals is dependent upon PRC willingness to respond. John N. Irwin II 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 60D. Secret. A January 13 transmittal memorandum from Hartman to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs; the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, Labor, Transportation, and Agriculture; the Deputy Attorney General; the Director of the U.S. Information Agency; and the Special Trade Representative, is ibid. Regarding the preparation and clearance of Irwin’s memorandum, see Document 353 . 2 Document 333 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 353 . 4 See footnote 4, Document 353 . See also footnote 14 below. 5 Confidential. 6 Department of Defense notes that only a very small number of the thousands of applications for visas to the PRC have been approved. Those receiving visas were persons in a position to influence US public opinion: journalists, prominent doctors, people sympathetic to the PRC, representatives of radical minority groups, or relatives of residents or prisoners. Since most of those who have traveled since March 15, 1971 to the PRC would have received validated passports before that date, very little of this travel can be attributed to US relaxation of passport controls. [Footnote in the source text.] 7 Department of Defense notes that the unique place of the Canton Fair and the lack of permission for Americans to attend shows that the meager response to our trade and travel overtures is a matter of deliberate policy and that the PRC for a considerable period of time to come may continue to respond to the US removal of travel and trade restrictions very slowly, if at all. In short, the PRC will attempt to use the US interest in trade and our desire to improve US-PRC relations as a lever with which to extract maximum political and economic concessions. [Footnote in the source text.] 8 Department of Defense believes that two considerations appear primary to the question of what further steps should be recommended at this time to augment travel and trade with the PRC. These are: (1) how to indicate to the PRC our intention that relaxation of controls on travel and trade proceed on a mutual and reciprocal basis, and (2) how to continue the policy of removal of discriminatory restrictions without affording to the PRC the opportunity to acquire from the US items of strategic value to them which cannot be acquired elsewhere and which their level of technology does not permit them to produce domestically. 9 Department of Defense objects because it believes the different levels of military, industrial and technological development of the PRC and USSR require that decontrol of items to the PRC be based on a specific determination of their strategic significance to the PRC. The DOD would place on general license all commodities found not to be strategically significant to the PRC. Items not placed on general license can still be exported to the PRC if on the basis of a case-by-case review they are found to be non-strategic. [Footnote in the source text. This footnote setting forth Department of Defense objections was appended to Options A, B, and C. None of the Approve/Disapprove decision options in the paper is checked.] 10 Department of Defense opposes addition of this option on the grounds that it is premature. [Footnote in the source text.] 11 Recommended by the Department of Defense. [Footnote in the source text.] 12 Department of Defense opposes exercise of this option until such time as we can be assured of some measure of customary protection of US flag ships, aircraft and their personnel. [Footnote in the source text.] 13 Department of Defense opposes addition of this option on the grounds that it is premature. [Footnote in the source text.] 14 The Commerce Department believes that it is imperative that the United States inform the PRC as soon as possible of our LTA obligations and the possibility of restraint action in the event of actual or threatened market disruption. Sufficient information is available to indicate that importers are encouraging the PRC, the world’s first or second largest exporter of cotton textiles, to export substantial quantities to the U.S. To wait until after this trade has built up would be academic. Restraint action without prior notice would then be needed if the Administration is to avoid grave problems with our domestic industry and with our bilateral partners to whom we have an equity obligation not to allow unrestrained exports to build up while they are restricted in what they can export to us. Commerce also believes that it would be wrong to wait until direct trade relations are established since it is possible for PRC cotton textiles to be shipped to us through Hong Kong and Canada as the PRC is presently doing. 15 Recommended by the Department of State. [Footnote in the source text.] 16 Recommended by the Department of Commerce. [Footnote in the source text.] 17 Recommended by Commerce if Option B not adopted. [Footnote in the source text.] 18 Annex A is not printed. It contains eight sections that correspond to the eight “Recommendations for Further Steps” above. 19 Department of Defense opposes bringing our trade policy with the PRC and the USSR into alignment now, but believes closer alignment should be considered after a year or two of experience provides a basis on which to judge the potential benefits of such an action. [Footnote in the source text.] 20 Not found. 21 Department of State believes that the earlier and more thoroughly our policies on trade with the PRC are brought into line with those toward the USSR, the greater likelihood of favorable impact upon US-PRC relations. State therefore favors early implementation of the recommendations in this paper. [Footnote in the source text.] 355. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 355. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 28, 1972. SUBJECT Travel and Trade with the PRC I understand that you are about to send to the President the NSC Under Secretaries’ Committee Report on Travel and Trade with the PRC. 2 In this connection, I wanted to share with you some of my personal reactions which may be slightly different than what my staff is conveying to yours. Generally, the problem with the USC Report is that it seems to have been formulated in a political vacuum without regard to the failure of the Chinese to respond positively in the economic arena. You and the President are in a position to make political decisions about this long list of options which, apart from the politics involved, strikes me as fairly sterile in most cases. More specifically, I favor moving on some minor issues at this time but oppose further relaxation of others. For example, on economic and trade policy grounds, I would normally favor the removal of any discrimination between the treatment of the PRC and USSR in our regulations concerning direct bilateral trade or travel. However, since the major relaxation of last year 3 has yet to move any direct trade, I would oppose the further relaxation of US trade regulations prior to the President’s China trip. My preference is to hold further liberalization against the possibility of later agreement or unilateral action (either during the trip or afterwards) 4 indicating that the Chinese actually intend to expand direct trade. Before going the whole distance to remove the China differential, we should be assured that there will be tangible results which, among other things, will at least help justify running the alleged security risk which continues to bother Defense. On the other issues under consideration (modification of remaining Foreign Assets Control Regulations and the controls on US firms abroad exporting foreign technology to the PRC), I favor the recommendations of the Under Secretaries’ Committee, i.e., that we abolish those controls which continue to require differential treatment by US subsidiaries abroad of exports to the PRC and USSR. I favor this mainly on the grounds that it would remove further irritants in our investment relations with friendly countries, which are more directly at issue here than are our relations with the PRC. Also, as a signal to the PRC of our intent to do something positive, removal of these controls prior to the President’s trip might be useful and could help set the stage for more meaningful results during or following the trip on trade and travel matters of direct US-PRC significance. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73. Secret. Attached to a February 2 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger; see footnote 1, Document 356 . 2 Document 354 . 3 Probably a reference to the measures announced on June 10, 1971; see Document 333 . 4 President Nixon traveled to the People’s Republic of China February 17-28, 1972. 356. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 356. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Results of Initial Steps Toward Augmentation of Trade and Travel Between the PRC and the U.S., and Recommendations for Further Steps to be Taken The report (Tab A) by the Under Secretaries’ Committee (USC) 2 indicates the results of your initiatives to augment travel and trade between the PRC and the U.S., and recommends further steps. You may wish to take some such steps prior to your visit to the PRC. Results of Your Initial Steps U.S.-PRC atmospherics have improved, due in part to your trade and travel initiatives of last April. Although it has not yet permitted direct trade, Peking has allowed exporters in third countries to re-export Chinese products to the U.S. Recommendations for Further Steps The USC recommended a considerable number of further trade modifications, only two of which involve discriminatory treatment between the PRC and USSR and would seem pertinent to your China trip: (a) expansion of the general license list to bring the PRC to the same level as the USSR, and (b) modification of two remaining Foreign Assets Control Regulations which are more restrictive on the PRC than on the USSR. The other options, which need not be considered in advance of the trip, pertain to the sale of aircraft to the PRC, the problem of PRC cotton textile exports to the U.S., the settlement of PRC and U.S. claims against one another, and mutual visitation of ships and aircraft. During the October visit to Peking, we informed the Chinese that you would unilaterally and unconditionally make a further reduction in the U.S. restrictions on trade with the PRC, and that we would do so by increasing the number of items on our general list of exports to China “up to the limits of the law.” 3 The most likely PRC interpretation of this is that we will place the PRC in the same category as the USSR in terms of items which can be exported directly from the U.S. without a license, or of items made in foreign countries with U.S. technical data. Issue I—Expanding the general list to give the PRC parity with the USSR A. Afford the PRC complete equality with the USSR both in commodities under general license regulations and, in the export of foreign products made with U.S. technical data, by placing the PRC in the same commodity control list category as the Soviet Union (Country Group Y; it is now in Z). This is the USC recommendation. However, Pete Peterson opposes (Tab B) 4 until the Chinese demonstrate a desire to begin direct trade. B. Afford the PRC complete equality with the USSR with respect to all commodities available under general license, but with no change in country group status. This would discriminate against the PRC with regard to foreign products made with U.S. technical data. C. Set the general license list for the PRC at 90 percent (or some other arbitrary figure) of the present and subsequent USSR list. D. In conjunction with B or C, remove controls on export to the PRC of foreign goods made with U.S. technical data to put them on the same level as controls governing such exports to the USSR. (Option A would have the effect of doing this as well.) E. Continue controls on exports to the PRC at current levels and consider further relaxation only after reciprocal actions by the PRC are in evidence. (This is a non-option in terms of what actions should be taken with respect to last October’s remarks, but is the only one which Defense supports.) Recommendation: That you approve Option A. This is the only option we believe is fully consistent with our statement to the PRC in October. We disagree with DOD’s objection to Options A-D on strategic grounds, since the PRC can obtain almost all of the goods involved elsewhere. 5 Issue 2—Modification of Foreign Assets Control Regulations Abolish Foreign Asset Control Regulations requiring U.S. firms in COCOM countries (Western Europe and Japan) to obtain a Treasury license in addition to host country license for the export of strategic goods to the PRC. (Even without this restriction, the USG can approve the sale of the commodity through the COCOM Committee, but it is an added impediment serving little effective purpose.) This is the USC recommendation—from which DOD dissented on grounds that the move would be premature. Peter Peterson concurs in the USC recommendation. Recommendation: That you approve the USC recommendation. In addition to giving the PRC parity with the USSR on this second remaining element, the change would also remove the appearance of U.S. interference in the affairs of third countries (NATO allies and Japan). 6 Issue 3—Other USC Recommendations The remaining USC recommendations pertain to other economic issues in U.S.-PRC relations such as the sale of aircraft to the PRC, the problem of PRC cotton textile exports to the U.S., the settlement of PRC and U.S. claims against one another, and mutual visitation of ships and aircraft, and we believe need not be addressed until after the trip. Recommendation: That you consider the other USC recommendations after the trip. 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume V 1/72-4/7/73. Secret. Attached to a February 2 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger recommending he sign the memorandum to the President. 2 Document 354 . 3 In his February 2 cover memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge wrote that Jenkins, at Kissinger’s direction, had told this to Hsiung Hsiang-hui, Prime Minister Chou’s secretary. 4 Document 355 . 5 Haig wrote “HK for RN” next to the Approve option. 6 Haig wrote “HK for RN” next to the Approve option. A February 11 Memorandum for the Record from Department of State Executive Secretary Eliot reported that Haig had called that evening to report the President’s approval of the Department’s recommendations in the January 13 USC memorandum. Haig noted that a draft press announcement for release on February 14 would be provided the next day for comment. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, Box 838, NSC Under Secretaries Committee Memoranda, 1971-1972) For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin , March 6, 1972, p. 291. 5 Haig wrote “HK for RN” next to the Approve option. 357. National Security Decision Memorandum 155 357. National Security Decision Memorandum 155 1 Washington, February 17, 1972. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce SUBJECT Relaxation of Restrictions on Trade with People’s Republic of China The President has considered the findings and recommendations forwarded in the report of the Under Secretaries Committee regarding trade and travel relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. 2 Based on that report he has made the following decisions: 3 1. The Secretary of Commerce should transfer the People’s Republic of China from Country Group Z of the Commodity Control List to Country Group Y. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury should eliminate the Foreign Assets Control requirement that subsidiaries of U.S. firms in COCOM countries obtain a Treasury license in addition to a host country license for the export of strategic goods to the People’s Republic of China, and the requirement that subsidiaries of U.S. firms abroad obtain prior Treasury licensing for export of foreign technology to the People’s Republic of China. Additional recommendations contained in the Under Secretaries report are under consideration. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 155. Secret. Copies were sent to the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence. 2 Document 354 . 3 See Document 356 . 358. National Security Decision Memorandum 188 358. National Security Decision Memorandum 188 1 Washington, August 30, 1972. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee SUBJECT PRC Blocked Assets and Private Claims The President has approved the Under Secretaries Committee recommendation contained in its memorandum of January 13, 1972 concerning the settlement of PRC blocked assets and private claims. 2 Specifically, the President directs: —That the United States should explore first, with the People’s Republic of China, a lump sum settlement of the claims of American citizens for property nationalized by the PRC, to be paid either as a single payment in full or in annual installments over a period of years, in return for which the U.S. would unblock all PRC assets. —That if the foregoing course proves non-negotiable, the U.S. should propose a settlement under which it would retain the blocked assets now under its control using them to compensate U.S. citizens for properties nationalized by the PRC. The President has directed that the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, should prepare a negotiating scenario based upon the foregoing decision which should be submitted for his approval by September 15, 1972. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 60D. Secret; Nodis; Homer. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. 2 Document 354 . 359. National Security Decision Memorandum 195 359. National Security Decision Memorandum 195 1 Washington, October 30, 1972. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Transportation SUBJECT Amendment to Transportation Order T-2 Affecting the PRC The President has considered recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee in its memorandum of January 13, 1972 2 and decided that Transportation Order T-2 should be amended to permit U.S. flag-vessels and U.S.-registered civil aircraft having a validated license from the Department of Commerce to visit the People’s Republic of China. The Department of State should notify U.S. airlines which had previously been granted authority to provide scheduled service to points in the PRC that they should not approach the PRC directly about the establishment of service until the Civil Aeronautics Board has examined the question of the establishment of scheduled service. Initial announcement of this decision will be made by the White House. 3 Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files, Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 195. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs. 2 Document 354 . 3 The announcement was made on November 22, 1972. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 , Appendix B, p. B-19. Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, 1969-1972 Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, 1969-1972 360. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 7, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. Secret. Attached to an August 8 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger recommending he approve the State Department approach. 361. National Security Study Memorandum 71 Washington, August 14, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 71. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. 362. Information Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 20, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. Secret; Limdis. 363. Editorial Note 364. Draft Memorandum for President Nixon Prepared in the Department of Defense Washington, October 14, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. Secret. 365. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) Washington, October 20, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. Secret. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 366. Action Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, October 20, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. Secret. A handwritten note by Kissinger dated October 31 reads: “Hal—Lucet has asked about the French request to cooperate on nuclear diffusion plant. Where does it stand? Please let me know by opening of business November 5.” In an attached November 4 note Sonnenfeldt reported that he dealt with the question in a separate memorandum of the same date. 367. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 8, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. Confidential. This memorandum is Tab C to a December 10 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger transmitting briefing material for Kissinger’s meeting with Hervé Alphand on December 11. 368. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, January 22, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. 369. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) Washington, January 25, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/USC Memos. No classification marking. 370. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 12, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. Secret. Attached to Document 371. At the top of the page is the handwritten note, presumably by Sonnenfeldt: “VERY URGENT.” Another handwritten note, dated February 17, by Kissinger reads: “Redo last page—I tend to agree with Defense and Commerce. French have not been cooperative enough to justify it on policy grounds.” 371. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, February 25, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. Secret. Attached to a March 4 memorandum from Davis to Eliot confirming that the President had decided to continue to oppose the French proposal to manufacture integrated circuits in Poland. A stamped notation indicates the President saw this memorandum, which was proposed to Kissinger by Bergsten and Sonnenfeldt; see Document 370 and footnote 1 thereto. 372. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon Washington, March 18, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 94C. Confidential. Transmitted to members of the Under Secretaries Committee under cover of a March 19 memorandum from Staff Director Hartman. Hartman also sent a copy to Peterson (CIEP). Several earlier drafts of the memorandum are ibid. 373. Letter From President Nixon to Prime Minister Heath Washington, May 12, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 728, UK, Volume VI 4/71-8/71. No classification marking. Attached to a July 3 memorandum from Kissinger to the President informing him that successful security negotiations with the United Kingdom had been completed and that on June 25 the United States had lifted its COCOM objections to the proposed computer sale. “The President has seen” is stamped on the July 3 memorandum. 374. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Hartman) to the Members of the Under Secretaries Committee Washington, May 13, 1971. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 94D. Confidential. A copy was sent to Peterson (CIEP). On May 13 Samuels sent a copy to Trezise, with a request that Trezise chair an interagency group to consider questions of implementation. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/USC Memos) 375. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, June 2, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 678, France, Volume VIII 4/71-12/71. Secret. A stamped notation indicates the President saw the memorandum. It is attached to a June 5 memorandum from Kissinger to Eliot informing him that the President had decided to approve in COCOM the modified French proposal for the manufacture of transistors in Poland, and that approval of the French/Polish case also meant the United States should accept a similar RCA proposal for Romania. A draft of the memorandum printed here was proposed to Kissinger in a May 28 memorandum from Johnston and Sonnenfeldt. (Ibid.) Sonnenfeldt outlined the genesis and tactics of the revised French proposal in an April 9 memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid.) 376. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon Washington, June 22, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71. Confidential. Kissinger, in a July 9 memorandum forwarding this memorandum to the President, summarized Laird’s points, and reported that other agency comments had not been requested because the administration was not yet ready for a decision on COCOM list revision, pending bilateral discussions with other COCOM members during the summer. “The President has seen” is stamped on the July 9 transmittal memorandum. 377. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon Washington, March 8, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 85. Secret. Copies were sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Commerce, the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology under cover of a March 8 memorandum from Hartman. (Ibid.) 378. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 17, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 729, UK, Volume VII 9/71-9/72. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Commerce. 379. Editorial Note 380. National Security Decision Memorandum 159 Washington, March 29, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence. 381. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Foreign Minister Schumann Washington, March 29, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 678, France, Volume IX 1/72-7/72. No classification marking. 382. Editorial Note 383. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force To Review the COCOM System (Armstrong) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) Washington, November 20, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 109C. Confidential. Drafted by R.B. Wright (EB/ITP/EWT). An attached November 24 memorandum from Acting Staff Director Seymour Weiss to members of the Task Force requested comments on the paper attached to this memorandum. Also attached is a draft memorandum to the President. For the revised memorandum based on comments received pursuant to Weiss’ November 24 memorandum, see Document 387. 384. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) Washington, December 12, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Confidential. The memorandum is Tab B to a December 30 memorandum from Armstrong to Irwin; see footnote 1, Document 387. 385. Letter From the Under Secretary of Commerce (Lynn) to the Acting Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Weiss) Washington, December 20, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Secret. The letter is Tab C to a December 30 memorandum from Armstrong to Irwin; see footnote 1, Document 387. 386. Letter From the Assistant General Manager for National Security of the Atomic Energy Commission (Giller) to the Acting Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Weiss) Washington, December 21, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Confidential. The letter is Tab D to a December 30 memorandum from Armstrong to Irwin; see footnote 1, Document 387. 387. Draft Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon Washington, December 29, 1972. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Confidential. The memorandum, a revision of the draft Armstrong sent Irwin on November 20 (Document 383), is Tab A to a December 30 memorandum from Assistant Secretary Armstrong to Deputy Secretary Irwin recommending that it be circulated to members of the Under Secretaries Committee for their prompt concurrence. Armstrong noted that the revised draft contained revisions from the Defense and Commerce Departments and the AEC (see Documents 384–386). Tab E to Armstrong’s memorandum comprised several revised pages to the paper on COCOM review attached to Document 383. The memorandum was circulated to the Under Secretaries Committee on January 3, 1973, under cover of a memorandum from Seymour Weiss. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159) 360. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 360. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 7, 1969. SUBJECT French Desire to Sell Transistor Technology to Poland In your conversation with Foreign Minister Schumann he referred to problems France has had with COCOM over the sale of strategic materials and technology to Eastern Europe. 2 He noted that the French Government is currently considering a proposed transaction with Poland whereby licenses would be sold to Poland for technology to manufacture silicon transistors (the transaction would also include integrated circuit technology). France did not wish to proceed without COCOM approval for the sale and US support, which he hoped would be forthcoming through bilateral discussions with us at the expert level. The French first mentioned the possibility of this sale in conversations with us in February. 3 At that time and in subsequent conversations Ambassador Shriver and Embassy officers have had with Foreign Ministry officials, the French were urged to submit the case to the Coordinating Committee with full technical information about the equipment and technology involved. Such detailed information would permit the US Government and the Governments of other participating countries to give thorough consideration to the French request. The French were told, however, that the US Government has always denied applications from US firms to export transistor and integrated circuit technology to Poland and other Eastern European countries. US intelligence estimates indicate that the West is well ahead of the Soviets and the other Eastern Europeans in both technology and manufacturing knowhow with respect to silicon transistors and integrated circuits. Since these items are used in the manufacture of advanced communications equipment and computers, they are in the US view among the more critical areas of the COCOM embargo. There have been several instances in which France has been anxious to export to Eastern Europe equipment or technology which had originally been included in the COCOM embargo list with French approval. In these cases the French had approached us seeking our support for the proposed transactions, which would then be followed by proforma approval in COCOM. Last December the French opened discussions with the US on a proposed sale of computer technology to Romania by means of a personal call by the Minister of Science on the Ambassador. The US responded by sending a high level team to discuss the matter but found the French-Romanian contracts to be advanced and apparently beyond recall. Subsequently the French proceeded with this contract without prior COCOM consultation. In 1967 the French exported computer technology to Czechoslovakia over US objections. In the present case, French failure to deal with COCOM places the US in the difficult position of being made privy to French contracts not reported to COCOM as required by the COCOM rules. The British were especially irritated over French actions in the Romanian computer case. While the U.S. and possibly one or two other participating countries would have great difficulty in approving this transaction, no firm position can be taken until full technical information about the technology involved and the delivery schedules has been supplied and studied by us. Although the French indicated on July 5 that they would prepare a technical memorandum, which we would be willing to study even in advance of its submission to COCOM, they have not yet provided anything further to us. We have noted Ambassador Shriver’s recommendations in his telegram 11850 4 and plan to instruct him to convey to Foreign Minister Schumann (1) assurances that we wish to work out a mutually satisfactory solution, (2) that on the basis of preliminary information it is clear that some items are on the embargo list and should therefore be submitted now for COCOM consideration; (3) but that in light of Mr. Schumann’s comments we are willing to examine informally technical or any other information bearing on the case which they may wish to supply us in advance of their COCOM submission; and (4) after review of this additional information we will advise the French of our views on the strategic significance of the technology concerned and related COCOM considerations. 5 Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. Secret. Attached to an August 8 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger recommending he approve the State Department approach. 2 Telegram 11787 from Paris, August 4, reported on Kissinger’s meeting with Schumann. (Ibid.) Additional documentation on East-West trade and COCOM is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972. 3 Not further identified. 4 Dated August 5. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69) In his transmittal memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten summarized Shriver’s views: “Ambassador Shriver is leery of prior bilateral talks…. He argues that the other COCOM members may say we have made a special deal if we agree to the sale before COCOM discussions, reducing COCOM to a formality. On the other hand, if we do not agree, the French may bypass COCOM and make the sale anyway, as they did in a similar Rumanian sale in December. Since the Rumanian transaction still rankles Shriver, he prefers no bilateral consultations.” 5 A draft cable, dated August 8, is ibid. Kissinger initialed his approval for bilateral conversations on Bergsten’s August 8 transmittal memorandum on August 12. 361. National Security Study Memorandum 71 361. National Security Study Memorandum 71 1 Washington, August 14, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, Office of Science and Technology The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT Advanced Technology and National Security The President has directed that a review be conducted of our policies governing the access by foreign countries to certain advanced technologies vital to our national security. The review will consider nuclear power reactors, ballistic missile systems, advanced computers, and other scientific and technological devices and information whose acquisition from the United States by other nations would assist in the development or improvement of independent national nuclear weapons capabilities or strategic delivery systems. The review should clarify the purposes and scope of existing policies and discuss the major issues posed by the export of sensitive technologies worldwide and with respect to specific countries. As a result of the review, recommendations should be offered on alternative policies to regulate the export of these technologies and on various procedures for policy implementation. Consideration of the impact on friendly and hostile governments should be included in reporting the assets and liabilities of each option. More specifically in recommending alternatives, the report should: —Consider any further obligations of the United States Government with regard to advanced technologies that result from (a) the commitment of this government to a single global commercial communications satellite system, and (b) the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should it come into force; —Make explicit those policies applicable to all countries; when a policy is not universally applicable, adequate guidelines should be prepared for identifying those countries, or types of countries, to which it is directed; —Propose criteria to be applied in considering requests for export licenses or for government financing of foreign projects involving these advanced technologies; —Offer any necessary procedures to allow the United States Government to monitor policies governing advanced technologies. This review should give full consideration to the commitment of the United States Government to international cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear and space technologies and to the necessity for free exchange of scientific knowledge when national security is not impaired. This review will be conducted by a committee to be chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State. The committee will include representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The committee will forward its report to the NSC Review Group by September 30, 1969. 2 Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 71. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. 2 No completed study was found. According to a May 28, 1970, memorandum from Thomas R. Pickering (PM) to Guhin of the NSC Staff, Pickering thought Guhin’s May 28, 1970, draft might set back the project and proposed some State Department language. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212. NSSM 71) In a June 22, 1971, memorandum to the President ( Document 376 ), Laird noted that the study was cancelled. 362. Information Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 362. Information Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 20, 1969. SUBJECT Conversation with French Charge—Transistor Deal with Poland; Schumann visit; Pompidou visit The Minister came in under instructions to follow up on Foreign Minister Schumann’s conversation with you in Paris on the proposed French transistor deal with Poland. 2 He said the French had no intention to bypass COCOM. In their view the equipment was not so sophisticated that the Soviets or East Europeans, not to mention some West Europeans, could not furnish it to the Poles. Siemens, for example, was sending a team to Poland in mid-September. (I interjected that the Germans were also subject to COCOM but Leprette said they might be “more clever” in getting around it.) In the French view, if the West loses the contract the Poles would be dependent on the Soviets when it was in our interest to divert such Polish dependence. (These are all old points.) Leprette then read from his instructions to provide certain technical data and to suggest that French technicians should come here to discuss the matter with us. (Text attached.) 3 He said the matter was urgent because the French wanted to settle the matter before the formal COCOM meeting in September. I noted that as a result of your conversation with Schumann, Ambassador Shriver had been instructed to suggest technical exchanges before the COCOM meeting; 4 Leprette said he heard nothing of any such demarche. (We have seen nothing either and Fred Bergsten is checking.) Leprette asked what our substantive position was and I said I did not have any information; our first order of business had been to clear up the matter of getting the technical information. Leprette said Schumann planned to be in Washington on September 25, following his UN speech and he asked about the possibilities of an appointment with the President. I said I would check and recalled that you had also expressed an interest in seeing the Foreign Minister. Comment: Perhaps you would like to set up an appointment on your calendar for September 25 and then take Schumann up the back steps to see the President. 5 If we make a public, formal appointment it will of course be much harder to turn down requests from other Foreign Ministers. (We already have one from the Belgian, and there is talk that Gromyko wants to come down. Manescu also has expectations; and Stewart will be hard to ward off.) On the Pompidou visit, I said we still had no firm date but were working on it. 6 Comment: We ought to get off the dime. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. Secret; Limdis. 2 See Document 360 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 Not printed. The one-page text, in French, indicated that Thomson-CSF was prepared to send representatives to Washington. 4 See footnote 5, Document 360 . 5 On August 27 Kissinger initialed his approval for an appointment in the margin next to this sentence. There is no indication in the Daily Diary that Schumann met with the President on September 25. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) 6 President Pompidou visited the United States in February 1970. 363. Editorial Note 363. Editorial Note On September 8 and 9, 1969, a 10-member French delegation, divided evenly between government and industry representatives, visited Washington for technical-level discussions with U.S. officials regarding their interest in exporting transistor technology to Poland. The U.S. delegation was headed by Assistant Secretary of State Philip Trezise and included representatives from the Defense Department, Commerce Department, and the CIA. On September 10 the Department of State sent a report to Henry Kissinger apprising him that as a result of the informal discussions, the French on September 15 were to submit a formal request to COCOM for an exception to the embargo for the first phase of the technology for silicon transistor production. The French reportedly understood that the United States would examine carefully all aspects of the transaction and might not approve exceptions for some of the items. In a September 12 memorandum to Kissinger transmitting the report, Helmut Sonnenfeldt noted that the talks had gone well and that the State Department report indicated that all agencies approved. He added that Kissinger had “brownie points” in Paris for his role in moving this case forward. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 695, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69) On October 8 Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a memorandum reporting on Sonnenfeldt’s meeting with French Ambassador Lucet that day. Sonnenfeldt noted that French officials were becoming increasingly “upset” and recommended that if Lucet raised the issue, Kissinger should tell him it had turned out to be more complicated than expected and was still under review by the concerned agencies. Sonnenfeldt attached a background paper on the transistor problem for Kissinger’s information in which he explained that following the French presentation of their request in COCOM on September 15, the U.S. delegation had been without instructions at subsequent meetings on September 23 and 30 and on October 7. He indicated that all Kissinger could tell Lucet was that the U.S. position would be ready for the next COCOM meeting on October 14. (Ibid.) 364. Draft Memorandum for President Nixon Prepared in the Department of Defense 364. Draft Memorandum for President Nixon Prepared in the Department of Defense 1 Washington, October 14, 1969. SUBJECT French Desire to Sell Transistor Production Line to Poland We are at the point where we must take a position for or against a proposal by the French to sell to Poland a silicon transistor production line. The contract would include certain machines as well as transistor production technology (for general purpose transistors used in communications equipment) that are subject to the international strategic embargo maintained by the fifteen countries (NATO plus Japan) in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM). The rules of the COCOM permit exceptions to the embargo provided all the member countries agree. The French submitted such an exception request on September 15 2 but in the COCOM discussions thus far the United States has reserved its position, as has the United Kingdom. The Netherlands has been the only country to file an objection, on the grounds that it is inconsistent to permit exports of machinery to produce transistors unless the transistors themselves are removed from the embargo list. The Dutch, whose motivations are probably largely commercial, have indicated that their final position would be strongly influenced by the United States position. The case is to be discussed again in COCOM on October 14. The French have made it clear from the outset that they attach great political and economic importance to this project. While the transistor contract is valued at only $2 million, the French state that it is part of a larger French/Polish industrial venture which is still being negotiated totaling some $50 million. Foreign Minister Shumann described the case and sought United States support during Mr. Kissinger’s conversation with him in August. 3 He referred to it again when he was in Washington at the end of September. 4 Ambassador Lucet here and the Foreign Ministry in Paris have continuously kept the Foreign Minister’s interest before us and have pressed us to take a favorable position in Tuesday’s meeting. Early in September a French Delegation came to Washington to discuss the project in technical detail. 5 (It should be noted that this is the second time this year that the French have attempted to get the US outside of COCOM to approve a contract to ship embargoed technology to Eastern Europe. The first case was for a production facility to make the French IRIS-50 computer in Romania.) Our first objective in agreeing to these discussions was to persuade the French to submit their case to COCOM, because their initial intention seemed to be to proceed without such consultation. They agreed to submit their case and we agreed to give a prompt response. The following considerations are pertinent: a. The equipment and technology in this case as well as their product are currently covered by COCOM embargo. The U.S., and other PC’s, have consistently denied many applications for exports of such machinery, technology, and the products in the past. For example, the UK, without coming to COCOM has turned down a proposal from a UK company similar to the French request and has a similar proposal now before UK licensing authorities. b. U.S. Intelligence estimates state that, while there has been a limited number of silicon planar transistors listed in Bloc catalogs, there is no evidence that they have sufficiently mastered the production process to satisfy their basic strategic needs. The U.S. information was detailed during the course of the recently finished list review. The continuing stream of COCOM exceptions cases for silicon planar devices attests to the shortage. c. The basic planar production process used (epitaxy, successive maskings and diffusions, wafer probing, bonding, etc.) is that now employed in strategic transistor and integrated circuit production. d. The production facility in this case, even with the masks being sent by France, could be used to produce military grade transistors of types currently being used in U.S. military equipment production. In view of Bloc deficiencies in this area there is reason to believe they might well be so used. e. Despite a French assertion to the contrary, the equipment and technology in this case, while insufficient by themselves to produce integrated circuits, would all be usable for such production. Equally important, the acquisition of skills in planar transistor production is a necessary prerequisite for integrated circuit production, and the additional equipment for such production would be minimal. f. The French have suggested that since they would only supply three basic masks they would retain some control over the products produced. As noted before the masks can produce excellent military grade transistors. The French, during the Washington discussions, also said the USSR, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have a mask-making capability. While mask making is not an easy task, it is basically a high precision adaptation of photolithographic techniques. It is a problem that can be more easily solved than that represented by the epitaxy, diffusion, and bonding technology and equipment which are to be ex-ported. g. The French, during Washington bilateral discussions, did not supply technical specifications of the equipment but have recently supplied limited data on the diffusion furnace and the mask aligners. Equipment technical specifications are of little consequence, in any event, since equipment which is adequate for the production of the specified products would be usable for the production of a variety of strategic devices. h. The French Delegation emphasized that the equipment to be exported was limited to manually operated devices. Only one U.S. company employs a significant degree of automation in transistor production and the quality of the transistors produced is degraded by the changes required to effect this automation. i. CIA says that approval of this case would be of major importance not only to Poland but also to the USSR. There are three possible choices as set forth below with considerations pro and con. Option 1 Express no objection to the exception request in COCOM. Advantages 1. Would be responsive to a French request made at high levels concerning a project to which they attach major economic and political importance. 2. Would be helpful in developing closer relations with the present French Government, particularly since this is likely to be viewed by the French as the first significant bilateral issue to be dealt with by the present Governments in both countries. 3. Would increase Western relations with Poland. Disadvantages 1. Would incur an important security risk since the technology and machinery would enhance Polish and probably Soviet capability to produce silicon transistors and integrated circuits. 2. Would probably put an end to the multilateral embargo in COCOM of the transistors in question and would make more difficult a continued embargo on related manufacturing equipment. 3. Would penalize the UK for its adherence to COCOM rules and regulations. 4. Would undermine the whole COCOM structure since it could be interpreted as demonstrating a lack of U.S. concern for COCOM regulations. Option 2 Express no objection provided certain additional safeguards are met. We might say that we will not object provided the French add such additional safeguards as: no copying, transshipment, or re-export of machinery; no improvements in the machinery to be provided by the French without COCOM approval; only French production masks will be used; French would discontinue technical assistance when a certain quality standard is achieved. Advantages 1. Would reduce risk of diversion or manufacture of more advanced semi-conductors. 2. Would provide precedent for very strict conditions relating to any future sale of production technology to Eastern Europe. Disadvantages 1. Would be very disappointing and possibly unacceptable to the French since it would require re-negotiation and major changes in the contract terms (which were agreed more that a year ago and suspended until now because of the invasion of Czechoslovakia). Option 3 Register objection to COCOM to French request. Advantages 1. Would avoid a significant security risk if in fact French did not proceed with sale anyway. 2. Would continue embargo on silicon transistors and technology and would not provide assistance to Eastern Europe for production integrated circuits. 3. Would strengthen COCOM by reassuring all members that the U.S. will not abet a flagrant disregard by any COCOM member of security factors in pursuit of commercial advantage. Disadvantages 1. Would be resented by the French Government and embarrass personally Foreign Minister Schumann. 2. If French should complete the transaction despite disapproval by COCOM, COCOM’s value as a facility for coordinating a Western embargo policy would be somewhat undermined. Recommendation The Department of Defense recommends Option 3, on the basis that a) the security factors are overriding, b) the effect on COCOM will be to strengthen it and, c) the French method used both in this case and the earlier IRIS-50 case of attempting to evade COCOM rules by presenting a contract fait accompli should be given no further encouragement. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. Secret. 2 See Document 363 . 3 See Document 360 and footnote 2 thereto. 4 Possibly a reference to the meeting Kissinger agreed to on August 27; see footnote 5, Document 362 . 5 See Document 363 . 365. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 365. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) 1 Washington, October 20, 1969. SUBJECT French Desire to Sell Transistor Technology to Poland The President has carefully weighed the options and considerations presented in your memorandum of October 13, 2 and has decided to approve your recommendation that we express no objection to the exception requested by the French in COCOM. Please take steps to implement this decision at the earliest opportunity. 3 Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. Secret. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 2 Not found. 3 An October 23 memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger informed him that on October 20 the Department had instructed the U.S. Mission to OECD to inform COCOM the United States did not object to the French exceptions request for the sale of transistor technology to Poland. The Mission had confirmed that COCOM was so informed on October 21. Telegram 177767 from USOECD, October 20, had conveyed the instruction. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69) 366. Action Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 366. Action Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, October 20, 1970. SUBJECT French COCOM Case; Your Potential Involvement In June, the French submitted to COCOM their proposal to sell to Poland certain machinery and technology required to produce a line of integrated circuits. The request also included an expansion of the number and type of silicon transistors to be produced by the Polish plant approved for export by COCOM last October. 2 This particular case involves only $7 million, but is the second stage of the French/Polish industrial venture, the total value of which might exceed $50 million. You will recall that the first stage (involving silicon transistors) was approved last October only after lengthy inter-agency debate and French intercession with you. It was made clear then to the French that the U.S. decision in no way established a presumption for approval of subsequent transactions. In the present case, all agencies concerned (Defense, State and Commerce) agreed that qualitatively and quantitatively transferring the technology and production equipment in the French request involved a substantial increase in the security risk over last year’s case. The quality and quantity of the devices to be produced exceed the needs implicit in the stated end use, and have direct military potential. Further, neither the USSR nor any Eastern European country has the capability at this time to manufacture the integrated circuit systems commercially, and the acquisition of this technology has been high on the Soviet shopping list. It is considered that the Soviets would probably have access to any Western electronic technology acquired by Poland. Finally, the agencies considered that approval of this case would make it almost impossible to maintain COCOM embargoes on this line of important technology (obversely, there is the possibility that, if their request is not approved, the French might proceed with the sale and thumb their nose at COCOM). Thus, in light of the unanimity within the bureaucracy not present in the case last year, we cleared (with General Haig’s concurrence) a cable stating the U.S. objection. Copy is attached at Tab A. 3 Predictably, the French were upset at the U.S. objection. Late on October 16, Lucet sent me an aide-memoire for transmission to you (Tab B). 4 I told the French that the note would be studied with care, but that they should understand that there was unanimity within the U.S. Government on this case unlike the situation which prevailed last year. In short, I gave the French no basis for encouragement. On October 17, Alphand called in Culley (DCM in Paris) and gave him a similar note (Tab C). 5 The notes point out the considerable importance the French place on this deal, and also indicate that the French read more into the favorable American decision of last year than they should have. The French proposed to send a team to Washington to furnish us with additional information which, they say, it is not possible to provide within COCOM because of potential competition in the Polish market. The French insist that the transfer of technology will not create any strategic difficulties in the military field. Prior to Lucet’s transmittal of the note to me, Phil Trezise met with his French counterpart who happened to be here and provided him with a copy of the aide-memoire Lucet later sent me. Trezise told him that we were willing to hold meetings with a French team of technicians, as well as individuals who could review the political aspects. Having received Trezise’s report, Culley also told Alphand the same thing. The French will very soon propose a date for the arrival of their team. 6 There are two possible directions which this issue can take. One possibility is that once the French team arrives, the solid phalanx of agency opposition will begin to crumble, with State finally favoring the deal, and with Defense remaining opposed on security grounds. At some point the issue will then be sent here for arbitration as it was last year. The other possibility (probably more remote) is that the agencies will remain solidly opposed, and the French then will expect you or the President to reverse the bureaucracy by a political decision. At that point you may want to take up the issue with the President. Regardless which direction the matter takes, the issue will be sticky, particularly in light of our own negative decision in the case of the catalytic cracker for Poland. 7 The other COCOM members are cagey in playing this one. Apparently, the UK, Dutch, Italians, Germans and Japanese are not happy with the French request on security grounds, but may not wish to buck the French (the UK increasingly feels that the French are getting away with more in COCOM than others). Commercial factors are also at play. These others may very well consider that if the French have their way on this case, then a quid pro quo can be demanded which would involve a loosening of the COCOM restrictions for future cases—which would benefit their own commercial interests. Recommendation: That you approve the general line of “no encouragement” which I took with the French. 8 That, since State has already agreed to receive the French team, you agree that there is no need for you to become involved at this point (I shall of course continue to monitor the action). 9 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. Secret. A handwritten note by Kissinger dated October 31 reads: “Hal—Lucet has asked about the French request to cooperate on nuclear diffusion plant. Where does it stand? Please let me know by opening of business November 5.” In an attached November 4 note Sonnenfeldt reported that he dealt with the question in a separate memorandum of the same date. 2 The French request was pursuant to the lifting of U.S. objections. See Document 365 . 3 Telegram 167672 to USOECD, October 12; not printed. 4 Not found. 5 Telegram 14224 from Paris, October 17; not printed. 6 The meetings were held November 16-17; see Document 367 . 7 See Document 319 . 8 Kissinger initialed the Approve option. 9 Kissinger initialed the Agree option and wrote below it: “Inform Lucet of State conv[ersation] with French team.” Sonnenfeldt wrote below that: “I called Lucet 11/3 to note that State will receive French team.” 367. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 367. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 8, 1970. SUBJECT French Proposal to Manufacture Integrated Circuits in Poland In M. Alphand’s meeting with you on December 11 it is anticipated that he will raise the French proposal to transfer equipment and technology to Poland for the manufacture of integrated circuits. This proposal, which constitutes the second phase of a large Franco-Polish electronics project, was opposed by the United States in COCOM 2 on October 13. 3 You will recall that M. Schumann raised with you the first phase of the project, i.e., silicon transistor technology, during your meeting with him in Paris in August 1969. Following bilateral discussions with the French in Washington later in the year, the United States approved that first phase while warning that the later stage would be more difficult. 4 As reported in my memorandum to you dated October 27, 1970, 5 we agreed to meet with French about their proposal and discussions were held in Washington on November 16 and 17 (see enclosed reporting telegram 189344 to Paris). 6 The French placed special stress on the political and economic importance of the overall Franco-Polish venture (valued at $100 million), which they say will be placed in jeopardy if the integrated circuit portion is not approved. They emphasized also the current depressed state of the French electronics industry and noted the advantages to the West in helping Poland become less dependent on the Soviet Union in the important electronics field. The main point at issue in the technical part of the discussions was the French assertion that the integrated circuits concerned are produced in France on a civilian production line and do not meet performance levels required for military applications. United States experts pointed out that in the United States, military and civilian integrated circuits are produced from the same process and materials. In this country testing determines which integrated circuits meet the higher military standards and which can be sold for less rigorous civilian applications. At the conclusion of the talks, the French invited us to send experts to inspect a French integrated circuit production line to clarify the question of whether a valid distinction can be made between military and essentially civilian integrated circuits. We accepted and a United States team plans to visit the plant on December 9 and 10. Their findings together with further technical evaluation of the French proposal which is taking place here will assist in reaching a final decision on this case. The Department went along with the desire of the other agencies concerned to object to the French proposal primarily because of the probable impact on COCOM strategic controls in the electronics sector. The French case cannot be judged in isolation since there are pending cases submitted by other COCOM members which will be virtually impossible to deny if the French case is approved. Moreover, it is clear that French assistance in this case could be expected to advance Polish production capabilities and it cannot be ruled out entirely that the Poles would in turn be able to provide some assistance to the Soviets. On the other hand, the Polish plant will not be in full production until 1975 when the Soviets will probably have expanded their own production of integrated circuits to meet their needs and when the state-of-the-art in the Soviet Union will probably have advanced beyond that represented by this French technology. Moreover, there is strong and growing support among COCOM members for a relaxation of COCOM controls on semi-conductors and manufacturing technology. West European and Japanese firms, as well as our own electronic component firms, are looking increasingly to the Eastern European market, and some relaxation of COCOM controls in this sector is likely to take place over the next few years in any event. All COCOM members have expressed approval of the French proposal except the United States and the Netherlands, and the Dutch will undoubtedly be guided by the final United States position. If this question is raised by M. Alphand, it is suggested that you tell him that we are following up on the French suggestion to visit their integrated circuit plant and that we hope to reach a final decision shortly. Ted C 7 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. Confidential. This memorandum is Tab C to a December 10 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger transmitting briefing material for Kissinger’s meeting with Hervé Alphand on December 11. 2 Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (includes NATO, except Iceland; and Japan). [Footnote in the source text.] 3 See Document 366 and footnote 2 thereto. 4 See Document 365 . 5 Not found. 6 Not printed; telegram 189344 to Paris is dated November 19. Telegram 167672 to USOECD, October 12, is also attached; see also footnote 3, Document 366 . 7 Curran signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature. 368. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 368. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, January 22, 1971. SUBJECT French Proposal to Manufacture Integrated Circuits in Poland In my memorandum of December 8, 1970, 2 I reported that discussions had been held with the French about their proposal to transfer equipment and technology to Poland for the manufacture of integrated circuits and that United States experts would conduct an on-site inspection of the production line in question. The technical evaluation of the French production line prepared by Mr. Howard H. Steenbergen, Electronics Engineer at the USAF Avionics Laboratory, is attached. 3 The report confirms the French assertion made during the Washington talks that separate production lines are operated for civilian and military integrated circuits. The major differences in the circuits produced on the two lines are described as follows: the military version uses ultrasonic aluminum wire bonding whereas the commercial version uses gold wire bonding (without tight production controls gold wire bonding may be less resistant to high temperatures), and the civilian version is encased in plastic whereas the military version is in a metal package. The report does not mention that the military circuits are required to meet broader temperature tolerances and in some cases have different switching characteristics (these differences were cited by French engineers at the plant and are also given in the firm’s product catalogs). While there has been no testing of finished integrated circuits from the French production line to determine how many would meet U.S. military specifications, the report states that since the production equipment and techniques are comparable to U.S. production facilities a significant portion of the French output from their commercial line would be expected to meet the requirements for advanced computers and certain military applications including missiles. On the other hand, the French maintain that circuits from their commercial line are unacceptable to French military purchasers. (The five circuits to be sold to Poland are all produced on the commercial line.) In discussing this report with Mr. Steenbergen, he stressed that it deals solely with the integrated circuit portion of the large Franco/Polish electronics project. He agreed that the additional security risk resulting from the sale to Poland of the integrated circuit technology and machinery, given that silicon transistor technology and machinery has already been sold to the Poles, would be small. He bases this conclusion on the following: 1) the planar technology for producing integrated circuits is essentially the same as that required to produce silicon transistors, 2) the only additional manufacturing equipment required is sorting and testing machinery, and 3) the French will supply from France the masks required for integrated circuit manufacture rather than supply the technology and machinery to produce the masks. We have summarized in an attachment the various technical considerations in this case as we see them. 4 As indicated, the precedent-making aspects cause us some concern. On the other hand, we do not believe that the Steenbergen report supports a conclusion that major strategic risk would be incurred if this sale goes through. The French can be expected to press in the strongest way for our concurrence. They will reiterate the importance of the Polish project to the French economy and stress that the project has taken on a new significance in light of the recent political developments in Poland. In the circumstances, we recommend the lifting of our objection to this transaction which was registered in COCOM last October. 5 James Carson 6 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. 2 Document 367 . 3 Not found. 4 Not found. 5 See Document 366 . 6 Carson signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature. 369. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) 369. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) 1 Washington, January 25, 1971. SUBJECT Sale of British Computers to the Soviet Union During his recent conversations with the President, Prime Minister Heath raised the question of the export of U.K. computers to the Soviet Union. 2 As a result, the President would like to receive an interagency review of the issue, outlining the implications for U.S. national security and foreign policy of the different courses of action open to the United States Government. The review should be conducted by the Under Secretaries Committee and submitted to the President by February 15, with agency recommendations. It would be useful if, prior to the Committee review, a technical examination were conducted by the Office of Science and Technology to help provide a basis for the policy decision, as proposed in the Executive Secretary’s memorandum of January 13. 3 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/USC Memos. No classification marking. 2 The President met with Prime Minister Heath at the White House and at Camp David on December 17 and 18, 1970. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 3 The January 13 memorandum was not found. The 23-page Office of Science and Technology report, entitled “Technical Examination of the Proposed Sale of an ICL 1906 Computer Complex to the Institute of High Level Physics at Serpukhov (USSR),” is dated February 11. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/USC Memos) 370. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 370. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, February 12, 1971. SUBJECT French Proposal to Manufacture Integrated Circuits in Poland The memorandum at Tab I forwards to the President for decision agency recommendations on the French proposal for integrated circuit manufacture in Poland. 2 We had previously hoped that a Defense Department “expert’s” report on the French production line 3 would assist in reaching a decision on this issue. However, the report is not very helpful on the question of Eastern Europe capability in producing integrated circuits. The report (attached to the State memorandum) 4 concluded that in the French plant there is a difference between the military and commercial production lines, but that the commercial production line produces a significant share of integrated circuits fit for military use. State argues for approval mainly on the basis that the transaction does not represent a serious threat to U.S. security. (State neglects making a strong foreign policy argument.) Commerce and Defense argue against the transaction primarily on the basis that it would enable the Eastern countries to produce high quality integrated circuits in great volume , something they are yet unable to do, though these agencies acknowledge that the Russians can produce a small number of these circuits already. 5 Your memorandum to the President makes no recommendation. I am afraid that if you want to make one you will have to weigh yourself the effect on our relations with France against the President’s either overriding (for the second time) 6 or going along with Secretary Laird. The security issue seems to be insoluble as between the interested agencies. There is no way for us to make an independent judgment on it unless you want to commission a whole new study, subject it to debate and thus delay a decision even longer than it unfortunately has been already. 7 After the President’s decision, you should sign the memorandum at Tab II if the President decides to approve the transaction, or the memorandum at Tab III if the President decides to deny the request. 8 To avoid future memoranda straggling in from the various agencies addressing the subject in a piecemeal fashion, both of these decision memoranda also ask that future contested cases be sent to the President through established interagency procedures to avoid our having to solicit separate agency comments which bypass each other’s arguments. Recommendation: 1. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I. 2. That after the President’s decision you sign the appropriate memorandum at Tab II (approval) or III (denial). 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. Secret. Attached to Document 371 . At the top of the page is the handwritten note, presumably by Sonnenfeldt: “VERY URGENT.” Another handwritten note, dated February 17, by Kissinger reads: “Redo last page—I tend to agree with Defense and Commerce. French have not been cooperative enough to justify it on policy grounds.” 2 Tab I was not found, but see Document 371 . 3 Not found. 4 Presumably a reference to Document 368 . 5 In a February 9 memorandum to Kissinger, attached to Document 371 , Laird wrote that after discussing the technical evaluation report again with Steenbergen, the Defense Department conclusions differed from those of the State Department, and he recommended sustaining the objection in COCOM. A February 12 memorandum by Secretary of Commerce Stans is also attached to Document 371 . 6 In 1969 the President had accepted the State Department position rather than that of the Defense Department. See Documents 364 and 365 . 7 Sonnenfeldt initialed in the right margin next to this paragraph. 8 Tabs II and III were not found. 371. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 371. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 25, 1971. SUBJECT French Proposal to Manufacture Integrated Circuits in Poland The French are pressing forward on a $100 million industrial transaction with Poland. You approved our assent to the first phase of this operation in October 1969 allowing the French to export silicon transistor technology. 2 Since June 1970 the French have been seeking our agreement in the international Coordinating Committee for Export Controls (COCOM) for the second stage of the project allowing manufacture of integrated circuits in Poland. In October we opposed their request. 3 The French then suggested a series of technical discussions and invited American experts to visit the SESCOSEM plant in Grenoble to examine the technology which would be reproduced in Poland. The French claim that their Grenoble plant had two separate production lines, one capable of making military-quality integrated circuits; the other makes a lower grade civilian quality circuit and would be the prototype of the Polish plant. The French maintained that their proposed sale would not significantly enhance Eastern bloc military capabilities and would not be a danger to Western security. In order to establish a basis for US Government decision, the agencies took advantage of the French invitation for an American expert to visit the Grenoble plant, but they now disagree on the implication of the expert’s report and on whether or not we should accede to the French request. In short, State recommends that we approve the transaction as one unlikely to be dangerous to the US national security and as necessary because of the serious foreign policy consequences of a refusal on US-French relations. 4 Secretary Laird recommends that we continue our refusal primarily because the proposal would significantly enhance Polish (and Soviet) capability to produce in large numbers high quality low-cost integrated circuits for military usage. CIA confirms the Defense analysis. Secretary Stans also concludes that the transaction would represent a major security risk. 5 In addition, he argues that acquiescence would place us in the untenable position of approving foreign applications for shipment of electronic products to Eastern Europe while denying this same market to American producers. The French maintain that the strategic implications of the transaction would be minimal. A number of high French officials have indicated that they will consider US refusal a blow to US-French relations. Should we continue to refuse, there may be a direct appeal from President Pompidou to you. It is also quite possible that the French would decide to go ahead anyway, which would undermine Western cooperation in the COCOM. Recommendation You have two choices: 1. I tend to agree with Defense and Commerce that we should continue to oppose the sale at this time. This course will cause displeasure with the French, and provide no guarantee that the French will not proceed with the sale despite our opposition (and undermine COCOM); but they have not been sufficiently cooperative of late, especially on Southeast Asian affairs, to justify approval on essentially political grounds since the security implications appear on balance to be on the negative side. 6 2. Agree to the sale as proposed by State, overruling Defense and Commerce. This would be consistent with the approach of making political gestures to the French, but could have negative security implications. 7 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 677, France, Volume VII 10/70-3/71. Secret. Attached to a March 4 memorandum from Davis to Eliot confirming that the President had decided to continue to oppose the French proposal to manufacture integrated circuits in Poland. A stamped notation indicates the President saw this memorandum, which was proposed to Kissinger by Bergsten and Sonnenfeldt; see Document 370 and footnote 1 thereto. 2 See Document 365 . 3 See Document 366 . 4 See Document 368 . 5 Regarding the Defense and Commerce Department positions, see footnote 5, Document 370 . The CIA position has not been identified. 6 The President initialed the Approve option. 7 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is initialed. 372. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon 372. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 18, 1971. SUBJECT Sale of British Computers to the Soviet Union Prime Minister Heath raised with you during his visit last December the British proposal to sell two large computers to the Institute of High Energy Physics at Serpukhov near Moscow. 2 This matter has now been reviewed by the Under Secretaries Committee, following a technical study conducted by the Office of Science and Technology. The Committee’s report as well as the OST study are enclosed. 3 The basic questions posed are 1) would the special safeguards proposed by the British be effective in reducing the risk of misuse of the computers to an acceptably low level, and 2) would approval seriously erode existing computer export controls or could this application be considered as constituting a unique case? The Committee could not agree on answers to these questions and the different views are given in the enclosed report. The Committee was also unable to agree on recommendations with respect to the policy options. DOD, JCS, AEC, and STR recommend that we reaffirm our objection to the sale. Commerce favors reaffirmation of our objection; but, if your decision is to approve the transaction, believes that approval should be predicated upon prior acceptance by the three governments concerned of very explicitly articulated safeguards and procedures for implementing them. State, Treasury, OST, CEA, and USIA recommend that we lift our objection on condition that the UK agree to effective implementation of the proposed safeguards and to support continuation of tight controls on computers and technology at the next COCOM list review. NS Enclosure 4 Washington, March 16, 1971. NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE REPORT SUBJECT British Proposal to Sell Two Large Computers to the USSR I. Introduction In response to Mr. Kissinger’s memorandum of January 25, 1971, 5 the Under Secretaries Committee has reviewed an outstanding U.S. objection in COCOM to the export by a United Kingdom firm (ICL) of two large computers to the Institute of High Energy Physics at Serpukhov in the USSR. Prime Minister Heath raised this matter during his visit with the President and with Secretary Rogers. In order to assist the Committee review, a technical study on this matter was prepared by a panel convened by the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and is attached to this report. The Institute at Serpukhov conducts unclassified basic research and engages in extensive exchanges of data, publications, and personnel in international cooperation efforts with institutions and scientists from free world countries, including the United States. The principal instrument around which the Institute’s activities center is the world’s currently most powerful (76 Gev) proton accelerator. 6 An appropriate computer facility has been designed to complement the research potential of the Institute. The computers proposed for export exceed the performance standards of the BESM 6, which is the best Soviet computer available to the Institute, and will satisfy only approximately one-half of the Institute’s foreseeable computational requirements. When the U.K. presented this proposal to COCOM in October 1970, we objected to it because of the risk of diversionary use of the computer facility for other than its intended purposes as well as the precedent-making implications which the export could have for controls over advanced computers. Additionally, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had urged that advanced computers not be sent to the USSR. Because of the unanimity rule in COCOM, and the inclusion of more than $3 million in U.S. parts and components, the British Government has been constrained from licensing the proposed export although the U.S. is alone in objecting. Italy and the Netherlands had reserved judgment at the time the U.S. raised its COCOM objection in October, 1970. A refusal by the United States to approve the case will offend the British, for whom this $11 million sale is a significant transaction in terms of their hope to be a principal supplier of large computers to the USSR. It also may disappoint some members of the U.S. scientific community whose work involves them with the Institute at Serpukhov. In order to overcome the U.S. objection, the British Government, in cooperation with ICL, has since outlined a series of safeguards which they believe will reduce the risks of misuse of the computers. Safeguards include (1) the planning of as full a research schedule as possible for the machines, (2) the necessity of written supporting documentation for individual program runs, (3) contractual rights of free access by specialists of free world parties, which have cooperation agreements with Serpukhov (presently U.S., U.K. and France), (4) 10-year control over spares and on-site maintenance, and (5) ICL willingness to obtain Soviet agreement before export of the computers to permit U.K. personnel to empty memory cores on demand of their stored informational contents and to transmit them for U.K. (and U.S.) governmental analysis. II. Security Aspects No transfer of production technology would be involved in this case. The security risk is the potential clandestine use of the computers’ capacity for strategic military purposes, e.g., advanced weapons design computations. The risk of diversion depends on the answers to two questions: 1) Can the proposed safeguards be implemented? 2) If implemented, will the safeguards be effective in reducing the risks of misuse of the computers? There is general agreement that the answer to the first question is, for the most part, yes. On the second question, opinions differ. State believes that the safeguards bring the risk of misuse to an acceptably low level. DOD believes that the safeguards are ineffective since they offer no high probability that diversion, if attempted, would be eventually discovered. Basis for position held by State The OST panel study deals with the British presentations on safeguards as well as the technical feasibility of establishing absolute safeguards and detection against misuse of the facility. The OST panel believes that diversion of less than of the order of 25 percent of capacity for two or more years would not be worth the effort required of the Soviets to effect clandestine diversion. The panel believes that this much diversion of the computers’ time from legitimate work needs would likely be sensed by foreign specialists working at the Institute and who will be familiar with its research programs. The study concludes that while complete elimination of risk of clandestine misuse is not possible, the risk of such diversion is low. The study posits that it is not possible to assert with certainty that diversion, if attempted, would be discovered. However, the study notes that the ability to “dump” the contents of the computers exposes the Soviets to a finite danger of discovery provided these dumps are analyzed by U.S. personnel. Experts believe that someone familiar with high energy physics programs and weapons programs would have a good chance of detecting a significant illicit program in the core, provided he had a knowledge of the machine’s language and an awareness of the program supposedly being run at the time of the dump. State accepts the technical views of the panel, noting that it consisted of distinguished scientists with extensive experience in the fields of computers, high energy physics and strategic weapons design. State suggests, moreover, that because of the presence of foreign scientists at the Institute and the core dump provision, the Soviets would not consider the Institution’s computers to be fully secure for handling classified programs despite the machines’ location on Soviet territory. Hence, they would be extremely unlikely to use weapons programs on such systems. The Soviets would be much more likely to use an additional Soviet-built BESM 6, which has approximately 25 percent of the power of the total British system, for weapons calculations than to try to divert time from an installation not completely under their control. State notes that the British have supplied information subsequent to the OST report which demonstrates that the main and secondary storage capacity planned for Serpukhov is similar to that provided for comparable U.S. and U.K. installations. Basis for position held by DOD The fundamental flaw in the safeguard proposals is that when the concrete steps required to put them into meaningful practice are examined, the potential effectiveness of the safeguards appears increasingly remote. For example, the first three safeguards proposed by the British assume that discrepancies between computer usage and the needs of legitimate programs would be quickly noted. Yet, according to the OST study, a knowledgeable U.S. scientist working at Serpukhov and knowing the various experimental and test programs there could assess the computational load only within a factor of two. In other words, so far as these three safeguards are concerned, a diversion of approximately half of the computational capacity might go undetected. To achieve even this much control would require considerable and continuing experience with the installation. Thus, these safeguards depend on the presence at Serpukhov of knowledgeable U.S. scientists willing to carry out a monitoring scheme and able to remain at the installation for extended tours of duty. DOD believes such a U.S. presence would be required on all shifts. 7 The OST report lists the “dumping” of the computer core as the only special safeguard offered by the U.K. which has any teeth against a determined effort at diversion. In this connection, it is worth noting that it is only the content of the cores, e.g., the internal memory of each central processing unit, and not all stored informational content which is subject to dumping on demand. Thus, the OST panel stated it could not assert that diversion, if attempted, would be eventually discovered with a high degree of probability. It pointed out that schemes are possible to “capture” the executive system and replace it with one which “looks” the same externally on legitimate work but which allows “hidden” programs to be run. This means that an illicit program might be detected only if it happened to be in the central processing unit when the dump was made. It is at this point that the OST panel’s questions as to why the system includes unusually large external memories become especially relevant. Assuming the right to demand core dumping is exercised at sufficiently frequent intervals to capture any illicit programs, there is, according to a report of the National Academy of Sciences, 8 no presently developed methodology for analyzing the contents of such a dump. Moreover, the National Academy of Sciences has estimated that an expenditure of several hundred thousand dollars of research effort over a period of one to three years would be needed to develop such a methodology. In addition, DOD believes it would be necessary to create in the U.S. a group of high-energy physicists, computer center managers and weapons designers to analyze the recorded data obtained from each dump. How large this group would need to be and whether it would be engaged on a full or only part-time basis will depend upon the frequency of the dumps and the methodology developed for analyzing their contents. Unless this aspect of the problem is addressed and solved, including the funding of such a group, even the core dump provision will be an empty safeguard. The 10-year control over spares and on-site maintenance is less a safeguard against diversion than the basis on which sanctions would be applied if a diversion were detected. It is, of course, a threat whose impact will depend on whether the USSR has any reason to suppose the U.K. would actually cut off support if a diversion was suspected and proved. In this connection, it is not easy to imagine such a drastic sanction being employed on the basis of the kind of evidence which the other safeguards are apt to provide. It is worth noting that when the Soviets two years ago expressed interest in a comparable U.S. computing system, the CDC 6600 for Serpukhov, an interdepartmental review, backed by two outside studies, concluded that the U.S. Government would be unwilling to issue an export license except possibly under safeguard conditions which would be either unacceptable to the Soviets or too expensive to carry out on the U.S. side. Comments by other Agencies AEC believes that the OST panel based its conclusion of low risk of diversion largely on U.S. presence at Serpukhov, although in the AEC view there is waning interest in Serpukhov and there may not be any U.S. scientists there after the present program is completed later this year. On the other hand, OST points out that the panel’s estimates were based on Western presence, not just U.S., and that the British have agreed to obtain random core dump printouts. OST believes that there will be continuing U.S. interest in the Serpukhov accelerator even after the large U.S. accelerator at Batavia becomes available. III. Precedent-Making Implications A difference of Committee views also developed in assessing the precedent-making implications of a decision to lift the U.S. objection to the export of these ICL computers. Position of State Regarding the potential impact of this export on COCOM and U.S. export controls, the international stature and importance of the Institute as the largest in its field, its willingness to accept extraordinary safeguard conditions and its openness to foreign scientists, can be considered as constituting a unique situation which justifies a single exception. Should the British export be approved, possible proposals by Control Data Corporation to sell large computers to other Soviet research institutes such as those at Yerevan and Dubna, as well as any subsequent proposals, would necessarily be subjected to detailed investigation on their individual merits in accordance with the standards applied in this case. An additional factor relating to large CDC machines, which does not apply in this case, is that there are weapons codes compiled in CDC computer machine language. Pressures for relaxation of computer parameters which exist within COCOM are endemic and can be anticipated to continue regardless of the outcome of the British proposal. As far is known British ICL is the only non-U.S. company presently seeking orders in Eastern Europe for computers which exceed the COCOM technical limits. A further consideration is that the Soviet agreement to on-site inspections by Americans on their territory could, if carried out, establish a useful precedent which might facilitate future arms control negotiations. Finally, the safeguards in this case bring it within the U.S./U.K. guidelines for dealing with computer exceptions requests. Position of DOD There is little doubt that this transaction, if approved, would create an undesirable precedent for both COCOM and U.S. controls. The OST panel noted that each of the two systems exceeds the COCOM guidelines in every relevant specification by a considerable margin. To approve this export and not do great violence to COCOM controls, it would be necessary for the U.S. to claim that the Institute is a uniquely deserving end-user, that its personnel are not likely to be required by the Soviet Government to divert the system and that, in any case, the safeguards included in the contract effectively eliminate the risk of such diversion. If these claims are made, the predictable result would be the prompt submission, by U.S. firms as well as others, of a number of requests for the export of very large computers to other destinations in the USSR. Each request will claim the end-user to be deserving; each will assert the improbability of diversion; and each will propose to include safeguards similar to those accepted for Serpukhov. It will be difficult for the U.S. to object to these requests since by approving the Serpukhov case, it will have, in effect, certified the adequacy of the Serpukhov safeguards. If the safeguards were, in fact, adequate, this result would be entirely acceptable. The crucial fact, however, is they are not, and to the extent that they can be used to justify computer exports the net result will be the rapid destruction of existing U.S. and COCOM controls. The British could go ahead despite lack of COCOM approval, but would then have to consider the need for U.S. unilateral approval to ship the estimated $3 million of U.S. parts and components which are included in their proposed export. Comments by other Agencies The AEC believes that a favorable U.S. decision could result in the establishment of undesirable precedents in our international embargo control scheme as well as increased pressures from both U.S. and foreign computer firms to sell embargoed computers to the bloc. It would be extremely difficult to maintain present U.S. and international controls if such a major exception is made to these embargo controls. The U.S. has been the primary spokesman among our Western European allies over the years for restraining trade with the bloc in large, strategically-useful computers. A major departure from this position, as would be represented by approval of the U.K. case, would erode significantly our posture on computer controls that the U.S. has long held with its Western allies. AEC believes that U.S. companies, particularly CDC, will push for approval of several large computer exports to the Soviet Union if the U.K. case is approved. OST believes that the security risk from this one transaction is not significant. Approval should be predicated on the uniqueness of the Serpukhov facility, its use and needs, as well as a clear understanding with the British that it would not represent a precedent for frequent exceptions of such magnitude. It notes that there are at present no other 76 GEV accelerators in the USSR or the world, which could similarly qualify as unique international institutions. Policy Options 1. Reaffirm U.S. objection in COCOM. PRO a. Would avoid incurring any security risk. b. Would avoid the precedent-making implications which would flow from approval of computers of this size. c. Would permit additional time to develop more effective safeguards as well as to determine if safeguards negotiated with the U.K. in previous cases are effective. CON a. Prime Minister Heath’s raising this subject with the President underscores the great importance the British attach to it. Reaffirmation of our negative position after their extraordinary efforts to satisfy our concerns would be very disappointing to the British. b. The Soviets would cite our decision as further evidence of U.S. reluctance to permit peaceful trade in goods containing advanced technology. c. If this exception is not approved, the U.K., supported by others, can be expected to press for relaxation of COCOM controls during the coming List Review. 2. Lift our objection. PRO a. Would be responsive to Prime Minister Heath’s personal approach to the President. b. The on-site inspection arrangements could establish a possibly useful precedent for future arms control negotiations. c. Would provide increased opportunities for Western cooperation in high energy physics at Serpukhov and might cause some general improvement in the Soviet attitude toward cooperative scientific ventures. d. Would ease pressures for sales of computer production technology to Communist countries by demonstrating that occasional sales of advanced hardware can be approved. CON a. Would provide the USSR with an advanced computer system better than any they now have and capable of being diverted to important strategic uses. Until additional details are developed on implementation of proposed safeguards, it is not possible to establish that such diversion would be detected. b. Would encourage U.S. and other firms to attempt sales of large computers to the USSR and Eastern Europe. c. Would cause increased pressure by American manufacturers for relaxation of U.S. export controls. d. Would encourage some COCOM members to demand a more flexible policy toward exceptional exports of other strategic items and technology. e. Would set the stage for demand by other COCOM members for a major reduction in computer embargo levels at the List Review. 3. Lift our objection on conditions that 1) U.K. agree to effective implementation of the proposed safeguards, particularly joint procedures for the inspection and random core dump provisions including the transmission of the core printouts to the U.S., 2) U.K. agree to support continuation of tight controls on computers and technology at the next List Review. PRO a. Would be responsive to Prime Minister Heath’s personal approach to the President provided agreement can be reached on effective implementation of the safeguards. b. Would involve the British with us jointly in a safeguards implementation procedure, which could provide valuable experience to both countries and have important implications for future transactions in the computer field. c. Would tend to reduce the unfavorable precedent-making aspects. d. Would provide increased opportunities for Western cooperation in high energy physics at Serpukhov and might cause some general improvement in the Soviet attitude toward cooperative scientific ventures. e. Might establish a precedent for inspection or safeguards of some future value in arms control negotiations. CON a. Could be expensive in U.S. manpower and money to implement safeguards. b. Would delay execution of ICL contract until implementing details were worked out. c. Would require USSR to accept controls possibly beyond those already contemplated. d. Would probably still entail some security risk. e. Might encourage U.S. and other firms to attempt sales of large computers to the USSR and Eastern Europe. f. Might encourage other COCOM partners to demand equal treatment on other strategic items and technology. g. Export of these large computers by the U.K. would tend to reduce the value of U.K. support for continued tight controls over computers in COCOM. DOD, JCS, AEC and STR recommend Option 1. State, Treasury, OST, CEA and USIA recommend Option 3. Commerce favors reaffirmation of the objection as in Option 1; but, if the President’s decision is to approve the transaction, believes that approval should be predicated upon prior acceptance by the three governments concerned of very explicitly articulated safeguards and procedures for implementing them. Approve: Option 1—reaffirm our objection Option 2—lift our objection Option 3—lift our objection on conditions that 1) UK agree to effective implementation of the proposed safeguards, particularly joint procedures for the inspection and random core dump provisions including the transmission of the core printout to the U.S., 2) UK agree to support continuation of tight controls on computers and technology at next list review 9 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 94C. Confidential. Transmitted to members of the Under Secretaries Committee under cover of a March 19 memorandum from Staff Director Hartman. Hartman also sent a copy to Peterson (CIEP). Several earlier drafts of the memorandum are ibid. 2 See footnote 2, Document 369 . 3 The OST report is not printed; see footnote 3, Document 369 . 4 Confidential. An undated memorandum from Trezise to Samuels transmitted a draft of this USC report, which Trezise indicated was based on the OST report. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/USC Memos) 5 Document 369 . 6 The U.S. will have available in the 1972-73 time frame a much larger accelerator (300 Gev) now under construction in Batavia, Illinois. However, it will be useful for Americans to have access to the Soviet machine even after the U.S. accelerator becomes available. [Footnote in the source text.] 7 OST notes in this regard that Dr. Ling, Chairman of the OST panel, in a subsequent conversation stated that this statement in the OST report is misleading outside of the context of the discussion which led to its inclusion and should preferably have been deleted from the final draft. The accurate statement summarizing the panel’s view is that a diversion of one-third of the computational capacity would be detectable to Westerners working at Serpukhov. [Footnote in the source text.] 8 Preliminary Report of the Computer Science and Engineering Board, National Academy of Sciences, September 22, 1969. OST notes that this report does not specifically refer to core dump analysis nor does it make an estimate of the man-years and costs involved in developing a methodology for core dump analysis. DOD has apparently taken the term “signature analysis” and equated it with core dump analysis. As OST understands the former term, it is a far more comprehensive effort designed to detect or distinguish any record, data or activity, which indicates unusual or unexpected operation of the system. [Footnote in the source text.] 9 None of the options is checked or initialed. 373. Letter From President Nixon to Prime Minister Heath 373. Letter From President Nixon to Prime Minister Heath 1 Washington, May 12, 1971. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Thank you for your recent message on the proposal to sell two computers to the Soviet Physics Laboratory at Serpukhov. 2 We have now studied the matter at length, for, as you well realize, those aspects involving precedents or what might be construed as precedents we felt needed to be considered very carefully. As a result of this study, we have come to the conclusion that it should be possible for our two Governments to work out an arrangement that will meet our security problems both in regard to this sale and in regard to future consideration of computer cases in the Coordinating Committee. The State Department will shortly be in touch with your representatives to settle these details. 3 I am pleased that we have been able once again to settle satisfactorily a question that was of concern to you and, consequently, to us. With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 728, UK, Volume VI 4/71-8/71. No classification marking. Attached to a July 3 memorandum from Kissinger to the President informing him that successful security negotiations with the United Kingdom had been completed and that on June 25 the United States had lifted its COCOM objections to the proposed computer sale. “The President has seen” is stamped on the July 3 memorandum. 2 A copy of Heath’s March 17 message is ibid., NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom: Heath. 3 See Document 374 and footnote 1 thereto. 374. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Hartman) to the Members of the Under Secretaries Committee 374. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Hartman) to the Members of the Under Secretaries Committee 1 Washington, May 13, 1971. NSC-U SM 94D TO The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Under Secretary of Treasury The Under Secretary of Commerce The Special Trade Representative Mr. Hendrik S. Houthakker, Council of Economic Advisers Mr. James R. Schlesinger, Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission The Director of the Office of Science and Technology The Director of the United States Information Agency SUBJECT Sale of British Computers to the Soviet Union The President has decided that on the basis of the Acting Chairman’s memorandum to the President of March 18, 2 we should lift our objection to the sale of two British computers to the Serpukhov Laboratory on the conditions that (1) the U.K. agree to effective implementation of the proposed safeguards, particularly joint procedures for the inspection and random core dump provisions including the transmission of the core printouts to the U.S., and (2) the U.K. agree to support continuation of tight controls on computers and technology at the next Coordinating Committee List Review. 3 The U.K. Government has been informed of this decision. 4 The Acting Chairman has asked Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Philip Trezise, to chair an inter-agency group to consider questions of implementation. A.A. Hartman 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 94D. Confidential. A copy was sent to Peterson (CIEP). On May 13 Samuels sent a copy to Trezise, with a request that Trezise chair an interagency group to consider questions of implementation. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/USC Memos) 2 Document 372 . 3 The President’s decision, including the language in conditions (1) and (2), was forwarded to the Department of State in a May 12 memorandum from Kissinger to Irwin. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/USC Memos) 4 See Document 373 . 375. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 375. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 2, 1971. SUBJECT French Proposal to Manufacture Transistors in Poland You decided in March that the U.S. would oppose in COCOM a $20-million French proposal for the manufacture of integrated circuits in Poland. 2 This was the second stage of the $100 million French/Polish electronic transaction. You had approved the first stage for transistors in 1969. 3 Because of our opposition, the French have now pared the second stage in half and requested that we approve only that part relating to the production of transistors and diodes, thus eliminating the manufacturing capacity for integrated circuits. State recommends (at Tab A) 4 that you approve the new proposal. Commerce and Defense (at Tabs B and C) 5 recommend that you deny. Arguments for approval are: —Ambassador Lucet, Foreign Minister Schumann, Finance Minister Giscard, and other officials in Paris have indicated that France was deeply disappointed at your previous refusal and that it attaches great importance to approval of this version. Refusal would be viewed as an unfriendly act, but acceptance would soften the blow of Export-Import participation in the El Paso project. 6 —The quantity of transistors to be produced is consistent with Polish plans for expansion of their production of civilian communications equipment. —The French have previously indicated that if we block the proposal in COCOM, they are likely to go ahead anyway. Schumann has now informed me that he has authorized the signature of the contract. —By eliminating the integrated circuit manufacturing aspects and concentrating on the manufacture of transistors and diodes, the transaction is less objectionable from a security viewpoint. Though the French admit that the remaining part could, with some changes, be used to manufacture integrated circuits, they claim that Poland is technologically too backward to do this without Western help. The Commerce and Defense arguments against the transaction are: —This project would significantly increase Polish production of semi-conductors, some of which would be of sufficiently high quality to be useful for the military or for high speed computers. —Poland will be able to make the changes that would allow this technology to produce integrated circuits and strategic-type transistors, particularly since there is some evidence that the French are not being completely frank with us on this project and are willing to supply missing elements outside the COCOM controls. —Even if the whole production could be used in civilian production, it is obvious that the military will be able to skim off whatever it needs. —Approval of this project would threaten the maintenance of effective COCOM controls on transistors and integrated circuits. Specifically it would make it more difficult to resist approval of other similar projects such as a smaller Italo/Romanian transaction and an RCA proposal one-fifteenth the Polish size, to manufacture transistors in Romania. (I do not consider this wholly negative argument because of our special relations with Romania, and Pete Peterson believes that we should approve the RCA case, along with the French one.) The current reduced French proposal represents less of a security risk than the one you refused in March, though it is not clear by how much. Your decision last time was partially based on a lack of French cooperation with us on Southeastern Asian problems. President Pompidou has not repeated that mistake. 7 On balance, I believe that the consequences of a refusal on our relations with France outweighs the economic security considerations. Pete Peterson also recommends approval of the project, but he believes that approval should be contingent upon our concurrent approval of the RCA Romanian proposal. 8 Though we do not have the case formally for White House decision, the agencies agree in the attached papers that approval of the Polish case would make it very difficult to refuse the much smaller RCA/Romanian case. Approval of the RCA application would indicate an interest in U.S. exports and fit in with our economic cooperation with Romania. Recommendations 1. That you approve the reduced French proposal for the manufacture of transistors and diodes in Poland. 2. That you also accept Pete Peterson’s suggestion that we approve at the same time the RCA/Romanian proposal. 9 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 678, France, Volume VIII 4/71-12/71. Secret. A stamped notation indicates the President saw the memorandum. It is attached to a June 5 memorandum from Kissinger to Eliot informing him that the President had decided to approve in COCOM the modified French proposal for the manufacture of transistors in Poland, and that approval of the French/Polish case also meant the United States should accept a similar RCA proposal for Romania. A draft of the memorandum printed here was proposed to Kissinger in a May 28 memorandum from Johnston and Sonnenfeldt. (Ibid.) Sonnenfeldt outlined the genesis and tactics of the revised French proposal in an April 9 memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid.) 2 See footnote 1, Document 371 . 3 Document 365 . 4 Tab A, a May 19 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, is not printed. 5 Tab B, a May 26 memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce Harold B. Scott to Davis, is not printed. Tab C, the Defense Department paper, was not found. 6 The El Paso project was a liquefied natural gas project in Algeria. 7 The May 28 memorandum from Johnston and Sonnenfeldt (see footnote 1 above) noted that “our previous problem over Pompidou’s Vietnam statement has faded.” 8 Peterson’s recommendations are in a May 28 memorandum to Kissinger. Kissinger initialed his approval for the French/Polish and RCA/Romanian proposals. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 678, France, Volume VIII 4/71-12/71) 9 The President initialed the Approve options for both recommendations. 376. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 376. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 22, 1971. SUBJECT Security Trade Controls As you know, I have from time to time made known to you my misgivings over certain types of trade transactions with Communist countries. A number of actions taken in the last few weeks or currently in preparation give me fresh cause for concern. The most recent one is the decision to approve the French sale of transistor-making machinery to Poland. 2 Another is the approval given a few weeks ago to the British export of very advanced computers to the USSR’s High Energy Physics Institute at Serpukhov. 3 In addition, some far-reaching proposals are now being formulated for your consideration regarding the next steps we should take toward Communist China as well as ways to increase the U.S. share of East-West trade. My concern is that these several measures, taken together, are virtually certain to weaken seriously if not destroy the existing system of security trade controls which form an important, although not always adequately recognized, element in our defense structure. In order to preserve that margin of military power required by the deterrent strategy upon which our security depends, it is not enough to maintain our Defense establishment. We must also frustrate as far as possible the build-up of forces which are or may be arrayed against us. An effective system of controls over the export to Communist countries of strategic commodities therefore contributes directly to our national security and can help to keep U.S. military expenditures at a minimum. Although it has been subjected to heavy pressures both at home and abroad in the last few years, we still have an effective system of security trade controls. In fact, a study done by the Department of Defense last year in support of the since cancelled NSSM 71 4 fully documents the conclusion that our export controls have delayed the development of new independent nuclear weapons systems capabilities and the improvement of existing ones abroad by substantial periods of time, in some cases by a number of years. Moreover, the study, a copy of which is attached, 5 further shows that the economic and diplomatic costs of these controls to the U.S. in terms of loss of trade, resentment by other governments, interference with scientific exchange and loss of U.S. influence over the technological developments in other countries have not been significant. In the light of this evidence, I feel compelled to express my deep uneasiness over the course we seem to be taking, not only because it appears to be based on the erroneous assumption that our controls are both ineffective and costly, but because, by approving the release of highly strategic items on an ad hoc basis, we are paving the way for the rapid dismantling of all controls. It is already clear that our Allies, who feel they can rely on the U.S. to offset whatever increased military risk may result, will treat these decisions as precedents for additional exceptions or the early removal of such items from the international embargo list altogether. In my judgment, we cannot afford thus to jeopardize our security trade controls unless as a result we will achieve tangible diplomatic and economic gains of substantial value. Under present circumstances, I believe our principal aim should be constantly to refine our embargo list to insure that it contains only items which are, in fact, strategic in nature and, having done so, to hold fast to that list. This is of particular importance at this time since negotiations with our Allies on revisions to the international embargo list are scheduled to begin this fall. To provide guidance for our negotiators in this list review as well as to insure that appropriate emphasis is given to the security aspects of all trade measures involving Communist countries, I recommend that you reiterate to the departments and agencies concerned that it is vital to our national security that an effective system of security trade controls be continued. Mel Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 402, Trade, Volume IV 7-12/71. Confidential. Kissinger, in a July 9 memorandum forwarding this memorandum to the President, summarized Laird’s points, and reported that other agency comments had not been requested because the administration was not yet ready for a decision on COCOM list revision, pending bilateral discussions with other COCOM members during the summer. “The President has seen” is stamped on the July 9 transmittal memorandum. 2 See Document 375 . 3 See Document 373 . 4 Document 361 . 5 Not found. 377. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon 377. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 8, 1972. SUBJECT Export of Integrated Circuit Technology to Eastern Europe In response to your request of February 8, 1972, this Committee 2 has reviewed the status of a number of pending cases involving the export of integrated circuit technology to Eastern Europe. A status report prepared by an ad hoc inter-agency working group is attached. 3 This memorandum considers, in particular, cases involving proposed British and French exports to Poland and a proposed U.S. export to Romania. Related, generally less significant cases are enumerated in the attached report (pp. 9–10 [ Pgs. 9–10 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] ). These minor cases would be reviewed in the light of your decisions respecting the Polish and Romanian cases. The Polish Case During 1971, you decided in favor of permitting French assistance to Poland in the manufacture of transistors and against permitting such assistance for manufacturing integrated circuits. 4 The French Government has asked us to re-examine our rejection of assistance related to integrated circuits. 5 The British introduced in COCOM in 1971 a proposal to assist Poland in the manufacture of integrated circuits. Following a U.S. objection, the British have also asked us to withdraw our opposition. The French case involves exports valued at $7-8 million; the British, $6 million. Both cases involve export of technological assistance and manufacturing equipment which would enable Poland to move from a pilot to mass production stage. The stated purpose is to manufacture integrated circuits for “civilian-type” use—television sets, desk calculators, small computers. The integrated circuits could, however, be used in military equipment and more advanced computers. The assistance rendered Poland would also help Poland to advance to strategically more significant circuits. The British technology is slightly more advanced than the French, but the difference is not sufficient to provide a technical basis for distinguishing between the two cases. We are not entirely sure whether the two cases are competitive or complementary; however, there is some reason to believe that if both were approved, Poland might, because of financial considerations, elect to conclude only one of the two projects. Completion of both transactions would provide the Poles with a higher probability of success in solving their production problems. The ability to mass produce integrated circuits has permitted the West to enter a stage of electronic technology that is still largely closed to the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Integrated circuits permit higher reliability and smaller size, cost, and power requirements for electronic equipment. They are widely applied in the U.S. in computer circuits, industrial controls, communications, avionics, entertainment products and desk calculators. Integrated circuits have become essential to a wide range of Western military equipment, including the most advanced strategic weapons systems. Their reliability and compactness are ideally suited for uses in communications, guidance, control and related systems which operate in the extreme environments that are normal for strategic weapons. They account in significant degree for the qualitative superiority of US strategic weapons over those of the USSR. Their application in advanced computers has significant military ramifications. The Soviet Union and East European countries were delayed in undertaking integrated circuit research and have not based their military electronics on integrated circuits. They are capable of manufacturing integrated circuits on a limited basis in laboratories and pilot programs. However, these countries have been unsuccessful in their attempts to mass-produce these integrated circuits and, as a result, they have not been able to profit from this technology in their weapons systems. While individual pieces of Western equipment have been diverted illegally to the USSR and Eastern Europe, these countries still lag behind the U.S. by at least five years in mass production and application of integrated circuits. China has acquired equipment illegally from Japan that should enable it to produce integrated circuits suitable for its modern weapons program. There is, however, no solid evidence as to the scale of production China has achieved. In urging us to agree to these exports, the British and French have argued that Poland will, in any event, be able to achieve mass production on its own within several years. They consider that it would be better to assist Poland on a controlled basis than to refuse all help, thereby obliging Poland to cooperate more closely in electronics with the USSR. The French and British have cited economic difficulties of their firms which are involved, Thomson-CSF and Ferranti, respectively. These firms are experiencing difficulties, but the Polish orders are not large in relation to the total turnovers of the two firms. Accordingly, we do not find the economic argument overly persuasive. The high level approaches by the British and French Governments in these cases makes it likely that our continued refusal to approve them will bring lasting repercussions. During the week of February 28th, the British made a new series of representations and French Foreign Minister Schumann again wrote to Secretary Rogers to stress France’s “particular interest” in its case. The French have stated they must sign a contract with Poland by March 31. In the past, the French have in some instances proceeded with projects without securing COCOM approval. They may well be prepared to act in defiance of COCOM in this case if it is of sufficient interest to them, or to retaliate against American electronics imports into France. In the case of the British, it can be argued that rejection of the Ferranti proposal would heighten British disenchantment with COCOM arising from American vetoes. The British have implied that they might feel obliged if necessary to issue a license in violation of COCOM. On the other hand, approval of these cases would also have repercussions in COCOM. Smaller countries, noting the US response to political pressures, might claim their share of relaxation of controls. Having accepted a major relaxation in a key strategic area, the US would find it more difficult to resist pressures for weakening other important elements of the COCOM structure. Under these circumstances, it can be argued that it would thus be less objectionable, in view of the fact that COCOM violations have previously occurred, to risk French and British violations in this case than to give these transactions US endorsement. Since we have always discouraged American firms from promoting the sale to Communist countries of equipment for manufacturing integrated circuits, approval of the French and British cases could be viewed, in effect, as discriminatory against American companies that might have competed for the same contracts. American firms with off-shore operations are quite competitive in the sale of integrated circuits as finished products. An application by an American firm to export $10.5 million of non-military type integrated circuits to Bulgaria for use in desk calculators is now under review in the Commerce Department and is subject to approval under present rules. If you should decide in favor of the British and French proposals, it can be argued that it would be consistent to license the sale of end-product integrated circuits in Eastern Europe up to a comparable level of technology. American firms would thus be afforded the opportunity of competing for orders for a wider range of integrated circuits. The Romanian Case The particular Romanian case which you asked this Committee to examine involves the export from the United States of manufacturing equipment valued at $200,000 for testing integrated circuits. The Romanians need this equipment in connection with a production line set up by the French. In 1969, the French informed us of their plans to assist Romania to produce the IRIS-50 computer and integrated circuits for the computer, but refused to submit the case to COCOM. Export of the test equipment was rejected by the Department of Commerce in 1971, but the Romanians have recently asked for review of this decision. We have also objected to the sale by other COCOM members of pieces of equipment apparently intended for the same production facility in Romania. Agency Views The interested Departments (State, Commerce and Defense) have considered several alternative ways of replying to the French and British. The alternatives considered but rejected are presented in the attached report. The specific recommendations of the Departments concerned are given below. Explanations by the three Departments for their recommendations are presented in the first attachment to this memorandum. 6 The Department of State recommends that you approve the export to Poland and Romania of integrated circuit manufacturing technology and equipment up to the performance levels of the British and French proposals, subject to the following conditions: (a) assurances from Poland and Romania of non-transfer of the technology; (b) no export of finished circuits from Poland and Romania to other Communist countries without prior authorization; (c) assurances from Poland and Romania regarding peaceful end-use of the integrated circuits; (d) agreement by France and U.K. that they will support continued denial of integrated circuit manufacturing capability to other Communist countries, as well as denial to Poland and Romania of technology going beyond the performance levels of these proposals. The Department of Commerce recommends that you disapprove the export to Poland and Romania of integrated circuit technology and equipment, but approve a more liberal COCOM licensing policy on sales of integrated circuits themselves for civilian uses. Commerce recommends that this decision be communicated to the French and British Governments at a high level with an expression of the importance the US Government attaches to continued multinational control over integrated circuit technology and equipment and to their support of this position in COCOM. The Department of Defense recommends that you avoid so far as possible relying on assurances of other governments to protect the important strategic interests involved in these cases and disapprove the export to Poland and Romania of integrated circuit technology and equipment. As Acting Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee, I strongly recommend that, at the conclusion of the current COCOM list review, a basic examination should be undertaken of our strategy toward future efforts to control, through COCOM, exports to the Communist countries. This Committee is prepared to undertake this study if you so direct. Although this memorandum and its attachments were forwarded to the Department of Defense and Defense views have been incorporated, formal Defense Department concurrence has not been received as of this date. Nathaniel Samuels 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 85. Secret. Copies were sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Commerce, the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology under cover of a March 8 memorandum from Hartman. (Ibid.) 2 For the purposes of this report, the Committee has, in addition to regular members, included representatives of the Department of Commerce and the Office of Science and Technology. The Office of Science and Technology may present additional views separately. [Footnote in the source text. The February 8 request was not found.] 3 Not found. An undated 31-page report entitled “Export of Integrated Circuit Technology to Eastern Europe,” presumably an early draft of the report attached to this memorandum, is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC-U/DM 85. 4 See Documents 371 and 375 . 5 According to a February 29, 1972, letter from Schumann to Kissinger, the Foreign Minister had raised the issue with Secretary Rogers during the Azores Summit December 13-14, 1971. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 678, France, Volume IX 1/72-7/72) 6 Not found. 378. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 378. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 17, 1972. SUBJECT Proposed US Position on UK Sale of Satellite Earth Station to PRC In the attached message, the Department of State proposes to raise no objection in COCOM to UK sale of another satellite earth station to the PRC. 2 It would be comparable to the one which RCA sold, ostensibly in connection with the President’s visit. 3 I would like to state my non-concurrence in the proposed U.S. position. Approval of the UK sale will establish another precedent weakening the U.S. negotiating position on strategic communications export controls to the PRC and Eastern Europe. The stated technical merits of the case set forth in paragraphs 2(a) through (d) are questionable. The PRC cannot on its own operate “within the Intelsat framework” until she joins the International Telecommunications Union. She is unlikely to join the ITU as long as the Republic of China is a member. In the meanwhile her only point of contact with Intelsat is through RCA. The PRC’s need to have several satellite earth stations for international communications has not been established. It is also not “clearly established” that Intelsat offers sufficient control against strategic use. If the PRC obtains more than one earth station, and later orbits its own satellite, the resulting system could be used for any purpose and in a country as deficient in strategic communications as the PRC, this risk would be significant. The argument that satellite communications are more expensive than land communications is not convincing in view of existing facilities in the PRC. Working up from the present low level would be costly and time-consuming. Satellites would seem a quicker and cheaper means of attaining a trunking system to meet the most urgent, immediate need for strategic communications. The RCA sale has been taken as a precedent for the UK application and the Japanese are close behind. I now gather that the two video-voice terminals delivered by RCA to Shanghai apparently had nothing to do with the President’s visit, except in the company’s press releases and in its statement of end use which we in State, Commerce and Defense unfortunately accepted. I understand that the White House communications people did not allow the use of the Shanghai earth station for public radio or television purposes, on the advice of PRC officials, even during the portions of the visit in that city and in Hangchow. I do not believe we should now throw good money after bad. The difference between one earth station in the PRC and two stations is the potential for internal strategic communications. If we go to two, I do not see how we can hold the line at four, eight, or any number. Hence, my nonconcurrence in the proposed U.S. position on the UK sale. 4 Melvin R. Laird 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 729, UK, Volume VII 9/71-9/72. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Commerce. 2 Not printed; the proposed telegram to the Mission to OECD was circulated to the Commerce and Defense Departments for clearance. The telegram dealt with a number of issues, including relations with INTELSAT, INTELSAT controls, numbers of stations, and prior COCOM licensing practices and decisions. 3 Reference is to the President’s visit to China February 17-28. 4 No Defense clearance is shown on the text of the attached telegram as sent on March 21 as telegram 48327 to USOECD, repeated to Tokyo, London, Oslo, Rome, Bern, The Hague, Brussels, and Ottawa. The text was cleared by Meyer at Commerce/OEC and Haig at the White House. The U.S. delegate was authorized to inform COCOM that the United States raised no objection to the proposed U.K. export. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 729, UK, Volume VII 9/71-9/72) 379. Editorial Note 379. Editorial Note In a March 28, 1972, letter to President Nixon, British Prime Minister Heath reviewed his views of the security issues regarding British export of integrated circuit technology to Poland, and wrote: “The COCOM system has survived now for some 22 years and I think that all its members would agree that it has served a useful purpose. I am sure it will continue to do so provided it operates, and is seen to operate, on strictly relevant and up-to-date criteria. I am convinced that there will be no increase in the Warsaw Pact threat to the West as a result of the Ferranti proposal. “Bearing these various factors in mind, I have come to the conclusion that I could not justify withholding an export license from the firm, at a time of high unemployment in this country. Accordingly, I have decided to authorize the issue of an export license on 30 March. “I am sorry that we have been forced to go ahead on this, but I am sure you will appreciate that I have come to this decision only after the most careful consideration.” Prime Minister Heath had first raised British interest in the export to Poland in a February 11 letter to the President. His two messages were sent to Kissinger in a March 29 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt, along with a letter from French Foreign Minister Schumann; see footnote 2, Document 381 . (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 678, France, Volume IX 1/72-7/72) Haig approved for Kissinger a telegraphic message to Prime Minister Heath, and a notation on Sonnenfeldt’s March 29 memorandum indicates it was transmitted on March 29. Following a quick response by Heath on March 30 on the export of integrated circuit machinery, President Nixon in his reply of April 4 wrote that Heath had now given his “views on the assurances that we consider necessary. I believe that this aspect, which has longer range control implications, should be handled at the COCOM level.” Both messages are ibid., NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom, Heath. 380. National Security Decision Memorandum 159 380. National Security Decision Memorandum 159 1 Washington, March 29, 1972. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce SUBJECT Integrated Circuit Technology Exports to Poland and Romania The President has reviewed the issues involved in the export of integrated circuit (IC) technology to Eastern Europe. He has considered the views of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce presented in the NSC Under Secretaries Committee memorandum of March 8, 1972, 2 and has made the following decisions: 1. The export of integrated circuit technology and equipment by British and French firms to Poland and by a U.S. seller to Romania described in the Under Secretaries Committee memorandum is approved subject to the following conditions: (a) assurances from Poland and Romania on non-transfer of the technology and on non-export of the finished ICs to other Communist countries without prior authorization; (b) assurances from Poland and Romania that the finished ICs will be used for peaceful purposes only; and (c) agreement by France and the UK that they will continue to support denial of integrated circuit manufacturing capability to other Communist countries. 2. The Departments of State and Commerce should take steps to bring about a liberalization of COCOM regulations that will permit sales to Eastern Europe of ICs themselves for civilian use up to a level of technology comparable to that which the ICs produced by the equipment going to Poland will provide. IC-producing equipment, however, should continue under present COCOM controls. 3. The Department of Commerce should modify U.S. export licensing policy so as to permit sales to Eastern Europe of ICs themselves up to a level of technology comparable to that of the ICs produced by the British and French equipment. IC-producing equipment should remain under present controls. 4. The Under Secretaries Committee should, following the current COCOM list review, undertake a basic examination of how the COCOM system should be used in the future to control exports to Communist countries. The results of this examination should be submitted to the President for his consideration no later than June 15, 1972. 3 Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence. 2 Document 377 . 3 The final report to the President went forward on January 30, 1973; see Documents 383 and 387 . 381. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Foreign Minister Schumann 381. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Foreign Minister Schumann 1 Washington, March 29, 1972. Dear Maurice: I am writing you about the sale of integrated circuit production equipment to Poland to which you refer in your letter of February 29. 2 After having given the most careful consideration to the issues connected with this export, the President on March 29 directed the Department of State to lift our previous objection to it. 3 In making this decision, the President believes that the sale should not be finally concluded until there have been received assurances from the Poles that they will not transfer the technology obtained from this equipment to other communist countries, that they will not export the finished circuits to such countries without prior authorization, and that the finished circuits will be for peaceful end-uses only. We hope furthermore that your Government will continue to support our common effort to deny the export of integrated circuit manufacturing capability to other communist countries. You will appreciate, I am sure, that the President reached this decision only after the extensive and meticulous deliberations appropriate to the complexity of the issues involved. Warm regards, Henry 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 678, France, Volume IX 1/72-7/72. No classification marking. 2 A copy of Schumann’s February 29 letter is attached to Sonnenfeldt’s March 29 memorandum to Kissinger; see Document 379 . In his letter Schumann recalled having taken up the French proposal with Secretary Rogers during the Azores Summit, and reviewed U.S.-French interaction on the issue since then. See also footnote 5, Document 377 . 3 See Document 380 . 382. Editorial Note 382. Editorial Note Pursuant to item 4 in NSDM 159 ( Document 380 ), John N. Irwin, II, in his capacity as Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, sent a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs, the Under Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology on May 22, 1972, informing them that the President had requested the Under Secretaries Committee to undertake a basic examination of how the COCOM system should be used in the future to control exports to Communist countries. He noted that although the COCOM list review had not yet been completed, work on the project would have to get underway in order to meet the June 15 deadline for the report to the President. Irwin indicated that he had asked Assistant Secretary Willis C. Armstrong to chair an interagency task force to prepare the report, and attached a suggested seven-page outline of topics the task force might include in the report. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 109B) Armstrong forwarded a copy of the task force report to Irwin under cover of a November 20 memorandum, Document 383 . 383. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force To Review the COCOM System (Armstrong) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) 383. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force To Review the COCOM System (Armstrong) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) 1 Washington, November 20, 1972. REVIEW OF THE COCOM SYSTEM (NSDM 159, PARA. 4) I am submitting herewith the report on this subject requested in the memorandum of the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee dated May 22, 1972. 2 The study has been completed in the immediate aftermath of a major COCOM List Review. 3 It has also been conducted within the environment of our changing economic and political relationships with the countries of East Europe—notably the U.S.-Soviet agreements on lend-lease, trade, and shipping, as well as improving economic relations with Poland, Hungary and other Eastern European countries. This process of regularization is drawing our East-West commercial policy more within our overall economic foreign policy with strong emphasis on export promotion. In conducting the work of the Task Force, I have found that there is general agreement on the need for an effective strategic embargo and on the continued value of COCOM as an essential part of such a program. No one has suggested either the withdrawal of U.S. support for COCOM or, at the other extreme, any sharp increase in the scope of the COCOM embargo program. All have agreed that there have been problems in maintaining the cooperation of the COCOM members in a relatively tight COCOM system. There has been general agreement on a number of steps, both within the U.S. Government and in COCOM itself, that would be helpful in making the system function somewhat more smoothly. Despite this considerable area of agreement, however, our discussions have reflected differences in evaluating the weight or priority that should be accorded to the U.S. effort in COCOM in relation to other elements in our national policies, both foreign and domestic. Other U.S. objectives in our political or economic programs, or compulsions that may flow from important international developments, may and indeed do compete with the objective of maintaining a strong COCOM system. When this happens, compromises may be necessary. It is clear from our discussions in the Task Force that the way different agencies would determine the kind of adjustment that should be made grows out of their evaluation of the relevant assumptions in the light of their primary responsibilities. One of the options reflects this aspect of our discussions, in suggesting a higher priority effort in COCOM based on evaluations of its high importance and low cost in terms of impact on competing programs. This option, espoused by Defense and supported by Defense comments at various points in the study, asserted a greater need for new basic guidelines, a more pessimistic view of the future of strategic controls without a major U.S. effort, and a higher appreciation of the past accomplishments of COCOM than the other members seem prepared to support. Since the agency views have been so fully developed in connection with the drafting of the report, I hope it will be possible to obtain agency positions without holding a meeting. Attachment 4 Washington, November 17, 1972. STUDY OF COCOM (NSDM-159) I. Summary Description of COCOM System In 1950, the U.S. and its principal Allies established a strategic trade control system the function of which was to restrict the flow to the Communist world of equipment and technology which could make a significant contribution to the military strength of those countries. This system remains today in its essential operating features much as originally established. Its administration is in the hands of a permanent Coordinating Committee (COCOM) which sits in Paris and whose 15- nation membership consists of all of the NATO nations (less Iceland) plus Japan. U.S. participation is authorized by the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act), and U.S. positions and actions in COCOM are formulated and taken by the Department of State in coordination with the Departments of Defense and Commerce and the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other departments and agencies concerned with security controls over exports. The basis of COCOM actions is a list of commodities (and technology related thereto) the export of which is embargoed. By agreement among the participating countries, no member country will license exports of these items to Communist countries without COCOM approval. A unique aspect of COCOM is that all decisions require unanimous agreement of the members, whether they are determinations of what will be included in the International List or approvals of requests by the participating countries for exceptions to permit them to license specific transactions of embargoed items. How the System Has Worked Despite many spotty areas and variations in thoroughness of application, the COCOM system has in our view worked reasonably well in accomplishing its limited purpose of controlling the flow of a selective list of strategic goods and related technology to the Communist countries. Approximately every three years this list is reviewed and revised in negotiations carried out over a period of months, the latest such review having just been completed. This updating process has resulted in a considerable narrowing of the embargo coverage over the past decade or so, but new items have also been added to protect new technological developments. Generally speaking, the U.S. has been in favor of maintaining more extensive controls than our COCOM partners, who are constantly seeking reductions in the embargo coverage. This basic difference in policy approach has led periodically to fairly serious strains within the Organization. Our partners have made a few spectacular departures from the rule of unanimous decision in response to heavy commercial pressures. The most serious of these was unilateral denunciation of the differential China list in 1957 by the UK. There have also been several important exports of embargoed commodities and technology without COCOM approval, particularly in the aircraft and computer fields. However, such instances have been surprisingly few. Defense points out that the COCOM system was established at a time when our partners, still trying to rebuild their economies in the aftermath of World War II, had little of strategic value to export. Now their situation is different and while all COCOM members render lip service to the principles of the embargo and even occasionally propose additions to it, their major emphasis is on its reduction and on obtaining exceptional treatment for the sale of their manufactures and technology. They have proved themselves quite willing to class as strategic and place under embargo a commodity which only the U.S. can export, but when they develop a capability to produce the same commodity (often as a result of U.S.-furnished technology) they tend to argue that it is no longer strategic, confident that the burden of any increased Free World defense expenditures which may have to be made as a result will be borne by the United States. Some inroads into the system have been made by illegal diversions to Communist countries of shipments of strategic commodities. While such diversionary activity can never be stopped completely, efforts to minimize it have varied greatly in intent and effectiveness from country to country and at different times. While it is of course difficult to assess the effects of this type of activity, such information as is available indicates that the controls have not been seriously undercut in most instances. A further limitation on the effectiveness of the embargo is the availability to a limited, though increasing, degree of strategic commodities from five Western “neutral” non-COCOM countries. The three most important—Austria, Sweden and Switzerland—have cooperated with COCOM in varying degree. Impact of the COCOM Embargo As demonstrated in the body of the report, the USSR’s technology applicable to nuclear weapons delivery systems lags significantly behind the West—from two to six years for such items as liquid and solid propulsion systems, guidance systems, penetration aids, test equipment, communications equipment, transistors, integrated circuits, and advanced computers. The study cited in the report shows that the lag is even greater for the PRC, ranging from eight to twelve years. It is a reasonable assumption, and Defense believes it is demonstrably the case, that the COCOM controls are playing a significant role in preventing this gap from closing. The resulting gain to the U.S., in military terms, is a margin of technological advantage on which the success of our deterrent strategy heavily depends and on whose maintenance in FY 1973 we will expend more than $8 billion for defense research and development alone. The Department of Defense considers that, in economic terms, the gain to the U.S. is the saving of several billion dollars for additional defense research, development, procurement and deployment which would become necessary if our present margin of technological advantage were to be lost or seriously impaired. At the same time, in terms of effect on total trade, only a small percentage of potential exports are affected by the embargo, and its complete elimination could be expected to produce only a minor increase in the present $12 billion level of Free World exports to the Communist areas. Present Situation and Problems The COCOM organization remains voluntary and informal, depend-ent upon the cooperation and cumulative effectiveness of the national control systems of the member nations. The principle of unanimous decision continues in effect. A major review of the lists has just been successfully concluded, and the day-to-day handling of exceptions requests continues relatively smoothly. However, the COCOM system as it presently exists is faced with some increasingly serious problems. First, as a result of the prevailing spirit of détente, the new emphasis on East-West trade, and heightened commercial interest, our COCOM partners put increased pressure on the U.S. during the recent list review to agree to substantial relaxation in the embargo. For example, at one stage the UK made it clear that it was unenthusiastic about continuing its COCOM cooperation if the U.S. could not be more forthcoming in reducing controls on items the UK regarded as crucial. 5 Our partners have also pressed for U.S. approval as exceptions to the embargo of exports of highly advanced technology. Departures from the principle of unanimity have been averted in several instances only by U.S. acquiescence in such proposals after high level political representation and review. We do not agree with our partners’ apparent assessment that the strategic risk has sufficiently lessened to permit the degree of liberalization they desire. However, it is evident that our increasingly divergent views are creating a serious political problem which threatens the continued effectiveness of the organization. In the view of the Department of Defense, in agreeing to relaxation of controls in the last list review and in approving a number of major exceptions cases, the U.S. has made substantial concessions to allied pressures. There is every sign that these pressures will continue unabated, particularly in the very areas, such as electronics, which can continue to benefit from strong controls, and the U.S. is thus faced with the choice of stiffening its stand from here on out, or having the COCOM system become little more than a facade. Second, the volume of requests for exceptions to the embargo has increased to such a degree that further measures must be found to permit concentration, both in COCOM and within the U.S. Government, on cases of major concern and to screen minor cases out of the international review process. In the ten years from 1961 to 1971, the value of exceptions to the embargo rose from $3.4 million to over $75 million annually, and the number of exceptions cases processed through the Committee from 142 to 635 per year. The results of the recent list review will eliminate many exceptions requests, but requests in 1972 are running at almost double the 1971 rate. Third, by 1972 it was apparent that the U.S. role in COCOM had undergone a gradual but distinct change. The U.S. still served very much as the conscience of COCOM, proposing more new embargo listings that the others, opposing the combined judgment of our partners on certain key items, and objecting to more exceptions cases than any other COCOM member. At the same time, the U.S. itself began to take a more aggressive interest in seeking exceptions. It moved into first place in number of submissions in 1971, and pressed hard for urgent action on some of its own cases. The handling of the RCA earth station and Boeing aircraft cases for the PRC dramatized for the other COCOM members this unusual U.S. interest in rapid almost after-the-fact COCOM approvals. The new U.S. policies on trade with the PRC and vigorous trade initiatives toward the USSR suggested to other COCOM members that the U.S. attitude toward COCOM was becoming more relaxed. Although we have repeatedly assured them that this is not the case, it seems unlikely that they are fully persuaded. Our pressing of exceptions which appear to diverge dramatically from our previous policy, and which in some cases are inconsistent with positions recently taken in the Committee on others’ exception proposals, has furthermore led to the view, now seriously held in some quarters, that the U.S. is attempting to take commercial advantage of its dominant COCOM role. The corrective steps recommended under Options B and C appear needed to prevent this new divergence of attitudes from fatally weakening the COCOM structure. In the judgment of the Department of Defense, many of our current difficulties in COCOM could be dealt with more effectively were it not for deep-seated differences of viewpoint toward COCOM, its role, its effectiveness, its cost, and its worth among the principal U.S. departments and agencies involved in the Washington decision-making machinery. These differences have resulted in an increasing inability of the interdepartmental machinery, particularly at the working group level, to reach decisions both on exceptions cases and on list review questions as is manifested by the growing number of COCOM matters which in recent months have had to be escalated to the White House for Presidential level decisions. If these differences, most of which remain unstated could be brought into the open, authoritatively examined and resolved once and for all, many difficulties in the system would either disappear or be reduced to manageable proportions. Future U.S. Policy Toward COCOM As part of the extended analysis of COCOM in the basic paper, a range of options for the United States is examined. These options are summarized with pros-and-cons in the section immediately following, entitled Options and Recommendations. 6 Most of the agencies participating in this study believe that it would clearly be unrealistic under prevailing conditions to expect success in any effort to broaden or strengthen COCOM. On the other hand, the agencies agree that the problems being experienced in the organization are not yet of sufficient gravity to warrant reliance on alternative mechanisms for controlling strategic trade nor to attempt to obtain basic modification of the COCOM structure. Several measures for improving operation of the system and preventing its deterioration, including procedures within the U.S. Government, have been identified. The question of undertaking preparations to make the COCOM List coverage as selective as possible is also examined in the report. The options considered in this study have been grouped into five basic approaches, as described below. Option A: Maintaining an Effective COCOM System Under this heading are listed a number of specific actions which might be undertaken as a positive U.S. program to prevent deterioration of the COCOM system. In recommending this Option, the Department of Defense believes that, while strategic trade controls have been reasonably effective to date, their future prospects are not promising unless the U.S. acts to give them greater support. The Departments of State and Commerce do not support the Option as presented. They believe that approaches to other member governments at an appropriately high level along the lines of Sub-Options (1) and (4) could be useful and appropriate if tied in with implementation of Sub-Option C (4) and completion of the U.S. review there referred to, dependent on the outcome of the review, but consider that a recommendation along these lines can usefully be made only after completion of the U.S. review. They also believe that such an approach made now, and unrelated to the outcome of the U.S. review, would be both undesirable and ineffective. A fuller statement of advantages and disadvantages of this Option is found on pages 7 Option B: Improved Support of COCOM Operations Under this heading we have grouped several actions which might be undertaken, without major overhaul of the existing system, to improve Washington support arrangements—by speeding up decisions on COCOM cases, insuring adequate and timely technical contributions, and minimizing paper work. With the exception of B (4) on which Defense dissents, these recommendations are supported by all agencies, although Defense believes that none of them go to the heart of the problem. Option C: Modifying the COCOM Organization Under this option, we have considered modifications of the COCOM system itself including the adoption of majority voting, national determination in exporting end-items, a liberalized de minimis rule, and further refinement of the embargo list. For reasons set out in the Options section and in the report, all agencies agree that it would be unwise to modify the present unanimity rule in COCOM or to curtail the COCOM structure to the extent of abandoning the system of international review of individual exceptions to the embargo. The Departments of State and Commerce believe that, although the de minimis level was raised from $200 to $500 earlier this year, it could without significant strategic risk be further raised to $1,000 (and from $4,000 to $5,000 for servicing of previously exported equipment). The Department of Defense disagrees. The Departments of State and Commerce are of the opinion that limiting the list to the minimum essential coverage necessary to meet the basic COCOM objectives should permit a further refinement of the list in 1974. Such a refinement will aid in preserving the existing effectiveness of COCOM in the face of the present spirit of détente and the mounting pressure for relaxation. The Department of Defense can accept this recommendation only to the extent that “further refinement of the list” is not a euphemism for a sharp reduction; first on security grounds, because with the list review just ended, a sharp reduction has been made and second, on practical grounds, because, as the mounting pressure for further relaxation shows, our COCOM partners are not appeased by such U.S. action. Moreover, the Department of Defense believes this fresh review should be undertaken only in connection with the other measures outlined in Option A. In fact, Item 6 in Option A provides for essentially this kind of review. Option D: Reliance Upon Unilateral Controls and Bilateral Understandings in Place of COCOM A shift away from the COCOM to a unilateral approach is examined but the conclusion is reached that the U.S. no longer has sufficient technological leadership to make such an alternative viable. Additional factors are the commercial discrimination that would affect American firms and other Western firms subjected to unilateral U.S. controls, and the serious political problems which would result from attempting to enforce these controls extraterritorially. While Defense agrees that the COCOM mechanism continues to be the preferred approach, it would not entirely rule out this alternative when it judged that COCOM controls were no longer sufficiently effective. Option E: Reconstitution of COCOM as an East-West Trade Coordinating Group The possibility of expanding COCOM’s role and giving it a more positive aspect has been studied. All agencies which have expressed positions on this option consider that it would be inadvisable under present circumstances to seek to broaden COCOM into a trade development or coordination group. While other existing organizations might prove to be more suited to this purpose, the possibility should be retained of utilizing COCOM in such a role upon completion of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. [Omitted here is the body of the paper.] 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC-U/SM 109C. Confidential. Drafted by R.B. Wright (EB/ITP/EWT). An attached November 24 memorandum from Acting Staff Director Seymour Weiss to members of the Task Force requested comments on the paper attached to this memorandum. Also attached is a draft memorandum to the President. For the revised memorandum based on comments received pursuant to Weiss’ November 24 memorandum, see Document 387 . 2 See Document 382 . 3 Not further identified. 4 The title page, which is not printed, carries a Secret classification marking, but all the pages in the Summary are marked Confidential. The entire study comprises 106 pages, including a 3-page prefatory table of contents and a 4-page appendix with examples of Chinese acquisitions of COCOM-controlled items from Japan. Only the Summary, pages 1–10 [ Pgs. 1–10 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , and Doc. 5 ] , is printed here. 5 Defense notes that it is easy to exaggerate the importance of these discontents for the fact is that quarrels and disputes which loom large within the relatively narrow confines of the COCOM system do not appear to have any appreciable effect on our larger relationships with the countries involved. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 This section of the paper is not printed. 7 Regarding this incomplete sentence, see footnote 3, Document 385 . 384. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) 384. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) 1 Washington, December 12, 1972. SUBJECT Review of the COCOM System (U) In response to your memorandum of 24 November 1972, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have reviewed the report and the draft Memorandum for the President prepared in response to NSDM 159. 2 We consider the report represents a balanced analysis of the COCOM system as it presently functions and options that could be adopted to control future exports to communist countries. It appears to reflect adequately those agency dissents on substantive issues. However, the draft Memorandum for the President does not present in adequate balance the views contained in the report and we cannot concur in it. We note that there was no interagency collaboration in the development of the Memorandum for the President. To insure that it reflects agency views as clearly as the Report, we recommend that our staffs collaborate in writing a new memorandum which does provide the needed balance and that it be returned subsequently for our concurrence. Kenneth Rush 3 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Confidential. The memorandum is Tab B to a December 30 memorandum from Armstrong to Irwin; see footnote 1, Document 387 . 2 See Document 383 and footnote 1 thereto. The November 24 memorandum is from Acting Staff Director Weiss. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Rush signed the original. 385. Letter From the Under Secretary of Commerce (Lynn) to the Acting Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Weiss) 385. Letter From the Under Secretary of Commerce (Lynn) to the Acting Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Weiss) 1 Washington, December 20, 1972. Dear Mr. Weiss: Your memorandum of November 24, 1972 sought our concurrence or views on the proposed report to the President on the review of the COCOM system required by NSDM 159, paragraph 4. 2 We have examined the report thoroughly and find it acceptable in most respects. We do note that, as might be expected from a report which has been subjected to inter-agency negotiations and compromise for six months, it does not have as hard and clear a focus on some of the basic issues as we might have wished. There are, moreover, several specific matters which we would like to see modified. These are set forth below: 1. Regarding Option A: Maintaining an Effective COCOM System : The present statement of the Commerce position in the second paragraph under this heading on page 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 3 ] (Chapter 1—Summary) is incorrect. Commerce believes that effective implementation of Sub-Options (1) and (4) could, indeed, be useful if tied to implementation of Sub-Option (C) (4) but feels strongly that the advantages from pursuing these Sub-Options would be maximized if the approaches to other governments were made at the outset of the next COCOM List Review which will probably occur in late 1973 or early 1974. Furthermore, Commerce believes consideration should be given to possible discussion of these problems with key COCOM governments at the same time that discussions are initiated with them on GATT issues. This tactical approach would, of course, require staffing out. Commerce recommends, therefore, that the subject paragraph be modified, beginning with the 8th line, to refer to the Department of State only and that the following statement be included to reflect the Commerce view: “… the Department of Commerce believes that approaches to other member governments at an appropriate high level along the lines of Sub-Options (1) and (4) could be useful, provided that they are properly tied in with implementation of Sub-Option (C) (4) and the approaches are made at the outset of the next COCOM List Review rather than now or following the completion of such list review. The Department of Commerce also believes that the possibility of combining and/or coordinating negotiations on these two points with the next broad GATT negotiations with key COCOM countries should be examined and reported on in the immediate future.” 3 2. Regarding Option B , Commerce recommends that: a. Sub-Option (1) on page 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] be made more realistic by revising it to read as follows: “(1) Introduce a more formalized decision-making procedure, as described on pages 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 41 ] and 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 41 ] to facilitate the resolution of interagency differences on COCOM matters within a specified period of time.” 4 b. Sub-Option (2) on page 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] be modified by removing the words “such” and “those” from the third line to reflect fully the intent of the Act. c. Sub-Option (4) on page 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] should be revised by adding thereto the words “to the extent consistent with an effective enforcement mechanism.” 5 3. Regarding Option C: Although Commerce staff officers accepted inclusion of the increased de minimis and servicing value levels in Sub-Option C (3), Commerce has now concluded that consideration of this Sub-Option should await further experience under the recently increased levels. In the Commerce view, there remains too much question as to the likely adverse strategic impact of further increase at this time. Therefore, Commerce should be dropped from support of this recommendation, and the second paragraph under Option C on page 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] of the Summary should be changed accordingly. 6 I ask that the report to the President be modified to reflect the above views and suggestions. Sincerely, James T. Lynn 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Secret. The letter is Tab C to a December 30 memorandum from Armstrong to Irwin; see footnote 1, Document 387 . 2 See Document 383 and footnote 1 thereto. 3 Tab E to Armstrong’s December 30 memorandum to Irwin comprises replacement pages to the paper attached to Document 383 with this language, which became the third paragraph in Option A. The incomplete sentence that was paragraph 3 is dropped. The Department of State added the following footnote to the new Commerce Department language: “While the question of relating an approach to COCOM members on COCOM matters to discussions with them of GATT matters was not considered in the preparation of this study, State has serious reservations as to the utility of using the GATT channel for COCOM purposes.” 4 The word “no” is written in the left margin next to this paragraph, and no replacement page 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5 ] was provided. 5 The note “ok” is written in the left margin next to this paragraph, and replacement pages 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5 ] and 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] were provided. A footnote on the Commerce Department recommendation on page 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5 ] indicates that the Defense Department did not concur. 6 The note “p. 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 6 ] ” is written in the left margin next to this paragraph, and replacement pages 8 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] and 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 6 ] were provided. 386. Letter From the Assistant General Manager for National Security of the Atomic Energy Commission (Giller) to the Acting Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Weiss) 386. Letter From the Assistant General Manager for National Security of the Atomic Energy Commission (Giller) to the Acting Staff Director of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Weiss) 1 Washington, December 21, 1972. Dear Mr. Weiss: I refer to your memorandum of November 24, 1972, to Chairman Schlesinger enclosing a copy of the National Security Decision Memorandum 159 (NSDM-159) COCOM Study and requesting AEC’s concurrence or comments. 2 The Commission has reviewed this study and is in agreement with the general substance of the report. With specific reference to the Options and Recommendations, the Commission favors the preservation of the COCOM system and a positive program to prevent its deterioration as similarly reflected in Option A. To achieve this goal, it recommends options (4), (5), and (6) of Option A 3 and the various options set forth in Option B. The Commission noted that State and Commerce are recommending Option C. (3) to increase the de minimis level from $500 to $1,000 and the servicing level from $4,000 to $5,000. While the Commission is sympathetic to decreasing the administrative burden occasioned by exception requests, it noted in the report that the present levels were at least doubled in September of this year, and concluded that further refinements in the embargo definitions based on careful technical reviews would be a more practical solution than arbitrarily increasing the value of the de minimis and servicing levels. With regard to Option C. (4), it was concluded that while changes in the COCOM list were necessary to maintain a current and workable list, these changes should result from careful strategic evaluations and current policy guidance or criteria as suggested in Option A. (5) without preconception of how the list should be limited. 4 Since the Commission’s views are not completely shown in the draft report, we would ask that they be reflected in the proposed memorandum to the President. Sincerely, Edward B. Giller 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Confidential. The letter is Tab D to a December 30 memorandum from Armstrong to Irwin; see footnote 1, Document 387 . 2 See Document 383 and footnote 1 thereto. 3 Language to this effect was added as paragraph 4 to the Option A section of the revised text of the paper attached to Document 383 . See Document 385 and footnote 1 thereto. 4 Language that reflects the AEC’s views on Option C is included in the revised page 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] . See footnote 3 above. 387. Draft Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 387. Draft Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 29, 1972. SUBJECT Study of the COCOM System On March 29, 1972, you directed that the Under Secretaries Committee, following the COCOM list review, undertake a basic examination of how the COCOM system should be used in the future to control exports to Communist countries. 2 The Committee’s report is attached. 3 All agencies agree that the system has been effective and has made a valuable contribution to our deterrent strategy. All agree also that there have been problems in maintaining the cooperation of the COCOM members in a relatively tight COCOM system and that these problems threaten the continued effectiveness of the system. Generally speaking, our present difficulties in COCOM arise from the prevailing spirit of détente, the new emphasis on East-West trade, and increased commercial pressures which have accompanied these developments in the U.S. as well as abroad. The agencies have agreed that we should reject the more extreme options of abolishing COCOM and relying on U.S. unilateral controls (Option D), or reconstituting COCOM as an East-West trade coordinating body (Option E). The agencies have also agreed on a number of procedural steps to help the system function more smoothly (Option B, parts 1-3). The agencies differ, however, on the more basic course of action which the U.S. should adopt in dealing with the difficulties described above. There are two such basic approaches reflected in the study: —the first, proposed by Defense, envisages now a high priority effort focused on encouraging a more positive attitude and commitment in COCOM on the part of its members—a program as set forth in Option A consisting of a number of individual measures designed to secure greater recognition at home and abroad of the direct linkage between national security and strategic trade controls; —the second, proposed by State and Commerce, envisages a thorough and probing analysis of the embargo list well in advance of the next COCOM List Review in order to satisfy both ourselves and our COCOM partners that we have made every effort to limit the embargo coverage to the minimum necessary based on sound strategic evaluations—a program as set forth in Sub-Option C (4) that would utilize the government-industry technical advisory groups provided for in the Export Administration Act as recently amended and would assure that U.S. objectives in COCOM are fully consistent with our changing political and economic relationships with the Communist countries. The distinction between these two approaches has a great deal to do with timing and emphasis. Thus, Defense would not reject a careful review of the embargo list provided it is undertaken in connection with the program outlined in Option A and does not presuppose a further sharp reduction. While neither State nor Commerce supports Option A as set forth, Commerce believes that the approaches to other governments foreseen in Sub-Options A (1) and (4) could, indeed, be useful if tied to implementation of Sub-Option C (4) but believes strongly that the advantages from pursuing these approaches would be maximized if they were made at the outset of the next COCOM List Review, which will probably occur in late 1973 or early 1974, rather than now. State considers that such approaches at an appropriate time and level might well be useful, but believes it is too soon now to determine such tactics which would be both undesirable and inappropriate if undertaken at this time. State also believes that we cannot legitimately influence the degree to which defense elements in member governments have a role in COCOM matters (Sub-Option A (2)) and that it would be impractical to try to relate COCOM formally to NATO (Sub-Option A (3)). The Atomic Energy Commission generally favors a positive program to prevent deterioration of COCOM as reflected in Option A and specifically recommends Sub-Options (4), (5), and (6). The Commission has also expressed the view that a review of the COCOM List as provided in Sub-Option C (4) should be undertaken within the kind of current policy guidance or criteria suggested in Sub-Option A (5) without preconception of how the list should be limited. The choice between these two approaches involves a decision on the priority to be given the COCOM effort in relation to other elements in our national policies. The first approach involves a concerted and strenuous U.S. initiative to strengthen support for the system. It is based on a relatively high appreciation of COCOM’s past achievements and a pessimistic view of its future effectiveness without this major effort. The other approach would attempt to assure that U.S. efforts in COCOM are in perspective with current developments in East-West relations; it is based on a pessimistic view of the prospects for influencing our allies toward a stronger course of action in COCOM. Sub-Option C (3) requires special comment. It recommends a moderate increase in the minimum value of exports proposed as exceptions to the embargo which must be submitted to COCOM for review. In the Study as circulated the proposal, supported by State and Commerce, was for an increase from the present $500 cut-off for new exports to $1000 and from the present $4000 cut-off for servicing of previous exports to $5000. Commerce has withdrawn its support for this recommendation on grounds that consideration of this Sub-Option should await further experience under the present recently-increased levels because there remains, in the Commerce view, too much question as to the likely adverse strategic impact of further increase at this time. The Department of State, as the only agency supporting this Sub-Option, has modified its recommendation to propose a $2000 rather than a $1000 level for new cases. This is a figure consistent with the basic analysis of the issue in the body of the Study which shows that during the sample period 28 percent of the cases submitted to COCOM were valued below $2000. State believes that leaving with individual countries the responsibility for deciding such minimum value cases would be an acceptable risk and would greatly relieve the work-load in the committee 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159. Confidential. The memorandum, a revision of the draft Armstrong sent Irwin on November 20 ( Document 383 ), is Tab A to a December 30 memorandum from Assistant Secretary Armstrong to Deputy Secretary Irwin recommending that it be circulated to members of the Under Secretaries Committee for their prompt concurrence. Armstrong noted that the revised draft contained revisions from the Defense and Commerce Departments and the AEC (see Documents 384 – 386 ). Tab E to Armstrong’s memorandum comprised several revised pages to the paper on COCOM review attached to Document 383 . The memorandum was circulated to the Under Secretaries Committee on January 3, 1973, under cover of a memorandum from Seymour Weiss. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 159) 2 See Document 380 . 3 The paper with the revised pages is not printed. Commodities and Strategic Materials, 1969-1972 Commodities and Strategic Materials, 1969-1972 388. Memorandum From L.T. Wallace of the Council of Economic Advisers Staff to Hendrik Houthakker of the Council of Economic Advisers Washington, April 4, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 18, Wheat-IGA. No classification marking. 389. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Secretary of State Rogers Washington, April 10, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. Secret. Drafted by C.R. Carlisle (E/ISM) on April 9 and cleared by Schnee (H). Attached to Document 390. 390. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) Washington, April 17, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. Secret. Drafted by C.R. Carlisle (E/ISM) and cleared by Greenwald (E), Katz (E/ORF), Schiff (E/ICD), and Schnee (H). Proposed for Secretary Rogers’ signature in Document 389. 391. Message From Prime Minister Holyoake to President Nixon Wellington, June 4, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, New Zealand: Nixon to Holyoake. Confidential. Sent to Secretary Rogers for delivery to the President under cover of a June 4 letter from the New Zealand Ambassador. (Ibid.) In his July 22 reply the President noted the Prime Minister’s expression of concern and wrote that his administration sought freer international trade and wanted to avoid new trade restrictions, “save for the most exceptional circumstances.” He indicated that these views had been communicated to Congress and concluded, “Although no partnership can be without its occasional difficulties, I shall make the most serious effort to insure that New Zealand’s interests are advanced rather than harmed in all decisions related to our mutual affairs.” (Ibid.) 392. Editorial Note 393. Memorandum From the Agricultural Trade Task Force to President Nixon Washington, July 3, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, International Grains Agreement. No classification marking. The memorandum is Tab A to Document 395. 394. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Petty) to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy Washington, July 7, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the Secretary—July-August 1969. Limited Official Use. Drafted by M. Ryss (OASIA/OIEA) on July 7. Copies were sent to Under Secretaries Walker and Volcker. The memorandum is attached to a July 7 note to Secretary Kennedy, presumably from Petty, which reads: “I doubt that Agriculture really believes the IGA is tenable. I think State may have their doubts too but are anxious that onus of break-up fall upon shoulders of others. This consideration probably dictates tactics at Ministerial meeting.” 395. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, July 11, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, International Grains Agreement. Confidential. Sent to Kissinger under cover of a July 7 memorandum from Bergsten. 396. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon Washington, July 14, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 18, Wheat-International Grains Agreement. No classification marking. 397. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon Washington, July 19, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 19, Wheat-Wheat Pricing. No classification marking. 398. Letter From President Nixon to Prime Minister Gorton Washington, July 22, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, Australia: Nixon to Gorton. No classification marking. Telegram 123219 to Canberra, July 25, transmitted the text of the President’s letter to the Embassy. The final paragraph of the telegram informed the Embassy that the White House did not plan to release the text but had no objection should the Prime Minister wish to do so. (Ibid.) No public release of the letter was found. A copy of the President’s letter is attached to a July 19 memorandum from Kissinger to the President, which indicates the letter was drafted by Bergsten. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, International Grains Agreement) 399. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon Washington, July 25, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 19, Wheat-Wheat Pricing. No classification marking. 400. Editorial Note 401. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, August 2, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. No classification marking. Presumably this memorandum was transmitted telegraphically to Kissinger, who was with the President in Bucharest on August 2. Kissinger left the President’s party in the United Kingdom the next day to travel to Paris to brief President Pompidou. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 402. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon Washington, August 5, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 19, Wheat-Wheat Pricing. No classification marking. 403. Editorial Note 404. Letter From the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury (Eggers) to the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee (Long) Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury Volume I. No classification marking. Attached to an August 29 memorandum from Richard Moose to Peter Vaky informing him that the Budget Bureau wanted the National Security Council’s informal comment on the Treasury report. Presumably the text printed here is a draft circulated for clearance. 405. Aide-Mémoire From the New Zealand Embassy Washington, September 24, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17, Meat: Australia/NZ. No classification marking. The aide-mémoire was presumably delivered to the Department of State. A covering note on New Zealand Embassy stationery reads: “With the compliments of the Minister (Commercial)” followed by Gordon R.J. Hope’s handwritten initials. 406. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) Washington, September 24, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Classified-OEP 1969. Confidential. Drafted by S.L. Sommerfield and W.L. Dickey on September 22. Copies were sent to McGinnis, Jurich, Eggers, Englert, Sommerfield, and Schwartz. 407. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon Washington, September 25, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 215, Council of Economic Advisers. No classification marking. At the top of the page, Haig wrote: “Send to Bergsten for urgent staffing—through Secretariat.” Below that is the note: “Done 1:30 pm 9/26.” 408. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, September 29, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. Confidential. Vaky and Holdridge concurred. 409. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Hardin to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17, Meat: CEA Memos. No classification marking. Attached to Document 410. 410. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon Washington, October 16, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17, Meat: CEA Memos. No classification marking. 411. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. Confidential. A handwritten note by Kissinger at the top of the page reads: “RN has disapproved.” 412. Letter From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy Washington, October 22, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Classified OEP 1969. Confidential. Attached to Document 414. 413. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Kendall) to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) Washington, October 27, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Classified OEP 1969. No classification marking. Drafted by Kendall on October 27. 414. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) Washington, November 7, 1969. Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Classified OEP 1969. Confidential. Drafted by W.L. Dickey on November 6. Forwarded to Kennedy, along with a letter to Congressman Gerald Ford (not found), under cover of a November 6 memorandum from Eugene T. Rossides. Rossides reported that on August 18 Congressman Ford had suggested release of Mint nickel to help meet the needs of domestic industry, and on August 28 Acting Secretary Volcker had informed Ford it was not feasible at that time. The letter to Ford was intended to provide advance clarification of what was being done and to point out that the current action was not inconsistent with Volcker’s letter. 415. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics (Shillito) to Secretary of Defense Laird Washington, November 26, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. No classification marking. Attached to a memorandum from Colonel Robert E. Pursley, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Secretary Laird. Both were transmitted to Haig under cover of a handwritten memorandum dated December 26 from Captain Daniel J. Murphy. (Ibid.) 416. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 26, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Confidential. Attached to a November 28 memorandum from Lindjord to Haig in which Lindjord highlighted Lincoln’s belief that a materials policy study should be considered in the NSC, since the United States was running out of raw materials and there had been no comprehensive study of the issue since the Paley Commission during the Truman administration (see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. I, Part 2, p. 857). Lindjord added that Lincoln had also asked the State Department to reconsider its refusal to permit sales of tin from the stockpile. 417. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 5, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Confidential. 418. Letter From President Nixon to Prime Minister Gorton Washington, December 6, 1969. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, Australia: Nixon to Gorton 12/6/69. No classification marking. Typed notations at the bottom of the first page indicate that the letter was pouched to Canberra on December 9 and also sent in telegram 203867, December 8. Copies of both are ibid. 419. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) Washington, December 15, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume II 11/69-12/71. Confidential. 420. Editorial Note 421. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to President Nixon Washington, December 29, 1969. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Confidential; Sensitive. Attached to a December 29 transmittal memorandum from OEP Deputy Director Russell to Flanigan, which indicated that the memorandum had been dictated by Lincoln over the phone from Colorado. Russell called Flanigan’s attention to two points discussed with Lincoln, but which were not included in the memorandum to the President: “(a) Does the Administration wish to subject itself to allegations that it has placed this country in a position to be ‘blackmailed’ by those foreign countries which are the sources of the critical materials which our country or this continent do not produce in sufficient quantity? (b) Is the Administration prepared to risk identifying itself as allegedly in favor of jeopardizing national security, disrupting the market, and injuring domestic industry and foreign countries when there is a substantial likelihood that Congress and industry will prevent the accelerating of stockpile disposals?” These memoranda were transmitted to Kissinger in a December 30 memorandum from Haig, who noted the possible disadvantages and agreed with Lincoln that it was unlikely $1 billion of sales from the stockpile could be realized. 422. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Mayo) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. No classification marking. Mayo met with the President from 11:15 a.m. to 12:20 p.m. on December 30. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Presumably this memorandum was discussed at that meeting. Three handwritten, undated notes and a January 15, 1970, typewritten note from Haig to Lynn are attached to this memorandum. One of the notes, from Flanigan to Kenneth Cole, reads: “I believe (read ‘am sure’) that Kissinger has a study underway to determine the long range future of the stockpile. I think this broad language is unnecessary. Let’s concentrate now on changing objectives as necessary to sell $750 million. After the NSC study, let’s change objectives as is necessary to make the desired further sales. I suggest you have Kissinger see this.” A December 31 memorandum from Lincoln to Flanigan provided a table that set out an approach to achieve in FY 1971 $750 million in receipts from stockpile sales and related actions; the suggested actions were arranged in order of increasing difficulty. Lincoln noted that the $750 million figure had come from the Bureau of the Budget. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile) 423. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, January 21, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. Limited Official Use. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a January 15 memorandum from Bergsten with a recommendation that he sign it. 424. Editorial Note 425. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, February 20, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. No classification marking. 426. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, March 9, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Confidential. A note at the top of the first page in red pencil reads: “Henry recommends Option #3 under which No Signature required.” 427. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs (Palmby) to the President’s Special Counsel (Colson) Washington, March 10, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. For Official Use Only. The memorandum is Tab A to Document 428. 428. Memorandum From the President’s Special Counsel (Colson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 10, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. No classification marking. Attached to a March 14 memorandum from Colson to Ehrlichman which reads: “Per your request I am enclosing a copy of my memorandum to Henry Kissinger, with which you concurred yesterday along with the earlier memo which the President signed off on which was prepared by Bergsten. Haig has the Bergsten memo—the one that says that the memo of March 9 had been staffed by everyone.” The Bergsten memorandum has not been found. 429. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Confidential; Sensitive. Attached to a March 17 letter from Kissinger to Laird responding to the latter’s February 20 memorandum regarding possible excess holdings in the stockpile that might be reduced without jeopardizing national security. Laird’s memorandum, Kissinger’s proposed reply, and the memorandum printed here were forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a March 13 memorandum from Lynn. Lynn indicated that the information on the “in-house” review, which Kissinger mentioned to Laird, was “presented as a memorandum for the President, should you choose to send it forward.” 430. Editorial Note 431. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Confidential. Attached to an April 22 memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger recommending that he sign the memorandum to the President. A handwritten note by Vaky on his April 22 memorandum, dated April 27, reads: “Agreed with Flanigan to handle matter without memo to President. Flanigan’s office will inform Lincoln.” 432. Draft Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman) to President Nixon Washington, June 20, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17, Meat: CEA Memos. Administratively Confidential. The final text of the memorandum sent to the President was not found, but it is presumably the memorandum from Ehrlichman to the President to which Johnston referred in his July 2 memorandum to the NSC Files; see Document 430. 433. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, July 15, 1970. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 153, Daily Staff Summaries. Confidential; Limdis; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by T.W. Sonandres (INR) and cleared by G. H. Summ. 434. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon Washington, August 20, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Secret. Attached to a September 5 memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger reporting that the President had approved Rogers’ recommendation and recommending that Kissinger sign a directive to the State Department and OEP informing the agencies of the President’s decision. Kissinger’s September 7 memorandum to Rogers and Lincoln, also attached, informed them that tin sales were further suspended for a period not to exceed 90 days and that plans to resume sales should be undertaken before the end of the 90-day period in order to take advantage of the favorable market. They were also to work out arrangements to minimize the risks to American lives and property. 435. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to President Nixon Washington, August 24, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Secret. Copies were sent to Kissinger, Flanigan, Trezise, Meyer, and Shultz. 436. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, September 1, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Secret. A notation indicates the memorandum was sent to the President at the Western White House in San Clemente. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) It was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an August 28 memorandum from Vaky which called Kissinger’s attention to Lincoln’s belief that the United States could not afford economically and budgetarily to wait the 90 days proposed by Rogers. Vaky reported that he had proposed a compromise at 60 days, to which Lincoln and Flanigan would agree, and expressed hope that the State Department would as well. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile) 437. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, December 14, 1970. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume II 11/69-12/71. Secret. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a December 7 memorandum from Nachmanoff, on which Kissinger wrote: “What is amount of money involved?” Another note, presumably by Haig, reads: “$23 million.” 438. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. Secret. Sent to the President in the week of December 21; see footnotes 3 and 4 below. 439. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, January 20, 1971. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume II 11/69-12/71. Secret. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a January 21 memorandum from Nachmanoff. A stamped notation reads: “The President has seen.” 440. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, undated. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume III 1972-1973. No classification marking. The memorandum is undated but is attached to Kissinger’s March 18, 1972, reply (Document 442), which refers to Lincoln’s February 23 memorandum. See Document 441. 441. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 3, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume III 1972-1973. Confidential. Attached to Document 442. 442. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) Washington, March 18, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume III 1972-1973. Confidential. A copy was sent to Under Secretary of State Irwin. Forwarded to Kissinger for his signature under cover of a March 14 memorandum from Hormats and Hewitt. (Ibid.) 443. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, March 22, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile (1973). No classification marking. Attached to Document 445. Also attached is a March 24 memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger proposing a reply to Ehrlichman, on which Kissinger wrote: “Before you send this—does tin affect Bolivia? If so see me.” Hormats’ proposed reply to Ehrlichman had no specific reference to Bolivia. 444. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, October 21, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 286, State, Volume 16. Secret; Exdis. 445. Action Memorandum From Phil Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, November 27, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile (1973). Confidential. Concurred in by Hormats, Jorden, and Holdridge. Attached to a January 19, 1973, typed note by J. Bushnell, that reads: “Note. State has been requested to provide considered opinion on timing of initiation tin sales and issue of sale to potential Japanese stockpile. State is divided between Economic Bureau which wants to negotiate long-term sale agreements with International Tin Council and ARA which wishes to continue the Presidential ban on any tin sales, even to a Japanese stockpile. The issue awaits new arrivals on 7th floor for resolution. Meanwhile the President has reviewed the entire stockpile issue and actions affecting tin as well as other commodities are proceeding separately in a manner which makes these letters OBE. We have consulted informally at the staff level with the authors of the incoming letters who agree that they not be answered and the tin sale issue be treated as part of the larger picture.” 446. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon Washington, December 26, 1972. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile (1973). Confidential. 388. Memorandum From L.T. Wallace of the Council of Economic Advisers Staff to Hendrik Houthakker of the Council of Economic Advisers 388. Memorandum From L.T. Wallace of the Council of Economic Advisers Staff to Hendrik Houthakker of the Council of Economic Advisers 1 Washington, April 4, 1969. SUBJECT International Grains Arrangement Summary of IGA The IGA is an outgrowth of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations. The final text was developed and negotiated at the International Wheat Conference in Rome, July 12 through August 18, 1967. 2 The IGA replaces the 18-year old International Wheat Agreement (IWA)—and, more specifically, the International Wheat Agreement of 1962. The IGA consists of two parts, a Wheat Trade Convention and a Food Aid Convention. The purpose of IGA is to provide for market stabilization, hopefully stopping actions like the wheat price war of 1965-1966 which was extremely costly to all exporting countries. Advantages to U.S. farmers were specified to be budgetary savings through reduced export subsidies and increased dollar earnings because of both stabilization of wheat prices and stabilization at a high enough level to insure profits. Participation in IGA includes 33 countries and the EEC. These cover approximately 85-90 percent of the total commercial world wheat trade, as compared with only about 55-60 percent under the old IWA. U.S. participation in IGA is similar to a treaty—and President Johnson submitted the IGA to the Senate on January 25, 1968. Wheat Trade Convention Under the WTC both minimum and maximum prices for 14 major wheats moving in world trade are set. For the U.S. the new minimum prices are generally about 23¢ a bushel more than the old IWA minimums, and maximum prices are about 40¢ higher. The schedule of minimum and maximum prices f.o.b. Gulf ports is attached. 3 A Price Review Committee has the authority to establish prices for wheats not listed in the Arrangement (these wheats apparently were the initiating source of the present below-minimum-price-sales problem), and it also has power to adjust minimum prices in response to changes in competitive conditions. The old IWA did not have such a committee. The IGA obliges, as did the old IWA, both exporters and importers to buy and sell at prices consistent with the established minimums and maximums. Food Aid Convention The FAC is a major attempt to attack the global hunger situation by an agreement of commercial exporters and importers to provide a total of 4.5 million metric tons of grain annually to the needy nations of the world. The approximate percentage breakdown of contributions is attached. 4 IGA Duration Both Conventions of the IGA began a 3-year period on July 1, 1968. Current Status and Problems Almost all of the major exporting nations have failed to live up to the Arrangement. Basically the reason is that the Arrangement is not structured to a condition of oversupply, and therefore all countries must lower prices if they are to vie for the given demand. Almost all nations have violated the IGA intent, if not its actual provisions, by loopholes found in classifying grades of wheat for export sale. Much of the problem can be traced to the initial setting of the price level, which did not consider a realistic estimate of the true production potential of the world’s wheat countries. In effect a monopoly price is attempted to be maintained in a market climate much more resembling that of perfect competition. Nobody seems to want to say that the Arrangement has broken down, though all agree that there have been continual violations. Assistant Secretary Palmby, USDA, set up a meeting for major exporters and grain industry interests, to meet in Washington April 2 through 4, to offer recommendations for improving the IGA. This year represents a potential growth in wheat supplies. According to a Wall Street Journal article of March 17, 1969, “World wheat trade currently is running at its lowest level in five years, and grain stocks are building up to record levels in producing lands.” Follow-Up I will check my source first thing Monday morning to get the recommendations and tone of discussion from the meetings mentioned above. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 18, Wheat-IGA. No classification marking. 2 President Johnson approved the signing of the International Grains Arrangement, which took place on November 8, 1967, on November 6; see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. IX, Document 354 . 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed. The shares for the major exporters were: United States, 42 percent; the EEC, 23 percent; Canada, 11 percent; Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, each 5 percent. 389. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Secretary of State Rogers 389. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Greenwald) to Secretary of State Rogers 1 Washington, April 10, 1969. SUBJECT Recalculation of Stockpile Objectives On an accelerated basis an inter-agency committee, headed by the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), 2 is now recalculating stockpile objectives for raw materials on the basis of criteria approved last autumn by President Johnson. 3 This memorandum recommends that you suggest to General Lincoln that these recalculations be suspended until the new Administration has had an opportunity to examine the criteria. OEP has the authority under law for setting stockpile objectives and for directing that the General Services Administration (GSA) procure for or dispose from the stockpiles. Discussion The US Government stockpiles some 55 basic commodities. Present inventories are worth at market value about $6.9 billion; on the basis of the “old” calculations, some $3.2 billion are in commodities excess to our needs. The last Administration sold surplus commodities: about $1 billion worth in Fiscal Year 1966, about $470 million in FY 1967, and about $210 million in FY 1968. Sales are continuing. After prolonged but sporadic inter-agency study President Johnson at an NSC meeting last October 31 approved “new” stockpile criteria. (The “old” and “new” criteria are described in Tab B.) Various agencies, chaired by OEP, were requested to calculate new stockpile objectives by last January 20. Only nine objectives, for relatively minor commodities, were approved by January 20th. In March six more objectives were approved, mostly for minor commodities but also for two major ones, tin and rubber. We have a number of misgivings about the way the new objectives are being calculated. The case of copper, on which we are now working, is a good example. Copper is one of the few commodities in which we are now under our stockpile objective; the current objective is 775,000 tons; the current inventory is 260,000. Under criteria approved by President Johnson the new objective could be as high as 1,150,000 tons —against which GSA, at OEP’s direction, would have to procure copper. But if the new copper stockpile objective were calculated somewhat differently, in a way which we think might be feasible, it might be reduced by as much as 200-300,000 tons. That represents several hundred million dollars. On the basis of new criteria we also might have to procure such high-cost items as platinum and nickel, although calculations have not yet been made. We are also concerned that the new criteria have not been checked with Senators Russell and Symington and Congressmen Rivers and Philbin of the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House. In the past these Congressmen have been suspicious that stockpile assumptions and criteria might be biased so as to create larger surpluses for sale. Congressional criticism at some future date of the new criteria and objectives might cause revision of the objectives we are calculating now. New stockpile objectives have important effects. The mere announcement of a new, higher copper objective would probably have a bullish effect on already high copper prices. If the USG procures copper, it will be competing with US consuming firms and, since the US is a net importer of copper, there will be an adverse effect on our balance of payments. Further we have procured commodities in the past, only later to revise our objectives downward and then sell. Sales from our stockpiles have caused problems for the executive branch with both domestic and foreign producers. Conclusion We see no need to rush ahead on stockpile recalculations prior to a careful review of the entire matter by the new Administration. At a minimum, we would suggest a suspension in the recalculation of stockpile objectives. During the suspension period we should not procure commodities except those whose stockpile levels are critically low. But, because many firms now count on stockpile disposals, we probably should continue to sell in those cases where it is reasonably clear that there is little risk that we will be selling commodities we later might have to buy. We also believe there would be considerable merit in going further and examining the basic premises of our stockpiling program. For example, are we stockpiling those things which we will need most in a national emergency? Could private industry play a greater role in our stockpiling program? There has not been a real review of the basic premises, at least not in recent years. A review carried out by the new Administration could lead to stockpile objectives that would be generally higher than those approved on the basis of criteria authorized by President Johnson. We understand, for example, that General Lincoln tends to favor larger rather than smaller stockpiles. But whatever the outcome of a review, at least we might be confident that our subsequent work rested on reasonably solid assumptions. Recommendation That you sign the letter to General Lincoln at Tab A. 4 Tab B Criteria for the Calculation of Stockpile Objectives The old stockpile objectives were calculated on the basis of civilian and military requirements during a three-year conventional war and on the basis of supplies that would be available from domestic sources and from a “contiguous” foreign area, i.e., Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean. Various factors were applied for concentration of supplies, shipping losses and other hazards. Under the new criteria: (1) we would continue to assume a three-year war; (2) we would now assume that supplies would be available from foreign countries, other than Canada, Mexico and in the Caribbean, on the basis of “accessibility” determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and political and economic reliability determined by State; and (3) the Council of Economic Advisers prepared a more sophisticated projection of civilian economic activity and requirements than had been used previously. In addition, the President approved a recommendation by Governor Daniel, then OEP Director, that we would assume that supplies would not be available from other than domestic sources and the contiguous foreign area during Year I of an assumed three-year war. This recommendation, apparently reflecting Governor Daniel’s concern about disruption of shipping during the first year of a war, was mentioned to other agencies but not staffed out prior to the NSC meeting. We believe that, among other things, we should examine further the assumption that no account should be taken of supplies from non-contiguous foreign sources during Year I; if such supplies are ruled out during the first year, a case can be made for counting them in during Years II and III, on the grounds that they were produced although not shipped during Year I. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. Secret. Drafted by C.R. Carlisle (E/ISM) on April 9 and cleared by Schnee (H). Attached to Document 390 . 2 P.L. 90-608, approved October 21, 1968, changed the name of the Office of Emergency Planning to the Office of Emergency Preparedness. (82 Stat. 1194) 3 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. IX, Document 375 . 4 Document 390 . 390. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 390. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 1 Washington, April 17, 1969. Dear General Lincoln: I understand that an inter-agency committee is recalculating stockpile objectives on the basis of new criteria approved last October 31 by President Johnson. 2 I would suggest that we suspend the recalculations pending a review by this Administration of those criteria. I make this suggestion for several reasons. First, new stockpile objectives may lead both to new procurement programs and to new disposal programs involving hundreds of millions of dollars. Second, procurement and disposal programs, even when carefully executed, can have a significant impact on our balance of payments and on domestic and foreign suppliers. Finally, I am told that the new criteria were approved so late in the previous Administration that there was no opportunity to check them with key members of Congress. I understand that certain Congressmen have been skeptical in the past about the calculation of stockpile objectives and have definite ideas of their own about the way objectives should be determined. I would like to suggest that the criteria approved by President Johnson be reviewed at a future NSC meeting. Such a review would enable us, for example, to determine whether various assumptions made about the availability of foreign supplies are in line with this Administration’s defense and foreign policies. We might also reexamine the projections of the US economy prepared by the previous Council of Economic Advisers, projections on which estimates of civilian and military requirements are based. I would also hope that we could go further by examining more basic assumptions. For example, are we stockpiling the items which we are most likely to need in time of national emergency? Are there better ways of holding stockpiles? Could private industry, for instance, hold some of our stockpiles in its pipelines? It seems to me that we might wish to think about these questions carefully before announcing new stockpile objectives. If we decide to suspend the calculations of stockpile objectives pending a review, I would recommend that during the suspension period we also suspend procurement for our stockpiles except for any commodities whose stockpile levels are critically low. Because many US companies now count on stockpile disposals, however, we might go ahead with current sales programs except in those cases where it is reasonably clear that we might be selling commodities which subsequently we later might have to buy. We are ready to cooperate with you in any way we can to ensure that this Administration’s stockpile objectives will be as realistic and as up-to-date as possible. Sincerely yours, William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 288, NSC/Misc. Secret. Drafted by C.R. Carlisle (E/ISM) and cleared by Greenwald (E), Katz (E/ORF), Schiff (E/ICD), and Schnee (H). Proposed for Secretary Rogers’ signature in Document 389 . 2 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. IX, Document 375 . 391. Message From Prime Minister Holyoake to President Nixon 391. Message From Prime Minister Holyoake to President Nixon 1 Wellington, June 4, 1969. My dear Mr President, You will be aware of the recent adoption by the Senate Finance Committee of a Bill incorporating a rider which would amend the 1964 Meat Imports Limitation Act to include quotas for imports of lamb into the United States. 2 I want you to know that the New Zealand Government, which is attempting to strengthen its overall relations with the United States, would regard with the utmost concern any additional restrictions on its exports to your country. As I pointed out during my visit to Washington last year, 3 New Zealand cannot be expected to play its full part in areas of international cooperation, including regional security arrangements to which the United States attaches importance, unless it has the trading opportunities which provide it with the economic means. There is a direct relationship between New Zealand’s capacity to play its part as a good ally and its ability to earn from fair trading opportunities overseas. Restrictive action on New Zealand’s exports to the United States makes it difficult for the New Zealand Government to justify to our people our alliance with the United States in other areas. To provide a further underpinning for this relationship I stressed that New Zealand—a country which has never received or asked aid from any other country—sought, not privileged treatment, but merely greater freedom to apply its competitive advantage in pastoral products. It is within this context—of economic as well as political interdependence—that I ask you to consider the proposed legislation to impose quotas on lamb imports. Such a measure could, in my view, result in irreparable damage to the United States/New Zealand relationship. It is of vital importance to New Zealand, as the world’s largest lamb exporter, to preserve unrestricted access to the United States market for this product. Lamb contributes substantially to New Zealand’s export earnings. At present almost all dairy products are already under quota in the United States and exports of New Zealand’s other major meat products to the United States are being limited to avoid quota action. Exports of agricultural products are responsible for the overwhelming bulk of New Zealand’s overseas earnings, and in respect of the United States, lamb is one agricultural product for which New Zealand has a chance to develop its exports in a modest but, to us, significant way. It is my firm belief that the volume of lamb which New Zealand is likely to be in a position to export to the United States will do more good than harm to the American industry. The domestic industry in recent years has consistently declined. Sheep numbers have been reducing at the rate of a million a year. Neither Government support for wool nor favourable market prices for lamb has induced the American industry to increase production. Imports have not offset this decline—far, far from it—and the amount of lamb in question is derisively small measured against the income level and meat-eating capacity of the United States. I would submit that, rather than constituting a threat to United States producers, New Zealand’s promotion efforts, by preserving the extremely limited taste for lamb and extending that taste to new groups, offer about the only possibility of keeping the American industry alive. New Zealand has gone about developing the trade in lamb in a responsible way over a period of years, incurring considerable expenditure in the process. Now an attempt has been made by a small group to render fruitless this effort and this investment. New Zealand has not failed to note the commitments of Administration spokesmen to include freedom to trade among the four economic freedoms which are to form the basis of United States trade policy during your term of office. Secretary Stans has spoken of the “dim view” which you take of quotas and other protectionist devices that may become permanent. I stress the point that New Zealand regards the issue of unimpeded entry of lamb as a talisman of this commitment. In terms of this commitment and New Zealand’s efforts to strengthen its overall relationship with the United States, my Government looks to your Administration to take an unyielding stand against the legislation at present before the Senate. I believe that there is no economic justification for the proposed quota action and that the issue is a quite simple one of foreign and trade policy considerations. I hope you will find it possible in this context to give tangible expression to your declared policy of trade liberalization and to the ANZUS Treaty and to make known, quickly and decisively, that legislative action to restrict lamb imports will not be tolerated by your Administration. Sincerely, Keith Holyoake 4 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, New Zealand: Nixon to Holyoake. Confidential. Sent to Secretary Rogers for delivery to the President under cover of a June 4 letter from the New Zealand Ambassador. (Ibid.) In his July 22 reply the President noted the Prime Minister’s expression of concern and wrote that his administration sought freer international trade and wanted to avoid new trade restrictions, “save for the most exceptional circumstances.” He indicated that these views had been communicated to Congress and concluded, “Although no partnership can be without its occasional difficulties, I shall make the most serious effort to insure that New Zealand’s interests are advanced rather than harmed in all decisions related to our mutual affairs.” (Ibid.) 2 In a June 5 memorandum to Under Secretary Richardson concerning the legislation, Acting Assistant Secretary Greenwald wrote in part: “There is no economic justification for the legislation: domestic supplies are low, imports comprise only 4% of total supplies, and lamb prices have reached record highs. Adoption of this legislation would not only create serious problems in our relations with Australia and New Zealand but also give impetus to the adoption of further quota legislation and of retaliatory action by our trading partners.” (Ibid.) 3 Prime Minister Holyoake visited Washington October 9-10, 1968. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 392. Editorial Note 392. Editorial Note The Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held its 12th meeting in Washington June 25-26, 1969. Secretary of State Rogers and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp headed the delegations, which included Cabinet-level agriculture and trade officials. According to the communiqué issued on June 26, the International Grains Agreement was prominent on the agenda, and the United States and Canada agreed to consult bilaterally and with other concerned governments to restore stability in world grain markets. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin , July 14, 1969, pages 38-40. On June 27 President Nixon and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau met at the international boundary to participate in the 10th anniversary ceremonies for the Saint Lawrence Seaway. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) In a June 27 memorandum to Henry Kissinger regarding the President’s meeting that day with Trudeau, Fred Bergsten noted that the Canadians, at the Cabinet-level talks that week, as well as the Australians (see footnote 2, Document 398 ), had urged the United States not to violate unilaterally the price minima of the IGA and to agree to a Ministerial meeting before taking any action. Bergsten added that the President could impress Trudeau by informing him of decisions he had made on June 26 regarding wheat and recommended that the President take the initiative to raise the issue with Trudeau. He also provided talking points for the President’s use, one of which was: “I have directed that U.S. wheat prices are not to be cut from their present level, pending an intensive internal review of U.S. policy toward the International Grains Agreement and a Ministerial meeting among the major exporters to discuss the problem which we all face at the present.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 670, Canada, Volume I through 2/70) 393. Memorandum From the Agricultural Trade Task Force to President Nixon 393. Memorandum From the Agricultural Trade Task Force to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 3, 1969. SUBJECT International Grains Arrangement (re Ministerial Meeting on Wheat) At the invitation of the United States there will be a Ministerial meeting to discuss the Wheat Trade Convention, which is a part of the International Grains Arrangement. This meeting will be held in Washington and is tentatively scheduled for July 10-11. The Task Force on Agricultural Trade, which includes the agencies listed at the end of this memorandum, has considered the options available to the United States. If you approve the recommendations at the end of this memorandum a position paper for the U.S. delegation will be drafted accordingly. Background The International Grains Arrangement, which also includes a Food Aid Convention, was negotiated in 1967 as part of the Kennedy Round and went into force on July 1, 1968. The Wheat Trade Convention is essentially a minimum price agreement encompassing a number of different grades of wheat exported by the principal Free World producers (the U.S., Canada, Australia, the European Economic Community, and a few others). Because of the worldwide oversupply of wheat the Convention has led to problems almost from the start. Some of the principal exporters have gone below the minimum prices, and others have been compelled to follow suit in order to safeguard their traditional markets. Because the minimum price schedule is based on a grade of U.S. wheat we have been in an especially difficult position and forward sales of our wheat are abnormally low. At a meeting in London last week the U.S. proposed suspension of the minimum price schedule but the other exporters were unwilling to support us. The Prime Minister of Australia sent you an aide-memoire urging us to keep the agreement alive and declaring a willingness to consider necessary changes. 2 Although our wheat experts are agreed that the long-run outlook for the Convention is poor we should not take the blame for letting it die without a further attempt to improve its provisions. Canada and Australia are believed to be very anxious to uphold the agreement and would be prepared to take specific measures, including possible revision in its provisions. The attitude of the EEC, whose sales policy has been especially disruptive, is not clear, however. We believe therefore that our proposals to the Ministerial meeting, while constructive in themselves, should also be designed to place the onus of a future breakdown on any exporter who resumes price cutting (most likely the EEC). The outcome of the IGA discussion also has important domestic implications. Unless we can ensure reasonable prospects for our exports the wheat allotment (soon to be announced) will have to be cut more sharply than will be necessary in any case. The available options fall into two categories: the short-run options that could be agreed upon immediately to keep the agreement alive and the long-run options that would change the agreement more drastically and therefore would take more time to negotiate. From our point of view the short-run options should furthermore reinforce the competitive position of our wheat, while the long-run options should help us in maximizing our export revenues and fulfilling our international obligations. Short-run Options Option 1: Maintain the status quo, i.e., freeze prices at prevailing export levels irrespective of the minimum price schedule). Advantages: (a) It would reduce uncertainty in the wheat market, thus buyers would resume a more normal level of purchases. (b) It would stop the trend toward further erosion of the IGA. (c) It would provide a stable situation under which to work for a more basic solution to wheat trade problems by negotiating changes in the IGA. Disadvantages: (a) It would provide no relief from the present decline in U.S. wheat sales. (b) It would provoke a strong negative reaction from U.S. wheat interests, aggravating the political problem connected with the impending announcement of an acreage allotment cut. (c) It would make it easier for non-IGA members to undercut IGA member sales and thus to gain an increased share of the world wheat market. Option 2: Unilateral price cuts by the U.S. Advantages: (a) It would enable us to maintain our share of the market, and in fact might lead to an improvement of our trade balance by as much as $75 million, provided other countries leave their prices unchanged. (b) It would make an acreage allotment cut (which will be unavoidable even with favorable export prospects) more palatable politically. Disadvantages: (a) It would mean a continuation of present market uncertainty, which would depress near-term sales volume. (b) It would further weaken the IGA. (c) It might lead to a round of price cuts by wheat exporters, for which the blame would be clearly placed on us. (d) It might involve somewhat higher budget costs. Option 3: Increases in landed prices by other exporters (Australia and the EC). Advantages: (a) It would provide an immediate amelioration of the situation. (b) It could provide a basis for later renegotiation of IGA price provisions (see Option 5). (c) It would also help Canada. (d) Any infraction could be easily detected, so that it could be used as a justification for our abandoning the minimum price schedule if this were in our interest. Disadvantages: (a) It would only represent a partial and temporary solution to our wheat trade problem and would not attack more fundamental inequities inherent in the IGA. (b) It is doubtful the EC would agree, thus leaving one of the major sources of our market difficulties unaffected. Long-run Options Option 4: Market sharing, which could take the form either of formal export quotas or of a concerted management of prices through a committee of exporters. Advantages: (a) It would provide the best means of ensuring that exporting countries maintain their historical shares in a limited market. (b) It would avoid more complex problems involved in altering pricing and/or freight provisions of the IGA. Disadvantages: (a) It would be difficult to obtain agreement on division of the market (such a proposal was raised and rejected in IGA negotiations). (b) There would be serious, if not insurmountable, technical problems relating to monitoring and enforcing the system. (c) In the case of formal quotas the U.S. would be forced to institute a visible and quantitative export control system which would be politically difficult and legally questionable. (d) It would stifle competitive market forces. Option 5: Changes in the IGA price schedule (in the prices and/or wheats listed). Advantages: (a) It strikes at the real problem, i.e., altering the price provisions of the IGA so as more accurately to reflect actual competitive price relationships than in the present price schedule, which was established in 1967. Disadvantages: (a) It may involve long and difficult negotiations. (b) Other exporting countries may refuse on the grounds that it involves a basic renegotiation of the IGA, which still has two years to run. Option 6: Move from a basing point system to another basis of setting prices (e.g., to some form of destination pricing, under which landed prices would be the same regardless of origin, or of origin pricing, under which f.o.b. prices would be set for all exporters rather than only for the U.S.). Advantages: (a) Either form of this option would rectify certain f.o.b. price and freight disadvantages to the U.S. built into the IGA. (b) Origin pricing would in theory correspond to an economically optimal pattern of production and transportation. Disadvantages: (a) This approach might lead to protracted negotiations. (b) Since destination pricing would lead to equal CIF prices, there would be no real basis for competition among the exporters to a given importer. Importers might therefore consider themselves exposed to exploitation. (c) Origin pricing might make it impossible for some exporters to supply remote areas, and thus also lead to some reduction in competitive forces. Option 7: Obtain agreement by Australia and EC to hold stocks. Advantages: (a) It would relieve some of the immediate pressure on the world market from oversupply. (b) It would provide for more equitable sharing of the burden of supply management, which at present is being done only by the U.S. and Canada to any significant extent. Disadvantages: (a) We have no means of bringing pressure on the other exporters to do this. For this reason it is unlikely that the EC would agree. (b) Since the excess supply of wheat may be even greater in the future than it is now there is no economic rationale for storage. Recommendations For the short run we believe that option 3 (price increases by other exporters) holds the most promise of serving our interests. It fits in with the relatively tough line we think is needed, yet it represents a serious attempt on our part to rescue the agreement. If this option is accepted but does not work out we would have a clear case for going it alone. Option 2 (a unilateral cut by the U.S.) would be the second best; it carries a greater risk that the blame for scuttling the IGA would fall on us. Since option 1 (a price freeze) is unpromising, we would have to withdraw from the minimum price schedule if neither option 2 nor option 3 are accepted. For the long run option 5 (revision of the minimum price schedule), which is the logical sequel to option 3, is preferred, with option 6 (a change in the basing point system) as the next best alternative. Both of them offer some promise of keeping the agreement in being, though world supplies may grow too much to make this feasible in the long run. In any case, our negotiators should present both these options as bases for discussion, without necessarily ruling out the less attractive options 4 (market sharing) and 7 (stock holding). Paul McCracken Chairman of the Council of Econmic Advisers Nathaniel Samuels Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs J. Phil Campbell Acting Secretary of Agriculture John W. Evans Acting Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, International Grains Agreement. No classification marking. The memorandum is Tab A to Document 395 . 2 See footnote 2, Document 398 . 394. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Petty) to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy 394. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Petty) to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy 1 Washington, July 7, 1969. SUBJECT Ministerial Meeting (July 10-11) on the International Grains Arrangement The International Grains Arrangement (IGA) was negotiated in 1967 in conjunction with the Kennedy Round negotiations. It is essentially a minimum price agreement encompassing different grades of wheat. Because of the unexpected and rapid shift from world-wide shortage of wheat to a world-wide oversupply, there have been problems with the arrangement almost from the start. The Department of Agriculture and the Department of State believe that the IGA works to the disadvantage of U.S. wheat exports. While the United States has refrained from selling wheat below the minimum price established by the IGA, other exporters have been playing footloose with the arrangement and have been selling below the minimum prices. Forward sales of U.S. wheat are abnormally low. Our share of free-world wheat sales this year have fallen from a traditional level of more that 40% to slightly more than 20%. In particular, the well-established U.S. market for wheat in Japan and Taiwan is threatened by EEC subsidized sales as well as Australian and Canadian shading of the IGA price. At a meeting in London at the end of June, the U.S. normally proposed suspension of the IGA minimum price schedule but the other exporters were not willing to support us. The Prime Minister of Australia wrote to President Nixon urging that the IGA be kept alive. 2 He suggested a meeting of exporters at the Ministerial level to consider the matter. At the invitation of the U.S. Government, such a meeting is tentatively scheduled for July 10-11. Australia and Canada are believed to be very anxious to maintain the IGA; Argentina has already oversold her crop and is no longer an exporter; but the attitude of the EEC, whose sales policy has been especially disruptive, is not clear. Our objective at the Ministerial meeting is to secure a short-term solution which will enable us to maintain our competitive position with regard to free-world sales of wheat. Moreover, if agreement is not forthcoming at the Ministerial meeting, we want to be in the position of placing the onus for the breakdown of the IGA on other exporters (most likely the EEC). An inter-agency task force headed by Hank Houthakker has recommended to the President that at the Ministerial as a short-term solution we seek the agreement of Australia and the EEC that they will increase their landed prices. 3 The second alternative is unilateral price cuts by the United States. (This was considered the second best solution because it might lead to continued uncertainty in the wheat market and a round of price cuts by wheat exporters with the U.S. bearing the blame. However, there was also concern that it could mean increased subsidy payments and higher budgetary costs.) The most desired long-term solution is a change in the IGA price schedule but this will take more time to negotiate. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Memo to the Secretary—July-August 1969. Limited Official Use. Drafted by M. Ryss (OASIA/OIEA) on July 7. Copies were sent to Under Secretaries Walker and Volcker. The memorandum is attached to a July 7 note to Secretary Kennedy, presumably from Petty, which reads: “I doubt that Agriculture really believes the IGA is tenable. I think State may have their doubts too but are anxious that onus of break-up fall upon shoulders of others. This consideration probably dictates tactics at Ministerial meeting.” 2 Presumably a reference to the June 24 aide-mémoire; see footnote 2, Document 398 . 3 See Document 393 . A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: “now based upon a U.S. base point and grade of wheat. Other countries, by making allowances for the volatile ocean freight and their judgment of the grade of wheat involved can—and have—rig their pricing against us. JR Petty” 395. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 395. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 11, 1969. SUBJECT U.S. Position for the Ministerial Meeting on Wheat Issue The Ministerial Meeting on the International Grains Agreement (IGA) takes place here in Washington on July 10-11. You decided that we should avoid any unilateral price reductions, which could break up the Agreement, without a Ministerial to attempt to find a cooperative solution to the problem. 2 Secretary Hardin heads the U.S. delegation. 3 Attached at Tab A is a paper, prepared by the Agricultural Trade Task Force chaired by Hendrik Houthakker, which presents our options for the meeting and recommends a U.S. position. 4 It has been signed by Acting Secretary of Agriculture Campbell, Deputy Under Secretary of State Samuels, Acting Special Trade Representative Evans, and Paul McCracken. All agencies agree that the United States is seriously disadvantaged by the present Agreement. Our wheat sales are off drastically from historical levels. We must therefore take a tough line at the Ministerial to assure restoration of our traditional position in the world wheat market. However, we also seek to maintain the International Grains Agreement for the longer term. If sufficient cooperation cannot be achieved to preserve it, we should seek to pin the blame for its breakdown on the other major exporters, particularly the European Community. Background The present IGA was negotiated in 1967 as part of the Kennedy Round. It has two parts: one sets minimum and maximum prices for wheat trade among participating countries and the other is the Food Aid Convention (FAC) which multilateralizes food aid to the developing countries. The price minima are under great pressure because world wheat supplies are much greater now than when the agreement was negotiated and because of the aggressive selling of some exporters. This pressure affects the U.S. more than the other exporters, because we were out-negotiated in the development of the pricing schedules which are the heart of the Agreement. All major exporters, including the United States, have now violated the minima to some extent. The Prices Review Committee met in London two weeks ago to attempt to deal with the problem. The U.S. tried to get the other countries to suspend the minima so that we could compete without the confines of the Agreement. We were unsuccessful, but then announced that we would cut prices unilaterally anyway, producing a de facto suspension. Canada and Australia (via Prime Minister Gorton’s direct letter to you) 5 expressed deep concern over our announcement and called for a Ministerial meeting to try to preserve the Agreement. The European Community and Argentina supported their proposals. We have agreed to the Ministerial but made it clear that we must have immediate relief for our competitive position. The United States has three major interests in the problem: maintaining our income from wheat exports, preserving the Food Aid Convention, and minimizing acrimony with the other exporters. The last objective is difficult, however, because the European Community (essentially France) and Australia can take advantage of technical provisions of the agreement to undersell us. An important and urgent consideration is our domestic political situation. Secretary Hardin needs to announce very shortly the National Wheat Allotment for the next crop year. This will call for at least a ten percent reduction in acreage on top of the fifteen percent reduction of each of the last two years, and he feels that a strong move to make U.S. wheat exports more competitive on world markets is necessary to minimize the political and economic costs of the cutback. Options In the short run, we could: 1. Freeze the current situation, continuing to accept the disadvantages to us of the present pricing schedules. 2. Unilaterally cut prices ourselves. This could restore our competitive position but at lower prices for all exporters. 3. Get the other exporters to raise their landed prices back to the levels called for by the Agreement. This would restore our competitive position at higher levels, maximizing our farm income, while also fully preserving the Agreement. For the longer run, the options are: 4. Market sharing among the major producers. This means that the major exporters would buttress the Agreement by dividing up most of the world sales among themselves by agreement. It would maximize our income but be very difficult to police. 5. Negotiated changes in the present price schedules to remove the disadvantages from which we now suffer. This would preserve the Agreement without its present obstacles to our sales. 6. Changes in the basic price-setting mechanism of the Agreement in such a way as to improve our competitive position. This would accomplish much the same as Option 5, and might be a necessary complement to it. 7. Build-ups of stocks by other exporters to bolster prices and give us an opportunity to increase our sales. Others would voluntarily withdraw from some competition; the large world wheat supply militates against its likelihood. Recommendations: The agencies recommend that we: 1. Attempt to get agreement on Option 3, price increases by the other exporters. It would meet our wheat needs, preserve the Agreement, and provide us with justification for going it alone later if the promised cooperation were not sustained. 2. Be prepared to move to Option 2, unilateral price cuts, as a second-best way to restore our competitive position while preserving the legal framework of the Agreement. 3. Withdraw from the Agreement if neither Options 2 nor 3 are accepted. This would restore our competitiveness, but cause foreign policy problems because of the Agreement’s importance to the others, especially Canada and Australia. By trying sincerely for the other options first, however, we could pin the blame squarely on the other countries for blocking a cooperative solution. 4. Express a willingness to consider all of the long-term options to put the Agreement on a viable basis, with preferences for Option 5 and then Option 6. I recommend that you authorize Secretary Hardin to pursue the course of action which the agencies have recommended. Approve 6 Prefer other options, see me 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, International Grains Agreement. Confidential. Sent to Kissinger under cover of a July 7 memorandum from Bergsten. 2 See Document 392 . 3 U.S., Canadian, Australian, Argentine, and EEC delegation lists are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 18, Wheat-IGA. 4 Document 393 . In his transmittal memorandum (see footnote 1 above) Bergsten indicated that the options paper followed up “on the President’s decision that the United States should avoid unilaterally breaking up the International Grains Agreement, as proposed earlier by Agriculture and supported by State, without meeting fervent Australian and Canadian desires to meet at the Ministerial level.” 5 See footnote 2, Document 398 . 6 President Nixon initialed this option. 396. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 396. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 14, 1969. SUBJECT International Wheat Negotiations The five major wheat exporters (the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina and the European Community) met in Washington on July 10-11 to find a solution for the problems besetting the International Grains Arrangement (IGA). The meeting appears to have been successful, though this cannot be said for certain until the European authorities in Brussels give their approval (probably on July 16). The discussion centered on an Australian proposal to manage international wheat prices in such a way that each exporter will obtain a fair share of the market. This would be done through a newly established committee located in London. For the immediate future, Australia, whose wheat sales have done well under the IGA, offered to raise its export prices so that we and the Canadians (the principal losers) can recapture some of the traditional outlets for our wheat. This proposal was finally accepted by the U.S., Canada and Argentina subject to concurrence by the EEC, whose delegates had to refer to Brussels. The EEC will also have to raise its export prices. Otherwise, it is understood that we will cut our prices unilaterally, which would be tantamount to destroying the IGA. The burden of preserving the IGA has consequently been shifted to Brussels, in accord-ance with our previously determined strategy. (See my memo of July 3, also signed by State, Agriculture and STR.) 2 The Australian proposal is not ideal from our point of view (it combines elements of options 2, 4 and 5 in the July 3 memo). It provides a means of keeping the IGA alive, however, and perhaps even of strengthening it. More important, it promised to get us out of the position where we alone seemed to be bent on destroying the IGA, at the expense of our friends in Australia, Canada and Argentina. The Australian Deputy Prime Minister McEwen, 3 who impressed everybody by his statesmanlike conduct, said privately that on political grounds he was very anxious not to let the U.S. appear to be the culprit. The Australians also believe that if the IGA can be made to work the Russians (now the principal outsiders) may want to join on a formal or informal basis. From a domestic point of view the new agreement is valuable because it should safeguard our wheat exports and thereby make our wheat program less restrictive. Our delegation, led capably by Secretary Hardin and Assistant Secretary Palmby, can therefore be satisfied with its work. Our hope is that the EEC will come through with its part in the agreement, but even if we have to go it alone we will at least have the understanding of the other exporters. In the longer run, however, the outlook for the IGA remains clouded. The agreement still has two years to run, but whether or not it survives we should start thinking about more viable alternatives. Paul W. McCracken 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 18, Wheat-International Grains Agreement. No classification marking. 2 Document 393 . 3 McEwen was head of the Australian delegation. On the delegation list he is identified as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (see footnote 3, Document 395 ). 397. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 397. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 19, 1969. SUBJECT Wheat Export Prices and Foreign Policy Yesterday the Agriculture Department announced a new schedule of wheat export prices. This was the first action since you ordered wheat prices frozen upon the receipt of the Aide-Mémoire from Prime Minister Gorton. 2 In the meantime there was a meeting of the five wheat exporting nations, on which I reported in my memorandum of July 14. 3 The new wheat export prices are 12 cents per bushel below the old one on the standard grade included in the International Grains Arrangement. (There were cuts of different magnitude in other grades.) These moves have been made in consultation with Canada and Australia, though not necessarily with their full approval. A special provision was made for Argentina in order to prevent any problems in Latin America. Although these are considerable price cuts they are not nearly as deep as the Agriculture Department wanted. They represent a compromise between our desire not to be blamed for the collapse of the IGA and the need to make our wheat more competitive in order to avoid a very restrictive wheat allotment. It is possible, however, that the troubles of the Wheat Agreement may not be over. Despite the consultation with Canada and Australia the latest move may be considered as excessive by some countries. The European Economic Community in particular may feel aggrieved because it made a somewhat conciliatory offer to us which was not taken up. In Canada, moreover, the Trudeau government is in trouble with its western wheat growers, who have staged serious incidents during the last few days. If the IGA breaks down, and Canadian wheat growers are hurt as a result, we are likely to be blamed. These troubles over wheat export prices illustrate two things: 1. The impossibility of preserving an international commodity agreement based on unrealistic assumptions concerning supply and demand. 2. The difficulty of reconciling domestic and foreign policy interests. The Task Force on Agricultural Trade worked out the U.S. position for the ministerial exporters meeting 4 and has continued to discuss the situation as it develops. Although the State Department is represented on the Task Force, it has unfortunately been quite difficult to determine where our foreign policy interests lie, and these may not have been fully taken into account. It might be desirable for you to reaffirm, to the agencies concerned, your interest in the foreign policy aspect of wheat negotiations. Paul W. McCracken 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 19, Wheat-Wheat Pricing. No classification marking. 2 See footnote 2, Document 398 . 3 Document 396 . 4 See Document 393 . 398. Letter From President Nixon to Prime Minister Gorton 398. Letter From President Nixon to Prime Minister Gorton 1 Washington, July 22, 1969. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I appreciate your having drawn to my attention developments in the world wheat trade and specifically those relating to the operation of the International Grains Arrangement. 2 I fully recognize the importance of wheat to Australia’s trade and consequently of the effective operation of the Arrangement. I should like to stress that my Administration desires, as you do, to maintain the Arrangement and to operate within its framework. The United States played an important role in the negotiations for the two conventions, the Wheat Trade Convention and the Food Aid Convention, which comprise the Arrangement. There should, therefore, be no disagreement between us that we should strive to work through the Arrangement to promote orderly trade in wheat at equitable prices. Accordingly, I am pleased that we were able to support your initiative and to act as host for the recent meeting of wheat exporting countries at Ministerial level in Washington. Similarly, I am pleased that agreement was reached on arrangements which will strengthen our cooperation on wheat pricing while enabling us to sell our wheat competitively. It is my hope that our two Governments will continue their close consultations and cooperation on matters relating to wheat. Sincerely, Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, Australia: Nixon to Gorton. No classification marking. Telegram 123219 to Canberra, July 25, transmitted the text of the President’s letter to the Embassy. The final paragraph of the telegram informed the Embassy that the White House did not plan to release the text but had no objection should the Prime Minister wish to do so. (Ibid.) No public release of the letter was found. A copy of the President’s letter is attached to a July 19 memorandum from Kissinger to the President, which indicates the letter was drafted by Bergsten. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 333, International Grains Agreement) 2 In his aide-mémoire of June 24, transmitted to the President under cover of a note from the Australian Chargé, Prime Minister Gorton stressed the importance to Australia of effective international arrangements regulating the sale of wheat in world markets. He requested President Nixon’s “personal interest” in ensuring that no precipitate action would be taken to threaten the International Grains Agreement without consultation and cooperation among wheat-exporting nations. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 18, Wheat-IGA) 399. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 399. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 1 Washington, July 25, 1969. SUBJECT Wheat, International and Domestic It is becoming increasingly probable that the international wheat market is headed for a price war. Our price cuts of last week have been followed to some extent by Canada and the Soviet Union. The grain trade is at a standstill, since traders are waiting for further cuts. The exporters committee set up at the Washington meeting two weeks ago has not yet met. The EEC has withdrawn its offer to cooperate, which was based on the assumption we would not cut our prices; however, there are indications of disagreement within the Community over the next steps. 2 If a wheat price war breaks out, the world price of wheat will undoubtedly fall to the level of feedgrain prices, which means a decline of another 20¢ a bushel. Feedgrains, of which we are the major exporter, will probably also fall. The effect of all this on our balance of payments and on our budgetary costs will be considerable, probably on the order of $200 million per year. It appears, therefore, that further efforts should be made to prevent a price war. The EEC has proposed another Ministerial meeting, but this would be of doubtful value. Our counterproposal is to activate the London Committee, which is strongly supported by Canada and Australia. The reductions already made in wheat export prices are probably irreversible. They should therefore be reflected in our decisions concerning the domestic wheat program. If we cannot sell our wheat at remunerative prices, it is clear that the case for a substantial cut in the wheat allotment is made even more compelling. I, therefore, support the Budget Bureau’s preference for a 16% cut in the allotment, as opposed to the 10% cut favored by Agriculture. Since the loan rate on wheat (not to be confused with the support price, which is fixed by law) is supposed to equal the world price, it would also be appropriate to reduce the loan rate by at least 10¢ a bushel. Although this will have only a minor effect on farm income and budget expenditures, it will serve to bring home the fact that a wheat price war will be partly at the expense of our own wheat growers. Unless the loan rate is changed the wheat growers and the Department may be led to expect that we are prepared to subsidize our wheat exports without limit. Paul W. McCracken 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 19, Wheat-Wheat Pricing. No classification marking. 2 For a report on the July 10-11 Ministerial meeting in Washington, see Document 396 . 400. Editorial Note 400. Editorial Note In a July 26, 1969, message to President Nixon, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau referred to U.S. and Canadian efforts to cooperate in bringing stability to the grains market and the IGA, and indicated he thought the current situation could lead to a breakdown in cooperation and the collapse of the agreed pricing system. He wrote that Canada would maintain its prices pending an assessment of the situation by the wheat exporters at a London meeting proposed for August 1, but implied that if the situation deteriorated further Canada would have to act. The message was transmitted under cover of a brief letter from Canadian Ambassador Ritchie to Acting Secretary of State Richardson, July 26. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, Canada: Trudeau to Nixon 7/26/69) Attached to Trudeau’s message and Ritchie’s letter is an undated message from Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp to Secretary of State Rogers. Sharp referred to Trudeau’s message to the President and the recent Cabinet Committee meeting in Washington (see Document 392 ) as examples of the seriousness with which the Canadian Government regarded developments in the wheat market. He wrote that he feared “we are now on the brink of a chain reaction we will live to regret” and hoped continued cooperation would be possible. Sharp informed Rogers that he had sent a message to the President of the EEC Commission urging “the greatest restraint on their part at this time.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 670, Canada, Volume I through 2/70) In a July 28 memorandum informing the President of Trudeau’s message, Kissinger noted that the current U.S. position was fully responsive to the Canadians and that the United States planned no further price cuts prior to the August 1 London meeting. Kissinger thought no response to Trudeau’s message was required at that time. (Ibid.) Other documentation, which points to Canadian price reductions making proposed courtesy replies inappropriate, is ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, Canada. No Presidential reply to Trudeau’s July 26 message was found. 401. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 401. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, August 2, 1969. SUBJECT WHEAT—Briefing and Talking Points for Your Meeting with Prime Minister [President] Pompidou Issue: Pompidou recently told Ambassador Shriver that wheat was the only outstanding issue between the U.S. and France. 2 He was referring to the breaching of the price minimums for wheat contained in the International Grains Arrangement (IGA), which we think was started by the EC but which they claim was begun by U.S. Some newspapers have labeled the problem a US-EC (meaning French) “price war” and Pompidou’s comment was undoubtedly based on his experts’ testimony that the U.S. was to blame. Talking Points: (If you wish to respond substantively) 3 1. It is my understanding that all of the exporting countries wish to preserve the IGA and have been making repeated efforts to try to find a way to do so. However, it is obviously difficult to do so in view of present world surpluses of wheat. 2. I hope that the Technical Group decided upon in London on Saturday will help in that process. 3. (If Pompidou were to mention the recent U.S. price cuts) The U.S. stated clearly at the Ministerial meeting in Washington on July 10-11 that we would have to cut prices to regain our competitive position unless others raised their prices. No one raised. We were thus genuinely surprised at the EC reaction when we made our adjustments. Background: The IGA developed from the Kennedy Round. Its core is a set of minimum prices which each exporter is supposed to maintain. The Agreement biases the wheat trade against the U.S. (and Canada), however, for several highly technical reasons. And it lacks any mechanism for sharing markets when prices are at the minimum. These problems became critical with the massive overproduction of the last two years. There were only two alternatives: price cuts below the minimum in response to market pressures or exporter cooperation to sustain prices by effectively sharing markets. A series of meetings has sought the latter but failed, in large part due to the inability of the EC to really control its wheat traders as well as its reluctance to give up its favored position under the IGA, and hence its retreat to the strict legalisms of the (biased) Agreement. The August 1-2 meeting in London agreed to set up a technical group which might be able to get at some of the technical inequities in the Agreement. More ambitious U.S. proposals to save the IGA again foundered on EC reluctance/inability. Australia—which is also favored by the IGA—was a problem earlier, but considers the Agreement so important politically that it is now playing ball. The result is an apparent confrontation between the Anglo-Saxons (U.S., Canada, Australia) and the EC which some of the press has tried to sensationalize as a US-EC “price war”. Further price cuts are quite possible in view of the lack of exporter cooperation. They need not carry “price war” connotations if handled properly, but they may very well remain a serious irritant in US-EC (especially US-French) relations until the market situation changes significantly or the Agreement can be re-negotiated. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69. No classification marking. Presumably this memorandum was transmitted telegraphically to Kissinger, who was with the President in Bucharest on August 2. Kissinger left the President’s party in the United Kingdom the next day to travel to Paris to brief President Pompidou. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 2 Ambassador Shriver reported on this aspect of his July 23 meeting with President Pompidou in telegram 11266 from Paris, July 24. (Ibid., NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, Box 675, France, Volume III Jan 69-10/31/69) 3 According to the memoranda of Kissinger’s conversations in Paris, the wheat situation was not discussed. (Ibid.) 402. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 402. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 1 Washington, August 5, 1969. SUBJECT The International Wheat Situation and Its Domestic Implications The wheat situation continues to be very unsettled. The EEC reduced some of its export prices in retaliation for our cut of July 18, but the European cut was not as deep or as extensive as we expected. On Friday and Saturday the five leading exporters, (the U.S., the EEC, Canada, Australia and Argentina) met in London. Although little concrete progress was made the atmosphere was good and press talk of a “price war” is premature. Another meeting is scheduled for August 11. Behind the apparent calm the danger of a major confrontation with the EEC and of friction with Canada, Australia, Japan and Brazil remains as real as ever. We have sold little if any wheat for several weeks now, which increases the impatience of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to make further cuts. Since the other exporters would undoubtedly follow us down, it is not clear that we would sell any more wheat as a result. The EEC would have further evidence for its accusation that we are bent on wrecking the International Grains Agreement, and we would lose the support of Canada and Australia. On the other hand Japan and Brazil, both major importers, are complaining that we have reduced prices to Europe but not to them. The IGA crisis is also beginning to have domestic repercussions. Senator McGovern last week urged the Administration to uphold the agreement; Senator Mansfield is reported to be of the same opinion. The announcement of the 1970 wheat program is already overdue; it will undoubtedly generate more heat. The interagency Task Force on Agricultural Trade is preparing an options paper for the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy. 2 Pending a consensus on this matter it would be highly undesirable to cut wheat prices any further. If you agree, I suggest that Secretary Hardin be informed of this. Paul W. McCracken 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 19, Wheat-Wheat Pricing. No classification marking. 2 The Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy took up the issue on August 12; see Document 403 . 403. Editorial Note 403. Editorial Note The President met with the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy from 9:35 a.m. to 12:35 p.m. on August 12, 1969, at the Western White House in San Clemente. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to Alexander Butterfield’s summary of the discussion of U.S. wheat prices to Japan and Latin America, the Committee noted that on July 18 the United States had announced a reduction in wheat prices for exports only to Europe and the Mediterranean, and that Japan and Brazil had complained, the former bitterly. The summary reports that the Interagency Task Force on Agricultural Trade had reached the unanimous conclusion that wheat prices should also be reduced for Japan and Latin America. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 19, Wheat-Wheat Pricing) Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry McEwen, in response to a Parliamentary question on August 13, indicated that a U.S. decision to reduce prices for exports to Japan and Latin America had been made, and that the Australians had been promptly informed. McEwen informed Parliament that Secretary of Agriculture Hardin had called at President Nixon’s request to inform him of the decision taken at San Clemente that day. McEwen explained the path and rationale of U.S. price reductions, and said the Australian Wheat Board immediately would take appropriate steps to adjust its prices. He reported that Hardin had given assurances that the official U.S. policy was to preserve the International Grains Agreement, and that he had responded that to remain competitive one had to meet the prices of one’s competitors but that “the high objective should be that when the forces of competition made it possible to do so there should be a return to the prices of the International Grains Agreement as originally negotiated.” A copy of the Parliamentary question and McEwen’s answer was forwarded to Henrik Houthakker under cover of an August 14 transmittal slip from the Commercial Counselor of the Australian Embassy, A.J. McGoldrick. (Ibid.) 404. Letter From the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury (Eggers) to the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee (Long) 404. Letter From the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury (Eggers) to the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee (Long) 1 Washington, undated. Dear Mr. Chairman: Reference is made to your request for the views of this Department on S. 2400, “To revise the quota-control system on the importation of certain meat and meat products.” 2 The proposed legislation would limit the imports of meat and meat products described in items 106.10 (cattle), 106.20 (goats and sheep, except lambs), 106.30 (lambs), 107.40, 107.45, 107.50, 107.55 and 107.60 (prepared or preserved beef and veal except sausages) of the Tariff Schedules of the United States to the average aggregate quantity of such articles imported during the calendar years 1965, 1966 and 1967, subject to an adjustment based on the percentage of increase or decrease in the domestic production of such products in that year and the two preceding years in comparison with the average annual domestic production during the years 1965-1967. It would also give the President discretionary authority to impose quotas on meat and meat products other than those enumerated above and would repeal Public Law 88-482 3 which limits imports of the products covered by items 106.10 and 106.20. The Department believes that the existing law and voluntary quota system provide adequate protection for the domestic industry. Furthermore, the imposition of a quota would tend to have retaliatory effects. The Department is, therefore, opposed to the enactment of S. 2400. The Department has been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection from the standpoint of the Administration’s program to the submission of this report to your Committee. Sincerely yours, Paul W. Eggers 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury Volume I. No classification marking. Attached to an August 29 memorandum from Richard Moose to Peter Vaky informing him that the Budget Bureau wanted the National Security Council’s informal comment on the Treasury report. Presumably the text printed here is a draft circulated for clearance. 2 The request was not further identified. 3 Approved August 22, 1964. (78 Stat. 594) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 405. Aide-Mémoire From the New Zealand Embassy 405. Aide-Mémoire From the New Zealand Embassy 1 Washington, September 24, 1969. AIDE-MEMOIRE Further to the discussions last week between the Prime Minister of New Zealand and the President of the United States and the Secretary of Agriculture on the subject of United States meat imports, 2 the New Zealand Embassy takes this opportunity of presenting the following views to the United States Administration. While overall meat production in the United States is rising, there is already evidence of an inadequate supply of manufacturing quality beef. It has been estimated that United States production of this kind of meat will decline by over 150 million pounds from the 1968 level during 1969, 1970 and 1971. Simply to maintain supply to satisfy the consumer demand for the normal annual increase of 2-1/2 per cent would require additional imports of between 150 million and 200 million pounds a year. If, in those circumstances, imports are not allowed to supplement domestic production, the result will be severe price increases for meat products of a kind—hamburgers, frankfurters, etc.—particularly consumed by lower income families, or, conceivably, the rapid development of meat substitutes. As we see it, there is no serious prospect of this deficit in supplies being filled by increased production in the United States. The dairy herd—a major domestic source of manufacturing quality meat in the past—continues to decline and milk cow numbers in the United States are at the lowest level since 1887. The production in the United States of other lean grass-fed beef comparable to the imported product also continues to decrease. Exporting countries, however—New Zealand and Australia in particular—can supply increased quantities of manufacturing meat at reasonable prices, and access to the United States market for this product is vital to the future of our cattle industries. In New Zealand’s view these considerations add up to a strong case for improved provision for imports of manufacturing quality meat into the United States. There are several ways in which this could be achieved; for example, by repeal of the 1964 Meat Import Act. In the immediate situation there is scope for increasing the quantity of meat which could be imported under the voluntary restraint arrangement and the New Zealand authorities urge that this possibility be carefully examined. The New Zealand authorities note that some livestock and meat prices (at wholesale level) have declined in recent weeks. Analysis of the situation shows that these reductions have been for cattle and meat of feeder and choice grades, i.e. high quality table meat. At the same time, however, prices for canner and cutter grade cattle, and boneless meat for manufacturing, have remained at or near earlier high levels, confirming continued high demand and a shortage of this type of meat. Pending a decision on the level of imports to be permitted in 1969, the New Zealand authorities are most concerned that the Administration take every necessary step to ensure that other suppliers do not exceed the restraint levels of the voluntary arrangement. The Embassy recalls that in its Note of 27 December 1968, notifying its acceptance of the arrangement, 3 the New Zealand Government set down its view that it would feel free to reassess its position should the situation develop where the intent of the restraint programs was being frustrated by the actions of any other exporting country. The Embassy takes this opportunity also to underline the expectation of the New Zealand Government that the Administration will reallocate to the four countries which signed bilateral agreements on meat with the United States in 1964, the expected shortfall in supplies of meat from Canada. The New Zealand authorities are disturbed to learn of the view which has been expressed in some sections of the Administration that a net shortfall only will be reallocated. In New Zealand’s view such an approach would be entirely contrary to the understandings reached in December 1968. It would mean that supplying countries which did not choose, or were not able, to carry out their undertakings, would be placed in a favorable position of the disadvantage of other suppliers, including New Zealand, which were living up to the undertakings entered into. New Zealand regards the December commitment on shortfalls to mean any estimated shortfall from any supplier would be reallocated and it expects the Administration to reach its determination accordingly. Looking ahead to 1970, the New Zealand authorities would hope that the United States Administration will see its way clear to finding ways of improving access to the market. In the absence of any other satisfactory arrangement, New Zealand would prefer, however, to see continuation of the voluntary restraint arrangement with New Zealand’s share of the market fully reflecting our position as a traditional supplier. If, in any event, mandatory quotas came to be triggered or otherwise brought into effect, New Zealand is most concerned that full account be taken in the determination of market shares of its place in the market before the 1964 law was enacted. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17, Meat: Australia/NZ. No classification marking. The aide-mémoire was presumably delivered to the Department of State. A covering note on New Zealand Embassy stationery reads: “With the compliments of the Minister (Commercial)” followed by Gordon R.J. Hope’s handwritten initials. 2 Prime Minister Holyoake met with President Nixon, Kissinger, and Hardin from 10:47 a.m. to 12:08 p.m. on September 16, and was the guest of honor at a White House dinner that evening. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) 3 Not further identified. 406. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 406. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 1 Washington, September 24, 1969. Dear General Lincoln: Representatives of this Department have been discussing with Deputy Director Russell of your Office possible action which the Treasury might take to alleviate domestic shortages of nickel resulting from the industry-wide labor strike in Canada. It has been suggested that the Department of the Treasury make available a portion of the nickel stockpile of the Bureau of the Mint. Additionally, the question has been raised as to whether it would be possible for the Office of Foreign Assets Control to authorize under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations importations of nickel oxide and refined nickel from France. The Mint’s current stockpile of approximately 40 million pounds of nickel is adequate for purposes of meeting our projected needs for an estimated period of four years. This four-year estimate contemplates approval of new legislation for production of a quantity of cupro-nickel dollars and half-dollars. A substantial reduction in our nickel stockpile, coupled with a prolonged strike within the nickel industry, could create a nickel shortage for Treasury within two years. Accordingly, release of a portion of the Mint nickel stockpile would not be now feasible. Further, we do not have legal authority to sell, loan or otherwise make available nickel from our stockpile for use by private industry. Special legislation would be required for us to make such an accommodation. The Cuban Assets Control restrictions on the importation of nickel and nickel products from France have been imposed as a consequence of the substantial purchase of Cuban nickel by Societe Le Nickel (SLN), the sole French producer of nickel. We have asked the Department of State to explore immediately with SLN the existing situation, including stockpiles of Cuban material on hand in France, and SLN’s planned imports from Cuba and Caledonia. If it is clear from these discussions that SLN has used up its Cuban stockpile and does not anticipate further imports under the existing contract, it would then be possible for Treasury to terminate all restrictions on nickel imports from France. If the importation restrictions could not be generally removed, inquiry was made as to whether Treasury could authorize (i) imports of nickel oxide for certain civilian consumption to avoid employee lay-offs, or (ii) nickel imports for priority defense production needs. If the essential facts have not changed, thus not warranting termination of all restrictions, I do not believe it would be advisable to make exceptions authorizing importation of nickel oxide for civilian consumers. Regarding defense production requirements, if it appears from the Department of State’s discussions with SLN that the latter has supplies of nickel available for sale to the United States for defense production needs, it would then be necessary, I believe, for the National Security Council to make a decision as to whether it would be preferable to authorize a release of nickel from the national stockpile for common defense needs, or alternatively to authorize such imports of nickel and nickel products from France. Substantial domestic and foreign policy problems will arise from any relaxation of our current policy restricting imports of nickel subject to Cuban Assets Control regulations. Any action affecting domestic nickel supplies should be carefully considered, because it might appear to be a strike-breaking action. With best wishes, Sincerely, David M. Kennedy 2 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Classified-OEP 1969. Confidential. Drafted by S.L. Sommerfield and W.L. Dickey on September 22. Copies were sent to McGinnis, Jurich, Eggers, Englert, Sommerfield, and Schwartz. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 407. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 407. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 1 Washington, September 25, 1969. SUBJECT Meat Imports Under law, the Secretary of Agriculture is required to make an estimate of meat imports by September 30. If in excess of 1,087 million pounds, the estimate triggers meat import quotas under the Meat Import Act of 1964. Previous quarterly estimates have been kept below the trigger point on the basis of export limits undertaken by supplying countries. Honduras has, however, exceeded its limit, and the ceilings of a number of other countries are under pressure. The estimate which the Secretary of Agriculture is to make will depend on the position taken on the voluntary export arrangements. 2 There are five basic options outlined in the accompanying paper. 3 1. (a) Take a hard line on the present export limits, which provide for total meat imports of 1,035 million pounds. (b) A variant would provide for a strengthening of our stand with the use of Section 204 of the Agricultural Act, involving quotas on the imports of countries exceeding their export ceilings. 2. Increase the limits under the export restraint program above 1,035 million pounds, but still below the 1,087-million-pound level. 3. Trigger the quotas (with an estimate over 1,087 million pounds), and keep them as close a possible to the 988-million-pound level specified by the Meat Import Act. 4. Trigger the quotas, but raise them significantly. 5. Trigger the quotas, and suspend them. The Agriculture Department favors the first line of action. The Secretary of Agriculture believes that any other course of action will result in beef quotas on a permanent basis, will fan the flames of protectionism both in U.S. agriculture and in industry, and will provide a poor introduction to the restructuring of farm policies. (The views of the Secretary of Agriculture, and of other agencies, are explained in more detail in the attached memoranda.) 4 The Department of State favors options 5, 4, and 2, in that order. An increase in imports would be helpful for our relations with the exporting countries, and there is economic justification for an increase because of the high prices of meat. Because most imports are of the lower quality beef consumed primarily by lower income groups, and because the price of this lower quality beef has risen at a higher rate than the prices of higher quality meats, an increase in imports is particularly appropriate. The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations favors option 1.(a), a hard line on the voluntary agreements without the use of quotas under Section 204. Other acceptable options are 2 and 5. The use of import quotas by the United States, either under Section 204 (option 1.(b)) or under options 3 or 4, would be adverse to our trade policy interests. The President’s Committee on Consumer Interests views option 5, involving the elimination of quantitative restraints on meat imports, as theoretically the best for the consumer. However, because of domestic political factors, they would favor option 4. They note that the total supply of manufacturing grade beef has not kept pace with our rising population, resulting in inflated prices for hamburger and other inexpensive meats which are important in low-income diets. The Commerce Department does not take a formal position on the options, but leans toward option 2, as does Treasury. Treasury also would be inclined to use Section 204 against Honduras. 5 The Council of Economic Advisers favors option 5 or option 2. In our view, import restraints are undesirable, particularly in the light of the high cost of low-grade meats. While option 5 is the most desirable on economic grounds, there is something to be said for option 2, since it involves a less drastic break with the past, and can be used as a means of temporizing until more fundamental decisions are made on the Administration’s position on meat imports. It must be noted, however, that the recent price levels of meat make this a particularly opportune time to relax our import policy significantly. This opportunity may not repeat itself at a later date. (The Meat Import Act requires a quarterly estimate of imports, which means that the question will come up again in 3 months.) Thus, there is some support for all the options, with the exception of 3. It should be stressed that the primary significance of the decision will not be economic (although its effect on our general trade policy may ultimately have significant economic effects). The difference between the meat imports under the most restrictive feasible policies and the most liberal is quite small. In 1970, a carry-through from option 1 would involve imports of about 1,050 million pounds. Without quantitative restraints, it is estimated that imports would be in the neighborhood of 1,300 million pounds. Thus, only about 250 million pounds are in question—amounting to about 1-1/2 percent of the domestic market. The key questions are political. How are the interests of domestic consumers and foreign policy considerations, on the one hand, to be weighed off against the interests of domestic cattle producers, on the other? Paul W. McCracken 6 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 215, Council of Economic Advisers. No classification marking. At the top of the page, Haig wrote: “Send to Bergsten for urgent staffing—through Secretariat.” Below that is the note: “Done 1:30 pm 9/26.” 2 Next to this paragraph is written: “Tony—FYI—Bergsten sent over memo 9/27.” 3 Not printed. 4 These memoranda are not printed. The agency positions are described in this memorandum. Attached are a September 24 memorandum from Secretary Hardin to President Nixon; a September 24 memorandum from Trezise to Houthakker; a September 24 memorandum from Herbert F. Propps to Houthakker; and a September 25 from Elizabeth Hanford to Paul Wonnacott. 5 The Treasury and Commerce views have not been further identified. 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 408. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 408. Action Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, September 29, 1969. SUBJECT Meat Import Policy At Tab I is a memorandum for the President on U.S. meat import policy, 2 which has been brought to a head by: (1) the need to determine the allowable import level for the fourth quarter; (2) Honduras exceeding its permitted export level under the present voluntary restraint program; (3) a letter to the President from Prime Minister Gorton; 3 (4) Prime Minister Holyoake’s raising the issue with the President while here recently; 4 (5) the forthcoming IA-ECOSOC meetings 5 at which this will be an important issue. A decision is needed within a couple of days because the Secretary of Agriculture is required by law to take a position on meat imports on September 30 (which can slip a day or two). It is impossible to temporize because of the Honduran overshipments: We must either crack down on them or increase overall imports to provide a cover for their violations. In addition, postponing a fundamental decision would carry us past Gorton’s election and the IA-ECOSOC meetings because the immediate decision will determine policy for the fourth quarter and, for market reasons, we could not then announce a change in policy until the end of the year. The issue is an analytically simple tradeoff between foreign policy-consumer interests and domestic producers. The main elements are: 1. Latin America The major immediate problem is with Honduras. Unless we liberalize, we will have to hit them hard. This would be blown out of proportion in Latin America generally and sour the atmosphere for IA-ECOSOC, especially since Latins are focusing heavily on trade in that context. Guatemala and Nicaragua have also officially asked for increased allocations although they have taken steps to stay within their present ceilings and avoid U.S. retaliation. These individual Central American countries are minor suppliers but Latin America as a whole accounts for about 20 percent of our beef imports. Some of their cattle industries have in fact been supported by our AID program as an important step in diversification of their economies. The Latin Americans asked for increased access to our meat market in the CECLA document and the Rockefeller Report recommends that we meet this request. 2. Australia Gorton has personally asked the President to allow an increase in Australian meat exports to the United States in time to boost Australian meat prices before his October 25 election. He notes that meat is Australia’s leading export to the U.S.; that Australian meat does not compete directly with U.S. meat; that U.S. prices of imported meat have continued to rise; and that meat prices in Australia could drop sharply if the U.S. does not permit increased imports because Australia has already met its permitted level for the entire year. John Holdridge adds that Gorton’s concern over the possible adverse political effects is indicated by his personal letter to the President. Although he has used this device before, this time it probably does denote a sense of urgency—for the first time in years, the Australian Labor Party seems to be building up a real political challenge and Gorton may need every vote he can get. 3. New Zealand Holyoake made meat, along with Vietnam, the major topic in his recent discussions with the President and he reported upon returning home that increased trade opportunities were the major result of his visit. He is facing general elections on November 29 and is in trouble with sections of the New Zealand electorate as a result of his strong support for our Vietnam policy. The New Zealand Embassy presented us with an aide-mémoire last week to press the case. 6 They undoubtedly regard meat as the first test of Secretary Rogers’ recent pledge that we will take their views into account in forming our own economic policies. 4. General Foreign Policy (a) Under any solution other than Option E, which would eliminate all controls, we will face the perennial problem of allocating quotas or “voluntary” restraint levels. Both the traditional suppliers (Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and Mexico) and the late starters (the other Latin Americans) feel that their present shares are too small. The only way to allocate without raising major problems with some supplier is to increase the size of the overall market so that each will gain in absolute terms. (b) Liberalization of meat imports would be the first concrete step in pursuit of the Administration’s avowed interest in freer trade and would therefore be applauded generally as well as by the direct beneficiaries. 5. Domestic There are several strong arguments from the domestic side in favor of increasing imports: (a) Prices of the type of meat which is imported have continued their sharp rise although prices of domestically produced meat have fallen from their June highs. Greater imports would thus contribute to the overall anti-inflationary effort (although their effect would be marginal and largely symbolic). It is precisely this kind of situation under which the present Meat Import Act permits an increase or suspension of the statutory quotas (Options D and E, respectively). (b) Imported meat is mainly ground into hamburger and frankfurters, and thus primarily helps lower income groups. (c) Imported meat differs in quality from domestically produced meat and does not directly compete with it. The complaints of our cattle industry are therefore not very justifiable. Recommendation: With the concurrence of Pete Vaky and John Holdridge, I strongly recommend that you recommend to the President that he choose Option E—suspension of the quotas. This course is favored by State, CEA, and, of course, by Consumer Representative Mrs. Knauer. Secretary Hardin strongly opposes any liberalization, however, and opts for A. It can be safely predicted that Bryce Harlow and Peter Flanigan will agree with him. (The memorandum for the President anticipates these views.) I am not sure where Arthur Burns would come out. Because of this strong opposition, we recommend a fallback if necessary to Option B—which would allow a 5 percent increase in imports under the present voluntary restraint system. This would avoid a confrontation with Honduras and give something to all of the suppliers. It would cause allocation problems but at least in the context of an increased total. It would not hurt the domestic cattlemen although they can be expected to protest anyway. This position is favored by Commerce and Treasury, neither of which is very close to the issue, however, and is acceptable to State, CEA, and STR. I recommend that you pursue Option E, with Option B as a fallback, with the other relevant parties in the White House—Harlow, Flanigan and Burns—or authorize me to do so for you. 7 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. Confidential. Vaky and Holdridge concurred. 2 Not found. 3 See footnote 2, Document 418 . 4 See Document 405 and footnote 2 thereto. 5 See footnote 2, Document 116 . 6 Document 405 . 7 At the top of the first page of the memorandum is the handwritten note: “OBE 9-30-69 HAK’s office.” The President met with Hardin, Whitaker, and Harlow from 4:40 to 5:25 p.m. on September 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) According to an October 16 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger, the President asked Secretary Hardin to work out an increase in meat imports so he could give something to Gorton and Holyoake; pursuant to that request Hardin consulted with Congress and the cattle industry. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy) See Document 409 . 409. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Hardin to President Nixon 409. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Hardin to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. You may recall that in our recent conversation regarding beef imports you asked me to consult with the cattle industry and Congressional leaders regarding a possible modest increase in the estimated import level for 1969. 2 I have now completed those consultations. Of course, the people I talked with would be most happy if we held imports to our current estimate of 1,035 million pounds, and that is the course of action which I recommended to you during our meeting. While they would grumble some, they would understand why we might have to quietly permit the import level to increase to 1,050 million pounds during the coming weeks. A further increase to l,060 million pounds would result in more grumbles, but again they would live with the result if you considered such a level necessary for overriding foreign policy reasons. Further weakness in domestic cattle prices would truly be politically undesirable. Prices have deteriorated about 15 percent from the peak period last summer or about $6.00 per hundredweight. Most students predict that cattle prices will continue to remain quite strong. On the other hand, an increase in unemployment and further consumer resistance may have a weakening influence on beef prices. Such possibility is a worry to me. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17, Meat: CEA Memos. No classification marking. Attached to Document 410 . 2 See footnote 7, Document 408 . 410. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 410. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken) to President Nixon 1 Washington, October 16, 1969. SUBJECT Meat Imports I understand that Secretary Hardin has completed his Congressional consultations and has found that resistance to a small increase in imports during the current quarter is not insuperable. 2 The quantity involved is so small as to be largely symbolic, though it is of some importance to Australia even so. It will also be welcome to the Central Americans, who claim that we have encouraged them to specialize in beef production and therefore should be more receptive to their exports. My main purpose in writing this memo is to remind you of the domestic aspects of the beef situation. There is great concern not only about meat prices in general, but especially about hamburgers and frankfurters. These are the products most dependent on an adequate supply of imported beef. Last week there were hearings before a House subcommittee in which considerable consumer sentiment on this issue became apparent. If the Administration now decides on a gesture towards increased imports this will certainly be a plus as far as the domestic consumer is concerned. Paul W. McCracken 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17, Meat: CEA Memos. No classification marking. 2 See Document 409 . 411. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 411. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Responses to Prime Ministers Gorton and Holyoake on Meat Attached at Tabs A and B respectively are proposed letters for you to send Prime Ministers Gorton and Holyoake, 2 which would inform them that we are increasing the amount of meat they can export to us this year. Gorton wrote you directly on the subject (Tab E) 3 and Holyoake raised the matter during his recent visit. 4 Secretary Hardin has gotten the cattlemen to agree very reluctantly to an increase of 25 million pounds in our import level, pursuant to your recent request to him (Hardin letter at Tab D). 5 He continues to feel, however, that the increase would cause significant domestic political problems. Bryce Harlow agrees that the move could cause trouble on the Hill. 6 We can also reallocate 21.5 million pounds of shortfall in imports which had been expected from Canada. The foreign suppliers already expect this amount, however, so it achieves no political gain with them. Australia will get 25 million pounds and New Zealand will get 11 million pounds of this combined increase. Most of the rest will go to Latin America, incidentally, and will give us a point with them for the forthcoming IA-ECOSOC meetings. Your letter would be especially timely for Gorton. A recent Gallup Poll in Australia showed a surprisingly sharp swing toward his Liberal opposition for the October 25 election. It will certainly be the closest Australian election since 1961 and, if Gorton wins by only a narrow margin, could set the stage for a Liberal victory in 1972. Voter displeasure over Gorton’s Vietnam policy and uncertainty over U.S. policy in the Pacific are issues cited as hurting him. A forthcoming step by you at this point could thus certainly help. Holyoake faces an election in late November and has only a one-seat majority at present. Your step would also help him significantly. Recommendations: 1. That you sign the letter to Gorton at Tab A. 2. That you sign the letter to Holyoake at Tab B. 3. That you sign the letter to Secretary Hardin at Tab C, thanking him for helping you on this foreign policy issue. 7 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. Confidential. A handwritten note by Kissinger at the top of the page reads: “RN has disapproved.” 2 Neither found. 3 See footnote 2, Document 418 . 4 See Document 405 . 5 Document 409 . 6 In an October 16 memorandum to Kissinger transmitting this memorandum, Bergsten noted that Harlow’s objections were linked to the Haynsworth nomination for the Supreme Court. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy) 7 Not found. 412. Letter From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy 412. Letter From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy 1 Washington, October 22, 1969. Dear Mr. Secretary: I am writing to ask you to give further consideration to the possibility of licensing imports of nickel for defense rated orders from the Le Havre plant of Societe Le Nickel (SLN), which Deputy Director Russell of OEP has discussed with Treasury officers. You wrote me on September 24 about this and other proposals to open up additional sources of nickel during this period of critical shortage. 2 You indicated that you had asked the Department of State to explore the situation with SLN, and suggested that the question of importation from SLN for defense orders then be considered in the National Security Council. In the interim, I have had an exchange of letters with the Department of State (copies enclosed) about this proposal. Assistant Secretary of State Trezise endorsed the proposal. He has suggested that SLN be asked for assurance that the material does not come from Cuba, and that the French Government be asked to so certify. 3 As I understand it, this procedure would probably eliminate the need for issuing licenses. OEP is prepared, if you agree, to stimulate orders to SLN by defense producers, or applications for licenses if they are required. The request in this letter is a separate matter from consideration of releases from the stockpile. It is an action I hope we can take under any future developments in the nickel strike situation, since the US will be short of nickel for at least six months after the strike is settled. Hence, I do question that National Security Council consideration is required of the proposal in this letter. I do defer in this, however, to Dr. Kissinger. As I did with my letter of October 10, I am sending information copies of this letter to the others concerned, who in this case are the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense, Assistant Secretary of State Trezise, and Messrs. Flanigan and Kissinger. Will you please let me know your reaction. Sincerely, G.A. Lincoln 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Classified OEP 1969. Confidential. Attached to Document 414 . 2 Document 406 . 3 Attached are Lincoln’s October 10 letter to Secretary Rogers and Trezise’s October 17 letter to Lincoln in reply, neither printed. Trezise also noted that there were intense nickel shortages in Europe, and the French were operating an export control program. 413. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Kendall) to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 413. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Kendall) to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 1 Washington, October 27, 1969. SUBJECT Legal situation on Mint nickel Of the alternative actions suggested for the Government to meet the current nickel crisis, the sale of a substantial part of the Mint inventory of nickel is the most attractive but it has raised several objections. These objections, not necessarily in the order of their importance, are that the Treasury Department may not want to reduce its inventory, that if they do so a large portion of the material will automatically go into the stockpile, that if they do so they will have no way to recover their investment in the metal, that the metal in the inventory may not be in a form convenient for industry use, that the Government may not be able to replace the nickel, and that the Government’s authority to arrange for special “chosen instrument” handling is limited. I shall deal with each of these objections. It is the function of the owning agency to declare property excess to its needs, and each agency is required by law “continuously” to survey property under its control to determine whether it is excess. The agency’s hand, however, is not entirely free, since the President may (by Section 205(a) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act 2 if statutory authority is needed) prescribe policies and issue directives governing the agencies in their performance of functions with respect to their property. Thus it was that on September 16, 1966, in connection with his efforts to cut Federal expenditures, President Johnson issued a statement to the departments and agencies requiring them, among other things, to review inventory levels of all supplies on hand and “whenever the quantity of an item is larger than necessary” take appropriate action including “reporting it excess.” 3 It would be difficult to conjure up a greater justification for special action to accomplish the declaration of material as excess than the current one. To breach the national defense stockpile while the government itself has in another inventory ten or more years’ supply for the uses of that inventory, is virtually unthinkable. The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act 4 does require that Government materials determined by the owning agency to be surplus to its needs “shall be transferred” to the stockpile to the extent that the stockpile goal has not already been met. This would appear to make 5000 tons of any nickel found by Treasury to be excess to its needs go to fill the stockpile goal for nickel. However, the same Act exempts from that requirement material necessary to make up any deficiency of supply for the current requirements of industry as determined by the Secretary of Commerce. Clearly the current requirements of industry are faced with a deficiency of supply far greater than the prospective Treasury excess, and the Secretary of Commerce is, I understand, prepared to make the necessary determination. While I do not think that the consideration should by any means be controlling, I am optimistic that the Treasury Department will not have to see a substantial part of their investment in nickel go to miscellaneous receipts as the proceeds of surplus sales. The Federal Property Act provides (Section 204(c)) that where the property disposed of was acquired by the use of a fund either not appropriated or by law reimbursable, the proceeds of the disposition may be turned over to the agency that declared the property excess. Because the purchase of this nickel was, I presume, financed by the Coinage Metal Fund created by Section 3528 of the Revised Statutes, it would seem to me that the proceeds of this disposition, be they cash or nickel, could properly go to Treasury. Where a material is declared excess the Administrator of General Services enjoys wide latitude under Section 203(e)(3) to negotiate such a disposal contract as will serve the public interest. The contract of disposition may have to be made with International Nickel Company because it is probably the only instrument by which the users’ requirements as to form of the metal may be approximated, and also because it is probably the only contractor who might give assurance of later delivery of nickel to the Government. A contract calling for the return to the Government of nickel pound for pound may be more than we can hope for, but there are lesser blessings more likely to materialize such as an agreement to put the proceeds of sale in escrow and deliver nickel to the full value thereof when production is again available, or perhaps a simple call option at prevailing market price but at a generous rate. The negotiation of the best possible deal is within the capacity as well as the authority of the General Services Administration staff. Charles H. Kendall 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Classified OEP 1969. No classification marking. Drafted by Kendall on October 27. 2 P.L. 152, approved June 30, 1949; 63 Stat. 377, as amended. 3 For text of President Johnson’s statement and memorandum to Federal departments and agencies, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 1032-1034. 4 P.L. 117, approved June 7, 1939; 53 Stat. 811, as amended. 414. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 414. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 1 Washington, November 7, 1969. Dear General Lincoln: By way of confirmation of our telephone conversation on the subject, 2 9,000,000 pounds of nickel held in the Bureau of the Mint inventory will be released to GSA for disposal at the direction of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. Consumption, I understand, will be defense-related. Because this nickel is held as a monetary asset on the books of the Treasury, it will be necessary to reimburse the Coinage Metal Fund of the Bureau of the Mint. Your letter of October 27, 1969, requested comments on a proposed Memorandum to the President on measures which could be taken to alleviate the existing nickel shortage. In light of the decision to release some nickel at this time, I understand that you do not intend to transmit this Memorandum to the President. 3 Even though the Memorandum will not be transmitted, I wish to comment upon its content. In discussing the Mint stockpile, the draft of the Memorandum proceeds assuming that the Mint nickel inventory is adequate for ten years based on the present rate of consumption. However, the Treasury-sponsored legislation authorizing production of the Eisenhower cupro-nickel dollar has passed the House. The Senate has passed a bill providing for the minting of a cupro-silver dollar. A conference between the House and Senate will be necessary to work out the differences, but it would appear that a coinage bill greatly increasing nickel consumption rates will be enacted during this Congress. Therefore, Treasury must manage its nickel inventory so as fully to allow for and meet such contemplated consumption rate increases. Accordingly, in light of (1) release of 9,000,000 pounds of nickel at this time and (2) anticipated passage of cupro-nickel coinage legislation, planning projections must be predicated on a three-year supply with current inventory, instead of the ten-year supply related in the Memorandum. In your letter of October 22, 1969, 4 you asked that Treasury make certain changes in its nickel certification arrangements with France. You indicated that the Department of State supports your request that arrangements be made whereby Societe Le Nickel, S.A. will be allowed to export nickel of non-Cuban origin to the United States. While we share your concern with respect to the existing nickel shortages, we seriously doubt the wisdom of this proposal. The Department of State, in a letter dated October 17, 1969, 5 makes clear that its recommendation is limited to nickel of non-Cuban origin and indicates that anything further would immediately confront us with much broader problems with respect to our policy towards Cuba. However, even the limited change proposed by the Department of State would raise these same problems, in our view. The basic thrust of the French certification procedure is to permit innocent French steel producers to purchase non-Cuban nickel from SLN and export their nickel-bearing steel products to the United States. At the same time, the procedure precludes SLN itself from marketing any of its French nickel production in the United States. Were it not for this provision, the embargo would be toothless. SLN could readily purchase Cuban nickel, market it in Europe, and sell its non-Cuban nickel in the United States. If that were permissible, there would be no reason for nickel users in Germany, Austria, Finland, the United Kingdom, or other European countries, to refrain from purchasing Cuban nickel either directly from Cuba or indirectly via SLN, and marketing the product thereof in Europe while maintaining their United States market by use of non-Cuban nickel. The fact is that our restrictions on SLN’s ability to market its non-Cuban nickel in the United States have successfully deterred those European countries from buying Cuban nickel, and have deterred other nickel consumers (e.g., certain Swedish mills) from doing so. To remove the restrictions on SLN, as now proposed, would vitiate this entire effort. In this connection, I want to make clear that the restrictions on SLN as a purchaser of Cuban nickel are equally applicable to the U.S.S.R. which is also a purchaser of Cuban nickel, wherever this can legally be accomplished. According to technical advice furnished to the Treasury, SLN markets nickel oxide, refined nickel, and other nickel products produced from Caledonian ores; markets nickel oxide of Cuban origin; and markets fire refined nickel and nickel products produced from Cuban nickel oxide. Thus, nickel products imported from France may be made either from Cuban or Caledonian materials, and the Treasury therefore embargoes all such SLN products. On the other hand, we have not embargoed SLN-produced ferro-nickel imported directly from New Caledonia into the United States, because no Cuban nickel exists in the Pacific and it would be impossible to contend that there is any risk of Cuban material entering the United States in this manner. A parallel situation exists with respect to Russia, and our policy has been applied consistently. Specifically, Russia markets nickel cathodes and nickel salts. We have been informed that it is not presently believed possible for Russia to produce cathode nickel from Cuban material. Accordingly, we have not embargoed Russian cathode nickel under the Regulations, any more than we have embargoed Caledonian ferro-nickel. On the other hand, we have embargoed nickel sulfate from Russia since this material could readily be produced by Russia from Cuban nickel oxide or Cuban nickel sulfide. Equally, Czechoslovakia markets various forms of nickel which can be produced in Czechoslovakia either from Russian or Cuban materials. We have therefore embargoed all such nickel materials from Czechoslovakia. Quite apart from the considerations discussed above, which in my view militate against the proposal to change the certification arrangements with France, there is a most practical objection as well. It is my understanding that an approach to SLN would be virtually futile in any event, since SLN has already indicated its output is fully committed elsewhere and it would have little, if any, French nickel available for defense-rated needs in the United States. I am sending copies of this letter to the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Defense, in view of their interest. I understand the Department of Defense plans to inform you of its views on this subject shortly. Sincerely, David M. Kennedy 6 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 A 7, Classified OEP 1969. Confidential. Drafted by W.L. Dickey on November 6. Forwarded to Kennedy, along with a letter to Congressman Gerald Ford (not found), under cover of a November 6 memorandum from Eugene T. Rossides. Rossides reported that on August 18 Congressman Ford had suggested release of Mint nickel to help meet the needs of domestic industry, and on August 28 Acting Secretary Volcker had informed Ford it was not feasible at that time. The letter to Ford was intended to provide advance clarification of what was being done and to point out that the current action was not inconsistent with Volcker’s letter. 2 Not further identified. 3 Attached to Lincoln’s brief letter is a draft memorandum to the President and Kendall’s October 27 memorandum to Lincoln, Document 413 . (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, OEP Volume I through 11/69) In a November 7 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten reported that the preparation of the draft interagency memorandum to the President had helped persuade Treasury to release 9 million pounds of nickel from its coinage stockpile without going to the President, and that this release more than covered defense requirements for November, increasing supplies for the commercial market and easing the shortage caused by the Canadian strike. (Ibid.) 4 Document 412 . 5 See footnote 3, Document 412 . 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original. 415. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics (Shillito) to Secretary of Defense Laird 415. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics (Shillito) to Secretary of Defense Laird 1 Washington, November 26, 1969. SUBJECT Proposed Reduction of Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiles Dr. Kissinger’s office (General Haig) advised your office verbally that the Bureau of the Budget had submitted a proposal to the effect that the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile be abolished. It also was reported that a preliminary White House discussion resulted in a verbal modification of the BoB proposal so as to impose only a 50 percent reduction. Whether this means 50 percent reduction in objectives, or in physical inventories, has not been made clear. My office has not seen the original BoB proposal, nor heard the modification, hence we have only a very general picture of its nature. It is alleged to be based on the presumption that the strategic planning factors underlying the present stockpile objectives are unrealistically conservative. As of 31 October 1969, these inventories totaled $6.75 billion at current value. The inventory objectives totaled $3.84 billion. With the advent of NSDM-27, 2 it certainly is logical that an examination of stockpile objectives be conducted to reflect the policies in that decision. There are two major factors that should be considered in the examination of stockpile objectives. First, certain countries or areas of the world may be assumed inaccessible as suppliers of basic or raw materials. The JCS developed a list of assumed inaccessible countries in a future non-nuclear engagement. This information was furnished OEP on 6 March 1968. 3 Naturally, this list should be re-examined in the light of NSDM-27. Second, since the possibility exists that it might become necessary in the future to engage in a non-nuclear conflict of such magnitude as to warrant the application of emergency powers, the need for strategic and critical materials under such circumstances must be provided for. The planning of requirements and production for military items, which forms the basis for computing the DoD strategic and critical materials needs, is specified in the DoD 4005 series of directives. This provides the data to identify needs and capabilities to meet such an emergency. The existing stockpile planning assumptions were established by Presidential decision, 31 October 1968, following a lengthy study by a special committee and discussion in the NSC. This approved planning basis represented a compromise between the views of DoD and OEP. DoD believes that stockpile objectives should be computed on the basis that supplies of materials will remain available to the United States, throughout the period of the conflict, from all normal world sources except those specifically excluded by JCS for strategic reasons. OEP had long favored a much more conservative assumption as to accessibility of sources. The 1968 decision envisages very limited source accessibility (U.S., Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean area) for the first year of war, and the much broader JCS view for subsequent years. Were the DoD strategic assumptions to be fully accepted, in lieu of the 1968 compromise decision, a reduction in objectives of perhaps 25 percent in total dollars might result. Re-evaluation of the DoD guidance, in light of NSDM-27, could have an even greater effect. In either case, however, the effect on reducing objectives would vary greatly between individual materials because no two exhibit the same source pattern. It should be pointed out that the Government inventories contain nearly $3 billion worth of materials in excess of existing stockpile objectives. One billion of this has been authorized for disposal and the balance still requires Congressional authorization. Thus, if attainment of additional funds is the prime objective, a more aggressive disposal policy could result in a significant increase in Government income. I recommend that in any discussion of this matter you take the position that the entire basis of stockpile planning should be re-examined in light of NSDM-27, including maximum tightening of all planning and safety factors, but that no arbitrary across-the-board cut should be made in stockpile objectives. Barry J. Shillito 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. No classification marking. Attached to a memorandum from Colonel Robert E. Pursley, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Secretary Laird. Both were transmitted to Haig under cover of a handwritten memorandum dated December 26 from Captain Daniel J. Murphy. (Ibid.) 2 NSDM 27, dated October 11, 1969, is entitled “U.S. Military Posture.” 3 Not further identified, but see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. IX, Documents 371 , 374 , and 375 . 416. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 416. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 26, 1969. SUBJECT Stockpile General Although I do not know the specifics of the Bureau of the Budget stockpile proposal, e.g., whether they propose a 50 percent cut in inventories or in objectives, the following information may assist you in evaluating the proposal. This paper describes the national stockpile, discusses disposal programs and problems, and summarizes the stockpile objectives system. Description of Stockpile The stockpile exists pursuant to legislation; the value of the current inventory in the stockpile is $6.7 billion. Of this total, $2.87 billion (43 percent or nearly half the inventory) is excess to our current stockpile objectives. Tab A 2 lists the commodities in the stockpile, showing inventories, objectives, excesses, and quantities available for disposal. Quantities of Sales GSA, which manages the stockpile under OEP policy guidance, has been selling excess stocks as rapidly as legislation, the market, and other conditions permit. (OEP Deputy Director Fred Russell devotes a great deal of his time and talent to assisting GSA in legislation and sales.) More than $2 billion in excesses (Tab B gives annual and cumulative figures) has been sold in the past five years. We expect to sell about $240 million in excesses during Fiscal Year 1970. Even if the current stockpile objectives were disregarded by the Executive Branch and Congress were willing to provide authorizing legislation, we estimate that GSA could sell no more, at a maximum, than another $580 million (see Tab C) within one year after the restraints were removed. ($360 million of this amount would be from nickel and copper; the latter was the material involved in the major criticism of President Johnson for stockpile releases.) 3 The other commodities cannot be sold rapidly, for a variety of reasons. As a practical matter, Congressional and other restraints would largely prevent the sale of additional materials. Restrictions on Sales There are now rigid restrictions on sales from the stockpile: a. Legislative authority is required to make such sales. Congress has vigorously rejected omnibus disposal legislation in the past. b. The law provides that sales must be made in a way which does not destabilize the market. c. The Department of State can object to disposals on the ground that they will have adverse international effects. (Only the President can overrule such objection by State.) A current case in this category is tin; we would like to sell excess tin but State has maintained that such disposals would be inimical to our relationships with Bolivia and Peru. (Tab D lists the twelve excesses of highest dollar value, and the obstacles to disposing of them.) Congressional Involvement There are at present eight bills on stockpile sales being considered by the Congress. The one that has the best prospect of early enactment is the cadmium bill, which would involve a total of about $14 million. I propose to seek a meeting with Senator Symington, who is Chairman of the key Senate Sub-committee, to ask his help with these bills, but my advisors are not very optimistic. OEP is proposing legislation that, if passed, should alleviate significantly the existing legislative obstacles to our disposal efforts. There is serious question, however, that such legislation will win approval. Even minor bills on stockpile matters meet major difficulties in Congress. It is very difficult to obtain legislative approval for detailed items for disposal, partly because Congress will not act without industry agreement. Congress is jealous of its authority over all disposals other than those made by the President for the common defense under Section 5 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act. Arbitrary action on the stockpile would likely further estrange an already distrustful Congress. Congressional distrust of the Executive Branch management of the stockpile was made very explicit to me during my confirmation hearings earlier this year, in the form of questions by Senators Symington and Stennis. Senators Symington and Russell, in an earlier OEP confirmation hearing in 1967, said that they viewed with apprehension the constant downgrading of the estimates of what is needed in the stockpile in case of national emergency in order to accommodate current economic needs. Summary on Disposals In summary, as far as disposal of materials excess to our objectives is concerned, the problems are with the Congress and with industry; the Executive Branch has been making every reasonable effort to push authorized disposals. Stockpile Objectives Current stockpile objectives are based on a policy determination by the President on October 31, 1968, following a report by an interagency Special Committee on Stockpile Objectives, which was presented by the Director of OEP to a meeting of the National Security Council. 4 Since that Presidential determination, the objectives have been calculated on the basis of the need to cover estimated shortages of materials for a three year emergency period, with substantial allowances being made for supplies from sources outside the United States during the second and third years (the JCS provide assumptions as to accessibility of the materials, and State provides assumptions as to political and economic reliability of the source country or area). Specific objectives have been established by OEP with the assistance of an Interdepartmental Materials Advisory Committee which includes representatives from Commerce, State, Defense, Interior, Bureau of the Budget, and other interested departments and agencies. Need for Stockpile The United States is critically dependent in peacetime as well as in war on certain strategic materials not found in the United States. Our dependence is growing. Because of such shortages, we are vulnerable to blockades, political actions by other nations and even to strikes within friendly nations—strikes that cannot be controlled by some of our closest allies. It seems evident to me that we need to maintain reserves of such critical items as copper and nickel, for example. It is worth noting in this connection how the nickel supply to the United States was virtually cut off for a long period by strikes in Canada. Need for NSC Review Any major changes in stockpile objectives should clearly be made on the basis of a review of our national security requirements rather than on budget considerations alone. I have been developing a plan for a national materials study that would include a review of the assumptions and procedures for establishing stockpile objectives. I believe such a study should be conducted under the auspices of the National Security Council. This study should examine the full range of our stockpile policies, but if properly done, should be a “national materials study”, going beyond narrowly national security aspects. The last such study was the Paley Report in the early 1950’s. The Department of Interior agrees with my view on the requirement for such a study, and also agrees with me that the current stockpile should not be arbitrarily run down for a budgetary purpose—like the purpose which was alleged to have motivated President Johnson in the release of copper which occasioned massive criticism from some quarters. (This release of copper constituted a substantial portion of the $2 billion sales mentioned above.) Defense Production Act funds are available to OEP for the initiation of the study—an enterprise that might be attractive enough to warrant mention in the State of the Union message; however, OEP under current budgetary restrictions does not have the resources to lead such a study. Comment Finally, I do note that the Bureau of the Budget has never made any proposal to me concerning the stockpile, other than an informal exchange with their Deputy Director who at that time suggested a “go at the stockpile after Christmas”. I assumed he meant an NSC or other interagency study—to which I have long been committed. G.A. Lincoln 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Confidential. Attached to a November 28 memorandum from Lindjord to Haig in which Lindjord highlighted Lincoln’s belief that a materials policy study should be considered in the NSC, since the United States was running out of raw materials and there had been no comprehensive study of the issue since the Paley Commission during the Truman administration (see Foreign Relations , 1952-1954, vol. I, Part 2, p. 857 ). Lindjord added that Lincoln had also asked the State Department to reconsider its refusal to permit sales of tin from the stockpile. 2 None of the tabs is printed. 3 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. IX, Documents 297 and 374 . 4 See ibid., Document 375 . 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Lincoln signed the original. 417. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 417. Information Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, December 5, 1969. SUBJECT Meat Import Program for 1970 I met today with Secretary Hardin, John Whitaker of John Ehrlichman’s staff, and Bryce Harlow on the meat import program for 1970. Three issues were discussed: 1. Whether to seek continued voluntary restraints by foreign exporters or apply quotas ourselves. 2. The level of imports. 3. The allocation of imports as between the traditional suppliers (Australia, New Zealand, Ireland) and the Latin Americans. All agreed that voluntary restraints were far superior to quotas. The main issue was thus the import level. Our objective was to minimize the level for domestic political reasons while offering enough to the foreign suppliers to preserve the voluntary restraint agreements. Secretary Hardin felt strongly that our initial negotiating position should be an import level of 1,050 million pounds, allocated among the suppliers a la 1969, plus an additional 5 million pounds for Latin America to exemplify the “special relationship.” Imports of 1,050 million pounds in 1970 would represent virtually no increase over actual imports in 1969 and only a 15 million pound increase from the agreed restraint levels of this year. I therefore expressed doubts that Australia and perhaps New Zealand would be willing to negotiate voluntary restraints at that level. They might calculate that they would come out better if we applied quotas, even at the lower statutory level of 1,000 million pounds. This is because they would expect the quotas to be allocated on an historical (5-year) basis, under which they would receive a much larger share of the total than they got in 1969 and would get in 1970 under the voluntary approach, which already encompasses substantially favored treatment for Latin America. It was clear at the meeting that you might wish to raise the issue with the President if you were dissatisfied with the decision. Despite my being overruled, I do not recommend further effort at this point because: 1. The 1,050 plus 5 for Latin America is only a first negotiating position, which State has already begun trying out on the suppliers. 2. Secretary Hardin is clearly prepared to fall back to 1,060 plus 5, or even 1,075, if necessary to secure voluntary agreements. 3. Australian and New Zealand meat has been entering the U.S. via Canada in excess of agreed amounts and there is thus a case for being tough with them as a result; I know of no particular foreign policy reason to be particularly accommodating to them at present. 4. The add-on for Latin America should give us a good point in the ongoing IA-ECOSOC dialogue. 5. Secretary Hardin has a point in wanting to maintain some leeway in the program for additional allocations later in 1970, as pressures build up for both economic and foreign policy reasons as they did this year. We should know within a week or ten days whether the 1,050 plus 5 level is negotiable. If it is not, we may need a Presidential decision at that time. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Confidential. 418. Letter From President Nixon to Prime Minister Gorton 418. Letter From President Nixon to Prime Minister Gorton 1 Washington, December 6, 1969. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Your letter about the arrangements on meat imports from Australia and other countries into the United States was received with a full appreciation of the problems which they cause. 2 I assure you that this Administration is thoroughly aware of the significance of Australia’s meat trade with the United States and of the importance which your country attaches to its access to the U.S. market. 3 During the last several months we have undertaken a complete review of our meat import policy for the remainder of 1969. In this review the interests of Australia and the other suppliers of meat to our market were kept fully in mind. I recognize the difficulties that the restraint program has caused for the Australian meat industry and the Government of Australia, and regret that we were unable to grant an increase in Australia’s allocation. We received similar requests for increased allocations from several other countries, also with compelling reasons. Under these circumstances, and given the quota provisions of the Meat Import Act, no revision of the current program was possible. As you know, however, we were able to reallocate nearly 15 million pounds of the expected Canadian shortfall to Australia. I hope that this amount will be of benefit to your country. You have my deep appreciation for the cooperative attitude demonstrated by your government and the Australian meat industry. We will do all we can to further the spirit of goodwill and cooperation which exists between our two countries. Sincerely, Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, Australia: Nixon to Gorton 12/6/69. No classification marking. Typed notations at the bottom of the first page indicate that the letter was pouched to Canberra on December 9 and also sent in telegram 203867, December 8. Copies of both are ibid. 2 Prime Minister Gorton’s letter was forwarded to President Nixon under cover of a brief September 16 letter from Australian Ambassador Keith Waller. Gorton reviewed the restraints on Australian meat exports to the United States, begun in 1968 to avoid the imposition of quotas, and requested an increase in the permitted level of imports over the remainder of 1969. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17, Meat: Australia/NZ) 3 On September 8, under cover of a memorandum to Houthakker, Palmby forwarded a copy of an undated paper entitled “Considerations Supporting Increased Imports of Australian Meat During 1969,” which he had received from representatives of the Australian Meat Board. (Ibid.) 419. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 419. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 1 Washington, December 15, 1969. I accept your recommendation and the recommendations of the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and the Interior regarding the need for additional supplies of nickel to meet defense production requirements. 2 In accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. 98(d)), I herewith determine that the release of up to 20 million pounds of nickel from the National Stockpile is required for purposes of the common defense. The rate, method, and forms of the nickel release and its replacement shall be as you deem appropriate. This use of the stockpile in a situation short of a national emergency should not be considered a precedent for the future, pending further review of stockpile policy. 3 In carrying out this responsibility, arrangements should be made to assure that all replacement of nickel is in upgraded forms without the need to seek additional appropriations for this purpose. Richard Nixon 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume II 11/69-12/71. Confidential. 2 Lincoln’s recommendation was made in a December 5 memorandum to the President informing him that the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and the Interior concurred in the recommendation. Lincoln added that the Secretary of Defense, while not making a recommendation, agreed in the need for nickel to meet defense needs. (Ibid.) 3 Kissinger had suggested the inclusion of this sentence in a December 13 memorandum to President Nixon. He noted that Lincoln’s proposal raised no national security implications provided the decision did not set a precedent for using stockpile materials to meet shortages in a situation short of a national emergency. (Ibid.) 420. Editorial Note 420. Editorial Note In his December 13, 1969, memorandum to the President recommending approval of nickel sales from the stockpile (see footnote 3, Document 419 ), Henry Kissinger indicated he was forwarding separately a more detailed explanation of the issues and problems associated with the stockpile of critical materials and implied that a NSSM would be issued to resolve them. No such NSSM was found. On December 19 Peter Flanigan sent Kissinger a memorandum recalling a discussion of stockpiles and requesting a copy of the study if it had been completed. He also referred to his responsibility for the Office of Emergency Preparedness. On Flanigan’s memorandum Kissinger wrote: “Send him Lynn memo—but tell him to lay off—explain Pres. feelings,” and a note by Haig reads: “I’ve done this.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile) No memorandum by Larry Lynn, who staffed stockpile issues at the National Security Council, has been found. 421. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to President Nixon 421. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 29, 1969. SUBJECT Receipts in Fiscal Year 1971 from Stockpile Sales The Bureau of the Budget has informed me of your decision that OEP should seek a minimum of $1 billion in receipts in FY 1971 from stockpile sales. 2 The purpose of this memorandum is to outline measures devised to maximize receipts in FY 1971 (a much more difficult task than maximizing sales). This memorandum also discusses the problems likely to be encountered by the Administration as a result of the proposed actions. Such discussion should assist in an appraisal of how firmly the Administration should commit itself at this time toward seeking $1 billion in stockpile receipts in FY 1971. In brief, about a half billion dollars of receipts in FY 1971 (including those in the current GSA estimate) 3 could be produced by measures which are not inconsistent with maintaining a stockpile concept or with existing stockpile legislation. Approximately an additional half billion of receipts in FY 1971 might conceivably be achieved if the Administration is willing to take more drastic action which would, in effect, do away with the stockpile concept. Any substantial acceleration of stockpile disposals would result in severe Congressional and industrial resistance. Also, any substantial acceleration of certain stockpile disposals would produce strenuous objections from friendly foreign countries. A proposal for stockpile sales and other actions to accomplish $1 billion of receipts in FY 1971 is attached. I must state very frankly, however, that I believe the prospects of achieving this $1 billion of receipts in FY 1971 are remote. One can well ask why $1 billion of receipts cannot be readily achieved from a $6.7 billion stockpile book value. A significant reason is that the previous Administration stripped the stockpile of most of its readily disposable assets other than the remaining nickel and copper. The previous Administration also tied up some of the assets (still carried in the $6.7 billion book value) in long-term arrangements—e.g., an agreement with the aluminum industry which provides for purchases of aluminum extending over a 14-year period. Undoubtedly, the stockpile actions of the previous Administration have intensified the concern of the Congress. In 1967, Senators Russell and Symington, incident to an OEP confirmation hearing, 4 said that they viewed with apprehension the frequent lowering of the estimates of what is needed in the stockpile for national emergencies, believing the reductions to be inspired by a desire to accommodate economic considerations. During my confirmation hearing, the Senate Armed Services Committee asked to be consulted on and to be kept fully informed concerning stockpile matters. Chairman Philbin, of the House Subcommittee, has repeatedly asked to be kept continually informed concerning proposed stockpile disposals. Immediately following the recent release of stockpile nickel, he specifically asked us to keep him fully advised of our actions on nickel. 5 There is continuing Congressional concern that the Executive Branch will thwart the intent of Congress in the Stock Piling Act by such actions as making unwarranted releases for “the common defense.” Congressional concern is not limited to the Armed Services Committees. The Interior and Insular Affairs Committees also are concerned and they give particular attention to the views of domestic industry. At all times, we are hobbled by Congressional reluctance to pass the legislation necessary to disposal of excesses, by industry’s frequent reluctance to support disposal bills or to buy, and by foreign policy considerations. We also are bound by the Stock Piling Act which provides that disposals must be made in such a way as to protect the United States against avoidable loss and to protect producers, processors, and consumers against avoidable disruption of their usual markets. There is obviously a need for obtaining and keeping the confidence and cooperation of both Congress and industry if we are to mount a large scale disposal program to maximize receipts. Pertinent to the reaction of Congress, industry, and the public are two immediate policy questions arising from possible stockpile actions by the Executive Branch: (1) Does the Administration wish now to take actions in a way that might be widely interpreted by Congress and industry as abandoning the stockpile concept? (2) Closely related to (1), does the Administration want to begin dealing with the stockpile in a way significantly and obviously inconsistent with the national security justification for continuation of oil import controls which is contained in the report of the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control which you are about to receive and which will be widely discussed? 6 I have not raised here the 1968 Presidential guidance, 7 based on NSC study, on which stockpile objectives are now calculated, nor the levels of the objectives themselves, nor any details of national security implications. A new study might result in some significantly reduced stockpile objectives, but it probably would not help our receipts from stockpile sales in FY 1971. I stress that the contents of this memorandum and its enclosure are estimates and judgments. They are the best I can now make, consulting with my staff and other agencies on very short notice—and they are far from certainties. Such developments as strikes, foreign disturbances, changes in the level of economic activity, and shifts in industry and Congressional attitudes may significantly change our projections. OEP will press forward, assisting GSA which is the action agency for legislation and sales, to begin execution of the FY 1971 sales plan outlined in the enclosure. Preparatory actions on the first half billion can go forward now. Final decision, needed from you, on the more drastic actions such as releases for the common defense, can be delayed for a while. G.A. Lincoln 8 Attachment PROPOSED STOCKPILE SALES AND OTHER ACTIONS TO ACCOMPLISH RECEIPTS OF $1 BILLION IN FISCAL YEAR 1971 All figures are approximate estimates subject to significant variations. Approximately the first half billion dollars Million Dollars 1. Estimate of receipts provided by GSA to BOB for FY 1971 budget. 221.6 2. Proceeds from quickly saleable material if tungsten, cobalt and cadmium disposal bills pass Congress. 125 3. Cancel all stockpile acquisitions and upgrading, and defer, where feasible, receipts from sales until FY 1971. 50 4. Place Treasury receipts from sales of silver in general fund, rather than coinage fund. (Treasury likely to object.) 60 5. Sell tin for which we have Congressional authorization. (State has objected thus far, because of likely repercussions in Bolivia.) 30 6. Sell rubber for which we already have Congressional authorization. (An OEP reduction in stockpile objective would be required. State may be expected to oppose.) 40 Subtotal (approximately) 525 Approximately the second half billion dollars Million dollars 7. Divert to commercial sale the copper scheduled for delivery to the DPA inventory in FY 1971 in payment against a DPA advance. (This action will continue the large deficiency in the copper stockpile, which now has less than two months normal consumption. Congress, which was critical of the previous Administration’s sales of copper, and which was informed in 1967 of this scheduled supply, may raise new objections.) 25 8. Attempt to sell in FY 1971 the rights to the remaining copper due to be delivered to the U.S. Government under the above contract in FY 1972-1975. (See comment on No. 7, above.) 75 9. Presidential conversion to cash sale of the recent loan of stockpile nickel. (This action will continue the deficiency in the stockpile, which now is a three months supply at normal consumption rates.) 25 10. Presidential release of the remaining nickel and copper “for the common defense.” (This action would require legal justification which, in turn, probably depends in part on the existence of a market shortage of these materials.) 335 11. Presidential release of antimony, chrome ore, fluorspar, platinum group metals, and other small miscellaneous saleable materials, “for the common defense.” (See comment on No. 10, above.) 125 Subtotal for items more sensitive from a national security and Congressional standpoint. 585 Grand Total (Approximately) $1,100 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Confidential; Sensitive. Attached to a December 29 transmittal memorandum from OEP Deputy Director Russell to Flanigan, which indicated that the memorandum had been dictated by Lincoln over the phone from Colorado. Russell called Flanigan’s attention to two points discussed with Lincoln, but which were not included in the memorandum to the President: “(a) Does the Administration wish to subject itself to allegations that it has placed this country in a position to be ‘blackmailed’ by those foreign countries which are the sources of the critical materials which our country or this continent do not produce in sufficient quantity? (b) Is the Administration prepared to risk identifying itself as allegedly in favor of jeopardizing national security, disrupting the market, and injuring domestic industry and foreign countries when there is a substantial likelihood that Congress and industry will prevent the accelerating of stockpile disposals?” These memoranda were transmitted to Kissinger in a December 30 memorandum from Haig, who noted the possible disadvantages and agreed with Lincoln that it was unlikely $1 billion of sales from the stockpile could be realized. 2 Not further identified. An earlier December 27 draft of Lincoln’s memorandum, however, cites Lincoln’s November 26 memorandum to Kissinger ( Document 416 ) as a reference. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, OEP, Volume II 11/69-12/71) 3 In the December 27 draft (see footnote 2 above), Lincoln reported that GSA had estimated $221.6 million in its submission to the Bureau of the Budget. 4 Not further identified. 5 Presumably a reference to the President’s December 15 approval; see Document 419 . 6 Documentation on this Cabinet Task Force is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Federal Government. 7 See footnote 4, Document 415 . 8 Printed from a copy that indicates Lindjord signed for Lincoln. 422. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Mayo) to President Nixon 422. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Mayo) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Stockpile receipts One major question has arisen in proceeding to implement your decision to achieve at least $750 million in FY 1971 receipts from sales from the materials stockpile. It reflects differing interpretations of your underlying and longer-range intent. It is our understanding that you wish the existing stockpile objectives to be amended or discarded to facilitate sales in FY 1971 and later years—rather than simply to obtain $750 million in FY 1971 alone without adjusting the objectives. If you wish to avoid sales being compromised to preserve objectives, we need your confirmation of the following—for transmittal to the responsible agencies. The $750 million or more receipts in 1971 are not a one-time financial decision, but the initial step in a policy decision to dispose of at least $4 billion of the roughly $7 billion total assets. 2 As such, the “objectives” which currently justify much of the stockpile quantities will not be used to restrict or prevent sales of any commodity. 3 Robert P. Mayo 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. No classification marking. Mayo met with the President from 11:15 a.m. to 12:20 p.m. on December 30. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Presumably this memorandum was discussed at that meeting. Three handwritten, undated notes and a January 15, 1970, typewritten note from Haig to Lynn are attached to this memorandum. One of the notes, from Flanigan to Kenneth Cole, reads: “I believe (read ‘am sure’) that Kissinger has a study underway to determine the long range future of the stockpile. I think this broad language is unnecessary. Let’s concentrate now on changing objectives as necessary to sell $750 million. After the NSC study, let’s change objectives as is necessary to make the desired further sales. I suggest you have Kissinger see this.” A December 31 memorandum from Lincoln to Flanigan provided a table that set out an approach to achieve in FY 1971 $750 million in receipts from stockpile sales and related actions; the suggested actions were arranged in order of increasing difficulty. Lincoln noted that the $750 million figure had come from the Bureau of the Budget. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile) 2 President Nixon changed “6” billion to “4” billion by hand. 3 The President initialed the Approve option. 423. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 423. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 21, 1970. SUBJECT Continuation of Voluntary Meat Import Restraint Program Secretary Hardin has now announced that a voluntary restraint program will continue to limit U.S. meat imports in 1970. The announcement was delayed nearly two weeks because of problems with some of the supplying countries, particularly Mexico and Australia. 2 The voluntary restraint agreements will allow the meat exporters an increase of about 1.5 percent over their 1969 allotments. (Our negotiators sold the package as a 4.4 percent increase, but the real increase is only 1.5 percent.) This was enough to gain agreement, because all of the suppliers preferred continued voluntary restraints to mandatory quotas, but none of the suppliers was pleased. All wanted higher restraint levels: the Australians because of their higher historic share of the U.S. market, the Mexicans because of their drought, and the Central Americans on the basis of their “special relations” with the U.S. and your October 31 speech. 3 Giving in to any of these special pleas would have jeopardized agreement by other suppliers, however, unless we were willing to raise significantly the total amount of our meat imports. Secretary Hardin was unwilling to raise the total because of domestic political pressures. The agreed level is about 40 million pounds below the level which would require you to invoke mandatory import quotas which you could then waive only on the basis of “overriding economic or national security interests”. The mandatory quota level would be about 6 percent below the voluntary restraint total, although you could raise it if you concluded that domestic price conditions so warranted. A new feature of the 1970 program is that all suppliers agree that we can apply our own controls against their meat shipments to us if they prove unable to themselves restrain their exporters within the agreed levels. (This will apply particularly to some of the Latin Americans, whose administrative machinery is not very good, and was done with Honduras in late 1969.) The program thus comes quite close to a quota system without our bearing the normal onus of implementing one. Australia, New Zealand and Ireland were unable to guarantee that their export restraints would effectively control shipments into the United States passing through other countries (particularly Canada), but they have no objection to our doing so. Agriculture will therefore ask you at some point to issue an executive order banning such imports. Some of the meat supplying countries, especially Mexico, Australia, and the Central Americans are not pleased with the new agreements. The Latin American countries have already begun to complain and we can expect to have special requests from all of them soon. If you wish to meet the desires of the foreign suppliers, and give special treatment to the Latin Americans consistent with your October 31 policy statement, you will have to face the question of triggering the mandatory quotas and raising the overall level of meat imports. It will not be possible to make a special allocation for Latin America alone within the voluntary levels, as we did in late 1969, because the large suppliers have insisted that they share equally in any further allotments in return for their agreeing to continued voluntary restraints. The pressures for higher meat import quotas from foreign suppliers may coincide with pressures which Secretary Hardin expects from domestic consumer interests seeking relief from high meat prices. If so, you will have to weigh all of these factors against the serious political opposition which can be expected from domestic meat producers. We will continue to maintain the voluntary restraint program for the pres-ent, but the issue may have to be reopened before long. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. Limited Official Use. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a January 15 memorandum from Bergsten with a recommendation that he sign it. 2 In his January 15 transmittal memorandum, Bergsten reported that Hardin announced the new program on January 12 instead of the December 31 target date. 3 See Document 122 . 424. Editorial Note 424. Editorial Note On February 2, 1970, Henry Kissinger, responding to a Presidential query, sent the President an action memorandum with options on how meat prices might be reduced through increased imports. Option 1 was to increase imports under the voluntary restraint program closer to the 1,100 million pound trigger point for mandatory quotas. Option 2, which Kissinger recommended, was to apply mandatory quotas at a much higher level, perhaps 1,200 to 1,300 million pounds. Option 3 was to waive quotas on meat imports altogether, which the Agriculture Department predicted would increase imports to about 1,400 million pounds in the total absence of any controls, and almost certainly assured a major battle with the domestic producers and their Congressional supporters and a drive for tight quota legislation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy) On January 27 the President had met with Senator Fannin and members of the National Cattlemen’s Association in the Cabinet Room from 4:10 to 4:42 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Senator Fannin left the meeting at 4:20 p.m. On February 2 the President met with Secretary Hardin, Don Paarlberg, Bryce Harlow, John Whitaker, and John Ehrlichman from 3:10 to 4:10 p.m. (Ibid.) Kissinger and Fred Bergsten joined the meeting at 3:44 p.m. and Ehrlichman and Kissinger stayed on to 4:14 p.m. Fred Bergsten’s memorandum of that conversation reveals the President’s interest in increased meat imports to lower meat prices and Hardin’s opposition. Hardin said wholesale prices were down, but retail prices had not followed due to the policies of the retail organizations. The President indicated his willingness to “jawbone” the retailers and thought McCracken should participate. Hardin said he was working for the farmers on that issue, a point the President took but said it had to be seen in a larger context that kept consumers in mind. “The President concluded that we should note publicly that he had met with the cattlemen and had learned that retail prices had Ônot been reflected in what the consumer pays’.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 196, Agriculture, Volume I 1969-1970) The discussion then turned to East-West trade; see Document 313 . On Kissinger’s February 2 action memorandum to the President, the “No Action” option is checked, followed by a handwritten date of February 3. A handwritten note by David Young accompanying Kissinger’s memorandum indicates that “Actions taken are marked in pencil on information from Bergsten who has done a follow up memo as result of meeting,” presumably a reference to Bergsten’s memorandum of the February 2 conversation. 425. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 425. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, February 20, 1970. SUBJECT Executive Order to Stop Indirect U.S. Imports of Meat from Australia, New Zealand and Ireland Secretary Hardin at Tab B 2 has proposed an Executive Order prohibiting U.S. imports of Irish, Australian and New Zealand beef and mutton which have been shipped via third countries. Budget has approved the Order and State, Treasury, Commerce, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Special Trade Representative concur (Tab C). The Department of Justice has certified that the Order is correct as to form and legality (Tab D). Peter Flanigan, John Whitaker, and Bill Timmons also concur. Background The State Department, in cooperation with Agriculture, has nearly completed negotiations with the principal exporting countries for a voluntary restraint program on meat exports to the United States for 1970. Under most of these agreements, the exporting country will restrain its total shipments of meat to the United States whether they are sent directly or whether they are transshipped through third countries. Three nations, however, (Australia, New Zealand and Ireland) informed us that they would be able to control only the direct shipments to the United States. They would not be able to control meat which they had originally sent to Canada and which might then be transshipped to the United States. These Canadian transshipments began to assume importance at the end of 1969 as the supplying nations reached their voluntary restraint limits and private traders took advantage of the Canadian loophole to get the highest possible (U.S.) prices for their beef. (Canada does not participate in the restraint program.) For the 1970 program, the three countries have agreed to control by the United States Government, since they cannot control the indirect shipments themselves. 3 This Order will accomplish such control. Based on the voluntary restraint program, the Secretary of Agriculture has estimated that 1970 meat imports will total 1,063 million pounds. Transshipments would be additional, and there is less than a four percent margin for error between the Secretary’s estimates and the point at which the Meat Import Act would trigger import quotas. Continued transshipments could thus be sufficient to trigger the quotas or, if their magnitude is revealed only by subsequent figures, give the impression that the Secretary had knowingly made a false estimate. The Agriculture Department estimates that 6 million pounds of transshipped meat have already entered the United States this year. Consequently, it is necessary to stop this traffic as soon as possible in order to be sure that we can preserve the voluntary meat restraint program. The Executive Order has been coordinated with Jim Keogh. Recommendation: That you sign the Executive Order at Tab A prohibiting indirect U.S. imports of meat from Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. No classification marking. 2 None of the tabs has been found. 3 See also Document 423 . 4 The President did not initial either the Approve or Disapprove option but wrote below: “no—Not until meat prices come down.” 426. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 426. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, March 9, 1970. SUBJECT Meat Import Policy You decided on February 21 that, until domestic meat prices came down, you would not sign an Executive Order to prohibit U.S. imports of meat shipped from supplying countries via third countries, mainly Canada (Tab A). 2 Meat prices have not declined since that time. In fact, they have again risen slightly. CEA estimates that strong consumer demand and stagnant domestic supply will keep meat prices strong through at least the first half of this year (Tab B). 3 Paul McCracken’s jawboning efforts, which you directed at the February 2 meeting on the over-all farm program, have had no success. 4 This raises a fundamental issue in terms of our present voluntary restraint program on meat imports. Transshipments via third countries, which would have been prohibited by the Executive Order, are additional to the voluntary restraint level of 1,062 million pounds. They therefore move us toward the 1,098 million pound level at which the Meat Import Act would require you to trigger mandatory quotas. (The Act calls for a quota level of 998 million pounds—a 10% reduction from trigger level and hence extremely inflationary—but gives you authority to set a higher level wherever you might choose. Agriculture estimates, incidentally, that imports would total about 1,400 million pounds if we imposed no controls on them.) Such transshipments have totaled about 7 million pounds so far this year, raising the estimated level of total imports for the year to 1,069 million pounds—less than 30 million pounds below the trigger point for quotas. They are now coming in at about one-half million pounds per week, but Agriculture fears that they will rise sharply when the trade becomes aware that we are not stopping them. (I have thus informed no one of your decision on February 21. 5 However, all of the suppliers were told that such controls would be part of the 1970 arrangement and may become curious fairly shortly.) In the present situation, you have three options: Option 1: Do nothing for the present. PRO: Avoids inflationary implications of new restraints on meat imports. CON: Risks a rush of imports when lack of transshipment control becomes known, forcing you to choose, under crisis conditions when tremendous political pressure would be brought to bear, between (a) the even more onerous price and foreign policy implications of mandatory quotas at the statutory level of 998 million pounds, and (b) the domestic political price of raising quotas or waiving import controls altogether. Option 2: Sign the Executive Order (Tab C) 6 now, prohibiting transshipment of meat to the U.S. via third countries. PRO: Would assure viability of voluntary restraint program, thus avoiding choice cited above. CONS: —Appears inconsistent with overall anti-inflationary program. —Could raise furor among consumers. Option 3: Use your discretion under the Meat Import Act to trigger mandatory quotas, raising them to a higher level than would be permitted under voluntary restraint program (probably 1,200-1,300 million pounds). PROS: —Significant anti-inflationary step, both in reducing the price of beef and in psychological terms. —Major foreign policy gains, especially with Latin America, Australia and New Zealand. CONS: —Risks domestic political problems with cattle industry and its Congressional supporters. (They might seek new legislation requiring a lower level of imports, so a corollary of this decision should be commitment to oppose such legislation.) —Institution of quotas runs counter to our general trade policy and exposes us to retaliation. (Both would be mitigated, however, by the higher level of imports which would result.) Recommendation: That you choose Option 3: triggering of import quotas, with the quota level set significantly higher than under the present voluntary restraint program, say at 1,200-1,300 million pounds. (If you choose this option, I will ask Secretary Hardin to prepare the documents to implement the decision immediately.) Approve 7 Disapprove, prefer Option 1: no action at this time Disapprove, prefer Option 2: sign Executive Order barring transshipments via third countries (Tab C) 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I. Confidential. A note at the top of the first page in red pencil reads: “Henry recommends Option #3 under which No Signature required.” 2 Document 425 . 3 Not found. 4 See Document 424 . 5 See Document 427 . 6 Not found. 7 The President initialed this option. At the end of the memorandum he wrote a note for Haldeman: “Have Colson—quietly to talk to cattlemen—only when it appears they will be informed of our decision—& tell them we will move in other directions when prices begin to come down—Tell them if we don’t do this—the consumer lobby will overrun them in Congress. Tell them it is a very modest step.” To the left of the President’s instruction is the stamped date of March 10. On that day the President met with Senators Fannin and Bellmon and Congressmen Brown, Steiger, and Quie from 8:39 to 9:49 a.m., and with Secretary Hardin from 2:58 to 4:05 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of these meetings has been found. 427. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs (Palmby) to the President’s Special Counsel (Colson) 427. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs (Palmby) to the President’s Special Counsel (Colson) 1 Washington, March 10, 1970. SUBJECT Beef imports I cannot believe that we are serious about a triggering of quotas under the Meat Import Law, a set-aside of the quotas by the President and then a decision to increase the allowable level of imports by a couple of hundred million pounds. 2 I say this (a) because we have not yet completed the process of implementing our mid-January decision to proceed with voluntary restraints in 1970 at a level of 1,062 million pounds; (b) because we had a high-level White House decision in December and early January which led to the restraint program in which we fully discussed the suggestions described above; 3 (c) because the economic facts have not changed materially since that time; and (d) because of the political headaches involved. Let me take the last point first. We had great difficulty in convincing our friends on the Hill and the cattlemen that the allowable level should be increased for this year. They are concerned because for the first time in nearly a decade cattle producers in this country are getting a decent return. And now that they are getting a decent return, people are saying bring in more imports to dampen the situation. Further, the restraint program is a substitute for quotas. We are already being charged with not using the quota law when we should be doing so. Think of the storm that will arise when we are not only accused of not using the quota law but of misusing it to hit our cattlemen. I honestly believe that if we were to add a couple of hundred million pounds to the present import level, we would guarantee that the cattlemen would become an overwhelming force in support of textile quotas, of shoe quotas, of steel quotas, and any other protective legislation you and I can think of. Think of the disbelief we would create in people’s minds if before we have even signed all the agreements to implement the decision of last January, we announced a new and completely different action. We are supposed to have signed restraint agreements with 12 countries. To date, only 6 have been signed. If anyone were to ask us the question, we would have to admit that this was a fact. Yet, my boss, Secretary Hardin, after those meetings late last year and early this year made a public announcement that we had the necessary agreements to hold imports to a level of 1,062 million pounds. We have said we would close loopholes for imports coming in, especially through Canada. We have not done so. This action is sitting, we understand, on the President’s desk. My boss has his neck stuck way out on the question of doing what we said we would do last January. It would be a severe blow to him and to this Department to consider a reversal at this time. Late last year and early this year the bone of contention among the participants which led to voluntary restraints was exactly the same kind of action that is now being discussed. At that time all the arguments were being made about an increase in the import level. At that time beef prices were higher than they had been in earlier years. Yet the decision was made. Here, we want to emphasize that although the prices were up, they were not nearly so high as they had been during the summer months of 1969. Now regarding the economic facts, our prices for beef cattle today are about $2.00 higher than they were at the same time last year. For all of 1970 we are looking for cattle prices to average somewhat above last year, but we are not looking for the run-up which occurred last May and June. Obviously, if that situation would occur again, we would have to take a look at the import level. But that is not our expectation. We should also keep in mind that cattlemen should not be penalized for cost factors beyond their control. It was not their fault that retail price decreases in 1969 lagged behind the drop in cattle prices. You may recall that this was a matter on which we did a little orating at that time with some success. Clarence D. Palmby 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. For Official Use Only. The memorandum is Tab A to Document 428 . 2 See footnote 7, Document 426 . 3 See Document 423 and footnote 2 thereto. 428. Memorandum From the President’s Special Counsel (Colson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 428. Memorandum From the President’s Special Counsel (Colson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 10, 1970. SUBJECT Meat Import Quotas With respect to your memorandum to the President of March 9, 1970, 2 I would like to suggest that further thought be given to Option 1 and that Option 3 not be adopted, at least at this time. I don’t think that the President has been made aware of all of the ramifications of Options 1 and 3. Implementing Option 3 at this time would: 1. Be extremely embarrassing for Secretary Hardin, who, with the President’s approval in January, announced that voluntary restrictions had been negotiated at the level of 1,062,000 pounds (see Palmby memo attached as Tab A); 3 2. Would create severe domestic political problems with the cattle industry and with a number of Senators and Congressmen, principally from Rocky Mountain states (see Timmons memo attached as Tab B); 4 3. Would run totally counter to our policy of avoiding mandatory quotas and intensify demands of shoe and textile interests for mandatory quotas; 4. Would make it more difficult to return to a voluntary system in the future; and 5. Is unnecessary at this time. I do not think that Option 1 fully states all future alternatives available to the President if he does nothing now. If, as a result of transshipments via third countries, the trigger level is approached, the President (a) can order mandatory quotas at any level he determines justifiable, (b) waive quotas altogether, (c) waive quotas and make new voluntary agreements at a higher level, or (d) sign the Executive Order preventing transshipments, if and when the trigger level is reached. At the present rate of transshipments, the statute would not be triggered this year. If the transshipments should increase or if countries should violate the voluntary agreements in any way, the statute would not be triggered for several months. Agriculture does have means of enforcing the voluntary agreements. Therefore, why prejudge the situation now? Economic and political considerations might be very different if and when that happens. Paul McCracken has been conducting a study of meat prices at the President’s request, which I understand will be ready later this week. 5 Certainly no decision should be made until we have the benefit of Paul’s study. John Ehrlichman, Bryce Harlow, Peter Flanigan, John Whitaker, Paul McCracken, Hendrik Houthakker and the Department of Agriculture concur with this memorandum. I think it is our general consensus that we can very well afford to wait perhaps until June. If, of course, transshipments increase the President could sign the Executive Order and then later on renegotiate the voluntary agreement. Hopefully the transshipments will not increase and we can reach some decision based on the facts available to us in June. I assume that you will want to prepare another memo to the President reflecting these views so that he can decide, based on the foregoing, whether or not he wishes to rescind the approval he gave to your memo of March 9. If you will let me know how you wish to handle this, I am sure that it can be staffed quickly on this end. Whatever we do, I would think we should keep the President’s options open as long as possible, cause minimum political controversy domestically and, if possible, avoid mandatory quotas which have very adverse trade implications. Charles W. Colson 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. No classification marking. Attached to a March 14 memorandum from Colson to Ehrlichman which reads: “Per your request I am enclosing a copy of my memorandum to Henry Kissinger, with which you concurred yesterday along with the earlier memo which the President signed off on which was prepared by Bergsten. Haig has the Bergsten memo—the one that says that the memo of March 9 had been staffed by everyone.” The Bergsten memorandum has not been found. 2 Document 426 . 3 Document 427 . 4 Timmons’ March 10 memorandum to Colson is not printed. Timmons wrote in part: “The President’s most loyal friends in the Senate—Hruska, Hansen, Bellmon, Dole, Allott, Miller, Curtis, et al—have been adamant in their opposition to increased imports of foreign meats.” 5 Not further identified. 429. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 429. Information Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT National Stockpile Objectives When reviewing the National Stockpile of Critical Materials last December, you directed that the stockpile be reduced from its $7 billion present level by at least $4 billion in the next few years, 2 and that disposals of excesses be accelerated in order to increase revenues in FY 71 and later. Since then, in conjunction with OEP, I have initiated an “in-house” staff review of the stockpile objectives. Most of the questions can be and are being dealt with at the staff level: —they are technical in nature; —they lie within the authority delegated to OEP and other executive agencies; and —they can be decided in a way consistent with your guidance to maximize stockpile disposals. For example, on the basis of an evaluation of risks and accessibility of supplies, OEP is changing several assumptions on which stockpile calculations are based: —Indonesia will be reinstated as a foreign source of supply, as recommended by Defense and State. 3 (This will reduce present stockpile objectives by about $110 million.) —Rhodesia will be considered a potential source of supply in a period of true national emergency, despite national policy supporting the present UN sanctions. 4 (This will reduce present objectives by about $25 million.) —Discounting for concentration of supply within the United States and Canada will generally be discontinued. (This will reduce present objectives by about $500 million.) These actions reduced stockpile objectives from $4.0 billion to $3.4 billion. Other agencies are also being requested, in a low key manner, to review and to update technical inputs which are the basis for calculating specific stockpile objectives: —Defense and the JCS have been asked to update their accessibility listings for foreign sources of supply and their estimates of transportation losses. Their replies are expected on 1 April 1970. —State has been asked to update its listings of the reliability of foreign sources. This reply is also expected at the beginning of April. Defense will also be asked to update its estimate of military requirements. OEP wants to delay making this request for several weeks, until the DOD logistics guidance memorandum is finalized, so that the request can be framed in terms consistent with that Defense document. In this updating, account will be taken of the recent NSDM 27 military posture decisions. 5 At least two issues may eventually require a Presidential decision: —Should we continue to stockpile for a three-year emergency, or should the period be reduced to one or two years? Both the second and third year each account for about $1.3 billion of the present value of the stockpile ($4 billion). —Should we consider all foreign sources of supply, other than North America and the Caribbean area, unavailable during the first year of a war? This factor accounts for approximately $1.2 billion of the present value of the stockpile. As it stands now, we should have an “in-house” study discussing these two issues, as well as any others requiring Presidential determination, in June. It could be used as a basis for decisions or for an NSC discussion. OEP would prefer to have these issues resolved through NSC channels. They were previously dealt with in the NSC: In NSC 5810 in the Eisenhower Administration, and in an NSC meeting which resulted in an October 31, 1968, memorandum from President Johnson. 6 General Lincoln believes that when we defend these decisions before Congress, we would be in a stronger position if the NSC process had been used to reach them, as before. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Confidential; Sensitive. Attached to a March 17 letter from Kissinger to Laird responding to the latter’s February 20 memorandum regarding possible excess holdings in the stockpile that might be reduced without jeopardizing national security. Laird’s memorandum, Kissinger’s proposed reply, and the memorandum printed here were forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a March 13 memorandum from Lynn. Lynn indicated that the information on the “in-house” review, which Kissinger mentioned to Laird, was “presented as a memorandum for the President, should you choose to send it forward.” 2 See Documents 420 and 421 . 3 Not further identified. 4 Imports of chrome and other items from Rhodesia were embargoed for foreign policy purposes. 5 See footnote 2, Document 415 . 6 Documentation on NSC 5810, “Basic National Security Policy,” April 15, 1958, and its revision, NSC 5810/1, May 5, 1958, are printed in Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. III, pp. 79 ff. The record of the NSC meeting is printed ibid., 1964-1968, vol. IX, Document 374 . 430. Editorial Note 430. Editorial Note Fred Bergsten on March 16, 1970, reminded Henry Kissinger in an information memorandum of the President’s approval of his March 9 meat import recommendation (see Document 426 ), and called his attention to the domestic advisers’ objections (see Document 428 ). Bergsten believed that the outcome might be “non-compliance with a strongly felt Presidential desire—to bring down meat prices.” He also noted that maintenance of the voluntary restraints instead of mandatory quotas would be a plus from a foreign policy standpoint. Bergsten’s March 16 memorandum is one of a number of documents attached to a July 2 memorandum from Ernest Johnston to the NSC Files. Johnston wrote: “The matter was eventually handled in a memorandum from Ehrlichman to the President which will not appear in our records. The attached file was sent to us for further action and our aborted memorandum is of no importance. However, some of the enclosures to it are originals with Presidential signatures, etc. which you may wish to keep.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 401, Trade General, Volume I) The “aborted memorandum” to which Johnston referred is an undated and unsigned memorandum on White House stationery from Kissinger to the President entitled “Reconsideration of Meat Import Decision.” The memorandum indicated that Kissinger’s March 9 memorandum ( Document 426 ) had been recast to include the points Charles Colson wanted brought to the President’s attention: 1) that increased imports would cost the administration political support among cattlemen, and 2) that resorting to quotas would “blow a hole” in the President’s trade policy. Kissinger presumably never saw the “aborted memorandum.” An April 4 memorandum from Colson to Alexander Haig recommended that no memorandum on meat imports should go to the President at that time; the question might be reopened in June depending on how the import situation developed. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy) On April 9 Bergsten sent Kissinger a memorandum reporting on his meeting with Colson that day. Colson reportedly agreed with Kissinger’s view that the meat import program would not be tenable for much longer and was leaning toward lifting the level of voluntary import restraints in June, to which Bergsten agreed. Kissinger, on April 13, approved the recommendation in Bergsten’s memorandum that he take no action at that time, but follow the issue with Colson in the lead on the grounds it was basically a domestic price issue. Bergsten concluded that he would submit a memorandum for the President when the domestic advisers agreed it was time to go forward. (Ibid.) 431. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 431. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Tin Disposal In the memorandum at Tab A, General Lincoln proposes that you authorize him to begin the disposal of 18,000 lbs. of tin from the stockpile to obtain $54 million, as part of the plan to realize $750 million from stockpile receipts in FY 1971. 2 Your decision is required under the terms of the Defense Mobilization Order, because there is a difference of views between OEP and State. General Lincoln favors going forward with tin sales now because market conditions are at an optimum point. Tin prices have been for sometime at the high end of the range permitted by the Tin Council—the organization of producing and consuming nations. On April 16 the Tin Council exhausted its buffer stock in trying to keep the price from rising above the maximum. After an initial spurt, prices have now settled down to just above the maximum. There is no doubt that from an economic point of view now is an ideal time for sales of tin from the stockpile. In addition, General Lincoln points out that Congress’ failure so far to enact several disposal bills jeopardizes $300 million in receipts from stockpile sales, and a delay in selling tin could jeopardize some portion of another $54 million out of the total of $750 million we are planning to sell in FY 1971. The State Department objects to the proposed tin sales at this time because such action would very likely upset the promising negotiations with Bolivia on compensation for Gulf Oil Company, 3 which are at a very sensitive stage. Prospects for a settlement of the Gulf problem within the next few weeks appear good. However, Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer, who recently visited Bolivia, believes that any tin disposal now would be taken by the Bolivians as a direct attack by the US on the Ovando Government. Announcement of a tin disposal now—in the midst of the Gulf negotiations—would play into the hands of anti-US radicals in Bolivia, who might use this issue to try to (a) topple the already-shaky Ovando Government and (b) nationalize other US properties in Bolivia. The GOB could be expected to react by breaking off the Bolivia-Gulf talks, which in turn would raise the question of applying the Hickenlooper Amendment, with all of the adverse consequences that would present for our overall Latin American policy. State, therefore, recommends that consultations on tin disposal be delayed until the Bolivia-Gulf negotiations are satisfactorily completed, which should be within a few months. I believe that the political costs—in Bolivia and Latin America generally—of disrupting the Bolivia-Gulf negotiations are too high to go forward with a tin disposal now. Although a 2-3 month delay until the Gulf problem is settled one way or another could entail some reduction from the anticipated $54 million in stockpile receipts, the longer-term consequences of going ahead now probably would prove far costlier. Peter Flanigan agrees with this recommendation. Recommendation That you not approve the proposed tin disposal now, but agree to reconsider the proposal after July 1, if State and OEP have not reached agreement by then. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Confidential. Attached to an April 22 memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger recommending that he sign the memorandum to the President. A handwritten note by Vaky on his April 22 memorandum, dated April 27, reads: “Agreed with Flanigan to handle matter without memo to President. Flanigan’s office will inform Lincoln.” 2 Lincoln’s memorandum at Tab A, dated April 8, is not printed. In Lincoln’s December 31, 1969, memorandum to Flanigan proposing measures to realize the $750 million target, item 7 was White House approval of tin/rubber disposals amounting to $70 million, which on a scale of 1-5, was given a rank of 3 for difficulty. See footnote 1, Document 422 . 3 See Documents 154 and 433 . 4 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked or initialed. Vaky wrote on his April 22 memorandum to Kissinger (see footnote 1 above): “Agreed with Flanigan to handle matter without memo to President. Flanigan’s office will inform Lincoln.” 432. Draft Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman) to President Nixon 432. Draft Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman) to President Nixon 1 Washington, June 20, 1970. SUBJECT Meat Import Quota Increase Background Meat import quotas for 1969 were set at the level of 1,035 million pounds. Because of normal slippage in the program actual imports were 1,070 million pounds. State and Agriculture negotiated voluntary quotas this year at a level of 1,062 million pounds, which is intermediate between the statutory level (998 million pounds) and the 1,099 million pounds at which the Secretary of Agriculture must impose mandatory quotas (the “trigger quantity”). Imports during the first five months of this year have been at a significantly increased rate—both over last year and over what was anticipated for this year. Agriculture estimates that imports for the first six months will be 620 million pounds. This is approximately 90 million pounds above the 531 million that would be half of 1970’s negotiated quota. There is no way to know, however, whether the increased amount has been consumed in the domestic market, or whether importers have deliberately accelerated shipments and put the excess in storage. It is known that total meats in storage are at a higher level than a year ago. However, cold storage holdings are currently at the same level as at the beginning of 1970. It is clear that if imports continue at present rates, imports will reach the quota level of 1,062 million pounds sometime early in the fourth quarter. Under the statute (as pointed out above) if imports exceed 1,099 million pounds, there is an automatic “trigger” of mandatory quotas reverting to the original statutory level of 998 million pounds. This would create an untenable situation. You have authority under the statute (on grounds of overriding economic or national security interests or inadequate supply at reasonable prices), either before or after the “trigger” point is reached, to trigger and then do one of three things: (1) suspend quotas altogether, (2) set mandatory quotas at a higher level or (3) suspend the quota level and order the State Department to increase the level of voluntary quotas. Anticipating that some upward adjustment will be necessary to maintain a stable price and supply situation, Secretary Hardin and Chuck Colson have been conducting quiet but extensive negotiations with the cattlemen and with the cattle state Senators. 2 They have the agreement of the cattle interests to the recommendation contained below and have the assurance that your decision, if you approve this recommendation, will be supported in the cattle states notwithstanding the fact that it would normally be considered politically very damaging. Choice cattle prices have declined in recent months somewhere between 7% and 10% and are well below last year’s peak levels. By comparison with the average of choice cattle prices over the last five years, however, 1970 prices are up 12%. Imported meat corresponds more closely to utility cow beef. Prices of utility cows reached new highs in 1970 and are almost 30% above average prices received in the last five years. Retail choice grade beef prices are about 7% higher than last year. Hamburger prices have already reached new all time highs. The spread between retail and wholesale has widened in the past year. The Department of Agriculture projects that choice cattle prices will strengthen through the summer and then decline slightly in the fourth quarter but remain above last year. Agriculture also projects that hog prices will decline significantly in the fourth quarter, which may have some effect on the price of beef and cattle. Options Option 1. Do nothing for the present . (This requires a third quarterly estimate by Agriculture that total imports for the year will not exceed the trigger level.) Pros: a. This would be good politics in the cattle producing states, particularly those in which a number of key Senate elections will be held this fall. b. It would leave your options open, probably at least until September. Cons: a. The Secretary of Agriculture’s third quarterly estimates would then have to project an overrun of imports for the year or face a credibility gap. b. Failing to act now would, therefore, probably make it necessary for you to act in September when it will be more difficult to minimize the adverse political impact. c. Failure to act now could bring a serious price rise in retail beef during the second half of 1970 if imports had to be halted abruptly to avoid overruns. Option 2. Trigger and immediately suspend the quotas and then increase voluntary quota agreements to 1,140 million pounds, an increase of 80 million pounds over the present voluntary agreement. Pros: a. In view of the Hardin-Colson agreement with cattlemen and cattle state Senators, this has a minimum political risk. b. It would help to alleviate the short supply for the next few months. c. It would diminish upward price pressures which would undoubtedly follow from taking no action now. d. It would have some limited consumer appeal. e. It would avoid trade problems associated with mandatory imports restrictions. Cons: a. Notwithstanding the agreement, there is risk of an adverse reaction politically in the cattle states. b. This would require a lower rate of imports in the second half of 1970 than during the first half of the year. To be specific it would permit 520 million pounds of imports for the second half, compared with 620 million in the first half (1,140 million for the full year). (After November further upward adjustments could be made if the demand situation required.) Option 3. Allow the statute to trigger and set mandatory quotas at 1,140 million pounds. Pros: a. It avoids certain problems of enforcement associated with voluntary quotas. Cons: a. Mandatory quotas are undesirable from the standpoint of trade policy and could cause retaliation even though set at higher levels than the present voluntary program. Option 4. Use your direction to increase imports of voluntary agreements or with mandatory quotas at a level higher than 1,140 million pounds. Pros: a. It would have a more favorable effect on retail prices of lower quality meats. Imports could continue at first-half levels, or even be raised further. b. It would thus be “pro-consumer.” c. It would be a visible step toward helping nations of the Western Hemisphere, as recommended by Governor Rockefeller. 3 Cons: a. It would cause an exceedingly adverse reaction among cattlemen and would be damaging politically in the Rocky Mountain states and in the South. b. It would be embarrassing to Secretary Hardin inasmuch as the January agreement was negotiated for the entire year. c. It might cause Congress to impose mandatory quotas on a permanent basis at a much lower level than we desire. d. It could make it difficult to reduce imports when prices come down. e. If the quotas were set at much higher levels or entirely suspended, the action could cause deterioration of choice cattle prices. Recommendations 1. It is recommended that you choose Option 2, an increase in the voluntary restraint level 1,140 million pounds. (Tab A contains a draft proclamation increasing voluntary quotas.) 4 Approve (Recommended by Ehrlichman, Harlow, Flanigan, Hardin, Whitaker, Kissinger, Timmons; the CEA approves of the action to increase voluntary quota levels but feels a higher level, say 1,200 billion pounds, is warranted.) Disapprove See me 2. In order to avoid Presidential involvement in decisions necessary to enforce voluntary quotas, it is also recommended that you delegate to Secretary Hardin your authority under Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1946. (A proposed Executive Order is attached as Tab B.) 5 This delegation will permit Secretary Hardin to stop transshipments through Canada. Stopping transshipments will have virtually no effect on the level of imports or prices particularly in view of the increase in quota levels recommended above. Transshipments are, however, a circumvention of the law. They penalize those countries which respect the voluntary agreements and benefit those which do not. When voluntary quotas were negotiated in January, a number of participating countries asked us for assurance that we would not permit transshipments. On February 21 and March 10 you decided not to sign an Executive Order precluding transshipments on the grounds that meat prices had not declined. 6 Cattle prices since declined somewhat but are now strengthening. However, transshipments at these levels do not appreciably affect prices but are highly discriminatory and are being strongly objected to by a number of exporting countries. This delegation will also permit the Secretary of Agriculture to take necessary enforcement measures with respect to the higher levels of imports if circumstances later require him to do so. This proposed delegation was a part of the package Colson and Hardin negotiated with the cattle interests—consideration, in effect, for the increased level of imports. Approve (Recommended by Ehrlichman, Harlow, Flanigan, Hardin, Whitaker, Kissinger, Timmons, and State Department.) Disapprove See me 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17, Meat: CEA Memos. Administratively Confidential. The final text of the memorandum sent to the President was not found, but it is presumably the memorandum from Ehrlichman to the President to which Johnston referred in his July 2 memorandum to the NSC Files; see Document 430 . 2 See footnote 7, Document 426 . 3 Presumably a reference to Rockefeller’s recommendations in late 1969 following his mission to Latin America; see Document 122 . 4 For text of the June 30 Department of Agriculture Press Release and Presidential Proclamation 3993 that provided for 1,140 million pounds of meat imports during 1970 under the voluntary restraint program, see Department of State Bulletin , August 3, 1970, pp. 157-158. 5 For text of Executive Order 11539, June 30, delegating authority to the Secretary of Agriculture, see ibid., pp. 158-159. 6 See Documents 425 and 426 . 433. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 433. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1 Washington, July 15, 1970. RARN-30 BOLIVIA: PROSPECTIVE TIN SALES THREATEN US INTERESTS Planned sales of US tin, temporarily in abeyance, 2 could jeopardize our longer term interests in Bolivia. The Ovando regime may be expected to protest dramatically if this long-considered action is taken, despite its relatively minor economic impact, and extensive prior consultations. More importantly, such tin sales might endanger the Bolivian President’s precarious political position and seriously complicate financial negotiations with the Gulf Oil Company. 3 US plans and Bolivian reaction . The United States has long considered making an orderly sale of excess stockpile tin in order to reduce surpluses, as well as to stabilize world price fluctuations. Under contemplated arrangements, the 6,000 ton disposal 4 would be spaced out over a 12-month period and stopped whenever the London market price dropped below $1.50 per pound. The plan has the approval of the International Tin Council and would be implemented in consultation with producer nations. Bolivians assert that these sales are insignificant to the US economy but vital to Bolivia. They also point out that tin prices have declined in recent months and that each one-cent drop reduces export earnings by some $750,000 (on an annual basis). At a late June press conference, the Mines Minister stated his country’s “intransigent opposition to [US] sales under any circumstances.” 5 Potential for violence . We believe that the Bolivian Government will resort to a “counter offensive” if the US proceeds with the tin sales. A source indicated that the Government intends to support, if not incite, anti-US demonstrations, if sales begin. Such a popular emotional issue would be of obvious value to Ovando who has repeatedly resorted to “anti-US” tactics in maintaining his precarious control over a political cauldron of extremists of the left and right, and diverse military elements. On July 10, the Finance Minister said in so many words that he is desperately searching for some outside factor on which to blame an inevitable devaluation and that he would instantly award that honor to the tin sales if they eventuate in the coming weeks or months. Threat to US interests . The tin issue, however, has adverse implications for US interests in Bolivia going beyond the immediate local reaction. The disposal would present new opportunities for the USSR, whose recent purchases of Bolivian tin already have enhanced its standing in La Paz. Furthermore, US sales risk the reversal of Ovando’s recent clamping down on nationalistic extremists. We see Ovando as a man probing for the political “center of gravity”. His first phase was “to the left,” exemplified by the Gulf Oil nationalization. His second and current phase is more to the middle (by Bolivian standards), with a strong push from certain military elements. The “gut issue” of tin sales, however, is so susceptible to exploitation by the nationalist extremists that Ovando would have to adopt the same stance, if not exceed it, to maintain his national-leader position. Any resurgence of a common identity of interests between Ovando and nationalistic extremists carries two risks: the possibility of a revival of the voice of these forces in government circles; and, subsequently, the heightening of tensions between Ovando and the “moderate military” who would see their recent gains (e.g., dismissal of the leftist command-er-in-chief of the Armed Forces) jeopardized. Finally, tin sales would seriously endanger the Gulf Oil compensation negotiations. It is doubtful that any Bolivian Government could negotiate a satisfactory settlement in an atmosphere of high tension created—in Bolivian eyes—by unjustified US tin disposals. And, the longer the Gulf issue goes unresolved, the greater is the danger that the issue will become a local political football as occurred in the IPC dispute in Peru. 6 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 73 D 153, Daily Staff Summaries. Confidential; Limdis; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by T.W. Sonandres (INR) and cleared by G. H. Summ. 2 In a July 14 memorandum for record, OEP Director Lincoln noted that the Department of State, at Samuels’ request, had requested a 1-week delay in referring the tin matter to the White House so that the Ambassador to Bolivia could inform the Bolivian President that the United States was about to resume tin sales. Lincoln agreed to the delay on the understanding that sales would commence in a week. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume II 11/69-12/71) 3 See Documents 152 and 154 . 4 Annual world demands for tin is some 200,000 tons; the sales impact on the world price is considered minimal. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 Brackets in the source text. 6 See Document 148 . 434. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 434. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon 1 Washington, August 20, 1970. SUBJECT Resumption of Commercial Sales of Stockpile Tin Recommendation: In the light of Ambassador Siracusa’s strongly reiterated warning that the initiation of stockpile tin sales now could lead to an irrational reaction in Bolivia which might threaten American lives and property, 2 I recommend that you authorize a further temporary suspension of sales for a period not to exceed 90 days. 3 We would plan to proceed with disposals before the end of that period, in order to take advantage of the favorable market, and would use the period or such lesser time as may be necessary to work out arrangements to minimize the risks to American lives and property. 4 Background: By memorandum of April 8, 1970, General G.A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, requested your decision on a difference of views between the OEP and the Department of State concerning commercial sales of excess stockpile tin. 5 In a memorandum of April 29, 1970, Mr. Peter M. Flanigan informed General Lincoln that you did not at that time approve the sale of 18,000 tons of tin from the stockpile as requested and that the request would be reviewed by July 1 in the event that General Lincoln and the Department of State were unable to agree upon the proposed sale prior to that time. 6 As a result of continued high prices for tin, an anticipated shortfall in supply and the exhaustion of the International Tin Council buffer stock, pressure from U.S. and foreign consumers for initiation of a stockpile disposal program intensified during late April and May. At the same time, political tension in Bolivia appeared to be easing. In an effort to be responsive to these pressures and to move toward the initiation of a tin disposal program, the Department instructed Ambassador Siracusa to determine Bolivian President Ovando’s attitude toward a modest disposal program in light of the new market conditions. While maintaining Bolivia’s basic opposition to disposals, the Bolivian President conceded that under existing market conditions some kind of action was required and he agreed in principle that some degree of stockpile sale was probably necessary. At the specific request of President Ovando, two officers from the Department were sent to La Paz during the first week of June to consult with Bolivian officials confidentially on a proposed commercial tin sales program. These consultations, in which the Ambassador participated, elicited Bolivian acquiescence in a modest one-year sales program of 6,000 tons. The Bolivians indicated that if the program were held to 6,000 tons they would make only a pro forma protest. Following the June meeting in La Paz, the Department opened consultations with the other major tin producers (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Nigeria, Congo (K) and Australia) and with the International Tin Council, looking to a disposal program limited to 6,000 tons annually, beginning on or about July 1, 1970. Some misgivings were expressed about the timing of our disposals but in the main those six producers and the Tin Council were reasonably satisfied and the Department had planned to conclude consultations in time for disposals to begin on July 1. On June 17, Ambassador Siracusa urgently requested suspension of action leading to tin sales. The basic change in the situation between the Ambassador’s discussion with President Ovando on May 23 and the dispatch of his June 17 cable was a deterioration of the political situation marked by a week of rioting and disorder in Bolivia that left four persons dead and scores wounded. In requesting the further suspension of tin sales the Ambassador warned of a serious danger to American lives and property that is likely to result from an irrational Bolivian reaction to U.S. disposals. Enclosed are a series of cables in which the Ambassador analyzes the situation and describes the threat (Enclosures 1. La Paz 2896; 2. La Paz 3235; 3. La Paz 3343; 4. Lima 3963; 5. La Paz 3590). 7 It is noteworthy that although President Ovando has as recently as July 22 reiterated his government’s assurances of making only a pro forma protest and providing protection should violence be directed against U.S. personnel and installations, 8 the Ambassador discounts the ability of the Bolivian Government to make good on these pledges. Ambassador Siracusa’s clear warnings about the dangers to American lives and property must be carefully weighed and appropriate steps taken to eliminate the risks or reduce them to a minimum. However, our legitimate tin disposal policies would be frustrated and a favorable market situation missed because of the possibility of an irrational Bolivian reaction. I, therefore, propose that, if you concur, we inform the Ambassador that we are going ahead with our sales program not later than 90 days from now. We would instruct the Ambassador to: (a) consult with President Ovando as to the most appropriate timing within this period for such a disposal in order to minimize the political problems such action would pose for him; and (b) request the cooperation of the Bolivian Government to work out arrangements to minimize the risks to U.S. personnel should our disposal program lead to violent anti-American reactions and to prepare an appropriate contingency plan. William P. Rogers 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Secret. Attached to a September 5 memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger reporting that the President had approved Rogers’ recommendation and recommending that Kissinger sign a directive to the State Department and OEP informing the agencies of the President’s decision. Kissinger’s September 7 memorandum to Rogers and Lincoln, also attached, informed them that tin sales were further suspended for a period not to exceed 90 days and that plans to resume sales should be undertaken before the end of the 90-day period in order to take advantage of the favorable market. They were also to work out arrangements to minimize the risks to American lives and property. 2 Telegrams 2896 and 3235 from La Paz, June 17 and July 7, respectively, transmitted the Ambassador’s warnings. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 2, Document 433 . 4 The President initialed the Approve option. 5 See Document 431 and footnote 2 thereto. 6 See Document 431 . 7 None printed. The five telegrams were also attached to Document 436 . 8 As reported in telegram 3590 from La Paz, July 23. 435. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to President Nixon 435. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to President Nixon 1 Washington, August 24, 1970. SUBJECT Resumption of Commercial Sales of Stockpile Tin REFERENCE Secretary Rogers’ memorandum to you, same subject, dated August 20, 1970 Secretary Rogers has proposed a further delay of up to 90 days in sales of excess stockpile tin, during which time he proposes that we work out arrangements and proceed with the sales. 2 Having been charged by you to proceed with actions to obtain receipts of $750 million from the stockpile in FY 1971, 3 I offer the following comment on this proposal: 1. With all due respect for the concern of the Department of State and Ambassador Siracusa about the situation in Bolivia, I am not fully persuaded of the need for appreciable further delay. Since the beginning of this Administration, we have deferred tin disposals in April and September 1969 and in April 1970 because of unstable situations in Bolivia. After reducing the proposed commercial sales from $54 million to $23 million, we obtained on June 5, 1970, the agreement of the Bolivian Government not to make more than pro forma objections to our sales. Although the political situation in Bolivia is unstable, I am inclined to question whether it is sufficiently serious to preclude our sales, and whether it is likely to become appreciably more stable in the foreseeable future. 2. I believe 90 days is too long a delay, in view of current tin prices and of the approaching Tin Council meeting in October. The price of tin, probably as a result of speculation based on our evident delay in selling tin, has again risen on the London Metals Exchange, to $1.69 a pound. A Tin Council meeting in October is expected to try to establish the present high price as the normal price, which would be costly to the United States and inflationary. If we do not sell beforehand, under these circumstances, we probably will receive complaints from industry, and perhaps from Congress. It should be noted that a 90 day delay would also extend beyond the Congressional elections. 3. The delay on tin disposals because of Bolivia—now known in the trade as the “Bolivian freeze”—is impairing other stockpile disposals. In the July meeting of the UNCTAD Commodities Committee in Geneva, 4 Bolivia taunted the rubber-producing countries, especially Malaysia, for weakly accepting US disposals. Malaysia has subsequently raised questions about US rubber disposals, and has cited the Bolivian case. In recent weeks, a number of other countries have also protested US stockpile disposals. Although this is not unusual, it may be due in part to the holdup in tin disposals because of Bolivia. Recommendation For the reasons given above, I recommend that we proceed with the tin disposals as soon as possible, and in any event no later than October 1. G.A. Lincoln 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Secret. Copies were sent to Kissinger, Flanigan, Trezise, Meyer, and Shultz. 2 Document 434 . 3 See Document 422 and footnote 1 thereto. 4 Not further identified. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Lincoln signed the original. 436. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 436. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, September 1, 1970. SUBJECT Resumption of Commercial Sales of Stockpile Tin Secretary Rogers and OEP Director, General Lincoln, agree that we should resume sales of stockpile tin, but they disagree as to when. In the memo at Tab A, Secretary Rogers notes the strongly reiter-ated warnings of our Ambassador to Bolivia that an initiation of stockpile tin sales now could lead to an irrational reaction in Bolivia which might threaten American lives and property there. 2 He accordingly recommends a delay for a period not to exceed 90 days. He proposes to use the delay to consult with Bolivia on the best timing of sales and on plans to protect American lives and property, as well as to make our own contingency plans. The Secretary stresses that the 90-day limit is a maximum, and that we would endeavor to initiate sales as soon as possible before that. General Lincoln believes that 90 days is too long a delay. He notes that the world tin price has risen probably because of our evident delay in selling from our stockpile. 3 A Tin Council meeting in October is expected to try to establish the present high price as the normal price which would be inflationary. If we continue to wait, therefore, we would surely receive industry and congressional complaints. The 90-day delay would also extend beyond the congressional elections He also notes that we have already delayed tin disposals for almost 18 months because of instability in Bolivia. He questions whether Bolivian instability is serious enough to preclude our sales, or whether it will improve in the foreseeable future. Having been charged by you to proceed with actions to obtain receipts of $750 million from the overall stockpile in FY 1970 [ FY 1971 ], General Lincoln believes we must proceed with tin sales (approximately $23 million) as soon as possible to take advantage of current favorable market conditions for such sales. We must weigh, on the one hand, the economic advantage of early disposal and the risk of industry complaints and unfavorable price movements if we do not; and, on the other, the risk of being inadequately prepared for a plausible threat to American lives and property. In my view the risk of violent Bolivian reaction is a central consideration. It is sufficiently probable that we must give the Ambassador the benefit of the doubt and assume it as a likely occurrence. We should not risk being in a position in which we could be charged with not taking reasonable precautions to protect our people. Therefore, I believe we must provide for a period within which we could make immediate and appropriate preparations before initiating the sales. Although General Lincoln recommended that sales resume prior to October 1, he acknowledges that this may leave too little time to take precautions and would agree to a later deadline. On the other hand, reasonable plans to meet the dangers cited surely can be made in a shorter time than the 90 days proposed by Secretary Rogers, if we begin immediately. A 60-day maximum period, i.e., November 1 deadline, should therefore be an adequate compromise which would accommodate the various considerations posed by OEP and State. Peter Flanigan concurs. Recommendation: That you instruct State and OEP to initiate tin disposal sales as soon as possible but not later than November 1, and to take immediately all feasible steps to protect U.S. lives and property in Bolivia against threats that may arise as a consequence. 4 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile. Secret. A notation indicates the memorandum was sent to the President at the Western White House in San Clemente. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) It was forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an August 28 memorandum from Vaky which called Kissinger’s attention to Lincoln’s belief that the United States could not afford economically and budgetarily to wait the 90 days proposed by Rogers. Vaky reported that he had proposed a compromise at 60 days, to which Lincoln and Flanigan would agree, and expressed hope that the State Department would as well. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile) 2 See Document 434 . 3 See Document 435 . 4 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked or initialed, but the President approved Secretary Rogers’ recommendation; see Document 434 and footnote 3 thereto. A handwritten note by Butterfield on the first page of the memorandum printed here called Kissinger’s attention to the Department of State memorandum. 437. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 437. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 14, 1970. SUBJECT Commercial sales of Stockpiled Tin and Their Impact on Our Relations with Bolivia On September 7 you approved State’s recommendation to delay by 90 days the resumption of commercial sales of stockpiled tin. 2 The additional period you authorized expired December 7. Acting Secretary John Irwin has requested a further suspension of 90 days to avoid further radicalization of the new Bolivian Government. (Memorandum at Tab A). 3 General Lincoln strongly opposes any further delay because of the possible adverse effect on your stockpile disposal program. (Memorandum at Tab B). 4 OEP will not initiate action, however, until a decision has been made on State’s request for an additional extension. Your decision of September 7 to delay tin sales was based on the need to work out a program acceptable to the Bolivian Government, then headed by General Ovando, in order to minimize the adverse reaction in Bolivia and reduce the threat to American lives and property. In fact State achieved an understanding with Ovando which would have permitted us to proceed with the sale of 6000 tons of tin, but Ovando was overthrown and replaced by General Torres before it could be implemented. Torres was expected to be more radical than Ovando, but he has taken a moderate approach thus far (including a commitment to abide by the Gulf Oil Company settlement). State argues that a resumption of tin sales so soon after he took office would —be taken by Torres as an attack on him and his government; —give radical elements a strong anti-US issue, and would tend to push him in the direction of radicalization thereby jeopardizing the Gulf settlement (which should be pinned down by March) and our longer-term relations with Bolivia; —additional time might permit the conclusion of an agreement with Torres similar to that achieved with Ovando. OEP contends that continued failure to resume tin sales jeopardizes the entire stockpile disposal program. The OEP case acknowledges that the amount to be realized from tin sales ($23 million) is not large relative to the total disposal program ($750 million), but notes that Congress will be increasingly reluctant to grant further disposal authorizations (16 disposal bills are pending on the Hill) if the Administration fails to use the authority it already has for tin disposal. (OEP is being prodded by Representative Mendel Rivers) 5 In addition, OEP argues that: —the most recent delay is only the last of a series stretching back to 1968; —tin sales at the level contemplated should not adversely affect the world market price of tin. With respect to State’s position, OEP points out that Bolivia is inherently unstable politically and that it is unlikely that the situation will improve much in 90 days. The tin sales issue is a dilemma to which there is no really good solution . The key questions to consider in making a decision which minimizes the adverse consequences to our interests are: —Would a further 90-day suspension in tin sales really endanger the entire commodities disposal program? —If not, would an additional 90 days make any difference in reducing the foreign policy costs of ultimately resuming sales? —If so, how can the additional time best be used to achieve this result? The immediate impact of a continued suspension in tin sales on the overall stockpile disposal program is not certain . The amount of money to be realized from tin sales is not great. Moreover it is by no means established that tin sales is the ruling factor in the passage by the Congress of the 16 pending disposal bills. It seems unlikely any action will be taken by the Congress during the remainder of this session regardless of actions on tin sales. Tin will be one factor during the coming session but only one of several. On the other hand, the foreign policy costs of resuming sales in the absence of adequate preparation could be very great . Bolivia is in a particularly unstable phase and the Torres Government is more likely to over-react to tin sales than would a more solidly-based government. This situation is not apt to be much different in three months but a little time devoted to careful diplomatic and propaganda work might help to limit the reaction of the Torres Government when we do begin sales . Bolivia was not very much different three months ago than it is now either, yet we achieved a tacit agreement with Ovando before he has overthrown. A further delay, therefore, might reduce the foreign policy risks. A major factor not present at the time of your earlier decision to suspend sales is the existence of the Allende Government in Chile. As yet Chile’s neighbors, including Bolivia, have taken a correct but cautious approach toward the Allende regime. If we give Bolivia a strong reason for reacting against us now, the likely result will be to align them more closely with Chile than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, the emergence of a more radical government in Bolivia, coming so soon after a Marxist victory in Chile, will be seen as another political loss for the US . This is by far the strongest argument for not resuming tin sales at the present time. 6 If you do approve a further delay, State should be directed to use the extra time to make a maximum effort to work with Torres to reach an understanding with him similar to the one achieved with Ovando, and to prepare a counter-propaganda campaign in Bolivia. Moreover, consultations should be held on the Hill to explain the reasons for delaying tin sales and to urge that consideration of the other disposal bills not be tied to the tin problem. Bill Timmons concurs. Peter Flanigan concurs with understanding that delay would be for not more than 90 days. Recommendation That you approve delaying resumption of tin sales by no more than 90 days, with the understanding that State will undertake a program to prepare the Bolivian Government and people for an eventual resumption of tin sales, and that extensive consultations will be undertaken to explain our position to the Congress. 7 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume II 11/69-12/71. Secret. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a December 7 memorandum from Nachmanoff, on which Kissinger wrote: “What is amount of money involved?” Another note, presumably by Haig, reads: “$23 million.” 2 See footnote 3, Document 434 . 3 Irwin’s December 2 memorandum to President Nixon is not printed. 4 Lincoln’s December 3 memorandum to the President is not printed. 5 Attached to Lincoln’s memorandum at Tab B is a copy of an October 19 letter from L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, asking about the delay in the release of surplus tin from the stockpile. 6 In the margin next to the last two sentences in this paragraph, the President wrote: “forget it—It will happen inevitably anyway—if it’s going to happen—Tin will not do it.” See Document 149 . 7 Neither the Approve nor Disapprove option is checked or initialed. The President drew a line through the paragraph and wrote below the options: “no—go forward with the sales as I ordered 18 months ago.” The President underlined “no” twice. This memorandum, however, is attached to a January 27, 1971, memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers and Lincoln informing them that the President had approved a further delay in the resumption of sales of stockpiled tin; see footnote 3, Document 439 . 438. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 438. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Meat Import Program for 1971 Two different options have been recommended by the agencies for setting the level of meat imports in 1971 under the voluntary restraint program. Agriculture and STR recommend no increase in 1971 over the 1970 level of 1,160 million pounds (Option III in the paper prepared by the Task Force on Agricultural Trade, Tab A), 2 for domestic political reasons. State, Treasury, CEA, and the Office of Consumer Affairs recommend increasing the import level from 1,160 million pounds to 1,300 million pounds (Option IV). The economic agencies base their views essentially on the anti-inflationary impact of the higher import level. State’s recommendation is based principally on the implications of this program for our relations with Latin America. Eight Latin American countries voluntarily restrain their meat exports to us, and at least one more will probably have to be brought into the program next year. Implementation of these restraints has increasingly caused major frictions between us and these countries over the past two years. Although the difference in the levels involved is small for us, it is economically important and politically sensitive for the Latin countries. I agree with State, and support Option IV. I recognize that 1,300 million pounds may be too high in domestic political terms; I would urge at least a token increase, however, to whatever level may be feasible in domestic terms. As State indicates, any decrease from the 1970 level would cause major foreign policy problems. There are two major reasons why a liberalization of this program is now particularly important to our Latin American policy. First, in view of the Chile situation, we want to be particularly careful to maintain our friendships elsewhere in the Hemisphere, and to demonstrate that we will cooperate with the Latins on issues that matter to them if they will cooperate with us. The eight Central American countries, who are all suppliers of meat, will play an important role in our efforts to maintain the OAS sanctions against Cuba in the wake of Chile’s decision to recognize Castro and begin trade relations with him. In addition, Mexico is by far the largest supplier of meat in Latin America, and the new Echeverria Administration there will regard this as the first concrete test of our attitude toward it. Second, there have been numerous sniping efforts in the Congress this year against Latin meat exports to us. The Senate Finance Committee trade bill, in fact, would “close some loopholes” in the existing Meat Import Act. A bill cloaked in environmental protection guise, passed by the House, would bar any imports from countries which did not control the use of pesticides as well as we do. Another bill, also passed by the House, would require all imported meat to be unfrozen for inspection at the border, which obviously would render it completely inedible. Needless to say, these moves have made the Latins very nervous about the security of the U.S. market for their meat exports. Your decision on the meat import level for 1971 provides the only foreseeable opportunity to take a concrete step which would reassure them. There is also a foreign policy case for liberalizing the controls in terms of Australia and New Zealand, the two largest suppliers. We are making major efforts to keep both involved in Vietnam, and to join in helping Cambodia. 3 Both regard our annual decision on meat imports as one of the major indicators of our interest in them, and our decision always occasions a great deal of political debate there. The Governments in both countries maintain only narrow margins in their Parliaments, and the alternatives in both would be much less cooperative with us in Southeast Asia. Finally, it is by no means certain that an unchanged overall level of imports would offer sufficient bait to obtain continued “voluntary” restraints. It is virtually certain that any proposal for a rollback from 1970 levels would destroy the “voluntary” cooperation. The alternative would of course be to shift to quotas. Recommendation: I therefore recommend that you choose Option IV in the paper prepared by the Task Force on Agricultural Trade—1971 meat imports at 1,300 million pounds—or a level above 1970 which may be feasible in domestic political terms; I will work out the specific number with your domestic advisers if you approve the principle of an increase over the 1970 level, but decide that 1,300 million pounds is too high. I oppose any rollback from the 1970 level. 4 Approve Option IV: 1,300 million pounds in 1971, an increase of about 11% over 1970 Prefer a smaller increase over 1970, the specific number to be worked out Prefer Option III: 1,160 million pounds in 1971, the same level as in 1970 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy. Secret. Sent to the President in the week of December 21; see footnotes 3 and 4 below. 2 Reference is presumably to a paper distributed to members of the Task Force by Houthakker on December 2 for a meeting that afternoon. Options III and IV described here are Options III and IV of the five options in Houthakker’s paper. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Houthakker, Box 17) 3 On December 28 Bergsten and Holdridge sent Kissinger a memorandum reminding him that he had sent the President a memorandum the preceding week recommending the maximum possible increase in meat imports in 1971 under the voluntary restraint program. They recalled that the case had largely been couched in terms of Latin America, but they called Kissinger’s attention to Australian and New Zealand developments that strengthened the maximalist case. In particular, the New Zealand Ambassador had informed the State Department on December 22 that economic stringencies, in part due to limited beef exports to the United States, were reinforcing the New Zealand desire to withdraw its troops from Vietnam in 1971. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 351, Meat Import Policy) 4 None of the options below is checked. In a January 26, 1971, memorandum regarding the President’s decisions, Bergsten informed Kissinger that the President has not accepted his maximalist approach but had instead decided to hold imports constant at 1,160 million pounds. After reviewing the issues Bergsten explained his view of the bureaucratic dynamics that had resulted in Kissinger’s recommendation not being accepted. He reported that Hardin and Colson originally had supported 1,160 million pounds but then fell back at the last minute to 1,125 million pounds to enable them to characterize 1,160 million as a reasonable compromise. The final paper to the President, Bergsten wrote, was a composite drafted by Flanigan and did not present Kissinger’s “token increase” as an option. He complained that for the second time they had been “end-played” by Hardin and Colson “in the absence of any countervailing force of sufficiently high level to expose its absurdity.” (Ibid.) 439. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 439. Action Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, January 20, 1971. SUBJECT Commercial sales of Stockpiled Tin and Their Impact on Our Relations with Bolivia On December 14, 1970, I sent you a memorandum (attached at Tab A) 2 on this subject recommending a further suspension of tin sales of no more than 90 days because —A resumption of tin sales at this time would tend to push the Torres Government in Bolivia to the left. —Some additional time might permit the conclusion of an accord with Torres similar to that which had been concluded with his predecessor, President Ovando, before the latter’s overthrow. You disapproved the recommendation , noting that radicalization of the Torres Government will occur in any event if it is to happen, and indicating that tin sales or their absence will not be a major consideration. I agree fully that radicalization of the Torres Government, should it come about, will arise primarily from the internal dynamics of the Bolivian situation rather than anything we may or may not do. However, two factors lead me to request that you reconsider your decision . They are: — The Bolivian situation has deteriorated markedly since the date of my last memorandum on this subject. There have been increasing reports from the Embassy and CIA of plots against the Torres Government, a growth in general lawlessness and the increasing inability of the Government to control it, and the rising influence of leftist student, peasant and worker groups. This past weekend moderate elements in the Armed Forces bungled a coup attempt as they did last October. The probable result of this unsuccessful coup will be more influence for student and peasant groups, and an accelerated move to the left by the Torres Government. — The importance of the timing of renewed tin sales in avoiding blame for the leftist shift in Bolivia . My earlier memo was not sufficiently clear on the point that, while I agree that what we do will not decisively affect the internal situation in Bolivia, I am concerned that the Administration will be blamed—however unjustly—if the Torres Government moves sharply to the left, or is overthrown and replaced by a more radical government, immediately after we have resumed tin sales. Obviously there is no guarantee that the situation will be any better at the end of an additional 90 days, but if the Torres Government is overthrown by leftist forces or turns sharply left on its own, the U.S. at least cannot be accused of having pushed it there because of an untimely resumption of tin sales. If a move to the left does take place in this period, we could, of course, go ahead with tin sales subsequently without taking the blame. On the other hand, if the Torres Government stabilizes somewhat, the additional 90 days can be used to work out an arrangement with Torres similar to that we had with Ovando to minimize the negative impact of a resumption in tin sales. As my earlier memo noted, an additional 90-day suspension of tin sales would not significantly affect the commodities disposal program legislation. Hearings on tin disposal in the House Subcommittee on Stockpile Disposal subsequent to my memo indicated that there was considerable understanding of our political problem with Bolivia among Committee members who did not push for immediate resumption of sales. Recommendation That you approve a delay in the resumption of tin sales by no more than 90 days, with the understanding that State will undertake a program to prepare the Bolivian Government and people for the resumption of tin sales at the end of that period. 3 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume II 11/69-12/71. Secret. Forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a January 21 memorandum from Nachmanoff. A stamped notation reads: “The President has seen.” 2 Document 437 . 3 The President initialed the Approve option. A January 27, 1971, memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers and Lincoln informed them that on January 25 the President had approved a further delay in the resumption of commercial sales of stockpiled tin for a period not to exceed 90 days. Kissinger noted that the President had instructed the State Department to take all feasible steps with the Bolivian Government to reduce the political costs and risks to American citizens and property when sales were resumed, and had asked the State Department and OEP to consult with Congress regarding the administration’s position on tin sales. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume II 11/69-12/71) 440. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 440. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Request for Exception to Prohibition on Sales of Excess Tin from the National Stockpile On April 9, 1971, the President, in response to an appeal from the Government of Bolivia, directed that commercial sales of stockpile tin be postponed indefinitely. 2 There have been no disposals of tin since that time other than non-commercial sales under the AID program (The Indian program which accounted for the bulk of these sales was terminated in December, 1971). 3 I now have before me a request from an American metals company for a quantity of tin in exchange for titanium sponge. We are presently acquiring 7,000 tons of titanium for the stockpile under an arrangement whereby payment by us will be in the form of excess materials previously authorized for disposal by Congress. The American firm (a U.S. Steel affiliate) requests that a portion of this payment be in the form of tin (2,000 tons valued at $7 million over a two year period). I am fully aware of the difficulties previously posed for our foreign relations by the sale of tin. However, I believe that, in this case, the impact on our relations with Bolivia and other tin producing states would be minimal. The sale, which is in effect a barter arrangement, is within the United States. The material would not enter the brokerage trade, but would be transferred by the recipient directly to U.S. Steel for use in stateside plants. The price of tin in the United States is presently at a relatively high level, and the amount involved represents less than 1.5% of U.S. consumption (in comparison, the earlier disposal program which triggered the President’s action called for sales of 6,000 tons in one year). Given the relatively small amount of the proposed transfer and the fact that it is a direct transaction outside of the world or even the domestic market, I believe that it could have no more than a remote effect on the world trade in tin. I would appreciate advice as to whether an exception can be made from the President’s directive which would permit this one-time barter transaction. I recognize that the proposal might first have to be explored with the tin producing states. G.A. Lincoln 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume III 1972-1973. No classification marking. The memorandum is undated but is attached to Kissinger’s March 18, 1972, reply ( Document 442 ), which refers to Lincoln’s February 23 memorandum. See Document 441 . 2 On April 9, 1971, Kissinger sent the following memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers and Lincoln: “The President has decided to rescind his decision to proceed with sales of stockpile tin after April 25, 1971. He has directed that sales of stockpile tin be postponed indefinitely.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume II 11/69-12/71) The April 25 date would mark the end of the 90-day deferral period the President agreed to on January 25. See footnote 3, Document 439 . The Bolivian Ambassador presumably brought up tin disposals from the stockpile on April 6 at a State dinner with President and Mrs. Nixon in honor of Chiefs of Missions of the Americas (including Canada) and their wives. There is no record in the President’s Diary that the President had another meeting with the Ambassador in April 1971. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) 3 Not further identified. 441. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 441. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 3, 1972. SUBJECT OEP Request for Exception to Prohibition on Sales of Excess Tin from the National Stockpile On February 18, General Lincoln requested that a one-time exception be made from the President’s directive of April 9, 1971, which suspended indefinitely commercial sales of stockpile tin. 2 The Department of State opposes the lifting of the ban on tin disposals at this time. The foreign policy reasons which caused the Department to recommend previously that no commercial sales of stockpile tin be made still obtain. Although the leftist regime of Bolivia’s former President General Torres has been replaced by a friendly government, serious political instability, critical monetary and fiscal problems, and high unemployment continue to exist in that country. Stockpile tin sales have not diminished as an emotional issue in the Bolivian political arena, and the precarious tenure of the Banzer Government would be threatened. As you informed the Department on February 2, the President wants a forthcoming assistance program for Bolivia. 3 Continued suspension of stockpile sales is an integral part of our cooperative policy toward Bolivia. The impact of a tin sale to a U.S. Steel subsidiary would have a particular impact on Malaysia since U.S. Steel generally buys Straits Tin. The Malaysians and other Southeast Asian producers would view the release of two thousand tons as damaging to their developing economies and as a prelude to future releases. The United States is committed to consultations with the producer governments and the International Tin Council before the commercial release of tin from the stockpile, and given the certainty of public knowledge of those consultations, the US would be faced with strong diplomatic protests even before the sales were made. A further foreign policy consideration is the likelihood of strong criticism of the US disposal programs at the upcoming UNCTAD-III Conference in Santiago. If we begin consulting with the tin producing countries now, we can expect adverse reactions at UNCTAD-III in April. 4 Although a one-time exception to the President’s directive might be justified on economic grounds, particularly since it involves a barter transaction, I believe that the ban should not be lifted now for the above foreign policy reasons. R.T. Curran 5 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume III 1972-1973. Confidential. Attached to Document 442 . 2 See Document 440 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 Not further identified. 4 For documentation on UNCTAD III, see Documents 144 ff. 5 Robert T. Curran signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature. 442. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 442. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Lincoln) 1 Washington, March 18, 1972. SUBJECT Request for Exemption to Prohibition on Sales of Excess Tin from the National Stockpile Thank you for your memorandum of February 23, requesting my advice on whether an exemption can be made from the President’s prohibition on tin sales from the stockpile. 2 Because of the economic and foreign policy significance of this matter, it is important that the President himself review this issue. I would therefore ask that the Department of State consult after UNCTAD III (April 13-May 19) 3 first with producer governments and then with the International Tin Council 4 to determine their reaction. OEP could include these results along with the views of the Department of State, CIEP and other appropriate agencies in a paper which would be submitted to the President on or about June 2. 5 With regard to the long-range issue of our tin stockpile, the possibility of commercial sales of excess tin from the national stockpile is viewed by the tin producing states as a threat to their economies. Therefore, so long as surplus tin remains, its disposal will continue to be an irritant in our bilateral relations with these countries. With a view to removing this irritant, it would be desirable if the Office of Emergency Preparedness, in consultation with the Department of State, could explore the possibilities of devising a mechanism or mechanisms for the possible gradual release of surplus tin in a manner least likely to disrupt the world market. Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Volume III 1972-1973. Confidential. A copy was sent to Under Secretary of State Irwin. Forwarded to Kissinger for his signature under cover of a March 14 memorandum from Hormats and Hewitt. (Ibid.) 2 Document 440 . 3 For documentation on UNCTAD III, see Documents 144 ff. 4 In their March 14 covering memorandum to Kissinger, Hormats and Hewitt pointed out that the United States was committed to consultation with the Tin Council before any release of tin from the stockpile. 5 Not found. 443. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 443. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, March 22, 1972. SUBJECT Disposal of Stockpile Tin Our $688 million budget projection of stockpile receipts for FY 1973 includes about $35 million for sale of around 10 thousand tons of excess tin on the assumption that the President’s current ban on tin sales would be lifted and that we would be in the market for the full year. I understand that for the past several years GSA has been directed by the White House not to sell tin in the domestic market in view of international policy considerations. As you know, this matter is a very sensitive political issue with the Bolivian government even though our tin disposals would constitute less than 5% of world production. Lifting the ban would permit GSA to sell the tin with due regard for impact on the market as required by law. Since it is nearly a year since the President ordered an extension of the tin freeze last April, 2 it would be most helpful to get a current evaluation to see if there are valid reasons why the President should not now be requested to lift the ban. In the past we have sold considerable amounts of tin with no significant impact on world prices—30 thousand tons in 1965 and 12 thousand tons in 1967. From the domestic side it would make good sense to move at this time— —The domestic market is strong at about $1.76 to $1.77 per lb.; —U.S. industry would favor sale of our tin surpluses (U.S. Steel has already asked GSA to exchange tin for their purchase of titanium); and —Sales should help our balance of payments since tin is not produced domestically but consumed here in large quantities. For many of our stockpile commodities we have had difficulty in getting OEP requirements lowered and disposal authority enacted by the Congress. Neither of these obstacles is present in the case of tin disposal which is solely an administrative matter. Even the Armed Services Committees have urged us to get into the market. 3 I recognize that any disposal of tin would be unwelcome by Bolivia, Malaysia, and other tin producing countries. However, in view of the budgetary significance for 1973 and subsequent years, I think we should have a fairly hard assessment of why the President should not be asked to rescind the ban on tin sales—at least by June 30, 1972. As you know, the tin producing countries have always opposed selling tin on the grounds that it would upset our foreign relations posture. I hope that the NSC will be able to give us an independent estimate of our present foreign policy interests in this area. I would think there might be some room for a change from our practice of the past five years—particularly since domestic requirements should now increase in view of the economic upturn and recommended increases in defense procurement. Perhaps there may be some room for negotiation to stretch out the sales or to consider other concessions which are of interest to these countries. John D. Erlichman 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile (1973). No classification marking. Attached to Document 445 . Also attached is a March 24 memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger proposing a reply to Ehrlichman, on which Kissinger wrote: “Before you send this—does tin affect Bolivia? If so see me.” Hormats’ proposed reply to Ehrlichman had no specific reference to Bolivia. 2 See footnote 2, Document 440 . 3 Not further identified. 444. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 444. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, October 21, 1972. SUBJECT Tin Disposal Program In response to the request telephoned by Mr. Jorden’s office to Deputy Assistant Secretary Szabo on October 11 for views on the proposed resumption of the USG tin disposal program, because of the situation discussed below the Department of State recommends against rescission of the current indefinite suspension of tin disposals and against initiating consultations with producing countries regarding the disposal program at this time. Such actions would prejudice U.S. policy objectives in Bolivia and would harm relations with other major producers. A ministerial delegation from Bolivia informed us on September 25 that President Banzer had decided to devalue the Bolivian peso provided Washington lending agencies gave assurances of adequate support to the measures. The delegation carried out detailed consultations with the IMF, IBRD, IDB and with us, departing early in October expressing satisfaction with the assurances received. We expect the devaluation to take place before the end of this month. We and the other Washington financial institutions concerned regard satisfactory execution of devaluation and its accompanying measures as critical to solution of the serious budgetary and monetary problems facing the Banzer Government. The central purpose of our emergency assistance policy toward that government since its inception in August 1971 has been to provide the breathing space for it to effect fiscal and allied reforms such as this one which will put the government and the economy on a firmer base. In coming to its decision, the Banzer Government has had to overcome major concerns that currency devaluation is such a drastic cure, and is widely feared because of past Bolivian experience, that its adoption would risk the fall of the government. The best hopes for a stable and prospering Bolivia are now tied to President Banzer’s determination to carry out an effective devaluation/fiscal reform program, a program which cannot succeed without the sympathetic support which has been promised by Washington financial institutions and ourselves. The IMF will provide in the weeks following devaluation standby resources totaling $22 million. IBRD and IDB have promised vigorous implementation of development lending activities. We have promised to release to the Bolivian Government upon devaluation the $4 million remaining from the 1971 U.S. emergency assistance program to Bolivia together with the $20 million in the second program loan to Bolivia signed last month. We are discussing with the GOB an accelerated and expanded PL 480 agreement which would provide timely shipments of wheat and oils to assist the government in heading off panic buying by consumers. Settlement of the remaining Bolivian expropriation case (Matilde Mine Co.) is in final stages, giving hope for elimination of this category of problem with Bolivia. Extreme Bolivian sensitivity at every level to U.S. Government tin disposals is a fact of political life. It cannot be doubted that rescission of the indefinite suspension of tin disposals or initiation of consultations on tin disposals at this time would come as such a heavy blow to the Banzer Government as to undermine the foundation of confidence and sympathy which we have built up in our relations, endanger the devaluation/fiscal reform program, jeopardize the Matilde settlement, and adversely affect the outlook for the success and continuation in power of the Banzer Government. Once the devaluation/fiscal reform program has taken effect and put Bolivia and the Banzer Government on a sufficiently firm and stable foundation economically and politically, it would be timely to reconsider the question of resuming tin disposals. 2 Harry G. Barnes 3 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 286, State, Volume 16. Secret; Exdis. 2 On the copy of this memorandum attached to Document 445 , a note in the margin next to this paragraph reads: “probably in 1993.” 3 Barnes signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature. 445. Action Memorandum From Phil Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 445. Action Memorandum From Phil Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 1 Washington, November 27, 1972. SUBJECT Disposal of Stockpile Tin Cap Weinberger (Tab D), 2 Peter Flanigan (Tab E), 3 and George Lincoln (Tab F) 4 have written concerning the President’s ban on the disposal of tin from the Stockpile in deference to our concern for the stability of the Bolivian Government. They would like to see the ban lifted and sales of tin resumed in order to provide additional budget revenues (about $20 million per year). Background In April 1971, in direct response to a plea from the Bolivian Ambassador, the President ordered an extension of a prohibition on disposal of surplus tin. 5 He recognized the potential revenue gains from the disposal, but the President assessed that the foreign policy repercussions of such action (in Bolivia in particular) would be adverse to U.S. interests. The State Department (see Tab G) 6 is opposed to lifting the ban on tin sales on the grounds that it would undermine the Banzer Government’s attempt to effect fiscal and monetary reforms, specifically the recent currency devaluation, which is crucial to placing the government and economy on a firmer base. There are already riots in the streets of La Paz and the Banzer Government which is under heavy fire has declared a state of siege. At this juncture in Bolivian economic and political development, it would be unwise to take the considerable political risk of tin disposal for a small revenue gain. Moreover, the world price of tin is now depressed although tin prices were high during 1970-71. Initiating sales would violate our 1966 understanding with the International Tin Council in which we agreed to cooperate with the Tin Council’s efforts to keep the price of tin from falling below a price floor. The current price is only a little above the floor and initiation of U.S. sales might force Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand as well as Bolivia to adopt export controls and suffer reduced export earnings. Thus the foreign policy considerations at this time extend well beyond Bolivia. An Alternative Approach While this is not the time to initiate sales of our surplus tin in a way that would depress the already weak world market, there may be a way to meet the underlying objective of increasing our budget and balance of payments receipts from tin. Japan is a major consumer of tin and has no official stockpile. Japanese purchase of a part of our stockpile to establish its own stockpile would: —help moderate Japan’s highly favorable trade balance with us; —increase our budgetary receipts; —give the Japanese some reserve supply of a key commodity (Japan in essence has been relying on our stockpile at no cost to it); —permit Japan to purchase tin from us at a favorable price because the tin price is low at the moment. Although Bolivia and other producer countries would prefer to have Japan establish a stockpile through purchases on the open market, a transfer from one stockpile to another which has no effect on the market should be acceptable to the producers especially if they understand this is an alternative to U.S. sales on the market. At our request the State Department has initiated discussions with the Japanese on such a tin purchase (Tab H). 7 We have no assurance Japan will agree to establishment of a tin reserve. But initiating these discussions allows you to be somewhat positive in responding to Weinberger, Flanigan and Lincoln without upsetting the Bolivian situation. Recommendation That you sign the memos at Tabs A, B, and C to Cap Weinberger, 8 Peter Flanigan and George Lincoln which state the foreign policy restraint on open market sales of tin is still necessary but that the underlying budgetary objective could be attained if negotiations which the State Department has opened result in a Japanese purchase of some of our surplus tin for a Japanese emergency stock. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile (1973). Confidential. Concurred in by Hormats, Jorden, and Holdridge. Attached to a January 19, 1973, typed note by J. Bushnell, that reads: “Note. State has been requested to provide considered opinion on timing of initiation tin sales and issue of sale to potential Japanese stockpile. State is divided between Economic Bureau which wants to negotiate long-term sale agreements with International Tin Council and ARA which wishes to continue the Presidential ban on any tin sales, even to a Japanese stockpile. The issue awaits new arrivals on 7th floor for resolution. Meanwhile the President has reviewed the entire stockpile issue and actions affecting tin as well as other commodities are proceeding separately in a manner which makes these letters OBE. We have consulted informally at the staff level with the authors of the incoming letters who agree that they not be answered and the tin sale issue be treated as part of the larger picture.” 2 Weinberger’s October 10 memorandum to Kissinger is not printed. 3 Flanigan’s October 10 memorandum to Kissinger is not printed. He referred to the President’s commitment to a stockpile reduction and noted the possible budget and balance-of-payments benefits of additional sales. He mentioned an ongoing rubber disposal program in which Malaysia had concurred and suggested reevaluation of the political considerations regarding tin sales. 4 In his November 14 memorandum to Kissinger, not printed, Lincoln noted the legislative authority to sell excess tin and urged reconsideration of the tin disposal program. 5 See footnote 2, Document 440 . 6 Document 444 . 7 Telegram 212280 to Tokyo, November 22, not printed, reported that on October 27 a Japanese Embassy officer had come in on instructions to explore possible purchases of excess commodities from the stockpile to help redress Japan’s balance-of-payments problem with the United States. The Japanese were particularly interested in nickel and cobalt, but the Department informed the Embassy in Tokyo that there was a strong interest to begin commercial sales of excess tin and asked the Embassy to approach Japanese officials regarding purchases of tin as well as other commodities. The Embassy was informed that Japan would have to agree to hold any tin purchases in a Japanese stockpile until an emergency arose to avoid depressing the tin market, and requested the greatest discretion on the part of U.S. and Japanese negotiators due to the adverse effects that rumors of possible tin sales would have on relations with the tin producers. 8 None printed; the memoranda were not signed. 446. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 446. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1 Washington, December 26, 1972. SUBJECT Stockpile of Strategic Material A review of the Stockpile of Strategic Materials has been completed which shows that our present inventory of materials far exceeds national security requirements. However, before the Administration can press for disposal authority from the Congress, you need to provide new planning guidance for Stockpile policy based on national security judgments. This memorandum provides, for your consideration and decision, policy alternatives that establish such a planning basis and rationale. Background The hypothetical national emergency which sets the size and mix of the Stockpile inventory is at present a three year conventional war in Europe and Asia. This scenario was reaffirmed by the previous Administration as the planning basis for the Stockpile and has been used to support in the Congress this Administration’s stated Stockpile requirement of 72 materials valued at $4.9 billion. (The total Stockpile inventory is $6.6 billion, including $1.7 billion which has already been determined to be excess.) Issues For Decision There are three key issues in establishing a new planning basis for the Stockpile. They are: 1. The War Scenario . The war scenario that is assumed for Stockpile planning is described in terms of a) the theater or theaters in which the war occurs; b) the duration of the war; c) the military manpower level the U.S. will support. Current Policy: Current Stockpile policy is premised on three year wars in Europe and Asia with U.S. support for a 5 million man military manpower level. The two theater planning basis does not necessarily imply forces engaged simultaneously in both theaters, rather it entails simultaneous conflicts in which the U.S. is engaged in at least one and material supply is interrupted from both theaters. Alternatives: Your principal choices are: A. Maintain the current policy guidance, i.e., 3 years, Europe and Asia; 5 million men. (OEP recommendation) B. Reduce the war duration in Europe, i.e., 2 years, Europe; 3 years, Asia; 5 million men. (DOD recommendation, I concur) (Weinberger, Ehrlichman & Timmons concur) C. Reduce further the war duration in Europe, i.e., 1 year, Europe, 3 years, Asia; 5 million men. (Most consistent with military planning for short war duration in Europe) 2 D. Other, as you may specify. 3 2. The Degree of Austerity Imposed on the U.S. Economy . The degree of austerity relates to sustaining growth in civilian consumption standards during war. If it is planned that the burden of meeting defense related production requirements during war will be borne largely by consumers in terms of their sacrifice of improvement in living standards, then the requirement for stockpiling materials will be diminished. For example, reduced private automobile production would increase the availability of lead and copper for defense related production, lessening the need for these materials in the Stockpile. Current Policy: Current Stockpile guidance is ambiguous on this issue. Alternatives: Your principal choices, are: A. Some austerity but quantities stockpiled should be sufficient to preclude declines below prewar levels in living standards. (DoD and OEP recommendation, I concur) (Weinberger, Ehrlichman and Timmons concur.) B. Other, as you may specify. 4 3. Cushion to Hedge Against Unanticipated Developments. Whatever the amount of material estimated necessary to meet expected Stockpile requirements, additional amounts may be added to hedge against unanticipated developments such as high losses of materials in shipment due to enemy submarine action or curtailment of exports from usual trading partners due to adverse political developments. Current Policy: Current guidance provides a hedge by assuming imports in the first war year from normal sources outside of North America, Mexico and the Caribbean area will not be available. This add-on amounts to approximately $1 billion of the present $4 billion Stockpile requirement. Alternatives: Your principal choices are: A. Reduce cushion by shortening non-availability period from 1 year to 6 months and by assuming only the principal sources of foreign supply are nonavailable rather than all sources of foreign supply. (DOD recommendation, I concur.) (Weinberger, Ehrlichman and Timmons concur.) B. Eliminate cushion. 5 C. Other, as you may specify. Stockpile Policy and Revenue Potential The planning basis recommended by DOD in which I concur requires a Stockpile inventory of $1.3 billion. (Current requirements is $4.9 billion; current inventory is $6.6 billion.) Such a reduced inventory requirement provides an opportunity to obtain substantial revenues from Stockpile disposals, however, experience indicates that the rate at which revenues are likely to accrue to the budget is slow and can extend over a period of several decades (revenue estimates at Tab A) because: —Disposals must be authorized by Congress. Authorization is often refused or is slow in coming because of views held by key Congressmen that a large Stockpile is vital to the national security and/or disposals from it are detrimental to their constituencies. —Even after authorization, disposals cannot (by statute) occur at a pace which will seriously disrupt materials markets. —Stockpile disposals may be an irritant to foreign governments whose exchange earnings come from material exports. We often find it advantageous to slow or forego disposals to eliminate this irritant. Recommendation Substantial reductions in the Stockpile inventory will not jeopardize the national security. I recommend, therefore, that you authorize the National Security Decision Memorandum (Tab B) 6 that directs General Lincoln to adjust downward the Stockpile inventory requirement consistent with the Department of Defense recommendations. If you wish to select other alternatives, the NSDM will be revised accordingly. The proposed National Security Decision Memorandum 7 provides guidance to lower the Stockpile requirement, but it does not establish a strategy for how and when to approach the Congress for Stockpile disposal authority or provide a plan for Stockpile sales once they are authorized. As soon as you approve a National Security Decision Memorandum lowering the Stockpile requirement, I will develop with Cap Weinberger and John Ehrlichman our recommendations for Stockpile disposal actions including a new disposal program for submission to the Congress. Cap Weinberger and John Erlichman concur. Bill Timmons also concurs. 8 Approve the NSDM Rewrite the NSDM to reflect my decisions Other Tab A Revenue Estimates ($ Millions) Stockpile Inventory Requirements Consistent With Revenues From Excess Sales 1972 1973-75 Total Potential Current Policy 4900 150 900 1700 DOD Recommendation 1300 — 1000/1200 5300 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile (1973). Confidential. 2 The President initialed this alternative. 3 The President also checked this alternative and wrote: “Reduce even further—all this is ridiculous.” 4 The President wrote and underscored “Cut it” next to this alternative. 5 The President drew a line through Alternative A and initialed Alternative B. 6 Not printed. 7 The President circled “National Security Decision Memorandum,” drew a line to the bottom of the page, and wrote: “Change to reflect my very dim view of this whole program. Unless cuts mortally affect the economy in the U.S.—make them.” NSDM 203 was issued on February 6, 1973; the cuts were reduced. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 396, Stockpile (1973)) 8 The President drew a line through this last paragraph and the options below and wrote “E” over Ehrlichman’s name. Index Index References are to document numbers. Abramowitz, Morton, 304 Abshire, David, 28 , 45 , 55 , 63 , 74 , 82 Adair, Ross, 13 , 31 , 113 Additionality, 112 , 114 , 115 , 116 , 118 Adjustment assistance, 146 , 181 , 188 , 190 , 213 , 236 , 264 , 272 Adjustment Assistance Act, 181 Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board, 236 Administrative Procedures Act, 1946 , 264 Aeroflot, 312 Africa, 147 EEC bilateral trade agreements with African nations, 258 , 262 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 4 , 253 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 193 , 210 , 214 U.S. economic aid, 120 , 131 , 151 U.S. military aid, 63 , 77 African Development Bank, 102 Agency for International Development (AID): Abolishment of, proposed, 125 Additionality measures for balance of payments, 112 , 114 , 115 , 118 Administrative costs, 86 Administrator’s Advisory Council, 81 , 82 Aid program reform, 55 , 65 , 81 , 93 Barnacles, 211 Budget request, 1970 , 4 , 5 , 15 Budget request, 1973 , 79 , 83 Country restrictions, 31 Development assistance, 76 Expropriation of U.S. property, 158 Highway construction vs. housing, 120 IDA replenishment talks, 23 International Development Bank as replacement for, 134 Investment guarantee program, 106 , 151 Multilateralism, 94 Nixon message to Congress, Sept. 15, 1970 , 137 NSDM 10 aid commitments, 7 Partnership for Peace programs, 93 Program reviews, 97 Public safety programs, 82 Security Assistance programs, 49 , 77 Task Force on International Development, 10 , 119 Technical assistance, 3 , 10 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 214 , 244 , 265 Vietnam programs, 14 Agnew, Spiro T., 5 , 122 , 192 , 298 Agriculture ( see also Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under European Economic Community) : Discriminatory treatment of U.S. exports, 205 , 207 In EEC, 183 EEC-U.S. talks on, 270 Export Control Act, 298 International Grains Arrangement, 394 , 396 Non-tariff barriers, 192 OECD High-Level Trade Group talks on, 25 PRC wheat purchases, 331 Task Force on Agricultural Trade, 393 , 395 , 402 , 403 , 438 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 181 , 244 U.S. quotas, 259 Agriculture Act, 1946 , 286 , 407 , 432 Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 83 , 93 , 134 , 214 , 228 , 231 , 232 , 244 , 252 , 258 , 265 , 282 , 298 , 428 , 432 , 438 Aiken, George D., 20 , 31 , 73 Albright, Raymond J., 7 ALCAN, 154 Aldrich, George, 158 , 159 Alfalfa, dehydrated, 183 Algeria, 151 , 153 , 155 Allende, Salvador, 149 , 154 , 159 , 273 , 437 Allen, Richard, 172 Alliance for Progress, 4 Allott, Gordon, 428 Alphand, Hervé, 366 , 367 Aluminum, 421 American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 207 , 264 , 285 , 287 American Selling Price (ASP): CEA position, 194 Elimination, proposed, 181 , 192 , 194 , 195 , 205 , 286 , 213 , 217 , 238 , 239 , 243 , 244 , 247 , 248 , 280 , 287 Foreign opposition, 192 Japan-U.S. agreement, 269 NSC position, 189 State Department position, 188 , 190 , 205 American Textile Association, 225 Anaconda, 149 Andean Code, 157 Anderson, Martin, 36 , 38 Anderson, Robert B., 2 Antidumping, 181 , 259 , 264 , 269 , 331 Antidumping Act, 264 , 269 Antimony, 421 ANZUS treaty, 391 Apartheid, 147 Arbuckle, Ernest C., 119 Argentina, 12 , 27 , 28 , 43 , 221 , 222 , 394 , 395 , 396 , 397 , 402 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 10 Arms sales: Chinese aircraft purchases, 322 , 383 To Israel, 28 , 29 , 32 , 35 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 46 , 47 , 63 , 78 , 84 , 86 , 99 Latin American aircraft purchases, 12 , 27 U.S. competitive position in, 59 Armstrong, Willis C., 382 , 383 , 384 , 385 , 386 , 387 Ascher, B., 274 Ash, Roy, 134 Ash Council, 134 Asian Development Bank, 24 Hickenlooper Amendment, effect on, 148 Loans by, 102 Special Funds, 2 , 4 , 6 , 79 , 146 , 176 Textiles, 225 U.S. aid channeled through, 43 , 44 , 134 Asian Development Bank Act, 1972 , 148 , 177 , 180 Atlantic Richfield, 153 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 372 , 383 , 386 , 387 Australia: IDA replenishment III, 24 International Grains Arrangement, 388 , 393 , 394 , 395 , 396 , 397 , 401 , 402 OECD High-Level Trade Group, 255 U.S. meat imports from, 391 , 408 , 410 , 417 , 423 , 425 , 426 U.S. sales of surplus tin, 434 Vietnam war role, 438 Australian Labor Party (ALP), 408 Australian Meat Board, 418 Austria, 221 , 222 , 223 , 226 , 228 , 281 , 383 , 414 Automobiles, 260 , 271 Avionics Laboratory, USAF, 368 Baker, James E., 214 Balance of payments, 23 , 63 , 108 , 112 , 114 , 115 , 116 , 118 , 128 , 130 , 131 , 135 , 181 , 188 , 206 , 249 , 290 Bananas, 253 Bangladesh, 79 , 83 , 102 , 143 Banzer, Hugo, 441 , 444 , 445 Barley, 183 Barnacles, 8 , 9 , 10 , 31 , 131 , 135 , 148 , 176 , 211 Barnes, Harry G., 444 Barnett, Robert W., 4 Battle Act, 1951 , 383 Bauxite, 154 , 157 Beam, Jacob, 349 , 350 , 351 Belgium, 24 , 201 , 221 , 222 , 258 BeLieu, Ken, 44 Bellmon, Henry, 426 Bennett, Wallace, 253 , 306 Benson, Edgar J., 260 Benzenoid chemicals, 244 Bergsten, C. Fred, 5 , 30 , 52 , 124 , 132 , 184 , 192 , 222 , 247 , 250 , 279 , 298 , 317 , 360 , 371 , 395 , 398 , 407 , 411 , 423 COCOM, 362 , 370 East-West trade, 290 , 306 , 307 , 310 , 313 , 315 Foreign assistance policy, 1 Aid targets, 26 , 34 , 36 , 38 IDA replenishment talks, 2 , 24 IDB replenishment talks, 2 Korry Report, 123 Nixon message to Congress, Sept. 15, 1970 , 137 Program for 1970 , 8 , 10 , 13 , 14 , 15 Program reform, 40 , 55 , 57 , 60 Task Force on International Development, 119 , 120 , 121 , 125 , 129 , 130 U.S. military aid and, 29 , 42 , 59 International Grains Arrangement, 392 , 401 Nickel shortage, 414 Trade policy, 186 , 201 , 213 , 229 EEC-Spanish bilateral trade arrangement, 223 , 228 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 253 Illustrative tariff preference lists, submission to OECD of, 208 OECD High-Level Trade Group, 255 Presidential blue-ribbon commission on, 205 Special Trade Representative, under Commerce Department, 197 Tariff exemptions and maquiladoras, 207 Textiles, 206 , 225 , 235 , 238 , 239 , 243 Trade legislation proposals, 217 , 230 , 231 , 248 U.S. meat imports, 408 , 424 , 429 , 430 , 438 Berlin, 63 Bethlehem Steel, 153 Biafra, 305 Binger, James, 229 Black, Eugene, 2 Blackie, William, 10 , 119 Blackman, Herbert N., 274 Bliss, 336 Boeker, Paul H., 51 Bogdan, Corneliu, 290 Boise Cascade Corp., 153 Bolivia, 416 , 421 , 432 , 437 Additionality measures for balance of payments, 114 Economic situation, 444 Expropriation of U.S. property, 153 , 155 , 156 Gulf Oil compensation talks, 431 , 433 , 437 U.S. military aid, 98 U.S. sales of surplus tin, 433 , 434 , 435 , 436 , 437 , 443 , 444 , 445 Border tax adjustments (BTAs), 188 , 191 , 192 Bourguiba, Habib, Jr., 226 Braderman, Eugene, 15 Bradfield, M., 139 , 156 , 166 , 280 Brandt, Willy, 24 , 250 Brazil, 7 , 12 , 27 , 28 , 56 , 59 , 114 , 214 , 267 , 402 British Commonwealth of Nations, 216 , 226 , 253 , 262 British Honduras, 274 Broilers, 183 Brooke, Edward, 323 Brookings Institution, 10 , 18 Brown, R. L., 232 , 304 Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN), 220 , 272 Budget, U.S. Bureau of (BOB), 10 , 20 , 23 , 117 , 122 , 134 , 214 , 231 , 399 , 404 , 416 , 421 , 422 Bulgaria, 297 , 320 Bunkering, 322 , 329 Burke, James A., 284 Burma, 85 , 155 Burns, Arthur F., 135 , 141 , 234 , 298 AID legislation, 211 East-West trade, 290 Foreign assistance policy, 8 , 10 , 31 International development, 113 , 119 Meat import quotas, 408 Trade policy: ECAT proposals, 205 Presidential authority to retaliate using tariffs, 213 Program Coordination Group report, 106 , 185 , 186 , 188 Task Force report on, 181 Trade legislation proposals, 204 , 213 , 286 Voluntary restraints on textile exports, 206 Burns, Jimmy, 286 Bushnell, J., 445 Butter, 183 Butterfield, Alexander, 231 , 436 Butz, Earl, 263 , 277 Byrnes, John, 197 , 217 , 235 , 237 , 238 , 239 , 248 , 253 Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, 192 , 201 , 402 , 403 Cadmium, 421 Camco, 320 Cambodia, 438 Thai military role in, 28 U.S. assistance, 35 , 68 , 70 , 73 , 83 , 85 U.S. military aid, 29 , 32 , 35 , 37 , 39 , 41 , 46 , 56 , 63 , 64 , 77 , 81 , 84 , 86 , 95 , 96 , 99 , 103 U.S. military role in, 28 , 45 , 129 Vietnam war role, 28 Campbell, J. Phil, 393 , 395 Campbell, John, 20 Canada, 143 Arms sales, 59 Asian Bank Special Funds, 2 Automotive Products Agreement, 207 Expropriation of Canadian property, 154 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 253 IDA replenishment III, 23 , 24 IDB replenishment, 102 Import surcharges, 192 International Grains Arrangement, 388 , 392 , 393 , 394 , 395 , 396 , 397 , 399 , 400 , 401 , 402 Meat production shortfalls, 405 , 411 Meat transshipment, 425 , 427 , 432 Nickel strike, 406 , 416 OECD High-Level Trade Group, 255 PRC textiles shipped through, 354 Strategic materials availability, 389 Tariffs, 214 , 241 United States, relations with, 260 , 271 , 285 , 286 , 300 Canned fruits, 183 Cargo, William I., 224 Caribbean, 389 , 429 , 446 Carlisle, C. R., 389 , 390 Carson, James, 368 Carter, Jared G., 51 Case, Clifford, 73 , 74 Casey, William J., 286 Castro, Fidel, 110 C.E. Cast Division, Combustion Engineering, Inc., 336 , 343 , 345 , 346 Central African Republic, 151 Central America, 410 , 423 , 438 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 157 , 294 , 296 , 298 , 343 , 364 , 439 Cerro, 149 Ceylon, 155 Chapin, Dwight, 14 Chemical warfare, 28 Chicken war, 24 Chickens, 183 , 259 Chile, 7 , 12 , 14 , 28 , 79 , 114 , 119 , 144 , 437 , 438 Expropriation of U.S. property, 149 , 152 , 153 , 155 , 156 , 174 China, People’s Republic of (PRC), 354 Arms sales, 59 Blocked assets, 358 Bunkering controls, 322 , 329 Integrated circuit technology, 377 ITU membership, 378 Market potential, 313 Port entry and cargoes, 322 , 329 , 356 , 359 Private claims, 358 Soviet talks, 1969 , 308 Tourist purchase of goods made in, 300 , 302 , 304 , 308 Trade delegation exchanges, 322 Travel to, 322 , 324 , 329 , 353 , 354 United States, relations with, 63 , 300 , 308 , 309 U.S. aircraft sales, 322 , 383 U.S. trade with, 290 , 326 , 331 , 353 Expansion of, 300 , 301 , 302 , 304 , 309 , 322 , 324 , 329 , 330 , 356 Grain sales, 322 , 331 , 337 List of restricted items, 329 Presidential decisions on, 333 , 357 ROC position, 329 , 354 China, Republic of (ROC): Asian Development Bank loans, 102 Continuing Resolution Authority and, 70 ITU membership, 378 Stans trade mission, 203 Textiles, 206 , 249 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 214 UN membership, 322 U.S. military aid, 14 , 20 , 28 , 29 , 32 , 39 , 41 , 46 , 47 , 49 , 77 , 79 , 84 , 87 , 95 , 98 , 101 , 104 U.S.-PRC relations and, 308 , 309 , 329 , 354 U.S. trade legislation proposals, 217 U.S. wheat sales, 394 Chromium, 157 , 429 Chrysler, 312 Church, Frank F., 45 Citrus fruits, 221 , 222 , 226 , 250 , 281 Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 359 Clams, canned, 269 Claxton, Philander, 82 Clay, Gen. Lucius D., 120 Clift, A. Denis, 349 Coal, 157 Cobalt, 421 , 445 Coca Cola, 275 Cocoa, 145 , 146 Coinage Metal Fund, 413 , 414 Colbert, James L., 312 Cole, Kenneth, 2 , 211 , 422 , 432 Colman, John C., 112 Colombia, 7 , 12 , 14 , 27 , 28 , 70 , 114 , 117 , 144 , 145 Colson, Charles, 267 , 426 , 427 , 428 , 430 , 432 , 438 Commerce, U.S. Department of: Balance-of-payments controls in LDCs, 135 COCOM, 370 , 371 , 372 , 377 , 380 , 385 , 386 , 387 East-West trade, 290 , 298 Export Control Act, 298 Export control guidelines, 315 , 317 Export control list, 291 , 299 , 306 , 310 , 311 , 314 , 317 Fino Amendment, 340 PRC trade and travel to, 301 , 353 PRC wheat purchases, 331 Refinery technology sales, 319 Expropriation of U.S. property, 153 , 158 , 165 IDA replenishment talks, 23 Meat import quotas, 407 Office of Special Trade Representative, 186 , 197 Partnership for Peace programs, 93 Soviet-U.S. trade talks, 350 State Department conflicts with, 315 Strategic materials, 416 Trade policy: EEC bilateral trade agreements, 223 , 228 , 258 , 282 Illustrative tariff preference lists, submission to OECD of, 208 Task Force on Non-Rubber Footwear, 212 , 236 , 267 Textiles, 230 , 231 , 252 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 209 , 214 , 232 , 244 U.S. competitive position in arms sales, 59 U.S. foreign direct investment, 222 Commission on World Trade, 213 Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, 249 Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, 120 Commodities: International Grains Arrangement (IGA), 388 Australian position, 394 , 398 Canadian-U.S. relations and, 392 , 400 Food Aid Convention (FAC), 388 , 393 , 395 , 398 French-U.S. relations re, 401 Ministerial meeting, July 1969 , 393 , 394 , 395 , 396 , 401 Price Review Committee, 388 , 395 Price war in wheat, 399 , 401 , 402 , 403 Schedule of wheat export prices, 397 Wheat Trade Convention (WTC), 388 , 393 , 398 Meat imports: Cattle industry and, 409 , 410 , 411 , 424 , 427 Meat Imports Limitation Act, 1964 , 391 , 405 , 407 , 427 , 438 Presidential decisions, 438 Program for 1970 , 417 Quotas, 391 , 407 , 408 , 418 , 426 , 427 , 428 , 430 , 432 Transshipments via third countries, 425 , 426 , 427 , 432 Voluntary restraints, 423 Commodity agreements, 5 Commodity Control List, 356 , 357 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). See under European Economic Community (EEC) . Commonwealth of Nations, 216 , 226 , 253 , 262 Computers, 298 , 332 , 341 , 360 , 369 , 372 , 373 , 376 Conference on European Security and Cooperation, 383 Congo, Republic of (Kinshasa), 434 Congress, U.S. ( see also House of Representatives, U.S. ; Senate, U.S. ), 247 Contributions to IFIs, 176 East-West trade, 298 , 309 , 337 Family assistance, 247 Foreign assistance policy ( see also Foreign Assistance Act ), 8 , 10 , 27 , 31 , 43 , 44 , 76 IDA replenishment, 2 Meat import policy, 427 Multilateral development aid, 102 OPIC authorization, 20 Strategic materials, 390 , 416 , 421 , 431 , 437 , 446 Task Force on International Development report, 131 Trade policy, 248 , 285 EEC bilateral trade agreements, 222 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) legislation, 146 , 249 , 253 , 264 Hartke-Burke bill, 260 , 264 , 267 , 284 , 285 , 286 , 287 Mills bill, 230 , 231 , 242 , 264 Mills-Byrne bill, 274 Special Trade Representative, under Commerce Department, 197 Textile quotas, 237 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 232 Tying practices for development loans, 139 , 140 , 141 , 142 Connally, John B., 259 East-West trade, 327 Expropriation policy, 154 , 155 , 159 , 165 , 166 , 167 , 168 , 169 , 170 , 172 , 173 , 175 , 177 , 178 Foreign assistance policy, 62 International monetary talks, 260 McNamara reappointment to IBRD presidency, 143 Military aid policy, 59 , 94 Trade policy, 260 , 261 , 271 , 273 Tying practices for development loans, 139 , 140 , 141 Consensus of Vina del Mar, 116 Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA), 69 , 70 , 71 , 73 , 75 , 78 , 100 Control Data Corporation, 341 , 372 Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 179 Cooper, John Sherman, 45 , 73 , 74 Cooper, Richard N., 192 , 196 , 205 Cooper-Bessemer, 312 Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) ( see also East-West trade), 383 Advanced technology and national security, 361 , 376 British position, 383 British satellite earth station, sale to PRC, 378 Computer technology: British sales to the Soviet Union, 369 , 372 , 373 , 376 French sales to Czechoslovakia, 360 French sales to Romania, 360 Differential PRC list, 383 European sales to Eastern Europe, 337 Implications of decisions, 372 Integrated circuit technology: British sales to Poland, 377 , 379 , 380 French sales to Poland, 360 , 362 , 363 , 364 , 365 , 366 , 367 , 368 , 370 , 371 , 372 , 377 , 380 , 381 U.S. sales to Bulgaria, 377 U.S. sales to Romania, 377 , 380 Lists: Requirements for listing items, 314 Reduction in size, 292 , 337 , 383 , 385 , 387 U.S. list reduction, 298 , 299 , 311 , 345 Meetings, 362 , 363 Nuclear diffusion plant, 366 PRC trade restrictions, 302 , 308 , 309 Review of system, 382 , 383 , 384 , 385 , 386 , 387 Transistor and diode technology: French sales to Poland, 360 , 375 , 376 , 377 U.S. sales to Romania, 376 , 377 U.S. deferral of initiatives, 294 U.S. policy review, 288 Copper, 157 , 389 , 416 , 446 Corn, 183 , 292 , 295 , 296 , 298 , 349 Costa Rica, 114 Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 1 , 38 , 187 , 213 , 214 , 231 , 232 , 244 , 252 , 265 , 298 , 372 , 389 , 407 , 426 , 438 Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), 51 , 57 , 169 , 249 , 260 , 263 Decision Memoranda, 58 , 277 , 278 , 281 EEC bilateral trade agreements, 278 , 281 , 282 Expropriation policy, 164 , 166 , 171 , 175 , 176 , 179 , 180 Fino Amendment to Export-Import Bank Act, 340 Foreign assistance program for 1972 , 83 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 254 , 257 OECD High-Level Trade Group, 255 , 270 Operations Group, 144 , 158 , 171 , 254 , 265 Policy Memorandum No. 15 , 272 Special Working Group for textile trade policy, 249 Study Memoranda, 257 , 272 , 327 UNCTAD III, 144 , 146 Countervailing duties, 181 , 188 , 264 Countervailing Duty Act, 264 Cowen, Eugene S., 74 Crimmins, John H., 159 Cronk, Edwin M., 246 , 311 Cross Company, 320 Cuba, 9 , 113 , 159 , 288 , 313 , 322 , 406 , 412 , 414 , 438 Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 406 Culley, Perry H., 366 Curran, Robert T. “Ted,” 87 , 367 , 441 Custer, B. Scott, 159 , 179 , 180 Curtis, Thomas, 121 , 428 Cyprus, 85 , 86 , 244 , 262 Czechoslovakia, 289 , 290 , 295 , 297 , 299 , 303 , 320 , 364 , 414 Dahrendorf, Ralf, 273 Dale, William B., 18 Dam, Kenneth, 79 , 80 , 105 , 286 , 287 Daniel, Price, 389 Darien Gap, 117 David, Edward, 46 , 341 Davis, Jeanne, 4 , 26 , 87 , 88 , 90 , 131 , 143 , 157 , 178 , 189 , 202 , 232 , 244 , 258 , 292 , 298 , 346 , 371 Davis, Ken, 223 , 306 , 310 , 318 , 375 Dean, John, 63 Debt relief, 5 , 22 , 131 , 134 , 146 Debt service, 12 , 22 Defense, U.S. Department of, 77 COCOM, 364 , 370 , 371 , 372 , 376 , 377 , 383 , 385 , 387 East-West trade, 298 Export control guidelines, 315 , 317 PRC trade and travel, 326 , 331 , 353 , 354 , 356 Refinery technology sales, 319 Export Control Act, 296 , 298 Military aid policy: Budgeting proposals, 1 , 5 Cooper-Church Amendment, 28 Financing through credit, 42 Grant aid, 98 International Security Assistance Programs, 49 , 56 , 77 , 88 , 89 , 101 , 103 , 105 , 134 , 135 Military sales, 131 Planning approach to, 63 Program for 1971 , 19 , 21 , 32 , 33 Program for 1972 , 46 , 47 , 83 , 87 Paris air show, 201 Security trade controls, 376 Strategic materials, 415 , 416 , 429 , 446 Trade policy, 252 , 265 , 282 U.S. competitive position in sales, 59 Defense Mobilization Order, 431 Defense Procurement Act, 42 Jackson Amendment, 39 , 46 , 70 , 103 Defense Procurement Program, 73 Defense Production Act, 1950 , 416 De Gaulle, Charles, 201 , 228 Democratic Party, 13 , 233 Deniau, Jean F., 226 Denmark, 23 , 24 , 183 Dent, Harry, 225 , 231 , 233 , 267 De Palma, Samuel, 147 De Roulet, Vincent, 94 Desalinization, 14 , 15 Destination pricing, 393 Development assistance ( see also International Development Association): International Development Assistance Act, 53 LDC self-prioritization for, 131 Multilateral, 94 , 102 , 120 , 121 , 125 , 126 , 131 , 133 , 134 , 205 Obligations for 1971-1972 , 70 OECD Development Assistance Committee, 68 , 112 , 137 , 138 Presidential decisions, 136 Requests for 1973 , 79 State Department views on, 126 UN Development Assistance Committee, 26 Development Assistance Committee (OECD), 68 , 112 , 137 , 138 Dickey, W. L., 406 , 414 Differential controls, 288 Dillon, C. Douglas, 23 , 124 , 289 Dobrynin, Anatoly F., 332 , 334 , 335 , 337 , 338 , 339 , 341 , 342 , 344 , 347 , 349 Dole, Robert, 428 Dominican Republic, 159 Dozier, W. B., 311 Dresser Industries, 153 Drew, W. H., 193 , 210 DuBridge, Lee A., 3 , 5 , 132 , 319 Dubs, Adolph, 312 Duda, Karel, 289 East European trade with the United States ( see also East-West trade), 288 , 289 , 292 , 294 , 297 , 298 , 311 , 318 , 337 , 340 East Pakistan. See Bangladesh . East-West trade ( see also Coordinating Committee (COCOM) on Export Controls ; Most-Favored-Nation status ; under individual Communist bloc countries ): Allied-U.S. relations and, 294 Business attitude toward, 290 Commerce Department position, 290 Credit restrictions, 290 Dobrynin-Kissinger talks, 332 Defense Department position, 296 East European trade missions, 320 , 323 , 328 Export Administration Act, 1969 , 309 , 311 , 314 , 315 , 317 , 318 , 320 Export Control Act, 1949 : Extension, 310 PRC sales and, 300 , 301 Renewal, 290 , 291 , 292 , 293 , 294 , 295 , 296 , 298 , 299 , 303 , 304 , 306 , 307 Export control guidelines, 314 , 317 Export control list, 291 , 299 , 306 , 316 , 317 , 318 Information to exporters on restrictions, 311 Political relations, effect on, 292 , 294 PRC, restrictions on trade with, 300 , 301 , 303 , 308 , 354 , 355 , 356 Presidential authority for regulation of, 311 Prospects for, 294 Reports on, 327 , 339 Romania, 305 Soviet trade delegation visit, 332 Soviet Union, restrictions on trade with, 312 Soviet-U.S. trade talks, 347 , 348 , 349 , 350 , 351 , 352 State Department position, 291 , 294 Strategic trade controls, 294 Treasury Department position, 295 U.S. expansion, 320 , 321 , 325 , 337 , 338 U.S. paper on trade with Soviet bloc, 292 U.S. policy review, 288 , 289 , 298 , 299 Eban, Abba, 42 Eberle, William D., 252 , 256 , 354 EEC-U.S. trade talks, 259 , 260 , 261 , 262 , 273 , 277 Trade policy, 263 , 267 , 269 , 270 , 281 , 283 , 284 , 286 Economic Development Administration, 236 Ecuador, 113 , 155 Eggers, Paul W., 404 , 406 Egypt. See United Arab Republic . Ehrlichman, John D., 20 , 284 , 327 , 354 , 424 , 428 , 430 , 432 , 443 , 446 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2 Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., 63 , 72 , 90 , 137 , 175 , 179 , 244 , 315 , 356 , 360 , 365 , 367 , 368 , 371 , 375 , 441 , 444 Ellsworth, Robert, 186 , 187 Embargos, 288 Emergency Banking Act Amendment, 249 Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT), 205 , 207 Enders, Thomas O., 4 Erim, Ismail Nihat, 87 Ertl, Josef, 250 Escape clause, 188 , 190 , 213 , 236 , 252 Esso, 153 Ethiopia, 29 , 48 , 49 , 70 , 84 , 85 European Economic Community (EEC) ( see also EEC bilateral trade agreements and Trade policy with under Spain ; EEC subheadings under other subjects ): British commercial arrangement with, 201 British membership, 147 , 226 , 250 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 183 , 191 , 201 , 241 , 250 , 262 Expansion talks, 248 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 253 International Grains Arrangement, 388 , 393 , 395 , 396 , 397 , 399 , 401 , 402 , 403 Preferential trade arrangements, 145 , 255 Subsidies for wheat sales, 394 Textiles, 206 , 235 , 237 , 240 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 214 , 216 , 232 , 244 U.S. trade talks with, 259 , 260 , 261 , 262 , 278 Yaounde Convention, 114 European Free Trade Area (EFTA), 221 , 260 , 262 , 273 , 281 Evans, John W., 393 , 395 Ewing, Raymond C., 207 Exchange rates, 141 Executive Order 11269, 173 , 175 , 176 , 177 , 179 , 180 Executive Order 11539, 432 Export Administration Act, 1969 , 309 , 311 , 314 , 315 , 317 , 318 , 320 , 387 Export Control Act, 1949 , 290 , 291 , 292 , 293 , 294 , 295 , 296 , 298 , 299 , 300 , 301 , 303 , 304 , 306 , 307 , 310 Export Control Bulletin , 331 Export-Import Bank: Darien Gap road, 117 Debt rescheduling, 134 East-West trade financing, 292 , 293 Commerce Department position, 290 , 320 Defense Department position, 296 , 321 Elimination of restrictions on, 298 , 339 Fino Amendment, 294 , 298 , 337 , 340 , 342 For Soviet trade, 351 Treasury Department position, 295 , 298 Expropriation policy, 158 , 175 Funding for 1972 , 69 , 78 IDA replenishment talks, 23 International Development Bank overlap with, 131 Liberalization of program operations, 5 Task Force on International Development view of, 125 Export-Import Bank Act, 1945 , 292 Fino Amendment, 294 , 298 , 337 , 340 , 342 Export-Import Bank Act, 1971 , 340 Expropriation policy: Bolivian actions, 153 , 154 , 431 , 433 , 444 Central African Republic actions, 151 Chilean actions, 149 , 152 , 153 CIEP views, 164 , 166 , 171 , 175 , 176 , 179 , 180 Deterrence, 156 Foreign reaction to, 174 Gonzalez Amendment, 148 , 172 , 176 , 178 , 179 Implementation, 175 In multilateral institutions, 165 , 168 , 175 , 176 , 177 , 179 , 180 Number and type of expropriations, 153 OPIC views, 160 Peruvian seizure of IPC, 135 , 148 , 152 , 153 , 433 Presidential decision on, 169 , 172 , 173 Proposals for, 157 Protection of U.S. investments abroad, 150 , 151 , 152 Senior Review Group discussion, 158 , 161 , 171 State Department position, 163 State vs. Treasury on, 159 , 166 , 167 , 168 , 170 , 171 , 178 Study for, 155 Treasury position, 156 , 162 , 167 Zambian actions, 151 , 153 Fannin, Paul, 424 , 426 Farley, Philip J., 1 Farrar, Curtis, 209 Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, 1949 , 413 Federal Reports Act, 1942 , 212 Feedgrains, 183 Ferranti, 377 , 379 Fiat, 295 Findley, Paul, 305 Finkel, E. J., 102 Finland, 24 , 414 Fish, 244 , 269 Fishing disputes, 28 Flanigan, Peter M., 211 , 270 , 320 , 412 , 435 East-West trade, 319 Expropriation policy, 175 , 177 , 178 , 179 , 180 Foreign assistance policy, 31 , 36 , 38 , 40 , 93 , 94 International development policy, 119 , 146 Meat import policy, 408 , 428 , 438 Strategic materials, 420 , 421 , 422 , 431 , 434 , 436 , 437 , 444 , 445 Trade policy: EEC bilateral trade agreements, 278 , 281 , 282 , 283 EEC-U.S. relations and, 272 , 273 , 277 , 279 Presidential authority to retaliate using tariffs, 213 Special Trade Representative, under Commerce Department, 197 Textiles, 231 , 239 , 243 , 284 Trade legislation proposals, 213 , 230 , 237 , 248 , 285 , 286 Flour, 183 Fluorspar, 421 Fong, Hiram, 298 Food Aid Convention (FAC), 388 Food for Peace Program, 81 Ford, Gerald, 14 , 307 , 414 Ford, Henry, 289 , 318 , 334 , 337 , 338 Ford Motor Co., 312 Foreign assistance policy ( see also Military aid policy; Security Assistance Program; Task Force for International Development (Peterson Task Force) ; under individual countries ): Communist threat as factor, 109 , 110 Country restrictions, 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 27 , 31 Defense Department control of, 134 Funding through IFIs, 52 International aid targets, 26 , 34 , 36 , 38 , 133 Korry Report, 123 , 124 Levels of aid, 5 , 61 , 70 Multilateralism, 94 , 102 , 121 NSDM 10 commitments, 7 NSSM 4 response, 1 , 4 Organization of aid, 5 Program for 1970 , 4 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 31 Program for 1972 , 62 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 75 , 78 , 83 , 93 Program for 1973 , 79 Program reform, 40 , 50 AID progress reports, 65 , 93 Briefing Paper on Reorganization, 81 Congressional consultation, 51 , 52 Coordination of agencies, 57 , 58 Creation by Presidential authority vs. statute, 53 , 54 , 55 Legislation, 60 Locus of coordination, 51 , 52 , 131 Presidential decisions, 136 State Department position, 133 Treasury position, 102 SDR-aid link study, 18 , 146 State Department aid program assessment, 18 Task force proposal for review of, 10 Technical assistance, 3 , 5 , 6 , 10 , 13 , 126 , 132 Foreign Asset Control, 300 , 301 , 302 , 309 , 355 , 357 , 406 Foreign Assistance Act, 1961: Authorization legislation for 1972 , 69 , 71 , 78 , 83 Barnacles, 8 , 9 , 10 , 31 , 131 , 135 , 148 , 176 Budget request, 1970 , 4 , 5 Congressional notification requirements, 83 Defense Department position, 1 Hickenlooper Amendment, 8 , 10 , 31 , 128 , 131 , 134 , 135 , 148 , 151 , 157 , 159 , 431 Javits Amendment, 1 , 93 , 111 , 119 , 128 , 130 Mansfield Amendment, 71 , 73 , 74 OMB position, 51 Reductions in appropriations through, 76 Section 506 action, 87 , 89 , 91 Section 620, 113 Section 638, 113 Security Assistance program, 49 Supplemental request for 1972 , 90 Symington Amendment, 11 , 12 Foreign direct investment, 222 Foreign Military Sales Act, 1968 , 39 , 46 Congressional notification requirements, 83 Conte-Long Amendment, 11 , 12 , 59 , 134 Cooper-Church Amendment, 11 , 28 , 29 , 45 , 71 , 73 , 74 Pelly Amendment, 59 Reuss Amendment, 59 Symington Amendment, 11 , 12 , 59 , 74 Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act (proposed), 5 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, 32 , 33 , 46 , 77 Obligations for 1971-1972 , 70 Program for 1972 , 84 Program for 1974 , 95 , 96 , 97 Foreign trade policy. See Trade policy. France, 12 , 23 , 24 , 26 , 59 , 138 , 141 , 183 , 226 , 258 , 282 , 286 , 289 , 395 , 401 , 406 , 412 , 414 Frei, Eduardo, 149 Freight rate disparities, 181 Frelinghuysen, Peter, 31 Fried, Edward R., 18 , 119 , 121 , 125 , 126 Fulbright, J. William, 15 , 45 , 52 , 56 , 63 , 71 , 81 , 83 , 85 , 93 , 105 , 134 , 176 Fund for Special Operations (FSO), 25 , 146 Furs, 339 Gates, Theodore R., 192 , 195 , 267 , 284 , 298 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ( see also Kennedy Round ): Agriculture Committee, 268 Article XXIII, 207 , 258 , 266 , 281 Article XXIV, 222 , 226 , 241 Bindings, 272 Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, 268 East European membership, 321 EEC bilateral trade agreements, 221 , 222 , 227 , 250 , 258 Japanese-U.S. talks, 187 , 268 Most-Favored-Nation provisions, 281 Non-tariff barriers, 204 , 205 , 217 Textiles, quadripartite talks on 190 , 201 , 203 , 206 , 235 , 240 , 243 Tokyo Round, 249 , 270 U.S. contributions, 213 U.S. support, 181 , 241 U.S. tariff legislation proposals, 188 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 4 , 146 , 190 , 246 , 249 , 253 , 254 , 257 , 264 , 265 , 268 General Services Administration (GSA), 389 , 413 , 414 , 416 , 421 , 443 Germany, Democratic Republic of, 317 , 318 Germany, Federal Republic of, 23 , 24 , 26 , 59 , 138 , 141 , 174 , 188 , 201 , 241 , 250 , 289 , 414 Ghana, 114 Gilbert, Carl J., 58 , 120 , 128 , 136 , 182 , 211 , 234 , 322 Confirmation as STR, 213 East-West trade, 288 , 327 , 374 Trade policy, 201 EEC bilateral trade agreements, 221 , 226 , 228 EEC-Spanish bilateral trade arrangement, 227 , 228 NSC ad hoc group papers on, 199 Quota legislation proposals, 231 Special Trade Representative, under Commerce Department, 197 Tariff Commission data confidentiality, 212 Tariff exemptions and maquiladoras, 207 Textiles, 206 , 235 , 237 , 240 , 252 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 198 , 216 , 218 , 245 Trade legislation proposals, 204 , 213 , 230 Giller, Edward B., 386 Giscard D’Estaing, Valery, 24 , 375 Gleason Works, 312 , 315 , 320 , 332 , 337 Gloves, 269 Gold, 59 , 256 , 264 , 303 Gonzalez Amendment, 148 , 172 , 176 , 178 , 179 Goodpaster, Gen. Andrew, 5 , 298 Gore, Albert, Sr., 43 , 44 Gorton, John, 393 , 394 , 395 , 398 , 408 , 411 , 418 Government procurement, 269 Grain, 183 , 250 , 259 , 261 , 308 , 322 , 337 , 339 , 352 Grant, L., 303 Greece, 83 , 244 EEC trade agreements with, 222 , 226 , 258 French military aid, 41 U.S. military aid, 19 , 28 , 29 , 32 , 39 , 41 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 63 , 64 , 77 , 84 , 98 , 101 , 103 Green, Marshall, 4 , 304 Greenspan, Alan, 181 Greenwald, Joseph A., 3 , 106 , 298 , 390 Commodities, 391 East-West trade, 291 , 293 , 296 Foreign assistance policy, 1 , 4 Strategic materials, 389 Trade policy: EEC-U.S. trade talks, 287 NSC ad hoc group papers on, 182 , 189 Presidential blue-ribbon commission on, 205 Program Coordination Group report, 188 Textiles, 202 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 193 , 220 Trade legislation proposals, 190 , 285 Gromyko, Andrei A., 347 , 348 , 362 Group of 77 (G-77), 144 , 145 , 146 Group of Ten, 146 , 262 Guatemala, 39 , 98 , 408 Guhin, Michael A., 361 Guinea, 113 , 155 Gulf Oil Co., 153 , 154 , 431 , 433 , 437 Guyana, 154 , 157 , 159 Hadsel, Fred L., 193 Haig, Gen. Alexander M., Jr., 5 , 11 , 73 , 79 , 88 , 172 , 192 , 248 , 254 , 258 , 281 , 285 , 298 , 300 , 309 , 330 , 334 , 335 , 346 , 351 , 356 , 377 , 407 , 416 , 420 , 430 Brookings Institution restrictions, 10 COCOM, 366 Expropriation policy, 178 Foreign assistance policy, 9 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 38 , 50 , 53 , 61 , 68 , 70 , 71 , 93 , 100 Military aid policy, 28 , 39 , 47 , 48 , 59 , 64 , 89 Soviet-U.S. trade talks, 349 , 352 Strategic materials, 415 , 421 , 437 Trade policy, 197 , 211 , 228 , 282 Haiti, 84 , 86 Hakone talks, 275 Haldeman, H. R., 10 , 40 , 61 , 177 , 197 , 231 Halperin, Morton, 4 , 109 , 303 Hams, canned, 183 Hanford, Elizabeth, 407 Hannah, John A., 3 , 4 , 109 , 160 , 234 Additionality measures for balance of payments, 112 , 114 , 116 , 118 Debt service, 12 Expropriation policy, 161 Foreign assistance policy: Ad hoc working group paper, 111 Continuing resolution, use of, 70 Country restrictions, 11 Economic aid, 62 , 68 , 69 , 71 , 73 In Latin America, 122 Military aid and, 20 , 76 Multilateralism, 94 Nixon message to Congress, Sept. 15, 1970 , 137 NSC meeting on, 5 , 6 NSDM 10 commitments, 7 Program for 1970 , 13 , 14 Program reform, 53 , 58 , 65 , 81 , 82 , 93 Task Force on International Development, 119 , 126 , 128 , 136 Technical assistance, 132 International Development Bank, 134 International Development Council, 134 OPIC, 106 , 108 , 113 Trade policy, 198 , 245 Tying practices for development loans, 127 Hansen, Orval, 428 Hardin, Clifford M., 58 , 192 , 195 , 298 Ad hoc working group foreign assistance policy paper, 111 East-West trade, 288 , 299 , 313 , 327 Foreign assistance policy, 7 , 136 International Grains Arrangement, 395 , 396 , 402 , 403 Task Force on International Development, 128 Trade policy: EEC agriculture, 183 , 250 EEC-Spanish bilateral trade arrangement, 227 NSC ad hoc group papers on, 182 , 199 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 198 , 218 , 234 , 245 U.S. meat imports, 407 , 409 , 410 , 411 , 423 , 425 , 426 , 428 , 432 , 438 Visit to Europe, Dec. 1970 , 250 Harlow, Bryce N., 8 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 20 , 28 , 31 , 213 , 217 , 231 , 237 , 238 , 303 , 306 , 307 , 313 , 408 , 411 , 417 , 424 , 428 , 432 Harriman, W. Averell, 351 Hartman, Arthur A., 51 , 82 , 123 , 133 , 214 , 322 , 331 , 353 , 354 , 372 , 374 , 377 Harvey, Matt, 81 Hauge, Gabriel, 119 Haynsworth, Clement, 411 Health, Education and Welfare, U.S. Department of, 83 , 236 , 239 Heath, Edwin, 146 , 264 , 287 , 369 , 372 , 373 , 379 Hebert, Edward, 88 Helms, Richard M., 5 , 6 , 32 , 109 , 122 , 128 , 155 , 169 , 192 , 195 , 288 , 298 , 302 , 322 , 325 , 329 , 331 , 354 , 357 , 359 , 361 , 374 , 377 , 380 , 382 Hennessy, John M., 102 , 166 Hickel, Walter, 245 , 419 Hides, 274 , 284 Highway construction, 117 , 120 Hijzen, Theodorus, 261 , 262 Hillenbrand, Martin J., 224 , 226 , 261 , 285 , 287 , 297 , 312 Hinton, Deane, 179 , 287 , 337 Hirschtritt, Ralph, 7 , 102 Hodgson, James D., 136 , 263 , 327 Holdridge, John, 29 , 355 , 405 , 408 , 438 , 445 Hollis, Walter, 207 Holyoake, Keith, 391 , 405 , 408 , 411 Honduras, 407 , 408 , 423 Hong Kong, 193 , 196 , 203 , 206 , 214 , 215 , 244 , 245 , 249 , 253 , 254 , 354 Hoof-and-mouth disease, 117 Hope, Gordon R. J., 405 Hormats, Robert D., 172 , 262 , 285 , 346 , 441 , 444 East-West trade, 345 EEC bilateral trade agreements, 281 , 282 Expropriation policy, 10 , 177 , 180 Foreign assistance policy, 68 , 77 , 79 IDB replenishment, 100 PRC trade and travel, 353 Trade legislation proposals, 285 , 286 , 287 Tying practices for development loans, 142 Houdek, Robert G., 50 , 200 , 303 , 334 House of Representatives, U.S.: Appropriations Committee, 13 , 15 , 131 Armed Services Committee, 49 , 56 , 389 , 421 , 443 Banking and Currency Committee, 2 , 102 , 131 , 176 , 293 , 340 East-West trade, 340 Export Administration Act, 1969 , 314 Foreign Affairs Committee, 12 , 13 , 52 , 93 , 56 , 64 , 71 , 77 , 102 , 103 , 131 Military aid funding, 30 Security Assistance program, 84 Subcommittee on Stockpile Disposal, 439 Ways and Means Committee, 188 , 204 , 230 , 231 , 237 , 241 , 243 , 260 , 264 , 286 Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of, 83 Houthakker, Hendrik S., 1 , 36 , 114 , 194 , 374 , 388 , 394 , 395 , 403 , 407 , 418 , 428 , 432 , 438 Hruska, Roman, 428 Hughes, Gen., 335 Hullin, Tod, 20 Humanitarian assistance, 136 Hungary, 297 , 320 , 364 , 383 Huntington, Prof., 121 Huntsman, Jon M., 50 , 140 , 258 , 339 Hussein, King of Jordan, 39 , 42 Iceland, 367 , 383 India, 4 , 5 , 7 , 59 , 62 , 69 , 70 , 79 , 85 , 94 , 102 , 120 , 142 , 155 , 214 Indochina, 102 Indonesia, 114 , 120 Expropriation of U.S. property, 155 IDA loans to, 102 Security Assistance program, 56 , 99 , 103 Strategic materials imports from, 429 , 434 , 445 Tying practices for development loans to, 142 U.S. economic assistance, 7 , 69 , 70 , 127 , 151 U.S. military aid, 29 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 48 , 79 , 80 , 84 , 120 Ingersoll, Robert, 275 Institute of High Energy Physics (Yerevan, Armenia), 341 Institute of High Level Physics (Serpukhov, USSR), 369 , 372 , 373 , 374 , 376 Integrated circuit technology. See under Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) . Intelsat, 378 Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Implementation of Export Administration Act of 1969 , 316 , 318 Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, 22 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB): Bolivian loans, 154 , 157 , 159 , 444 Debt service, 22 Expropriation of foreign property, 157 , 165 , 168 , 171 , 178 Fund for Special Operations (FSO), 25 , 100 , 146 , 157 Guyanese loans, 154 , 157 , 159 Hickenlooper Amendment, effect on, 148 Meeting, Uruguay, Apr. 1970 , 25 Replenishments, 25 , 100 , 102 , 124 Soft loan window, 102 Task Force on International Development report on, 128 U.S. assistance channeled through, 43 , 44 , 68 , 79 , 134 Value of, 130 , 131 Inter-American Development Bank Act ( 1972 ), 148 , 177 , 180 Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC), 22 , 25 , 112 , 116 , 122 , 130 , 214 , 244 , 408 , 417 Inter-American Social Development Institute, 79 , 83 , 128 Interdepartmental Materials Advisory Committee, 416 Interior, U.S. Department of, 41 , 213 , 214 , 232 , 244 , 265 , 319 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD): Additionality measures for balance of payments, 114 Annual Meetings, 137 , 143 Bolivian economic situation, 444 Bolivian loans, 154 , 157 , 159 Debt service, 22 Expropriation policy, 173 Guyanese loans, 154 , 157 , 159 Hickenlooper Amendment, effect on, 148 IDA administration by, 2 , 17 IDA replenishment III, 23 India policies, 94 Korry Report recommendations, 124 Latin American loans, 102 McNamara reappointment as president, 143 Quota increases, 17 Task Force on International Development view of, 125 , 131 U.S. assistance channeled through, 5 , 43 , 44 , 126 International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 157 , 169 International Development Assistance Act, 53 International Development Association (IDA): Replenishment, 2 , 17 , 18 , 23 , 24 , 43 , 102 , 146 Tanzanian loan request, 174 Task Force on International Development view of, 125 , 128 , 131 , 134 Trade and tariff preferences for developing countries, 1 U.S. assistance channeled through, 5 , 44 , 68 , 79 , 131 International Development Association Act ( 1972 ), 148 , 177 , 180 International Development Bank proposal, 130 , 131 , 134 , 135 International Development Corporation, 51 , 53 , 55 , 57 , 58 , 136 , 137 International Development Council, 128 , 130 , 131 , 134 International Development Institute, 53 , 55 , 57 , 58 , 128 , 130 , 131 , 132 , 134 , 136 International development policy ( see also Overseas Private Investment Corporation ; Task Force on International Development (Peterson Task Force) ): Additionality, 112 , 114 , 115 , 116 , 118 Adjustment assistance, 146 Darien Gap road, 117 Export development, 146 Foreign private investment, 146 Import surcharges, 146 Korry Report, 123 , 124 Multilateral Interest Equalization Fund, 146 Rockefeller Mission, 5 , 12 , 22 , 120 , 122 State Department position, 133 Tying practices for development loans, 127 , 130 , 131 , 138 , 139 , 140 , 141 UNCTAD III, 144 , 145 , 146 International Economic Policy Council (CIEP), 51 , 57 , 58 , 248 , 250 International Finance Corporation (IFC), 128 International Grains Arrangement (IGA). See under Commodities. International Investment Insurance Agency (IIIA) (proposed), 134 , 136 , 157 International Metals Processing Company (IMPC), 154 International Military Education and Training Act, 98 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 17 , 18 , 43 , 44 , 114 , 126 , 137 , 146 , 321 , 444 International monetary policy, 211 , 260 , 273 , 278 , 279 , 286 International Nickel Company, 413 International Petroleum Company (IPC), 135 , 148 , 152 , 153 , 178 , 433 International Private Investment Advisory Council (IPIAC), 106 , 107 , 108 International Security Assistance Act, 82 International Security Cooperation Act, 30 International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 378 International Telephone and Telecommunications Company (ITT), 149 International Tin Council, 433 , 434 , 435 , 441 , 442 , 445 International Trade and Investment Policy Commission (Williams Commission), 229 , 238 , 248 , 249 , 256 , 265 International Wheat Agreement (IWA), 1962 , 388 International Wheat Conference, Rome, 1967 , 388 Investment, private, 5 , 106 , 150 , 151 Iran, 28 , 29 , 59 , 84 , 226 Iraq, 59 , 155 , 226 Ireland, 408 , 417 , 423 , 425 Iron ore, 157 Iron scrap, 318 Irwin, John H., II, 49 , 76 , 374 , 386 COCOM: Computers, 369 Integrated circuit technology, 365 , 382 Review of system, 382 , 383 , 384 , 387 Darien Gap road, 117 Expropriation policy, 153 , 155 , 158 , 163 , 178 , 179 , 180 Foreign assistance policy, 52 , 62 , 66 , 67 , 82 International development policy, 144 Military aid policy, 42 , 46 , 63 , 64 , 74 , 84 , 86 , 88 , 90 , 91 PRC blocked assets and private claims, 358 PRC trade and travel, 322 , 324 , 331 , 333 , 353 , 354 Strategic materials, 437 , 441 Trade policy, 202 , 246 , 273 , 278 , 279 , 281 Israel: Continuing Resolution Authority and, 70 Desalinization, 14 , 15 EEC membership for, 258 EEC trade agreements with, 221 , 222 , 223 , 226 , 228 , 241 , 250 , 258 , 281 , 282 , 283 U.S. economic assistance, 69 U.S. military aid, 28 , 29 32 , 35 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 46 , 47 , 63 , 78 , 84 , 86 , 99 U.S. trade and tariff preferences, 193 , 244 Italy, 23 , 24 , 59 , 183 , 201 , 237 , 289 Jamaica, 94 , 154 , 156 Japan: American Selling Price (ASP), 188 Asian Bank Special Funds, 2 , 6 Communist bloc trade with, 320 East-West trade, 289 EEC barley exports to, 183 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 253 Hide exports, 284 IDA replenishment, 23 , 24 , 131 International aid targets, 26 International Grains Arrangement, 388 , 402 , 403 Joint U.S-Japan statement on international economic relations, 268 Latin American balance of payments with, 114 LDCs, trade with, 181 Multilateral development aid, 120 Non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 286 OECD High-level Trade Group, 255 Okinawa issue, 201 , 260 PRC purchases of COCOM-controlled items from, 383 Textiles, 201 , 248 , 345 Agreement with the United States, 249 Quadripartite talks, 240 Trade war over quotas, possible, 237 U.S. export quota legislation proposals, 225 , 230 , 231 Voluntary restraints on exports, 206 Tin stockpile purchases, 445 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 214 , 216 , 232 , 244 Tying practices for development loans, 138 United States, relations with, 285 U.S. expropriation policy, 174 U.S. trade balance, 275 U.S. trade legislation proposals, 217 U.S. trade talks, 187 , 202 , 219 , 235 , 239 , 249 , 260 , 275 , 276 U.S. wheat sales, 394 Japanese National Railways (JNR), 275 Javits, Jacob, 73 , 74 , 107 Jervis B. Webb Company, 343 , 345 , 346 Jet fuel, 314 Johnson, Lyndon B., 1 , 2 , 5 , 119 , 212 , 238 , 292 , 300 , 388 , 389 , 390 , 413 , 416 , 429 Johnson, U. Alexis, 6 , 27 , 28 , 32 , 117 , 223 , 228 , 289 Johnston, Ernest, 140 , 159 , 254 , 256 , 317 , 332 , 334 , 336 , 337 , 338 , 340 , 342 , 375 , 430 , 432 Johnston Act, 337 Johnston Island, 28 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 1 , 318 , 372 , 384 , 389 , 415 , 416 , 429 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 372 Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, 392 Jones, J. Wesley, 148 Jonnes, Lloyd, 161 Jordan, 28 , 35 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 68 , 70 , 77 , 79 , 81 , 84 , 86 , 99 Jorden, William J., 444 , 445 Journal of Commerce , 289 , 323 Jurich, Anthony J., 406 Justice, U.S. Department of, 55 , 83 , 236 , 322 Kamman, Curtis W., 324 Katz, Abraham, 144 , 190 , 390 Kearns, Henry, 1 , 111 , 155 , 288 , 292 , 293 , 325 , 340 Kellogg, Frank, 82 Kendall, Charles H., 413 , 414 Kendall, Donald M., 205 , 211 Kennecott, 149 Kennedy, Col., 155 Kennedy, David M., 5 , 118 , 135 , 298 , 325 Additionality measures for balance of payments, 114 , 116 Ad hoc working group foreign aid policy paper, 111 Debt service, 12 , 22 East-West trade, 288 , 295 , 299 , 302 Foreign assistance policy, 2 , 6 , 7 , 17 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 43 , 58 , 122 , 128 , 130 , 134 , 136 , 137 International Grains Arrangement, 394 International monetary policy, 211 Military aid program for 1971 , 33 OPIC, proposals for creation of, 106 , 108 Strategic materials, 406 , 414 Task Force on International Development, 128 , 130 , 134 , 136 Trade policy, 182 , 186 , 191 , 198 , 199 , 202 , 207 , 218 , 225 , 227 , 234 , 245 , 249 , 263 Kennedy, John F., 120 , 292 Kennedy, Richard T., 28 , 29 , 48 , 54 , 56 , 64 , 69 , 70 , 77 , 79 , 80 , 84 , 85 , 88 , 90 , 104 , 222 , 345 , 346 Kennedy Round, 181 Agricultural issues, 183 American Selling Price, elimination of, 192 , 194 , 205 , 286 International Grains Arrangement, 388 , 393 , 394 , 395 , 401 Tariff rates, 188 Kenya, 221 , 222 , 226 Keogh, Jim, 130 , 425 Kiesinger, Kurt, 201 Kirillin, Vladimir A., 351 Kissinger, Henry A., 1 , 30 , 58 , 67 , 73 , 81 , 83 , 103 , 109 , 118 , 124 , 132 , 140 , 153 , 157 , 175 , 184 , 189 , 192 , 195 , 221 , 222 , 246 , 247 , 262 , 282 , 298 , 322 , 324 , 331 , 334 , 339 , 377 , 382 , 395 , 398 , 405 , 411 , 412 , 435 Additionality measures for balance of payments, 116 COCOM: Advanced technology and national security, 361 , 376 British satellite earth station sale to PRC, 378 Computer technology, 369 , 372 , 373 Integrated circuit technology, 360 , 362 , 363 , 364 , 365 , 366 , 367 , 368 , 370 , 371 , 379 , 380 , 381 Transistor and diode technology, 375 Darien Gap road, 117 East-West trade: Dobrynin talks, 332 , 335 East European trade missions, 323 , 328 Export Control Act, 290 , 303 307 , 310 Export control guidelines, 314 , 315 Export control list, 316 , 317 , 318 Fino Amendment, 340 , 342 Interdepartmental study, 327 Kama River project, 334 , 335 , 336 , 339 , 341 , 342 , 343 , 344 , 345 , 346 , 348 P.L. 480 sales, 313 PRC trade and travel, 300 , 301 , 302 , 309 , 326 , 329 , 330 , 333 , 355 , 356 Refinery technology, 319 Romania, 305 Soviet corn purchases, 292 Soviet gear-making equipment purchase, 320 , 332 Soviet trade delegation visit, 332 Soviet-U.S. trade talks, 347 , 348 , 349 , 351 , 352 U.S. expansion, 325 , 337 , 338 U.S. policy review, 288 , 298 , 299 Expropriation policy, 148 , 149 , 154 , 155 , 159 , 160 , 161 , 162 , 164 , 165 , 166 , 168 , 170 , 172 , 173 , 177 , 180 Foreign assistance policy ( see also Military aid policy below): Communist threat as factor in, 110 Continuing resolution, use of, 70 Funding through international institutions, 43 IDA replenishment talks, 2 , 23 IDB replenishment talks, 25 International targets, 34 , 38 Korry Report, 123 Latin America, 12 , 122 Levels of aid, 61 Nixon message to Congress, Sept. 15, 1970 , 137 NSC meeting, 4 , 5 , 6 Program for 1970 , 8 , 10 , 11 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 31 Program for 1972 , 66 , 69 , 71 , 74 , 75 , 85 Program for 1973 , 79 Program reform, 40 , 50 , 52 , 55 , 57 , 60 Task Force on International Development, 119 , 120 , 121 , 125 , 128 , 129 , 130 , 134 , 135 International Grains Arrangement, 392 , 395 , 400 , 401 Military aid policy ( see also Foreign assistance policy above): Cooper-Church Amendment, 28 To Latin America, 12 , 27 Planning, 64 Program for 1971 , 20 , 29 , 32 , 33 , 35 , 37 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 45 Program for 1972 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 80 , 86 , 91 Program for 1973 , 104 Program for 1974 , 96 , 97 , 101 Security Assistance programs, 77 , 84 , 88 , 89 , 92 , 95 , 99 , 105 U.S. competitive position in arms sales, 59 McNamara reappointment as IBRD president, 143 Okinawa reversion to Japan, 260 OPIC, 113 Strategic materials: Nickel shortages, 416 , 419 , 420 Stockpile objectives, 420 , 429 , 446 Stockpile reduction, 415 , 421 Stockpile sales, receipts from, 422 Tin disposal, 431 , 434 , 436 , 437 , 439 , 440 , 441 , 442 , 443 , 444 , 445 Trade policy: Bureaucratic problems in, 211 Canada-U.S. trade talks, 271 CEA position, 194 CIEP meeting, Jan. 3, 1972 , 263 ECAT proposals, 207 EEC agriculture, 183 , 250 EEC bilateral trade agreements, 223 , 228 , 258 , 281 , 283 , 286 European mission report, 201 European strategy and, 285 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 253 , 254 Illustrative tariff preference lists, submission to OECD of, 208 Japan-U.S. talks on, 275 NSC ad hoc group papers on, 182 , 199 OECD High-level Trade Group, 255 Presidential authority to retaliate using tariffs, 213 Program Coordination Group report, 186 Special Trade Representative, under Commerce Department, 197 Task Force on Foreign Trade Policy, 181 Textiles, 190 , 206 , 233 , 235 , 237 , 239 , 243 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 196 , 200 , 218 Trade legislation proposals, 213 , 217 , 230 , 231 , 232 , 248 , 287 U.S.-Japan trade policy, 202 , 203 Williams appointment, 229 Williams Commission report, 256 Tying practices for development loans, 127 , 130 , 141 , 142 U.S. meat imports, 408 , 423 , 425 , 426 , 428 , 430 , 432 , 438 Kiuchi, Akitano, 275 Klein, Herbert, 60 , 130 , 351 Kleindienst, Richard, 322 , 331 Klosson, Boris H., 351 Knauer, Virginia, 408 Knorr, Gene A., 100 Komarov, Nikolai Dmitrievich, 332 , 334 , 338 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, 10 , 42 , 322 Korea, Republic of, 32 , 42 , 70 , 203 , 206 , 217 ADB loans to, 102 Textile agreement with the United States, 249 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 214 U.S. economic assistance, 7 , 85 , 151 U.S. military aid, 8 , 10 , 19 , 28 , 29 , 32 , 35 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 63 , 49 , 77 , 79 , 80 , 84 , 87 , 88 , 95 , 96 , 103 , 126 Korologos, Thomas C., 88 Korry, Edward M., 18 , 111 , 119 , 123 , 149 , 154 Korry Report, 123 , 124 Kosygin, Aleksei N., 348 , 349 , 350 , 351 Kuwait, 39 , 244 Labor, U.S. Department of, 187 , 212 , 213 , 230 , 231 , 232 , 236 , 244 , 252 , 265 , 267 , 282 , 298 , 331 Labor unions, 260 , 292 , 294 , 295 , 298 Laird, Melvin R., 5 , 109 , 192 , 195 , 277 , 298 , 302 , 359 , 412 Brookings Institution restrictions, 10 COCOM, 361 , 370 , 371 , 378 , 380 Darien Gap road, 117 East-West trade, 296 , 318 Expansion, 321 , 325 Kama River project, 337 , 338 PRC trade and travel, 329 , 353 , 354 , 357 U.S. policy review, 288 , 299 Expropriation policy, 155 , 169 , 175 Foreign assistance policy, 1 , 6 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 69 , 71 , 111 , 122 , 128 , 130 , 136 , 137 Military aid policy: Funding through Defense Department, 30 , 134 , 135 To Korea, Republic of, 10 To Latin America, 12 Planning approach to, 63 , 64 Program for 1971 , 19 , 21 , 32 , 33 , 35 , 37 , 39 , 41 , 42 Program for 1972 , 80 , 89 , 90 Program for 1974 , 96 , 97 , 101 Security Assistance programs, 49 , 56 , 77 , 88 , 89 , 92 , 95 , 103 U.S. competitive position in arms sales, 59 Paris air show, 201 Strategic materials, 414 , 415 , 419 , 429 Trade policy, 263 , 266 Visit to Greece and Turkey, 46 Lamb, 391 Land reform, 41 Langley, Ken, 159 Laos, 5 , 7 , 29 , 56 , 63 , 64 , 70 , 73 , 81 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 99 , 103 , 126 , 131 , 134 , 135 Lard, 183 , 259 LaSalle Company, 320 Latin America, 12 , 70 , 120 , 121 , 133 , 144 , 145 Additionality measures for balance of payments, 114 , 115 Debt service repayments in local currencies, 12 , 22 Expropriations in, 154 , 157 , 159 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 253 , 257 Highway construction vs. housing, 117 , 120 IBRD loans to, 102 IDA loans to, 102 International Grains Arrangement, 403 Meat exports, 408 , 417 , 426 , 438 Rockefeller Mission, 5 , 12 , 22 , 120 , 122 , 129 , 137 , 194 , 408 , 432 Task Force on International Development report, 130 , 131 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 214 , 216 , 232 , 244 Tying practices for development loans to, 142 U.S. economic assistance, 5 , 14 , 43 , 44 , 62 U.S. foreign assistance program for 1970 , 13 , 14 , 15 U.S. military aid, 12 , 27 , 28 , 46 , 63 , 69 , 77 , 79 , 83 , 84 , 94 , 95 , 98 , 101 Laurel-Langley Agreement, 232 Lead, 446 Leahy, John S., Jr., 76 Leary, John C., 145 , 208 , 232 Leather products, 196 Lebanon, 39 , 41 , 42 , 84 , 221 , 222 , 226 , 228 , 241 , 262 Leddy, John M., 288 Lehman, John, 28 , 45 , 69 , 77 , 88 , 89 Lend-Lease, 350 Leprette, Jacques, 362 Less Developed Countries (LDCs): Balance-of-payment controls, 128 , 135 Barriers to trade with, 181 Democracy in, 120 Developed countries, relations with, 145 , 146 EEC, relations with, 273 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 249 , 253 , 257 , 264 , 268 International aid targets, 26 , 36 Regionalism, 121 Trade and tariff preferences: In agriculture, 181 Commerce Department position, 215 Competitive need safeguard, 215 Market access on equal terms, 216 NSC position, 198 , 214 NSDM 29 amendments, 234 Preferential ceiling, 232 Presidential decisions, 218 , 234 , 245 Proposed legislation, 191 , 192 , 194 Self-election formula, 244 State Department position, 200 Task Force on International Development view, 134 U.S. position, 209 U.S. proposal to OECD on, 220 Trade issues with the United States, 1 U.S. economic assistance, 5 , 133 , 134 , 157 U.S. investments in, 157 Levitsky, Mel, 226 Lewis, W. H., 76 Liberia, 49 , 98 Libya, 39 , 59 , 155 , 159 Lima Declaration, 146 Lincoln, Gen. George A., 5 , 192 , 195 , 298 , 439 Nickel shortages, 412 , 413 , 414 , 419 Stockpile objectives, 389 , 390 , 429 , 446 Stockpile reductions, 416 Stockpile sales, receipts from, 421 , 422 Tin disposal, 431 , 433 , 434 , 435 , 436 , 437 , 440 , 441 , 442 , 445 Lindjord, Haakon, 416 Linen, James, 187 Ling, Dr., 372 Lisle, Raymond E., 312 Lleras Restrepo, Carlos, 12 , 117 Lodge Commission, 83 Loken, J. B., 274 London Committee, 399 , 400 London Metals Exchange, 435 Long, Olivier, 205 , 240 , 243 Long, Russell, 253 , 404 Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (LTA), 184 , 189 , 206 , 249 , 331 , 353 , 354 Lopez Bravo de Castro, Gregorio, 228 , 258 , 266 Lucet, Charles, 363 , 366 , 375 Lynn, Larry, 29 , 222 , 353 , 385 , 420 , 422 , 429 MacArthur, Douglas, II, 289 , 291 MacGregor, Clark, 50 , 52 , 56 , 60 , 71 , 74 , 75 , 81 , 88 , 89 , 91 , 325 , 340 Mack Trucks, Inc., 332 , 336 , 337 , 341 , 342 , 343 , 345 , 346 Macomber, William, 4 Magnuson, Warren, 41 , 298 Mahon, George H., 15 , 52 Mailliard, William S., 52 Malaysia, 434 , 435 , 441 , 443 , 445 Malfatti, Franco M., 259 , 261 Malta, 84 , 86 , 99 , 226 , 244 , 258 Manescu, Corneliu, 362 Mansfield, Mike, 42 , 43 , 44 , 96 , 247 , 402 Margolies, Daniel, 3 Marshall Plan, 255 Mason, Prof., 121 Massey, Eugene A., 311 Matilde Mine Co., 444 Matz, J. R., 246 Mayo, Robert P., 1 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 11 , 20 , 111 , 122 , 128 , 182 , 198 , 199 , 234 , 422 McCloy, John J., 289 McCormack, John, 14 , 15 , 52 McCracken, Paul W., 1 , 192 , 195 , 298 , 325 Balance-of-payments controls in LDCs, 135 Commodities: Meat, 407 , 410 , 424 , 426 , 428 Wheat, 393 , 395 , 396 , 397 , 399 , 402 East-West trade, 327 Foreign assistance policy, 137 Trade policy, 182 , 194 , 198 , 199 , 200 , 205 , 230 , 237 , 238 , 239 , 245 , 248 , 263 Tying practices for development loans, 141 McEwen, John, 396 , 403 McGee, Gale, 73 McGinnis, John J., 406 McGoldrick, A. J., 403 McGovern, George, 402 McHenry, Donald, 293 , 294 McNamara, James A., 269 McNamara, Robert, 17 , 23 , 24 , 94 , 124 , 143 , 148 Meat imports. See under Commodities. Meat Imports Limitation Act, 1964 , 391 , 405 , 407 , 427 , 438 Meir, Golda, 362 Mexico, 43 , 85 , 113 , 155 , 193 , 196 , 207 , 214 , 389 , 408 , 423 , 438 , 446 Meyer, Charles, 2 , 13 , 116 , 118 , 120 , 122 , 144 , 151 , 208 , 379 , 431 , 435 Middle East, 42 , 95 , 226 , 305 Military aid policy ( see also Foreign assistance policy) Conte-Long Amendment, 11 , 12 Cooper-Church Amendment, 11 , 28 , 29 , 45 Foreign Military Credit Sales, 32 Funding through Defense Department, 30 , 49 , 88 , 101 , 103 , 105 , 134 , 135 Funding under Foreign Assistance Act, 4 , 6 Latin American aircraft purchases, 12 , 27 Planning approach to, 63 , 64 Program for 1969 , 131 Program for 1970 , 8 , 10 Program for 1971 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 29 , 32 , 33 , 35 , 37 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 45 Program for 1972 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 59 , 63 , 69 , 80 , 81 , 83 , 84 , 86 , 87 , 89 , 90 , 91 Program for 1973 , 76 , 79 , 80 , 95 , 99 , 104 Program for 1974 , 92 , 95 , 96 , 97 , 101 , 103 Program for 1977 , 63 U.S. competitive position in arms sales, 59 Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs), 83 Military Assistance Program (MAP) ( see also Military aid policy): Cooper-Church Amendment’s effect on, 28 Funding through Defense Department, 30 , 134 , 135 Funding under Foreign Assistance Act, 4 , 6 Planning approach, 63 , 64 program for 1971 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 35 , 39 , 41 Program for 1972 , 46 , 69 , 70 , 78 , 80 , 90 Program for 1973 , 76 , 104 Program for 1974 , 95 , 97 Security Assistance program, 56 , 76 , 77 Task Force on International Development views, 125 Military Education and Training Program, 98 Miller, Arjay, 10 , 119 Miller, Clarence, 428 Miller, J. Irwin, 10 , 119 Milliken, Roger, 233 Mills, Bradford, 154 , 155 Mills, Wilbur, 197 , 217 , 230 , 235 , 237 , 238 , 240 , 248 , 253 , 256 , 264 , 284 , 285 Mint, Bureau of the, 406 , 413 , 414 Mintzes, Joseph, 151 Mitchell, John, 231 , 329 , 357 Mobil Oil Co., 153 Moeller, Alex, 24 Molenhoff, Clark, 150 Mondale, Walter, 289 , 290 , 305 , 306 Moorer, Adm. Thomas H., 32 , 155 , 169 , 322 , 325 , 331 , 354 , 374 , 377 , 382 Moore, Richard, 75 Moose, Richard, 404 Morgan, Thomas “Doc,” 13 , 28 , 30 , 52 , 77 , 78 , 94 , 103 , 105 Morocco, 70 , 84 , 221 , 222 , 226 , 250 , 258 Mosher, Sol, 303 Moss, John E., 41 Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status: For Bulgaria, 297 For citrus fruit exporters, 259 For Communist countries, 222 , 244 , 290 , 294 , 297 , 298 , 320 , 321 , 337 For Czechoslovakia, 289 , 297 For East European countries, 339 EEC threat to, 221 , 222 GATT provisions, 281 For Hungary, 297 For Poland, 222 , 290 , 297 Presidential authority to withhold, 204 , 205 For Romania, 290 , 297 , 305 , 337 For Soviet Union, 297 , 347 , 349 , 351 , 352 Trade with North Vietnam and, 305 For Yugoslavia, 222 , 244 , 290 , 297 Mountain, Maurice J., 353 Multilateral development aid, 94 , 102 , 120 , 121 , 125 , 126 , 131 , 133 , 134 , 255 Multilateral Interest Equalization Fund, 146 Murphy, Capt. Daniel J., 415 Muskie, Edmund, 41 , 306 , 311 Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, 1951 , 383 Nachmanoff, Arnold, 13 , 254 , 437 , 439 Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 275 Narcotics control, 83 , 84 , 86 , 176 National Academy of Sciences, 372 National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies (NAC), 17 , 165 , 167 , 173 , 175 National Cattlemen’s Association, 424 National Export Expansion Council, 59 National Security Council (NSC): Document NSC 5810, 429 Foreign assistance policy, 1 , 51 , 57 , 83 , 88 , 97 Interdepartmental Group for Latin America, 12 , 122 Meat import quotas, 404 Meetings: Oct. 31, 1968 , 389 Mar. 26, 1969 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 119 Apr. 9, 1969 , 189 , 190 , 191 , 192 , 195 , 196 , 204 , 213 , 249 , 288 May 7, 1969 , 201 May 14, 1969 (cancelled), 298 May 21, 1969 , 298 July 9, 1969 , 122 Oct. 15, 1969 , 12 , 122 Apr. 1, 1970 (cancelled), 128 , 129 , 130 , 131 Apr. 8, 1970 (cancelled), 131 Apr. 21, 1970 (cancelled), 133 Partnership for Peace programs, 93 Senior Review Group, 155 , 193 Strategic materials, 406 , 412 , 416 Trade policy, 182 , 186 , 187 , 189 , 191 , 192 , 195 , 198 Under Secretaries Committee, 12 , 27 , 49 , 130 , 131 , 136 National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM): No. 4 , 7 No. 10 , 7 No. 15 , 299 , 303 , 306 , 311 , 312 , 321 No. 17 , 302 , 303 , 304 , 308 , 309 , 322 No. 27 , 415 , 429 No. 29 , 136 , 218 , 220 , 234 , 244 No. 31 , 12 No. 37 , 244 No. 41 , 22 , 131 No. 45 , 227 , 228 , 258 No. 46 , 27 No. 65 , 136 No. 68 , 228 No. 76 , 31 , 34 , 40 , 51 , 136 , 137 , 138 No. 80 , 35 , 39 No. 86 , 245 , 246 No. 99 , 323 , 325 , 327 , 328 , 340 , 341 No. 105 , 329 No. 136 , 149 , 164 , 169 , 170 , 171 , 172 , 175 No. 148 , 170 , 173 , 175 No. 155 , 357 No. 159 , 380 , 382 , 383 , 384 , 385 No. 188 , 358 No. 195 , 359 No. 203 , 446 National Security Study Memoranda: NSSM 3 , 109 NSSM 4 , 1 , 3 , 4 , 111 NSSM 5 , 202 NSSM 10 , 288 NSSM 15 , 122 NSSM 16 , 184 , 186 , 189 , 190 , 194 , 288 NSSM 35 , 288 , 292 , 293 , 295 , 296 NSSM 45 , 111 , 119 , 123 , 124 , 129 NSSM 46 , 221 , 223 , 226 NSSM 48 , 198 , 200 , 209 , 214 , 215 NSSM 49 , 197 , 199 NSSM 71 , 361 , 376 NSSM 82 , 226 NSSM 99 , 35 , 39 , 41 NSSM 106 , 322 NSSM 108 , 159 NSSM 124 , 331 NSSM 131 , 155 , 157 , 158 , 159 , 160 , 161 , 163 , 169 NSSM 136 , 169 NSSM 164 , 283 National Wheat Allotment, 395 Natural gas pipelines, 312 Nehmer, Stanley, 267 , 274 Netherlands, 23 , 24 , 183 , 221 , 222 , 226 , 258 Neubert, Joseph W., 293 , 294 New Caledonia, 406 , 414 New Economic Policy, 62 , 249 , 256 Newmont Mining, 153 New Obligational Authority, 76 Newsom, David D., 151 , 159 , 210 New York Times, 1 , 123 , 351 New Zealand, 391 , 405 , 408 , 411 , 417 , 423 , 425 , 426 , 438 Nicaragua, 408 Nickel, 157 , 389 , 406 , 412 , 413 , 416 , 421 , 445 Nigeria, 7 , 84 , 86 , 221 , 222 , 226 , 305 , 434 Nixon, Pat, 73 Nixon, Richard M. ( see also Nixon Doctrine ), 81 , 242 Addresses: On foreign assistance, May 28, 1969 , 8 , 119 On foreign assistance, Sept 15, 1970 , 36 , 137 , 141 On foreign assistance, Apr. 21, 1971 , 82 , 83 , 141 On foreign assistance, Sept. 9, 1972 , 79 On foreign assistance supplement, Jan. 6, 1971 , 42 On foreign policy, Feb. 1971 , 141 To IMF/IBRD meeting, Sept. 25, 1972 , 280 On Latin America, Oct. 31, 1969 , 13 , 127 , 131 , 133 On Vietnam, Nov. 3, 1969 , 14 On world trade, 213 Australian conservatives, political help for, 411 Brookings Institution restrictions, 10 COCOM: Advanced technology and national security, 361 Computer technology, 369 , 372 , 373 Integrated circuit technology, 362 , 364 , 365 , 370 , 371 , 379 , 380 , 381 Review of system, 387 Transistor and diode technology, 375 Darien Gap road, 117 Debt repayment in local currencies, 12 , 22 East-West trade: Commerce Department position, 290 Dobrynin-Nixon talks, 332 , 341 Defense Department position, 296 East European trade missions, 323 , 328 Export Administration Act, 1969 , 311 Export Control Act, 307 Export control list, 317 , 318 Fino Amendment, 340 , 342 Gromyko-Nixon talks, 347 , 348 Kama River project, 334 , 335 , 337 , 341 , 342 , 343 , 344 , 345 , 346 , 347 , 348 P.L. 480 sales, 313 Policy review, 298 , 299 , 303 PRC trade and travel, 301 , 302 , 308 , 309 , 329 , 330 , 331 , 333 , 354 , 355 , 356 , 357 Reports on, 339 Soviet trade restrictions, 312 Soviet-U.S. trade talks, 347 , 348 , 351 , 352 State Department position, 294 Treasury Department position, 295 U.S. expansion, 320 , 321 , 337 , 338 Expropriation policy, 156 , 167 Chilean seizure of U.S. companies, 149 Congressional barnacles, 176 For multilateral institutions, 165 , 168 , 177 , 178 , 179 , 180 Number and type of expropriations, 153 Peruvian seizure of IPC assets, 148 Senior Review Group statement on, 171 , 172 State vs. Treasury on, 159 , 166 , 168 Foreign assistance policy ( see also Military aid policy below ): Ad hoc working group paper, 111 Communist threat as factor in, 109 , 110 Funding through international institutions, 43 , 44 IDA replenishments, 2 , 17 , 23 , 24 IDB leadership, 43 IDB replenishment talks, 25 International aid targets, 26 , 34 , 38 Israeli aid and domestic politics, 42 Levels of aid, 61 Multilateralism, 94 NSC meeting on, 5 , 6 NSDM 10 commitments, 7 Political involvement in developing countries, 109 Program for 1970 , 4 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 13 , 14 , 31 Program for 1972 , 68 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 75 , 78 , 83 Program for 1973 , 79 Program reform, 50 , 51 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 57 , 60 , 65 , 133 Rockefeller Mission, 122 Special committee, 1 Task Force on International Development, 119 , 120 , 121 , 128 , 131 , 132 , 134 , 135 , 136 Hartke-Burke bill, 286 International development policy, 144 , 146 , 154 Additionality measures for balance of payments, 116 , 118 OPIC, 106 , 107 , 108 , 113 Tying practices for development loans, 127 , 130 , 138 , 142 International Grains Arrangement, 392 , 394 , 396 , 397 , 398 , 399 , 400 , 403 Legislative goals, 247 Military aid policy ( see also Foreign assistance policy above ), 27 , 28 , 30 , 76 Latin American programs, 12 Program for 1971 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 35 , 37 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 45 Program for 1972 , 87 , 90 , 91 Program for 1974 , 101 Security Assistance programs, 49 , 88 , 89 , 92 , 95 , 103 , 104 , 105 U.S. competitive position in arms sales, 59 McNamara reappointment as IBRD president, 143 Okinawa reversion to Japan, 260 Strategic materials: Nickel shortage, 414 , 419 Stockpile objectives, 420 , 429 , 446 Stockpile sales, receipts from, 421 , 422 Tin disposal, 431 , 434 , 436 , 437 , 439 , 440 , 441 , 443 Textiles ( see also Trade policy below ):, 191 , 237 , 239 , 240 , 249 Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement, 184 Non-rubber footwear escape clause action, 251 , 252 , 284 Quota legislation proposals, 225 , 235 , 238 , 274 Voluntary restraints on exports of, 206 , 233 Trade policy ( see also Textiles above ): Canada-U.S. talks, 271 CEA position, 194 CIEP meeting, Jan. 3, 1972 , 263 EEC agriculture, 183 , 250 EEC bilateral trade agreements, 221 , 266 , 278 , 282 EEC-U.S. relations, 279 EEC-U.S. talks, 273 , 277 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 246 , 254 Illustrative tariff preference lists, submission to OECD, 208 Japanese-U.S. talks, 187 , 219 , 260 , 276 NSC ad hoc group papers on, 191 , 199 NSC recommendations on, 195 OECD High-level Trade Group, 255 Program Coordination Group report, 185 , 186 , 188 Special Trade Representative, under Commerce Department, 197 Tariff exemptions and maquiladoras, 207 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 200 , 209 , 210 , 214 , 215 , 216 , 218 , 232 , 234 , 244 , 245 Trade barrier removal, 181 Trade legislation proposals, 204 , 205 , 213 , 230 , 231 , 285 U.S.-Japan trade policy, 202 , 203 Williams appointment, 229 Williams Commission report, 256 U.S. meat imports, 391 , 405 , 407 , 408 , 409 , 410 , 418 , 423 , 424 , 425 , 426 , 427 , 428 , 430 , 432 , 438 Visits: Asia-Europe, July-Aug. 1969 , 121 , 304 Azores, Dec. 1971 , 259 , 261 Canada, Apr. 1972 , 271 China, Feb. 1971 , 61 , 93 , 353 , 356 Europe, Feb.-Mar. 1969 , 2 , 183 , 184 Hawaii, Aug.-Sept. 1972 , 275 , 276 Romania, Aug. 1969 , 304 , 305 , 319 , 401 Soviet Union, May 1972 , 273 Nixon Doctrine, 19 , 21 , 28 , 32 , 42 , 49 , 56 , 59 , 64 , 77 , 96 , 137 Nixon Round, 241 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 361 Non-rubber footwear, 212 , 236 , 251 , 252 , 267 , 274 , 284 North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA), 181 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 87 , 289 , 367 Norway, 23 , 24 Nuclear weapons development, 361 , 376 Nutter, Warren, 293 O’Connor, Roderic, 62 , 76 Odeen, Phil, 96 , 445 Office of Emergency Planning, 389 Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), 298 Stockpile objectives, 389 , 415 , 420 , 429 , 446 Stockpile reductions, 416 Stockpile sales, receipts from, 421 Tin disposal, 431 , 434 , 436 , 437 , 439 , 442 Office of Management and Budget (OMB): Additionality measures for balance of payments, 112 Expropriation policy, 180 Foreign assistance policy, 38 , 51 , 62 , 68 , 69 , 83 , 93 Military aid policy, 37 , 46 , 47 , 49 , 56 , 80 , 83 , 88 , 95 , 97 Trade policy, 265 , 273 Office of Science and Technology, 372 Ogden, R. M., 145 Oil, 181 Gathering systems for petroleum fields, 292 , 295 , 296 , 298 , 299 Refinery technology sales, 337 , 341 Sales to Chinese and China-bound ships of, 300 , 301 , 322 , 329 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 220 , 232 , 244 , 245 U.S. imports, 157 Oilseeds, 183 , 308 Okinawa, 28 , 201 , 260 Olive oil, 183 O’Mahoney, J., 274 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): COCOM, 365 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 68 , 112 , 137 , 138 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 190 , 253 High-level Trade Group, 25 , 255 , 270 Illustrative tariff preference list, U.S. submission to, 208 Ministerial Council meetings, 232 , 254 Non-tariff barrier policy group in, 188 Trade and tariff preferences for developing countries, 1 , 189 , 191 , 192 , 196 , 200 , 208 , 209 , 214 , 244 Trade Committee, 220 Tying practices with development loans, 138 , 139 , 141 U.S. expropriation policy, 174 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 255 Organization of American States (OAS), 253 , 438 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 157 , 159 Origin pricing, 393 Ortiz Mena, Antonio, 43 , 100 Ovando, Alfredo, 431 , 433 , 434 , 437 , 439 Overseas Development Bank, 124 Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC): Authorizing legislation, 20 , 53 , 130 Budgeting for 1973 , 79 Country restrictions, 113 Creation of, 5 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 57 , 58 , 106 , 107 , 108 , 124 Expropriation of U.S. property, 154 , 158 , 160 Expropriation risk insurance, 157 Foreign assistance program for 1972 , 83 State Department position, 133 Task Force on International Development views on, 125 U.S. foreign aid channeled through, 134 Paarlberg, Don, 313 , 424 Packard, David, 32 , 46 , 48 , 318 , 322 , 324 , 326 , 331 , 374 , 377 Pakistan, 4 , 7 , 59 , 62 , 69 , 70 , 79 , 83 , 85 , 120 , 142 Pakistan International Airlines, 322 Paley Commission, 416 Palmby, Clarence D., 388 , 396 , 418 , 427 , 428 Palme, Olaf, 348 Palmer, Joseph, II, 193 Pan American Airlines, 312 Pan American Highway, 117 Panama, 98 , 117 , 178 Paper products, 281 Paris air show, 201 Paris Club, 174 Park Chung-hee, 29 Parker, Dan, 10 Partnership for Peace programs, 93 Passage, David, 73 Passman, Otto, 4 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 42 , 52 , 93 , 94 , 100 , 102 Pastrana Borrero, Misael, 117 Patolichev, Nikolai S., 349 , 350 , 351 Peace, Department of, proposed, 107 Peacekeeping, 147 Pearson, Lester, 23 , 124 Pearson Commission on International Development, 23 , 36 , 102 , 124 Pederson, Richard, 1 , 190 , 193 , 202 Pelikan, Robert G., 191 Pencil sharpener factories, 338 Pepsi Cola, 275 Perez Guerrero, Manuel, 195 Perkins Commission, 1 , 119 , 120 Peru, 135 , 148 , 152 , 153 , 155 , 156 , 178 , 214 , 416 , 433 Peterson, Peter G., 252 , 264 , 277 , 325 , 372 East-West trade: Dobrynin-Nixon talks, 341 Expansion, 337 , 338 Fino amendment, 340 Kama River project, 334 , 338 , 339 , 341 , 345 PRC trade and travel, 355 , 357 Reports, 327 , 339 Soviet trade talks, 332 , 335 , 347 , 352 Expropriation policy, 155 , 164 , 165 , 169 , 170 , 171 , 172 , 177 , 179 Foreign assistance policy, 50 , 57 , 60 , 94 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 254 , 257 , 265 Trade policy, 255 , 258 , 259 , 260 , 263 , 286 Transistor technology sales to Romania, 375 Peterson, Rudolph, 10 , 17 , 157 Appointment to Task Force on International Development, 119 , 120 , 128 , 137 Foreign assistance program reform, 40 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 55 , 57 , 60 , 102 , 121 IDA replenishment talks, 23 Multilateralism, 125 Task force status report, 125 , 126 Tying practices for development loans, 140 , 141 , 142 UNCTAD III, 144 Peterson Task Force. See Task Force on International Development . Petty, John R., 7 , 17 , 23 , 24 , 123 , 139 , 154 , 156 , 162 , 166 , 202 , 394 Pharmaceuticals, 308 Philbin, Philip J., 389 , 421 Philippines, 22 , 29 , 70 , 84 , 85 , 87 , 99 , 103 , 214 , 232 Pickering, Thomas R., 82 , 361 P. L. 480 , 4 , 5 , 7 , 94 , 313 P. L. 90-482 , 404 P. L. 90-608 , 389 Planar production process, 364 , 368 Platinum, 389 , 421 Platt, Nicholas, 153 Plaza Lasso, Galo, 72 Plywood, 196 Poats, Rutherford M., 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 15 , 106 , 127 , 209 , 234 Point IV, 120 Poison gas, 28 Poland, 222 , 290 , 319 , 320 , 337 , 341 , 348 , 352 , 377 , 379 , 380 , 383 Policy Analysis Decision Memoranda (PADM), 144 , 147 Policy Analysis Study Memorandum (PASM) 3 , 144 Pollack, Herman, 3 Pompidou, Georges, 24 , 259 , 362 , 371 , 375 , 401 Population control, 120 , 131 Population growth, 10 Pork bellies, 183 Portugal, 98 , 147 , 244 Pravda , 241 Presidential Task Force on Footwear, 212 President’s Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, 229 , 238 President’s Committee on Consumer Interests, 407 President’s Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund, 79 President’s Science Advisory Committee, 3 Price, Ray, 213 Price Commission, 273 , 274 Prisoners of war, 321 Private Investment Corporation. See Overseas Private Investment Corporation . Productivity Commission, 238 Program Coordination Group, 106 , 185 , 186 , 188 Propps, Herbert F., 407 Protectionism in U.S., 187 , 189 , 192 , 241 , 250 , 260 , 264 Proxmire, William, 63 , 93 PSAC World Food Report, 3 Public safety program, 56 , 82 , 84 , 86 Pursley, Lt. Gen. Robert E., 63 , 80 , 88 , 415 Quie, Albert H., 426 Rangel Amendment, 175 Rapeseed oil, 183 RCA, 375 , 378 , 383 Redman, Peter, 150 Refugees, 62 , 79 , 83 , 84 , 86 Rey, Jean, 221 , 270 Reynolds Aluminum, 154 Rhodesia, 147 , 429 Richardson, Elliot L., 5 , 124 , 192 , 298 Additionality measures for balance of payments, 114 Commodities, 391 East-West trade, 293 , 294 , 296 , 297 , 299 , 300 , 301 , 304 , 308 , 309 , 312 Foreign assistance policy, 3 , 4 , 8 , 15 , 18 , 26 , 111 , 119 , 123 , 126 , 128 , 131 Military aid policy, 12 , 27 OPIC, creation of, 107 , 108 Special Trade Representative, under Commerce Department, 186 Trade policy, 190 , 208 , 210 , 214 , 218 , 220 , 223 , 224 , 226 , 228 , 230 , 232 : Tying practices for development loans, 127 Richardson, Mark E., 274 , 284 Rickett, Denis, 102 Ritchie, A. Edgar, 400 Rivers, L. Mendel, 389 , 437 Roan Selection Trust, 153 Rockefeller, David, 195 , 289 Rockefeller Mission, 1969 , 5 , 12 , 22 , 120 , 122 , 129 , 137 , 194 , 408 , 432 Roemer, Mike, 209 Rogers, William P., 5 , 195 , 242 , 277 , 361 , 377 , 380 , 381 , 412 , 438 , 439 COCOM, 361 , 377 , 380 , 381 Commodities, 391 , 392 , 400 Darien Gap road, 117 Debt service, 12 East-West trade: Export Administration Act, 1969 , 311 Export control list, 318 Interdepartmental study, 327 PRC blocked assets and private claims, 358 PRC trade and travel, 302 , 304 , 308 , 322 , 329 , 357 Soviet trade restrictions, 312 Soviet-U.S. talks, 348 U.S. expansion, 321 , 325 U.S. policy review, 288 , 299 Expropriation policy, 149 , 155 , 160 , 169 , 170 , 171 , 172 , 173 , 175 Foreign assistance policy ( see also Military aid policy below): Congressional view, 1 Country restrictions, 11 Funding through international institutions, 43 IDA replenishment talks, 2 , 23 , 124 International targets, 26 , 133 Latin America, 12 , 122 NSDM 10 commitments, 7 NSSM 4 response, 1 , 4 , 111 Political involvement in developing countries, 109 Program for 1970 , 13 Program for 1972 , 62 , 69 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 78 Program reform, 51 , 52 , 53 , 55 , 58 , 81 , 133 Task Force on International Development, 119 , 126 , 128 , 130 , 132 , 136 International development policy: Additionality measures for balance of payments, 116 , 118 CECLA, 145 GSP legislation, 146 OPIC, proposals for creation of, 106 , 107 , 108 Pearson Commission, 124 Tying practices for development loans, 127 UNCTAD III, 144 Military aid policy ( see also Foreign assistance policy above): Funding through Defense Department, 30 Planning approach to, 63 , 64 Program for 1971 , 32 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 45 Program for 1972 , 46 , 76 , 80 , 87 Program for 1974 , 92 , 96 , 98 , 103 Security Assistance programs, 49 , 89 , 92 , 95 , 98 , 103 , 105 , 135 New Zealand-U.S. relations, 408 Strategic materials, 389 , 390 , 414 , 419 , 434 , 436 , 440 Trade policy: CIEP meeting, Jan. 3, 1972 , 263 EEC bilateral trade arrangements, 221 , 224 , 227 EEC-U.S. trade talks, 261 , 273 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 253 , 254 Hickenlooper Amendment, 10 Japanese-U.S. talks, 187 NSC ad hoc group papers on, 182 , 199 OECD High-level Trade Group, 255 Program Coordination Group report, 185 , 188 Textiles, 240 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 198 , 200 , 218 , 220 , 234 , 245 Trade legislation proposals, 190 , 205 , 286 Visit to Africa, Feb. 1970 , 126 Rojas, Patricio, 72 Romania, 290 , 297 , 299 , 300 , 303 , 304 , 305 , 313 , 317 , 318 , 319 , 320 , 321 , 325 , 328 , 337 , 340 , 348 , 360 , 375 , 401 Rossides, Eugene T., 414 Rubber, 157 , 421 , 431 , 435 , 445 Ruggiero, Renato, 259 , 261 Ruser, Claus, 147 Rush, Kenneth, 241 , 382 , 384 Rusk, Dean, 300 Russell, Fred, 406 , 412 , 416 , 421 Russell, Richard, 42 , 389 , 416 , 421 Ryss, M., 394 Saccio, Leonard J., 117 Saint Lawrence Seaway, 392 Salans, Carl F., 178 Salmon, 28 Salzman, Herbert, 106 , 151 , 160 Samuels, Nathaniel, 159 , 160 , 190 , 192 , 234 COCOM, 277 , 372 Commodities, 393 , 395 Debt service, 12 East-West trade, 289 , 291 , 292 Expropriation policy, 151 , 157 , 158 , 170 Foreign assistance policy, 1 , 25 , 38 , 137 International development policy, 123 , 126 , 144 , 146 McNamara reappointment to IBRD presidency, 143 Trade policy, 202 , 205 , 209 , 210 , 214 , 220 , 226 , 228 , 232 , 240 , 244 , 253 , 254 , 255 , 265 Sanz de Santamaria, Carlos, 72 Sato, Eisaku, 24 , 184 , 217 , 219 , 225 , 230 , 260 , 263 , 269 Saudi Arabia, 29 , 39 , 84 Saunders, Harold, 28 , 29 , 281 , 283 , 323 Scali, John, 71 , 352 Scandinavia, 214 , 216 , 244 Schaetzel, J. Robert, 226 , 261 Schiff, Stanley D., 390 Schlesinger, James R., 34 , 36 , 46 , 51 , 53 , 56 , 60 , 137 , 374 , 386 Schnee, Alexander, 51 , 52 , 190 , 293 , 294 , 311 , 389 , 390 Schultze, Charles L., 1 Schumann, Maurice, 261 , 360 , 362 , 364 , 367 , 375 , 377 , 381 Scott, Harold B., 320 , 323 , 351 , 375 Scott, Hugh, 42 , 74 , 96 , 247 Scranton, William, 10 , 119 Second UN Development Decade, 131 Security Assistance Contingency Fund, 76 , 79 Security Assistance program, U.S., 49 , 56 , 77 , 84 , 88 , 92 , 95 , 96 , 98 , 99 , 101 , 103 , 104 , 105 , 133 , 134 , 135 , 136 , 137 Selden, Armistead, 59 Semi-conductors, 367 Senate, U.S.: Appropriations Committee, 13 , 100 Armed Services Committee, 42 , 56 , 101 , 134 , 421 , 443 East-West trade, 340 Export Administration Act, 1969 , 314 Export quota legislation, 237 Finance Committee, 204 , 264 , 391 , 438 Foreign Relations Committee, 2 , 35 , 37 , 42 , 52 , 56 , 64 , 69 , 71 , 73 , 74 , 77 , 89 , 94 , 101 , 131 , 134 : Inter-American Development Bank appropriations, 100 Military aid policy, 20 , 30 , 35 , 37 , 42 Senior Review Group (SRG), 158 , 159 , 161 , 169 , 171 Service-funded military assistance (MASF), 56 , 64 , 77 , 103 Sharp, Mitchell, 392 , 400 Shillito, Barry J., 415 Shipping: Bound for China, 300 Of PRC grain purchases, 322 , 337 , 339 PRC-U.S port entry and cargoes arrangements, 322 , 329 , 356 , 359 Reciprocal U.S.-Soviet port access, 336 Of Soviet grain purchases, 292 , 294 , 295 , 296 , 299 Shoes, 220 , 230 , 231 , 232 , 235 , 247 , 284 Shriver, Garner, 15 Shriver, Sargent, 202 , 360 , 362 , 401 Shultz, George P., 48 , 58 , 81 , 141 , 277 , 281 , 298 , 325 , 435 Appointment as Treasury Secretary, 273 Balance of payments controls in LDCs, 135 East-West trade, 298 , 299 , 327 , 357 , 358 Expropriation policy, 155 , 169 , 176 , 177 , 178 , 179 , 180 Foreign assistance policy ( see also Military aid policy below), 53 , 55 , 57 , 58 , 60 , 62 , 68 , 75 , 79 , 100 , 136 Military aid policy ( see also Foreign assistance policy above), 33 , 41 , 46 , 76 , 77 , 79 , 80 , 84 , 86 , 88 , 89 Trade policy, 182 , 198 , 199 , 207 , 218 , 234 , 238 , 245 , 248 , 263 , 284 , 285 , 286 , 287 Siciliano, Rocco C., 223 , 298 , 319 , 320 , 374 , 377 Siemens, 362 Silberman, Laurence H., 272 Silver, 421 Simon, William, 286 Siracusa, Ernest V., 434 , 436 Sisco, Joseph, 4 , 226 Slater, Courtenay, 1 Small Business Administration (SBA), 236 Smith, K. Wayne, 32 , 35 , 37 , 39 , 41 , 46 , 47 , 48 Smith, Robert, 151 Smithsonian Agreements, 273 Smoot-Hawley Act, 1930 , 298 Societe Le Nickel (SLN), 406 , 412 , 414 Solomon, Anthony, 119 , 238 Somalia, 59 , 155 Sommerfield, S. L., 406 Sonandres, T. W., 433 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 222 , 285 , 303 , 323 , 334 , 346 , 367 , 371 COCOM, 362 , 363 , 366 , 370 , 375 , 379 , 381 East-West trade, 299 , 348 , 349 , 351 , 352 Foreign assistance policy, 110 Trade policy, 281 , 282 , 283 , 286 , 287 South Africa, Republic of, 147 South American Power, 153 South Asia, 62 , 79 , 83 , 226 , 352 Soviet Union: Air landing rights, 312 Arms sales, 59 Bolivia, relations with, 432 Corn purchases, 292 , 295 , 296 , 298 , 349 Cuban nickel sales, 414 Europe, relations with, 241 EXIMBANK financing of trade with, 292 Export control list, 318 Gear making equipment, 312 , 320 , 332 Integrated circuit technology, 360 , 364 International Grains Arrangement, 396 , 399 Kama River Project, 332 , 334 , 335 , 337 , 338 , 339 , 341 , 342 , 343 , 344 , 345 , 346 , 347 , 348 MFN status for, 297 Oil field gathering systems, 292 , 295 , 296 , 298 , 299 Peacekeeping, 147 Pencil sharpener factories, 338 PRC talks, 1969 , 308 PRC-U.S. trade and, 354 , 355 Refinery technology, 341 Siberian copper deposits, 320 Synthetic leather technology, 349 Trade delegation visit, 332 Truck factory equipment, 292 , 294 , 295 , 296 , 298 , 299 , 320 , 332 , 334 , 337 , 343 U.S. trade policy, 311 Soybeans, 183 , 231 Spain: Currency deposit requirements, 85 EEC bilateral trade agreements with, 221 , 222 , 223 , 224 , 226 , 227 , 228 , 250 , 258 , 266 , 278 , 281 , 282 , 283 EEC membership, 253 Non-rubber footwear escape clause action, 267 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 244 U.S. base agreements, 224 , 237 , 266 , 281 , 282 U.S. military aid, 11 , 20 , 98 U.S. textile quotas, 274 Spanish-U.S. Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, 258 , 281 Special Committee for Latin American Coordination (CECLA), 144 , 145 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), 18 , 146 Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Office of: COCOM, 372 Commerce Department administration of, proposed, 186 , 197 EEC bilateral trade agreements, 282 EEC-U.S. trade talks, 273 International Grains Arrangement, 396 Meat import quotas, 407 , 438 Non-rubber footwear, 274 , 284 Proposals for creation, 124 Task Force on Foreign Trade Policy discussion, 181 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 214 , 232 , 244 Trade legislation proposals, 280 Spiers, Ronald I., 30 , 49 , 64 , 76 Spong, William B., Jr., 73 Springsteen, George S., Jr., 293 , 294 Standard Oil of New Jersey, 135 Stans, Maurice H., 58 , 135 , 192 , 312 , 412 Advanced technology and national security, 361 COCOM, 361 , 371 , 380 Integrated circuit technology, 371 , 380 East-West trade: Commerce Department position, 290 East European trade missions, 323 , 328 Export control list, 306 , 316 , 318 Fino Amendment, 340 , 342 Interdepartmental study, 327 Kama River project, 342 , 343 , 345 , 346 , 348 PRC trade and travel, 302 , 359 Soviet gear-making equipment purchase, 332 Soviet-U.S. talks, 347 , 348 , 349 , 350 , 351 , 352 U.S. expansion, 320 , 325 U.S. policy review, 288 , 299 Expropriation policy, 155 , 169 , 172 , 175 Foreign assistance policy, 136 OPIC, creation of, 107 Strategic materials, 413 , 419 Task Force on International Development, 128 Textiles ( see also Trade policy below ), 189 , 190 , 192 , 202 , 206 , 211 , 231 , 233 , 235 , 239 , 267 Trade-aid linkage, 120 Trade policy ( see also Textiles above ), 182 , 185 , 186 , 187 , 197 , 198 , 199 , 201 , 204 , 205 , 207 , 213 , 215 , 217 , 218 , 223 , 227 , 230 , 234 , 245 Visits: Asia ( 1969 ), 187 , 189 , 190 , 202 , 203 , 206 , 249 Europe ( 1969 ), 190 , 194 , 195 , 197 , 201 , 205 Steel, 181 , 185 Steenbergen, Howard H., 368 , 370 Steiger, William, 426 Stein, Herbert, 1 , 89 , 286 Stennis, John, 56 , 73 , 77 , 88 , 89 , 91 , 103 , 416 Stern, Ernest, 38 , 155 Stern, Thomas, 82 Stevenson, John R., 151 , 157 Stewart, Michael, 362 Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, 1939 , 413 , 416 , 419 , 421 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 63 , 121 , 286 , 308 , 332 Strategic materials, 419 Indonesia as supplier, 429 Nickel, 157 , 389 , 406 , 412 , 413 , 416 , 421 , 445 Rhodesia as supplier of, 429 Stockpile objectives, 389 , 390 , 413 , 416 , 420 , 429 , 446 Stockpile reduction, 415 , 416 , 421 Stockpile sales, receipts from 421 , 422 Tin, 157 , 416 , 431 , 433 , 434 , 435 , 436 , 437 , 439 , 440 , 441 , 442 , 443 , 444 , 445 Sugar, 253 Sugar Act ( 1948 ), 148 , 157 , 259 Suharto, 42 Sullivan, William, 230 Summ, G. H., 433 Supporting Assistance (SA) programs, 32 , 33 , 35 , 39 , 41 , 62 , 70 , 76 Sutton, Glenn W., 212 , 251 Sweden, 23 , 24 , 221 , 222 , 281 , 383 , 414 Swindell-Dressler, 320 , 336 , 343 , 345 , 346 Switzerland, 174 , 216 , 221 , 222 , 383 Symington, Stuart, 73 , 77 , 389 , 416 , 421 Syria, 39 , 155 Szabo, Daniel, 444 Taiwan. See China, Republic of . Tanaka, Kakuei, 275 , 276 Tanzania, 174 , 221 , 222 , 226 Tariff Act ( 1930 ), 212 , 252 , 269 Tariff Commission, U.S., 157 , 188 , 212 , 213 , 236 , 238 , 251 , 267 , 284 Tariffs. See under Trade policy; Trade and tariff preferences under Less-Developed Countries . Tariff Schedule of the United States (TSUS), 272 Tarr, Curtis, 92 , 97 , 98 , 99 , 103 , 104 Task Force on Agricultural Trade, 393 , 395 , 397 , 402 , 403 , 438 Task Force on International Development (Peterson Task Force), 17 , 20 , 111 , 232 Meetings, 120 , 121 , 125 , 126 Report, 30 , 43 , 53 , 73 , 93 , 123 , 125 , 126 , 128 , 129 , 130 , 131 , 132 , 133 , 134 , 135 , 136 Task Force on Non-Rubber Footwear, 212 , 236 , 267 Taxes, 114 , 181 , 183 , 188 , 191 , 192 Technical Assistance Foundation, 124 Textiles, 181 Domestic concerns, 185 , 211 , 233 , 236 East Asian-U.S. agreements, 249 European-U.S. talks, 201 Japanese-U.S. talks, 187 , 202 , 217 , 225 Non-rubber footwear, 212 , 236 , 251 , 252 , 267 , 274 , 284 NSC position, 189 Options for action, 192 Quadripartite talks, 235 , 240 Quota legislation, 238 , 274 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 220 , 232 Trade legislation proposals, 190 , 247 Trade war over quotas on, possible, 237 Voluntary restraint vs. quotas, 184 , 191 , 206 , 231 , 233 Thailand, 5 , 7 , 29 , 39 , 49 , 56 , 63 , 64 , 70 , 79 , 81 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 95 , 99 , 103 , 126 , 134 , 135 , 434 , 445 Thomson-CSF, 362 , 377 Thurmond, Strom, 225 Time-Life , 187 Timmons, William, 15 , 28 , 36 , 38 , 42 , 44 , 45 , 71 , 75 , 88 , 89 , 105 , 134 , 135 , 231 , 233 , 237 , 238 , 267 , 317 , 319 , 340 , 428 , 432 , 446 Tin, 157 , 416 , 431 , 433 , 434 , 435 , 436 , 437 , 439 , 440 , 441 , 442 , 443 , 444 , 445 Titanium, 440 , 443 Tobacco, 183 , 250 , 281 Tokyo Round, 249 , 270 Tolbert, William, 73 Tomato products, 183 Torres, Gen. Juan J., 437 , 439 , 441 Tower, John, 306 Trade Expansion Act ( 1962 ), 181 , 188 , 190 , 205 , 207 , 213 , 236 , 251 , 252 , 267 Trade policy ( see also Agriculture; American Selling Price; Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status ; Textiles): Adjustment assistance, 146 , 188 , 190 , 213 , 264 Border tax adjustments (BTAs), 188 , 191 , 192 Bureaucratic problems in, 211 CEA position, 194 Coordination between national economic policies, 181 Domestic industry safeguards, 192 , 215 EEC bilateral trade agreements ( see also under Spain ): With African countries, 221 , 222 , 226 , 258 , 262 Citrus fruits, 250 , 258 Defense Department position, 266 , 282 French position, 226 , 258 , 282 With Israel, 221 , 222 , 223 , 226 , 228 , 241 , 250 , 258 , 278 , 281 , 282 , 283 With Lebanon, 221 , 222 , 226 , 228 , 241 , 262 Netherlands position, 226 With North Africa, 221 , 222 , 226 , 250 , 258 NSC position, 222 With South Asian countries, 226 STR position, 221 Tobacco, 250 Treasury position, 258 , 282 U.S. actions, 258 , 281 , 282 , 283 U.S. political difficulties, 250 EEC-U.S. trade talks, 259 , 260 , 261 , 262 , 273 , 277 Escape clause, 188 , 190 , 213 , 236 , 252 European mission report, 201 Export credits, 181 Future of, 189 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 4 , 146 , 190 , 246 , 249 , 253 , 254 , 257 , 264 , 265 , 268 International monetary negotiations, relation to, 278 , 279 International Trade and Investment Policy Commission (Williams Commission), 229 , 238 , 248 , 249 , 256 , 265 Japan-U.S. talks, 187 , 202 , 219 , 268 Less-Developed Countries (LDCs), 5 , 181 , 191 , 192 NSC recommendations on, 195 Presidential blue-ribbon commission on, 190 , 195 , 205 Private investment, 187 Quotas: Japanese, on imports, 187 Legislative proposals on, 225 , 230 , 231 On U.S. agricultural products, 259 U.S. opposition to, 184 Tariff Commission data confidentiality, 212 Tariffs ( see also Trade barriers below ): Authority to cut, 287 On bound items, 259 Illustrative preference lists, submission to OECD of, 208 On Japanese items, 269 Limits on use of authority to cut, 204 , 205 , 213 Maquiladora plants and exceptions to, 207 Non-rubber footwear escape clause action, 251 , 252 , 267 , 284 OECD High-level Trade Group discussion of, 255 , 270 Presidential authority to retaliate using, 213 Proposed legislation on, 192 Reductions in, 181 Reverse preferences, 253 Task Force Report, 181 Trade barriers ( see also Tariffs above ): Burns Report, 188 Non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 181 , 188 , 192 , 204 , 205 , 270 , 280 , 286 , 287 : U.S. business dislike of, 217 Trade legislation proposals, 188 , 189 Additions to, 204 , 205 ECAT proposals, 205 , 207 European strategy and, 285 , 287 Grouping of legislative measures, 248 Legislative strategy paper, 264 Mills Committee hearings, 230 , 231 Nixon threat to veto, 239 , 243 , 247 NSC position, 192 , 248 , 287 State Department position, 190 , 205 , 207 STR position, 280 Tariff cutting authority, 287 Timing for submission, 217 Treasury position, 191 Trade Reform Act ( 1973 ), 249 Trade Study Commission, 217 Trading with the Enemy Act, 1917 , 249 Train, Russell, 182 Transistors, 360 , 375 Transportation, U.S. Department of, 117 , 236 Treasury, U.S. Department of: COCOM, 372 Darien Gap road, 117 East-West trade, 298 , 301 Expropriation of U.S. property, 158 , 159 , 165 Foreign assistance policy, 18 , 59 , 83 , 93 , 137 International development policy, 106 , 125 , 134 , 135 , 140 International monetary talks, 273 Meat import quotas, 407 , 438 Nickel shortage, 406 , 413 Trade policy, 191 , 212 , 213 , 214 , 220 , 228 , 231 , 232 , 244 , 252 , 258 , 269 , 273 , 282 U.S. foreign direct investment, 222 Trezise, Philip H., 18 , 23 , 51 , 124 , 144 , 159 , 207 , 208 , 210 , 221 , 226 , 240 , 244 , 311 , 340 , 363 , 366 , 372 , 374 , 407 , 412 , 435 Trinidad, 116 Troxel, Oliver, 123 Trudeau, Pierre Eliot, 260 , 271 , 392 , 397 , 400 Tsukahira, T. G., 275 Tsurumi, Kiyohiko, 275 Tuna, canned, 269 Tungsten, 421 Tunisia, 29 , 84 , 85 , 221 , 222 , 226 , 250 , 258 : Turkey, 70 , 85 , 87 EEC trade agreements with, 222 , 226 , 258 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 244 U.S. economic assistance, 7 U.S. military aid, 19 , 28 , 29 , 32 , 39 , 41 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 56 , 63 , 77 , 79 , 84 , 87 , 88 , 95 , 96 , 103 Uganda, 221 , 222 , 226 Ukawa, Hidetoshi, 275 Under Secretaries Committee, 12 , 27 , 49 , 130 , 131 , 136 Unemployment, 248 United Arab Republic (UAR), 42 , 59 , 221 , 222 , 226 , 228 , 241 , 262 United Kingdom: Arms sales, 59 Cuban nickel sales, 414 East-West trade, 289 EEC membership, 226 , 250 EEC trade agreements with, 222 European commercial arrangement with, 201 IDA replenishment III, 23 , 24 Import surcharges, 192 International Grains Arrangement, 388 Lard exports to, 183 OECD High-level Trade Group, 255 Soviet oil equipment purchases, 320 Textiles, 201 , 240 Trade and tariff preferences for LDCs, 214 U.S. expropriation policy, 174 Voluntary restraints on textile exports, 206 United Nations (UN), 5 , 26 , 38 , 83 , 126 , 131 , 147 , 244 , 429 : United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): Commodities Committee, 435 Increases in funding, 131 SDR-aid link study, 18 UNCTAD II, 214 UNCTAD III, 144 , 145 , 146 , 273 , 441 , 442 Special Committee on Preferences, 244 Trade and tariff preferences for developing countries, 1 , 192 , 200 , 220 , 244 United Nations Development Assistance Committee, 26 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 79 , 94 , 131 , 147 United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 26 United Nations General Assembly, 26 , 38 , 147 , 244 United States Information Agency (USIA), 83 , 214 , 298 , 320 , 372 Uruguay, 39 , 98 , 114 U.S. Extended Risk Guarantee Program, 136 Ushiba, Nobuhiko, 268 U.S. International Development Council, 128 , 130 , 131 , 132 U.S. News and World Report , 93 , 352 U.S-Spanish Joint Committee on Defense Matters, 266 U.S. Steel, 440 , 441 , 443 Vaky, Viron Peter, 25 , 27 , 29 , 122 , 129 , 404 , 408 , 431 , 434 , 436 Valdes Subercaseaux, Gabriel, 116 Vaznaugh, Frank, 18 Velasco, Gen. Juan, 148 , 159 Veliotes, Nicholas A., 325 Venezuela, 12 , 43 , 174 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV): East European aid to, 289 , 290 Infiltration into Cambodia, 32 , 42 Soviet aid, 295 U.S. prisoners of war, 321 U.S. prohibitions on shipping to, 9 U.S. sales restrictions on countries trading with, 294 , 295 , 298 , 305 , 313 , 319 , 337 , 340 , 342 U.S. travel restrictions, 322 Vietnam, Republic of, 28 , 121 Continuing Resolution Authority and, 70 Currency deposit requirements, 85 Land reform program, 39 , 41 U.S. economic assistance, 7 , 13 , 16 , 35 , 68 U.S. military aid, 5 , 20 , 29 , 39 , 41 , 42 , 46 , 49 , 56 , 63 , 64 , 79 , 81 , 83 , 84 , 86 , 99 , 126 , 131 , 134 , 135 Vietnamization, 13 , 14 , 15 , 20 , 32 Vietnam war, 289 , 290 , 294 , 305 , 313 , 347 , 408 , 438 Voice of America (VOA), 297 , 299 Volcker, Paul, 135 , 156 , 160 , 192 , 195 , 263 , 264 , 354 , 394 Additionality measures for balance of payments, 112 , 114 , 115 British computer sales to Soviet Union, 374 Foreign assistance policy, 17 , 100 , 102 Nickel shortage, 414 Task Force on International Development, 134 Trade policy, 191 , 281 , 286 Tying practices for development loans, 139 Volpe, John A., 117 , 359 Walker, Charls E., 17 , 43 , 44 , 100 , 162 , 166 , 170 , 394 Wallace, L. T., 388 Waller, Keith, 418 Wall Street Journal , 388 Walsh, John P., 149 , 207 Ware, R. A., 314 Washington Post , 35 , 43 Watts, William, 14 Webster, Donald A., 267 Weinberger, Caspar W., 35 , 62 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 81 , 92 , 96 , 97 , 99 , 104 , 95 , 179 , 263 , 445 , 446 Weintraub, Sidney, 18 , 51 , 151 , 158 , 159 , 175 Weiss, Seymour, 383 , 384 , 385 , 386 , 387 Wenk, Edward, Jr., 3 Westerfield, Samuel Z., 4 Wheat, 231 , 286 , 292 , 331 , 392 , 393 , 394 , 395 , 396 , 397 , 399 , 401 , 402 , 403 Wheat Trade Convention (WTC), 388 , 393 , 398 Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 5 , 6 , 12 , 128 , 192 , 195 , 296 , 298 , 302 , 318 , 361 Whitaker, John, 313 , 408 , 424 , 428 , 432 White, Eli G., 284 Widnall, William., 306 , 340 Wilhelm, J. K., 82 Williams, Albert L., 229 , 238 , 256 Willis, George H., 102 Wilson, Harold, 201 Witman, William, 210 Wonnacott, Paul, 407 Woods, George, 12 , 22 Woolens, 190 , 195 , 206 , 269 Working Group on Protection of U.S. Private Investment Abroad, 150 , 151 World Bank. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) . World Food Panel, 3 Worthington, Howard L., 190 , 207 , 280 Wright, R. B., 291 , 293 , 294 , 312 , 334 , 383 Wriston, Walter B., 119 Wylie, Chalmers P., 341 Yaounde Convention, 114 , 221 , 226 Yemen, 155 Yoshino, Bunroku, 206 Yost, Charles, 26 Young, David R., 335 Yugoslavia, 221 , 222 , 244 , 245 , 290 , 292 , 297 , 325 Zagorin, Bernard, 144 Zaire, 84 Zambia, 151 , 153 , 155 Ziegler, Ron, 42 , 60 , 69 , 75 , 172 , 352 ZIL truck factory, 292 , 294 Zinc, 157