FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXXIV, ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL ISSUES Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XXXIV Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIV) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations Persons Scientific Matters The Technology Gap (Documents 1-20) Cooperation in Space (Documents 21-62) Communication Satellites (Documents 63-110) Development of the Supersonic Transport Aircraft (Documents 111-129) Water for Peace (Documents 130-174) Energy Problems Petroleum (Documents 175-227) The 1967 Oil Embargo (Documents 228-268) Global Issues Population Growth (Documents 269-295) Hijacking (Documents 296-314) Human Rights (Documents 315-335) Index Sources Sources The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files for these years have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In preparing this volume, the editors conducted research in a wide range of manuscript sources. They made particularly extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Some White House memoranda, including memoranda to the President, document President Johnson's concern with these scientific, energy, and global issues. The bulk of the foreign policy records at the Johnson Library are in the subject and country files and the other component parts of the National Security File, and in the papers of the President's science adviser. The Department of State arranged for access to the many audiotapes of President Johnson's telephone conversations that are held at the Johnson Library. These audiotapes include substantial numbers of telephone conversations between President Johnson and his principal foreign policy advisers and key members of Congress. The editors of this volume cited for publication a summary of one audiotape of President Johnson's telephone conversation dealing with water for peace. Second in importance only to the White House records at the Johnson Library were the records of the Department of State. The Department's central files contain the cable traffic recording U.S. diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, European nations, and the Middle East, memoranda of diplomatic conversations, and memoranda proposing action or providing information. Some important documents are found only in the Department's lot files. Documentation on initiatives that were not approved is often found only in desk or bureau files. The papers of Hubert H. Humphrey at the Minnesota Historical Society were also very useful. Vice President Humphrey was chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council and took an active interest in the problems of rapid population growth and family planning matters in the developing world as well as world food production. The editors also collected documents on space policy in the Historical Reference Collection at the National Space and Aeronautics Administration and on energy policy at the Department of Energy Archives. Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the records of U.S. government agencies is in process. Many of the records are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12958, under which all records over 25 years old, except file series exemptions requested by agencies and approved by the President, should be reviewed for declassification by 2000. Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files . See National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files . These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park Maryland, Record Group 59. ARA Files: Lot 74 D 467 Country files, chronological files, subject files, and staff assistants' files for Assistant Secretaries Charles Meyer and Covey T. Oliver, 1967–1969 and 1971–1972 E Files: Lot 69 D 76 Country files for 1965, plus the records of petroleum and fuels and energy, general files, and office chronological files for 1963 and 1964 E Files: Lot 70 D 54 Chronologies for 1965 and 1966, general, petroleum, and fuels and energy files for 1966, and country files for 1966 E Files: Lot 71 D 84 Office files for 1967 including chronological files and the records of fuels and energy, petroleum, general files, and country files SCI Files: Lot 67 D 132 Office of Science and Technology subject files for 1964; miscellaneous office files including personnel, atomic energy, and science SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152 Office of Science and Technology subject files for 1965 and personnel records SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383 Office of Science and Technology subject files for 1966 plus miscellaneous office files SCI Files: Lot 71 D 483 Office of Science and Technology material having to do with the special local currency program, P.L. 480, for Israel, 1968–1970; plus one folder on the brain drain, 1966–1968 S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199 Policy Planning Council files for 1963–1964: subject files by subject, country, or area containing S/P papers and memoranda; studies and reports relevant to S/P interests; S/P chronologicals, working papers, and research files; and speeches and statements of the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State S/P Files: Lot 72 D 124 S/PC and S/P files for the years 1963 and 1965–1968; chronologicals and personal files; and subject and country files S/S Files: Lot 69 D 217 Chronological files for the Middle East Crisis, the Pueblo Crisis, and the Dominican Crisis; administrative history of the Johnson administration; and transition books S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master File of the National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs), 1961–1968 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State Central Files Following are the principal files used for this volume: AE 6, Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy AV 3, Organizations and Conferences AV 3 ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization AV 6, Airlines AV 6 US, Airlines, United States AV 12 US, Aircraft and Aeronautical Equipment, United States AV 12–1 US, Production, Repair AV 12–7 US, Research and Development E 11, Water Resources E 11–3 NEAR EAST, Saline Water Conversation, Near East E 11–3 ISRAEL, Saline Water Conversation, Israel ORG 7 OST, Visits PET 1 IRAQ, Petroleum General Policy, Plans, Iraq PET 1 OECD, Petroleum General Policy, Plans, OECD PET 1 UK-US, Petroleum General Policy, Plans, United Kingdom-United States PET 1 US, Petroleum General Policy, Plans, United States PET 2 ARAB, Petroleum General Reports and Statistics, Arab World PET 2 GERW, Petroleum General Reports and Statistics, West Germany PET 2 UK, Petroleum General Reports and Statistics, United Kingdom PET 3 ARAB, Petroleum Organizations and Conferences, Arab World PET 3 OAPEC, Petroleum Organizations and Conferences, OAPEC PET 3 OECD, Petroleum Organizations and Conferences, OECD PET 3 OPEC, Petroleum Organizations and Conferences, OPEC PET 3 US, Petroleum Organizations and Conferences, United States PET 5 IRAQ, Petroleum Laws and Regulations, Iraq PET 6 IRAN, Petroleum Companies, Iran PET 6 IRAQ, Petroleum Companies, Iraq PET 6 KUW, Petroleum Companies, Kuwait PET 6 LIBYA, Petroleum Companies, Libya PET 6 SAUD, Petroleum Companies, Saudi Arabia PET 6 US, Petroleum Companies, United States PET 7 US, Petroleum Visits, United States PET 10–3 IRAQ, Petroleum Concessions, Leases PET 12–2 FR, Petroleum Stocks, France PET 12–3 US, Petroleum Surpluses, Shortages, United States PET 15–2 ALG, Petroleum Nationalization, Appropriation, Algeria PET 15–2 KU, Petroleum Nationalization, Appropriation, Kuwait PET 15–2 SYR, Petroleum Nationalization, Appropriation, Syria PET 17 IRAQ–TURK, Petroleum Trade, Iraq and Turkey PET 17 SAUD–US, Petroleum Trade, Saudi Arabia and the United States PET 17–1 ARAB, Petroleum Exports, Arab World PET 17–1 IRAQ, Petroleum Exports, Iraq PET 17–1 LIBYA, Petroleum Exports, Libya PET 18–1 IRAQ–SYR, Petroleum Pipelines and Facilities, Iraq-Syria POL ARAB–US, Political Affairs and Relations, Arab World-United States POL 7 GER, Political Visits and Meetings PS 8–4 US–ALG, Consular Protective Services SCI 1–1 EURW–US, Science and Technology, International Cooperation, Western Europe-United States SCI 1–1 NATO, Science and Technology, International Cooperation, NATO SCI 3 OECD, Science and Technology, Organizations and Conferences, OECD SCI 3 NATO, Science and Technology, Organizations and Conference, NATO SOC 13, Social Conditions, Population SOC 13–3, Social Conditions, Population, Growth, Decline SOC 14 UN, Social Conditions, Human Rights, Race Relations SOC 14–3, Social Conditions, Human Rights, Race Relations, Children, Youth SP 1 US, Space and Aeronautics, General Policy, Plans, Coordination, United States SP 1–1 EUR-US, Space and Aeronautics, General Policy, Plans, Coordination, International Cooperation SP 6, Space and Aeronautics, Peaceful Uses of Space SP 6 UN, Space and Aeronautics, Peaceful Uses of Space, United Nations SP 10 US, Space and Aeronautics, Space Flight and Exploration, United States SP 11 ELDO, Space and Aeronautics, Research and Development, ELDO TEL 1 US, Telecommunication, General Policy, Plans, United States TEL 6, Telecommunications, Space Communications Record Group 359, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission Office of Science and Technology, OST Administrative History Lyndon B Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson National Security File Agency File Charles E. Johnson Files Country File Gordon Chase Files Harold H. Saunders Files McGeorge Bundy Files Memos to the President Name File NSC Special Committee Files Robert W. Komer Files Subject File White House Central Files Office Files of White House Aides Ernest Goldstein Other Personal Papers Donald F. Hornig Oral History Papers of Donald F. Hornig Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey Vice Presidential Files National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Laurel, Maryland Historical Reference Collection Files of the Office of International Affairs Department of Energy, Germantown, Maryland Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission Secretariat Files Published Sources Basic Facts About the UN (New York: United Nations, 1992) Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966 , Volume XXII (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1967) Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967 , Volume XXIII (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968) Frutkin, Arnold. International Cooperation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965) King, Alexander. Science and Policy : The International Stimulus (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) Logsdon, John M., ed.: Exploring the Unknown, Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program , Vol. I: Organizing for Exploration (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1995) ——. Exploring the Unknown, Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program , Vol. II, External Relationships (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1996) Seaborg, Glenn T. Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg , Pub-265, 28 volumes (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 1989–1992) U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs (90th Congress, 2d Session). Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area; report pursuant to H. Res. 179 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968) U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents , 1964–1967 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) ——. Department of State Bulletin , 1964–1968 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) ——. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson , 1963–1968 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) U.S. Task Group on Nuclear Power and Saline Water Conversion. An Assessment of Large Nuclear Powered Sea Water Distillation Plants; a Report of an Interagency Task Group (Washington, D.C.: Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President, March 1964) Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968 , Vol. 22 (New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1971) Abbreviations Abbreviations AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AID, Agency for International Development ANC, Air Navigation Commission/Council APQ, Annual Programmed Quantity ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ARAMCO, Arabian American Oil Company ASAP, as soon as possible BAC, British Aerospace Corporation b/d, barrels per day BP, British Petroleum BPD, barrels per day CAA, Civil Aeronautics Administration CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board Cedto, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to European Regional Organizations in Paris to the Department of State CETS, European Committee for Telecommunications Satellites CFP, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles CNAD, Conference of National Armaments Directors CNES, French National Space Agency (Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales) CNET, Centre National d'Etudes des Telecommunications COB, close of business COMSAT, Communications Satellite Corporation cos, companies COSPAR, Consultative Committee of the International Committee on Space Research CSC, Communications Satellite Corporation Deptel, Department of State telegram DOD, Department of Defense ECOSOC, Economic, Cultural and Social Committee of the United Nations ECSC, European Conference on Satellite Communications EE, Eastern Europe ELDO, European Launcher Development Organization ENI, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi EPSC, Emergency Petroleum Supply Committee ERAP, Enterprise de Recherches et d'Activites Petrolieres ESRO, European Space Research Organization EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State FAA, Federal Aviation Administration FAUSST, French-Anglo-U.S. Supersonic Transport Group FCC, Federal Communications Commission Fr, France; French GA, UN General Assembly GOC, Government of Canada; Government of Cuba GOI, Government of Iraq; Government of Iran GOP, Government of Portugal GOT, Government of Turkey HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare HMG, Her Majesty's Government IATA, International Air Transport Association ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization ICSC, Interim Communication Satellite Corporation ICY, International Cooperation Year INOC, Iraq National Oil Company INTELSAT, International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IPC, Iraq Petroleum Company ITU, International Telecommunications Union KOC, Kuwait Oil Company LDC, less-developed countries LE, Egyptian pounds Leo, Leopoldville MINECON, Ministry of Economics MOA, Ministry of Aviation MOL, Manned Orbiting Laboratory MWD, Metropolitan Water District NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASC, National Aeronautics and Space Council NATUS, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCS, National Communications System NIOC, National Iranian Oil Company NOA, new obligational authority NSF, National Science Foundation OAPEC, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OST, Office of Science and Technology PAHO, Pan American Health Organization PM, Prime Minister POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants PSAC, President's Scientific Advisory Committee R&D, research and development SAG, Saudi Arabian Government SARG, Syrian Government SCI, Office of Science and Technology, Department of State SecGen, Secretary General Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington SEPR, Societe d'Etude de la Propulsion par Reaction SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group Sitrep, situation report SOCAL, Standard Oil Company of California SOCONJ, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Esso) SOCONY, Standard Oil Company of New York (Mobil) S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State S/PM, Office of the Special Assistant to Secretary of State Rusk for Population Matters S/S–O, Secretariat Staff, Operations Center, Department of State SYG, Secretary-General Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State while away from Washington UGTA, Algerian labor union UNGA, UN General Assembly UK, United Kingdom UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development USG, United States Government USRO, Mission of the Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Persons Persons Abram, Morris B., Representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission Al-Bazzaz, Abdul Rahman, Iraqi Ambassador to the United Kingdom; OPEC Secretary General, 1964; Iraqi member of OPEC negotiating committee, 1965; Prime Minister of Iraq, 1966 Agger, Donald G., Assistant Secretary of Transportation for International Affairs and Special Programs Allen, Sir Roger, British Ambassador to Iraq Arif [Aref], General Abdul Rahman, President of Iraq beginning April 1966; replaced Naji Talib as Prime Minister in May 1967; overthrown by Major General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in July 1968 Arif [Aref], Colonel Abdul Salam Muhammad, President of Iraq, February 1963–April 1966 Armstrong, Willis C., Minister for Economic Affairs, Embassy in London Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 30, 1966; Representative to the United Nations, June 26–September 25, 1968 Bator, Francis M., Senior Economic Adviser, Agency for International Development, until April 1964; member, National Security Council Staff, April 1964–1965; Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1965–September 1, 1967 Beckett, J. Angus, British Under Secretary, Ministry of Power, Petroleum Division Beaumont, Richard A., British Ambassador to Iraq Bell, David E., Administrator, Agency for International Development Binaghi, Walter, President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization Black, Eugene R., Special Adviser to the President on the Financial Aspects of the SST, 1963–1964 Blagonravov, Anatoli A., Academician and Chairman of the Commission on Exploration and Utilization of Outer Space, USSR Academy of Sciences Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France, 1962–1968 Bowie, Robert R., Counselor of the Department of State Boyer, Charles, Office of the Regional Coordinator for the Middle East, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Brenchley, T. Frank, Head of the Arabian Department, British Foreign Office Bruce, David C.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs until February 1966 Bunker, Ellsworth, Desalination Project Coordinator, 1966 Caradon, Lord [Hugh Mackintosh Foot], British Ambassador to the United Nations Carter, William T., Special Assistant for Space Communications, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State Cary, Charles O., Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, Federal Aviation Administration Cash, Harvey, Senior Vice President of Texaco, Inc., and a Director of Aramco Cater, Douglass, Special Assistant to the President Chadwick, John E., Commercial Minister of the British Embassy in Washington Charyk, Dr. Joseph, President of the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) Chayes, Abram, Legal Adviser, Department of State; Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Exploratory Meeting on a Global System for Communication Satellites, 1964 Claxton, Philander P., Special Assistant to Secretary of State Rusk for Population Matters Cook, General Orval, Chair of the Public Advisory Committee on construction of the SST; former president of Aerospace Industries Group Cottam, Howard, Ambassador to Kuwait, August 1963–July 1969 Crooker, John H., Jr., Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board Dalley, Cyril, London-based General Manager of the Iraq Petroleum Company Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Doyle, Arthur, Government Relations executive of the Iraq Petroleum Company, based in London Dryden, Arthur, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Duncan, Enoch S., Charge d'Affaires in Iraq Duroc-Danner, Henri, French Director of the Iraq Petroleum Company Eagers, Derek, Petroleum Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington Ensor, Andrew, Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy, Department of State Faber, Richard S., First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington Fanfani, Amintore, Italian Foreign Minister Fearnley, John T., Oil Adviser to the Oil Department of the British Foreign Office Findlay, Luke, Manager of the Government Relations Department, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Fried, Edward R., Member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, until October 24, 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, October 24, 1965–August 15, 1967; thereafter member, National Security Council Staff Frutkin, Arnold, Assistant Administrator for International Programs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D-Arkansas), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Gaud, William S., Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development, February 27, 1964–July 1966; Administrator from August 1, 1966 Gazdik, Julian, General Counsel and Secretary of the Legal Committee of the International Air Transport Association Goldberg, Arthur, Ambassador to the United Nations, July 25, 1965–June 24, 1968 Goldstein, Ernest, Special Assistant to the President from 1967 Gordon, Kermit, Director, Bureau of the Budget, until 1965 Grant, General Harold W., Director of Telecommunications Policy, Department of Defense Greenhill, Denis A., Minister of the British Embassy in Washington Gremillon, Monsignor Joseph, Executive Director of the Papal Commission on Peace and Justice Gruening, Ernest, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, Senate Committee on Government Operations Halaby, Najeeb, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration Abd al-Hamid, Colonel Subhi, Foreign Minister of Iraq Hammarskjold, Knut, Director General of the International Air Transport Association Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 17, 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large Harrison, Sir Geoffrey, Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office Hart, Parker T., Ambassador to Saudi Arabia until May 29, 1965 Henry, E. William, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission Herter, Christian, Jr., Manager of Government Relations, Standard Oil Company of New York Horner, John Evarts, Consul General at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia until May 29,1965 Hornig, Donald F., Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Hoveyda, Amir Abbas, Prime Minister of Iran Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1965 Hyde, Rosel H., Chairman, Federal Communications Commission Idris, King of Libya Jenkins, Roy, British Minister of Aviation Jernegan, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Johnson, Charles E., Member, National Security Council Staff Johnson, G. Griffith, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until May 1, 1965; U.S. representative to the conference to sign an agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system Johnson, John A., Vice President and Director for International Arrangements, International Communication Satellite Corporation Johnson, Joseph, Vice President, Arabian American Oil Company Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until July 12, 1964; Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, July 1964–September 1965; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1, 1965–October 9, 1966; Ambassador to Japan from November 8, 1966 Joukhdar, Muhammad, Secretary General, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Joyce, J. Wallace, Acting Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Department of State Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Deputy Attorney General until September 1964; then Attorney General until October 3, 1966; thereafter Under Secretary of State Keating, Kenneth B., National Chairman of the Population Crisis Committee until December 1965; former Senator Keeny, Spurgeon, Jr., Member, National Security Council staff Keldysh, M., President, Soviet Academy of Sciences Kelly, John D., Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources Khrushchev, Nikita S., Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until October 15, 1964 Killick, John F., Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until November 14, 1966; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 29, 1966–December 31, 1967 Leprette, Jacques, Minister of the French Embassy in Washington Loy, Frank E., Deputy Assistant Secretary for State for Economic Affairs Lucet, Charles, French Ambassador to the United States Marks, Leonard, Director, to U.S. Information Agency; Chairman of the U.S. delegation to Intelsat final negotiations Martin, Noel, Petroleum Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington Massey, Sir Harrie, Chairman of the British National Committee on Space Research Mayer, Max, Director of the Department of Scientific Exploration of Space, German Ministry for Science Research Mazid, Faisal, Director, Kuwait Oil Company McCormack, James, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Communications Satellite Corporation McGhee, George C., Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany until May 21, 1968 McGinnis, Edgar L., First Secretary of the Embassy in London McKee, William E., Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense until February 29, 1968 Meyer, Armin H., Ambassador to Iran from April 1965 Mili, Mohammed, Acting Secretary General, International Telecommunications Union Miller, William K., Director of the Office of Telecommunications, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State Moore, J. Cordell, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources Morris, Fred W., Jr., Associate Director of Telecommunications Management, Executive Office of the President Moses, Henry C., Vice President, Socony Mobil Oil Company Muir, Joseph, Deputy Director of the Office of Petroleum Logistics, Department of Commerce Murphy, C.H., Jr., President, Murphy Oil Company Murray, Allen, General Manager of the Middle East and Indonesian Affairs Department, Socony Mobil Oil Company Muusa, Khalifa, Libyan Petroleum Minister Nakasian, Samuel, Executive of the Sinclair Oil Company Narbonne, Jacques, immediate adviser on space matters to French President Charles de Gaulle Nazer, Hisham, Saudi member of OPEC's negotiating delegation, 1965 O'Brien, Lawrence, Special Assistant to the President O'Connell, General James D., Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and Director of Telecommunications Management Ockrent, Roger A., head of the Belgian Delegation to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development O'Leary, John F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources Oliver, John G., Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State Ortiz, Nestor, Foreign Affairs Representative, Gulf Oil Corporation Osborne, Stanley de J., Special Adviser to the President on the financial aspects of the SST, 1963–1964 Ortona, Egidio, Italian Ambassador to the United States; Chairman of the 1964 European Conference on Space Communications Owen, Henry, Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State from June 19, 1966 Page, Howard, Vice President, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Parkhurst, George L., Vice President, Standard Oil Company of California Peyrefitte, M. Alain, French Minister of Scientific Research, Atomic and Space Affairs Piercy, George, Director of the Standard Oil Company of New York; Director of Aramco Piret, Edgar L., Scientific Attache of the Embassy in Paris Pollack, Herman, Acting Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Department of State Powell, A. Barry, Petroleum Attache of the British Embassy in Washington Razzaq, Arif Abdul, Prime Minister of Iraq until 1966 Read, Benjamin H., Executive Secretary of the Department of State Richardson, E. R., Jamaican Ambassador to the United Nations Rielly, John, Senior Adviser to Vice President Hubert Humphrey Rockefeller, John D., III, Chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation; Chairman of the Board of the Population Council Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 14, 1966; Chairman of the President's Task Force on Communications Policy Rostow, Walt W., Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, until March 31, 1966; Special Assistant to the President from April 1, 1966 Rouhani, Fuad, Iraqi member of OPEC negotiating team, 1965; Secretary General of OPEC Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Schultze, Charles L., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, until June 1, 1965; thereafter Director Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission Seamans, Dr. Robert C., Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, until December 1965; thereafter Deputy Administrator Schuman, Maurice, French Minister of Science Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Sloan, Frank, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Solomon, Anthony, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Starbird, Alfred D., Manager, U.S. National Communications System Stephens, William, Technical Director, European Launcher Development Organization Stewart, Michael N.F., Minister at the British Embassy in Washington Stewart, W.W., Chief Representative in Iraq, Iraq Petroleum Company Stoltenberg, Gerhard, German Minister of Science Strong, Robert C., Ambassador to Iraq Swihart, James W., Economic Counselor of the Embassy in Tehran Talbot, Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until September 1, 1965 Talib, Naji, Prime Minister of Iraq Tariqi, Abdallah, former Saudi Minister of Petroleum Tarkington, Andrew W., Executive Vice President, Continental Oil Company Tavoulares, William P., Director, Socony Mobil Oil Company Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large until December 1966; Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, July 1964–October 1965; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from January 23, 1967 Tree, Marietta, Representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission Trezise, Philip H., Ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris from October 26, 1965 Trowbridge, Alexander S., Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business until May 1967; Acting Secretary of Commerce, February 1, 1967–June 14, 1967; Secretary, June 14, 1967–February 28, 1968 Udall, Stewart, Secretary of the Interior Vanden Boeynants, Paul, Prime Minister and Science Minister of Belgium Vinson, Fred, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice Vinsonneau, Fernand, Secretary General, Eurospace Volio Jimenez, Fernando, Costa Rican Ambassador to the United Nations Warder, A.J., Managing Director, Iran Oil Consortium Wahab, Abdul, Kuwaiti Under Secretary of Oil Warner, Rawleigh, President, Socony Mobil Oil Company Al-Wattari, Abd al-Aziz, Iraqi Minister of Oil Webb, James E., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Welch, Leo, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board, Communications Satellite Corporation Welsh, Edward C., Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council Wiesner, Jerome B., Science Adviser to President John F. Kennedy Wilson, Colin, First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington Woods, George D., President of the World Bank until March 31, 1968; Coordinator of the Israeli Desalting Project, 1968 Wright, Patrick R. H., First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington Wright, Sir Denis, British Ambassador to Iran Yahya, Taher, Iraqi Prime Minister until 1966 Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Zuckerman, Sir Solly, Science Adviser to the British Cabinet The Technology Gap The Technology Gap 1. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, January 14, 1966, 2013Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SCI 3 OECD. Limited Official Use; Priority. Passed to the White House. 2. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Belgium Washington, June 6, 1966, 1:01 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Under Secretary Ball on June 6, cleared by John Walsh (S/S), and approved by Ball. Secretary Rusk was in Brussels attending a NATO meeting. After stopping briefly in Bonn and London, he returned to Washington on June 10. 3. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson Washington, June 7, 1966, 7:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. Secret. Drafted by Spurgeon Keeny on June 7. Attached to the source text is a June 7 note from Hornig to Rostow indicating that the memorandum was transmitted to Rostow for action and that a copy was sent to Francis Bator. 4. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Joyce) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) Washington, November 7, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential. Drafted by Henri Bader (SCI) and Eugene Kovach (SCI) and cleared by George S. Springsteen (EUR). 5. National Security Action Memorandum No. 357 Washington, November 25, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 357. Confidential. 6. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) Washington, December 2, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. Confidential. Drafted by David Beckler. 7. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, January 13, 1967, 8:09 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential. Repeated to all NATO and OECD capitals and USRO. Drafted by Percival (EUR) on January 11; cleared by Jacob M. Myerson (RPM), Oswald H. Ganley (SCI), William M. Kerrigan (E), Jonathan Dean (C), and Springsteen (EUR); and approved by Bowie. 8. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, January 25, 1967, 1723Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential. Repeated to the White House for Hornig, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and to Brussels and Rome. 9. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson Washington, January 31, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Office of Science and Technology, Vol. I [1967], Box 42. Confidential. 10. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State Paris, March 1, 1967, 2020Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential. Repeated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Brussels for BUSEC, London, and Rome. 11. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson Washington, July 15, 1967, 1:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. Secret. Drafted by Daniel F. Margolies, Beckler, and Hornig. 12. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 18, 1967, 5:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69,SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Secret. The source text is Part IV of VI. Drafted by Neil Seidenman (LS), approved in S on September 2 and by the White House (Edward Fried) on October 5. The meeting was held at the White House. 13. Memorandum of Conversation Brussels, December 11, 1967, 9:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69,SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Secret. This memorandum is Part IV of IV. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister's office. In an attached memorandum from Bowie to Rusk of December 22, Bowie told the Secretary that the idea of a major speech by President Johnson on the technological gap had been considered by the Interdepartmental Committee and rejected. Rusk agreed to discuss the issue with the President in light of the Hornig committee's decision if the Belgian Prime Minister raised the issue again, but there is no indication that he did so. 14. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson Washington, December 22, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. No classification marking. 15. Memorandum From the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap to President Johnson Washington, December 22, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Memos and Misc. [II], Box 60. Confidential. Transmitted to the President under cover of a memorandum from Hornig, Document 14. 16. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State Paris, March 12, 1968, 1909Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 3 OECD. Limited Official Use. Also sent to Brussels for USEC and pouched to all OECD capitals. 17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson Washington, May 2, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 6. Confidential. Drafted by Beckler. 18. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, June 13, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Memos and Misc. [II], Box 60. Confidential. Drafted by Oswald H. Ganley (SCI) and cleared by William M. Kerrigan (E), William G. Barraclough (EUR/RPE), and Donald R. Lesh (U/SIG). The source text is Attachment A to a July 2 memorandum from Arthur Hartman to SIG members, informing them that after Presidential review, the report had been referred to the SIG and circulated to U.S. overseas missions in OECD countries for information. The memorandum also indicated that no immediate action was required. 19. Airgram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State Paris, July 15, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Lester E. Edmunds, cleared by Philip R. Cook, and approved by Ambassador Trezise. 20. Airgram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, August 5, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential; Noforn; Priority. Drafted by Edgar L. Piret and Harding W. Ballough (SCI) on July 30; cleared by Jack R. Perry (POL), Robert J. Morris (ECON), the Minister, and Ambassador Shriver; and approved by Piret. 1. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, January 14, 1966, 2013Z. Cedto 580. Pass OST for MacLeod, NSF for Haworth, Commerce for Holloman. Subject: Science Ministers Meeting. 2 1. Science Ministers Conference January 12–13 concentrated on discussion papers prepared by interim committee. Agreement reached to continue science policy work, to meet again at ministerial level in two years, and to establish a working party to make proposals to OECD Council within three months for continuing work of interim committee in association with OECD activities. 2. Highlight of meeting was Dr. Hornig's speech January 13 on fundamental research, text of which eagerly sought by other delegates and press. 3. Disparity in financial and scientific resources for R&D and in technological development between U.S. and Europe and between large and small countries was major underlying theme in discussions. Speaking for PriMin Harmel 3 and noting his general comments on January 12, Ockrent especially emphasized growing technological gap between U.S. and Europe. He stated Europe can no longer “suffer” emigration its scientists. Lauding Marshall Plan for saving Europe from economic catastrophe after World War II, he asked for cooperative efforts to close “technological” gap to avoid “future catastrophe.” 4 Sharply asserting that new technology kept from Europeans, he suggested U.S. investment in Europe should be not just in production but also in R&D. In reply, Dr. Hornig pointed out that aerospace and defense electronics industry development not closely related to civilian market and U.S. has no clear idea of magnitude direct economic effect of R&D in these fields. 5 As to suggestion, he commented that if Europeans prepared make progress in economic integration, Kennedy Round and on monetary reform, then progress could be made in their obtaining new technology. 4. Smaller countries emphasized their special problems and emphasized need for international scientific cooperation. 5. French delegation was restrained and did not press argumentation on “technological gap” but left lead to Belgians in this respect. French hesitancy to formalize science policy activities within OECD framework was evident throughout discussions future work and possible institutional arrangements for its future conduct. 6. In sum, meeting, while devoted to science policy matters, focused primarily around economic, social and political effects of modern science and technology. Discussion seemed to clear air on some issues but European concern about technological gap, “brain drain,” and alleged failure U.S. companies carry out R&D in Europe, was not dispelled. Trezise 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SCI 3 OECD. Limited Official Use; Priority. Passed to the White House. 2 The January 1966 meeting of OECD Science Ministers was the second held by the organization. The initial session in October 1963 opened a debate on the importance of science and technology to the broader economic and social objectives of the OECD. At the 1963 session, Ministers commissioned a comparative study of national research and development efforts and agreed to reconvene in January 1966. The paucity of data uncovered by Professor Christopher Freeman of the University of Sussex led the OECD to redouble its efforts at comparison and analysis. The problems of disparity uncovered by these studies formed the basis for discussion at the 1966 session, and an additional series of studies on what became known as the “technological gap” was commissioned. For more information on the early years of OECD science policy, see Alexander King, Science and Policy: The International Stimulus (London, 1974). King was Assistant Secretary General of the OECD for Scientific Affairs, 1961–1974. 3 Pierre C.J.M. Harmel of Belgium. 4 The OECD was the successor organization to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which administered the Marshall Plan. 5 Hornig's comments are in telegram 4054 from Paris, January 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SCI 3 OECD) 2. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Belgium 2. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Belgium 1 Washington, June 6, 1966, 1:01 p.m. Tosec 92. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. I recognize the problem of the technological gap between the United States and Europe, but until our ideas on this question have been thoroughly digested I would suggest we play it in a low key. 2 The technological gap exists primarily because European industrial enterprises have failed to organize themselves on an adequate scale of size and have not developed the practice of investing a sufficient proportion of their sales dollars in research. The Europeans now have a big common market and European firms should be encouraged to consolidate to meet the requirements of that market. At the same time, they should modernize their practices and increase their research budgets. For us to assist this process by a technological subsidy would, I think, be doubtful wisdom, since it might serve to perpetuate bad European practices. Moreover, a substantial part of our favorable trade balance with the world depends upon our technological superiority and we should not give it away for nothing. My views on this question are not fully developed and I would not wish to prejudice the evolution of some progress in this field, but I feel that we should be quite restrained in suggesting such a program before we have thoroughly thought it through. 3 Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Under Secretary Ball on June 6, cleared by John Walsh (S/S), and approved by Ball. Secretary Rusk was in Brussels attending a NATO meeting. After stopping briefly in Bonn and London, he returned to Washington on June 10. 2 Rusk had raised the idea of a “Marshall Plan for Technology” with Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani on June 5. (Telegram 309 from Brussels, June 5; ibid., SCI 1–1 NATO) 3 Although Rusk made no further offer during this meeting, Fanfani initiated discussions within the Italian Foreign Ministry on June 21. (Telegram 3198 from Rome, June 21; ibid.) See Tab A to Document 4 . 3. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 3. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 7, 1966, 7:30 p.m. SUBJECT Measures to Attack the “Technological Gap” between the United States and Europe At Walt Rostow's suggestion, I am reporting for your information a number of measures that I believe could be helpful in attacking the “technological gap” between the United States and Europe. Dean Acheson discussed this problem with me last week in connection with his study for NSAM 345. 2 We agreed that the basic problem of the “technological gap” relates to such fundamental issues as the size of European markets, European management procedures, and policies toward capital investment in industry, research and development and education, and that these problems could not be cured by any package of technological proposals that we might offer. At the same time, I do believe that there are specific proposals that would point the Europeans in the right direction toward solving these problems, would have a unifying effect on Europe, and would help remove the widespread impression in Europe that the United States was trying to perpetuate the “technological gap.” I have given some preliminary thought to the following specific proposals on which we could move relatively quickly: 1. NATO Computer Center . Europe is considerably behind this country in the use of modern computers which are fundamental to advanced technology, business management, economic planning, etc. Although these computers are on the open market, the required investment is too great for the smaller European countries and most industrial concerns. We could therefore propose that a very advanced computation center, using both US and European hardware, be established and operated by NATO. This center, which could be remotely connected with other facilities by existing telephone lines, could serve NATO governmental and industrial enterprises directly in solving military, commercial, and research problems. We would offer our assistance in organizing the operation and in introducing Europeans to the full range of possibilities involving the best modern computer equipment. 3 2. Technological Information Service . The Europeans are very concerned that they do not have access to the advanced technology emerging from our advanced military and space projects. We have tried to make such information available to domestic concerns through such programs as the NASA Technology Utilization Program and the State Technical Service Program of the Department of Commerce. To help overcome this problem in Europe, we could propose a NATO technological information service that would perform similar services there. The participating governments would pool the relevant technological information available to them in this organization. These are examples of the kind of proposals that we could make in this area. On the basis of my preliminary look, I think that it will be possible to put together a reasonably good package that would ease the political tensions resulting from the “technological gap” problem even though it would not solve it. Donald F. Hornig 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. Secret. Drafted by Spurgeon Keeny on June 7. Attached to the source text is a June 7 note from Hornig to Rostow indicating that the memorandum was transmitted to Rostow for action and that a copy was sent to Francis Bator. 2 National Security Action Memorandum No. 345 dealt primarily with nuclear planning, but in it the President also noted his “wishes to have developed other forward-looking proposals that would increase the cohesion of NATO and the North Atlantic Community.” For text of NSAM No. 345, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 159 . 3 NATO discussion on and plans for a NATO computer center continued throughout the Johnson administration. A later reference is in telegram 5052 from Brussels, October 20, 1968. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SCI 3 NATO) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Hornig signed the original. 4. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Joyce) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) 4. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Joyce) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 7, 1966. SUBJECT Proposals for Scientific and Technological Cooperative Projects with Europe Your office has requested an inventory of the major proposals outstanding for technological and scientific cooperation between Europe and the United States. Attached are brief notes on fourteen such proposals. There are a large number of bilateral and multilateral projects current between Europe and the United States; the ones we have selected represent only those presently under discussion or offering actual or potential political problems. ATTACHMENTS 2 Tab A Fanfani Proposal Tab B OECD Program in Technological Cooperation Tab C U.S. Proposal for Defense Communications Satellites Tab D U.S. Assistance to ELDO Tab E Cooperative Program for Advanced Space Research Tab F U.S. Proposal for a NATO Computer Center Tab G NASA's Technology Utilization Program Tab H International Cooperation in Military R & D Tab I Information Pooling Agreements in the Nuclear Field Tab J U.S.-EURATOM Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy Tab K Proposed USAEC-Spanish Cooperation in Reactor Development (DON Project) Tab L International World Weather Program Tab M Water for Peace Program Tab N Cooperation in Desalting Tab A The Fanfani Proposal to Bridge the Technological Gap Between the United States and Europe I. Background In a meeting at New York on September 19, 1966, Minister Fanfani presented a document to Secretary Rusk personally. 3 A presumably identical document “Europe's Technological Gap and the Desirability of an International Collaboration for a 'New Drive,'” was presented to an Embassy officer in Rome by Ambassador Mondello on September 22. Mondello said that Minister Fanfani, encouraged by the interest of Secretary Rusk, had instructed the Foreign Office to transmit the document personally to representatives of all embassies of NATO countries in Rome. GOI officials have admitted to Embassy Rome that the main purpose of the Italian proposal is political, planned to breathe new life into the Atlantic Alliance by an action which will hopefully capture the public imagination. The Italians also hope that it may counter the effect of the French NATO policy and perhaps even induce France to reconsider the benefits of the Alliance. For this reason the Italians believe that their proposal should be taken up by NATO rather than EEC or OECD. II. Substance of Proposal The document notes that the technological gap between the U.S. and other developed countries of the Western World is growing and becoming a matter of serious concern. The prospects of economic unbalance and its undesirable political consequences, “psychological discomfort”, and weakening of the West lead to the necessity of an initiative directed towards an increasing and balanced advancement of the countries of the Atlantic zone. The initiative should emphasize the paramount importance of close collaboration among European countries, and promote greater collaboration between Europe and the United States. In essence, two things must be brought about: 1. A “new technological drive” for Western Europe. 2. A “technological agreement” for collaboration with the United States. The initiative should be launched by a “common declaration” of the NATO Governments, proposing to convene a conference to negotiate a “technological agreement”. Interested non-NATO Governments would be invited to participate. Then an “international institution” would be established to coordinate the European effort and to execute the agreement with the U.S. The immediate task would be to elaborate a “ten-year plan for technological development”, with a determination of “priority areas”, such as 1. computers 2. aeronautical industry 3. space research and booster rockets 4. satellites for every use 5. atomic and energy research 6. desalination and pollution control Another important requirement is the establishment of a method of cooperation between Europe and the U.S. There can be cooperation on “specific projects,” such as planetary exploration, a great protonsynchrotron, and a hydrogen-oxygen space booster. One can also envisage “sector cooperation,” for instance in electronics within a framework of “production agreements” with the U.S. Third countries, particularly those of Eastern Europe and developing countries, should not be ruled out. Comments Only a few preliminary comments have been received from posts in NATO countries. They indicate considerable interest in the Fanfani proposal but also skepticism. The existence and seriousness of the technological gap is generally recognized, but some think that OECD may be a better vehicle for action than NATO. The vagueness of the Italian proposal with respect to the nature of the “Technological Agreement” is noted, but no useful constructive comments have yet emerged. The President has twice (in the Erhard communiqué and in his New York speech on European policy) 4 publicly welcomed the Italian initiative and recognized the desirability of cooperative action in the technological sphere. The Department and other agencies are studying the proposal. We have put a number of questions to the Italians in an attempt to understand better their thinking—and perhaps to induce them to clarify their own ideas, which are clearly grandiose but also somewhat fuzzy as presented in their memorandum. We have told the Italians that we agree with the implication of the memorandum that the primary emphasis should probably be placed on project, as opposed to sector, cooperation, and that we see no necessary conflict between the Italian proposal and the study of technological potentials that the OECD is undertaking. We do not believe the value of technological cooperation depends on the validity of the “technological gap” concept, which is an oversimplified approach to the subject. We are sympathetic to the Italians' desire to use an approach to the technological problem to strengthen NATO and European unity. However, we will be in a better position to take a position on the specifics of their proposal when we receive a clearer view of it, which we expect to be presented at the NATO Ministerial meeting in December. We understand the Italians are refining their proposal. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential. Drafted by Henri Bader (SCI) and Eugene Kovach (SCI) and cleared by George S. Springsteen (EUR). 2 Only Tab A is printed. 3 Fanfani's proposal was the result of an Italian Foreign Ministry study sparked by his conversation with Secretary Rusk on June 5. See footnote 2, Document 2 . A portion of the September 19 Rusk-Fanfani memorandum of conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 205 . Fanfani's paper was not found. 4 For texts, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1079–1080 and 1127. 5. National Security Action Memorandum No. 357 5. National Security Action Memorandum No. 357 1 Washington, November 25, 1966. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology SUBJECT The Technological Gap I have been impressed with the increasing concern in Western Europe over possible disparities in advanced technology between the United States and Europe. While many Europeans are convinced that this “technological gap” exists, there is substantially less agreement on its nature and extent, its causes and possible remedies. As I indicated in my October 7 speech, 2 we must determine how best to develop science and technology as a common resource. I have, therefore, asked the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology to chair an interdepartmental committee which will examine all aspects of this problem and explore possible courses of action. The committee should also examine ways in which the United States might engage interested West European governments in a joint study of what should be done. I would like to receive a preliminary report by January 30, 1967. This is to request that each of you name a representative to serve on this committee. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 357. Confidential. 2 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1125–1130. 6. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) 6. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) 1 Washington, December 2, 1966. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission SUBJECT Technological Disparities between the U.S. and Western Europe REF National Security Council Action Memorandum No. 357 I have been asked by the President to chair an interdepartmental committee to examine the problems generated by the increasing concern in Western Europe over possible disparities in advanced technology between the United States and Western Europe, and to explore courses of action. A preliminary report to the President is due January 30, 1967. It is the purpose of this memorandum to request the early designation of a representative of your agency to serve on the committee, and to provide background for discussion at its first meeting which I propose to hold in Room 213 of the Executive Office Building at 2:30 p.m. on Friday, December 9th. 2 Although there have been many discussions of the matter (see attached background material), little has emerged in the form of specific proposals that would be appropriate and effective in dealing with the root causes of the European concern which has been expressed primarily at political levels in Europe. As the NSAM points out, there is less agreement on its nature and extent of the technological gap, its causes and possible remedies. It is clear that the problem is exceedingly complex and that no single factor such as relative technological capabilities or investments in R&D is responsible for differences in competitiveness within industrial sectors. Management attitudes, market size, availability of venture capital, educational infrastructure, mobility of technical manpower and ideas, among other factors, are necessarily involved. In light of the developments to date, it is timely to consider and devise constructive approaches to U.S.-European cooperation whereby the U.S. might appropriately facilitate technological advance and industrial innovation in Europe without restraining such advance in the U.S., and to utilize technological and industrial advance as a unifying rather than a divisive force in the Western community. The work of the committee should bring about a common understanding within the government of the nature of the problem, and should develop major new initiatives and a strategy for carrying them out through new modes of cooperation as well as through the various agency contacts with European governments and international organizations. In consideration of the above, the following questions come to mind. First, there are questions of policy and research cooperation, including: (a) What can, or should, the U.S. do to assist the European countries in acquiring (or regaining) status as leaders in scientific and technological advance? (b) Is the objective of meeting the concerns of European countries over deficiencies in technological capabilities in conflict with the need to maintain a vigorous pace of technological advance and innovation in U.S. industry? (c) How can European concern over the technological gap be channeled to promote a new spirit of cooperation among European countries leading to economic and technological integration and the creation of a more favorable climate for the growth of innovative industries? (d) In what ways can U.S. governmental policies influence industrial arrangements between U.S. and Europe, e.g., “Buy American” policies, licensing arrangements, joint ventures, investment in R&D in Europe, tariffs, tax and anti-trust policies, etc.? (e) To what extent can NASA and DoD research, development and procurement programs admit European companies on a basis competitive with U.S. industry? (f) Should measures be taken to lessen the migration of scientists and engineers from Europe to the U.S., e.g., through changes in visa procedures, control of recruitment practices of U.S. government contractors, etc.? Second, there are questions of organization and approach to European governments, including: (a) what combination of European countries are we encouraging to develop cooperative proposals—NATO, OECD, other; should similar cooperation be extended to Eastern Europe; (b) what is our position on the respective roles and activities of existing organizations, particularly NATO and OECD; use of international scientific organizations such as EURATOM, ESRO, ELDO; involvement of other organizations such as EEC, ECE, the Coal and Steel Community; (c) should further European initiatives be encouraged to organize intra-European discussion and to consider new forms of cooperation and organization (such as a Technological Community or a ten-year plan)? At the first meeting of the committee, I hope that your representative will be prepared to present views on the character of the problem, on the nature of your agency's involvement with the various facets of it, and on the questions that have been raised above, among others. Additionally, I would like to encourage you to submit any suggestions or proposals deserving future study or action by the committee. Donald F. Hornig 3 Attachment BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON TECHNOLOGICAL GAP As Mr. Moyers indicated in the attached transcript of the White House News Conference on November 26th (Attachment A), 4 the creation of the committee is the result of a number of discussions during the past year between the President and heads of European governments and between other governmental officials. The development of European skills in advanced technology was discussed by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard in December 1965 in the context of cooperative ventures in outer space. 5 The subject of the technological gap was mentioned during the Erhard visit of last September when the President indicated that the United States stands ready to respond to any proposals by our European allies in the area of advanced technology. Reference was made to the initiatives of the Italian Government (Attachment B). 6 The matter was discussed further with Mr. Webb and with me during a visit last spring by the German Minister of Science Gerhard Stoltenberg, and by Mr. Webb during his visit to European capitals. More recently the subject was dealt with in the New York speech of the President on October 7th and in the addresses of the Vice President and Secretary Connor during the Commerce Symposium on Technology and World Trade. Belgian Prime Minister Harmel at the meeting of the Ministers of Science and OECD countries last January made a strong plea for U.S. technological cooperation; a copy of my response is attached (Attachment C). Also attached is a letter to me from Mr. Harmel, now Belgian Foreign Minister (Attachment D). As an outcome of the Ministers of Science meeting, the OECD Science Policy Committee has recently initiated a study of the differences in technological potential among OECD countries which will include a detailed examination of nine industrial sectors and will attempt to analyze all of the factors that influence the exploitation of technological potentials in attaining economic and other national objectives (Attachments E and F). The U.K. interest in this problem has recently been expressed in an address by Prime Minister Wilson on November 14, 1966, calling for the creation of a new European technological community (Attachment G). The French have raised this theme on a number of occasions, for example in computers and satellite communications, and in discussions I have had with French Minister of Science M. Alain Peyrefitte. U.S.-European cooperation in advanced technologies has also been mentioned in the NATO context as a means to achieve greater cohesiveness among member nations. It is raised, for example, in the Fanfani proposal. Perhaps the best summation of the European point of view on U.S.-European technological disparities is expressed in the attached talk by Mr. Theodore Lefevre, former Belgian Prime Minister, given at Harvard last December (Attachment H). On the other hand, a study by Joseph Rosa shows that the rate of economic growth in most Western European countries over the past 15 years compares very favorably with that of the U.S. (Attachment I). 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. Confidential. Drafted by David Beckler. 2 Robert R. Bowie, Counselor of the Department, was designated as the State representative to Hornig's committee. (Memorandum from Read to Pollack, December 6; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316) No record of this meeting has been found. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 4 None of the attachments has been found. On November 30 the Department transmitted the transcript of the press conference to European posts in circular telegram 94188. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Office of Science and Technology, Vol. I (1966)) 5 See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1165–1167. 6 For a summary of this initiative, see Tab A to Document 4 . 7. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 7. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, January 13, 1967, 8:09 p.m. 118575. Subj: Technological Gap. 1. Following is general guidance on technological gap. Specific guidance for USRO action in NATO context as requested Paris 9979 2 by septel. 2. At December NATO Ministerial Meeting, Ministers recommended that North Atlantic Council perm reps study the procedure which might be followed for further examination and implementation of Italian proposal on technological gap, and report findings to Spring Ministerial meeting. 3. Three facets of technological disparities problem are politically important to U.S. First is problem of “technological gap” between Western Europe and U.S. which is primary subject this guidance. Second is implication any U.S. response may have in East-West context. Third is fact science and technology disparities is global problem and great gap between industrialized countries and LDCs is grave problem for economic development and world stability. 4. In one sense “technological gap” is by-product of American economic and military superiority over Europe and European reaction to this predominance. Europeans concerned that European industry will be unable to compete with marketable products of advanced technology even though technological superiority today in some areas rests with Europe. Gap concept reflects fear of “bigness” and is consciously used to stimulate larger government investment in science and technology. Problem unlikely be resolved in foreseeable future because Europeans unable on national basis to marshal resources needed to transform their societies at same pace as U.S. 5. In responding to gap problem, we will have three inter-related U.S. objectives: (A) in first instance, to deal directly with European attitude that U.S. is somehow responsible for gap; (B) to try to transform European concern with technological disparity into impetus for furthering intra-European cooperation and cohesion including UK relations with continent and European Communities; and (C) to improve Atlantic relations and strengthen OECD and NATO. 6. In pursuit of these political objectives, U.S. should: A Indicate general willingness to cooperate with Western Europeans and to welcome initiatives, including that of Italians, leaving to Europeans responsibility for developing specific proposals which involve intra-European action and agreement. B Actively continue mutually beneficial cooperative programs and joint projects underway and develop appropriate new ones in nuclear energy, space, exchange scientific information, in cooperative research as now carried out in OECD and in defense-related R&D and production. Institutionally Euratom provides an excellent partner for nuclear energy cooperation. We stand ready to cooperate in space activities with ELDO, ESRO, and bilaterally. 3 In OECD, cooperative research program is being more focused on problems of modern societies, water and air pollution, highway and auto safety research and problem of urban society. Moreover, major study of technological potentials has begun which we strongly support. NATO in addition to its science program provides opportunity and has machinery to deal with defense-related R&D and joint production as members may decide. C Review internally those policies and practices which lead to European charges that U.S. is responsible for “technological gap” and consciously seeks to maintain it. These may include a reassessment of our export controls, a look at U.S. corporate practices abroad, U.S. visa and immigration policy, and field of restrictive business practices. In this re-examination, U.S. must keep in mind that it would not be in our interest to restrain U.S. competitive position or to give away American technology through a Marshall Plan type program. Our aim is to diminish disparities through promoting a two-way flow of cooperation. At same time, we must recognize that the greatest volume of scientific and technological exchange occurs in private or commercial channels, and that role of U.S. government is minimal or merely facilitative. D Pursue action on a low key which would support UK in using her considerable resources and strengths in field of science and technology as leverage for membership in the European Communities. E React generally with restraint and minimum publicity to gap problem while Europeans are in process of sorting out their approach to this subject. F Point out that much greater gap in education, science, technology and the other benefits of modern society exists between industrialized countries of OECD and LDCs. It is this gap which must be reduced in interest of world peace and stability. 7. U.S. is already fully committed to support basic study of composition and characteristics of gap by OECD. Results of this OECD analysis may remove mystique of “gap” and demonstrate that many aspects of solution lie in European actions such as scales of market, organization, education, corporate structure, management techniques, etc. 8. Fanfani also introduced this proposal into EEC Council of Ministers prior to NATO Ministerial. A thorough examination of “technological gap” is scheduled for EEC consideration early in 1967. Beyond this, British prefer avoid arrangements or institutions which would undercut their efforts to use technology as lever in effort to join EEC. Impulse toward integration would be best served if European Communities in concert with UK were to accept major responsibility for development of measures and institutions to deal with technological gap. 9. In short, we support pluralistic approach to scientific and technological cooperation, utilizing whole range of existing institutions. As short term measures this sense, in absence of European grouping which could effectively push European reforms and proposals for joint actions, we propose place greatest emphasis on OECD structure as vehicle for our discussion with Europeans, advancing our general philosophy on subject after it takes shape in interim report to President about January 30. Main role of NATO discussion in present phase as we now see it is to sort out organization aspect, break up problem into components which can be handled by NATO and other organizations. U.S. will lend full support to this effort. 10. In addition to what may be done in framework of existing institutions an eventual special US-European conference on matter might be desirable. Such a conference, however would be premature until NATO and OECD actions clarify this complex subject. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential. Repeated to all NATO and OECD capitals and USRO. Drafted by Percival (EUR) on January 11; cleared by Jacob M. Myerson (RPM), Oswald H. Ganley (SCI), William M. Kerrigan (E), Jonathan Dean (C), and Springsteen (EUR); and approved by Bowie. 2 Not found. 3 See Documents 21 ff. 8. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 8. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, January 25, 1967, 1723Z. 11144. NATUS. BUSEC. Subject: Technological Gap. Ref: State 118575 circular. 2 1. While topic of “technological gap” is not on the agenda, initial meeting of Conference of National Armaments Directors February 13 offers a first test of whether NATO is going to do something about the “technological gap” besides talk about it. 2. We are in general agreement with the analysis and basic U.S. posture set forth reftel. Looked at from the point of view of enthusiasts such as Fanfani, this analysis comes perilously close to the rather chilly U.S. reply that (a) the “technological gap” between Europe and the rest of the world is larger and more important than the gap between Europe and the U.S.; (b) the U.S.-Europe gap is primarily a question of political and economic organization, and insufficient effort on the part of the Europeans; (c) the U.S. has been generally forthcoming in making scientific and technical information available and in its readiness to cooperate with its European allies whenever they were willing to meet us halfway, so that U.S.-European technical cooperation is essentially a matter of trying to do a little better what is already underway; and (d) no single step, whether a “Marshall Plan” or a cooperation project, initiated by the U.S. cld substitute for an across-the-boards effort by Europeans to improve scientific training, support of basic and applied research, modern management techniques, intra-European industrial and governmental cooperation, and continued enlargement of markets and industries. 3. Sensible Europeans recognize these things and are trying to bring their governments and private leaders to act on these premises. Hearing them said gently by the U.S., in NATO and in the OECD and other Atlantic institutions, can help these Europeans, and we should not hesitate to speak the truth as we see it. 4. One result may be a more vigorous European partnership with us in nuclear energy cooperation in EURATOM, in space cooperation in response to the President's general offers or our specific defense COMSAT offers in NATO, last year and in cooperative research development and production in the military field under the general auspices of NATO. Some concrete cooperation of this kind needs to come about. Such major activities will be a visible demonstration to the Europeans that their dialogue with us on technological cooperation is leading to concrete results. It will also respond to the political need to show that Atlantic cooperation is better than European independence—even if European selfhelp is an indispensable prerequisite to cooperation. 5. In NATO we can anticipate a good deal of general discussion of the nature and causes of the “technological gap.” We will probably conclude that the Europeans will need to get together in some fields through institutions like the European Communities either to cooperate or to compete with us effectively. Analyzing how technical advance can be transformed into technological progress will probably be recognized as the domain of the OECD. 6. These will be meritorious conclusions—but they will leave the question: what then can NATO actually do besides exhort? Some things are underway and can perhaps be given additional impulse: these include the defense communications satellite program, and such excellent NATO institutions as the SHAPE and SACLANT technical centers. 7. But the broadest, most important, and most central NATO role should properly be in fostering cooperation among NATO governments in the general field of military technology and future weapons research and production. It has, in the past, been a frustrating field in which to seek cooperation—but if we fail to find significant areas of cooperative development and production, then NATO will be subject to the criticism that it has failed to contribute in its peculiar area of responsibility to doing what could be done with the “technological gap” problem. Conversely, since a major reason for European difficulties in weapons development even with bilateral U.S. help is that the industrial capabilities and markets are too small on a national scale, we can use the current dialogue on the “technological gap” to urge again a broader European base and a multilateral approach. 8. As the “technological gap” comes under intensified discussion at the ministerial level and in public, NATO is just breaking in new machinery in its continuing effort to identify and initiate cooperative arms development and production. The Conference of National Armaments Directors is the capstone of a new committee structure which is intended to be more flexible and pragmatic than the old apparatus, dismantled last year, which succeeded in holding innumerable discussions and exchanges of information, but put in train very few actual hardware programs. 9. Because this is the first CNAD meeting, it needs to be a success. And because if NATO is to be relevant to the “technological gap” problem over the long-term, it must be so in this area, the U.S. representatives in the CNAD meeting should act and speak in a way which will move in this direction. 10. As a minimum this means two things: (a) the U.S. representative to the CNAD must be fully aware of the work and thinking of the Hornig Committee and be prepared to respond to the interest of his colleagues by saying something about how the U.S. views the problem and the potential contribution of the CNAD and its supporting committees to its solution; and (b) he should stress the importance of a flexible and pragmatic approach which, in the CNAD and in the advisory groups, seeks to identify practical programs of cooperation of mutual benefit to two or more NATO countries. If there is no other, the Defense COMSAT program is one obvious example to use—but surely there could be others. Cleveland 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential. Repeated to the White House for Hornig, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and to Brussels and Rome. 2 Document 7 . 9. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 9. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 31, 1967. Dear Mr. President: On November 25, 1966, you asked me to chair an Interdepartmental Committee to examine the problem of the “technological gap” between the United States and Western Europe and to explore possible courses of action. The preliminary report which you requested by the end of January is submitted herewith. 2 In this connection, the main issue which may face you in the near future concerns our position with respect to initiatives generated in Europe, such as the Fanfani proposal, and the development of constructive responses to such initiatives. The term was originated by Europeans and has been surrounded by a certain amount of controversy and confusion. Therefore, the first effort of the Committee has been to clarify the reality behind the expression “Technological Gap”. Our preliminary assessment convinces us that the Technological Gap is mainly a political problem although it has roots in actual disparities. A much higher degree of European economic integration will surely contribute in a major way to alleviating the underlying economic problems. We cannot be sure at this stage whether real progress will be made in this direction. U.K. entry into the Common Market offers the most promise at this time for narrowing technological/industrial disparities, though the success of the U.K. effort is far from certain. If progress is not made, widening disparities could pose longer range economic problems for the United States. Therefore, we have recommended a strategy to convert European resentment over the Gap into a constructive source of support for greater intra-European cooperation. Furthermore, unless there is European progress in a host of factors, such as education at all levels, work habits, and management and marketing practices, as well as in properly conceived research and development programs, the U.S. advantage is not likely to be diminished. Since the Gap is an important factor in U.S./European relations, we need to develop a deeper understanding of its economic and political aspects. We believe that we have identified the general nature of the problem, but our formulation will not be complete until we have heard further from the European governments, which are just now beginning to discuss the question among themselves. We are also investigating specific actions this government could take both to show its good will and to deal with the substance of the issue, but are not yet prepared to recommend any of them to you at this time. This report is, therefore, an interim report. Its main object is to define the political and economic problem as we see it, to outline a strategy for U.S. steps to be taken abroad in the near future, and to indicate the areas we are examining for possible action by this government and the European governments. We expect to submit a final report to you this June. Respectfully, Donald F. Hornig Chairman Robert R. Bowie , State 3 J. Herbert Hollomon , Commerce Donald M. MacArthur , Defense Samuel M. Nabrit , AEC Arthur M. Okun , CEA James E. Webb , NASA 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Office of Science and Technology, Vol. I [1967], Box 42. Confidential. 2 Not attached. A copy of the report is attached to a February 3 memorandum from Bowie to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US) 3 The following typed names appear on the source text. 10. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 10. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 1, 1967, 2020Z. 13261. NATUS. Subj: International technological cooperation. 1. The Italian proposal for international technological cooperation was discussed in the NAC meeting March 1. In addition to Bowie and FonMin Fanfani , UK represented by Edmond Dell, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Technology, and Belgium by Spaey, Secretary General of National Council of Science Policy. The most important results of the meeting were (a) consensus that this was a highly complex problem which could not be solved by a give-away program by the US nor simply by concentration on technology; (b) the main responsibility for making progress in diminishing the gap belongs to the Europeans themselves, with some cooperation by the US at appropriate but later stages; (c) a consensus that duplication of effort among international institutions should be avoided. (None of these points were formally summarized as NAC consensus, however.) On procedure, NAC agreed on terms of reference for a special working group to draft a report for the Permanent Council to submit to the NATO Ministers in June (see below). 2. As for the complexity of the problem, most speakers said that if progress was to be made on narrowing the gap it could not be the result of a simple device. Fanfani for instance did not mention “sharing patents” or anything of this type in his remarks. He stressed instead the serious political consequences for the future if the gap is allowed to grow. The other main point of his remarks concerned procedure (see below). Dell warned that there was a danger in getting too involved with the gaps that exist in glamour industries. The real problems lay in less dramatic fields such as industrial management and market organization. Spaey also stressed the complexity of the problem and the need to distinguish between the study aspect and the operational aspect. Boon (Netherlands) stated that Europeans must avoid only analyzing symptoms and should get to the roots. In the Dutch view there were four key elements that made up the roots of the problem: 1) mentality, 2) management, 3) organization, 4) finance. He believed no progress could be made in any of these areas unless there was increased European integration. 3. There also seemed to be agreement that the Europeans had to tackle this problem themselves in the first instance. While the speakers did not ignore the possible cooperation of the US it seemed obvious that they realized that they could not and should not look to US initially for help. Spaey underlined that Europe cannot simply depend on US assistance but must grow to a point where there can be a profitable two-way exchange between Europe and the US. The primary responsibility of the Europeans was in the remarks of all speakers, ranging from the emphatic to the implicit. 4. Within the same range there was also agreement that duplication of effort among the international institutions had to be avoided. While it seemed to be agreed that NATO should initially identify the various aspects of the gap problem which come under cognizance of other international organizations and that NATO would eventually end up itself with the defense technology aspect, it was not wholly clear from the Europeans discussion how work between the OECD and the EEC would be split up or phased. Fanfani talked about 5 stages of activity which might take place in dealing with the gap: a) each country first takes stock of its national situation; b) then stock-taking by the EEC, by EFTA and then by both organizations as a whole; c) after that discussions between the two sides of the Atlantic; d) gap diminution efforts would then be widened to other European countries; and e) such efforts would then extend to other countries of the world. Greece and Turkey did not hesitate to point out that the 6 should certainly become the 8 when they discuss gaps and that special consideration had to be given to Greece and Turkey. Grewe (Germany) repeated the German position that the discussion should start in the EEC with non-members added. He did not mention the OECD, although most other members talked about the responsibility of the OECD. 5. Bowie's remarks stressed the necessity to have a common definition of the problem, which is extremely complex involving many interrelated economic, social and technological factors. He agreed that much of the action will have to be taken in Europe, and assured NATO members that the US stands ready to cooperate. In addition to the role that NATO can play in the area of defense technology, Bowie underlined the fact that other international organizations have competence in different aspects of the over-all problem. 6. On the basis of a UK draft and considerable discussion NAC agreed on the following terms of reference for the special working group: “The Council decided to create a special working group to assist the Council in its study of the procedure which might be followed for further examination and implementation of the Italian proposals. “The working group should in particular—a. define further the nature of the problems to be faced; b. report on the progress of the studies being made on the consideration of the issues by other organizations concerned; c. report to the Council on any means of furthering the achievement of the objectives set out in the Italian proposals; d. define the area of work which may properly be done within NATO, including particularly the area of cooperation in defense technology. “The working party should prepare a draft of the report which the Council has to submit to Ministers at their meeting next June.” 7. Comment: This NAC meeting served very well to sharpen the focus of the Europeans on the gap problem. Although there was not a deep discussion of substance, it was nevertheless clear that movement so far seems to be in the right direction—the direction of Europe. The recognition by the Europeans that the problem, and its origins, are basically theirs seems to reflect conclusion that the more responsible thinkers on this subject are so far resisting the temptation to give it an anti-American twist. Accordingly, our current posture of standing ready to be helpful but not forcing the pace seems to be the right one. 8. A following cable reports meeting Brosio held this afternoon with Bowie and other visitors to get some drafting started. Cleveland 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential. Repeated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Brussels for BUSEC, London, and Rome. 11. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 11. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 15, 1967, 1:30 p.m. SUBJECT Highlights of Trip to Europe on the Technological Gap June 21–July 7, 1967 2 Political concern in Europe with the technological gap remains high. However, there has been a healthy shift in emphasis. Last year European political leaders seemed to feel the United States had developed a mysterious technique for moving ahead in science and technology which Europe could not match. They (e.g. Fanfani of Italy and Harmel of Belgium) called on the United States to restore the balance. Today, they see the problem more clearly as one of putting technological knowledge rapidly to effective use. They recognize that all of the major factors are ones they must deal with themselves, and there is no longer talk of a “Marshall Plan for technology.” But a deep uneasiness remains. There is a quite general feeling of having to defend themselves against the American colossus. They still want a “helping hand.” Two favorable developments have resulted from the heightened political interest in the technological gap. First, all the countries have stepped up the amount of resources devoted to higher education and to scientific research and development, some of them dramatically. Second, there is a growing feeling that European industry must be restructured on a continental scale, including the U.K., to get the scale of operation needed to take advantage of the opportunities offered by modern science and technology. In France this view was strongly held by industrial leaders, although it runs counter to de Gaulle's European policy. On the other hand, we encountered evidence of rising nationalism everywhere, most clearly in Germany, 3 where the view was expressed, for example, that a major modern State must have an independent capacity to produce computers which are the key to the new society of the electronic age. In France and the U.K. this view was shared and applied as well to the aeronautics industry. 4 Concern was expressed about extra-territorial controls resulting either from decisions taken in the home office in the United States affecting investment and employment policies of European subsidiaries or from the various U.S. Government rules and regulations applicable to transactions of subsidiaries in Europe by reason of the control of the parent company in the United States (e.g., trade with Eastern Europe). Of course, their economists generally agree with us that from a purely economic standpoint we all do best by letting the most efficient source provide new technology, no matter where it is. The critical policy issue to be faced by these countries, therefore, is the economic price they want to pay for such independence of national operations. It is clear that they are willing to pay some price, and this could lead to discriminatory measures against U.S. corporations. The Europeans feel they will ultimately find a European solution to their problems. Their principal concern is that this may be a slow process and in the interim American industry will securely establish itself in the lead in the key technologically advanced sectors and control important elements of the European economy. The U.S. posture of refraining from taking initiatives—and of friendly cooperation—has proved to be successful. However, the fear within Europe of U.S. domination in key European industries is a source of political strain. There are undercurrents of concern on this issue in certain countries that could damage our political and commercial ties with Europe. A possible constructive action which was discussed generally in every country was a “code of corporate good citizenship” which might be generated informally or through international agreement. It would (1) be a guide to good citizenship of international corporations in host countries and (2) protect corporations against discrimination if they complied. It was my general impression that in all of the six countries visited (plus NATO, OECD and EEC) there was real appreciation of the concern by the U.S. for their problem and the search for constructive action. The Ambassadors all felt that the visit had created a great deal of good will. The conclusions from this trip, as well as the results of the studies undertaken here, will be incorporated in the report of our Technological Gap Committee which we hope to submit to you on September 1st. Donald F. Hornig 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. Secret. Drafted by Daniel F. Margolies, Beckler, and Hornig. 2 In a May 18 memorandum to the President, Hornig raised the idea of a mission to Europe to discuss technology gap issues. (Ibid.) He explained that since November 1966, when he had been named to chair the interagency committee studying the problem, the Europeans had been expecting a visit, an idea that was supported by the State Department. Prior to his departure on June 21, Hornig updated the President's Special Assistant, Marvin Watson, on the issues and included a request: “Since it is a tight rope walk, I would very much like to meet very briefly with the President to get his point of view so I can take a stance which coincides with his outlook.” (Memorandum from Hornig to Watson, June 21; ibid., National Security File, Agency File, Office of Science and Technology, Vol. 1 (1967)) No record that Hornig spoke with the President prior to his departure has been found. 3 Hornig's discussions in Germany are detailed in telegram 162 from Bonn, July 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, ORG 7 OST) 4 The meetings in France are summarized in telegram 3 from Paris, July 1. (Ibid., SCI 1–1 EURW–US) The London visit is reported in airgram A–454 from London, August 2. (Ibid., ORG 7 OST) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 12. Memorandum of Conversation 12. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 18, 1967, 5:30 p.m. SUBJECT Technological Gap PARTICIPANTS Italy His Excellency Giuseppe Saragat, President of the Italian Republic His Excellency Amintore Fanfani, Minister for Foreign Affairs United States The President The Secretary Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President Mr. Neil Seidenman, Interpreter The President said that Foreign Minister Fanfani's proposal made in NATO to narrow the technological gap between the US and Western Europe had aroused considerable interest. On this point we are attempting to co-operate in every possible way, both through NATO and the OECD. Dr. Hornig, the President's Scientific Adviser, is presently engaged in a thoroughgoing study of the matter. We must still arrive at a definition of the problem which will help us discover the ways in which we can co-operate further. We are very much in debt to the Foreign Minister for his leadership in this field. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69,SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Secret. The source text is Part IV of VI. Drafted by Neil Seidenman (LS), approved in S on September 2 and by the White House (Edward Fried) on October 5. The meeting was held at the White House. 13. Memorandum of Conversation 13. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Brussels, December 11, 1967, 9:30 a.m. S/MS/2 UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTIETH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL Brussels, Belgium, December 12–14, 1967 PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Secretary Leddy Ambassador Knight E.S. Glenn Belgium Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants SUBJECT Technological Gap The Prime Minister said that there was widespread talk in Belgium and all of Europe that the technological gap between the United States and Europe was increasing and was becoming very dangerous. Sometime ago President Johnson made a speech saying that it was not the intent of the United States to broaden that gap but that speech came at a moment when public opinion in Europe was not prepared to understand it and it did not produce much effect. At present public opinion is much more alive to the problem and if President Johnson were, again, to make a speech along the same lines and in particular to say that he urged American firms investing in Europe to carry out technically advanced production in Europe so as to close rather than increase the gap, this would have the most salutary effect. The Secretary said that indeed the United States does not seek to increase the gap and it is possible that a statement of this kind may be made. It is important, however, that as at the time when the Marshall Plan was first announced, there should be European leadership in evidence to show that the Europeans are interested in cooperating with the United States in narrowing the technological gap. The Prime Minister agreed with this point of view that European leadership can and should be forthcoming. The Secretary said that he would report this conversation to the President immediately upon his return and that he would suggest that the Prime Minister might direct a personal message to the President on this subject. The President would certainly be most interested in receiving such a communication. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69,SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Secret. This memorandum is Part IV of IV. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister's office. In an attached memorandum from Bowie to Rusk of December 22, Bowie told the Secretary that the idea of a major speech by President Johnson on the technological gap had been considered by the Interdepartmental Committee and rejected. Rusk agreed to discuss the issue with the President in light of the Hornig committee's decision if the Belgian Prime Minister raised the issue again, but there is no indication that he did so. 14. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 14. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 22, 1967. Attached is a report of the “Technological Gap Committee” 2 you asked me to chair just a year ago. Your request came after the “Gap” had been raised during the visits of several Heads of State. At that time it had acquired political and emotional significance—for example, in the Fanfani suggestion of a Technological Marshall Plan. Although the issue has subsequently been raised from time to time (e.g., by Prime Ministers Wilson and Harmel), the “low-key” strategy suggested in our preliminary report last January has paid off handsomely. The analyses carried out in OECD, NATO and EC agree with each other and with this report as to what is involved—education, management, markets, etc.—and much of the heat has come off. For the present, the mystique has gone out of the “Gap.” But we should not be deceived into thinking the problem has gone away. Europeans now understand it, but they have yet to solve it. As they feel the hot breath of American competition, the pressure for us to “do something” will likely increase again. This view seems to be borne out by the December 13th cable from Brussels from Secretary Rusk pointing to rising concern. Although we suggest many small steps, big steps can only be taken in Europe. However, the steps we suggest do add up to a constructive response, and I consider it important that we take such steps as are feasible at regular intervals so as to maintain a posture of concern and interest. A very important move in that direction is a proposal on its way to you from the Bureau of the Budget that government-purchased computers must be compatible with internationally established standards. I recommend that you approve the actions outlined in the Committee's cover memorandum 3 and would like an opportunity to discuss the Committee's recommendations with you, after which I might brief the press on the outcome of this effort. Donald F. Hornig 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 4. No classification marking. 2 Not attached; see Document 15 . 3 Document 15 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 15. Memorandum From the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap to President Johnson 15. Memorandum From the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 22, 1967. SUBJECT Principal Points Raised in Report on the Technological Gap The final report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap is submitted herewith for your consideration (Attachment B). 2 This Committee was created in November 1966 by NSAM 357 3 to examine the problem of technological disparities between the U.S. and Western Europe and to explore possible courses of action. We submitted a preliminary report in January 1967 and subsequently have completed a detailed analysis of the problem including a survey of American direct investments in Europe (Attachment C). 4 Members of the Committee have had discussions with key European governmental and industrial leaders, and with leaders from American industry and universities. We have also cooperated in a joint study with the OECD countries in preparation for a Ministers of Science meeting next March. In our study, we have started from the proposition that the expansion of technological capability and freer exchange of technology on both sides of the Atlantic can be to the mutual advantage of the U.S. and Western Europe and, indeed, the entire world. THE “TECHNOLOGICAL GAP” The problem of the “technological gap” is only partly technological. Psychological, political, economic, and social factors are probably more important. —The European lag in technological know-how is largely in a few sectors of advanced technology, principally those that have benefited from U.S. military, space, and atomic energy programs—computers, advanced aircraft, microminiature electronic components, civil nuclear power, space communications. —Although Europeans are concerned about the long-term national implications of these technological disparities, they also recognize the existence of an economically more significant lag in European industrial abilities to utilize available technology. For example, many inventions made in Europe were first introduced commercially in the U.S. —The European lag in the utilization of technological know-how is due to a number of long-standing structural factors that only the European countries themselves can overcome, including: underinvestment in education; less aggressive and skilled management; less profit-oriented social customs and work habits; slowness in industrial modernization; small size of firms and national markets; conservative investment attitudes; and lack of mobility and inadequate number of highly trained personnel. This general view of the situation is now widely shared by informed European leaders. It represents a marked change in their understanding during the past year. In our view, the technological gap problem is a current manifestation of the historical differences between Europe and the U.S. in aggressiveness and dynamism, reflecting the American frontier past and its restless quest for progress and change. The Problem for the U.S. Improved European understanding of the nature of the technological gap has already led to some corrective steps, both nationally and European-wide—a constructive response to American competitive pressures. However, many Europeans are concerned that during the time they are taking corrective actions the U.S. will move further ahead of them in advanced technological development and industrial innovation, and will capture greater control of world markets for advanced technological products. This concern has been sharpened by the very rapid growth of American direct investments in the technology-intensive industries of Western Europe. Some Europeans are also concerned that major decisions affecting the future of European industry, and even their national independence, may not be in their hands. They feel they may be undesirably influenced by American corporate decisions and by U.S. governmental trade and financial controls. Other Europeans recognize that American investment has been a highly valuable force in moving their economies forward. As we see it, the technological gap issue is one aspect of the broad disparities in power and economic strength between the U.S. and a fragmented Europe which will be a recurrent problem for a long time to come. The frictions caused by these general disparities will continue, and will take different forms—economic and political—from time to time. Although European concerns about the technological gap may be exaggerated, they may nonetheless result in European counteractions to discriminate against American firms or products and in other measures that would pose political and economic difficulties for the U.S. However, we believe that the adoption of restrictive measures by Western European countries and ensuing pressures for countermeasures by the U.S. can be deterred (if not prevented) by: (a) a continuing long-range program of U.S. actions designed to show our cooperativeness, our desire to promote European advance, and our willingness to remove obstacles to the exchange of technology, and (b) the self-interest of European countries and their firms in maintaining the flow of American technology and management skills. U.S. Strategy The only long-range “cure” for the disparities problem lies in actions which must be taken by Europeans themselves: internal reforms in the European countries and moves toward greater European integration and cooperation. There is little that the U.S. government can or should do by way of direct assistance. But, the U.S. can play a significant complementary role—primarily through promoting scientific and technological cooperation and through the mutual reduction of obstacles to the flow of technology and related trade. At the same time, we should maximize both the short-term and long-term economic benefits to the U.S. from the transfer of technology. We should utilize our technological position to achieve the objectives set forth in this report. Events of the past year have confirmed the soundness of the overall strategy recommended in our report of last January. Although we should look mainly to European initiatives, the U.S. should provide a positive response to European concerns. The U.S. should try to convert European resentment about the technological gap into a constructive source of support for greater intra-European cooperation for solving the underlying problems. At the same time, we should discourage parochial solutions and attempt to ensure an outward-looking Europe which will be a strong force in the world economy. Specifically, the U.S. should: —stress that the U.S. and Europe have a joint stake in technological and economic progress; that our future prosperity is mutually interdependent; and that all stand to gain by promoting an open technological market, the international flow of scientific and technological advances, as well as management and organizational skills; —acknowledge (in low-key) that there is a U.S.-European gap in ability to utilize technological know-how, and to a certain extent in technological know-how per se; that this is a problem of mutual concern; and that the U.S. is prepared to participate constructively in seeking mutually beneficial actions—but that the basic actions to strengthen Europe must be taken by the Europeans themselves; —underscore the very extensive U.S. governmental programs and efforts to share the results of federally-financed research and development and to cooperate in R&D activities with Western European countries—in defense, aerospace, atomic energy, and other sectors; —emphasize that the technological gap issue reveals an essential need for the effective integration of Western Europe, and encourage Europeans to strengthen institutions which can deal comprehensively with the disparities problem, particularly the OECD and the European Communities; —avoid U.S. actions that might divert European attention from the need to act within a European framework, while taking initiatives that promote multilateral cooperation; —continue to work toward a common understanding of the nature and causes of the disparities and the role of governments in creating an atmosphere conducive to innovation, in the forthcoming meeting of the OECD Ministers of Science and other forums as they arise. In implementing the foregoing strategy, the U.S. should: —carry out the Kennedy Round agreements and avoid the imposition of new barriers to trade; —take the initiative to cooperate with Western European countries in the mutual reduction of non-tariff trade barriers (including “Buy American” and corresponding European restrictions on government procurement) through appropriate channels as soon as preparations and conditions permit; —analyze the contributions of American direct investments abroad to achieving U.S. national goals (optimum growth of national income, full employment, price stability, satisfactory balance of payments, freedom of international capital movements, foreign assistance), and minimize the inconsistencies of various national policies in relation to these goals; —continue to develop among COCOM members a better understanding of the major technological-security issues involved in their controls in advance of the need for a particular control action; —explore ways to encourage joint U.S.-European technological contributions to governmental programs of common interest (such as defense, space pollution, and transportation), particularly through appropriate consortia of U.S.-European companies; —assist European initiatives toward intra-European technological cooperation in space science and technology, in atomic energy, and in the application of computers in research, industry, and government; —lead in the strengthening of international mechanisms for the exchange of scientific and technical information and for the development of internationally agreed commercial standards, and in promoting international patent cooperation; —promote exchanges between the U.S. and Western Europe of scientists, engineers, industrialists, and public officials to transfer technical skills and management understandings in relation to the problem of technological disparities; —cooperate with European governments in applying science and technology to the common problems of highly industrialized countries—in air and water pollution and urban problems, for example. Recommendations The Interdepartmental Committee has agreed on the substance of the attached report and recommends: a that you endorse the foregoing strategy and the proposed assignment of responsibilities set forth in the attachment to this memorandum (Attachment A); 5 b that the responsibility for annual review of the implementing studies and actions be placed in the Senior Interdepartmental Group; c that the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments undertake a broad examination of the role of American direct investment in Western Europe in relation to U.S. overall economic and foreign policy goals, making use of studies by other agencies including the office of the President's Special Trade Representative; d that this memorandum and its attachments be distributed to appropriate U.S. officials and Ambassadors to communicate the understandings in the report and to facilitate follow-up actions; and e that the Department of Commerce publicly release an appropriate version of the background analytical report (Attachment C). Since we are not recommending major U.S. initiatives, we do not believe it desirable to make a Presidential statement concerning this report. However, in view of the considerable public interest in this report, I will be pleased to make a statement to the press reporting its submission and explaining its general thrust, if you so desire. Donald Hornig Mr. Robert R. Bowie 6 Department of State Dr. Donald M. MacArthur Department of Defense Dr. John F. Kincaid Department of Commerce Mr. James E. Webb National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dr. Arthur M. Okun Council of Economic Advisers Mr. Wilfrid Johnson Atomic Energy Commission Mr. John R. Petty (Observer) Department of the Treasury Mr. Donald F. Turner (Observer) Department of Justice Ambassador William M. Roth (Observer) Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Memos and Misc. [II], Box 60. Confidential. Transmitted to the President under cover of a memorandum from Hornig, Document 14 . 2 Not printed. 3 Document 5 . 4 Not printed. 5 Not printed. No action was taken on this attachment, and on March 16, 1968, Hornig wrote to the President: “Last December I sent you the report of the Technological Gap Committee which you had asked me to chair. Since I have had no response and have been unable to locate the report in the White House, another copy is attached for your attention.” (Memorandum from Hornig to Johnson, March 16, 1968; Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 6) 6 The following typed names appear on the source text. 16. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 16. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 12, 1968, 1909Z. 11403. CEDTO. Subject: Science Ministerial Discussion—Technological Gaps. 1. Discussion completed March 11 this major agenda item highlighted general endorsement OECD studies, need for European economic unity, and follow-up work on diffuse issue involving non-tariff barriers, restrictive business practices and patent-licensing procedures research intensive industries. 2. Chairman Stoltenberg (Germany) set tone for conference by stressing increasing significance OECD forum, particularly European-US dialogue, all common problems science and technology. He referred directly to value OECD discussions backing up current EC planning for concerted attack on technological problems which has objective of extension other European countries. CSP Chairman Spaey (Belgium) followed by underscoring current and future OECD efforts in creating conditions for success in development through science (education, research technology transfer). 3. Lead off speaker on gaps Rubinacci (Italy) pointed to need for effective European political economic social unity in order to have constructive competition and dialogue with US for balanced economic development. His proposals to ministerial meeting included international scientific and technical info system for industry needs, unification patent rules and technical standards, encouragement of research by US firms in Europe, technological forecasting studies, promotion research in large public sectors concerned with social economic goals. 4. Some 20 speakers including EC and Council of Europe observers praised and endorsed OECD work but focused little on CSP recommendations. Statements and follow-up discussion pushed by French, Belgian and Japanese reps focused largely on removal obstacles to technology transfer between US and other member countries. Issue took form of need for further work on non-tariff barriers, restrictive business practices, with extended discussion of patent licensing arrangements. 5. French Minister Schuman noting irreplaceable value OECD forum, and positive Hornig statement January US science policy review concerning availability technology, stated value of Kennedy negotiations put in doubt unless access to technology improved. He proposed OECD identify obstacles, set up negotiating machinery to facilitate transfer, particularly government patents, establishment code good business conduct. 6. Belgian PM Vanden Boeynants stressed value European technological community, enlarged EC, need for Europeans agree among themselves in order to negotiate with US. 7. Japanese Vice Minister Inoue as expected pushed for OECD work on international understanding aimed at removing restrictions on “basic” patent licenses which they say are common property of all mankind. 8. Hornig stated US anxious see expansion technological capabilities all OECD countries and US willingness to cooperate mutually beneficial reduction technology transfer barriers on specific issues. He endorsed analysis and recommendations in CSP report on gaps and noted US willingness exchange views on how multinational firms can most effectively complement national scientific and technological efforts. He clearly distinguished between actions US Government could take and those which lie within private sector. 9. Issue resolved by ministerial agreement member governments exchange views for improving condition technology transfer and negotiate as may be appropriate when specific problems identified. OECD requested establish inventory technology transfer obstacles especially field of patent licenses with view possible discussions and negotiations. Inventory to distinguish between patents subject control of government and those which are not. 10. This agreement, para 9 above, contained in recommendations attached to aide-mémoire to governments. Other modification in draft recommendations, ref annex to CMS (68)3, now refers to exchange of views on conditions which multinational companies, foreign owned companies and joint ventures could most effectively complement national scientific and technological effort including question maintaining research activities in countries where they operate plus original text of ref document. Second item under exchange of views shortened to say “the means for facilitating access to patents and scientific and technological information.” Hornig stated US Government would like to make it absolutely clear that US not in position to negotiate terms or conditions patent licenses private sector, ministerial aide-mémoire to governments, DAS/SPR/68.12 (1st rev.), essentially same as US text put forward as Secretariat document and approved by CSP. 11. Short press release notes agreement, para 9 above. Proposed text noting economic political fragmentation of Europe presents obstacles requiring concerted action and concrete steps towards European scientific technological policy dropped on French objection. Belgium and Netherlands backed UK in wanting inclusion. 12. Message other aspects science ministerial will follow. Brown 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 3 OECD. Limited Official Use. Also sent to Brussels for USEC and pouched to all OECD capitals. 17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 2, 1968. Attached is a final report of the interagency committee on the “technological gap” between the U.S. and Western Europe 2 which you created in November 1966 under my chairmanship (NSAM 357). Your action was taken after the “gap” issue had been raised with you by several European leaders, e.g., Prime Ministers Wilson and Harmel and Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani. The committee report has the agreement of the participating agencies (State, Defense, Commerce, NASA, AEC, CEA). There are no major differences of view for you to resolve, and the agencies are prepared to undertake the follow-up actions. In brief, the report proposes that the U.S. Government continue to follow the “low-key” strategy recommended in our preliminary report a year ago. It concludes that there is little that the U.S. can or should do by way of major initiatives or direct assistance, since the only long-range “cure” lies in actions which must be taken by Europeans themselves. This strategy has already paid off handsomely . During the past year much of the mystique (and political and emotional heat) has gone out of the “gap”, largely as the result of studies carried out in the OECD and NATO and in the European Communities. There is now widespread agreement among Europeans that the “gap” is principally a lag in the utilization of technological know-how due to a number of factors—education, management, markets, etc., as well as technology. This was evident at the OECD Ministers of Science meeting which I attended on March 11 and 12. European attention appears to be shifting from “gaps” to creating the conditions needed to relate technological developments to progress. While the committee report recognizes that the big steps needed to improve European industrial performance can only be taken in Europe, it urges that the U.S. make a positive response to European concerns—to deter the possible adoption of restrictive measures against American firms in Europe and to maximize the economic benefits to the U.S. from the transfer of technology. To implement the foregoing strategy, the report proposes a number of steps (Attachment A): —mutual reduction of non-tariff barriers to the flow of technology-intensive products; —improving the administration of our trade and financial controls on the flow of technology to Western Europe, and developing a better understanding among COCOM members of the technological issues involved in their controls; —a study by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to define the role of American direct investment in Western Europe in relation to U.S. economic and foreign policy goals; —developing international principles concerning the rights and responsibilities of foreign subsidiaries; —expanding Western European direct investments in the U.S.; —cooperating with Western European countries on government-financed development and procurement; —intensifying U.S./Western European educational exchange programs in selected areas, particularly industrial management; —promoting the exchange of scientific and technical information, international patent cooperation and the development of common commercial standards; —encouraging further U.S.-European technological cooperation on governmental programs of common interest such as pollution, transportation and urban problems. The Committee further recommends: (a) that the report be transmitted to our Ambassadors in Western Europe for comment and for advice regarding the desirability of public release of an edited version, and (b) that the report and recommendations be submitted to the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) for follow-up action. Accordingly, I recommend that you approve these two recommendations and that the agencies be informed that they may proceed along the lines agreed in the report. Refer report and recommendations to the SIG for follow-up: Yes__No__ 4 Donald F. Hornig 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Box 6. Confidential. Drafted by Beckler. 2 Attachment A, not attached. The final technology gap committee report as distributed to posts is in circular airgram 8702, June 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US) 4 Neither option is checked, but see Document 18 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 18. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 18. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, June 13, 1968. SUBJECT Interdepartmental Committee Report on the Technological Gap The attached report 2 prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap chaired by Dr. Hornig was submitted to the President on December 22, 1967. The President has reviewed the report and, in line with its recommendations, has referred the report to the Senior Interdepartmental Group. Studies undertaken by NATO, the OECD, the European Communities and various private organizations, and discussions between ourselves and European leaders during the past year have done much to clarify the economic and social factors involved in the Technological Gap, and have helped dissipate the political pressures which tended to dominate the early stages of the debate on this subject. The OECD Science Ministerial meeting, which was held March 11–12, 1968, constituted another major step in this progression. The most important results of this meeting, attended not only by science and education ministers, but also by some ministers of economics and industry, were: (1) a clear endorsement of the results of the OECD studies, which in most respects parallel the conclusions presented in the Report to the President; (2) a consensus that national and joint action on the part of Europeans will be required as the principal contribution to technological progress in Europe; (3) a general political relaxation and a turning away from a “blame the U.S.” philosophy to a more realistic intra-European introspection. Evidence is thus at hand that the U.S. strategy first enunciated in the Preliminary Report to the President in January 1967, and further detailed in the final report of December 22, 1967, has been and is successful in dealing with the problems engendered by the Technological Gap. It is my view that most of the recommendations and tasks enumerated in Annex A 3 are being pursued in an orderly fashion by appropriate government agencies. I am satisfied that the present efforts in these areas are sufficient to meet U.S. needs and see no need to inject a sense of urgency into the studies and actions now underway. I would suggest that studies underway be continued and remain principally directed at their original aims. Those items requiring additional comments are as follows: 1. Since this report was written, the Commerce Technical Advisory Board has broadened its scope to include all relevant aspects of government and industrial policies affecting international transfer and use of technology. 2. In the case of the studies of the Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments and those underway in the Office of the President's Trade Representative, I propose bringing to the attention of the heads of these groups the report to the President and pertinent reports of the OECD in order that they can take note of some of the special problems inherent in research-intensive sectors of the economy. 3. The Department of Defense is urged in the report to assess the feasibility of reducing selectively the 50% bidding differential for foreign procurement of research-intensive products. DOD, DOT, NASA are asked to study the possibilities for more joint R&D, and promoting consortia between U.S. and European firms including the question of procurement programs. In light of our present Balance of Payments difficulties, it does not seem desirable to pursue either goal at this time. A study, viewing the situation in the long term, may, however, be profitable. 4. Under present budgetary restrictions it does not seem practical to ask the Congress for monies to increase US-Western European educational exchange programs. 5. Intensive and continuous efforts are being made to improve overall scientific and technical cooperation with Western Europe and Japan. The matter of scientific and technical information exchanges is being vigorously and urgently pursued in special committees of the OECD and UNESCO/ICSU. The report is being transmitted to our Ambassadors in OECD countries and they have been asked to comment on the desirability of publishing an edited version of the report. As far as any other publicity is concerned, it is my recommendation that for the present it be kept to a minimum. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Memos and Misc. [II], Box 60. Confidential. Drafted by Oswald H. Ganley (SCI) and cleared by William M. Kerrigan (E), William G. Barraclough (EUR/RPE), and Donald R. Lesh (U/SIG). The source text is Attachment A to a July 2 memorandum from Arthur Hartman to SIG members, informing them that after Presidential review, the report had been referred to the SIG and circulated to U.S. overseas missions in OECD countries for information. The memorandum also indicated that no immediate action was required. 2 Not printed; footnote 2, Document 17 . 3 Reference is to the attached report. 19. Airgram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 19. Airgram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 15, 1968. CEDTO A–897 SUBJECT Technological Gap Hornig Report REF CA–8702, June 14 2 The report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Technological Gap makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the subject. This Mission is in complete accord with the conclusion that the technological gap is only to a very limited degree a question of technological leads and lags. It clearly was the presence of political, psychological and economic considerations that enhanced the danger that the gap might develop into a divisive force of considerable importance in our relations with Western Europe. Due in large measure to United States willingness to cooperate in investigating the causes and effects of the gap in the OECD and NATO, and as a result of the educational process that also took place, much of the sensitivity surrounding the issue has been removed. It is apparent that the subject no longer arouses the strong emotions that it did, as recently as a year ago. The Mission, therefore, believes there would be little advantage in making public an appropriately edited version of the report at this time. Issuance of an official high-level report on the gap, even in a heavily edited version, might only serve to bring the issue once again to the forefront of the political arena, and we believe it best that it remains quiescent. Trezise 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Lester E. Edmunds, cleared by Philip R. Cook, and approved by Ambassador Trezise. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 20. Airgram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 20. Airgram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, August 5, 1968. A–2504 SUBJECT Technological Gap REF CA–8702 2 Dr. Hornig's final report to the President is an excellent study of the problems which comprise the Technological Gap issue. It is particularly valuable in that it analyses the Gap in terms of a very broad variety of inter-related problems some of which, heretofore, have been approached largely on a piecemeal, sector-by-sector basis. A substantial number of the points brought out in the report were very effectively presented by Dr. Hornig and members of his delegations during the several major OECD science policy meetings of the past three years. As a direct result, many French government and industrial leaders were brought to a more realistic understanding of the nature of the problems and the fact that their resolution (or amelioration) cannot be dependent upon some form of American largesse but, at base, must be approached in terms of structural reforms to be carried out by the Europeans themselves. This broadening awareness has certainly played a large part in vitiating the shrill and relatively uninformed political outcry which characterized initial European approaches to the Technological Gap issue. However, with the subsidence of that initial round of European agitation on the Gap issue, it has become all too easy for us to lose sight of a basic fact—the problem in Europe remains. Many of the underlying causes of the Technological Gap (inflexible and outmoded educational system and managerial practices, lack of innovative climate, severely limited mobility of highly trained personnel, etc.) were among the very factors which led to the May–June upheavals in French universities, government laboratories and high technology industries. These demonstrations cogently pointed up the magnitude and severity of the unresolved problems facing France in these and other areas. Protracted and searching confrontations and discussions during and since the May–June events have brought to surface and underscored the formidable difficulties the French face in their attempts to determine and successfully implement fundamental reforms which can meet their problems. Although some intensive efforts are underway within the French Government to devise new and effective reforms, the prospect of significant near-term successes appears, at best, highly doubtful. There is, in fact, a distinct possibility that failure to achieve timely results in line with expectations could bring the government under renewed pressures. Since some French leaders might then find it difficult to resist a search for scapegoats, a new wave of Technological Gap agitation could result with the United States again cast as the villain of the piece. Such a prospect was foreshadowed only a few days ago when M. Lattes, Managing Director of METRA, the largest French computer service organization operating under “Plan Calcul,” expressed the firm belief that the Gap is going to increase rapidly during the next ten years and will become a major divisive force separating the United States and Europe. Lattés, who is active in top advisory committees of the Plan Calcul, DGRST 3 and IRIA, 4 displayed very strong feelings on the Gap and spoke of it in highly emotional terms. In another recent conversation, M. Wacrenier, a senior member of the DGRST, pointed out that, on conclusion of the present crash efforts to meet the more immediate crisis problems, he believed that the Technological Gap question could quite possibly receive fresh emphasis. Foreign Minister Debré himself, at his first Foreign Ministry staff meeting only a few days ago, demonstrated anew his deep concern regarding the presence and role of U.S. industrial firms in Europe. According to Quai Director of American Affairs Jurgensen, after identifying “Le Defi Americain” as one of the principal “dangers” confronting France, Debré went on to expound at length on the Servan-Schreiber economic and financial theme that U.S. industry in Europe constitutes the threat to European independence. (See Embtel 18383, July 23, 1968.) 5 Dr. Hornig's report is a national policy paper cast largely in terms of U.S. interests. Consequently, we feel that it would not be suitable in its present form for open publication or presentation to French officials. However, the French Government's intensive search for solutions has created an atmosphere of potential interest among French leaders in constructive analyses of just this nature. These leaders, some of whom only recently came to their jobs with the new government, thus constitute something of a ready-made audience. We believe that this affords an opportunity to employ to advantage the background study on Gap now in preparation in the Department of Commerce. Assuming that it covers—and may expand upon—those elements of the Hornig report which describe and analyze causes of the European lag in utilization of technological know-how, we recommend that it be completed on a timely basis and made available to the Embassy for selective presentation to key French government and industrial leaders. As an objective, analytical background study, that paper could be given a serious and appreciative reception within the French Government. Since the appearance of an American Hornig report is anticipated with widespread interest in France, association of Dr. Hornig's name with the study—perhaps through a brief, signed introduction or in some other manner—would certainly further enhance the authority and effectiveness of the paper. Shriver 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SCI 1–1 EURW–US. Confidential; Noforn; Priority. Drafted by Edgar L. Piret and Harding W. Ballough (SCI) on July 30; cleared by Jack R. Perry (POL), Robert J. Morris (ECON), the Minister, and Ambassador Shriver; and approved by Piret. 2 See footnote 2, Document 19 . 3 Delegation General Recherche a la Scientifique et Technique. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 Institut de la Recherche d'Informatique Appliquees. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, FN 9 FR-US) 6 Initialed for Shriver by Piret. Cooperation in Space Cooperation in Space 21. Letter From the Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Dryden) to President Johnson Washington, January 21, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 260. No classification marking. 22. Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson Washington, January 31, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14. Confidential. 23. Report Prepared by the Committee on National Security Policy Planning Implications of Outer Space in the 1970s, Basic National Security Policy Planning Task I (1) Washington, January 30, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1 US. Secret. The 20 Committee members were drawn from international departments and agencies including the Department of State, NASA, ACDA, OST, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The paper was reviewed by Walt Rostow and the Policy Planning Group. In the preface, Rostow called this report “a pioneering study, the first to relate the scientific-technical intelligence and political factors involved in our future space policy relating to national security problems.” (p. iii) 24. Memorandom From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 4, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14. No classification marking. 25. National Security Action Memorandum No. 285 Washington, March 3, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199. Confidential. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Charles E. Johnson, and Secretary Rusk. 26. Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson Washington, April 30, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14. Confidential. 27. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 15, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 28. Action Memorandum From the Acting Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, December 8, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Scientific and Technological Development, 1965. Secret. Cleared by Edwin M. Kretzmann (SCI), Scott George (G/PM), and William R. Tyler (EUR). A copy was sent to Ambassador Harriman. 29. Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson Washington, December 18, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14. Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. 30. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey Washington, March 1, 1965. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964–April 1967, 150.F.9.10 (F). No classification marking. No official minutes of the Space Council meetings were kept. According to a later Humphrey staff memorandum: “The Executive Secretary has been approached by the staff regarding the preparation of a record of action memorandum signed by the Chairman to be sent to the Council members following the meetings. The Executive Secretary is opposed on the basis that the meeting results are privileged material. At present, interested individuals from the participating Agencies are briefed on the meeting results at their request on an ad hoc basis by the Executive Secretary.” The result was that each agency had its own interpretation of the taken decisions which could lead to confusion: “In instances where the participating Agency may be lukewarm about the Council findings the net result can be inaction.” (“Suggestions for Improving the Effectiveness of the Space Council,” May 3, 1966; ibid.) 31. Editorial Note 32. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, April 26, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1 US. Confidential. 33. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 29, 1965. Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152, SP 1–1 USSR 1965. Unclassified. Drafted by M.F. Smith (SCI). A notation on the source text indicates that the Secretary saw the memorandum. 34. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, August 26, 1965, 7:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 10 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by William H. Edgar (EUR/SOV) on August 25 and cleared in draft by Martin Rosenberg (FE), Peter T. Higgins (AF), Peter D. Constable (NEA), Margaret E. Beshore (ARA), James B. Freeman (P), and James W. Milner (SCI). Cleared in substance by David H. Henry (SOV), Llewellyn Thompson (S/AL), Richard M. Moose (S/SO), Thomas W. Wilson (IO), and Bromley Smith (White House); and approved by Richard H. Davis (EUR). 35. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, September 8, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 US–USSR. Limited Official Use; Priority. No time of transmission appears on the source text; the telegram was received at 9:51 a.m. 36. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, December 23, 1965, 1940Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 EUR-US. Confidential. Repeated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and NASA for Webb. 37. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, December 28, 1965, 1630Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 EUR-US. Confidential. Passed to NASA for Webb on December 28. 38. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, December 30, 1965, 1910Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 EUR-US. Confidential. Also sent to London, The Hague, Bonn, Rome, Brussels for USEC, Stockholm, Bern, Vienna, Madrid, and Luxembourg. 39. Letter From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Frutkin) Washington, February 9, 1966. Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. Confidential. Drafted by Trevanion H.E. Nesbitt (SCI) on February 8 and cleared by Leroy F. Percival (EUR/RPE) in draft. 40. Memorandum for the Record Washington, March 23, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Scientific and Technological Development 1966. Confidential. Drafted by James E. Goodby (S/P) on March 25. 41. Memorandum for the Files Washington, March 29, 1966. Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Milner (SCI) on April 5. 42. Editorial Note 43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, April 20, 1966, 5:17 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. Drafted by Percival (EUR/RPE), Milner (SCI), and George (G/PM) and cleared by Jerome H. Kahan (ACDA), Murray (DOD) (informed), Hausman (NASA) (informed), and Howard Meyers (G/PM) in draft. Also sent to Brussels, Canberra, London, Paris, Rome, and The Hague; and repeated to Geneva. 44. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) Washington, May 12, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, ORG 7 NASA. Confidential. Drafted by Nesbitt (SCI) and cleared by Johnson (G), Schaetzel (EUR), and Percival (EUR/RPE). 45. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 16, 1966. Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. Limited Official Use. Cleared by J. Robert Schaetzel (EUR). A copy was sent to Ball. A May 16 cover memorandum attached to the source text reads: “Amb. Johnson believes you should be aware of the attached for your meeting with George Thomson but does not believe you should take the initiative in raising it. E.J.S.” 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, May 24, 1966, 8:29 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Pollack and cleared by Morris (OTM), Robert L. Bruce (S/S), Barber, Frutkin (NASA), Frank E. Loy (E/TT), Sidney N. Graybeal (ACDA), and Spurgeon Keeny (White House). Cleared by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Paris, Rome, and The Hague. 47. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Belgium Washington, June 4, 1966, 2:17 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. Drafted by Pollack on June 4, cleared by Percival (EUR/RPE) in substance and Alexander L. Rattray (S/S), and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Secretary Rusk was in Brussels for a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, June 6–8. During this session, the Ministers agreed to move NATO headquarters to Belgium. 48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, June 10, 1966, 6:31 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Michael F. Smith (SCI) and cleared in substance by Frutkin and Percival; approved by Nesbitt (SCI). Also sent to Bonn, London, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels. 49. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, June 14, 1966. Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. This paper was prepared for a meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council on June 15 to discuss post-Apollo planning and specifically to answer a question of the Vice President: “Do you see any special advantages in selecting any particular goals in advancing this country's prestige or bargaining position abroad?” (Memorandum from Pollack to Rusk, June 15; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 10) In the June 13 covering memorandum to the Secretary that accompanied this memorandum, Pollack stated the Department's goals: “Because of the hard facts of international relations in a space conscious world, post-Apollo programs have significant political importance and must therefore be constructed with that in mind. In order to establish and clarify the record it is suggested that you table a paper at the meeting … which would voice the Department's interest in post-Apollo programs.” (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383) According to reports of the meeting, “The Secretary stated that his main interest was in near earth activities in space rather than expensive activities for interplanetary performance. He stressed communications and navigation satellites, space sciences, improvement in defense use of space; he did very nicely.” (Memorandum from Nesbitt to Pollack, June 15; ibid.) 50. Statement Prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Space Council Washington, July 21, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. The first draft of this paper was prepared by Pollack and a working group of the International Cooperation subcommittee, chaired by Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson. Pollack sent the draft, in circulation for comments, under cover of a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on June 15 in preparation for a National Aeronautics and Space Council meeting. (Ibid., SP 10) On July 22 Joyce sent the final version of the paper, as printed here, prepared as a draft NSAM, under cover of a memorandum to President Johnson requesting Johnson's signature to another memorandum to the Vice President. 51. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, July 24, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. Drafted by Robert F. Packard (SCI) on July 21. 52. National Security Action Memorandum No. 354 Washington, July 29, 1966. Source: Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316. Confidential. Copies were also sent to the National Aeronautics and Space Council, Hornig, O'Connell, and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Foster. 53. Editorial Note 54. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 19, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Post-Apollo (Outer Space Goals), Box 16. Confidential. 55. Department of State Policy Paper Washington, October 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1 US. Secret. Prepared by the Policy Planning Council. A typed note on the cover page reads: “The Secretary of State believes the attached paper may be of interest to Members of the Space Council. The Secretary, however, reserves his own position pending discussion in the Council.” Only the summary (pages i-iii) of the 23-page report is printed here. 56. Letter From Vice President Humphrey to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 25, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1 US. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the attached Action Slip reads: “Note: Secretary informed and requested to authorize distribution of Space Goals paper to members of the Space Council. 12/2 by memo from S/P (Owen) and SCI (Pollack).” 57. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) and the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, December 2, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Scientific and Technological Development 1966. Secret. Drafted by Packard (SCI) and cleared in substance by Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM). Regarding the drafting of this paper, see Document 56. 58. Editorial Note 59. Editorial Note 60. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 27, 1967, 8–11 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 1–1 US–USSR. Secret; Exdis. The conversation took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Drafted by William D. Krimer, concurred in by Ambassador Goldberg, and approved in S on September 29. The memorandum is Part III of IV. 61. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey Washington, October 9, 1967. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.F.10.1 (B). A cover memorandum attached to the source text reads: “October 9, 1966. To: The Vice President. You indicated in your meeting with several of my staff members and also in memoranda to me that you were interested in an additional study on the subject of international cooperation, particularly with the USSR. I have prepared the attached, as a brief staff study on this subject. This may prompt you to make additional recommendations as to how you think the matter should best be pursued. E.C. Welsh.” 62. Letter From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 11, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 10 US. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Vice President Humphrey. 21. Letter From the Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Dryden) to President Johnson 21. Letter From the Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Dryden) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 21, 1964. Dear Mr. President: With reference to our conversation at the reception following the dedication of the National Geographic Society's new building on January 18th, I wish to report the following: A position paper on possible US–USSR cooperation in lunar exploration is now in the final stages of coordination with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Aeronautics and Space Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency 2 and will be forwarded through channels in approximately one week. 3 This paper outlines a step-by-step approach to further cooperation and discusses the many aspects to be considered in making specific proposals, a number of which are described and analyzed. If, in the light of that discussion, you should decide that the US should take the initiative now in the direct presentation of a specific proposal, I suggest that you propose that the US and the USSR cooperate in a joint program of unmanned flight projects to support a manned lunar landing. The effort should begin with the exchange of data already obtained and with joint planning of future flight missions to secure additional data in the following areas: 1. Micrometeoroid density between the earth and the moon. 2. Radiation and energetic particles associated with solar activity along trajectories to the moon. 3. Characteristics of the lunar surface. 4. Selection of best lunar landing sites. While we cannot forecast the Soviet response in advance, and adequate implementation requires a change in the Soviet attitude with respect to disclosure of information with regard to program plans and results, I believe this proposal constitutes a practical step which goes as far as we should prudently go in the light of our own national interests. If such a cooperative project were satisfactorily under way, more advanced proposals could be considered. In view of the personal interest of Secretary Rusk in this question, I enclose a copy to be forwarded to him, should you so desire. This specific package proposal has not been coordinated with other agencies. Respectfully yours, Hugh L. Dryden 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 260. No classification marking. 2 On November 12, 1963, in NSAM No. 271, President Kennedy directed NASA Administrator James E. Webb to take personal responsibility for the formulation of proposals to explore the possibility of cooperation with the USSR in space. In January 1964, Webb deputized Hugh Dryden to convene an interagency meeting to establish a basis for a report to the new President. (Memorandum from Webb to Charles E. Johnson, December 18, 1963; ibid., National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14) NSAM No. 271 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XXV . 3 See Document 22 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Dryden signed the original. 22. Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson 22. Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 31, 1964. Dear Mr. President: The attached report 2 on possible projects for substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of outer space is provided to you in accordance with National Security Action Memorandum 271, dated November 12, 1963, and my interim report to you of December 13, 1963. 3 It has been coordinated with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Executive Secretary of the Space Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Science Adviser, and White House staff. Since space technology is closely related to and in some measure interchangeable with technology of military interest, careful examination of the attached report is desirable in connection with further initiative in this field. 1. An appendix to the report reviews the status of agreements already reached between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences for cooperation in three areas: (1) coordinated meteorological satellite program; (2) passive communications satellite experiments with the ECHO II satellite launched this month; and (3) geomagnetic satellite data exchange. The appendix also reviews Soviet rejection of numerous specific offers of space cooperation made in the past by the US. At this writing, the Soviet Academy, while in communication with NASA in regard to the agreements between us, has failed to meet time limits on most agreed action items but has conducted optical observations of the ECHO II satellite as agreed and apparently intends to proceed with communications experiments between the USSR and the Jodrell Bank Observatory. Other tests of Soviet intentions under these agreements will materialize shortly. 2. The report focuses upon possible cooperation in manned and related unmanned lunar programs. (Possibilities for cooperation in other space programs have been and will continue to be advanced in the channel between NASA and the Soviet Academy.) 3. The report recommends these guidelines to govern foreseeable negotiations with the Soviet Union in the space field: substantive rather than propaganda objectives alone; well-defined and comparable obligations for both sides; freedom to take independent action; protection of national and military security interests; opportunity for participation by friendly nations; and open dissemination of scientific results. 4. The report recognizes that cooperation with the Soviet Union must ultimately rest on specific projects. However, the advantages and disadvantages of specific proposals are not absolute. They may vary significantly, depending upon Soviet objectives, techniques, procedures, and schedules relative to ours. Lacking sufficient information of these factors, we remain uncertain of the security and tactical aspects of specific proposals which might be advanced to the Soviets. 5. Accordingly, the report outlines a preferred structured approach calculated to determine a level of confidence in any Soviet response, to gain information on basic elements of the Soviet program, and to merit confidence and support by the public and the Congress. Briefly, this approach provides for maximum exchange of past results (generally subject to verification from other US sources), proceeds then to sufficient disclosure of the future planning of both sides to identify areas favorable for cooperation, and concludes with the joint definition of specific projects. Examples of specific projects would be put forward in the initial presentation of this approach to lend credibility and substance to it. 6. The report recognizes that the Soviet Union is unlikely to be amenable to such an approach. In that case, it would be possible to proceed directly to specific proposals. Some 15 examples of possible projects are described in the report and evaluated in such terms as our current knowledge of the Soviet program permits. However, limitations (described in the report) attach to virtually all these proposals. These limitations reflect the general climate of US-Soviet relations and are therefore subject to change—which might bring any of the proposals within the range of realistic negotiation. At present, a change in sentiment appears necessary even for small steps in cooperation; for example, in the exchange of purely scientific data relating to solar radiation and micrometeorites, the Soviet Union has within the past year declined to provide details of instrumentation and calibration required for their understanding. Given a change in sentiment, however, such exchanges would be useful and some cooperation might be proposed and developed in several areas including those listed below and, in addition, mutual tracking support and the recovery and return of manned capsules after their return to earth. 7. On balance, the most realistic and constructive group of proposals which might be advanced to the Soviet Union, with due regard for the uncertainties and limitations discussed above and detailed in the report, relates to a joint program of unmanned flight projects to support a manned lunar landing. These projects should be linked so far as possible to a step-by-step approach, ranging from exchange of data already obtained to joint planning of future flight missions. They include projects for the determination of: (a) Micrometeoroid density in space between earth and moon. (b) The radiation and energetic particle environment between earth and moon. (c) The character of the lunar surface. (d) The selection of lunar landing sites. 8. I believe this affords flexibility for positive action, utilizing either a variant of the structured approach (paragraph 5) or, with necessarily greater caution, selected specific proposals without reference to the structured approach (paragraph 7). 9. With regard to the timing and form of further US initiatives toward the Soviet Union, the report recommends the following: (a) Continuing interest should be expressed through the existing NASA-Soviet Academy channel, in a positive Soviet response to the proposals for cooperation already made by President Kennedy and by you. (b) No new high-level US initiative is recommended until the Soviet Union has had a further opportunity (possibly three months) to discharge its current obligations under the existing NASA-USSR Academy agreement, or, in the alternative, until the Soviets respond affirmatively to the proposal you have already made in the UN. (c) If Soviet performance under the existing agreement is unsatisfactory, a high-level initiative on a non-public basis would seem desirable to prod the Soviet Union to better performance; additional public steps might be considered if this proves unavailing. (d) If Soviet performance under the existing agreement proves satisfactory, personal initiative by you would still be required to extend this success to cooperation in manned lunar programs. Because the scope of initiative by Soviet Academy representatives seems limited, Mr. Khrushchev's personal interest and support would also seem to be required for any significant extension of joint activity. It is believed that your initiative will be more effective if taken privately in the first instance. (e) A US initiative should establish our interest in the preferred structured approach described above. If it then becomes feasible to proceed with technical negotiations, the NASA-Soviet Academy channel should continue to be the vehicle used; as in the past, technical proposals to be considered in such negotiations should be made available for prior interdepartmental comment. (It may become appropriate to consider an effort to induce the Soviet Union to make personnel available who are closer to their technical program.) (f) Agreements reached in technical negotiations should be embodied in memoranda of understanding, explicitly subject to review and confirmation by governments. (g) To demonstrate the serious intentions of the US with regard to international cooperation in space and to maintain some pressure upon the Soviet Union to follow suit, we should continue to expand our current and successful joint projects with other nations to the degree possible. This report will be kept under continuing review in NASA in concert with other interested offices and agencies, and we shall keep you advised of our progress with the Soviet Academy under the current agreement between us. I believe we are well prepared to support whatever initiative you determine to be appropriate in light of this report and stand ready to provide such additional information and judgment as you may require. Respectfully yours, James E. Webb 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14. Confidential. 2 Not attached. A copy is ibid. 3 The interim report has not been found. 23. Report Prepared by the Committee on National Security Policy Planning Implications of Outer Space in the 1970s, Basic National Security Policy Planning Task I (1) 23. Report Prepared by the Committee on National Security Policy Planning Implications of Outer Space in the 1970s, Basic National Security Policy Planning Task I (1) 1 Washington, January 30, 1964. [Here follow a title page, table of contents, two-page preface, and a list of Committee members.] PLANNING IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY OF OUTER SPACE IN THE 1970s Conclusions A The implications of exploration and use of outer space in the 1970's indicate clearly that, from the viewpoint of its national security in the broadest sense, the United States must continue an active space program. This program should place its main emphasis on broadening our horizon of knowledge and breadth of competence in this new medium, with particular attention both to the political implications of our achievements measured against those of the USSR and to the assurance of our national security. We should be alert to particular political prestige considerations in space activities. We should continue to encourage international cooperation in space activities, through appropriate international organizations, including the U.N., and through bilateral arrangements (including with the USSR), and embracing the development of space law. We should continue to stand on the general principle of freedom of space. We should actively seek arms control arrangements which enhance national security. We should pursue vigorously the development and use of appropriate and necessary military activities in space, while seeking to prevent extension of the arms race into space. There follow several conclusions concerning selected aspects of space activity which deserve particular attention from the viewpoint of national security policy. B Military activity in outer space will not be sui generis; rather, it will relate to the character of, and balance among, earth-based military systems. The essential requirement for military capabilities in outer space will be the need for research, development, testing and operational activity sufficient to enable the U.S. to avoid technological surprise in outer space, and to achieve and maintain that margin of superiority in space activity necessary as insurance to offset possible Soviet military developments. Space activities of military value can be conceptually divided into three main categories: (a) basic developmental work (e.g., systems for sustained manned space flight, rendezvous and inspection capability, and in general, broadening and exercising space competence), (b) support systems (e.g., communications observation, navigational aids, and the like), and (c) spaceborne weapons systems, for offensive use against other spacecraft or targets on earth, or for defensive interception in or from space of hostile earth or space launched offensive weapons. 1. We should study fully the possibilities of relatively low-cost launching and in-flight propulsion systems which could alter cost efficiency criteria and provide maneuverability, range and speeds which would have very important potential civil and military uses. 2. Space support systems of military value are already under active development and use, and should continue to be pursued fully. As particular spaceborne support activities become increasingly important, so does their defense and preservation, though excessive dependence on any single and potentially vulnerable means should of course when possible be avoided in space as on earth. 3. An anti-satellite capability (probably earth to space) will be needed for defense of the United States, and may also be required to ensure freedom of space. Current high priority efforts should be continued, and extended as necessary in the future. 4. Weather manipulations may, conceivably, become an important weapon, and begin to become relevant even as early as the 1970's, though we cannot yet identify the particular techniques. While this is not primarily a question of space technology, it may be useful to study possibilities of “weather control”, and warning and countermeasures of such control (including possibilities for international measures), in space. C We would place one particular constraint on our space program for military purposes: avoidance of actual deployment in outer space of any spaceborne weapons of mass destruction so long as the USSR refrains from deploying such weapons. We conclude that the United States should continue to favor and to seek a tacit or negotiated arms control agreement banning the placing of weapons of mass destruction into orbit. 1. While we recognize that technological and political conditions change over time, as viewed from the perspective of 1963 we see the situation in the 1960's and 1970's as warranting this policy. This approach should not be regarded as binding one hand behind our back, but as an effort to prevent, if possible, extension of military competition into a new dimension which has new risks and costs and which we would do well to avoid. Of course, the choice may not be ours—but it may. We should actively pursue research and, as necessary, developmental work on possible weapons systems. Also, if we were to develop a new weapons system requiring placement in space of weapons of mass destruction which promised to alter the military situation radically in our favor—although we do not now foresee such a development—and even assuming we were confident the Soviets did not have it, the question whether to deploy it should of course be posed, so long as there were no binding international agreement prohibiting it. 2. Clearly, the United States must also consider the possible effects of any introduction of non-nuclear spaceborne weapons on stimulating or justifying Soviet initiation of the deployment of nuclear weapons in space. We favor retaining the option of deploying spaceborne non-nuclear anti-missile or anti-satellite systems that may be developed, but decision on their stationing in space should include consideration of the effect of such action on our efforts to prevent extension of a nuclear arms race into outer space. D There may be a substantial change of pace and emphasis of over-all U.S. outer space activity during the 1970's. Such a change may begin shortly after a manned lunar landing. The novelty of space will have passed away, but there will be new challenges in space. We will have redressed our present inferiority in space boosters, and our program will be less dependent on reacting to a Soviet lead, particularly if we first achieve a lunar landing. There is no question that we are in space to stay, and in a large way. However, a change of pace could occur and could apply to the character and to the scheduling of our over-all program, and in differing degree to various parts of the program: to further lunar exploration, to subsequent interplanetary exploration, to space applications involving satellites in earth orbit (e.g., communications satellites, meteorological satellites, navigational satellites), and to the general balance between scientific investigation and practical application. E The nature of outer space activities, and of the international context in which they will develop, poses the prospect of increased international interdependence in this field. The United States should regard this prospect as an opportunity and seek international cooperation in space and space-related activities not only from the point of view of gaining such foreign support as our program may require, but also from the standpoint of the broader foreign policy objectives which can be served. The character of this cooperation will, however, change in the following significant respects: 1. There will be an increasing need for tacit or negotiated international agreement for the conduct of our space program (frequency allocation, rescue and return of astronauts and spacecraft, effective channels for the exchange and analysis of data, etc.). Space law, at least through customary usages of space, will continue to develop, and the United States should encourage this development. 2. We will have to take account of active and increasingly sophisticated space programs conducted by other countries, particularly the Western European countries and Japan. Substantial involvement of these countries in space programs will afford a greater opportunity to encourage multilateral programs as opposed to purely national or bilateral programs. 3. Communications satellites will facilitate international intercourse, and will probably be capable of serving either cooperative or adversary use for direct communication to the homes of populations in other lands. The opportunities, and dangers, of this technique deserve careful further study. 4. Outer space developments tend to accentuate, rather than mitigate, the differences between the industrial countries on the one hand and developing countries on the other. There may be an increasing reaction in the economically underdeveloped countries against great expenses in space exploration while millions on earth barely subsist. The United States should therefore continue to be responsive to the desire for international participation in some outer space programs. 5. It is possible that by or during the 1970's some disarmament and/or U.N. peacekeeping arrangements will come to use spaceborne observation. The U.S. should consider possible ways of facilitating such international uses of observation satellites without jeopardizing essential unilateral capabilities. 6. The United States should consider the desirability, and feasibility, of proposing or accepting a joint US–USSR major space effort on the order of magnitude of a lunar landing in lieu of a competitive race in the 1970's. An evaluation should be made of the long-run political potential for altering the US–USSR relationship by such a dramatic development. In this connection, even a joint effort to make a lunar landing should not be excluded. This evaluation would, of course, have to take into account the fact that political assets accruing to the United States in the event of our making the first lunar landing would be sizeable, and that formidable and possibly prohibitive technical problems would be involved in a joint effort. [Here follow Part III: Space Weapons, Part IV: Options and Threats in the Space Age, and Annex A: Terms of Reference.] 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1 US. Secret. The 20 Committee members were drawn from international departments and agencies including the Department of State, NASA, ACDA, OST, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The paper was reviewed by Walt Rostow and the Policy Planning Group. In the preface, Rostow called this report “a pioneering study, the first to relate the scientific-technical intelligence and political factors involved in our future space policy relating to national security problems.” (p. iii) 24. Memorandom From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 24. Memorandom From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 4, 1964. Mac— (1) The President can get the gist of the entire report by reading Mr. Webb's four-page letter. 2 (2) The attached draft NSAM 3 has been prepared after consultation with NASA, State and Ed Welsh. The action proposed is the one they would like to have. (3) No dramatic move is recommended at this time. The action is now with the Soviet Union and it is generally agreed that some performance on their part is needed before we should make our next moves. (4) If the President intends to communicate secretly with K., 4 he might consider including a personal expression of hope that K. would personally oversee and expedite the Soviet response to our offers of cooperation, realizing the great difficulty any Chief of State has in getting the bureaucracy moving with alacrity particularly when mistaken notions of military security may be impeding performance. (5) The item concerning Ed Welsh's Space Council is included in Ed's suggestion. 5 He has already made his suggestion orally and in writing to the President. It certainly would do no harm to the program of cooperation and might be the occasion for the President to impress his personal stamp on this program, it would be all to the good. Charles E. Johnson 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14. No classification marking. 2 Document 22 . 3 The attached draft text with handwritten changes is identical to the final version of NSAM No. 285 ( Document 25 ). 4 Nikita S. Khrushchev. 5 Welsh suggested that the report form the basis of a briefing to the Space Council; see the last paragraph of NSAM No. 285, Document 25 . 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 25. National Security Action Memorandum No. 285 25. National Security Action Memorandum No. 285 1 Washington, March 3, 1964. MEMORANDUM FOR The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration SUBJECT Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space Matters Thank you for the report presented in compliance with National Security Action Memorandum No. 271, 2 and which you prepared in coordination with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Executive Secretary of the Space Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Science Advisor, and certain of my staff. This report presents a reasonable and persuasive approach to a program of cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of outer space. The report and recommendations therein have my general endorsement and I hereby request you in cooperation with the other responsible officers of the Government, particularly the Secretary of State and the Executive Secretary of the Space Council, to proceed with this program keeping me informed of progress and calling upon me for such help as I may be able to offer. I will expect NASA and the other responsible departments and agencies to keep this report under continuing review, and to keep me currently advised of the progress being made with the Soviet Academy under the current agreement, and also of any Soviet response to our initiatives at the United Nations on cooperation in outer space. By the first of May, the Soviet Union should have had ample opportunity to make its intentions with respect to cooperation clear to us. I will expect you to assume the initiative in preparing appropriate recommendations for my attention to deal with the situation as it appears to be at that time. The Executive Secretary of the Space Council has suggested that the report be used as the basis for a briefing at some appropriate time for members of the Space Council. By copy of this memorandum I request him to work with you in developing this briefing and setting a time therefor. Lyndon B. Johnson 3 1 Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199. Confidential. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Charles E. Johnson, and Secretary Rusk. 2 See Document 22 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates the President signed the original. 26. Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson 26. Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 30, 1964. Dear Mr. President: Your National Security Action Memorandum No. 285, endorsing our report on cooperation with the USSR on outer space matters, called for further recommendations appropriate to the Soviet attitude as of May 1. There has been no Soviet response to our initiative at the United Nations, and progress under the current agreement has been limited thus far to Soviet participation in joint tests with the passive communications satellite ECHO II. Dr. Dryden expects, however, to have further bilateral discussions with Academician Blagonravov in Geneva when they are both there for the United Nations' space committee meetings from May 22 through June 12. We request approval, therefore, to defer any further recommendations to you until the latter part of June. 2 You also asked that the members of the Space Council be briefed on our report. Such a briefing was held on April 10. Respectfully yours, James E. Webb 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14. Confidential. 2 Bundy transmitted the President's concurrence in a memorandum to Webb on May 11. (Ibid.) Growing administration frustration with Soviet unresponsiveness to U.S. initiatives is also reflected in memoranda from Charles E. Johnson to Bundy, May 4 and May 8. (Ibid.) 27. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 27. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 15, 1964. INR–24 SUBJECT Soviet Outer Space Policy This Memorandum, prepared as a contribution to a forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate, is being circulated more widely because of current interest in possible Soviet shifts in space policy. Abstract In general Soviet policy toward outer space is likely to remain conservative. The Soviets seem likely to move slowly in a field whose potentialities remain to be explored, being careful not to freeze themselves out of potential technical or military advantages. They will probably wish to keep their agreements for cooperation with the US and other foreign countries carefully limited, lest they undertake obligations which may later prove onerous. They have privately come to accept spaceborne reconnaissance as a fact of life, but have not yet publicly acknowledged its legality. They may in the future decide to do so, and thereby attempt to turn the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance to their own advantage. The Soviet Union tends to look upon outer space as the preserve of the great powers, and upon its successes there as an important hallmark of national greatness. The Soviets probably believe that spectacular achievements in space exploration are destined to be the distinguishing marks of the great powers to an even greater extent than possession of nuclear weapons. They probably see in their space program not only opportunities for enhancing their prestige (using both scientific achievement and military power as the criteria) but also may see some room for cooperation with the US in a field which emphasizes the unique role of the world's two super powers. The Moon Race Obviously, Soviet space activities have been expensive. And at the same time allocation of economic resources to new investment has been a major problem in Soviet internal affairs. However, it does not necessarily follow that the Soviet space program will be cut back for lack of funds. Though resource allocation decisions have involved difficult choices, Moscow is not so strapped that it is deprived of choices. Later on in the decade Soviet economic strains may decrease, and in the interim the Soviets apparently wish to do at least enough to keep their options open. The Soviet attitude toward a manned lunar landing appears to be much along these lines. Some of Khrushchev's remarks have raised the question of whether Moscow might be bowing out of the space race because of the expense involved. Read carefully, Khrushchev's statements on the subject reveal an artful vagueness. He has rejected competition in suicidal efforts, but has not ruled out the possibility that it might be a Soviet astronaut who makes the first successful trip to the moon and back again. Even while making this qualified rejection of competition Khrushchev did state that Soviet programs in preparation for a moon flight were continuing. We believe that until such time as they may be assured of success, the Soviets will probably refrain from stating an open challenge to be the first to the moon. But the absence of an explicit Soviet challenge does not necessarily mean that they have given up hope of being the first to make the trip. Prospects for Space Cooperation Past practice suggests that the Soviets will be more interested in ad hoc, bilateral ventures than in multilateral arrangements in space cooperation. The few cooperative space projects which the Soviets have thus far agreed to undertake with the US have several features in common. Key elements in the acceptability of the proposals were that (1) they involve no infringement of Soviet security, (2) they are demonstrably “peaceful,” i.e., non-military in character, (3) they are non-competitive in the sense that they involve no revelation of fundamental technological weakness or strength by either side, and (4) they are not very important, at least from the point of view of contributing much to the space capabilities of either side. To the extent that the information to be exchanged is useful, both sides would gain equally. The fact that neither would be dependent on the other, however, for data essential for progress in its own national space program, clearly simplified the matter of agreement. Cooperation in any major venture—certainly any as major as manned space flight—goes well beyond the above considerations, however. For even such a relatively simple proposal as the exchange of astronauts, for example, the Soviets would have to reveal rather full details of flight techniques, life support systems, and space capsule characteristics, as well as characteristics of their launch vehicles themselves. Similarly, any consideration of use of shared tracking facilities would require some infringement of Soviet security. Furthermore, any full exchange of data would inevitably require an admission of Soviet shortcomings and space failures—which they have not yet even tacitly admitted. The Soviets have been extremely sensitive on this subject thus far, and are not likely in the future to wish to lead from a position of weakness. In light of the foregoing considerations, certain specific fields for future cooperation are likely to appear more attractive to the Soviets than others. Meteorology, for example, is likely to continue to be a field where further cooperation will be possible. Communications satellites, on the other hand, will probably not appear worthwhile to the Soviets from an economic standpoint, although a cooperative arrangement could probably be developed which would not infringe on Soviet security considerations. Other space projects where cooperation with the US might be economically advantageous to the USSR include such fields as mapping, geodesy, and navigation. The obvious military applications of each of these fields, however, would tend to make the Soviets shy away from much, if any, joint activity with the US. We therefore think it unlikely that they will decide to undertake any of them with us in the near term. Thus as they consider each potential step to be taken in the future, the Soviets will probably weigh strategic implications, whether they can expect a net gain—or at least no net loss—in technology, and the financial costs. Given their concerns, the Soviets are more likely to continue to be responsive to specific limited propositions (which give them a built in assurance of the limits of their commitment and obligations before they make a decision), rather than cooperative programs for larger-scale space endeavors. In sum, the Soviets may see political advantages in future space cooperation with the US, but we think it unlikely that they will wish to cooperate in projects which they consider prejudicial to their security or which involve major investments. Space Law and Arms Control The Soviet Union will probably continue to value consultations with the US on space law which also stress the unique roles of the US and USSR in this field. The Soviets will almost certainly revert from time to time to attempts to exploit discussions of space law in order to score propaganda points. However, the secular trend is probably in the direction of a series of small agreements covering such matters as assistance and return of distressed astronauts and spacecraft. Moscow will nevertheless continue to be conservative in space law questions, and will probably move slowly in freezing legal definitions in a new field in which the totality of Soviet interests may not yet be clear. For example, the Soviets may remain reluctant to agree to a legal definition of outer space for some time. Moscow has already concluded one arms control agreement affecting outer space—viz. the UN General Assembly resolution on not orbiting nuclear weapons. 2 To the extent they have no pressing military requirements, they may seek other declaratory agreements barring further military uses of space. The Soviet preference for declaratory agreements appears likely to rest both upon the desire to establish precedents applicable to terrestrial disarmament, and upon a reluctance to reveal military technology. The Soviet preference is not, however, absolute. Moscow has agreed in principle to the use of satellites as part of control systems to monitor nuclear tests in space, and might return again to the idea of space-borne control systems. Satellite Reconnaissance Moscow's public position is that reconnaissance satellites are illegal. Heretofore, the Soviets have argued that espionage was a violation of international law and could not be legitimized by a new choice of locale. There are, however, signs that this position may be changing. The Soviet Union is developing a satellite reconnaissance program of its own which it presumably must protect. Moreover, recently Khrushchev and lesser Soviet officials have indicated that the existence of reconnaissance satellites obviates the need for other disarmament controls and make unnecessary US overflights of Cuba. So far all of the Soviet statements indicating Soviet possession of a satellite reconnaissance capability or a degree of willingness to recognize satellite reconnaissance as legitimate have been made in private conversations and have not been published in Soviet media. As a tactical matter, if they found themselves pressed publicly on the issue in the near future, the Soviets might return to restating their standing public position that satellite reconnaissance is illegal. Given the general unresponsiveness of UN members to this issue, we doubt that such an approach would be fruitful for Moscow. At any rate, we believe that sooner or later—in part depending upon the degree to which they may have restated their old charges of illegality—they will find it more productive to turn the international acceptance of satellite reconnaissance to their own advantage. They may then generate proposals advocating the use of observation satellites—to the exclusion of all other means of inspection—to monitor disarmament agreements. Whether, in an even longer term, Moscow may conclude that the existence of satellite reconnaissance has so degraded key forms of military secrecy that it would be in the Soviet interest to accept a controlled general disarmament arrangement remains highly problematical. It would still involve revelation of a substantial amount of military technology, it would still require a politically intrusive inspection system, and the terms of the agreement would still be the subject of long and difficult negotiations. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 2 Reference is to General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) adopted on October 17, 1963; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1082–1083. 28. Action Memorandum From the Acting Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk 28. Action Memorandum From the Acting Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, December 8, 1964. SUBJECT Adequacy of US Space Programs Discussion: Before he left for Lima, Walt Rostow wanted to express to you his concern as to whether the US was applying sufficient effort and resources to research and development in advanced space technologies, particularly (1) in space propulsion, (2) in the requisites to exploration of the nearby planets and (3) in the extension of technology in present applications, such as communications satellites, to more advanced applications. This memorandum spells out the basis for his concern. We must be in a position to exploit all significant opportunities which may affect both our military capability in space vis-é-vis the Soviets and our world leadership in advanced technology and the exploration of space. This concern has been brought to mind by two recent events: 1. The decision taken by DOD to cancel as of December 31 all government support of research and development work on Project Orion, which, as you know, involves the development of a large maneuverable space vehicle that would be propelled by small nuclear explosions and might carry heavy loads into deep space. 2 2. A recent NASA briefing for US Ambassadors and State Department officers 3 —particularly Mr. Webb's responses to questions about the scope of NASA's long-range research and development program in advanced space technology. In addition, as part of the Administration effort to economize, both the NASA and DOD space programs have been curtailed. These budget limitations necessarily lead to concentration on current commitments at the possible expense of longer-range programs. Between the criteria of DOD for a military requirement and of NASA for emphasis upon Apollo and Apollo-related programs we may be overlooking some important areas of research. In the case of space propulsion, for example, the imminent abandonment of Project Orion may be disquieting. This particular project involves only one of several advanced techniques for space propulsion, and has not been demonstrated thus far to be among the most advantageous to them. Nonetheless it is one of the areas in which a quantum jump in space technology is possible by either side and may constitute an option which should not have to be foreclosed. There may be other similar instances. We have not fully recovered from the blow to our prestige, and the burden imposed on our diplomacy by the Soviet sputniks and luniks and orbiting manned-space vehicles, as USIA polls of foreign opinion on the relative military strengths of USSR and USA continue to attest. We must continue to be concerned by the possibility not only of a significant breakthrough by the USSR in military technology in space, but of dramatic advances which boost Soviet prestige, and damage ours, even if they do not gravely affect the military balance. You are familiar with the President's general observations, made in St. Louis on October 21, on one of the ten ways to fight communism: “by maintaining superiority in every field of science and technology which does or can affect the security of the Nation. This applies to the exploration of outer space. We dare not leave this area of our universe to become a monopoly in the hands of those who would destroy freedom. We must therefore obtain and maintain a leadership for the Free World in outer space and we are trying to do that.” 4 We have discussed this matter with SCI, which shares our concern lest desirable long-range options be side-tracked in the present squeeze between budgetary limits and existing program commitments. Although we have no specific evidence that this is the case in any critical respect, Mr. Kretzmann agrees that the matter merits early attention. He has suggested that the best way to seek a balanced and authoritative answer is through the National Aeronautics and Space Council, of which you are a member. I agree. Recommendation: We recommend that, soon after Senator Humphrey assumes the Chairmanship of the Council as Vice President, you request a meeting of the NASC to review the broad question of whether the US Government is doing all it should in research and development to assure that we are preserving significant opportunities which may affect our military capability in space and our world leadership in the advanced technology of space exploration. This would seem to be an appropriate step at that time. Meanwhile, if you agree, SCI will put the staff of the Council on notice and work with them in preparing for a useful discussion by the Council. 5 1 Source: Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Scientific and Technological Development, 1965. Secret. Cleared by Edwin M. Kretzmann (SCI), Scott George (G/PM), and William R. Tyler (EUR). A copy was sent to Ambassador Harriman. 2 More information on the Department's position on Project Orion is in a memorandum from Kretzmann to Eugene Rostow, November 24. (Ibid.) 3 On November 10. 4 For the full text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book II, pp. 1396–1401. 5 Secretary Rusk initialed the approval line. 29. Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson 29. Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 18, 1964. Dear Mr. President: This letter is to review developments in our bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union in outer space matters since my letter to you of June 29, 1964. 2 That letter, prepared in compliance with National Security Action Memorandum No. 285, reported the negotiation of a Second Memorandum of Understanding and a Protocol (June 6, 1964) 3 providing for (1) further implementation of the existing bilateral Agreement, particularly with regard to the establishment and use of a communications link for exchange of weather data, and (2) new cooperation in the preparation and publication of a major review of space biology and medicine in the US and USSR. In addition, the letter reviewed Soviet performance and attitudes and, conditional on Soviet demonstration of a desire to fulfill existing commitments, recommended that the United States adopt as positive an approach toward the next confrontation between Dr. Dryden and Academician Blagonravov as national program requirements would permit. The Second Memorandum of Understanding, agreed at Geneva on June 6, was to go into effect if neither side took exception to its provisions by July 6. We had no substantive changes to suggest but did request the correction of some editorial discrepancies between the English and Russian texts. Academician Blagonravov wrote that the Soviets could not accept certain provisions of the Memorandum relating to the joint review of space biology and medicine. These were the provisions for parallel chapters by Soviet and American authors, each reviewing the work done in his own country. Instead, the Soviet side reverted to its initial position at Geneva that either Soviet or American authors undertake to review the work of both sides on various subjects. Dr. Dryden proposed continued discussion of the space biology and medicine project in New York during the October meetings of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 4 Blagonravov accepted this suggestion. Although he agreed readily to continued discussion, Blagonravov failed to confirm acceptance of the editorial changes necessary to establish the status of the remaining sections of the Second Memorandum. We insisted that such confirmation was necessary before the United States could consider in effect those sections of the Second Memorandum of Understanding which provide for the exchange of magnetic field and conventional meteorological data. The necessary assurances came by telegram on October 23, thus clearing the way for the exchange of conventional data over the communications link established under the Protocol of June 6. With the interested agencies concurring, Dr. Dryden decided that should the Soviets, in the October meeting, maintain their opposition to parallel reviews of space biology and medicine, he would propose as a compromise that Soviet and American specialists prepare and submit equivalent background material for each agreed chapter. With this raw material in hand, a Joint Editorial Board would assign to a single author, either Soviet or American, the actual task of preparing each chapter for publication. This procedure would satisfy the American concern that there be an equivalent exchange of data; it would assure the availability of Soviet data to American authors; and it would meet the Soviet objection to parallel chapters. In addition, Dr. Dryden proposed an exchange of visits by expert teams to deep space tracking stations and an exchange of data which might result from 1964 Mars missions. In the New York meeting, the agreed portions of the Second Memorandum of Understanding were signed on November 5 and submitted through the respective Missions to the UN to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. No agreement was reached on the space biology and medicine project. The Soviets rejected the American compromise proposal and continued to insist that authors be assigned at once without any assurance that Soviet data would be made available to American authors and, indeed, with no mechanism for making it available. Dr. Dryden explained that the United States position was flexible in detail but that no agreement would be possible that did not provide a sound prospect of an exchange of equivalent data. The American representatives offered to elucidate their position in writing for further Soviet consideration, and this has since been done by means of a Dryden-to-Blagonravov letter of December 2. Blagonravov accepted in principle the proposal for an exchange of visits to deep space tracking stations but suggested that the detailed arrangements be left to correspondence. Dr. Dryden has since pursued this suggestion in a letter of December 8, outlining a plan for reciprocal visits by Soviet and American teams to the stations at Goldstone, California, and at Yevpatoriya in the Crimea. With regard to our proposal for an exchange of data gained from 1964 Mars missions, Blagonravov replied that the Soviets would be willing to exchange data if they should fly Mars missions and these should be successful. On several occasions during the course of the discussions, the Soviets expressed an interest in exchanging information on closed ecological systems. Dr. Dryden informed them that we stood ready to consider any specific proposals that the Soviets wished to make. Our experience since June suggests that the Soviets are willing to cooperate in a generalized and limited way, but that they remain relatively inflexible with respect to commitments in negotiation and are laggard in execution. Their performance does not seriously reflect the assurances recently offered by Academician Keldysh and Foreign Minister Gromyko that the Soviet Union is receptive to expanded cooperation in space research. 5 We shall continue to examine our developing program for possible opportunities for cooperation with the Soviet Union. For the immediate future, it might be useful to convey to top Soviet leadership, as opportunity affords, our dissatisfaction with the painfully slow and limited progress to date, as well as with Soviet reluctance to enter into reasonable arrangements for implementing agreements. It may be that Soviet leadership does not know of these limitations in performance. (In this connection, the attached material was provided to Dr. Hornig before his recent visit to the Soviet Union.) 6 Dr. Dryden is now awaiting responses from Academician Blagonravov to his letters on the space biology and deep space station projects. We are in continuing contact on these matters with your staff, the Department of State, and other agencies, and I shall continue to keep you directly informed. Respectfully yours, James E. Webb 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14. Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 For texts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1164–1168. 4 The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of the UN General Assembly held its sixth session at New York October 26–November 6. For excerpts of its report, see ibid., pp. 1168–1177. 5 Gromyko's comments are in a Rusk-Gromyko memorandum of conversation, December 2, during a general discussion of disarmament matters in a private session at the UN General Assembly. Secretary Rusk told Gromyko that the United States was prepared to go “as far as possible” in the field of space cooperation, but noted that “we were sufficiently realistic to understand that where military aspects were involved, cooperation might be limited.” Gromyko replied that the Soviets favored cooperation “in principle” but would find it easier to respond if the United States fielded specific proposals. “He said that he would be in touch with Mr. Webb of NASA and perhaps we [the United States] would have some suggestions to make.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 6) 6 Not printed; the report was entitled “Status of NASA/Soviet Academy Cooperation in Space.” Hornig visited the Soviet Union for 2 weeks in mid-November with Assistant Secretary of Commerce Hollomon and business leaders from IBM, DuPont, and Bell Labs as part of a planned exchange visit. Hornig believed that he was the first senior U.S. Government official to see Brezhnev and Kosygin after the change of government; “that was the first time the President really became clear that science and technology had a role to play in the conduct of foreign affairs.” (Johnson Library, Donald F. Hornig Oral History, AC 74–131) No written report of Hornig's visit has been found. 30. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey 30. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey 1 Washington, March 1, 1965. SUBJECT Space Council Meetings It would probably be well if you called a Council meeting in the relatively near future. 2 There is a tendency on the part of some, both in and out of the Government, to measure the Vice President's interest in space by the frequency of the Council meetings. 3 I believe that to be unfair as meetings should not be called just for the sake of having them. However, an occasional meeting is clearly warranted. The procedure to date has been for there to be a discussion as to a subject or subjects for the meeting; to decide upon a convenient day and time; and then to have me call the members and advise them of the meeting. I follow that up with a written notice as soon as the time has been made firm. You may have a subject or subjects in mind. If not, possible items for joint consideration are: (1) Status and plans for the DOD's Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL); (2) Action if Congress should restore funds for SNAP 8, the 260 solid engine, or the M–1 liquid engine; (3) Review of the Soviet space program; (4) Status of the Supersonic Transport program; 4 (5) International aspects of the space program, including a report on U.N. activities. 5 In cases like item (4) above, for example, my recommendation would be to bring Halaby of FAA into the meeting. I would like to discuss this subject with you at your convenience. E.C. Welsh 1 Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964–April 1967, 150.F.9.10 (F). No classification marking. No official minutes of the Space Council meetings were kept. According to a later Humphrey staff memorandum: “The Executive Secretary has been approached by the staff regarding the preparation of a record of action memorandum signed by the Chairman to be sent to the Council members following the meetings. The Executive Secretary is opposed on the basis that the meeting results are privileged material. At present, interested individuals from the participating Agencies are briefed on the meeting results at their request on an ad hoc basis by the Executive Secretary.” The result was that each agency had its own interpretation of the taken decisions which could lead to confusion: “In instances where the participating Agency may be lukewarm about the Council findings the net result can be inaction.” (“Suggestions for Improving the Effectiveness of the Space Council,” May 3, 1966; ibid.) 2 In early December 1964, Secretary Rusk agreed to request a meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) once Vice President Humphrey assumed the chair to review the overall U.S. effort in space (see Document 28 ). Rusk charged the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (SCI) to work with the NASC to arrange a meeting. 3 Humphrey had begun preparatory work for his new position as Chairman of the Space Council, scheduling meetings with Glenn Seaborg of the AEC and Brockway McMillan of the Air Force. (Memorandum from Norman Sherman to Humphrey, March 5; Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964–April 1967) 4 “Checked—never occurred” has been noted by hand at the bottom of the page with a line drawn to this item. 5 On March 22 SCI's Acting Director, Herman Pollack, submitted to Rostow for comment a draft request to the Vice President to hold a meeting. Rostow's response and a copy of the draft memorandum are attached to a March 24 memorandum from Rostow to Pollack. (Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot C, Scientific and Technological Development, 1965) On April 8 Welsh sent notification to participants that the meeting would be held on April 13, and that the Vice President “has indicated that he wishes a discussion of the international aspects of the space program.” (Memorandum from Welsh to Rusk, April 8; Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964–April 1967) At the meeting, the Vice President circulated a series of questions to which he requested responses from Rusk, McNamara, Webb, and Seaborg. 31. Editorial Note 31. Editorial Note On March 19, 1965, Vice President Humphrey gave his first major speech on space policy at a dinner honoring Robert Goddard, father of the modern space program. Humphrey set out his vision for America's space program and placed it in the context of the administration's goals. “Let me assure you that the Great Society envisioned by President Lyndon Johnson is not one limited to the fight against poverty, ignorance, disease, and intolerance,” he said. “The Great Society requires, in addition, an urgent quest for excellence, for intellectual attainment, for crossing new frontiers in science and technology. Let me emphasize that an adequately funded, well-directed space program is an integral part of our nation's commitment to its future, to its greatness.” Humphrey argued that the nation's “strong and prosperous” economy would permit the government to simultaneously address domestic problems while exploring space: “We can put a man on the moon at the same time as we help to put a man on his feet.” He also reminded the audience that the Soviet Union was enjoying great success in its space program. “Our national security alone would suggest reason enough for us to strive for absolute leadership in space exploration,” he said. “Every time we pause, we have had a shock from the Soviet efforts in space,” Humphrey explained, citing the first successful space walk completed by a cosmonaut the previous day. The text of the Vice President's speech is in the Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68. On April 13, in his first appearance as Chairman of the Space Council, Humphrey expanded on these themes: “I see benefits flowing from the space program in the furtherance of international cooperation and in laying the groundwork for the creation of world peace. It is my belief that the total of these benefits will greatly exceed our total investment in the entire program. Our activities in space and in aeronautics are important parts of President Johnson's Great Society.” “I am convinced,” he emphasized, “that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space is a cornerstone of United States policy.” The text of Humphrey's speech is ibid., Outer Space General Files, 1964–April 1967. 32. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 32. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, April 26, 1965. Department of State Responses to Questions Raised by the Vice President after the Meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council on April 13, 1965 2 1. What have overseas public opinion polls shown regarding the relative standing of the United States and the Soviet Union in space activities? Have you any suggestions for improving this standing? The latest world-wide opinion survey conducted by USIA early in 1964 in nineteen countries and major cities indicated that, by large margins, the public abroad believes that the USSR is ahead of the U.S. in space activities and, perhaps by association, in nuclear strength and general scientific development. Only in Ankara was there a majority favoring U.S. superiority. Opinions were close in West Germany, Austria, Manila and Bangkok. In the U.K. measurements of public opinion have been taken frequently over a considerable period of time so as to reflect the variations caused by specific space events. A nationwide public opinion survey taken in the U.K. following the Ranger VII moon shot in July, 1964 showed an improvement in the relative U.S. position. Later, however, on the heels of the Soviet orbiting of the three-man VOSKHOD–1 in October, 1964 British public opinion favored a Soviet lead in space by nearly four to one. The most recent survey, conducted immediately following the Soviet VOSKHOD–2 flight and the U.S. Gemini manned flight in March of this year, suggests that this sequence of space events benefited the Soviets. 3 In the short term (between now and 1970) we must anticipate that the Soviets will succeed in confronting us with additional space “coups” and that the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution (1967) will likely see special efforts in this regard. During this period we should attempt to anticipate these Soviet events with a view to softening their impact—particularly any public misreading or exaggeration of military implications—and maximizing the impact of our own successes. An improvement in the image abroad of our space program relative to that of the Soviets requires first and foremost successful completion of the space flight programs to which the U.S. is already committed publicly. From the reactions abroad thus far it is quite clear that there can be no substitute for successful flight programs. In addition, such an improvement will require an enlarged public relations program and extension of the NASA international cooperative program. a Thus far our public relations program has been modest. Although such a program cannot substitute for successful space accomplishments, it can emphasize the openness, breadth and purposes of our space program. It should be possible at a reasonable additional expenditure to expand our public relations program through more active NASA participation in events abroad such as the Paris Air Show, extension of the NASA exhibits and spacemobile programs sponsored abroad by the USIA, expansion of the NASA lecture program sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences and carefully arranged appearances abroad of U.S. astronauts. b An active and expanding cooperative program, in addition to serving useful operations and foreign relations purposes, increases foreign identification with our space program and acquires for us the advantages of favorable foreign publicity whose credibility and effect may considerably outweigh our own. c Obviously neither of these programs should be expanded at the expense of U.S. flight programs to which we are already committed publicly. [Here follow questions 2–7. The questions were: 2) What should be done to enhance international cooperation with friendly countries in the space effort?; 3) What, if anything, should be done to increase cooperation with the Soviet Union in the space effort?; 4) What have West European space organizations, such as ESRO and ELDO, done to increase cooperation with the United States?; 5) What has the United States policy been regarding the release of information about our space program and about the Soviet space activities? What should be done to improve or clarify this policy?; 6) How effective have NASA exhibits been in increasing understanding of our space program abroad? What are the plans for improving this part of the program?; and 7) What should be done to improve foreign understanding of the nature of our military space proposals?] 8. What space programs should be emphasized in our current planning so that the United States does attain and maintain a world leadership position in the future? Our paramount concern is for the successful completion of the programs to which we are publicly committed. In addition, from the viewpoint of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the long run, it appears essential that we maintain an effort in advanced research and development sufficient to enable us to take advantage of important opportunities in the future which will be beyond the present state of the art and may affect our national security and international posture. This would appear to be particularly true in the case of those advanced technologies required for space propulsion and interplanetary missions in the period following the initial manned exploration of the moon and unmanned exploration of the nearby planets. It is also important that we take advantage of all significant opportunities to extend the development and use of practical applications of space technology which can engage the effective participation of other countries and from which other countries can derive direct benefit, e.g.: communications satellites, meteorological satellites and broadcast satellites. Bearing in mind the requirements of our national security and our international posture, it is in these latter areas (advanced capabilities and maximum early development of practical applications) that we urge the members of the Space Council to give particular consideration to the long-range aspects of the space program. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1 US. Confidential. 2 A State Department record of the NASC discussion is in a memorandum from Pollack to Secretary Rusk, April 14. (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152, SP 1 NASC 1965) Another perspective on the meeting is in an April 14 memorandum for the files by Humphrey's aide Norman Sherman. (Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964–April 1967) In a separate memorandum for the files dated the same day, Sherman reported on a clash between the Vice President and NASA Chief James Webb: “The Vice President had indicated that we should make the maximum propaganda use of our space activities. He felt that many things could be done which were not being done to involve the interest of peoples around the world. He cited Latin America as one area particularly where more could be done. Webb objected rather strenuously to some aspects of what the Vice President had to say. It was my judgment that Webb responded not to the details of what was offered but to other factors. He indicated that no President had ever told him to use the space program in a propaganda way. The Vice President clearly responded that this was not his intent. It was only after something was done that we should maximize its international impact.” (Ibid.) 3 In a March 19 memorandum for Rusk reporting on VOSKHOD II, Pollack wrote: “This Soviet flight, clearly well in advance of our own program, underlines our growing concern as to the relative impact abroad of U.S. and Soviet space activities over the next few years.” (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152, SP 11, Research and Development, USSR, 1965) 33. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 33. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 29, 1965. SUBJECT U.S.-West German Cooperative Satellite Project NASA and the West German Ministry for Scientific Research announced agreement last week on a joint outer space project which it is hoped will culminate in 1968 with the launching by the U.S. of a German-built satellite to investigate the earth's radiation belts and solar proton phenomena. This is the first significant bilateral cooperative space project with West Germany and is, in fact, the first major project undertaken by the Germans as a national space activity. NASA has already carried out cooperative satellite projects with the U.K. (Ariel I, 1962; Ariel II, 1964); with Canada (Alouette, 1962); and with Italy (San Marco, 1964). Additional projects involving foreign satellites are scheduled over the next two years: one with France (late 1965) at least two with Canada (1965 and 1967), another with Italy (1966 or 1967), a third with the U.K. (1967), and two with the European Space Research Organization (both in 1967). 1 Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152, SP 1–1 USSR 1965. Unclassified. Drafted by M.F. Smith (SCI). A notation on the source text indicates that the Secretary saw the memorandum. 34. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 34. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, August 26, 1965, 7:30 p.m. 301. President announced August 25 that NASA Administrator Webb will invite Soviet Academy of Sciences to send “a very high level representative” to observe launching Gemini VI (October). President explained we “continue to hold out to all nations including the Soviet Union the hand of cooperation in the exciting years of space exploration which lie ahead for all of us.” 2 This invitation is part of continuing US efforts seek ways to improve relations with USSR where possible. Presence Soviet scientist at Gemini VI launch would dramatize public, open nature of our space program. Hopefully it would lead to further moves toward US-Soviet cooperation this field. It should be noted invitation extended without condition of reciprocity. Invitation tangible step toward declared US goal of international cooperation in peaceful exploration outer space. This goal set before launching of first US manned orbital flight. In January 1961 State of Union message, President Kennedy invited all nations including USSR join with us in preparation for probes outer space. In reply to Khrushchev's congratulations for John Glenn flight February 1962, Kennedy stated he welcomed and shared Khrushchev's statement that US and USSR should cooperate in space exploration, and in subsequent letter made specific proposals. US–USSR agreement signed December 1962 providing for space cooperation in fields of meteorology, geomagnetic survey and a passive communications satellite. In his State of Union message January 1964, President Johnson urged peaceful exploration outer space “in cooperation with other powers if possible.” In phone conversation with orbiting astronauts McDivitt and White June 1965 President said: “We can pray that time will come when all men of all nations will join together to explore space together, and walk side-by-side toward peace.” Above may be drawn upon in discussions with foreign officials and press representatives. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 10 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by William H. Edgar (EUR/SOV) on August 25 and cleared in draft by Martin Rosenberg (FE), Peter T. Higgins (AF), Peter D. Constable (NEA), Margaret E. Beshore (ARA), James B. Freeman (P), and James W. Milner (SCI). Cleared in substance by David H. Henry (SOV), Llewellyn Thompson (S/AL), Richard M. Moose (S/SO), Thomas W. Wilson (IO), and Bromley Smith (White House); and approved by Richard H. Davis (EUR). 2 For text of the President's announcement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 917–927. The text of the invitation is in a letter from Webb to Keldysh, August 26. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Cooperation in Space, US–USSR #2, Box 14) 35. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 35. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, September 8, 1965. 746. Embtel 606. 2 Following is translation of Keldysh reply to Webb handed today to Embassy officer by Oberemko, Deputy Chief, USA section at MFA: Begin Verbatim Text. “Dear Mr. Webb, I received your letter of August 27. The Academy of Sciences of the USSR is grateful for the invitation transmitted on behalf of the President of the United States, to send its representative to Cape Kennedy to observe the launching of the American spaceship 'Gemini 6.' Soviet scientists positively evaluate cooperation between our countries in the study of cosmic space for purposes of its peaceful use. However, at the present time our representative cannot avail himself of your invitation. Availing myself of the opportunity, I would like on behalf of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to congratulate you, the Cosmonauts G. Cooper and C. Conrad and also the scientists and engineers who took part in the preparation and execution of the flight of the spaceship 'Gemini 5.' Respectfully, M. Keldysh, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.” Kohler 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 US–USSR. Limited Official Use; Priority. No time of transmission appears on the source text; the telegram was received at 9:51 a.m. 2 Dated August 27, 1965. (Ibid., SP 10 US) 36. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 36. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 23, 1965, 1940Z. 3605. NATUS. 1. The President's initiative re outer space cooperation during Erhard visit came at most propitious moment. 2 2. Long-standing European interest in space activities both as human adventure and as new frontier for industry and science has culminated in recent weeks in acute European sense of participation in Gemini rendezvous and recovery. Sec will recall unprecedented spontaneous applause when Brosio congratulated U.S. during NATO Ministerial meeting. 3 Whatever wariness may be evident in coming months, due to understandable skepticism as to what may be possible between partners as disparate as U.S. and individual European countries in space field, I am certain visit of Presidential commission, which newspapers here report Jim Webb is to head, will be looked forward to with keen anticipation. 3. As a starter we have a few immediate comments to throw in the hopper. 4. Thoughtful Europeans have become increasingly concerned about the technological gap between the U.S. and its allies as a result of our commanding lead in nuclear, space and related industries, and especially by the prospect that as things are going this gap will continue to widen at an accelerating rate. It seems to us that the U.S. might well share some of that concern for a number of reasons not the least of them being that we would not wish to reach the point where Europe's only chance of studying in the technological game would lie in partnership with Moscow. Gaullists are already talking up this option. 5. The President's initiative could go a long way toward beginning to deal with this gap. Symbolically the Atlantic umbrella is far preferable to a stepped-up series of NASA bilaterals. Impressive though bilaterals are when taken together, their political meaning is either that others are helping U.S. prosecute an American program; or that U.S. is boosting national packages of others; they are correctly not regarded as evidence of U.S. willingness to develop technology jointly with others. Also, they tend to foster nationalistic competition among the European countries cooperating with us, which is contrary to general U.S. policy in Europe. 6. If we are indeed to begin Atlanticizing some aspects of NASA's program, we should not bring Europeans in as last minute passengers on a journey which we have already thought through and under way but should offer them the opportunity to join with us in planning and carrying out new ventures. This has the added advantage of offering to share the more sophisticated future stages and obviates any suspicion that we are offering last season's technology. The suggestion of a Jupiter probe or exploration of sun fits this way of proceeding. 7. But there must also be projects of earlier maturity and even greater popular and industrial appeal which might merit consideration. Particularly attractive is manned lunar exploration. Putting the first men on the moon is a U.S. project with such momentum that it clearly does not offer real prospects for internationalization. But surely lunar exploration thereafter will be a long-term and broad program to which other countries could contribute—and participating in U.S. program on cooperative basis is one chance other countries can have for sharing this experience. Surely it is politically right to offer our friends a chance, through cooperation with us, to reach the moon—and not reserve that achievement of a dream as old as mankind for Americans and Russians alone. 8. As for organizational sponsorship we are, frankly, of two minds. (A) In principle there is much to be said for a defense organization such as NATO, having succeeded in creating a credible military deterrent, then demonstrating that it can go on to logical next steps such as arms control, working toward détente by working at political solutions of underlying problems, and pursuing cooperative scientific and technical projects both in defense and in outer space. This would, or should, gradually revise the image of NATO from that of a supposedly military organization to that of a multipurpose Atlantic institution. (B) On the other hand, the prevailing image might serve to muddy the peaceful purposes of a cooperative outer space program, and to mount the venture under NATO might serve to keep it more exclusive than, in the long run, we might want it to be—by keeping out neutrals like Sweden and non-Europeans like Japan or Brazil. There are also existing European space organizations (ESRO and ELDO) to take into account, if their missions and membership and capabilities match what needs to be done. (C) At outset we lean to an open ended functional organization for which the initial motive power is provided by a small group of Atlantic countries. Believe small group of NATO countries without NATO label could get a cooperative project off the ground, and decide in early discussions what political umbrella (Atlantic or UN or ad hoc) best suits the projects selected as a beginning. 9. In any event, leadership of the commission by person of Webb's stature is indispensable in following up President's suggestion. Europeans will want to speak to someone with authority rather than merely with someone sent to sound out their interests—which will necessarily be uncertain and ill-defined in field where we know so much and they know so little. 10. We hope that at appropriate point, if as newspapers indicate Webb is projecting a trip to Europe, he could meet with North Atlantic Council to review with PermReps of our NATO allies perspectives for future outer space exploration and for common efforts among interested countries. Assuming—as we have every reason to assume—that a number of European countries will be interested in cooperation, the right organizational arrangements can then be devised to fit the breadth of participation that organizing group thinks desirable. 11. But the first step is not to decide how global the proposed program should be, but to find and energize the two or three or four governments with the scientific capacity, the industrial interest, and the political self-confidence to respond to the President's initiative in the spirit that prompted it. The most likely prospects are of course our allies in NATO. Germany (to whose Chancellor this was first extended) is of course an obvious candidate for the short list of enterprising governments. Some useful groundwork can be laid here, even before visit to Europe by a Washington mission. 12. Would appreciate guidance as to whether to begin informally talking up Presidential initiative and need for European response, with representatives of NATO countries here (presumably in parallel with discussions by Embassies in selected capitals), along lines this cable. Meanwhile, would be helpful have full text President's remarks to Erhard this subject and any relevant background material. Cleveland 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 EUR-US. Confidential. Repeated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and NASA for Webb. 2 The text of the December 21 Erhard-Johnson communiqué is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 458–459 and 497–498. The text of President Johnson's toast concerning space is in telegram 2925 to Paris, December 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 EUR-US) See also Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1161–1167. 3 Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, spoke at the 36th North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in Paris December 14–16. 37. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 37. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 28, 1965, 1630Z. 3636. Ref: NATUS 3605. 2 1. Embassy sounding French reaction to President Johnson's proposals for space collaboration and will submit assessment of probable French reaction and implications for US-French relations. Meanwhile: following are some initial views, particularly regarding relationship of Franco-Soviet space cooperation. 2. Embassy would agree that there is an element of psychological threat to US and Atlantic concept in both current and potential France-Soviet space cooperation. However, we believe that even Gaullists are not at present seriously considering extensive partnership with Moscow as alternative to present arrangement and prospect of greater cooperation with US (paragraph 4 reftel). 3. French consider US generally ahead of USSR in overall space technology and thus are concerned about maintaining and extending cooperation with US. Soundings made by Embassy during recent Franco-Soviet space talks tend confirm that French aware that talking up the Moscow option may not be compatible with developing space cooperation with US. 4. French also aware that Soviets unlikely to share technology in areas having military implications. This emerged clearly from such information Embassy was able to obtain on Franco-Soviet space talks in October. 5. In short, while de Gaulle may in future make gestures to the East—and ones which are more damaging to Western solidarity than those undertaken in past—we believe institution connections (both governmental and commercial) will limit French freedom in exploiting Moscow option in field of space technology. McBride 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 EUR-US. Confidential. Passed to NASA for Webb on December 28. 2 Document 36 . 38. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 38. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 30, 1965, 1910Z. 3682. Ref: NATUS 3605, Dec 23, 1965; Embtel 3636, Dec 28, 1965; 2 Deptel to Paris 2893, Dec 28, 1965. 3 Subject: Possible US-European Space Cooperation. 1. Erhard communiqué has stimulated French speculation on significance and implications of proposal for international space cooperation. Embassy plans probe present thinking both of French space people and of Paris-based European space research experts on possible useful US-European multilateral space research projects. Following interim comments refer to organizational aspects. 2. As Department aware, only viable international space research organization in existence in Europe is the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) which has survived a difficult birth to become an effective basis for a collective European space effort in the face of advanced US and Soviet space technology. We assume any multilateral program of US-European space research cooperation would have to take account of this institutional framework. 3. ESRO constitutes the only space program of most if its members, and it enjoys their strong support, without exception. It enjoys the additional advantage of having no military connection, involvement, or image. Moreover, ESRO has succeeded in surmounting such difficult organizational problems as the apportionment among its members of ESRO research laboratories and test sites and has reached agreement on the distribution of contracts among the industries of its members. 4. ESRO therefore is a natural candidate as an institutional framework through which multilateral international space research cooperation could take place. Although sometimes criticized for establishing unrealistically ambitious goals in terms of its present technical and financial capabilities, such a phase of development is to be expected in the evolution of any new space program, and the US has had a similar experience. 5. Since ESRO is a European endeavor with no direct US participation (although US is already engaged in cooperation with ESRO), it provides a framework within which European countries could work collectively with US on partnership basis; this might be preferable to arrangement in which one member (US) of a multilateral organization held such a dominant role as to discourage effective participation by other. 6. We would add that because initiative by French professor Pierre Auger, Director of ESRO since its creation, has played very important role in organization's formation, suggestions of extra-ESRO organizations as cooperative instrumentalities for international space research are likely to meet unfavorable reception from French as well as from other Europeans. In particular, NATO possibility discussed in NATUS 3605 suffers drawbacks of military image, exclusion of several members of ESRO (European members), and probable opposition of French who are strong ESRO supporters and whose views on NATO are well known. In addition, absence of space research capability makes NATO less suitable vehicle for such a program and encourages speculation that in so proposing it, the US would be using the appeal of space cooperation as an artificial mechanism with which to bolster NATO. 7. Relevant to the above, we note that Arnold Frutkin, in his book International Cooperation in Space comments on past suggestions that a cooperative space program be based on NATO, OECD or another existing body, as follows: “Of primary concern is the fact that the European Community has itself selected the machinery through which it wishes to conduct civil space research and exploration, namely ESRO and ELDO. In the face of this fact, advocacy of an alternate base for cooperation, however commendable in itself, could be viewed only as inimical to the express choice of the European nations.” 4 McBride 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 EUR-US. Confidential. Also sent to London, The Hague, Bonn, Rome, Brussels for USEC, Stockholm, Bern, Vienna, Madrid, and Luxembourg. 2 Documents 36 and 37 . 3 Dated December 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, POL GERW–US) 4 Arnold Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965). 39. Letter From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Frutkin) 39. Letter From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Frutkin) 1 Washington, February 9, 1966. Dear Mr. Frutkin: The following reaffirms our agreed understanding as to the guidelines which govern the joint NASA-State, pre-Webb commission advance team which will visit Bonn and other capitals in Europe during the next two weeks to engage in discussions on possibilities for joint exploration of space. 2 As you will recall President Johnson, in his meeting with Chancellor Erhard on December 20, 1965, in a toast, made the following proposal concerning space cooperation: “Only last summer, our two governments worked out an agreement whereby we would launch a German-built satellite to probe the inner radiation belts. Now, we would like to discuss with you—and with others—an even more ambitious plan to permit us to do together what we cannot do so well alone. Examples would be two projects which stand high on the space agenda. Both are very demanding and both are quite complex. One would be a probe to the sun, and another a probe to Jupiter. To cooperate on such a major endeavor would contribute vastly to our mutual knowledge and to our mutual skills. So, I propose, early in the year, to send a commission—headed by our able Administrator of NASA, James Webb—to consult with you and other governments of Europe wishing to participate in a joint exploration of space.” The communiqué following German Chancellor Erhard's visit to the President in December, 1965, contained the following offer of cooperation in space: “The President and the Chancellor voiced mutual satisfaction at the arrangements worked out, and already successfully under way, between the United States Space Agency and the German Ministry of Scientific Research for a joint project to launch a German-built satellite to probe the inner radiation belts. The President suggested several other possible cooperative projects, including a probe to the sun and a probe to Jupiter. He also indicated his intention to send a commission to Europe early in 1966 to consult with the German Government and other European Governments which wish to join in the cooperative exploration of space.” 3 The President's proposal and the team's mission are to be represented as an American response to the frequently-stated European desire for greater participation in the development of space technology. The President is desirous of accommodating this desire and has therefore suggested certain opportunities which may be taken up by the European nations if they are, in fact, sufficiently interested. These opportunities can and should be formulated in terms consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives and NASA's cooperative program. This means that the United States is willing to cooperate in identifiable, essentially non-duplicating, advanced projects of mutual interest in the mainstream of space exploration. The significant difference is that the examples cited by the President in his suggestion to Chancellor Erhard make clear his readiness to consider cooperative projects of considerably greater magnitude and more far-reaching technological implications than anything proposed heretofore. The President's specific suggestions of Jupiter or solar probes are to be understood only as examples indicating (a) the extent to which the United States is prepared to go in cooperation with European nations, and (b) types of projects which can afford a wide exercise in space technology. The precise levels of cost and difficulty which Europe may be prepared to face are entirely for Europe to decide. It is possible to modify the division of responsibilities in such advanced projects so that certain spacecraft elements would be contributed by the U.S. to lighten the load on Europe. It is also possible to define useful projects of lesser cost and difficulty which yet can contribute toward the advanced projects suggested by the President. NASA is prepared to discuss projects at either the advanced or intermediate levels and to hear from interested European authorities ideas of their own which are subject to formulation within the existing guidelines. While Europe must determine its own interest in these prospects, and the United States does not mean to pursue the matter in the absence of such interest, we are nevertheless prepared to explain our own concept of the values, in the near and distant term, which we attach to our own heavy investment in space technology. We are prepared to do this in the thought that our own experience and our own expectations may be of some use to European authorities in determining where their best interests lie. (These values are to be stated in terms of the contribution major advanced technological exercises can make to the partnership of government, university, and industry, to the development of critical management capabilities, to economic security, and to common political objectives of institution-building and western cohesion.) Discussion of the foregoing benefits should establish a basis for pointing out the possible growth implications of a successful collaboration of the kind envisaged by the President. Collaboration in space technology in associating its technical capability with other technology in the future could lead to the development of other broader, political economic and technical interests. Reverting to the specific project formulations which are possible, the President's suggestion is premised on the following conceptual framework. It is possible to define spacecraft whose development would afford a very wide exercise in space technology and whose use would fit into on-going space exploration programs. The European community might undertake responsibility for the preparation of such spacecraft while the U.S. would undertake their launching and, to the extent required, tracking and data acquisition. Tracking and data acquisition by ESRO or its members to the extent they can meet the requirement is not precluded. European recourse to American experience and competence would be available essentially through two channels: (a) a joint working group at the project level, and (b) commercial ties which may arise between European and American firms, with export arrangements facilitated by the United States. Effective precedents and patterns for the functioning of both channels are well established. The conceptual framework should serve (a) to accommodate most alternative project proposals which may be suggested either by NASA or the Europeans, and (b) to direct discussion toward spacecraft responsibilities for Europe rather than delivery vehicle-related responsibilities. The U.S. preference is that any cooperative undertaking should be multilateral in character while allowing scope for West German leadership. (Expanded bilateral cooperation with European countries can go forward as appropriate.) Indeed, German initiative may be useful in motivating the participation of other countries. 4 The utilization of ESRO in such a multilateral undertaking is considered to have political and technical advantages. Even if all members of ESRO would not wish to participate, it remains desirable to explore the use of ESRO as a mechanism for those members who are more positive. An ESRO/NASA memorandum of understanding confirmed by exchanges of notes among all the participating governments, would be a suitable format for agreement. In a major sense, however, the choice of mechanism for implementation would have to be made by the participating European governments. The team should keep in mind that policy considerations make it desirable for the Japanese to have a full opportunity to cooperate in a comparable space venture. Therefore, as appropriate, the team should explore European interest in the possible association of Japan with whatever undertaking they initiate. The team should attempt to determine, in appropriate ways, the reaction of the governments contacted, their notions of their future courses of action, and the next suitable steps, including the timing of a visit by Mr. Webb and the commission. 5 In addition, I urge that every consideration possible be given to requests for visits, beyond the presently planned itinerary, to other countries which may desire a visit by the team. I wish you and your colleagues every success in this mission which is both scientifically and politically important. Sincerely yours, For the Secretary of State: Herman Pollack 6 1 Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. Confidential. Drafted by Trevanion H.E. Nesbitt (SCI) on February 8 and cleared by Leroy F. Percival (EUR/RPE) in draft. 2 During February 14–25 a NASA-State Department advance team visited Bonn, London, The Hague, Paris, and Rome. 3 See footnote 2, Document 36 . 4 As Humphrey wrote: “I think it especially important that our new program with the German Federal Republic, which might well set a pattern for other programs of peaceful Atlantic cooperation, should be undertaken on a multilateral basis. I should think our German friends would not only agree, but would welcome this opportunity for positive and constructive leadership within Europe.” (Letters from Humphrey to Webb and to John Leddy, both January 10; both Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964–April 1967) 5 The team concluded that no firm decision could be taken before mid-April, after talks with British and French officials and tentative meetings of ESRO and ELDO. (Memorandum from Frutkin to Webb, March 22; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) NASA officials continued to monitor European opinion, according to a memorandum from Frutkin to Webb, April 4. (Ibid.) 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Pollack signed the original. 40. Memorandum for the Record 40. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, March 23, 1966. SUBJECT International Space Cooperation I attended a debriefing today 2 given by Herman Pollack on discussions which took place at this week's meeting at the Space Council. According to Mr. Pollack the Space Council had a very lively discussion of whether the U.S. was making the best use of its space program in the international field. 3 The implication of the various remarks made at the meeting seemed to be that the U.S. had been playing a fairly passive role in space cooperation and ought to do much more. Mr. Pollack is seeing Ed Welsh of the Space Council staff this afternoon about setting up an interdepartmental working group which will conduct a fundamental review of international space cooperation. Mr. Pollack will suggest that the question of export of space technology be handled by one group while all other aspects of space cooperation be handled by a second group. Mr. Pollack apparently thinks that G/PM might handle the export of space technology while SCI would take the leadership on all other aspects. The State Department had evidently gone to this session of the Space Council prepared to take the initiative in suggesting a basic review of space cooperation but was pre-empted to some extent by Vice President Humphrey. The Vice President expressed concern that European industry gets the benefits of technological spin-offs from the U.S. space program at a bargain basement price, not having to pick up the tab for basic research which is done in the United States. Mr. Webb pointed out that technology is sold to Europeans by U.S. industry on the basis of cash on the barrel head. Secretary McNamara charged into this subject in a major way with sharp criticism of present restraints on the export of technological information. He maintained that we should restrict export of information only to a narrow range of subjects having to do with capabilities to acquire a nuclear delivery capability. 4 Moreover, the Government should not let business determine the nature of cooperation with European industry. Government cooperation would be preferable in some instances and, in particular, there should be a pro rata charge of the R&D element of technological information, a cost often borne by the U.S. Government. Secretary McNamara also suggested that rather than ask each country what its interest was in the space field we should look at each country's technological capacity and then push them to use this capacity to the limit in the space field. In response to a question from the Vice President as to whether this was “positive disarmament” Secretary McNamara replied that it was since at the present time many countries felt they should make technological progress through military hardware programs. A divergence to a space program would be wholesome for all concerned. It was also mentioned by Mr. Pollack that Leonard Marks will come up with a proposal for exploitation of space technology. This proposal will obviously have a close relationship to the working groups which Mr. Pollack anticipates will be established. 1 Source: Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Scientific and Technological Development 1966. Confidential. Drafted by James E. Goodby (S/P) on March 25. 2 March 23. 3 Discussions at the meeting also linked the space program to nuclear weapons, according to an account Webb wrote to McNamara on April 23: “In connection with our brief conversation, at the March 23 meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, about the problems of stimulating foreign involvement in space technology as a means of diverting energies from the development of nuclear weapon systems, I suggest that we both take steps to indicate to our staffs the importance of this objective.” (Letter from Webb to McNamara, April 23; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) Webb raised the same issue with U. Alexis Johnson in an April 26 letter: “The rapid advance of vehicle technology in Europe may be outdating some of our controls and concerns and may warrant our focusing on a very few critical items still left to us, such as advanced guidance and reentry systems. Indeed, the basic reason for restricting vehicle technology at all is its supporting role in nuclear weapons delivery. If we could focus our controls upon the weapons themselves, we might even hope to free vehicle technology for maximum stimulus of space activity abroad.” (Letter from Webb to Johnson, April 26; ibid.) 4 In an April 29 letter to U. Alexis Johnson, John S. Foster, Jr. of the Department of Defense cautioned, “Although DOD is alert and receptive to new opportunities in the military space programs, our cooperative efforts must necessarily be highly selective.” He detailed joint ventures with the United Kingdom and Canada and said that Australia soon might also be a partner, but stated: “We should pay particular attention to the need for avoiding the export to the French of booster technology….France's role in the international space organizations, ELDO and ESRO represent special problems.” McNamara wrote to Webb on May 14: “As you know, I strongly support international cooperative ventures in space. I have directed my staff to be as liberal as possible regarding the release of space technology for payloads and other support items.” (Ibid.) 41. Memorandum for the Files 41. Memorandum for the Files 1 Washington, March 29, 1966. SUBJECT Meeting in the Space Council Office 4:00 p.m., March 29, 1966 STATE Mr. Herman Pollack, Mr. T. H. E. Nesbitt, Col. James W. Milner SPACE COUNCIL Dr. Edward C. Welsh, Mr. Russell Hale, Mr. Hirsch, Mr. Means Dr. Welsh opened the meeting by stating that he had dispatched a letter to each member of the Space Council (copy attached), 2 which indicated the necessary follow-up action resulting from the last Space Council meeting. Mr. Pollack then stated that he had delved into the export of technology question and determined that it has a long history; that considerable work had been accomplished by an interagency working group under NSAMs 294 and 338; 3 that ACDA had done considerable thinking in this area and were now pushing the position for “positive disarmament.” Mr. Pollack queried into the background of why the Vice President raised the export of technology question at the Space Council. Dr. Welsh pointed out that in meetings with the Space Council staff the export of technology had been discussed and that this probably grew out of earlier interagency working group meetings in which the export of technology had been added as a possible item for discussion by the Space Council. He also pointed out at the Space Council meeting on March 3, 1966 the Vice President had announced that the next Space Council meeting would be on the subject of International Cooperation. This subject was the Vice President's idea and it resulted from his travels and thinking. However, the Vice President wanted to talk about specific items and the advanced working group meeting had been held for the purpose of delineating the specific items which would be worthy of discussion by the Space Council. The Vice President stated he would like to see a greater participation by Europe in space activities particularly in cooperation with the US and that the great scientific potential of Europe, Germany for instance, tapped to help solve the space problems. Dr. Welsh emphasized that the export of technology is only one of many items which had entered into the overall international cooperation picture. He acknowledged it was the most talked about item at the Space Council meeting but implied that this was only because the participants who did the most talking were particularly interested in this aspect of international cooperation. Dr. Welsh pointed out that considerable importance was attached to international cooperation in space as evidenced by the fact that international cooperation was the only subject on which the Space Council had had two meetings. This emphasis was due to the fact that it was considered by the Space Council staff to be a subject of great importance. Dr. Welsh pointed out that in the letter he sent to the Space Council principals the Vice President had requested each member of the Space Council to prepare a paper on ways international cooperation in space could be improved and to pass these to U. Alexis Johnson. The principal purpose of this exercise was to bring in ideas. It was not the desire of the Vice President at this time to tell the agencies how to improve international cooperation in space but to seek ideas from the agencies. Some of the example suggestions were: positive disarmament, selling abroad, and improved public relations of our space program. At a future Space Council meeting Mr. Johnson should probably present a consolidation of these ideas pointing out existing authority or additional authority that was needed to accomplish the program, existing funds available or funds that would be required to carry out the program. Dr. Welsh further pointed out that the “Marks” Study is not a separate entity but a part of the overall program. Mr. Pollack then raised the question about communication satellites and how this fits into the overall picture. He pointed out this was a very large subject in itself and would require extensive study from the point of view of educational satellites, TV satellites, distribution satellites and direct broadcasting satellites and ground stations. It was pointed out that considerable study is already underway by various agencies of the Government as well as by the ComSat Corporation in these areas. 4 Dr. Welsh concluded by stating that proposals for more effectiveness in international cooperation in space should not be inhibited by any current policy directives or studies, that we should come up with a number of items that could improve international cooperation in space, 5 that he hoped one of these items would be the export of space technology. 1 Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Milner (SCI) on April 5. 2 Dated March 29; not printed. 3 NSAM No. 294, “US Nuclear and Strategic Delivery Systems to France,” and NSAM No. 338, “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in Development of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities.” (Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316) 4 See Documents 63 ff . 5 On March 30 Nesbitt (SCI) transmitted such items in a memorandum to Pollack. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1) 42. Editorial Note 42. Editorial Note In March 1966 Donald Hornig, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, asked Vice President Humphrey if he could attend Space Council meetings, a request his predecessor, Jerome Wiesner, had also made. Hornig wrote in his March 29 letter to Humphrey: “I was sorry not to have been invited to the most recent meeting, since it concerned questions in which I have been deeply interested for the President.” He noted that he particularly wanted to discuss international and trade policies with the Vice President, so that his “efforts and thinking could be closely tied into it.” (Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files, 1964–Apr 1967) The initial draft response, prepared by Vice President Humphrey's staff, was unreceptive to Hornig's request, because membership in the Council had been limited by Congress. (Draft memorandum from Humphrey to Hornig, April 6; ibid.) Humphrey rejected the draft, and the final response, dated April 6, read: “As you know, membership of the Council is prescribed by statute. I do believe, however, that we can and should have considerable flexibility in inviting responsible officials on the basis of subject matter to be covered and the specific interest of the members in the views of those invited.” (Ibid.) On April 22 Welsh informed Humphrey that he had issued the invitation to Hornig as directed, but had taken precautions in case the Science Adviser tried to send a staff member instead, noting the fact that Hornig's likely choice “is quite unpopular with Webb and Seaborg.” (Memorandum from Welsh to Humphrey, April 22; ibid.) It is unclear to whom Welsh was referring. 43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, April 20, 1966, 5:17 p.m. 1919. 1. Department concerned about speculation that future of ELDO is uncertain. We see advantages in multilateral framework for launcher development. In such framework rocket programs tend to be more open, serve peaceful uses, are subject to international control and absorb manpower and financial resources that might otherwise be diverted to purely national programs. National rocket programs on other hand tend to concentrate on militarily significant solid or storable liquid fuel systems, are less open, and less responsive to international controls. Any breakup of ELDO might lead to some national programs tending in latter direction. 2. In order to assist us in review current ELDO situation, request your evaluation of ELDO's future viability and interest host governments in continuing ELDO programs. Department particularly interested in UK intentions, French interest in continuing ELDO, and your assessment of significance ELDO Council meeting later this month. 2 3. We have been giving preliminary thought to possibility of U.S. cooperation with ELDO which would involve supplying non-storable liquid-fueled rocket technology. This might be attractive to ELDO and we believe cooperative offer could be designed and implemented in such manner as not conflict with current U.S. non-proliferation objectives and guidelines. In fact, as indicated above, such cooperation might assist in non-proliferation effort by channeling resources down non-storable liquid-fueled road rather than solid fuel or storable liquid roads, which are much more significant in military terms. 4. In addition to comment on points mentioned para 2 request addressees evaluation of likely reception such offer of U.S. cooperation and likely effect in terms strengthening ELDO. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. Drafted by Percival (EUR/RPE), Milner (SCI), and George (G/PM) and cleared by Jerome H. Kahan (ACDA), Murray (DOD) (informed), Hausman (NASA) (informed), and Howard Meyers (G/PM) in draft. Also sent to Brussels, Canberra, London, Paris, Rome, and The Hague; and repeated to Geneva. 2 According to telegram 4981 from London, April 22, the United Kingdom, which was funding the largest share of the ELDO bill, was unenthusiastic about the organization in light of its fiscal difficulties. (Ibid.) Telegram 893 from The Hague, April 22, indicated that the Netherlands strongly supported the ELDO and was seriously concerned about its future, but that confidential Netherlands sources had indicated that the “French military would be happy with ELDO breakup so that French ELDO contribution could be channeled into national programs, mainly military.” (Ibid.) The Embassy in Bonn reported that the Federal Republic of Germany also wanted to preserve ELDO as a vehicle for advancement and cooperation: “The FRG would strongly support U.S. cooperation of any kind with ELDO.ELDO would be materially strengthened in FRG eyes by firm U.S. endorsement through an offer to cooperate.” (Telegram 3458 from Bonn, April 26; ibid.) 44. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) 44. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) 1 Washington, May 12, 1966. Dear Jim: I have given considerable thought to the proper timing for a visit by you to Europe to discuss larger space cooperation. 2 There are a number of problems, either directly related to a visit by you or having a bearing thereon, that are currently with us in our relations with Western Europe. 3 Among these are the lack of clarity as to the ESRO response to the President's space offer, the ELDO crisis and the situation regarding NATO. Under the circumstances, I feel that it would be a mistake to risk the President's or your prestige in the face of European indifference or reluctance. Therefore, I do not think it propitious for you to plan a visit, even if on an informal basis, to Europe at this time. The picture may clear up by the end of June, and we can perhaps settle then on the best time for you to visit Europe. 4 With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, ORG 7 NASA. Confidential. Drafted by Nesbitt (SCI) and cleared by Johnson (G), Schaetzel (EUR), and Percival (EUR/RPE). 2 According to a memorandum for the Secretary, Webb wrote to Rusk on April 8 asking for advice on a proposed visit. (Ibid., SP 1–1 EUR-US) NASA files include such a letter, but it is hand-dated April 6, 1966. In it, Webb asked for advice on the timing of his visit, acknowledging Rusk's concerns: “Several times you have expressed some concern that we not oversell a larger space cooperation program for Europe but rather be prepared to cooperate with the Europeans as they determine their own interests.” (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) 3 “The present situation is not auspicious for an early Webb visit,” Pollack (SCI) wrote to Rusk in an April 25 memorandum. “Governments potentially interested in the project are currently preoccupied with the NATO crisis.” (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383, SP 1–1) Webb finally visited London and Bonn in September 1966. (Memorandum from Pollack to Rusk, September 27; ibid.) 4 Webb agreed with Rusk's assessment and noted that German Science Minister Stoltenberg also concurred. (Letter from Webb to Rusk, May 24; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 45. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 45. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 16, 1966. SUBJECT Preservation of European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) Discussion This morning Mr. Richard Faber of the United Kingdom Embassy, acting on instructions of the Ambassador who had just received a letter from the Foreign Office, suggested it would be useful if you could mention to Mr. George Thomson that the United States is hopeful that the United Kingdom will not withdraw from ELDO. Background ELDO, created in 1960 largely at the initiative of the United Kingdom which supplies 38 percent of the ELDO budget, is now facing a major crisis due to the threat of United Kingdom withdrawal (composition and functions of ELDO attached). 2 This threat is motivated largely by budgetary concerns and doubts as to the cost effectiveness of the British investment in ELDO. The British Foreign Office has staunchly supported continued participation in ELDO because of its implications to British relationships with the Continent and the Common Market, and because of adverse impact on European multilateral developments that would follow a breakup of ELDO. Comparable considerations ran through the minds of various officials of the Department and NASA. Additionally, we preferred multilateral to national programs of launcher development, we were concerned about possible Soviet moves to fill the vacuum that would be created by ELDO's dissolution, and we related Europe's technological development to its participation in major space activities. Our general concerns about the consequences of ELDO's dissolution were conveyed to the British prior to the ELDO meeting on April 28. Partially as a consequence the British Cabinet decided against immediate withdrawal and the ELDO meeting resulted in a six-week “reprieve”. The crucial ELDO meeting will now be held on June 9. The British Cabinet will be meeting on May 26, according to Mr. Faber, to settle the British position to be taken at that ELDO meeting. 3 Although State and NASA are in general agreement that ELDO ought not to fail there is as yet no agreed interdepartmental position on this matter. Deputy Under Secretary Johnson has convened an interdepartmental meeting for this coming Thursday, May 19, which I will chair, to develop a government-wide position. Although there are involved problems of communication satellite policy and export of booster technology, I am reasonably confident that we shall end up encouraging the continuation of ELDO and expressing a willingness to provide ELDO with meaningful support, if this should prove necessary. Recommendation That you seek an opportunity to express to Mr. Thomson your concern about the possible United Kingdom withdrawal from ELDO and inform him that we are currently studying ways in which we might be helpful to ELDO's future program. 1 Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. Limited Official Use. Cleared by J. Robert Schaetzel (EUR). A copy was sent to Ball. A May 16 cover memorandum attached to the source text reads: “Amb. Johnson believes you should be aware of the attached for your meeting with George Thomson but does not believe you should take the initiative in raising it. E.J.S.” 2 Not printed. Member assessments were: U.K.—38.79 percent; France—23.93 percent; Germany—22.01 percent; Italy—9.78 percent; Belgium—2.85 percent; and the Netherlands—2.64 percent. Australia contributed the use of the Woomera Range. 3 Telegram 7206 from Paris, April 28, reads: “the only new pro-ELDO argument having any impression on [British] Prime Minister was suggestion of possible U.S. interest in cooperation with ELDO.” According to sources, the argument had enough impact to reverse a previous U.K. decision to “make a clean out.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO) 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, May 24, 1966, 8:29 p.m. 7034. Ref: Deptel 6208, April 20 repeated Bonn 2771, Brussels 1285, Canberra 875, Paris 5349, Rome 2205, The Hague 705. Deptel 6902 to London. 2 Interdepartmental working group of committee established pursuant to Space Council decision to review possibilities of expanded international cooperation in space held initial meeting on May 19 on subject of cooperation in launcher technology. 3 Discussion centered on cooperation with ELDO. It was agreed that continuation of ELDO is desirable from U.S. point of view and that a U.S. position would be prepared providing for cooperation with ELDO in the event ELDO members desire such cooperation. U.S. cooperation would be subject to government to government agreement that ELDO members would honor their Intelsat commitments, i.e., adherence to a single global commercial satellite system, and that launcher technology would not be used for advancement of national missile launching capability or be provided to non-ELDO nations. NASA currently developing for Government review list of items of cooperation U.S. would be willing to undertake in assisting ELDO projects. Department is seeking to establish fully cleared government position on urgent basis. In its discretion Embassy may advise Foreign Office and other appropriate officials of evolving consensus within U.S. Government but with cautionary note that fully cleared U.S. Government position not yet established. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Pollack and cleared by Morris (OTM), Robert L. Bruce (S/S), Barber, Frutkin (NASA), Frank E. Loy (E/TT), Sidney N. Graybeal (ACDA), and Spurgeon Keeny (White House). Cleared by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Paris, Rome, and The Hague. 2 Telegram 6208 is dated April 20. (Ibid.) Telegram 6902 was not found. 3 Details of the meeting are in the summary minutes, May 19. (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383, SP 1 NASC) 47. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Belgium 47. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Belgium 1 Washington, June 4, 1966, 2:17 p.m. Tosec 68. FYI. British Embassy informed Department June 3 that British Government will announce at June 9 meeting of ELDO its decision to withdraw from participation in ELDO once its current commitments have been met. 2 This action based on British budgetary considerations and concern with poor cost effectiveness of launch vehicle ELDO producing. Since U.K. provides 38 percent of ELDO financing its withdrawal makes continuation of European multilateral space launching program most unlikely. Other members ELDO are France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Australia. Department and other interested agencies had been concerned about this prospect because of implications of collapse of European multilateral organization at this time, our preference for multilateral launcher development programs in contrast to national programs, connection between space technology and European efforts to meet technological gap and potential for advantage to Soviets in collapse of ELDO. We also have in mind implications to British relationships to Continent in Common Market. These views conveyed to British Embassy here and to Sir Solly Zuckerman during visit to Washington early May. On May 16 British Embassy suggested it would be useful if highest levels Department could mention to George Thomson U.S. hopes that U.K. would not withdraw from ELDO. Both Alex Johnson and Under Secretary did so. Interested U.S. agencies have been in process of developing U.S. position providing for U.S. cooperation with ELDO in event that proved relevant to ELDO's continuation (see Deptel 1285 to Brussels). 3 Other European members will be much aggrieved at British decision and reaction may be strong. 4 Since all ELDO members now aware of British decision, it is possible that this subject may be raised with you in Brussels. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. Drafted by Pollack on June 4, cleared by Percival (EUR/RPE) in substance and Alexander L. Rattray (S/S), and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Secretary Rusk was in Brussels for a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, June 6–8. During this session, the Ministers agreed to move NATO headquarters to Belgium. 2 Details of the British decision are in a June 3 memorandum of conversation between Pollack (SCI) and Faber of the U.K. Embassy. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 4 In a June 14 memorandum to Frutkin, Ousley described the members' reactions: “Stoltenberg can be credited (in Aubiniere's mind) with providing the European arguments and support for the continuation of ELDO. During the ELDO Ministers' conference, he effectively led the constructive discussions. Peyrefitte only summarized the other countries' positions, never stating that of France. The Dutch were the most violent against the UK, with Italy weakly calling for the continuation of ELDO based primarily on European cooperation principles.” (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) 48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, June 10, 1966, 6:31 p.m. 6606. Subject: ELDO Crisis. Ref: NATUS 8588, 2 Info Bonn 1423, London 1697, Rome 1155, The Hague 874, Brussels 959. 1. Huigens/Von Merkatz report on ELDO crisis, 3 charging that US offer to cooperate with Europe in advanced space projects is aimed at insuring US monopoly in com sat field and obliging Europeans choose between major project and ELDO, has great mischief-making potential if left unchallenged. 2. Posts should draw on following guidance in discussing matter with appropriate officials: (a) Contrary to conclusion of Von Merkatz report, US has demonstrated consistent pattern of helpfulness toward ELDO, which is recognized as primary instrument for achievement of European launcher capability. (b) Original establishment of ELDO depended on US permission for UK to share Blue Streak technology with other ELDO members. (c) When ELDO turned to US for fuel to permit development of ELDO stages, US promptly licensed export of storable liquid fuel (UDMH) and has continued to do so. (d) When ELDO requested advanced Hydrogen-Oxygen technology for future systems, US licensed North American Aviation to furnish such assistance. (e) Other accommodations have included technology for separation devices for ELDO stages and access to US ground facilities. (f) Contrary to rumor reported by Huigens, US was seriously concerned about threatened UK withdrawal from ELDO. 4 US has favored and continues favor multilateral framework for launcher development. Supports continuation ELDO, including UK, as in US interest and has indicated to European governments willingness to consider sympathetically request for help. 5 (g) As explained by Advance Team in February, 6 President's space offer was open-ended and invited European initiative to propose major space project of advanced scientific and technological nature of interest to Europe. Interplanetary exploration was cited merely as illustrative of magnitude of projects which US had in mind. Cooperation in projects of direct economic benefit, while not stressed, was not excluded from consideration. Nature of response left entirely to Europe, and US still awaits European response. (h) Similarly, US booster offer was open-ended and went far beyond anything currently planned in Europe. US also made clear its willingness discuss European assumption of responsibility, most likely through ELDO, for developing high energy kick stage for deep space use if project selected requires it (Depcirtel 1849). 7 3. In connection with threatened UK withdrawal from ELDO, we note Peyrefitte-Stoltenberg meeting (Bonn's 4049) 8 in which Ministers “announced their intention to seek solutions in concert with other member nations to permit cooperative European rocket development to proceed.” While decision obviously European matter, US would continue to regard favorably effective European functional approach to launcher development. This would be in keeping with our overall European policy. Action Requested : Addressee posts should convey sense of US concern at tone of report to influential host country officials. We would hope that next week's proceedings might reflect recognition of points in paragraph 2 above and contribute to more constructive atmosphere on this subject. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Michael F. Smith (SCI) and cleared in substance by Frutkin and Percival; approved by Nesbitt (SCI). Also sent to Bonn, London, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels. 2 Not found. 3 Not found. 4 See Document 47 . 5 In a June 25 memorandum to Shapley, Frutkin noted: “A positive US attitude toward ELDO was expressed through State Department and NASA channels and a task group has been agreed on a program for such assistance (developed by NASA). Mr. Rusk, during the NATO negotiations in early June, explicitly conveyed this positive posture toward ELDO to several of the NATO foreign ministers, including Michael Stewart [of the UK]and Fanfani [Italy].” (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) 6 See Document 39 . 7 Dated March 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1 EUR-US) 8 Not found. 49. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State 49. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, June 14, 1966. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VIEWS ON THE POST-APOLLO PROGRAM United States scientific and technological achievements have become prominent indices of our international power and standing. Such achievements, and especially those in the field of space, are important components in the definition of our international stature. The United States should not be diffident about using its scientific and technological prowess in support of its international objectives. Yet we must recognize that international advantage flows more readily and constantly from sound and solid scientific endeavors than from enterprises designed primarily for political purposes. In the development of a post-Apollo program, the first and overriding objective must be goals that are sound, scientifically valid and consistent with fiscal realities. At the same time it must be appreciated that the size, scope, content and effectiveness of the program will inevitably have a significant bearing on international events and the way we are regarded by the rest of the world. In short, the effect of the U.S. Space Program on our international posture is substantial and cannot be overlooked. Design of programs should be calculated to fulfill the scientific and technological potential of outer space, but on a scale and in a manner that will exploit all reasonable opportunities which may enhance our world position in the future. Soviet skill in exploiting space achievements to their advantage in the areas of national prestige and international politics must be recognized and countered. We must expect that space spectaculars will continue to be the order of the day to the extreme limit of Soviet capability. And they will not stop at the moon. During the first ten years of the Space Age we have regularly found ourselves in the apparent position of following the Soviet lead in space exploration, of responding to, rather than issuing, challenges. We have, and should continue to have, a superior program characterized by openness and a willingness to share knowledge freely. We should guard against a gap in planning and development that will vitiate our advantages and leave us in a posture of response rather than of leadership. In view of all these points it does not seem too early to seek answers to several questions regarding what comes next. 1. When will the post-Apollo program provide for exploration of near-by planets? Manned? Unmanned? 2. How adequate are the resources allocated to research for advanced, post-Apollo, space vehicle propulsion systems? Are power sources for spacecraft receiving sufficient support? 3. What is the nature of the follow-on lunar program? What are the plans for a lunar research station? When will we be ready for internationally manned lunar stations? 4. Does the program include development of technology for broadcast satellites direct to community antennae? To homes? 5. What does the program provide for the development of remote sensing technology for agricultural, geological, oceanographic, and other scientific and commercial purposes? 6. When will the program provide for a Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory? What degree of international cooperation is foreseen in utilizing such facilities? 1 Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. This paper was prepared for a meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council on June 15 to discuss post-Apollo planning and specifically to answer a question of the Vice President: “Do you see any special advantages in selecting any particular goals in advancing this country's prestige or bargaining position abroad?” (Memorandum from Pollack to Rusk, June 15; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 10) In the June 13 covering memorandum to the Secretary that accompanied this memorandum, Pollack stated the Department's goals: “Because of the hard facts of international relations in a space conscious world, post-Apollo programs have significant political importance and must therefore be constructed with that in mind. In order to establish and clarify the record it is suggested that you table a paper at the meeting … which would voice the Department's interest in post-Apollo programs.” (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383) According to reports of the meeting, “The Secretary stated that his main interest was in near earth activities in space rather than expensive activities for interplanetary performance. He stressed communications and navigation satellites, space sciences, improvement in defense use of space; he did very nicely.” (Memorandum from Nesbitt to Pollack, June 15; ibid.) 50. Statement Prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Space Council 50. Statement Prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Space Council 1 Washington, July 21, 1966. US COOPERATION WITH ELDO Background In the spring of 1966 the British Government began the process of reconsideration of its participation in ELDO. When it became apparent that this reconsideration might lead to British withdrawal from ELDO, the United States made known to the British and to certain other members of ELDO its hope that the British would continue their ELDO membership and participation. The United States informed the British that a “U.S. position would be prepared providing for cooperation with ELDO in the event ELDO members desire such cooperation.” At a meeting of ELDO on June 9, Great Britain sought a reduction in the British ELDO assessment. 2 The decision to follow this course of action rather than anticipated withdrawal from ELDO was no doubt influenced by the severe European reaction to the possibility of British withdrawal and to the expressions of US interest in the continuation of ELDO and the U.S. willingness to cooperate with ELDO should ELDO desire. [At a subsequent meeting on July 7–8 ELDO agreed on a reduction in the British assessment and confirmed the continuation of its present program (the completion of the ELDO-A vehicle) through 1971.] 3 It is therefore desirable to have available as promptly as possible for contingency use the U.S. position on cooperation with ELDO. Policy Considerations The principal US interest in the continuation of ELDO is political rather than programmatic. British withdrawal from ELDO or ELDO's demise would adversely affect US foreign policy objectives in the following respects: 4 A It would be unfortunate not only with respect to British political relationships with the Continent and the Common Market but also could have an adverse impact on other European multilateral efforts. B The US prefers multilateral to national programs of launcher development which might be stimulated in the absence of ELDO. C The US is concerned that, if ELDO were to be dissolved, France might devote more of its resources to a national, military-related program or that it might establish undesirable bilateral relationships for the construction of satellite launch vehicles. D The US feels that Europe's technological development is in part dependent upon its participation in major space activities involving highly advanced technology. US Position It should be made known that the US stands prepared to offer cooperation and assistance to ELDO, which would contribute to the desirability from the European point of view of the continuation of ELDO. A. Conditions underlying cooperation —In view of existing policies concerning US assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite capabilities and the non-proliferation of ballistic missile delivery capabilities as stated in NSAMs 338 and 294, it is understood that in responding to requests for cooperation by ELDO, US cooperation would be selective and subject to government-to-government agreement that launcher vehicles, components and technology would not be used for: 1. Advancement of communication satellite capability other than (a) to permit participation in the US National Defense Communication Satellite System; or (b) in connection with the Single Global Commercial Communication Satellite System in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and Special Agreement of August 20, 1964. 5 2. Advancement of nuclear missile delivery capabilities of one or more member countries. 3. Transmittal or transferral to non-ELDO countries without US authorization. B. Areas of US cooperation and assistance— 1. General assistance applicable to both short and long range ELDO projects, as follows: a Training—Participation by ELDO nominees in NASA seminars for technical management training in such subjects as PERT and Companion Cost System, Reliability and Quality Assurance in Specific Systems, Testing and Checkout, Systems Compatibility, Incentive Contracting. b Facilitating export licenses for ELDO requirements, including an extension of the ELDO export certification process (originally adopted for UDMH) to cover the procurement of other launch vehicle and ground support equipment hardware. (A device to give ELDO items priority and access beyond European national vehicle programs.) c Use of NASA test facilities. d Designation within NASA of a technical office specifically to serve in an expediting and assisting role for ELDO. 2. Short range assistance in the proposed reconfiguration of ELDO-A. a Make available on a case by case basis, subject to export control approval, Atlas Standard Launch Vehicle (SLV) technology additional to that already provided under past export control actions. b Technical advice and assistance in such areas as (1) Multi-stage vehicle integration. (2) Stage separation (3) Range organization, lay-out, and equipment as related to the ELDO vehicle. (4) Synchronous orbit injection techniques. c Procurement of unclassified flight hardware in the US including such items as the Miniature Integrating Gyro (MIG) strapped-down “guidance” (auto-pilot) package used on the Scout vehicle. Comparable hardware has already been exported to Japan. 3. Long range assistance in the development of follow-up ELDO projects using high-energy cryogenic upper stages (e.g. ELDO-B). a Access to related US experience and technology as available in the Atlas-Centaur system through technical documentation and contacts. b Bring ELDO technical personnel into intimate touch with problems of systems design, integration, and program management of a high-energy upper stage such as the Centaur. c Consideration of joint use of a high-energy upper stage developed in Europe. C. Supplementary action —To supplement ELDO-A launch services the US will sell Scout, Thor, and Atlas vehicles and launch services for scientific and applications satellites to Western European and other countries as deemed appropriate and consistent with A above. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. The first draft of this paper was prepared by Pollack and a working group of the International Cooperation subcommittee, chaired by Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson. Pollack sent the draft, in circulation for comments, under cover of a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on June 15 in preparation for a National Aeronautics and Space Council meeting. (Ibid., SP 10) On July 22 Joyce sent the final version of the paper, as printed here, prepared as a draft NSAM, under cover of a memorandum to President Johnson requesting Johnson's signature to another memorandum to the Vice President. 2 See Document 45 . 3 Brackets in the source text. 4 The DOD feels that paragraph A alone is a sufficient basis for the US position; the DOD does not endorse Paras. B, C, and D. [Footnote in the source text. Secretary McNamara explained his objectives to President Johnson on July 2: “I cannot endorse all the 'Policy Considerations' since several of the points listed imply conclusions which seem doubtful as to French and other ELDO nations' policies.” He added, “It is understood that should the ELDO structure change significantly, such as by withdrawal of the UK, the policy proposed herein would be reconsidered.” (Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383, SP 11 ELDO)] 5 See Document 71 . 51. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 51. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, July 24, 1966. SUBJECT US Cooperation with the European Launcher Development Organization The attached statement concerning US cooperation with the European Launcher Development Organization (Enclosure 1) 2 anticipates the need to be in a clear position to encourage the development of ELDO through US cooperation with ELDO's present and future programs. It is designed to support US objectives with respect to the role of European multinational institutions in space activities while at the same time safeguarding US concerns about the proliferation of nuclear delivery systems and communication satellite technology. The statement includes a brief background summary, a statement of relevant policy considerations and a proposed US position vis-à-vis ELDO. It has been prepared with the assistance and agreement of an ad hoc committee of the National Aeronautics and Space Council which is considering the several possibilities for expanded international cooperation in space activities. We feel that this is a matter of urgency in view of the recent debate among members of ELDO as to the efficacy of ELDO's programs and the measure of their continued support for space vehicle development within Europe on a civil multinational basis. The Department recommends that the proposed US position contained in this statement be promulgated as a National Security Action Memorandum along the lines indicated in Enclosure 2. 3 John P. Walsh 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. Drafted by Robert F. Packard (SCI) on July 21. 2 Not printed; the text is identical to the “US Position” section of Document 50 . 3 Not printed; the revised, final version appears in Document 52 . 4 Walsh signed for Read above Read's typed signature. 52. National Security Action Memorandum No. 354 52. National Security Action Memorandum No. 354 1 Washington, July 29, 1966. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission SUBJECT U.S. Cooperation with the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) The President has noted the memorandum of July 24, 1966, 2 from the Department of State transmitting the conclusion of the Ad Hoc Committee of the National Aeronautics and Space Council that it is a matter of urgency that we clarify and define our policy with respect to the development of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the extent of U.S. cooperation with ELDO's present and future programs. The President concurs in the overall statement of policy that it is in the U.S. interest to encourage the continued development of ELDO through U.S. cooperation. He further approves the recommendation that in the event that ELDO desires cooperation with the U.S. the Department of State in consultation with NASA, the Department of Defense and other responsible agencies, may make the above policy known to the members of ELDO and to take such specific action in cooperation with the other interested agencies as may be necessary to carry out this policy. The President has also noted that the Department of State with the assistance and agreement of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the National Aeronautics and Space Council has prepared a detailed statement defining the nature and extent of U.S. cooperation with ELDO which the U.S. Government is now prepared to extend (attached). 3 He concurs in the desirability of such interdepartmental program development and requests that this statement be continuously reviewed by the responsible agencies to ensure that it is current and responsive in terms of developing circumstances. W.W. Rostow 1 Source: Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316. Confidential. Copies were also sent to the National Aeronautics and Space Council, Hornig, O'Connell, and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Foster. 2 Document 51 . 3 This word in parentheses has been inserted by hand. The attachment is identical to the “US Position” section of Document 50 . 53. Editorial Note 53. Editorial Note In a memorandum of July 26, 1966, to Francis Bator, Arnold Frutkin summarized the difficulty of implementing the President's December 1965 proposal for international space cooperation (see Documents 36 and 37 ). U.S. ideas for an “Advanced Cooperative Space Project” (ACSP) included proposals for a joint U.S.-European probe to either the Sun or Jupiter. The European countries limited their consideration to these specific projects although they were only examples of possible missions. NASA believed that European officials were favorable to a joint program, but the fact that the proposal came from the United States was a serious defect in European eyes. NASA officials had few options on how to proceed and hoped that Prime Minister Wilson, during an upcoming visit to Washington, would signal his readiness for the United Kingdom to provide leadership within Europe. NASA suggested that, in his meetings with Wilson, the President note “casually that he continues to have some interest in the possibility that advanced space projects could stimulate Europe to more rapid progress in technology through joint efforts in cooperation with the United States.” (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) The European space organization, ESRO, reviewed the proposals and reported in August 1966 that some proposals were “very favorably received” and others were discussed. But, the chairman added, “The Council had to recognise that an additional project of the proposed magnitude could not be completed within the financial resources which, under existing agreements, will be available to this Organisation during the years 1967–1971.” (Letter from Hocker to Webb, August 3; ibid.) On August 11 Frutkin informed Webb that, because the prospects for a positive response to the President's initiative were “sufficiently distant,” it was time to reconsider the proposal for a Webb mission to Europe. Webb's visit would be billed as a personal fact-finding mission. He was to stress U.S. interest in cooperation and assure the Europeans that “the President's proposal was in no sense intended to channel European interests in any preconceived direction but rather to offer the widest possible opportunity for Europe to consider what advanced space projects might serve European technological interest.” Although the general atmosphere had been slightly improved by the State Department's helpfulness toward ELDO, “All in all, we must say the President's proposal got off to a poor start due to misunderstandings which are inevitable when a proposition of this sort is first made in the headlines without preparation of the ground, the existing poor climate, the ELDO and NATO crises, and the fiscal problems of the UK. My own cautious view at the moment is that the proposal will not be given a hard negative in Europe, that we will be successful in keeping it alive and on the books, and that slowly we will induce the Europeans to recognize the advantages in directing their future ESRO planning in such a fashion as to encompass a useful project of the kind we have suggested.” (Memorandum from Frutkin to Webb, August 11; ibid.) Rusk concurred that Webb's mission would be difficult. In an August 29 letter to Webb, he wrote: “The European countries, with the exception of Germany, are apparently not prepared to respond positively to the President's offer and to our suggestions for an advanced cooperative space program at the present time.” He added that Webb's visit would contribute to a general improvement in climate and he instructed that “Major multilateral space projects should remain our long-term goal.” (Ibid.; Webb's response, September 1, is also ibid.) Webb visited only the United Kingdom and West Germany. No other capitals were visited “in order to avoid undue exposure to the press in light of reports of major Soviet booster developments, and to avoid any appearance of boycotting Paris.” He reported to Secretary Rusk in October that the British were interested but “severely limited” by fiscal constraints. The Germans were interested in bilateral projects, but were not prepared to discuss launching a German experimental communications satellite by the United States. “Taken together with information obtained in London, this suggests the possibility of an increasing regional European interest in communications satellites, comprehending ELDO, ESRO, and CETS and requiring careful US consideration in light of the 1969 INTELSAT renegotiations.” ( See Documents 63 ff .) The German preference was for a communications satellite launch within the “European framework.” Webb argued that a regional system might be obsolete before it could be put into operation because of the work being done in the United States and elsewhere in connection with INTELSAT. (Notes on Webb's visits to England and Germany are enclosed in a letter from Webb to Rusk, October 14; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs) In his final assessment of his mission for the Secretary, Webb noted: “I believe the effort was productive but also believe we must begin to pattern the individual actions taken within our government toward a more consistent approach to the needs of those nations we are anxious to have increase their own competence so that they can better participate in multilateral activities and can better understand their own needs and opportunities in bilateral negotiations.” European suspicion about U.S. intentions combined with U.S. export restrictions on key technology was a serious bar to cooperation, despite “the liberal positions taken by you [Rusk] and the President on this subject.” (Letter from Webb to Rusk, October 14; ibid.) 54. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 54. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 19, 1966. SUBJECT A Key Issue—Future Space Goals 1 One of the most important questions to be faced by this administration is, quite simply: “After the moon, what?” 2 Post-lunar space objectives have not been fixed. The basic issue is illustrated by two crude and over-simplified alternatives: Alternative #A : Agreement with the USSR that any further exploration into outer space beyond the moon will be conducted only in a framework of close cooperation. Since this kind of cooperation will be long in coming, and hard to come by, main emphasis would be placed in the meantime, within the US national space program, on “bringing space down to earth,” i.e., on using the knowledge gained in space to enhance human welfare, particularly in developing countries (resources surveys, communications, etc). We would not abandon other efforts but would pursue them on a more orderly basis rather than at the forced pace of the moon race. Alternative #B : Continuing US and Soviet competitive exploration of outer space beyond the moon. Both these courses would be expensive. But if Soviet attitudes should make course (a) feasible, the saving over course (b) might conceivably run to several billion dollars annually. The difference in expenditures (plus some difference in employment in the aerospace industry) might begin to be felt around FY 1968. 3 The issue does not, of course, present itself in these stark terms. There will be many options—not two. And a wide variety of technical and foreign policy considerations not mentioned above will need to be brought to bear. 4 The burden of this memo is that the choice should not, however, be made solely on the basis of these considerations. This is an issue in which important domestic and foreign considerations intertwine. 2 Someone whose main concern is with our domestic programs should interject himself into the exercise—both to ensure that all the alternatives are examined and to grind into the final mix of staff work a careful weighing of the domestic effects of each alternative. 3 HO 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Post-Apollo (Outer Space Goals), Box 16. Confidential. 2 Owen explained to Rostow in his September 27 covering memorandum to this memorandum: “What our space policy does to domestic expenditures and to employment in the aerospace industry at home is as important as what it does to our 'image' abroad.” 3 Responsibility in the White House devolved to Spurgeon Keeny and Charles E. Johnson. (Memorandum from Johnson to Keeny, October 13; Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Post-Apollo (Outer Space Goals), Box 16) 55. Department of State Policy Paper 55. Department of State Policy Paper 1 Washington, October 1966. SPACE GOALS AFTER THE LUNAR LANDING Summary Even before the outcome of the moon race has been decided, we face the question of whether to commit ourselves to still more ambitious programs—proceeding with manned exploration of the moon after the initial landing; mounting large-scale scientific investigations with unmanned planetary and solar probes; projecting man through space to the planets. These are challenging goals. There are probably good reasons for pursuing them in due course, and achieving them might enhance our international position. For example, efforts directed toward manned lunar exploration and toward conducting scientific observations from the moon's surface would be useful for advancing scientific knowledge and could demonstrate that the moon race was not an end in itself. However, from the standpoint of our foreign policy interests, we see no compelling reasons for early, major commitments to such goals, or for pursuing them at the pace that has characterized the race to the moon. Moreover, if we can de-emphasize or stretch out additional costly programs aimed at the moon and beyond, resources may to some extent be released for other objectives—foreign aid, domestic needs, scientific efforts in other areas—which might serve more immediate, higher priority U.S. interests. A Twofold International Objective Instead of indefinitely extending the space race, it would be preferable to work toward a twofold objective: —“De-fusing” the space race between the U.S. and Soviets . This would mean working toward arrangements for conducting major future ventures jointly, or at least coordinating national efforts with a view to limiting pressures for racing toward new goalposts deep in space. We probably can't expect the Soviets to be seriously interested in tapering off before (and unless) the moon race itself convinces them that cooperation—or the more deliberate pacing of space exploration achievable through coordination—is more advantageous than wasteful national competition. For our own part, we can proceed now to examine ways and means of working with them when and if they are ready, and we can seek to engage them in additional cooperative efforts in near space. —Bridging the gap between the space powers and others . While continuing efforts to ameliorate the political and economic effects of the widening technological gap, we can and should work harder to bridge the gap in awareness and understanding of the changes just emerging, for example, from the new tools of communication, the deepening knowledge of weather and climate, the increasing openness of the earth to the view from space. Although our own grasp of the potentialities of these changes is still limited, that of technically unsophisticated countries is far less. Greater awareness and understanding will be needed to ensure an international adjustment consistent with our own interests. This means using our program more effectively to engage the interests of others, partly through broadening the base of cooperation, searching out and resolving potential problem areas; and demonstrating responsible leadership in the process. Implications for our Space Effort Given the uncertainties that will continue to persist in space as well as on earth, we will need a vigorous and imaginative space effort. In order to support the foregoing twofold objective while ensuring flexibility to meet unforeseeable needs, we might most usefully emphasize programs serving the following purposes: — Advancing our defense/arms control/peacekeeping interests . On the one hand, we will need to continue using capabilities in support of our defense programs, and to avoid future technological and psychological surprises affecting our security. On the other hand, we should be ready to use space technology for arms control and peacekeeping if and as political conditions permit. — Utilizing space as a resource for man . This would involve placing added emphasis on practical applications (for example, communications, meteorology, earth resources survey satellites) which serve to “bring space down to earth” and make space useful and meaningful to “haves” and “have nots” alike. — Extending options for cooperation . While the preceding programs offer a number of opportunities for cooperating, it may also be desirable to open new doors. For example, a Manned Orbital Research Laboratory could serve scientific purposes and provide a vehicle for cooperation in manned spaceflight. — Extending technical options . On a selective basis, we should move ahead with capabilities necessary for advanced manned and unmanned spaceflight. This should enhance our flexibility and help keep our knowledge and skills at the “cutting edge of technology.” This kind of program emphasis would not be cheap, but it would be less costly than an indefinite expansion of the scope and pace of the space race. If we pursue this kind of program vigorously and imaginatively, we will have a firm footing for our foreign policy interests as they are affected by space. The decisions now confronting us will, of course, be influenced by a broader range of considerations, and foreign policy needs must be properly related to other national interests. For present purposes, the main question is whether the thrust of the approach outlined above is in the right direction. [Here follow Sections A. The Problem; B. Basic Considerations: 1. Changing International Attitudes, 2. Continuity of Soviet Objectives, 3. Security and Uncertainty in Space, 4. Factors Bearing on Decisions; C. Programmatic Goals: 1. Priority Programs, 2. Bonus Program; D. International Framework: 1. A Twofold International Objective, 2. De-fusing the Space Race, 3. Bridging the Gap Between the Space Powers and Others; and E. Pro's and Con's.] 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1 US. Secret. Prepared by the Policy Planning Council. A typed note on the cover page reads: “The Secretary of State believes the attached paper may be of interest to Members of the Space Council. The Secretary, however, reserves his own position pending discussion in the Council.” Only the summary (pages i-iii) of the 23-page report is printed here. 56. Letter From Vice President Humphrey to Secretary of State Rusk 56. Letter From Vice President Humphrey to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 25, 1966. Dear Mr. Secretary: I have read with considerable interest the study of space goals as prepared by the State Department. 2 It is a thoughtful, informative, and, I might add, provocative paper. It is also very timely in light of the budgetary situation. If it is agreeable with you, I would like to have this study be the subject of one or more Space Council meetings starting in late December or early January. We are at the point in our space program where we must give immediate attention to developments beyond the Apollo phase. I am sure you recognize that your study will provoke a good deal of comment and undoubtedly run into considerable resistance from NASA. I regret the delay in a formal response to your communication of October 19. I have read the study very carefully. Sincerely, Hubert H. Humphrey Will want to talk to you about this. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1 US. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the attached Action Slip reads: “Note: Secretary informed and requested to authorize distribution of Space Goals paper to members of the Space Council. 12/2 by memo from S/P (Owen) and SCI (Pollack).” 2 Reference is to Document 55 . 3 The postscript was handwritten by Humphrey. 57. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) and the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk 57. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Scientific and Technological Affairs (Pollack) and the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, December 2, 1966. SUBJECT Planning Paper Concerning “Space Goals After the Lunar Landing” The Vice President has now replied to you (Tab A) 2 concerning the planning paper on “Space Goals After the Lunar Landing” (Tab B) 3 which you sent to him in early October. The Vice President suggests that the matter be discussed in the Space Council. Meanwhile, the Vice President has referred the paper to the Executive Secretary of the Space Council, Dr. Welsh, and his staff for examination and comment, and the existence of the paper has become known outside the Vice President's office (e.g.: to Mr. Webb and Dr. Seamans of NASA). There is increasing speculation and interest as to what the paper may contain among officials who are concerned with this matter and would be involved in its consideration by the Space Council—particularly since the paper is thought to be relevant to pressing budget decisions affecting the space program. In view of the Vice President's response, and as a means of responding to the interest of these officials, we suggest that the paper be made available now to other members of the Space Council (especially Mr. Webb and Secretary McNamara) and appropriate members of their staffs. This could be done with the clear stipulation that the paper is a staff “think piece” and is circulated for information and comment rather than as a formal proposal. We would be prepared to see to this promptly, if you agree. Recommendation: That you authorize us to arrange distribution, with the above stipulation, of copies of the planning paper on “Space Goals After the Lunar Landing” to the members of the Space Council and other officials who may be involved in its consideration by the Council. 4 1 Source: Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Scientific and Technological Development 1966. Secret. Drafted by Packard (SCI) and cleared in substance by Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM). Regarding the drafting of this paper, see Document 56 . 2 Document 56 . 3 Document 55 . 4 Approved by Rusk on December 2. 58. Editorial Note 58. Editorial Note On February 12, 1967, the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) released a report entitled, “The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period.” Prepared by the Space Science and Space Technology panels of the PSAC, the report rejected the adoption of a “single dominating goal” like the moon race, in favor of a balanced program based upon the expectation of eventual manned planetary exploration. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Post-Apollo (Outer Space Goals), Box 16) In a February 27 memorandum to the Secretary, Pollack summarized the conclusions and implications of the report. He wrote: “The Report is directed solely to the space program. It does not attempt to weight the relative importance of science in space as compared with other major scientific tasks.” The PSAC authors admitted their belief that the expenditures for a continuing national effort in space science and exploration were so great that “the justification must be found in indirect benefits to the Society which we cannot evaluate in scientific terms.” Accordingly, the report dealt little with military, political, and economic factors. While addressing the questions of U.S. leadership and international cooperation, the report was heavily weighted toward the scientific objectives and benefits of the space program. Pollack pointed out that on international cooperation, an issue of major importance to the State Department, “The Report is not particularly helpful.” There were other issues on which the PSAC report diverged from positions taken previously by the Secretary. ( See Document 55 and footnote 1 , Document 49 .) While conceding that much of the significant space science to be done during the 1970s would be accomplished in earth orbit, “PSAC considers [planetary exploration] to be the primary objective of the post-Apollo program.” The PSAC proposed three funding options, ranging from about $3.5 billion to about $7 billion. (Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Scientific and Technological Development) 59. Editorial Note 59. Editorial Note During the first half of 1967 disaster struck both the U.S. and Soviet space programs. On January 27 Astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee died when fire engulfed their space capsule during a training exercise, and less than 3 months later Soyuz 1 cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov was killed during re-entry into earth orbit. These disasters and a $1 billion Congressional cut of the NASA budget prompted a reassessment of the U.S. program. On May 10 Henry Owen, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk suggesting that a third country, such as Japan, propose U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space by fixing “1971 or 1972 as the Lunar Exploration Year (i.e., as the year in which moon landings are to take place), with a view to defusing the moon race and thus ensuring that it is not prosecuted at a pace which would endanger astronauts' lives.” (Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Science and Technological Development 1967) In a May 13 memorandum to Humphrey, Welsh noted that agreement on these suggestions was unlikely: “Little practical possibility exists in the near future in cooperative activity with the USSR on flying spacecraft with astronauts from both countries, or particularly of a joint venture to go to the moon. The former difficulty arises from a lack of training and acquaintance with the equipment and also a dead-end argument as to whose equipment would be used for what. The latter is impractical because both countries have proceeded so far along the path of facilities and equipment that any joint venture would undoubtedly require scrapping of major investment and a total net increase in costs.” (Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files 1964–Apr 1967, 150.F.9.10 (F)) Later in May, the Department submitted a redraft of its October 1966 paper ( Document 55 ). The revised paper, entitled “Space Goals and Foreign Policy Priorities,” was similar to the earlier version, and re-emphasized its most important points, especially in light of the conclusion of the PSAC report on interplanetary travel ( see Document 58 ). The paper noted: “as best as we can now understand its implications, an interplanetary program—particularly a manned planetary program—will have the least direct relevance to our international needs.” The paper pointed out that overseas interest in a U.S.-Soviet space race was diminishing and that a post-Apollo program should not be designed in that context since “it appears that space will be increasingly internationalized.” It concluded that space objectives were important, but that they must be competitive with other national goals and that the United States must embrace a broad-based approach to science because “the ‘Sputnik 1' of the future could well occur not in space, but in some other field of science or technology” which has an “equal or greater” claim on U.S. resources. (Letter from Kohler to Rostow, May 26; Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Post-Apollo (Outer Space Goals), Box 16) The paper raised some questions at the White House. Charles Johnson wrote to Spurgeon Keeny on July 11: “Did you get a copy of this directly? I don't know what State expects this paper to do. I don't think NASA has yet reacted.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Opportunities for Expanded International Cooperation in Outer Space Activities, July 1967) In June the Interagency Working Group on Expanded International Cooperation in Outer Space Activities submitted its final report to the Vice President. The report sounded a note of caution on international cooperation in space, citing numerous problems of classification and control. NASA's leaders did not believe that the possibilities for cooperation should be the prime criteria for determining national space goals. “We must be careful lest, in designing our space programs for the future, we submerge these opportunities in commitments to other objectives or projects which do not lend themselves as readily to international cooperation.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 6) 60. Memorandum of Conversation 60. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 27, 1967, 8–11 p.m. SecDel/MC–7 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE 22ND UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York—September–October 1967 SUBJECT Outer Space Cooperation PARTICIPANTS U.S. Secretary Rusk Ambassador Thompson Ambassador Goldberg Ambassador Foster Mr Stoessel Mr. Krimer (Interpreter) USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister Soldatov Ambassador Dobrynin Ambassador Fedorenko Mr. Mendelevich Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter) The Secretary referred to the news-ticker clipping he had shown Mr. Gromyko on Monday reporting the remarks of a Soviet scientist in Belgrade concerning Soviet-American cooperation in exploring other planets. He wanted to emphasize to Mr. Gromyko that we were interested in this type of cooperation. He did not think that it meant we would immediately proceed to send joint expeditions to the other planets, but we did want to stress our interest in future cooperation. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 1–1 US–USSR. Secret; Exdis. The conversation took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Drafted by William D. Krimer, concurred in by Ambassador Goldberg, and approved in S on September 29. The memorandum is Part III of IV. 2 On October 2 Ambassador Dobrynin spoke with Deputy Under Secretary Kohler and confirmed that after Rusk and Gromyko spoke on September 27, “Gromyko had put a note in his briefcase to check on the possibilities of space cooperation between our two countries.” (Ibid.) 61. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey 61. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey 1 Washington, October 9, 1967. SUBJECT U.S.-USSR Space Cooperation 1. Policy . It has been and continues to be the policy of the U.S. to seek areas of mutually beneficial cooperation with the USSR in space activities. This policy practice is based on the assumption that such cooperation would improve relations between the two nations and might introduce some economy either by joint projects or through coordinated avoidance of unnecessary duplication of effort. 2. Record . The history of this country's attempts to develop useful cooperation with the USSR in space includes the following: a Beginning in 1955 in the planning for the International Geophysical Year, efforts were made to arrange for wide exchange of space data. Soviet participants opposed all but the most general and non-obligatory agreements. b In 1959, an offer by the U.S. to assist in tracking Soviet manned flights was not accepted. c In 1962, after an exchange of correspondence between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev and after the John Glenn flight, Khrushchev expressed the view that it would be good if the two nations could pool their efforts in space. d Later in 1962, an agreement between Dr. Dryden and Academician Blagonravov provided for (1) coordinated launchings and exchange of meteorological data; (2) coordinated launchings and exchange of data for a map of the Earth's magnetic field; and (3) joint communications tests using the U.S. Echo II satellite. In 1965, a second agreement was arrived at, for the preparation and publication of a joint U.S.-USSR review of space biology and medicine. e Soviet performance in even these limited projects has been disappointing. Better than nothing is the best that can be said. f Both President Kennedy and President Johnson have urged space cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR. U.S. invitations to the USSR to join Intelsat have had no effect. Invitations to view our launches have not been accepted by the Soviets. Offers to assist the Soviets on tracking of space shots have not been favorably received. g In reporting on Soviet-U.S. cooperation in space, October 2, 1967,NASA told the Congress as follows: “We regret that the Soviets have not been prepared to move more rapidly and more broadly to cooperate in space. We would welcome meaningful cooperation in projects of mutual interest and have set no arbitrary limits of any kind. We do not propose to stop trying, but it seems apparent that significant cooperation depends upon the Soviet Union effecting very substantial changes in its attitudes.” 3. Dr. Sedov's Statements . Sedov made several statements in a press conference at the International Astronautical Federation meetings in Belgrade recently which were interpreted here in the United States as indicating that the USSR favored space cooperation with the United States. It is NASA's view that Sedov's statements were misinterpreted. First of all, the meeting was not a governmental meeting and none of Sedov's comments committed his Government either as to policy or as to plan. In NASA's view, there is no basis for encouragement from the reports on Sedov's remarks. The State Department also has analyzed these statements and seems to feel that prospects regarding USSR cooperation are remote and that such cooperation would have to be based on a new international climate. Disagreement with the war in Vietnam seems to be a major stumbling block. It is recalled that Sedov has made statements vaguely suggestive of cooperation practically every year at the International Astronautical Federation meetings. I attach no significant weight to the reports on Sedov's remarks and believe that they were carried primarily by the New York Times because they fitted so well with that newspaper's editorial policy. 4. Recommendations . In spite of this gloomy picture regarding Soviet cooperation, it seems reasonable that we should continue to try not only because it might assist in the space program, but also because it might have broader international impact. Consequently, the following is suggested: 1. We should explore further the possibility of joint use of the Soviet Molniya communications satellite system along with the Intelsat system. 2. U.S. and USSR experts should review what specific steps might be taken to implement the recently concluded Space Treaty. This could deal with assistance to astronauts in distress, coordinated tracking and data acquisition, etc. 3. Arrangements should be attempted for effective rescue in the case of space emergencies. This should include some interface between hardware and life support systems so that such cooperation could be realistic. 4. Since Article X in the Space Treaty provides for equality of opportunity to observe the flight of space objects, it would be well to attempt mutuality of observations. This would call for the development of common frequencies for tracking and data readouts, etc. The above-listed are just some of the possible approaches which might be made. This is not to indicate that NASA has failed to explore these various avenues, but rather is simply a recommendation that we not be discouraged with the small amount of progress made in past attempts. E.C. Welsh 1 Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.F.10.1 (B). A cover memorandum attached to the source text reads: “October 9, 1966. To: The Vice President. You indicated in your meeting with several of my staff members and also in memoranda to me that you were interested in an additional study on the subject of international cooperation, particularly with the USSR. I have prepared the attached, as a brief staff study on this subject. This may prompt you to make additional recommendations as to how you think the matter should best be pursued. E.C. Welsh.” 62. Letter From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Secretary of State Rusk 62. Letter From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 11, 1967. Dear Mr. Secretary: The Vice President has urged me to transmit to you and to Jim Webb the necessity for greater emphasis upon international cooperation in space activities, with both the U.S.S.R. and the non-communist countries. I am writing Webb separately on this matter. The remarks of the President and you at the recent Space Treaty ceremony form an excellent foundation for this additional attention. 2 Sincerely, E. C. Welsh 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 10 US. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Vice President Humphrey. 2 In his remarks, the President noted that the space age had begun just one decade ago on October 4, 1957. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, pp. 918–920) Communication Satellites Communication Satellites 63. Position Paper for the United States Delegation Washington, undated. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. This position paper, prepared for a meeting with members of the European Conference on Satellite Communications and Canadian officials, is an enclosure to a letter from Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harland Cleveland to Legal Adviser Abram Chayes. 64. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to President Johnson Washington, March 13, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications Systems, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. Confidential. 65. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, March 16, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Drafted by Leonard Marks (USIA). Copies were sent to Cleveland (IO), Johnson (E), Nesbitt (SCI), and Edgar J. Beigel (WE). 66. Editorial Note 67. Letter From the Chairman of the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations (Holifield) to President Johnson Washington, May 13, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1. No classification marking. 68. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State Geneva, June 16, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Confidential. Passed to Charyk and Ende (FCC). An advance copy was passed to Bushong (L) and the E message center was notified. 69. Editorial Note 70. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 10, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [1 of 2]. No classification marking. 71. Editorial Note 72. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to the President's Special Assistant (Watson) Washington, May 7, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 806 COMSAT CORP. Confidential. 73. Policy Paper Washington, August 25, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communication Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. There is no drafting information on the source text. 74. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, September 13, 1965, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communication Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. 75. National Security Action Memorandum No. 3381 Washington, September 15, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communications Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Executive Secretary, NASC; Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; and the Communications Satellite Corporation. 76. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson Washington, September 21, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 806, COMSAT CORP. Confidential. 77. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson Washington, November 17, 1965, 3:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Comm. System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [2 of 2], Box 6. Secret. Copies were sent to Moyers, Valenti, Bundy, Watson, and Califano. 78. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) Washington, December 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT, NSAM No. 342, #2, Box 12. No classification marking. 79. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson Washington, January 28, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—Educational Purposes, Domestic and Foreign, NSAM No. 342, #1, Box 12. Confidential. 80. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 1, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files,COMSAT—US Communications Policy, NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. Copies were sent to Komer and Charles Johnson. 81. Editorial Note 82. National Security Action Memorandum No. 342 Washington, March 4, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 70 D 316. Confidential. Also printed in John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civilian Space Program, vol. III: Using Space (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1998), pp. 95–96. 83. Editorial Note 84. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson Washington, June 3, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. II [2 of 2], Box 6. No classification marking. 85. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) to the Director of the Defense Communications Agency (Starbird) Washington, June 4, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Nelson (E) and cleared by Gil Carter (AID) and O'Connell. 86. Report Prepared in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development Washington, June 27, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—Educational Purposes, NSAM 342 (Domestic and Foreign), #3, Box 12. Confidential. Transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Read to Rostow through O'Connell. A typed cover note dated July 25 from Charles Johnson to William Bowdler, Edward Hamilton, William Jorden, and Howard Wriggins, reads: “This is an advance copy of a State Department report now being reviewed in the Office of Telecommunications Adviser prior to transmittal to the President through Walt Rostow. I would appreciate very much receiving your views with respect to the findings and conclusions covering the individual countries that you keep your eye on. For your information, those of us who have looked at the report feel that it does not reflect the urgency and importance attached to this project by the President in NSAM 342.” The report was finally submitted to President Johnson on July 28; see Document 87. 87. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson Washington, July 28, 1966, 4 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files,COMSAT—Educational Purposes NSAM 342 (Domestic and Foreign), #3, Box 12. Confidential. 88. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) Washington, September 3, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1. Confidential. Drafted by Nesbitt (SCI) and cleared by Loy (E), George (G), and Pattman (L). 89. Editorial Note 90. Memorandum for the File Washington, November 25, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communications Policy, NSAM No. 338, #2 [2 of 2], Box 13. Official Use Only. Drafted by Welsh. 91. Report Prepared in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development Washington, December 31, 1966. Source: Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316. Confidential. A covering memorandum from Read to Rostow indicates the report was transmitted to the White House on January 4, 1967. 92. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant (Cater) Washington, January 14, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—Educational Purposes, NSAM 342 (Domestic and Foreign), #3, Box 12. Confidential. 93. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson Washington, February 17, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. III [2 of 3], Box 6. Confidential. 94. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 21, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Confidential. 95. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) Washington, April 24, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Nelson (E), Loy (E), and Pattman (L); and cleared by Silberstein (ARA), Nesbitt (SCI), Sneider (EA), and Springsteen (EUR). 96. National Security Action Memorandum No. 338 (Revised) Washington, July 12, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communication Policy NSAM No. 338, #2 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. Copies were also sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; the Executive Secretary, NASC; the Special Assistant for Science and Technology; and the Communications Satellite Corporation. 97. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, August 14, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Gotzlinger (E) and cleared by Robert Grey (M) and Loy (E). Sent to U.S. Missions in all 58 INTELSAT member countries. 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 15, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. Drafted by G. Huffcutt (E) and cleared by Nelson (E), O'Malley (DTM), Nesbitt (SCI), Newman (EUR), and Loy (E). Repeated to Bonn and Paris. 99. Editorial Note 100. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 25, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 101. Airgram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, May 13, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. Drafted by John H. Buehler (SCI) and A. Eugene Frank (TRC), cleared by Edgar L. Pire (SCI) and Richard G. Long (POL), and approved by Robert A. Brand (MINECON). 102. Editorial Note 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, August 13, 1968, 1714Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Miller (E) and Loy (E) and cleared by Dubs (EUR), Nesbitt (SCI), James Van R. Springer (L), Solomon (E), Abraham Katz (EUR), Joseph P. Lorenz (IO), Clark (DTM), Carroll Brown (S/S), Ende (FCC), Kemp (DOD), Radius (NASA), Johnson (NASC), and Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Belgrade, Bern, Bonn, Bucharest, Canberra, Copenhagen, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris also for CEDTO, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, USUN, Mission at Geneva, USEC Mission at Brussels, and Mission to NATO. 104. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State Vienna, August 16, 1968, 1602Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, and Rome. 105. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 19, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Rostow on August 20 and approved by Robert Brown. The memorandum is Part III of IV. 106. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State Vienna, August 21, 1968, 1604Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 6 UN. Confidential; Priority. 107. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, September 3, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Loy and Nelson and cleared by Rostow and Allen. 108. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 27, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. No classification marking. The date is handwritten on the source text. 109. Editorial Note 110. Editorial Note 63. Position Paper for the United States Delegation 63. Position Paper for the United States Delegation 1 Washington, undated. MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AND THE CANADIANS Rome—February 10, 1964 The European Conference on Satellite Communication, composed of 22 European Governments, has invited the United States and Canada to meet with it in Rome for several days beginning February 10. The agenda for the meeting, proposed by the European Conference and accepted by the United States, is as follows: 1. Functions, structure, and financing of the world organization; 2. Planning and negotiating machinery required in the preparatory period; 3. Design and operation of the system in the preliminary and subsequent stages; 4. Problems connected with provision of equipment, procurement of services, exchange of technical information; 5. Timetable for the preliminary and subsequent stages of the system, including coordination with cable systems; 6. Date and composition of the conference of interested governments. I. United States Objectives The basic objectives of the United States in the field of satellite communication have been defined in a number of public policy statements. The most important of these are the President's policy statement of July 24, 1961, the Communication Satellite Act of 1962, Part D of the US-sponsored General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), an Aide-Mémoire of June 26, 1962, a paper distributed to selected delegations at the ITU Space Communication Conference held in October, 1963, and the President's statement on the results of that conference. The basic objectives of the United States, as set forth in these statements, are: 1. To get a communications satellite system operating as soon as possible; 2. To have this system reflect US political and technological leadership; 3. To extend the system to provide global coverage with nondiscriminatory access at the earliest practicable date; 4. To direct care and attention to providing the services of the system to economically less developed countries and areas as well as those more highly developed; 5. To establish the system as part of an improved global communications network, to reflect the benefits of this new technology in both quality of services and charges, and to make efficient use of the frequency spectrum; 6. To have, for economic, political, and technical reasons, a single global commercial system rather than competing systems; 7. To provide an opportunity for participation in the system by other countries, both through investment, with consequent participation in design, ownership and management, and through leasing of channels or other arrangements; and 8. To give the qualified industries of participating countries an opportunity to compete for supplying satellites, launchers and other equipment for the system as it is expanded and developed. These objectives will set the framework for United States participation at the Rome meeting. II. Background This is the first major meeting with the European Conference on Satellite Communications in which the United States will be an official participant. It marks an important stage in the development of international arrangements for satellite communication. However, the meeting is not a negotiation and the delegation is not authorized to negotiate or enter into any agreements. The principal purpose of the meeting is to permit the parties to explore views and objectives, both on the subject of definitive arrangements for satellite communication and on the question of interim arrangements. These explorations look towards continuing discussion with European countries culminating, hopefully, in the negotiation and conclusion of organizational agreements. The United States is the only country that has developed and launched communication satellites. The Soviet Union is presumed to have the technology, and could probably launch communication satellites in a short period of time. It will be several years at best before any European countries, acting either individually or in combination, can launch communication satellites with their own boosters, and many years before they would be in a position to launch a system competitive with that of the United States. The United States is in a position to move forward rapidly with the development of a communication satellite system. This development will fall roughly into three stages. First, the Communication Satellite Corporation plans to establish a limited “experimental/operational” capability over the North Atlantic in 1965. Work will go forward also on various medium altitude systems. Second, there will be a basic global system. Under present plans, the choice of basic system will be made in September, 1965. If the Corporation opts for synchronous satellites the “experimental/operational” systems will be extended to provide it. If not, it will be a medium altitude system. In any event the United States anticipates that the basic system, which will have a global capability, will come into being in 1966–67. And finally, there will be a fully developed global system of communication satellites. This will have to evolve over a period of years. Although technical developments may thus be divided into three roughly defined stages, it is convenient to think of organizational arrangements in terms of two stages: first, arrangements for an interim period, and second, a definitive organizational structure designed to accommodate a broader range of international interests. Both stages are on the agenda for discussion at the Rome meeting. The primary goal of the United States at the Rome meeting will be to explore ways of obtaining participation by other nations in each of these stages on a basis that is compatible with United States satellite communications objectives, and particularly in such a way as not to delay the schedule on which the CSC is now operating. As to definitive arrangements , the United States will necessarily have to discuss these in rather generalized terms because our thinking is still not very far advanced. It will be important, however, to explore in as much detail as possible the ideas of individual European countries and the Conference so that, as we develop our own proposals over the coming months, the United States will be able to make maximum use of its bargaining power, which may well be at its peak during the early years of the system when we have a monopoly of the boosters and of communication technology. The European countries know that the United States will dominate the system for the next few years, and it is likely that a primary interest on their part will be to assure that this country does not continue to monopolize the system indefinitely. With some variations in attitude from country to country, the European delegations are likely to press hard for assurances on the ultimate organizational structure. This may be the price that they demand for permitting the Corporation to manage the interim system. As to interim arrangements , for a commercially viable system it is desirable that there be some form of European participation. 2 Originally both the Corporation and the United States Government thought exclusively in terms of European participation through capital investment in the system from the beginning, either on behalf of the Conference or by several individual European countries. As the Corporation's plans matured and the prospect of an “experimental/operational” capability in 1965 emerged, a number of European countries expressed interest in participating at this stage by leasing channels rather than by making a capital investment. Recently, at a technical meeting in Karlsruhe, European interest in capital investment from the beginning has again emerged, largely as a result of an indication that the UK would be prepared to invest. Investment and channel leasing are not mutually exclusive; discussions and negotiations could proceed on both forms of arrangement simultaneously. It is obvious that arrangements for rental of channels in the 1965 limited capability would be simpler to negotiate and would retain maximum managerial control in the United States. At the same time, if a number of European countries indicate that they may be prepared to make an investment commitment now in the over-all CSC program, we will want to discuss interim organizational arrangements permitting such investment. These arrangements would be somewhat more complicated, but they would have to be simple enough to operate efficiently and to be compatible with the over-riding United States interest in developing a system as soon as possible. The United States has on several occasions asked the Soviet Union if it wished to discuss a communication satellite system. An Aide-Mémoire in February 1963 suggested exploratory talks, there were probes at the ITU Space Communication Conference, Ambassador Kohler approached Gromyko on the subject in November, and approaches were made in December at the UN. The Soviet Union has not responded affirmatively to any of these. The Europeans are likely to ask for our views on Soviet participation in a communication satellite system. The delegation is authorized to point out that the United States is committed to seek a single global system, and that this implies Soviet participation as a desirable objective. However, the United States will be guided by the principle that the development of the system should not be delayed by the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to participate, or by unproductive negotiations with the Soviet Union. [Here follows Section III, Agenda Items.] 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. This position paper, prepared for a meeting with members of the European Conference on Satellite Communications and Canadian officials, is an enclosure to a letter from Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harland Cleveland to Legal Adviser Abram Chayes. 2 Telegram 3775 from Paris, February 7, reported that the French, for example, “made much of point that GOF [Government of France] could not and would not treat communications satellite problems as solely telecommunications affairs. Emphasized repeatedly that strong national interests are involved.” (Ibid.) 64. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to President Johnson 64. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 13, 1964. SUBJECT Procurement of Satellite Communications Services for the National Communications System from the Communications Satellite Corporation The discussions under way to explore whether it would be feasible for the Communications Satellite Corporation to provide satellite communications services for the NCS, 2 using the Government's transportable and fixed ground terminals, through the global system the Corporation will deploy have resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding covering these services (Tab 1). 3 The Corporation's Board of Directors and management favor entering into the arrangement. They believe that it must also be acceptable to the communications common carriers and the key European countries interested in investing in the global system. Discussions with these parties and appropriate Congressional Committees are in process. The terms of the Memorandum are substantially agreed upon. An outstanding question with respect to frequency allocation is still being resolved. The Memorandum makes provision for adequate satellite services to be supplied for the NCS if it should develop that the global system the Corporation decides to deploy is not suitable for the Government's needs. Inasmuch as the Memorandum of Understanding deals with the satellite circuits required for the entire NCS, it would be preferable that the Memorandum be executed by the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the NCS. This would permit the arrangements for the Government's procurement of such services to be integrated with anticipated arrangements for the participation of other governments in the global system which may result from discussions being carried on with foreign governments by the Corporation and the Department of State. Accordingly, I have prepared for your approval Tab 2 which would authorize the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the NCS, to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of the Government. Previous directives are not explicit in giving this power to the Secretary of Defense. The Ad Hoc Committee Group on Satellite Communications concurs in this course of action. Cyrus Vance 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications Systems, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. Confidential. 2 NSAM No. 252, July 11, 1963, called for the establishment of a National Communications System by linking together the facilities of various federal agencies. The objective of the system “will be to provide necessary communications for the Federal Government under all conditions ranging from a normal situation to national emergencies and international crises, including nuclear attack.” (Ibid.) 3 Neither tab was attached. 65. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 65. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, March 16, 1964. SUBJECT Communication Satellites Mr. Welch, Dr. Charyk, Lee Marks, and Alvin Friedman (Special Assistant to John McNaughton in DOD) visited London, Paris, Bonn and Rome last week to discuss proposed arrangements between the United States Government (DOD) and the Corporation regarding a shared commercial-United States Government communication satellite system. They also showed and discussed the draft Interim Agreement relating to arrangements for international participation in the system, which had been prepared for the February 10 Rome Conference. The European Conference on Communication Satellites met in London Friday and Saturday. Lee Marks returned home via London and talked with Mr. Hope-Jones, of the UK Foreign Ministry, about the Conference. Two issues emerged—the nature of the proposed U.S. Government-Corporation “deal”, and the form and timing of negotiations on the draft Interim Agreement. 1. The U.S. Government-Corporation “deal”. The Europeans did not react strongly to the proposed deal. They questioned whether it was technically possible to use one satellite system to meet both commercial needs and those of the U.S. Government, and they questioned whether it was politically saleable. Hope-Jones told Lee Marks Saturday that the European Conference had discussed the proposal briefly and decided it was a “political non-starter”. Sweden and Austria reportedly said flatly they could not participate in a system one-half of which was reserved exclusively for the U.S. military needs. I believe the U.S. Government and the Corporation could nonetheless conclude a Memorandum of Understanding if it was properly drafted and presented. It is important that we not lead Congress or the Europeans to believe that the deal gives the Government the right to use half of a 24-satellite medium-altitude random-orbit system if that is the system deployed. Rather, the deal must provide a series of options—i.e., shared system, Corporation deployment of a separate system for the Government—all subject to suitable arrangements being worked out. The present draft of the Memorandum of Understanding should probably be altered to make this clear. Mr. Friedman and Dr. Charyk see this point clearly. We do not know what Secretary McNamara's views are. This issue is complicated because the Military Operations Sub Committee (headed by Chet Holifield) of the Government Operations Committee begins two weeks of hearings on DOD use of a communications satellite system tomorrow. 2. Form and Timing of Negotiations. As you will recall, the Europeans proposed at the Rome meeting that a group representing the European Conference come to the United States to negotiate in mid-March or early April. Although we agreed to this approach in Rome, upon reconsideration, the Corporation decided that it did not like this and we thereupon declined to set a date for the negotiating meeting. My reply to Ambassador Ortona, attached at Tab A, 2 suggested an alternative and was approved by the Corporation. A reply to my letter, attached at Tab B, 3 was sent from London last week end. It rejects our proposal and asks for an early “informal” conference. We must now reply to Ambassador Ortona's letter. The Corporation prefers to negotiate bilaterally, although as a result of the trip last week, it may now realize that this is simply not possible. Alternatively, it would like to talk to a small group of countries. It doesn't want to deal with the Conference as such, or with a group of countries on behalf of the Conference. The Europeans have a strong political stake in the European Conference and seem so far to have achieved a high degree of unity. (Hope-Jones told Lee Marks in London that the British and French Governments, at “the highest levels,” considered the political stake “enormous” because “we and the French agree on every point and together we are leading the rest of Europe.”) Moreover, they are generally irritated at the Corporation's insistence on bilateral talks and on what they believe to be the brush-off of my letter to Ambassador Ortona. The issue is how strongly we should press the Corporation to accept Ambassador Ortona's proposal or to make a reasonable counter-proposal. Our problem, of course, is that if we press the Corporation to negotiate we will bear the onus for what comes out of the negotiations; and the issues of State Department involvement that were discussed so heatedly during the legislative battle over the Act, and that have popped up from time to time in recent months, will be raised again. Predominant congressional feeling is undoubtedly that the less State Department involvement the better. The FCC Staff, and several of the Commissioners (though not the Chairman) share this view. On the other hand, DOD has an interest in this issue since the success of its deal, and indeed of a separate communication satellite system, may depend on not irritating the Europeans unnecessarily. A joint approach to the Corporation by State and DOD might be possible. These issues will probably have to be resolved in the next few days. Pending further developments at the Corporation and DOD, we do not have any recommendations, but we believe you should be aware of the problems. 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Drafted by Leonard Marks (USIA). Copies were sent to Cleveland (IO), Johnson (E), Nesbitt (SCI), and Edgar J. Beigel (WE). 2 Not printed. In this letter, March 5, Chayes told Ortona that the corporation faced “a number of domestic decisions and actions in the next weeks which would make it difficult to prepare for and carry out the proposed negotiations,” since COMSAT was preparing to release a prospectus and issue stock. Chayes proposed that a series of informal, bilateral sessions be held instead. 3 Not printed. On March 14 Ortona wrote to Chayes: “The members of the conference do not favor the proposal that there should be bilateral discussions. They wish once again to point out to the United States that they will be pursuing a common aim in these negotiations, and that they are determined to negotiate in common.” 4 Chayes responded to the Europeans on March 23, announcing the arrival of a U.S. delegation on April 6. “Because of the problems of publicity in connection with the stock issues of the Corporation, we would very much prefer to meet in Europe, in any city that is agreeable to you.” (Telegram 2203, March 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6) 66. Editorial Note 66. Editorial Note In February 1964 the Soviet Union accepted a long-standing U.S. proposal for discussion of a global communications satellite system. The United States had first proposed an exploratory exchange of views with the Soviet Union in February 1963. In a March 30 memorandum for Secretary Rusk, Abram Chayes speculated that Soviet interest was related to the ongoing U.S. discussions with the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and the European Conference on Satellite Communication. He recommended that the talks take place in June. “By that time, our negotiations with the Europeans and others should have advanced sufficiently so that the risks of Soviet participation would be minimal.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6) The Soviet Union's interest in the U.S.-European negotiations was strong. In April a Soviet Embassy official asked Joseph Charyk, President of COMSAT, about the progress of the talks. “Mr. Karpov then indicated that it was his understanding that we were having a difficult time negotiating with the European countries and that as a matter of fact this had been described as a 'telephone war.' Charyk assured him that there was great interest on the part of the Europeans.” (Airgram CA–10238, April 6; ibid.) 67. Letter From the Chairman of the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations (Holifield) to President Johnson 67. Letter From the Chairman of the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations (Holifield) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 13, 1964. Dear Mr. President: I take this opportunity to convey to you my deep concern over recent developments in the Government's program for satellite communications. My Military Operations Subcommittee has been holding extensive hearings on this subject, updating some earlier work in this field. In April of last year, General Starbird of the Defense Communications Agency told us about the Defense Department plans for a medium altitude random orbit system of satellite communications. The Defense Department has been ready for some time to build such a system, but the project has been held up since at least October 1963, when Secretary McNamara decided to explore with the Communications Satellite Corporation the possibility of a joint military-commercial system operation. Many months have been consumed in technical and policy discussions. Numerous options have been analyzed, numerous proposals made and discarded. Several drafts of an “agreement” between the Department and the Corporation have been formulated, the latest of which is now before the Corporation for approval or, possibly, further negotiations. Even if an “agreement” is entered into, the Defense Department will not know until October 1965 whether the Corporation is prepared to meet its requirements. The Corporation may decide the military tie-in is not profitable because of added satellite weight and complexity. The Corporation may go synchronous, in which case the military specifications will not be met. Or the Corporation may find that its foreign partners object to the military tie-in, in which case the State Department will not approve it. Our hearings have made it clear that a time delay of a year or more would be involved if the Department waits on the Corporation to decide what system it wants to choose. While it appears, through the testimony and our other investigations, that most of the civilian and military experts in Government communications are opposed to a shared system operation, or at least have serious reservations about it (because the operating advantages are nil and the economies dubious), the Defense Department is still trying to work out an agreement. Possibly an agreement has this attraction—that public capital outlays on satellite communications will not be necessary for the next several budget years. And later, the Defense Department will pay off that portion of the Corporation's investment required for special Government purposes by paying yearly rates for services approved by the Federal Communications Commission. From the Corporation's standpoint, presumably there is an advantage in having a “built-in” major customer committed several years in advance of system operations. The hearings impel me to seriously question whether the long-range interests of the United States will be served by associating the most sensitive military and other essential Government requirements for satellite communications with the business requirements of a commercial corporation which must pay dividends to stockholders. I see all kinds of political and international implications. For the next few years the Corporation will be deeply involved in transactions and arrangements with domestic and foreign carriers and in devising a system operation which will produce revenues in competition with cable and other communications systems. Can the Government afford to hold up while these complicated problems are being solved—a lengthy process which entails numerous international negotiations, regulatory agency proceedings, and other involvements? Indeed, the Government adds to the Corporation's domestic and international problems by the proposed tie-in. The Cuban crisis showed how seriously deficient we were in our communications, and the directive for a National Communications System was President Kennedy's immediate response to these deficiencies. While the Government now buys communications services from carriers and will buy such services from the Corporation in the future, it seems to be the better part of wisdom for the Government, without further delay, to move ahead with its own hard-core military system, already carefully studied, already designed and engineered. I trust you will give this matter your personal attention. 2 Respectfully yours, Chet Holifield 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1. No classification marking. 2 A response to Holifield's letter provoked debate among the White House staff. Special Assistant Joseph Califano and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance urged Lawrence O'Brien to sign a letter to the Congressman, reassuring him that “The present shared satellite design meets all of the important technical and operational requirements that would also be met by an independent Government design.” (Memorandum from Califano to O'Brien, June 10; ibid.) But Edward Welsh, Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, disagreed, explaining that Holifield had made a persuasive case and that the proposed response “is not fully responsive to the Congressman's letter.” Welsh also pointed out that the Department of Defense proposal “would make the whole problem more difficult for the State Department.” Welsh noted that “In fact, it would be better not to send any further response than to send the one proposed.” (Memorandum from Welsh to O'Brien, June 11; ibid.) No final response to the Congressman has been found. 68. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State 68. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State 1 Geneva, June 16, 1964, 1 p.m. 2285. Space Communications Talks with Soviets. US group met June 15 with six-man Sov delegation consisting Blagonravov and Milovidov (Academy of Sciences), Badalov and Kalashnikov (Ministry Communications), Stashevsky and Krasulin (Foreign Ministry). 2 Blagonravov said he made head delegation since Academy responsible for communications satellite experiments. Said assumption from outset his talks with Dryden in 1962 was that joint US–USSR efforts would lead to global communications satellite system, but experiments needed on both sides.USSR does not yet have communications satellite but expects to and has had experiments on means of communication in connection its space flights. (When queried later re nature of such experiments, Sovs referred only to television broadcasts from Vostok spacecraft to earth and between spacecraft.) Morning devoted mainly to introduction by Chayes and to technical presentation by Istvan (CSC) of company's work to date and future plans. Sovs questioned justification for planning use of frequencies assigned by EARC on temporary basis. Asked why US emphasized telephone traffic in calculating needed future capacity for satellites, and not giving more weight to television. Same alleged Sov concern emerged in afternoon discussion of US majority control based on telephone traffic with little regard to television. Afternoon meeting devoted mainly to exposition of organizational plans by Johnson (CSC). 3 Sovs claimed US plan had discriminatory features in violation GA Res 1721 and Communications Satellite Act. Pointed out frequency bands are property of all countries. Objected as discriminatory to right organization would have after six months to set terms for adherence by additional countries, on ground committee could impose onerous terms on countries which may not now have resources to participate. Chayes pointed out this would be contrary both to agreements creating committee and to US law, emphasizing Presidential authority over CSC. Sovs concerned to know whether agreements would be between governments or entities appointed by governments. US closed with frank explanation why inevitable that US, which has pioneered technology, should have main influence over early years of organization. Comment: US presentation candid throughout, supplying details where appropriate or requested by Sovs. No mention yet of discussions with Europeans. Sovs attentive but somewhat reserved, asking few questions. Next meeting Tuesday pm. Tubby 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Confidential. Passed to Charyk and Ende (FCC). An advance copy was passed to Bushong (L) and the E message center was notified. 2 A full transcript of the meetings is in circular airgram 2247, August 26. (Ibid.) 3 John A. Johnson of the Communications Satellite Corporation. 69. Editorial Note 69. Editorial Note In late June and early July 1964, the discussions of the COMSAT-Department of Defense joint satellite project continued. In a long memorandum for the President, General James O'Connell, the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications, laid out the issue: “Top echelons of DOD and COMSAT both want this agreement for financial and other reasons.” He explained: “If we seek to look at this mixed system from the viewpoint of world opinion, the COMSAT Act of 1962 proposed to the world a global system for peaceful use. No matter how much we wish to disguise the fact, it is clear that the U.S. military will have the use of half the system and is attempting to provide financial and other inducements to bring about a COMSAT and consortium decision to adopt the type of system the Defense Department desires. Such a setup can have the tendency to drive out other countries and reduce the possibility that there will be a truly global system. In any case, our position as advocating and promoting a peaceful global system appears hypocritical. Another view which foreign nations may take with some logic is that our Defense Department exercises such decisive influence on our national objectives as to have changed the originally stated purposes of our global COMSAT network.” O'Connell concluded that the United States could have a more flexible communications system if the Department of Defense network was separate, and he cautioned: “We are taking a step right now which has very large implications with regard to the future of communication satellites in the world. Irrevocable decisions can be made now which, while having relatively little impact in the short run, may have long-range impact on our world position.” He argued: “The change in worldwide public image of our COMSAT system is an important consideration. A global commercial system dedicated to increasing world understanding, and for the equal opportunity of use by all nations, is the image we have sought to create. It does not seem credible that all nations could think that equal opportunity is practical when the U.S. military has nearly half the potential of each satellite.” Summing up, he noted that “the proposed agreement, because of a preponderance of negative long-range potential consequences, presents hazards which are virtually impossible adequately to evaluate and is therefore not the best choice for the United States Government.” (Undated, but probably June 1964; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.) Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) The President's Science Adviser, Donald Hornig, also examined the issue. In a draft memorandum for the President on July 2, he commented: “It is clear that our international relations would be better if our military communications system were separated from the international system. If we were to back off from the concept of an international system at this stage, if that is indeed possible, our position on peaceful uses of space would at least be greatly weakened in the eyes of the world.” (Ibid.) A later version of the Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 12, with Department of Defense revisions is in a memorandum from Fubini (DOD) to McGeorge Bundy, July 17; ibid. 70. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 70. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, July 10, 1964. SUBJECT DOD Comments on Draft International Agreements to Establish a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System This confirms information which has been conveyed to you informally concerning a meeting of interested Government departments to consider the subject matter on July 8, 1964. 2 At that meeting a consensus was reached that the Department of Defense recommendations for changes in the Draft International Agreements were of such nature as to make them non-negotiable with the other signatories of the proposed international agreements. It was therefore concluded that these proposed changes should not be introduced into the negotiations preparatory to the international meeting scheduled for July 21, 1964. As a part of the record, I am attaching memoranda from the Department of State and the Federal Communications Commission expressing their concern over the introduction of proposals for changes of such importance into the international negotiations at this time. 3 J.D. O'Connell 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [1 of 2]. No classification marking. 2 Not found. 3 Not attached.FCC objections to the proposed changes are in a July 8 memorandum from Chairman of the FCC Henry to O'Connell. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) A handwritten note attached to the first page reads: “Mr. Bundy: FYI. This is largely for the record in view of DOD's decision to give up on the shared system. However, it is a clear statement and FCC deserves credit for not hiding behind State. LBJ.” The State Department's objections, also apparently written for the record, are in a July 10 memorandum from Thompson to O'Connell. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates O'Connell signed the original. 71. Editorial Note 71. Editorial Note The Communications Satellite Conference convened in Washington on July 21, 1964, and concluded an intergovernmental agreement that established organizational principles for the system and another agreement that provided for the commercial, financial, and technical operations of the system. The latter would be signed by COMSAT on behalf of the United States. Together, the two agreements provided a framework for a global commercial communication satellite system. (Memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson, July 24; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) The COMSAT Board, however, refused to convene, threatening the success of 6 months of negotiations. General O'Connell, in a July 28 memorandum for the record, described the problems: “many [Board members] were outspoken in their disagreement with actions taken by the management; the philosophy of the international consortium; the details of the international agreements; lack of information which had been furnished to the Board in the past; [and] pressure which had been put on the Board to make decisions prematurely or too rapidly.” (Ibid.) In a July 28 memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, O'Connell foresaw the possibility for “further adverse action,” including “Rejection by the Board of the International Agreement in toto and recommendation for unilateral U.S. action to put up a Comsat system” and “Refusal of this Board of Directors to act to approve the new International Agreement so that it may be signed by the United States.” (Ibid.) Nonetheless, on July 24 the agreements were initialed by representatives from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United States, and the Vatican. The documents would be open for signature for 6 months, beginning on August 19, 1964. (Circular airgram CA–1278, July 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6) For text of the agreement establishing the Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System and the Special Agreement, signed at Washington and entered into force August 20, 1964, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pages 1137–1154. President Johnson spoke to the COMSAT Board on August 17, lauding the satellite system as one that would make possible 24-hour-per-day telephone service and the transmission of photo facsimile messages. “All the human knowledge stored in computers will be available in seconds to help solve problems half-a-world away.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book II, pages 971–972) 72. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to the President's Special Assistant (Watson) 72. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to the President's Special Assistant (Watson) 1 Washington, May 7, 1965. SUBJECT Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in the Development of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities Activities and controversies by and among (primarily European) members of the International Communications Satellite Consortium have provided evidence to indicate: (1) Dissatisfaction of the European entities with the dominant role of the U.S. and the Communications Satellite Corporation in the managing of the operation. 2 (2) A desire to build their national capabilities in the communications satellite field by requesting direct assistance from U.S. Government agencies and U.S. manufacturing firms having know-how in this field instead of obtaining this know-how through the International Consortium as specified in international agreements. (3) One U.S. firm has proposed to the United Kingdom the activation of a U.K. system to be operational before the Consortium system becomes operational. This and other firms have been promoting foreign satellite communications activity which could tend to proliferate development of competitive systems and violate the spirit and letter of the agreements establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Because of these trends action was initiated by this office in January 1965 to: (1) Coordinate the formulation of a U.S. National Policy Statement to cope with the developing situation. (2) Make all interested U.S. Government agencies aware of the situation. (3) Moderate the over-aggressive activities of certain U.S. firms to better serve the U.S. overall national interests. These actions have to a considerable extent moderated a situation which was becoming increasingly confused and embarrassing to the U.S. and the Communications Satellite Corporation. The coordinated policy paper, after prolonged negotiation among the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, is now in a final form and ready for formal concurrences by the departments and agencies prior to submission to the President for approval. A copy is attached for your information. 3 As soon as the global commercial communications satellite system is established and providing service some of the provisions of this policy will have less significance. At that time revision to relax these provisions should be initiated promptly. J.D. O'Connell 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 806 COMSAT CORP. Confidential. 2 On April 23, officials from eight Western European Embassies met with Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Solomon to voice their displeasure. Led by the Swiss, the Belgians, Danes, French, West Germans, Dutch, Norwegians, and Swedes pressed the United States for changes in COMSAT's administration. Three days later, Richard Faber, First Secretary of the British Embassy, told Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard Gardner that the British position was not as extreme and that the United Kingdom would help mediate the dispute. (Memorandum of conversation, April 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6) 3 Not attached; the formal concurrence copy is in the Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 806, COMSAT CORP. See Document 73 for the final, revised version. 73. Policy Paper 73. Policy Paper 1 Washington, August 25, 1965. POLICY CONCERNING U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CAPABILITIES General: It is the policy of the United States to support the development of a single global commercial communications satellite system to provide common carrier and public service communications. The intent of the United States to exploit space technology for the service of all mankind, and to promote its use in support of peace, understanding and world order has been stated clearly in legislation and in Administration speeches and official releases. The U.S. Government is committed to use global commercial communications facilities for general governmental communications purposes wherever commercial circuits of the type and quality needed to meet government requirements can be made available on a timely basis and in accordance with applicable tariff or, in the absence of Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction, at reasonable cost. Separate satellite communications facilities including surface terminals may be established and maintained by the U.S. Government to meet those unique and vital national security needs which cannot be met by commercial facilities. The capacity of these separate facilities shall at all times be limited to that essential to meet such unique needs. These policies underlie the spirit and the letter of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, its legislative history and the position of the United States in the negotiations leading to the signing of agreements establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Provisions for the establishment of the global commercial communications satellite system and a U.S. national defense communications satellite system consistent with these policies have now advanced to the point where it is desirable to amplify and interpret these policies in order to guide United States relations with other countries in the development of communications satellite capabilities, and particularly with respect to providing technology and assistance therefor. Discussion: Most major countries of the World other than the United States provide international public communications services through governmental agencies or chartered chosen instrument corporations partially or wholly owned by the government. Assistance to any of these foreign governments in the development of communications satellite systems can potentially develop competitors seeking to divert traffic from the single global system being developed by the international consortium established as a result of U.S. actions initiated by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 and now joined by forty-six nations. The communications satellite activities of U.S. Government agencies, including the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, have an important bearing on the U.S. support of the objectives of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. These activities may contribute to the dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge of the subject to foreign countries which might be used to the detriment of U.S. policy in this field. A policy to guide government agencies in the dissemination of satellite technology and in the provision of assistance which is consistent with the overall policies enunciated above is necessary. Such policy should be sufficiently comprehensive to give due regard to the specific requirements of national security. For purposes of this policy statement it is intended that restrictions upon transfer of technology and provision of assistance refer to detailed engineering drawings, production techniques and equipment, and manufacturing or fabrication processes pertaining to complete communications satellites or a significant portion thereof, and to provision of launching services or launch vehicles for communications satellites. It is not intended that this policy statement apply to surface terminals and stations or limit dissemination of information concerning systems concepts, description of spacecraft and normal scientific and technical publications of a professional character. Furthermore, it is not intended that this statement shall limit the dissemination of information required to be disclosed under the provisions of the Special Agreement of August 20, 1964, pertaining to the establishment of a global commercial communications satellite system. Specific principles to guide United States arrangements for assistance to other countries in the development of communications satellite capabilities are: 1. The United States should conform fully with the 1964 Agreements Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System. 2. The United States should refrain from providing assistance to other countries which would significantly promote, stimulate or encourage proliferation of communications satellite systems. 3. The United States should not consider requests for launch services or other assistance in the development of communications satellites for commercial purposes except for use in connection with the single global system established under the 1964 Agreements. 4. The United States should recognize the vital national security needs of other allied nations which can be met by satellite communications and which cannot be met by the commercial system. For example, the United Kingdom has indicated its need for highly reliable satellite communications from England to Australia and to other Far East terminals. 5. The United States aim is to encourage selected allied nations to use the U.S. national defense communications satellite system rather than to develop independent systems and to accommodate allied needs within the U.S. system (with additional costs normally to be borne by the participants). Recognized needs should be restricted to those, similar to ours, which are vital to the national security of the selected allied nations and which cannot be met by commercial facilities. To accommodate the needs within the U.S. national defense system it may prove necessary to include one or more satellites, synchronous or otherwise, whether of the same or different design. In this case, such satellite(s) should be designed to be electronically interoperable with the satellites of the basic U.S. national defense communications satellite system in order to permit mutual usage. 6. Agreements for direct assistance to allies which may significantly promote their communications satellite capability should require satisfactory assurance that the assistance furnished will be used only within the framework of agreements and arrangements to which the United States is a participant and will not be transmitted or transferred to a third nation without prior U.S. authorization. No agreement should be concluded with any nation until information has been made known to other allied nations concerning the U.S. willingness to cooperate in meeting other nations' national security needs which are similar to ours. 7. U.S. firms are required to comply with the Munitions Control licensing procedure prior to communicating satellite or related technology, transferring equipment or components as embraced by the United States Munitions List, including booster technology and launch services, to foreign nations or firms. 8. U.S. firms are also required to comply with the Department of Commerce's export licensing requirements prior to communicating or transferring to foreign nations or firms certain other relevant technology, equipment or components, not covered by the U.S. Munitions List. 9. All transactions approved under paragraphs 7 and 8 involving technology and assistance pertaining to complete communications satellites or a significant portion thereof, and to provision of launching services or launch vehicles for communications satellites should be conditioned upon express (written) assurances to this government by the foreign nations(s). The assurances should be that technology and assistance obtained will be used only within the framework of the existing international consortium agreements for a single global system or the framework of such special agreements as are referred to in paragraph 6 above and will not be transmitted or transferred to a third nation without prior U.S. authorization. 10. The principles and policy set forth in this document should be reviewed and updated as communications satellite system developments progress and definitive requirements are determined and after the global commercial communications satellite system has been established and is in substantial use. Policy: Therefore, in keeping with the above, it is the United States policy to: 1. Promote the prompt establishment and successful operation of a single global common carrier and public service communications satellite system in cooperation with other nations as part of an improved global communications network which will provide expanded telecommunications services and which will contribute to world peace and understanding. 2. Avoid measures which would adversely affect either the continued expansion of participation in the existing international agreement for a single global commercial communications satellite system or acceptability of the basic premises of the present agreements on a permanent basis. 3. Make use of commercial communications facilities for general governmental purposes wherever commercial circuits of the type and quality needed to meet government requirements can be made available on a timely basis and in accordance with applicable tariff or, in the absence of Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction, at reasonable cost. Establish and maintain separate satellite communications facilities including ground terminals with capacity limited to that necessary to meet those unique and vital national security needs which cannot be met by commercial facilities. The capacity of these separate facilities shall at all times be limited to that essential to meet such unique needs. 4. Encourage selected allied nations to use the U.S. national defense communications satellite system rather than to develop independent systems and accommodate their needs within the U.S. system (with additional costs normally to be borne by the participants). Recognized needs should be restricted to those, similar to ours, which are vital to the national security of the selected allied nations and which cannot be met by commercial facilities. 5. Withhold provision of assistance to any foreign nation in the field of communications satellites which could significantly promote, stimulate or encourage proliferation of communications satellite systems. 6. Provide technology and assistance in the field of communications satellites to foreign nations: (a) only if such nations are to participate in the U.S. national defense communications satellite system and then only to the extent required for that participation to be effective; or (b) only for use in connection with the single global commercial communications satellite system in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and Special Agreement of August 20, 1964; and only if there exist appropriate assurances that such technology or assistance will not be transmitted or transferred to a third nation without prior U.S. authorization. The policies expressed above will be kept under review by the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management and the agencies and departments concerned. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communication Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. There is no drafting information on the source text. 74. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 74. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 13, 1965, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Helping Others to Use Communications Satellites Attached (Tab A) 2 is a complicated proposed internal U.S. policy statement governing what we do to help other nations become technically able to use communications satellites. It is the product of Jim O'Connell's lengthy negotiations with State, Defense, Commerce, and NASA, and is approved by everybody concerned in the White House and EOB. The core of the proposed policy is to use our technological superiority to discourage commercial competition with COMSAT and/or wasteful investment in several duplicative Free World defense-related systems. Essentially, the statement says that we will: 1. Devote our effort and know-how to development of the single, world-wide commercial system envisaged in the COMSAT Act. 2. Use the commercial system ourselves except where security demands that we use our separate defense system. 3. Encourage other governments to promote and use the COMSAT system rather than create or subsidize other systems. 4. Encourage selected allies to buy time on our national defense system for their security needs. 5. Provide technical information, launch vehicles and launching services to other nations only when they: —assure us that what we supply is needed to develop or use the global commercial system, or —assure us in writing that what we provide will only be used pursuant to special bilateral agreements for use of our defense system, and will not be transferred to any third country with out our consent. Though some problems of interpretation and enforcement will inevitably arise, I think that this is the right sort of general policy statement to start with. If you approve, I'll let the affected agencies know through the attached NSAM (Tab B). 3 And then at an appropriate time the publishable parts of this policy could be a public statement. 4 McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communication Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. 2 Document 73 . 3 Document 75 . 4 The approve line is checked and a handwritten note beside the final paragraph reads: “CEJ: Will you see if this can be done? Return to Bundy/Pres later.” 75. National Security Action Memorandum No. 3381 75. National Security Action Memorandum No. 3381 1 Washington, September 15, 1965. TO Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and Director of Telecommunications Management Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Secretary of Commerce Administrator, National Aeronautics & Space Administration Chairman, Federal Communications Commission SUBJECT Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in the Development of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities The President has noted and concurred in the promulgation of the national policy statement concerning U.S. assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite capabilities, transmitted to him by a memorandum dated August 25, 1965, from J.D. O'Connell, Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and Director of Telecommunications Management. 2 The President also noted that the policy will be kept under review by his Special Assistant for Telecommunications in collaboration with the departments and agencies concerned, and will be updated as necessary in the light of changing circumstances. The President will look to his Special Assistant for Telecommunications to keep him informed of any proposed changes in policy that will require his personal attention and decision. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communications Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Executive Secretary, NASC; Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; and the Communications Satellite Corporation. 2 See Document 73 . 76. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 76. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 21, 1965, 10 a.m. Recent events indicate that the future of the Communications Satellite Corporation and of United States participation in the development and operation of the global commercial communications satellite system are in jeopardy in several ways: 1. The European partners in the international consortium dedicated to the establishment of a single global commercial communications satellite system find that their financial interests are better served by the continued use of cable systems in which they have larger ownership participation than they have in the communications satellite consortium. 2 2. It appears that foreign members of the international consortium consider that their chances of exercising influence in effecting advantageous changes in the agreement establishing interim arrangements for the global commercial communications satellite system will be greatly enhanced in 1969, when definitive arrangements are to supersede interim arrangements, if there is lack of progress and coverage of the global system. Furthermore, delays in progress will facilitate foreign-owned cable system extension. 3. Actual and now anticipated usage of the initial Early Bird communications satellite is falling seriously behind the projected usage upon which tariffs were determined. Prospects are for continued serious short falls in usage and the resulting financial embarrassment of the Communications Satellite Corporation. The President has indicated interest in recommendations made by Ambassador Korry for U.S. assistance to African nations in attaining early communications satellite service to further assist in the development of these nations and to bring them closer to the United States. To attempt to provide such service by a government-owned system would be contrary to established U.S. national policy and international agreement. Direct aid to the Communications Satellite Corporation and the international consortium might be politically criticized as subsidy. There is a possibility that the Soviet Union may act soon to assist lesser developed nations attain communications by satellite. Early action by the United States is necessary to preclude this possibility. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has stated an urgent requirement to obtain communication services from the Communications Satellite Corporation. No facilities exist to provide acceptable service to meet this requirement. In response to a request for proposal, the Communications Satellite Corporation on August 26, 1965, submitted a proposal to provide communications services to meet the NASA Apollo Program requirements. 3 Contracting with the Communications Satellite Corporation on a commercial common carrier basis to meet the NASA requirement is consistent with established policy (National Security Action Memorandum No. 338) and U.S. international agreement dedicated to the early establishment of a single global commercial communications satellite system. It is my view that satisfaction of the NASA requirement through contract with the Communications Satellite Corporation will accomplish the following important objectives: 1. Substantially advance the advent of global commercial communications satellite service through availability of the capacity of the satellites in excess of that required for the Apollo requirement; 2. Reduce the opposition of the international communications satellite consortium members to rapid growth of the global system; 3. Make possible early availability of communications satellite service for lesser developed nations at reduced cost; and 4. Strengthen the position of the United States in the 1969 international revision of the present interim arrangements and thus further the objectives of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. I strongly recommend that the President support me in the policy position that the urgent NASA requirement for communication satellite service in support of the Apollo Program be met through the Communications Satellite Corporation and that the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration immediately enter into direct negotiations for such services. The requirement and the procurement of services should be coordinated with the Executive Agent, National Communications System, to determine whether additional features or arrangements can be effected to enhance the contribution of the specialized services to the National Communications System without unduly jeopardizing the primary objectives for which the communications are being provided. J.D. O'Connell 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 806, COMSAT CORP. Confidential. 2 According to unattributed typed notes attached to this memorandum (not printed), the principal problem was lack of European interest. Of the 240 available circuits, only 61 were under contract. “Principal trouble is Great Britain. With only a small ownership in Comsat, they are not eager to destroy their valuable cable business by building up Comsat.” 3 According to the attached, typed notes, NASA's Apollo needs would require the equivalent of 120 circuits. The only possible rival for the business was the Department of Defense. “If COMSAT does not get this contract, the company will face serious difficulties.” But the NASA contract would “give Comsat a wider global range because of the satellites to be launched to handle the NASA requirement.” 77. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 77. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 17, 1965, 3:15 p.m. SUBJECT Suggestion by Ambassador Korry for Assistance to African Nations with Communications by Satellite Ways and means for the provision of early communications service to African nations have been studied in conjunction with Mr. Bundy's staff, State Department, AID, FCC,NASA, and the Communications Satellite Corporation. 2 Alternatives studied were: a Provision of a U.S. Government-owned experimental-operational satellite with an offer of earth station financing by the U.S. Government to African nations; b The early provision by the International ComSat Consortium of suitable additional satellites with the U.S. Government financing aid, if needed, to those African nations, initially Ethiopia and Nigeria, which can be furnished assistance without raising serious international problems. The consensus strongly favors alternative b above for the following reasons: —Much lower costs to the United States. —The NASA Apollo Program communications service negotiations with ComSat Corporation (the International Consortium) will provide required satellite capacity by September/October 1966. —Conflict with European nations having communications interests and investments in African nations can be avoided in nation-by-nation negotiation. —Instead of competing with the International Consortium it can be supported and its expansion expedited. —The U.S. Government can avoid competition with financial interests already negotiating with African nations. Nigeria, soon to become a member of the Consortium, reportedly has allocated five million dollars for an earth station. —The orderly negotiation for regional groupings of African nations can be furthered rather than obstructed. —Satellite service can be initiated to some African nations sooner than in any other way. Without promising any U.S. assistance, the State Department has encouraged Ethiopia and Nigeria to consider early establishment of earth stations. No direct U.S. financial aid is presently expected. If these two nations were to request total U.S. financing, the estimated cost is $14,000,000 over three years. I am coordinating actions of U.S. agencies and ComSat Corporation in determining the potential contribution of satellites to communication requirements of other developing nations, including those in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Latin America. J.D. O'Connell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Comm. System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. 1 [2 of 2], Box 6. Secret. Copies were sent to Moyers, Valenti, Bundy, Watson, and Califano. 2 Department of State views are in an October 3 memorandum from Loy to O'Connell. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6) 78. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 78. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 1 Washington, December 22, 1965. Doug— I have been keeping an eye for Mac Bundy on the development of COMSAT ever since the legislation was drafted and had been working closely with Jim O'Connell on a number of problems that come to focus on him, such as our policy on giving help to other countries on satellite communications systems, including ground stations. Recently Komer and I wrote a memo for the President urging greater attention to using satellites for international education and information purposes. 2 This happened on the same weekend that Marks talked to the President and got his directive to pull together a Governmental position. 3 Since you tie in with the Marks group, it occurs to me that it might be useful for me to keep you filled in on any peripheral space communication activities that might support your work. I keep an eye on COMSAT through Bob Button and generally try to keep in touch with the space community that is thinking about communications matters. I should talk to you about some of these matters at your convenience. Meanwhile, in case you missed it, I am attaching two cables subsequent to the Paris 3382 cable on the UNESCO meeting that I know you received. 4 Charles E. Johnson 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT, NSAM No. 342, #2, Box 12. No classification marking. 2 Not identified. 3 In a November 29 memorandum Cater announced the first meeting of a working group composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Information Agency, the Office of the Science Adviser, the Bureau of the Budget, NASA, AID, and the Office of Telecommunications Management. The first meeting was held on December 3. An agenda, minutes, and list of attendees is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files,COMSAT, NSAM No. 342, #2, Box 12. 4 Attached but not printed. Telegram 3382 from Paris, December 14, reported “considerable enthusiasm at the UNESCO experts meeting about the potential of communications satellites.” The U.S. experts in attendance recommended an educational pilot project as soon as possible. The Soviets expressed keen interest, and a U.S. delegation member emphasized that such a project “would unquestionably be of historic significance and command worldwide attention.” The Ambassador added, “I strongly recommend you explore such a pilot educational satellite project as a means of dramatizing President's new international education program.” (Ibid.) The Department's response in telegram 2385 to Paris, November 30, included: “FYI—Because deliberations UNESCO Space Mtg may give US some difficulties, we not interested in building up its importance.” (Ibid.) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 79. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson 79. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 28, 1966. SUBJECT Report of White House Working Group on Communications Satellite Service for Less-Developed Countries The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 was based on the premise that the United States would take the initiative in creating a global communications satellite system. The Act contemplates that the communications satellite system will be worldwide in coverage, directed towards providing communications service “to economically less-developed countries and areas as well as those more highly developed.” It provides that the President shall see that such objectives are attained in a manner consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the United States. In the policy statement which preceded the passage of the Act itself, President Kennedy stated that the system should include “service where individual portions of the coverage are not profitable.” The Act provides that this mandate be carried out within a unique framework of U.S. commercial enterprise in conjunction with comparable private or governmental organizations throughout the world. Within this framework the global satellite system is being established by an international consortium, now joined by 48 nations and managed by the U.S. Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) which controls a 55.37 percent interest in the consortium. Consortium membership is open to all countries belonging to the International Telecommunications Union. Although it has a majority ownership, COMSAT is restricted in establishing certain policies for the system without the concurrence of additional nations. The establishment of earth stations and thus the provision of access to the global system is the responsibility of the nations desiring access. These provisions have important implications for the President's responsibility to create a global satellite system, particularly in less-developed countries. As business ventures, the COMSAT Corporation and members of the consortium are not likely to subsidize earth stations and related activities in these countries unless profitable operations are forecast. By the end of 1966, the consortium, managed by COMSAT, will have launched communications satellites in a pattern that will cover three-quarters of the globe. These satellites will provide an essentially worldwide network of telephone, telex, radio or TV links. However, while the satellites will be available, complete global participation will not be possible until earth stations are established in both developed and less-developed areas. The present prospect is that only a handful of less-developed countries will have earth stations within the next few years. A Working Group of representative agencies, identified in the appendix 2 to this report, has considered the following question: Will U.S. national interests be served by encouraging and assisting less-developed countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia to establish earth stations for communications satellite service? As a result of its study, the Working Group has unanimously concluded that: the national interest would be served by actively encouraging the establishment of earth stations in selected less-developed countries as soon as possible. Detailed background information supporting these recommendations can be found in the attached addendum. 3 The Working Group accordingly recommends the following actions: 1. You direct the Department of State to intensify its activities leading to the accelerated construction of earth stations and related facilities in less-developed countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, to link them to the worldwide communications satellite network now being established by the consortium managed by COMSAT. 2. Direct the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Agency for International Development, to determine whether U.S. technical and financial aid should be provided to selected less-developed countries which are unable to finance earth stations and related facilities out of their own resources, through commercial sources or through multi-lateral lending organizations. Any projects in this program should be funded out of existing FY 1966 funds or out of regular FY 1967 appropriations. A report of such findings should be submitted to you, through the office of your Special Assistant for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management by July 1, 1966. 3. Assign responsibility for coordinating this program to the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management. 4. Instruct the Executive Agent and Manager of the National Communications System and U.S. Government agencies operating facilities outside the NCS to utilize the global communications satellite system in handling traffic wherever possible and where national security requirements will not be compromised in furtherance of the objectives of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, consistent with sound cost-efficiency and other management considerations. 5. Issue a National Security Action Memorandum covering these recommendations. A draft is attached for your approval. 4 6. Authorize a Working Group to commence a study of the possibilities of using the satellite communications system to advance information exchange and education in less-developed parts of the world. This project would be consistent with your recommendation on international education in the State of the Union message. Members of this Working Group should include NASA, Health, Education and Welfare, State Department, USIA, AID and the Executive Office of the President. 5 Leonard H. Marks Chairman, White House Working Group on Communications Satellite Service for Less-Developed Countries 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—Educational Purposes, Domestic and Foreign, NSAM No. 342, #1, Box 12. Confidential. 2 Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 78 for a list of member agencies. 3 Not printed. 4 Not found. 5 The approve/disapprove line is not checked. The report was sent to the President on February 1. (Memorandum from Marks to the Working Group; Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—Educational Purposes, Domestic and Foreign, NSAM No. 342, #1, Box 12) 80. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 80. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 1, 1966. Dear Mr. Bundy: At a recent meeting, 2 it developed that serious concerns exist in several departments of the Government as to: a The progress being made in exploiting the new capabilities of satellite communications. b Restraints imposed or to be imposed on or by common carriers in the development of this new capability. c The need for additional Executive Branch representations to the FCC on the authorized entity issue. d Constraints on U.S. leadership in communication satellites as a result of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 and the International Agreement of 1964. e The future potential viability of Communications Satellite Corporation. f The problems to be encountered in the 1969 international conference to determine a suitable permanent form of organization for the consortium. All these matters have been of continuing concern to me during the past year. Memoranda have from time to time been given to the President to acquaint him with the situation. It appears timely to make better known to all agencies the actions of my office on these matters and more importantly to receive proposals of the interested departments and agencies for policies, ways, and means to improve our progress in communications satellites. 3 I will appreciate receiving the views and guidance of all departments toward policy modifications they consider important to improve the position of the United States and in formulating further policy in this field. For this purpose, I propose the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to accomplish these objectives. I propose that the initial meeting of this committee be held at 10:00 A.M., Monday, February 7, 1966, in room 749, 1800 G Street, N.W., Washington. Would you be so kind as to let me know of your designated representative. Sincerely, J.D. O'Connell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files,COMSAT—US Communications Policy, NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. Copies were sent to Komer and Charles Johnson. 2 Not further identified. 3 In a February 3 note to Komer, Charles Johnson wrote: “O'Connell is trying to head off the establishment of a policy committee under the chairmanship of State by pre-empting the field with his own Ad Hoc committee. I don't think he will succeed because his tactic is too late and too transparent. The solution the Bureau of the Budget is thinking about and discussing with the major agencies is a continuing policy committee under State chairmanship with O'Connell providing secretariat services.” In the margin next to the last sentence, Komer wrote “Amen.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—Educational Purposes NSAM 342 (Domestic and Foreign), #1, Box 12) 81. Editorial Note 81. Editorial Note O'Connell was successful in his plan to establish a Communication Satellite Policy Coordination Committee. He saw the committee as the logical successor to the Katzenbach Committee of 1963–1964, which effected coordination of government policy during COMSAT's formative stages. In a letter of February 21, 1966, to Secretary Rusk, O'Connell spelled out some of the concerns which had prompted the formation of the committee, including: “Is research and development in the communication satellite field progressing as rapidly as required,” and “Are we progressing with sufficient rapidity in exploiting the new capabilities of satellite communications?” He proposed that the first meeting be held on March 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6) No record was found of Secretary Rusk's concurrence, but a February 24 memorandum from Bundy to O'Connell refers to O'Connell's letter of February 21 to Rusk as establishing the committee. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. I, Box 6) 82. National Security Action Memorandum No. 342 82. National Security Action Memorandum No. 342 1 Washington, March 4, 1966. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Chairman, Federal Communications Commission The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, United States Information Agency The Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and Director of Telecommunications Management SUBJECT U.S. Assistance in the Early Establishment of Communications Satellite Service for Less-Developed Nations In carrying out his responsibilities under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, the President has directed that the United States Government take active steps to encourage the construction of earth-station links to the worldwide communications satellite system in selected less-developed countries. Emphasis in this effort is to be on encouraging the selected countries to construct these stations out of their own resources, stressing the many benefits of direct access to the global communications satellites. The Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management has been designated by the President as the agent for coordinating this project. The State Department and AID are to determine (a) the countries to be included in this program and (b) U.S. Government actions, if any, for encouraging the accelerated construction of earth stations and related facilities in these countries. In cases involving possible U.S. technical or financial assistance, the President has directed that no special funds should be requested. All funding of such projects is to be handled out of current AID FY 1966 appropriations or out of regular FY 1967 funds. The Department of State is to report its findings to the President, through the Special Assistant for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management, by July 1, 1966. 2 The President has directed that the Executive Agent and Manager of the National Communications System and U.S. Government agencies operating facilities outside the NCS utilize the global communications satellite system in handling traffic whenever possible and where national security requirements will not be compromised, consistent with sound cost-efficiency and other management considerations. A Working Group is to be established, in accordance with the President's instruction, to study the possibilities of using the communications satellite system to advance information exchange and educational purposes, in line with his desire that the United States play a greater role in international educational efforts, particularly in less-developed countries. 3 Bromley Smith 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 70 D 316. Confidential. Also printed in John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civilian Space Program , vol. III: Using Space (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1998), pp. 95–96. 2 See Document 86 . 3 The White House Working Group on Educational Uses Abroad of Communications Satellites submitted its report through O'Connell to Rostow on June 30. (Memorandum from Read to Rostow, June 30; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 12–1) Regarding the President's approval of the report, see Document 92 . 83. Editorial Note 83. Editorial Note As the Department of State and the Agency for International Development moved to implement NSAM No. 342, Leonard Marks, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, informed Under Secretary Ball on March 7, 1966, that the international common carriers (AT&T, ITT, World Communications, RCA Communications, and Western Union International) had informally expressed their willingness to provide financing for earth stations without recourse to government financing. Marks suggested that the Attorney General be given clearance to suspend anti-trust considerations to allow the companies to cooperate. (Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316) In an April 27 memorandum to Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Solomon opined that government financing still should be considered because of the history of unsuccessful efforts of the carriers and less-developed countries (LDCs) to come to mutually acceptable terms. Since most LDCs chose to work through government or domestic entities, “There is considerable reason to believe that in many countries there will be no rapid earth station construction if the only help available comes from private United States companies.” (Ibid.) On April 22 Mann suggested that the Department of State and the Agency for International Development establish a working group under Deputy Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Frank Loy to finalize site choices and prepare a report for the President. (Letter from Mann to Marks, April 22; ibid.) 84. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 84. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 3, 1966. There has been a unanimous expression of conclusion by the Interim Committee (the operating management instrument of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium—INTELSAT) that the Federal Communications Commission has been delaying contracting actions decided upon by the Consortium. It is a further conclusion of the Interim Committee that the Federal Communications Commission is seeking to exercise jurisdiction on behalf of the United States which can override or nullify the decisions of the international body. In two meetings which I have held with the Acting Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Rosel Hyde, and with a representative of the State Department, it has been made clear by Mr. Hyde that, in his opinion, the Commission does not have jurisdiction of this nature. I concluded that it was important for this office to make a clear statement available to the Commission as a whole, and for this purpose transmitted the attached letter (Enclosure 1) to the Acting Chairman of the Commission. The State Department also transmitted a letter to the Commission and a copy is attached at Enclosure 2. 2 Enclosure 3 is a copy of the resolution which was passed unanimously by the international Interim Committee of INTELSAT on May 27, 1966. J.D. O'Connell Enclosure 1 Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to the Acting Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (Hyde) Washington, June 1, 1966. Dear Mr. Hyde: This is in regard to the application of the Communication Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) which has been pending at the Federal Communications Commission since February 25, 1966, and which requests authority to construct six satellites for the INTELSAT global system. COMSAT filed a notification with the FCC on April 27, 1966, of a proposed contract with TRW, Inc. for the satellites. As you know, the basic decision to award the construction contract for the satellites to TRW was made by the INTELSAT Interim Communication Satellite Committee (ICSC) in January 1966. At that time the ICSC directed COMSAT, as the manager of the INTELSAT system, to proceed with definitive negotiations with TRW. This basic decision was made after full consideration of competing proposals submitted by Hughes Aircraft Company and Radio Corporation of America. On March 15, 1966, during the negotiations between COMSAT and TRW, Hughes filed two more proposals for satellites. The ICSC was advised of the additional Hughes' proposals; but at its meeting on April 13, 1966, nevertheless, authorized the manager to execute the proposed contract with TRW. On April 27, 1966, therefore, the proposed contract was filed with the FCC pursuant to its procurement regulations. Despite these two decisions by this international body to award the basic construction contract for the satellites to TRW, its manager, COMSAT, is unable to go forward with the program because it has not received the requisite authority from the Commission. You are aware, I am sure, that this delay is creating serious diplomatic repercussions and is raising serious questions concerning the authority of the FCC to review, qualify, or annul a valid decision of an international organization constituted by an international agreement to which the United States is a signatory. In view of the responsibilities for the satellite program which have been delegated to me by the President I feel obligated to make my serious concern known to the Commission. Basically, I am concerned because if the matter is not soon decided by the FCC, I believe that United States interests will be irreparably harmed with serious residual damage to the United States in the international discussions on the permanent satellite system and organization when these are held. In commenting, I am fully aware that the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 establishes FCC jurisdiction over COMSAT as a United States entity. However, the Act does not appear to contemplate the role which COMSAT must play as the elected manager of an international partnership, with responsibility for implementing policy decisions of the designated governing instrument of the partnership. It would be most helpful if the Commission could expedite review of the COMSAT filing. In order to avoid the possibility of further problems of this nature it would also be most helpful if the Commission could give favorable consideration to the adoption of rules and procedures which would clearly delineate the differences between COMSAT as a domestic corporation and as the manager of an international consortium and which would prevent possible future claims that the Commission's procedures have delayed the progress of INTELSAT in achieving a global system. If the Commission feels that it is not possible or advisable to adopt such procedures, I would recommend that remedial legislation be enacted without delay. Sincerely, J.D. O'Connell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. II [2 of 2], Box 6. No classification marking. 2 Enclosures 2 and 3 are not printed. 85. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) to the Director of the Defense Communications Agency (Starbird) 85. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) to the Director of the Defense Communications Agency (Starbird) 1 Washington, June 4, 1966. Dear General Starbird: National Security Action Memorandum 342 requires that this Department and A.I.D. determine what steps should be taken, if any, to encourage the early establishment of earth stations in selected less-developed countries for use in conjunction with the INTELSAT system. Previously it was determined that the following countries should be tentatively considered as the “selected” countries: Brazil Central America Chile Colombia Ethiopia India Kenya Korea Nigeria Pakistan Philippines Thailand Turkey Viet Nam This list is subject to change and certain of these countries are accorded a higher priority than others. In general the countries were selected for a combination of reasons including political, economic, technical and national security factors. We are of course aware of your interest for the establishment of earth stations in Thailand and the Philippines. However, we believe it would be helpful if you could inform us which of the above listed countries, or other developing countries not listed above, the Defense Department would like to see placed in a priority position in the establishment of earth stations, with particular regard to the need for such stations in meeting NCS telecommunications requirements. Sincerely yours, Frank E. Loy 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Nelson (E) and cleared by Gil Carter (AID) and O'Connell. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 86. Report Prepared in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development 86. Report Prepared in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development 1 Washington, June 27, 1966. SUBJECT Communication Satellite Earth Station Construction in Less-Developed Countries—NSAM 342 Background In June 1965 the Early Bird satellite was placed in commercial operation. Additional satellites will be launched this year and next, as indicated in Annex I. 2 Earth stations required to receive and transmit messages via satellites are now in place in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. Many more are planned in other developed countries. None have been built in less-developed countries. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 contemplates a single global system providing communication by satellite to less-developed as well as developed countries. In NSAM 342, Annex II, 3 you requested that active steps be taken to encourage construction by selected less-developed countries of earth stations linking these countries to the global system. You asked that State and A.I.D., by July 1, 1966, determine the countries to be included in this program of encouragement and recommend appropriate action, if any, to be taken. You also directed that, to the extent possible, less-developed countries be encouraged to construct earth stations with their own resources, and that in cases involving United States financial or technical assistance, no special funds be requested other than those included in fiscal year 1966 and 1967 appropriations. Conclusions 1. Prospects for early construction of earth stations are quite good in a few less-developed countries. In most LDCs, however, stations will not be built on a timely basis without some active United States governmental encouragement. 2. The absence of earth stations in LDCs to date is not particularly surprising. The basic characteristics of the satellites to be used in the global system (and thus the required earth stations) were not determined until April 1966 after experience with Early Bird had been evaluated. Moreover, earth stations make no sense in many of the poorer LDCs which lack the requisite local communication system. 3. In any program of assistance by the United States to extend the global system to less-developed countries the following countries should be given priority: Central America (one station serving all 6 countries) Colombia* Chile* Brazil* Nigeria* Ethiopia* Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda (through their East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) Turkey Pakistan* India* Thailand* Philippines Korea *Member of INTELSAT. The criteria used in the selection of these countries are set out in Annex III. 4 4. There are three principal factors which tend to slow down the establishment of earth stations in developing countries. First, these countries require time to make the decision to build a station. This is not surprising considering how new this development is and the difficulty of allocating scarce resources. Second, the countries frequently have difficulty in determining the national policy as to the ownership of these stations—should they be nationally owned or should foreign interests be encouraged to participate in the ownership. Third, as earth stations involve a foreign exchange cost of $3 to $5 million, many countries will require some financial assistance. 5. The United States can help overcome the first and last of these three obstacles, and has indeed begun to do so. Through discussions with Embassy officials and visits from technical experts from Comsat Corporation and other United States companies, as well as by sponsorship of an international seminar on earth station technology, the United States has helped the LDCs understand how the global system functions and the kind of earth stations that are needed by such systems. In the area of financial assistance, the United States has indicated to Ethiopia, Nigeria and the three East African Common Services nations willingness to consider assistance via the Export-Import Bank or A.I.D. A fuller description of United States activities to date is attached in Annex IV. 6. The United States Government is by no means the only source of financial assistance. The available sources include the following: 1. Private companies and communication carriers (with or without help of the Export-Import Bank) 2. World Bank (I.B.R.D.) 3. Inter-American Development Bank (and similar regional development banks) 4. Export-Import Bank 5. United States Government assistance through A.I.D. Financing plans generally contemplate that the country will finance the local current component. A few countries, such as Brazil and the Philippines, may also be able to finance all or a part of the foreign exchange requirements. A discussion of each of these sources is attached at Annex V. 5 7. Firm decisions to build and finance earth stations will take some additional time—both for the LDCs involved and the potential sources of financial help. If it were vital that earth stations be constructed in the priority countries not just in the near future but on a crash basis, the United States could achieve this goal best by not waiting for other sources but rather by strong promotional efforts of the Export-Import Bank or, more likely, direct offers of A.I.D. assistance. This does not seem to be a necessary or desirable course of action. The field of satellite communication is so glamorous, the general interest so high, and the various plans for earth stations are being so actively pursued, that in most of the countries on the priority list other forms of financing will probably become available in the relatively near future. The reason A.I.D. has expressed willingness to help the African countries referred to in paragraph 5 is that these seemed to be unlikely to obtain other forms of assistance. For the same reason A.I.D. is prepared to consider possible assistance to Turkey, Pakistan and Korea, in each case with appropriate Export-Import Bank coordination. A country by country resume of prospects for financing of each of the selected countries is attached at Annex VI. 6 Recommendations In view of the above conclusions we recommend: 1. That the United States continue its present program of educating the LDCs as to (i) the value of membership in the global system, and (ii) the desirability, in selected LDCs, of establishing earth stations. 2. That we continue to encourage and stimulate sources of possible financial and technical assistance other than A.I.D. to provide such assistance to the countries on the priority list at an early date. 3. That A.I.D. continue to consider financing for earth stations in those countries on the priority list, assuming other financing is not available on reasonable terms and that the project satisfies development loan criteria. 4. That State and A.I.D. keep abreast of the progress in the construction of earth stations, and plans for such construction, and by January 1, 1967 report to you (a) the status of earth station construction in the priority countries, (b) whether, generally, anticipated assistance from non-United States Government sources has indeed materialized, and (c) what, if any, further United States Government action should be taken. Annex IV United States Government Actions to Date 1. In 1964 the Department of State in cooperation with the Communications Satellite Corporation initiated a program of visiting and contacting many nations, including each of the listed LDCs, to explain the potentials of satellite communications and to urge their membership in INTELSAT. Membership in INTELSAT has grown from the initial eleven signatories in August 1964 to fifty-two at the present. Of the listed LDCs, the following are INTELSAT members: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and Thailand. These countries are committed to invest a total of approximately 7–1/2 million dollars in the space segment of INTELSAT. They are paying their monthly assessments regularly. 2. The United States Government has encouraged the construction of earth stations. The joint State/Comsat contacts promoting membership in INTELSAT also include discussions on technical assistance, and in depth discussions of such subjects as circuit requirements and site selections. With the Department's active encouragement United States industry has been promoting the sale of earth stations throughout the world. 3. On May 16–27, the Department conducted a Seminar on Communications Satellite Earth Station Technology. From May 28–June 3 field trips to earth stations and space installations in this country and Canada were provided the foreign participants by United States industry and NASA. The Seminar provided delegates from thirty-five new or developing countries, as well as eleven more advanced countries, with basic knowledge and practical information on earth station economics, earth station technical requirements, and space segment access requirements. This information is useful to the LDCs in implementing their respective earth station programs. Commercial exhibits, field trips, and receptions provided opportunity for extended discussions between the participants at the Seminar and suppliers of earth station equipment. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—Educational Purposes, NSAM 342 (Domestic and Foreign), #3, Box 12. Confidential. Transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Read to Rostow through O'Connell. A typed cover note dated July 25 from Charles Johnson to William Bowdler, Edward Hamilton, William Jorden, and Howard Wriggins, reads: “This is an advance copy of a State Department report now being reviewed in the Office of Telecommunications Adviser prior to transmittal to the President through Walt Rostow. I would appreciate very much receiving your views with respect to the findings and conclusions covering the individual countries that you keep your eye on. For your information, those of us who have looked at the report feel that it does not reflect the urgency and importance attached to this project by the President in NSAM 342.” The report was finally submitted to President Johnson on July 28; see Document 87 . 2 Not printed. 3 Printed as Document 82 . 4 Not printed. 5 Not found attached. 6 Not found attached. 87. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 87. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 28, 1966, 4 p.m. SUBJECT U.S. Assistance in the Early Establishment of Communications Satellite Service for Less Developed Countries Progress has been made in recent months towards meeting the President's desire that the U.S. Government take active steps to encourage the construction of earth station links to the worldwide communications satellite system in selected less developed countries. Pursuant to your direction as conveyed in National Security Action Memorandum No. 342, dated March 4, 1966, the State Department has determined: (a) The countries recommended for inclusion in this program and (b) current and potential U.S. Government actions to encourage accelerated construction of earth stations and related facilities. Action has been limited in accordance with your direction in that no special funding has been considered appropriate. The enclosed memorandum has been prepared for the President jointly by the Department of State and the Agency for International Development and is transmitted herewith in accordance with NSAM 342. 2 You will note the positive action taken with respect to Africa. This action was stimulated by the President's remarks to the Organization of African Unity on May 26, 1966 3 and the constructive assistance of Ambassador Ed Korry. Planning for the construction of earth stations in only three of the thirteen countries selected by the State Department appears to be lagging. These countries are Turkey, Pakistan and Korea. As noted in the enclosed memorandum, AID is prepared to consider possible assistance to these countries. I recommend that you approve the recommendations set forth in the enclosed memorandum and that you approve stepped-up U.S. initiatives with respect to Turkey, Pakistan and Korea. I will continue to serve as the President's agent for coordinating this project with the State Department and AID and will report by January 1, 1967 concerning further progress made. J.D. O'Connell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files,COMSAT—Educational Purposes NSAM 342 (Domestic and Foreign), #3, Box 12. Confidential. 2 NSAM No. 342 is Document 82 . An advance copy of the enclosed report is printed as Document 86 . 3 Johnson spoke of three missions on which Africa and the United States could work together: First, to strengthen regional economic activities; second, to increase the number of trained Africans; and third, to develop effective communications. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 556–560) 88. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) 88. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) 1 Washington, September 3, 1966. Dear Mr. O'Connell: At the March 23 meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the Vice President asked members to examine our objectives and programs for international cooperation in space to see if proposals might be developed for making such cooperation even more effective than it is. On that occasion the Vice President appointed a subcommittee under the Chairmanship of the State Department and requested that each member of the Council submit to it his ideas on this important subject. In pursuance of the directive from the Vice President the Department has in cooperation with other agencies of the Government, including your office, reviewed a number of possibilities for expanded international cooperation in space matters. During the course of this review it has become evident that NSAM 338, 2 which established policy concerning United States assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite capabilities should be reviewed in light of recent developments. NSAM 338, which has served well as an instrument of non-proliferation for both commercial and unique governmental communications satellite systems, by the same token limits the flow of advanced technology from the United States to foreign countries. It has become apparent in recent months that the restrictive aspects of NSAM 338 have become a political irritant to a number of European countries and are serving to limit the effectiveness of international cooperation in space matters to a degree no longer justifiable. Under the circumstances, and as provided in the last paragraph of NSAM 338, the Department requests that a review of the NSAM be undertaken and especially of those provisions which relate to the export of communications satellite technology. Sincerely yours, U. Alexis Johnson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1. Confidential. Drafted by Nesbitt (SCI) and cleared by Loy (E), George (G), and Pattman (L). 2 Document 75 . 89. Editorial Note 89. Editorial Note Herman Pollack wrote Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson on September 21, 1966, that “a number” of important European members of Intelsat felt unable to participate because of the restrictions on international cooperation imposed by NSAM No. 338 by inhibiting the export of satellite technology. “This feeling has become a significant political irritant affecting our relations with these countries.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1–1) James Webb, Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, voiced similar feelings in an October 3 letter to O'Connell: “There is no doubt in our mind that this has fostered an impression of obstructionism on the part of the United States, exacerbating existing political strains and prejudicing the climate for cooperative space programs.” Webb was also concerned about the continued U.S. “domination” of Intelsat by denying the Europeans an opportunity to improve their competitive position and win contracts. “Such an impression serves to support the arguments of particular countries that only the establishment of independent European systems can relieve the situation.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files,COMSAT—US Communications Policy NSAM No. 338, #1 [1 of 2]) Officials in the U.S. Embassy in London reported on November 9 that the benefits of a change would have a psychological impact rather than cause a real technological advance. “It is believed most countries are basically concerned with industrial aspects and are quite content with single system concept so long as they obtain fair slice of the equipment cake.” (Telegram 3872 from London, November 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6) The Embassy in Bonn warned on November 14 that German industrial officials believed that the United States was “not sincere in our repeated offers to collaborate in advanced technology” and to work with the Europeans, treating them as “equal and respected partners.” While official German support for Intelsat was strong, the Embassy warned: “The potentially damaging effect that our restrictive Comsat policy could have on our relations with the FRG should not be obscured by the relatively minor reaction noted in Germany so far.” It seemed like a contradiction, the telegram noted, between “the warm US reception given the Italian Technology Gap initiative” and “what would seem to be an effort to preserve and even broaden the technology gap in the vital communication area.” (Telegram 5840 from Bonn, November 14; ibid.) 90. Memorandum for the File 90. Memorandum for the File 1 Washington, November 25, 1966. SUBJECT Questions re Communications Satellite Policy The following records briefly phrased views on certain current issues regarding Communications Satellite Policy: First of all, the countries with some technological competence are going to insist on participating in the communications technology and, if possible, in the actual production of some of the hardware that goes into an international or regional system. So we might just as well recognize that fact and lessen substantially the restraints against the export of technology. Second, some areas around the world, such as Western Europe for example, are going to develop regional communications systems. I suggest that we recognize this eventuality and develop our policy in such fashion that it would encourage the compatibility of such regional systems with the international system. There is no reason to pretend that such regional systems will not develop, so why not make the most of it and encourage them to become associated with the international system. If we do not, I would expect that the international system will be the one which breaks up and fails. Third, I see no reason why the United States should not have a regional system, including Canada and Mexico, for example. It makes sense to have such a system handled by the ComSat Corp. and the system be compatible and associated with the international system. Fourth, not only is it in accord with the law but it also is in accord with good management to have the ComSat Corp. contract directly with the United States government, if ComSat Corp. is in fact the low bidder and can meet the requirements. E.C. Welsh 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communications Policy, NSAM No. 338, #2 [2 of 2], Box 13. Official Use Only. Drafted by Welsh. 91. Report Prepared in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development 91. Report Prepared in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development 1 Washington, December 31, 1966. SUBJECT Communications Satellite Earth Station Construction in Less Developed Countries—NSAM 342 Background On June 30, 1966, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development submitted a report (Annex IV) 2 pursuant to NSAM 342 which had directed that active steps be taken to encourage construction of earth station links to the worldwide communications satellite system (INTELSAT) in selected less developed countries. In the June report it was concluded that thirteen countries and/or regions should be given priority in any program of assistance by the United States. The list of countries or areas selected for this priority is as follows: Central America (one station serving all 6 countries) Colombia Chile Brazil Nigeria Ethiopia Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda (through their East African Common Services Organization (EACSO)) Turkey Pakistan India Thailand Philippines Korea 3 The following four recommendations were made: 1. That the United States continue its present program of educating the LDCs as to (i) the value of membership in the global system, and (ii) the desirability, in selected LDCs, of establishing earth stations. 2. That we continue to encourage and stimulate sources of possible financial and technical assistance other than AID to provide such assistance to the countries on the priority list at an early date. 3. That AID continue to consider financing for earth stations in those countries on the priority list, assuming other financing is not available on reasonable terms and that the project satisfies development loan criteria. 4. That State and AID keep abreast of the progress in the construction of earth stations, and plans for such construction, and by January 1, 1967 report to you (a) the status of earth station construction in the priority countries, (b) whether, generally, anticipated assistance from non-United States Government sources has indeed materialized, and (c) what, if any further United States Government action should be taken. Discussion While progress in establishing earth stations in the selected LDCs has not been uniform, progress is being made. Annex I provides an up-to-date status report on each priority country and/or area. Annex II shows earth station planning in areas other than the priority group. These Annexes clearly indicate that there has been considerable movement during the past six months and that this movement is widespread. We conclude that the intentions and plans of many countries with respect to satellite communications jelled during this period. LDC interest is shown not only by earth station developments, but also by the number of countries that joined INTELSAT and those about to become members. Annex III provides the names of these countries. Financing does not appear to have been the real problem in moving along earth station programs, although it was an element; rather, organizational and technical problems have held up some decision making by the developing countries. The critical element is to develop some national momentum toward establishing an earth station; once this is done, countries seem to move along with their plans without undue delay. This momentum was furthered by the United States in various ways. The Department of State's Seminar on Earth Station Technology, held in Washington in May 1966 was clearly a help; repeated visits by officials of the Communications Satellite Corporation, and to a lesser degree by other United States international telecommunications carriers and by American manufacturers, also helped; so did the efforts made by our missions abroad. All were designed to educate the developing countries about the benefits of communications via satellites and all constituted significant factors in developing this momentum. In making the satellite communications system an operable one, the major effort remains, however, the rapid emplacement of earth stations so that the satellites can be put to use as they become available. We do not believe the recent failure to place the INTELSAT II Pacific satellite in a synchronous orbit will materially delay the system. In any case, new launches are now scheduled for early in the new year. Moreover, production of the INTELSAT III satellite series is on schedule and these satellites should be in orbit early in 1968. In order to insure that earth station construction proceeds in a positive way, we believe it prudent to continue to encourage and stimulate interest, as well as to render financial and technical assistance as is necessary and appropriate on a case-by-case basis. During the past six months, the IBRD, IADB and the Ex-Im Bank have all become involved in financing of earth stations. It appears these financial sources are available for financing stations where the economic viability of the installation is reasonably good. We do not believe that any special persuasion needs be made at this time, although developments will be closely followed. With regard to two of the selected countries, it appears that Korea will need assistance from the Ex-Im Bank, IBRD or AID. A similar situation prevails in Pakistan. Moreover, as it now appears likely Iran will forge ahead of Turkey in joining the consortium and in establishing an earth station, we believe the previous selection of Turkey should be dropped or changed in favor of Iran. An earth station in Iran (with one scheduled in Greece) should be adequate for this area, taking into account the existing high quality CENTO microwave facilities (financed by AID) linking together Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Conclusions In view of the above, we conclude: 1. That the progress being made in the establishment of earth stations, taking into account the newness of this mode of communications, has been satisfactory during the past six months, and that it is likely that this progress will continue in the future; 2. That the United States should continue its present program of actively promoting membership in INTELSAT, as well as the establishment of earth stations in selected developing countries; 3. That, based on current assessments, financing is available for earth station construction in the selected countries except in Korea and Pakistan where Ex-Im Bank and/or AID assistance may be required. 4. That the United States should continue to encourage management of the various international development banks to look with favor on the financing of earth stations in the developing countries; and 5. That Turkey should be deleted from the list of selected countries and/or areas, and Iran substituted. Recommendations Inasmuch as satisfactory progress is being made in planning for and the establishment of earth stations, we have only two specific recommendations: 1. State and AID should pay particular attention to earth station developments in Pakistan and Korea, with the objectives of insuring rapid establishment of earth stations in those two countries and encouraging and helping those governments to obtain financial assistance from international development bank sources; and 2. State and AID continue to report from time to time on the status of the establishment of earth stations in the less developed areas of the world. 1 Source: Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316. Confidential. A covering memorandum from Read to Rostow indicates the report was transmitted to the White House on January 4, 1967. 2 Annex IV was not found attached. Regarding the June 30 report, see Documents 86 and 87 . 3 A detailed 4-page breakdown of the countries is in Annex I. None of the annexes is printed. 92. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 92. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 1 Washington, January 14, 1967. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Administrator, Agency for International Development Director, United States Information Agency Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and Director of Telecommunications Management SUBJECT Foreign Educational Uses of Communications Satellite The President has approved the report of the White House Working Group on Educational Uses Abroad of Communications Satellites, set up earlier this year under authority of NSAM 342. 2 The report recommends that the United States Government adopt an active program for examining ways in which international educational programs in support of U.S. goals can be furthered by the use of satellite communications. The following recommendations made in the report should now be implemented by the agencies concerned: 1. As satellite communications technology advances and satellite capacity becomes available, the U.S. Government will encourage different types of experimental programs to demonstrate to less-developed countries the potential educational uses of the satellites. Involvement of the Comsat Corporation in these programs should be considered. (Action: NASA, with the assistance of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, USIA, the State Department, and the Office of Telecommunications Management.) 2. In less-developed countries of concern to the United States and where there is top-level interest in assessing the potential of educational broadcasting, the United States Government, working with American educators, will offer to assist in a careful study of the educational needs of each country and the cost and technical aspects of meeting these needs technologically in comparison with conventional methods. Consideration should be given in such studies to a practical demonstration of the use of satellite technology. (Action: AID with HEW, NASA, and OTM.) 3. In proceeding with programs of advanced technology, NASA should bear in mind the potential use of satellite communications in educational programs abroad. (Action:NASA with OTM.) 4. At a propitious time, the U.S. Government should consider raising with the Soviet Government the possibility of “live” satellite cultural television exchanges under the now-dormant TV-exchange section to the US–USSR cultural agreement. (Action: Department of State.) 5. The Executive Branch's Committee on Scientific and Technological Information (COSATI) should develop a special study of the factors involved in overseas extensions of the proposed U.S. national information-retrieval network, utilizing satellite and other transmission means. (Action: Office of the Science Advisor.) Douglass Cater 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—Educational Purposes, NSAM 342 (Domestic and Foreign), #3, Box 12. Confidential. 2 NSAM No. 342 is Document 82 . Regarding this report, see footnote 3 thereto. 93. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 93. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 17, 1967. I submit a proposed draft of the President's 1966 report to the Congress as required by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. 2 This report emphasizes positive accomplishments. It does not describe the hazards which INTELSAT and Comsat face. Some of these hazards are: a Actions of certain international record carriers indicate that they consider it to be in their corporate interest to emasculate INTELSAT, the single global system, and ComSat. b Certain major aerospace manufacturers both here and abroad deprecate the value of INTELSAT and the single global system. They favor many proliferating domestic and regional systems. Obviously these would provide a larger market for their products. c France has been promoting within Europe a regional communications satellite system which will compete with INTELSAT, and will probably join the Soviet Molnya system. d There has not been established within the Executive Branch a national policy which clearly delineates the effect on INTELSAT, the single global system, and the encouragement to the formation of regional systems which would be involved by the establishment of a separate domestic satellite system in the near future and in the same frequency bands as the international system. A strong Executive Branch position on a national policy is needed urgently which states that the United States, until approximately 1972, will obtain domestic communication services through INTELSAT. e Certain members of INTELSAT who derive a favorable balance of payments under present arrangements are not supporting the U.S. policy of actively encouraging the establishment of satellite communications facilities for the developing nations. This has resulted in inadequate progress toward the design of low cost earth terminals and satellite systems—concepts which are needed to promote early effective and economical use in the developing nations. f Major continental European nations are critical of the “excessively dominant” position of the United States in the decisions of the International Consortium. Actions to reduce U.S. dominance and to obtain a manager other than Comsat are expected during the 1969 negotiations to extend the existing Interim Agreement or consummate a more permanent one. g Action by the United States to embark upon separate domestic or regional enterprises prior to 1969 will have a serious negative impact on the single global system, the International Consortium, the 1969 renegotiations, and ComSat's future as Manager for INTELSAT. h The recent FCC action to adopt a 50–50 shared ground station ownership formula between Comsat and the communications common carriers has not reduced conflict as had been hoped. ComSat's investment capital potential has been cut in half but the record carriers still want more. A merger of Comsat with the six other U.S. international carriers is becoming increasingly vital. i The general disorder of U.S. international telecommunications has been and is a serious obstacle to progress in commercial communication satellites and is a threat to their future. It is also creating increasing pressures to reverse the trend toward greater Government use of the international common carriers and causing serious consideration of programs to step up the capacity of the Government's own communication satellite systems. Diversion of Government traffic from the carriers will further jeopardize the future viability of Comsat and the global system. j Communication satellites are in such an early stage of their technological and systems development that present systems should soon be made obsolete by the new developments. But research and development efforts by Comsat and NASA are inadequate to push progress fast enough. I am increasing the efforts of my office to push for faster progress. The national policy established by the President and the Congress is to give first priority to the successful achievement of a single international global system at the earliest possible time. It is a sound policy which makes paramount the objectives of world peace and understanding. The importance of the single global system to achieve these objectives cannot be overemphasized. Executive Branch departments are working diligently to reduce the hazards and obtain the objectives sought by the Communications Satellite Act, but success is far from certain as yet. The trend appears to be toward progressively more serious obstacles. Further discussion of these obstacles is contained in the attachment. In a subsequent report I will set forth the steps being taken by my office and other Government agencies to cope with these hazards. Some of my proposals for Government actions are included in the attached summary. J.D. O'Connell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Communications (Nat'l Communications System, COMSAT, etc.), Vol. III [2 of 3], Box 6. Confidential. 2 Not found attached; a copy is ibid., White House Central Files, UTI—Communications/Telecommunications (Conf/Declass). 94. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to Secretary of State Rusk 94. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 21, 1967. Dear Mr. Secretary: Recent analysis of the status of COMSAT and of INTELSAT, and indeed of international telecommunications in general, has led me to conclude that there are increasingly serious threats to the future success and viability of both COMSAT and INTELSAT. The motivations and the ongoing actions in response to them by many interests have such serious potentials that I have prepared and submitted to the President a memorandum expressing my concerns. A copy of this memorandum is attached. 2 The purpose of this letter is to focus more sharply upon those critical issues which appear to me to require prompt and continuous action. A variety of motives and incentives are leading certain nations to conclude that it may be in their best interests to establish regional satellite communications systems separate from and independent of the INTELSAT system. That one of the incentives relates to maintaining or achieving greater financial returns is apparent. Equally apparent is the fact that the unique promises of satellite technology for effecting greater international understanding and for promoting the social, political, and economic growth of less developed nations will be subverted to the narrower interests of national prestige, political influence, and unilateral economic gains at the expense of greater growth, lower costs, and better service for all nations. The French, for example, are moving aggressively in the direction of establishing a European-African regional system which could contribute to her quest for hegemony in Europe and would strengthen her traditional political and economic influence in her former African colonies. Japan, whose technological capability in telecommunications is great and growing, gives clear evidence of her desire to establish a regional system which would include the Japanese islands, the Far East, and probably Southeast Asia. I believe it to be of the greatest importance that the incentives for the establishment of regional systems be removed to the extent that it is possible to do so, and that the United States redouble its efforts on behalf of the single global satellite communication system. If this is not done, and if the concept of regional systems is successfully implemented by the French and the Japanese, they will inevitably be followed by other nations capable of competing. The ensuing proliferation of regional systems will destroy the concept underlying the establishment of COMSAT and INTELSAT and ultimately destroy INTELSAT itself. The situation is confused, moreover, by the introduction of a number of U.S. domestic issues which are now before the FCC and will soon be considered by committees of Congress. Action by the United States at this time to establish a separate domestic system would, by our example, add much strength and support to the French concepts of a European regional system outside of INTELSAT. Thus, there is urgently needed the formulation of a national policy which will clarify the position of the Executive Branch in respect to the global system and the respective roles which COMSAT and INTELSAT play in establishing the global system. Such a statement of policy by the Executive Branch does not now exist. 3 For text of NSAM No. 338 (Revised), see Document 96 . A number of intragovernmental panels have been engaged in addressing these matters. The complexity of the problems and the infrequency of panel meetings have caused the panel actions to move slowly and they have not been keeping pace with the rapidly developing situations. As a result, representatives of our respective offices have discussed ways and means of expediting action on the most serious and fastest growing problems. We are now working on an informal but increasingly expedited basis with representatives of your Department. I believe that our joint efforts can profitably be directed toward two immediate objectives. It needs to be made clear to the nations of INTELSAT that the seeming attraction of regional systems is illusory, that there is nothing which a regional system can do which the global system cannot do better and at less cost, that replacement of the idea of a unified, integrated, and free association of nations in the INTELSAT venture by a scheme to partition the world into spheres of separate, competing systems will bring with it all of the serious defects of our present international communications structure. Specifically, as a matter of urgency, there would appear to be great value in instituting a series of talks with the European nations which are currently considering entering into the proposed European regional system. I further believe that a most important objective in the interest of getting INTELSAT more firmly established is to achieve more rapid progress in establishing the required earth station complex. Earth stations are the means by which the global system can be completed. Far more significantly, however, they are the means by which the voices of the poorer, underdeveloped nations can be heard in the councils of INTELSAT. This collective voice can be the strongest counteracting influence upon those nations which seek to establish or reestablish in this new field nationally polarized communications hegemonies. A variety of influences appears to be delaying decisions concerning the establishment and financing of earth stations in developing countries, particularly in South America. In the latter area, additional conflict and confusion result from domestic and international interests of U.S. common carriers. The tide of events presses urgently for a policy which will permit expeditious acquisition of earth stations by those countries which are clearly interested but apparently unable to make headway in obtaining them. In this respect, I recommend that the Department of State make such representations to the Inter-American Development Bank as will result in prompt action on loan requests from South American nations, and that any indications which previously may have been made to these nations of an unwillingness by the Inter-American Development Bank to accept loan requests be rescinded. I cannot overemphasize, Mr. Secretary, my concern with the need for prompt and aggressive action in these matters. I want you to know that the resources of my office are available to support and assist you in all such actions that you may decide to take. Sincerely, J.D. O'Connell 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Confidential. 2 Document 93 . 3 U. Alexis Johnson wrote to Richard Sneider from Japan on January 20: “I agree with you that the basic problem is that not even we ourselves have defined a 'single global system' and, therefore, it is tough to get another country to sign on the dotted line for something that even we cannot define. However, I fully understand the impossibility of getting such a definition at this time.” He added: “It also seems to me that there is an inherent illogic in the draft [NSAM No. 338] in recognizing that there are 'unique and vital national security needs which cannot be met by commercial facilities' in so far as the U.S. Government is concerned, but not recognizing that other countries may feel that they also have 'unique and vital' needs, whether security or otherwise, which cannot be met by a 'single global system.'” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6) 95. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) 95. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O'Connell) 1 Washington, April 24, 1967. Dear Mr. O'Connell: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of February 21 2 in which you outlined your concerns on developments in the international telecommunications field, particularly regarding the future of the commercial communications satellite systems, INTELSAT. There are, as you note, some indications that certain members of INTELSAT are restive and seem to be pursuing a separate regional approach rather than the single global system concept that is contemplated by the 1964 INTELSAT Agreements. I believe that the international cooperative effort of INTELSAT has been an extraordinary success to date, and hope that we can build on this success, rather than dismantle the basic INTELSAT structure which was designed to achieve the goals set forth in the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 and the related policies expressed by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. This success of INTELSAT leads me to believe that INTELSAT's future is not perhaps so dark as might be assumed from a restive member such as France. I understand that you and representatives from this Bureau have been working very closely together, and will continue to do so, in preparing for the proposed renegotiations of the 1964 Agreements. In this regard I would like to commend you for the efforts you are making to establish for this Government a rational and coordinated policy concerning communications by satellite. Concerning the specific suggestions made in your letter, I agree that we should press on in convincing our partners in INTELSAT of the advantages of some form of a single global system. It may be necessary and desirable to accommodate within the single global concept establishment of domestic communications satellite services. This effort involves a process of continuous definition of this concept, and I see this as a central part of the renegotiation of the 1964 Agreements. We have already had preliminary discussions with the Canadians, the British, and the French to ascertain their thinking, and similar talks will be instituted with other countries as preparations for the 1969 conference proceed. In regard to the establishment of earth stations, progress is being made in certain less developed countries. Just how much this rate of progress can be speeded up is hard to predict in light of the newness of this mode of communications and the many other pressing problems these countries have. As you know, AID offered last May to assist three African countries in the construction of earth stations, but, even with this assistance assured, actual construction has not commenced. With regard to your suggestion that we urge the Inter-American Development Bank to take an active role on loans for the establishment of earth stations in Latin America, as you know, we are now in process of carefully reviewing the history of our policy with regard to IDB lending for earth stations and the overall United States interests involved. I have also noted your February 17 Memorandum to the President 3 and wish to assure you that this Department will continue to work closely with you in seeking solutions to the many problems discussed therein. Again, thanks for bringing to our attention the various issues confronting us in the field of satellite communications. I am sure that if we persevere we will be able to arrive at decisions which will be fully responsive to the needs of the United States in the telecommunications field and also be in the best interest of this country. Sincerely yours, Anthony M. Solomon 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Nelson (E), Loy (E), and Pattman (L); and cleared by Silberstein (ARA), Nesbitt (SCI), Sneider (EA), and Springsteen (EUR). 2 Document 94 . 3 Document 93 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 96. National Security Action Memorandum No. 338 (Revised) 96. National Security Action Memorandum No. 338 (Revised) 1 Washington, July 12, 1967. TO Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and Director of Telecommunications Management Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Secretary of Commerce Administrator, National Aeronautics & Space Administration Chairman, Federal Communications Commission SUBJECT Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in the Development of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities The President has noted and concurred in a revision of the subject policy recommended by J.D. O'Connell, Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and Director of Telecommunications Management, in a memorandum dated June 28, 1967. (attached) The President noted that the policy will continue under revision by his Special Assistant for Telecommunications in collaboration with the departments and agencies concerned, and will be updated as necessary in the light of changing circumstances. The President will look to his Special Assistant for Telecommunications to keep him informed of any proposed changes in policy that will require his personal attention and decision. W.W. Rostow Attachment 2 POLICY CONCERNING U.S. ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CAPABILITIES Purpose The purpose of this directive is to provide policy guidance for various elements of the United States Government in dealing with requests from foreign nations or foreign business entities for the transfer of, or other assistance in the field of, space technology applicable to communication satellite systems. Policy 1. The United States is committed to the encouragement of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space. One important use of space is the improvement of communications. In this regard, it is the policy of the United States to support and promote continuing development of a single global commercial communications satellite system. The United States Government is committed to the use of global commercial communications facilities for general governmental communications purposes wherever satellite circuits are required and commercial circuits of the type and quality needed to meet government requirements can be made available on a timely basis and in accordance with applicable tariff or, in the absence of Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction, at reasonable cost. Separate satellite communications facilities including surface terminals may be established and maintained by the United States Government to meet unique governmental needs or, as may be determined by the President, when otherwise needed in the national interest. The capacity of these separate facilities shall be limited to that essential to meet such unique needs. 2. In view of the above factors, within the limits fixed by national security considerations and other pertinent regulations, the United States may decline to make available space technology to other nations when (a) such technology is critical to the development of a communications satellite capability and (b) it has been determined that this technology will be used in a manner inconsistent with the concept of and commitments to the continuing development of a single global commercial communications satellite system as embodied in the 1964 Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system and the related Special Agreement (TIAS 5646) or subsequent definitive arrangements or (in the case of military systems) will be used in a manner inconsistent with the concepts of the United States national defense communications satellite systems, as discussed in paragraph 3. The same limitations will apply whenever the United States assists nations to launch communications satellites for either experimental or operational purposes. 3. The United States has established a national defense communications satellite system to accommodate the unique and vital United States National Security requirements that cannot be met by commercial facilities. It is United States policy to encourage selected allied nations to use the United States national defense communications satellite system, rather than to develop independent systems. Costs of such use shall normally be borne by the participating foreign nations. Foreign use of the United States national defense communications satellite system shall, however, like United States use thereof, be restricted to accommodation of the participant's unique and vital national security requirements that cannot be met by commercial facilities. 4. For purposes of this policy statement, the restraints on the transfer of technology and provision of assistance are intended to refer to those of the following which are critical to the development of a communications satellite capability in terms of time, quality, or cost: complete satellites or launch vehicles or components thereof; detailed engineering drawings pertaining to complete satellites or launch vehicles or components thereof; production techniques and equipment, and manufacturing or fabrication processes pertaining to complete satellites or launch vehicles or components thereof; launch services. It is not intended that this policy statement apply to surface terminals and stations or limit dissemination of information concerning systems concepts, description of spacecraft, and normal scientific and technical publications of a professional character. Furthermore, this shall not limit the dissemination of information required to be disclosed by Article 10(f) of the Special Agreement of 1964. 5. Requests for provision of technology or other assistance to a foreign nation will be assessed on a case by case basis in relation to the principles set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 above. If necessary, government agencies may seek to determine the nature of the intended use of the technology or other assistance and need not rely on the intention stated by the requestor. After a review of each request by interested government agencies, it may be decided, consistent with the principles of paragraph 2, to deny an export license for requested technology or to decline to provide other requested assistance. 6. Implementation of restraints provided for in this policy statement shall be through the Munitions Control licensing procedure for items on the United States Munitions List and through the Department of Commerce's export licensing procedure for items not covered by the Munitions List and within the scope of both established procedures. 7. The foregoing policies shall be kept under review by the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management and the agencies and departments concerned. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, COMSAT—US Communication Policy NSAM No. 338, #2 [1 of 2], Box 13. Confidential. Copies were also sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; the Executive Secretary, NASC; the Special Assistant for Science and Technology; and the Communications Satellite Corporation. 2 Confidential; No Foreign Dissemination. 97. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 97. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, August 14, 1967. 20678. Subject: Presidential Message on Satellite Communications. 1. White House issued today Presidential message to Congress outlining basic USG views as to future of international communications, particularly communications by satellite. 2 Message stresses role of modern communications in promotion of understanding among peoples, and reaffirms US commitment to a global system designed to make these available to all nations. 2. Highlights as follows: a) US supports continuation of INTELSAT organization as owner and operator of satellites, and hopes other nations, particularly Sov Union and East European countries, will join 58 present members. b) We recognize particular importance of INTELSAT system for LDCs to assure them of direct, economical telecommunications links now largely unavailable. USG would be prepared to consider financial assistance to build needed ground facilities in LDCs, and where appropriate, to help plan for joint facilities to serve needs of entire geographic areas. 3. US does not seek domination of INTELSAT and welcomes increased participation by other nations. In particular, we will a) Consider ceiling on voting power of any single nation, including US; b) Support creation of formal assembly of all INTELSAT members so that all may share in consideration of policy; c) Consider arrangements for enlarging opportunity for representatives of other nations to join with Comsat in carrying out management responsibilities; d) Promote wider distribution of procurement contracts, and continue sharing of technical information and technological advances. 4. US believes the possible desire by some countries to establish domestic systems should be accommodated. Such systems, however, should be technically coordinated and compatible with INTELSAT system. Message does not propose any “regional system”, separately owned, but says if international traffic is carried over any “regional satellite” adequate provision must be made to assure that any international traffic diverted will not jeopardize the economic efficiency of the INTELSAT system or limit its extension to developing countries. INTELSAT members should adhere to INTELSAT supervision in any use of domestic or regional satellites. 5. President has appointed a task force, headed by Under Secretary Eugene Rostow, to recommend a US national communications policy. 3 6. Message being pouched. 7. Addressee posts should call message to attention of host governments. This can be done either by drawing on foregoing highlights, or by waiting until message arrives and then delivering it, or a combination of both. Choice left to discretion of posts, as is the level of host officials contacted. 8. Posts may point out that message contains some basic ingredients of USG proposal for INTELSAT definitive arrangements, which USG representative to INTELSAT is expected to advance at an early meeting of INTELSAT interim committee. FYI. Probably at next meeting, September 27. End FYI. All governments belonging to INTELSAT will receive copy of this proposal shortly after meeting, through INTELSAT channels; a copy will also be pouched to all addressee posts for information. 9. If asked about further steps in developing definitive arrangements, you may say that the 1964 agreements establishing INTELSAT contemplate that initial consideration will be undertaken in INTELSAT interim committee. This does not rule out bilateral intergovernmental discussions, but we are anxious not to undermine the INTELSAT discussions. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Gotzlinger (E) and cleared by Robert Grey (M) and Loy (E). Sent to U.S. Missions in all 58 INTELSAT member countries. 2 In his message, the President emphasized the future potential of the satellites: “Who can measure the impact of this live, direct contact between nations and their people? Who can assess the value of our newfound ability to witness the history-making events of this age? This much we know: because communications satellites exist, we are already much closer to each other than we have ever been before.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, pp. 763–771) 3 Further information is in telegram 25533 to certain U.S. posts, August 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 1 US) 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, November 15, 1967. 69795. Ref. London 3659. 2 1. We perturbed by inference contained reftel that British industry may be on verge lobbying, possibly with some Governmental support, British divergence from full adherence single global communication satellite system concept. 2. Initial USG position on INTELSAT definitive arrangements (forwarded by CA–2813) 3 provides for accommodation communication satellites for domestic purposes, including complete procurement from national resources. In case of domestic satellites, essential element vis-é-vis INTELSAT is INTELSAT's coordination of technical and operational parameters. Position is totally silent on regional satellites. US does not wish to encourage them. President's August 14 message (CA–1299) 4 stated that if there should be a regional satellite that carries international traffic, adequate provisions must be made so that traffic diverted will not jeopardize the economic efficiency of the INTELSAT system or limit its extension to developing countries. 3. Admittedly, intended purposes end use Project Symphonie 5 and its relation INTELSAT still subject to speculation. However, any regional functions to be accomplished by Symphonie or “follow-on” project, could, without doubt, be provided at less cost and better by INTELSAT. 4. Issues then, as concerns industry, boil down to simple factors pride and supposed economic benefits. Adherence by all administrations to principle INTELSAT and support for concept presented by USG for INTELSAT definitive arrangements, will in end afford national industry greater benefits through continuing receipt INTELSAT technology, freedom (if granted by administrations) to be sole source producers of satellites for domestic purposes and, as already demonstrated in fact, an increasing role in the production of components, subassemblies and complete satellites for the INTELSAT system. USG position is that INTELSAT procurement processes should to extent feasible be responsive to interests and capabilities all members, affording them equitable opportunity compete for INTELSAT procurements regardless nature of material or sophistication involved. In that regard it significant that U.S. assistance in areas technology, fabrication, etc., is possible in cases not inconsistent single global system concept and INTELSAT arrangements. 5. Embassy, on basis press release reported para 3 of London 3659, should contact appropriate officials UK Government and urge careful consideration of implications vis-é-vis INTELSAT stemming from industry recommendation concerning Symphonie or follow-on project. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. Drafted by G. Huffcutt (E) and cleared by Nelson (E), O'Malley (DTM), Nesbitt (SCI), Newman (EUR), and Loy (E). Repeated to Bonn and Paris. 2 Dated November 7. (Ibid.) 3 Dated October 11. (Ibid.) 4 Dated August 15. (Ibid.) For text of the President's message to Congress on communications policy, August 14, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, pp. 763–771. 5 “Project Symphonie” was a joint Franco-German plan to construct a wholly European satellite. Other European countries also were to be invited to join the consortium. (Airgram A–2035 from Paris, June 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6) 99. Editorial Note 99. Editorial Note Early in 1968 State Department officials began to prepare for the February 1969 conference to negotiate permanent arrangements for communications satellites. On January 9, 1968, U.K. Government officials told Embassy officials that the European countries generally were favorably inclined toward Intelsat, but that some conditions would definitely require renegotiation and that France especially was inclined not to agree: “FonOff representative made thinly veiled insinuation that but for the French there would be a unanimous position and that this position would closely parallel that of the U.S.” (Telegram 5328 from London, January 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6) The Embassy in Rome reported on March 15 that an Italian Foreign Ministry source claimed that “the French are obsessed by American hegemony in INTELSAT… . Their objection to any move that would reduce the divergencies between the American and European positions, he believes, based on French tactics: if the American and European concepts are far enough apart, the French will be able to pull out all the stops at the time of the formal negotiations for the permanent INTELSAT arrangements, and rely on nationalistic and crowd-pleasing arguments to carry the day and disrupt the proceedings.” (Airgram A–928 from Rome, March 15; ibid.) 100. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 100. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 25, 1968. RSB–46 SUBJECT The Ambivalent Soviet View of INTELSAT An assessment of the factors shaping Soviet attitudes toward the question of international satellite communications. Abstract Since the President invited the USSR and its allies to join INTELSAT last August, the Soviets—after a delay—have parried with vague counterproposals of cooperation between INTELSAT and MOLNIYA (the USSR's satellite communications system), possibly under UN auspices. Moscow has been countering such proposals in one way or another since 1964 (when it rejected the first US invitation to participate in INTELSAT), proposing first UN control of communications satellite arrangements, later an international hookup based on MOLNIYA. Cooperative arrangements such as the Soviets now hint at, however, may well represent their first preference, for cooperation combines the best of two Soviet worlds: use of INTELSAT's communications facilities without the drawbacks of joining what the Soviets see as a US-dominated organization. Soviet Hints at Cooperation In his message to Congress of August 14, 1967, the President urged the USSR and Eastern European countries to give serious consideration to membership in INTELSAT. This proposal was conveyed formally to the USSR on August 28, 1967, and repeated March 12, 1968. While the Soviets have not yet responded directly to these invitations or expressed interest in them, they have been dropping a few hints about their view of the future development of international Comsat (satellite communications): —In an interview published in Trud on December 27, 1967, Soviet Deputy Minister of Communications Sergeichuk stated that “questions of exchanges of television programs will constitute a substantial part of the activity of the international systems of satellite communications now being created—the joint system of socialist countries and the INTELSAT system. The regular intercontinental exchange of black-and-white and color programs will depend on cooperation between them.” —In mid-January, the USSR hosted an international conference on development of communications equipment. A TASS dispatch of January 17 reported that the main result was to establish close contacts between Western and Soviet specialists. It also quoted an ITT official to the effect that establishment of a global Comsat system required the participation of Soviet specialists. —A French official told us in early March that, during talks between French and Soviet space experts in February, the Soviets showed interest in participating in a global Comsat organization along UN lines, possibly as a UN-attached agency. (A few days later, a Yugoslav telecommunications official, in urging a more flexible US attitude toward Comsat arrangements, suggested that UNESCO was interested in this matter and should, if possible, be accommodated.) Soviet Attitudes to INTELSAT For Use of INTELSAT as Facilities. There are several reasons why the USSR would probably accept cooperation with INTELSAT, if conditions were right. In view of the actual direction of Soviet telecommunications development and the relatively high cost of establishing a worldwide Comsat network, MOLNIYA was probably intended from the outset mainly as a national system. 2 The USSR has launched 7 communications satellites and built 20 ground stations and appears well on the way to achieving a high level of domestic Comsat service. With this core of facilities, Molniya also has potential for expansion into a regional system, accommodating Eastern European and perhaps southern and Far Eastern border countries. In addition, the USSR reportedly concluded agreements in 1966 to construct ground stations in Egypt and Cuba. In none of these cases, however, has there been confirmation of follow-up action. It seems doubtful that the Soviets ever seriously considered breaking out of a regional framework and mounting a self-sufficient world hookup competing across-the-board with INTELSAT. To be sure, the USSR for a while went through motions consistent with such a policy; while beefing up Molniya ground and space facilities, the Soviets proceeded to exchange color-television transmissions with Paris via MOLNIYA and last April got Eastern European regimes to sign a joint communiqué endorsing international development of MOLNIYA. These motions, however, may merely have been ploys designed to increase Soviet bargaining power in future negotiations on a deal with INTELSAT. The transmissions to and from Paris never passed the experimental stage and were probably aimed mainly at dramatizing the Paris-Moscow “dialogue” and advertising the French SECAM process. (Even in the latter sphere, Franco-Soviet cooperation has so far been stunted; mass production of color-television sets has been stymied by technical difficulties, and marketing prospects are dimmed by Eastern European malaise about SECAM's cost and incompatibility with Western color-television processes. 3 Lacking worldwide facilities themselves, the Soviets have little alternative but to sacrifice the convenience of future Comsat or to make a deal with other regional systems, which at this stage means INTELSAT. The time is appropriate for such a deal. INTELSAT's 61 member nations are now developing definitive arrangement proposals for consideration at an international conference early in 1969. These definitive arrangements will, when they become effective, supersede the present Agreement on Interim Arrangements. Against INTELSAT Organization as Presently Constituted. Soviet silence in the face of recent US invitations to join INTELSAT is consistent with the initial Soviet posture when the organization was formed in 1964. The USSR declined a US invitation on that occasion also, suggesting that any international Comsat system should come under UN control. In the Soviet view, the main drawback to membership in INTELSAT is probably that it would, inter alia, amount to an official Soviet endorsement of an organization that seems to be dominated by the US. (The formula for allocating voting power among INTELSAT members—their share of international communications traffic—gives the US about 53 percent of the vote.) The USSR has consistently avoided such endorsements, as in the case of the Asian Development Bank (where the US subscribes the majority of capital). Vietnam of course makes the Soviets doubly wary of overt demonstrations of direct cooperation with the US. Furthermore, INTELSAT itself is currently undergoing some ferment which, in the Soviet calculus, no doubt appears promising and which might be discouraged by a sudden Soviet entry at this time. Moscow has no doubt gotten wind of various French proposals for either decreasing the US voting share or forming separate regional Comsat systems. The Alternative of INTELSAT-MOLNIYA Cooperation . This probably represents the Soviet first preference in international Comsat arrangements. A cooperative setup might well involve the best of both worlds for the USSR, securing the advantages of INTELSAT service without the drawbacks of INTELSAT membership. Moscow could stay out of what it may feel is a US-operated club, yet at the same time plug Molniya into a world hookup and accordingly enhance its international standing and earnings. The Soviets would also probably obtain considerable leverage in international satellite-communications affairs if cooperative arrangements gave MOLNIYA a regional monopoly and if user countries came to rely on MOLNIYA as a link in the world system. Soviet interest in Comsat cooperation has been demonstrated as well as referred to in recent statements. In 1967 the Soviets agreed to transmit two television shows to a global audience in conjunction with INTELSAT. Satellites of this organization were allowed to relay live telecasts between Moscow and Tokyo on the occasion of the inauguration of Japanese-Soviet air service last April. One MOLNIYA and three INTELSAT satellites were also scheduled to cooperate in a global television spectacular last June, but this agreement was not carried out because of Soviet reaction to the Middle East crisis; Moscow claimed that Western TV stations were “conducting a smear campaign against Arab countries.” The Future . The USSR is no doubt still quite uncertain about the likelihood of Comsat cooperation and about Western views on this question. Soviet statements to date have been framed in low key and channeled through spokesmen of middling authority. Future Soviet tactics and postures in the Comsat game will doubtless be strongly affected by the emerging moves of Western players—and perhaps spasmodically by the East-West “political climate”—as the 1969 renegotiation date approaches. The main Soviet objectives, however, will probably remain fairly constant: a Soviet monopoly on Comsat over or near the USSR, plus close and regular telecommunications exchanges with other international systems—whether they remain one, INTELSAT, or become several. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 2 See Research Memorandum RSB–26, “The Molniya Satellite of the USSR: Its Place in International Communications,” March 22, 1966 (Limited Official Use/No Foreign Dissem). [Footnote in the source text.] 3 See Research Memorandum RSB–132, “Signs of Eastern European Indecision about Adopting French Color TV,” December 12, 1967 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem). [Footnote in the source text.] 101. Airgram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 101. Airgram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, May 13, 1968. A–2127 SUBJECT French Views on Satellite Communications Arrangements REF Paris A–1899, April 5, 1968 2 Summary In a meeting with Embassy and COMSAT officials, French communications system experts explained and defended their view that definitive arrangements for the INTELSAT global communications satellite system should provide for the extensive implementation of regional systems. They believe commercial considerations must be kept paramount, that systems investment must bear a direct relationship to circuit ownership and control, and decisions affecting regional services must be taken directly by those member nations having a declared regional interest. M. Rene Sueur, Assistant to the Director General for Telecommunications, Ministry of P & T, invited Embassy representatives to participate in discussions with the COMSAT Corporation's Geneva office representatives, Colino and Mellen. These discussions, which took place at CNET on April 23 and 24, provided an opportunity for an expose of the views of COMSAT and especially by the French P & T on possible definitive arrangements for global communications via satellite. In its essentials the discussions centered around two largely contradictory philosophies, the US view as put forth by the COMSAT representatives that the communications needs of the world can be satisfied by a highly integrated network of high capacity satellites, and the French view that provision must be made for system member countries to buy and own circuits in their selected areas of world interest. The exposition of the French views which follows is a very brief summary of the principal contentions, reiterated several times in one form or another by Sueur and the French representative to INTELSAT, Jean Paul Voge. [Here follow four pages detailing the French views. The sections include: “General Views on Development of the Global System”; “French Views on Regional Systems”; “Socialist Communications Satellite Systems”; “Global Coordination”; “Joint Efforts within INTELSAT”; “Services to Underdeveloped Areas”; “INTELSAT and France”; “System Optimization”; “System Investment—The Practical View”; and “Extension of INTELSAT Interim Arrangements.”] Comment: Although all these discussions were amicable, the French representatives stated their views with a conviction and force which seemed to indicate that there is presently little negotiating latitude in the French position. Colino, acting as spokesman for the COMSAT views, tried patiently to cite instances and areas in which INTELSAT had either shown flexibility or is moving in a direction to respond at least partially to the French position. Where the French motivation was obviously political such counter arguments fell on very barren ground. The political ends which a French regional communications satellite system must serve completely elude the cool, patient, statistical study of the growth in world communications and its extension to probable future needs. It seemed clear that the French do not see INTELSAT as providing either the political or the industrial “satisfactions they seek”—to use Voge's words. At this point in time when France fears television broadcasts directly from satellites into her sphere of political interest with as much passion as she yearns to beam broadcasting into that area from her own satellites, she feels that she cannot afford too much objectivity in her communication satellite policy. A global system in which France would of necessity play not the smallest, but certainly a rather minor role, especially in its sphere of major interest, does not respond to what the French believe are their political needs. A regional system, on the other hand, covering the French sphere of interest would probably permit France to play the dominant role. Shriver 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. Drafted by John H. Buehler (SCI) and A. Eugene Frank (TRC), cleared by Edgar L. Pire (SCI) and Richard G. Long (POL), and approved by Robert A. Brand (MINECON). 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 102. Editorial Note 102. Editorial Note On June 4, 1968, President Johnson returned to Glassboro, New Jersey, the site of his 1967 summit with Soviet Chairman Kosygin. Johnson spoke of the progress and setbacks of the previous year and proposed additional fields in which the two nations could build cooperation. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968 , Book I, pages 679–684) One of his “new” proposals called for stepping up efforts to develop a global communication satellite system. “The United States believes that better communications are essential to mutual understanding between nations,” he said. “We look forward to the day when the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe will join the system.” Henry Owen, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, commented on the proposal the next day: “it is unrealistic to suppose that the Soviets would join an organization which is subject to a U.S. veto and managed by a private U.S. corporation.” The questions of vetoes and voting rights were sensitive ones: “If the Soviets were not willing to settle for a respectable piece of the action, then their participation would not be much of a bonus for cooperation anyway.” Owen concluded: “In brief, we should try to show the Soviets that they can't beat INTELSAT, so they might as well join it.” (Memorandum from Owen to Starr, June 5; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 156, Task Force on Communications Policy, Meeting Minutes, August 1967–November 1968) On July 19 the Department transmitted another proposal to the Soviets, following it up with an offer of talks at the upcoming UN Outer Space Conference in Vienna in August. (Airgram A–307 to Vienna, July 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6) Officials in the Embassy in Moscow reported that the Soviet Deputy Director for Space Communications told them that the principles of INTELSAT did not appear “good enough” for the Soviet Union to consider. He was unenthusiastic about the proposed talks in Vienna. (Telegram 5021 from Moscow, August 9; ibid.) 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, August 13, 1968, 1714Z. 219721. Subject: Soviet International Satellite Communications System Proposal. 1. As reported London 11433 (NOTAL) 2 Soviets have put forward in London and apparently in selected other capitals proposal for new international satellite communications organization to be called Intersputnik. 3 According UN Outer Space Secretariat official, text of Soviet draft agreement has been transmitted to UNSYG under cover of joint letter from USSR and seven other Communist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia). It is presently being translated and will be circulated August 13 as UN document. Distribution may be timed to coincide August 14 opening of UN Space Conference in Vienna. 4 Approach was not made to US but on August 9 Soviet official gave Embassy Moscow copy of draft agreement when Emb officer pressed for views on INTELSAT (Moscow 5021 NOTAL 5 ). Canadian and Italian Embassies have informed Dept approaches made to their Governments and Emb Paris reports French Government has copy Soviet proposal; no others yet confirmed. Canadians provided additional information in conversation August 6, including very incomplete summary in English of Soviet draft agreement. Full text draft agreement given to UK and Canada in Russian, being translated and not yet available. 2. On basis information available, proposed organization appears similar to INTELSAT in most respects, but with major difference that power would lie in one-nation-one vote council rather than in committee operating with weighted voting. Intended relationship to INTELSAT and whether it is contemplated that latter would continue to exist not stated. 3. Action addresses requested communicate following US views to host governments: A We have not seen text of draft proposed agreement. Therefore, following views, based on impression we now have, are tentative pending more complete information. B Most likely among possibilities of what Soviets intend appears to be global satellite communication system in place of INTELSAT. If this is intent, we see two major problems. First, there is in INTELSAT a going, world satellite communications organization which meets the purposes of the Soviet proposal. INTELSAT is operating successfully with very wide coverage, membership including countries of all sizes. (Sixty-two member nations of INTELSAT handle more than 95 percent of world's international telecommunications traffic. INTELSAT now has operating satellite coverage of major parts of world and will by middle of 1969 have satellites capable of handling all major areas. Eighteen earth stations that are part of system now in operation in fourteen countries and about thirty in various stages of construction or planning. Forty to fifty earth stations expected to be operative by 1970. Total investment in satellites and earth stations by that time will be around $350 to $400 million—see CA–7411, April 19, 1968. 6 ) We have made clear Soviet participation would be welcome; President Johnson reiterated invitation to Soviets to join in August 1967 message on communications policy and in June 1968 Glassboro speech. 7 We do not think progress of INTELSAT or negotiation of INTELSAT definitive arrangements should be held up in favor of new organization. Second problem is voting formula for important decisions. If it is, as it appears, one member-one vote, the formula is unacceptable to US since it does not take account of extreme differences in contributions to and use of the system. C We welcome Soviet interest in establishment of global telecommunications organization, though we note that there is such an organization in existence. US for its part would be prepared to consider with INTELSAT partners whether there is some way INTELSAT structure could be made more attractive to USSR. We believe that, in view of apparent similarity of Soviet proposal to INTELSAT, this could be productive if Soviets are serious. We are not, however, prepared to hold up progress of INTELSAT or drop concept of weighted voting on important questions. We note that US proposal for INTELSAT definitive arrangements introduced in October 1967 contained provision for assembly of members which would deal with certain broad policy matters (but would not decide many important, including commercial, questions) and which would act on the basis of a majority vote (counting one-nation-one vote) and a two-thirds vote by investment shares. Precise description of assembly, including voting arrangements, obviously subject to further discussion, subject however to basic US views described above. 4. Dept responding similarly to Canadian approach here and informing British Embassy of substance of above. 5. Would appreciate reactions action addressee host governments soonest; any replies prior August 27 should be repeated Vienna for US Del, Outer Space Conference. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Miller (E) and Loy (E) and cleared by Dubs (EUR), Nesbitt (SCI), James Van R. Springer (L), Solomon (E), Abraham Katz (EUR), Joseph P. Lorenz (IO), Clark (DTM), Carroll Brown (S/S), Ende (FCC), Kemp (DOD), Radius (NASA), Johnson (NASC), and Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Belgrade, Bern, Bonn, Bucharest, Canberra, Copenhagen, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris also for CEDTO, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, USUN, Mission at Geneva, USEC Mission at Brussels, and Mission to NATO. 2 Dated August 2. (Ibid., POL 17 USSR-UK) 3 The Intersputnik proposal was published as UN doc. A/AC.105/46 on August 9, 1968. 4 The UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was held in Vienna August 14–27 under the chairmanship of Austrian Foreign Minister Kurt Waldheim. The conference had two objectives: 1) to examine the practical benefits to be derived from space research and exploration and the extent to which non-space powers, especially in the developing world, could benefit, and 2) to examine opportunities available to non-space powers for international cooperation in space. More information on the conference is in the Yearbook of the United Nations 1968 , vol. 22, pp. 57–69. 5 See Document 102 . 6 Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6) 7 See footnote 2, Document 97 , and Document 102 . 104. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 104. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 1 Vienna, August 16, 1968, 1602Z. 6010. Subject: Outer Space Conference (Intersputnik). Ref: State 219721. 2 1. In agreement with USDel Chairman Webb, I met privately with FonMin Waldheim this morning to discuss several matters including Outer Space Conference which he chairs. Drawing on reftel and other messages, developed reasons why we strongly support INTELSAT and why we would be much concerned if Conference acted to inflate Soviet Intersputnik proposal or let it be considered as substitute for INTELSAT or otherwise. Waldheim said he understood and could assure us Conference as such would not go along with any such Soviet maneuvers although he could not, of course, predict what Soviets might do or say. He added when Soviets approached Vice President of Conference Sarabhai (Vienna 5980) 3 to give a paper on Intersputnik in addition to paper it already agreed they were to present, Sarabhai had consulted Waldheim who instructed Soviet proposal should be rejected on procedural grounds since it had not been cleared by panel as required. 2. Referring to Soviet motivation, Waldheim said Soviets have been opposed to INTELSAT from very beginning (1) on doctrinal grounds since private enterprise (capitalism) is heavily involved and (2) because if Soviets joined they would have virtually no voice because Soviets have less than 5 percent of global communications traffic. Waldheim believes Soviets [garble] making Intersputnik proposal as ploy (that French and some LDC's may be disposed to support) to enhance Soviet capability to bring about revision of INTELSAT charter and rules to make them more acceptable to Soviets. 3. Our discussion concluded with some general talk re role of UN and agreement that while UN indispensable organization, it very dubious that it should try to take over certain types of activity that are today being handled successfully by private enterprise working closely with interested governments. MacArthur 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, and Rome. 2 Document 103 . 3 Dated August 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 6 UN) 105. Memorandum of Conversation 105. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 19, 1968. SUBJECT Intelsat and Intersputnik PARTICIPANTS Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs At the Secretary's dinner on the Honey Fitz, on August 19, Ambassador Dobrynin invited Under Secretary Rostow to withdraw for a private talk. The topics covered are treated in separate memoranda. Rostow remarked that the reports about the Soviet space proposals were interesting. Why hadn't they been given to us? Dobrynin said they had been made public, and Rostow referred to the fact that they had been handed to other members of Intelsat before being publicly announced. If the Soviets were serious about finding a politically appropriate way to cooperate in the field of satellite communications, Rostow said, we should be glad to discuss the problem with them. They knew the President's policy in this regard, to which he had referred again recently in Glassboro. Dobrynin asked whether the question should be taken up in Vienna. Rostow said that Mr. Loy would be going to Vienna shortly, and would be glad to talk with the Soviet representative, but the problem could also be examined here privately if they wished to do so. As Dobrynin knew, Rostow had these matters on his plate. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Rostow on August 20 and approved by Robert Brown. The memorandum is Part III of IV. 106. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 106. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State 1 Vienna, August 21, 1968, 1604Z. 6091. Subject: Outer Space Conference. For IO/OIC and EUR. 1. Sov and EE intervention Czechoslovakia is major subject of corridor speculation at Outer Space Conf as of 1200 hours GMT today. 2 No indication that question will emerge on floor but corridor comment emphasizes sadness and anger over Sov actions. Italian del making private comment on Sov Intersputnik proposal: “So this is what they mean by 'one-nation, one-vote' procedure”. 2. Italian reception tonight (only national reception scheduled thus far) summarily cancelled by written notice “Because of invasion of Czechoslovakia”. 3. Czech occupation appears to have cut ground from under Sov discussion of Intersputnik. US approach to Sovs (State 222051) 3 here on this matter at this time seems undesirable. Please instruct. 4 MacArthur 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 6 UN. Confidential; Priority. 2 On the night of August 20–21 Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia with 200,000 troops. 3 Dated August 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 6 UN) 4 In telegram 225355 to Vienna, August 22, the Department wrote: “In view of events of the past twenty-four hours Department agrees it undesirable to seek out Soviets at this particular moment for bilateral discussions re INTELSAT/Intersputnik.” Loy canceled his plans to fly to Vienna. (Ibid.) 107. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 107. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 3, 1968. SUBJECT Soviet Intersputnik Proposal Just before the Czech invasion, the Soviets, along with seven other Communist countries, floated a proposal for the establishment of an international communications system, which they dubbed Intersputnik. A message from Premier Kosygin announcing the proposal was read at the opening session of the Vienna UN Space Conference, August 14. He said that ”… in order to satisfy the needs of the developed and underdeveloped countries, the USSR is proposing the creation of an international communications system through artificial earth satellites based on democratic principles with total equality of all its participants”. The draft agreement is structurally similar in content to the present INTELSAT agreement. A major difference is the provision for decision making on a one-country/one-vote basis rather than weighted voting based on investment as in the INTELSAT system. At present we can only speculate as to the Soviet motives in putting forth this proposal at this time. We doubt that they seriously expect to establish a truly world-wide system to supplant INTELSAT. It could be that they envision a more limited one which would handle some of the traffic among the Soviet Union and its allies. A number of countries, principally for political reasons, may want to participate in such a system as well as in INTELSAT. Alternatively, the Soviets' real aim may be to force a restructuring of INTELSAT in the forthcoming negotiations on INTELSAT permanent arrangements, so that they can participate on a basis of equality with the United States. Lastly, they may simply be interested in making these negotiations more difficult for the United States. They have not exhibited any interest in INTELSAT to date. You may recall that since the spring of 1964 we have at various times encouraged the Soviets to join INTELSAT, the last time being your speech in June commemorating the Glassboro talks. It is worth noting that both Yugoslavia and Romania are showing interest in joining INTELSAT, and, in fact, the Communications Satellite Corporation just recently concluded a consulting engineering contract with the Government of Yugoslavia to design and prepare earth station specifications for that Government. Jim Webb has reported from Vienna that the Soviets did not gain the propaganda splash they must have intended, and that the United States presentations have been most impressive. While the Soviets have not succeeded in disrupting the agreed agenda of the Conference, they may have set the stage for continuing agitation on this issue. 2 I agree with Mr. Webb that we must continue energetically our preparations for the INTELSAT negotiations next February. We should be prepared to make such changes in the structure as are necessary and acceptable to continue the very broad support this organization has built in the last four years. The problem is to ascertain whether the Soviets are interested in discussing this subject with us in a serious manner. In light of the current Czech situation, we will not be able to do that now, but we shall attempt to sound the Soviets out as soon as such contacts are feasible. Dean Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Confidential. Drafted by Loy and Nelson and cleared by Rostow and Allen. 2 In telegram 6231 from Vienna, August 28, the delegation wrote: “Czech adventure has removed any small possibility of serious consideration of Sov Intersputnik proposal. Item is forgotten except for derision in view Sov real world performance.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 6 UN) 108. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to Secretary of State Rusk 108. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 27, 1968. E—Mr. Solomon's underlying action memorandum 2 recommends that the United States position on INTELSAT membership eligibility at the 1969 conference should be in favor of an “all states” provision in the agreement (with appropriate safeguards as to recognition of states). The recommended fall back position would be to support ITU membership as an INTELSAT membership requirement. M—Mr. Rostow (Tab E) supports Mr. Solomon 's recommendation for universal membership. 3 He notes that you and the President have supported the position that INTELSAT should become universal in membership. If the contrary view prevails among the present membership, we should insure that the definitive arrangements negotiated in 1969 should not preclude universal membership. EUR—Mr. Springsteen (Tab F) opposes the “all states” membership position on the basis that the Germans will not understand why we espouse a position which would allow the East Germans to sign. 4 The majority of the present membership also opposes the “all states” provision. EUR supports ITU membership as a requirement for INTELSAT membership. H—Mr. Schnee (Tab G) raises a strong qualification to E's recommendation. He notes that unless the “appropriate safeguards” under the “all states” provision bar the membership of non-recognized communist countries, especially Communist China and East Germany, there will be considerable Congressional reaction. 5 BHR Attachment Washington, September 27, 1968. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to Secretary of State Rusk 6 SUBJECT Membership in INTELSAT The purpose of this memorandum is to confirm and establish primary and fall-back United States positions on the INTELSAT membership issue for use during the 1969 Conference on “definitive arrangements” for INTELSAT. 1. INTELSAT was formed and operates under interim arrangements. Pursuant to Article IX of the 1964 Agreement establishing the interim arrangements (Tab A), 7 we plan to convene a Plenipotentiary Conference in Washington on February 24, 1969, to negotiate definitive arrangements. We have proposed unrestricted eligibility for membership in the permanent organization (an “all states” concept). Other INTELSAT members oppose this concept, and we anticipate that membership will be a controversial issue at the Conference. Preparatory work for the Conference is going forward, both in the INTELSAT Interim Committee and bilaterally, and it will be advantageous for us to know as early as possible where we are going on the issues involved. 2. The 1964 Agreement on interim arrangements provides that to be a member of INTELSAT a state must be a member of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a 135-member specialized agency of the United Nations. 3. In August 1967 President Johnson sent a message to Congress on the “Global Communications System” in which he said: “Today I reaffirm the commitments made in 1962 and 1964. We support the development of a global system of communications satellites to make modern communications available to all nations… . We support a global system of commercial satellite communications which is available to all nations—large and small, developed and developing—on a nondiscriminatory basis.” On May 4, 1968, in your Law Day address at the University of Georgia, you said: “Next year we will enter into negotiations looking towards a definitive set of arrangements. These will determine whether we can preserve international cooperation in this field and whether we can expand the membership of this international institution [INTELSAT] 8 to include all members of the world community.” We stated in our October 1967 proposals to INTELSAT (Tab B) that “participation in the global commercial communications satellite system shall be available to all nations”. All of these statements clearly imply “all states” eligibility, though none of them expressly states it. 4. During a discussion of the membership issue in connection with definitive arrangements which was held by the INTELSAT Interim Committee in March-April 1968, the U.S. spokesman was asked to clarify the United States position on membership. The U.S. spokesman said at that time that it is the United States position to favor unrestricted membership in INTELSAT. A summary of the discussion is attached at Tab C. 5. Having thus proposed an “all states” membership provision, we precipitated responses which indicate that we will be in a minority among the major states in INTELSAT on this issue. To date only Australia and some Latin American countries have supported preliminary consideration of an “all states” membership provision for the INTELSAT definitive arrangements. 6. In western Europe the opinion appears to be unanimously in favor of continuing to require ITU membership as a prerequisite to INTELSAT membership and we anticipate that more than half of the countries participating in the 1969 Conference will support adoption of the ITU membership requirement. A significant political implication arising out of the ITU criterion is that the Communist regimes not recognized by the United States (with the exception of Mongolia) do not belong to the ITU. Thus, neither East Germany, North Korea, North Viet Nam, nor Communist China would be eligible to join INTELSAT if the present ITU membership requirement is continued in effect. 7. As a political manifestation of our commitment to a universal global satellite system, it still may be desirable for the United States to support “all states” eligibility for INTELSAT membership. However, pressure from our allies may later make it advisable to abandon this position in favor of eligibility criteria based on membership in the ITU. We therefore recommend that you approve the following U.S. position and fall-back position with respect to INTELSAT membership. If we have made our position in favor of a universal system clear and it is publicly known, there would be no basis for charges that we had wished to make membership exclusive or isolate any non-member. Recommendation It is recommended that you approve: (1) The United States position on INTELSAT membership eligibility at the 1969 Conference should be in favor of an “all states” provision in the agreement (with appropriate safeguards as to recognition of states). 9 (2) The fall-back United States position on INTELSAT membership eligibility at the 1969 Conference should be to support ITU membership as an INTELSAT membership requirement. 10 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. No classification marking. The date is handwritten on the source text. 2 Printed below. 3 Not printed. Rostow commented: “The provision of commercial communication by satellite should not be a political issue, any more than the international arrangements for delivering mail.” There is some confusion over the dating of items in this package. The October 2 Rostow memorandum appears to have been added to the package after the Action Memorandum was submitted to the Secretary on September 27. Rusk did not make a decision until October 10. 4 Dated September 17, not printed. Springsteen believed that this was particularly important in light of East German aggression against Czechoslovakia. He felt that an “all states” course would be “too costly in terms of principle.” 5 Dated September 13, not printed. Schnee added, “Barring some dramatic change in our relations with Communist China and the Soviet bloc, I think the majority of Congress will continue to support the current 'hard on Communists' line.” 6 Confidential. Drafted by Stephen E. Doyle (E), Thomas E. Nelson (E), and William K. Miller (E); and concurred in by Allen (IO), Barnett (EA), Springsteen (EUR), Belman (L), and Schnee (H). 7 Tabs A–G are not printed. 8 Brackets in the source text. 9 Rusk initialed the “Disapproved” line on October 10. 10 Rusk crossed out “fall-back” and initialed the “Approved” line on October 10. 109. Editorial Note 109. Editorial Note As preparatory negotiations continued for the February 1969 INTELSAT conference, the Soviet Union maintained that it would not join an organization in which usage determined voting rights and control. As reported by the Embassy in Stockholm on October 11, Sweden was planning to raise the issue in the UN Space Committee because Swedish officials “seem prepared to assume that conference will fail.” The Swedes believed that the Soviets and their East European allies would find a conference under UN auspices “useful and more attractive.” (Telegram 3171 from Stockholm, October 11, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6) On October 15 the Department replied: “While we agree that the Soviet Intersputnik proposal cannot simply be ignored, we believe it is important to maintain proper perspective with respect to it. INTELSAT is going concern with 63 members in most parts of the globe and with effective and important international communications in being. It is also an operating commercial enterprise representing major investments. Intersputnik on the other hand is only a proposal, and its only known support is regional, not global.” The Department believed that the Swedish proposal would be counterproductive since it would not prevent the establishment of an independent Soviet satellite system and would seriously undercut U.S. efforts to obtain Soviet participation in INTELSAT. (Telegram 255834 to Stockholm and USUN, October 15; ibid.) In November the United Kingdom launched a strong effort to rally opposition in Europe and dissuade Sweden from approaching the United Nations. (Telegram 27302 from London, November 16; ibid.) U.K. officials found that Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany opposed the Swedish initiative, Norway was equivocal, and France was sympathetic. (Telegram 280799 to London, December 3; ibid.) The Department urged the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to explain the problem to its Swedish counterpart: “The Soviets have not responded to our past invitation to discuss membership in INTELSAT, and we simply do not know whether U.S.S.R. is sincerely interested in joining organization or what changes, if any, would make INTELSAT politically acceptable to it. If Sweden believes itself in a position to explore this matter with U.S.S.R. prior to conference establishing definitive arrangements, its assistance would be most welcome.” Swedish representatives privately informed USUN officials on December 18 that they would “make no further move re INTELSAT at this session.” (Telegram 8567 from USUN, December 18; ibid.) 110. Editorial Note 110. Editorial Note On December 30, 1968, the Department of State named the members of a delegation to the Plenipotentiary Conference To Establish Definitive Arrangement for the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium, scheduled for February 24–March 21, 1969. The delegation was chaired by Leonard H. Marks. Vice Chairmen were Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and James McCormack of Comsat. Other members were Ward P. Allen, Bureau of International Organization Affairs; Rosel H. Hyde, Federal Communications Commission; John A. Johnson,INTELSAT; William K. Miller, Office of Telecommunications, Bureau of Economic Affairs; and James D. O'Connell of the White House. See Department of State Press Release 284 (Revised) printed in Department of State Bulletin , January 20, 1969, page 69. Development of the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Development of the Supersonic Transport Aircraft 111. Editorial Note 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 7, 1964, 5:20 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Confidential. Drafted by W.E. Knight (OA/AN) and cleared by Richard G. Long (WE), J. Amstutz (OA/AL), Lieutenant General Grant (FAA), and Trezise (E). Also sent to Paris. 113. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, November 10, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London for CAA and FAA. 114. Memorandum for the Record Washington, December 5, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. No classification marking. Prepared by Califano on December 10. Copies were sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, Secretary of State Rusk, and Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs McNaughton. 115. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, January 19, 1965, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris. 116. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, January 21, 1965, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Secret; Limit Distribution. 117. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, January 22, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Secret. Repeated to Paris. 118. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Ball to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (Halaby) Washington, February 8, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12–7. Secret. Drafted by Amstutz (OA/AL) on February 4, and cleared by P. Bogart (AL), Maloy (FAA), Johnson (E), Ferguson (OA), Beigel (WE), Tucker (BNA), and Creel (EUR). 119. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, February 17, 1965, noon. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Confidential. Repeated to Paris. 120. Editorial Note 121. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, October 22, 1965, 1937Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12–7 US. Confidential. Repeated to Paris for USRO and the Embassy and to the Department of Defense for McNaughton and Enthoven. 122. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 8, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Amstutz and Luppi. Copies were sent to J. Starkey (BNA), Beigel (WE), Leddy (EUR), and A. Caswell (E). 123. Letter From the Assistant Administrator for International Aviation Affairs, Federal Aviation Agency (Cary) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) Washington, December 14, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text reads, “RMIR Files. Letter drafted in reply by AL—Amstutz 2–17–66.” 124. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 28, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12–1 US. Confidential. Drafted by Amstutz on February 15. 125. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 8, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Confidential. Drafted by Amstutz on February 15. 126. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (McKee) to Vice President Humphrey Washington, March 15, 1966. Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. No classification marking. 127. National Security Action Memorandum No. 344 Washington, April 1, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3. No classification marking. 128. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) to the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (Crooker) Washington, March 22, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12–7 US. No classification marking. Drafted by M. Styles (E/AN). 129. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for International Affairs and Special Programs (Agger) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) Washington, April 10, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 6 US. No classification marking. 111. Editorial Note 111. Editorial Note The Soviet Union had begun work on an SST design in the late 1950s, and the Kennedy administration begin a feasibility study under the chairmanship of Federal Aviation Agency Administrator Najeeb Halaby soon after taking office. (See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 26–43 and page 56.) The Soviet threat to the international prestige of the United States would be a major factor in the decision-making process. (Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGhee, February 18, 1963; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12–7 US, and memorandum from McGhee to Welsh, February 28, 1963; ibid., AV 12 US) State Department officials were concerned that the psychological aspects of the proposal had not been adequately researched and agreed on March 4, 1963, to survey the attitudes of U.S. Ambassadors in key countries. (Memorandum from Welsh to McGhee, March 1, 1963, and memorandum from Johnson to McGhee, March 6, 1963; both ibid.) Reaction from the Ambassadors was mixed, but all were concerned with the possible impact on the overseas image of the United States. (For example, see telegram 2280 from Moscow, March 14, 1963, and telegram 423 from Budapest, March 15, 1963; both ibid.) In a personal cable for Edward R. Murrow, George F. Kennan, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, wrote: “Would like to say that personally I regret to see question placed in this way. Have long held view … that we should be careful not to give impression to world opinion that our competition with USSR was some sort of sporting contest to show who could first achieve spectacular but unnecessary material successes. Fact is that whether it becomes possible to fly to Paris on American planes in two hours rather than six is matter of supreme unimportance from standpoint of anything that really matters in our civilization.” (Telegram 1258 from Belgrade, March 19, 1963; ibid.) The State Department concluded that the United States should focus on developing a safe and commercially viable SST and should not compress the time frame simply to “win” a race. (Memorandum from Harriman to Welsh, April 16, 1963; ibid., AV 12–7 US) Others within the administration, especially at the FAA and Treasury, felt the nation needed to move more quickly. Halaby wrote: “If the United States does not develop a supersonic transport, this nation will lose prestige in the eyes of the world. The presumption will be that this country does not have the technological and financial capability to be competitive.” (Memorandum from Harriman to the Acting Secretary, May 22, 1963; ibid.) On June 5, 1963, President Kennedy told the graduating class at the U.S. Air Force Academy that the United States would commit itself to build an SST: “This commitment, I believe, is essential to a strong and forward-looking Nation, and indicates the future of manned aircraft as we move into a missile age as well.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , pages 440–443) In August 1963 President Kennedy appointed Eugene R. Black and Stanley de J. Osborne as special advisers on the financial aspects of the commercial SST program. Their report, completed in December 1963, was made public by President Johnson on February 29, 1964. (Ibid.: Lyndon B. Johnson , 1963–64, Book I, page 323) In their report, Black and Osborne concluded: “We recommend that the United States must proceed with the Supersonic Transport program. It is in the national interest so to do, it is of great economic importance to the nation, and failure to do so might well leave our important airline and aircraft industries in potentially dangerous competitive situations.” Black and Osborne did not believe it would be in the interest of the United States either to enter the Anglo-French consortium or to compete with it: “We conclude that one of the basic philosophies of the current program, namely, that of tying the United States effort to the 'Concorde,' and therefore compressing the time of development and construction is dangerous, technically and economically. We feel that a superior aircraft which is available within two or three years of the first 'Concorde' deliveries will still be able to capture the bulk of the world market.” (Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Secretary Rusk, March 2, 1964; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 2–7 US) The Anglo-French consortium was a joint development project launched by the British and French Governments because of the high cost of developing a supersonic transport. The SST project faced considerable technical and economic difficulties. On March 28, 1964, when President Johnson announced the formation of an SST advisory board, he commented: “We believe the technical challenge of the SST is manageable. We think that the main problem lies in the financial area.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, page 428) The project was delayed when potential contractors failed to meet technical standards, and by December 3 the President took the delays and difficulties into account: “The development of a commercially profitable supersonic transport is a very difficult and complex understanding. I believe that this country must take, in the words of Senator Monroney, 'time for deliberate, proven development' and time to make certain that this will be the best supersonic in the world's airways.” (Ibid., Book II, page 1635) 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, November 7, 1964, 5:20 p.m. 3064. Pass Assistant Secretary Johnson. In response your request for guidelines for any conversation on SST that may occur in your meetings in London or Paris, 2 position that U.S. should adopt has been discussed with Halaby and Boyd. Consensus is that situation is still fluid and you should be noncommittal on any possible U.S. collaboration with Concorde program, hearing out British and French without taking any particular position. At same time we believe you should be careful to avoid giving impression that door is already closed to U.S. collaboration. Subject has implications going beyond technical and financial aspects and U.S. interest is to leave issue open pending further study here and further developments in UK and France. 3 FAA official Cecil Mackey, who will meet Boyd in Paris Tuesday is fully familiar with latest FAA assessment of economics of SST. See also Deptel 2623 to Paris rptd info London 3030. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Confidential. Drafted by W.E. Knight (OA/AN) and cleared by Richard G. Long (WE), J. Amstutz (OA/AL), Lieutenant General Grant (FAA), and Trezise (E). Also sent to Paris. 2 The United States had been meeting with the French and British in a series of informal Tripartite Meetings on the Supersonic Transport. This was the fourth in the series; the third session had been held in Paris in June 1964. (Airgram A–3137 from Paris, June 12; ibid., AV 3) 3 Bohlen reported from Paris that the British Ambassador had shared with him a message from Pompidou to Wilson: “Message stated in effect that since appears UK may not wish to go through with project French would appreciate yes or no answer on British intentions. In subsequent conversations Couve pointed out to Sir Pierson that continued shilly-shallying would permit US to close gap.” (Telegram 2957 from Paris, November 13; ibid., AV 12) 4 Dated November 5. (Ibid.) 113. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 113. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, November 10, 1964, 6 p.m. 2868. In conversations with Boyd, Chairman of CAB, and Prill, Asst. Administrator FAA, Vergnaud today informed us of meeting of Ministers planned for tonight to prepare French position on Concorde for submittal President de Gaulle this week. Choice appears to be “abdication” or proceeding alone. Vergnaud seems to feel time too late for American-French cooperation and that British-French cooperation no longer possible. While responsible French officials do not believe accusations of American duplicity that have been appearing in French press for last week they do not seem to regret their appearance. As present US position based on assumption of continuation present Concorde program, we not able to discuss alternatives with GOF until all facts available on past discussions. Would appreciate all information to help alleviate anti-American aspect of cancellation if this is forthcoming. 2 Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London for CAA and FAA. 2 In telegram 2829 to Paris, November 16, the Department informed Bohlen that the French had never formally approached the United States requesting cooperation on the SST project. “Oblique references” had been made in conversations with American officials in 1962, but “when U.S. officials did not react affirmatively, subject was not pressed.” The original initiative and approach came from the British in September 1960. “Lack of positive US response was probably major reason leading UK turn to France.” (Ibid.) 114. Memorandum for the Record 114. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, December 5, 1964. SUBJECT Conversation between French Ambassador Alphand and Pete Quesada on December 5, 1964 General Quesada visited me this morning and told me that the French Ambassador had discussed the French SST program with him on December 5. He said the Ambassador went out of his way to bring up the SST program. The Ambassador said he was going to discuss the SST when he returned to France and made the following points. 1. The French were disturbed about the actions of the British. If the British pulled out, he doubted that the French would continue. 2. He pursued a reorientation of the program as a tripartite program, mentioned that the current “race” atmosphere was most unfortunate, said he was interested in retrieving the French position, and asked about our attitude towards a three-way deal. 3. He asked whether America was bound to the Mach 3 regime. He favored the prolonging of the program, and was disturbed by the increased costs. 4. He believed that the U.S. should raise any tripartite interest directly with the French rather than through the British, or rather than have the French come to the U.S. for help. He suggested that if the U.S. raised the SST problem with the French, it might help to heal some of the wounds that have come up from time to time. 5. He indicated that he was anxious to see General Quesada again and pursue their conversation before he returned to France next week. General Quesada also told me he would like to make clear why he started the SST program. He said that he started the program as a result of the B–70 program and he was not advocating an SST but rather exploiting the know-how of the B–70 program and attempting to avoid duplicating programs. He said that he never conceived of the SST program being pushed the way it now is and never thought in terms of the government picking up 90% of the cost on the program. At best, he thought the SST development might follow a successful B–70 development by five or so years. I thanked General Quesada for his views and told him I would inform Secretary McNamara of them. The Special Assistant Joseph A. Califano, Jr. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. No classification marking. Prepared by Califano on December 10. Copies were sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, Secretary of State Rusk, and Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs McNaughton. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 115. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 115. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, January 19, 1965, 5 p.m. 3350. Pass personally Halaby,FAA. Embtel 3333. 2 Econ Minister and Prill FAA were invited by Minister of Aviation, Jenkins, for briefing on Concorde decision prior to planned announcement first day of new Parliament January 19. Due Churchill illness and reorganization of debate, however, government presentation in Parliament will not be made until later this week or possibly next week. Message on decision is being delivered to Premier Pompidou Tuesday, January 19, and MOA obviously concerned over possible leaks. Embassy will report public statements when made. 3 Significant points of conversation with Minister were: British have decided continue original Concorde program. As nothing on engineering or production side of program has been changed since election, despite political furor, Jenkins feels that Concorde lead still substantial. He would like Administrator Halaby to discuss possibility of agreement on rate of progress both projects during visit February 15th. Discussions would include Minister Jacquet and could be held either London or Paris. In suggesting London, he had not known of Halaby intention of visiting Paris February 11th, 12th. (Jenkins saw Jacquet secretly in France January 11; only January 17 Observer carried news.) Prill told Minister that he believed Administrator would be willing to discuss subject but that this obviously difficult question for U.S. and that he certain Administrator would wish to discuss with other officials and possibly President before and after meeting British/French. In answer to Prill's question Minister stated that he believed initial agreement should be between governments but that he would have no objection to Boeing or Lockheed making either technical or sales agreements with BAC and SUD. Prill explained normal American competitive practice as affects delivery dates and delivery position and pointed out that the present Concorde/U.S. SST sales relationship followed this pattern, with U.S. airlines leading scramble to be first on both delivery lists. Minister indicated he understood this but felt agreements to delay production of both aircraft until more experience available with sonic boom and proof of prototypes would help both aircraft. Minister confirmed that decision to build only prototypes was worst of both worlds and that they did not intend to follow this course. Minister also made it clear that desire to reach agreement with U.S. on rate of progress was not based upon hope that this would give British another chance to cancel but rather a sincere concern about wisdom of committing money for tooling so long before prototype flight. Minister candidly admitted that initial decision by Labor government to cancel project had been changed by strong French political pressure coupled with obvious French conviction that airplane economically viable. Minister admits there are still many doubters on economic acceptability of airplane. As in U.S., economics and sonic boom are two biggest concerns. Minister related economic capability to five million pounds selling price. He used this figure in a way that indicated at least tentative agreement had been given to this price, recognizing that it would not cover research and development costs, which governments would not expect to recover. No decision taken yet on TSR–2 which, if cancelled, would certainly affect development of Olympus engine. In summary, Embassy believes that if Administrator Halaby willing, he should be prepared to discuss with ministers: 1. Agreed time-table for prototype flying and in particular, delivery dates to carriers. 2. Size, range and speed of aircraft. 3. Sales agreements. 4. Cooperation between Boeing/Lockheed and SUD/BAC. Comment follows. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris. 2 Not found. 3 The British made an announcement in Parliament the next day. The Embassy reported: “Despite sharp questioning, Jenkins was careful not to commit govt. on whether original program would or would not be maintained. Govt. purpose here appears to be to maintain flexibility to adjust course of action in light further discussions with French and possibly US.” (Telegram 3392 from London, January 20; ibid.) Roy Jenkins was U.K. Aviation Minister. 116. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 116. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, January 21, 1965, 7 p.m. 3415. Pass personally Halaby,FAA. Embtel 3350 sent Paris 628. 2 Embassy understands Jenkins proposal 3 as effort to stabilize time schedule Concorde and US SST programs in order to: (A) avoid uneconomic crash programs due competitive pressures, (B) reduce at least near term commitments of UKG and, (C) allow ample time for additional research into sonic boom and economic aspects of SST operations. Jenkins proposal for talks presents two issues for decision by US. First we must decide almost immediately whether to enter into tripartite talks at all on program stabilization. Two views on this point evident—if we can immediately conclude that US has no interest in agreement of this type, it might be better not to enter into discussions which could lead only to failure and frustration. On other hand it would be discourteous and perhaps even more dangerous to assert we will not even talk. US could then be used by UKG as whipping boy in defending accelerated Concorde program to British public. UKG could use similar argument in event failure of talks but impact would be less, particularly if US has well-reasoned position. Second decision USG must ultimately make is long term. Is it in US interest to stabilize respective SST programs so that each side knows where it stands or is US better off maintaining independence and flexibility? US Govt is now subject more pressures for slowdown in Concorde program than either French or US Govts. Key here is whether British, once over temporary economic and financial embarrassment, would be forced forge ahead as fast as possible on Concorde, given presumed French position, if faced with dynamic and unpredictable US SST effort. On strictly competitive considerations, if we conclude that Concorde is faced with unavoidable slowdown due British political and economic realities, might be to US advantage to maintain free hand to adjust US SST program as we see fit. On other hand if we conclude that Concorde timetable inevitably linked with our own (and vice versa) despite temporary UK problems, might be to mutual advantage to stabilize situation by entering into schedule agreement. Aside from competitive considerations, value of stabilizing agreement to US appears primarily related to extent and importance of unknown factors in US program such as sonic boom and economics. If these problems resolved or can be expected to be resolved in good time, then difficult perceive over-riding considerations favoring US acceptance of commitment on timetable which might inhibit production and delivery viable US SST. If determination satisfactory solution these problems still some time away or unpredictable, then rational approach would seem call for some form agreed schedule on both sides. In any event presume that US, if it decides to enter into discussions leading eventually to a schedule agreement, would not accept any arrangement which would increase time gap contemplated by respective original programs. Above views represent our attempt to present Washington with alternatives available as we see them, and we have at this time not made recommendations, but these will follow shortly. 4 Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 Document 115 . 3 U.K. Aviation Minister Jenkins invited Halaby to meet with him and French Minister of Public Works Jacquet in London on February 15. (Memorandum from Johnson to the Acting Secretary, February 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12–7) 4 Document 117 . 117. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 117. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, January 22, 1965, 6 p.m. 3443. Pass personally Halaby,FAA. Embtels 3415 and 3350. 2 Reftel attempted present Washington with alternatives facing US re Jenkins proposal. Embassy views on proposal are along following lines: Believe question SST cooperation must be regarded in wider context than simply aviation. Events of last few months have more than ever involved entire UK Government including PM in SST problem. Assume French Government involvement similar. Result is that reasonable degree of success on Concorde program must be considered important national objective. Failure to achieve this objective, particularly when cause can be ascribed to US intransigence, may well have adverse effect on major US aims vis-à-vis UK and France. For these reasons Embassy believes in over-all US interest to enter into discussions with British and French and reach at least timetable agreement on development respective SSTs. See no particular reason, however, why necessary reach agreement on aircraft characteristics, sales agreements, and industry cooperation (items 2–4 in Embtel 3350) if not sensible from aviation viewpoint. Even on aviation grounds there appears to be some merit in stabilizing respective timetables. Current official target date for Concorde is 1971. Embassy estimates more realistic date for original program is 1972. Without outside competitive pressures consider likely Anglo-French re-examination of details and attempt develop more efficient program would delay completion of program by 1 to 2 years, i.e. to 1973 or 74. On other hand, given US program which UK/Fr might reckon would endanger early lead, governments would attempt keep Concorde as close to original timetable as possible. Embassy doubts that current British efforts to reduce near term commitments would stand in the way of accelerated activity on Concorde if UK/Fr saw time lead slipping away. Washington, of course, in better position evaluate completion date US SST program. All estimates Embassy has seen indicate US SST might be 2–4 years later than Concorde, i.e. 1973–75. Understand anticipated substantial advantages US SST over Concorde such that lag not expected affect materially prospects of US project. However, there seems to be general consensus in US that US should not proceed with production until basic economic and technical problems resolved. Thus, it appears to Embassy that US has much to gain and little to lose by entering into stabilizing agreement. First, we would be in a position to develop and complete a sensible program with adequate time to resolve current difficult problems without looking over our shoulder at the competition. Second, an acceptable time lag position would be assured for the US thus permitting ultimate exploration superior performance of US aircraft. Third, a sensible UK program will permit more effective use of that nation's limited resources, and thus strengthen its role as an important US ally. Embassy notes that Halaby will have only one day with Jenkins during forthcoming FAA/MOA meetings. While this would presumably allow only conceptual exploration of possible agreement, see no reason why details could not be worked out in FAUSST committee. 3 Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Secret. Repeated to Paris. 2 Documents 115 and 116 . 3 Reference is to the French-Anglo-U.S. meeting on SST airworthiness standards. No record of the first meeting, presumably held in January 1965, has been found. Regarding the second meeting, see Document 120 . 118. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Ball to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (Halaby) 118. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Ball to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (Halaby) 1 Washington, February 8, 1965. Dear Mr. Halaby: I refer to the meeting on January 27, 1965, of the Interagency Committee on International Civil Aviation Policy (ICIAP) 2 regarding the invitation extended by the British Minister of Aviation Roy Jenkins that you meet with him and French Minister of Public Works and Transportation Jacquet to discuss supersonic transport aircraft, including the possibility of a tripartite US-UK-French agreement to delay production of both the Concorde and any American supersonic transport. As a result of the above meeting and subsequent discussions by the Department of State with the Department of Defense and your Agency, I authorize you to accept the invitation. I further authorize you to inform the UK and French Ministers that: 1. The United States Government has made no decision as to the next step in its supersonic transport program. 2. As in the past, you would be willing to meet periodically with the British and the French to discuss the status of our supersonic transport program and the technical problems of sonic boom, airport capability, air traffic control and the like. 3. The United States will not tie itself to any time schedule for introducing an American supersonic transport and will not agree to any limitation on its design of the supersonic transport. 4. You are willing to discuss the major technical and economic prospects and difficulties of the United States supersonic transport program and the United Kingdom-French supersonic transport program, emphasizing that at this early stage in the program there is great uncertainty as to many of the major operating and economic characteristics that are achievable. 5. In the event that the United Kingdom and/or France seek United States Government permission to approach American manufacturers for help on the Concorde, they should understand that such matters should be handled directly between the companies involved. Further they should understand that this in no way indicates that they have United States Government approval to obtain any information or assistance from those companies and the usual procedures would apply in this case. 6. If the United Kingdom and French Aviation Ministers make any significant proposals on which the United States position has not been determined, you should indicate that you have no authority to agree but would be happy to report them back to your Government. In the discussions every effort should be made to avoid giving the French representatives any basis for charging that the UK has in any way ceded to US pressure at the expense of European technical and production interests. Sincerely yours, George W. Ball 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12–7. Secret. Drafted by Amstutz (OA/AL) on February 4, and cleared by P. Bogart (AL), Maloy (FAA), Johnson (E), Ferguson (OA), Beigel (WE), Tucker (BNA), and Creel (EUR). 2 No record of this meeting was found. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 119. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 119. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, February 17, 1965, noon. 3959. Deptel 4949. 2 CIVAIR—Tripartite Meeting on SST. US-UK-French meeting on SST held Feb 16 with Messrs. Halaby, Jenkins and Jacquet leading for respective teams. Jenkins opened meeting by outlining recent British review of Concorde project and decision to proceed with determination and speed. Current schedule called for first prototype 1967, certification in 1970 and service inauguration in 1971/72. He asked Halaby if he could give current status of US program. Halaby emphasized govt interest in safety, operational and economic requirements. He was pleased to learn that UK proceeding vigorously with environmental tests. Three unknowns in this area inter alia: (1) Public acceptability sonic boom, (2) noise at airports, and (3) atmospheric temperature conditions. US has been studying SST for 8 years at cost of $110 million. In addition safety and environmental factors, US has been working at economics proposed SST operation in light of current and projected subsonic developments. US program still not established although President expected make decision in next 90 days to do one of following: Terminate, study further, or construct prototype. USG had no time schedule established but US industry had made preliminary estimates that, subject to early decision, prototype could be built by 1968, certification in 1972, with service inauguration some time later. Characteristics US SST—gross weight 500,000 lbs., L:D ratio 8.9, approximate transonic over-pressure 2 lbs., cruise over-pressure 1.5 lbs., cruising altitude 55 to 75 thousand feet, Mach 2.6 to 3, capacity 200 to 250, and operating cost equal current jets. Material would be titanium and new engine would be required. Jenkins noted vast expense SST projects and big govt investment. This demanded govt responsibility ensure economic program. Although in past UK/France had hoped collaboration with US possible, now appeared evident joint development and construction not practical. Nevertheless he felt useful maintain contact on respective schedules. At moment he had no precise proposals but was expressing only general ideas. Halaby agreed not feasible at present reconsider joint construction; this question really determined by UK/French decision to proceed with Concorde. USG position had always been that respective companies could discuss and work out any arrangements not inconsistent with respective statutes. In fact manufacturers had consulted earlier but could not agree on basic concepts. US did not consider situation involved competitive race but attempt to cooperate on safety and economics. He estimated total investment, operation and maintenance cost of SST program worldwide would be 75 to 100 billion dollars by 1990. Impossible to exaggerate importance of sonic boom acceptability which could easily spell difference between profit and loss. Agreed useful to keep in touch on time scale but could not tie US time schedule to Concorde as limited US design on this account. He would be willing consult UK/French further after President's decision as suggested by Jenkins and Jacquet. Jenkins appreciated this response and indicated UK/France would welcome ideas on proceeding faster with sonic boom studies. Halaby indicated in US view UK/French work on sonic boom so far was largely theoretical. What was needed were practical sonic boom tests to determine public acceptability in UK and on continent. Heretofore aircraft have been built first and acceptability determined later. This not possible with SST. US will do everything possible assist UK/France in environmental studies but substantial info so far provided by US with very little forthcoming from other side. Even if President decides to terminate it was desirable to pursue environmental studies. Jenkins felt group had moved as far as possible at the moment and UK/France would expect to hear further from US after Presidential decision. Jacquet's participation largely consisted of indication general support for position advanced by Jenkins who had been selected as UK/French spokesman. 3 Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Confidential. Repeated to Paris. 2 Dated February 3. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 4714 from Paris, February 18, also reported on this meeting. It reads: “It is interesting note that favorite French theme on possible US cooperation with UK and France on SST did not appear during tripartite talks Feb 16 in London. As previously reported by Embassy, this theme has been: 'Let us agree UK and France build Concorde, US produce bigger, faster and longer range SST and in effect divide the world market.'” At a luncheon, the French stated their rationale for proceeding with Concorde more clearly than ever before: “Old World cannot be left behind. The Concorde is technically feasible. We can do it, we will do it. And we must maintain our aeronautical research, development and production capability.” (Ibid.) 120. Editorial Note 120. Editorial Note The second meeting of the FAUSST group, held in Washington February 1–5, 1965, discussed air frames, atmosphere, and the sonic boom. In a report dated June 10, an economic officer observed: “I attended part of one session on the SST. The FAA summarized some of the results of the Oklahoma City and White Sands sonic boom tests. The data on community reaction in Oklahoma City is now being analyzed by the National Academy of Science. A report will be prepared on the community reaction. From casual observation, the FAA felt that there had not been any significant reaction to the booms by the populace of Oklahoma City and FAA did not know of any physiological damage.” (Memorandum for the files by Mary Irene Pett, June 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3) On May 7 the Federal Aviation Agency released its reports on the sonic boom studies. It noted that “over 80 per cent of those questioned, when informed of the SST plans of the British, French and Russians, expressed the opinion to opinion researchers that the U.S. should proceed with developing an SST.” Nonetheless, “Substantial numbers of residents reported interference with ordinary living activities and annoyance with such interruptions, but the overwhelming majority felt they could learn to live with the numbers and kinds of booms experienced during the six month study.” However, the report continued, “the acceptance of the booms fell from about 90 per cent of those residents of Oklahoma City interviewed during the first weeks of the program to about 75 per cent of a comparable sample of the population during the final weeks.” (Circular airgram CA–11884, May 7; ibid., AV 12–7 US) On July 1, at the swearing in of the new Administrator of the FAA, President Johnson said that he had received the second interim report of the SST Advisory Committee and that it had recommended a move forward “at the fastest possible rate consistent with the goals that I have outlined.” The President said that he would be requesting $140 million over 18 months for SST development. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, page 714) 121. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 121. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, October 22, 1965, 1937Z. 1840. Advance indications are that Plowden Report, 2 which now in revised draft stage, expected to be published latter part November, will make strong recommendation for increased cooperation with France and rest of Europe and aerospace field. Report will contend that cooperation with US difficult if not impossible and attempt to do so would result in demise substantial part of UK aerospace industry. Report has important politico/military implications for US which will be commented on fully when report published. Of significance at moment, however, are indications we have received that Plowden Report appears be based to great extent on untested assumptions, loose general analysis and inadequate statistical base. Report will lack rigorous analysis and economic-military back up data which should be essential in major report of this kind. Final review of draft report by Plowden Committee now going on. Embassy understands there may be minority of Plowden Committee which does not support conclusions of majority and which may, therefore, release minority report which may call for cooperation with US as well as continent. Embassy believes that in this final review serious weakness in Plowden Report due to lack of sound analytical base may be called to attention of the committee by the minority. Believe minority hand in review would be strengthened by having example of sort of analysis in depth typified by recent DOD economic study of SST if it could be made available. 3 While Embassy suggests that ultimate release of SST report would be useful to British and French in terms Concorde project, its use in context of Plowden Report would be primarily to dramatize what seem to be major deficiencies in Plowden Report. Since Plowden Committee review expected to be completed next week imperative that immediate decision on this proposal be forthcoming. 4 Please advise. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12–7 US. Confidential. Repeated to Paris for USRO and the Embassy and to the Department of Defense for McNaughton and Enthoven. 2 Not found. 3 Not found. 4 On November 11 Willis Armstrong, Minister for Economic Affairs at the Embassy in London, reported that he had called on Minister of Aviation Roy Jenkins and had given him two copies of the Defense Department paper entitled “The Limited Market for Concorde.” “I also observed that in giving it to him we were not attempting to 'shoot down the Concorde.' I told him simply that the Embassy had been acquainted with a study of SST problems being made by the Defense Department, and that we had asked for permission to give to the British Government whatever our authorities in Washington thought suitable, and this was the result.” Armstrong told Jenkins that the paper had “some extremely interesting methodology” and thought that perhaps he might want to pass a copy to the Plowden Committee. (Airgram A–1120 from London, November 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12–7) 122. Memorandum of Conversation 122. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 8, 1965. SUBJECT Proposed U.S. Airworthiness Certification of the Concorde PARTICIPANTS Mr. Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Telecommunications Mr. Charles O. Cary, Assistant Administrator, International Aviation Affairs, FAA Mr. George S. Moore, Director, Flight Standards Service, Federal Aviation Agency Mr. Richard S. Sliff, Assistant Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Division, FAA Mr. Hobart Luppi, Aviation Liaison Division, Department of State Mr. J. Bruce Amstutz, Aviation Liaison Division, Department of State The meeting was held at the Federal Aviation Agency on October 8, 1965, at the request of Mr. Loy for the purpose of discussing the problems involved in issuing a United States airworthiness certificate on the Concorde. Mr. Loy referred to FAA Administrator McKee's letter of September 22, 1965, addressed to Under Secretary Mann, in which problems associated with type certification of the Concorde were briefly discussed. 2 Mr. Loy said he was particularly concerned that, in order to minimize possible political repercussions, the British and the French be quickly and fully informed of any perceived deficiencies in the Concorde which might possibly prevent issuance of a United States type certification. The FAA group explained that the Concorde represented a substantial advance in design and technology over the existing generation of aircraft and therefore new airworthiness standards had to be drafted for this aircraft. The FAA was in this regard concerned solely with safety and was worried about certain features of the Concorde such as cockpit visibility and design. The FAA group further explained that on the basis of the information it had available it probably would not be able to issue an airworthiness (Type) certificate for the Concorde unless some substantial changes were made on the aircraft. The refusal of the US to certificate the Concorde would not represent a violation of the US–UK bilateral airworthiness air agreement, for the agreement accorded wide latitude to the parties in the certification of each other's civil aircraft. Furthermore, should the United Kingdom and France certificate the plane, the United States would not stop it from being operated by foreign air carriers to and from the United States. The refusal of the FAA to grant a United States certificate would only affect use of the Concorde by US carriers. However, in view of the probable limited world market for the Concorde (only 50 have been ordered on option, 21 by US carriers) a refusal by the US to issue an airworthiness certificate could very well cripple the Concorde program. The Anglo-French SST people are generally aware of the areas where the FAA is having problems regarding the Concorde. They know this from the two tripartite technical SST meetings which have been held. (These tripartite meetings are referred to as FAUSST meetings; “FAUSST” stands for French-Anglo-US meeting on SST airworthiness standards.) Moreover, the FAA has already issued two SST airworthiness standards publications: the “Red Book” of 1961, and the “Blue Book” of 1963. By early November, the FAA expects to issue its latest version which would be called the “White Book.” It is FAA's intention to send copies of the “White Book” to the British and French. Also, in November, the FAA team responsible for certification is to tour UK and French SST facilities, after which the FAA should have a better understanding of Concorde characteristics which might make United States certification difficult. The FAA is to meet with the UK and France at FAUSST meetings in December 1965 and February 1966, and an Anglo-French team will be coming to the US in March to submit an application to the FAA for a preliminary type certificate. It is FAA's thinking that sometime after the February 1966 FAUSST meeting, the FAA should officially inform the UK and France of our reservations, perhaps by means of a letter from George S. Moore (FAA) to his UK and French counterparts. Mr. Loy requested that, after the FAA team returns from Europe in November, the FAA inform us promptly of its views so we can determine how this matter should be brought to the attention of the UK and France. Any airworthiness standards set by the FAA which would restrict use of the Concorde by US airlines would be bound to have undesirable political effects. It is imperative, therefore, that we officially inform the UK and France at the earliest feasible moment of any difficulties foreseen by the FAA. The FAA said it would be in touch with the Department upon the group's return. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Amstutz and Luppi. Copies were sent to J. Starkey (BNA), Beigel (WE), Leddy (EUR), and A. Caswell (E). 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 123. Letter From the Assistant Administrator for International Aviation Affairs, Federal Aviation Agency (Cary) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) 123. Letter From the Assistant Administrator for International Aviation Affairs, Federal Aviation Agency (Cary) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) 1 Washington, December 14, 1965. Dear Frank: As you know, there are periodic meetings of the French-Anglo-U.S.-Supersonic Transport (FAUSST) Group; the latest, FAUSST III, has just concluded in London. 2 Actually, there are no formal agenda for these meetings, but merely topics to be discussed. These topics fall within the terms of reference of the Group and are enclosed for your information. 3 Our Assistant Administrator for Europe-Africa-Middle East recently held informal discussions with both the French and British, who originated the discussions, on the desirability of inviting the USSR to participate in future FAUSST meetings. The French and British believe this might be desirable because: 1. The Soviets are probably already getting all of our joint regulatory proposals. 2. We may learn more of their thinking. 3. They will be operating their SST in Western European airspace. 4. They seem to have a genuine interest in improving the airworthiness of their designs. Both French and British representatives indicated that while they favor inclusion of the Russians, at least to a limited degree, they have not discussed the proposal with the Soviets and have no idea of Russian reaction. We know relatively little about USSR development in the SST field, and it is possible that if the Soviets participated objectively, we might not only learn something of their development, but they might also contribute something of value to the mutual effort. If it is eventually agreed that the Soviets are to be invited to participate in the meetings, it will, of course, have to be under controlled conditions. They should be active participants and not just observers as they presently are at various ICAO meetings. Our representatives just returned from FAUSST III are available for discussions if you wish. Inasmuch as the proposal presented by the French and British raises policy issues beyond the authority of this Agency to decide, we would appreciate your reaction to this proposal before any further action is taken. Sincerely, Charlie 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text reads, “RMIR Files. Letter drafted in reply by AL—Amstutz 2–17–66.” 2 The third tripartite session was held December 6–14 in London. A record of the discussion is airgram A–1400 from London, December 16. (Ibid., AV 12–7) 3 Not printed. 124. Memorandum of Conversation 124. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 28, 1966. SUBJECT Visit of Stephen Enke, DOD, to France and the UK Regarding Supersonic Transport Matters PARTICIPANTS Dr. Stephen Enke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of European Affairs Stanley Harris, European Integration Affairs (EUR/RPE) J. Bruce Amstutz, Aviation Liaison Division (E/OA/AL) Dr. Enke stated that the letter of January 21, 1966, from Stanley Cleveland in Embassy Paris was a good description but not a complete one of his talks in Paris. 2 The objective of his visit to the Department of State was to relate further what took place in Paris and London. Dr. Enke stated that Mr. Vergnaud, Director of Transport (Civil Aviation), expressed interest in a tripartite agreement among the US-UK-France to delay the introduction of the Concorde and the US SST. Mr. Vergnaud said, however, that in view of the rebuff from the U.S. of February 1965, the ball was in the US court to take any initiative. Dr. Enke suggested to Mr. Vergnaud that he might wish to raise the subject with the two private members of the President's SST Advisory Committee, Eugene R. Black and Stanley de J. Osborne, when they pass through Paris in the near future. Dr. Enke added that the French also continued to be interested in a share-the-market agreement whereby the Concorde would be developed to serve shorter distances than the US SST. In London, Dr. Enke held discussions with various UK Ministry of Aviation and Treasury officials. It was clear to him from these talks that some British officials were unhappy about the UK being associated with the Concorde. They believed that UK participation was a basically political decision to facilitate future British entry into the EEC. To withdraw from the project might result in about a $500 million indemnity to France. Mr. Schaetzel said he was skeptical that UK participation in the Concorde project was political. He suspected that the project appeals to UK and aircraft manufacturers who fear further contraction of the British aviation industry. Dr. Enke stated that the British appeared also to be quite interested in a tripartite extension agreement but said, like Mr. Vergnaud, that any initiative would have to come from the US in view of the decision of February 1965. Dr. Enke believed that the British would be pleased to stretch out the Concorde program to lessen the annual financial commitment for R&D funds and to gain time to produce a better aircraft. Dr. Enke suggested to the British that if they were interested in a tripartite agreement, they raise the question privately with Mr. Black and Mr. Osborne during their visits to London. Dr. Enke said that his interest in seeing a tripartite agreement concluded was based on his conviction that a better US SST and a better Concorde would be built if several more years were allowed for their development. He felt that the schedules of the SST development programs on both sides of the Atlantic were much too fast to produce economical aircraft. Mr. Schaetzel asked if Dr. Enke could prepare and send the Department an economic study and justification for a tripartite agreement. 3 Dr. Enke said he would do so. Mr. Schaetzel said that when it was received, the Department would study it and let him know its views. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12–1 US. Confidential. Drafted by Amstutz on February 15. 2 Not found. 3 Not found. 125. Memorandum of Conversation 125. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 8, 1966. SUBJECT The Concorde and the US SST PARTICIPANTS Brigadier General Jewell C. Maxwell, Deputy Administrator for Supersonic Transport Development Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Economic Affairs J. Bruce Amstutz, Aviation Liaison Division, Department of State Mr. Loy said that the purpose of his meeting with General Maxwell was to gain further insight into the US SST program and to obtain the General's views regarding Dr. Stephen Enke's (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense) proposal for a tripartite US-UK-France agreement to delay commercial introduction of the Concorde and the US SST. 2 For purposes of perspective, General Maxwell said that the Concorde was expected to make its first prototype flight in 1968 and to be in commercial operation in 1971. The first flight of the US SST prototype was expected to take place in 1970 with commercial deliveries in 1974 at the earliest. There was a good possibility, however, that the US SST would not be ready for commercial service until 1976 or thereabouts. General Maxwell added that a unique feature of the US SST development schedule was the overlapping of the prototype, certification, and production phases. This is not the normal way civil aircraft are built. All three phases would overlap in 1970, and the certification and production phases would continue to overlap for three and a half more years. This overlapping of phases, with the many retoolings that will be required, promises to be very expensive. The full 4-year certification and production stage will cost $1 to $2 billion, bringing the total bill for the US SST (together with R&D costs) to $3 to $4 billion. This overlapping of phases is a consequence of a decision of the President's Advisory Committee which calls for: go slow now; accelerate later. Elimination of this overlapping of phases would result in an extension of the time necessary to develop a US SST. This would suggest that the FAA was in favor of Dr. Enke's proposal for a tripartite agreement. On the contrary, the FAA was against it. The idea of a tripartite agreement was raised and discussed last fall during a meeting of the President's Advisory Committee and was not adopted. It was discussed again most recently, a few days ago, between FAA Administrator General McKee and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Both agreed the proposal should not be pursued. General Maxwell said that the FAA was opposed to an agreement for several reasons. First, the FAA did not believe that the US was in a good bargaining position or could ever get the UK and France to delay introducing the Concorde. The builders of the Concorde were well aware of the time advantage they enjoyed over the US SST and may be cognizant that the 3-year lead time they now have could stretch to 5 years. They would be foolish to delay introducing their plane. Secondly, even if negotiations could be concluded successfully to delay introduction of the Concorde, FAA would oppose this for fear of the adverse appropriations effect this would have on Congress. Congress would be sure to learn of any attempt to delay introduction of the Concorde and US SST and would probably react by cutting FAA's annual requests for SST development funds. Any cut this year and for the next few years, when we are already in a slow stage, would be particularly unfortunate. In any case, it is hard to believe Congress would not try to stretch out its appropriations, with the effect that at the end of the extended period, the US SST would not be any more ready for service than under the present plan. It is thus doubtful that a more efficient US SST would end up being built by negotiating a stretch-out agreement. Thirdly, this year, 1966, is not the most advantageous time to negotiate with the UK and France. If we were to decide to negotiate, it would best be done in 1968. At that time, the UK and France will be faced with the decision of moving into their expensive production phase costing $1 billion or more. Similarly, the US would be at the point of requesting large appropriations for the first year of the overlapping phases mentioned above. Both sides and the three national legislatures involved would be faced with the need for very large sums and thus might be more amenable to some stretch-out agreement. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 12. Confidential. Drafted by Amstutz on February 15. 2 See Document 124 . 126. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (McKee) to Vice President Humphrey 126. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (McKee) to Vice President Humphrey 1 Washington, March 15, 1966. SUBJECT Establishment of National Urgency Position for United States Supersonic Transport Program The establishment of the United States Supersonic Transport Program as one of the highest national urgency is considered necessary at this time if the United States is to maintain a reasonable international competitive position. The maintenance of test and prototype construction schedules require the provision of the DX industrial priority rating in the following critical areas: (a) Shortage category test facilities (b) Long lead time numerically controlled and shortage category machine tools (c) The processing of requirements for standard machine tools through the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center (d) Material procurement (e) Electronics (f) Forgings and extrusions The total SST Program through the planned delivery and flight test evaluation of two prototype aircraft represents an estimated expenditure of $1.3 billion through 1970. In accordance with existing procedures, the Federal Aviation Agency has coordinated this request with the Secretary of Defense and has received his indication of favorable support. Favorable consideration by the National Aeronautics and Space Council and your subsequent recommendation to the President, as Chairman, is most respectfully requested. William F. McKee 1 Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. No classification marking. 127. National Security Action Memorandum No. 344 127. National Security Action Memorandum No. 344 1 Washington, April 1, 1966. TO The Vice President The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency Director, Bureau of the Budget Director, Office of Emergency Planning SUBJECT Assignment of Highest National Priority to the Civil Supersonic Development Program Under the authority vested in me by the Defense Production Act of 1950, I hereby assign the highest national priority to the Civil Supersonic Transport Development Program for research and development and for construction of two prototype aircraft, in accordance with the unanimous recommendation of the Members of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3. No classification marking. 128. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) to the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (Crooker) 128. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) to the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (Crooker) 1 Washington, March 22, 1968. Dear Mr. Chairman: At our meeting on March 14 concerning the US-Brazil negotiations, 2 the Board invited the Department's comments on a proposal to undertake a study on the probable impact of the 747 and SST aircraft on our international aviation relations. 3 The Department believes that such a study is indeed needed. We have, in fact, felt for some time that it would be desirable to look in depth into the question of the impact of aviation technological advances on U.S. international air transport policy and we had already given some preliminary thought to the question. It has been evident that, while much work has been done on the technical and economic characteristics of the 747 and SST, little or no study has been directed toward the effect which the introduction of these aircraft will have on the whole range of our international aviation policy. We should have a clear idea of what the impact will be, not only to plan for resolution of any problems when these advanced aircraft are introduced, but also to respond to foreign pressures for advance assurances of one sort or another, such as in the Brazilian situation. We believe that the General Counsel's memorandum of March 7, 4 which was made available to us, provides a general outline of the scope and purpose of such a study. We offer the following comments either in amplification of or in addition to that memorandum: 1. We agree that attention should be directed toward an appraisal of the introduction of jet aircraft in the late 1950's and 60's. For example, it would be instructive to review the expectations which then existed and whether these expectations proved to be correct or not. Identification of the problems that arose and their causes would be desirable, as well as a review of how these problems were resolved. While there may be differences between this situation and the situation with respect to the introduction of the 747 and SST, some valuable lessons might be learned. 2. Although the question is most simply put in terms of 747 and SST, we suggest that the study focus attention also on the stretched versions of current aircraft. Also, it may be necessary to differentiate among these various categories, since it does not necessarily follow that the situations with respect to the stretched aircraft, the 747, and the SST will be the same. In fact, there may be significant differences among these situations. 3. The possibility of arrangements (such as financing, leasing, or cooperative arrangements) for foreign carrier use of these aircraft certainly deserves close attention, since this may be a means of resolving the foreign competitive impact problem. 4. The fare question also is crucial. Perhaps a case can be made that, since the 747 is expected to have a lower cost per seat mile than present aircraft, there should be a discount on the fares. On the other hand, there may be pressures for a fare surcharge to reduce the competitive impact. Perhaps advance planning can avoid the prospect of having to decide between basically irreconcilable alternatives. 5. The impact of the new aircraft on capacity is perhaps the most critical question for U.S. air transport negotiations. We need to know, first of all, when and where the new aircraft will be used and the extent to which these services will replace existing services. The impact in these particular markets at the indicated times will then have to be determined, based on several sets of assumptions on the state of the market at the time. The Department welcomes the proposal that the Board undertake this study. In view of our very close interest in the subject, we would like to have the opportunity of participating in review of the study at appropriate stages and of contributing in any way we can to a useful end-product. Sincerely yours, Frank E. Loy 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12–7 US. No classification marking. Drafted by M. Styles (E/AN). 2 The United States and Brazil were negotiating a bilateral air transport agreement, February 15–March 18; the agreement was concluded in July 1968. 3 Not found; historians at the FAA speculate that the study was never undertaken. 4 Not found. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Loy signed the original. 129. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for International Affairs and Special Programs (Agger) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) 129. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for International Affairs and Special Programs (Agger) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Loy) 1 Washington, April 10, 1968. Dear Frank: I think we will need some fairly intensive consultations (including consultations with you), and plenty of careful thought before definitive conclusions can be reached on the points raised in your March 15 letter 2 concerning the Concorde noise question. We are also well aware here in DOT that the question and its many ramifications have to be brought in hand soon. Our preliminary information (confirming your understanding) is that the Concorde will be very noisy, reaching levels significantly beyond those we contemplate as standards of tolerance for noise control purposes. Unfortunately, we will not have a fully adequate basis for decisions until we obtain the noise level measurements to be made in connection with the Concorde flight tests. There is no substitute for such data in assessing how the Concorde will really sound in various stages of take-off or landing, and in different modes of operation. We expect to have such information shortly after the forthcoming tests, and our technical authorities here have every confidence (given past experience with their French and British counterparts) that the data will be timely, reliable, and complete. Data should also be available during the early phases of flight testing to permit considering the related and equally if not more difficult question of the sonic boom. Meanwhile, it is obvious that the noise/sonic boom question, coming ripe with the approach of an operational Concorde, is a web of technical, legal, social, economic, and political issues. It is being undertaken here in DOT to put these many aspects into some coherent form, because that kind of understanding will be essential for any decision about the admissibility of aircraft; the conditions (such as speeds, times, routings, or operational modes) to be applied to their flights; and the distribution of responsibility (e.g., as between the DOT and local airport authorities) for various parts of our solutions. We recognize that the overall problem also contains important international factors, and that these must be taken into account. I look forward to discussing these aspects with you very soon. I think it might also be worthwhile if you would indicate a point-of-contact in your office with whom we might be in touch as the DOT work on this problem proceeds. Sincerely, Donald G. Agger 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 6 US. No classification marking. 2 These points included: “From various sources of late, we understand that the Concorde engines may or will be very noisy. If so, we could have some rather severe problems at the United States airports where these planes will be operated.” (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Water for Peace Water for Peace 130. Editorial Note 131. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, June 22, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, 6/1/64–2/9/65, Vols. 5–8. Secret. 132. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson Washington, July 9, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 359, Office of Science and Technology,OST Administrative History, Volume II—Documentary Supplement, Box 5, E—Water Resources. No classification marking. 133. Memorandum for the Record Washington, July 9, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 359, Office of Science and Technology, OST Administrative History, Volume II-Documentary Supplement, E—Water Resources, Box 5. No classification marking. 134. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 2, 1964. Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 71 D 483. Unclassified. Drafted by Pollack and cleared by Jernegan. 135. Editorial Note 136. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, December 9, 1964. Source: Department of Energy, Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretariat Files, RD–1 Desalination Program. No classification marking. According to a December 10 memorandum from Pollack to Komer, Rusk sent an identical letter to the Department of the Interior and letters excluding the second paragraph to AID, Bureau of the Budget, and OST. (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 67 D 132) The State Department position on this issue is discussed in a memorandum from Kretzmann to Llewellyn Thompson plus enclosures, October 28, ibid.: Lot 78 D 483. 137. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 18, 1965. Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 71 D 483. Limited Official Use. Drafted by William C. Salmon (SCI). Copies were sent to George Ball, Thomas Mann, Llewellyn Thompson, and William Crockett. 138. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 30, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Nuclear Desalting of Water (Nuclear Power), 3 of 3. Confidential. 139. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Joyce) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 3, 1965. Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Joseph Rosa (SCI), William Salmon (SCI), and Pollack; and cleared by Richard Cooper (E) and John Wilkes (AID). Copies were sent to Ball, Mann, and Thompson. 140. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) Washington, September 14, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FO 7/1–FO 7/5, Box 53. No classification marking. 141. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, International Atomic Energy Agency. Confidential. Copies were sent to Schultze, Hornig, Rowen, and Charles Johnson. 142. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. 1. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Komer and Keeny. 143. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Schultze) to the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) Washington, September 23, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, FO 7/1–FO 7/5. Confidential. The handwritten phrase “Keep where can get fast” is at the top of the document. 144. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 20, 1965. Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152. Unclassified. Drafted by Salmon. Copies were sent to Ball, Mann, Thompson, and Sisco (IO). 145. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff and the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) Washington, February 16, 1966. Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. No classification marking. 146. Letter From Jerome Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to President Johnson Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 28, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Nuclear Desalting of Water (Nuclear Power), 1 of 3. No classification marking. Wiesner was Kennedy's Science Adviser. 147. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, May 21, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. 148. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 30, 1966, 2:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. 1. Secret. 149. Editorial Note 150. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 10, 1966. Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. No classification marking. Drafted by Lightner (SCI) and Pollack and cleared by Kotschnig (IO). Also sent to U. Alexis Johnson. 151. Editorial Note 152. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 12, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. 153. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of the Interior Udall to President Johnson Washington, August 31, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, E 11. No classification marking. 154. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to the President's Special Assistant (Califano) Washington, September 17, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald Hornig, Box 4. No classification marking. 155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 19, 1966, 9:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. No classification marking. 156. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, October 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Water for Peace (2 of 2). No classification marking. Copies were sent to Cater and Califano. An October 15 covering memorandum from Rostow to the President reads: “I think Don Hornig is right. If you can possibly persuade the Speaker to reverse his judgment when you see him today you will be saved a quite substantial international embarrassment.” 157. Editorial Note 158. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) Washington, December 6, 1966. Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. No classification marking. Drafted by Nelson Sievering, Jr. (SCI) 159. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 22, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Water for Peace, Vol. 1. No classification marking. A covering memorandum from Rostow to the President reports the concurrence of Rusk, Udall, Hornig, and Schultze, and recommends signature. Johnson checked the “approved” line on Rostow's memorandum and wrote “Who do we get to run this?” next to it. 160. Editorial Note 161. Editorial Note 162. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council's Special Committee on the Middle East Crisis (Bundy) Washington, June 7, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, C. Johnson Memos, Box 5. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Bromley Smith. 163. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 13, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Desalination. Confidential. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. A handwritten note on the source text reads “to Bator per our conversation.” 164. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 19, 1967, 7:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee, #2, July 1, 1967–July 31, 1967 [2 of 2]. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Harold Saunders. 165. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson Washington, July 26, 1967, 3:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, NSC Special Committee, #2, July 1, 1967–July 31, 1967 [1 of 2]. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Rostow and Bundy. 166. Memorandum From Admiral Lewis J. Strauss to Former President Eisenhower Undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Box 21. No classification marking. The source text is a copy of the memorandum that Strauss gave to former President Eisenhower on June 23, which the White House did not receive until July 27 when Hornig met with Strauss (see footnote 4, Document 165). An attached cover letter from Strauss to Hornig, July 28, reads: “This is a legible copy of the memorandum we discussed yesterday and which you wanted to show to the President. I hope to follow it up on Monday [July 31] with a memorandum in the brief form that you thought might be acceptable with the cost and other calculations 'omitting the tables.' I very much enjoyed my talk with you and Dr. Smith.” No memorandum of July 31 by Strauss has been found. 167. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council's Special Committee on the Middle East Crisis (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, July 28, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Desalination. Secret. Sent through Rostow. 168. Editorial Note 169. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 1, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Secret. Copies were sent to John Walsh, Alan Novak, Lucius Battle, and Robert Woodward. A handwritten note by Saunders next to their names reads: “I'll send these as a means of spelling out the problem after we've talked.” 170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 9, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Confidential. 171. Editorial Note 172. Letter From the Coordinator of the Israeli Power and Desalting Project (Woods) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Lisbon, August 28, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Personal and Confidential. A covering memorandum from Saunders to Rostow, September 20, reads: “As you will see on rereading the attached, George Woods has come around to the view that we should put aside much of our effort to make the Israeli desalting plant look economical and frankly admit that it would be a research and development project. He is even thinking about the possibility of an Indus type international consortium to finance such experimentation. This fresh approach is probably healthy although the economic work is still necessary, since we will have to determine costs whatever we do. The operational question is whether the time has come to put this up to the President as a recommendation and to begin discussing procedures with the Israelis so that the President might frame a proposal for Congress in their departing legislative program.” 173. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 29, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, E 11–3 ISRAEL. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Dean Peterson and T. Childs (M/WP) and cleared by Davies (NEA), Torbert (H), Gaud (AID), and Pollack. 174. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, December 18, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Confidential; Exdis. 130. Editorial Note 130. Editorial Note In 1963 the Kennedy administration began negotiations on a proposal for the peaceful use of nuclear energy to fuel desalination plants in regions lacking fresh drinking water. Under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and 10 other nations, including Israel and Tunisia, met twice to discuss the proposal. (Circular telegram 1474, February 11, 1964; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AE 6) President Johnson signaled his strong interest in the project and his belief that science would play an increasingly central role in international affairs on February 6, 1964, in a speech delivered at the 18th annual dinner of the Weizmann Institute of Science in New York. The President announced that the United States and Israel had begun negotiations “on cooperative research in using nuclear energy to turn salt water into fresh water.” He acknowledged the technical difficulties inherent in the problem, but noted that “the opportunities are so vast and the stakes are so high that it is worth all of our efforts and worth all of our energy, for water means life, and water means opportunity, and water means prosperity for those who never knew the meaning of those words. Water can banish hunger and can reclaim the desert and change the course of history.” Johnson also said that the United States was equally ready to cooperate through the IAEA with other countries anxious to cure water shortages. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, pages 270–272) The Soviet Union was one of the first nations to express interest in working with the United States on desalination. On April 30 McGeorge Bundy wrote the President acknowledging that there might be opposition to cooperation in such a sensitive area, but that “our judgment is that this one can be handled in such a way that in this case the criticism should be manageable. We are not dealing with highly classified materials, and the object is one of cooperation in which with any luck both sides would gain.” (Memorandum to the President, April 30; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Box 1) Correspondence between Johnson and Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev on this issue is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, Volume XI, Documents 22 - 24 and 26 . Planning for the desalination project with Israel proceeded. In a toast on June 1, during Prime Minister Eshkol's visit to Washington, President Johnson said: “Mr. Prime Minister, you told me only this morning that water was blood for Israel. So we shall make a joint attack on Israel's water shortage through the highly promising technique of desalting. Indeed, let us hope that this technique will bring benefit to all of the peoples of the parched Middle East.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book I, page 732) 131. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 131. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 22, 1964. The Soviet Government agreed today to our proposal that, as an initial step in exploring the possibility of U.S.-Soviet cooperation on methods of desalting sea water, a meeting of U.S. and Soviet representatives should be held in Washington on 14–15 July. The Soviets proposed that both countries concurrently release statements announcing the meeting at noon tomorrow. We have asked that the release would be advanced to 10:30 a.m. tomorrow for your press conference and will assume this is acceptable unless we hear to the contrary from the Soviets. 2 Ambassador Dobrynin has been shown the attached draft press release and has promised to give Ambassador Thompson a copy of their release this evening. 3 The proposal for scientific cooperation on desalting was originally made by Premier Khruschev in one of his oral messages dealing with the nuclear cutback. 4 You indicated interest in the proposal and the Soviets have pursued the idea vigorously, emphasizing the use of nuclear power as the source of energy. It is not yet clear whether the Soviets are really interested in desalting which is a serious technical problem quite aside from nuclear power or whether their real interest lies either in the possibility of technical discussions on large nuclear reactors or of simply associating themselves with us in this activity which they may feel has far reaching significance in certain areas of the world such as the Near East. In the latter connection, you should recall that we have recently entered into a cooperative agreement with Israel and that we have a continuing program with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 5 It is intended that this preliminary meeting will help clarify these questions and provide a basis for deciding how far we can go with the Soviets in a cooperative enterprise without jeopardizing our other commitments in this area. Finally, there is a problem of internal U.S. Government organization on the desalting problem. Technically, desalting is the responsibility of the Department of Interior; however, the Atomic Energy Commission has the responsibility for the development of nuclear reactors that would probably be used in any very large scale projects and has the technical manpower and funds that would be required to pursue this project on a large scale. In order to coordinate the activities of these agencies, it was decided to make Dr. Hornig the responsible officer for this activity and he has agreed to serve as Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the preliminary meeting. This procedure and the attached press release have been agreed to by Dr. Hornig, Dr. Seaborg, and Secretary Udall. 6 McGeorge Bundy 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, 6/1/64–2/9/65, Vols. 5–8. Secret. 2 Johnson announced the agreement at his June 23 press conference. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book I, p. 804) 3 Not printed. 4 Khrushchev made the proposal in a February 28 message to the President; see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XI, Document 15 . 5 See Document 130 . 6 The U.S. representatives were Hornig, Kenneth Holum (Interior), Seaborg (AEC), James Ramey (AEC), John Calhoun (Interior), Ragnar Rollefson (State), and C.F. MacGowan (Interior). (White House Press Release, July 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 359, Office of Science and Technology, OST Administrative History, E—Water Resources) 7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 132. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 132. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 9, 1964. Next Tuesday 2 I shall begin discussions with the Russians to explore the possibility of cooperation in the development of means for the large scale desalting of water. I am anxious, before these talks begin, to discuss the desalting problem with you in order a) to reflect your attitude in the talks and b) to apprise you of problems in our domestic program and to propose that we commit ourselves firmly to an orderly program aimed at large scale desalting. The present situation, in a nut shell, is this: 1. The interagency study carried out under the leadership of my office concluded that using very large, dual-purpose, nuclear heat sources, fresh water could be produced from sea water at selected sites at a cost which makes it competitive for municipal and industrial (but not general irrigation) purposes. 3 It was estimated that such plants could be in operation by 1975–1980. 2. The plant envisaged would produce about 500 million gallons per day. The largest distillation plant we have yet built produces somewhat more than one million gallons per day. Therefore, a large research and development effort on distillation technology is needed before success can be achieved. 3. The plants envisaged would require nuclear reactors some 3 times bigger than we have yet built. Reactor technology is therefore relatively more advanced than distillation technology. 4. At the present time the Office of Saline Water in Interior has a research and development budget of about $10 million per year and is moving methodically forward but has no systematic development plans aimed at large scale desalting plants. The situation about which I am concerned is that on the basis of the favorable prognosis by our report we have offered to share our technology internationally, and in particular have committed ourselves to cooperation with Israel. We are about to enter discussions with the Soviet Union. Yet, we have no clear internal commitment to proceed down the road toward large scale desalting plants. I urge, therefore, that in general terms we do commit ourselves to such a development and that the AEC and Department of the Interior be instructed to prepare an imaginative plan to do so. I shall be glad to play whatever role you desire. Don Hornig 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 359, Office of Science and Technology,OST Administrative History, Volume II—Documentary Supplement, Box 5, E—Water Resources. No classification marking. 2 July 10. 3 In March 1964 a special task group under the leadership of an OST consultant, Dr. Roger Revelle, Dean of Research at the University of California, completed an extensive desalination study. The group concluded that if better methods of distillation could be developed, the heat produced by large nuclear reactors could be used to cost-effectively desalt sea water by the late 1970s, but that it would be cost-prohibitive for agricultural use. ( An Assessment of Large Nuclear Powered Sea Water Distillation Plants; a Report of an Interagency Task Group , Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1964) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Hornig signed the original. 133. Memorandum for the Record 133. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, July 9, 1964. Conversation with the President, July 9 (45 minutes) [Here follows 4 paragraphs unrelated to desalination.] 5. I briefed him on the desalting situation along the lines of my memorandum, 2 emphasizing that we were building up a climate of expectation in the world without a matching program to achieve it. Following my memorandum, he directed that I get together with Kermit Gordon to draw up a directive to be signed either by him or Gordon instructing the AEC and the Department of the Interior to draw up a bold and imaginative plan for a development program leading to large-scale desalting units immediately and for inclusion in the fall budget. 3 He was appalled at the small budget at the present time and suggested that if more could be done right away that I discuss with Gordon the possibility of diverting some AID money to the desalting program. He suggested that if there was a problem in coordinating AEC and Interior that we might assume that responsibility. I said that Gordon and I would discuss the organizational questions. 6. He agreed that in view of the magnitude of the expectations and commitments we made that numbers like 50 or 100 million dollars were not out of the question. He said that this is just as important as space, and we should be prepared to do whatever is necessary. 7. As regards the Russian discussions, 4 he expressed dismay that we might have nothing to offer; I assured him that despite my worries about our pace, we probably were more advanced than the Russians but that in fact we knew very little about their position. I inquired about his general attitude, and he said he wanted to go all out for cooperation and maximum progress on behalf of the whole world. I should make every effort to reach an understanding with them and get a program moving. Subsequent to our meeting, he called me back and we had a brief discussion with Kermit Gordon at which he repeated the points about AEC and Interior and asked Gordon to get together with me to implement this as soon as possible. He then called in Walter Heller and we talked briefly about the Energy Study and he volunteered to help us get MacDonald from Texas if necessary. Donald F. Hornig 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 359, Office of Science and Technology, OST Administrative History, Volume II-Documentary Supplement, E—Water Resources, Box 5. No classification marking. 2 Document 132 . 3 A copy of the July 15 letter, signed by Gordon, is in the Department of Energy, Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretariat Files, Box 1416, Folder 1. Seaborg and Udall submitted their final report to the President on September 22. It included: “The program is designed to advance the technology of water desalting so that within the next decade this developing technique will be a significant factor in meeting municipal and industrial requirements for high-quality water on a local and regional basis, both in the United States and abroad.” (Ibid.) 4 Negotiations with the Soviet Union were scheduled for July 14–16. A later history of the Office of Science and Technology noted that talks paved the way for a formal intergovernmental agreement for cooperation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 359, Office of Science and Technology, OST Administrative History, E—Water Resources and F—Water Desalting) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 134. Memorandum of Conversation 134. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 2, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting in Myer Feldman's Office re Desalination PARTICIPANTS Myer Feldman, White House Commissioner Ramey, AEC Bill Williams, AEC Kermit Gordon, Bureau of the Budget Assistant Secretary Holum, Department of Interior Mr. Chase, Department of Interior Dr. Donald F. Hornig,OST Mr. Komer, White House Staff Mr. Jernegan, NEA, Department of State Mr. Pollack, SCI, Department of State Mr. Feldman announced that he had called a meeting in his office to coordinate the various actions taking place domestically and internationally regarding desalination. At a later point in the meeting he stated that he envisaged desalination becoming one of the planks of President Johnson's “Great Society” program and that he was seeking the basis for a major Presidential message on this subject next spring. The discussion ranged over many aspects of desalination. It revealed that the desalination budget for Fiscal Year 1966 was entirely for research and development—Interior's plans called for $33 million and AEC's for $11 million. It was pointed out that although the Israelis were interested in having the desalination reactor based on the heavy water technique, both AEC and Interior were proceeding with a pressurized water reactor. Commissioner Ramey pointed out that the heavy water reactor would not be economically efficient unless an output of approximately three hundred million gallons a day was anticipated. Moreover, U.S. technology in the heavy water reactor is not yet developed. There was some discussion of the problems inherent in attempting to extrapolate by a factor of 100 the current desalination technique. Extrapolations by a factor of four to five are much more customary and there seems to be general agreement that the next step upward should be a prototype plant capable of producing ten to fifteen million gallons a day. In response to Mr. Feldman's query about the nature of contemplated U.S. contributions to the Israeli project, 2 both Mr. Holum and Mr. Ramey indicated that their agencies intended to follow a hard-headed business approach of relating their financial investment in the Israeli project to the technological information the U.S. might derive from the project. It was agreed that U.S. financial assistance to the Israelis on this project was a political question and should be approached as such. Commissioner Ramey reported that a joint U.S.-Mexico effort was in the offing and that discussions would begin when the new Administration in Mexico had settled into office. Technical discussions would also get under way with Egypt very shortly. 3 Mr. Gordon made clear that neither the engineering firm about to be employed on the Israeli project nor the Joint Board being established to supervise engineering activities should discuss U.S. financial assistance to the Israeli Government. Mr. Feldman stated that there was apparently a need for coordination of the several governmental interests in desalination both on a technical and on a policy level. Mr. Pollack reported on a pending proposal for the State Department to establish an inter-Departmental Committee to develop policy governing U.S. participation in international desalination projects including the nature of the financial arrangements. Mr. Feldman stated that he thought it was a good idea to proceed simultaneously at the engineering and the policy level and asked Mr. Pollack to send him some information on the contemplated Committee. He also suggested that Treasury should possibly be included on the Committee. 1 Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 71 D 483. Unclassified. Drafted by Pollack and cleared by Jernegan. 2 On October 14 the United States and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding outlining the terms under which they would conduct a detailed feasibility study of a large-scale desalination plant in Israel. For text, see Department of State Bulletin , November 16, 1964, pp. 724–726. 3 Documentation on U.S.-Mexican desalting agreements are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XXXI . A copy of the U.S.-UAR desalting cooperation agreement, June 1, 1965, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Nuclear Desalting of Water (Nuclear Power), 3 of 3. 135. Editorial Note 135. Editorial Note On November 18, 1964, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement on desalination research and technology cooperation. The final agreement was signed in Moscow by Hornig and Ambassador Foy Kohler for the United States. The 2-year agreement called for the exchange of technical information, holding of technical symposia and meetings, and reciprocal visits by desalting experts on an unscheduled basis. (Department of State Bulletin , December 7, 1964, pages 828–829) 136. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 136. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, December 9, 1964. Dear Glenn: It is becoming abundantly clear that foreign interest in U.S. desalting technology is going to mount rapidly in the months ahead as a result of the current discussions with the Government of Israel and of the rapid development of U.S. technical capacity in this field. Similarly, arrangements for U.S. collaboration or assistance in projects abroad will become increasingly frequent. In order to assure that the foreign relationships arising out of the desalting program are consonant with other foreign programs and policies of the U.S., it is requested that no financial or other commitment involving other countries be entered into without prior consultation with and the approval of the Department of State. 2 In order to facilitate the provision of guidance on this subject, I am establishing a Committee on Foreign Desalting Programs at the Assistant Secretary level. I have asked the Director of International Scientific Affairs to serve as Chairman. The Department of State will also be represented by the Regional Bureau Assistant Secretaries as appropriate to the agenda. The Agency for International Development, the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology are being invited to join the Committee. I would also be pleased to have you designate a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission to serve on the Committee. The Committee will (1) maintain continuing surveillance over the status of foreign desalting programs contemplating or using U.S. technical or other assistance; (2) develop recommendations for policies and guidelines to govern U.S. participation in such programs; (3) map and coordinate the financial and other relationships with specific countries with whom the U.S. is collaborating on desalting programs. The Committee's deliberations will, of course, be in accord with the political guidance respecting country relationships provided by the geographic bureaus of the Department of State. As we acquire experience in dealing with desalination programs abroad, it may be expected that new or amended institutional arrangements will become desirable. Should the need for this become apparent in the first instance to the Atomic Energy Commission, please let me know. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean 1 Source: Department of Energy, Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretariat Files, RD–1 Desalination Program. No classification marking. According to a December 10 memorandum from Pollack to Komer, Rusk sent an identical letter to the Department of the Interior and letters excluding the second paragraph to AID, Bureau of the Budget, and OST. (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 67 D 132) The State Department position on this issue is discussed in a memorandum from Kretzmann to Llewellyn Thompson plus enclosures, October 28, ibid.: Lot 78 D 483. 2 The fact that this paragraph was sent only to Interior and the AEC reflects Secretary Rusk's desire to assert the State Department's role in this issue. On December 28 Seaborg and Secretary of the Interior Udall agreed that the AEC would “play a more primary role” in implementing the agreement because of that agency's pre-existing relationship with the designated Soviet partner. ( Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961–1971 , Vol. 9, p. 554) Udall and Seaborg made this arrangement official through an exchange of letters dated January 11–12, 1965. (Department of Energy, Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretariat Files, Folder 2, RD–1 Desalination Program) Llewellyn Thompson reminded Seaborg in a February 25 letter that the NSC had directed State to implement any exchange programs, but he assured Seaborg that the Department did not anticipate difficulties “with any division that you and Secretary Udall might work out.” (Ibid.) 137. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 137. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 18, 1965. SUBJECT Cooperation in Desalting With Other Countries On December 9, 1964 you established the interagency Committee on Foreign Desalting Programs, chaired by SCI for the Department of State. 2 Other members are the Department of the Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Science and Technology and AID. The Committee has brought the rapidly developing Israeli program under a reasonable degree of foreign policy guidance and coordination, which was the Department's initial objective. In addition, the Committee, averaging monthly meetings, has usefully served to: bring to a common focus the interests of the member agencies in cooperative desalting programs with other countries; initiate policy guidelines to serve as the basis for consistency in these programs; establish effective procedures for interagency communication and coordination. Cooperation with Israel is now well into a jointly financed detailed engineering and economic feasibility study under contract to Kaiser Engineers, Inc. The first phase of the report, due June 15, 1965, will identify the size of the most-favorable plant. The final report, due in October, 1965, will include detailed cost data. Financing of the proposed plant is being studied intensively by the Committee. Pending the conclusion of the feasibility study, we have instructed U.S. officials not to speculate on U.S. financial participation in the plant. (See Deptel 1029 to Amembassy Tel Aviv—attached 3 ). Cooperation with Other Countries is expanding at a faster rate than is generally appreciated. Technical reports have been exchanged pursuant to our desalting agreement with the U.S.S.R . of November 18, 1964 and visits of technical experts are proposed for this calendar year. A three-man team, representing AEC and Interior, visited the U.A.R . at its request this past December to advise local water authorities on current desalting technology and on a proposed nuclear fueled power-desalting facility. The group also visited Tunisia for similar discussions. Water authority personnel from Greece and Italy have visited U.S. desalting and nuclear facilities. U.S. experts have consulted recently with officials in Athens on a proposed large-scale desalting plant for that city. Interior's Office of Saline Water has agreed to provide technical advice to Spain regarding a plant for Grand Canary Island. Under IAEA sponsorship Mexico and the U.S. plan a preliminary feasibility study this Fall of a large-scale dual purpose plant located at the northern tip of the Gulf of California. Electricity and water from this plant would be used by both countries. Government officials of Peru, Senegal and Yugoslavia have discussed desalting technology with U.S. Embassy officials and technical reports have been provided to assist their studies. The Office of Saline Water routinely sends its technical reports to 55 countries. We anticipate that the Department of the Interior-sponsored First International Symposium on Desalination, to be held in Washington October 3–9, 1965, will develop awareness throughout the world of desalting possibilities and stimulate additional interest in many countries for cooperation with the U.S. in this field. Fifty-three countries and six international organizations have indicated their intention to send representatives. The technology of economical desalting is not much beyond its infancy. The largest desalting plant now in operation produces 1.7 million gallons per day (mgd). There is now in the detailed design phase a plant intended to produce 50 mgd. The Israeli project relates to a plant intended to produce 120 mgd to go into operation in 1970–71. The ability to produce this much water at an economical price is dependent on technology under development but not now on hand. The U.S. investment in desalination research and development is in the process of being doubled. We are being responsive to the repeated offers of the President to share our knowledge in this field with the nations of the world. At the same time, we are attempting to ensure that the utility and economy of present day desalting technology is not oversold and that desalting is kept in proper juxtaposition by interested countries with other possible solutions to their water problems. 4 1 Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 71 D 483. Limited Official Use. Drafted by William C. Salmon (SCI). Copies were sent to George Ball, Thomas Mann, Llewellyn Thompson, and William Crockett. 2 See Document 136 . 3 Not attached. Telegram 1029 to Tel Aviv is dated April 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, ORG 7 NEA) 4 In a June 19 memorandum to Rusk, Pollack repeated his concerns: “Other countries are seeking solutions to water problems through desalination because it is being highly advertised (and because it is being increasingly related to nuclear energy sources which have separate attractions) when a properly conducted water resources survey might reveal far simpler, cheaper and more effective answers.” (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152) 138. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 138. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, August 30, 1965. Mac— It looks as though AEC and Interior may press for a major program decision so that the U.S. Government may have a foreign aid “spectacular” to announce at the Desalination Symposium in October. Ramey and Holum believe that the President is somehow committed to making some sort of an announcement of a new development initiative at that time and they are talking about a possible soft loan and grant program of $300 million to assist in the construction of large-scale combination nuclear power and desalting installations abroad. The Bureau of the Budget doubts the need for any further initiative at this time and Dr. Hornig told Keeny last week that the only directive the President has laid on Interior and AEC is to use the $200 million appropriation to develop desalting technology to the point where it is practical. Hornig feels that the present U.S. R&D program should furnish ample material for discussion at the October Symposium and believes that anything more would be premature. There is an element of uncertainty in the picture due to the pressure that will build up this fall to get the U.S. committed to a substantial contribution to the Israeli plant. There has even been some talk in Interior and AEC that the U.S. should make up its mind on the Israeli project in time for an announcement at the October Symposium. Such an announcement would then be considered as precedent-making in terms of U.S. willingness to underwrite similar projects in other countries. I believe that the efforts of OST and BOB will be successful in keeping this matter under control but there is always the possibility of an end run. It seems that desalting has a mystique of its own and somehow an impression has been given around town that the President is personally committed to a major program of assistance abroad. It is for this reason that I bring the above to your attention. I will also send a copy of this memorandum to Bob Komer and will keep him filled in on the Israeli developments as they occur in the desalting community. 2 CEJ 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Nuclear Desalting of Water (Nuclear Power), 3 of 3. Confidential. 2 Bundy wrote “OK” in the left margin next to this sentence. 139. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Joyce) to Secretary of State Rusk 139. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (Joyce) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 3, 1965. SUBJECT Cooperation with other countries in desalting Background: The President has repeatedly expressed his deep personal interest in desalting and on several occasions he has offered to share U.S. knowledge and technology with other countries (Tab A). 2 The First International Symposium on Desalting, to be held October 3–9, 1965 in Washington, had its genesis in part in the Presidential interest in desalting (Tab B). It will provide yet another occasion for the President to address this subject, and especially its international cooperation aspects. The Committee on Foreign Desalting Programs (State, Interior, AEC, AID, OST and BOB), which you established in December 1964, has established a study group to consider what additional initiatives in international cooperation might be developed to give substance to the President's interest in this subject. The Committee's study group developed several proposals ranging from an intensification of existing activities by AID, Interior and AEC under existing legislation to a large scale program (approximately $300 million for a five-year period) of grants and/or long-term low interest loans to cover capital costs of desalting plants. 3 Discussion: All agencies participating in the Committee concurred in the desirability of intensifying present desalting activity. However, the Department of Interior and the AEC felt that such a program would not be sufficiently responsive to the intense Presidential interest in this subject and that considerations of national prestige justify a bold large scale international desalting program. They strongly advocate the $300 million program, 4 contending that the large scale program will advance desalting technology by providing an industrial base and through encouraging construction, expand the activity and competitive position internationally of the U.S. desalting industry, and will enhance the U.S. image associated with efforts to improve man's living standards, particularly in countries deficient in fresh water. The representatives on the Committee of State, AID, Bureau of the Budget and Dr. Hornig's office do not share the enthusiasm of Interior and AEC for the large scale program for the following reasons: 1. The technology of desalting requires more research and development before it can be employed economically for most industrial and domestic uses, and considerable additional progress will have to be made before desalted water will be economic for agricultural use. The intensive U.S. research effort authorized by the Saline Water Conversion Act of August 11, 1965 ($200 million over a five-year period) is barely under way. While the pace of research and technology development will undoubtedly be rapid, at this time a major international construction program would be premature and would give rise to expectations which the United States could not fulfill. 2. Because of the rapid development that is taking place in desalting technology, desalting plants constructed in the immediate years ahead may quickly become obsolete. 3. Since plants constructed under the large scale program are not likely to be economic, they will have to be heavily subsidized. In the case of developing countries, to the extent that the subsidy is not covered by U.S. assistance, such plants become a drain on the resources of these countries and this would have a negative effect on their economic development. 4. The research and development benefits to be derived from a large scale international program are likely to be small since prototypes will in most cases be constructed in the United States. Foreign plants will reflect improvements rather than basic changes in concept. 5. In light of existing water shortages in the United States and the lack of a Federal program for the support of plant construction in the United States, the Department and AID would find it difficult to justify to Congress at this time a large scale program of construction assistance in foreign countries. 6. Problems of nuclear weapons proliferation are posed by the large scale program which contemplates at least 2 large nuclear-powered dual purpose plants, one in Israel and one in Mexico. 7. Announcement of a $300 million program at the Symposium would prejudice our flexibility regarding the position we might want to take on the expected request for the construction of a $185 million dual purpose power-water plant in Israel. SCI is of the opinion that the most substantial argument developed by the proponents of the large scale program is that of advancing the national prestige of the United States. However, the technology of desalting, upon which a bid for national prestige would be made, is not yet in hand. Breakthroughs can be anticipated and major advances will undoubtedly be made. When these occur it may indeed be propitious to launch a major international program supported in part by United States resources to bring economic water to the parched areas of the earth. In the interim the United States is appropriately concentrating its efforts on research and the development of the necessary technology; in the international field it should cooperate with other countries extending them as much assistance as feasible under existing legislation. Current Status: Interior and AEC officials have developed a joint recommendation to the President, recommending adoption of a large scale program to be announced by the President in an address to the International Symposium on October 4. This recommendation is now being considered by Secretary Udall and Chairman Seaborg. 5 Dr. Hornig's office is contemplating the convening of a meeting of principals shortly after Labor Day to discuss recommendations to the President on foreign desalting programs. The principals involved would probably be Secretary Udall, Chairman Seaborg, Dr. Hornig, Mr. David Bell, Mr. Charles Schultze, and either yourself or one of the Under Secretaries. SCI is developing appropriate remarks on the foreign policy aspects of desalting to be used by the President should he decide to address the International Symposium in October. Similar statements are being drafted at Interior, AEC and OST. 1 Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Joseph Rosa (SCI), William Salmon (SCI), and Pollack; and cleared by Richard Cooper (E) and John Wilkes (AID). Copies were sent to Ball, Mann, and Thompson. 2 Tabs A and B are not printed. 3 A copy of the committee's discussion paper is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Nuclear Desalting of Water (Nuclear Power), 3 of 3. 4 A staff-level working group of the Committee on Desalting was unable to agree on a proposed program and, instead, presented three alternatives for the committee's consideration on August 23. The committee was also unable to reach a conclusion, and “the Departments of State and AID were unable to state their positions on the alternatives presented.” (Memorandum from Ramey (AEC) and Holum (Interior) to Udall and Seaborg, August 26; Department of Energy, Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretariat Files) 5 In a September 13 memorandum for the file, Salmon recounted the history of the proposal: “Recently the Committee discussed three alternative courses of action; several problems were highlighted regarding the third alternative, a $300 million five-year foreign construction program. AEC and Interior agreed to develop a pro and con paper on the third alternative. Apparently, since the meeting, the pro and con paper developed into a proposal from AEC and Interior to the President urging that such a program be undertaken and announced on October 4. Mr. Pollack noted that BOB, OST, State, and AID representatives at the meeting expressed reservations about such a large-scale program at this time and did not believe the President should make such an announcement on October 4.” (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152) In their September 10 proposal to the President, Udall and Seaborg wrote: “The program has been developed under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Holum and Commissioner Ramey in consultation with the Interdepartmental Committee on Foreign Desalting Programs. While the program we propose is consistent with one of the alternatives considered by the Interdepartmental Committee, it has not been reviewed with the principals from the agencies. We propose to do so immediately.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. 1) See also Document 140 . 140. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) 140. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) 1 Washington, September 14, 1965. In the proposals for “An Expanded Program of International Cooperation in Desalting,” Secretary Udall and Chairman Seaborg make several suggestions worth serious consideration for use in a Presidential statement at the forthcoming international desalting symposium. 2 These include the offer of: 1. Surveys to identify and compare available water and energy resources and needs. 2. Detailed feasibility and economic studies of particular projects. 3. Research and development on special problems involved in foreign desalting plants. In addition, I would think that the President could reiterate the firm intention of the United States to share its desalting technology with other nations, both by making our research reports available and by improving our consulting capabilities and our facilities for receiving foreign scientists and engineers to review our activities here. However, I believe that the central proposal by Udall and Seaborg for a 300–500 million dollar assistance program raises several very serious questions and should be very carefully thought through before any decision is made on whether to include a reference to it in any Presidential statement. 3 One major concern is the timing of such a program in relation to the state of the technology. We have not yet built or even authorized any large desalting plants. The largest plant on which we have actual experience produces on the order of a million and one-half gallons a day. If we try too quickly to assist in the construction of large plants abroad, without having well developed and tested technology on hand ourselves, we risk severe damage to our international prestige and reputation 4 and the proposal might backfire for either of two reasons: 1) by resulting in an uneconomical “white elephant” which might require continuing operating subsidy over its useful lifetime (in addition to capital subsidy) or 2) by resulting in a “lemon” which might not operate satisfactorily without extensive and costly modifications. A dual purpose (power and water) plant of the type being considered for Israel would produce water at about 35/1000 gallons. Since the water is worth at most 20/1000 gallons to grow oranges (and less for any other crop), the subsidy required would be about $5 million per year. A “water-only” plant would produce water at a higher cost and therefore would require a higher subsidy. The same problem comes up elsewhere in the world except that it is harder to sell power in nations which are less developed than Israel. I think it might be appropriate for the President to point out that we are just in the process of undertaking a five-year R&D program to cost nearly $200 million, and to talk about overseas financial assistance, if at all, only in the context of a future time, certainly after we have gotten authorization for at least one plant here. We must also consider the following very significant concerns: 1. The relation of the proposal to our existing foreign aid programs. 2. The palatability to Congress of undertaking an expensive foreign assistance program in the absence of any comparable domestic program. What will be the effect of announcing he will request this money before he has made any request for U.S. plants. 3. The foreign policy issues raised. The only concrete item in sight is the Israeli plant which raises the question of aggravation of Arab-Israeli problems implicit in U.S. assistance to a large plant in Israel. 4. The questions raised in supplying, with U.S. financial aid, large nuclear plants capable of plutonium production to some of the politically less stable countries that might be candidates. Some of these questions would be much easier if the President were to propose an internationally managed loan fund analogous to the Southeast Asian Development Program. I understand that the State Department, the Budget Bureau and Mac Bundy's shop are also concerned about questions of this nature raised by the Udall-Seaborg proposals, and it seems especially important to me that the views of these agencies be sought. I understand Charlie Schultze is pulling together their comments. Don 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FO 7/1–FO 7/5, Box 53. No classification marking. 2 Dated September 10; see footnote 5, Document 139 . 3 The Interior Department's draft Presidential statement read: “Science has given man great powers—the power to destroy and the power to create. We are endeavoring with all our might to limit the power to destroy. We have been sitting at world council tables for years in pursuit of this endeavor. It is time we called the world to one conference room to use the other power—the power to create.” The statement described water as the most vital, and most limited, resource: “The dribble from a leaky faucet in New York City may be the liquid which slaked the thirst of a dinosaur, watered the hanging gardens of Babylon, or refreshed Hannibal at some Alpine stream.” Neither sentence appeared in the final version of the President's remarks. (Attachment to letter from Holum to Pollack, September 15; Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 71 D 483) 4 According to “An Expanded Program of International Cooperation in Desalting,” “Perhaps foremost among the above objectives and corresponding benefits noted above is the prestige implication of United States leadership in desalting. The United States experience, both affirmative and negative, in two other areas of modern technology—atomic energy and space—establish beyond a doubt the great significance to the promotion of our vital interests abroad of maintaining technological leadership. There is no field where the value to be derived from such leadership is more apparent at the present time than in that of desalting the water of the sea. The strong appeal of this concept is apparent to the President and to the leaders of many other countries.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Nuclear Desalting of Water (Nuclear Power), 1 of 3) 141. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 141. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, September 21, 1965. Mac— A Middle Course on Desalting . This issue needs resolving soon, because First International Conference on Desalting opens here 3 October. Of course LBJ doesn't have to move then; he can get just as much of a splash by moving later. My sympathies are with Schultze, Hornig, State, AID, Treasury, etc. that this is all premature . Yet if the President wants to push ahead with a big initiative, I see a middle road. The real argument is over the proposed $3–500 million authorization request for “soft” financing abroad (the Udall/Seaborg report says this means loans repayable in dollars or local currency, or even grants) over a five-year period. Actual appropriations would be requested annually as needed. So this doesn't mean we'd waste $3–500 million right away on uneconomic plants. We wouldn't even go up for the authorization till 1966, and could hold off any big appropriations till later in the 1966–70 period. We could also (a) eliminate the repayment in local currency and grant feature or make it only a specified small percentage, say 10%, of the total and earmark it solely for feasibility studies; (c) include an interest requirement equal to the Treasury rate; (d) say that we wouldn't go for an appropriation till FY 68—the year after the authorization; and finally (e) make clear that we would not use this money for uneconomic projects. We could even include a provision requiring joint financing where a recipient's financial resources so permit. And we could include a feature allowing local currency loans or grants from PL 480 proceeds (this could permit us to lend Israel, for example, up to $50 million or so in Israeli pounds). All this would also give us some money to go ahead with Israel when ready , which would please our Zionist friends without committing us much beyond what is already in the cards. And as a program not specifically addressed to Israel, it helps protect our Arab flank (though we'd have to build an Arab plant too sooner or later). Ergo, it seems to me that we might be able to have our cake and eat it too on this one. Bob K. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, International Atomic Energy Agency. Confidential. Copies were sent to Schultze, Hornig, Rowen, and Charles Johnson. 142. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 142. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, September 21, 1965. Mac— Here is a draft memorandum that the Bureau of Budget staff has prepared for Charlie to send to Jack Valenti to warn against a foreign aid “spectacular” for desalting. 2 I have asked the BOB staff to delete your name, but said that my request in no way indicated that you were sympathetic to the idea of a large offer of financial assistance to foreign countries or that you were necessarily opposed to such an idea. Keeny and I find ourselves somewhat at odds with Bob Komer over the possibility that something might be salvaged out of the Interior-AEC idea of a Presidential commitment to a major aid program at the First International Conference on Desalting. 3 We share the feelings of State, AID, the Bureau and Treasury that it is premature to make a commitment in view of our primitive technology and the large number of policy questions to which we don't have answers. We also feel that if the offer is hedged to such an extent that it is “only pie in the sky” the effect might be the opposite of what we expect. It might be interpreted as nothing but an empty and politically motivated gesture. I understand that you have been filled in as to what occurred at the meeting with Udall last week and are not uninformed. Therefore, this note is principally to keep you up to date on what has happened since that meeting. 4 CEJ 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. 1. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Komer and Keeny. 2 Not printed; the final version is printed as Document 143 . 3 See Document 141 . 4 Bundy wrote “Thanks” in the margin next to this sentence. 143. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Schultze) to the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) 143. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Schultze) to the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) 1 Washington, September 23, 1965. SUBJECT Immediate Next Steps on International Desalting Program As you know, the First International Conference on Desalting will be held in Washington October 3–9. Secretary Udall and Chairman Seaborg have requested the President to announce at the Conference a program of expanded cooperation with other nations in the field of desalting. Briefly, the program would commit us to— —assist water resources studies in developing countries; —urge other developed countries to join with us in establishing a “talent bank,” under United Nations or similar auspices, to help solve water problems throughout the world; —seek authorization for a fund of $300–$500 million to help provide “soft” financing for desalting plants abroad. Don Hornig, Mac Bundy, 2 and I have serious reservations about committing the Administration to a $300–$500 million foreign aid construction program in desalting at this time. The technology of economic, large-scale plants is as yet undeveloped. The largest plant built so far is on the order of 2 million gallons per day. The Interior-AEC proposal contemplates plants of 100 million gallons per day. Until we have a well-developed and well-tested technology firmly in hand, we run the risk of supporting plants that will be uneconomical or which will not work satisfactorily . The foreign policy implications of either outcome could be very unfortunate. We ought not to be conducting what is essentially a major R&D program in less developed countries. (Don Hornig has outlined this in more detail in his September 14 memorandum to you, copy attached.) 3 The proposal will involve high budgetary costs, particularly in fiscal year 1967 (NOA of $120–$190 million). In addition, we run the serious risk of budgetary costs over and above those now contemplated if the demand for plants is greater than the number now planned. Since the Interior plan contemplates only two large desalting plants, the question arises as to how we discriminate in selecting sites. If the plants prove uneconomic, added budgetary cost would surely arise. For example, the Israeli project could require operating subsidies on the order of $5 million per year. The proposal would mean support of large plants abroad in the absence of a similar program at home. Congress has recently approved a 5-year domestic program of $200 million for research and development only . A program to construct foreign plants raises serious questions of Congressional acceptance, especially since we could certainly test more efficiently in the United States. The proposal raises serious questions of nuclear proliferation. We might be supplying the capacity to produce plutonium to countries having long-standing enmities with their neighbors. The amount of plutonium generated by a 200 MWe plant would produce enough materiel annually for a large number of nuclear weapons. In addition, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the Treasury Department raise the following important questions (see letters attached): 4 State believes that from the standpoint of foreign policy we should refrain from committing the United States to a specific, large-scale program to support plant construction and operation overseas until the present uncertainties about our capacity to build reliable and economic desalting plants now and in the near future are resolved. The Department also believes announcement of such a fund now would substantially predetermine a decision on U.S. financial participation in the prospective Israeli project. This decision should not be made until completion of technical studies now underway and a thorough assessment is conducted of the economics and political implications of the project. AID believes that the proposed fund will largely constitute a substitution for present aid resources. The Agency further points out that this proposed use of resources weakens AID's requirement that capital projects be economically feasible. AID also questions the use of concessionary financing in countries where we are largely out of the aid business. The Agency also suggests that earmarking of funds for specific types of projects distorts developmental priorities. Treasury questions the advisability of committing the United States to spending large amounts of money for foreign desalting plants until plans are firm enough to assess accurately the effect on the balance of payments. The Department also questions the advisability of “soft” loans to countries that are being phased out of the aid program, and the desirability of funding a large-scale “AID-type” program outside AID channels. The upcoming Conference is such that the President need not become involved . It will be a highly scientific and technical conference. (See copy of agenda attached.) 5 Roughly 2/3 of the delegates will be from the United States, including many industry and university representatives. Most foreign official delegates are a cut below the ministerial level. It would be entirely appropriate for Don Hornig to address the delegates as the President's top adviser on research and development matters in general and coordinator of U.S. desalting efforts in particular. As an alternative, Secretary Udall could deliver a welcoming speech for the President, indicating the President's deep interest in desalting and the importance he attaches to the Conference (we understand that in view of the President's planned absence from the city on October 4, Secretary Udall is planning to deliver an opening speech). If the President (through Secretary Udall or personally) wishes to address the Conference, there is plenty he can say without committing the United States to support of foreign desalting plants . Suggested items, based in part on the list submitted by State (see pp. 3–4 of letter), are attached. 6 The alternatives for the Conference are: (1) A Hornig speech; (2) A Presidential speech delivered by Udall without a commitment to support foreign desalting plants; (3) A Presidential speech delivered personally without a commitment to support foreign desalting plants; (4) A Presidential speech delivered personally including a commitment to seek a fund to support foreign desalting plants. I recommend a Presidential speech delivered by Secretary Udall (alternate 2). 7 Charlie 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, FO 7/1–FO 7/5. Confidential. The handwritten phrase “Keep where can get fast” is at the top of the document. 2 Despite the discussion in Charles Johnson's September 21 memorandum to Bundy ( Document 142 ), Bundy apparently decided to “sign on” to Schultze's memorandum. 3 Document 140 . 4 Not attached. Reference may be to a September 16 letter from Seaborg to Schultze, a September 17 letter from Bell to Schultze, a September 18 letter from Ball to Schultze, and a September 17 letter from Trued to Clark. All are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. 5 Not attached. 6 Not printed. 7 In a September 30 memorandum to the President, Douglass Cater recommended that the President not address the conference. Hornig, Schultze, and Valenti concurred. “Hornig felt, and we agreed, that we need to make a breakthrough on the domestic front—hopefully a nuclear desalting plant for Los Angeles—before making concrete proposals on the foreign front.” They noted that Udall would address the conference and recommended that the President either invite the delegates to the White House and make informal remarks or send a brief message to be read at the conference. “We believe that alternative one would be greatly preferable to number two,” Cater wrote. Johnson left the first alternative unchecked, but agreed to the second alternative. (Memorandum from Cater to the President, September 30; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, September 1965 (Open)) 144. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 144. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 20, 1965. SUBJECT Recent Desalting Activities Over 2400 persons representing 65 nations and 6 international organizations, registered at the highly successful First International Symposium on Water Desalination which was held during the week of October 3–9. Secretary Udall addressed the opening session of the Symposium, Monday morning, October 4 (copy of speech at Tab A), 2 noting U.S. willingness to: share our information, receive foreign visitors at research laboratories and test centers, assist the training of foreign water resources engineers, assist other countries in regional and national water surveys, give increased attention to water supply problems under the AID programs, and render advice to countries seeking assistance in water resources. The President addressed the official Delegates and Observers in the East Room of the White House Thursday afternoon, October 7 (Tab B). He announced a Water for Peace program which he described as a massive cooperative international effort to find solution for man's water problems. The specifics of the program include: (1) presentation to the next session of Congress of a plan and program for constructing practical prototype plants; (2) a call to all nations to join the U.S. in creating an international fund to bring the fruits of science and technology to all the corners of a parched and thirsty world; (3) an offer to contribute to an international crash program to deal with world water resources; (4) the convening within a year of another large conference to deal with all the world's water problems; (5) an increase in U.S. support for scientists now working on water problems for the United Nations; (6) an offer to send our best experts abroad when requested; and (7) a program of grants and fellowships for scientists from other lands to study on water resources in the United States. 3 Following his speech, the President witnessed the signing of the Mexico-U.S.-IAEA Study Agreement which provided for the study of the practicality of a large nuclear-powered water desalting-electric power plant to assist in meeting the needs of northwestern Mexico and southwestern U.S. Speculatively, the plant might produce over 200 million gallons of water per day and supply 300 megawatts of power. In his closing remarks to the Symposium Saturday noon, October 9, Secretary Udall announced preliminary agreement with Saudi Arabia which would lead to construction of a dual-purpose plant for Jidda (5 million gallons of water per day and 36 megawatts of electricity) (Tab C). 4 SCI sponsored, and Interior and AEC attended meetings with several country delegations to further our programs of cooperation in desalting. In addition to meetings with representatives of Mexico and Saudi Arabia, we met with the UAR, Israel, Italy, Greece, Kuwait and the USSR. The Symposium provided a major impetus not only to U.S. efforts in the field of international desalting cooperation, but also to enlarging the area of cooperation to water resources generally. Although the “Water for Peace” program is at this point little more than a concept, it is a valid concept and one of undeniable and wide appeal. It is clear that the Department shall need to make a major input into this program during the weeks ahead. In order to develop preliminary Departmental proposals on the “Water for Peace” program SCI has established a working group within the Department of representatives from E, H, IO, CU and AID. It is also intended to use, initially at least, the Committee on Foreign Desalting Programs to provide liaison with some of the other agencies concerned with this program. 5 1 Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152. Unclassified. Drafted by Salmon. Copies were sent to Ball, Mann, Thompson, and Sisco (IO). 2 For text, see Department of State Bulletin , November 1, 1965, pp. 716–720. 3 Tab B was not attached. The President said: “Let future generations remember us as those who freed man forever from his most ancient and dreaded enemies—drought and famine. And now our efforts to free him from the enemies of draught and famine will be extended to free him from ignorance by an international education program, free him from disease by cooperative health adventures together. And what a great satisfaction it would be to everyone in this room if at some future date we can point back to this year when the United States of America was willing to put forth leadership to free humanity from the ancient enemies of mankind—poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, disease, thirst.” The full text of the President's statement is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pp. 1054–1056. 4 Not printed. 5 On November 8 Rusk wrote to Udall proposing use of a similar structure to staff and implement the Water for Peace program. (Department of Energy, Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secret) The committee held its first meeting on December 10. (Memorandum from Pollack to Rusk, December 11; Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152) 145. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff and the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) 145. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff and the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) 1 Washington, February 16, 1966. Mr. Johnson called Mr. Pollack to compare notes re debriefing on Eban conversations with Secretary Rusk and President Johnson. Mr. Johnson said Mr. Komer attended the meeting (with the President) and that there was considerable discussion regarding desalting. 2 With regard to the proposed project the President has expressed following wishes: (1) He does not want to be associated with an “uneconomic project.” (2) There are to be no operating subsidies. (3) Before he appoints man to the 2-man negotiating team proposed by Eshkol, he would like to see terms of reference. 3 With regard to the latter point, Charles Johnson understands President wishes that paper to be drafted give him a picture of perimeters of U.S. negotiating position—money in sight, etc. Johnson also received impression from Komer that President thought he should have by end of next week draft of terms of reference which spells out figures that have been going around. C. Johnson disagreed with Komer thought that the Desalting Committee might pull together necessary paper. C. Johnson believes Committee not too flexible but believes that Mr. Pollack is right man to work along with Mr. Alexis Johnson and Ambassador Hare; that Mr. Pollack, Bell, Ramey and Holum could probably do piece of paper. C. Johnson also mentioned to Komer project appears to be in neighborhood of $2 million. C. Johnson reported that Bell was quite opposed to the project; that if we did loan money it should be at full interest rate rather than subsidized rate. Bell evidently wonders whether it is something from which we will get enough politically to justify paying the price involved. From Komer, C. Johnson gained impression that President wishes to keep this matter going a year or so. There appears to be no reason to head for a particular target date for completion of negotiations—but project should not appear to be inactive. Before Mr. Pollack could complete a question on McNamara, Mr. Johnson interrupted to say that Komer neglected to mention anything on this. Mr. Pollack commented that the Bell-McNamara view not necessarily the President's. 4 Mr. Johnson mentioned one question which was not resolved—whether the conveyance and inter-structure (?) would require additional construction capital or would be part of the plant project. Does one take 7 off cost of water at plant? There was some discussion as to whether sinking fund, private financing through revenue bonds, etc. Mr. Pollack reported his understanding that President not yet ready to appoint anyone to 2-man committee, although it is Mr. Pollack's view that it would be most helpful to have collaboration of such a person in drawing up terms of reference. C. Johnson inquired whether Mr. Alexis Johnson could be of help—perhaps drawing him in on assumption he will be negotiating individual and on informal basis. Mr. Johnson asked Mr. Pollack if he would take on and Mr. Pollack agreed to do so. In closing, Johnson indicated Komer interested in MWD. Mr. Pollack said we hoped to know about that by end of the month. 1 Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. No classification marking. 2 The meeting was held on February 9 at the White House. Documentation on the meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XVIII . 3 In a telephone conversation with Pollack the following day, Komer said that he regarded “the appointment of the 2 man committee as a time-buying device (possibly 6 months to a year) before a decision needs to be made.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Pollack and Komer, February 17; Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383) 4 A February 12 memorandum for the record noted: “On desalting, Bell and McNamara suggested that we should not help the Israelis on any plant that was uneconomic. We should help out with loans at the normal rate for the investment required, but there should be no subsidies.” (Ibid.) 146. Letter From Jerome Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to President Johnson 146. Letter From Jerome Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to President Johnson 1 Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 28, 1966. Dear Mr. President: I believe that your project to develop a nuclear desalting plant jointly with Israel might be exploited to bring nuclear disarmament and possibly even some reductions of conventional armaments to the Middle East. 2 Apparently both Egypt and Israel would welcome an opportunity to reduce their arms spending, if they could do so without increasing the threat to their security from each other. In addition, Egypt can only do so if it did not appear that she was making a deal with Israel. Egypt has a serious water shortage in spite of the Aswan Dam, particularly in the desert region close to Israel and is, I believe, anxious to participate in a project similar to the one being planned with Israel. I have been told this by a visiting Egyptian, and Arthur Goldberg has confirmed it in a discussion with the Egyptian Ambassador to the U.N. Furthermore, the Egyptians are very worried by the prospect of the Israelis making a nuclear bomb and would like to head this off, as would we. Israel is anxious to cut its arms costs and would, I am told, be willing to experiment with a substantial cut in its defense expenditures next year if they could be assured that the Egyptians would not increase theirs. 3 In all of this there appears to be the hope of halting the Middle East arms race if we are bold enough in our approach. The ingredients would be these: a nuclear desalting project with Egypt as well as Israel, declarations by both countries—possibly registered with the U.N.—that they will not undertake the development of nuclear weapons. Agreement to permit inspection of all nuclear facilities by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, 4 and U.S. reprocessing of all of the expended fuel elements from the desalting plants to prevent either country from acquiring plutonium. Finally, and probably most difficult, would be agreements to limit the buildup of conventional arms. This could be done in many ways. An agreement to limit budgets at present or somewhat lower levels would be one course. A freeze on the acquisition of any new weapons is another. Without further exploration it is not possible to say just how much is possible in this direction, but it is clear that you have a powerful lever for use in pushing for some conventional disarmament in the desire that exists for nuclear water plants. Not only is the need for water desperate in both countries, but also it is certain to get worse. The prospect for providing unlimited amounts of fresh water from the sea has the aura of a scientific miracle and in your hands, could bring about a political miracle. In fact, I think that it already has; I believe that your original announcement of the U.S.-Israel project had much to do with halting the Jordan River crisis. When you pointed out that there was a way to provide Israel with water from the sea, the Arabs lost whatever real interest they previously had in the difficult project of diverting the Jordan. The Israelis, in turn, were not quite so fearful of the diversion. This morning's New York Times carried a story from Cairo which indicates that a plan similar to this may already be being considered. If I can be of any help with it, please call on me. 5 Sincerely yours, Jerry 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Nuclear Desalting of Water (Nuclear Power), 1 of 3. No classification marking. Wiesner was Kennedy's Science Adviser. 2 On March 7 the Department of State, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of the Interior, and the Government of Israel announced completion of the joint study for a proposed desalting plant in Israel. For text of the announcement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 539–54. In a memorandum transmitting Wiesner's letter to the President on March 11, Komer wrote: “Jerry Wiesner is in with attached glorious scheme for using US-supplied nuclear power or desalting reactors as sweeteners to get the UAR and Israel to agree to (a) cut their military budgets; and (b) not go nuclear. We'll send his proposal to State and ACDA for careful study, but as an old veteran of arms control probes, I frankly see this as only a long shot.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Nuclear Desalting of Water (Nuclear Power), 1 of 3) 3 In his March 11 memorandum, Komer remarked: “Israel might conceivably agree to Jerry's scheme if Nasser would agree to a freeze on any new conventional weapons. But none of us old Arab hands see a prayer of this happening. As for Nasser denying himself the nuclear option if we gave him a big reactor too, why should we pay this price? Nasser has no nuclear potential, so we'd be paying something for nothing.” 4 In his March 11 memorandum, Komer wrote: “We have already made clear to Israel that we would insist on IAEA controls over any new desalting reactor we helped them build. But Jerry's idea that we go further and insist they also put their French-supplied Dimona reactor under IAEA would generate a violent Israeli reaction (as already occurred in response to a false leak that we were considering just this). The Israelis already allow us to secretly police Dimona, anyway.” 5 The Department of State's response to Wiesner's suggestions is in a March 29 memorandum from Read to Smith. (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383) 147. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 147. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 21, 1966. SUBJECT Appointment of Coordinator on Desalting Projects in Israel and the United Arab Republic The attached memorandum 2 speaks for itself, but I wish to comment on three points: (1) I believe Governor Harriman would be an excellent choice as the United States coordinator on the proposed desalting projects. Other possibilities as coordinator, any of whom could perform with distinction, include Gene Black, Doug Dillon, and Mac Bundy. All of these people not only have the sensitivity and the broad grasp required for the job, but are thoroughly acquainted with what it takes to guide a project through the Washington structure. (2) I consider it important to link the Israeli project to a possible United Arab Republic project with a view to making significant progress on controlling the spread of nuclear weapons development. 3 We see a promising opportunity to work toward that goal through acceptance by both Israel and the United Arab Republic of IAEA safeguards, which provide a verifiable control system. I would stress also that in moving ahead we not lose sight of the importance of using our cooperation on this matter to obtain effective safeguards over the existing Dimona Reactor in Israel. (3) In view of the current state of our relations with Nasser, I believe any public announcement on the appointment of a coordinator should be related only to the possible Israeli project. (We would, however, privately inform Cairo at an appropriate time of our willingness to undertake an economic feasibility study in the United Arab Republic in the context of a possible understanding on safeguards with both Israel and the United Arab Republic.) Such an announcement should not be made before we have reached an understanding privately with the Israelis on what we have in mind to announce. Some delay in making the announcement would also help to mitigate a foreseeable tendency on the Arabs' part to associate the nuclear desalting issue with the announcement just made on our sale of military aircraft to Israel. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. 2 Not printed. The May 21 State Department staff memorandum for the President asked for a decision on naming a high-level U.S. coordinator for desalination issues. 3 The State Department's views are more fully set out in a March 29 memorandum from Read to Smith. (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 63 D 383) 148. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 148. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 30, 1966, 2:30 p.m. SUBJECT Appointment of Coordinator on Desalting Projects in Israel and the United Arab Republic In the attached memorandum 2 Secretary Rusk recommends you name a high-level coordinator to explore conditions under which we might cooperate on nuclear desalting plants in Israel and the UAR. (The Israelis, understandably, want the coordinator attached to the White House rather than State.) The coordinator would look into using these projects to negotiate IAEA controls on all existing and future nuclear installations in both countries. Sec. Rusk also recommends we undertake economic feasibility studies of both plants. Before acting on these recommendations, we wished you to have available a clear account of the issues the coordinator will face—and our government—as we move forward in this matter. Dr. Hornig's staff, Charles Schultze's and mine all collaborated in this staffing exercise. Here are the four key questions. 1. Can these projects be economic ? The recently completed joint U.S.-Israeli engineering study of the proposed Israeli desalting/electric power plant shows it is technologically feasible. 3 While establishing the cost of producing water, it did not address the economics of future water use. We know a lot less about the UAR project. Since it is primarily a nuclear electric power plant with a small desalting capability, the water economics will be secondary; but we need to know whether the nuclear power plant would be more economic than an oil-fueled one. The economic analysis we have makes clear that the Israeli plant will not produce water at currently competitive costs unless financed by grant or at heavily concessional rates. Eshkol himself has said that only if the project could be financed at “zero interest rate” could it be done without putting an unacceptable strain on the Israeli economy. To illustrate, Israelis estimate the current maximum value of agricultural water in their remote southern Negev desert area at about 16 per 1000 gallons—which happens to be the actual cost of supplying water there from the Jordan River diversion works. By comparison: —At 8.4% interest (about equal to commercial rates), water from the proposed plant would cost 67 per 1000 gallons. —At 4.6% interest (half way between AID terms for Israel and Ex-Im Bank terms) it would cost 43.4 per 1000 gallons. —At no interest, repayable in 30 years, cost of water would be 25 per 1000 gallons. —And each of these costs should be increased by about 7 per 1000 gallons to cover the costs of delivery. An outright gift of any part of the capital would, of course, lower the cost of water. For example, if 4.6% money were replaced by grant, the cost would be lowered by 2 per 1000 gallons for each $10 million. But with no concessional capital financing and at present water prices, an annual subsidy of about $16 million would be required. But these projections, based on present economic conditions in Israel, are not a proper basis for decision. We need an authoritative evaluation of the water economics of Israel in the 1970's. After all, the plant is being considered because of future water shortage in the country. Therefore, it will be necessary to: —Analyze supply and demand factors (population growth, industrial investment, agricultural expansion, decreasing natural water supply) which will determine the price of water. —Project into that context the relative advantages of desalting with nuclear as opposed to non-nuclear fuels. —Study alternative sources of water (such as filtered sea water for limited uses) and ways to do without water. The study would, in addition, have to get into basic questions on water supply and use in the 1970's. Israel is one of the best case studies we have, and we would like to put the best minds in the country on it. 2. Will these projects undercut our efforts to stem proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East? a Israel appears unlikely to give up its nuclear option by accepting controls on Dimona and all future reactors. Eshkol still has not answered your persuasive May 1965 letter urging him to accept IAEA safeguards. So we may not get much more than we already have—Eshkol's assurance that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. If we cannot strike the cross-the-board bargain Rusk recommends, should we go ahead with nuclear desalting anyway, thereby sacrificing the one bargaining counter possibly big enough to get Israel off the nuclear weapons track? State's paper leaves this up in the air. b Even if Israel accepted IAEA safeguards on all its reactors, would they be adequate assurance against weapons proliferation? You have strongly urged Eshkol to accept safeguards as the best means of controlling existing reactors. This has been our policy throughout the Atoms for Peace program. However, despite our official endorsement of IAEA controls, some disarmament experts are skeptical about the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in a crisis. With countries as mutually hostile as Israel and the UAR, it is not hard to imagine a situation in which they might cheat or try to abrogate the safeguards. If they could get away with it, we would have enhanced the potential of each to build nuclear weapons without establishing compensating controls. From the viewpoint of preventing nuclear proliferation, it might be better to have no new nuclear reactors in the Middle East and to look more closely at desalting with non-nuclear fuels, especially if nuclear desalting shows no clearcut economic advantage. 3. If we decide to go ahead for the sake of desalting, should we link the Israeli and UAR projects ? Secretary Rusk suggests we make a stab at nuclear safeguards by doing a project in both countries, to give us bargaining leverage. (Jerry Wiesner wrote you along the same lines.) He argues that one country would hardly forswear nuclear weapons unless the other did, and the politics of the Middle East make it risky to help one side on any nuclear project without balancing on the other. On the other hand, there are persuasive arguments against linking the two: —Helping the UAR would forfeit most of the political kudos we could expect from helping only Israel. —It may not be politically feasible for some time to go ahead with any capital project in the UAR, much less a nuclear one. So it may be unwise to tie the Israeli project to a balancing project in the UAR. In any case, the UAR project is primarily an electric power plant and is, therefore, not symmetrical with the Israeli project. —Nasser has little immediate hope of developing nuclear weapons. If we could strike a deal with Israel on safeguards, we might be able to persuade him to accept them without giving him a plant. After all, getting Israel off the nuclear track would be a big gain for him at little cost since he would be sacrificing no potential weapons of his own. —It is probably unrealistic to expect Israel to accept safeguards on all its reactors. So a private deal with Israel on nuclear self-restraint may be the best we can hope for. Realistically, quiet bilateral U.S. approaches to both parties might be as good a bet as urging public commitment to safeguards. Bilateral understandings might be worked out with quite different bargaining counters in each country provided we could give each essential assurance that the other would not go nuclear. 4. Can adequate USG financing be made available for the Israeli project? State's paper includes $20–45 million in grants from Interior and AEC, but if our own proposed plant in Los Angeles goes ahead using the same technology, both Interior and AEC agree that there would be little or no technological justification for going to the Congress for a large grant to develop the same technology in Israel. Moreover, Congressman Aspinall and other members of the House Interior Committee oppose aiding any such project abroad. Current thinking calls for $48 million in local currency from PL 480 sales, but AID and Agriculture policy toward Israel calls for a shift to Title IV dollar sales. So no new large holdings of local currency will be accumulating, and current holdings are programmed to the hilt. Dave Bell believes AID should not finance any such project unless it can pay its own way without continuing subsidy. As nearly as we can tell from Executive Branch discussions so far, it is unlikely that our coming recommendations on the Water for Peace program will propose a new source of U.S. capital aid for large-scale desalting plants. So for the $200 million project, the only likely source of U.S. funds under current policies would be, say, $50 million from Ex-Im. The rest would have to be raised in world money markets at interest rates which would make the project uneconomic. Based on likely sources of financing, the water cost appears closer to 47 per 1000 gallons than to the 35 cited in State's paper. To sort these questions out, we support Secretary Rusk's recommendations that: 1. You appoint a high-level coordinator. We feel that Douglas Dillon (one of Secretary Rusk's suggestions) may be the best choice. He combines full understanding of the complex economics involved with diplomatic experience. But Secretary Rusk also mentions Averell Harriman, Gene Black, or Mac Bundy. 4 2. You instruct the coordinator to organize a U.S.-financed independent broad-gauge economic study of the Israeli project (as Secretary Rusk recommends). 5 3. You instruct the coordinator to explore the conditions under which Israel might accept safeguards on all its nuclear reactors (especially Dimona) in connection with this project (as Secretary Rusk recommends). 6 4. You instruct the coordinator to keep the UAR angle under review but not to move without your approval. We would suggest that any approach to the UAR be deferred until we know better where we stand with Israel. Sec. Rusk recommends we offer a feasibility study of the UAR project when the political climate allows, because he feels we must balance our books with the Arabs. While we agree we must do what we can to contain Arab reaction, we feel that our present relation with Cairo makes even a semi-commitment to the UAR impractical in the immediate future. We also view Israel as the key to the safeguards question, since the UAR may eventually be far easier to persuade. (Nasser has more to gain by getting Israel off the nuclear track, since he has no nuclear capability.) We do not wish to commit ourselves to anything in the UAR until we think we have a deal with Israel that would make it worth while. 7 5. You delay announcement of the coordinator at least until the end of June. Sec. Rusk agrees that we do not want it to follow too closely our aircraft sale announcement. It seems good policy to space our Israeli moves carefully in order to maintain steady momentum rather than giving too much away at once. 8 6. These issues might be worth discussion in your presence either with a group from the NSC staff, Budget Bureau, Science Adviser's office, or in a formal NSC meeting. 9 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. 1. Secret. 2 Document 147 . 3 In a May 12 memorandum to Udall and Seaborg, Schultze noted that the joint project was technically feasible, but questioned whether it was technically justifiable: “It seems to me altogether clear that essentially concurrent construction of two large first-generation desalting plants in pursuit of a single technology cannot possibly be justified… . Any decision with respect to the Israeli plant must therefore be based upon a careful study of its values in terms of different economic and technological factors than those underlying the MWD [Metropolitan Water District in California] plant.” ( Seaborg Diaries , p. 65142) 4 Neither the approve nor disapprove option was checked and no coordinator was named. 5 The approve line was checked. 6 The approve line was checked. 7 The option “Approve this approach” was checked. 8 The approve line was checked. 9 The option “White House-EOB Group” was checked. 149. Editorial Note 149. Editorial Note The economic and technical feasibility study of the Israeli project was completed in late March 1966. One of the principal conclusions of the study was that “for the quantities of electricity (200 MWe) and water (100 MGD) involved, and the cost of fossil fuel and the fixed charge rates considered, a nuclear steam supply is more economical than a fossil-fueled source.” But the figure of 28.6 cents/1,000 gallons was exclusive of the costs of electrical transmission, water conveyance facilities, and the cost of land. (Memorandum from Udall and Ramey to the President, March 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, E 11–3) Because of “a host of political, economic, and financial considerations,” Herman Pollack advised Secretary Rusk to transmit the report to the White House without State Department approval, which Rusk did on March 29. (Memorandum from Pollack to the Secretary, March 23; ibid.) On June 15 President Johnson called a meeting of his key staff members to discuss, among other things, naming a high-level water projects coordinator. In a June 14 briefing paper, Rostow characterized the debate as one between “the desalters and the disarmers,” and he urged the President to ask, “If there is no other way, how much is the Israeli project worth to us?” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I; scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XVIII ) No official record was kept of the June 15 meeting, but 2 months later, Harold Saunders recorded his impressions. Saunders reported that the President asked Rostow “how fully committed to the Israelis we are on this project.” When Rostow said that it appeared that the United States was not committed “to any specific line of approach,” Johnson asked him to research the nature and extent of the commitment, “and then 'tell me what I ought to do.'” (Memorandum for the Record, August 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, Harold H. Saunders Files, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona, 4/1/66–12/31/66; Saunders mistakenly recollected the date of the meeting as June 22.) 150. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 150. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 10, 1966. SUBJECT Water for Peace Program As you may recall, you and Secretary Udall agreed last November to set up an interdepartmental committee to produce a report recommending what the United States, with other nations, should do to contribute to the solution of water problems throughout the world. (Tab B) 2 Interior chairs the committee and you named me to represent the Department. A task force set up for the purpose has prepared a draft report and our committee is now considering final recommendations. The Interior Department is proposing that these recommendations be submitted by you and Secretary Udall jointly to the President. Since we will be at the final drafting within a few days, it would be helpful to have your reactions at this time. This endeavor goes back to a speech (Tab C) 3 the President made last October 7 at the Desalting Symposium in Washington in which he announced the beginning of a Water for Peace program. This speech has been the main source of guidance for the Interdepartmental Committee and its Task Force. The essence of what he said was to call upon other nations to join us in creating an “international crash program to deal with the world's water resources” and a special international water fund. He announced his intention to convene within a year an international conference “to deal with all the world's water problems” and his support for international research programs and other efforts to improve knowledge and skills in the water resources field. Our Committee has selected twelve from the comprehensive recommendations in the draft report of the Task Force that seemed especially appropriate for priority attention and action. (Tab A) 4 In arriving at these, the following considerations were relevant: 1. We singled out community water supply for the direct personal use of people as warranting high priority. This is also fully in line with the emphasis in the President's speech. However, we recognized that water resources are only one important economic resource and that plans and programs for water projects must be based on each country's own broader development needs. 2. We found that in virtually all developing countries there is a lack of understanding of many aspects of their water problems, lack of basic data, lack of trained personnel and, in short, an inability to deal with their problems. Hence, we placed a high priority on training, education and related efforts to improve this situation. 3. Capital assistance will be required in larger amounts than in the past, but in the immediate future existing international sources seem adequate. We should be watchful to see that capital sources are replenished if and when needed to finance expanded water development projects. The obstacles to establishing a new international fund for water projects at this time are formidable and it has not been included in the initial program. If normal international sources are ever inadequate, we should, of course, reconsider the idea and explore with others the desirability of forming a special international water fund. 4. Desalting has an especial appeal; it is dramatic; the United States has a leading position in this field; large-scale projects might well contribute to technological progress. We favor using this technique in areas where it makes good economic sense. The relative costs of other methods of providing new water must always be weighed. We realize that certain imponderables, including political considerations, should be taken into account. Each case should be judged on its individual merits. 5. Although the United States has done a good deal to assist other nations to improve their water resources, it is in our interest to follow through on President Johnson's initiatives and to provide new leadership and stimulus to efforts to solve the world's water problems. International water programs are closely related to food and health programs, in which the United States is very active. We also would appear to have a responsibility and an opportunity to be of all possible assistance in this critical area. We should embrace the opportunity as a contribution to our foreign policy objectives to help bring peace and well-being to mankind. 6. The United States is not only doing a big bilateral job through AID but it supports the multilateral water programs carried out under the United Nations family and affiliated international banking institutions. Yet our efforts and those of other countries are not keeping pace with global needs. The water problem, like the food problem, is partially the result of the population explosion. 7. It is tentatively estimated that the priority recommendations might cost about $30 million the first year, $50 million the second year, and might level off at about $90 million the third year. These are still very rough estimates. We do not plan to suggest any specific year for the first year, leaving the White House strategists to decide whether an FY–67 Supplemental is desirable or practical. At the moment it is not clear what sort of draft legislation, including appropriations, should be suggested to the President nor can I indicate very precisely when the report will be in your hands. It is possible you may have it by the end of June. In this memorandum I have tried to give you a brief picture of the course we are following and some of the rationale behind it. I would appreciate an indication as to whether you subscribe to the program as it is evolving. Recommendation: It is recommended that you 1. Approve the priority recommendations at Tab A. 5 or 2. Meet with SCI and IO to discuss the Water for Peace Program. 6 1 Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. No classification marking. Drafted by Lightner (SCI) and Pollack and cleared by Kotschnig (IO). Also sent to U. Alexis Johnson. 2 Not attached; see footnote 5, Document 144 . 3 Not attached; see footnote 3, Document 144 . 4 Not printed. The recommendations included establishment of a Water for Peace office and sponsorship of an international Water for Peace conference in May 1967. 5 U. Alexis Johnson approved this recommendation on June 16. 6 No option was checked. 151. Editorial Note 151. Editorial Note The appointment of a U.S. coordinator on desalting projects in Israel and the United Arab Republic was considered and discussed in the summer of 1966. According to a June 7, 1966, memorandum from Rostow to the President, the appointment was a sensitive one because of the large sum of money involved and because desalination touched on the issue of nuclear power regulation. Israel was interested and preferred that the coordinator be attached to the White House rather than to the State Department. Israel approved of W. Averell Harriman, whom Secretary Rusk had proposed on May 21 (see Document 147 ), but he was not chosen. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow) On July 25 Rostow sent the President a list of items for discussion, including one on considering appointing Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador to the Organization of American States, negotiator for the desalting initiative. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, July 25; ibid.) Rostow reported on July 29 that “Bunker is OK with his clients,” and that “Bunker tells me Sec. Rusk mentioned this as a possible assignment; and he likes the idea.” (Ibid.) Bunker was officially designated as the U.S. coordinator in a memorandum from Bromley Smith at the White House to Executive Secretary of the Department of State Benjamin Read on August 19. (Ibid., NSC Special Committee Files, Desalination) Public announcement of Bunker's appointment was delayed until October. On October 7 Rostow noted: “Apart from the Bunker-desalting announcement and the leftover $6 million, this is the last such Israeli aid move we anticipate before November 8th.” (Ibid., Memos to the President) President Johnson publicly announced the appointment during a press conference on October 13; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, page 1165. In a July 1967 memorandum to Bundy, Harold Saunders recollected: “The main reason for appointment Bunker was that we could not trust any element of the bureaucracy to provide a dispassionate recommendation for the President on desalting in Israel since so many emotions pro and con were involved. Bunker's job was first—and maybe most importantly—to establish a US position and then to negotiate a deal with the Israelis.” (Memorandum from Saunders to Bundy, July 27, 1967; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Desalination) 152. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 152. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 12, 1966. SUBJECT Next Steps on Israeli Desalting Ambassador Bunker is reading into the problem. 2 But as you know, he has a quick job to do on India/Pak arms, and he has hopes for a couple of weeks' long overdue leave. We have worked out a tentative schedule with him that I think should be satisfactory. To nail this down, I recommend you approve the following: 1. Timetable . Bunker would spend 2–3 weeks beginning 29 August digging in and organizing whatever further study he needs to have done. Then he would go off for about 3 weeks while staff work moves ahead. Returning mid-October, he would wrap up his preliminary work and present his recommendations to you in early November. If it looks appropriate then, he could have a get-acquainted session with his Israeli counterpart before he gets deeply involved in the American summit in early December. 3 2. Announcement . If you approve this general approach, I would vote to delay our announcement until mid-September when Bunker has collected his thoughts. We will know better then how he plans to proceed, and I should think that would still be early enough to meet our domestic needs. Meanwhile, I could quietly pass word to the Israelis of this timetable. 4 3. Terms of reference . If you are ready to put Bunker in business, I suggest you approve the attached terms of reference (checked with State). 5 Briefly these instruct him to: —Take till early November to review all available economic data (perhaps with the help of a good economist or other specialist) to find out whether further study is needed. A clear picture of Israel's water position in the 1970's is needed to determine how much concessional or grant financing or continuing subsidy would be involved if we went ahead. Don Hornig argues rightly that we should not pile one study on another, and the Israelis will not stand still for that either. But my understanding is that we still do not have an economic picture of Israel in the 1970's which gives us a clear picture of what water prices will be acceptable then. —Recommend what further study may be needed after he has completed these preliminary reviews. If he feels we need no more study, he should recommend a USG position. If he thinks we should go ahead with the project, he should recommend a way to finance it. He should also recommend the timing and content of his first approach to the Israelis. —Look especially closely at the problem of requiring the Israelis to accept IAEA safeguards on this, Dimona and all future reactors. Our current position is to make this our price for going ahead with a nuclear plant. We know the Israelis will not accept this condition readily, if at all. But we would stick with our position rather than prompting the bureaucracy to begin thinking about fallback positions already. However, our coordinator will have to know this problem inside out to argue our case with the Israelis. Moreover, we must be realistic about Israeli resistance on this point and will have to know whether there are other good ways to achieve our objective. 6 This is quite consistent with the earlier approach worked out with Don Hornig's and Charles Schultze's staff, and we have checked it with both Bunker and Hare. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. 2 See Document 151 . 3 The “approve” option was checked. 4 The “approve” option was checked. 5 Not attached. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Desalination. 6 The “Approve terms of reference” option was checked. 153. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of the Interior Udall to President Johnson 153. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of the Interior Udall to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 31, 1966. Dear Mr. President: We are transmitting to you by separate memorandum designed to be made public 2 our recommendations on the Water for Peace Program you announced last October 7. 3 Enclosed with this letter are preliminary cost estimates at two possible levels of funding. 4 We will refine these estimates as you deem appropriate and develop the requisite new legislation which will be required. We have made no specific recommendation regarding the international fund you foresaw in your October 7 address. We have concluded that in the immediate future international funding sources seem adequate, but we will keep the need for international funds under constant review. Although we propose that a Water for Peace office should be established, and agree that both Departments must be involved in its operation and management, we have not attempted to delineate at this juncture precisely how this effort would be organized. This we will do after receiving your reaction to our program recommendations. In addition to the $1.2 million appropriation to finance the International Water for Peace Conference which is being requested in the current fiscal year, we have also agreed to seek $2.5 million to finance fiscal year 1967 United States activities in support of the International Hydrological Decade which will provide an essential scientific base for the Water for Peace Program. We will, of course, be pleased to supply any additional material or information that you consider appropriate. Our Departments stand prepared to do anything necessary to move this program forward. Respectfully yours, Dean Rusk Stewart Udall 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, E 11. No classification marking. 2 Not printed; there is no record that the memorandum was ever publicly released. 3 See footnote 3, Document 144 . 4 Not printed. 154. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to the President's Special Assistant (Califano) 154. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to the President's Special Assistant (Califano) 1 Washington, September 17, 1966. SUBJECT Water For Peace At the meeting the other day 2 you raised the question of where we stood. I assume you are aware that a fat report, “Water for Peace” together with a copy of a letter to Secretaries Rusk and Udall from Holum and Pollack was sent to the President just over a week ago under a covering letter from Secretaries Rusk and Udall. 3 The Holum-Pollack letter identified 12 items drawn from the report as having high priority. 4 In his Summerville speech, September 2, the President referred to all of these items except community water development, increased support of international sources of capital, and establishment of a Water for Peace office. 5 The Bureau of the Budget recommended not releasing the Holum-Pollack letter or the Udall-Rusk letter which also mentioned the priority items until they had time to examine the budget implications and the possible perturbations to international assistance policy. 6 I agree, but also because I am concerned about the management of the program. The report is deficient in that it does not adequately deal with responsibility for implementation. As an integrated program, the priority items could add up to something worthwhile and reasonably exciting. Generally these items, while individually perhaps not dramatic, are directed toward improving conditions which now inhibit the effectiveness of our international water program. Some systematic attempt to deal with them could result in considerable improvement. The report suggests a Water for Peace office having a coordinative role guided by an interdepartmental committee. It does not say where the office is to be located. I think the attractiveness of the program will depend on having someone in charge with sufficient rank and a directive to do the job. In short, if we want to go ahead, the President probably ought to appoint someone and tell him to get the job done. While I recognize Interior's interest in water, I think the leadership here belong in State and the job might either be added to one of the Secretary's assistants for “Food for Peace” or “Fish and Wildlife” or perhaps a new one added. Dean Peterson in my office has been close to the development of this program thus far, but since he has now left, the responsibility will be undertaken by Mr. Robert Smith, a distinguished authority on water, who is just about to join my staff. We are working together with BOB in trying to speed their review and recommendations. Donald F. Hornig 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Donald Hornig, Box 4. No classification marking. 2 Not further identified. 3 Not printed; attached to Document 153 . 4 These items were: “Regional Centers for Water Resources Development; Education and Training; Increase assistance for all water projects, particularly community water supply; Cooperative studies in water pollution; Assistance to desalination plants; International rivers; International hydrological decade; Expert technical services; Support international organizations; Support US career water service; Water for Peace office; International Conference on Water for Peace.” 5 The President spoke on September 3 in Summersville, West Virginia. For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , BookII, pp. 943–947. 6 In a September 2 memorandum, Schultze advised the President not to endorse the proposals in total: “they are potentially very costly , their relationship to our existing foreign assistance programs is unclear, and administrative arrangements have not been thought through.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Water for Peace (2 of 2)) 7 Printed from a copy that indicates Hornig signed the original. 155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 19, 1966, 9:30 a.m. Mr. President: Herewith Commissioner Ramey's response to your invitation to present a personal assessment of the progress and problems in the nuclear desalting program. 2 Jim Ramey has been, as you know, an effective crusader in this effort. The memorandum reflects impatience at the pace of progress and with those who have had reservations about the program. 3 His specific recommendations are: —that you assemble those concerned and express your personal interest and support; —that the expanded program submitted to you in September 1965 by AEC and Interior be made a part of the new Water for Peace program. I have followed this field closely for some years as State Department planner. If there is any bureaucrat in this town who wants to see this program go operational more than Jim Ramey, it is I; for it could have immense foreign policy and human benefits. The problem has been that technology has not yet yielded us economic irrigation water by this route; and various bureaucrats have been afraid of getting us into either excessive subsidies or actual white elephants. On the other hand, I am not personally convinced that calculations of those who have resisted are the last word. I keep remembering that we would not have built the transcontinental railway on a conventional cost/benefit basis. Therefore, I place great store by the Bunker exercise. I believe he must keep his mind equally open to Ramey and (say) the Budget Bureau; and he must be equipped with some first-rate men who have not been fighting this war. Properly conducted, the Israeli exercise plus the project firming up for the Metropolitan Water District in California should give us some hard answers. In addition, I am told, the Water for Peace Conference will take up nuclear desalting in a serious way. As for your meeting the experts, I believe the right occasion would be a session with Bunker when he is far enough along. I assume you will wish me to make Jim Ramey's memorandum quietly available to Bunker. Make Ramey memo available to Bunker 4 Call early expert session as Ramey suggests Await Bunker report See me Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. No classification marking. 2 Not printed. The President had asked for AEC Commissioner Ramey's opinions during a July 20 meeting with AEC, AID, USIA, and other officials. (Memorandum from Ramey to the President, September 9; ibid.) 3 Ramey wrote in his memorandum: “That brings me to the principal problem that we face in the nuclear-desalting program—the doubters! … the program seems to have more than its share of persons in a staff review capacity who are inveterately negative and unconstructive in approach. For example, experience on the Committee on Foreign Desalting has been very frustrating (despite the good efforts of its Chairman) because of the negativism of the representatives from agencies other than Interior and AEC. Much time has been wasted answering superficial questions, rather than getting on with the job of planning and following an imaginative program.” 4 This option is checked. 156. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 156. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, October 14, 1966. SUBJECT Water for Peace You should be informed of a minor catastrophe which, if we cannot find means to rectify it, will badly tarnish the President's image abroad. You will recall that just a year ago the President announced the Water for Peace Program and called for a large international conference for that purpose to be held in Washington in the Spring of 1967. He referred to the Conference once again in early September of this year. 2 Invitations have been sent world-wide with the proviso, to be sure, that this was attendant upon legislation. Nevertheless, acceptances have been coming in, abstracts of papers have been received, and planning is well under way. The State Department informs me that last night the Speaker of the House informed Henry Wilson that the House Leadership had decided against seeking a rule which would permit legislation authorizing the Water for Peace Conference to be held next May. The Senate had passed this legislation in July, but when it came up in the House last week it was passed over because of objection. 3 In order to obtain action before adjournment, a rule would be required. Henry Wilson told the Speaker yesterday that this was part of the “must” legislation. Last night Wilson was told the legislation was dead. 4 I think the notion of cancelling a conference called by the President for which many foreign nations have already made preparations and submitted papers is unfortunate, to say the least. It will certainly create a poor image abroad of the President's relations with the Congress. It seems important to me that the President be made aware of this development promptly so that whatever steps are needed to obtain a rule and to move it through the House can be taken in time to get action before adjournment. 5 Don 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Water for Peace (2 of 2). No classification marking. Copies were sent to Cater and Califano. An October 15 covering memorandum from Rostow to the President reads: “I think Don Hornig is right. If you can possibly persuade the Speaker to reverse his judgment when you see him today you will be saved a quite substantial international embarrassment.” 2 The President announced during his September 3 address that the United States would sponsor an International Conference on Water for Peace in Washington in May 1967; see footnote 5, Document 154 . On September 9 the Bureau of the Budget notified the Department that the funding request had been reduced by 25 percent to $900,000. “Subsequent attempts by the Department of State to ascertain the precise basis for the reduction has elicited only the information that the original estimate was too much for one conference ('too fat').” (Memorandum from Hagan to Holum, Sisco, and Pollack, September 13; Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383) 3 The legislation, originally submitted to Congress on May 30, requested $1.2 million to defray the costs of the conference and passed the Senate on July 19. It was defeated in the House on September 19. ( Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 89th Congress, 2nd Session … 1966, vol. XXIII, p. 689) 4 On October 15 Wilson reported to the President that he had spoken with the Speaker on October 14 and that he hoped a rule could be worked out during the next week. (Memorandum from Wilson to the President, October 15; Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 11–9/OST, 10/1/65–1/31/67) 5 According to his Daily Diary, the President met with Speaker McCormack and Senator Mansfield on October 15. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Five days later, the House passed a $900,000 authorization for the conference, which was $300,000 less than originally requested. The bill passed, despite objections that the conference would be a “'booze' party at taxpayers' expense.” ( Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 89th Congress, 2nd Session … 1966, vol. XXIII, p. 689) Later that week, the funding level was again reduced, when a supplemental appropriation bill (H.R. 18381) set the total at $500,000. (Ibid.) The President signed the bill on November 8 as Public Law 89–799. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, p. 1352) 157. Editorial Note 157. Editorial Note In November 1966, the Soviets requested consideration of a renewal of the 2-year-old bilateral desalting agreement (see Document 135 ), scheduled to expire at the end of the month. When Seaborg met Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs-Designate Foy Kohler on November 25 to discuss the U.S. response, the AEC Chairman expressed concern over Soviet unresponsiveness to both the terms of the 1964 agreement and to his efforts to renew the general “peaceful uses agreement” between the two countries. (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 13, page 547) According to an undated Atomic Energy Commission chronology, since the 1964 agreement the United States had sent at least four letters proposing methods of implementation and six technical reports on desalting but had received neither documents nor firm responses in return. (Department of Energy, Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretariat Files, Folder 7) According to Seaborg's journal entry, Kohler said that the Soviets “have a basic posture on this thing—there won't be anything that gets a lot of publicity or anything new … until the Vietnam situation is over.” He recommended renewal as “consistent with the President's philosophy.” (Seaborg, Journal , Volume 13, page 547) In early December the Embassy in Moscow delivered a positive response to the Soviet request, following Department instructions to “express hope that level of cooperative activity during the next two years will be substantially higher than under lifespan of original agreement.” (Telegram 95767 to Moscow, December 2; Department of Energy, Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretariat Files, Folder 7) Officials at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs were surprised to hear of their own government's lack of responsiveness. (Telegram 3472 from Moscow, December 5; ibid.) According to a Department of Energy report, 35 reports and 2 books on desalination were sent by the Soviets under cover of a December 24 letter, which also promised responses to the other proposals. (Ibid.) 158. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) 158. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Pollack) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) 1 Washington, December 6, 1966. SUBJECT USSR Participation in Water for Peace Conference The United States will host in Washington on May 23–31, 1967 an International Conference on Water for Peace. Our posts abroad were authorized in October to extend to all countries with whom we maintain diplomatic relations invitations to participate in the Conference. On November 28, Soviet Embassy Counselor Chernyakov delivered an oral statement to Mr. Stoessel rejecting the invitation. The refusal to attend was said to be based on the fact that invitations had been extended to “Germany, China, Korea, Viet-Nam, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.” The refusal sharply protested the inclusion of “emigre governments of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.” 2 On December 1, Mr. Stoessel called in Counselor Chernyakov to explain that the Baltic countries have not and will not be invited to the Conference; that other invited countries are all members of the UN or specialized agencies of it; and, that the only UN members not invited are those with which US does not maintain diplomatic relations. Mr. Stoessel expressed our “earnest hope” that the Soviets will reconsider their decision not to attend the Conference. 3 The Water for Peace Conference is an initiative of the President, himself. He has referred to the Conference in three public statements. When the authorizing legislation was in jeopardy of being passed over in the closing hours of the last Congress, the President personally intervened to assure its passage. We have ample evidence of the President's commitment to this Conference. Failure of the Soviets to participate in the Conference would be a serious blow not only from the loss of the technical contribution which we know the Soviets can make but also to the theme of the Conference. Should the occasion present itself during your lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin, I believe it would be constructive for you to express the hope that the USSR will participate in the Water for Peace Conference. 4 1 Source: Department of State,SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383. No classification marking. Drafted by Nelson Sievering, Jr. (SCI) 2 As reported in a November 28 memorandum of conversation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, E–11 WATER RESOURCES) 3 Transmitted in telegram 105317 to Moscow, December 19. (Ibid.) 4 Ambassador Thompson discussed this with Anatoly Dobrynin on December 6, but received no response. (Memorandum of conversation, December 6; ibid.) U.S. officials tried repeatedly to secure Soviet participation: “Ambassador Kohler agreed to attempt to secure Soviet participation at the forthcoming Water for Peace Conference as an extension of their participation in the Desalination Agreement. Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, had written to Ambassador Dobrynin to urge that the Soviets reconsider their prior refusals. Secretary Udall's approach received such a flat turndown that the Department, and Ambassador Thompson agreed, has abandoned the effort to obtain Soviet participation. Other Soviet bloc countries are following the USSR lead in this matter and none have accepted invitations to attend or observe the Conference.” (Memorandum from Kratzer to Hollingsworth, March 28, 1967; Department of Energy, Archives, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Secretariat Files, Folder 9) 159. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 159. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 22, 1967. SUBJECT Water for Peace In order to provide a central point within the government for leadership and coordination of the Water for Peace program, I hereby assign to you responsibility for overall direction and coordination of the international water-related activities of the United States Government under the Water for Peace program. In fulfilling this responsibility, I expect that you will carry out the following functions on a continuing basis: —Formulate comprehensive policy, plans and evaluations of the international water-related activities of the government. —Assist in the formulation, presentation, and review of program and budgetary requirements for such activities. —Assure appropriate consideration of Water for Peace programs in foreign policy decisions. —Maintain liaison with inter-governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations dealing primarily with international water-related programs. —Provide information on Water for Peace activities to the Congress and the public and take appropriate action on their requests. I would like you to survey all of the international water-related activities currently being carried out or supported by the government, to identify needs which are not being met, and to recommend to me by October 1, new measures required to meet those needs. Therefore, I would like to have an annual report on the Water for Peace program, including recommendations for improving the coordination and effectiveness of our various bilateral and multilateral efforts. In carrying out these functions you should work closely with the Secretary of the Interior and heads of other agencies having responsibilities and technical competence in the water resources field. I request that you establish adequate organizational and staffing arrangements within the Department of State to assist you in fulfilling this assignment. 2 Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Water for Peace, Vol. 1. No classification marking. A covering memorandum from Rostow to the President reports the concurrence of Rusk, Udall, Hornig, and Schultze, and recommends signature. Johnson checked the “approved” line on Rostow's memorandum and wrote “Who do we get to run this?” next to it. 2 On May 25 Secretary Rusk established the Water for Peace Office under the direct supervision of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. On June 24 he named Robert F. Woodward as Interim Director. (Department of State Press Releases 116 (May 25, 1967) and 168 (July 28, 1967), Department of State Library) Dean Peterson was named permanent director on April 29, 1968. (Department of State Bulletin , May 20, 1968, p. 668) 160. Editorial Note 160. Editorial Note The International Conference on Water for Peace was held May 23–31, 1967, in Washington. President Johnson addressed the conference during the opening ceremonies, pledging that the United States would “continue work in every area which holds promise for the world's water needs,” and would “share the fruits of this technology with all of those who wish to share it with us.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book I, pages 555–558) The Department of State Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs considered the conference a “complete success,” and an internal report noted that “94 countries were represented together with 24 international organizations; 635 official delegates, 61 participants from international organizations, and over 2,000 observers attended.” (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 69 D 217, The Department during the Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, November 1963–January 1969, Vol. XI, Science and Technology) The proceedings of the conference were published as the International Conference on Water for Peace, May 23–31 , 1967. 161. Editorial Note 161. Editorial Note One of the technical papers presented at the Water for Peace conference, entitled “Desalted Water for Agriculture” by R. Philip Hammond, hypothesized that, with demonstrated methods of agriculture and “virtually demonstrated” methods of nuclear desalting, food could be grown with water costing 3 cents per day per person. ( International Conference on Water for Peace ) Alvin Weinberg, Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, was convinced, based on the work of his own institution, that these price estimates were “not unreasonable.” After reading the paper in draft, Weinberg determined that more research was needed, and passed the paper on to Dr. J. George Harrar at the Rockefeller Foundation because of his “longstanding interest in the development of countries, such as Mexico, that suffer from a lack of water.” Weinberg noted that the AEC was planning to conduct a small study to assess the credibility of this proposal during the summer and promised to send Harrar the results. (Letter from Weinberg to Harrar, March 23, 1967; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Desalination) Hammond's proposal focused on the creation of “agro-industrial” complexes or food factories. Weinberg wrote: “The idea of producing food in underdeveloped countries in 'food factories' rather than on farms seems very appealing to me. For if agriculture can be converted into an industrial operation in which a few experts make the primary decisions, and the workers carry out carefully specified tasks, one in principle avoids the problem of convincing countless peasants to change their individual farming methods.” (Ibid.) Harrar was also enthusiastic about the benefits, but cautioned that he was “not clear as to how quickly such an operation on some major scale might come into being economically.” He added that in a recent discussion with Israeli President David Ben-Gurion, “I understand that it is his hope and plan that atomic power for water desalination may become a reality in the Negev one day.” (Letter from Harrar to Weinberg, May 10; ibid.) Weinberg reported to AID Administrator Bell on June 20 that the AEC's study of the “credibility and economics” of Hammond's proposal was underway. Although no conclusions had been reached, the trend was positive. “When these ideas were first discussed within the nuclear community, they were generally received with skepticism,” Weinberg explained. “However, in the past few months there have been enough technical developments, particularly in the technology of desalting the sea, to cause people to look much more seriously at the matter. In particular, AEC Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg and AEC Commissioner James T. Ramey have expressed interest in such agro-industrial complexes in several of their recent speeches.” (Letter from Weinberg to Bell, June 20; ibid.) 162. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council's Special Committee on the Middle East Crisis (Bundy) 162. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council's Special Committee on the Middle East Crisis (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 7, 1967. Mac— This is related to your request for information concerning various plans that have been kicking around in the Executive Branch for improving the availability of low-cost water in the dry areas of the Middle East. On May 23 the President addressed the Water for Peace Conference. 2 At that time he called for an intensified effort in water resources development world-wide and asked the Secretary of State to establish a Water for Peace Office to provide leadership for this Government's efforts. Subsequently the Secretary released a statement announcing the creation of the new office to be headed by a special assistant under the direct supervision of Gene Rostow. This is the extent of State Department implementation of the Presidential directive. The special assistant has not been named and the office is not operational. 3 A needle to State at this time would help activate the machinery that is now critically needed as a result of the Middle East crisis. 4 Charles E. Johnson 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, C. Johnson Memos, Box 5. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Bromley Smith. 2 See Document 160 . 3 On June 15 Johnson reported to Rostow on progress on planning from AID and Interior, but nothing from the State Department. Since the Bureau of the Budget had told the Department that it would have to support the Water for Peace office out of existing funding, Johnson was not optimistic about its effectiveness: “In view of the Presidential commitment and the great international interest in this program, it is unfortunate that the program is in danger of being nibbled to death.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Box 21) 4 The Water for Peace Advisory Group scheduled its first meeting for August 10. (Memorandum from Woodward to the Advisory Group, August 1; ibid., Subject File, Water for Peace (1 of 2)) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 163. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to Secretary of State Rusk 163. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 13, 1967. Dear Dean: The recent developments in the Middle East prompt me to recall to your attention certain projects which have been under consideration for this region for some time in the past. I am referring to the two dual-purpose nuclear desalting projects, one proposed for installation in Israel and the other proposed for installation in the United Arab Republic, which were the subject of your memorandum to the President of May 21, 1966, 2 and with respect to which Ambassador Bunker was serving as the President's special coordinator. We recognize that the situation in the Middle East is enormously complex and that the question of what disposition should be made of these projects may not appear to be one of urgent priority. Nevertheless, it occurs to us that the possible usefulness of these projects in the overall settlement of the Middle East dispute may be rather significant and that they should not be lost sight of in the efforts which are now under way to develop a possible settlement. As you know, both Israel and the UAR have attached considerable importance to their respective projects. The proposed Israeli project, in particular, always had the advantage of providing Israel with a source of water not subject to interruption by neighboring states and not dependent on the allocation of the already inadequate water resources of the Jordan Valley. Once again, it seems to me that the recent events may well intensify the problem of water allocation in the area rather than ease it. One or more desalting plants would both add significantly to the total volume of water available to the region and help overcome the problems of excessive salinity of Lake Tiberias, which is currently a limiting factor on the usefulness of the waters of the lower Jordan. We believe it is interesting to note that at the recent Water for Peace Conference in Washington, which took place after the Middle East crisis had developed, UAR and Israeli representatives participated in a collateral meeting of nations interested in nuclear desalting and reaffirmed the strong interest of their governments in these projects. At the same time, it has been recognized that there could be substantial political advantages to the United States in giving support to these projects. Among other things, proceeding with the projects would introduce international safeguards into the area on a major scale, and U.S. assistance could possibly be used to secure Israeli agreement to place its entire nuclear program, including the Dimona project, under IAEA safeguards. It seems to me that the recent events probably increase rather than decrease the danger that one or more of the Middle Eastern countries will feel, however mistakenly, that its best interest in the future would be served by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We recognize that questions have been raised as to the economic desirability of these proposed projects. The study completed by Ambassador Bunker before his departure led, in our view, to a favorable finding on this point. It demonstrated that the water that would be supplied by the proposed Israeli project would have substantial value to the Israeli economy, although, as anticipated, outside assistance would be required to overcome the gap between the tangible value of this water and its cost of production in the proposed dual-purpose plant. We believe that the possible role that these projects could play in the Middle Eastern settlement is such that the financial assistance that they would require is more readily justifiable now than any time in the past. As first plants of their kind, they would give each country a start in the application of a technology which, with the improvements which we believe are inevitable, can play a major role in the future peaceful development of this area. As you know, we have made extensive studies of this project and will be most pleased to cooperate with the Departments of State and Interior, and with the NSC Committee just named by the President, in giving them urgent consideration in the coming weeks. Commissioner Ramey is in frequent touch with members of your staff in connection with these projects and I have asked him to take responsibility for any necessary follow-up. I am also sending copies of this letter to Mac Bundy and Walt Rostow in view of their association with you in the study of the Middle East situation. Cordially, Glenn T. Seaborg 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Desalination. Confidential. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. A handwritten note on the source text reads “to Bator per our conversation.” 2 Document 147 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Seaborg signed the original. 164. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 164. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 19, 1967, 7:10 p.m. Mr. President: Gen. Eisenhower is clearly pushing a Middle East desalinization initiative pretty hard—perhaps pressed by Adm. Strauss. 2 In the following passage from a letter to Gen. Goodpaster, dated July 19, 1967, there is even a bit of implied pressure. “Regarding the suggestion that the basic problems of the Mid East might be greatly ameliorated by desalinization of water through atomic power, I shall be interested to see whether the administration devotes to it any serious study. Of course, even if feasibility, both technical and financial, could be proved, there is still no guarantee that the contending parties would adopt it. However the theory is that if successful the plan would assure to each side such great advantages that it would be difficult for either to refuse to cooperate.” 3 I'm having lunch with Andy tomorrow. I already told him on the phone: —The President has a long and deep interest in the matter, having personally inserted the reference to the deserts in his June 19 speech; 4 —The Bunker mission made a good start; —Our Water for Peace man is hard at work; —We have galvanized the World Bank into planning in this field. I also pointed out that the surfacing of any such initiatives involved delicate matters of timing. W.W. Rostow 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Special Committee, #2, July 1, 1967–July 31, 1967 [2 of 2]. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Harold Saunders. 2 Former AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss handed General Eisenhower a proposal on June 23 (see Document 166 ), and President Johnson spoke with Eisenhower on June 25. Eisenhower repeated for the President remarks he had made to Ambassador Thompson: “I said as I study this problem, there are two problems in the Mid-East that have got to be settled before there is ever going to be even a modus operandi there in the Mid-East. One of them is these waters and the other one is these refugees.” Eisenhower suggested setting up a corporation in which the United States would own 51 percent of the stock and sell the remainder to bankers around the world. Johnson was noncommittal and said that Kosygin had no response to the idea. (Conversation between former President Eisenhower and President Johnson, June 25, 9:44 p.m.; Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F67.13, Side A, PNO 1; transcript prepared by the Office of the Historian especially for this volume) On July 18 Ambassador Bruce reported from London on a similar proposal by financier Edmund de Rothschild for three nuclear desalting plants for Israel, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip to assist in the resettlement of more than 200,000 refugees. British Prime Minister Wilson was convinced of the technical-economic feasibility of the plan, but the Foreign Office was concerned about the cost. According to Embassy officials in London: “Apart from the obvious political difficulties, it was mainly a question of a very large amount of cheap money, which the UK did not have available.” Rothschild was apparently willing to put up 1 million pounds sterling of his own money. (Airgram A–222 from London, July 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, E 11–3 NEAR EAST) 3 The full text of General Goodpaster's letter has not been found. 4 The President said: “In a climate of peace, we here will do our full share to help with a solution for the refugees. We here will do our full share in support of regional cooperation. We here will do our share, and do more, to see that the peaceful promise of nuclear energy is applied to the critical problems of desalting water and helping to make the deserts bloom.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book I, p. 634) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 165. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 165. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 26, 1967, 3:30 p.m. SUBJECT Eisenhower Proposal for Mid-East Water Project A proposal for a bold, large-scale Mid-East water project based on (1) very large nuclear desalting plants and (2) a Comsat type of corporation to finance and manage them has been proposed in a memorandum from Admiral Strauss to President Eisenhower. 2 It was reported by Sulzberger ( N.Y. Times , July 16, 1967) 3 that the Strauss memorandum had been commended to you by President Eisenhower and handed to me for detailed study. I have never received any document from either Admiral Strauss or President Eisenhower. However, on July 11, 1967, Dr. Alvin Weinberg, Director of the AEC's Oak Ridge National Laboratory, visited me on behalf of Admiral Strauss to tell me of the memo to Eisenhower and to outline their general line of thinking. Tomorrow (Thursday, July 27) Admiral Strauss will call on me and at that time I hope to get a copy of the memo. 4 The ideas in the memo are based on: —The work at ORNL on the economies of scale in both water and power production which can be achieved with very large nuclear desalting plants , perhaps 10 times larger than those on the drawing boards now; —The concept of the agricultural factory , combining desalted water and the most intensive scientific farming. By optimum use of water, much less would be needed and its value enhanced. For example, instead of the U.S. average of 4000 gallons of water per day to feed one person, one could get by on 200 gallons/day; —The idea of using the cheap electric power to mechanize the agricultural factory and establish industry. It is impossible at this time to evaluate the project or to answer even such simple questions as how to use the fantastic amounts of electric power (2,400,000 kilowatts) which would be produced. My intention is simply to listen to Admiral Strauss and to get something in writing if I can. Donald Hornig 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, NSC Special Committee, #2, July 1, 1967–July 31, 1967 [1 of 2]. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Rostow and Bundy. 2 Document 166 . 3 In the article, “Foreign Affairs: Water and Work—II,” Sulzberger commented that former President Eisenhower “talks of up to one billion gallons of sweet water being thus produced each day,” and Eisenhower was quoted as saying that “The project should be really enormous because the bigger the plant, the more economic the operation.” (Notes for Use in Event of Consideration of Possible Feasibility of Large Water Projects for Middle East, attached to a memorandum from Saunders to Bundy, July 24; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, NSC Special Committee Memos—McGeorge Bundy) 4 Hornig met with Strauss on July 27 and obtained a copy of Document 166 . He reported that Strauss had said the Eisenhower proposal had “got into the press by accident and not by design. It was their hope that you would take it up as your plan.” Strauss also made explicit the link between this proposal and Rothschild's proposal: “Both he and Lord Rothschild are convinced that private capital can be obtained for the project through a Comsat type of corporation.” See footnote 2, Document 164 . (Memorandum from Hornig to the President, August 1; Johnson Library, Papers of Donald F. Hornig) 166. Memorandum From Admiral Lewis J. Strauss to Former President Eisenhower 166. Memorandum From Admiral Lewis J. Strauss to Former President Eisenhower 1 Undated. A PROPOSAL FOR OUR TIME Attention to the debates in the United Nations since the end of May must convince the observer that an end to the trouble in the Near East is not in sight. The introduction of a new and dramatic element will be required to establish a climate in which peace can begin to be negotiated. The resources of diplomacy appear exhausted, and the “lie direct” has been exchanged so often that men can hardly be expected to reach agreement by rational discussion in the atmosphere which has been created. The two fundamental problems in the Near East are (a) water, and (b) displaced populations. It is these issues basically which have exacerbated international relationships in that area over the years, and they are not to be resolved by political or military measures. By a simple, bold, and imaginative step, it is in our power to solve both problems. Let a corporation be formed with a charter resembling that of Comsat, with the Government subscribing to half of the stock, the balance to be offered for public subscription in the security markets of the world. The amount thus to be raised, say $200,000,000, would be used to begin construction of the first of three large nuclear plants for the dual purpose of producing kilowatts of electrical energy and desalting sea water, with emphasis on the latter purpose. Two of the installations would be located at appropriate points on the Mediterranean coast of Israel and a smaller one at the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba in either Jordan or Israel, as the most suitable terrain may dictate. Design and construction contracts would be let on bids in the several countries which have had experience in building large nuclear reactors, i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.S.R. The cost of the plants, beyond the sum raised by subscription to the common stock, would be financed in succeeding steps by an international marketing of convertible debentures. These would bear no interest for the first years (approximately the time required to construct the first plant). Operation of the plants would be made the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of which agency each of the major belligerents, fortunately, is a member, and that agency would also have jurisdiction and control of reprocessing of fuel elements to insure that all nuclear material was accounted for. The International Atomic Energy Agency would also sell the power and water and service the debentures with the proceeds. During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States allocated for peaceful uses overseas considerably more than sufficient uranium to fuel these installations, and it is still available. The first plant would be designed to produce daily the equivalent of some 450,000,000 gallons of fresh water (incidentally, more than the combined flow of the three main tributaries which make up the Jordan River). It would also produce an amount of power which, though in excess of the present needs of the area, would attract industry and would be used to pump the fresh water into the water-starved areas of Israel, Jordan, and other Arab countries—perhaps even including part of Egypt east of the Nile Valley. The introduction of fresh water from all three plants into the arid and semi-arid areas would have the effect of opening to settlement many hundred square miles which heretofore have never supported human life (other than on a nomadic basis), and the controversy over the division of the Jordan River would become de minimis. The work of building the great plants, laying the pipe lines, constructing reservoirs, power lines, irrigation ditches, etc., will absorb the unskilled labor of thousands of displaced persons. When the plants are in operation, the labor force could be settled in irrigated areas under conditions far superior to any life that they have ever experienced. Solely as a measure of magnitude, it might be noted that the completed project will represent substantially less than one year's expenditure on the moon program. It will pay for itself and return income in perpetuity, retiring the borrowings incurred and rewarding the governments and individuals with vision enough to have subscribed to it initially. Cooperation of the Arab and Israeli governments will be necessary in order to agree upon a modus vivendi for allocating water and power, and it will be apparent that any government which simply declined to discuss or participate in such a cooperative arrangement would have to answer to its citizens sooner or later. Were the President of the United States to electrify the world by such a proposal, as President Eisenhower did in his Atoms-for-Peace speech to the United Nations in 1953, it would be hailed and welcomed by millions who now can see no way out of the morass in which the powers are presently floundering with its threat of triggering more widespread war. The proposal might well be the beginning of a new life in the lands of the oldest civilizations. The proposal, of course, does not settle the boundary disputes and other acute issues now confronting the belligerents, but their settlement would be immensely accelerated and facilitated by the pressure from all sides to get ahead with such a project where delay would be counted in human lives and misery. It could be announced that no affirmative steps would be taken until negotiations at least began. In the atmosphere that would immediately follow such a proposal, the leaders of the Near Eastern countries would be invited to come together on the basis of the proposals. They have a common forum in the International Atomic Energy Agency. Private capital both in the United States and Great Britain would certainly respond to the challenge of such an enterprise on the initiative of the Government. Footnote: It may be argued that the cost of de-salted water if it exceeds 15 per thousand gallons will be too high for agriculture (though citrus farming can use water at more than twice this figure). There was an identical objection by those who counselled the Atomic Energy Commission that the development of electrical energy from nuclear fission would never be economic. Although the advice came from respected scientific quarters, it proved to be wrong. The Commission found that the cost per kilowatt hour fell very rapidly as the size of plants increased (from an estimated 18 mills per k.w.h. to less than 3 mills, and the cost is still going down). Within the past year, nuclear power has become fully competitive with power conventionally produced, and more than half of the new power plants contracted in the United States in 1966 are nuclear. The same factors will lower the cost of water. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Box 21. No classification marking. The source text is a copy of the memorandum that Strauss gave to former President Eisenhower on June 23, which the White House did not receive until July 27 when Hornig met with Strauss (see footnote 4, Document 165 ). An attached cover letter from Strauss to Hornig, July 28, reads: “This is a legible copy of the memorandum we discussed yesterday and which you wanted to show to the President. I hope to follow it up on Monday [July 31] with a memorandum in the brief form that you thought might be acceptable with the cost and other calculations 'omitting the tables.' I very much enjoyed my talk with you and Dr. Smith.” No memorandum of July 31 by Strauss has been found. 167. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council's Special Committee on the Middle East Crisis (Bundy) to President Johnson 167. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council's Special Committee on the Middle East Crisis (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 28, 1967. SUBJECT Israeli Desalting Project and Middle East Water With all the talk about water projects in connection with a Middle East settlement, I think it would be wise to get Ellsworth Bunker's successor to work. 2 We would not announce this now, but it will take some time to read him in. Under present circumstances, we think it would be wise if and when an announcement is to be made to tab him as your negotiator on water throughout the Middle East. We don't at this stage know for sure what more that might involve than completing the Israeli negotiations if you decide to go ahead. However, it would be bad politically for us right now to move ahead with a big project in Israel alone, and there may be a time when a combined Israeli-Jordanian or Israeli-Egyptian water project of some kind could be a dramatic and constructive contribution to a political settlement. Now that Bob Woodward is in business heading State's Water for Peace Office, we would envision him as being “Mr. Inside”—pulling together our planning effort both in and out of government. Ellsworth's successor could serve mainly as “Mr. Outside”— your negotiator ready to talk to Arabs and Israelis alike whenever they have a good scheme. Therefore, we are asking your approval to begin reading your new man in now on the Israeli project and the broader Mid-East context. Both Don Hornig and Bob Woodward see this as a reasonable way to proceed. You were considering Jack Valenti when we put this on the shelf before the war. Is he still your choice, and should we begin briefing him? McGeorge Bundy 3 Valenti? Yes 4 No Begin briefing him? Yes No 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Desalination. Secret. Sent through Rostow. 2 Bunker was appointed Ambassador to Vietnam on April 5. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 4 None of the options is checked. 168. Editorial Note 168. Editorial Note After news of the Eisenhower-Strauss proposals appeared in the press, on June 25, 1967, President Johnson spoke to the former President to assure him that the administration was considering a variety of water programs (see footnote 2, Document 164 ). In a personal letter of July 28, Eisenhower reminded Johnson that his interest in nuclear desalting was a long-standing one and to assure him “that my support of this kind of work is both disinterested and non-partisan.” (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX UT 4) In his July 31 response to Eisenhower, Johnson wrote: “I know we have both long felt in our bones that the time when desalting would become economic for irrigation could be made a great constructive turning point in human history and, in particular, a basis for movement towards reconciliation in the Middle East.” (Ibid.) A briefing on water issues was scheduled for the former President, according to a list of pending measures from the NSC Special Committee meeting of August 10. A handwritten comment by Saunders reads: “and tell him Strauss already has the Senate up in arms—” (NSC Special Committee, August 10; ibid., National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, NSC Special Committee—Suspense, HHS) On August 14 Republican Senator Howard Baker, Jr. and 52 co-sponsors submitted a sense-of-the-Senate resolution calling for the “prompt design, construction, and operation of nuclear desalting plants” as a means to alleviate the Middle East's “chronic shortage of fresh water, useful work” and lack of an “adequate food supply.” The sponsors argued that these economic benefits could provide the basis for a “stable and durable peace” in the region. ( Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 90th Congress, 1st Session … 1967 , Volume XXIII, page 962) On August 15 British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean forwarded a Foreign Office paper critical of the Rothschild proposals to Eugene Rostow at the State Department. While the desalination plans were “technically possible,” the Foreign Office wrote, only some agricultural crops “in very special conditions” could be produced economically given the high cost of the water. Israel would be able to use both the additional power and water, but “Studies which have been made also show that three hundred million gallons per day of water [one hundred million gallons per day more than a nuclear plant] could be provided in Jordan, by developing existing ground water sources, at a capital cost of … less than one-seventh of the capital cost of nuclear desalination plants of similar capacity.” The Gaza Strip would also have trouble absorbing the proposed capacity. (Letter from Dean to Rostow, August 15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Europe and the USSR, United Kingdom, Vol. XII, Memos, 7/67–12/67) Because of the crisis in the Middle East, political pressures for quick action on the proposals were intense. On August 22 Interior Secretary Udall wrote Johnson: “At this point the Republicans have—through the Strauss-Eisenhower effort 'stolen our clothes' as far as the water issue in the Middle East is concerned… . We will spend more this year on desalting than was spent during the entire eight years of the Eisenhower Administration… . We have the answers. Let's unveil them now.” (Report by Udall to the President, August 22; ibid., White House Central Files, EX UT 4) Two days later Udall proposed immediate action and release of a press statement to “quickly summarize those action alternatives that deserve serious consideration by all nations interested in a peaceful solution of the Middle East crisis.” (Memorandum from Udall to Johnson, August 24; ibid.) The next day, however, Hornig wrote to Seaborg informing him of problems with the Atomic Energy Commission's proposed demonstration desalting plant in California: “It has been obvious from the beginning that the site proposed for the large nuclear power and water desalting plant in California (the MWD project) could present a very serious safety and licensing problem, because of its close proximity to a large population center, its possible seismic implications, and novel features of the man-made island. We have all hoped, of course, that these problems could be resolved before any substantial amounts of money were irrevocably committed to the project.” (Ibid., Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Chron File July–Sept 1967) In mid-December the Baker resolution was passed by the Senate. In a December 26 memorandum to Rostow, Saunders urged him to “flip through” the resolution “especially to be aware of the curiously ambivalent Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report.” The White House should continue to “show we're doing something”: “Even the proponents of the 'energy center concept' admit it's not sensible to talk about jumping to the Strauss vision all in one step.” (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II) By December 22 Hornig wrote to Califano that he was concerned that AEC material prepared for the State of the Union message reporting that “food factories” were “being studied” was too optimistic: “If this interesting and potentially very important development for the future is to be included in the State of the Union Message, I will be glad to draft suggested language that will place the 'dream for the future' in perspective and indicate that, in the meantime, efforts to meet the world food and population crisis must be pressed forward on the international front, there being no panacea yet that will eliminate hard work.” (Ibid., Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Chron File Oct-Dec 1967) 169. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 169. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 1, 1967. SUBJECT Middle East Water As you know, we decided back in June that the US should not be the obvious author of a big economic plan for the Middle East. 2 Therefore, we stimulated the World Bank to do the job, and its staff is at work. However, we have one operational problem for which we can not depend on the Bank's help. In any case, the Bank's plans probably wouldn't be ready in time to do us any good. This problem is the probable necessity of renewing discussions on the Israeli desalting plant. The updated Kaiser study will be ready in its final form by the beginning of October. Shortly thereafter, we can expect the Israelis to want to begin talking where Bunker left off. Our problem—in addition to the technical and financial ones so familiar to us—is what political quid pro quo to exact if we decide to go ahead with this plant. This time last year we were talking about requiring the Israelis to put all their nuclear activities under IAEA control in return for our cooperation. I was never too sure that would be a feasible deal and it may be even less so now that Israel's future security requirements are in a greater state of flux. But entirely apart from that, we have new problems of wanting to use anything we do in this field in the context of an overall political settlement. Even forgetting about anything so dramatic as the Strauss plan, 3 it's obvious that desalting might inject a new element into management of water in the Jordan River Basin. As I understand it, all the Jordan Valley plans to date have been written in terms of water available from natural sources. Now desalting makes it possible to bring new water sources—particularly brackish and hitherto unusable water—into play. We need to know what sort of Jordan Plan one might write making use of desalting technology. No one realistically expects to come up with a technically sound version of the Strauss plan in the next few months. 4 What we can come up with, however, is enough of a vision to know what we can require of the Israelis to make their plant the first phase of an overall Jordan Valley plan which might lead to a second desalting plant sometime in the next few years. What we would be shooting for is some Israeli commitment on future limits on use of Jordan Valley water and their commitment to make that water available for developing the West Bank. We have begun the staff work in our refugee plan that moves us toward some kind of development arrangement on the West Bank. What we have not done is the staff work which would make it possible for us in very specific terms and requirements to use the desalting plant as leverage to move the Israelis toward the broader objectives of regional water management and refugee settlement. I understand that it would be possible in about sixty days to do enough in-house work to put us in that position. We would have to do this with carefully drawn terms of reference and without any publicity whatsoever. Going ahead in this limited way by ourselves need not cross anything the World Bank does. But I see no alternative at this stage to our putting ourselves in a position to handle this initially bilateral negotiation with Israel. I do not think we need to clear further with the President on this. We would undoubtedly want Luke Battle through Bob Woodward to keep a firm grip on the study, but Frank di Luzio in Interior with the help of a couple of outside experts would have to do most of the work. Do you see any objection? Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Secret. Copies were sent to John Walsh, Alan Novak, Lucius Battle, and Robert Woodward. A handwritten note by Saunders next to their names reads: “I'll send these as a means of spelling out the problem after we've talked.” 2 No record of such a decision occurring before the Strauss-Eisenhower proposal has been found, but in an August 29 memorandum to Valenti, Rostow noted: “Shortly after the Mid-East war ended, we decided that we ought to avoid the appearance of developing any big US economic plan for the area. We thought the 'made in the USA' label might kill a good idea, and besides, the President has taken the general line that, by standing back, we might draw out local initiative. (I'm sure you above all understand this tack.) However, we recognized the importance of having such a plan. We asked the World Bank whether it could do the quiet planning necessary to undergird a possible economic proposal to be made at the right political moment.” (Ibid.) 3 Document 166 . 4 Work on the Oak Ridge demonstration project, which inspired the Strauss plan, was continuing. A preliminary report was scheduled to be presented to the President's Science Advisory Council in mid-October with a final report available “before December.” (Memorandum from Hornig to Califano, September 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 359, Office of Science and Technology, OST Administrative History, E—Water Resources) 170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 9, 1968. SUBJECT Response to Congressional Resolutions on Mid-East Desalting Last December, the Senate passed the Baker Resolution and now the House is considering an identical one. 2 Both state that building large nuclear desalting plants in the Mid-East will hasten peaceful cooperation. Both request you to pursue this. These, of course, stem from the Eisenhower-Strauss plan of last summer. That, in turn, grew out of a study at Oak Ridge. That study developed a theoretical model showing how one could build up around a big nuclear desalting and electric power plant an industrial and agricultural complex that could absorb the tremendous amounts of electricity that such a plant would have to produce to make its water economical. The men who ran that study made clear that further study would be needed to apply this idea to any specific area. Therefore, the most direct response to the Baker resolution would be to follow up the Oak Ridge study, applying its theories to the Mid-East. However, that by itself doesn't make sense, and besides we'd like to go the Baker resolution one better. We don't quarrel with its vision and hope, but it is naive on two serious counts: —Fresh water alone won't solve the problems that block peace in the Mid-East. If we could devote the $1 billion or more Baker's dream would cost to resettling refugees in all kinds of jobs—not agriculture—we'd take a much bigger step toward settlement. That's not to say that water isn't important; but other issues are more basic. —Nuclear desalting is not necessarily the most immediate, practical or economic way to bring more water to the area. It may be the best answer in Israel where most other sources of water are already being efficiently used well. But we still have a long way to go in developing ground water and other sources elsewhere. The kind of study we would frame would be broader than just applying nuclear desalting to the Mid-East. Oak Ridge could do that study, but we would make that just one piece in a broader study applying other advanced concepts of water management and development. We would bring in some of the pioneers in our own water planning, and we would make our work complement studies being done by Mac Bundy through RAND and by the World Bank. There are two bureaucratic problems: 1. How to keep these studies in technical perspective . AEC has a way of going wild with its ideas and getting nuclear desalting out of economic perspective. On the other hand, the economists are too skeptical of desalting. In looking around for someone to keep all parts of this effort in tune, we believe we should entrust this to your Water for Peace Office. If we're going to build that office up, now is the time. The alternative is to let Interior or AEC run the show, and we just can't be confident of a balanced result there. 2. How to assure proper program control . The water experts will have to carry the technical ball. But State Department control is necessary to mesh this with other efforts in the region. Baker proposed a Presidential Commission, but we fear that creates expectations beyond what we can deliver. We have concluded that the best bet is to say that the Water for Peace Director, responsible to the Secretary of State, will report in this case to the Secretary through Luke Battle's Interdepartmental Regional Group for this purpose. We are persistently trying to strengthen State's coordination machinery which you established but at the same time we want to build up the Water for Peace Office. Luke has an effective group going, and we think the Water for Peace Director can work through him without unduly restricting the experts' freedom or his own prestige. Recommendation : Before we go any further down this track, we would like to be sure you approve our general approach. Specifically, State recommends that Secretary Rusk send the attached letter to Senator Fulbright 3 and that a similar letter go to Congressman Morgan. If you approve, we would then work out precise terms of reference for these studies and determine how to finance them. We can do something within the existing Budget, but we might judge that asking for a small budget amendment (less than $1 million) would be worth considering in order to engage the Congress immediately in responsibility for its recommendations. (We believe Congressman Rooney would be glad to support a small State budget amendment that would contribute to Arab-Israeli progress, but we will be back to you on that.) I have discussed this with Don Hornig and Charlie Zwick, and they join in the recommendation that you approve the attached letter. 4 W.W. Rostow 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Confidential. 2 See Document 168 . An identical resolution was introduced into the House of Representatives by Congressman William D. Hathaway on February 5. 3 Not printed. The final version of the letter is dated March 19. While announcing the next steps the administration was going to take, the letter also cautioned: “The scope and locality of our studies will naturally be affected by the trend of political attitudes and international relationships. We may have to conduct them primarily within the United States, but one or more of them could include participation by those Middle Eastern countries and their scientists and technologists whose governments express an active interest.” (Letter from Rusk to Fulbright, March 19, Annex B to airgram CA–8581, June 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, E 11–3 SALINE WATER CONVERSION) 4 Approved on March 11. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 171. Editorial Note 171. Editorial Note In early 1968 the search for a replacement for Ellsworth Bunker as coordinator for the Israeli desalting project continued. Rostow sent the results of an “informal in-house canvas” to the President on February 29. Johnson indicated that his first choice was Walter Heller and that Rostow should again check with Feinberg about the selection. (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 29; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II) The issue was still unresolved in April, when several prominent candidates were unable to commit the necessary time to the project. (Memorandum from Saunders to Rostow, April 18; ibid.) On May 6 the President approved the selection of George D. Woods, former President of the World Bank, for the position. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, May 6; ibid.) 172. Letter From the Coordinator of the Israeli Power and Desalting Project (Woods) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 172. Letter From the Coordinator of the Israeli Power and Desalting Project (Woods) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Lisbon, August 28, 1968. I will be in New York on September 9, and expect to meet in Washington during that week or the following one with Messrs. Peterson, MacAvoy and probably Chase 2 —all of whom were with me in Israel during the week of August 12. They are digesting and pulling together the facts and impressions we collected and expect to be prepared to discuss them with me when we meet. Meanwhile, a few highly tentative thoughts: 1. It seems to me almost certain that the cost of nuclear power and desalting equipment will make a viable, economically justifiable project impossible at this point of time in the development of dual purpose plants. Use of fossil fuel would not appreciably change this fact. 3 2. Too much time is being spent—and has been consumed in the past—trying to estimate “cost of water to the farmer.” Nothing will come of these exercises because there are too many variables and it is not possible to make meaningful guesses about the several variables in the mid-seventies. 3. Highest priority should be given to the technical problems of economically desalting sea water. Intensive development of processes for distilling sea water at reducing costs should continue. Experiments looking toward other methods of desalting should be encouraged and increased. 4. The efforts to finance and build large desalting plants in California and in Israel should continue. It may be that a third large plant to be located in Libya should be added to the program. 5. I am advised that considerable desalting research is underway in West Germany, Italy and, to a lesser extent, France. Italy is particularly interested, I am told, because of the future need for water in developing the southern part of the country. Through State Department channels, these activities should be identified. Some mechanism for coordinating them should be created. U.K. produces nuclear power units and interest in desalting processes in that country should also be inquired into. 6. I am inclined to think—subject to further examination of figures—that the most effective procedure for the future should contemplate straightforward research and development projects which hopefully will produce great rewards in the future but would not be expected to yield immediate direct returns. I doubt the advisability of presenting desalting projects as good business undertakings based on estimates of future income under present conditions. 7. I begin to visualize a group of industrialized countries joining in a consortium (vaguely along Indus River lines) and authorizing a substantial sum (to be disbursed over a period of years) for assisting in financing research and development, including construction of experimental plants, of processes for desalting sea water. (U.S., Germany, Japan, France, U.K., Italy, Canada, for example.) 8. Such a consortium would confine its activities to developing countries where the entire local currency expenditure or a minimum of 50% of the aggregate expenditures, whichever is greater, could and would be the responsibility of the host country. (Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, for example.) 9. In my thinking, the capital and operating cost of that segment of dual purpose desalting plants relating to the production of electric power needed to satisfy normal requirements of the host country for power, would be excluded from the calculation of the amounts to be shared by any such consortium with the host country. Please do not circulate this rough and preliminary memo beyond Harold Saunders. It is written as I would talk to you over a luncheon table, and I will look forward to pursuing it further when I see you. The Israel situation is extremely interesting, and everything I learned there confirms the importance of widespread activity on desalting. While it is highly important for Israel, its implications for the Middle East are vast, and I am sure some way of lifting it out of the context of “Israel” is necessary. G.D. Woods 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Personal and Confidential. A covering memorandum from Saunders to Rostow, September 20, reads: “As you will see on rereading the attached, George Woods has come around to the view that we should put aside much of our effort to make the Israeli desalting plant look economical and frankly admit that it would be a research and development project. He is even thinking about the possibility of an Indus type international consortium to finance such experimentation. This fresh approach is probably healthy although the economic work is still necessary, since we will have to determine costs whatever we do. The operational question is whether the time has come to put this up to the President as a recommendation and to begin discussing procedures with the Israelis so that the President might frame a proposal for Congress in their departing legislative program.” 2 Dean F. Peterson was Director of the State Department's Water for Peace Office, Professor Paul W. MacAvoy was Associate Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Milton Chase of the Department of the Interior was chairman of the U.S. part of the U.S.-Israel Joint Board. 3 The word “Iran” is handwritten and circled by Woods in the margin next to this sentence. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Woods signed the original. 173. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 173. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 29, 1968. SUBJECT Mr. George D. Woods' Proposal on an Israeli Desalting Plant Discussion: In a memorandum to you dated November 8, 1968, (Tab C), 2 Mr. Walt W. Rostow requested you to draw together for the President the positions of the agencies involved in Mr. Woods' proposal to construct a desalting plant of reduced size in Israel. 3 The subject has been under discussion within the United States Government for almost five years. It has not proved possible to reach agreement on the feasibility of financing the original proposal to construct a 100 million-gallon-per-day (MGD) desalting plant. That plant would have required a subsidy of from $60–$70 million, only about 50 per cent of which could have been justified as a grant for the advancement of technology. Mr. Woods has now proposed the construction of a smaller plant that would still be large enough to give promise of significant increases in our experience with large-scale desalting operation. Its cost appears to be within the range of available financing. The proposal is both practical and attractive as a logical next step in large-scale desalting, and would be a first step toward larger-scale installations which may be needed later. I believe that the Department should endorse the Woods proposal under the conditions set forth in the attached memoranda. While the Department of the Interior is in agreement with this recommendation, 4 the Atomic Energy Commission is not. 5 Recommendation: That you approve transmittal of the attached memorandum (Tab A) to Mr. Walt W. Rostow. 6 This memorandum summarizes the positions of the Department of State, Interior, AEC, and AID and transmits as enclosures expanded statements of these positions prepared in the respective agencies (Tabs B–F). 7 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, E 11–3 ISRAEL. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Dean Peterson and T. Childs (M/WP) and cleared by Davies (NEA), Torbert (H), Gaud (AID), and Pollack. 2 Not printed. 3 The first draft of Woods' proposal submitted for comment is attached to a November 5 memorandum from Saunders to Hornig and Clark. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 359, Office of Science and Technology History, E—Water Resources) The final version of his report is filed under cover of a November 12 letter to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I) 4 Udall wrote to Rusk on November 15 that “we believe that the proposal by Mr. Woods is both feasible and appropriate. All of the water resources interests of the Department of Interior are strongly concerned here. Beyond this, the interests of the United States government are involved in providing technology for low-cost water for world-wide use.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, E 11–3 ISRAEL) 5 Seaborg wrote to Rusk on November 18 that “while we do not question the technical feasibility of constructing a 40 million gallon per day desalting plant in Israel, we do not agree that the proposed course of action is appropriate or realistic.” Seaborg argued that Congressional approval would be more difficult if the project failed to utilize nuclear technology. He explained that “our disagreements with the conclusions and recommendations of the report relate particularly to whether the desalting plant should make use of nuclear or conventional energy sources, with the size suggested for the proposed plant, and with the method proposed for securing Congressional appropriations.” (Letter from Seaborg to Rusk, November 18; ibid.) The problems stemmed from the cost of nuclear power plants and their competitiveness. As Rostow explained to the President: “prices this spring in the nuclear desalting field have jumped sharply. At the same time, the price of fuel oil has gone down, making oil-fueled desalting more competitive. Our large planned plant in California is up in the air until we can reconcile problems created by these increased costs.” (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, July 2; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II) 6 Not attached. A copy of the memorandum from Read to Rostow, November 29, is ibid. 7 Not printed. Rusk initialed his approval on November 29. 174. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 174. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 18, 1968. SUBJECT George Woods' Proposal on Israeli Desalting In short, George proposes (Tab A) 2 that we stop thinking for the moment in terms of a large 100–150 million-gallon-per-day (MGD) desalter and concentrate on a 40 MGD plant. He fully shares your goal of becoming able over the next 10–15 years to desalt seawater on a large scale, and he believes we should push ahead with this plant “as a matter of priority.” He has two main reasons for recommending a smaller plant than we initially considered: 1. He believes that the next logical step in developing the technology of large-scale desalting would be to build a 40 MGD plant. This would be enough larger (more than 5 times) than present plants to provide an important test of new technology at reasonable cost (about $58 million). We would gain almost as much in technological knowledge as we would from the $100 million plus that would be needed at a minimum from us to help build the $250 million larger plant. 2. Taking this smaller bite, he feels, is the only way to cut through the highly emotional argument we've had for several years between the crusaders and those who don't believe the time is ripe yet for a $100–250 million leap of faith. Everyone—except possibly AEC—believes this has been George's main contribution. To simplify our financial problem, George believes we should concentrate on desalting and get away from the idea of financing an Israeli electric power plant as part of a dual purpose water and power plant. The Israelis will be building new power plants right along to meet increasing demand for electricity. He doesn't see why they shouldn't provide the steam from one of these power plants as part of their contribution while we concentrate on the desalter to turn that steam into water. Therefore, George proposes we take the necessary steps to get Congressional authorization for Interior to spend up to $40 million on this plant. In addition to the steam from the power plant, Israel would provide $18 million using a loan from the World Bank or some other such loan agency. While the cost of water would still be very high, George believes the total Israeli contribution would not exceed the actual value of the water to Israel. Since the power plant would cost around $20 million, this would add up roughly to a 50–50 split between us. Walt asked Secretary Rusk to pull together the views of State, AID, Interior and AEC on George's proposal (Tab B). 3 With some variations, I think it is fair to say that each of them but AEC would go along with George's general proposal that we try to move ahead with a smaller plant and that you put it in your legislative program. AEC has no objection to going as far as George proposes but objects (especially Jim Ramey) strenuously to: —George's strong words about “abandoning” or “holding in abeyance” the plan for a big dual purpose plant. They believe it is important to preserve the idea that this is just the first step toward a later expansion into a larger plant. Secretary Udall goes along with presenting this to the Congress as Phase I of a larger project, but he would say that Israel must fund later expansion by itself. George says he didn't mean to close any doors—just to re-focus for a moment. —George's unwillingness to insist that the plant use nuclear fuel. His investigations persuade him that there's no economic advantage to nuclear over fossil fuel and that, if we ask Israelis to provide the steam-producing plant, the choice of fuel ought to be theirs. AEC believes we have a strong interest in nuclear desalting. AEC further feels we should keep our strings on that Israeli decision to be sure they buy US nuclear equipment with safeguards. AEC believes it could justify a contribution of $10–15 million to the power (not desalting) plant if it were nuclear and if our own California plant doesn't go ahead. Secretary Udall believes we should leave the choice of fuel open. (The Israelis, like the rest of us, would like to leave the choice of fuel open until they can decide what is most economical.) —George's judgment that it's “not possible at this time to obtain financing in the amount [$244 million] 4 on the terms which would be necessary.” AEC feels there would be “extensive Congressional support” for a big nuclear desalting plant because of the sympathetic attitude of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which would review the proposal along with the two Interior Committees. George's proposal for an Interior contribution would only go before the two Interior Committees which would be less cordial. On this last point, Secreatry Udall thinks the Senate Interior Committee would be receptive but is less sure about the House. However, he points out that the FY 1970 expenditure would be only $5 million and remaining costs would be spread over five years. Only about $1 million of the FY 1970 figure would be needed for Israeli planning. The rest would go for testing some promising new technology which should go into the Israeli plant. Interior should proceed with this testing in any case, and that would cost about $4 million. AID feels Congress might see even $40 million as “just another aid spigot” and thinks Israel should foot even more of the bill than George recommends. State recommends that we pick up about $30 million of the $40 million, leaving the rest to Israel. In searching for a reasonable compromise, I would stand with George in saying that the fuel is an Israeli decision, but I would be a little less emphatic in “abandoning” the goal of a larger plant. I don't believe we are ready to commit ourselves yet, but I don't see why we shouldn't be quite honest in saying we're neither opening nor closing that door at this stage. We asked both Don Hornig and Charlie Zwick to look at this package: —Don feels that desalting technology has reached a stage where it's time to test a prototype of a large plant. He believes the 40 MGD size George proposes is reasonable. Given the apparently indefinite delay in building the large plant in California, he thinks it's sensible to try the experiment in Israel. He accepts George's recommendation that we concentrate on the desalter and let Israel provide the power plant to produce the necessary steam. He does not believe we should commit ourselves to future expansion of the Israeli project. —Charlie suggests that you let this decision ride. He questions the need to spend tight resources on a large experimental plant where the economic benefits are uncertain, especially when we are straining to keep your budget down. If a large desalting demonstration is to be undertaken, he would prefer that it be done in the US where technological access to the plant is assured over time. He specifically questions the Israeli site in view of the risk of building and operating the plant in a war zone. He feels that AEC funds should not be used to put AEC in the “foreign aid” business on the scale contemplated by AEC. For these reasons, Charlie feels that if we go ahead with the Israeli project the contribution be limited to $30 million, and like foreign aid, we should require that procurement, construction, and operation contracts be limited to US sources. Charlie agrees with Don that we should not commit ourselves to future expansion of the Israeli project. Charlie also agrees with Woods that we would get as much technology out of the 40 MGD plant as out of the big dual-purpose-plant—and at substantially less cost. Yesterday, I had a visit from Yaacov Herzog—Eshkol's chief assistant whom you met at the Ranch—and General Ben Artzi—George Woods' Israeli counterpart. George has shared his thinking with them informally to see whether he was being realistic. Yesterday, Herzog gave me the following message for you in Eshkol's name: Eshkol deeply appreciates your continued attention to this project, even in the closing days of your Administration. He thinks Woods' proposal is quite reasonable, and he would be prepared to discuss details of how to proceed. Herzog felt it would be helpful if you were to include this in your legislative program. The issues are: 1. Whether you wish to put George's proposal in your legislative program. The advantage in doing so would be to put yourself on record with a proposal for a feasible next step (a) in desalting and (b) in a program which you launched with Israel in 1964. The disadvantage is that the Congress may well disregard this proposal, leaving it in worse shape than if it had been left to a riper time. I personally feel that, after four years of pushing this, we should have a concrete proposal from President Johnson on the record. Put it in the program 5 No Call me 2. Whether, if you put it in your program, you would seek authorization for a US contribution of the full $40 million George suggests or press the Israelis to pay even part of the desalting research costs and go for only $30 million. In either case, only about $5 million would need to be appropriated in FY 1970. The argument for the full $40 million is that Israel would build the entire power plant (roughly $20 million plus more than $1.5 million yearly for fuel) and assume the $18 million loan in addition as its fair contribution. This would be about a 50–50 split between us. The argument for $30 million is that Israel too will profit in future plants from the results of the research and should contribute to the desalter too. $40 million 6 $30 million Call me 3. Whether, if you go ahead, you make clear that nuclear fuel must be used. The only people pushing for this are the AEC. George and the rest of us think it makes sense just to leave the door open. Ben Artzi yesterday said he'd like the door left open until they can make studies to determine the most economical approach. Leave door open on fuel 7 Nuclear Call me My own feeling is that, uncertain as our judgments are, we should go ahead with a plant like this soon. However, I recognize that there are still political questions to be considered and that we would probably not wish to begin construction if another war seemed likely. But these are questions for the next Administration. The main issue is whether you wish to propose this first step now or leave the issue entirely to the next team. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II. Confidential; Exdis. 2 Not found attached. See footnote 3, Document 173 . 3 Not found attached. For a discussion of their positions, see Document 173 . 4 Brackets in the source text. 5 This option was checked. 6 This option was checked. A handwritten note: “approved by the President 24 Dec. 1968” appears in the left margin. 7 This option was checked. Petroleum Petroleum 175. Editorial Note 176. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 29, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 1 UK-US. Confidential. Drafted by Blackiston. 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State Baghdad, February 7, 1964, 10 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to London, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, and Dhahran. 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State Jidda, April 12, 1964, 0505Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Baghdad, Dhahran, Kuwait, London, Tehran, and Tripoli. 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq Washington, April 13, 1964, 4:23 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 10–3 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Blackiston (NEA); and cleared by Ensor (FSE), Lowenfeld (L), Dinsmore (NE), Davies (NE), Jernegan (NEA), Hilliker (S/S), and Harriman. Repeated to London and Rome. 180. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, May 1, 1964, 8:15 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential. Drafted by Blackiston and cleared by Oliver (FSE) and Davies (NEA). Sent to Kuwait, Jidda, Tehran, Tripoli, London, Baghdad, and Dhahran. Repeated to Djakarta and Caracas. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq Washington, August 21, 1964, 6:53 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by W. Wolle (NEA); cleared by M. Tiger (GTI), J. Oliver (FSE), G. Alexander, T. Ehrlich (U), H. Symmes, Davies (S/S), and J. Grant (NEA). Also sent to Tehran and repeated to London. 182. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 23, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle and approved in U on October 19. 183. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 18, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 15–2 SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Bennsky. 184. Editorial Note 185. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria Washington, November 24, 1965, 6:32 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential. Drafted by Oliver (FSE) and cleared by Spielman (EUR/WE), Bennsky (NEA), and Ensor (FSE). Repeated to Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Bonn, Brussels, Cairo, Caracas, Djakarta, Jidda, Kuwait, Lagos, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Tehran, Tripoli, USEC Brussels, USEC Luxembourg, USRO Paris, and the Mission in Geneva. 186. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, December 22, 1965, 8:45 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 1 UK-US. Confidential. Drafted by R. Shuler (E) and cleared by Adams (NEA), Eurchamp (EUR/BNA), Sober (NEA/SOA), Starkey (EUR/BNA), Post (AF/AFN), Enders (EUR/RPE), Crowley (ARA/CV), O'Leary (INT), and Ensor (FSE). Sent to Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Bonn, Brussels, Cairo, Caracas, Damascus, Djakarta, Karachi, Kuwait, Jidda, Lagos, London, Ottawa, New Delhi, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Tehran, The Hague, Tripoli, Vienna, USEC Brussels, USEC Luxembourg, Paris OCED, and the Consulate in Dhahran. 187. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, January 6, 1966, 1345Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to London. 188. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, January 20, 1966, 1325Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to London. 189. Airgram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State Kuwait, March 14, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by J. Twinam (ECON), and concurred in by J. Gatch, Jr. (DCM), W. Bromell (POL), and J. Vonier (USIS). Pouched to Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Bonn, Brussels, Cairo, Caracas, Djakarta, Jidda, Lagos, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Tehran, Tripoli, USEC Brussels, USEC Luxembourg, USRO Paris, Mission in Geneva, and Vienna. 190. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy (Oliver) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) Washington, June 10, 1966. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 70 D 54, PET 3 Organizations and Conferences 1966. OPEC. Limited Official Use. 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, October 25, 1966, 1445Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London. 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, October 28, 1966, 9:22 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by T. Eliot (NEA/IRN), cleared in draft by Oliver (E/FSE) and S. Rockwell (NEA), cleared by Solomon (E) and Shaver (S/S), and approved by Hare (NEA). Also sent to London. 193. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 3, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Newberry. The briefing memorandum for the meeting is in a memorandum from Oliver to Fried, November 1. (Ibid.) 194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, November 4, 1966, 6:06 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Eliot (NEA/IRN); cleared by Rockwell (NEA), Fried (E), Oliver (E/FSE), Solomon (E); and Hare (NEA). Also sent to London. 195. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, November 22, 1966, 1825Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to Tehran and Jidda. 196. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State Cairo, December 16, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 15–2 SYR. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Dhahran, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Tehran. There is no time of transmission on the source text; the telegram was received at 11:11 a.m. 197. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State Baghdad, December 17, 1966, 1110Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Kuwait, Moscow, Tehran, and Dhahran. 198. Telegram From the Consulate in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, to the Department of State Dhahran, December 19, 1966, 0945Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Jidda, Kuwait, and Tehran. 199. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State Kuwait City, December 24, 1966, 0615Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 KUW. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to London and Tehran. 200. Telegram From the Embassy in the Syrian Arab Republic to the Department of State Damascus, January 12, 1967, 1440Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 18–1 IRAQ–SYR. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, London, Paris, The Hague, Tehran, Cairo, Dhahran, and Aleppo. 201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Syrian Arab Republic Washington, January 25, 1967, 3:05 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Oliver (E/FSE) and L. Kinsolving (NEA/ARN), cleared in draft by R. Houghton (NEA/ARN), and cleared by R. Davies (NEA). Repeated to London and Damascus. 202. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs(Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 1, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAQ (SYR). Confidential. Drafted by Kinsolving (NEA/ARN), and cleared by Chaplin (E/FSE) and Houghton (NEA/ARN). Rusk's initials on the source text indicate that he saw the memorandum. A handwritten note after Handley's name on the “from” line reads “per RPD” (i.e., Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies). 203. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 3, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Oliver on March 8, cleared by Eliot, and approved in S on March 11. 204. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Meyer) to the Country Director for Iran (Eliot) Tehran, March 16, 1967. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET—Petroleum Iran 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. An attached March 20 covering memorandum from Eliot to Oliver reads: “As the attached is 'Eyes Only', I would appreciate your showing it only to Messrs. Solomon and Fried prior to the talk with the British this week on the Iranian oil situation. The letter provides evidence of the necessity for Mr. Solomon to indicate forcefully to the British that we must present a 'united front' to the Iranians. Please return the letter after the three of you have seen it.” 205. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 22, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Mulligan on April 4, cleared in draft by Solomon, cleared by Oliver, and approved by Walsh (S/S) on April 27. 206. Editorial Note 207. Memorandum From George R. Jacobs of the Office of International Resources and Food Policy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) Washington, August 11, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential. 208. Editorial Note 209. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 23, 1967, 11:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69,POL 7 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot and approved in S on August 30. The meeting was held at Blair House. 210. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 31, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 15–2 ALG. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 211. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 25, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 15–2 ALG. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Dick. 212. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) Washington, October 12, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Akins and cleared by Eliot and Oliver. 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, October 31, 1967, 0755Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to London, Beirut, Paris, Jidda, and Kuwait. 214. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 1, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Akins on November 3. 215. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, November 22, 1967, 1530Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA. 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, December 29, 1967, 0824Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to London. 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, February 23, 1968, 0940Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris and London. 218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, February 29, 1968, 0025Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Akins (E/FSE); cleared by Neuman (NEA), Oliver (E/FSE), Eliot (NEA/IRN), and Malmborg (L/E); and approved by S. Rockwell. Also sent to London and Paris. 219. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 6, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by McClelland and Rostow and approved in M on March 14. 220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, March 30, 1968, 0049Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Akins and Rostow; cleared in draft by McClelland and by Jacobs, Oliver, and Meehan (S/S); and approved by Rostow. Repeated to London, Kuwait, Jidda, and Dhahran. 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State Tehran, April 23, 1968, 1005Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, and London. 222. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen Affairs (Brewer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) Washington, August 1, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OAPEC. Confidential. Drafted by D. Newton. 223. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 8, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 1 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Baas. 224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, October 15, 1968, 2346Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Saudi Arabia Cables Vol. II, 4/67–1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies and approved by Brown (S/S) and Rostow. 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State Jidda, October 29, 1968, 1315Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Saudi Arabia Cables Vol. II, 4/67–1/69. Secret; Exdis. 226. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 7, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Limdis. 227. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 6, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Drafted by Eliot on December 8 and approved in S on December 11. 175. Editorial Note 175. Editorial Note During the Eisenhower administration steady expansion in oil output and a long period of price stability allowed the United States and United Kingdom to focus attention on strategic defense of the Persian Gulf region and the Soviet threat to long-term access; for documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1955–1957, volume XII, pages 1 ff. Despite British fears that oil company positions were weakening and that closer U.S.-U.K. cooperation was necessary, the State Department believed that the companies were strong enough to resist producer-government pressure for the next few years. Although global consumption nearly doubled during the 1950s, oil was still plentiful and inexpensive. New production capacity outstripped demand, resulting in a glut. In response, oil companies cut the posted price of crude oil, which served as the basis for calculating net profits in profit-sharing arrangements with producer governments. On paper, oil seemed to be less profitable, although in most cases the companies' net incomes increased and they were able to pay higher dividends to shareholders. “This has not been lost on concessionary governments, which maintain that the companies, notwithstanding their pleas to the contrary, should be well able to increase their tribute to the government.” (Note by the U.K. Government, May 1963; Department of State, E Files: Lot 69 D 76, PET-Petroleum United Kingdom 7 Visits.UK-US Petroleum Talks, 1963) As a result of the unilateral price cut, the producer nations founded the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in August 1960. The United Kingdom sought greater coordination with the new Kennedy administration on oil matters during February 1961 bilateral discussions; see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, volume IX , pages 752–754. In June 1962 OPEC proposed fundamental changes in oil concession agreements which would increase by 20 percent the producers' share of oil profits. (Note by the U.K. Government, May 1963; Department of State, E Files: Lot 69 D 76, PET-Petroleum United Kingdom 7 Visits.UK-US Petroleum Talks, 1963) The United States and United Kingdom reached a “general identity of views” on strategic matters in the Persian Gulf in April 1963. Both agreed on the need for the close interrelationship of the oil companies, and they scheduled a series of petroleum talks for June 1963. See Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, volume XVIII , pages 559–561. In preparation for the talks, the State Department prepared a series of memoranda on various aspects of the oil problem, including one that spelled out the relationship between the oil companies and the government. Oil was unique because of the size of the companies, because it was vital to economic progress and national security, and because of the close relationship between the companies and the producer states: “a more direct relationship to foreign governments than is usually the case with other business enterprises.” The memorandum noted the importance of maintaining frequent contact with the oil companies in case a company “at any time” ran into a “serious crisis in its relationship to a foreign government,” but it concluded: “The United States Government is most reluctant to intervene diplomatically in disputes between American oil companies and foreign governments. Our view is that to do this, except on very rare and critical occasions, is to undermine the responsibilities of the companies themselves.” (Memorandum by Ensor for Session II, June 4, 1963; Department of State, E Files: Lot 69 D 76, PET-Petroleum United Kingdom. 7 Visits. UK-US Petroleum Talks, 1963) One result of the 1963 oil talks was that the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to coordinate their advice to the international oil companies. “The U.K. and U.S. Governments should therefore exchange information on the general advice which they are giving to their companies and consult beforehand as appropriate in regard to advice given in regard to specific disputes and problems of mutual concern.” On the question of diplomatic intervention, the two nations agreed: “Discreet and informal representation by a British or American diplomatic representative abroad might from time to time, and in consultation with the oil company/companies concerned, be advisable.” (Ibid.) This position, with its emphasis on prior consultation, formed the basis for U.S.-U.K. action on oil during the Johnson administration. 176. Memorandum of Conversation 176. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 29, 1964. US–UK TALKS SUBJECT Middle East Petroleum PARTICIPANTS Sir Geoffrey Harrison, Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office T. Frank Brenchley, Head of Arabian Department, British Foreign Office Denis A. Greenhill, Minister, British Embassy Patrick R. H. Wright, First Secretary, British Embassy A. Barry Powell, Petroleum Attaché, British Embassy NEA—Phillips Talbot NEA—John M. Kelly, Assistant Secretary for Mineral Resources, Department of Interior NEA—Frank Sloan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Defense NE—Rodger P. Davies NE/E—Slator C. Blackiston, Jr. Mr. Talbot said that since the US–UK talks on petroleum of last June had dealt with the agenda item in detail we did not have a great deal to add. 2 Since June we have encouraged the companies to do what they can to resolve the OPEC issues with the producing governments. Mr. Talbot asked for Sir Geoffrey's comments. Sir Geoffrey expressed pleasure with the results of the June talks. His colleague, Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Power Stevenson had said he hoped the talks could be repeated some time in 1964. During the past year US–UK policies with respect to petroleum problems in Indonesia, Peru and Ceylon have been closely aligned as a result of the agreed positions reached in June. Turning to OPEC, Sir Geoffrey observed that the organization might break up as a result of the “unholy alliance” of Venezuela, Indonesia and Iraq, but that its demise did not seem likely. Rouhani has welded the organization together. Necessarily the UK has a greater interest in Middle East oil than the United States. 3 In the future the pressure will be on the companies to accept a lower return on their Middle East investments. HMG has always regarded Aden as providing military protection to UK petroleum interests in the Persian Gulf. Although it can be argued that the Arabs cannot drink their oil and must sell it, a cutoff of oil supplies is not what Britain fears. HMG is concerned for the maintenance of the supply of oil at reasonable prices. 4 We have always feared Iraq's getting hold of Kuwait. The combined oil production of the two countries and consequent economic influence would make it difficult for other countries, such as Iran, to follow a line independent of other OPEC members in dealing with the companies. We dread a confrontation between the companies and the producing governments since this would certainly lead to a government-government confrontation with all the political consequences which this would entail. In this connection, Prime Minister Alam of Iran had told the British Ambassador that in view of the then OPEC impasse, it would not be too difficult to resurrect the Mossadeq spirit in Iran. Because of this,HMG is inclined to be a little ahead of but in step with the US in matters involving Middle East petroleum. We continue to believe, said Sir Geoffrey, that the companies should do the negotiating, but we do not believe that our recent actions in Iran diverged from this policy. Rouhani is a slippery character and he was not reporting fully to his government on the negotiations with the Consortium. We wished to be sure that the Iranian Government knew precisely the state of play of these negotiations. We have a special relationship with the Iranian Government and believe it possible to discuss these matters frankly with Alam. We no longer have this same type of relationship with Kuwait or Qatar. (In a subsequent conversation with Mr. Blackiston, Mr. Brenchley explained that HMG reluctance to intervene in Kuwait was not so much a result of the changed UK-Kuwait relationship per se, but rather stemmed from the belief that in the first years after full Kuwait independence the Kuwaitis would suspect Britain of attempting to continue its former prerogatives. By leaning backward to avoid pressuring the Kuwaitis on any issue, HMG hopes that Kuwait will voluntarily resume asking Britain for advice some years hence. We envisage, said Sir Geoffrey, that a confrontation on OPEC issues might take place in three different ways. 1) We might find ourselves in a position where, despite our wishes, we would have to support the companies. This would have many drawbacks, including the invoking of Arab nationalist sentiments, provide potential for Soviet meddling and create internal political difficulties in the countries concerned. Because of these fears, the Shah was prepared to get out in front in order to avoid enactment of sanctions at the Riyadh OPEC meeting. He, in fact, blocked sanctions against the companies. 2) A confrontation might arise with the Western European consuming governments since our Western allies would not be happy if difficulties over OPEC should lead to an interruption in the supply of their principal energy source. 3) A price rise could likewise provoke a Western European consumer combination to oppose OPEC. However, we incline to the belief that a rise in prices will come about in any event and the European governments will just have to learn to live with it. Sir Geoffrey said the US and UK Governments should keep closely in touch as in the past as the situation develops. Mr. Talbot asked whether the companies understood the situation in all its aspects. Sir Geoffrey said that the British companies did understand the situation. The companies do not, however, want to give away money if they can avoid it. The problem is whether they may maintain too firm a position too long. Mr. Kelly expressed agreement in principle with everything Sir Geoffrey had said. We no longer can brush OPEC under the rug, said he. We are also worried about a consumer-producer confrontation and there is a chance we might provoke this sooner than is necessary. The UK, with respect to the OECD Oil Committee, is about one-half a step ahead of the U.S. We fear, however, that this is too far ahead for our own joint interests. By focusing European attention now on Middle East oil problems we may stimulate European thinking on an oil consumer grouping to counter OPEC, and it was for this reason that we opposed discussions of the dependence of Western Europe on Middle East oil by the OECD Oil Committee. We wish to avoid a confrontation between OPEC and OECD in 1964. Mr. Kelly said we are also fearful that the three-man team named by OPEC may seek to negotiate with the companies in OPEC's name rather than as representatives of the individual producing governments. Were this to be accepted by the companies, the next step could be to exclude the companies as bargaining agents in favor of governments. Mr. Powell expressed agreement as to the danger of creating two massive blocs (consumer and producer) in opposition. However, HMG believes it is possible to have discussions of the problems in small OECD groups without creating the dangers previously noted. Sir Geoffrey said he wished to reaffirm the joint position reached in the June talks on the desirability of maintaining a stance of neutrality and non-recognition of OPEC. On the subject of whether future OPEC company relations will be bilateral or multilateral, Sir Geoffrey said HMG is encouraged by a Kuwait Government letter on this subject which maintains the fiction of company-government rather than company-OPEC negotiations. We greatly fear the multilateral approach but believe we will get by the next stage of discussions without having to face this problem. Mr. Talbot remarked that the Department has been under pressure to recognize a number of entities, e.g. Palestine and the Arab boycott. Our position has been to deal only with governments and this policy could be extended to OPEC. Sir Geoffrey expressed concern about the attitude which OPEC Secretary General-elect Bazzaz will take. He characterized Bazzaz as an “extreme nationalist.” In conclusion Sir Geoffrey said the main point which HMG wished to make is that it is quite concerned over Middle East oil and must watch developments very closely. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 1 UK-US. Confidential. Drafted by Blackiston. 2 See Document 175 . 3 The two nations agreed that oil was becoming an increasingly important energy source for Europe. It was expected to account for about 50 percent of the total by 1970. (Memorandum from Davies to Talbot, January 25; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 1 US) 4 During their 1963 oil meeting, the two sides had concluded that the international oil industry played an essential and effective role in balancing interests and requirements of producers and consumers. “Alternative systems—direct negotiation between blocs of such countries: an international commodity agreement: or a public utility status implying international regulation of the industry—would prejudice the economic continuity of supplies.” (Ibid.) 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State 177. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State 1 Baghdad, February 7, 1964, 10 p.m. 736. Embtel 735. 2 UK Ambassador Allen saw PriMin and Wattari 3 this afternoon and says in effect he got brushoff despite fact he made clear that GOI enactment of NIOC law could well have adverse effect on Anglo-Iraqi relations. 4 PriMin took position issuance of law would enhance possibility of fruitful negotiations between GOI and IPC, and he expected such negotiations would begin within a month. Wattari confirmed firm decision taken issue law but would not tell Allen when. Allen thinks it will be soon and that there is no chance GOI will now decide seek IPC views first. Comment (Noforn): From our conversation believe Allen inclined regard GOI pressure on IPC as part of larger GOI plan to exert maximum pressure on British position in Persian Gulf and Aden with view to drive British out as soon as possible. If he reflects FonOff views, may mean UK will seek handle IPC problem in this broader context. This likely run counter to US interests in Iraq. Strong 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to London, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, and Dhahran. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 Iraq's Oil Minister. 4 The NIOC law would set up the National Iraqi Oil Company to develop oil fields in areas expropriated from the Iraq Oil Company (IOC) in Law 80 of December 12, 1961. Law 80 took back 99.6 percent of IOC's original concession. Background on the Iraq petroleum situation is in a memorandum from Lowenfeld to Under Secretary Ball, October 24, in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAQ. 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State 1 Jidda, April 12, 1964, 0505Z. 973. OPEC. Tehran's 892 to Dept. 2 During recreational visit by Barger, Pres of Aramco, to Jidda April 10 I asked him whether he had news re OPEC negotiations. 3 He said he had no news from Geneva but did not appear to be overly concerned. In reply to his query whether I had spoken to Faysal I told him I had not. He immediately commented “After all, what can you say?” I told him that any line which simply boiled down to suggesting moderation seemed pretty thin. In reply my question as to companies' current position his question was rhetorical, “What can they do?” Later, in presence UK Ambassador Crowe Barger strongly agreed with us both that it would not be in Arab interest to expel Iran from OPEC. 4 Barger stated he and Brougham would be taking advantage of 'Id 5 formalities to make courtesy call on Faysal Jidda this coming week. Believe Barger and Brougham have in mind offering opportunity for review of OPEC matters and companies' offer although probably will play situation by ear. British Ambassador this morning (protect source) gave me paraphrase copy of UK Embassy Tehran supplying more detail than reftel. UK Ambassador Tehran reported he informed PM there little merit in trying postpone day of decision and recommended GOI prepare for Arab propaganda attacks by presenting Iran's case to public for acceptance Consortium offer. He reported that he did not get impression from PM of any weakening of Iran's position but from other source learned Shah much depressed and particularly disappointed Kuwait's attitude. Conclusions: 1. Any attempt by US Govt to advise Faysal at this point would almost surely be countered by reply that of course SAG will not be taken in by extremists but that companies' offer is not adequate and there no good reason why they cannot pay a bit more, say one or one and a half cents per barrel (Dhahran tel 324 to Jidda, relayed as Embtel 943 to Dept, 6 describes Faysal's arguments to Iran FonMin). From here it appears that there is general Arab sentiment in OPEC that some improvement over existing company offer should be made. Dispute among Arabs lies over degree. Iran's willingness accept Consortium offer essentially little better substantively than December offer invites suspicion there collusion between Iran Govt and US and UK Govts to back companies' position. 2. For US to urge by implication that companies' latest “final” offer be accepted would be to inject US Govt into negotiations on side of companies without any clear indication that extremism about to triumph over moderate but hard bargaining. Demand for extra one cent or cent and a half mentioned by Faysal to Aram presumably constitutes basis Yamani's instructions. Recalling vividly as I do US Dept Justice anti-trust suit against American major oil companies dealing in Middle East oil which began 1952 and settled by separate consent decrees about 1960, question whether companies could justify some additional payment cannot I believe be automatically answered in negative. Oil pricing is enormously complex and profits have been huge, resulting in much re-investment to benefit producer countries as well as great yield to American stockholders. Certain top-level Aramco officials have clearly implied in private conversations they only fighting war of attrition and will have to bow eventually to full expensing of royalties. One of them guesses Arab governments would accept company offer of full expensing royalties over six year period but admitted some companies unwilling go this far, unless very firm guarantees of stability and “quit-claims” also made. 3. More important problem from point view companies may be question of admitting power of OPEC to force companies to yield position which they have taken as “final.” If companies stand by position and Iran stands with them and if Iran is then expelled from OPEC, Arabs face difficult problem of applying sanctions which they know in advance Iran will not back and know that any diminution in off-takes from Arab producers might well be picked up by Iran. Strength of OPEC lies in unanimity and is lost by division. At same time break-up of OPEC would not appear to be against interest of companies nor do I see any particular advantage to US Govt in preservation of OPEC. As we understand it here US Govt position has been to avoid any excuse for formal approach by OPEC country seeking negotiations with USG on OPEC matters. It preferred that no US official be at Riyadh OPEC meeting last year even in observer status. 4. If I were to approach Faysal on basis that OPEC should not be too hard on Iran his conclusion would be that US Govt and GOI working together and would insist that proper course of action for US Govt would be to suggest GOI align itself with “moderate” Arab position which he had suggested to Aram. Actually I suspect Faysal would welcome my approach hoping to get us to save OPEC from disaster. 5. There is, of course, important difference in our position here and that of Embassy Tehran in that GOI has consistently sought and welcomed consultation with USG whereas SAG has never broached OPEC matters with us. Recommendations: 1. That this Embassy avoid intervention at this stage and let hard bargaining among OPEC members work itself out. 2. If Iran, surprisingly, should be expelled from OPEC that US news media be well briefed for intelligent commentary and that briefing avoid indication USG happy over break-up of OPEC. 3. That in case Geneva meeting results in re-united OPEC position Dept suggest to major oil companies involved searching, hard-headed review of their positions to determine whether they might not make adjusted offer which would enlist “moderate” Arab support and set pattern of peace in industry for lengthy period. Aramco top executives told me in 1950 they hoped 50–50 formula would last “a few years.” Actually its term has exceeded their expectations. Hart 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Baghdad, Dhahran, Kuwait, London, Tehran, and Tripoli. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., PET 1–14) 3 In an attempt to increase bargaining power, OPEC was conducting contract negotiations on behalf of Iraq, Qatar, and Kuwait and pressuring Iran to insist on similar terms in its own independent contract negotiations. The negotiations, however, were deteriorating. The Iraq Petroleum Company had proposed to OPEC terms similar to those offered by the Consortium to Iran if Iraq would satisfactorily resolve outstanding difficulties, including the provisions of Law 80. When the IPC refused to reconsider this precondition, OPEC suspended the talks. OPEC also rejected similar terms on behalf of Qatar and Kuwait. “It is believed that OPEC, on seeing the companies' common front, has decided against conversations with Aramco and the Libyan companies at the present time.” (Memorandum from Brodie to Trezise, March 24; ibid., PET 2 US) 4 Oil analysts considered this course of action likely if Iran accepted lesser terms than those on which OPEC was insisting. For example, see airgram A–168 from Dhahran, February 12; ibid., PET 3 OPEC. 5 An Islamic holiday. 6 Not found. 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq 1 Washington, April 13, 1964, 4:23 p.m. 489. Embtel 864. 2 Department has given considerable thought to problem posed by American companies seeking concessions in areas expropriated from IPC prior to settlement of the Law 80 issue. Thus far, as Embassy aware, we have gone no further than advising such companies of possibility of legal action by IPC. We have not informed American shareholders in IPC of names of companies which have shown interest in Iraqi concessions but have found that through grapevine they know names of most such firms. We have cautioned shareholders against public pronouncement threatening legal action believing this could force GOI into intransigent position which could threaten chances of success of negotiations. Shareholders, for their part, appear divided as to advisability of public warning but some consideration being given by IPC to sending private warning letter to companies so interested. We have suggested that, at least as first step, IPC might wish consider private discussion with such firms and there is possibility this recommendation will be adopted. Apparent willingness of Sinclair and possibly of Phillips, Pauley and others 3 to take up concessions whether or not there is an IPC-GOI settlement of Law 80 could we fear have broad implications affecting concessionary agreements not only in Iraq but elsewhere. If other companies should bid for concessions without a prior settlement, GOI will have good reason to suppose that concession agreements can be terminated unilaterally and replaced with contracts with other oil companies under conditions dictated by GOI wherever GOI considers that it is in its own interest to do so. Other producing governments could draw same conclusions and concept of unilateral change of agreements which already has its adherents, e.g., Tariki, would be markedly strengthened. Moreover foreign producing governments would be led to conclude that U.S. companies are not concerned for legal rights of others and are motivated solely by advantages to be derived from access to additional oil resources and new profits. The Department is considering taking initiative in privately informing the American companies which it knows to be interested in Iraq concessions, i.e. Murphy, Phillips, Pauley, Sinclair, Continental and General Exploration and others as they become known, along the following lines: 1. IPC in which there is 23.75 percent American interest is most interested in reaching a settlement with GOI on the Law 80 matter and we are hopeful that negotiations will open shortly. The USG believes that mutually acceptable settlement is necessary and desirable in interest of all oil companies having or contemplating overseas concessions. 2. During period of these negotiations we hope that American companies will refrain from making offers to GOI for onshore concessionary areas as this would constitute acceptance by segments of American oil industry of arbitrary alteration of an existing concessionary accord. It would leave new companies defenseless should GOI elect to change the agreement which it had signed with them. 3. Final decision is up to American companies involved but should companies enter into concession agreement with GOI prior to settlement of Law 80 USG would continue to support rights of American shareholders in IPC and could not assure diplomatic support in Iraq to new American companies should this be requested. It would be inconsistent for Department to support IPC claim and also attempt to protect an arrangement made in disregard of that claim. 4. We recognize that by asking American companies to defer negotiations of concessions with the GOI we may leave the door open to foreign firms, e.g. ENI, 4 but we believe disadvantage of completely passive attitude on part of USG towards developing situation justifies risk of possible lost opportunities to American firms. 5. We will undertake diplomatic efforts with foreign governments where possible to dissuade similarly their firms from entering Iraq at this time. Your comments on above requested. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 10–3 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Blackiston (NEA); and cleared by Ensor (FSE), Lowenfeld (L), Dinsmore (NE), Davies (NE), Jernegan (NEA), Hilliker (S/S), and Harriman. Repeated to London and Rome. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 U.S. independent oil companies. 4 Italy's national oil company. 180. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 180. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, May 1, 1964, 8:15 p.m. 2037. British Embassy has informed us that according BP source all OPEC countries withdrawing negotiating authority from OPEC team of Bazzaz, Rouhani and Nazir. Member countries have been authorized make direct approach their concessionary companies with view obtaining improvement oil companies offers. BP source stated he had seen Kuwait draft letter to KOC informing company that negotiating authority of Bazzaz et al has been withdrawn and that GOK wished direct discussion with company to begin May 28. This would appear to constitute appreciable weakening in OPEC strength but comment addressee posts requested. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential. Drafted by Blackiston and cleared by Oliver (FSE) and Davies (NEA). Sent to Kuwait, Jidda, Tehran, Tripoli, London, Baghdad, and Dhahran. Repeated to Djakarta and Caracas. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq 1 Washington, August 21, 1964, 6:53 p.m. 117. Deptel 61 Baghdad 67 Tehran rptd London 607; Tehran's 101. 2 C.H. Murphy, Jr., President Murphy Oil Company, called on Under Secretary Ball August 19 to discuss Iran and Iraq. In previous discussion August 11 Murphy had advanced following proposals for Department consideration: (1) that USG promise special diplomatic support to Murphy and other four members of its group which endeavoring obtain Iran offshore concession; (2) that USG consider as precedent for action in 1964 its efforts in 1920's supporting American companies then seeking participation in Mesopotamian oil resources (i.e. that USG be guided by this rather than continue to dissuade American companies from bidding in Iraq); (3) that USG consider idea of cordon sanitaire in Iraq (i.e. cordoning off certain IPC areas leaving territory outside these areas for concession bids by other companies without fear of USG or IPC objection). On August 19 Ball pointed out difficulties of USG taking special action promote interests one group American oil independents in Iran when other U.S. independents and majors bidding also. Asked if Murphy felt he could assemble larger group of independents. If so, USG would go to Shah promoting advantages to Iran of having independent US companies as participants in its oil development. Murphy found this Department position reasonable and stated would discuss with present partners and seek enlarge group. He would report back in any event. Asked by Murphy to predict effectiveness of possible USG démarche to Shah promoting independents, Ball responded Department could not guarantee results but believed such approach would receive careful Iranian attention. Murphy agreed with Ball and Talbot Iran probably looking for companies with substantial US oil import quotas as well as overall marketing ability. Ball said Department had reviewed Mesopotamian experience of 1920s and concluded situation today quite different. Certain factors important then, such as our fear domestic oil resources would run out and total exclusion American companies from access Near Eastern oil, no longer existed. He reviewed for Murphy rationale present USG policy of dissuading American companies from making oil bids to Iraq, and added he would be discussing with Department colleagues possibility altering this policy in relatively near future if IPC failed to draw nearer agreement in present Iraqi negotiations. Murphy volunteered that Sinclair Chairman Steiniger intended speak to Department soon regarding Sinclair activities Iraq. Was agreed Department would contact Steiniger. Question of cordon sanitaire did not enter discussion. Full memcon being pouched. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by W. Wolle (NEA); cleared by M. Tiger (GTI), J. Oliver (FSE), G. Alexander, T. Ehrlich (U), H. Symmes, Davies (S/S), and J. Grant (NEA). Also sent to Tehran and repeated to London. 2 Neither printed. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 182. Memorandum of Conversation 182. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 23, 1964. SUBJECT Iraqi Oil Situation PARTICIPANTS Mr. Ball U—George S. Springsteen NEA—John D. Jernegan Robert C. Strong, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq FSE—Andrew Ensor NE/E—George M. Bennsky NE/E—William D. Wolle Mr. Ball asked if the IPC-GOI negotiations were getting anywhere. Ambassador Strong said it was very hard to say because our information was not complete and because it was difficult to judge the real intentions of the two parties. Mr. Ball said we were now in a position where we should press the American IPC shareholders on precisely where the negotiations stand. Ambassador Strong remarked that Socony Mobil representative Henry Moses, one of the IPC negotiators, had brought in company lawyers and drafters from New York to join the talks and that this seemed a good sign. Mr. Ball said this might be so but one could never be sure that the arrival of lawyers signified progress. He went on to say that the time was coming fairly soon when representatives of the two companies should be invited down from New York for a discussion. The Department had stood down the independent companies for quite a while now 2 and yet did not have a clear idea of just how the negotiations were progressing and what the prospects were. We should make clear to Standard of New Jersey and Socony Mobil that we could not hold the line in Iraq forever. While we were prepared to go along for a while yet we could only do this if the companies proceeded diligently with the negotiations and kept us informed of progress and results. Mr. Ball added that we might consider saying the same things to the British Government as added insurance against intentional holding back by IPC. Ambassador Strong expressed the view that the Iraqis desired settlement with IPC but did not want to appear too anxious since that would clearly give the company an advantage. He hated to see the negotiations drag on too much longer for as time passed there was increasing danger that Iraq's political instability, together with British and Iranian activity against the present Iraqi Government, might result in a new Iraqi regime less willing and able to reach an agreement than the present Government. While he had no proof, the Ambassador felt almost certain that the British and Iranians were not just hoping for but working toward a change of government in Iraq. Certainly, he said, it was British policy to keep Iraq weak and relatively poor so as to avoid pressure from Iraq on Britain's oil and political position in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Jernegan said he was impressed by the importance of the principle the U.S. Government had upheld for many years regarding oil concessions: namely, that oil producing countries should be prevented from making a success out of nationalization or other unilateral actions with respect to oil concessions legally held by foreign companies. Mr. Ball agreed this was important but said he feared that in the present situation the American companies which heeded the Department's advice to stay out of Iraq might eventually find themselves undercut by other American companies that chiseled. Also there were the Japanese, Italians, and other foreign oil operators to worry about. Mr. Jernegan pointed out that the American companies seriously interested in Iraq had in fact done some groundwork and therefore, in the event a foreign company suddenly breached the line there, our companies would be in position to move ahead rapidly and would not be at a serious disadvantage. Ambassador Strong suggested that there might not be serious adverse effects on oil company operations outside Iraq in the event the Iraqis got away with their Law 80 action. He thought that if we considered the situation in other countries on a case by case basis we might find that there would not be repercussions elsewhere. Mr. Jernegan indicated that he thought there would be repercussions. Mr. Ensor felt that adverse effects were probable, and mentioned Algeria and Indonesia in this connection. With regard to action by the Department, Mr. Jernegan said he was inclined to recommend that the two American IPC shareholders be called to Washington as Mr. Ball suggested, but that we limit ourselves to telling them that we could not hold the line in Iraq indefinitely and wanted to be absolutely sure that the two companies and their IPC associates were doing everything they possibly could to reach an agreement in Iraq. Mr. Ball said this would be fine but that we should also emphasize to them the real responsibility on their part to move rapidly toward a settlement. In conclusion, Mr. Ball said he would speak to Governor Harriman and would let NEA know when to proceed with arrangements for the meeting with Standard of N.J. and Socony Mobil. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle and approved in U on October 19. 2 See Document 181 . 183. Memorandum of Conversation 183. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 18, 1965. SUBJECT Syrian Nationalization of Socony Mobil Marketing Subsidiary PARTICIPANTS Socony Mobil Rawleigh Warner, President, Socony Mobil Oil Inc. E.L. Waggoner, Relations Advisor to President of Mobil International William Henderson, Manager, International Government Relations Z. William Ross, Manager, Government Relations Washington office NEA—Phillips Talbot OR/FSE—John G. Oliver NEA:NE/E—George M. Bennsky Mr. Warner opened the conversation by saying that the Syrian nationalization of the Socony subsidiary was worrisome because of its possible repercussions and precedents elsewhere in the Near East and the world in general where his company has much larger interests. He then requested Mr. Talbot's views on how the Syrian nationalization fitted into the current Near Eastern situation. Mr. Talbot reviewed the situation and motivations of each of the Near Eastern countries in the context of such major developments as the Unified Arab Command, the Arabs' Jordan River diversion activities, the West Germany-UAR confrontation, the growing UAR economic and military difficulties, and US–UAR relations. Among his observations on Syria were the following: The Syrian Government has been taking various extreme actions in an attempt to prop up its shaky regime. Syrians consider themselves as the vanguard of Arabism, and they are out to one-up the Egyptians whenever they can, whether it be in terms of Arab socialization (nationalization) or struggle against the “imperialists.” It should be noted also that the nationalization of the oil marketing companies is but part of a much larger Syrian socialization program that gained new impetus in January. Mr. Warner asked Mr. Talbot's views on Nasser's possible reactions given the tightening UAR economic situation. Mr. Talbot said that Nasser has shown that he can and will lash out when confronted. The UAR is in economic straits and, even though Nasser has received some substantial commitments from Communist countries and possibly also from Kuwait, it appears that Nasser would like to keep his contacts with the West open. Our problem is to keep Congress from cutting off our contact with the UAR and bringing about a confrontation that would lead to a dangerous polarization in the Near East, with the West and Israel on one side, ranged against the Communists and the Arabs on the other. In parting, Mr. Warner told Mr. Talbot that Socony would make no public denunciation of the Syrian nationalization of its marketing subsidiary and would try, in coordination with ESSO and Shell, to negotiate an acceptable settlement with the Syrian Government. After Socony has had a chance to see how things are going, he plans to come back for further discussion with Messrs. Mann and Talbot respectively. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 15–2 SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Bennsky. 184. Editorial Note 184. Editorial Note In a memorandum of April 26, 1965, to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon, Stanley Nehmer discussed the growing dispute between the Departments of State and Interior over control of international oil policy. The immediate cause was a proposed round of Anglo-American oil talks, and the point of contention was whether Solomon or Assistant Secretary of the Interior John Kelly would host the conference. Nehmer commented: “it has seemed almost inevitable that, sooner or later, the line would have to be drawn between oil policy and foreign affairs. If a confrontation is inevitable, it would be difficult to find an issue more likely to be resolved in the Department's favor than one which involves the politics of world oil and has as precedent a series of similar meetings in which leadership by the Department has been a foregone conclusion.” Nehmer noted that the Interior Department was contending that Kelly had been personally invited to discuss oil matters by the U.K. Minister of Power because the U.K. proposal for the talks had been contained in a letter to Kelly, but he stressed that the proposed talks were a part of a series, all of which had been held under State's chairmanship. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 69 D 76, PET—Petroleum United Kingdom 1965, US/UK Oil Talks 1965) Under Secretary of State Mann agreed. (Letter from Nehmer to Armstrong, May 5; ibid.) In a letter to Kelly on April 28, Solomon invited him to serve as “vice-chairman” of the talks. (Ibid.) Kelly replied on April 30: “As you point out, the talks are part of a series. There has occurred, however, a fundamental change in Interior's responsibilities since the last of these discussions in June 1963. I refer of course, to the President's assignment to the Secretary of the Interior of responsibility for oil policy within the Executive Branch.” “In the circumstances,” he continued, “I am of the view that it would be appropriate for the senior representative from the Department of the Interior to act as chairman of the U.S. delegation. I would anticipate that the Department of State would provide the vice chairman.” (Ibid.) Kelly's reference to the President's assignment was to a December 1963 meeting between President Johnson and Secretary of the Interior Udall, after which Udall told the press that the President had put him “in charge of oil policy.” As Andrew Ensor later wrote: “Kelly used this frequently, to little effect I'm glad to say, to try to horn in on State's role. The fact is pretty clear that both the President and Udall thought of 'oil policy,' at that time, as purely a domestic matter.” (Memorandum from Fried to Solomon, February 8, 1966; ibid., E Files: Lot 70 D 54, ORG Organization and Administration 1966) Although the talks were scheduled to begin on May 10, 1965, the issue was still unresolved on May 5 when Solomon was called away from Washington unexpectedly to deal with the Dominican crisis; in a memorandum of that day, Ensor referred to Solomon as the “prospective chairman.” (Ibid., E Files: Lot 69 D 76, PET—Petroleum United Kingdom, US/UK Oil Talks 1965) In June the Department rescheduled the talks for early July. Kelly again refused to serve as vice chairman in a letter of June 9 to Solomon, but a handwritten note approved by an officer in FSE reads: “In view of Kelly leaving Interior, should we take the British option of September?” Another note, dated June 30 reads: “No reply. File.” (Ibid.) The Anglo-American Oil Talks eventually were held on November 15, 1965, at the State Department with Cordell Moore heading the Interior contingent; see Document 186 . Ensor later wrote: “Interior used to be always for cutting imports; it is now, genuinely and of its own steam, not restrictive on this subject beyond minutiae… . State, too, used to be what I call 'wishy-washy' free trade on oil issues but has of late grown up a lot. I believe that it is increasingly recognized in State that, even though domestic politics were the cause of our imports policy (and the 'national security' basis was hypocrisy really), it is still a wise policy. This country should not become dependent on regularly receiving large quantities of oil from areas which are even slightly unreliable over the long term (which in my view means everywhere but Canada) and the economic price of this is well worth it.” Foreign and domestic oil policies, he wrote, were increasingly unrelated matters. “What must be borne in mind is that, regardless of the 1963 announcement, the fact remains undisputed and indisputable that State has full practical responsibility for our oil policy abroad. If this is done badly, it is State's fault entirely.” (Memorandum from Fried to Solomon, February 8, 1966; Department of State, E Files: Lot 70 D 54, ORG Organization and Administration 1966) 185. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria 185. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria 1 Washington, November 24, 1965, 6:32 p.m. CA–5671 SUBJECT U.S. Policy Toward the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Contact of Embassy Officers with the OPEC Secretariat REF Depts CA–386, July 10, 1963; 2 CA–1436, Aug. 5, 1963; 3 Geneva's A–43, July 19, 1963 4 The referenced airgrams (copies attached) 5 state the policy of the USG in respect of the OPEC and communications by US Reps with that organization. These are forwarded for the guidance of the Embassy now that the OPEC is headquartered in Vienna. The US–UK policy of neutrality and non-commitment towards OPEC detailed in CA–386 (paragraph 8) has not prevented the OPEC from obtaining recognition from international organizations, specifically the ECOSOC and UNCTAD, and Austria has granted diplomatic status to the organization and its personnel. In light of these and other successes by the OPEC, the USG intends to review the present policy towards the OPEC and consider if some other policy towards the organization might more usefully serve U.S. interests. Comments from Embassy Vienna and other addressees regarding U.S. policy towards the OPEC are welcomed. Until further notice, however, the policy detailed in the referenced communications continues in effect. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential. Drafted by Oliver (FSE) and cleared by Spielman (EUR/WE), Bennsky (NEA), and Ensor (FSE). Repeated to Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Bonn, Brussels, Cairo, Caracas, Djakarta, Jidda, Kuwait, Lagos, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Tehran, Tripoli, USEC Brussels, USEC Luxembourg, USRO Paris, and the Mission in Geneva. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., PET 1 UK) 3 Not printed. (Ibid., PET 3 OPEC) 4 Not printed. (Ibid., PET 1 US–UK) 5 None found attached. 186. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 186. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, December 22, 1965, 8:45 a.m. CA–6447 SUBJECT US/UK Oil Talks Informal discussions with the U.K. were held in Washington November 15 and 16 on international oil matters. The British delegation, headed by Mr. Angus Beckett, Under Secretary, Ministry of Power, consisted of Mr. John T. Fearnley, Oil Adviser, Oil Department, Foreign Office, Mr. Noel E. Martin, Petroleum Counselor, British Embassy, and other members of the British Embassy Staff. On the U.S. side, the meetings were chaired by Mr. Edward A. Fried, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Participants included Mr. J. Cordell Moore, Assistant Secretary of the Interior-Mineral Resources, Mr. John F. O'Leary, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior-Mineral Resources, Mr. Howard R. Cottam, American Ambassador to Kuwait, Mr. Andrew F. Ensor, Director, Office of Fuels and Energy, Department of State, Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (NEA), Department of State and Mr. Edgar L. McGinnis, First Secretary, American Embassy London. The Department of Commerce was represented by Mr. Alexander B. Trowbridge, Assistant Secretary for Domestic and International Business, and the Department of Defense by Mr. Joseph J. Muir, Deputy Director, Office of Petroleum Logistics. The mutuality of U.S. oil policy objectives shared with the U.K. provides the basis of these talks, which are held roughly every two years, and permits detailed exchange of information and evaluation of specific problems. Because of the brevity of the discussions and their function as a part of a continuing interchange on oil problems, the talks tended to concentrate upon changes in the oil scene—less time was devoted to historical analysis and relatively stable situations. The items discussed included a review of supplies up to 1970, security of supplies, contingency planning, and long-term hedges such as shale oil, tar sands, and liquid hydrocarbons from coal. Relations with producer countries were discussed with emphasis upon Arab oil policy, and OPEC developments. Individual country problems were reviewed with stress being given to the major producing countries of the Middle East and Africa with Latin American and also Indonesian developments also noted. The situation in the EEC as it affects oil, and the work of the OECD in oil and energy generally were subject of exchanges of views, as were the developments in the consuming countries of Europe. There was brief discussion on the problems of oil in India and Pakistan. The discussions concluded with the subject of the financial problems of the industry arising from balance of payments programs, and reduced self-financing capacity of the companies. The highlights of the meetings included the following items: Supplies to 1970 Projections of supplies to 1970 worked out by the Ministry of Power and the Department of Interior in advance of the meetings were quite useful in pointing out differing production and consumption growth rates which will be at the heart of many future problems. Excluding a major disruption, supply will be adequate during this period and in fact problems may arise stemming from conditions of increasing over-supply. North Sea The U.K. is distinctly optimistic about the prospects for North Sea gas production. Gas so far discovered is of high quality (98% methane) and the BP discovery is confidently expected to be a commercial producer. Two other gas shows, as yet unpublicized, indicate at least the possibility of commercial gas production. U.K. White Paper The recent white paper on U.K. fuel policy is the first such document published by HMG. Mr. Beckett regarded as significant the statements in the White Paper that undue curtailment of the use of oil could affect the health of the economy generally and that reduced reliance on imports for security or B/P reasons had its limits. The Paper reflects the position that no discrimination would be practical in relation to the Free World sources of crude imports, and while the same policy is to be applied to refined product imports, it would be kept under review. This latter point, Mr. Beckett stated, was aimed at the Six. 2 Nigeria The U.K. anticipates Nigerian production of its highly desirable crude will reach 1 million b/d by 1970. This is a strong upward revision of previous estimates. Nigerian associated gas production will be high and preliminary studies indicate its landed price in the U.K. may be lower than Algerian gas. Development of Nigerian gas may therefore pose serious policy problems for HMG. U.K. Posted Prices Mr. Beckett indicated that the U.K. may well be about to take a critical view of the posted prices paid by U.K. importers of crude. Under the present price structure these prices were high, reflecting the traditional pattern of the integrated companies to shift profits to their production accounts. OECD The OECD Oil Committee Small Group (also called the High Level Working Party) was fathered by the British. Angus Beckett is the chairman. As one function, the Small Group is to prepare studies centered around the question of the security of Western Europe's imported oil supplies. To date the Small Group has considered a paper prepared by the British outlining the demand-supply outlook for oil and gas from 1965 to 1970–75. It will next examine a British prepared survey of various emergency contingencies, i.e. peacetime situations where oil from one or several major supplying countries is cut off. The Small Group has under revision a tanker transport outlook covering the same period prepared by the U.S. and the Netherlands. The U.K.'s reasons for establishing the Small Group included the objective of influencing the form of common energy policy the EEC would eventually adopt. This objective was reviewed in light of events. While the EEC crisis deprives the Small Group of some of its urgency, both delegations agreed that in view of the greater uncertainty as future Community energy policy it is if anything more important now to continue its work as a means of influencing EEC attitudes. Mr. Beckett emphasized the need to keep representation in the Group at an “appropriate” level and urged that the U.S. and U.K. set an example in this regard. The OECD Oil Committee reorganization proposed by Molkenboer seemed of questionable utility to the U.S. The proposal did not right what was wrong—primarily that the Committee lacked something important to do (with the exception of the Small Group). The proposal would seemingly confuse procedure with substance. The U.K., in contrast, regarded the Oil Committee as having importance apart from any studies it might make. It is a Committee in being which could deal with a supply crisis. The U.K. agreed that there should not be a search for work for the Committee, but feels Molkenboer's proposals deserve some sympathy, partly because it eliminates the redundancy of having both GWP and Plenary sessions. The proposal would bring other members into more active participation, giving them specific jobs to perform, and thus relieve the U.S. and U.K. of making all the running. Mr. Beckett also noted that with the abolition of the Gas Committee its work would be assumed by the Oil Committee. Mr. Beckett indicated he had spoken with Molkenboer recently and the latter will develop a modified proposal. OPEC Both sides agreed OPEC has gained in international status through obtaining objectives on royalty expensing, obtaining recognition by the UN, and in the competence of some of its staff. No change in current U.S. and U.K. policy toward OPEC should now be made. It was thought that the premises of the “neutrality” policy should be reexamined even though this might well produce no change. There was agreement that the OPEC prorationing scheme is not likely to succeed, but its failure may lead to much “bad blood” and the plan is based on dangerous principles. There was also the thought that negotiations regarding allowable discounts off posted prices after 1966 for the expensing of royalties could present very serious difficulties. Concession Trends Both sides agreed the current situation is characterized by a combination of sizable bonus payments and new kinds of terms. This trend is likely to continue. The British said they were pleased to note that the countries continued ready to let new concessions and no real enthusiasm appears to exist for contracting for oil operations. We noted, however, the trend in the evolution of government oil entities toward integrated export operations. Iran has crude of its own now and Kuwait may soon be in a similar position with refined products. It is hard to foresee how all of this will develop, but it appears downstream operations could prove unprofitable and difficult for them. Labor in the Persian Gulf We expressed concern that labor issues could become one of the most serious problems in the Persian Gulf area. Reluctance of the governments to face this issue and company convictions that the Persian Gulf labor movement is politically motivated per se must be overcome. Otherwise the field would be open to radical politically oriented groups such as the UAR-dominated Arab Federation of Petroleum Workers. Already this appears to have taken place in Kuwait. The British agreed that this was a matter of increasing importance that should be looked at closely. They suggested that it might be well for both sides to discuss it again soon. Nasser and Arab Nationalism There was general agreement about the UAR's role, present and future, in oil matters. We pointed out the conflict of interests that exists between the UAR and the Arab oil producing states. There is a limit to which the UAR can squeeze or force these countries, even Iraq. Nasser has gone about as far as he can in this respect. The discovery of oil in the Gulf of Suez by Pan American (eventually production may reach 100,000 b/d) could even lead to more responsible UAR attitudes on oil. We mentioned Syria as being perhaps more vociferous than the UAR in hewing to the radical line on oil. We also pointed up our concern over reports that the ideas of Abdullah Tariki still have considerable popular appeal in the Arab world. His influence should not be discounted. In addition, there are others, like Faisal Mazidi in Kuwait, who, while not in favor of immediate nationalization, still advocate eventual government control of the oil industry. In short, we thought we should not be over-confident that these dangers were not real. The British agreed that we should not be overly confident even though there is evidence of growing responsibility in the area on oil matters. Informational Activity The British said the informational efforts of the U.S. and U.K. Governments and the oil companies in the Middle East should not necessarily be directed against the more sophisticated approach of OPEC. What requires countering are the wilder, radical Arab views. This is a long-term operation requiring time to prepare and execute. Mr. Beckett indicated that extremist propaganda was being countered through a program developed in quarterly HMG-U.K. company liaison group consultations. The U.S. expressed interest in the outcome of the discussions. Although the form did not seem applicable here because of the multiplicity of interests and companies, there was perhaps real value in the idea of working on the problem in concert with industry. No formal consultation between the U.S. and U.K. seems necessary. We do feel the U.S. companies are doing a good job and we have encouraged them to prepare papers and distribute them in both European and Arab oil circles. Iraq The British expressed pessimism about Iraq Government ratification of the agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company. They mentioned the efforts of Prime Minister Bazzaz to link the agreement with the Kurdish problem in recent discussions in London. We agreed that prospects for ratification are not bright. A solution of the Kurdish question, however, might pave the way for a settlement. Iran The British said the production growth rate remained a problem for the consortium with the Shah. There had been some improvement in the situation recently, however. The British discussed the problem that had arisen regarding a median line between Abu Dhabi and Iran. Atlantic 3 has a strike in an area that could be on either side of the line depending upon which principles are applied in drawing it. The Iranians must now decide one way or another on this. While one set of principles would give Iran the Atlantic strike area, their application would confer upon Abu Dhabi advantages in other parts of the Gulf. Kuwait We expressed concern about events in Kuwait, especially political developments affecting the prospects for ratification of the supplemental agreement. We pointed out that unilateral action against KOC by the National Assembly was a potential possibility. The British, while agreeing that early ratification is unlikely, were somewhat surprised by the possibility of unilateral action. They listened attentively to a description by the U.S. side of political changes in Kuwait (reduced role of the Amir, increased political activity, etc.) which had greatly altered the premises of successfully dealing with the Government). The U.K. tended to agree that changes had indeed occurred and said they would closely examine this question. Abu Dhabi The British said prospects for larger increases in Abu Dhabi were very good particularly offshore where output could easily reach approximately 1,400,000 b/d in the not too distant future. Abu Dhabi offshore could well become one of the largest fields in the Middle East. A 50/50 agreement between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd. will probably be concluded in due course. Algeria Though the Franco-Algerian Oil Agreement strengthens the French dirigiste oil policy, it is regarded as sui generis because of the special relationships between Algeria and France. It was agreed that the Agreement could raise problems for U.S. and U.K. companies and these could ultimately require official intervention. The RAP-Saudi Arabian deal and French attempts to buy their way out of the IPC negotiations this year, suggest that the French may be getting away from arrangements based on economic grounds and moving toward a political orientation of their oil policies. Although these factors and increased French takings of Soviet oil seemingly bear this out, the British suggest that the emergence of Abu Dhabi as an important producer might dull the French appetite for uneconomic oil deals. Libya The U.S. representatives outlined the serious effect adoption by the GOL of the OPEC settlement formula would have for the U.S. “independents” producing in Libya. The U.S. concern in respect to the pricing problem in Libya is that the GOL give the independents a full opportunity to be heard so that a mutually agreeable solution can be attempted rather than a new tax regime be imposed on those companies unilaterally by GOL decree. The British made no specific response to the U.S. presentation but implied some surprise that the USG supported the independents in Libya. They did point out that the large discounts offered by the independents on sales of Libyan crude oil have a very marked effect on the returns obtained by the majors on their sales, especially on sales to non-affiliated companies. The British representatives recognized that the majors in urging Libya to adopt a posted price system are encouraging the GOL unilaterally to breach concession agreements, a development not in the long term interest of the international oil industry. Oil Industry Finance It was mutually recognized that a problem existed in the enormous capital requirements of the international oil industry on the one hand and its inability to generate sufficient self-financing for its requirements. Capital needs are increasing as world economic growth requires fairly rapid expansion in the supply of oil products. The trend has been towards more borrowing by the companies. The sums needed are too vast to be supplied by the capital market, access to which is limited by balance of payments programs and the thinness of the European capital market. The required self-financing is restricted by low prices and producing country measures to increase taxation. The widespread exploration activities of the companies will strain capital resources even more, but it appears that the companies have not so far been deterred from this by the prospect of lower profitability. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 1 UK-US. Confidential. Drafted by R. Shuler (E) and cleared by Adams (NEA), Eurchamp (EUR/BNA), Sober (NEA/SOA), Starkey (EUR/BNA), Post (AF/AFN), Enders (EUR/RPE), Crowley (ARA/CV), O'Leary (INT), and Ensor (FSE). Sent to Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Bonn, Brussels, Cairo, Caracas, Damascus, Djakarta, Karachi, Kuwait, Jidda, Lagos, London, Ottawa, New Delhi, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Tehran, The Hague, Tripoli, Vienna, USEC Brussels, USEC Luxembourg, Paris OCED, and the Consulate in Dhahran. 2 Reference is to the European Community. 3 An American independent oil company. 187. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 187. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, January 6, 1966, 1345Z. 981. Sharp Decrease in Iran Oil Offtake. PriMin Hoveyda summoned UK Ambassador Wright and me 6th to complain that Iranian oil offtake dropped more than 200,000 barrels per day in December. He said Shah and other GOI leaders suspect this is unwelcome retaliation on part of oil Consortium for recent Kharg Island problem (A–415). 2 Hoveyda went on to say Iran's vital plans for development will suffer if anticipated increases in oil offtake do not materialize. Noting greater foreign exchange shortage would result Hoveyda said Iran would dislike to have to shift to heavier reliance on Eastern Bloc countries for commerce and possibly even arms. Making clear this is issue outside jurisdiction of USG, I took occasion to recall frequent USG cautioning over excessively rosy estimates of future Iran income. Noted specifically how during last summer's economic review Shah had brushed aside realistic estimates his economic advisors as being too conservative. Also explained this pointed up our concern re too much Iranian spending on things military (Hoveyda cited current flare-up of hostilities with Iraq as justifying GOI's judgment re military expenditures). In any case, I made clear my conviction oil Consortium worked by laws of supply and demand rather than political vindictiveness (Wright says he took same line). I also expressed some doubt about plethora of Iranian barter deals with Eastern Bloc countries, noting how Hitler used these tools for political purposes. Also suggested Iran keep wary eye on its oil sales to Rumania and others for possibility exists Eastern Bloc countries will flog this oil on European market at expense Iranian markets. Noted that Iran would do well to keep in mind its predominant oil market (and inconvertible exchange) must inevitably be with free world countries. Hoveyda said he realized USG unable take specific action but expressed hope we might informally encourage oil companies to keep Iran offtakes up. He contrasted this year's sharp increase in production in Saudi Arabia (I noted year ago Iran percentage of increase was high while Saudi was low) and in Abu Dhabi. We both agreed frank discussion of these problems of type he undertaking is much preferable to artillery salvo technique employed in Kharg Island issue. Hoveyda said Consortium Chief John Warder, who was leaving his office when I arrived, is going to London to seek explanation from Consortium members. Meyer 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to London. 2 Airgram A–415 from Tehran is dated December 16, 1965. (Ibid., PET 1 IRAN) Iran and Iraq had recently clashed militarily over Kharg Island, Iran's primary offshore oil loading terminus. 188. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 188. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, January 20, 1966, 1325Z. 1041. Shah's Pique at Oil Companies. Re Embtel 981. 2 1. Short-fall in Oil Income. Practically at outset our discussion US-Iran military cooperation 20th, Shah diverted discussion to his bitterness re UK and US oil Consortium. He cited 200,000 barrel per day nosedive in liftings in December and $30,000,000 deficiency in 1965 revenues anticipated by Iran. He went on to say that both military security and economic development are vital to Iran. If oil companies do not provide anticipated growth in revenues, Iran might have to reorient “philosophy” which Shah said he had espoused “during twenty-five years of my reign.” 2. US Companies' Record. Noting I had not come prepared to air this problem and in any case USG's capability vis-à-vis oil companies as he knew is very circumscribed, I mentioned receipt few days ago of letter from Esso Vice President Howard Page. Page's letter had been drafted pursuant to PriMin Hoveyda's and Fornmin Aram's having raised this problem with me at Shah's instructions. In general, Page's letter indicates Consortium, and American companies in particular, have good record. Shah said he had already seen Page letter (Page sent copy to NIOC's Falla). 3. Broader Picture. Shah seemed have no arguments to counter Page letter. He sought elevate subject to broader free world interests in maintaining militarily secure and economically progressive Iran. Shah realized companies work for profit and that they have obligations as in Saudi Arabia, but in his view it is in their higher interest to support large progressive country like Iran instead of paying vast revenues to tiny entity like Abu Dhabi with its few tens of thousands of people and where oil production is expected to rise to million and half barrels per day. He said Abu Dhabi being operated primarily by British companies. He acknowledged that in oil matters UK Govt. has more direct involvement than does USG. Important point was that tranquility of entire Gulf region depends upon Iran; oil companies, as well as UK and US Govts., should take this into account in formulating their offtake policies. I said I felt Page's letter reflected awareness of Iran's value. 4. Iran-Consortium Relationship. When I expressed doubt re wisdom of shifting Iran's “philosophy,” Shah said he might have no choice. He would have to supply his military and economic development needs where money and cheapest prices available. It was in this connection that he mentioned Soviet MIG–21 sales to Arab countries for only $600,000 per copy. I said from direct experience Iran should keep in mind foolhardiness of falling out with oil companies. He noted current difficulties between Kuwait and KOC but said Arabs always somehow keep oil revenues coming in, at same time reaping benefits of their demagoguery with oil companies. He agreed nevertheless that healthy Iranian relationship with oil Consortium is essential. Comment. Although Shah knew we were coming to discuss military matters, he obviously had decided to make major point of his disappointment re oil income. Incidentally, after Shah had unloaded his complaint it was possible to exploit his concern to point up importance of our annual review designed to put military and economic expenditures in perspective bearing in mind prospective GOI income. Meyer 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to London. 2 Document 187 . 189. Airgram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State 189. Airgram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State 1 Kuwait, March 14, 1966. A–229 SUBJECT U.S. Policy Toward the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); U.S. Contact with OPEC Secretariat REF CA–5671 of November 24, 1965; 2 Vienna's A–697 to Dept of February 4, 1966 3 SUMMARY The Country Team welcomes the policy of review of U.S. attitudes towards OPEC; and concludes that the establishment of a U.S. Government working relationship with OPEC would serve U.S. interests. U.S. Attitudes The present aloof U.S. attitude toward OPEC is not a lively issue in US-Kuwaiti relations, but we are somewhat at loss to find a locally acceptable theoretical defense of our position and appreciate the opportunity to participate in this policy review. A Kuwaiti advocate of OPEC might claim that its mandate rests on the right of a state to exercise commercial regulation of its petroleum reserves and to seek this regulation in an entity transcending state boundaries when the companies controlling its petroleum industry are engaged in “interstate commerce.” He might assert that OPEC is not dissimilar from a commodity agreement in which the leading exporters of petroleum, developing nations heavily dependent upon foreign exchange earnings of the commodity, are seeking to improve its international terms of trade. In our own historical experience and present economic policy, we find little theoretical justification for remaining unsympathetic to an organization so founded and motivated. On a more practical level, OPEC is ostensibly opposed to the interests of American petroleum companies which the United States Government has a certain obligation to protect. We are insufficiently expert to determine, but we wonder, nevertheless, if certain OPEC objectives—stability in crude production and price and a uniformity in producing-country petroleum laws and concession terms—might not, in the long run, be in the interest of some American oil companies. We wonder if, at some point, the United States itself might not conceivably become a “petroleum exporting country.” We particularly question, as the dust settles in Libya, whether there is one definable “U.S. oil company interest” on which the U.S. Government can afford to hang a petroleum policy. When our oil companies deal with individual producing-country governments, the U.S. Government, through normal diplomatic channels, quite properly maintains a separate identity, permitting us the flexibility to assist in mediating possible disputes and to avoid impairing wider U.S. policy interests in the country concerned. If our petroleum companies accept the reality that, in their multi-national negotiations with the producing countries, they are dealing with OPEC, should not the United States Government be in a position to exercise a similar third-party role? We see OPEC as a manifestation of a strong historic trend toward economic nationalism in Arab and other developing countries. Like it or not, we have little enough possibility of directing this trend, and even less of opposing it successfully. There are issues on which the U.S. Government must oppose this trend. If OPEC is not one of these, we would seem to be borrowing trouble and foregoing a possible opportunity in failing to establish a working relationship with it. Certainly, our oil companies might wish that there were no demand for an organization such as OPEC, but OPEC does exist. While OPEC's viability and reputation for economic statesmanship are by no means assured, the organization does appear to have mellowed with age. In the context of economic nationalism—certainly in the context of Arab nationalism—OPEC may emerge as a force for reason and moderation. In our assessment, American oil companies, in spite of their economic power and technical prowess, are politically and psychologically on the defensive in their dealings with the producing countries. As an offensive alliance, OPEC is a somewhat cumbersome one. By attempting to force the companies to deal with OPEC, the producing countries have to reduce their collective objectives to the lowest common denominator. In Kuwait, at the moment, it is, after all, not the Government, but Gulf-BP that is seeking ratification of the “OPEC settlement.” In short, if there were no OPEC, perhaps the companies would have to create one. Contact with OPEC We understand from Kuwaiti oil officials that OPEC is considering shifting its attentions from obtaining larger benefits from international companies to seeking a reduction of consumer country restrictions and tariffs on crude oil. In anticipation of this possible shift of emphasis, the U.S. Government should be in position to deal directly with the organization. Consequently, we think that establishment of a U.S. Government working relationship with OPEC would serve U.S. interests. The form such recognition might take raises tactical as well as legal questions. In the Arab world, OPEC is not above suspicion for its “ineffectiveness” in obtaining producing-country demands and because it is subject to “subversive” Iranian and Venezuelan influences. Should the U.S. Government embrace OPEC too warmly,OPEC's credibility as a champion of producing-country aspirations might be further impaired. For this reason, perhaps our approach to OPEC should stress the establishment of a working relationship rather than formal recognition. Howard R. Cottam 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by J. Twinam (ECON), and concurred in by J. Gatch, Jr. (DCM), W. Bromell (POL), and J. Vonier (USIS). Pouched to Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Bonn, Brussels, Cairo, Caracas, Djakarta, Jidda, Lagos, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Tehran, Tripoli, USEC Brussels, USEC Luxembourg, USRO Paris, Mission in Geneva, and Vienna. 2 Document 185 . 3 Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 2 AUS) 190. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy (Oliver) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) 190. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy (Oliver) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) 1 Washington, June 10, 1966. SUBJECT Significance of Recent OPEC Resolutions The Eleventh Session of the OPEC adopted two resolutions indicating new moves by the member countries to increase their revenues from oil and ultimately to raise prices at which crude oil is sold by concessionnaire companies. Resolution 71 recommends that each member country take steps toward the complete elimination of the tax free discount off of posted prices permitted the companies. The discount was granted in the OPEC settlement of 1964 as a quid pro quo to the companies for their agreeing to treat royalty payments to governments as an operating expense instead of as a part of the total tax liability to governments as was the case under the original 50–50 profit sharing formula. The net effect of the tax free discount under the 1964 settlement was to offset in part the amount governments would receive by treating the standard 12.5 percent royalty payment as an operating expense. By the terms of the 1964 agreement, negotiations are to take place this year on the amount of the tax free discount for 1967 and future years. The companies are committed to reduce the discount if market conditions justify a reduction below the 6.5 percent rate in effect for 1966. If the OPEC membership were to succeed in forcing an immediate elimination of the discount beginning in 1967, total payments to governments would be increased significantly. For Kuwait for example, discontinuance of the discount would result in an increase in payments to the GOK of about $0.05 per barrel of production, or $40 million per year. The producing companies are certain to resist any move by governments to terminate the discount, and the probability is that the best the governments will obtain will be agreement to eliminate the discount gradually over a period of years, at a rate of decrease of perhaps 1 percent per year over five years. The important point in respect of this resolution is that altering the percentage discount will require protracted negotiations with the companies. Therefore Resolution 71 should not have an immediate impact upon either government revenues or the cost of crude oil to the companies. Resolution 72 recommends that member countries apply posted or “reference” prices for the purpose of determining the tax liabilities of the oil companies operating in their territories; and that no petroleum rights be granted or contracts entered into concerning exploration or exploitation of new areas unless royalty payments and income tax liabilities are calculated on the basis of posted or reference prices, or unless the share to be obtained by the government is not less favorable than that obtained under existing arrangements based on posted or reference prices. This resolution derives from a resolution taken at the Tenth OPEC conference in December 1965 directing the Economic Commission of the OPEC to study the “implications” of applying posted prices for tax purposes. Of significance is the fact that the December 1965 resolution was taken “in pursuance of” a September 1960 resolution which said member countries would require oil companies to maintain stable prices, try to reestablish posted prices at levels prevailing before these were cut (in 1958–1959), and assure that oil companies enter into consultations with governments to explain any circumstances they felt required any future price modifications. A posted price system does not now apply in all OPEC member countries. Venezuela and Indonesia compute income liabilities on prices realized on crude sales. In Saudi Arabia, ARAMCO sales to non-affiliated companies are taxed at realized prices. The OPEC countries have apparently concluded that so long as crude production in some countries is taxed on actual sales realizations the way is open for some companies to grant “excessive” sales discounts off of posted prices which depress the price of crude oil on world markets. If posted prices were the uniform rule in the OPEC membership this would have the desirable effect of steadying and stabilizing world crude oil prices. We believe that this resolution will not prove too difficult for the OPEC countries to bring into effect. Venezuela is already considering an offer by the oil companies to compute future taxes on a “reference price” basis. Saudi Arabia has raised with ARAMCO the idea of calculating income from third party sales on posted prices applying to transfers to affiliated companies. Our assessment is influenced by the conviction that most “major” international companies are accustomed to a posted price system and can see some advantage in placing Venezuela and Indonesia on the same basis in that tax disputes and claims for additional tax payments by those countries might be avoided in the future. There is a further attraction to the old line majors to posted prices; it could affect the capability of the “newcomers” internationally to compete with them in major markets. The latter companies do not have anything like the integrated marketing structure of the major companies. The newcomer's ability to sell at discounted prices and be taxed on those prices has assisted their effort to find markets for their production. To the extent that the range of discounts those companies can offer is narrowed by having to compute taxes on posted prices, particularly when posted prices are out of line with market realities, the newcomers will be able to compete less favorably with the majors in the principal international markets. Once a posted price system is in effect throughout OPEC, a logical subsequent move by the OPEC countries would be to demand some increase in actual prices posted. Such a move would support the objective stated in the 1960 resolution to obtain a return of posted prices to 1958–1959 levels. Resolutions 71 and 72 have implications for consumer countries. Each amounts to an increase in real costs of crude oil to the companies which will be reflected in prices offered consumers. The range of discounts off of posted prices companies are willing to absorb as a cost of doing business is narrowed in either case, and increases of the real costs of crude to the producer will be passed on to the buyer. The Eleventh Conference also adopted a non-specific resolution on future production programming within the OPEC membership, although at a prior meeting this year OPEC had announced that a decision had been made to “go into the second period of the joint production program.” The resolution refers to “unsatisfactory” rate of production increase in “certain” member countries, and attributes this condition to “manipulation” of production by companies. It warns that all members will give full support of efforts by those countries “to safeguard their legitimate natural national interests” should their “rates of growth not be improved to satisfactory levels during the year 1966.” This last resolution probably is another case of producer countries using the OPEC as the “bogey man” so to speak in pressuring companies to meet their demands. Nevertheless it is an indication of the concern some members have with the levels of production, and is an important resolution to keep in mind when discussing proposals such as DOD's to return a substantial part of foreign procurement of products to the United States. 1 Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 70 D 54, PET 3 Organizations and Conferences 1966. OPEC. Limited Official Use. 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, October 25, 1966, 1445Z. 1860. Iran Oil. 1. Shah 25th presented Iran's case vis-à-vis Consortium in same terms as Hoveyda (para 2 Tehran 1817), 2 i.e. unresponsiveness of Consortium to Shah's appeals and GOI's proposals. Shah said at London yesterday Consortium had “asked” for month to give matter further study. Shah readily agreed but he hoped by end of month GOI would receive forthcoming response. 2. Shah stressed usual theme that Western oil companies and govts fail to appreciate role Iran can and must play in this region. While companies deny Iran 17 percent increase, Saudi liftings were up 26 percent last year and will be so again this year. Shah added that he does not object to high Saudi increase since Faisal is investing money wisely in economic development and also is required to build up military security. What is irritating, Shah said, is large offtake from places like Kuwait and Abu Dhabi with small populations and even Libya with its 2,000,000. 3. I assured Shah oil companies been very sympathetic to Iran's problems, and been trying to do their best. They have, however, problems and commitments elsewhere which cannot be ignored, and their markets are limited. An annual influx to Iran nearing $600,000,000 from the Consortium convinces me, I said, that Consortium treating Iran very well. Saying it not necessary to make speeches re what happened in 1951, 3 I noted Iran would probably be even better off today had it not on that occasion fomented confrontation with oil companies. While implying he expected no similar impasse this time, Shah quickly, though bit lamely, said Consortium should know that if companies suspend production this time other Mideast producing countries would stand by Iran. In any case, he said, such calamity here would affect stability of whole Gulf area, a result which would harm oil companies as well as Iran. 4. I expressed gratification for his intention to avoid disastrous show-down. Making clear I not spokesman for companies, I said it behooves reasonable men in situations of this kind to sit down and determine what is possible and realistic. Shah emphatically agreed. I went on to express view that a main consideration is to avoid setting precedent which other Mideast countries will follow. Such “escalation” I said can in end only harm achievement of Shah's objectives. Shah agreed with this thesis also. 5. First step, I told Shah, is definition of problem. In this connection we been a bit confused by impression gleaned in London talks of immediate financial need and by Hoveyda's indicating this not true. Shah said chief problem is financing Iran's upcoming five-year plan. GOI realizes, he said, that 12 percent growth rate of last year cannot be maintained. However, 8–10 percent growth rate is necessary to achieve level of investment needed to reach 8–10 percent rate Iran's economists have determined annual 17 percent increase in income from Consortium is required. Since Consortium keeps saying that 12 percent is highest figure possible, way must be found to fill 5 percent gap. Thus GOI has successively proposed: a) advance payments by Consortium to be repaid after 1970 (he did not specify formula for repayment); b) equivalent amount of crude which Iran Govt can provide to noncompetitive East Europe markets (he did not specify formula under which crude would be provided); and c) relinquishment of some of agreement area so that Iran can arrange production of crude for East Europe (he gave no indication re extent of relinquishment). 6. Re East Europe, Shah said Soviets are very annoyed by Romanian-Iranian cooperation both re tractors and oil. Just yesterday, he said, Soviets made approach to Iran (he declined to be specific when I asked how serious was the approach) to purchase oil from Iran. Shah speculates that Soviets want Iranian oil so that they can maintain their monopoly on Romanian oil imports. Shah said Soviets been selling oil at $3.00 per barrel to satellites, whereas highest price at which NIOC been able to sell is $1.35 except NIOC's transactions with Consortium which are at $1.84. When I speculated that both Soviets and Romanians might have in mind importing Iranian crude and exporting at least some refined products to markets now served by Consortium, Shah expressed skepticism but agreed it is worth looking into. I tried to pin Shah down whether Iran already has specific deal with Romanians or other East Bloc countries. Shah gave no affirmative indication. We did, however, do some arithmetic which showed that 5 percent of present Consortium production would mean 100,000 barrels per day. Shah wanted this translated to tons per year which came out to nearly 6,000,000 tons. Shah gave distinct impression this more than Iran needs for East Bloc, at least for foreseeable future. He mentioned only Romania and Poland as prospective buyers. (Incidentally, PriMin Hoveyda leaves 27th for Romania where Romanian-Iran oil transactions may receive further consideration. It may have been Hoveyda's trip which prompted NIOC's deadlines last few days.) 7. At end of one and one-half hour discussion of number of subjects, Shah returned to oil question. We reviewed Iran's position as giving Consortium any one of three options: a) advance payments; b) cost oil for East Europe; c) some relinquishment. 8. Comment . Obviously moratorium arranged in London yesterday took pressure off this discussion. Shah was cordial and seemingly reasonable. Apparent lack of specifics re any of three options is hopeful sign. Also there is some hope that third course may not be necessary if adequate response forthcoming on either of first two courses. Our impression is that first course is unacceptable to companies for precedent and other reasons. While we cannot guarantee that question of relinquishment will not arise, it appears companies are on right track if they can come up with something along lines of Warder's “loan oil” proposal (Tehran 1842) or Embassy's suggestion (Tehran 1818) 4 re utilizing “royalty oil” provided for in Consortium agreement. Meyer 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London. 2 Dated October 22. (Ibid.) 3 Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeq nationalized Iranian oil production in 1951, resulting in an embargo on Iranian oil. Mosadeq's government fell in 1953. 4 Telegrams 1818 and 1842 from Tehran, both dated October 25, are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 Washington, October 28, 1966, 9:22 p.m. 75441. Iran Oil. 1. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. 2. British Ambassador called on Under Secretary Rostow 27th to make following points which also incorporated in paper which he left and which being pouched addressees: 2 a Motives for Iranian demands on Consortium are mix of need for money, desire to establish a position in marketing of oil, belief that Iran should be able utilize her own oil assets, and Shah's views that Iran deserves more than its neighboring oil countries, that East-West détente makes him less dependent on West and that Iran should do more to assert independence. b Demands on Consortium come from Shah and there is real risk of unilateral Iranian action which would not only be contrary Iran's best interests but would also cause “irrevocable damage” to UK and US political, commercial and strategic interests. c It is vital that Consortium should agree on position which would be “negotiable” with Iranians if latter also prepared show some give.HMG stressing this to British companies and hopes USG will do same with US companies. d Both governments should use influence with companies to persuade them “take as forthcoming an attitude as possible.” In this connection companies should be aware that issues involved are far wider than commercial. Warder's recommendations seem worthy of serious consideration. e HMG proposes team of FonOff officials (Morris of Eastern Dept and Fearnley, petroleum expert) come Washington next week to discuss “factual oil questions” and political issues. f HMG believes two aspects of problem should be raised with companies. First they should be encouraged liberalize currently rigid overlifting arrangements, a move which would have dramatic short-term effect on offtake. Secondly some US companies, particularly Jersey, SOCAL, Texaco and Gulf, “do not take as high a proportion of their maximum offtake entitlement as other member companies” and hopefully USG can persuade them to “come closer to their maximum entitlement.” 3. British also said they have report of Shah's speech 26th which particularly rough on Consortium. 4. Rostow replied we would be happy have discussions next week; we are also concerned and wish continue keep in close touch. He said that we have been asked by our companies only to express hope to Iranians that they work for a reasonable solution and that we have indicated to US companies similar hope. 3 Before agreeing to talk with US companies again we would wish study British proposals and have the suggested talks next week. We would hope get by without becoming too much involved. One aspect of matter is Iranian concern about British withdrawal from Aden and South Arabia. 5. British Ambassador responded by indicating HMG awareness of Iranian concerns about British withdrawal is one reason for suggesting political aspects be discussed next week. He stressed HMG thinks there is real risk of unilateral Iranian action against Consortium and Shah is capable of upsetting applecart. 6. Talks are now scheduled take place in Washington November 2 and 3. 4 We do not intend mention these meetings to companies before they take place. We are also asking British not to tell Iranians about UK-US talks next week because we do not wish to raise Iranian hopes that US Government will intervene with US oil company Consortium members since this would make it more difficult for GOI and Consortium reach compromise agreement. For same reason we do not wish give talks any publicity. Septel follows. 7. Embassies London and Tehran should transmit soonest their comments on British position to assist Dept prepare for talks. In particular would appreciate Tehran's views on what Iranians hope achieve from current confrontation with Consortium and extent of risk of unilateral Iranian action against Consortium. 5 Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by T. Eliot (NEA/IRN), cleared in draft by Oliver (E/FSE) and S. Rockwell (NEA), cleared by Solomon (E) and Shaver (S/S), and approved by Hare (NEA). Also sent to London. 2 A copy is attached to an October 28 memorandum from Fried to Solomon. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 70 D 54, PET—Petroleum (Iran) 1966) An October 27 background memorandum prepared by Hare for Rostow sums up the U.S. understanding of the Iranian oil situation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN) 3 Telegram 71891 to Tehran, October 24, informed Ambassador Meyer: “While expressing hope you would continue help keep lid on, companies agreed USG should not become involved in substantive questions.” (Ibid.) 4 See Document 193 . 5 Ambassador Meyer reported in telegram 1927 from Tehran, October 31, that while he generally agreed with the British analysis, he did not think that the Shah was preparing for a confrontation: “While some dangerous brinkmanship involved in present exercise, fact we are dealing with Persians who have behind them 2500 years of bargaining experience leads us conclude they have sensed there still some give in Consortium position.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN) 193. Memorandum of Conversation 193. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 3, 1966. SUBJECT Political Aspects of the Iranian Oil Consortium Problem PARTICIPANTS UK Mr. Willie Morris, Foreign Office, London Mr. John Fearnley, Foreign Office, London Mr. Nigel Trench, Counselor, Embassy Washington Mr. Christopher Everett, First Secretary, Embassy Washington Mr. Noel Martin, Counselor (Petroleum), Embassy Washington Mr. Derek Eagers, Mr. Martin's newly arrived replacement Mr. Robert Alston, Foreign Office, London US Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Mr. Edward Fried, Deputy Assistant Secretary, E Mr. James W. Swihart,EUR/BMI Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., NEA/IRN Mr. John Oliver, E/FSE Mr. Daniel O. Newberry, NEA/IRN Mr. Rockwell, expressing the hope that our two governments could present a united front, stressed that the Iranians are always quick to perceive differences in our points of view. Mr. Morris replied that HMG would see the problems in the same way as the USG insofar as possible and he looked upon the day's task as of finding how and where our two governments differ. He recalled that the importance of Iran to HMG came out strongly in the Defense Review. It had been clear that Britain could not give up its obligations in the area of Iran and the Gulf despite economic pressures to do so. Mr. Morris thought that the job of keeping Iran on its promising course as long as possible was worth quite a lot of effort. In commercial terms the Consortium companies were now in a strong position. In the longer term, he thought, we both could only be the losers in the event of a confrontation, apart from the ill effects that Iran itself might suffer. He did not question the doctrine of leaving the companies to settle their affairs with the GOI but he saw the present situation as one in which the companies would appreciate and would need advice from their governments. Mr. Rockwell remarked that while we in the USG consult regularly with the U.S. companies, the companies at this time were showing no more disposition than usual to ask our advice. Mr. Morris' analysis of Iranian motives centered around the role of the Shah himself who was master-minding the Iranian effort. While there was a certain logic in the shifting economic arguments put forward by Iran, essentially what they want is more money. Mr. Morris cited an additional psychological factor influencing the Shah, namely that Mossadeq was still figuratively pointing a finger at the Shah and HIM felt an urgent need to display “independence.” Mr. Rockwell agreed that the Shah was calling the turns for Iran and added that the aim of getting a marketing role for the NIOC figured in Iranian calculations. He also mentioned the Iranian feeling that the Consortium agreement somehow deprived Iran of its sovereignty. There was also a feeling of envy at the disproportionate income from oil enjoyed by neighboring states. The American companies, he believed, seemed to regard the present problem as a continuation of a general dilemma faced by oil companies in other areas as well. Mr. Fearnley added that the companies seemed to take the problem seriously for its own sake. The British companies were looking for a formula to control the eventual erosion of their position in Iran rather than accept “an imposed erosion.” Mr. Morris called attention to the draft minute on the Iranian economic situation which had been given to the Department on a rush basis. Mr. Rockwell distributed a companion U.S. memorandum on the Iranian economic position. Mr. Morris noted that Iran does have a foreign exchange problem which will be especially acute next year. He recalled that the US and UK Ambassadors in Tehran were trying to persuade the GOI to get an expert to identify the problem; he suggested that we continue to put this idea to the GOI, apart from the Consortium problem. Mr. Rockwell agreed that there was a foreign exchange problem but noted that Iran does have considerable capacity to incur medium and long-term debts. He added that the improved economic management performance by such agencies as the Ministry of Economy and the Central Bank made us more optimistic about the GOI's ability to control inflation and otherwise to manage its economic planning. Mr. Eliot called attention to the annual IMF consultation in December which should also be helpful. Mr. Morris, in considering US and UK strategic interests in Iran, saw no persuasive alternative to the present regime. He felt that if the Shah could be dissuaded from taking suicidal action in the Consortium affair, Iran showed great promise. Britain, he emphasized, continued to depend heavily on over-flight privileges in Turkey and Iran. Mr. Rockwell responded that the USG attached equal if not more importance to Iran than the UK. In an area beset by nationalist irritations, the Shah's conduct was one element that could be counted on and we find that we have to put up with a great deal to keep the Shah in a reasonably reasonable mood. Mr. Rockwell went on to cite the Iranian apprehensions over the prospect of British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf area. Mr. Morris related that Foreign Secretary Brown had discussed this subject with Mr. Aram in New York recently, at which time Mr. Brown reiterated UK intentions to maintain military dispositions in the area for the foreseeable future. Mr. Morris recalled that the Foreign Secretary had written a personal letter of reassurance to the Shah while the latter was in Austria, noting that the Shah's initial reaction to the letter had been good but that later on HIM had displayed some disquiet. Mr. Morris predicted that the Shah must reconcile himself to not getting sovereignty over the other shore of the Gulf. The Shah could, however, take some satisfaction in having the biggest “fleet” in the area. The remainder of the conversation was focused on the risk of unilateral action by the Shah. Mr. Morris dismissed the thesis that the Shah might be bluffing and predicted that even if Iran had to retreat altogether from its present position vis-à-vis the Consortium, the Shah would harbor so much rancor that he would be very difficult to deal with in the future. Mr. Morris thought the most likely form that unilateral action might take would be legislation designed to take away part of the concessions, perhaps one or more of the producing areas. The Shah seemed to think that the Consortium would go on producing even while accepting a fait accompli. Mr. Rockwell agreed that if Iran decided to take over any of the producing areas, the crisis would take on really serious proportions. It was not our impression however that the Shah was ready to wreck the 1954 Agreement. Mr. Morris thought that, although such was not the Shah's intention, the danger lay in the possibility that the Shah might set in motion a course of events that he could not stop. Mr. Morris agreed that the Shah was unlikely to pursue such a course knowingly, but HMG felt that we must take seriously the possibility that the Shah might try to out-Mossadeq Mossadeq. Mr. Morris wondered what were the less drastic possibilities of unilateral action. Mr. Rockwell thought that it depended on how much the Consortium could absorb. He added that the companies must be the judges of what would be considered drastic and they obviously must make some proposal which the Iranians would not feel that they had to reject out of hand. The companies' proposal would need to offer some meaningful financial result for the Shah in order to register other than a negative impact. Mr. Rockwell added that the USG took no position on what the companies' proposals should be. Mr. Fearnley and Mr. Morris felt that the British companies did not want a showdown. They had a public relations problem, not wanting to appear to be “grinding the faces of the poor.” British Petroleum was seeking to find a formulation that would appear to the layman as just, reasonable and fair. Mr. Morris expressed the hope that the USG would point out to the US companies the probable consequences of provoking unilateral action by Iran. Mr. Rockwell noted that we had already spoken in general terms with the companies and would do so again; he was confident that the US companies were aware of the seriousness of the situation. The Department had told the American companies that we did not want to be involved in the substance of negotiations. We were satisfied that the companies were mindful of USG interest in the problem and that the companies were resolved to seek a way out of the impasse that would not damage their basic interests. Mr. Rockwell recapitulated the following points of view held by the USG: 1. The USG does not wish to become involved in the discussions within the Consortium on possible counterproposals to the Iranians and does not wish to pressure the American companies to make any particular proposals. 2. We do not believe that the Shah will go so far as to risk destruction of the 1954 Oil Agreement. 3. The USG has pushed its military and economic aid programs for Iran to the maximum, and we do not propose to offer any more in the context of the Consortium impasse. 4. The USG nevertheless regards the current Iranian demands on the Consortium as a serious matter. We will continue to attempt to restrain the Iranians from any rash action and to persuade them to keep the door open for discussions. We will keep in touch with the American member companies. We also want to stay in close consultation with HMG and, if there is any way in which HMG believes we might be helpful, we would be happy to have further discussions. Mr. Morris agreed that the situation does not call for consideration of additional US or UK economic or military assistance to the GOI and noted that the companies understood this. He observed that the difference between the evaluations of HMG and USG had to do with the probability rather than the consequences of unilateral action by the Shah. Mr. Fearnley asked whether, if the negotiations were to bog down, the USG would exclude the possibility of speaking in general terms about the seriousness of the situation and urge the companies to get their heads together. Mr. Rockwell responded that we did not exclude anything; if the companies were to ask our advice we would give it and they could accept or reject it. At the conclusion of the talks, it was agreed that the two governments would inform the companies of the fact that the talks had taken place in the State Department and would ask the companies to regard this as privileged information. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Newberry. The briefing memorandum for the meeting is in a memorandum from Oliver to Fried, November 1. (Ibid.) 2 The two governments were also concerned that the French would find out about the extent of the consultation between them: “British Emb indicated earlier on 1st that FonOff expecting French approach and wanted to coordinate line we take with the French… . [British Emb] indicated he would stress to FonOff the desirability of not informing French of Nov. 2–3 UK-US talks in Washington and of merely telling French they are being told same thing as HMG is telling USG.” (Telegram 76782, November 1; ibid.) 194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 Washington, November 4, 1966, 6:06 p.m. 79406. Iran Oil 1. Senior officers five major American member companies Iranian Oil Consortium and Chairman of IRICON Board called November 4 on Assistant Secretaries Hare and Solomon to discuss Iranian oil situation. Following summarizes highlights of two-hour conversation. Memcon being pouched addressees. 2 2. Companies agreed situation very critical, with GOI and Consortium on collision course. Problem compounded by Shah and Prime Minister referring to possible unilateral Iranian action. 3. Companies cannot agree to provide oil to Iran at cost because such action would establish “disastrous” precedent with respect other oil-producing countries. Companies can also not agree relinquish proven oil fields as matter of principle and are prepared demonstrate to Iranians that Consortium has no excess reserves. They also reject idea of loaning oil to NIOC which they believe would have same effect as selling it at cost. In short, all Iranian demands unacceptable. Companies' memorandum summarizing their views on Iranian demands being pouched. 4. Companies reported that all member companies meeting almost daily in London in effort come up with counterproposals to put to Iranians. No agreement yet reached among them but seems clear that any counterproposals will be far short of meeting Iranian demands. Current thought is to send high-level Consortium delegation to Tehran before November 22 deadline. 5. Among possible proposals being considered are closer achievement of top of 10–11 percent growth range for 1966, maximum possible growth target for 1967, keen price for royalty oil for sale to NIOC and relinquishment some non-producing and unexplored parts of concession area such as Fars and Lurestan. US companies reported they have no substantial disagreements with BP although BP may be running a little more scared and may still be considering proposal to loan oil to NIOC. 6. Companies were briefed on USG talks with British (State 78491). 3 Dept officers stressed points of agreement with British on Iranian motives, Iranian economic situation, US and UK interests in Iran and likely consequences of drastic unilateral Iranian action. While mentioning HMG has asked British companies be forthcoming, Dept did not mention divergence of US–UK view on risk of unilateral Iranian action. Dept stressed we hope keep govt-to-govt talks confidential in companies' own interest. 7. Dept also made it clear that there no room for additional USG assistance to Iran in context current oil problem. 4 Ambassador Hare informed companies of Ambassador Meyer's and Governor Harriman's discussions with Shah counseling restraint and reminding him of 1951. He also noted recent embargo of news on oil dispute in Tehran press. 8. Companies displayed concern that collision would occur following presentation their counterproposals which would fall so far short of Iran's demands. They agree that they would prefer a collision to making concessions which would create unacceptable problems for them in other oil-producing countries. If GOI should take unilateral action, simplest type of which would be expropriation part of concession area, Consortium would go to arbitration. 9. Companies expressed view it essential for them obtain more time beyond November 22 to permit Iranians to back away from their extreme position. At same time, in requesting more time, companies would not want give GOI false hopes that Consortium would come close to meeting Iranian demands. In fact some concern expressed that GOI may have been given such false hopes when month's grace obtained in London. Companies asked if USG could help them obtain more time. 10. Companies stated they would not welcome “intimate involvement” of USG but hope that USG will make clear to Shah what consequences any rash Iranian action likely have and help convince Shah present Iranian demands are unacceptable because their acceptance would prejudice companies' position elsewhere. 11. In response Solomon stated that in our contacts with the Iranians we would give them our view that we feel what they demanding is not feasible and that to pursue such demands would be self-defeating. If asked by Iranians for suggestions we would tell them they should negotiate specifics with the Consortium, allowing sufficient time to determine what a feasible solution would be. We would make certain this message reaches Shah. 12. Instructions based on preceding para will be sent septel within few days. 13. Dept is informing British Embassy (a) US companies have told us they still working on counterproposals to be presented to Iranians in Tehran and hope keep door open to further discussions with Iranians, and (b) we considering what further we might do assist companies keep door open. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Eliot (NEA/IRN); cleared by Rockwell (NEA), Fried (E), Oliver (E/FSE), Solomon (E); and Hare (NEA). Also sent to London. 2 Company representatives in attendance included George Piercy (Standard Oil of New Jersey and Director of Aramco), James Royds (Chairman of the Board, IRICON Agency Ltd.), William Tavoulareas (Mobil Oil), George V. Parkhurst (Standard Oil of California), Harvey Cash (Texaco and Director of Aramco), G.J. Davis (Gulf Oil), and Nestor Ortiz (Gulf Oil). A complete record is ibid. 3 Telegram 78491 to London and Tehran, November 3. (Ibid.) 4 According to a November 3 memorandum from Fried to Solomon, the United States was disinclined to consider additional resources for Iran in light of the U.S. 5-year $470 million cash and credit military equipment commitment, agreement to provide F–4 Phantom fighters, and more than $200 million in Export-Import Bank aid. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 70 D 54, PET—Petroleum Iran (2) 1966) 195. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 195. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, November 22, 1966, 1825Z. 4274. Subject: Iranian Oil. During conversations in London yesterday, Under Secretary Rostow stressed importance our parallel efforts to ensure success of oil talks this week in Iran. 2 While we did not get as far as British Government did with oil companies, we had made clear both to GOI and to American oil companies our sense of the sensitivity of situation and our hope they would reach a reasonable compromise acknowledging the rightful interests of both sides. FonMin Brown urged separate American approach to Aramco with respect both to present negotiations and possible future Aramco transactions with Saudi Arabia. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to Tehran and Jidda. 2 On November 26 Ambassador Meyer reported in telegram 2298 from Tehran that the Consortium team had tentatively completed its negotiations with the Iranians. (Ibid., PET 6 IRAN) 196. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 196. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Cairo, December 16, 1966. 3385. Subject: IPC Dispute. Ref: Jidda 2307 and Kuwait 638. 2 1. Cairo line on IPC dispute with Syrians predictably supports Syrian position. 3 Ahram on Dec 15 compares situation with 1956 ANC claims powers which exploit Arab oil have forgotten lesson of Suez. Recalls that solidarity of Iraq and Syria with Egypt during tripartite aggression contributed to victory and thus solidarity between Syria and Iraq in confronting IPC will lead to victory. Less cautious Akhbar same day characterizes dispute as similar to Suez dispute which Egypt won by nationalization. Nationalist wave in Near East now irresistible and there strong possibility Iraq will nationalize IPC. 2. Same line given to Embassy political counselor by Mustafa Abdul Aziz, Vice President Zakaria Muhieddin's Secretary, Dec 15. Abdul Aziz says Syrians are right for first time in their lives. IPC has been making enormous profits and refusing pay what it had already consented to under agreement. Western governments striking pose that this was simple dispute between IPC and Syrians when in effect it threatened to turn the whole oil economy of Middle East upside down. He hoped from bottom his heart Iraqis would nationalize IPC. This would lead to wave of nationalizations. Algerians had already moved against profiteering oil companies, Syrians were now moving and Iraqis were next. Other Arabs, including Libyans, would be forced to go along whether they like it or not. They might have some difficulty marketing their oil, but Soviets and Japanese would help and Arabs would find a way. Nationalizing Suez and building Aswan dam had not been easy but Arabs had done it and would find customers for their oil. We should not underestimate their solidarity in such matters. 3. After going on at some length in this vein, getting progressively shriller, Abdul Aziz suddenly relaxed and said for our information President Nasser had received Iraqi Chargé Dec 14 and latter had carried request from Baghdad that Nasser try ease situation and calm down Syrians. Abdul Aziz commented that Iraqis very irritated with Syrians and Nasser mad at both of them. Indicated Nasser would try reason with Syrians but not enthusiastic about it. 4. Comment : Solidarity forever seems to be theme, but Egyptians likely tread with some caution as long as they anticipating heavy American oil investment here. They may hope however that nationalized Arab oil companies would finance development Egyptian oil resources, in which event UAR would perhaps be prepared lose American investment, particularly now that initial prospecting done and oil actually found. 5. It seems evident from Abdul Aziz's remarks on LIL marketing, subject he has been following because of involvement in Pan American negotiations, that Egyptians have been studying possibilities marketing their own oil and not relying on foreign companies. His remark about Soviets helping dispose of Iraqi oil made in tone implying Soviets had given some undertaking this regard, but this may have been wishful thinking on Abdul Aziz's part. In this connection Abdul Aziz said it not true Soviets have excess of oil. Egyptians had asked them for LE 26 million worth in 1965 and Soviets had been unable supply. He admitted situation may be different this year or next. 6. It would be very useful to us have candid appraisal from Department, London, Damascus and Baghdad as to merits respective sides in this dispute. While we second to none in appreciating lunatic factor in Syrian policy, we have impression IPC may in fact be reneging on agreement, or interpreting it too narrowly. If views of Egyptians are relevant, current crisis threatens jeopardize Western oil interests throughout area. If IPC is being fair with Syrians a better case for it should be made in world press and in local contacts. Battle 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 15–2 SYR. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Dhahran, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Tehran. There is no time of transmission on the source text; the telegram was received at 11:11 a.m. 2 Both dated December 15. (Ibid.) 3 Syria had few oil resources of its own, but a pipeline of the Iraq Petroleum Company traversed Syrian territory, feeding Syrian refineries and carrying oil to the Mediterranean with an additional fee payable to the government. At this time, Syria was seeking an increase in the transit fees and a retroactive increase covering the past decade, which was unacceptable to the oil companies. Iraq, involved in its own protracted oil negotiations, wanted to support Syria, but a shutdown meant a significant loss of revenue since the pipeline carried two-thirds of Iraq's oil output. Syria broke off negotiations with the company on November 23, and on November 28 the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister asked the oil company to “be generous with Syria.” The company representative said that “IPC had been generous with Syria. Danner said that IPC had been as generous as possible. Could give no more: to do so would make it cheaper ship Kirkuk oil via Basra.” (Telegram 1014 from Baghdad, November 28; ibid., PET 6 IRAQ) On December 9 Syria unilaterally doubled the transit fee and imposed a surcharge to recoup monies it claimed to have been owed for 10 years while seizing the company's in-country assets. (Telegram 4785 from London, December 9; ibid.) 197. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State 197. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State 1 Baghdad, December 17, 1966, 1110Z. 1135. Oil Crisis—consequences for Iraq of prolonged closedown of IPC. State 102651. 2 1. First should say we believe Syrians have moved against IPC after very careful calculations with perhaps four main objectives in mind: (1) to strike a telling blow against Eastern [Western ?] interests and to encourage other extremists in same direction; (2) to take Syrian claim to leading role in Arab causes; (3) to try to bring Iraq into radical camp; and (4) to get more money. 3 We wonder whether current Syrian regime will back down unless, perhaps, Iraq pays an acceptable political price and Communist countries prove unable buy and market large amounts oil. Successor regime may have trouble disencumbering itself of current SARG commitment even if so inclined (which is imponderable). Thus we think there is good possibility of extended shutdown of Kirkuk-in Zala production. 2. Economic consequences for Iraq more readily identifiable than are political. Two-thirds of GOI revenues come from Kirkuk-in Zala oil. While IPC apparently increasing Basra liftings to 30 million on rate without further investment, GOI at best will still receive less than half as much as heretofore. Impact would be severe on development plan, on payment of salaries, on employment and on essential ports. Payments to numerous contractors would be postponed and efforts would be made to postpone payments to external creditors. Internal tax and customs receipts would decline. All private investment would stop. Nothing would be done to reconstruct north. GOI has been facing real financial limitations for past six months as result of Kurdish war and has limited margin to work on at best. Despite presumed adoption of drastic measures, we would have to assume that in four to six months GOI would be scraping bottom of barrel and its credit abroad would be nil. This of course would have major impact on US exports and on US firms working in Iraq or seeking contracts here. 3. Foregoing assumes GOI will fail ratify draft IPC agreements which would bring cash benefits and an improved credit rating. We must assume non-ratification since possibility of ratification seems limited. We assume IPC will refuse make any new investment without ratification. We also assume IPC willingness increase liftings of Basra oil to maximum possible with existing facilities in absence of any further GOI measures against IPC. If extremists eventually take over or if PriMin Talib pursues current threat to give North Umaila to INOC, another situation will exist. 4. Political consequences both external and internal are difficult envisage. They are dependent on decisions taken by Iraqis on basis of relative power of different elements, something that is unlikely to be stable. If the present Cabinet remains in office, results will be unremitting and hope for effective resistance can be maintained only if sufficient resources found elsewhere, or perhaps not even then. 5. Moderate trend in Iraq has been strong for three years. Efforts by extremists have been increasing in recent months and moderates have been getting more and more worried. Yet moderates have shown little inclination or ability organize and make weight felt. Many of moderates lack courage and are fearful that as individuals they may in future have to face peoples court if they stand openly against extremists. Also, moderate Sunni Arabs unable draw upon Kurds and Shias for support. 6. We cannot rule out possibility that moderates will prove able to hold their own, but given nature of country and its history we justified in fearing worst. As we see it there is real possibility that as economic bind becomes felt increasingly, radicals will be able to obscure real issues and arouse emotions of people on basis of anti-Western, anti-IPC appeal to point of serious “street” action in form of mass student strikes and mob demonstrations which moderate authorities unable deal with short of serious bloodletting. Extremists then would be able to take over by default. This might then lead to takeover of IPC or even control of Iraqi oil production by Communist countries; complete socialization of Iraqi economy; reversal of present policy of improving relations with Turkey, Iran and Kuwait; a renewed threat to security of Kuwait; serious prosecution of “Arab causes”; hostility to foreigners in Iraq; and drastic increase in the strength of Commies with a concomitant rise in role of Soviets in Iraq. Moderates in Iraq would be persecuted and prosecuted vigorously. While economic situation in Iraq would become very bad, extremists likely remain in power for some time until revulsion plus normal fragmentation of power elements would permit reversion to something saner. 7. If moderates are able to hang on, they are going to need good deal of help if IPC crisis continues more than a month or two and they will expect to receive help from West and its friends. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are unlikely to want to help much.IPC is unlikely to extend loan if its issues with GOI remain unsettled. We doubt Western governments or banks will wish assist financially. International Monetary Fund can be tapped but this source inadequate for prolonged crisis. Yet failure to provide support will probably be fatal. 8. Another imponderable is Kurdish question. If GOI gets into deep financial trouble, its ability to prosecute a war will decline. Would Kurds decide take advantage of GOI situation to start rebellion again? If moderates in office Soviets would be likely support Kurds, but if extremists in office would Soviets assist them against Kurds? In any event Kurdish problem could become even more serious than in past. Israelis and Iranians would probably try to stir up Kurds against radical regime. 9. Foregoing is unhappy picture. We trust Department will not discount it. Whether it comes true or partially true depends on myriad of decisions and events in coming months over which USG will have limited influence in some instances and none in others. At same time we should state we advocate that IPC stand its ground with Syria on transit issue and with Iraq on draft agreement; while doing so it should be of maximum helpfulness otherwise to Iraq unless and until Iraq takes measures against IPC. If a successor to Talib Cabinet ratifies IPC agreements, IPC should be willing to provide supplementary benefits such as construction of new pipeline from K–2 to loading terminal in Gulf if GOI so requests. This might be held out to a moderate GOI as a reward to encourage ratification. 10. Situation will have to be played by ear, note by note, without advance knowledge of what tune is. Objective should remain constant: prevent crisis from deepening and prevent Iraq from sliding into extremism. Strong 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Kuwait, Moscow, Tehran, and Dhahran. 2 Dated December 14. (Ibid., PET 15–2 SYR) 3 According to telegram 2307 from Jidda, December 15, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani felt Iraq had been surprised by the Syrian action. “Yamani noted that during OPEC meeting in Kuwait, when Syrian takeover of IPC pipeline announced, Iraqi delegate to OPEC expressed surprise and dismay. Iraqi delegate allegedly told him GOI thought it had agreement with SARG that Iraqis would support SARG's claims against IPC on understanding SARG would do nothing block IPC pipeline throughput from Iraq. Iraqi delegate had expressed concern that SARG double crossed Iraqis on this one. … He believes SARG, apart from its attempt extract more from IPC, is also seeking indirectly put pressure on Iraq to nationalize oil industry there. He noted OIG virtually bankrupt and heavily dependent on IPC revenues.” (Ibid.) 198.Telegram From the Consulate in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, to the Department of State 198.Telegram From the Consulate in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, to the Department of State 1 Dhahran, December 19, 1966, 0945Z. 397. Iran Oil. 1. December 17 Min Pet Yamani told Brougham of Aramco he disturbed and embarrassed by reports of Consortium-NIOC settlement. 2 Says others in SAG already asking if Iran being helped at SAG's expense and what he proposes do about it. 2. Using backgrounder sent him by parents, 3 Brougham reminded him OPEC programming gave Iran strong arguing point. 3. Pointed out that in 1965 Saudi Arabia has been preferred source crude to meet fluctuating increased needs and with late winter in Europe early December liftings had dropped. In effect SAG not losing, merely not gaining as much as had been hoped. 4. Iran had made arrangements barter oil in Eastern Europe in expectation greater success in district one than has been case. Royalty oil will replace this and not affect markets Consortium now has. 5. Relinquishment merely brings Iran to point SAG reached in 1963. 6. Effect IPC troubles not yet predictable but might result in higher liftings here as well as elsewhere. 7. Yamani said he and others should keep close eye on liftings and if they discovered Iran being helped at SAG expense they would learn a lesson. 8. Comment : For the moment Yamani would appear to be pacified. Allen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Jidda, Kuwait, and Tehran. 2 On December 10 Ambassador Meyer reported in telegram 2473 from Tehran that Iran had reached agreement with the Consortium and the deal would be announced in the Majlis the following day. “As Addison [the Consortium's representative] believes, and so do we, that as some of my Beirut oil friends phrased it, 'Oil's well that ends well.'” (Ibid.) 3 Reference is to parent oil companies. 199. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State 199. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State 1 Kuwait City, December 24, 1966, 0615Z. 662. Ref: Kuwait A–170, Dec 8, 1966; Tehran 2619, Dec 21. 2 Protect source and limit use of substance: To assuage GOK fears that Iran's publicized “victory” over the Consortium 3 would become hardship for Kuwait KOC Director permitted Oil-Finance Undersecretary Abdul Wahab to read the agreement. Undersecretary promised not to use info against companies or Iran and to deny having had access through KOC. Cottam 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 KUW. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to London and Tehran. 2 Neither printed. (Ibid., PET 2 KUW and PET 6 IRAN, respectively) 3 See footnote 2, Document 198 . 200. Telegram From the Embassy in the Syrian Arab Republic to the Department of State 200. Telegram From the Embassy in the Syrian Arab Republic to the Department of State 1 Damascus, January 12, 1967, 1440Z. 809. Ref: Damascus 806. 2 Subj: IPC Situation. 1. While reftel reported on private Syrian apprehension over IPC, its public stance continues harshly uncompromising with threats to raise it to a “political level.” 2. Recently formed higher petroleum committee chaired by PriMin in statement Jan 10 attacking IPC called Arab oil organized object theft thus Arabs faced violent political battle. Called for active propaganda campaign with masses. Blamed oil co for Israel, resistance to Arab unity and to revolutions and liberation. Arab oil should be tool for liberation and fuel to “burn imperialism.” 3. MinInfo Zu'bi in press conference same day explicit in making issue political not economic with state resorting “any measure” to preserve peoples rights. Threatened “serious surprises” if necessary. Claimed govt, were it to retreat, would be overthrown by masses. 3 IPC must understand extent peoples resistance and that Syrian army “inviolate.” Any “gap” in army would have be exploited. Zu'bi while vaunting entente with Iraq spoke about Iraq embracing attitude dictated by “national interests.” 4. Sammarai statement drew predictable Syrian press attack that he and Bazzaz imperialist agents, but without revealing substance his statement. 5. While beginning four day post Ramadan holiday on Jan 11 has temporarily stopped govt activities, B'thi posters appeared profusion that morning including walls Embassy and ConGen Aleppo with legends “Arab petroleum is means liberation from imperialism” and “No to oil monopolies after today.” 6. We interpret these outbursts as evidence mounting pressure regime feels for resolving dispute. Smythe 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 18–1 IRAQ–SYR. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, London, Paris, The Hague, Tehran, Cairo, Dhahran, and Aleppo. 2 Dated January 10. (Ibid.) 3 Foreign Minister Makhus, in a meeting with Ambassador Smythe several days earlier, “said that even if Nuri Said returned from grave and seized with IPC's Dalley 'throne' of Iraq, they could not help IPC. The masses, said Makhus, would demand nationalization and no power could thwart people's will.” (Telegram 797 from Damascus, January 9; ibid., PET 18–1 IRAQ–SYR) 201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Syrian Arab Republic 201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Syrian Arab Republic 1 Washington, January 25, 1967, 3:05 p.m. 124921. Ref: Baghdad's 1304. 2 1. Dept. endorses line you took with Talib 3 and your recommendations para 8 reftel. 4 Also agrees per your 1306 5 you should advise Talib to think twice about taking any action against IPC which would be irrevocable. 2. As response to specific suggestion by Talib that USG pressure IPC to accept Syrian demands you should say that USG has maintained close communication with US shareholders with intent on part of USG to be as helpful as possible in situation. Dept knows from those discussions that IPC for its part sincerely desires to mitigate effects of Syrian action on GOI, as well as to secure re-opening of pipeline. We believe IPC has made constructive proposals this regard. There are however limits in each situation to actions IPC can reasonably be expected to take to reach those objectives. What IPC shareholders can do in either situation is matter of managerial judgment in light of worldwide commitments of each company, precedents which might be set, economics of marketing Iraqi oil, and financial situation of shareholders. 3. GOI must know that USG does not have an ownership interest in any US oil company and consequently does not have power to compel private companies to agree to any specific formula for resolution of disputes between them and foreign governments with which they have contractual relationships. Since USG does not have an ownership interest, as matter of policy USG does not attempt to substitute its judgment for that of company management as to degree to which companies can accede to foreign government demands which alter contractual arrangements negotiated in good faith with governments. 4. While USG cannot be helpful in way suggested by Minister Talib in conversation of Jan 23rd, USG sincerely desires to offer such assistance to GOI and IPC as may be appropriate and feasible. USG would therefore give serious consideration to other suggestions GOI may make as to means of resolving dispute involving the IPC pipeline, and particularly desires maintain dialogue with GOI on subject. 5. At your discretion you may say that USG of opinion that GOI's efforts to break impasse between IPC-SARG should be directed at SARG. 6 Syrians closed line and have rejected every effort by IPC to reestablish negotiating situation. GOI may want to remain aloof but realism must indicate to GOI that it cannot. It is Iraqi oil which is affected and it is GOI's concessionaire company which being prevented from using line it owns. Partnership with IPC is of major importance and economic benefit to Iraq. USG would think that GOI would find it to be in latter's national interest to support its concessionaire company against government doing injury to company and GOI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Oliver (E/FSE) and L. Kinsolving (NEA/ARN), cleared in draft by R. Houghton (NEA/ARN), and cleared by R. Davies (NEA). Repeated to London and Damascus. 2 Dated January 23. (Ibid.) 3 According to telegram 1304 from Baghdad, when Talib asked the Ambassador for his assessment of the situation, Armstrong said: “Seemed clear SARG desired to [do]something to consolidate own shaky position, make Syria leader in Arab causes, deal serious blow to West (but IPC replacing lost oil from other sources), force Iraq install radical regime which would cooperate with Syria, and only incidentally obtain more money. Aims mainly political and Iraq principal target; SARG thus unlikely reach agreement even if IPC agreed pay more, which IPC cannot do without opening self to blackmail everywhere; nor could Iraqi Government accept such blackmail.” Talib agreed, but said that Iraq must take a middle path; that it “could not be at odds with those Arab states promoting Arab causes, could not create situation in which Syrian supporters and other extremists able create internal trouble on increasing scale. Soon he [Talib] will be unable to pay full salary to hordes of officials and army officers, financial situation was desperate even before pipeline closure.” 4 Strong wrote in paragraph 8: “See little point in encouraging Talib in any way.” He recommended that the United States adopt its traditional position that this was a commercial dispute and that Iraq should “consult closely” with IPC. “USG questions wisdom of putting entire onus on IPC and regarding IPC as devil rather than as partner of Iraq.” 5 Dated January 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAQ) 6 Telegram 1306 commented on the attitude of the Iraqi Government on the impasse: “From other sources we have heard that in debating Iraqi posture Cabinet exhibited great fear of opposing Syria [garble] fear of UAR reprisal even to point of assassination.” The telegram continued: “Problem for Sunni Arab minority ruling Iraq (with help of a few ambitious denatured Shias) is very deep. As minority they feel very insecure particularly in terms of Kurds, and need assurance of backing of UAR. They have a guilt complex at failure of Iraq under both Nuri and Qasim to play a proper role in Arab causes in conjunction with other good Arabs and they have sworn this must not happen again; in this context Egypt is key, but Syria also important.” 202. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs(Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk 202. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs(Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 1, 1967. SUBJECT Status of Iraq Petroleum Company dispute In the last week the developments in the Iraq Petroleum Company crisis have succeeded each other rapidly. Early last week Iraqi Prime Minister Talib, fully aware that his country is losing $630,000 a day as a result of the oil dispute, broadcast a vaguely-worded warning to the Iraq Petroleum Company to arrange at all costs to have the oil start flowing across Syria again by January 26. The alternative threat implied by the warning was not specified. However, there had been enough loose talk of seizure or nationalization of some parts of IPC concession areas in Iraq to alarm the American partners, who expressed their concern to the Department. Meanwhile Prime Minister Talib had summoned our Ambassador and requested the US Government to influence the American share-holders of IPC in favor of a quick settlement with Syria in order to extricate Iraq from its present political and economic predicament. On the 26th our Ambassador under instructions urged Talib to think before undertaking rash or irrevocable actions against IPC and urged the Iraqi Government to support its own concessionary company against Syria. The Syrians, who may have begun to suffer from the joint squeeze of (1) a dwindling supply of the IPC crude oil on which their refinery primarily depends and (2) a loss of transit revenues of over $2 million a month, then conveyed to the Iraqis their willingness to resume negotiating discussions with IPC on the basis of a new draft agreement rather than a unilateral Syrian Government decree. The key issue as to whether the Syrians will accept arbitration of Syrian claims for retroactive payments, which might amount to over $100 million, was not made clear in the Iraqi version of the Syrian counter-proposal which was given to IPC the 26th. However the first versions of the new Syrian proposal reaching Paris apparently sounded reasonable enough to prompt the French Government to recommend to us and the British that IPC should seize this opportunity to resume contact with the Syrians so as to attempt to settle the crisis. However, when IPC on the 30th received the specifics of the Syrian proposal, all of the partners including the French unanimously rejected the new proposal because it would not give IPC enough protection on the retroactive payments issue. If it accepted the Syrian proposal, IPC would in effect be admitting liability to retroactive payments back to 1955. The issue would accordingly be not whether IPC was liable for retroactive payments, but what the extent of the liability was. IPC therefore requested its representative in Damascus to seek further clarification of the Syrian proposal, but make clear that IPC cannot agree to make any automatic payments on retroactive claims. The present status therefore appears to be as follows: 1. The Syrian proposal is actually a step forward in that it would rescind the unilateral decree and put any settlement in the form of a bilateral agreement with IPC. 2. IPC would probably accept the increased payment rates on current oil transit if the Syrians would agree to some form of impartial arbitration or other negotiated settlement of the Syrian claim for retroactive payments. 3. The Syrian counter-proposal has at least re-established the negotiating dialogue between Syria and IPC. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAQ (SYR). Confidential. Drafted by Kinsolving (NEA/ARN), and cleared by Chaplin (E/FSE) and Houghton (NEA/ARN). Rusk's initials on the source text indicate that he saw the memorandum. A handwritten note after Handley's name on the “from” line reads “per RPD” (i.e., Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies). 203. Memorandum of Conversation 203. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 3, 1967. SUBJECT Iranian Consortium Exports PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Patrick Dean, British Embassy Derek Eagers, Petroleum Counselor, British Embassy Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Director, Iranian Desk John Oliver, Director, Office of Fuels and Energy Ambassador Dean said he had been instructed by the Foreign Secretary to speak to Secretary Rusk about Iranian oil production. The Foreign Secretary was very encouraged by the degree of Anglo-American cooperation in resolving the dispute last year between the Iranian Oil Consortium and the National Iranian Oil Company, and although the Shah was not restive at this moment, there could be further trouble between the Consortium and Iran about the volume of oil exports. The Shah could be expected to react critically if the rate of production in Saudi Arabia should continue to be substantially larger than the growth in Iran. Once he is dissatisfied with the Consortium the consequences might be serious for U.S. and U.K. interests. While the Foreign Secretary fully appreciated the relative position of Middle East countries in oil production involves issues of commercial judgment and policy, the Foreign Secretary nevertheless considered it very important that all the oil companies involved should appreciate the need in making their commercial judgments to take into account wider political considerations. The Foreign Secretary stressed this particular point to the British companies during last year's dispute and would speak to them again on the same line if necessary. The Foreign Secretary very much hoped that should it become necessary, Secretary Rusk might see his way clear to speak to the U.S. oil companies and emphasize the need for them to take wider and longer term considerations into account with a view to improving prospects for Consortium production. Ambassador Dean commented that a particular difficulty is that the American-owned Aramco has fewer member companies than the Consortium in Iran and is of greater importance to the owner companies than their holdings in the Consortium, but at the same time the Aramco member companies carry such weight within the Consortium as to be able to determine the Consortium's policies, at least in a negative way. FYI. The British AideMèmoire 2 left with the Secretary connects the comments about the influence of the Aramco membership within the Consortium to specific comments by the Foreign Secretary as to ways the American companies could influence an increase in Consortium production, i.e. increase their own liftings, and by agreeing to a more flexible over-lift arrangement for all members of the Consortium. The Ambassador did not mention these ways for the U.S. companies to be helpful within the Consortium. He made his presentation one of urging the Secretary to insure that the U.S. participants met fully their obligations under the 1967 crude export program. End FYI. The Secretary inquired whether the Consortium had committed itself to a specific percentage rate of growth for 1967 and was informed that the Consortium as a matter of practice does not commit itself to a specific percentage rate of growth. However, for 1967 and 1968 the Consortium had in fact told the Iranians what exports would be on a volume basis which worked out for 1967 to a percentage rate of growth of about 13%. The Secretary commented to Ambassador Dean that he assumed the Foreign Secretary did not refer to the “windfall” increase Iran and other Middle East countries had obtained as a consequence of the Syria-IPC dispute when he spoke of increases in Iranian production and exports. The Ambassador confirmed that the temporary benefits arising out of the IPC case were not a part of the Foreign Secretary's presentation. The Secretary said the Department would consider the matter. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Oliver on March 8, cleared by Eliot, and approved in S on March 11. 2 Attached to a March 3 memorandum from Borg to Handley, Leddy, and Solomon. (Ibid., PET 12 IRAN) 204. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Meyer) to the Country Director for Iran (Eliot) 204. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Meyer) to the Country Director for Iran (Eliot) 1 Tehran, March 16, 1967. Dear Ted: John Oliver's Memcon of Sir Patrick's talk March 3 with the Secretary only arrived this morning. 2 Meanwhile, we had had our post mortem with the Consortium fellows at the Residence last night. A summation is going in today. You will note the overlifting agreement bugaboo did not come up. Quite clearly my respected British colleague here, in league with Walter Levy, is determined to beef up the secret overlifting agreement into a major issue. You may recall he pushed this matter strongly last fall during the Consortium crisis. 3 But, as we surmised, that agreement is relatively insignificant as long as the total offtakes here are acceptable. What I am trying to say, is that Iran is only interested in results, not in formulas utilized in their attainment. 4 Denis 5 really has a thing about that overlifting agreement. Obviously he pressed London to send Sir Patrick in to see the Secretary. It fits in, incidentally, with several recent evidences that Denis is making real headway with his thesis, which has almost become a fixation, that the UK should put all its Mideast chips on the Shah. For example, I noted that when our Bahrein memorandum was presented to the Sheikh, the reporting telegram told of British reluctance to take certain steps because HMG's Ambassador in Tehran does not want anything to disturb the Shah. Similarly, when Luke Battle and I chatted briefly with Denis at Alam's dinner for the Consortium representatives, Denis again made crystal clear that as far as he and his country are concerned all interest is centered in keeping the Shah happy. With this background, the worrisome thing is that Sir Patrick's approach may presage later efforts by our British cousins to blame the American companies if there is any Iranian disappointment re crude liftings here. I remain convinced that the agreement per se will not be a major issue, unless the British build it up to be one. If they do so they will expect to improve their stock here at our expense. The opportunity to do so can come earlier than we might think. From telegrams to and from Baghdad, I sense widespread interest in making up to the Iraqis for the three months' reduction in their production. 6 Obviously this can only be done at the expense of Iran and other Gulf producers. As our telegram reports, the IPC partners are already anticipating this. The best we could get out of the Consortium group was clear assurance that they would stand by their commitment of last fall re liftings for this calendar year, i.e. 675–685 million barrels. The excess liftings, due to the IPC-Syria crisis, which brought production up to around 2.6 million bpd, may not be an extra windfall beyond the 1967 commitment. On this point we may see some reaction from the Iranians. While we do not deny that there may be troubles ahead, the alarm bell sounded by Sir Patrick was at least a bit premature and certainly out of tune with the harmony which characterized the Consortium pilgrimage the past two weeks. Sincerely, AHM 1 Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET—Petroleum Iran 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. An attached March 20 covering memorandum from Eliot to Oliver reads: “As the attached is 'Eyes Only', I would appreciate your showing it only to Messrs. Solomon and Fried prior to the talk with the British this week on the Iranian oil situation. The letter provides evidence of the necessity for Mr. Solomon to indicate forcefully to the British that we must present a 'united front' to the Iranians. Please return the letter after the three of you have seen it.” 2 Document 203 . 3 As Meyer reported on November 10, 1966: “In talks with Amb. Wright and me Levy stressed his long-standing anxiety re secret arrangement of Consortium members which in his view tends to keep total annual program for Iranian offtake at lower figure than desirable and which discourages oil-short companies like Shell from taking additional quantities they would otherwise take. Levy is thoroughly convinced that if this secret arrangement ever becomes known to Iranians it will precipitate explosion because of sensitive political implication that Iran's welfare is decided by self-interested foreign oil moguls behind closed doors.” (Telegram 2090 from Tehran, November 10, 1966; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 7 US) 4 For a description of the secret agreement, see Document 192 . 5 Sir Denis Wright, British Ambassador to Iran. 6 According to an item by Oliver for a report to Katzenbach, March 16, oil began flowing through the IPC pipeline through Syria by mid-March. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, FSV Facilitative Service—1967) 205. Memorandum of Conversation 205. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 22, 1967. SUBJECT Response to British Ambassador's Representation to the Secretary Regarding the Performance of U.S. Members of the Iranian Consortium in 1967 PARTICIPANTS Sir Michael Stewart, Minister, British Embassy Mr. Christopher Everett, First Secretary, British Embassy Assistant Secretary Anthony Solomon—E Mr. John G. Oliver—E/OR/FSE Mr. J.P. Mulligan—NEA/IRN Mr. Solomon stated that the Department had looked carefully into the questions which had been raised recently with the Secretary by Sir Patrick Dean and said that according to every indication we had the Consortium would meet its target in 1967 exports. No significant areas of dissatisfaction arose in the recent talks which the Consortium representatives had with the Iranians in Tehran and it did not seem to us, therefore, that there was any need for the U.S. Government to intercede with the American companies and bring political considerations to their attention at this time while things are going well. With regard to the Ambassador's second point on the overlifting arrangement, we understand that the member companies of the Consortium are discussing this question at the present time, including possible ways of modifying this arrangement. Mr. Solomon added that he wished to mention in confidence to Sir Michael that he himself had taken the opportunity of mentioning this subject with one or more U.S. members and had indicated that we thought it would probably be advisable to modify this arrangement if the companies could see their way clear to do so. He added that while we do not attach the same importance to this matter as some others (for example, Walter Levy), at the same time we recognize it is conceivable that this arrangement could serve as a pretext for dissatisfaction which the Iranians might feel with regard to the Consortium's overall performance. Since the situation is reasonably satisfactory, however, we would not wish to intercede with the U.S. companies now on political grounds even though we would, of course, wish to stay in touch with the British Government and continue our exchange of views on these matters. This, therefore, was our official answer to Sir Patrick Dean's approach to the Secretary. Mr. Solomon added that he would like to raise a question personally, that is, he would like to know why the British Government was as concerned as it seemed to be about this situation at the present time. He would like to know why there was so much emphasis on the question of exports from Iran, particularly now that matters had been settled between the Consortium and the Iranians, when at the same time there is room for concern over the situation in Kuwait and Iraq, where the British also had extensive interests. Was it because the British Government considered the oil issue in Iran so politically explosive? Sir Michael replied yes, this was the answer. It was a matter of the importance of Iran to his Government as well as the fact they believed Iran was also significant for the U.S., although they recognized there were some differences in our viewpoint. He added that the purpose of Sir Patrick Dean's conversations with the Secretary was really to draw attention to the risk of a certain political unawareness on the part of some members of the Consortium. His Government wanted to make certain that this factor was taken into account well before a crisis arises again, if this should happen. Mr. Solomon replied that as a matter of tactics it was certainly important that we all be aware of these political factors. It was equally important that we not give any impression to the Iranians that we and the British view things differently. Nonetheless, it is our belief that the Consortium's promises will be kept and that there is no reason for stirring things up at this time. Sir Michael declared that his Government of course had no desire to add any element of instability to the situation and he wished to give absolute assurances that our talks were not meant to lead at any time to a three-party conversation. It was the Foreign Secretary's feeling however that the political factors should be taken into account at this time. Sir Michael said he would, of course, report the U.S. Government's full views on the situation and added that although they had no evidence which we did not also have, it was his personal judgment that in taking note of the U.S. Government's viewpoint, the Foreign Secretary might nonetheless reopen the question if in his judgment this was necessary. In conclusion, Sir Michael re-emphasized that the U.S. Government need have no fear that the Shah would get any encouragement from his Government to raise a problem which we both hope to avoid. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Mulligan on April 4, cleared in draft by Solomon, cleared by Oliver, and approved by Walsh (S/S) on April 27. 206. Editorial Note 206. Editorial Note The June 1967 Six-Day War and the concomitant oil embargo disrupted the equilibrium achieved in the early part of 1967 by the oil companies and the producer governments; see Documents 228 ff. The major contractual issue still to be resolved on the eve of the war was the dispute between the Government of Iraq and the IPC over the 99.6 percent of the IPC concession removed from company control. The oil company wanted to be able to choose the 0.5 percent it would still control. In May Iraqi President Arif assumed the Prime Ministry, replacing Naji Talib, and appointed a moderate Cabinet without strong Nasserites and active Baathis. An FSE item for a May 12 report to Katzenbach noted: “Unless Arif feels that he must defend himself against potential Syrian and Egyptian propaganda attacks by exceeding both countries in socialism and xenophobia, the chances of a revival of the private sector of Iraq's economy and a settlement of its dispute with IPC are greatly enhanced.” (Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, FSV Facilitative Service—1967) 207. Memorandum From George R. Jacobs of the Office of International Resources and Food Policy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) 207. Memorandum From George R. Jacobs of the Office of International Resources and Food Policy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) 1 Washington, August 11, 1967. SUBJECT New Iraqi Oil Legislation Finally Deprives IPC of Most of its Concession Area Iraqi Law 80 of December, 1961 deprived IPC of about 99.6 percent of its concession area. It provided, however, that about 0.5 percent could be returned to the company. IPC has tried to get the right to choose which parcels of land would be included in this crucial half-percent. It especially wanted the proven reserves in the south—the north Rumaila field—to be returned to the company and it has stated repeatedly that any agreement with Iraq on increased production or exports would have to include the return of this field to the company. The GOI has been equally reluctant to give back land where an excellent field is known to exist. In spring of this year when Iraq was financially pressed as a result of the closing of the IPC line by the Syrians, the GOI negotiated a loan from the IPC and the company hoped that the GOI would then sign an agreement with the company settling all outstanding issues, including substantial additional payments to Iraq and the return of the North Rumaila field to the company. A loan was given but in spite of varied attempts no settlement was reached. With the outbreak of hostilities between the Arabs and Israel in June 1967 it became highly improbable that a settlement could ever be reached. On August 7, 1967 the Iraqis published a decree Law 97 (it has not, apparently, yet been published in the official gazette) which ended finally IPC's hope of settlement and which is, with the exception of the near-sequestration of US–UK interests in Algeria, the first permanent action taken against the US/UK oil powers since the crisis began. Although Law 97 may seem somewhat unclear (a Mobil oil translation of the law taken from the Baghdad radio announcement is attached), 2 its meaning is unmistakable: IPC is left with the territory given it by Law 80 and no more; the National Iraqi Oil Company is given all the rest—to exploit by itself or with other companies. In the latter case, any agreement between NIOC and another company would have to be ratified by Iraqi law. The IPC parent companies were not especially surprised by the action and will try to take legal action outside Iraq against any company entering into agreement with NIOC on exploitation of these fields (London's 928) 3 but it has little hope of affecting events inside Iraq. Comment: It should become clear in a very short time whether ENI or ERAP have indeed made any deals with Iraq. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential. 2 Not found attached. The oil company response is in airgram A–602 from London, August 12. (Ibid., PET 5 IRAQ) 3 Dated August 9. (Ibid., PET 6 IRAQ) 208. Editorial Note 208. Editorial Note After the promulgation of Law 97 in August 1967, the four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands) which represented the Iraq Petroleum Company's shareholders had to decide the nature of the protest to be delivered to the Iraqi Government. The decision was complicated because the oil company partners were incorporated in four different countries and the interests of the governments were not identical. Time was also of the essence, because other countries and independent U.S. companies were interested in gaining access to Iraq's oil resources. During a meeting with the American partners, Mobil and Standard Oil of New Jersey, on August 17, “Mr. Moses stated that he has reports from Baghdad that ENI, Sinclair, Japanese, Spanish, and Bulgarians have been in contact with NIOC.” Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies informed the oil company executives that the Department would be coordinating its actions with the British, and that “With a coordinated approach we may be able to persuade the French Government to protest also; the Dutch should be agreeable.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAQ) Concerted Western action, however, was difficult to achieve. In a meeting on August 22, a British Embassy official explained that “the Dutch are reluctant to make a protest on the ground that they need Iraqi oil and do not want their supply cut off… . Mr. Urwick also reported that the French Foreign Ministry desk level reaction to a protest was negative. He was doubtful that the reaction at higher levels would be more favorable.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 22; ibid., PET 5 IRAQ) At another meeting 2 days later among U.S. officials including Assistant Secretary Solomon, British Embassy officials, and representatives of Mobil and Standard-NJ, it was decided that a protest was not advisable. A British official noted: “Such protest would serve to point out the difference among the four governments and might give the impression of the Americans and British 'ganging up' on the Iraqis. Therefore, the British Government doubts that such protests would be wise and proposes instead to submit a protest on behalf of IPC, as a British incorporated firm, but not on behalf of the British shareholder.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 24; ibid.) On August 31 the Embassy in London informed the Department: “FonOff (Oil Department) seems believe that in view Dutch and French refusal US decision not to protest represents best course of action, in that it avoids Anglo-Saxon coloration and demonstrates that British note reflects views of all shareholders.” (Telegram 1557 from London, August 31; ibid., PET 6 IRAQ) 209. Memorandum of Conversation 209. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 23, 1967, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT Oil and Gas (Part V of V) PARTICIPANTS H.I.M. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, ShahanShah of Iran H.E. Hushang Ansary, Iranian Ambassador The Secretary The Honorable Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA The Honorable Armin H. Meyer, Ambassador to Iran Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Country Director for Iran, NEA The Shah said that he had met with oil company officials in New York and had indicated to them that they should support countries which are stable and reliable and that they merely caused trouble by giving so much to small desert countries such as Kuwait. He hoped the companies would agree. 2 Commenting on Arab oil policies, he said it was ridiculous for any Arab to believe that the West could really be hurt by an Arab oil embargo. Iranian, Venezuelan and American oil are available. The West could stand an oil embargo for a couple of years, but the Arab countries could not. Agreeing, the Secretary commented that he has found it useful to suggest to our moderate Arab friends that they make this point. The Shah said he has been doing the same thing. The Secretary said the Arab countries would not only hurt themselves in the short run by imposing an oil embargo, but they might cause the West to turn away from Middle East oil and substitute nuclear power on a crash basis. The Shah mentioned plans for an oil pipeline across Turkey to the Mediterranean, for a gas pipeline from Iran to Trieste and for an oil import terminal in Yugoslavia to supply Eastern Europe. On the latter point, he said that the Eastern European market for oil is of course a limited one. As for gas, he said that he would much prefer to use Iranian gas to make petrochemical products, especially fertilizers, for Iran and for export. He had urged the oil companies to interest themselves and others in this possibility. In the meantime, however, Iran was making plans to export gas, and it seemed desirable to have customers in addition to the Soviet Union. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69,POL 7 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot and approved in S on August 30. The meeting was held at Blair House. 2 The gist of the position taken by the oil executives is in a company briefing paper transmitted in airgram A–690 from London, August 19. (Ibid., PET 2 IRAN) The oil company executives later reported that “Shah made predictable plea that Iran's stability and reliability be taken into consideration in companies' planning and investment. Stressed that Arab-Israeli crisis not ended and may revive.” They also characterized the Shah's speeches as “milder than often in past. In sum, they feel results of conversation 'not too bad,' although they remain concerned that Iranian expectations will continue to exceed realities.” (Telegram 25746 to Tehran, August 23; ibid., PET 6 IRAN) 210. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 210. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 31, 1967. SUBJECT Algeria Nationalizes Esso and Mobil Affiliates The Algerian Government has formally announced the nationalization of five US-owned companies engaged in distributing and refining oil (Esso Standard-Algeria, Esso Africa, Esso Saharienne, Mobiloil Nord-Africaine, and Mobiloil Francaise). 2 The companies' assets have been transferred to the state-owned company, Sonatrach, which has long had its eye on the Esso and Mobil distribution networks, as well as their holdings in the Algiers refinery. Two other Mobil affiliates, both producing companies, have escaped nationalization. The decrees authorizing the nationalizations provide in principle for compensation after an inventory of the companies' assets, but the details have yet to be spelled out. Political Motives Uppermost . In nationalizing the Esso and Mobil affiliates, Algeria appears to have been guided mainly by political considerations. Despite strong pressures from the domestic left, Industry Minister Abdesslam Belaid had previously resisted nationalization of the distributing companies on the grounds that Sonatrach would be unable for some time to absorb them efficiently, and that they would eventually fall into the government's hands anyway; indeed, the government has for some time been employing a strategy of graduated harassment. The Middle East crisis has produced compelling reasons, however, for overriding Abdesslam's reservations. Unable to translate its hard line against Israel and its Western backers into effective military action, the Boumediene regime can at least point to its nationalization of US oil firms as proof of its militancy. Prospects for the Producing Firms . The Algerian Government's intentions towards US oil-producing companies remain unclear. Its short-term goal appears to be to force the producers to accept the government's demands on a wide range of unresolved issues (tax reference prices, arbitration, new investment). 3 It is currently using both the carrot of new offers of cooperation and the stick of possible nationalization. Two major US producers, Phillips and Sinclair, have been approached with tentative offers of participation in new companies to be jointly owned by the Algerian Government and the US firms. The latter would contribute their present concessions as an investment and, in return, would be allowed to manage the new firms without harassment. However, even should the US companies agree—the initial reactions of the field representatives have been positive—they would have little assurance of long-term security. In Algeria political, rather than economic, considerations will continue to shape government policies in the petroleum sector. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 15–2 ALG. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 2 The Algerian Government announced the nationalization on August 30. (Telegram 30198 to Algiers, August 31; ibid., PET 15–2 ALG) 3 See Intelligence Note 654, “US Oil Companies in Algeria: The Tightening Noose,” August 10, 1967 (Confidential/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem). Footnote in the source text.] 211. Memorandum of Conversation 211. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 25, 1967. SUBJECT United States Government note to the Government of Algeria on the nationalization of the US-owned oil interests PARTICIPANTS Mr. Luke W. Findley, Natl. Govt. Relations Dept, Standard Oil Mr. Grant Kelleher, General Counsel, Standard Oil AF—Mr. William C. Trimble AF/AFN—Mr. John Root AF/AFN—Mr. Rene Tron L—Mr. Carl F. Salans L—Mr. Murray Belman L/E—Mr. Philip Patman L/C—Mr. Edison W. Dick Mr. Findley began the discussion by stating that Esso was unhappy that a note was sent to the Government of Algeria without Esso first being consulted as to the content of the note. 2 Mr. Findley stated that Esso objected to the note in that it gave the Algerian Government the alternative of merely paying compensation for the nationalization of Esso interests rather than insisting upon rescission of the actions and restitution of the property. Mr. Findley stated that the ordinances and decrees enacted by the Government of Algeria were clearly discriminatory, arbitrary and confiscatory and that thus restitution was the only appropriate remedy under international law as interpreted by the United States. Mr. Salans pointed out that the historical United States position was not that restitution was the only appropriate remedy under the circumstances but rather that damages by the United States has always been considered to be an equally satisfactory form of reparation. Mr. Belman brought out the point that the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property confirmed this fact. He referred specifically to the notes and comments to Article 5 of the Draft Convention which discussed “full reparation” in the event of an illegal act. He pointed out that these notes and comments were altered at the insistence of the United States to state that “in practice, such reparation will generally take the form of damages.” He stated that the reason for the United States insisting on this language is because of a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the federal government could never be bound to restore property it had taken by eminent domain. Mr. Belman went on to say that the United States position for the OECD draft with respect to this question of reparation was reached following consultation with the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and was concurred in by that Committee. Mr. Belman stated that he worked closely with Mr. Haitt of Shell Oil Corp. on this question and that to his knowledge Mr. Collado of Standard of New Jersey had been involved. Mr. Findley stated that he was unaware of what had transpired in connection with the OECD Foreign Property Convention and was grateful for the information regarding the United States position on reparations and how it had been developed. Mr. Findley stated that he believed the United States position was a poor one since it would have the effect of selling the United States investment community down the river overseas. He felt that foreign governments (especially those in the Middle East) would have less hesitation about nationalizing United States properties in violation of international law since they only would be required to make some compensation which was rarely ever prompt, adequate or effective. Mr. Salans pointed out that the promptness, adequateness or effectiveness of compensation was a separate question. Mr. Salans suggested that since the United States note had already been delivered to the Government of Algeria, no decision be taken at the moment on what the tactical position of the United States should be with respect to reparations and that any such decision would await a reply from the Government of Algeria. Mr. Findley agreed with this course of action. Mr. Dick pointed out that the Government of Algeria in 1964 took the position that “either compensation or restitution at the discretion of the Algerian authorities” was the appropriate remedy with regard to the properties nationalized pursuant to the decrees of 1963. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 15–2 ALG. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Dick. 2 The text of the note was transmitted in telegram 38371 to Algiers, September 15. (Ibid., PS 8–4 US–ALG) 212. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) 212. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) 1 Washington, October 12, 1967. SUBJECT Iranian Oil Production The December, 1966 agreement between the Iranian Oil Consortium and the Government of Iran included the following points: the Consortium would at least match the overall Middle East production increases in 1967 and 1968 (they had been running at about 10.5 percent increase each year) and would make best efforts for subsequent years. Specifically, the Consortium agreed to try to increase production from an average of 1.9 million bbls/day in 1966 to about 2.1 million bbls/day in 1967 and to 2.35 million bbls/day in 1968 (an increase of 11–12 percent per annum). Early this year the British became skittish about these production goals and asked us to urge the American companies to make sure they would meet them. The Secretary told the British Ambassador on March 3 that we had no reason to believe they would not be able to and we were hence not willing to raise the subject with the companies. Furthermore, we had no indication that the Iranians were dissatisfied with the agreement. Because the IPC pipeline remained closed for the first two months of this year and the Arabs stopped shipments to the United States and the United Kingdom in June and July, Iranian production has increased much more this year than expected and in the first nine months it has averaged over 2.4 million bbls/day. Production will probably drop below these levels for the remainder of the year but the Consortium expects the average for the year to be at least 2.25 million bbls/day—an increase of 17 percent over 1966 levels and 150,000 bbls/day more than the projected increase for the year. (FYI: We believe the Consortium estimate is deliberately low to allow room for bargaining. Production for the year will probably average closer to 2.35 million bbls/day—the level which has been projected for 1968.) This compares with an estimated increase in the Arab Middle East (not including North Africa) of only 7 percent for the year. Although the Shah expressed his satisfaction with the December, 1966 agreement, the Iranians apparently now wish to extract a new commitment for 11 percent increases per annum based on December, 1967 capacity (not production) of 3 million bbls/day, arriving at 4 million bbls/day production in 1970 with a production capacity of about six million bbls/day. The Consortium believes it is highly unlikely that production figures can be anywhere near this amount in 1970 unless there is some further unexpected deterioration in operating conditions in the Arab world. At an annual increase of 11 percent from 1966, Iranian production in 1970 should be about 2.9 million bbls/day; capacity at that time should be around 3.6 million bbls/day. The Consortium has been reluctant to increase capacity much beyond actual production, at least partially because of the Iranian tendency to insist that production be kept near maximum possible levels. The Iranians have raised the subject with the Consortium, with the British in London 2 and with our Embassy in Tehran although Prime Minister Hoveyda said he realized there was little the United States could do to influence the American companies' policy (Tehran's 1534 attached). 3 Ambassador Ansary seems to be putting in a few licks on the same subject. Rèsumè on Differences Between Consortium Plans and GOI Desires (All figures in millions of barrels/day) Production Provided in Dec. 1966 Agreement* New Iranian Demands for Prod Levels Consortium Plans for Capacity Iranian Demands for Capacity 1966 est 1.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1967 est 2.3 2.1 2.3 3.1 1968 — 2.35 3.1 1969 — 2.6 3.3 1970 — 2.9 4.0 3.6 6.0 *11–12 percent increase in 1967 and 1968; same percentages have been projected in this table for 1969 and 1970. Recommendations: We suggest that you tell Ambassador Ansary: 1. We cannot of course dictate policy to the American member companies of the Consortium. 2. The American companies of the Consortium have always taken their commitments to the GOI seriously and we have every reason to believe that they will do all possible to see that Iran gets its fair share of the Middle East increase in production. It appears that the Consortium will substantially exceed its commitment for 1967. But it is difficult and probably impossible for any oil companies to make absolute commitments as far in the future as 1970. 3. Although it is unlikely that production ratios will ever be precisely what they would have been had there been no Middle East crisis this summer, it is inevitable that some of the pre-crisis purchasing patterns have been restored as a result of the lifting of the boycott on oil shipments and it would be unrealistic for Iran to expect to retain all the additional production which has accrued to it as a result of the crisis. 4. We understand that the current talks in London between the Consortium and the Iranian team ended amicably, although we do not have detailed information on the decisions. (London's 2768 included for your information.) 4 5. Kuwait will have almost no increase in oil income this year and Saudi Arabia will have less than it had counted on. It is in the interests of the U.S. as well as Iran to maintain and support the moderate governments of these two countries. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Akins and cleared by Eliot and Oliver. 2 The British Minister of State told the Iranians that “Iranian demands are unrealistic; that companies' plans are reasonable in current commercial context; and that companies could not give Iran preference on political response grounds without provoking undesirable political response in Iran's Arab neighbors.” (Telegram 2851 from London, October 11; ibid., PET 6 IRAN) The British submitted a memorandum to the Department on October 12 regarding their concern. (Ibid.) 3 Not found attached. Dated October 5. (Ibid.) 4 Not found attached. Dated October 9. (Ibid.) 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, October 31, 1967, 0755Z. 1911. Iran Oil. 1. During intermission at Los Angeles symphony concert, Shah said he had just received report from PriMin Hoveyda to effect Consortium would fall $100 million dollars short of GOI expectations this year. He acknowledged expectations had soared during June Mideast crisis. 2. I suggested more valid viewpoint is that Iran will in fact receive this year $50 million more than Consortium had promised in agreement reached year ago. Shah acknowledged this is so. 3. I went on to point out that one cannot assume that other oil producing countries may not repeat foolish tactics against oil companies. I noted how poorly Iraq been doing as result of its excessive pressures and that situation there or in certain other countries could easily get worse. 4. Shah said Iraq Govt is totally irrational. It is taking poor Iraqi people, he said, down same catastrophic road as Mossadeq took Iran. 5. With reference to destruction of Suez refinery, Shah complained Western oil companies will increase their offtakes from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait which countries will then pay off UAR sums equivalent to amount of destruction. 6. Emphasizing Iran has been doing very well indeed, I urged Shah to continue to profit from policy of reasonableness. Meyer 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to London, Beirut, Paris, Jidda, and Kuwait. 214. Memorandum of Conversation 214. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 1, 1967. SUBJECT Iranian Oil PARTICIPANTS Hushang Ansary, Ambassador of Iran Anthony Solomon, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Walter McClelland, NEA/IRN James Akins, E/FSE After greetings Mr. Solomon opened by saying our long-standing friendship with Iran made it possible to discuss problems which arise between us in a completely frank manner (the Ambassador concurred) and frankly, the Iranian requests to the U.S. Government both here and in Tehran to insure greatly increased petroleum exports from Iran had caused us considerable difficulty. The Department and the U.S. Government had considerable sympathy for Iran's aspirations and great admiration for its plans for development but this did not mean we were able to translate this sympathy and admiration into pressures on the American companies in the Consortium to comply with the Iranian wishes. Mr. Solomon said that there should be no confusion about the relationship between American companies operating abroad and the Department of State. We give advice to companies before they go into a country, if they ask for it; we especially want our views known in cases where the companies ask for U.S. Government assistance. But once a company is in a country it is on its own. There are certainly some disadvantages to this but on balance we believe that they are far outweighed by the advantages in our free system where companies act according to their commercial interests rather than in following instruction from the U.S. Government. The host countries can therefore look on local branches of American firms as good citizens, not as tools of U.S. foreign policy. It is very important to recognize both the very limited nature of U.S. influence over private firms and the reluctance, or even inability of the US Government to set commercial policies of these firms abroad. Venezuela for example has tried for eight years to get special consideration for its oil exports. While the case is not comparable to the Iranian requests there are some similarities. Venezuela is one of our best friends in the Hemisphere and we have a common problem with Castro but nonetheless, we have consistently refused to permit these important political factors to influence our purely commercial policy toward Venezuelan oil. If the State Department should try to influence companies to favor Iran or any other country, the reaction from companies operating elsewhere and from Congress would be immediate and hostile. We can tell the American companies in the Consortium of the Iranian approaches to us and we can give them our views on the importance of Iran, as we have done repeatedly, but in spite of our warm friendship for Iran we cannot do more and Iran should not think that these mild interventions will outweigh the companies' own purely commercial interests. There are many complex factors which the companies have to consider. The comparative cost of oil in Iran and elsewhere is extremely important. And all of the American companies have interests in other oil producing countries which must be protected. (Incidentally it seems to us that it is in the interest of both Iran and the United States for such moderate Arab nations in the area as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to be strengthened.) We are very interested in the Consortium activities and note with pleasure that it has shown its willingness to see that Iran gets its fair share of the Middle East offtake, but given the vagaries of the oil industry, it is impossible to make long term commitments for offtake from Iran for the next five years or even through 1970. We can also understand why the companies in the Consortium are disturbed by the Iranian desire to revise or even discard the 1966 offtake agreement only ten months after it had been concluded to the apparent satisfaction of all parties. As the Ambassador himself has noted, the continuing Iranian pressure on the Consortium to use all production facilities to their capacity has caused it to be reluctant to enlarge facilities until they are actually needed. This does not seem in the interest of anyone, as surplus capacity in Iran is necessary if Iran is to increase production rapidly during any future oil crisis. Finally, the Consortium has a vast marketing network which is extremely important to Iran especially during times of a surplus of world oil production. We would hope that the amicable relationship between the Consortium and the Government of Iran which has proven so profitable to Iran will continue uninterrupted. The Ambassador said the points were well made but he feared that the companies were ignoring other important considerations. Iran believes that its special position warrants special treatment; Iran has a development program which increases the wealth and the stability of Iran and thereby benefits the West and the Western oil companies. Iran is particularly disturbed at the increase in production of certain small Arab countries who are given far more money than they can use and who then give or lend this surplus capital to men like Nasser. The Iranians consider it ironic that the Western oil companies are willing to increase production and therefore royalties and taxes to these small countries which are, quite directly, financing a man who is committed to their destruction and to wiping out all Western influence in the Middle East. Such a policy can only aggravate the instability of the area. Iran believes that there is more than short-term economic profit to be considered and the oil companies should look once again at what Iran is doing with its income and compare it with actions of the small Arab countries. Mr. Solomon said U.S. has investments abroad valued at about $71 billion. The world-wide investment in oil is of course important but it is only a minority of the total. American companies operating abroad act according to their own economic interests as they see them and none serves as a tool of the U.S. Government. Mr. Solomon then said that the American oil companies have important investments in the small Arab countries the Ambassador referred to and if any of the local rulers thought that the American parent companies were shifting their emphasis from the Arab world to Iran—particularly if they suspected it was at U.S. Government instigation—they would certainly retaliate against the American firms. We must also be aware of the danger that general, undiscriminating pressure frequently results in a reaction quite the opposite from that which is intended. The Ambassador concluded by saying that it was clear that the Consortium could not make firm commitments for the next five years; Iran had not asked for this but only for an agreement in principle to increase production. The next development plan, starting in March of 1968, is based on a large income from the exploitation of oil and Iran must have this money. The problems might start even before the new development plan; the Ambassador had just been informed that because the increase in oil earnings was less than expected, Iran would probably have deficit of $110 million this year. A short discussion of Iran's economic development followed. The Ambassador said Iran had a 9.5 percent growth in GNP last year and expected to have 11 percent this year—and all with a price inflation of only 0.5%. Mr. Solomon commented that oil had made all this possible. The Ambassador agreed, said that income from oil now runs about $700 million per year and provides about 70–75% of Iran's foreign exchange earnings. But this does not mean that more money is not needed. After leaving Mr. Solomon's office, Ambassador Ansary commented on Mr. Solomon's lucid presentation of the U.S. position and said it was important that it be understood in Tehran. While it is possible to explain some things in letters or telegrams some of the more subtle points may be lost. He said he thought he should return to Tehran to explain the U.S. position directly to his government before the Iranian position hardens to the point where retreat might be impossible. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Akins on November 3. 215. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 215. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, November 22, 1967, 1530Z. 2249. Iranian Oil. 1. In discussion with Harriman 22d, 2 Shah rehearsed his usual theme that Consortium should accord Iran preferential treatment. He referred to Iran's good behavior this past summer, its stabilizing role in this region now and in future, and importance of executing Iran's extensive Fourth Plan (which he admitted had been based on false statistics re projected oil revenues). 3 2. Shah said it is simply question of “money,” implying he not particular how increased revenue is achieved. He suggested four possibilities: A) as transportation rates come down following last summer's crisis companies should let Iran share in benefits from increased prices now prevailing in Europe; B) 6–1/2 per cent OPEC discount now being given companies be eliminated; C) Consortium internal regulations should be changed to become like those at Aramco so that those who wish to overlift are not penalized; and D) oil companies should encourage expansion of petrochemical industry in Iran. 3. Re natural gas, Shah said estimates for building pipeline (with L–60 steel) to Trieste range around $800 million but he suspects cost more likely to be in $1 billion to $1.2 billion range. He disclosed new idea, apparently being developed by French, whereby Soviets would deliver to France quantities of natural gas equivalent to those delivered by Iran to USSR border (via second pipeline) and French would pay Iranians in free foreign exchange. Shah said this proposal is agreeable to Iranians because it means foreign exchange rather than bartered Soviet goods. He acknowledged, however, that French have yet to negotiate such deal with Soviets. 3. Comment : Shah's discussion of oil was dispassionate. He said he hopes points mentioned in para two can be worked out when Consortium team comes to Iran for discussions Nov. 29. Meyer 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA. 2 The Consortium prepared a paper to brief Harriman before his meeting with the Shah. The paper, a comprehensive analysis of the status of the oil negotiations, is in a memorandum from McClelland to Akins, November 23. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET—Petroleum Iran (2) 1967) 3 Dr. Eqbal, managing director of NIOC, had explained the error to Consortium members in October: “Dr. Eqbal stated that an error had occurred in calculations within the GOI in that capacity figures given to NIOC by the Consortium had been taken by NIOC as production and offtake levels to be achieved by the end of 1967. These were notably 3.1 million bpd production and 2.9 million bpd offtake, both of which are projected capacity figures, not actual production of offtake. (In fact, 1967 offtake is expected by the members to average about 2.3 million bpd.) Dr. Eqbal said that he had informed Finance Minister Amuzegar of offtake levels based on the above and that Mr. Amuzegar had used these figures as a basis for the computation of revenue from oil not only for the balance of 1967, but also for projections for future years….According to Mr. Amuzegar, assumptions about financing incorporated in the Fourth Plan were based on revenue figures derived from the above mentioned offtake figures. He repeated, as Dr. Eqbal had stated in London, that the GOI required $6 billion in oil revenue during the five-year Fourth Plan, which begins in March 1968.” The effects of the miscalculation were far-reaching: “Mr. Amuzegar informed the member representatives that revenue based on a level of 2.9 million bpd for the next quarter of 1967 had already been spent and beseeched the members to help resolve the GOI's dilemma (though admitting it was founded on inaccurate information) by revising their offtake estimates for 1968.” (Airgram A–242 from Tehran, November 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, PET 6 IRAN) 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, December 29, 1967, 0824Z. 2702. Ref: Tehran 2701. 2 Iranian Oil. 1. My audience with Shah 28th turned out to be one of most unpleasant of my tour here. He was obviously smouldering over devaluation shortfall issue with which he had been preoccupied earlier in day 3 (see reftel). 2. Using terms such as “robbery,” “thieves” and some unprintable epithets, Shah professed to be completely disgusted with Consortium's behavior. At one point in discussion, Shah said if companies wanted war they could have it. This time it would not be with a Mosadeq but with a united Iran behind Shah himself. 3. When I noted Consortium believes it has legal basis for its position and perhaps arbitration might be one possibility for solving devaluation problem, Shah said arbitration is totally unacceptable. As for matter being legal issue, Shah said GOI would take care of that once and for all by immediate passage of legislation which would insure GOI undepreciable payments. Comment : Since this is critical point, I later sounded out Shah again and received distinct impression that as of now unilateral legislation which Shah has in mind for dealing with devaluation issue will be limited to insuring value of payments. Question is, of course, re wisdom of having any precedent set for unilateral legislation against Consortium. 4. In justification of righteousness his cause, Shah cited fact that both British Ambassador and Consortium Chief O'Brien had registered disapproval of Consortium's action in reducing December 15 payments. 4 5. Shah's bitterness splashed over whole oil picture. Re OPEC discount problem, Shah contended companies give with one hand, i.e. agree to phase-out of discount, but then take back with other, i.e. gravity allowance. He said he had doubted wisdom of Amuzegar's going to 52 cents on gravity allowance figure but had gone along with it. Comment: [garble] Amuzegar indicated (Tehran 2633) 5 that he had only gone to 45 cents in recent Tehran discussions, Shah's use of 52 cents figure, which he repeated twice, may mean that Amuzegar is prepared to move to that figure in attempt to reach compromise. 6. Shah went on to berate Consortium for its continual maltreatment of Iran, despite Iran's exemplary behavior in comparison with other countries. 6 My efforts to point out that Iran has in fact been treated very well fell on deaf ears. Shah once again contended that Consortium is sitting astride Iran's vast reserves and he cannot permit such restraining influences on Iran's welfare. 7. I pointed out problem is one of marketing. In this connection, I suggested Iran may be trying to carry water on both shoulders, i.e. pushing Consortium to find greater markets while at same time stealing some of Consortium's markets, e.g. recent IPAC deal for providing 18,000 bpd to Philippines which previously been almost exclusively market for American majors in Consortium. Shah argued such competition is infinitesimal compared with bonanzas greedy oil companies are throwing to countries like Libya. When I pointed out geographic factor which places Libya in favorable situation with Suez closed, Shah said what really infuriates him is companies' lifting large quantities from Sheikhdoms like Kuwait and Abu Dhabi when Iran with its 26,000,000 people needs funds to maintain its progress and play its role in Mideast security. Shah also asserted that Saudi Arabia's production will soon move up to 4,000,000 barrels per day. Since geographic factor a la Libya cannot be applied vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, this further demonstrates he said, how companies discriminate against INOC. 8. Shah once again mentioned possibility of legislation which would enable GOI to have oil at well-head for clients which GOI may develop not in competition with Consortium. He noted Iraq had long since found companies submissive to such measures. My natural response was to point to Iraq's sorry plight today and how much better off Iran is. I urged Shah “with every bone in my body” not to go down Iraqi road. 9. When subject of Iraq first arose, Shah said derisively, “congratulations.” He contended that unhappy developments in Iraq, leading to influx of Soviets into Iraq's oil fields, are primarily due to faulty Western policy over past ten years. Since there was little likelihood of rational discussion, I did not pursue this point further to ascertain what Shah had specifically in mind. 10. I told Shah Washington would be appreciative his views re Soviet intrusion in Iraqi oil industry. Shah said much depends on nature of Soviet involvement. However, danger is real, he said, that perhaps with pipeline through Syria, Soviets can get both Iraq and Syria in their clutches, thus leapfrogging over Turkey and Iran. This would place them in dominating position in Mideast, particularly since they already doing so well in what Shah has often mentioned as triangle (it is somewhat linear) of Cairo, Aden-Yemen, and Djibouti. 11. This provided occasion to pass some of interesting analysis contained in Beirut 5181, 7 particularly ambition of Soviets to become international major. I noted in this connection recent PIW statistics that Soviets last year exported 56 percent of their production, which was 14.6 percent increase from previous year. Here follows a brief general discussion of the oil industry. Meyer 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to London. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 Since Iran's contract with the Consortium was based on payments in sterling and the international oil market was based on dollars, depreciation meant that Iran would be getting proportionately less for its oil than would Arab producers like Saudi Arabia with contracts payable in dollars. 4 The British Foreign Secretary moved quickly to “dissuade the Shah from taking any rash action” and asked the United States to make a “similar demarche,” which the Americans agreed to do at the Ambassador's discretion. (Telegram 92281, January 3, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN) 5 Not printed. (Ibid.) 6 The Consortium notified the Finance Minister the next day that they had agreed to make additional payments to make up the devaluation shortfall. (Telegram 2767 from Tehran, January 4; ibid.) 7 Dated December 26. (Ibid., PET 6) 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, February 23, 1968, 0940Z. 3441. Subj: Iran Oil. Ref: London 6620, 2 6655. 3 1. Alam says Shah hopes for significant increase in Abadan refinery uplift which when coupled with other indicated increases will net Iran an additional $280 million this year. However, this is still $100 million short of Shah's primary objective, which remains “money.” 4 Alam Nohzd Reza Fallah currently in States exclusively to discuss these matters with American members of Consortium. 2. When I noted unlikelihood of Consortium's being able to reach 2.8 million bpd level demanded by Shah or to provide shortfall in “cost oil,” Alam recognized Consortium's inveterate opposition to providing oil which would be competitive. He also acknowledged GOI would have no ready markets if cost oil were made available. 3. According to Alam, Shah hopeful inter-participants agreement, as revised or revisable, will increase total Iranian offtake. 4. Comment : As Department knows, Embassy has consistently taken position that inter-participants agreement per se not as politically explosive as British and Walter Levy been insisting. Our point has been Shah could not care less re formula provided production makes gains he desires. Now, however, issue seems increasingly to be focusing on what appears to be deliberate effort by certain Aramco companies to prevent other Consortium members, some quite oil hungry, from taking oil they might otherwise wish to tap. 5 French in particular are attacking this vulnerable point, and CFP apparently has made clear to Iranians it prepared to lift sizable additional quantities of crude, were it not for penalties re which certain Aramco companies remain insistent. 5. If our impression is correct, certain Aramco companies are manifesting “restraint of trade” which would cause Teddy Roosevelt to turn over in his grave and which more pertinently is contrary to spirit if not letter of American law. While we hold no brief for Shah's unrealistic demands, and while we believe in friendly informal cooperation between companies and USG, we wonder whether time may not have come for USG to caution companies against such “restraint of trade”. Unless CFP and other oil-hungry companies (probably including Shell, Mobil and Iricon) are permitted to lift Iranian crude beyond their quotas without prohibitive restrictions, we see real trouble ahead. Thus we share concerns expressed by British in reftels. Meyer 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris and London. 2 Dated February 21. (Ibid.) 3 Dated February 22. (Ibid.) 4 See Document 215 . 5 Before leaving for Tehran, the Consortium's shareholders met in London to discuss revisions to their overlift arrangements. As the Embassy reported, “Jersey Standard Oil softening, but Socal still resisting and Texaco adamant (under Consortium voting procedures any two of these three can prevent agreement).” Representatives from BP told the Americans that if agreement could not be reached, the American companies could travel to Tehran alone to explain the situation to the Shah. (Telegram 5913 from London, January 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN) After further consultation, the Americans backed a Jersey proposal which the other companies considered inadequate: “FonOff Oil regards Jersey as equally villains of this piece along with Socal and Texaco, and apparently some shareholders have similarly sour reaction as result this past week's negotiations. One shareholder put it to EmbOff only half jokingly 'facade of unity only precariously preserved.'” (Telegram 6051 from London, January 30; ibid.) 218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 Washington, February 29, 1968, 0025Z. 122201. Subject: Iranian Oil. Ref: Tehran's 3441. 2 1. Dept increasingly disturbed by reports from Tehran, London and Paris that Aramco parents are being blamed for frustrating Shah's wishes for increased off-take and income and by implication that all others would be pleased or at least willing to give Iran favorable treatment. 3 2. Our understanding is that there is no major disagreement among shareholders on the two essential points: 1) the Shah's demands for 20 percent annual increase in off-take cannot be met, in fact, 8–9 percent growth is all that can be assured in 1968, and 2) NIOC cannot be given cost oil. We understand there is also essential agreement now on new quarter-price arrangements on over-liftings. Although some companies might well wish to be allowed to take, at cost, more than their equity share, this opposed by BP as well as all American majors and we doubt that other companies seriously believe refusal to permit this could be called constraint of trade. 4 3. Rules on programming production give Iran advantages over Aramco system and new agreement, we understand, gives companies option of applying Aramco over-lift agreements if they find them to their advantage. 4. We fear that high visibility of Aramco may lead Iranians to concentrate their irritation on its parent companies. But we also fear that French and British (Fearnley) may be encouraging this tendency by trying to shift blame to Americans when there is none to shift. 5. We hope addressees will be able to counter suggestion of American intransigence if it arises again. 6. It is interesting to note that greatest percentage increase among major Gulf producers in 1968 will not be Aramco but Abu Dhabi off-shore where only British Petroleum and CFP are involved. In addition CFP was one of two companies (other was Texaco) which opposed increase in Abadan refinery throughput. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Akins (E/FSE); cleared by Neuman (NEA), Oliver (E/FSE), Eliot (NEA/IRN), and Malmborg (L/E); and approved by S. Rockwell. Also sent to London and Paris. 2 Document 217 . 3 In a March 18 letter to Robert Dowell, Jr., Petroleum Attachè in Tehran, Akins noted that despite the fact that the oil companies felt a change in the overlift arrangement would make no difference to Iran, they were reluctant to make a change. He wrote: “John Oliver and I called company vice-presidents March 14, told them of our views of the seriousness of the situation and the impression we got from them was, 'Tough; but a clash has become inevitable and we might as well have it now and get it over with.' Mr. Rostow will probably call the presidents or executive vice-presidents to Washington next week to go over the same material. I doubt if he will be effective in persuading them of anything unless they are frightened. Maybe they will be. The Shah is an oriental despot and the oil executives are dinosaurs. If they come to blows it could be the battle of the century.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN) 4 In his letter to Dowell, Akins wrote: “Your references to 'restraint of trade' were a bit disturbing. We were surprised to see the accusation put into a telegram which was given fairly wide distribution in the Government. But fortunately the strong anti-oil company voices in Treasury and Commerce do not seem to have picked up the matter. They couldn't get very far, in any case, given the fact that the American companies were given specific exemption from anti-trust legislation when they entered the Consortium.” 219. Memorandum of Conversation 219. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 6, 1968. SUBJECT Iranian Oil Situation PARTICIPANTS Mr. George Parkhurst—SoCal Mr. George Ballou—SoCal Mr. George Piercy—Esso Mr. L.W. Folmar—Texaco Mr. Harvey Cash—Texaco Mr. Henry Moses—Mobil Mr. John Pendleton—Aramco Mr. J.J. Johnston—Aramco Mr. S.J. Anderson—Gulf Mr. Nestor Ortiz—Gulf Mr. Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary of State Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA Other Departmental Officers Mr. Rostow began by reviewing the general situation in the Persian Gulf, in the light of the proposed British withdrawal, 2 his VOA press conference, and the violent Russian attack on US policy there. Mr. Rostow's message in his press conference had been a) for the US public, that the US does not have to fill every military vacuum left by a British or French withdrawal, and b) for the Russians, that the US is interested in seeing vacuums filled, and security assured. Our hope is that security can be provided by the cooperation of the states in the area. He believed that much of the current Russian propaganda was in preparation for Kosygin's forthcoming visit to Iran. Mr. Rostow noted that the two strong countries in the Persian Gulf are Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both are our friends and we are neutral in any controversy between them. We encourage their close cooperation. The Shah wants good relations with Saudi Arabia, but there are conflicting claims and sensitivities. With respect to Bahrain, the Shah has no intention of using force, but Iran has a national-minded government and he cannot abandon national claims lightly. In such problems the USG tries to stay out, be neutral and help the cause of peace from the side lines. The USG has no plan for the Gulf, but it does not intend to let the Russians take over. Mr. Rostow went on to say that we are now in a peculiar situation vis-à-vis Iran, with the Shah unhappy and suspicious that the USG has favored Saudi Arabia over Iran in the Median Line issue. 3 The arms issue is also involved with special reference to Iran's responsibilities in the Gulf after the British departure. After thorough consideration of why the Shah feels as strongly as he does on the oil issue with the Consortium, Mr. Rostow remarked that while the government did not wish to take responsibility or to become involved in a commercial negotiation, we did have a national interest in successful and harmonious resolution of the oil negotiations, to the mutual satisfaction of the parties. We had important long term political interests in good relations both with Iran and with Saudi Arabia. Mr. Rostow wondered whether what the Shah really wants is the same level of production of oil as Saudi Arabia has. The Shah's present unsettled mood is probably due to many other factors too. Russia is one, but the Shah knows the Russians are his enemies and wants his arms from the US. Mr. Rostow commented that if current oil negotiations work out, he was hopeful that agreement on the Median Line could also be reached. He had raised the thought of arbitration, but there are many problems, including conflicting claims for various islands. Mr. Cash said that the Shah's demands are so far from reality that they could not be met. Mr. Rostow said that the Shah is also concerned with the internal rules of the Consortium. He believes that some companies are short of oil and would be very glad to take more if the internal rules of the Consortium permitted. 4 Mr. Parkhurst said the French certainly want more, but they have only made a small investment and he questioned whether it was fair to other members of the Consortium to allow them to take more. Mr. Piercy pointed out that the demand for Middle East oil is limited and more offtake by some companies would reduce sales by others. In response to Mr. Rostow's reiteration of the possibility that the psychological and political key to the Shah's problem is equality with Saudi Arabia in production and growth, Mr. Parkhurst said he had never heard of this suggestion before, but, in any case, the companies involved had no cartel and could not arrange matters that way. In the first place, there was no way to divide up the “pie” and secondly, although the companies can explain how (as a result of the Arab-Israeli war and aftermath) Iran's offtake grew 22% in 1967 as compared to about 8% in Saudi Arabia, they will be hard-pressed this year by the Saudis who will be anxious to catch up. Mr. Cash agreed that whatever the Shah gets, Saudi Arabia will also demand. If the Shah gets cost oil, then Saudi Arabia—and Kuwait—will also demand it. Mr. Piercy said there had been some confusion in the GOI demands on the Consortium. The GOI demand for $5.9 million over five years apparently covered all GOI oil revenue. However, income from the various joint ventures in the Gulf would mean only about $14 million a year, from a production of 150,000 bpd. The “gap” in 1968 is about 250,000 bpd and this will be worse in future years. Mr. Rostow voiced his hope that the matter could be resolved. Mr. Cash said that in his opinion the Consortium was heading for a head-on collision with the Shah. Mr. Parkhurst said that the only hope for working out a solution was in confidential discussions and now the Prime Minister has brought charges in the open. Mr. Folmar commented that the Consortium had done the best it could. Mr. Rostow said that all he could add, from the point of view of the United States, is that Iran is the strongest country in the Gulf, is moving ahead, and is interested in maintaining its momentum. The USG must rely on Iran, not in any way at the expense of Saudi Arabia, but a cooperative relation between Iran and Saudi Arabia was necessarily the keystone of United States plans and hopes for the area. Mr. Parkhurst commented that although Iran may be number one, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the next two in importance. Mr. Rostow agreed and said that only if all worked together could serious problems in the South of the Gulf be forestalled. Several representatives pointed out foreseeable problems for Middle East oil in the coming year. Mr. Piercy said 1968 was considered a low growth rate year—or “Crunch Year”—with increasing competition with Libya and continued closure of the Suez Canal likely. Mr. Parkhurst mentioned that the sulphur problem was becoming more severe, with more emphasis on quality. African producers had a location advantage, even if the canal were open, and he could see low Persian Gulf growth down the road. Mr. Rostow then mentioned the stir caused in Germany when it appeared that some foreign buyer, through a Swiss bank, was trying to take over the (German) Gelsenberg Oil Company. Although the offering buyer had not been identified, there had been deep concern that Americans were trying to take over the company, and the Germans showed marked political sensitivity on the subject. This sensitivity to American ownership, even in Germany, pointed out a field in which American companies operating abroad should carefully consider their policy in the long run. Companies should consider bringing in foreign partners and spreading the venture over a wider range of people. The troubles we had had in Mexico and Canada were not unique. It would be prudent to establish as broad a base as possible for American investment abroad. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by McClelland and Rostow and approved in M on March 14. 2 Due to its continuing fiscal crisis and subsequent budgetary constraints, the United Kingdom had announced its decision to withdraw its military presence from “east of Suez” by 1971. 3 Reference is to an ongoing dispute over division of the waters in the Persian Gulf and the search to determine a “fair” median line. Because Gulf waters are so shallow, there is no differentiation between a Continental Shelf and a seabed, leading to ownership problems over the oil resources of the seabed. The issue was further complicated by the question of sovereignty over the large number of islands in Gulf. 4 See Document 217 . 220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 Washington, March 30, 1968, 0049Z. 138990. 1. In a meeting with top executives of Esso, Mobil, Standard Oil of California, Texaco, Gulf and Iricon (morning March 28) Undersec Rostow said USG wished to have candid exchange of views with them about Iranian oil negotiations in their full political context. We did not wish to cross the delicate line between political and commercial considerations nor did we wish to take responsibility for the negotiations. But there was a deep national interest in a mutually satisfactory outcome for the negotiations at this time. The Consortium came into being with special anti-trust and other privileges by reason of such political considerations. He wished to discuss directly with the responsible leadership of the companies the political factors we saw impinging on the negotiating process. So far as the Persian Gulf was concerned, we faced a national security problem in view of the British withdrawal, and the risk of penetration of weak Gulf States by movements of radical Arab nationalism, as well as by more direct Soviet interventions. In that perspective, Iran was the keystone of American plans. We wished to have equal friendship with Iran and with Saudi Arabia, and close cooperation between them. At this point, Iran was clearly the stronger partner, progressive and developing. But Saudi cooperation with Iran was indispensable from every point of view, political, psychological and geographic, if stability in the Persian Gulf was to be assured. Rostow reviewed recent history and present prospects of efforts to bring Shah and Feisal together, and stressed importance of an oil settlement compatible with the necessities of that process. But Persian Gulf problem was intimately linked to Middle East crisis as a whole. After reporting on problems of M.E. since Nov. 22 S.C. Resolution, 2 Rostow said we regarded the situation as increasingly grave. UAR was blocking progress on the Jarring Mission. And Syria—perhaps UAR as well—were training and sending out terrorists on a very dangerous scale. Jordan had a Vietcong on its territory, as Laos does, and could no longer control it. In the absence of peace negotiations, Israeli reprisals were inevitable, despite our urgent efforts to prevent them. As a result, there was a serious possibility of renewed general hostilities in the Middle East, with incalculable potentialities. We were working on a crisis footing to head off hostilities, but we could not be sure of the outcome. 2. Rostow referred to Shah's statements that he cooperated with West at his great risk during crisis last June. If he felt this cooperation not recognized through favorable treatment by Consortium, there was possibility he would not cooperate with West in new crisis. 3 Rostow also said withdrawal of British from area made it necessary for Iran to cooperate with Arabs in Gulf and in a new round of hostilities he might not be willing risk their wrath by breaking Arab blockade again. As companies knew, even temporary boycott of Middle East oil, if it included Iranian production, would be catastrophic. 3. Iran, he said, has written $5.9 billion into its development plan and Shah would not change it. We know companies cannot give Iran all it wants for its plan but we also believe that if there is some increase in earlier estimates there will be chance of averting confrontation and new crisis in Iran this year. 4. Rostow asked without prejudice about possibility of investment commitments, raising APQ, altering over-lift arrangements to permit crude-hungry companies to take more oil, on equitable terms, increasing refinery throughput, and making special allowances for British Petroleum if it decided to reduce Abu Dhabi production in favor of Iran. Desirability of equality of treatment between Iran and Saudi Arabia was stressed, and generally accepted. Companies said they are examining all these possibilities and said all offered some room for adjustment but they gave no definite assurances on any. 5. They pointed to certainty more favorable treatment Iran would result immediate demands from Arab and other producing countries which they could not meet. 4 In reference this as well as to willingness French other “oil hungry” companies to take more cost oil they said such oil could only be sold at expense current marketing since demand was being fully met. Rostow said USG recognized all alternatives were impossible, but we would weigh the political value of a settlement with Iran very highly. 6. Companies asked USG attempt convince Iran that Consortium trying help it meet development goals. Rostow said we had done this repeatedly and would do so again, if companies assured us they would make genuine effort to reach satisfactory agreement. This assurance was given. To be effective, companies would probably have to improve their estimates and do everything economically feasible to help Iran. Companies said they knew any approach would have to be on this basis. 7. At end of meeting question was asked whether USG seriously thought risk of confrontation, and of rash and destructive action by Shah, was high. Rostow answered affirmatively, and said our concern over this risk was the subject matter of meeting, and the reason it was called. 8. Company position throughout meeting was neither hostile or negative and we believe they will endeavour seriously to devise new offer before April 20. Clearly any new offer will be below Iranian demands but we hope enough will be offered to avert crisis this year. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Akins and Rostow; cleared in draft by McClelland and by Jacobs, Oliver, and Meehan (S/S); and approved by Rostow. Repeated to London, Kuwait, Jidda, and Dhahran. 2 UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. The resolution called for a “just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security.” (UN doc. S/RES/242 (1967), printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , pp. 616–617) 3 On March 19 Enders reported to Rostow that oil analyst Walter Levy told Department officials: “Can't predict whether or not the Shah will make good on his threat. But clearly there is a strong risk he will. Therefore companies should make up their mind on basis of how well they, the United States and indeed the West as a whole could stand another crisis in the Middle East. In Levy's judgment we are all in period of relative weakness given Soviet position in Middle East, threat of another Arab-Israeli blow-up, and payments crisis. We could not absorb a break with Iran. Even if companies are right, they should stand on principle only when strong. We would never forgive ourselves if we superimposed an Iranian crisis on what could be a general payments and Middle East crisis.” (Memorandum from Enders to Rostow, March 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN) 4 According to Enders, Levy did not believe that parity with Saudi Arabian production would “cause a problem” in Riyadh. (Ibid.) 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 Tehran, April 23, 1968, 1005Z. 4304. Iran Oil. Ref: Tehran 4300. 2 1. Referring to Tehran press morning 22d which referred to GOI “victory” in negotiations with Consortium, 3 I told Saudi Ambassador same morning to tell Yamani not to get excited. 2. Without, of course, in any way getting into substance of negotiations I told Saudi that happy outcome was largely what Arabs call gali gali (slight of hand). 4 Meyer 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, and London. 2 Dated April 23. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 4336 from Tehran, April 24, indicated that “EmbOff has learned from fairly reliable source that NIOC/GOI official discussed Consortium/GOI talks with wire service stringer in such a way as to intentionally encourage press services to draw strictly erroneous conclusions as to outcome these talks, i.e., Iran had obtained all it had asked from Consortium.” (Ibid.) 4 The Embassy called the resolution a “Persian solution which, by adroit placement of mirrors, gives appearance of compliance with Iranian demands.” As the Ambassador explained: “By ignoring first quarter of 1968, and counting all revenues from Consortium during Iranian year 1347 (March 21, 1968–March 20, 1969), GOI will apparently receive the $865 million it wants in revenues from the Consortium 'this year.'” (Telegram 4270 from Tehran, April 21; ibid.) 222. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen Affairs (Brewer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) 222. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen Affairs (Brewer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) 1 Washington, August 1, 1968. SUBJECT Slow Start for Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) OAPEC, formed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya after the Khartoum summit conference last fall 2 to coordinate the oil policies of those states for which petroleum is the major export, recently held a disappointing preliminary meeting of oil ministers in Beirut on July 25. The Libyan Minister of Petroleum failed to attend the meeting, which was to have named a secretary general and set up working committees, and the Saudi and Kuwaiti ministers were able to accomplish little in his absence. Libya has approved but not yet ratified the OAPEC charter. While this may have been a factor in the Libyan “no show”, a more likely reason was concern that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would pressure Libya to slow down its rapidly expanding crude oil production, already partly responsible for a substantial decline in Saudi and Kuwaiti production in June. Having been subject to heavy pressure from his two Arab counterparts at the OPEC in Vienna in late June, the Libyans evidently decided to avoid what would have been another unpleasant round of lecturing. OAPEC was formed chiefly to give the conservative, oil-rich states a pan-Arab “umbrella” under which pressures from the radical Arab states might more easily be resisted. (Iraq is eligible for membership under the OAPEC charter, but the UAR, Algeria, and Syria are excluded). But the members do compete and may find it difficult to coordinate their varying interests now that pressure from the radical states has subsided following the Khartoum arrangement to provide budget subsidies to the UAR. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OAPEC. Confidential. Drafted by D. Newton. 2 The formation of OAPEC was announced on December 21, 1967, by Saudi Oil Minister Yamani in Riyadh. (Telegram 90419, December 28, 1967; ibid., PET 3 ARAB) See Document 268 . 223. Memorandum of Conversation 223. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 8, 1968. SUBJECT IPC Report on Baghdad PARTICIPANTS Mr. A. K. Wolgast, Esso, New York Mr. Bryan H. Baas, NEA/ARN Mr. Wolgast phoned to pass on a report received from a Mobil Oil Company employee who had recently been in Baghdad. 2 He had limited contacts with Iraqi Government officials but he talked with a number of other individuals there including Ghanim Uquaily, former General Manager of the Iraq National Oil Company. The Mobil representative reported that the GOI is taking extreme repressive measures against opponents of the regime, including the left wing of the Baath Party. Among the prominent people who have reportedly been jailed are Subhi Abdul Hamid and Arif Abdul Razzaq. 3 The Mobil representative was very pessimistic about the oil situation. He believes that the Iraqi Government has not yet formulated an oil policy. The GOI needs money badly and may offer settlement of specific minor issues as a quid pro quo for cash payments. However, it does not appear that the GOI is prepared to settle any territorial problems. In this connection, there is nothing new on the question of IPC development of North Rumaila under contract to the INOC. When the Mobil representative met with Uquaily he was asked if IPC was still concerned about repercussions elsewhere over any agreement that might be reached with the GOI. He was assured that this indeed was a concern of IPC. Uquaily also wanted to know if the IPC partners had given CFP a green light to negotiate for Iraqi territory. The answer was negative. Former Oil Minister Abdul Aziz Wattari will reportedly return to Iraq as a private citizen in the near future. Uquaily said that no political significance should be applied to his return. In conclusion, Mr. Wolgast said that an IPC team is going to Baghdad this weekend for exploratory talks. The team will not be authorized to negotiate or discuss any substantive points, thereby avoiding any confrontation with the GOI at this time. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 1 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Baas. 2 The Mobil Oil Company official presumably was Vice President Henry Moses who had informed the Embassy in Beirut on October 7 about his recent trip to Iraq. (Airgram A–1386 from Beirut, October 7; ibid., PET 6 IRAQ) 3 Moses believed he had witnessed the aftermath of a coup attempt. (Ibid.) 224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1 Washington, October 15, 1968, 2346Z. 255853. From Under Secretary Rostow. 1. Understand Brougham and top command Aramco increasingly disturbed at what they consider unbalanced US posture in Arab-Israel dispute and fearful of consequences to major US interests in peninsula. 2. If your briefing of senior company executives in Dhahran did not cover the recent US–USSR exchange, you may wish to return to fill out the picture in supplementary briefing or pouch copy State 254108, Oct 14, 2 to ConGen Dhahran to serve as basis for briefing. 3. We believe rationale outlined in our reply makes clear pitfalls we see if we do not persevere in our efforts to bring parties into agreement which will reduce or eliminate the basic causes of Arab-Israel conflict. 4. We would appreciate any impressions you may have gleaned of Aramco concerns during your recent briefing. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Saudi Arabia Cables Vol. II, 4/67–1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies and approved by Brown (S/S) and Rostow. 2 Not found; the reference should presumably be to telegram 254018, October 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State 1 Jidda, October 29, 1968, 1315Z. 5776. For Under Secretary Rostow. State 255853, 2 260750; 3 Jidda 5646. 4 1. I briefed Barger and Dinsmore subsequently briefed Brougham and Hills on State's 254018. 5 While appreciating USG position, their general reaction was negative. All felt strongly that current USG policy risky and is badly hurting American position, both public and private, in Middle East. Soviets gaining at our expense. All argued that Arabs have responded generally in positive terms to President's five points and that we are accepting uncritically Israeli positions. I assured Barger this not so and that USG also pressing Israel be forthcoming. 2. Top Aramco men consider USG has missed opportunity bring Israel to compromise and are pessimistic over likelihood better terms from Arabs. They appear to believe that second round will come in which Arabs (perhaps with Soviet help) will prevail and in process remaining American interests in Middle East will be irrevocably lost. At times their attitude is explosively critical of our actions. I am going make another attempt explain USG position to new Aramco Vice President Knight, who will be my house guest next few days, to broaden understanding of what we are about. 3. I neglected mention in Jidda 5646 that at Aramco board meeting Brougham asked what USG doing to cultivate potential upcoming Saudi leaders. I told him Secretary Udall earlier agreed in principle invite Minister Interior Prince Fahd for three day official visit, but scheduling any such visit not possible until after election. Various Aramco board members strongly endorsed idea and urged that USG do more to cultivate upcoming Saudi leaders, even though some of them may be Princes, by official invitations to US and a bit of glad-handing by American officials. They also indicated willingness extend hospitality. I assured board we fully aware of this need and will continue do best we can arrange such visits. Eilts 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Saudi Arabia Cables Vol. II, 4/67–1/69. Secret; Exdis. 2 Document 224 . 3 Not found. 4 Dated October 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) 5 See Document 224 . 226. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 226. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 7, 1968. RNA–34 SUBJECT The Problems and Prospects of the Iranian Oil Consortium The temporary settlement in April 1968 of current disputes between the Iranian Government and the group of western oil companies known as the Iranian Oil Consortium gave the companies additional time to determine their joint position for the subsequent round of negotiations, which began on September 30, 1968, at the semi-annual Consortium/National Iranian Oil Company meeting in London. This paper will attempt to present the background and an analysis of the problems involved. Abstract In order to achieve an exceptionally large increase in its oil revenues for several years to come, the Iranian Government will in the next few months bring heavy pressure to bear upon the Iranian Oil Consortium. Wishful thinking plus an error in computation 2 has led the Iranians to plan upon a level of revenue from future Consortium operations that is, in the Consortium's view, far above the probable figure, and the government has been so informed. The Iranian position, in essence, is that Iran's development needs (in particular, its fourth five-year development plan, covering the Iranian years 1347–51, roughly 1968–72) require a certain level of funds, that oil is the only Iranian resource capable of generating that level, and that the bulk of the necessary oil must come from the Consortium's concession area, which contains by far the most prolific known and presently operational deposits. The Iranians would prefer, as the simplest solution (and the only one likely to succeed), that the members of the Consortium lift enough oil to provide, through the usual royalties and taxes, the desired level of governmental revenue. If the Consortium is unable to do this, it must provide the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) with a sufficient quantity of oil from the Consortium area at a low enough price so that NIOC could make up the shortfall in revenue through its own sales or barter arrangements. The oil could be provided by modifying the terms of the Consortium's 1966 agreement to make barter oil available to NIOC, by turning over to NIOC an already producing field in the Consortium area, or by conferring upon the Iranian Government membership in the Consortium. The government has indicated that, in case of refusal, Iran might take unilateral measures to obtain the oil. In spite of the apparent Iranian determination to reach, in one way or another, its revenue goal, the government is very probably aware that this goal is unattainable—that the Consortium is in fact doing its best to increase its offtake but will not be able to meet Iranian demands, that additional sales by NIOC could not possibly close the gap, and that any unilateral measures Iran might take in an attempt to reach its goal not only would not accomplish that end but might prove to be disastrous. There have been indications of Iranian hesitation to enter into an irreconcilable confrontation with the Consortium. The Iranians backed down in April 1968 with a “Persian solution” to the problems raised by their demands. They shifted the time frame of the dispute. Their recent offer to discuss production capacity as well as actual offtake of oil has opened up another avenue which could at least postpone a showdown. If the Consortium remains adamant about future commitments on offtake, refusing to promise the levels the Iranians are demanding, the government can back down again by accepting Consortium assurances that the necessary production capacity will be available in case Consortium offtake or a combination of Consortium offtake and NIOC offtake for barter purposes should by some chance reach the desired level. The Consortium is apparently in a position to make such a commitment for at least one year and possibly two. With room for the Iranians to retreat, we believe they will probably do so. They will make every effort to better their position, such as by obtaining easier terms for barter oil and some additional minor concessions, as well as the highest possible offtake commitments, but we strongly doubt that they are as yet prepared to resort to unilateral measures of compulsion if their demands are not met. Here follows the body of the 26-page report. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Limdis. 2 See footnote 3, Document 215 . 227. Memorandum of Conversation 227. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 6, 1968. SUBJECT Oil Matters (Part 4 of 4) PARTICIPANTS H.E. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran H.E. Hushang Ansary, Ambassador of Iran H.E. Mehdi Samii, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran Dr. Reza Fallah, Director, National Iranian Oil Company The Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State The Hon. Armin H. Meyer, American Ambassador to Iran Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Country Director for Iran, NEA The Prime Minister asked Dr. Fallah to join the meeting for a discussion of oil matters. He said that Iran has no problems in the current year with the Oil Consortium but that it hopes for one billion dollars in oil revenues next year ( comment : presumably the Iranian year beginning March 21, 1969). The member companies of the Consortium are considering this request, but have not yet responded. Last year, he said, the Shah told the companies that if they could not meet Iran's requirements, Iran would find its own markets. He decried what he described as the companies' policy of supporting such states as Abu Dhabi and Kuwait that either have no useful way to employ their oil revenues or use them to support radical Arabs. The Prime Minister went on to say that Iran is now looking at the American market. One way to sell oil to the United States would be through the present American quota system, using the proceeds to purchase American goods. Iran might possibly buy into an American firm having an import quota. In any case, the Prime Minister said, two aspects of this situation deserved special mention. One is the fact that the United States needs additional oil reserves. Iran has entered into a contract with another country ( comment : South Africa; see below) desirous of stockpiling oil and has asked a private firm for a study on a similar possible contract with the United States. Iran would give this study to the United States Government for its consideration. Iran could use the proceeds from such sales to the United States to buy American products. The second aspect of the matter was possible sales of petroleum products to the Department of Defense. Dr. Fallah said that sales to the Department of Defense pose a problem because DOD purchases on the basis of public tender. The Secretary asked if Dr. Fallah meant that Iran could not meet the price competition. Dr. Fallah said that the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) would act as the Consortium's agent. The Prime Minister said that the NIOC would find a market for the Consortium. The NIOC would make no money as an agent, but Iran would profit through the taxes the Consortium would pay on higher production. Dr. Fallah said that Iran desires a three-year contract with DOD, but the latter won't go beyond six months. This and not price is the problem. The Prime Minister said that Dr. Fallah would be talking with DOD officials. The Secretary said that we can be sympathetic provided that the price is right, but we do not want to subsidize the seller. Dr. Fallah said that on the other aspect of the Iranian plan to sell oil to the United States, Iran believes that it is in the US interest to buy inexpensive Iranian oil. The Secretary asked how such purchases would be financed. He said that he couldn't imagine the Congress financing an oil stockpile. Dr. Fallah said that at some time in the future, the United States, like South Africa, might finance a stockpile. Iran could provide credit for that part of the sale whose proceeds would go to Iran. The Secretary said that from the standpoint of national resources policy there was some logic in the Iranian proposal. But to translate the proposal into financial and political terms would be difficult. He asked if such a proposition might not be more attractive for Western Europe. Dr. Fallah replied that Western Europe is already a market for Iranian oil. The Secretary commented that in our case, the proposal would appear to hurt our own producers who wouldn't trust their government to keep the stockpile locked up. Dr. Fallah said that the major American companies would like the proposal. The Secretary said he was interested in the subject and would give it more thought, but there are political and financial problems. Dr. Fallah said that Alaskan finds are not the permanent answer to American oil needs and added that the Iranian proposal would not hurt the American balance of payments. The Secretary repeated that the proposal is politically very difficult. He asked that Iran provide us with its studies informally and that future discussions be on an informal basis. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Drafted by Eliot on December 8 and approved in S on December 11. The 1967 Oil Embargo The 1967 Oil Embargo 228. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic Affairs (Oliver) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Fried) Washington, May 23, 1967. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET 2 Middle East Department Memorandum 1967, Box 6297. Confidential. Drafted by J.E. Akins (E/OR/FSE). 229. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 24, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 SAUD. Secret; Exdis. A note attached to the source text on White House letterhead reads, “May 24, 1967 To: S/S, Mr. Ben Read From: Bromley Smith FYI.” A note on the source text by Harold Saunders reads, “President From—.” 230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, June 3, 1967, 1140Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Secret; Exdis. 231. Letter From John J. McCloy to Secretary of State Rusk New York, June 5, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 SAUD. Exdis. A handwritten note initialed by Assistant Secretary Battle reads, “S—Mr. Borg. Thank you. Will you see that DR acknowledges this.” No acknowledgment was found. McCloy, Chairman of the Ford Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations, was also a board director of Chase Manhattan Bank and the Allied Chemical Company, both of which had investments in Iran. In addition, the Consortium in Iran included a number of McCloy's clients. 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State Baghdad, June 6, 1967, 2140Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 ARAB. Unclassified. Repeated to Algiers, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tripoli, and Basra. 233. Editorial Note 234. Letter From the Manager of the Government Relations Department, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Finlay) to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources (Moore) New York, June 8, 1967. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET 3 Orgs and Confs,OECD Oil Committee, April, May, June 1967. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon and John Oliver. 235. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of the Interior Udall Washington, June 8, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 12–3 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by M. Chaplin (E/OR/FSE) on June 7 and cleared by Solomon, Oliver (FSE), Hinton (EUR), and Patman (L/E). 236. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, June 9, 1967, 1621Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and The Hague and passed to the White House and USIA. 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State Algiers, June 9, 1967, 2220Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 15–2 ALGERIA. Limited Official Use. 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State Kuwait City, June 10, 1967, 2325Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Passed to the White House. 239. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State Tripoli, June 11, 1967, 1200Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for OECD, Dhahran, Jidda, and Kuwait City. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 240. Editorial Note 241. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State Paris, June 12, 1967, 2216Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to The Hague, London, Ottawa, Rome, Tokyo, Ankara, Athens, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Reykjavik, Stockholm, and Vienna. Passed to the White House and USIA. 242. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, June 12, 1967. Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET 2 Middle East Department Memorandums 1967. Confidential. The date is handwritten on the source text. A copy was sent to Eugene Rostow. 243. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State Tripoli, June 15, 1967, 1900Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for OECD, Baida, Beirut, Jidda, and Kuwait. Passed to the White House, CIA, USIA, DOD, NSA, COMAC, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya Washington, June 16, 1967, 11:41 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 LIBYA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Oliver on June 16 and cleared by Held (NEA), Post (AFN), and Oliver. Repeated to Paris, London, Kuwait, Jidda, and Dhahran. 245. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, June 17, 1967, 5:25 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 1 OECD. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Percival and Rogers (EUR/RPE); cleared by Oliver (E/FSE), Patman (L/E), and Moore (Interior); and approved by Solomon. Repeated to all other OECD capitals. 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, June 19, 1967, 9:19 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by E. Crowley (EUR/GER) on June 19; cleared by Akins (E/OR/FSE), Puhan (EUR/GER), McCall (S/S), Springsteen (EUR), and Rostow. Also sent to Paris and London. Printed from an unsigned copy. 247. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State Tripoli, June 22, 1967, 0905Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and Paris for OECD. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 248. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, June 23, 1967, 1205Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and Paris. 249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, June 24, 1967, 3:12 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Rogers (EUR/RPE), cleared by Oliver (E/FSE), Crowley (EUR/GER), Enders (M), Patman (L/E), Moore (Interior), and Solomon. Repeated to Brussels, The Hague, London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo. 250. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, June 27, 1967, 1415Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 12–2 FR. Confidential. Repeated to London and Brussels. 251. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State Paris, June 27, 1967, 1729Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Athens, Bonn, Brussels, London, and Rome. Passed to the White House and USIA. 252. Memorandum of a Briefing by Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, June 29, 1967, 9:51–10:18 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Economic 2 of 2. No classification marking. The meeting was held in McCone's office. An attached covering note from Helms to McGeorge Bundy reads: “Here is the write up of John McCone's presentation to us on the importance of Middle East oil to the United States. This is the paper I promised you.” 253. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State Tripoli, June 30, 1967, 0940Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Baida, Beirut, Jidda, and Kuwait. 254. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State Paris, June 30, 1967, 1717Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central File, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Reykjavik, Rome, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Vienna. Passed to the White House and USIA on June 30. 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State Tripoli, July 6, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential; Priority. There is no time of transmission on the source text; the telegram was received at 7:05 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris for USOECD, Algiers, Baida, Beirut, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, and Tehran. Passed to the White House, USIA, CIA, DOD, NSA, CINCEUR, and USUN. 256. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Special Committee on the Middle East Crisis (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, July 10, 1967, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Country File—Arab Nationalism. No classification marking. 257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, July 11, 1967, 8:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Economic [2 of 2]. Confidential. Drafted by C. Held (NEA/ARP), cleared by W. Brewer (NEA/ARP) and J. Akins (E/FSE), and approved by Davies. Repeated to Dhahran. 258. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 18, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of the NSC Special Committee, Economic [2 of 2]. Confidential. A July 19 covering note from Robert Cox to Nathanial Davis on White House letterhead reads, “For your information.” The cover note also bears Davis' handwritten notation: “Mr. Bundy, FYI.” 259. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State Paris, July 21, 1967, 1935Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Reykjavik, Rome, Stockholm, Toyko, and Vienna. 260. Editorial Note 261. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, August 3, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 2 UK. Limited Official Use. Drafted by J. McGrath (E/GEN), cleared by W. Armstrong, and approved by L. Percival. Repeated to Paris for OECD and Brussels for USEC. 262. Airgram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, August 4, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 2 GERW. Limited Official Use. Drafted and approved by M.J. Dux (ECON). Also sent to London, Paris for OECD, Hamburg, and Beirut. 263. Editorial Note 264. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, August 25, 1967, 0343Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 ARAB. Confidential. Drafted by D. Newton (NEA/ARP) on August 24; cleared by L. Dinsmore (NEA/ARP), Davies, Battle, and Kelly (S/S); and approved by Rostow. Sent to Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, Rabat, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, Cairo, Dhahran, and Jerusalem, and repeated to London, Paris, and USUN. 265. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rockwell) Washington, September 22, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET–NEAR E. Secret. Drafted by Sidney Sober (NEA/RA). Copies were sent to Palmer (AF) and Solomon (E). 266. Editorial Note 267. Circular Information Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, October 20, 1967, 6:11 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Unclassified. Drafted by J. Stromayer (EUR/RPE) and approved by J. Oliver (E/FSE). Sent to all OECD capitals, Beirut, Tehran, and Dhahran. 268. Airgram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut, January 17, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OAPEC. Limited Official Use. Drafted by R. Wright and cleared by N.K. Pratt. Also sent to Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tripoli, and Dhahran, and passed to Algiers, Amman, Ankara, Brussels, Cairo, Caracas, Djakarta, Lagos, London, Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, The Hague, USUN, Vienna, and Beirut. 228. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic Affairs (Oliver) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Fried) 228. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic Affairs (Oliver) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Fried) 1 Washington, May 23, 1967. SUBJECT FSE Meeting with Department of Interior Officials on Possible Effects of Middle East Crisis on World Oil Supply At my request Admiral Lattu, Director of the Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior, called a meeting on May 23 of Interior's experts on fuel supply and transport to discuss possible effects of the current Middle East crisis on world oil supply. 2 State was represented by myself, Jim Akins, Maxwell Harway of the Vietnam working group, and Stephen Rogers of EUR/RPE. Jim Akins gave a short briefing on the current political scene in the Middle East; we believe that if fighting starts the best we could hope for would be a loss of only the two pipelines, the worst would be a loss, through government action or sabotage of all Arab oil and the closing of the Suez canal. The actual situation would probably lie between the two extremes. Interior's experts conclude that the loss of two of the five major Middle East producers (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya) and the Suez canal would be tolerable. (We note that the loss of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia together would create serious disturbances.) Loss of more would cause disruptions in Europe (and Japan) commensurate to the size of the loss. Arab production is now as follows (millions of b/d): Saudi Arabia—3.2 Kuwait—2.9 Iraq—.9 Total Eastern Arab—7.0 UAR—.1 Libya—1.7 Algeria—.8 Total North African Arab—2.6 Total Arab—9.6 If the oil were lost it could partially be made up from the following sources: “Immediately” Within six months North America 1.0 2.5–3.0 Nigeria .2 .35–.5 Indonesia .1 .15–.3 Iran .3 .8 Total 1.6 3.8–4.6 The emergency oil would be expensive. Europe currently imports about 7.5 million b/d for which it pays $6.7 billion per year. Under emergency conditions about 3.9 million b/d could probably be made available to Europe but the cost would be $5.7 billion per year—a per barrel increase of about 67%. The problem is solely that of crude oil; tankers are available or can be made available to ship it but at a higher cost than currently is paid. The Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee is responsible for organizing fuel supplies for the U.S. and its allies. It is currently inactive; its members are top level Department of Interior officers and executives of American oil companies with foreign operations. Its company participants are immune from anti-trust action. It last functioned during the Suez crisis but could be reactivated within a week or two. The permanent subcommittee, the Petroleum Security Subcommittee is composed of Interior officers and oil company employees—mostly those occupying higher technical positions. It met the middle of May and was scheduled to meet again on June 5. If the situation in the Middle East deteriorates it will be asked to come to Washington by the end of this week. 3 Attachment 4 OUR TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION REACHED AFTER CONSULTATION WITH NEA Production(Mill. b/d) In case war with Israel—no foreign intervention In case of active US support of Israel i.e. sixth fleet action Libya—very susceptible to Nasserite pressures—large numbers of foreign Arabs work in oil fields. 1.7 Probably will continue supply—at least to European neutrals Probable compliance of Lib. Govt. to Nasser pressures to close fields—if not, probability of sabotage Kuwait—also susceptible to Nasser pressure. Non-Kuwaitis outnumber Kuwaitis by 2:1 in sheikhdom. 2.9 Some pressure to take action against KOC. Probable continuance supplies to Japan and European neutrals Strong pressure to close and/or nationalize fields. If GOK refuses, strong possibility sabotage Saudi Arabia—less susceptible to Nasser's pressures. But Saudis, like other Arabs, emotionally involved in question Israel vs. Arab honor. 3.2 Inclination of Govt. to remain in full production—danger of sabotage Probability SAG will yield to nationalist pressures to close or nationalize fields Iraq—GOI pays full lip service to Arab solidarity. Iraq is only one of Arab combatants not to sign armistice with Israel after Palestine war. .9 Strong pressure to close or nationalize IPC or at least cut supplies to “imperialists” Increased pressure to nationalize Iran—non-Arab, enemy of Nasser, friendly to Israel but oil is produced in Arab speaking areas of Iran where nationalists have been working—but heretofore ineffectively. 2.5 Possibility of attempted sabotage Possibility increased of attempted sabotage but also increased Govt. vigilance IPC and Aramco pipelines. 1.1 (throughput) Cut Cut unless Iraq nationalizes IPC, then IPC line kept open for selected customers Although it may not be the prime reason for Nasser's bellicose stand, he seems to be using the overheated atmosphere to excite the citizenry and armies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan to overthrow their “reactionary” rulers. Unless he gets full cooperation from Kuwait and Libya he is likely to try to overthrow the rulers of those two countries as well. His chances of success in these long-standing plans will be enhanced if his armies give a good showing against Israel—the aura of the conquering hero. Paradoxically, they would also be increased if the Israelis succeed in occupying parts of Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon; the case would then be made that Arabism was threatened and could only survive if the “lackies of imperialism” were thrown out. Hussain is more vulnerable than Faisal. It is impossible to calculate what is activating Nasser (the Russians? Are they finally yielding to Chinese taunts of being afraid to distract the Americans away from Vietnam?). He may be risking a war with Israel, may even expect to be defeated (and then rescued by the UN) but will consider it worthwhile if he can, during the process, bring down Hussain, Faisal and perhaps the Kuwaiti and Libyan thrones. 1 Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET 2 Middle East Department Memorandum 1967, Box 6297. Confidential. Drafted by J.E. Akins (E/OR/FSE). 2 Interior's Office of Oil and Gas had been studying the problem since the beginning of May. Early that month, the Petroleum Security Subcommittee of the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee recommended that the Department of Defense, as a precautionary measure, consider alternative sources for the 200,000 b/d purchased from Persian Gulf refineries. This figure represented 80 percent of oil used by U.S. military forces in the Pacific. Alternatives were suggested but the meeting was recessed until June 5 to gather more data. (Memorandum reviewing potential petroleum developments, May 31; ibid.) 3 The Petroleum Security Subcommittee was called to Washington for a meeting on May 26, 1967. FSE's May 25 submission for the nightly report for Under Secretary Katzenbach is ibid., FSV Facilitative Service—1967. 4 No classification marking. 229. Memorandum for the Record 229. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 24, 1967. SUBJECT Conversation with Aramco Representative Aramco's Washington representative, John Pendleton, called me this afternoon to read a telegram which he had received from Aramco's Vice President Brougham, who is currently visiting Beirut. Brougham reports a conversation with Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Yamani at Beirut airport on 23 May. Yamani is convinced there will be war between the Arabs and Israel. Syria is pushing Nasser toward war and Russia must not resist the Syrians too sharply because Moscow fears Syria is leaning toward Peiping. Yamani recommends that the US keep hands off this crisis, work through the UN and not try to be a policeman. He disagrees flatly with our position on the Gulf of Aqaba and says that if the US directly supports Israel, Aramco can anticipate being nationalized “if not today, then tomorrow.” If the US does not stay out of this conflict, the US is finished in the Middle East. When Brougham asked Yamani why Saudi Arabia would object to our standing up to Nasser, Yamani replied, “We are all Arabs. Your government would be foolish if it does not keep out.” Harold H. Saunders 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 SAUD. Secret; Exdis. A note attached to the source text on White House letterhead reads, “May 24, 1967 To: S/S, Mr. Ben Read From: Bromley Smith FYI.” A note on the source text by Harold Saunders reads, “President From—.” 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, June 3, 1967, 1140Z. 10105. Ref: London 10099. 2 Concern about oil supplies mounting here and apparently in continental consumer countries. Gregory (MinPower) told Embassy yesterday that OECD Secretariat phoned last week to suggest early meeting OECD oil committee. 3 According Gregory committee chairman (Beckett) declined, and still considers that OECD meeting now would be provocative rather than helpful. 4 Kaiser 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Secret; Exdis. 2 Not found. 3 The OECD Special Committee for Oil was the designated forum for the United States and its allies to take steps to manage an oil crisis. In 1960 European OECD members had agreed on emergency procedures to deal with an oil shortage including the “interim apportionment of available oil supplies.” The United States, Canada, and Japan were specifically exempted from participation. “However, the U.S. has consistently declared that, as a matter of principle, it would have regard for and take appropriate action to assist its allies and other friendly governments in times of oil shortage.” (Draft action memorandum by S.H. Rogers (EUR/RPE), June 8, 1967; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD) 4 Beckett called the meeting for Monday, June 12. (Ibid.) 231. Letter From John J. McCloy to Secretary of State Rusk 231. Letter From John J. McCloy to Secretary of State Rusk 1 New York, June 5, 1967. Dear Dean: I have just had read to me over the telephone a communication from Aramco reporting a conversation which the head of Aramco in Saudi Arabia had with King Faisal, which I think you will be interested in reading. I am enclosing a copy of the message herewith but meanwhile I have asked the Washington Office of Aramco to deliver a copy of it to you this afternoon. 2 I have also received just now a communication from Dr. Calvin Plimpton, President of Amherst College and Chairman of the Board of the American University in Beirut, to the effect that the President of the latter institution (the American University) has asked him to stress with the U.S. Government that any stand by the United States against the Arab position in favor of Israel could have the deepest consequences in prejudicing the good relations between the United States and the Arab world. He referred to the fact that all of the important Christian professors on the University's faculty feel strongly to the same effect. I do not know whether this communication was sent before or after the outbreak this morning, but I am certain that the view of the President of the American University would not be moderated by anything that happened today. Sincerely, Jack 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 SAUD. Exdis. A handwritten note initialed by Assistant Secretary Battle reads, “S—Mr. Borg. Thank you. Will you see that DR acknowledges this.” No acknowledgment was found. McCloy, Chairman of the Ford Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations, was also a board director of Chase Manhattan Bank and the Allied Chemical Company, both of which had investments in Iran. In addition, the Consortium in Iran included a number of McCloy's clients. 2 Not printed. In this June 5 cable from Dhahran, Aramco's R.I. Brougham reported on a conversation with King Faisal that was intended to be a courtesy call after his return from Geneva. Upon arrival, Brougham learned that Egypt had been attacked by Israel. The King, in a very somber mood, said that the issue had been joined and that the Arabs and Israelis could no longer live together—“one side or another must be defeated.” “No direct reference to Aramco nor oil policy but His Majesty has made it perfectly clear that major powers and America in particular must not become involved in conflict on either side because consequences of such involvement on behalf of Israel will leave Arab states no alternative but to take measures against those countries involved in providing such assistance.” 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State 1 Baghdad, June 6, 1967, 2140Z. 2108. 1. According communiquè Oil Ministers' Conference 2 Baghdad June 4–5, unanimously passed two resolutions declaring (A) “Arab oil shall be denied to and shall not be allowed reach directly or indirectly countries committing aggression or participating in aggression on sovereignty of any Arab state or its territories or its territorial waters, particularly Gulf Aqaba,” and (B) “involvement any country, directly or indirectly in armed aggression against Arab states will make assets of its companies and nationals inside territories of Arab countries subject to laws war. This includes assets of oil companies.” 2. Conference also (A) recommended creation permanent committee Arab Foreign Ministers meet on 48-hour notice discuss what new attitudes might be classed as hostile to Arab nation; (B) recommended emergency meeting Arab states to enforce resolution in respect to all assets invested by companies, nationals of aggressor countries; (C) warned all foreign petroleum companies operating in Arab countries of consequences of supplying oil to Israel regardless its origin and whether this done directly or indirectly or in cooperation with others. Said companies would thus be liable have rules standard boycott law enforced against them; (D) considers signing any declaration affecting sovereignty Arab states over Gulf Aqaba will be act warranting banning tankers of signatory countries from transporting Arab oil; (E) stated committee Oil Ministers Arab producing countries “shall be formed to adopt necessary resolution”; (F) called on all Islamic and friendly oil producing countries, especially Iran, to take necessary steps to prevent oil from reaching Israel in any way. 3 Duncan 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 ARAB. Unclassified. Repeated to Algiers, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tripoli, and Basra. 2 On May 28 the Iraqi Cabinet decided to ban oil shipments to any country that joined in “Israeli aggression.” The Cabinet also decided to convene a conference of Arab oil producers in Baghdad to coordinate action. (Telegram 2029 from Baghdad, May 29; ibid., POL 27 ARAB–ISR) Invitees included the United Arab Republic, Syria, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar. Iraq also sent copies of the Council resolution to the Embassies of Iran and Indonesia. According to telegram 2037 from Baghdad, May 31, “Foreign Ministry also reportedly soliciting support of Venezuela for resolution.” (Ibid., PET 17–1 ARAB) 3 The complete text of the communiquè is in airgram A–804 from Baghdad, June 6. (Ibid., PET 2 ARAB) 233. Editorial Note 233. Editorial Note On June 5, 1967, war broke out between Israel and the United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan. At 7:40 a.m. on June 6, Radio Cairo began broadcasting the charge that U.S. aircraft had participated in the Israeli attacks. (Telegram 8565 from Cairo, June 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) The same day, Iraq was the first to announce that the flow of oil to the United States and the United Kingdom was cut off in light of “military assistance to the enemy,” and called on the other Arab oil producers to follow through on their resolutions of the previous day (see Document 232 ). When the Charge denied the charge, the Iraqis said that the information about U.S.-U.K. intervention had come from the UAR and Syria. The Embassy commented: “In this whole tortured business, this is possibly kind of action President Aref might take to protect oil installations of Iraq. We had been in touch privately with certain government officials earlier who have indicated they powerless deal with allegation of US involvement since all actions on this score clearly coordinated and linked with Cairo.” (Telegram 2099 from Baghdad, June 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 IRAQ) Aramco officials in Saudi Arabia also urged Oil Minister Yamani to issue a statement stressing Aramco's cooperation to prevent sabotoge. “Yamani confirmed SAG aware U.S. and British have not been aggressors but must await appropriate time to acknowledge publicly.” (Aramco cable of June 8, transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Saunders to Bundy, June 8; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, NSC Special Committee Memos—McGeorge Bundy) Also on June 6, according to oil company sources in Kuwait, the Kuwaiti Government insisted on immediate take-over of shipping communications and was preparing to prevent shipment of oil to the United Kingdom and United States. The oil companies did not, however, expect that their assets would be confiscated. The Kuwaiti Government, the Embassy concluded, would “prefer that we not evacuate.” (Telegram 1262 from Kuwait City, June 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 KUWAIT) Two days later, the Embassy reported that the “Amir expressed pride in GOK 'cleverness' in demonstrating its Arabism by prompt and full cooperation. By cutting off oil shipments to US–UK, sabotage had been averted. He hoped oil cut-off would be temporary and have minimum bad effect on Kuwait.” (Telegram 1286 from Kuwait City, June 8; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Kuwait) Despite compliance with the embargo, which was announced on June 7, the Libyan Government voiced similar sentiments: “GOL desires operators and experts to stand fast in Libya to reopen production and export when that becomes feasible.” (Telegram 1136 from Tripoli, June 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA) Documentation on U.S. policy with regard to the Arab-Israeli war and the charges of U.S. involvement is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XIX . 234. Letter From the Manager of the Government Relations Department, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Finlay) to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources (Moore) 234. Letter From the Manager of the Government Relations Department, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Finlay) to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources (Moore) 1 New York, June 8, 1967. My Dear Mr. Moore: We have received word from London that pressures are developing in Europe for the establishment of a petroleum industry advisory group to work directly with the OECD Oil Committee 2 in handling petroleum supply problems arising out of the present difficulties in the Middle East. As I pointed out at the April 19, 1967 meeting of the OECD Petroleum Advisory Committee in Washington, the American oil companies have no legal sanction for effective collaboration in emergencies of this sort except through the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee, which was established under Section 708 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and which gives the participants the protection under the antitrust laws and Federal Trade Commission Act provided by that Section. As you know, the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee was used as the vehicle for American industry collaboration in meeting the Suez crisis of 1956–57. A Plan of Action was drawn up on August 10, 1956 and amended on November 30, 1956 (with Attorney General approval on December 3, 1956), under which the Middle East Emergency Committee was established and authorized, within the limitations set forth in the Plan of Action, to deal with foreign agencies and foreign industry committees in meeting the emergency. Coordination across the Atlantic was effected through the dealings of the Middle East Emergency Committee with these three European industry advisory committees: first, the British-organized Oil Supply Advisory Committee (OSAC); next, the British, French and Dutch-organized Oil Emergency London Advisory Committee (OELAC); and, finally, following the closure of the Suez Canal and the IPC pipelines, the OEEC-organized OEEC Petroleum Emergency Group (OPEG). In each case, the activities of the Middle East Emergency Committee were approved by the Administrator or Director of the Voluntary Agreement Relating to Foreign Petroleum Supply and were thus brought within the protection of that agreement. I am sure that the question of industry collaboration with the OECD will be discussed, or more likely is already being discussed, at the governmental level. 3 I would, therefore, like to urge your assistance in insisting on the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee route as the vehicle for American industry collaboration. Our lawyers frankly tell us that there is no other means, short of new Congressional legislation, that would provide the necessary antitrust clearance for effective American industry collaboration in the event that the present crisis is not eliminated through a quick political solution. Yours very truly, Luke W. Finlay 4 1 Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET 3 Orgs and Confs,OECD Oil Committee, April, May, June 1967. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon and John Oliver. 2 Once the Europeans activated the OECD emergency procedure, the agreements provided for the establishment of an International oil industry advisory committee which would act as the mechanism for international oil industry cooperation. See footnote 3, Document 230 . 3 Proposals for an Anglo-American company committee were not approved by the State and Interior Departments. “Existence such committee virtually certain to become known in international oil industry and through industry by governments. Knowledge on part of OECD members existence Anglo-American company organization might generate suspicion US and UK not forthcoming re capability those companies to provide petroleum Western Europe and Japan with potential danger that individual OECD members might be encouraged to take separate actions to procure greater POL supplies.” The State Department did say that such a proposal would be reconsidered later “in event OECD organization found not to function satisfactorily in the oil crisis.” (Telegram 210030 to London, June 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 1 OECD) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Finlay signed the original. 235. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of the Interior Udall 235. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of the Interior Udall 1 Washington, June 8, 1967. Dear Mr. Secretary: Recent developments affecting the United States access to foreign sources of crude oil have clear implications for the national security. 2 In the past few days the Governments of Algeria, Kuwait and Bahrein have prohibited the export of petroleum to the United States or to the United Kingdom. The Government of Iraq has ordered the Iraq Petroleum Company to cease operations. The Trans Arabian Pipeline of the Arabian American Oil Company has been closed, as has the Suez Canal. The Libyan Government has ordered foreign oil companies to cease operations. The denial of petroleum from these sources creates an oil supply emergency and adversely affects the capability of the United States and our allies to meet our security responsibilities. I consider that this situation calls for the initiation of emergency procedures to ensure that adequate supplies of petroleum continue to be available. 3 Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 12–3 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by M. Chaplin (E/OR/FSE) on June 7 and cleared by Solomon, Oliver (FSE), Hinton (EUR), and Patman (L/E). 2 A provision of the Defense Production Act of 1950 authorized the President to take into account the oil supply situations of allies and friendly countries in determining the national security of the United States. 3 On June 10 Assistant Secretary of the Interior J. Cordell Moore announced that “a petroleum emergency exists which threatens the broad security interests of the United States.” The decision was concurred in by the Departments of State and Defense and the Office of Emergency Planning. (Circular telegram 210177, June 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 12–3 US) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 236. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 236. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 9, 1967, 1621Z. 20041. Ref: (A) Paris 19995, (B) Paris 20012. 2 Subj: Emergency Session OECD Oil Committee. 1. Jordan, in charge of petroleum matters in economic section of Foreign Office, informed us that late this morning on his telephoned instructions French Embassy in London asked British Foreign Office to propose to OECD Oil Committee Chairman Beckett postponement of special session now scheduled for June 12. Jordan said that French proposal was prompted by publicity given to meeting in this morning's Financial Times (story out of Paris), and fear that this would cause Arab oil exporting countries to generalize their embargo now limited to US and UK. He said that French believed it was in interest of all countries concerned, including US and UK, to avoid such generalization, since it was obvious that if some countries could go on obtaining Middle East oil, this would make it possible to rearrange supply patterns in way that would maximize scarcities. Moreover, request for postponement did not mean France was attempting to go back on commitments which she had taken re petroleum supply in OECD framework. Hordan said France was not alone in her viewpoint, which was shared at least by Dutch. 2. We asked Jordan if he had as yet any indication of British reaction to his proposal. He replied Foreign Office had commented merely that it seemed very late hour for calling off meeting scheduled to convene on Monday. Jordan did not know reactions of Beckett, but expected that he would be getting [garble]in next few hours. We asked Jordan whether if meeting took place despite French proposal for postponement, French representative would attend. He was clearly not prepared for this question, and said merely that no decision in this regard had yet been made. 3. Jordan reiterated at several points that he wanted us to know that French suggestion in no way signified unwillingness on their part to cooperate with other Western countries in meeting any emergency petroleum situation that might arise out of Middle East crisis. He said that Giraud, Directeur des Carburants, already had appointments for bilateral consultations in Paris on Monday with petroleum officials of several other countries, and French very much favored such consultations. Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and The Hague and passed to the White House and USIA. 2 Telegram 19995, June 8, is ibid., PET 12–2 FR; telegram 20012, June 9 is ibid., PET 3 OECD. 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State 1 Algiers, June 9, 1967, 2220Z. 4052. Esso Situation. 1. Esso, like other US companies, now being administered by Algerian director. Esso reports that its director is operating in a significantly different way from those with other companies and believes it being singled out for unfavorable and discriminatory treatment. 2. As Embassy reported some weeks ago, Esso already believed it singled out for salami tactics takeover. Company now believes that present situation will eventually be tantamount to a de facto expropriation without formal action by GOA. 3. Esso manager cites following as examples discriminatory treatment: A) Esso manager denied all outside communications within and without country. Telephones cut off and mail censored. He not permitted take papers from office. B) Today forced to open his personal safe at gunpoint. C) Esso station at Algiers airport has been seized by Sonatrach 2 and is now being repainted as Sonatrach station. Station itself is not Esso property, but much Esso equipment was in it. When challenged as to legality this action, Algerian director in apparent slip of tongue said it would be settled in later litigation. D) Algerian director appears to be operating under control of marketing division of Sonatrach. 4. Esso manager has protested and will continue to protest that Algerian director is exceeding his authority in order to protect legal position of company, plans send repeated protests to relevant ministries to establish a record. 5. UGTA is supporting American management since union apparently feels that unlimited authority Algerian director will allow him to ruin company and seems fear that GOA takeover will leave UGTA in position of docile union in govt enterprises. Jernegan 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 15–2 ALGERIA. Limited Official Use. 2 Algeria's national oil entity. 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State 1 Kuwait City, June 10, 1967, 2325Z. 1304. Ref: State 210122. 2 1. Amir proposes Bedu chicanery by changing manifests to permit tankers to carry oil to UK or US. 3 Ambassador Arthur thinks this ruse once discovered may lead to public demand for stronger action against companies and that Amir would be obliged to act. I also consider it risky. 2. Inasmuch as Gulf sells most of its share KOC crude to Shell the problem is essentially a UK one in first instance. Amb Arthur was told by Amir several days ago and made arrangements with UK Foreign Office about secrecy which I think should be revised to bring KOC Director Lee into act for consultation at once. 3. Arthur promised cable my views London and I agreed to leave it UK to tell us in Washington and/or London on need-to-know basis. Hope you will deal with it that way in first instance. 4 Seems to me there is time to deal this way. Cottam 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Passed to the White House. 2 Not found. 3 Ambassador Cottam's earlier reports of his meeting with the Amir were restrained, and he declined to commit the details to paper until he had spoken with his British counterpart. (Telegram 1299 from Kuwait City, June 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Kuwait; and telegram 1303 from Kuwait City, June 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 ARAB) 4 On June 14 the Department suggested that the Ambassador not raise the issue with the Amir. “Should he inquire you authorized tell him on personal basis you think suggestion might have number real problems.” The Americans left the British to deal with BP and Shell. (Telegram 210928 to Kuwait City, June 14; ibid.) The next day a British Foreign Office source told the Embassy in London that both companies felt such a move would be a mistake. “FonOff indicated its own concurrence in this view saying this matter of prudence rather than ethics, but noting also that effort at deception, particularly with flags, would raise number of difficult questions concerning maritime law and insurance. Without specific reference to Kuwait situation, Esso, Mobil and Gulf London reps indicated their view that companies should follow closely destination advice of Middle East governments.” (Telegram 10390 from London, June 15; ibid.) 239. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 239. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 1 Tripoli, June 11, 1967, 1200Z. 21. Libyan Oil Sitrep—June 10 and 11. 1. Petroleum Minister Khaliifah Muusa departed morning June 11 for Baida, where he hopes to convince Prime Minister Hussain Maaziq to allow resumption of production and export to countries other than U.S. and U.K. According to Esso Libya President Hugh Wynne (protect source) Muusa was surprised on his return from Baghdad to learn GOL had banned totally all production and exports, thus going beyond scope of Baghdad resolution which banned exports only to countries aiding Israel. 2 2. To best Embassy's knowledge, there has been no destruction yet of oil installations, and expatriate staff at least are standing by. Operations apparently could be resumed within hours of GOL approval. 3. Morning June 10 bomb thrown into Tripoli warehouse of Geophysical Service International (GSI). There were no personal injuries, but valuable seismic records were destroyed. 4. Saturday (June 10) most oil company offices in Tripoli reopened for business. Libyan absenteeism higher than previous, but union has ordered Libyans return to work on Monday. Newsom 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for OECD, Dhahran, Jidda, and Kuwait City. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 2 See Document 232 . 240. Editorial Note 240. Editorial Note On June 10, 1967, Kuwaiti oil workers began a strike that completely shut down AMINOIL, the Getty subsidiary, and partially closed the Kuwait Oil Company. (Telegram 1305 from Kuwait City, June 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 ARAB) Embassy officials were convinced that the Kuwaiti Government had no prior knowledge of the oil workers' actions. Although the Kuwaitis did not acknowledge it, rumors circulated of an imminent meeting of oil-producing Gulf states in Kuwait itself. (Telegram 1306 from Kuwait City, June 11; ibid.) That same day, June 10, Aramco's Brougham met in Dhahran with Yamani who explained that an Iraqi delegation had arrived after meeting with government representatives in Kuwait. According to Brougham's account, the pro-Nasserite Iraqis were urging oil producing countries to use “vigorous measures,” including nationalization if necessary; Yamani believed that using the companies as “friendly instruments” was a preferable alternative. Iraq agreed to join Kuwait and Saudi Arabia at a meeting in Kuwait with oil executives the following day. Yamani then said that “he would probably do most of talking for the government side and would probably make a number of harsh statements to the company representatives. It would then be my [Brougham's] cue vigorously defend Aramco and history of its relations with SAG and recent example our successful effort to intercede with USG.” After detailing the points that Brougham should make, “Yamani suggested at this point I offer to urge USG through our shareholders to use their best efforts to see that Israel does not gain from its recent aggression.” Yamani urged Brougham to cable promptly so that the United States would have time to respond: “I know your government willing give this assurance. I am just trying to find a way for the oil companies to get credit for having produced it and thus prove that companies are friendly instruments.” (Aramco cable PC 7683 from Dhahran, June 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Economic [2 of 2]) On June 11 U.S. Embassy officials were summoned to a meeting with oil company executives and the Oil Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait. As spokesman, Yamani conveyed the bitterness of his colleagues “against US, UK and French Governments as a result of recent ME hostilities and the resulting danger to investments nationals of these governments in ME countries.” He said: “We expect from you a real sincere effort with your governments to the extent that they take positive action to stop Israel from gaining anything from their attack, go back to the original border line and nothing to be imposed on the Arabs as a permanent settlement.” (Telegram 1319 from Kuwait City, June 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) Brougham commented that “Meeting followed script outlined PC 7683 almost exactly.” (Aramco cable PC 7689 from Dhahran, June 11; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Economic [2 of 2]) Through British sources, the Embassy in London reported that a similar ultimatum had been delivered in Baghdad to the chief representative of the Iraq Petroleum Company: “The oil companies should make representations to the British, American, and French Governments that they should oblige Israel to withdraw behind the borders which existed before fighting started on 5 June. Until this objective is achieved Iraq together with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab producing countries will continue the suspension of oil exports.” (Telegram 10336 from London, June 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 IRAQ) By the end of the day on June 11, Ambassador Cottam was less certain that the Amir and his government had been surprised by the labor strike: “Today's strike was contrived by GOK to exert maximum pressure on KOC and Aramco representatives who met with Kuwaiti, Saudi and Iraqi petroleum ministers this morning.…More speculative is my belief that Kuwaitis and Saudis acted in collusion to convince their Iraqi colleague of their complete willingness sacrifice oil in Arab cause, knowing that report of meeting would reach Aref and Nasser very soon. Iraqi left for Baghdad shortly after meeting. Kuwaitis and Saudis may be trying extremely delicate and dangerous game of proving their Arabism and at same time not jeopardizing their long-range interest in keeping oil flowing.” (Telegram 1322 from Kuwait City, June 11; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Kuwait) On June 12 representatives of Gulf Oil Corporation, part owner of the Kuwait Oil Company, met with State Department officials as Yamani had requested. The assessment of one Gulf Oil official “was that neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia wanted to shut off oil shipments but that they were both worried about the stability of their regimes if they were not seen to be responding to popular feeling.” (Memorandum of conversation, June 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, POL 2 KUW) 241. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 241. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 12, 1967, 2216Z. 20116. CEDTO. Subj: OECD Oil Committee. 1. Session opened with supply sitrep by Chairman (growing out of pre-session caucus US, UK and Dutch dels). 2 France immediately took floor next with strong intervention expressing displeasure meeting called and noting particular concern over “excessive” press coverage. Further stated France felt Mid-East situation should not give us great concern at present and opposed Chairman's suggestion that agenda include item on action needed. 2. Noting fluidity of situation chair passed on to round table contributions by members in order round out supply picture. US del (Asst. Secy Interior Moore) presented statement noting our desire cooperate in assessing situation and participate in any plan action commonly agreed upon by committee. At same time we informed group of our plan of action and made clear while we would wish include provisions for company level cooperation between our firms and foreign companies, committee resolution recognizing emergency or threat of emergency—plus council approval—prerequisite. 3. Netherlands led off for group supporting action by committee to invoke all or part of existing emergency procedures—particularly bringing industry officially on board ASAP—with backing by Sweden, US, UK, Germany and Canada. Several dels, including Spain, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium, Denmark and Norway took rather complacent view, noting satisfaction with own stock levels and present general supply situation, but indicated willingness to cooperate. Japan and Greece had received no instructions. France expressed general agreement with idea industry participation as advocated by Dutch but again insisted no decision should be taken at present session. Several dels expressed desire keep out of press results committee deliberations whatever was decided. Piga, Vice Chairman and member Italian del, summarized situation at end general discussion, accused some countries too complacent, and called for bringing industry on board immediately. Belgium countered by suggesting watchdog group to follow developing situation and keep committee up-to-date with daily sitreps. Chair suggested adjournment until afternoon to allow dels to digest info and suggestions so far presented. At this point French, who had been in frequent telephonic contact with ministries, essentially withdrew from session by announcing they would attend afternoon session as observers only. After procedural ruling by Secretariat against observer status, France returned p.m. session as dels but did not participate in debate. 4. Chair opened re-convened session by tabling three options 3 which in his opinion open to group (reported septel) and challenged any del accept third alternative he colorfully described as simply sitting on our bottoms and doing nothing. With French silent, no del advocated do-nothing course and remainder afternoon spent serious discussion which of two remaining alternatives to accept. (Comedy relief provided by drunken Belgian del who frequently intervened to note Belgium small country but great nation and willing cooperate. Sweden del recommended first option, calling on Council to approve partial activation emergency machinery by creating industry advisory group. US del (Hinton) strongly supported Swedes and clearly outlined situation, including fact two-thirds Mid East oil as of now unavailable. Also called on members (1) not to waste insurance afforded by reserve stocks and (2) urged all dels take into account in forming decision fact it much easier for us all to take common action now rather than trying amend later US action plan implemented without provision for working directly with European companies. Noted key point for us to be able do so this stage is resolution by committee recognizing emergency element in present situation. 5. After considerable discussion, most dels, including Japanese who had received new instructions, lined up behind idea activating Industry Advisory Group. Only vocal active opposition was from Greeks who disclaimed ability receive instructions in less than week, at same time echoing chairman's suggestion decision be taken only after consultation with governments. Small drafting group composed Secretariat and interested dels to meet ten o'clock tomorrow, June 13, with committee re-convening at 2:30. Chairman appears determined get decision tomorrow in order refer final resolution to Excomm scheduled for June 15 and thereafter to Council. Trezise 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to The Hague, London, Ottawa, Rome, Tokyo, Ankara, Athens, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Reykjavik, Stockholm, and Vienna. Passed to the White House and USIA. 2 The three nations represented the largest oil companies in the world, known as the “Seven Sisters.” 3 The three options were to set up an Industry Advisory Committee, to rely on inter-governmental discussions, or to take no action at all. (Memorandum of conversation, June 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 1 OECD) 242. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 242. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, June 12, 1967. SUBJECT Walter Levy's Oil Assessment 2 Even though I agree with the chamber of horrors that Walter has predicted as being possible in the event of total oil denial, I doubt that total oil denial will materialize, or that even the current oil denial program will continue in the same intensity. The most likely outcome to develop during the next few days will be the assumptions of Case 2 or possibly even Case 3 in the attached paper (as distinguished from Case 1 of total Arab oil denial). In other words, even with the closure of the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean pipelines and a total denial of oil from Iraq and with a denial to US and UK destinations of oil from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, the shortfall in European and Japanese needs will be quite manageable. The tanker problem, a component of this shortfall, would be the more significant factor but I also assume that the Suez Canal will not be kept closed for more than a few weeks since the Soviets, as well as the rest of the world, will probably bring private if not public pressures to reopen (Soviet tankers and freighters carrying supplies to North Vietnam would have to be almost doubled in number with the Canal closed). If the shortfall in Europe and Japan is manageable and if the OECD Oil Committee contingency arrangements are activated, the dangers of side deals by Italian, French, Japanese and other companies with the Arabs are considerably reduced even though the Middle Eastern crisis might very well push the Italian/Iraqi negotiations to a successful conclusion. I might live to regret this more optimistic prediction but I felt you should have these views in view of Walter's feelings on the other side. 1 Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET 2 Middle East Department Memorandums 1967. Confidential. The date is handwritten on the source text. A copy was sent to Eugene Rostow. 2 This undated 5-page assessment of the oil situation, plus two annexes, was attached to the source text under a June 12 covering memorandum from Levy to Katzenbach. Levy speculated that the loss of oil exports for a significant time would not only result in “unmanageable” shortages for the West, but would also cause political instability in the Middle East oil producing states. He believed that the cessation of oil supplies was the only tool left to the Arabs and that they and their Soviet backers would not hesitate to use it. Sequestration and/or confiscation of U.S.-U.K. production facilities would be a real possibility. The political unity of the West would splinter, Levy felt, with a tendency for smaller nations to deal directly with the Arab states instead of looking to oil companies for oil. “While we must obviously try to maintain as long as possible a united political and oil front of the free world, we might, if the crisis should not cease very soon, have to decide whether our longer-term interests would not be better served by either closing our eyes to side deals or trying to handle such arrangements on an agreed upon common basis, say through some machinery of OECD which might provide for some ultimate responsibility to an organized group of countries and to the US and British owners of the oil concessions.” 243. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 243. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 1 Tripoli, June 15, 1967, 1900Z. 138. Subject: Discussion with Libyan Petroleum Minister. During cordial conversation with Econ Counselor and EmbOff morning June 15, Petroleum Minister Muusa made following points. 1. GOL policy banning all exports remains unchanged, despite diplomatic representations by Spain, France, Italy, and West Germany. Contrary to his remarks to Ambassador June 12 (Baida 593) and to OIC Baida prior to meeting Prime Minister Maaziq June 13, Muusa gave no indication that he expects any change in near future. Muusa stated that he had been unsuccessful at June 13 meeting in winning any special consideration for waxy crudes (Tripoli 78). 2. GOL has been kept fully informed about recent meeting in Kuwait of Saudi, Iraqi, and Kuwaiti Oil Ministers and their approaches to oil companies for diplomatic support. GOL has not yet exerted pressure through oil companies, partly because large number (about 40) here. 2 3. Discussing earlier meeting in Baghdad of all Arab Oil Ministers, Muusa emphasized that Baghdad meeting did not identify states aiding Israel militarily and thus subject to export ban. To date, there has been no joint Arab decision on this point, 3 despite recent parallel decisions by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Muusa revealed that second major Baghdad resolution (possible confiscation of oil companies owned by nationals of such states) was proposed by Iraq and Algeria; supported by UAR; and opposed by Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Muusa claimed he told Baghdad meeting that Algeria wanted to confiscate non-French companies anyway and this resolution was merely pretext. 4 4. In general, Muusa indicated GOL willingness to coordinate oil policy with certain “producers,” in which category he clearly included Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and clearly excluded Syria and UAR. In reply to question, Muusa stated that there no present plans for another meeting of Oil Ministers, although there possibility of direct contacts during Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuwait June 17. Muusa not yet sure whether he will be included in GOL delegation. 5. Muusa would not be drawn out on Libyan work stoppage. While he did not seem to condone stoppage, he implied that vigorous GOL opposition not indicated at present, another apparent shift from an earlier position. Newsom 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for OECD, Baida, Beirut, Jidda, and Kuwait. Passed to the White House, CIA, USIA, DOD, NSA, COMAC, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 2 See Document 240 regarding the approach to the companies by the oil producers. The Embassy reported that later in the afternoon of June 15, the first hints surfaced that the oil companies in Libya would be asked to exert pressure on Western governments because of “tremendous pressure” from UAR and the Libyan man-in-the-street. “This comes within hours after Muusa told EmbOffs that GOL did not intend use oil companies as levers against USG. Clearly, Petroleum Ministry was instructed otherwise during afternoon June 15.” Later that same day, the four largest oil companies operating in Libya, Oasis, Esso, Mobil, and Amoseas, were asked to meet with Minister Muusa the following day, June 16. The Embassy did not inform them beforehand of the subject of the meeting. (Telegram 147 from Tripoli, June 15; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 LIBYA) 3 According to an Embassy report, the Libyan Oil Minister told the company representatives on June 16 that “Libya, in contrast to other Arab oil producing countries, had ordered total shutdown of exports in order not to identify without positive proof any country as being involved on the side of Israel in recent conflict.” Muusa also indicated that the “reasonableness of U.S. in resolving this problem could well influence when and to what extent exports will recommence and future relations between Libyan Government and American oil companies operating in Libya.” In conveying the message to the U.S. Government, Esso's parent company, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, stated its concerns: “In view of Jersey's tremendous investments and profit potential here and in other Arab producing countries feel strong approach to state this matter along above lines warranted.” The other oil companies received a similar message from the Minister. (Telegram 187 from Tripoli, June 16; ibid.) 4 On June 19 Algerian President Boumediene called for all Arab producers to cut off petroleum production for one year “to save Arab honor.” (Telegram 4268 from Algiers, June 19; ibid., PET 17–1 ARAB) 244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya 1 Washington, June 16, 1967, 11:41 a.m. 211679. Ref: Tripoli 147. 2 Same request has been made previously of concessionnaires by governments Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Dept has received representations from Aramco, Mobil and Gulf Oil, which companies said they were making in order be able report back that cos did communicate with USG in compliance with requests those govts. Agree that you should not seek out cos to forewarn them; however some co managers (Esso and Mobil particularly) may anticipate the purpose of the Muusa mtg and request your advice prior to call on Minister. If they do you should advise them their response to a demand to pressure USG to support Arab position should be that they can undertake only to report substance of conversation with GOL to the USG. Cos, however, should emphasize to GOL that oil industry does not determine USG foreign policy. In the event cos approach Emb after Muusa mtg you should merely advise them to inform the GOL that its views were presented to USG. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 LIBYA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Oliver on June 16 and cleared by Held (NEA), Post (AFN), and Oliver. Repeated to Paris, London, Kuwait, Jidda, and Dhahran. 2 See footnote 2, Document 243 . 245. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 245. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, June 17, 1967, 5:25 p.m. 212280. CEDTO. Subj: Council Consideration of Oil Committee Report—June 20. 2 Ref: Paris 20251. 3 1. In Council and pre-Council negotiations of decision on oil, you should bear in mind our conviction that emergency does in fact exist ultimate seriousness of which we cannot judge, but it almost certainly involves necessity for effective coordinated use free world tanker fleet and may ultimately require apportionment measures. 2. We would hope as companies provide more information on oil supply situation to officials host governments potential seriousness will be clearer to them. We are pleased to note German position seems to be moving in right direction. There also some indication Japanese movement. 3. Begin FYI. Our objectives are: a To avoid position of demandeur while protecting U.S. interest in health free world economy and position of Anglo-American oil companies both in producing and distributing areas. We are concerned at danger of nationalization or take over both in Arab world and in European markets. b Staying as close as possible to existing OECD plan both because it provides agreed rules and because those rules exempt U.S. from apportionment formula. End FYI. c Establishing International Industry Advisory group as soon as possible with mandate that would permit it to advise Oil Committee on use of available tanker capacity. We think Europeans should share our concern that mere study exercise will lose us all valuable time. d To obtain recognition that emergency exists in order to facilitate decision that will permit American companies to participate actively in International Industry Advisory group. This last objective is derived from domestic U.S. requirements and unfortunately it appears to conflict with European, especially French, interest, in avoiding action which allegedly might stimulate irrational Arab reaction. To extent OECD agrees on common approach as a precautionary measure, however, we would hope likelihood of irrational Arab reaction may decline. Moreover, supply shortfall is likely to be greater without an agreed plan of action, and impact would fall unevenly on European countries. 4. If, in your soundings of other delegations prior Council meeting, you find major opposition to setting up Industry Advisory group closely linked to C(60)83 Final, 4 Council consideration could perhaps be kept essentially exploratory. If another country wishes delay Council meeting for short period this could be accepted. In our view both time and the information which should become available to governments are working towards adoption recommendation 3(a) in Oil Committee report although we recognize French for own reasons may continue to obstruct. 5. It is most important that Council action be based on 1960 arrangements because of allocation aspects of plan. We consider it certain that pressures for U.S. participation in allocation mechanism would be greater under approach not connected to 1960 agreements than under implementation of 1960 agreements, which are European arrangement from which U.S. is exempted. Moreover, advantage of allocating under previously agreed rules is an important one. 6. U.S. Defense Production Act and relevant provisions of Voluntary Agreement concluded pursuant thereto require that emergency situation exist which affects or threatens to affect adversely the defense mobilization interests or programs of the U.S. before U.S. companies can participate in concerted action otherwise inconsistent with anti-trust law, including participation in international industry advisory body to be set up by OECD. Since direct effect of present disruptions of oil supply falls mainly on European countries rather than on U.S., clear statement that Europeans agree emergency situation exists is highly important to support giving of authority to U.S. companies to engage in cooperative efforts. Conversely, indication that they doubt seriousness of present situation makes it nearly impossible to support conclusion that US faces emergency threatening its security interests. 7. We therefore need as clear indication as Europeans willing give that they consider present interruptions of normal petroleum supplies constitute emergency. For this purpose, following are possibilities in order of preference: a Statement that action setting up industry advisory body is being undertaken in response to existence of emergency. b Statement that action setting up industry advisory body is being undertaken in response to existence of supply disruption which adversely affects or threatens to affect security of OECD members. c Implicit agreement that adverse effects or threat exists by reference to documents (such as C(60)83 Final or para 3a document contained in Paris 20158) 5 that provide for actions by OECD in event of emergency. 8. In any of these cases, acceptability of wording to U.S. depends, at least for purposes of Tuesday Council meeting, also on explicit reference to 1960 arrangements and, of course, on provision for establishment international advisory group. 9. If other members agree on wording acceptable in terms paras (7) and (8), you may accept. If such wording provides that U.S. companies would necessarily participate in international industry advisory body, you may accept ad referendum or reserve, approval to be given when it certain U.S. companies will legally be able participate. If wording not acceptable in terms paras (7) and (8), you should seek delay or, if impossible postpone decision without giving appearance U.S. obstructionism, you should abstain. 10. We believe there will be considerable pressure on French to agree as major countries such as Germany and Italy realize that, while France might be able maintain her own supply, she is unlikely to be of any real assistance to them. If French were to abstain from Council decisions, we assume that under rules of procedure way could be found for others to implement industry advisory group and for group to be effective even without French. We prefer French abstention on decision implementing first part of OECD emergency plan to either sui generis study group idea or French multi-subgroup idea (Paris 20299) 6 in any form which would separate out “guilty” countries (U.S. and U.K.) from all or most other OECD members. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 1 OECD. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Percival and Rogers (EUR/RPE); cleared by Oliver (E/FSE), Patman (L/E), and Moore (Interior); and approved by Solomon. Repeated to all other OECD capitals. 2 See Document 241 regarding the drafting of this report. The report has not been found. 3 Dated June 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 1 OECD) 4 Reference is to the original OECD decision document on cooperation during an oil crisis which was agreed in 1960; see footnote 3, Document 230 . Document 241 details the actual 1967 OECD proposals. 5 Dated June 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD) 6 Dated June 16. (Ibid.) 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, June 19, 1967, 9:19 p.m. 212733. NATUS, CEDTO. Subject: Discussion of Oil Situation with FRG Economic Minister. 2 1. Under Secretary Rostow discussed the oil situation at length with FRG Economic Minister Schiller on June 19. Rostow told Schiller it was important that arrangements be worked out in OECD for declaration of emergency or threat of emergency in order to allow U.S. to permit companies to cooperate to meet oil situation. Also said it was important that agreement be reached on Industry Committee. 2. Schiller said he was becoming more and more concerned. He had seen German press reports of rumors of rationing coming out of Paris. He had earlier been operating on assurances from companies that stocks were adequate. He now sees danger of a run on supplies in the FRG. Rostow said the question now was cooperation between producers to arrange for efficient use of tankers. OECD not talking of allocation or rationing and we hope it will not have to. Cooperation between Europe and the US is necessary, in order to minimize impact of any shortfall in Europe. 3. Schiller said he saw declaration of emergency as connected with US antitrust laws and not a concern for Europe. Then entered into lengthy diatribe saying foreign oil companies had through rough competitive methods taken over German energy market and now had a responsibility to meet their commitments, from Western Hemisphere sources if necessary. Should it become necessary to go ahead with national energy policy in FRG (which French had already suggested), everyone would be faced with an entirely new situation in the energy field. 4. Rostow said possibility of increasing supplies from Western Hemisphere could be one item for discussion in industry advisory group. Schiller expressed strong reservations on adverse effect on Arab oil deliveries if faced with optical collaboration of Western consumers. He favored something less apparent. Rostow impressed on him that Western cohesion would have a beneficial effect on conservative oil producers since it would strengthen their hand in arguing that Nasser was damaging Arab interests and would show that hard Arab line not likely to succeed. On the other hand if we do not have a common stand, we will be picked off one by one. Added that convening of industry group hardly likely to be major political event, either way. 5. FRG Economics State Secretary Schoellhorn said FRG could accept any of three proposed approaches to question but wanted to work out something satisfactory to both US and France. Schiller said he was concerned both with domestic impact in FRG and also with impact on Arabs. He said FRG in very weak position. He could not say what cabinet would decide, but he favored second alternative because of domestic and Arab reaction. He reiterated his view that companies who conquer market must accept responsibilities. If not, everyone is going to say FRG must move in French direction. This would be a point of no return. FRG must have oil however much he personally opposed action by Government. He feared this entire process will escalate to rationing, controls and Government intervention. 6. Rostow concluded by saying that threat in crisis not to US but to Europe. We are ready to do our part by joining in contingency planning. This seems to us only simple prudence. If Germany and other OECD members believe there is no real danger we hope they are right. But should Iraq and above all Libya—which is in bad political shape—remain closed down, there will be a serious problem. Need to reroute tankers around Cape plus failure to act so far mean that effective European stocks not much over 30 days. For Bonn: We are disturbed by Schiller's tone and views. If crisis persists we will need to get to German Government to overcome this narrow approach. Appreciate your views on how best to do so. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by E. Crowley (EUR/GER) on June 19; cleared by Akins (E/OR/FSE), Puhan (EUR/GER), McCall (S/S), Springsteen (EUR), and Rostow. Also sent to Paris and London. Printed from an unsigned copy. 2 Schiller's views were also summarized in a memorandum from Akins to Enders, June 19. (Ibid., POL 7 GERW) 3 The oil companies were also trying to get the German Government to modify its views so they would be in a better position to respond to the crisis. On June 19 Mobil Oil in London reported that it had again instructed its German affiliate to “urge on German Government existence of emergency situation.” (Telegram 10473 from London, June 19; ibid., PET 3 OECD) 247. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 247. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 1 Tripoli, June 22, 1967, 0905Z. 288. Ref: State 213238. 2 1. During audience with King June 21, I expressed deep regret that false charges against US and UK of collusion with Israel were threatening significant relationships of mutual value. 3 I mentioned particularly oil and our desire see flow commence. He said stopping production particularly regrettable. He had told government so, but government had said in present situation it best stop production as temporary measure for appearances sake. He said he regretted if government had not consulted first with Ambassadors of countries concerned. 2. King made it plain this is matter he has left to government and, although vital interests involved, he is not, for moment, likely step in. 3. Meanwhile there are reports cabinet, which met June 20, is trying to prepare public for positive decision on oil in near future. Libyan radio has been laying groundwork in broadcast June 20 which stressed degree of Libya's sacrifice in comparison with other oil producing states. Newsom 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and Paris for OECD. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 2 In telegram 213238 to Tripoli, June 20, the Department noted that the Ambassador should specifically mention oil during his meeting with the King: “In your audience with the King, be sure impress upon him our concern at failure to resume oil production and export. We appreciate Libyan statement that they wish avoid singling out US and UK, but it is clearly in interest of Libya resume at least to Western Europe. Of course we would like all exports resume soonest.” (Ibid.) 3 A similar message was passed to the Esso representative for transmission to Libya: “With regard to the charges of aggression levied against the US, the USG has categorically denied the charges and wishes to assure Libya of their complete falseness. Furthermore, the USG has invited an impartial UN investigation of these charges. This invitation has not been taken up, not even by the state that originated the charges.” (Telegram 212867 to Tripoli, June 20; ibid., POL ARAB–US) 248. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 248. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, June 23, 1967, 1205Z. 15121. TOCED. Subject: Oil Supplies and OECD. 1. I am disturbed by what appears to be a continuing tendency on our part to regard the problem of oil supplies for Europe as a European problem which does not immediately affect us and in which we need not share. The instructions to our delegation in Paris (most recently expressed in State 213850) 2 that we must avoid the application to the US of any apportionment measures is, I believe, evidence that we are pursuing a dangerous course which ignores the clear warnings expressed in our 15025 and 15066. 3 Germany, at least, expects that American and other foreign oil companies will recognize the obligation inherent in their dominant position in the German market, and that they will continue to supply that market, even if this requires changes or dislocations in the normal production and marketing patterns in the US. 4 2. In this context I find it completely unrealistic even to speak of the possibility of everyone going his own way, as indicated in State 214217. 5 I am sure that the American companies involved would also regard this as unrealistic, and would in fact do everything they could to serve their customers as equitably as possible—whether or not freed from the threat of anti-trust action. Obviously they can cooperate better if freed from that threat, however, it is unrealistic to even consider the possibility that our companies could take the cream of profits from their operations in Germany in good times, and not give them their fair share of oil and shipping in time of crisis. 3. Approval of the recently announced plan of the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee 6 is no doubt more important and helpful for them than what we have produced so far in the OECD. Action there, and in relation thereto, has only again put us into conflict with deeply held European political concepts. 4. If the Europeans have not seen through our insistence on references to OECD documents which exempt the United States from apportionment and from sharing the discomforts of an oil shortage, we may yet have to face some uncomfortable moments when they do get wise. I do not understand how the U.S. Government can allow itself to be placed in this position. 5. It is not clear to me either, whether and why in my further discussions with the Germans here, I should be urging them to accept an OECD resolution in terms of “emergency,” which they have made clear they find distasteful. I would want to avoid a situation analogous to that with regard to the maritime declaration, where the Embassy and the Department were out of phase, i.e. the Department was telling the German Embassy that the declaration was still under consideration while we—as was obvious—were telling them it had been overtaken by events. Insofar as I understand the issues, a U.S. Government finding that an emergency situation exists with respect to the supply and transport of oil should be sufficient to meet our U.S. anti-trust problem. If this is so, we should let the companies then get on with the job, and give them every encouragement and help to meet their obligations in Europe—as they will from the standpoint of their own interests very much wish to do—without prolonging further politically divisive arguments. McGhee 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and Paris. 2 Dated June 21. (Ibid., PET 1 OECD) 3 Dated June 20 and 21, respectively. (Ibid., PET 3 OECD) 4 See Document 246 . 5 Dated June 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 12 FR) 6 Regarding the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee mechanism, see Document 234 . The referenced plan was produced by a committee of 21 major U.S. oil companies and dealt with technical questions of supply and routing. (Telegram 15093 from Bonn, June 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD) 249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, June 24, 1967, 3:12 p.m. 215890. BUSEC; CEDTO; NATUS. Subject: Oil Emergency Actions. Ref: Bonn 15093, 2 Bonn 15121, 3 Paris 20659. 4 1. In answer to your question (para 5 Bonn 15121) we continue think it important you and other key Embassies maintain contact and continue exchange views with host govts as appropriate on oil situation and steps to meet it, but we do not think it desirable for you now to urge them further to take specific line of action in OECD. 2. OECD Council decision has again been postponed, apparently due in large part to German Del's lack of instructions. 5 Council decision now scheduled for June 27. We are reviewing position for June 27 meeting. As stated State 212280, 6 we want to avoid position of demandeur, and we do not, therefore, intend put pressure on FRG or others to take actions we believe in their best interests. Evolving situation may well bring them to conclusion establishment oil industry committee is warranted. Unfortunately, loss of time in reaching conclusion could become significant factor. 3. US Foreign Petroleum Supply Cte has presented proposed plan of action to Secretary of Interior. Plan cannot become effective, and companies cannot legally participate in joint activities either within US or with Europeans, until plan approved by Interior, Office of Emergency Planning and Attorney General. 4. These approvals have not yet been given. Approval requires that each approving agency be persuaded that necessity exists for concerted action in order to prevent adverse effect on US national defense interests. Interior's June 10 determination of emergency is not sufficient by itself. 7 5. Since Europe and Japan, but not US, are directly threatened with supply shortage, their assessment that emergency exists is good supporting evidence for finding that our defense interests are adversely affected. This does not mean US is not involved. We clearly are, because (a) directly affected countries are our allies whose economic health is of major concern to US; (b) US companies supply Europe/Japan; and (c) traditional sources for part of US oil imports have been cut off. 6. We therefore have not said and do not intend say US will not help meet European/Japanese supply problem. We expect cut in US imports from Eastern Hemisphere and perhaps Venezuela will make substantial increased quantities of oil available if they are necessary, and further, the US production will if necessary be increased to permit exports. 7. Question of apportionment is premature, as Europeans have recognized to the point of insistence. Supply of oil to Europe at this moment is primarily function of tanker availabilities rather than oil at shipping points. In fact, production of oil has been slowed by unavailability of tankers to carry it. 8. Thus, rather than trying tackle very difficult and complex apportionment problem now, when it premature, we (like Europeans) believe present focus our activities should be immediate problems of (a) getting best possible (i.e., industry) assessment of current situation, and (b) if, as we believe, assessment shows necessity of using limited tanker capacity with maximum efficiency, establishment as soon as possible of mechanism to do so. 9. We assume US oil companies will make great effort to meet European supply needs regardless of OECD action. However, there is no physical means of doing so if necessary tankers do not exist, and maximum efficiency in tanker use requires organized approach that we think can best be accomplished through OECD industry advisory group. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Rogers (EUR/RPE), cleared by Oliver (E/FSE), Crowley (EUR/GER), Enders (M), Patman (L/E), Moore (Interior), and Solomon. Repeated to Brussels, The Hague, London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo. 2 Dated June 22. (Ibid., PET 3 OECD) 3 Document 248 . 4 Dated June 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 15 OECD) 5 Ambassador Trezise at the OECD reported that the Germans were awaiting the outcome of negotiations in Libya. (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Trezise and Stephen H. Rogers (EUR/RPM), June 19; Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET 3 ORGS & CONFS, OECD Oil Committee) 6 Document 245 . 7 See footnote 3, Document 235 . 250. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 250. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 27, 1967, 1415Z. 20797. Subject: Petroleum: French Intentions in Mideast Crisis. 1) The following is our estimate of current French intentions in the petroleum crisis. 2) One long-time constant in French energy policy is to secure maximum energy independence. This is why France took steps to impose three month storage requirement, build up French flag tanker fleet, and invest heavily in Algerian oil, leaving her in much better position face current crisis than most other European countries. Embassy has previously reported French reluctance, in framing its long-term supply security plans, to take into consideration possible increased US production freeing Venezuelan, Mideast and Canadian oil for Europe. 3) Retention of as much independence as possible appears to be important element in current French attitude. Thus, initial French position special meeting OECD Oil Committee was non-participation, when French supply prospects appeared relatively favorable. French attitude toward cooperation began to change a few days later, when French realized that Libya and Iraq might not resume exports for some time, leaving France with 50 percent normal crude receptions for indefinite period. French appear to realize now that even if Libyan exports do resume in near future it may happen only gradually, and instability in Libya might result in second shut-down. Thus, the limits of French oil independence in current crisis are now clearly visible, and we may hope (unless consideration of high policies intervene) for corresponding degrees of French cooperation in OECD supply plans. 4) Another important element in French attitude of course has been to preserve her existing crude sources in Arab producing countries, particularly Algeria. However, Embassy as yet seen no indication of French intention to go beyond this consideration and use current crisis to poach on US–UK company concessions. Ensor of Mobil Oil regional office London recently called on us to discuss this point. Such an effort is indeed possible particularly on the part of ERAP, whose crude sources still almost exclusively Algerian; ERAP is heavily investing in worldwide oil exploration; ERAP also not as vulnerable to retaliation by the internationals as CFP. However, it is worth noting that from outset of crisis, French petroleum press has rejected “poaching”. Thus, knowledgeable daily bulletin De l'Industrie Petrolliere on June 14 stated French Government had no intention of breaking with other Western powers on petroleum, citing French refusal deal separately with IPC during Syrian pipeline crisis as example of France's recognition of its real interests. Syndicated column by Joseph Alsop that French were after US and British oil elicited reply in Agence Economique et Financiere of June 21 that “According to official circles, 'all that is madness.'” (Brunet said the same to us.) The odds at this point seem against the French undermining legal framework under which their companies have recently attained worldwide crude production greater than internal French consumption, in exchange for a shaky and vulnerable arrangement. 5) French sharing of oil specifically with other EEC countries appears unlikely without full resumption Libyan exports which would result in estimated 85 percent normal French crude receptions. French would then have some scope at least to fill in gaps until situation returned to relative normalcy, in pursuit of France's special petroleum objectives within EEC. ERAP in particular controls much more crude than it has facilities to refine and market in France: in 1966, 17.4 million metric tons of crude production, but only 7.3 million metric tons of products refined and marketed by ERAP. Most of ERAP's excess Algerian crude now sold (under compulsion) to internationals in France at posted price, while the rest exported, mainly to Germany, at considerable discount. Post-Libyan export situation may thus offer ERAP opportunity further to develop crude and product sales in Europe. In any event, French appear likely to use Mideast crisis, and especially problems of US and UK internationals, in arguing that aspects of highly regulated French national petroleum policy be adopted by EEC as part of its common energy policy. Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 12–2 FR. Confidential. Repeated to London and Brussels. 251. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 251. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 27, 1967, 1729Z. 20828. CEDTO. Subject: OECD Oil. 1. Following is text of oil resolution (CES/67.33, with amendments) agreed by Council at today's meeting (non-essential words omitted): Begin text . Council having regard article 2 of Convention on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 14 December 1960; having regard to recommendation of Council of OEEC, approved Council on 30 September 1961 (C (69) 83) Final, OECD/C (61)5): instructs Special Committee for Oil: (1) convene international industry advisory body to inform Special Committee for Oil on technical matters relating to availability oil for member countries; (2) report to Council ASAP on any prospective shortfall in supplies as compared with the estimated level of consumption in member countries. End text . 2. As expected, FRG and France abstained, with Germany expressing hope its decision would not prevent others from proceeding with work. 2 Greece and Belgium needed final instructions from capitals in light FRG position. Portugal accepted ad ref and Turkey abstained pending review amended text by GOT. All others accepted resolution quoted above. Resolution to become effective soon as replies from stragglers. Belgium accepted shortly after conclusion meeting and Greece almost certainly will do so tomorrow. Council will not reconvene on question and we can now safely proceed. 3. As agreed in pre-session caucus of U.S., FRG, U.K. and SecGen it was made clear by SecGen that abstention by any member did not preclude such member from participating in Oil Committee deliberations or prevent cooperation between its companies and industry advisory group. SecGen stated chairman Oil Committee (Beckett, U.K.) standing ready call Oil Committee together 10:00 Friday 30 June. Washington should decide on and send delegation without further exchange this subject. 4. No press communiqué will be issued. Press inquiries will be answered straightforwardly that Council decision has been taken with some members abstaining from decision. Abstention does not mean objection to decision. Abstaining countries will be named if inquirer specifically asks for names. 5. I very much appreciate prompt and responsive message from Department in 216353, 3 which was decisive in bringing this matter to satisfactory conclusion. Trezise 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Athens, Bonn, Brussels, London, and Rome. Passed to the White House and USIA. 2 On June 26 German Economic Minister Schiller told Ambassador McGhee that Germany would be abstaining. McGhee reported that Schiller “said he understood our interest in a declaration of emergency and our wish to demonstrate Western solidarity in the form of OECD action but did not find either point persuasive.” Schiller said that any overt solidarity on the part of the West would simply provoke Arab solidarity. The Americans did not press them on the matter. (Telegram 15260 from Bonn, June 26; ibid., PET 1 OECD) In a conversation the same day in Washington, Dr. Dietrich, Economic Counselor of the German Embassy, also discussed the decision. Among the political considerations, he mentioned: “The Soviets are exploiting the Middle East question for their own objectives on the German question,” and “Any FRG action which appears anti-Arab will favor the Communists, especially in Libya.” (Memorandum of conversation, June 26; ibid., PET 3 OECD) 3 Not found. 252. Memorandum of a Briefing by Director of Central Intelligence McCone 252. Memorandum of a Briefing by Director of Central Intelligence McCone 1 Washington, June 29, 1967, 9:51–10:18 a.m. SUBJECT Briefing by Mr. John McCone on the Importance of Middle East Oil to the United States 1. The U.S. possession of oil in the Middle East is of great importance to the U.S. as is the general question of Middle East oil. Many reasons for this can be cited, but three specific points can be mentioned as examples: a We are getting two or three hundred thousand barrels of petroleum products daily from the Middle East for the war effort in South Vietnam. 2 b The activities of the international oil companies through their subsidiaries constitute the largest and most effective channel of contact in the relationship with the governments of the Middle East, with the exception of the State Department. It is useful to maintain this channel. c The oil of the Middle East does contribute substantially to the U.S. balance of payments. 2. It is most important from the standpoint of the U.S. Government that American possession of Middle East oil be maintained as a matter of national interest. The subject is all too often dismissed as purely a commercial and vested interest of the oil companies, whereas if looked at in the broadest sense it is clearly an interest of the U.S. Government as well. 3. The current situation in the Middle East does not parallel that of 1957, as is often claimed both here and in Europe with the accompanying comment that the oil companies lived through the crisis of 1957 and they will live through this one. The present situation is significantly different. In 1957 the U.S. Government stood absolute in its position against aggression. In that conflict it was really on the side of the Arabs versus Israel. We were forcing Israel back, we were taking a position in opposition to the French and the British, and one which was favorable to the Arabs. This position was stated absolutely unequivocally, condemning the British, the French and the Israelis, and leaving no question as to where the U.S. stood. 4. Developments in recent weeks, and particularly in recent days, have been working against the interests of the U.S. Government in the Middle East as far as the retention of oil properties is concerned. The friendly Arab states are encountering difficulty in maintaining their position against the constant criticism of the U.S. Government by the hostile states. An example is the problem the Saudi Arabian Government is having in maintaining its position, which is essentially friendly, against the demands of such unfriendly countries as Iraq, which are urging the expulsion of Americans and the nationalization and expropriation of the American-owned companies. Lebanon is having similar troubles with Syria. Lebanon would like to open the port of Sidon, get the Tapline into operation again, and ship oil from the east through the Mediterranean. However, partly because she took little part in the war, whereas Syria suffered greatly, Lebanon does not want to antagonize another Arab state. Public indoctrination by Radio Cairo is placing the heads of basically friendly Arab regimes in a position where they cannot speak out publicly for fear of the indignation of the masses which, whipped up by Cairo propaganda, might even cause the overthrow of such governments. 5. A very important point is that the friendly consuming countries—the European countries, the U.K., and the Asian states—are confronted with shortages, rationing, and higher prices which they blame on U.S. Government policy. Whereas some 10 or 15 years ago these countries were living on coal as their principal source of energy, in the succeeding period they have converted their economic life to one entirely dependent on oil. They claim that now their source of energy supply is through American interests, that obviously American interests are controlled and affected by U.S. Government policy, and that therefore their economic life is actually tied to U.S. Government policy. In reviewing this dependence and considering what they should do, they are thinking of nuclear energy and alternate sources of energy in the Middle East—a situation very different from that of 1957. 6. At the heart of the problem, and what makes efforts to correct it difficult, is the fact that the U.S. Government position on territorial issues in the Middle East is considered to be highly equivocal. President Johnson's speech 3 is questioned because when you analyze just exactly what he said on the question of territory, you find that it is subject to a wide range of interpretations. What does he mean when he links territorial boundaries to security? Does he mean Syrian border changes to give security to Israel, or the Gaza Strip takeover? The UN resolution offered by Goldberg likewise cannot be considered unequivocal on territorial issues. 7. The background of the Israel-Aqaba deal has been forgotten and is not being revived in the memory of the Arabs. A very important point should be recalled on this matter. In order to meet Arab demands, the Israelis pulled back from the Straits of Tiran and the Sinai Peninsula. The U.S. negotiated an arrangement in which the quid pro quo was that Israel move back to her former borders in return for access to the Gulf of Aqaba. This is all forgotten now, and the Arabs believe that we sponsored a great concession on their part to Israel. Actually the reverse is true, and when the issue was argued in the United Nations, our Ambassador was very weak on this point. This point should be surfaced. 8. Experience with the functioning of executive committees here suggests that our desire for flexibility and the retention of the maximum number of options has left doubts in the minds of the Arabs and of our friends in Europe as to what our true intentions are. These doubts are being exploited by both sides. As a result, the resentment of the Arabs toward the U.S. is intensifying whereas their resentment towards the U.K. is lessening. Brown's speech was no accident, no slip of the tongue. And Wilson's rather meager attempt to pacify certain critics by his discussion on the floor of Parliament was rather unconvincing, and certainly received no very wide circulation, particularly in the Middle East. 9. With these trends in evidence, the dangers of expropriation, expulsion, and nationalization of American interests seem real and should not be dismissed in Washington. Furthermore, the consumer countries are growing concerned that their economic life is dependent on U.S. oil money, and therefore on U.S. Government policy, and they are therefore meddling in this situation. 10. Current statistics show that the reserves in Western Europe are down to an estimated 30–40 days as of June 30th, as compared to the 60–70 days, and are going down quite fast. Tanker rates are up 100–200 from what they were a month ago. The deficits are forecast to continue at least until the Suez Canal is opened because there are simply not enough tankers to make the long trip around the Horn. It takes 68 days for a tanker to make the round trip from the Persian Gulf to Europe, as against 22–24 days through the Canal. Although there was some excess tanker capacity before the crisis, it just cannot carry the added load. 11. The reopening of Libyan production would offer some relief. With the Libyan pipeline open and the Canal closed, the deficit would be of the order of 500 thousand barrels daily against a demand of 10 million barrels, provided we take certain action. We would have to increase Texas and Louisiana production to meet our East Coast requirements and divert to Europe Persian Gulf oil which would normally go to the East Coast. This the oil companies would like to do. 12. If Libyan production and the pipelines remain closed, the daily deficit is of the order of a million and a half barrels a day, which is enough to cause all kinds of trouble. The pipelines are down and the Saudi Arabian Government has declared that it will ship no oil through the trans-Arabian pipeline as long as it runs through occupied territory, namely through a part of Syria now occupied by the Israelis. Until the Israelis pull back to their former border there is no prospect, under the present policy, of a resumption of shipment through this channel. 13. The Lebanese would like to ship out of Sidon, but they are loath to do so for fear of offending the Syrians. The Libyans on the other hand are endeavoring to get things moving. They are suffering from loss of revenue, and both the Government and the labor leaders want to resume shipments for this reason. However, they are having internal labor troubles—the constant harangue by Radio Cairo is heard loud and clear in Libya, and has the working people stirred up. 14. The Europeans are definitely making carefully guarded overtures to all of the oil-producing Arab countries, pointing out that should the latter be forced to take over American oil properties, they can depend on the Europeans for assistance. This information comes in many, many ways from apparently rather good sources, [ 2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. The situation is very different from 1957, when none of these countries had the capability to enter the oil business, and therefore the Arab oil-producing states do not have to look back at the tragedy of Iran after Mossadeq expropriated the oil and production was shut off completely because of lack of capability. Now the Arabs can move, although with some considerable inconvenience, most particularly in transportation. 15. This brings up some ideas about possible U.S. Government action that will help. First, the Government should put more pressure on Texas and Louisiana to increase the allowables for the East Coast, and thus permit diversion to Europe of oil bound for the U.S. from the Persian Gulf. Steps taken hitherto by the Texas and Louisiana petroleum authorities have been very niggardly in increasing their allowables. This is understandable because it is very difficult to cut back the allowables at a later date once they turn those valves open. Furthermore there is a unique situation because some of the oil companies in the Louisiana and Texas oilfields have installed pipelines and pumping facilities capable of handling only their present allowables, whereas others have facilities to handle their total potential production. An increase of allowables would thus put some companies at a competitive disadvantage. The companies are trying to straighten this out themselves and this action could account for several hundred thousand barrels daily. 16. The second thing the U.S. Government can do is emphasize a balanced position in its statements. This should come through clearer and louder than it does because the attitude of the press, radio, and television is such as to make government pronouncements appear oriented toward Israel. As an example, the New York Times published an article three or four days ago stating that the U.S. is resuming aid to Israel. This went through the Middle East like wildfire. The article didn't say one word about the fact that a few days earlier we had resumed aid to two or three Arab states. We must be sure that our official statements come out loud and clear and represent a very balanced position because there is a certain amount of brainwashing going on by the press. 17. The third action the U.S. can take is to come up with some clear and unequivocal statements on the question of territorial aggrandizement through military action. While this represents our policy, we have equivocated somewhat. This is one of the items of flexibility and options on which we have to bear down a little more thoroughly than we have. The background of the 1957 Aqaba transit arrangement should be recalled, probably privately, in every Arab capital in order to make it clearly understood that what was done at that time was done in the Arab interest, and that the story has since been twisted around as something done in the Israeli interest. The concession to Israel to permit their shipping to go through the Gulf was very small compared to what the Arabs wanted, which was to get the Israelis out of the Sinai, out of the Straits of Tiran, out of the Gaza Strip, and back behind their lines. 18. Finally, we must guard against the Europeans taking advantage of our plight. Brown's speech was no accident, as said before. The talks going on between the Economic Ministers with the European oil representatives really represent a tremendous threat. These are the realities of the situation as seen from the point of view of the international oil companies. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Economic 2 of 2. No classification marking. The meeting was held in McCone's office. An attached covering note from Helms to McGeorge Bundy reads: “Here is the write up of John McCone's presentation to us on the importance of Middle East oil to the United States. This is the paper I promised you.” 2 According to a [ text not declassified ], June 30, this was an important issue because: “The Saudi official said that three-fourths of the production of Aramco's Ras Tanura refinery previously has been sold to the U.S. Seventh Fleet as the ultimate consumer.” (text not declassified, June 29; ibid., Economic 1 of 2) 3 President Johnson spoke on June 19; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, pp. 630–635. 253. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 253. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 1 Tripoli, June 30, 1967, 0940Z. 383. Libyan Sitrep—June 25 thru 29. Ref: Tripoli 320. 2 1. Decision on change in total ban on exports remains suspended while King Idris searches for new Prime Minister to replace Hussain Maaziq, who resigned June 27. It not yet clear to what extent, if any, oil export question figured in resignation of entire cabinet. 3 There are some indications, both public and private (Tripoli 348), 4 that by June 26 Maaziq cabinet was on verge of deciding to accept security risks of resuming exports and to meet King's objection to naming US and UK as having aided Israel by following Iraqi example of specifying permissible destinations, probably starting with Spain, France, and Italy. However, it not yet known whether Maaziq even discussed this proposed policy with King June 27. 2. Third general meeting of oil workers (estimated at 300) held June 25 and reaffirmed opposition to resuming any exports until unanimous Arab agreement on export policy. Workers insulted Petroleum Ministry representative who attempted rebut their decision and they again threatened sabotage of oil installations. Following day Petroleum Ministry recommended preventive detention of oil labor leaders when GOL decides to resume exports. Morning June 29, former Petroleum Minister Ku'baazi reportedly met with oil labor leaders, but significance this meeting not yet known. 3. Libyan news media, reporting Iraqi resumption of exports to Turkey and France, 5 emphasized fact that Libya now only Arab state maintaining total embargo. Newsom 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Baida, Beirut, Jidda, and Kuwait. 2 Dated June 24. (Ibid.) 3 The day before Maaziq's resignation, high-ranking sources told Embassy officials that the major factor inhibiting a resumption of exports was internal political opposition to the Maaziq Cabinet. The Libyan Government was unconcerned about a general strike by oil workers but was concerned about sabotage, a threat made stronger by the fact that the oil industry's labor leadership “overlapped considerably” with those in opposition to the government. (Telegram 335 from Tripoli, June 26; ibid.) 4 Dated June 29. (Ibid.) 5 Iraq resumed limited shipment of oil on June 30, provided that France and other countries would guarantee that Iraqi oil would not be diverted to the United States or the United Kingdom. Both the Americans and the British disliked the idea of “government-to-government” guarantees, but acquiesced “in interest of improving oil supplies.” (Telegram 219506 to Baghdad, June 30; ibid., PET 17 IRAQ–TURK; and telegram 10805 from London, June 29; ibid., PET 17 FR-IRAQ) 254. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 254. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 30, 1967, 1717Z. 21085. CEDTO. Subject: OECD Oil Committee Meeting. Ref: State 219017. 2 Oil Committee meeting today ended with decisions as follows: 1. Secretary-General will invite governments to ask oil companies, or will invite companies directly, to participate in international industry advisory body. Thus French and German companies will receive SecGen invitations, and French companies at least evidently will participate. Germans are undecided as of today but were leaning toward participation. 2. Mission of industry group will be as per Council resolution, that is keep Oil Committee informed of technical matters related to availability of oil for member countries. However, US del placed in record our view task of advisory group as stated para 5(A) reftel, and Dept may wish mention this to oil company representatives. 3. Industry group will be asked to report to Oil Committee during week of 17 July, at which time Oil Committee will reconvene. 4. Beckett, after lunch-hour consultations, came up with company list as follows: ENI, Shell, BP, ERAP,CFP, Petrofina, Deminex, Arabian Oil Co. together with “such US international companies as USG may notify to SecGen.” Japanese del stated Arabian Oil Co. will not participate for time being. Possibility held open for other companies take part at later date. 5. Arrangements will be worked out for Shell to invite representatives from companies on advisory group to meet in Hague, with provisional date set for Thursday, July 6. OECD Secretariat will act as post office for this purpose. 6. Now that Europeans have begun to act with some sense urgency, Mission hopes USG can give us names our nominees very promptly, if possible by COB July 3, at latest COB July 4. 3 Trezise 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central File, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Reykjavik, Rome, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Vienna. Passed to the White House and USIA on June 30. 2 Dated June 29. (Ibid., PET 3 OECD) 3 Ambassador McGhee reported from Bonn: “If our companies are long stopped from collaborating among themselves by U.S. antitrust law and by our failure to authorize consultation, it will seriously undermine the position of U.S. oil company subsidiaries here which are already under criticism for being subject to control from the U.S. and for being unable to act solely in their own and in German interests.” (Telegram 15424 from Bonn, June 30; ibid.) 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State 1 Tripoli, July 6, 1967. 43. Libyan Oil Sitrep—July 3 thru 5. Ref: Tripoli 19 (Notal). 2 1. Announcement evening July 2 3 that new Badri Cabinet would allow oil exports to France, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Italy and other “friendly” countries, but not to US and UK, has been followed by continuing confusion about other destinations, notably Libya's biggest market, West Germany. Evening July 4, GOL broadcast policy statement which seems to approve oil exports to all countries other than US and UK, but Petroleum Ministry has so far refused to implement this announced policy. 2. Situation complicated by open ended oil strike and three-day general strike called evening July 3 by political opposition. Ostensible objective of strike is to extend oil embargo to West Germany, Italy, and Netherlands; real objective is to force replacement of Badri cabinet. GOL moved forcefully against oil union leaders and workers, jailing perhaps as many as 50. Participation of Libyan oil workers in strike has varied inversely with distance from Tripoli: almost complete absenteeism in Tripoli offices, significant absenteeism at Es Sidra (Oasis) and Ras Lanuf (Mobil), some confusion but little absenteeism at Marsa Brega (Esso), and virtually no absenteeism in Benghazi offices and at Marsa Hareega (BP). Although there was an unsuccessful bomb attempt against Oasis office in Tripoli, there have been no known sabotage attempts yet at field installations, despite earlier union threats and GOL fears. In Tripoli, distribution of petroleum products from bulk storage being done at night by expatriates under police guard. 3. Standby tankers began loading almost immediately after July 2 announcement. Despite necessity using expatriate labor which has slowed down loading at Es Sidra and Ras Lanuf to one tanker at a time, loading continues at maximum rate possible. By evening July 5, five tankers had cleared ports, all bound for one of five approved destinations. Pumping from fields has also begun. By evening July 5, Oasis was pumping at 500,000 bpd; Esso at 450,000 bpd; Mobil/Gensenberg and Amoseas at 170,000 bpd; and BP/Hunt at 100,000 bpd. 4. Despite continuing political uncertainties, Libya is back in oil business. 4 Newsom 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 LIBYA. Confidential; Priority. There is no time of transmission on the source text; the telegram was received at 7:05 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris for USOECD, Algiers, Baida, Beirut, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, and Tehran. Passed to the White House, USIA, CIA, DOD, NSA, CINCEUR, and USUN. 2 Dated July 3. (Ibid.) 3 The report of the announcement is in telegram 414 from Tripoli, July 2. (Ibid.) 4 As a July 10 memorandum from Solomon to Eugene Rostow reported, by the next week most other producers of oil were back in at least partial production. The major problem would continue to be the shortage of tanker tonnage. (Ibid., PET 6 IRAN) 256. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Special Committee on the Middle East Crisis (Bundy) to President Johnson 256. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Special Committee on the Middle East Crisis (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 10, 1967, 7 p.m. SUBJECT Your conversation with Howard Rambin (Texaco) and Al Nickerson (Mobil) 7:30 PM, July 10 My guess is that these two gentlemen are coming in not to talk about the current oil problem, but to ask for U.S. public statements that they can use with their friends in Saudi Arabia. Texaco at 30% and Mobil at 10% are large partners in the Arabian-American Oil Company. The Saudi Finance Minister, Yamani, is coming to New York next week and my guess is that they would like to be able to show him some U.S. statement or action for which they can claim partial credit. The fact is that we agree with their analysis in large part and would like to make a statement that would have something in it for the moderate Arabs this week, perhaps at the end of the General Assembly debate. We have been drafting such a statement for several days and I attach at Tab A the latest version. 2 What it aims to emphasize are certain points that the Arabs need to hear, about withdrawal, Jerusalem, and our opposition to the unilateral changes of frontiers, all in the context of a re-affirmation of your basic June 19 statement. 3 (We have not yet tried this statement on friends of Israel, but I think nearly all of it would go down fairly smoothly.) In this situation I think you may want to take the lead with these people and not let them think that they can crowd you. You might start by telling them that right from the beginning you have had the moderate Arabs high in your thoughts. Our five principles are in their real interests and in their quiet moments they admit it. Moreover you have talked with the Kuwait Foreign Minister and with King Hussein and with Hassan of Morocco, and with just about anyone that Rostow or Bundy or anyone else forces you to stick on your calendar. You have written letters to Saudi Arabia and Iran. You seized the first opportunity to make a strong statement on Jerusalem, (they may follow other oil men in telling us that our abstention on the Pakistani resolution was too bad) and you can pre-empt this one too by saying that we did our damnedest to get the moderate Arabs to accept one little modification that would have allowed us to support it and could not get any cooperation out of them. Cooperation on these matters is a two-way street. I think you will want to give all this to them in a quiet and sympathetic tone because the oil companies continue to behave quite well and they do have a case. But it is also true that the moderate Arabs will always have a sore point as long as their fundamental grievance is that we are not directly arrayed against Israel. Finally, if you want to remind these gentlemen of the basic sentiments of the American people on this issue you may find it helpful to have the attached Harris poll. 4 Harris told me last week that in all his years as a pollster he had never seen a more sweeping and definite registration of overwhelming support for one side of a question. What is even more striking is that the reservations of the American people are precisely those which we ourselves have registered—on Jerusalem and on refugees. McG.B. 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Country File—Arab Nationalism. No classification marking. 2 Not printed. No indication has been found that this statement was ever delivered by the President. 3 See footnote 3, Document 252 . 4 Not found. 5 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1 Washington, July 11, 1967, 8:45 p.m. 4967. 1. Aramco VP Pendleton called on Dep Asst Sec Davies July 7 to report private conversation July 2 between SAG Minister Petroleum Yamani and Aramco VP Brougham. 2. According Aramco report, Yamani re-emphasized worsened US position in Arab world and growing Arab bitterness toward US. Declared no Arab state could accept settlement that includes Arab recognition of Israel. Said USG will have to take position more favorable to Arabs if USG interests, including Aramco concession, to be maintained in Arab world. 2 Declared SAG trying defend its relations with and attitude toward Aramco against attacks from Iraq, Syria, and Algeria. Said moderate Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia will be friends of West for long time if permitted do so. 3 Yamani also dwelt on several articles he had written for Saudi press showing unfavorable impact on Saudi economy resulting from ban on oil exports. 3. Brougham apparently made effective rejoinders to Yamani statements and attempted explain rationale of pertinent US actions. 4. Comment : While Yamani continues paint gloomy picture, his own articles and similar relatively realistic SAG propaganda line (e.g., July 7 Jidda radio) demonstrate type enlightened self-interest we hope see increasingly exhibited by SAG and other governments of Arab oil-producing countries. Such welcome initiative should of course continue be given appropriate encouragement. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Economic [2 of 2]. Confidential. Drafted by C. Held (NEA/ARP), cleared by W. Brewer (NEA/ARP) and J. Akins (E/FSE), and approved by Davies. Repeated to Dhahran. 2 Yamani told Brougham that the U.S. position in the Arab world had deteriorated seriously and that there would be negative consequences for the oil company as a result: “That whereas we should have thirty odd years in which to enjoy the remainder of the concession, he predicts that unless there is a change in USG policy that our tenure will be closer to four years.” (Aramco telegram from Dhahran, July 3; ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis, Dhahran Cables, 6/67–7/67) 3 In the meeting Yamani discussed issues that could inhibit Arab relations with the West: “He then asked my appraisal of the value of the Aramco assets including the reserves. I refused to hazard a guess and he said in any event the figure is in the billions of dollars and I replied it is certainly many billions. Yamani then said 'Is this not worth more than five million votes in the US?'” Brougham argued that Yamani must recognize that the oil companies had no voting power but “have worked very hard to acquaint the USG with the facts bearing on the Middle East situation and where the US national interest lies.” (Ibid.) 258. Memorandum of Conversation 258. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 18, 1967. With Dr. Alirio A. Parra, Venezuelan Director of Petroleum Economy I believe Tony Parra has traveled more in Arab countries and has more contacts among the Arab leaders than any other Latin American. He gave me the following information today, for the most part in response to my questions: —Venezuela is naturally taking advantage of the Middle East crisis to maximize its oil revenues, but much of the added income will be absorbed by the bureaucracy. The Government now maintains that 30% of oil revenues go to economic and social development projects, but no one can really trace these funds and it is probably a much smaller percentage. Minister of Finance Benito Paul Losada intends to “sterilize” (I suppose that means segregate) the windfall profits to be used for future contingencies, but other Government officials are already planning to use them in current and expanded programs. —The Iraqis recently asked Venezuela to curtail its petroleum shipments to the West. This was a bi-lateral representation, not made through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. (Parra left the impression that no other Arab countries had made similar requests.) —But “the Arabs have not learned their lesson.” They plan to resume fighting with Israel as soon as they are armed and ready. They are almost constitutionally incapable of sitting at a conference table with the Israelis. —From the earliest days of the Arab-Israeli crisis, the Saudis openly told the diplomatic corps—including the Venezuelan Ambassador in Jidda—that of course they would permit oil shipments to go to the West, despite the announced embargo. Only the Iraqis are naive enough to believe what the Egyptians tell them and to do what Nasser says. Robert G. Cox 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of the NSC Special Committee, Economic [2 of 2]. Confidential. A July 19 covering note from Robert Cox to Nathanial Davis on White House letterhead reads, “For your information.” The cover note also bears Davis' handwritten notation: “Mr. Bundy, FYI.” 259. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 259. Telegram From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 21, 1967, 1935Z. 1098. CEDTO. Subj: OECD Oil Committee Meeting, July 20–21. Ref: Paris 1087. 2 1. By end of Oil Committee meeting July 21 there seemed to be little doubt in minds delegates that world oil situation somewhat graver than portrayed by industry group. 3 Some delegates expressed disappointment that Oil Committee still not inclined move to action phase of OECD emergency plan but all agreed that in view relatively optimistic industry group study, such action could not be taken. 4 2. Oil Committee concluded that task of transport, not shortage of crude, was main problem. But almost as important is possibility that certain products, namely naphtha and heavy fuel oil, will be in short supply soon. 3. Industry study was recognized as hurried and incomplete and group was charged with preparing new report early September. Representatives of all five countries (Austria, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey) which have not supplied data to committee have said information on stocks, draw-downs and requirements by products will be submitted to industry group within two weeks. Other European OECD countries have agreed supply, as soon as possible, additional information required by group. Japanese delegate said Arabian oil company had not participated in industry group study only because company did not have representative in Europe but it was prepared submit any information group required. 4. Only other substantive action of Oil Committee was decision charge existing working group (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden) with task maintaining liaison with industry group. Proposal received strong support of entire committee (including French). 5. Not all members of working group will work with industry group at all times. Details of working group cooperation will be formalized by group itself. US delegate, who said US will appoint representative to group, suggested its first meeting with industry body be held shortly after EPSC completes its petroleum situation study which we expect to be considerably more detailed and probably more accurate than OECD industry group paper. 6. If subsequent data reveal that problem more serious than supposed, or if there is sudden deterioration of oil situation, Oil Committee can be summoned reconvene on short notice but next meeting tentatively scheduled for September 7. 7. US delegate also called attention of group to necessity maintaining high degree of security in talks; this was supported by German delegate, who fears that leaks of industry assumptions of renewal of shipments from Libya to Germany might imperil such deliveries. No one, however, has illusions about probability maintaining complete secrecy in meetings which include 21 governments and often as many 100 individuals. 8. Operative paragraphs of committee report OECD Council being submitted separately. Trezise 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Reykjavik, Rome, Stockholm, Toyko, and Vienna. 2 Dated July 21. (Ibid., PET 3 OECD) 3 A report for the President's evening reading on July 24 summarized the information that the committee had received. European oil stocks had been drawn down by 19 days—about one-third of the on-hand supply—and the British stocks were down by 28 days. Some countries were already experiencing shortages of naphtha and fuel oil. (Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, FSV Facilitative Service—1967) 4 According to a report received by the Department from the British Oil Attaché, the OECD Oil Committee would listen to the industry report but would not act. U.S. oil experts concurred: “The British conclusions may be correct. Interior believes that some of the international oil companies in the Industry Group may fear that some of their European clients would be alarmed by precipitous OECD action and will tend to sugarcoat the report.” (Memorandum from Oliver to Fried, July 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD) 260. Editorial Note 260. Editorial Note At the end of July 1967 Saudi Oil Minister Yamani traveled secretly to New York to meet with executives from Aramco's parent companies. “Aramco emphasizes meeting highly sensitive and Yamani anxious avoid any publicity,” the Embassy reported in telegram 274, July 22. When word of the impending visit leaked to a business publication, Aramco officials denied the story. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Economic [1 of 2]) Three days after the August 1 meeting with Yamani in the New York area, an Aramco executive told a Department official in Washington that the meeting had been devoted to “oil not politics.” (Telegram 16312 to Jidda, August 4; ibid.) But Yamani did make an impassioned appeal to the oil companies to protect their own business interests and the position of both the United States and the moderate Arab nations: “Yamani told companies Arab/Israel struggle is cover for regional conflict between 'socialist' and conservative Arab states. At May Baghdad oil meeting, Yamani surprised find Syria and Lebanon represented. He had considered playing for time by suggesting Jordan and Sudan also be invited but in the end had felt unable to do so. Original intention meeting had been to provide for 'nationalization and confiscation' oil industry even in event Arabs won expected war. SAG efforts alone resulted in more moderate resolution.” (Telegram 18475 to Jidda, August 9; ibid.) Yamani also said that the representatives of Arab states had discussed the U.S. position of support for the integrity and independence of all area states and had concluded that “effort should be made reduce USG to second rate power' so that significance our [U.S.] commitment to Israel would be lessened.” (Ibid.) 261. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 261. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, August 3, 1967. A–476 SUBJECT Oil Crisis: Kudos to US In the course of a wide range of conversations with official and trade sources about the European or more specifically UK oil outlook which is generally characterized now as probably manageable although still fraught with uncertainties, the Embassy has repeatedly heard one theme—that if the supply and tanker situation do seem manageable now and for the foreseeable future, this is in large part due to the prompt response of the US to the emergency, in the form of emergency measures and increased crude availabilities, and to the sense of urgency that the US initiatives generated among companies and governments in Western Europe. In almost every conversation, comparisons are made with 1956, and there follow expressions of gratification, frequently coupled with surprise, at the speed and effectiveness of the US response in 1967. (Questions usually are asked then about continuing and/or increased availabilities of US crude, and about prices.) Comment : We think it worth reporting these expressions because they have occurred so frequently and so spontaneously at all levels and because for a variety of reasons official and trade sources are likely to avoid public announcements on the subject. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 2 UK. Limited Official Use. Drafted by J. McGrath (E/GEN), cleared by W. Armstrong, and approved by L. Percival. Repeated to Paris for OECD and Brussels for USEC. 262. Airgram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 262. Airgram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, August 4, 1967. A–188 SUBJECT Oil Supply Situation Herr Kling of the Economics Ministry (Deputy Assistant Secretary) has confirmed information given us by the Bonn representative of Esso, A.G. to the effect that the crisis point in the German oil supply situation has been passed, and that supplies currently and for the foreseeable future are adequate for normal operations. There is, consequently, no present intention of permitting draw-downs of mandatory reserve stocks of crude oil or products. Both sources said that there have not as yet been any reported receipts of Libyan oil, although Kling pointed out that the government is not asking any questions as to the country of origin of oil entering the FRG via pipeline; it is permitting all Middle East oil to be declared as “Arab State” oil. Country of origin statistics will therefore have a permanent gap for the current year. Kling highly praised the performance of the companies during the past weeks in providing a continuing flow of crude through cooperation and organization. If the situation continued as at present, the perennial claim of the coal interests that only German coal can be relied upon as a safe form of energy will be deprived of validity. This would clear away one obstacle to the reduction of German coal production capacity and the extension of the duty-free coal import quota. Hillenbrand 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 2 GERW. Limited Official Use. Drafted and approved by M.J. Dux (ECON). Also sent to London, Paris for OECD, Hamburg, and Beirut. 263. Editorial Note 263. Editorial Note On July 24, 1967, as the crisis abated, Iraq announced that it would resume shipments to all countries except the United States, United Kingdom, and West Germany. (Item for the Katzenbach report, July 27; Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, FSV Facilitative Service—1967) But the major suppliers to the United States continued to hold back due to fears of the political climate in the Arab world. When questioned, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani told U.S. officials that the U.S. position at the United Nations was making it difficult for Saudi Arabia to resume normal shipments: “Yamani said political climate needs to improve before SAG can risk lifting embargo.” (Airgram A–41 from Jidda, July 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17 SAUD US) On August 9 Libyan Petroleum Minister Muusa confirmed to Embassy officials that his country had resumed direct export of oil to West Germany after the company agreed not to publicize the shipments. He explained that resumption of direct shipments to the United States and United Kingdom was still unlikely: “Indirect shipments via Canada and Ireland being encouraged, however.” According to Muusa, the oil producers were unhappy that Arab Foreign Ministers had referred a decision on a proposal for a 3-month total oil boycott to all Arab states rather than just exporters. (Telegram 568 from Tripoli, August 10; ibid., PET 17–1 LIBYA) Despite the boycott, Abu Dhabi was exporting to the United Kingdom, and Bahrain was shipping to both the United States and the United Kingdom, while Shell was about to begin unrestricted production in Muscat and Oman. (Circular airgram CA–1232, August 12, 1967, ibid., PET 17–1 ARAB) On September 1 the Arab Heads of State Conference in Khartoum adopted a resolution calling for the resumption of production. Since export, not production, had been halted earlier, it was interpreted to mean that the embargo was over. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , pages 590–591. An item for Under Secretary Katzenbach's September 1 report notes: “The three moderate producers seem to have had to pay heavily for this and perhaps other concessions; Kuwait has agreed to an 'annual' payment of $154 million, Saudi Arabia $140 million and Libya $84 [million] to the 'victims of Zionist aggression' namely Egypt, which will get $266 million and Jordan which will get $112 million.” (Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, FSV Facilitative Service—1967) When King Faisal returned from Khartoum on September 2, he announced that Saudi Arabia would resume oil shipments to all countries “without exception.” (Telegram 874 from Jidda, September 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 SAUD) In Libya, the oil companies were unofficially informed that the embargo was lifted that same day. (Telegram 941 from Tripoli, September 5; ibid., PET 17–1 ARAB) 264. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 264. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, August 25, 1967, 0343Z. 26879. Ref: State 26123; Dhahran 146. 2 1. Briefing top oil company executives of Aramco, four Aramco parents, Gulf, and Continental held August 24 at request of companies. 3 Meeting chaired by Rostow and attended by Harriman, Battle, Solomon, Davies, and representatives of USIA and Interior. 2. Rostow gave executives our views on current situation in Middle East, our efforts find constructive solution Arab-Israel problem, our attempts help moderate Arabs withstand pressure from radicals, and our thoughts on developments for near future. 4 3. Companies made specific proposal that public USG statement be made before new Arab foreign ministers conference and summit which would provide reassurance to moderate Arab states. Executives stressed this “key moment” to make such statement. Rostow agreed give proposal full consideration. Battle pointed out many such statements drafted but it is exceedingly difficult to construct one which satisfies one side without offending other. Davies discussed aide-mémoire (State 26123) 5 to be presented Arab foreign ministers before August 26 meeting in Khartoum. 4. Executives asked how companies could help in current situation. 6 Rostow and Battle emphasized need for support in current difficulties with Congress, especially in fields foreign aid and arms supply. 5. FYI. We are considering merits backgrounder in depth for selected U.S. correspondents prior summit to provide some ammunition for moderates. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 17–1 ARAB. Confidential. Drafted by D. Newton (NEA/ARP) on August 24; cleared by L. Dinsmore (NEA/ARP), Davies, Battle, and Kelly (S/S); and approved by Rostow. Sent to Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, Rabat, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, Cairo, Dhahran, and Jerusalem, and repeated to London, Paris, and USUN. 2 Neither printed. (Ibid., POL 7 SUDAN and PET 17–1 ARAB, respectively) 3 In attendance were G.L. Parkhurst (Standard-California), G.T. Piercy (Standard-New Jersey), H. Cash (Texaco), H.C. Moses (Mobil), I.G. Davis (Gulf), J.S. Royds (Continental Oil), L.F. Hills (Aramco), and J.W. Pendleton (Aramco). An August 23 briefing memorandum for Rostow reads: “The companies are worried over the positions of the Arab moderates and fear that the latter may be unable to stem the tide of radical Arab policies.” (Memorandum from Battle to Eugene Rostow, August 23; ibid., PET 6 US) On August 9 Akins summarized the U.S. position: “Our vulnerability to Arab pressure lies in the possibility of nationalization of our oil interests in the Arab world. This would mean a loss of several billion dollars in direct investment, of thirty years effort in building an industry and of at least a billion dollars annually toward our balance of payments—the direct damage to the United Kingdom would be even more severe.” (Memorandum from Akins to Bergsten (OMA), August 9; Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, FSV Facilitative Service—1967) 4 The briefing memorandum prepared by Battle for Rostow summed up the problem of dealing with the Arab states: “They are now forced to consider accepting conditions of life which have the effect of declaring to the whole world their impotence and their ineptitude. The pain caused by embarrassment over their exposure is still sensitive, and they seek alternatives which would eliminate their discomfiture. The signs are all too few that Arabs will see the light as we see it or will reverse their stated policies.” The briefing memorandum also includes an analysis of the situation in each of the Arab states. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 US) 5 Not found. 6 In his briefing memorandum, Battle forwarded to Rostow a variety of development proposals which other sectors of the American business community had suggested. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 6 US) 265. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rockwell) 265. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rockwell) 1 Washington, September 22, 1967. SUBJECT Study of our Oil Interests in the Middle East In considering the recent State-Defense study prepared under Ambassador Holmes, 2 the SIG directed IRG/NEA, in cooperation with IRG/AF, to come up with a better assessment of our oil interests in the area, and whether or not the threat to these interests can be minimized. I would like you to chair a small group to draft the assessment which the SIG has requested. Your group should have representation from E (which I assume will provide a major share of the input), AF and, I should think, CIA as well perhaps as EUR and INR. Your assessment should take account of scientific and technological research and development prospects, as they may affect the future for oil. Your draft should be ready by November 6, so that it may be considered by IRG/NEA (and also by IRG/AF if it wishes) in time to permit the study to be forwarded to the SIG by November 15. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET–NEAR E. Secret. Drafted by Sidney Sober (NEA/RA). Copies were sent to Palmer (AF) and Solomon (E). 2 Not found. 266. Editorial Note 266. Editorial Note During the late summer and early fall of 1967, disagreement arose among the oil producers when the Secretary General of OPEC proposed to move the organization's scheduled September meeting from Vienna to Beirut. Saudi Arabia concurred in the proposal, but Venezuela objected on the grounds that “Beirut venue would tend to inject politics into what should be strictly non-political conference.” The Venezuelan Ambassador in Saudi Arabia told U.S. officials that “Venezuela has been subjected to considerable amount of Arab pressures re supporting Arab position in Israel and re participating in Arab embargo on oil shipments to US.” He stated that Venezuela had made it “very clear” that it would not embargo oil shipments to the United States and that its “association with Arab states in OPEC must continue to be on strictly non-political plane.” (Telegram 789 from Jidda, August 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OPEC) At the OPEC summit, which was held in Rome, a split between Iraq and Libya on one side and Iran and Venezuela on the other became apparent. Telegram 1506 from Rome, September 20, reported that an Iranian Embassy source confirmed that “effort was made to get non-Arab members agreement to limit their output in future to assist Arabs at appropriate time in putting pressure on West European customers. Stated that Iran flatly rejected all such suggestions as did Venezuela.” Also, “In discreet manner, source implied that Iran had not and would not participate in politically motivated boycott actions and was pleased with the increase in offtake from Iran which situation since June had brought about.” (Ibid.) The Embassy in Jidda reported that the Venezuelan Ambassador in Saudi Arabia believed that the prime mover behind the OPEC summit was Saudi Oil Minister Yamani who tried to make it “appear united Arab effort.” The Venezuelan Ambassador described the “basic aim of Arab states as deriving sufficient extra revenue from companies to offset new subsidies to 'victims of Israeli aggression.'” (Telegram 1324 from Jidda, October 31; ibid.) In late October reports emerged in the press that Yamani was advocating the formation of an association of Arab oil exporting countries. While noting that they had not yet had the opportunity to meet with him, Embassy officials reported that “In recent months the concept that petroleum should become an instrument not only of economic policy but also of international political policy has gained strength, even though Arab efforts this summer to influence the United States and certain European countries through a partial embargo on oil proved generally ineffective.” (Airgram A–180 from Jidda, October 24; ibid., PET 3 ARAB) 267. Circular Information Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 267. Circular Information Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, October 20, 1967, 6:11 p.m. CA–3052 SUBJECT Free World Petroleum and Transport Adequate for Near-Term Needs 1. The Emergency Petroleum Supply Committee (EPSC) reported to Assistant Secretary of the Interior J. Cordell Moore on October 10 that it did not foresee Free World petroleum supply difficulties or a tanker shortage through March 1968 that would require emergency action. The principal conclusions of the Committee's report are: —There will be no Free World shortage of crude oil or refining capacity in the fourth quarter of 1967 and the first quarter of 1968. —Tanker tonnage during this period will be tight but adequate to meet requirements. —The opening of Tapline, a pipeline that originates in Saudi Arabia and terminates in Lebanon, as well as the easing of destination restrictions by Arab nations, will continue to provide additional petroleum supply flexibility. —There is no need for emergency Federal action to meet Free World requirements at the present time. —No further analysis of the first quarter of 1968 is required unless there is some significant change in the present situation. The committee estimated that Free World petroleum demand in the fourth quarter of 1967, excluding the United States and Canada, will be 19,150,000 barrels per day while crude oil production is estimated at 20,230,000 barrels per day—an increase of 9.7 per cent over the third quarter. The committee estimated first quarter 1968 Free World petroleum demand at 19,500,000 barrels daily, an increase of 1.8 per cent over the fourth quarter, and crude production at levels fully adequate to meet demand. 2. The conclusions of the EPSC report are consistent with those submitted to the OECD Oil Committee by its International Industry Advisory Body on September 13, 1967. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OECD. Unclassified. Drafted by J. Stromayer (EUR/RPE) and approved by J. Oliver (E/FSE). Sent to all OECD capitals, Beirut, Tehran, and Dhahran. 268. Airgram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 268. Airgram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State 1 Beirut, January 17, 1968. A–605 SUBJECT Petroleum: Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia Sign Charter of Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) REF CERP D; Beirut A–557, 12/29/67; Jidda A–254, 12/30/67 2 The Arab World's three leading oil producers, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, signed an agreement in Beirut on January 9, 1968, establishing an Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), which will have its headquarters in Kuwait. We are enclosing Middle East Economic Survey's report (January 12) 3 on the establishment of the new organization; MEES also reports the major provisions of the OAPEC charter. During the press conference that followed the signing ceremony, Saudi PetMin Yamani confirmed that neither Algeria nor the UAR would be eligible for membership in the new group, as would, on the other hand, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Bahrain. Yamani pointed out that the charter provision on membership states that petroleum must constitute the principal and basic source of income for member-states. Although not specifically mentioned by Yamani, Syria would also be left outside OAPEC. As for membership and the rationale for establishment of the new grouping, MEES concludes that the three charter members believed “the main responsibility for policy decisions on Arab oil should rest with those who actually produce it and are utterly dependent on this one source of revenue.” As we noted in our A–557, Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Libyan frustration with Middle East oil policy decisions following the June war probably gave considerable impetus to their decision to form OAPEC. Indeed, Iraq's refusal to become a charter member of the new group substantiates this view, i.e., whereas Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya wanted to establish a more moderate group (without the likes of Syria, the UAR, and Algeria), Iraq decided not to join the new group and indicated it would prefer to coordinate its oil policy under the aegis of the Arab League, which of course includes more radical elements than the new OAPEC. The commercial and economic nature of the new organization is also worthy of note; as Yamani stated during his press conference, OAPEC will be “the EEC of the Arab oil producers” and will be empowered to conclude commercial agreements and initiate and undertake transactions and joint enterprises with regard to oil and other related economic fields. It remains to be seen what sort of commercial cooperation can be undertaken between the diverse economies of the three charter members of OAPEC. However, as MEES notes, OAPEC will “at least provide a feasible framework for the implementation, … of the same sort of desirable inter-Arab projects as have in the past been consistently wrecked on the rocks of regional political discord.” Finally, it would be interesting to learn the reactions of company lawyers to the idea of an OAPEC court which, under the OAPEC charter, will have authority over: 1. disputes regarding interpretation of the Charter; 2. disputes which may arise between the member states regarding oil matters; and 3. disputes which, in the opinion of the OAPEC Council of Ministers, fall within the jurisdiction of the court. Risalat al betrol al-arabi (a new Arabic petroleum newsletter published in Beirut, see A–602) goes beyond MEES's interpretation of the court's functions and notes that decisions of the court on disputes between member states (2 above) will be binding. As for 3, disputes the OAPEC Council of Ministers may decide fall within the jurisdiction of the court, Risalat al betrol al-arabi interprets this to mean that the court will act as a mediator or arbitrator between the OAPEC member states and the petroleum companies. MEES believes the court may have such jurisdiction in the future, but the new oil publication is more definite on this subject. We would appreciate information obtained by other posts as to the reaction of company lawyers to the idea of an OAPEC court and OAPEC in general. Reports on discussions between the Department and company headquarters legal staffs on this subject would also provide useful background information. Porter 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, PET 3 OAPEC. Limited Official Use. Drafted by R. Wright and cleared by N.K. Pratt. Also sent to Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tripoli, and Dhahran, and passed to Algiers, Amman, Ankara, Brussels, Cairo, Caracas, Djakarta, Lagos, London, Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, The Hague, USUN, Vienna, and Beirut. 2 Neither printed. (Both ibid., PET 3 ARAB) 3 Not printed. Population Growth Population Growth 269. Editorial Note 270. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 4, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 13. No classification marking. Drafted by R. Gardner (IO) and L. Van Nort (OES) on November 3 and cleared by Lee and William D. Rogers (AID) and Robert Barnett (FE). 271. Memorandum From a Senior Adviser to the Vice President (Rielly) to Vice President Humphrey Washington, November 27, 1964. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.12.7 (B). No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads “Draft.” 272. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, April 27, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Robert W. Komer Files, Population Control 1965–March 1966. Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Bill Moyers, and Douglass Cater. An attached covering memorandum reads: “Mac—Here's a little flank attack that I think might just penetrate LBJ's defenses. It's a hard dollar and cents argument for taking a more serious view of birth control in the LDCs. Any harm in just trying this out on LBJ? It might score, and he did tell Gaud he wanted to talk aid this week. The study mentioned is a paper by Steve Enke, a RAND economist. Didn't want to overload LBJ but you ought to read it.” 273. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 4, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Robert W. Komer Files, Population Control 1965–March 1966. Secret. 274. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson Washington, September 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 15. No classification marking. 275. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, November 4, 1965, 9:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 16. Confidential. A handwritten note indicates the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on November 6 at 9:10 a.m. 276. Editorial Note 277. Editorial Note 278. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 11, 1966, 6:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Gordon Chase Files, ICY—Vol. II. Confidential. 279. Letter From the Chairman of the Board of the Population Council (Rockefeller) to Secretary of State Rusk New York, September 13, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 13. No classification marking. 280. Action Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 23, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 13. Confidential. 281. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to all Assistant Secretaries of State, Assistant Administrators of the Agency for International Development, and Other Bureau Heads Washington, January 19, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. Confidential. Submitted by Claxton to the Secretary for signature under a January 12 covering memorandum. 282. Memorandum From Hugh Moore, Director of the Population Policy Panel of the Hugh Moore Fund, to John Rielly of the Vice President's Staff New York, February 2, 1967. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.10(F), Box 933. No classification marking. 283. Letter From Secretary of State of the Holy See Cicsquani to Vice President Humphrey The Vatican, February 21, 1967. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.10(F), Box 933. No classification marking. 284. Letter From the Chairman of the Board of the Population Council (Rockefeller) to Secretary of State Rusk New York, March 3, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. No classification marking. 285. Information Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 2, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3. Limited Official Use. 286. Editorial Note 287. Memorandum From John Rielly of the Vice President's Staff to Vice President Humphrey Washington, April 14, 1967. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.10(F), Box 933. No classification marking. A handwritten note by Humphrey at the top of the page reads, “John R. See me.” 288. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 11, 1967, 11 a.m. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.10(F), Box 933. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Executive Office Building. 289. Action Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 25, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. No classification marking. Cleared by R.T. Ravenholt (AID), R. Petree (EA/J), Goldstein (EUR/BMI), and L. Van Nort (IO/OES). 290. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson Washington, June 15, 1967. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.8(8), Box 931. No classification marking. 291. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) Washington, June 23, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. Limited Official Use. A covering memorandum, also June 23, from Read to Rostow states that Claxton had been working with Cater on the President's request that additional efforts be made to induce British Prime Minister Wilson and Japanese Prime Minister Sato plus other world leaders to sign. 292. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) Washington, August 4, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. No classification marking. Attached is a covering memorandum, also dated August 4, from Read to Rostow. 293. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) Washington, December 5, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. Limited Official Use. 294. Editorial Note 295. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts Washington, August 12, 1968, 2031Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3. Confidential. Drafted by Claxton; cleared by Gaud, Brown (S/S), and Pauker (USIA), and Poole (ARA/LA) for paragraph 3; and approved by Secretary Rusk. 269. Editorial Note 269. Editorial Note The need for increased food production and the problem of rapid population growth in the developing world became linked as foreign policy issues during the Johnson administration. These issues were comparatively new ones, which had previously been left primarily to private citizens, universities, and institutions such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and The Population Council. President Eisenhower discussed population growth in December 1958 and remarked that “something drastic” had to be done to solve the problem, but he “certainly did not know how to get started on this solution and he furthermore could not himself get it started.” See Foreign Relations , 1958–1960, volume IV , page 439. According to a July 1968 State Department study, the turning point for U.S. Government interest came in July 1959 when then President Eisenhower appointed General William H. Draper, Jr., to study U.S. assistance programs and rapid population growth. (AID Circular Cable PA–201, July 13, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3) The President, however, was opposed to any statement of policy by the U.S. Government on the subject of birth control and felt that foundations and private citizens must be the ones to come up with a solution; see Foreign Relations , 1958–1960, volume III , page 226. In 1961 President Kennedy discussed the “staggering” magnitude of the population growth problem in Latin America in his first message to Congress on foreign aid. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, page 206. During his administration, the United States awarded a grant of $500,000 to the World Health Organization for research on fertility in May 1962 and openly supported UN programs to study the nature and scope of population growth. (AID Circular Cable PA–201, July 13, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3) The President, however, spoke of the problem only in terms of relieving hunger; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , page 435. The growing problems began to change the opinions and attitudes of knowledgeable decision-makers. In October 1963, only 4 years after his earlier statement, former President Eisenhower said: “The time has come, also, when we must take into account the effect of the population explosion on our mutual-assistance system. …Unless we do, it may smother the economic progress of many nations which, with our technical and economic assistance, are striving to build a decent standard of living.” (AID Circular Cable PA–201, July 13, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3) 270. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 270. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 4, 1964. SUBJECT Your Luncheon with Mr. John D. Rockefeller, III, Thursday, November 5, 1964 Mr. Rockefeller is expected to request your support for a Presidential Commission on Population. 2 Mr. Rockefeller obviously hopes that such a Commission would enlarge the area of public consensus on governmental measures for dealing with the population problem. At bottom, the issue is whether a Presidential Commission would advance—or delay and deter—operating decisions which will have real impact. The following considerations are among those you may wish to bear in mind in responding to Mr. Rockefeller's proposal: 1. The United States offered in Deputy Assistant Secretary Gardner's statement before the U.N. General Assembly in December 1962, to “help other countries, upon request, to find potential sources of information and assistance on ways and means of dealing with population problems.” 2. Since then the U.S. has become publicly committed in a series of statements by the late President Kennedy, Ambassador Stevenson, Deputy Assistant Secretary Gardner, and by votes cast in the U.N. Asian Population Conference and in ECAFE, to supporting provision through governmental bilateral and multilateral channels of all forms of assistance for dealing with population problems, with the clear exception of the shipping of manufactured contraceptive devices. 3. In actual practice, both the U.S. Government through its AID program and the U.N. agencies have so far limited themselves to technical assistance in the traditional fields of demography, statistics and census taking, together with verbal encouragement of attention by less developed countries to their population problems. Neither AID nor the U.N. agencies have so far specifically earmarked funds in direct support of family planning programs. From a political point of view there may be advantages in avoiding such earmarking and in supporting family planning only indirectly through general budgetary support or support for health and social welfare services. But direct support may well be necessary to accelerate progress in countries such as India, Pakistan and Turkey which are having difficulty in finding funds to implement what are specifically described as national family planning programs. 4. The question of U.N. technical assistance to national family planning programs, debated earlier in subordinate bodies, is likely to be a major issue at the forthcoming General Assembly. Two years ago—before the public statements referred to above—the U.S. voted in the Second Committee for a resolution calling for technical assistance, but abstained in Plenary in the separate vote on this issue, which we will now probably have to face once again. 5. An increasingly vocal body of Congressional opinion led by Senators Clark and Gruening and by Congressman Udall, has been demanding evidence of effective action by AID to cope with the population problem. They may well introduce legislation in the forthcoming Congressional session earmaking AID funds for this purpose. 6. On balance, we believe that a Presidential Commission would not succeed in extending the area of consensus to the necessary operating decisions, and might by its deliberations render such decisions more difficult and controversial than if they are dealt with in the normal way. 3 You may wish to communicate to the other Department participants in advance of the luncheon your own views on the Commission and on the other points raised in this memorandum. 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 13. No classification marking. Drafted by R. Gardner (IO) and L. Van Nort (OES) on November 3 and cleared by Lee and William D. Rogers (AID) and Robert Barnett (FE). 2 In a November 6 letter to Secretary Rusk, Rockefeller confirmed that he had discussed a Presidential Commission with Rusk at the meeting. (Ibid.) Rockefeller wrote in a second letter on November 11: “We can quickly agree, I think, that the problems of population are among the most critical now facing mankind. Hardest hit are the two-thirds of the world's people who live in the developing countries, but all of us are vitally affected. Here at home our growing population presents us with problems of urban congestion and sprawl, of relocation of industry and political reapportionment, of mass higher education, of leisure and outdoor recreation, of voluntary fertility regulation, of immigration policy, of economic growth—all basic to the realization of the Great Society. Abroad in our efforts to aid the developing countries, we are confronted with population growth at a rate unprecedented in human history—a rate that threatens to defeat the struggle for social and economic development in which such countries are so deeply involved.” (Ibid.) 3 On December 22, Rusk wrote Rockefeller: “I have been giving thought to the considerations which you advanced in your helpful letters. While we may not see eye to eye on your tactical suggestion of a Presidential Commission, we in the Department will continue to seek ways of encouraging wider recognition of the implications of this problem and explore opportunities for further progress.” (Ibid.) 4 No Presidential Commission was established, but the President did include a message on population in his January 5, 1965, State of the Union message: “We seek not to extend the power of America but the progress of humanity. We seek not to dominate others but to strengthen the freedom of all people. I will seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, p. 4) 271. Memorandum From a Senior Adviser to the Vice President (Rielly) to Vice President Humphrey 271. Memorandum From a Senior Adviser to the Vice President (Rielly) to Vice President Humphrey 1 Washington, November 27, 1964. SUBJECT Conference on “Pacem in Terris” sponsored by the Fund for the Republic As the enclosed letter 2 indicates, the conference on Pope John's encyclical “Pacem in Terris” 3 will be held in New York on February 17–20. You will recall that we discussed this some months ago and passed the word to Robert Maynard Hutchins 4 that you were interested in attending and addressing the group. They are now moving ahead with plans to make a definite schedule for the conference. As the enclosed letter indicates, their plans are a bit grandiose. They had hoped to get Khrushchev, the Pope and President Johnson. I doubt if they are going to end up getting any of them. As Harry Ashmore's letter indicates, they want you to put the arm on the President and get him to make a commitment on this. I do not think I would be in any hurry to do so. This strikes me as the type of conference where it might be better to have the Vice-President as the star, rather than the President. I think it is going to be a first-rate conference with very high level people from the intellectual, journalistic and diplomatic world attending. 5 But it is designed to be a highpowered intellectuals' conference, not a conference given to cautious diplomatic statements. I am not at all sure that this is the right medium for the President. I see no harm in having him open the conference but I'm not sure that he would want to schedule a major speech there. To be perfectly blunt, I am somewhat reluctant to see you bypassed as the star of this conference. This would probably be the best foreign policy speaking engagement you would get in the next year. The subject of the conference would permit you to give a very high level speech which would really combine all your major foreign policy interests—arms control and disarmament, relations between the developing and the developed world, foreign aid, international organizations, United Nations, and peace. 6 If the President is inclined to attend, by all means I would not discourage him. But I don't think I would exert any pressure at this time. 1 Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.12.7 (B). No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads “Draft.” 2 Not found. 3 Pope John XXIII's encyclical, Pacem in Terris, urged international cooperation for peace and justice and committed the Church to a concern for all human problems. 4 Hutchins, President of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, was the chairman of the convocation. The Center was an American non-governmental organization and was hosting the conference as part of the UN International Cooperation Year. 5 Other speakers scheduled to attend included U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson, Chief Justice Earl Warren, Senator J. William Fulbright, Ambassador George Kennan, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban, three former Presidents of the General Assembly, historian Arnold Toynbee, Nobel Prize-winning scientist Linus Pauling, and theology professor Paul Tillich. (UN Press Release ICY/22, February 9, 1965; Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.F.13.7 (B)) 6 On February 17, 1965, Humphrey delivered a long speech at the conference, in which he explained that statesmen “cannot ignore the implications for the survival of mankind of new discoveries in technology, biology, nuclear physics, and space.” He also clearly enunciated the new threats to peace and security: “In Pacem in Terris John XXIII returned to a theme he had discussed in Mater et Magistra when he stated: ‘Given the growing interdependence among peoples of the earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring economic inequality among them persists.' If control of nuclear weapons is a central issue in improving relations between East and West, accelerating the economic development of new nations is essential to harmony between North and South.” Humphrey spoke of the need for social justice: “Those who have been ‘more blessed with this world's goods' must heed the Pope's plea to assist ‘those political communities whose citizens suffer from poverty, misery and hunger and who lack even the elementary rights of the human person.' We must do this out of compassion—for we are our brother's keeper. And we also do it out of self-interest as well—for our lot is their lot, our future their future, our peace their peace. This planet is simply too small for the insulation of the rich against turbulence bred of injustice in any part of the world.” (Remarks of the Vice President, February 17, 1965; ibid.) 272. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 272. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 27, 1965. While you're thinking about foreign aid, here's a fascinating statistic. A recent study claims that if economic resources in many LDC's were devoted to retarding population growth rather than accelerating production growth, these resources could be 100 times more effective in raising output per capita! In many of these countries, spending only about one percent of their present overall development outlays on reducing births could be as effective in raising per capita output as the other 99%. The above figures are just one good economist's. 2 However, even if they're off somewhat, there's no doubt of the rapidly declining cost of population control because of new devices. This could have immense significance for areas where we are investing massive amounts of development capital—all of Latin America, India, Pakistan, Turkey (to take just our biggest clients). The process of getting these countries to the stage of self-sustaining growth, and thus reducing the longer term foreign aid burden on us —could be greatly foreshortened. I'm not propagandizing for a big US push on the still sensitive issue of birth control. Things are already moving in this field at a pretty good pace. But the relevance of figures like the above to the achievement of our foreign aid goals is so striking that you may want to consider ways and means of gradually using our foreign aid more as an incentive to major efforts in this field by the less developed countries themselves. You might want to include this subject in your aid talks with Bill Gaud. Would you like to hear more about this? R.W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Robert W. Komer Files, Population Control 1965–March 1966. Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Bill Moyers, and Douglass Cater. An attached covering memorandum reads: “Mac—Here's a little flank attack that I think might just penetrate LBJ's defenses. It's a hard dollar and cents argument for taking a more serious view of birth control in the LDCs. Any harm in just trying this out on LBJ? It might score, and he did tell Gaud he wanted to talk aid this week. The study mentioned is a paper by Steve Enke, a RAND economist. Didn't want to overload LBJ but you ought to read it.” 2 Komer sent the studies to which he is referring to Bill Moyers the next day. They include two papers by RAND economist Stephen Enke, “Economic Programs to Prevent Births” and “Lower Birth Rates—Some Economic Aspects,” as well as summaries of recent polls concerning birth control. (Memorandum from Komer to Moyers, April 28; ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 273. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 273. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, August 4, 1965. Mac— We're moving on population control. Califano is setting up a task force 2 (perhaps more at Moyers' urging than LBJ's; Bill is a bug on this). The argument will be over how much splash we can make without setting up counterpressures, both here and abroad. Much will depend on what the Vatican finally comes out with. Another problem is that little in the way of legislation seems called for. Most of what's needed can be done by Executive action. This creates a special message problem, so I suggested linking population control abroad at least to the war on want. 3 Incidentally, population research in government is abysmally low—only about $500,000 directly attributed. RWK 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Robert W. Komer Files, Population Control 1965–March 1966. Secret. 2 No other references to the Califano task force have been found, and no mention of such an entity appears in later State Department internal histories on this topic. 3 In a letter dated August 30 to UN Secretary-General U Thant at the second UN World Population Conference in Belgrade, President Johnson wrote: “we must now begin to face forthrightly the multiplying problems of our multiplying population. Our government assures your conference of our wholehearted support to the United Nations and its agencies in their efforts to achieve a better world through bringing into balance the world's resources and the world's population. …It is my fervent hope that your great assemblage of population experts will contribute significantly to the knowledge necessary to solve this transcendent problem. Second only to the search for peace, it is humanity's greatest challenge.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, p. 951) 4 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 274. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 274. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 22, 1965. SUBJECT White House Conference on International Cooperation Recommendation 1. That you agree in principle to the proposed program of the White House Conference on International Cooperation 2 scheduled to be held November 28 through December 1, 1965. 3 2. That you make remarks at the final plenary of the Conference on December 1, 1965. (Text to be provided.) 4 3. That following the final plenary there be an early evening reception at the White House. 5 Discussion Following your designation of 1965 as International Cooperation Year (ICY), you appointed a Cabinet Committee to coordinate the Government's participation. The private sector was engaged through the United Nations Association. In response to your public requests (excerpts enclosed), 6 the Cabinet Committee and the United Nations Association created joint committees on various areas of international cooperation. We expect a number of the committee reports will contain proposals worthy of consideration for your State of the Union message. You will recall that this was discussed when you recently joined us for a luncheon in the Department. It may be desirable for you to release some of the recommendations before the opening of the Conference. We plan to make specific suggestions to this end. We have developed the enclosed tentative program of the Conference which would personally involve you, high government officials and congressional leaders. You would participate in the final plenary session of the Conference on Wednesday, December 1, by receiving the reports and recommendations of the Conference and making appropriate remarks. This would be followed by an early evening reception at the White House. The Congress passed a concurrent resolution 7 supporting the ICY program and designated six Senators and six Congressmen to attend the Conference. Other legislators will also participate. We expect about 1200 top citizen leaders and 300 government officials to participate. The Conference will, therefore provide you and the United States Government with the opportunity to present graphically the efforts of the Administration to achieve peace and cooperation in the world. George W. Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 15. No classification marking. 2 The attached proposed program is not printed. To commemorate the 20th anniversary of the United Nations, 1965 was designated “International Cooperation Year.” On October 2, 1964, President Johnson announced U.S. participation in the ICY. He told the representatives of the more than 200 bipartisan participating groups that international cooperation was “a clear necessity to our survival.… The greater the nation the greater is its need to work cooperatively with other people, with other countries, with other nations.” The President also announced his intention to call a White House conference in 1965. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book II, pp. 1186–1188) On November 24, 1964, Johnson named a Cabinet committee under the chairmanship of Harlan Cleveland to coordinate U.S. participation. Three objectives designated by Cleveland for the ICY included: “1. An inventory of ongoing projects and programs involving international cooperation. 2. An intensive public relations campaign in the U.S. to stress the magnitude and effectiveness of international cooperation. 3. A series of suggestions for future international cooperative projects.” (Memorandum from Joyce to Pollack, February 17; Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 152) 3 The “approve” line is checked. A handwritten note by the President reads: “If I'm available which I doubt.” In a September 23 memorandum to the President, McGeorge Bundy “warmly” supported the recommendations, but added, “I would put all this even more affirmatively if I did not feel that you were wary of additional engagements.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 15) Gordon Chase commented to Bundy in a September 28 memorandum that the President's hesitancy “probably” reflected a “general reluctance to get tied on firmly to anything so far in advance.” (Ibid.) 4 The “approve” line is checked. A handwritten note by the President reads: “See above.” 5 The “approve” line is checked. A handwritten note by the President reads: “See above.” 6 Not printed. 7 Senate Concurrent Resolution 36, agreed on June 22, 1965. (79 Stat. 1429) 275. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 275. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 4, 1965, 9:30 a.m. SUBJECT Should we go Ahead with the White House Conference on International Cooperation Year? 1. Jake Jacobsen has passed me your message, and I have not done anything further on this matter until I could get back to you. But neither have I issued any general stop order. 2 I want to do just what you want done, but I don't think I should cancel or postpone this Conference without a definite decision from you. It is now scheduled, by your repeated public affirmation, for November 29–December 1. No one short of the President should make any decision to derail what the President has repeatedly ordered. 2. My memoranda to you have failed to speak adequately of the history of all this. It began in 1964 after the UN General Assembly designated 1965 as International Cooperation Year. You gave that designation your enthusiastic support. (1) First in your June, 1964 speech at Holy Cross you said, “I propose to dedicate this year to finding new techniques for making man's knowledge serve man's welfare. … “We intend to call upon all the resources of this great nation—both public and private—to work with other nations to find new methods of improving the life of man.” (2) Then on October 2, 1964 you issued a Proclamation of International Cooperation Year. The operating clauses of this Proclamation are as follows: “Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, do hereby —proclaim the year 1965 to be International Cooperation Year in the United States of America; —rededicate the Government of the United States to the principle of international cooperation; and —direct the agencies of the Executive Branch to examine thoroughly what additional steps can be taken in this direction in the immediate future. I also call upon our national citizen organizations to undertake intensive educational programs to inform their memberships of recent progress in international cooperation and urge them to consider what further steps can be taken.” (3) On the same day you addressed a gathering of notables in the East Room and made an eloquent and moving announcement of plans for a White House Conference on International Cooperation: [Here follow excerpts from the President's remarks on October 2; see footnote 2, Document 274 .] (4) With that send-off, people went to work. On November 24, 1964, you designated a Cabinet Committee under Dean Rusk to prepare for the White House Conference. Committees were formed on a whole range of topics, and the interest of leading private citizens was engaged in a year of preliminary work. They really are leading citizens, and I attach two pages of representative names of those who have taken an interest in the Conference (Tab A). 3 (5) On March 4, 1965, you received Bob Benjamin and gave the whole undertaking another strong boost. “On October 2, I proclaimed this twentieth anniversary year of the birth of the United Nations as International Cooperation Year in the United States. “I am highly pleased by the extent of voluntary support being given to this observance by citizens throughout the country. Mr. Benjamin's progress report this morning was inspiring. I believe Americans today fully recognize that international cooperation is the one sure way toward peace. The depth of such citizen support is a source of strength for all of this nation's policies and purposes. “I am hopeful that the White House Conference on International Cooperation which I have called for November 29 to December 1, can be a landmark session. I hope the conference and the preliminary discussions leading toward it can be a source of new and thoughtful evaluations of what we can do in every major field of international cooperation.” (6) Since then the wheels have been rolling. Thirty Committees of private citizens have prepared reports which are now going to press. Invitations have been printed. Committee and Panel Chairmen have arranged their programs. A remarkable group of Americans have responded to the challenge you gave their leaders in the East Room a year ago. All of this can do good. Little if any of it can do harm. You started it in a great speech. Why should it be stopped now? 3. It may be that I have failed to respond to some special concern of yours. Here are some cases of possible objections with brief answers. Objection One : The Conference will mess up the White House for three days. Answer : All that the White House is committed to is a single reception which the President needs to attend only if he is in town. Objection Two : The Conference will put forward a lot of embarrassing proposals. Answer : There will be no wild proposals, because the private committees have shown themselves very responsible. Moreover, the freedom of action of the executive branch will be fully protected. 4 Objection Three : Some far-out type may use the White House for his own protest on Vietnam, or something else. Answer : This is always a possibility when any group is asked to the White House, but the very presence of 1,000 other well-behaved peace-lovers will be the best possible answer. 4. So my strong recommendation is that we should proceed on schedule. I can think of no reason whatsoever for cancellation, and the only good reason for a postponement would be to allow you to take a larger part in the Conference after your convalescence. Such a postponement can readily be arranged if you wish—though it might raise unnecessary questions about your health, and it would also increase the burden on you at a later time. The only other alternative I can see is to proceed with the Conference, enlist the help of Mrs. Johnson and the Vice President, and keep the load on you as light as possible. Carry on with Mrs. Johnson and the Vice President Postpone it on grounds of health Speak to me 5 McG.B. P.S. Arthur Goldberg just called me on another matter and I checked this problem with him. He asked me to pass this message: It really would be disastrous with all the supporters of the UN if we cancel the Conference. He and Dorothy Goldberg will be delighted to do anything they can to pitch in and keep the load on you as light as possible. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 16. Confidential. A handwritten note indicates the memorandum was received at the LBJ Ranch on November 6 at 9:10 a.m. 2 Bundy had raised the issue with the President in a memorandum on November 2: “At the outset, let me say that while I don't blame you for your concern about the number of White House Conferences, the record shows we are pretty firmly committed to go through with this one as scheduled. In addition to the fact that many leading private citizens have already contributed much time and effort in preparation for the Conference, the public record leaves us little room to maneuver.” (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 4 On November 19 the Bureau of the Budget informed Chase that the ICY report on food and agriculture was “closely parallel” to a proposed Presidential statement on food. However, “BOB has informally made the point to me that if this report comes out, it will substantially decrease the chances of the President making a food initiative anytime in the near future—i.e. he won't want to appear to be following the ICY Committee's lead.” (Memorandum from Chase to Bundy, November 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, White House Conference on International Cooperation, ICY—Tabs 26–31) 5 None of the three options was checked. 276. Editorial Note 276. Editorial Note The White House Conference on International Cooperation was held November 29–December 1, 1965, in Washington. President Johnson, who was in Texas, did not address the conference, but Vice President Humphrey read a message from the President at the opening session on November 29. In his message to the conference, which the President called “a Town Meeting of the leaders of the Nation,” he urged the participants to seek “new ways to raise the world's millions up from poverty, new policies to conserve and develop the world's resources, new methods to rid the world of destructive disease; new means to increase commerce between nations; new safeguards against the overriding danger of war; new avenues to world peace.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pages 1128–1129) The administration found that many of the conference's reports contradicted stated policy or supported programs targeted for extinction. According to an early Bureau of the Budget reaction memorandum, the report on population—a “tricky and sensitive subject” called for more extensive and dramatic U.S. action, when the current U.S. policy was “not to be doctrinaire and to use soft approaches.” Regarding the human rights report, another memorandum noted: “This report proposes to press forward the U.S. into international cooperation in human rights on a broad front. The efficacy of the recommendations involves judgments of U.S. domestic political aspects and how far U.S. goes in surrendering sovereignty or binding its internal affairs by international agreements. These are ticklish problems.” (Memoranda from Chase to Sisco, November 12 and November 17; both in Johnson Library, National Security File, Gordon Chase Files, International Cooperation Year) White House staff members hoped that the conference would be forgotten. “The one outstanding piece of business left over from the ICY conference,” Harold Saunders wrote Bundy on December 17, “is how to organize (or scuttle) the follow-up. …Sisco has sent all the reports to the Cabinet Committee requesting reaction to their recommendations by 22 December. So far the citizens' committees haven't done anything but talk about organizing themselves to follow through. Sisco hopes a quick informal reaction to the recommendations will pre-empt them. My sense is that we want to keep communication informal and let it trail off.” Bundy wrote on this memorandum: “I agree.” (Memorandum from Saunders to Bundy, December 17; ibid., Name File, Saunders Memos, Box 7) 277. Editorial Note 277. Editorial Note In late 1965, as White House staff began to review the issue of population, the State Department's population expert, Robert Barnett, was asked to prepare an overview for White House use. Barnett reported, “Gordon Chase (White House) says it seems to be what was needed for the aid review now afoot over there.” (Memorandum from Barnett to Read, November 22, 1965; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 13) After providing a historical overview stretching back to the Eisenhower administration, Barnett set out a series of principles by which U.S. Government policy could be guided. He made two points. First, the United States could “treat the population problem scientifically without anxiety that to do so will provoke obfuscating ideological dispute as to propriety of that activity.” Second, the U.S. Government “should advocate no specific or elaborate national policy with respect to population questions beyond the policy of stating readiness to respond to requests for help originating at home or in foreign countries with needed resources, financial, scientific, technical, and personnel.” (Ibid.) In a series of major messages in the first 2 months of 1966, President Johnson raised the issue and followed these guidelines on at least six occasions. On January 20, in an address in Independence, Missouri, he said: “The hungry world cannot be fed until and unless the growth in its resources and the growth in its population come into balance. Each man and woman—and each nation—must make decisions of conscience and policy in the face of this great problem. But the position of the United States of America is clear. We will give our help and support to nations which make their own decision to insure an effective balance between the numbers of their people and the food they have to eat.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, page 42) He spoke again on February 1: “The United States cannot and should not force any country to adopt any particular approach to this problem. It is first a matter of individual and national conscience, in which we will not interfere.” (Ibid., page 119) A National Security Action Memorandum, dated November 21, 1966, and annotated “draft not used,” includes a covering memorandum that urged immediate action, but cautioned: “There are admittedly some tough issues to be resolved, both in policy and in tactics. … There's also the political question—whether pushing hard encourages opponents to fight back when we might get just as far by moving ahead quickly. I gather you've decided this is urgent enough to risk a fight. In any case, this in-house shouldn't cause trouble.” The matter went no further. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Robert W. Komer Files, Population Control 1965–March 1966) 278. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 278. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 11, 1966, 6:45 p.m. Pressure is building up for followup on the recommendations of the White House Conference on International Cooperation . 2 Senator Clark spoke on the floor, and the House delegation to the Conference has reported to the Speaker urging vigorous implementation of Conference recommendations. Important private citizens, greatly enthused by the conference, are beginning to ask whether anything will come of it. Dick Gardner will keep the issue alive with a book on the Conference this fall. Our problem is to lay the Conference to rest decently. We do not want to perpetuate it. On the other hand, it would be a bad mistake to ignore the Conference recommendations completely. Too many influential citizens invested too much time, thought and energy. Ignoring their work would unnecessarily antagonize some of our best foreign policy constituents. Besides, there are some good ideas (maybe as many as 200 big and small) among the recommendations, and we might as well take some credit for them. As I see it, there are three ways to handle this problem, making the most of the sensible Conference recommendations and scrapping the useless ones: Course #1: Decentralize implementation to the agencies . State Department recommends (attached)3 that you direct: (1) the Government departments and agencies concerned to implement those ICY recommendations which are in the national interest; (2) the ICY cabinet committee chairman to send each private sector chairman a copy of the progress report (attached); 3 and (3) each Government committee chairman to inform his private sector counterpart that he will be available for further consultations as desired. This would push implementation of recommendations down into the departments and, in effect, bury the Conference without further ceremony. In my view, this would unnecessarily give the private people who participated in the Conference—people who are basically sympathetic with your foreign policy aims—a cause to say we are deaf to new ideas. Course #2: Centralize and spotlight implementation under White House supervision . Enthusiasts like Senator Clark would like you to appoint a small secretariat in the White House or in the Vice President's Office to push the Conference recommendations through the bureaucracy. They would also like to set up a group of leaders from the citizens' committees to provide a channel of continuing communication. I do not recommend that approach either. It would go too far in perpetuating the Conference machinery. It could produce too much publicity and pressure for some of the recommendations on which we are not prepared to act. Course #3: A Compromise . The course I favor (Budget Bureau and Doug Cater agree) is for you to assign an in-house committee headed by Charles Schultze to review the Conference recommendations in the context of preparing your FY 1968 budget and legislative program. You might even assign one of the summer task forces this responsibility, though it is mostly an in-house job since the outsiders have already had their say. We would set this up with a simple memo to department and agency heads (draft attached) 4 asking their cooperation. Then we could put out just enough of a press release to show we are not letting these ideas die. My idea of the committee would be to include the Budget Director (providing the staff work), Joe Califano (in connection with the legislative program), myself and maybe one non-government participant we could trust (to give the outsiders testimony that we have given their ideas a fair shake). This would be mostly dressing up for public consumption work Budget would be doing anyway in the normal budget process. We would just give a little special attention to programs recommended by the Conference so we could produce a good box-score next January. I think this is the least we can do. Burying this show as State recommends risks a bad political backfire. Handling it this way would give an appearance of honest White House attention without perpetuating the Conference or associating you any further with its unpalatable recommendations. There are enough good recommendations that I think we could put together a pretty good story for you in January about how many you have incorporated in your program. By good public relations, we could create a glowing picture of your new efforts to tap good minds everywhere. I see this as complementing our new efforts to increase State Department use of consultants. It is a one-shot deal to screen out good ideas from one of the “[illegible] consultants” we have ever put to work. We will not reassemble that group, so there is no conflict with our new program. However, the image of giving their ideas full hearing would nicely complement announcement of your new program to tap the best private thinking on a permanent (and less cumbersome) basis. There are other advantages in forcing the bureaucracy to follow through on the conference recommendations and on the private contacts they established during the conference. One of the big bottlenecks as we begin adding an international dimension to the Great Society will be to get the traditionally domestic departments like HEW, Interior, and Justice to think in international terms too. If we can perpetuate their contacts with internationally minded private experts and make them think about international programs, we will begin bringing them along into the foreign field. This would not distort any existing or planned programs for expanding use of consultants. It would just underscore their importance. Walt Approve your compromise (Course #3) 5 —Prefer anonymous committee of advisers —Prefer task force Approve State's approach (Course #1) See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Gordon Chase Files, ICY—Vol. II. Confidential. 2 See Document 276 . 3 Not found. 4 Not found. 5 This option is checked. On August 1 Rostow told the President that Charles Schultze had agreed to chair the committee and that they would like to ask Ray Nasher to “sit with us as the one outsider.” Rostow explained, “He worked with us as Executive Director of the Conference last fall and is safe.” (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, August 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Gordon Chase Files, ICY—Vol. II) In an August 26 memorandum setting August 29 as the first meeting date, Saunders told Rostow that part of the purpose of the first meeting was to give Nasher a sense “that this review is serious business.” “Schultze will have him to lunch, and we'll brief him to the hilt,” he added. (Memorandum from Saunders to Rostow, August 26; ibid., Subject File, ICY) 279. Letter From the Chairman of the Board of the Population Council (Rockefeller) to Secretary of State Rusk 279. Letter From the Chairman of the Board of the Population Council (Rockefeller) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 New York, September 13, 1966. Dear Dean: When we met at the luncheon for Prime Minister Holt of Australia, 2 you spoke to me about the quite amazing progress that had been made during this past year concerning the population problem. I agreed that this is true, but said that still the subject is a sensitive one and still there is relatively little around the world in terms of really meaningful action programs. With these thoughts in mind, it has been suggested that it would give encouragement and a real lift to world leaders generally if the heads of government in countries where meaningful family planning programs are under way or at least on the threshold of action, were to sign a joint statement for worldwide release—a sort of manifesto of faith and belief. Attached is a suggested draft of such a statement and a list of the countries whose leaders we would like to interest in signing it. 3 In order to test the validity of the idea and to get reaction to it, the statement was shown to Mr. Douglass Cater at the White House. Our understanding is that he and Mr. Moyers showed it to the President and that the President reacted favorably to signing it provided a number of other key countries were to participate. 4 While I was in India last month I showed the statement to Mr. L.K. Jha, Mrs. Gandhi's principal personal assistant, and also talked with Chester Bowles about it. Word came back that Mrs. Gandhi was favorably inclined. Yesterday while in Washington, I talked with the Ambassadors of Japan, Turkey and Pakistan and the reaction was favorable to the idea although the Turkish Ambassador indicated it might be difficult for his Prime Minister to sign as he had not made any public statement at home on the subject of population as yet. This letter is primarily for your information. If our proposal should move forward as we are hopeful it will, we will be glad to send copies of correspondence concerning it to the American ambassadors in the individual countries if you feel that this would be desirable. 5 With warmest best wishes, I am Sincerely, John 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 13. No classification marking. 2 A White House luncheon on July 14; a complete guest list is in the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) 3 Dated July 22; not printed. The potential signatories listed were India, Pakistan, South Korea, Ceylon, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Kenya, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, the United States, and Sweden. 4 Claxton confirmed this to the Secretary: “Cater tells me this is correct. The President has made no commitment. He wants to know first what other national leaders will sign.” (Memorandum from Claxton to the Secretary, September 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 13) 5 Rockefeller moved forward on his proposal, and by early December the President seemed prepared to sign. (Telegram 2947 from USUN, December 6; ibid., SOC 13 UN) But in November Catholic bishops in the United States had issued a statement on birth control that raised doubts in the White House. On December 5 Gaud called the bishop responsible for the foreign aid section of the statement who assured him that “he had no objection to our responding to requests for aid from other governments provided the programs of those governments were voluntary rather than coercive insofar as individuals are concerned, and told me 'not to worry about it.'” (Memorandum from Gaud to Califano, December 5; ibid.) President Johnson, apparently, was not reassured. (Telegram 99962 to USUN, December 9; ibid.) On December 10, Human Rights Day, UN Secretary-General U Thant released the declaration signed by 10 nations, 9 of which appeared on the original list (Colombia, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Singapore, Sweden, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia) plus Finland and Nepal. (Letter from Rockefeller to Rusk, December 16; ibid., SOC 13–3) Rockefeller was disappointed, but understood “it was due partly to the strong statement of the Catholic bishops and partly because it was suggested to him that maybe there should be other major Western countries included.” (Letter from Rockefeller to Rusk, December 16; ibid.) 280. Action Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to Secretary of State Rusk 280. Action Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 23, 1966. SUBJECT Statement of Policy on Population Matters Summary This memorandum reviews where we are on population policy and summarizes some of the increasing dangers of population growth to economic progress, sufficiency of food and political stability. It argues that excessive population growth is the most serious single problem facing most of the LDC's and that despite the very real advances made by the Department and AID in this field during the last two years, substantial additional attention, planning, staffing, persuasion and action are now essential to make the publicly announced policies of the President on this subject effective and to forestall enormously dangerous future crises. It requests your approval of steps to establish and carry out a policy of more positive action by the Department and AID to encourage and assist family planning programs in AID-assisted and other developing countries. [Here follow two sections entitled “Discussion” and “Policies and Actions Required.”] Recommendations That you approve: 2 1. The attached airgram (Tab A). 3 2. The development by AID of necessary plans and programs and provision of personnel and material to encourage national public and private population control programs in AID countries and to assist them upon request—as a matter of priority. 3. Preparation by State and AID geographic bureaus of joint regional policy papers as guidelines for population activities in the individual countries in their areas. 4. Enlisting the assistance of the Peace Corps and USIA as outlined above (p. 28, at clip). 5. A renewal of efforts by the Department to increase action by UN related agencies to encourage and assist population programs in LDC's and to fund such activities adequately. 6. The development by the Policy Planning Council of a general long-range policy guideline in this field. 7. A briefing along the lines of Tab 4 to be set up on a Saturday morning in late October or early November. 8. The establishment of a Working Group on Population Matters to be composed of appropriate representatives of State, AID, USIA, and the Peace Corps to be chaired by the Special Assistant for Population Matters. 9. The establishment of an Interdepartmental Working Group on Population Matters composed of representatives of State, AID, USIA, the Peace Corps, and such other agencies as Agriculture, HEW, Defense, Bureau of the Census, Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Science and Technology, and the White House, also to be chaired by the Special Assistant for Population Matters. (Specific proposals for the membership and duties of such an Interdepartmental Working Group will be considered as a first order of business by the Working Group referred to in Recommendation 8 and the necessary letters to request heads of other agencies to designate members of this Working Group will be submitted to you later.) 10. That you approve the idea of an Advisory and Coordinating Committee on Population Matters, subject to later decision by you on a list of members and description of duties. (Specific proposals for the membership and duties of such a Committee will be considered as a first order of business by the Working Group referred to in Recommendation 8 and the necessary action papers submitted to you later.) 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 13. Confidential. 2 All recommendations were approved and initialed by Rusk on December 20 except for recommendation 7, which was labeled “previously approved.” A handwritten comment by Gaud reads, “I agree with all the recommendations on pages 32–34, but not all the prefatory discussion and comments.” These are the recommendations printed here. 3 Not found. 4 No specific tab is indicated on the source text. 281. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to all Assistant Secretaries of State, Assistant Administrators of the Agency for International Development, and Other Bureau Heads 281. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to all Assistant Secretaries of State, Assistant Administrators of the Agency for International Development, and Other Bureau Heads 1 Washington, January 19, 1967. SUBJECT Policy and Programs on Population Matters The President in his State of the Union Message has again declared that next to the pursuit of peace, “the really greatest challenge to the human family is the race between food supply and population increase”—a race now being lost. He again stressed the need for concerted action to produce more food and for the developing nations, especially the growing number with food deficits, to undertake voluntary family planning programs. 2 The President's statement underscores the urgency of the policy guidelines and instructions on this subject I have recently approved (attached). 3 These state that for countries threatened by the effects of rapid population growth—either because of danger of famine or burden on economic progress—the Department and Missions must give population matters the high priority, quality and magnitude of attention we are now undertaking to give to food production. I would appreciate it if you would assure that all Country Directors, program officers and others in your bureau dealing with problems of developing nations be fully familiar with these instructions and give their attention to means by which they can be effectively carried out in their areas of responsibility. In view of the increasing urgency of this matter, I hope it will be possible for Missions to have available for me within the next two or three months outlines of their plans for carrying out the President's policy and their instructions in ways appropriate to the circumstances in their country, and their indication of assistance they may need from Washington for this purpose. I anticipate questions from the Congressional Committees on this subject during testimony on the Foreign Aid Bill a few months from now. I would also like a report on what effective contribution we can expect—or arrange for—international organizations and private organizations to make to this task. I have asked Mr. Claxton to be available to consult with you and your staffs on appropriate means to accomplish these purposes and to help arrange necessary assistance from other agencies and private organizations. Dean Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. Confidential. Submitted by Claxton to the Secretary for signature under a January 12 covering memorandum. 2 For text of the January 10 State of the Union message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 2–14. The quoted passage is on p. 11; it reads: “Next to the pursuit of peace, the really greatest challenge to the human family is the race between food supply and population increase. That race tonight is being lost.” 3 Not printed; see Document 280 . 282. Memorandum From Hugh Moore, Director of the Population Policy Panel of the Hugh Moore Fund, to John Rielly of the Vice President's Staff 282. Memorandum From Hugh Moore, Director of the Population Policy Panel of the Hugh Moore Fund, to John Rielly of the Vice President's Staff 1 New York, February 2, 1967. Dear Mr. Rielly: You may have noted that all the polls show the American public to be overwhelmingly in favor of birth control. This goes for Catholics as well as non-Catholics. People are increasingly concerned by the rapid deterioration of living conditions in our country. Over-crowded cities, slums, mounting crime, traffic congestion, polluted air and water, loss of space for recreation, etc. Too many people! And let us not overlook the fact that the burgeoning billions of hungry people abroad will affect us here at home. We are feeding many of them right now and the appeals today are as nothing compared with the demands upon us in the not distant future when millions may be starving. It is therefore fortunate that Catholic laymen generally do not go along with the recent Bishops' injunctions against birth control quoted in a reprint from The New York Times enclosed. 2 It is fortunate also that official Church attitudes do change, however slowly. Masses may now be said in English, meat eaten on Fridays, nuns' clothing modernized, etc. Conscientious public servants meantime should realize that the people at large applaud their efforts to stem the tide of humanity which threatens to engulf us. Sincerely, Hugh Moore 1 Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.10(F), Box 933. No classification marking. 2 Not found; see footnote 5, Document 279 . 283. Letter From Secretary of State of the Holy See Cicsquani to Vice President Humphrey 283. Letter From Secretary of State of the Holy See Cicsquani to Vice President Humphrey 1 The Vatican, February 21, 1967. Dear Mr. Vice President, The Holy Father was pleased to receive your kind letter of January 24th in which you expressed your satisfaction with the establishment of the Papal Commission on International Peace and Justice. 2 The Pontiff has repeatedly urged international collaboration between the nations of the world because He sees in this a very valuable means for advancing an environment in which peace can prevail. Economic assistance and the interchange of technical knowledge will enable the emerging nations to enter with honour and dignity into the family of nations and will help immeasurably in dissipating suspicions. Richly endowed nations will have to shoulder heavy burdens, but history will record for all time their efforts to achieve understanding and respect, a preliminary step towards world peace. His Holiness would have me thank you for your encouragement and for your support of this very important initiative. With kindest personal regards, I am Sincerely yours, A.G. Cardinal Cicsquani 1 Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.10(F), Box 933. No classification marking. 2 In his letter Humphrey wrote: “This is a source of great encouragement to those of us in public office who have for a long time taken a deep interest in the issues of peace and world poverty.” (Ibid.) 284. Letter From the Chairman of the Board of the Population Council (Rockefeller) to Secretary of State Rusk 284. Letter From the Chairman of the Board of the Population Council (Rockefeller) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 New York, March 3, 1967. Dear Dean: My understanding is that a principal reason why President Johnson did not feel he could join in endorsing our World Leaders' Statement on Population was that he felt the group which had agreed to participate was not representative enough. With this thought in mind and recognizing that the Statement would obviously carry more weight if it should be signed by the leaders of some of the great countries of the West, 2 we have now approached the heads of governments of the following countries: Afghanistan Australia Barbados Cambodia Canada Denmark Ecuador El Salvador Ethiopia Ghana Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Liberia Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Philippines Rwanda Syrian Arab Republic Thailand Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United Kingdom of Great Britain This new group is based partly on the list of sponsors of the United Nations resolution on population which was adopted by the General Assembly on December 17, 1966 and partly on the basis of the impact that the country and its chief would have on world opinion. I wanted to send you this information for the record. 3 It was good to see you the other day 4 and I am pleased indeed that you now feel that the Presidential Commission idea has merit. Through Messrs. Gardner and Cater an approach will shortly be made to the President for an appointment with me sometime towards the end of this month. With warmest best wishes as always, I am Sincerely, John 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. No classification marking. 2 See footnote 5, Document 279 . 3 In a March 10 memorandum, Claxton told the Secretary that Rockefeller's goal was to get a “sufficiently long list, including one or more European countries, to open the way for President Johnson to sign.” Claxton also confirmed that Cater would be willing to approach the President again if, for example, Prime Minister Wilson and “one or two others” would sign. (Memorandum from Claxton to the Secretary, March 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13) 4 Secretary Rusk last met with Rockefeller at 12:10 p.m. on February 7. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) 285. Information Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to Secretary of State Rusk 285. Information Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 2, 1967. SUBJECT Pope Paul VI Statement Concerning Population In His Encyclical of March 28, 1967 The portion of Pope Paul's Encyclical which deals with population matters (attached), 2 although so ambiguously worded in places that I hesitate to try to analyze it, seems to me (after consultation with a Catholic demographer who was on the Papal Commission on birth control) to make at least three statements of which may turn out to be of great importance. 1. It recognizes that high rates of population growth add difficulties to the problems of development. 2. It states plainly (“it is certain”) that public authorities can intervene both “by favoring the availability of appropriate information” and “by adopting suitable measures.” The statement that public authorities can intervene is new and potentially of wide applicability. It should open the way for United Nations, national, state, and municipal authorities to provide appropriate information—presumably, but not plainly, meaning birth control information. They may also adopt “suitable measures”—a phrase perhaps intentionally left vague but apparently intended to be different from the “radical measures” that are rejected and may well be interpreted to include provision of some kind of fertility control program. There are two limitations on the “suitable measures:” (a) They must be in conformity with “the moral law,” which is not defined, but may refer to the standing doctrine on birth control—or may not; and (b) They must respect the rightful freedom of married couples, which is not a material limitation in practice. 3. The statement very importantly repeats in plainer language some of the revolutionary statements made by Vatican II: “It is for the parents to decide … on the number of their children,” with four considerations in mind: taking into account their responsibilities toward God; taking into account their responsibilities toward themselves—which presumably can mean their economic situation, the health of the mother and other such factors; taking into account their responsibilities toward the children they already have—which again is an important factor of broad meaning; and taking into account their responsibilities toward their community—again a new factor not in Vatican II and possibly important in communities where there are shortages of food, where economic growth is difficult and where social progress will be held back by excessively large numbers of children. The statement qualifies all this decision-making by the parents with another factor that was not stated by Vatican II: that the parents are to make their decision “with full knowledge of the matter”— which might be read to mean adequate information concerning the possibilities of birth control. The statement concludes with a limitation which is potentially broad in that it says “they must” (and hence may) “follow the demands of their own conscience.” This broad authority may be limited by the following phrase which speaks of the “conscience” as “enlightened by God's law authentically interpreted.” A footnote to this clause refers to one of the Vatican II documents which refers to the statement of Pope Pius IX in 1931 regarding “natural” means of birth control. It is perhaps significant that the word “enlightened” is used—not such a word as “governed.” The fact that the entire statement is ambiguous in several places and open to interpretation is itself important in giving flexibility to officials, individuals and perhaps individual priests. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3. Limited Official Use. 2 Not printed. The encyclical, Populorum Progressio, was released on March 28. It acknowledged that too frequently an “accelerated demographic increase adds its own difficulties to the problems of development: the size of the population increases more rapidly than available resources, and things are found to have apparently reached an impasse.” 3 Commentators at the time interpreted the encyclical as progressive. For example, the March 28 headline in the Washington Evening Star read: “Pontiff Voices Eased View on Birth Control.” This interpretation was shared by some observers in Latin American countries as well. The Embassy in Caracas reported: “Liberal Catholics in Venezuela have seen the Pope's statement as a new opening or at least a willingness to continue further study of the problem of birth control.” (Airgram A–735, April 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3) 286. Editorial Note 286. Editorial Note In April 1967 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations took a major step on population matters. The committee chair, J. William Fulbright, ranking minority member Bourke Hickenlooper, and 17 other Senators supported an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill authorizing $50 million per year for 3 years “to provide assistance for voluntary family planning programs in friendly foreign countries and areas, on such terms and conditions as he (the President) shall determine, to foreign governments, United Nations specialized agencies, United States and foreign nonprofit organizations, universities, hospitals, accredited health institutions, and voluntary health or other qualified organization.” (AIDTO circular telegram 2417, April 12, 1967; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3) As a State Department analysis prepared in mid-1968 noted, policy developments in population matters in the Executive Branch were “in part led” by developments in Congress. (AID circular cable PA 201, July 13, 1968; ibid.) In mid-1968 the Senate Committee re-emphasized its concerns of the previous year, charging that State Department and AID officials had not given the population problem “the priority it deserves.” (Ibid.) The House Foreign Affairs Committee agreed and urged that family planning be a central element of AID activities: “In order to counteract any possible tendency … to continue business as usual and to regard family planning programs as a fringe operation, $50 million of economic assistance funds have been set aside to be used only for this purpose.” (Ibid.) The Department believed that the discussion surrounding the amendment of the Foreign Aid legislation, which ultimately passed as Title X, signaled six major elements of policy favored by leaders of both parties in Congress: “1. The Congress is deeply concerned that present rates of population growth in many developing countries are seriously impeding efforts toward economic and social development and threaten serious food shortages in only a few years; “2. The Congress wants the Executive Branch to move much more rapidly and effectively than it has in the past to provide assistance in this field to developing nations; “3. The Congress is willing to provide greatly increased funds for this purpose and wants the funds used more liberally—even permitting grants to be made where loans are required for older programs; “4. The Congress knows that the fundamental decisions for action can be made only by each developing nation itself and that the United States and other outside agencies can help only as we are wanted; “5. The Congress would like to see U.S. program assistance conveyed as far as is reasonably practicable through United Nations and other multilateral channels and wants to see the widest practical involvement of private organizations; “6. The Congress wants to be sure that U.S. aid goes only to programs where participation is voluntary and each individual is free to practice methods of family planning consistent with his or her beliefs.” (Ibid.) 287. Memorandum From John Rielly of the Vice President's Staff to Vice President Humphrey 287. Memorandum From John Rielly of the Vice President's Staff to Vice President Humphrey 1 Washington, April 14, 1967. SUBJECT Pope's Encyclical “The Development of Peoples” Although I know you are familiar with the Pope's encyclical 2 and discussed it with him two weeks ago, I doubt if you had a chance to read much of the text or to go over it thoroughly. I am attaching a copy of the text together with an article from the Times on it. 3 The encyclical provoked a stronger reaction both here and in Europe than most encyclicals do. The reason is clear: language is blunt and direct both in its indictment of the status quo and in its prescription for the future. It states clearly that no purely economic standard, whether Marxist or capitalist, can be the ultimate guide to governing a society. Because it condemned the evils of unrestrained capitalism and insisted that private property and profit must be subordinated to a higher common good, it was criticized by the Wall Street Journal as “warmed over marxism.” Similar judgments were rendered by certain conservative journals in Europe, particularly in Italy. They were further annoyed by the fact that it does not discuss communism per se (just as the encyclical Pacem in Terris 4 did not) but concentrates instead on the problems arising from the disparities involved between developed and underdeveloped nations. In contrast to earlier encyclicals, the discussion focuses on the propertyless nation rather than the propertyless class. The status of the underdeveloped countries today is regarded as similar to the proletariat in European nations a century ago. The situation will get worse instead of better until action is taken. The Pope makes it unequivocally clear that not only individuals have a moral obligation but nations as well. Humanitarian aid is not enough, but rather “it is a question, rather, of building a world for [where?] every man, no matter what his race, religion or nationality, can live a fully given life, freed from servitude imposed on him by other men or by natural forces over which he has not sufficient control; a world where freedom is not an empty word and where the poor man Lazarus can sit down at the same table with the rich man.” The implications of all this are very concrete for wealthy nations like the United States and Western European powers. These countries must face the explosive political questions of paying taxes to help developing nations. Will we pay higher prices for imported goods from these nations? Will we be willing to work out some alteration of our trading policies to guarantee a fair and stable price for agriculture products and raw material? These are of course some of the questions being discussed at the Latin American Summit Conference in Punta del Este this week 5 and they are the questions which come up in the United Nations every year. The President indicated a greater willingness to consider these measures than we have previously done. Through the newly established Papal Commission on Justice and Peace, 6 through a similar secretariat at the World Council of Churches and the National Council of Churches here, a concerted effort will be made to change popular thinking precisely on these issues discussed in the encyclical. It will be a long, slow process, resisted by many vested interests here. But, if the prescriptions suggested in this encyclical are ever to be followed, it will take a long-term massive shift in public opinion before any legislative body will approve a program implementing what the encyclical proposes. It is not so much the cost—some one figured out that the Marshall Plan in total cost roughly what the Vietnamese war takes for seven months. Rather one must convince the public that it is just as worthy to spend money to build nations as it is to spend it in a war. I think you should probably plan to make one address on this subject during the commencement season. The last time you gave a full speech on this was at Fordham University two years ago (incidentally, the message of the Fordham speech and the encyclical are almost identical—note attached). 7 You have one commencement speech scheduled at the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul which might be an appropriate forum for such a speech. 8 1 Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.10(F), Box 933. No classification marking. A handwritten note by Humphrey at the top of the page reads, “John R. See me.” 2 See Document 285 . 3 Neither found. 4 See Document 271 . 5 A meeting of the Latin American Heads of State was held April 11–14 at Punta del Este, Uruguay. 6 See Document 283 . 7 Not found. 8 The Vice President wrote “Yes,” underlined twice, in the margin next to his sentence. 288. Memorandum of Conversation 288. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 11, 1967, 11 a.m. PARTICIPANTS The Vice President Monsignor Joseph Gremillon, Executive Director of Papal Commission on Peace and Justice Monsignor Marvin Bordelon, Executive Secretary of National Secretariat on Justice and Peace John E. Rielly, Assistant to the Vice President The Vice President opened the conversation by commenting on what a powerful document the Pope's encyclical on “The Development of Peoples” 2 was. He had discussed it with the Pope and he had been thinking about how one could best translate this into action. We should not be content just to have it discussed for a few weeks then dropped. Monsignor Gremillon explained that this is precisely what the Papal Commission on Justice and Peace in Rome and the National Secretariat on Justice and Peace in Washington were set up to do. 3 He said that his own office was in Rome and that Monsignor Bordelon was setting up an office in Washington under the auspices of the United States Catholic Conference. The Vice President wondered whether the energies of Vietnam could be redirected and rechanneled into positive development avenues after the war was over. He hoped this would be so but was not sure. Monsignor Gremillon explained that the whole effort to arouse and educate the consciences of people to the problem of development must be strictly ecumenical. He explained that he was in regular contact with his colleagues in the World Council of Churches and only three weeks ago had visited Eugene Carson Blake in Geneva. Blake was coming to Rome next week for further meetings. It turned out that they were also cooperating regularly with the Russian Orthodox Church. The Archbishop of Leningrad invited a group of 30 leaders from the World Council of Churches and from the Catholic Church to come to a meeting in the Soviet Union sometime this year to discuss the whole theory and doctrine of development. The Archbishop said not only would this be very worthwhile world-wide, but would be immensely helpful to them in Russia. The Vice President stated that that is a most significant development. He believed that leaders of some of the socialist countries should be encouraged by certain parts of the Pope's recent encyclical because of the sharp critique of certain forms of capitalism contained in it. This does not necessarily apply to the United States, but it does apply to capitalism in some areas. Monsignor Bordelon suggested in that regard that one of the functions of the Washington National Secretariat here is to serve as a vehicle for communicating with the Vatican on issues of concern to the United States or to any important segment of the United States public. For example, the American business community has not really participated in the writing of the recent encyclicals. As a result there really has been no encyclical which elaborates fully on the difference between the American private enterprise system and this sort of laissez faire capitalism that the Pope condemns. The Vice President said he was concerned about the debasement of public opinion in the United States today. This not only applies to international affairs but to the poverty program, civil rights, as well as foreign aid. Therefore, we have a great problem in trying to get people to think about war on hunger, social justice and the other themes discussed in the encyclicals Pacem in Terris and The Development of Peoples. We would like to see people get aroused about this as well as about the war. The United States Government is ultimately responsive to public opinion. If public opinion on this issue changes, Government policy will reflect the change. But, meanwhile, millions of people are dying. Monsignor Gremillon said that he hoped what he was trying to organize would do precisely that. He told the Vice President that at a meeting this week in Detroit, where he talked about the encyclical and the problem of development, he discussed the issue of developed nations contributing one percent of their gross national product to foreign assistance. Walter Reuther, who was the respondent on the platform, said he believed it should be two percent. Monsignor Gremillon said that at the recent meeting of the Papal Commission an idea was put forth by Barbara Ward to develop a “package plan” among developed nations. They agreed to aim at $30 billion by 1970. This would be divided between the United States and Europe. Once all developed nations agreed on a package there would be pressure put on them to live up to the commitment. It would clearly be a multilateral effort, involving not only governments and other groups but church groups, professional groups and a wide variety of lay associations. The Vice President said that the more the United States becomes involved in military programs the greater the need for the United States to be involved in programs in the field of social justice overseas. He said he was going to discuss this subject at an agribusiness conference in Chicago tonight. Monsignor Gremillon said he hoped that he and Monsignor Bordelon could work with the Vice President and his staff, given his background and history of interest on this subject. The Vice President said he wanted to work closely and he hoped they would feel free to share with us their problems and any ideas they may have. He said Mr. Rielly of his staff would be available to keep in regular touch. Occasionally when people come through Washington Mr. Bordelon should bring them around to see him. The Vice President then concluded the conversation with a summary of the highlights of his conversation with the Pope when he was in Europe. 1 Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.10(F), Box 933. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Executive Office Building. 2 See Document 285 . 3 See Document 283 . 289. Action Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to Secretary of State Rusk 289. Action Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 25, 1967. SUBJECT Population—1) President's Commission on Population; 2) President's Approval of World Leaders' Statement on Family Planning Discussion I understand from Mr. Cater that Mr. John Rockefeller's visit to the President 2 resulted in the following: 1) The President was sufficiently interested in Mr. Rockefeller's proposal for a Presidential Commission to study the population problem that he asked Mr. Rockefeller to submit a detailed memorandum. He also asked Mr. Cater to follow up on it. 3 2) Mr. Rockefeller expressed the hope that the President would find it possible to sign the World Leaders' Declaration on Population. 4 He mentioned his hopes that Prime Minister Wilson would do so and said that Mr. Kosygin had expressed interest. Mr. Cater told the President he understood you would have some recommendations for him. The President said: “That's fine.” Background : You will recall that the World Leaders' Statement (Tab B) 5 as released by the Secretary-General with a statement of his own (Tab B) on Human Rights Day, December 10, 1966, was signed by 12 Heads of State or Government. (Names at Tab C.) 6 The Prime Minister of Japan had indicated he would sign but declined after it became known that the President would not. When Mr. Rockefeller asked the President to sign early in December 1966, you believed it would be better for him to defer until the leaders of one or more of the major developed nations would also sign, so that the President would not be the only such signer. Since then, Mr. Rockefeller has asked an additional 25 leaders to sign (list of countries at Tab C). The leaders of Iran, Jordan, Barbados and Ghana have agreed (Tab C). Former Prime Minister Zjilstra of the Netherlands agreed but is no longer in office. I anticipate that Mr. Rockefeller will ask Prime Minister de Jong to sign. He has reasonable hopes from the reply to his letter to Prime Minister Wilson that he will sign as part of a governmental statement on population. Mr. Kosygin sent Mr. Rockefeller a message through the Soviet Mission to the U.N. that he would give Mr. Rockefeller's request careful consideration as a matter of importance. Apparently his requests to several other Heads of State or Government are also still under consideration by them. Comment : I believe it is appropriate to recommend to the President that he should now decide to sign and that he permit his decision to be used to encourage Prime Minister Wilson and other leaders still considering the matter to decide to sign with him. I feel sure Mr. Cater agrees with this conclusion. My reasons are: 1) The resolution is fundamentally right, sound and conservatively worded. 2) Each of the four statements beginning “We believe …” is fully in line with comparable statements made by the President. The key statement “that the opportunity of families to decide the number and spacing of their children is a basic human right” is closely in line with the President's statement in his Domestic Health and Education Message, March 1, 1966: “We have a growing concern to foster the integrity of the family, and the opportunity for each child. It is essential that all families have access to information and services that will allow freedom to choose the number and spacing of their children within the dictates of individual conscience.” 3) Since December 1966, acceptance of the ideas involved in government assistance to voluntary family planning has continued to increase in the United States: We are not aware of any publicly or privately expressed opposition to Mr. Gaud's statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that AID would now receive requests to provide contraceptives; Representative Zablocki has said publicly that he does not oppose aid to family planning as long as there is no coercion; there seems to have been a generally favorable public reaction to the fact that the recently disclosed Report of the Papal Commission on birth control showed that the overwhelming majority favored a Papal statement allowing contraception. 4) Pope Paul's Encyclical shows a substantial advance: It expressly recognizes that “too frequently an accelerated demographic increase adds its own difficulties to the problems of development …” On the most delicate point, it says: “Finally, it is for the parents to decide, with full knowledge of the matter, on the number of their children, taking into account their responsibilities toward God, themselves, the children they have already brought into the world, and the community to which they belong.” 5) The President's leadership at this point might have an encouraging effect on those leaders who are still considering whether to sign. 6) The absence of the signature of the President of the United States when the next group of signatures is released would be inconsistent with the position the U.S. takes domestically and internationally. Recommendation That you send the President the proposed memorandum at Tab A or discuss the matter with him along the same lines. 7 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. No classification marking. Cleared by R.T. Ravenholt (AID), R. Petree (EA/J), Goldstein (EUR/BMI), and L. Van Nort (IO/OES). 2 Rockefeller wrote Rusk on May 5 that he had a meeting scheduled with the President for May 12. (Letter from Rockefeller to Rusk, May 5; ibid.) Rockefeller did meet with the President in an off-the-record session. According to the President's Daily Diary, “Cater's briefing memo indicated that he would like to mention briefly the progress in Latin America and elsewhere in the area of population planning—also Rockefeller believes that it would be highly appropriate for the President to set up a Commission on population.” (Johnson Library) 3 President Johnson asked Rockefeller to submit a detailed memorandum complete with mandate and list of possible participants. (Memorandum from Rockefeller to the President attached as an enclosure to a letter from Rusk to Rockefeller, August 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13) 4 See Document 284 . 5 Not printed here, but see Document 279 . 6 Not printed; see footnote 5, Document 279 . 7 Tab A, a June 8 memorandum from Rusk to the President, is not printed. It shows that on June 8 Rusk approved the memorandum to the President recommending “That you decide to sign the World Leaders' Declaration on Population and authorize me to tell Prime Minister Wilson, the Prime Minister of Japan, and the leaders of several smaller countries now considering signing, that you hope they will join you in signing.” 290. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 290. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 15, 1967. Dear Mr. President: I am pleased to send you an advance copy of the report on the World Food Problem which was prepared by a Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee. 2 The report will be released by the White House on Sunday, June 18. This report defines the magnitude of the food problem, describes the reasons why the United States should be concerned, and outlines and recommends what must be done if the problem is to be solved. I believe the scope and significance of the report are apparent from its four basic conclusions: 1. The scale, severity, and duration of the World Food Problem are so great that a massive, long-range, innovative effort unprecedented in human history will be required to master it. 2. The solution of the problem after 1985 demands that programs of population control be initiated now. For the immediate future, the food supply is critical. 3. Food supply is directly related to agricultural development and, in turn, agricultural development and overall economic development are critically interdependent in the hungry countries. 4. A strategy for attacking the World Food Problem will, of necessity, encompass the entire foreign economic assistance effort of the United States in concert with other developed countries, voluntary institutions, and international organizations. If you have any questions concerning the report or its recommendations, please feel free to call my office. Sincerely yours, Donald Hornig 1 Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, 1965–68, 150.E.14.8(8), Box 931. No classification marking. 2 Not printed. The President tasked the Science Advisory Committee to undertake the study in his Food for Peace message on February 10, 1966. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 163–169) The June 17 White House announcement of the release of the report is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 134–135. The report, which was published in late 1967 as The World Food Problem, consisted of three volumes; for a summary of volume III, “Resource Papers,” see Department of State Bulletin , December 25, 1967, p. 874. 291. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 291. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 1 Washington, June 23, 1967. SUBJECT World Leaders' Declaration on Population John Rockefeller 3rd is, of course, very pleased by the President's decision to sign the Declaration. 2 He is anxious to follow the President's wish that further efforts be made to obtain the signatures of other leaders. I have worked out with him and his assistant, Mr. Raymond Lamontagne, the following procedure: A. Rockefeller will: 1. Work out with U Thant an arrangement for a second announcement of additional signers in the late summer like the announcement last December. This would include the President and all other signers who can be accumulated by that time. 2. Renew his requests to the Prime Ministers of the UK and Japan as a matter of priority. He has already talked to their Ambassadors at the UN, both of whom are confident that their PM's will sign. He has written Prime Minister Sato. 3. Renew his request to Kosygin, telling him the President has signed. I have spoken to Ambassador Thompson about this. He believes the President's signing will have some favorable influence on Kosygin. Rockefeller wrote Dobrynin a few days ago offering to talk with Kosygin on this subject. Kosygin replied through a Washington Embassy Counsellor that he was “terribly grateful” for Mr. Rockefeller's invitation; he could not accept on this visit; he is interested in the matter; it will receive his attention and Rockefeller will hear from him in the near future. 4. Renew his requests to the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. All these have given him favorable personal reactions but have not signed because of concern within their governments. Now that France is repealing its anti-contraceptives legislation, it is possible the atmosphere may change in Canada. 5. Renew his requests to the leaders of Norway, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Liberia, Jamaica and El Salvador, most of whom have not replied either way. He talked to the King of Thailand here. The King said he was personally sympathetic and would speak to the Prime Minister. 6. Probably approach the President of Costa Rica who in April announced family planning services would be provided in government health clinics. 7. Talk to the President of the Philippines on a visit there in August. 8. Consider writing President DeGaulle. Rockefeller will send each of our Ambassadors a copy of his new message to the local leader. B. The State Department will: 1. Send special messages to our Ambassadors in the UK, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, informing them that the President has agreed to sign and instructing them to tell the Prime Minister the President would welcome the Prime Minister's joining him. Messages are attached for your concurrence (Tab A). 3 2. Send a circular airgram to our Ambassadors in Norway, Turkey, Pakistan, Liberia, Jamaica and El Salvador to the same effect. The circular is attached for your concurrence (Tab B). 3. Inform our Embassy in Thailand of Rockefeller's discussion with the King. 4. Ask our Ambassador in the Philippines to coordinate his approach to the President with Rockefeller. 5. Follow up with our Ambassador to Costa Rica and to France as appropriate. Rockefeller tells me he has received from each signing leader a short letter to him which he has given, or will give, to U Thant as a means of official notification of signature. He would like such a letter from the President, possibly with some appropriate brief expression of personal feeling. A draft of a proposed letter is attached (Tab C). 4 Phil 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. Limited Official Use. A covering memorandum, also June 23, from Read to Rostow states that Claxton had been working with Cater on the President's request that additional efforts be made to induce British Prime Minister Wilson and Japanese Prime Minister Sato plus other world leaders to sign. 2 The date on which President Johnson actually signed the declaration has not been determined; for information on its public release, see footnote 2, Document 292 . 3 Tabs A and B were not found. 4 Not printed. 292. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 292. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 1 Washington, August 4, 1967. SUBJECT World Leaders' Declaration on Population Prime Minister Wilson has now informed Mr. Rockefeller that he has decided to adhere to the World Leaders' Declaration on Population on behalf of the Government of the U.K. He asks to be told what plans are being worked out with U Thant for the release of additional names (Tab A). 2 (As I have mentioned to you before, Rockefeller has talked to Philippe de Seynes, U Thant's Under Secretary, about a release of several names in the late summer or early fall and de Seynes has assured him there would be no difficulty.) Rockefeller at once asked the Japanese Ambassador to follow up with Prime Minister Sato. The Ambassador has cabled Sato, telling him of Wilson's agreement and asking for an early decision. Rockefeller would like to have this before writing Prime Ministers Pearson, Holt and Holyoake to tell them of Wilson's action and again invite their signatures. However, he will write these three before leaving August 11 for the Far East, even if he has not heard from Sato. He will send copies to each of our Ambassadors which will initiate their follow up with their Prime Ministers, as requested in our messages to each Ambassador. I mentioned to you that the principal statements in the Declaration (Tab B) 3 go no further than Pope Paul's statements in the Encyclical Populorum Progresio (Tab C). You asked for a comparison. One is attached which also shows comparable statements made by the President (Tab D). You may also be interested in the apparent derivation of the statements in the Encyclical from the majority report of the Papal Commission on Birth Control (Tab E). Phil 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. No classification marking. Attached is a covering memorandum, also dated August 4, from Read to Rostow. 2 Not printed. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson informed Rockefeller on July 19 that he would sign the declaration. (Letter from Wilson to Rockefeller, July 19; ibid., SOC 13) Secretary-General U Thant's Statement on Population also is attached to the memorandum. On December 11 the Secretary-General released a list of new signatories of the World Leaders' Declaration on Population. President Johnson, British Prime Minister Wilson, and Japanese Prime Minister Sato were among the 18 new signatories, bringing the total to 30. 3 Tabs B–E are not printed. 293. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 293. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters (Claxton) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater) 1 Washington, December 5, 1967. SUBJECT Proposal for a Presidential Commission on Population Some time ago, before the President decided to defer action on the Rockefeller proposal for a Presidential Commission on Population, 2 you asked me to see what the interested people thought about it. Here is a summary of the information I had collected. Secretary Rusk believes the Commission should be undertaken at an appropriate time, primarily as a matter of importance to the United States internally, but also because the existence of such a study will put us in a less vulnerable position as we endeavor to obtain appropriate attention by foreign countries to their population growth problems. The list of members should be looked at for proper balance. Phil Lee told me that Secretary Gardner, who last year was doubtful about the desirability of such a study, now believes it should be undertaken. He thought it should have a domestic emphasis. The immediate need is for additional funding of domestic and foreign programs in the population/family planning field. Since a Commission would presumably recommend such increases, it would be wrong to go forward unless the President believes he could propose such increases to the Congress. Secretary Gardner would like to go over the membership list with care before appointments might be made. Secretary Udall strongly favored such a Commission. He suggested a blue-ribbon group to focus sharply on the domestic population problem with the thought that recognition that we have a problem and are taking action to move on it would help us abroad. He would like to review the list of names suggested to be sure highly qualified people from minority groups are included. He believed strongly the Commission should be public in nature with a report to be made publicly. Secretary Weaver's office reported that he would go along with the proposal. Sargent Shriver was not convinced that the public visibility of a Presidential Commission is needed at this time. He thinks good progress is being made in obtaining public acceptance of the need for providing opportunities for family planning through individual freedom of choice—such as the Family Planning Program conducted by OEO. He was concerned that the publicity attendant on White House projects might upset present acquiescence and tacit support by groups in our society that are evolving new positions in this sensitive area. However, if such a Commission were established, OEO would cooperate fully with it. The membership of such a Commission should be less professorial and should include those who can speak for the poor, including Negro spokesmen for that group. Phil 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13. Limited Official Use. 2 See Documents 270 and 289 . Rockefeller spoke to Rusk again in August 1967 when he submitted a memorandum to the President (see footnote 3, Document 289 ). At that time, Claxton told Rusk that the White House had submitted the proposal to the Bureau of the Budget, which had responded unfavorably. (Memorandum from Claxton to the Secretary, August 15; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13) After consultation with Laurence Rockefeller, Cater decided that the matter should be deferred until late September. (Ibid.) In October Cater asked Claxton to survey interested agencies for their opinions. Rockefeller also approached Mrs. Johnson: “Mr. Cater told me later that Mrs. Johnson took the matter up with the President who replied that he did not want to go forward with the Commission idea then.” (Ibid.) 294. Editorial Note 294. Editorial Note On July 29, 1968, the Vatican released Pope Paul VI's encyclical letter, Humanae Vitae, on birth control. It reaffirmed traditional Catholic views, calling every form of contraception except voluntary continence “illicit.” In doing so the Pope overruled the recommendations of the majority of the Papal Commission set up by his predecessor to provide a factual basis for a reply by the Church. The encyclical also viewed economic development and social progress as the only solutions to the problems of the developing world. A detailed discussion of the encyclical and a comprehensive analysis of world reaction is in INR Research Memorandum RSF–2 to Secretary Rogers, February 17, 1969. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3) 295. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 295. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 1 Washington, August 12, 1968, 2031Z. 219240. Subj. Population/Family Planning Programs. Joint State/AID/USIA message. For Ambassadors, USAID Mission Directors, Public Affairs Officers. 1. We do not wish to engage in any public discussion of the Papal Encyclical 2 and you should decline to comment if asked. If answers to questions on U.S. policy toward population/family planning activities are called for, they should be along the following lines: a The U.S. Government is deeply interested in the economic development and social progress of developing countries and in the health and well-being of individual families in those countries. b It is of course for each country to determine its own policy on population and family planning matters. c It is also for parents to decide voluntarily whether they wish to accept family planning services. d If any country wishes assistance that we can provide for a voluntary population/family planning program it decides upon, we will be glad to offer it. e If appropriate, it might also be pointed out that the U.S. has a national policy and program to provide family planning information and materials to its own people through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and many State and local programs.) 2. CA–4609 of December 1966 3 continues to apply. 3. For ARA Posts: We are told that both OAS SYG Galo Plaza and PAHO Director-General Horowitz have told their staffs to go ahead with their respective population programs previously planned. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 13–3. Confidential. Drafted by Claxton; cleared by Gaud, Brown (S/S), and Pauker (USIA), and Poole (ARA/LA) for paragraph 3; and approved by Secretary Rusk. 2 See Document 294 . 3 Dated December 20, 1966. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 13–3) Hijacking Hijacking 296. Editorial Note 297. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 25, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas Williams (E/OA) and cleared by William Beal (E/OA), John Meadows (E/OA), and Frank Loy (E/TT). 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland Washington, July 10, 1968, 1544Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential. Drafted by John Fitzerald (ARA/CCA); cleared by Clement Sobotka (S/R–ORM), Nikstatus (INS), Williams (E/TT), Barbara Watson (SCA), and John Crump (EUR/AIS); and approved by Fitzgerald. 299. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation July 17, 1968, 9:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Limited Official Use. Loy was in Washington; Gazdik in Vermont. Drafted by Loy. 300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico Washington, July 20, 1968, 0048Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Fitzgerald, cleared by Loy and Chaplin (ARA/MEX), and approved by Robert Sayre (ARA). 301. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 1, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Feehan. 302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico Washington, August 9, 1968, 2141Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential; Limdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Feehan (OA/AVP), cleared by Chaplin (ARA/MEX) and Richard Frank (L/ARA), and approved by Loy. 303. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 5, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. No classification marking. Drafted by John Meadows (E/OA) with concurrences from Allan Mendelsohn (L/E) and Alexander Schnee (H). A handwritten note at the top of the page reads: “Sir: Proposed memo from Read to Rostow below. Your report to the President should be signed where indicated by blotter.” Rusk's initials appear on the memorandum. 304. Editorial Note 305. Telegram From the Consulate in Montreal to the Department of State Montreal, October 19, 1968, 2028Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; Priority. 306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico Washington, October 24, 1968, 0011Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Feehan (E/OA); cleared by Michael Styles (E/OA), Mark Feldman (L/ARA), Rueda (ARA/MEX), and Park Wollam (ARA/CCA); and approved by Loy. 307. Airgram From the Department of State to the Mission to the International Civil Aviation Organization Washington, November 6, 1968, 4:34 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 6. Confidential. Drafted by Feehan (E/OA); cleared by Styles (E/OA), Knute Malmborg (L/ARA), Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA), Flynn (DOT), and Helfert (DOT); and approved by Loy. 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 27, 1968, 1607Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; Limdis; Priority. Drafted by Feehan (E/OA); cleared by Meadows (E/OA), Feldman (L/ARA), Wollam (ARA/CCA); and approved by Styles (E/OA). 309. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, December 6, 1968. Source: Department of State,ARA Files: Lot 74 D 467, Covey T. Oliver, December 1968. Confidential. Drafted by Feldman (L/ARA) and Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA); cleared by Murray Belman (L), Malmborg (L/SCA), Loy, Feldman (L/ARA), Vaky (ARA), and Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA). A copy was sent to the Under Secretary. 310. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, December 10, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential. 311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland Washington, December 11, 1968, 1947Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Feldman (L/ARA) and Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA); cleared by Loy (E/TT), Vaky (ARA), Kiselyak (H), Stabler (EUR/AIS), and Brown (S/S); and approved by Secretary Rusk. 312. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for International Affairs and Special Programs (Agger) Washington, December 12, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential. Drafted by Loy and Solomon and cleared by Fitzgerald. 313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland Washington, December 20, 1968, 2354Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Fitzgerald; cleared by Feldman (L/ARA), Vaky (ARA), Loy, John Crump (EUR/AIS), and Brown (S/S); and approved by Fitzgerald. 314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada Washington, December 30, 1968, 2056Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential. Drafted by Feehan (E/OA); cleared by Beal (E/TT), Feldman (L), Scott (EUR/CAN), Styles (E/OA), Fitzgerald, and Vaky; and approved by Loy. 296. Editorial Note 296. Editorial Note On May 1, 1961, National Airlines Flight 440 to Key West became the first American aircraft to be hijacked to Cuba. Three more American planes were seized during July and August. On September 5, 1961, P.L. 87–197 made it a crime to commit or attempt to commit air piracy. (U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area; Report Pursuant to H. Res. 179 (1968), page 4) After the law was passed, in the period September 1961–July 1967, two hijacking attempts were frustrated, two succeeded, and one plane was stolen and flown to Cuba. (Appendix A; ibid.) Previous international prohibitions on the seizure of aircraft during transnational flights were stipulated in the Chicago Convention of 1944, which codified public international aviation law. To strengthen these measures, as early as 1950 the legal committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) began a study of the jurisdictional issues of crimes committed on board aircraft. The Tokyo Convention, completed by the committee in 1963, established a positive rule of law that awarded jurisdiction over offenses committed on board an aircraft to the State in which the aircraft was registered. The convention was signed by 29 nations but would not enter into force until 12 nations had ratified it. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, pages 974–975) As late as the end of 1968, only seven nations—Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of China, and Italy—were signatories. (Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area) In August and September 1967 two Colombian planes were hijacked, followed by seizure of a Bahamian craft in November. In the United States, a small plane was hijacked on February 17, 1968. Four days later, a DC–8 with 102 passengers was hijacked to Cuba on a Chicago-to-Miami run. During March hijackers struck Colombian, Venezuelan, Mexican, and American aircraft. 297. Memorandum of Conversation 297. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 25, 1968. SUBJECT Hijacking of Commercial Aircraft PARTICIPANTS Mr. Knut Hammarskjold, Director-General of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Mr. Julian Gazdik, General Counsel and Secretary of the Legal Committee, IATA Mr. Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic Affairs Mr. Thomas E. Williams, Aviation Liaison Division Mr. Loy opened by saying that we have been concerned by the number of recent incidents of US and other aircraft hijacked to Cuba 2 and particularly the hijacking of commercial aircraft, which threatens the safety of so many passengers. He pointed out there are two major aspects to this problem from our point of view: first, what can be done to discourage these incidents and second, how best to assure the return of aircraft and passengers once a hijacking occurs. With regard to the latter question, Mr. Loy stressed that we have not had any problems in the past and, despite Castro's recent speech indicating he might not be so cooperative in the future, we did not anticipate any difficulty. However, in the event that there should be some difficulty about the return of a plane and/or passengers which could not be resolved through other channels, we might want at that time to ask the Director-General if he could be of some assistance. Mr. Loy said again that we were not asking Mr. Hammarskjold to take any action at this time and we would not want anyone, particularly the Cubans, to get the impression we were anticipating difficulties. Mr. Hammarskjold said he understood and, without giving any definite commitment, indicated that his office might well be able to be of some assistance in such a situation if the need should arise. He observed that ICAO might also be able to help since the seizure of an aircraft engaged in scheduled international service would be contrary to the Chicago Convention. He mentioned also the Tokyo Convention on offenses committed on board aircraft but it was noted that the Convention is not yet in force and that it has not been ratified either by the US or Cuba. As for possible means of discouraging hijacking, Mr. Loy summarized recent hijacking incidents and pointed out that in many cases the individuals involved had been mentally unbalanced and/or criminals fleeing from justice. He said we had been considering the possible deterrent effects if such individuals could be returned to the country where the hijacking was committed to stand trial. We realized, he said, there are both legal and political difficulties involved in extradition of such persons to or from Cuba. Moreover, while the US Government might be willing to explore the possibility of a reciprocal understanding on the return of commercial aircraft hijackers, where the lives and property of others are generally endangered, we have reason to believe that the Cubans would probably want to extend the issue to cover the return of all escapees from Cuba, including those that may escape by means of small boats, rafts, etc. Mr. Loy said return of such persons—who were often politically motivated—would generally be politically and morally unacceptable to the United States. Mr. Loy pointed out, again, that we were not asking Mr. Hammarskjold to take any specific action at this time but, rather, were interested in obtaining his views as to what might be done in this regard. Mr. Hammarskjold said he had given careful thought to this matter. He could, he said, more readily visualize a role for IATA, as a representative of the carriers, on the question of return of aircraft and passengers than on the more political question of return of hijackers. He said any action by IATA in this regard would have to be very carefully considered but he did not preclude the possibility. Hammarskjold then said that his office might be willing to consider a low-key approach, through Cubana Airlines officials, indicating that the various carriers involved, i.e., Mexican, Venezuelan, and Colombian, as well as US, had expressed to him their concern over these incidents and asked his office to explore possible ways of discouraging future incidents. Mr. Hammarskjold implied he might be willing in this context to raise the question of the deterrent effect of returning hijackers of commercial aircraft. As a representative of the commercial air carriers, the Director General would be concerned only with hijackings involving commercial aircraft. Mr. Hammarskjold pointed out that there will be a number of meetings where such an approach might be made, including an IATA Traffic Conference beginning September 18 in Cannes, an IATA Annual General Meeting in Munich at the end of October and an ICAO meeting in Buenos Aires at the end of September. He observed, however, that if any such approach were to be made by his office, it should be discussed in advance by the Governments of the countries most directly concerned. Mr. Hammarskjold asked whether we had considered the possibility of encouraging prosecution of aircraft hijackers by the government of the country to which the aircraft is diverted. Mr. Loy replied that this had been discussed and that, while the US Government probably would not object in many cases, we would not want to be in the position of urging the Cubans to prosecute US citizens. Moreover, there was a question whether the hijacking of a foreign-owned aircraft in another country would be a crime under Cuban law aside from the technical question of unauthorized entry, and whether, for political reasons, the Cubans would have any desire to prosecute such persons. Mr. Gazdik raised the question of protective measures on aircraft such as requiring that the door to the flight deck be kept locked, arming of the crew, etc. and said IATA felt strongly that in an attempted hijacking situation particular care should be exercised to avoid violence that might endanger the safety of the aircraft. Mr. Loy said we concurred, and pointed out that when the life of a crew member or passenger is threatened, the pilot has little moral alternative but to comply with the hijacker's demands, assuming there is sufficient fuel, etc. Mr. Gazdik said there had been suggestions that there should be a device on the aircraft to permit the flight crew to observe the passenger compartment from the flight deck. Mr. Loy said he felt this ought to be explored. In general, however, we were not sanguine about the general usefulness of such measures for the reasons already indicated. Mr. Hammarskjold said he would continue to give some attention to these matters and would be in touch if he had any further suggestions. Mr. Loy thanked Mr. Hammarskjold for his time and his thoughts on these matters and added that we might want to get in touch with him again in this regard. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas Williams (E/OA) and cleared by William Beal (E/OA), John Meadows (E/OA), and Frank Loy (E/TT). 2 See Document 296 . A complete listing of all hijacked aircraft and details of the incidents are in Appendix A of Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area, cited in Document 296 . 3 In a May 1 letter to Charles Cary, Assistant Administrator for International Aviation Affairs at the FAA, Loy wrote: “I think the conversation with Hammarskjold was useful but I am not optimistic that any concrete solution to the problem of aircraft hijacking will result. To avoid arousing unwarranted expectations, as well as to protect IATA's 'non-political' role, I believe that both the fact of my conversation with Hammarskjold and the contents thereof should be held as closely as possible.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US) Loy also met with Walter Binaghi, President of the ICAO Council, on May 17. Binaghi “indicated his belief that ICAO's ability to do anything would be much greater if either in general or in a specific case the matter appeared to be one involving a common criminal or involving a deranged person rather than one involving a politically-motivated person.” (Memorandum for the files by Loy, May 17; ibid.) 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland 298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland 1 Washington, July 10, 1968, 1544Z. 199169. REPCU. 1. Recent wave of hijacking of planes to Cuba 2 has caused much concern and examination of all measures which might reduce danger of further hijackings. 2. Proposal has been made in Congressional and aviation circles that U.S. announce that persons desiring to return to Cuba may use refugee airlift plane particularly since aircraft now travels without passengers on Miami-Varadero leg. Department believes this does not really meet basic problem inasmuch as most hijackings have been carried out not by Cuban refugees desiring return to Cuba but rather by others including fugitives from justice on criminal charges and persons of unstable mental condition. Obviously USG cannot facilitate flight of criminal fugitives and most persons of type who have hijacked planes in past would not be likely apply to USG for travel on airlift plane or to Cuban Government for admission. In any case, refugee airlift is operated pursuant to Memorandum of Understanding between U.S. and Cuban governments and any change in present exclusive use of airlift for refugees from Cuba would require Cuban concurrence. Moreover, any persons transported to Cuba would undoubtedly have to be approved for admission by GOC on individual case basis. 3. Nevertheless, to extent that any Cuban exiles living in U.S. might wish to return to Cuba and might be tempted to hijack a plane, this danger might be diminished somewhat if such persons knew they could return to Cuba on airlift planes. Cuban refugees in U.S. have always been free to return to Cuba permanently if they wish to do so, provided of course they are not wanted in U.S. on criminal charges, but transport has been practically limited to flights from Mexico or Europe. USG would be prepared to announce that such persons could use refugee airlift for repatriation if GOC concurred and agreed to admission of persons involved. 4. Department therefore requests Swiss Embassy Havana to explore this question with GOC and ascertain whether Cuban Government will agree in principle. It is presumed that GOC would insist on approving admission of individuals on case-by-case basis. In any event, proposal is limited to Cuban exiles or other former residents of Cuba who may wish to return there for permanent residence. It would not include those wishing to go to Cuba for temporary visit or anyone without previous permanent residence in Cuba. 5. Views of Swiss Embassy on this and any other matters relating to hijacking problem would be appreciated. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential. Drafted by John Fitzerald (ARA/CCA); cleared by Clement Sobotka (S/R–ORM), Nikstatus (INS), Williams (E/TT), Barbara Watson (SCA), and John Crump (EUR/AIS); and approved by Fitzgerald. 2 Three planes were hijacked from June 19 to July 1, 1968. 3 The Embassy in Bern received no response from the Swiss and approached them again on July 23 and July 30. A Swiss official said that “he assumed absence of reply from Swiss Embassy Havana reflected likelihood that Cubans had not reacted to Swiss approach,” the Embassy reported. (Telegram 3844 from Bern, July 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US) When they did respond on July 31, the Cubans called the proposition “interesting” and agreed to raise the matter with the government in Havana. (Telegram 3855 from Bern, July 31; ibid.) 299. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 299. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1 July 17, 1968, 9:30 p.m. SUBJECT Hijacking of Commercial Aircraft PARTICIPANTS Mr. Julian Gazdik, General Counsel and Secretary of the Legal Committee, IATA Mr. Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Economic Affairs Mr. Gazdik called me from his vacation home in Vermont in response to my request made to his office earlier in the day. I referred to my earlier conversation with Mr. Hammarskjold and Mr. Gazdik on April 28, 1968 2 in which I expressed our concern over the increasing number of hijacking incidents. I told Mr. Gazdik that we had had several incidents since that conversation (most involving IATA member carriers), the latest one today. 3 We believed that the situation had become so serious that, in distinction to our last conversation, we were now asking IATA to take up with the Cuban Government, through such channels as IATA deems appropriate, the problems of enlisting the cooperation of the Cuban Government in deterring future hijacking. Specifically, we think there would be a deterrent effect if Cuba could return hijackers to stand trial in the US, or other country where the hijacking occurred. I indicated that if the Cubans asked whether this would be a reciprocal arrangement, we could make it such so long as it dealt with like incidents, i.e. incidents involving large commercial carriers, or IATA carriers, or however the matter might be defined. Mr. Gadzik said he appreciated our concern and he recognized that matters had gotten a little more serious since our April meeting. He noted one immediate caveat, which is that it wasn't clear to him whether Cuba would be willing to return Cuban citizens. I indicated that I thought that hijacking was still a crime in the US regardless of nationality, but I also noted that most of the hijackers had been US citizens. Mr. Gazdik said he could not act without consultations with Mr. Hammarskjold, but he would try to get hold of Mr. Hammarskjold immediately. (Mr. Hammarskjold is on vacation and out of reach.) Either Mr. Hammarskjold or Mr. Gazdik would call us back on Friday, the 19th. In response to a question, I told Mr. Gadzik that we would not plan to make public at all this approach to IATA. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Limited Official Use. Loy was in Washington; Gazdik in Vermont. Drafted by Loy. 2 Loy appears to be referring to the meeting on April 25; see Document 297 . 3 Five of six attempted hijackings had been successful since the April meeting. Most recently, on July 17 a DC–8 from Los Angeles to Miami was forced to refuel in New Orleans before continuing on to Havana. 300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico 300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico 1 Washington, July 20, 1968, 0048Z. 205994. 1. In last year there have been 14 incidents of hijackings of planes to Cuba. Although few cases involved small chartered aircraft most were commercial airliners. Nine of planes were of U.S. registry and remainder of Colombian, Venezuelan and Mexican registry. In all cases so far planes and passengers have been allowed to depart Cuba but all hijackers have been given asylum there and in one case pilot of U.S. plane, now U.S. citizen, was detained on charges relating to his earlier departure from Cuba. 2. Increasing frequency of these hijackings has caused great concern in aviation and governmental circles as well as in general public. Examination of security measures designed to reduce hijacking hazard indicates difficulties of preventing inclusion of hijackers in flights and once hijacker is aboard little can be done to thwart him in view of high risk to safety of plane and passengers. Emphasis therefore being placed on deterrence which might result from knowledge hijackers could not count on safe asylum in other country. 3. While GOC has so far permitted all hijackers remain in Cuba, there is no evidence thus far that GOC is back of hijackings and there are some indications it may be uncomfortable over publicity these incidents and fact hijackers remain in Cuba. While few of hijackers appear to be Cubans, majority have not been and many are either mentally unbalanced or criminal fugitives. However, prospect for surrender of hijackers for prosecution in U.S. does not appear favorable if solution attempted in purely U.S.-Cuban bilateral terms. 4. Department therefore exploring with international civil aviation organizations possibility of attempting solution on basis of fact problem is international. 2 U.S. airlines are also understood to be considering announcing offer of substantial reward for return of hijackers for prosecution. 3 (Such offer, while mainly applicable to Cuba in present circumstances, would not be limited to that country and would be payable to either governments or individuals for return of hijackers.) 5. Embassy requested to discuss this situation with GOM at highest appropriate level, 4 drawing on foregoing, with view to soliciting Mexican views on subject, bearing in mind fact that at least one Mexican plane was hijacked in last year and there could be further incidents involving Mexican planes. Mexican views on approach vis-à-vis Cubans to this problem most likely to offer prospect of success are especially desired. 5 While Mexican approach to Cubans is not specifically requested at this point, Department would be particularly interested in any indication Mexicans would be inclined to take up with Cubans through Mexican Embassy Havana question of return of some or all hijackers to country where hijacking took place. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Fitzgerald, cleared by Loy and Chaplin (ARA/MEX), and approved by Robert Sayre (ARA). 2 Gazdik met with Loy on July 19 to tell him that Hammarskjold was willing to make an initial approach to Cubana Airlines on hijacking. “They would send a telegram to Cubana to the effect that in the interests of safeguarding the confidence and safety of regular air transport they would like to meet with Cubana representatives at Mexico City, or any other place, for an exchange of views as to what could be done through IATA or its members on hijacking.” (Memorandum of conversation, July 19; ibid.) 3 On July 19 a representative of National Airlines suggested a reward of as much as $500,000 for the apprehension. Perhaps because a National aircraft had been hijacked most recently on July 17, the airline was willing to put up $100,000 without going to its board of directors. (Memorandum of conversation, July 19; ibid.) 4 When approached on July 23, the Mexican Foreign Secretary was “most interested and willing to cooperate” and agreed to raise the issue with his President and Ambassador in Havana. (Telegram 6129 from Mexico City, July 23; ibid.) 5 According to a U.S. Embassy report, Foreign Secretary Carillo Flores told the Ambassador on July 25 that the Mexican Government was “enthusiastic about exploring this matter and we can count on its taking sincere and active interest.” (Telegram 6167 from Mexico City, July 25; ibid.) 301. Memorandum of Conversation 301. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 1, 1968. SUBJECT Conference with IATA Officials on Airplane Hijacking PARTICIPANTS Mr. Knut Hammarskjold, Director General of IATA Mr. Julian Gazdik, General Counsel of IATA Mr. Frank E. Loy, E/TT Mr. John S. Meadows, E/TT/OA Mr. Harry Feehan, E/TT/OA/AVP Mr. Richard A. Frank, L/ARA Mr. Allan I. Mendelsohn, L/E Mr. John F. Fitzgerald, ARA/ CCA Mr. Park Wollam, ARA/CCA The Messrs. Hammarskjold and Gazdik called on Mr. Loy at his request for the purpose of discussing what these gentlemen might say to a Cuban representative to the UN that afternoon about the hijacking of planes to Cuba, and for the purpose of discussing hijacking in general. Mr. Loy began by thanking the Messrs. Hammarskjold and Gazdik on behalf of the United States Government for undertaking to help us deal with the Cubans on the hijacking problem. He stated that he had some statistics on the hijacking of planes to Cuba, as well as some biographical and motivational information on the hijackers, which he would first summarize and then hand over to Mr. Hammarskjold for the latter's use. Mr. Hammarskjold asked if there was “any pattern.” Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the element most common to all of hijackers was mental instability, although some common criminals were involved. Mr. Loy said that it was hard to find a pattern; however, political objectives were apparently not dominant, except that, in relation to the hijackings of foreign aircraft to Cuba, there was some evidence of political motivation. Mr. Hammarskjold asked if any Cuban planes had been hijacked. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that there had been no such instances in recent years, although there had been instances of small planes having been stolen in Cuba and flown to the United States. Mr. Loy then said that we had thought of several things that might be done in relation to hijacking, first in specific regard to Cuba and second in regard to hijacking in general; and that the objective was to find a way to deter hijackers. He hoped that it would be possible to persuade the Cubans that their return to the USG of hijackers, both past and future, would pose a deterrence and would be in the Cuban as well as the United States interest. He then described a recent New York Times story, referring to a story in the Miami News, which indicated that the Cubans took a dim view of hijacking and hijackers, adding that, while he had no way of knowing whether the story was accurate, he had no reason to doubt it. It showed an intelligent point of view by the Cubans. He went on to say that it was apparent that the hijacking of the El Al plane to Algeria had caused severe strains and divisions within the Algerian government; and that this might be pointed out to the Cubans by Mr. Hammarskjold. Mr. Hammarskjold observed that a recent IATA statement about hijacking was a non-political one. Mr. Loy went on to say that we had had no problem with the Cubans so far with regard to the return of the planes and the passengers, but that, for the sake of deterrence, we would wish the hijackers to be returned. We would be prepared to consider a reciprocal agreement with the Cubans for the return of hijacked planes, hijacked passengers who wished to return to Cuba and of hijackers. But we would balk at a deal involving the return of political refugees. Mr. Hammarskjold observed that “we have the instruments we need,” both for the definition of issues and deterrence, in the Tokyo Convention. 2 He said that he recently had received assurances from the Venezuelan and Colombian governments, and was expecting one from the Mexican government, that each would enforce Article 11 of the Convention as if the Convention were in effect if others would. 3 However, he conceded that there was some doubt as to what the Convention did to the hijacker himself. Mr. Loy said he had not thought of the Tokyo Convention as requiring the return of the hijacker as opposed to allowing the onward movement of the plane and those passengers who wanted to go. Mr. Gazdik said this was a matter of interpretation; that so much of Article 11 as required signatory countries to “take all appropriate means to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander” could be interpreted so as to require the return of the hijacker. (There then ensued a general discussion of this point and several doubts were expressed as to the validity of Mr. Gazdik's proffered interpretation, which he himself described as strained.) Mr. Gazdik asked if we had any information as to what had happened to the hijackers now in Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald said that we had very spotty information, that one was known to be working on the Isle of Pines, presumably in the cane fields, that one had been executed for crimes subsequently committed in Cuba, that a couple more (including the hijacker of the NAL DC–8 in July) were known to be in jail; but that was about all we had since the Cubans gave very little public play to these incidents. Mr. Gazdik then asked if we knew of any provisions of Cuban law relative to hijacking. Mr. Mendelsohn said that we did not know of any. Mr. Hammarskjold then returned to the Miami News story and, after a general rehashing of its contents, asked if we were doing anything to give it more publicity. Mr. Loy replied that we had considered this and were casting about to find out what could be done. Mr. Gazdik then observed that our real interest seemed to be in getting the hijacker back, and asked if we did not have an extradition treaty with Cuba. Mr. Frank stated that it was doubtful that the treaty would apply, citing among other considerations the one that it had been concluded with a predecessor government to the Castro government. Mr. Loy said that the important thing was that the Cubans return the hijackers, with or without a treaty or an agreement; and that, however they wanted to do it, if they wanted to, that was enough for us. Mr. Hammarskjold said that it might be useful if the Cubans were under the pressure that the matter might come up at the ICAO conference in Buenos Aires this September; they presumably would want their hands clean at that time. Mr. Loy stated that we were thinking about ways and means which this issue would be raised at Buenos Aires. He also said that we had considered approaching Mr. Binaghi 4 for his ideas as to how ICAO might be able to help us with the Cubans, and generally in regard to hijacking. Mr. Loy then said that one of the U.S. carriers had suggested the payment of a cash award to the Cubans for the return of a hijacker. 5 He said that we were not sure whether this idea could be married to our other proposals, i.e. whether it was compatible with approaches based on concern with safety; but that if other measures did not work, perhaps we would turn to this one. Mr. Hammarskjold observed that the Cubans give excellent ATC service to aircraft flying near Cuba for only nominal fees; and that perhaps a general increase in the fees would be preferable to the reward approach. Mr. Fitzgerald said that the reward would be offered generally, not just to the Cubans. Mr. Hammarskjold thought that the increase-in-fees idea would be “cleaner.” Mr. Loy thought the approach to the Cubans on safety and international responsibility would be better without the reward aspect. Mr. Hammarskjold said that the Cuban(s) whom they were going to talk to that afternoon either had been told to accept some type of proposal, or to do nothing but listen; but that he agreed the public interest approach, rather than the reward one, was the better one. Mr. Loy then said that we had discussed with the Mexican government the possibility of their taking up the matter with the Cubans on the basis of Mexico having diplomatic relations with Cuba and on the basis of a Mexican plane having been involved in one of the hijackings. While the Mexicans had expressed an interest, no action had been taken yet; but Mr. Hammarskjold should be aware of this. Mr. Hammarskjold thought this was “a clever idea.” Mr. Loy then said that, turning to the subject of hijacking world-wide, the USG was also concerned about this larger problem. He said that we hoped to be able to submit the Tokyo Convention to the Senate in the near future. Mr. Hammarskjold said he had commitments from the UK, Germany, Holland and France that each planned to accede before the end of 1968. 6 Mr. Loy said that probably the USG would accede; but that it was sort of a poor time of year to be sending things to the Congress. 7 He then said that we had some ideas about what IATA might consider doing on a general basis. (Mr. Loy then presented and described the proposals set out on p. 3 of the attached talking paper 8 except for the one of IATA offering a cash award for the return of a hijacker. He stressed these were ideas for consideration rather than USG proposals.) Mr. Hammarskjold said that all of these were worth discussion. Mr. Gazdik said that the CAB might have some difficulty with the proposal that IATA carriers refuse the provision of interline and other usual services to the carrier(s) of a state refusing the reasonably prompt return of a hijacked plane and its passengers. Mr. Loy said that we could present him with a USG view, including that of the CAB, if he wished. Mr. Gazdik said that, with regard to the proposal that IATA carriers pressure their governments to refuse landing and take-off rights to the carrier(s) of a hijack-offending state, IATA preferred not to get into the business of recommending to carriers what to do or not do in relation to their governments; that perhaps ICAO would be a better mechanism for the implementation of this proposal. Mr. Gazdik then went on to outline an idea of his to the effect that perhaps the Two Freedoms provision of the Transit Agreement could be used to pressure a hijack-offending state. In substance, it was that the privilege to land for non-traffic purposes included the privilege to take off after such landing; that a state refusing the take-off privilege was in violation of the Agreement; that the state of the aircraft involved could complain of this violation to ICAO; that ICAO then had to send a commission to investigate the complaint; and that the dispatch of this commission would be highly embarrassing to the state visited, etc. Mr. Loy said he would think about this and would consider an approach to ICAO. Mr. Hammarskjold said that he was disappointed that the whole problem of hijacking had not been handed over to one of its specialized agencies (ICAO) by the UN for handling. Mr. Loy then asked if there was anything else Mr. Hammarskjold and Mr. Gazdik wished to talk about. Mr. Gazdik asked if we had used our extradition treaty with Cuba recently. Mr. Frank said that we had not; that perhaps we would not object to making a request under it; but that its use raised other issues. Mr. Gazdik asked if we had concluded any type of an agreement with the Cubans during the past two or three years. Mr. Fitzgerald said that we had concluded the Refugee Airlift Agreement, although the Swiss had acted for us, and that, of course, we were in several multilateral agreements with the Cubans. Mr. Hammarskjold asked if we had any impression of their general attitude on the subject of hijacking, whether they seemed to think that they were under some obligation to “behave normally.” Mr. Fitzgerald stated again that, to date at least, the Cubans had returned hijacked planes and passengers fairly promptly; but that there was no evident basic change in their overall attitude toward the U.S. which was militantly anti-U.S. He observed that the Cubans had good reason for relaxing the tensions between the two countries because of their severe economic problems, but they had given no evidence of such relaxation. He added that he thought Mr. Hammarskjold should be aware that we went to great lengths to return assorted small watercraft to Cuba which had been used for transporting political refugees. There being nothing further, the meeting broke up at about 1:00 p.m. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Feehan. 2 See Document 296 . 3 None of these governments had yet ratified the convention. 4 Loy had met with Walter Binaghi on May 17; see footnote 3, Document 297 . 5 See footnote 3, Document 300 . 6 None of these countries acceded in 1968. 7 The convention was submitted to Congress on September 25; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, pp. 974–975. 8 Not printed. 302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico 302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico 1 Washington, August 9, 1968, 2141Z. 218668. Ref: Mexico's 6405. 2 Subject: Hijacking. 1. Unless Embassy perceives objections, Department will tell Hammarskjold that Mexican approach to Cubans is underway. Would not disclose detail of approach or manner by which that detail or fact of approach available to USG. 2. We have undertaken to keep Hammarskjold generally informed as to Mexican progress. When Hammarskjold conferred with us in Washington on August 1 3 just prior to his meeting with Cuban UN rep in New York 4 (which meeting he undertook at our behest), we told him had asked GOM to approach GOC subject hijacking. He asked to be kept informed of developments from this direction. We told him we would keep him informed. 3. Hammarskjold's further efforts with the Cubans in New York would be facilitated by his at least generally knowing as much as his Cuban counterpart. 4. We do not perceive that merely telling Hammarskjold that the Mexican approach is in train, without more, would prejudice the confidentiality of Embassy's reftel transaction with the GOM FonOff this subject. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential; Limdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Feehan (OA/AVP), cleared by Chaplin (ARA/MEX) and Richard Frank (L/ARA), and approved by Loy. 2 Dated August 8. (Ibid., AV 12) 3 See Document 301 . 4 Hammarskjold and Gazdik met with Cuba's Ambassador to the United Nations and proposed that the Cubans make a statement “to the effect that (a) they will abide by the hijacking element of the Tokyo Convention as if it were in effect and applicable to them; (b) they will consider hijacking a criminal act which should be punished; and (c) they will, upon request, consider returning a hijacker, based either on a treaty of extradition or in accordance with principles of reciprocity.” The Cubans did not respond. (Memorandum of conversation, September 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US) 303. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to Secretary of State Rusk 303. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 5, 1968. On August 1, L sent to you for transmittal to the President documents necessary to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate to the Tokyo Convention. In my memorandum of August 21 2 I advised you that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff suggested we should send the Convention to the Senate, stating that the Committee was probably as anxious as we were to do something about hijacking. An additional factor favoring early action on this matter is that the Triennial Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is meeting in Buenos Aires commencing September 3. We hope to use the ICAO Assembly forum to encourage other governments to expedite their ratification of the Convention. However, our efforts to do this would be seriously handicapped unless we ourselves could indicate that the Convention had at least been transmitted to our Senate although not yet ratified. In view of the favorable attitude of Senator Sparkman, the Acting Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the desirability of seeking support for the Committee at the ICAO Assembly, I urge you to transmit the documents contained in the L memorandum of August 1 to the President as soon as possible. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. No classification marking. Drafted by John Meadows (E/OA) with concurrences from Allan Mendelsohn (L/E) and Alexander Schnee (H). A handwritten note at the top of the page reads: “Sir: Proposed memo from Read to Rostow below. Your report to the President should be signed where indicated by blotter.” Rusk's initials appear on the memorandum. 2 Not found. 3 The attached memorandum of transmittal from Read to Rostow is dated September 6. A bill to implement the jurisdictional matters was transmitted to Congress on October 8 by the Department of Transportation. (Letter from Fascell to Macomber, October 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12) 304. Editorial Note 304. Editorial Note The Triennial Assembly of the ICAO convened in Buenos Aires on September 3, 1968, and continued for the next 3 weeks. During that time an attempt to hijack a Canadian plane was thwarted, but one American and two Colombian aircraft were forced to fly to Cuba. ICAO Director General Hammarskjold proposed a resolution on the hijacking issue in the ICAO plenary session. (Telegram 4815 from Buenos Aires, September 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 3 ICAO) The resolution urged states to become parties to the Tokyo Convention “as soon as possible” and encouraged them, even before ratification of or adherence to it, “to give effect to the principles of Article II of that Convention.” It also requested that the ICAO Council institute a study of other measures which could be taken to cope with the growing problem. The vote in both the legal committee and the plenary session in favor of the resolution was unanimous. (Letter from Macomber to Fascell, October 3; ibid., AV 12 US) The Cuban delegate raised no objection to the resolution, but was critical of the United States: “Cuba agrees with the concern over hijacking… . At no time has Cuba encouraged such seizures. We consider that the mere fact of Convention ratification would not prevent hijacking. The difficulty and roots of the problem is tyranny in the United States—the massacre of Negro people and the Vietnam war. Let that cease and then hijacking will cease.” (Ibid.) The delegates also discussed additional measures to prevent seizures and encourage the return of hijackers, but “at least two delegations (Spain and UK) indicated some skepticism that their governments would agree to do anything against the concept of political asylum.” (Telegram 4815 from Buenos Aires, September 24; ibid.) 305. Telegram From the Consulate in Montreal to the Department of State 305. Telegram From the Consulate in Montreal to the Department of State 1 Montreal, October 19, 1968, 2028Z. 745. For Bureau of Economic Affairs E–OA. Reference Telecon of Feehan and Durkin2 subject high jacking 1) Text of note to IATA re high jacking is as follows: “Dear Mister Hammarskjold, I have received the following message from His Excellency Doctor Osvaldo Dorticos President of the Republic of Cuba in reply to your previous messages with the instructions to transmit it to you. ‘In connection with your messages about high jacking of aircraft I wish to call your attention to the fact that Cuba has no responsibility whatsoever for such facts of which she was originally the victim while no initiative was taken internationally to prevent it. Such facts are derived from the criminal policy of blockade and hostility which the imperialist Government of the United States of America has adopted against Cuba with the support of the oligarchical and reactionary governments of Latin America. We believe that as long as such criminal policy is maintained no investigation (examination) whatsoever can take place to avoid its regrettable consequences. Therefore we regret not to be able to accept your suggestion. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba has never encouraged nor does it encourage high jacking of aircraft. But such facts have become a practice adopted against our country by the promoters of a stupid policy lacking of foresight the regrettable consequences of which are apparent.' I take this opportunity to send you my highest regards. Dr. Ricardo Alarcon, Ambassador, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Cuba at the United Nations” 2) Original Spanish text to follow by mail. 3) Gazdik unwilling furnish Department reply while still in draft form. Stated Hammarskjold will deliver reply Monday in person. 2 Hawkins 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; Priority. 2 Not found. 306.Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico 306.Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico 1 Washington, October 24, 1968, 0011Z. 260705. Ref Mexico 6405; State 254172; Mexico 7659. 2 Subject: Hijacking. 1. On basis of recent developments, Dept. has concluded it would be undesirable to mention USG interest or involvement in any GOM approach to GOC on hijacking. Therefore unless Embassy perceives overriding reasons for inclusion USG interest/involvement, Embassy should approach FonSec with request to eliminate any reference to USG in any approach to GOC. If GOM feels reference to USG necessary, we would like to know why but are predisposed to alternative of no GOM approach if it includes mention USG. 3 2. From here, GOC attitude toward USG on subject anti-hijacking measures continues to be one of unmitigated intransigence. Our mid-July proposal to utilize the Refugee Airlift for Cubans in US who wish to return to Cuba has gone unanswered for over three months. 4 The GOC rep to the ICAO Assembly in Buenos Aires in September went along with an ICAO anti-hijacking resolution only after a long diatribe against the “oppressive and warlike policies” of the USG. 5 In a note recently delivered to IATA, 6 in response to an IATA approach beginning last August and periodically renewed since then, the Cuban Ambassador to the UN (speaking for Cuban President) engaged in more political fulmination against the US and refused to consider the IATA proposals. And, of course, we all are aware of the public attitude of the GOC toward the USG. In sum, in one direct approach, the USG has been ignored; and in two indirect approaches, the GOC has perceived the underlying USG interest and taken the occasions to blast us. We don't see how a different result would eventuate from GOM inclusion of USG interest in any GOM approach to GOC. 3. Therefore deletion as per para 1 above recommended. If GOM plans approach, we suggest for GOM consideration either (a) a unilateral declaration of general applicability by GOC that hijackers not welcome in Cuba and either (i) they will be returned forthwith to country of nationality of aircraft (or to some third country if possible) or (ii) they will be tried for violation(s) of Cuban law; or (b) a bilateral GOM–GOC understanding for the reciprocal return of hijacked planes, crews and passengers (except crew members or passengers who wish to remain) and hijackers (hijackers to be returned willy-nilly). 4. The bilateral alternative would do little immediate good for USG. But it would establish a favorable precedent and, more importantly, would advertise anti-hijacking attitude of GOC. The unilateral declaration alternatives would go directly to the more significant deterrence point. 5. Despite turn-down IATA proposals mentioned para 2 above, IATA still pursuing matter, having delivered reply to Cuban note Monday, October 21. All info re IATA approach is FYI only. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Feehan (E/OA); cleared by Michael Styles (E/OA), Mark Feldman (L/ARA), Rueda (ARA/MEX), and Park Wollam (ARA/CCA); and approved by Loy. 2 Dated August 8, October 11, and October 21, respectively. (The first two are ibid.; the last is ibid., AV 12 MEX) 3 Mexico agreed to consult with the United States before making an approach. “While not explicitly so stating, Rosenzweig appeared to concur that such association would be counterproductive,” the Embassy reported. (Telegram 7773 from Mexico City, October 25; ibid., AV 12) 4 See Document 298 . 5 See Document 304 . 6 See Document 305 . 307. Airgram From the Department of State to the Mission to the International Civil Aviation Organization 307. Airgram From the Department of State to the Mission to the International Civil Aviation Organization 1 Washington, November 6, 1968, 4:34 p.m. A–32 SUBJECT Hijacking The Department suggests the US Representative approach President Binaghi 2 as soon as possible and ask him to immediately and personally communicate with the Cuban Government and request that the GOC issue a public statement which (1) expresses strong disapproval of hijacking as a means of entering Cuba, and (2) declares either (a) that hijackers will be returned to the country of the registration of the hijacked aircraft for trial under the laws of that country for the hijacking, or (b) that hijackers will be tried under the applicable Cuban law. (Alternative (a) is the preferable alternative.) As an alternative, and second choice, we would be happy to have the Cubans return to us one or more hijackers for trial, without any public statement. We are not totally confident that these actions will produce the desired result, or any particularly desirable reaction from the Cubans. But we feel strongly that ICAO should increase its efforts to deal with the hijacking problem. The most obvious effort is to obtain the cooperation of the Cubans who, however innocently, are intimately enmeshed in the hijacking picture. The November 4 hijacking of the NAL B–727 to Havana is the 32d instance of a hijacking or attempted hijacking to Cuba since May 1961, and the 15th such instance in the past 6 months. It was also the first instance of actual physical violence in the cockpit. Hijackings are on the increase. The threat to the safety of air travel is obvious. It is equally obvious that a meaningful deterrent to hijacking is needed now; and that we cannot wait for international law to be brought to that point at which it poses a meaningful deterrent to hijacking. We believe the best deterrent would be the return of hijackers for trial or their trial in the country to which they have taken the aircraft. A statement by the GOC along the line set out above is the best and most immediate deterrent which occurs to us. It can be pointed out that the GOC does not approve of hijacking. The Cuban representative to the 16th Assembly voted for the anti-hijacking resolution. And, to date, the Cubans have acted responsibly in returning planes and passengers. Binaghi may be reluctant to do this (see Memorandum of Conversation, Loy/Binaghi, of May 17, 1968), 3 or something like it, on the ground that “political” considerations are involved. To this it can be said that the planes and passengers of several nations have been involved; that our request for his assistance is not politically motivated, but is based solely on considerations of air safety; that only the Cubans attach political connotation to hijacking to Cuba; and that, in any event, the threat to air safety certainly overrides any political considerations which possibly could be involved. We anticipate also that Binaghi may demur on the grounds that he would not wish to “single out” Cuba. The answer to this is that, as a practical matter, Cuba must be singled out because more hijacked planes go to Cuba than to anywhere else. Begin FYI: As US Rep knows, IATA (Hammarskjold) has approached GOC (the UN Ambassador and Castro himself) on this same subject at USG behest. Hammarskjold's most recent communication to the GOC was in strong and forthright terms (and as yet is unanswered). Given this consideration, and given the GOC's intransigence so far, we do not believe that any Binaghi approach will be effective unless it is in strong and forthright terms. There should be no mention of the IATA approach to Binaghi. And Binaghi should not mention the USG in his approach. Certainly he could act in his own name, in the name of ICAO, or both. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 6. Confidential. Drafted by Feehan (E/OA); cleared by Styles (E/OA), Knute Malmborg (L/ARA), Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA), Flynn (DOT), and Helfert (DOT); and approved by Loy. 2 President of the ICAO. 3 See footnote 3, Document 297 . 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, November 27, 1968, 1607Z. 278461. For Deputy Asst. Secy. Frank E. Loy. 1. Due recent proliferation demand service to Havana, 2 ARA, L, and OA have concluded that direct USG note to GOC should go forward ASAP and without waiting outcome Binaghi/other approaches. Note now being drafted will (a) recite relevant hijacking statistics; (b) point out known anti-hijacking remonstrances by GOC (concurrence in ICAO resolution, GOC disclaimer of having encouraged hijacking, etc.); (c) state USG apprehension that, despite safety record to date, future disaster almost certain; and (d) in general terms, ask GOC cooperation in seeking arrive at mutually agreeable and effective deterrent. 2. Note theme generally prescribed by ARA (Vaky) and concurred in by interested staffs in lieu of any specific proposal such as returning or trying hijackers, it being feeling that returning/trying proposal more likely to get rejection than general probe. 3. Boyle has not yet contacted Binaghi, his instructions having arrived after Binaghi left for Manila (airgram time Washington-Montreal five days). 3 Concluded here efforts should go forward in parallel rather than seriatim principally because each entity has own legitimate interest not necessarily conflicting with that of any other. Mexican approach still dormant. 4. OA and H reps briefed House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee staffer November 26 and left package on hijacking similar to that furnished Selden Subcommittee. 5. Loy comments would be appreciated. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; Limdis; Priority. Drafted by Feehan (E/OA); cleared by Meadows (E/OA), Feldman (L/ARA), Wollam (ARA/CCA); and approved by Styles (E/OA). 2 Three large American aircraft—carrying more than 230 people—and one Mexican plane had been hijacked to Cuba so far in November. A fourth American plane was hijacked on November 30. 3 Document 307 . 4 Loy responded that a general request for cooperation “seems a sure way to get fuzzy, unhelpful response.” “Would it not be easier,” he asked, “for GOC to take certain action than to sit down with USG in spirit of cooperative action?” (Telegram 14704 from London, November 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12) 309. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State Rusk 309. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, December 6, 1968. SUBJECT Hijacking of Aircraft to Cuba Summary Until now efforts to obtain Cuban cooperation in deterring the hijacking of aircraft have been confined to third-party initiatives because it was considered that these represented the best hope of success. However, with the failure of these initiatives thus far, and the alarming increase in frequency of hijackings, we now request authorization to approach the Cubans bilaterally through the Swiss, proposing an arrangement for return of hijackers. If we do so we must be prepared to offer reciprocity by returning to Cuba hijackers of Cuban commercial planes even though they ask for political asylum. Discussion Attached is a note which proposes that the Cuban Government return hijackers of commercial aircraft, 2 and offers to discuss arrangements for the return of hijackers on a reciprocal basis if so desired by the Cuban Government. If you agree, we shall transmit this note to the GOC through the Swiss as soon as possible. Until now, we have confined our efforts to obtain Cuban cooperation in the return of hijackers to third-party initiatives such as that undertaken by Knute Hammarskjold, Director General of the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Prospects of a favorable Cuban response are dim, and it had been our belief that a direct approach by the USG would be even less likely to succeed. Therefore we planned to exhaust other channels such as the Mexican Government and ICAO before approaching Castro directly. At this point, however, Hammarskjold's efforts have been rebuffed and hijackings are increasing at an alarming rate. Public and Congressional pressure for action is intense and we believe we should act promptly to test the remote possibility that Castro would respond to a direct approach. It is often asked whether we have approached Castro directly, and we wish to be in a position to respond affirmatively in the near future. Therefore, we propose to supplement our efforts to obtain Cuba's cooperation through third parties, or in a multilateral context, with a direct approach. Until we get a response from the Cubans, we cannot predict what kind of solution may be negotiated. What we would like to see, however, is a Cuban undertaking to return hijackers. Our draft note specifically contemplates reciprocity, as did Hammarskjold's proposals to Cuba, because we cannot conceive of Castro's accepting less. The draft Protocol to the Tokyo Convention concerning the return of hijackers which, with your approval, we raised informally at the ICAO Assembly last August was premised on the assumption that the United States would be prepared to reciprocate the return of hijackers even when the hijacker claimed that he had committed the hijacking to escape political persecution. As explained in the previous memorandum, 3 it has been U.S. practice to decline extradition of political refugees for stealing the means of escape. However, we have concluded that this practice should not be applied to hijackers of airliners because of the disproportionate hazard. We continue to believe that the serious dangers to air safety caused by the hijacking of commercial aircraft outweigh the hijacker's interest in securing political asylum, and our discussions on the Hill have not revealed opposition to this judgment. It is our hope to limit any understanding to commercial aircraft, thus reducing the possibility of a problem arising with respect to a refugee fleeing Cuba, but Castro might seek a broader agreement. We do not plan to cover boats or military aircraft or to include theft of commercial aircraft not involving coercion of the pilot. If the Cuban Government should respond favorably to this proposal, it is conceivable that it might lead to a Cuban request for face-to-face negotiations between U.S. and Cuban representatives rather than through the intermediary of the Swiss or other third-country representatives. We believe we must be prepared to accept this if necessary in the interest of solving so important a problem. As extradition raises serious legal and political problems, we would expect to implement our side of the agreement, in most cases, by refusing to admit a non-U.S. citizen hijacker of a Cuban aircraft into the United States and deporting the alien so excluded to Cuba. If necessary to satisfy our laws, we would attempt to do so via the country whence he came to the U.S. This procedure would represent a departure from our normal immigration policy toward Cuba and INS has advised us that they would be reluctant to take such action without the consent of the Attorney General. 4 At his request we have agreed to meet with Knute Hammarskjold, Director General of IATA, on Monday, December 9, to hear his views as to the effect of our proposals on his initiatives with the Cubans. We would not despatch the attached note until we have had a chance to talk to Mr. Hammarskjold. If he provides us with compelling reasons not to pursue a bilateral course now we could, of course, refrain from sending a note at this time, but we do not now believe that this will be the case or that there is any overriding reason to delay a bilateral approach. We would in any case like your approval to move as recommended so that we can proceed immediately 5 if after our discussion with Mr. Hammarskjold this continues to appear desirable. Recommendations: 1. That you authorize me to dispatch to the Cuban Government a note on the lines of the note attached. 6 2. That you telephone the Attorney General to request his agreement in principle that the U.S. would reciprocate by deporting to Cuba an alien who hijacks a Cuban aircraft to the United States. You should tell him that we will try to limit the arrangement to hijackers of commercial aircraft but cannot guarantee such a limitation. 7 1 Source: Department of State,ARA Files: Lot 74 D 467, Covey T. Oliver, December 1968. Confidential. Drafted by Feldman (L/ARA) and Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA); cleared by Murray Belman (L), Malmborg (L/SCA), Loy, Feldman (L/ARA), Vaky (ARA), and Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA). A copy was sent to the Under Secretary. 2 Not printed. 3 Not further identified. 4 The following week, Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson confirmed that the Attorney General “agrees in principle with the Secretary of State's decision to seek a reciprocal agreement with the Cuban government in connection with the return or prosecution of those who hijack aircraft.” Vinson wrote that the Attorney General suggested that strong efforts be made to limit the agreement to commercial aircraft since problems existed with regard to expulsion or deportation of possible political refugees under immigration laws. (Letter from Vinson to Feldman, December 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12) 5 See Document 311 . 6 Although Rusk approved the recommendation, no initialed copy of this memorandum was found. 7 No record of Rusk's action on this recommendation was found. 310. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 310. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, December 10, 1968. No. 957 SUBJECT Airline Hijackings Increase: No Solution in Sight Four US commercial airliners have been hijacked to Cuba during the past two weeks, highlighting the continuing difficulty of finding a solution to a complex legal, political and security problem. The hijackings constitute not only a serious inconvenience to the airlines and passengers, and a danger to life, but they also pose a security threat to traveling US officials and to classified government documents carried by air. Although there is no evidence of official Cuban complicity in the hijackings, Fidel Castro does obtain a certain amount of political leverage from the incidents. Efforts by the US Government to obtain the cooperation of the Cuban government in stopping the hijackings have been either rebuffed or ignored and the problem is gaining increasing public and official concern. Increased tempo . There have been twenty-seven successful and unsuccessful attempts to hijack US and Latin American planes to Cuba during 1968, compared to twelve during the period from 1961 through December 1967. Well over one-third of the hijackers were US citizens, with the rest being Cuban exiles, or other Latin Americans. There does not appear to be a distinct pattern to the hijackings; most of the perpetrators can be classified as mentally ill, criminal types, or simply homesick Cubans. It is believed that almost all of the US-originated hijackers have been immediately jailed and thoroughly interrogated on arrival in Cuba. None has been accorded a hero's welcome and in most cases little has been heard from the persons after their release from jail. There is as yet no evidence that any of the US or Cuban hijackers have been encouraged in their ventures by the Cuban government. Similarly, there is no hard information of the existence of any sort of international conspiracy. Puerto Rican—liberationists—and black militants have carried out a few of the hijackings, but again there are no firm indications that these persons collaborated with the Cubans. Some Colombian and Venezuelan hijackers have been well received by the Cubans, but this is partly understandable in that it is extremely difficult for members of Cuban-supported insurgency groups in the hemisphere to reach Cuba using regularly scheduled flights. All of the passengers of the US and Latin American hijacked planes have been relatively well-treated, although the Cubans have harassed some US servicemen in uniform, especially Negro veterans of Vietnam. Castro benefits . While the Cubans have shown some nervousness, the hijacking episodes nevertheless provide Castro with a domestic propaganda weapon. He attempts to show that these increasing occurrences represent the desperation of Cuban exiles and US citizens to leave the land of “workers exploitation” and journey to the “free territory of the Americas.” In this way he seeks to discourage those who are planning to eventually emigrate to the US. Moreover, Castro has very little political and no economic leverage which he can apply against the US, whom he considers Cuba's mortal enemy. A hijacked US airliner naturally supplies him with the potential for blackmail or at least a means of illustrating to US policymakers that the US also has an exposed area. After each hijacking the US is forced to go to the Cuban government, through the Swiss, and request the return of the plane, its crew and passengers. The Cubans have always complied with the requests, but since mid-year, they have used the episodes to engage in some low-level harassment. Using the argument that the runways are too short, they have not allowed the passengers to return to the US on the hijacked airliner. Instead they have forced the planes to leave Cuba empty and have obligated the State Department to arrange for the sending of a separate plane to Cuba to retrieve the passengers—an annoying and time-consuming operation. The Cubans are well aware that there is no danger to a fully loaded jet taking off from the Havana airfield. In addition to the separate plane harassment tactics, the Cubans have also charged the airlines stiff fees for accommodating passengers. The refusal to return hijackers . The most effective, and possibly the only feasible method of stopping the hijacking, would be an agreement by Cuba to return the guilty persons. Nevertheless, efforts by international conferences to work out a mutually satisfactory agreement have not met with success and approaches to the Cubans through the UN have been rebuffed. Moreover, the Cubans have not officially responded to a US suggestion that dissatisfied Cubans in the United States be allowed to return to Cuba on the US-operated refugee airlift. An extradition agreement between the US and Cuba remains in force, but hijacking is not specified as an extraditable offense under the treaty. Furthermore, Castro would probably find it very difficult for ideological and public relations reasons to return Cubans to the United States for prosecution, particularly if they come to him as disillusioned persons who profess to believe that revolutionary Cuba is the more desirable state. Even if Castro did find it advantageous to return the non-Cubans, he would probably attempt to extract a fairly high price from the US. He might, as an example, demand that the US Government not give asylum to Cubans fleeing the island clandestinely (or as hijackers) as a quid pro quo for an agreement to send back non-Cubans to the US. It would however be politically difficult for the US to agree to an arrangement of this kind. A double-edge sword. Though Castro may take some satisfaction in the hijackings, they probably also give him some sense of uneasiness. An airline tragedy would expose Cuba to charges that its failure to cooperate with the US to prevent hijackings had contributed to the accident and, especially in view of the unbalanced personalities of many hijackers, an accident is a very real possibility. In addition, Castro may be concerned that the continued hijackings will increase pressure on US officials to “do something about Cuba,” particularly with a new administration about to assume office. The hijacking of four aircraft from Mexico to Cuba is also believed to have caused some embarrassment to the Cubans who are anxious to avoid additional strains in their highly valued relations with Mexico. Legislation to combat hijackings submitted to the Mexican legislature on December 5 by President Diaz Ordaz (submission by the president is tantamount to passage) will undoubtedly heighten Castro's sensitivity to the seriousness of the matter, particularly where Mexico is involved. 2 On balance, however, at least for the short term, Castro will probably continue to view the hijacking as primarily a US, and to a lesser extent, a Mexican problem, and is not likely to feel any sense of urgency about contributing to a settlement of the issue. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential. 2 The proposed legislation requires a prison term of from five to twenty years for any —persons who by use of threats, violence, intimidation or any other illegal means, cause an aircraft to change its destination or leave its route.—[Footnote in the source text.] 311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland 311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland 1 Washington, December 11, 1968, 1947Z. 285410. REPCU. 1. Embassy should immediately request Swiss Foreign Office to transmit to Cuban Government through Swiss Embassy Havana following note (introductory paragraph and complementary close excluded): 2 2. “The Government of the United States of America seeks the cooperation of the Government of Cuba in attempting to arrive at a mutually agreeable means of deterring the hijacking of commercial aircraft to Cuba. 3. Since May 1961, 33 airplanes of Canadian, Colombian, Mexican, United States and Venezuelan registry, including 23 scheduled passenger airliners, have been forced to deviate from their prescribed courses and fly to Cuba. So far during 1968 alone, 25 airplanes of the same registries, including 19 scheduled passenger airliners, have been forced to fly to Cuba. In addition, there have been several unsuccessful attempts to hijack aircraft to Cuba. 4. Each one of these incidents presents a direct and serious threat to air safety. Armed, often dangerous and unbalanced, men are in forcible control of an aircraft which they are unqualified to operate. The discharge aloft of a firearm or explosive device could precipitate the crash of an aircraft. Crewmen may be unfamiliar with procedures for approaching their enforced destination, with the extent and condition of the facilities at that destination, with the language spoken there, and with the weather there and en route. For much of their journeys, the aircraft are beyond the discipline of ground control, threatening the safety not only of the particular aircraft involved, but also of all other aircraft operating in the area. Fortunately, there have been no major accidents involving multiple deaths or injuries to date, but the danger of such incidents has increased with the increase in the number of hijackings and attempted hijackings in recent months. 5. The Government of the United States is deeply concerned at this serious threat to air safety, and it has reason to hope that the Government of Cuba, which is a member of ICAO and whose flag airline is a member of IATA, is also concerned at the threat to air safety, and would be prepared, on humanitarian grounds, to consider means of averting the threat of serious accidents before one takes place. In particular, this Government notes that the Cuban delegate to the 16th Assembly to ICAO at Buenos Aires stated that Cuba shared the general concern over hijacking and that at no time had Cuba encouraged such seizures. Further, the Government of the United States notes that the Government of Cuba has acted responsibly in returning hijacked aircraft and their passengers, crews and cargoes to the states of registration of the aircraft. Unfortunately, the incidence of aircraft hijackings continues to increase and further measures are necessary if such hijackings are to be deterred. 6. The Government of the United States notes that the Government of Cuba, like the Government of the United States, concurred in Resolution A 16–37, unanimously adopted by the 16th Assembly of ICAO, which, while calling upon all states to become parties to the Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft and to implement Article II of the Convention before adherence, recognized that this Article does not provide a complete remedy for the situation. 7. The Government of the United States is of the opinion that the most effective means of deterring further hijackings would be to ensure the prosecution of the hijackers. Therefore the Government of the United States proposes that the Government of Cuba return hijackers to the state of registry of the aircraft involved. If the Government of Cuba considers it desirable that an arrangement for the return of hijackers be established on a reciprocal basis, this Government is prepared to join with the Government of Cuba in discussing such an arrangement. 8. The Government of the United States also takes the opportunity to renew to the Government of Cuba the proposal which the Government of the United States made some time ago through the Swiss Embassy in Havana with relation to the use of the Miami-Varadero refugee airlift plane by those Cuban residents of the U.S. who wish to return to Cuba for permanent residence. It is believed that this would reduce the temptation to hijack airplanes with respect to at least one category of potential hijackers. 9. The Government of the United States invites the comments of the Government of Cuba on these proposals and further solicits the views of the Government of Cuba as to any other practical steps that might be taken by the two Governments to reduce the threat to air safety arising out of hijacking of commercial aircraft.” 10. Embassy should request Swiss Government to inform us as soon as note delivered as well as any initial reaction. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Feldman (L/ARA) and Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA); cleared by Loy (E/TT), Vaky (ARA), Kiselyak (H), Stabler (EUR/AIS), and Brown (S/S); and approved by Secretary Rusk. 2 The Swiss Ambassador delivered the note to the Cuban Foreign Ministry on December 17. (Telegram 5248 from Bern, December 19; ibid.) 3 According to the Swiss, the Cubans were “non-committal” on the substance of the note and reacted unfavorably to press reports which had appeared in the United States prior to the presentation of the note. The Embassy in Bern reported: “Although the Cubans made no reference to quid pro quo, Ambassador Fischli considers it possible that Cuba might request, as compensation for return of hijackers, return of Cubans who left Cuba illegally by boat or private plane. He comments that, although situation entirely different because no international agreements exist regarding latter actions, argument might have certain political and propaganda repercussion.” (Telegram 5248; ibid.) 312. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for International Affairs and Special Programs (Agger) 312. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for International Affairs and Special Programs (Agger) 1 Washington, December 12, 1968. Dear Don: I have your letter of December 4 2 concerning our proposed direct approach to the Cubans on the subject of hijacking. You suggest that if we substituted a concerted approach from Canada, Mexico and the U.S., we might have a greater chance of enlisting Cuban cooperation. You are obviously correct in your implicit belief that a direct suggestion by the U.S. may not be successful. We agree there is merit in stressing the multilateral view of the problem. For this reason our efforts to date have involved action by IATA and ICAO. Unfortunately, the IATA efforts, which have been direct and skillful, have been rebuffed to date by the Cubans.ICAO seems to be having difficulty moving very rapidly. We have also considered concerted action with other Western Hemisphere countries, but have felt that, on balance, it was preferable for these countries to go to the Cubans separately. There are several reasons. First, if Castro has difficulty with a U.S. approach, this difficulty would infect the whole of any joint approach, and thus make it more difficult for him to agree with the Canadians, Mexicans or others to the principle of returning hijackers for trial. Second, we earlier discussed with the Mexicans their taking up this problem with Cuba, but subsequent events, in their judgment, made the time inopportune. While the Mexicans have their own hijacking problem, we doubt that they would be in a position to move promptly on a joint approach. Third, there remains the outside possibility that Cuba may in fact prefer to deal with the U.S., particularly in a situation where the U.S. has taken the first step. I might add that Knut Hammarskjold is continuing his multilateral efforts, and plans to sound out the Cubans about the possibility of an IATA legal committee meeting in Havana to consider this problem. 3 In view of these various considerations, we would not think it advisable at this time to try the combined Canadian-Mexican-U.S. approach that you suggest. However, we will bear it in mind along with other possible concerted approaches. Sincerely yours, Anthony M. Solomon 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential. Drafted by Loy and Solomon and cleared by Fitzgerald. 2 Not found. 3 On the same day Loy also wrote a comprehensive memorandum tracking the status of all State Department measures to deal with the hijacking problem. (Memorandum from Loy to Vaky, et al., December 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland 313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland 1 Washington, December 20, 1968, 2354Z. 290754. REPCU. Ref: Bern 5248. 2 1. Department wishes emphasize to Ambassador Fischli (who may so inform GOC if he deems it appropriate) that it has not given any publicity whatever to approach to GOC embodied in note Ambassador delivered to Cubans December 17. 3 Some U.S. journalists have referred to alleged approaches or possible approaches to GOC by USG on subject but these stories were based either on speculation or on misunderstanding of other aspects of hijacking problem such as earlier proposal on use of refugee airlift plane to repatriate Cubans in U.S. who desire permanent return to Cuba. Department well aware of impropriety of announcing diplomatic moves at this stage and of fact that to do so would be counter-productive. However, in view of free press status this country and keen public interest in hijacking situation, it is impossible for us to keep journalists from writing wide variety of articles on subject some of which incorrectly imply official sources for speculation about diplomatic démarches. 2. Department also mindful of possibility suggested by Ambassador Fischli (paragraph 3 reftel) that Cubans may attempt to widen scope of proposed agreement on hijackers to include illegal escapees from Cuba. We deliberately attempted to discourage this by drafting note which focuses on the specific problem which presents major threat to air safety, i.e., use of force to hijack commercial passenger aircraft. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Fitzgerald; cleared by Feldman (L/ARA), Vaky (ARA), Loy, John Crump (EUR/AIS), and Brown (S/S); and approved by Fitzgerald. 2 See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 311 . 3 Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12) 314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada 314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada 1 Washington, December 30, 1968, 2056Z. 293341. Subject: Hijacking. 1. Embassy is requested to approach GOC at appropriate high level and request GOC cooperation in dealing with Cubans on hijacking. Specifically, GOC should be asked to suggest to Cubans that, as an immediately effective means of deterring hijacking to Cuba, the Cuban Government should (1) return hijackers to the state(s) of registration(s) of the hijacked aircraft; and (2) publicly announce its intention of doing this. 2. In making approach, Embassy may, in its discretion, draw on one or more of the following considerations (plus any others which seem appropriate to Embassy): a Hijacking poses a grave threat to the safety of air transportation. Armed, often mentally unbalanced persons are in forcible control of an aircraft which they are incapable of operating. Not being subject to ground control, the hijacked aircraft is a collision threat to other airborne aircraft. Crewmen are unfamiliar with approach procedures to Cuban airspace, with the extent and condition of facilities at their destination and with the language spoken there. In sum, a hijacked aircraft is a serious threat to lives and property both in the air and on the ground. b The number of hijackings rapidly is increasing. During 1968 alone, 19 large commercial aircraft, including one Canadian flag commercial aircraft, have been hijacked to Cuba or their hijacking to Cuba was attempted. Given the dangerous and volatile circumstances common to all hijackings (para a above), it is almost inevitable that, as the instances of hijackings increase, one or more of them will end in disaster. c Hijacking has been condemned as inimical to air safety in two ICAO resolutions (by the Assembly in Buenos Aires in September, 1968, and by the Council in Montreal in December, 1968). (We add that the December resolution was not as strong as we would have liked it.) It also has been condemned by IATA, by the International Federation of Airline Pilots, and by both the Canadian and U.S. Airline Pilots Associations. d In addition to its interest on behalf of the travelling public, Canada has an individual interest in stopping hijacking. An attempt was made to hijack an Air Canada flight (#303) to Cuba on September 11, 1968. And Air Canada operates to and from various points in “hijacking country,” i.e., Miami, Tampa, Bermuda, Freeport, Nassau, Montego Bay, Kingston, Antigua, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. e Although there are stiff laws against hijacking in various affected States, including Canada, the deterrent effect of these laws is largely vitiated by the Cubans keeping the hijackers beyond the reach of these laws. 3. If Embassy deems appropriate, Embassy may disclose to GOC, on close-hold basis, that USG recently sent note directly to Cubans requesting return of hijackers to states of registration of hijacked aircraft and suggested that Cubans publicize such return. 4. In event the GOC suggests to Embassy use of US-Cuban extradition treaty for obtaining return of hijackers of US planes to Cuba, Embassy should reply that we have studied this matter but have concluded that, for variety of reasons, we did not wish to use the extradition treaty. Embassy may pass to GOC on close-hold basis the following reasons, among others, for our not wishing to go extradition route: (a) Treaty would permit every aircraft hijacker to raise political offense exception as defense to extradition; and (b) in exchange for honoring treaty, Cubans might request extradition of Cubans who fled Cuba for political reasons, who could raise same political exception defense, and whom USG would not wish to extradite. Possible net result of (a) and (b) above would be no extradition by either government and so no deterrent to hijacking available by use of USG-Cuban extradition treaty. 5. In event that Cubans suggest to Canadians use of US-Cuban extradition treaty, Canadian rep should be non-committal, saying knows nothing of details of US-Cuban extradition treaty. But Department would like to know if Cubans suggest this. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, AV 12 US. Confidential. Drafted by Feehan (E/OA); cleared by Beal (E/TT), Feldman (L), Scott (EUR/CAN), Styles (E/OA), Fitzgerald, and Vaky; and approved by Loy. Human Rights Human Rights 315. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 20, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14 UN. No classification marking. Drafted by Rachel C. Nason (IO/OES). 316. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs Washington, October 14, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. No classification marking. Drafted by J. Sisco; cleared by Mark B. Trenary (OIA), Francis O. Allen (AF), Nathan A. Pelcovits (UNP), Richard B. Bilder (L/UNA), Edward B. Persons (OES), Means (Labor), Gates (HEW), Roger Pineau (CU/MPP), Constantine Warvariv (OES), Francis M. Rogerson (US–CRR); and approved by Sisco. This paper is an enclosure to airgram A–89 to USUN, which authorized using the paper in corridor conversations with colleagues but not submitted to the Secretary-General. 317. Editorial Note 318. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 24, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Confidential. Drafted by J.E. Means, and cleared in draft by Marietta Tree and C. Blau. 319. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, November 26, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Passed to the White House and FAA. 320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, December 2, 1964, 1:46 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO. Confidential. Drafted by R. Funseth (EUR) and L. Williams (EUR); cleared by Joan S. Gravatt (AL), Elizabeth Ann Brown (UNP), and Wagner (AFI); and approved by D. McKillop (WE). Also sent to Rome and Montreal and repeated to Pretoria and USUN. 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, December 9, 1964, 7:31 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by R. Nason (IO/OES), cleared by William J. Stibravy (OES), and approved by J. Sisco (IO). 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, January 20, 1965, 12:05 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Confidential. Drafted by Brown (IO/UNP), cleared by Buffum (UNP) and Nason (OES), and approved by J. Sisco. Also sent to London. 323. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 21, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Unclassified. Drafted by Nason and Widenor. 324. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, February 18, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Confidential. Repeated to USUN. 325. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State Addis Ababa, April 1, 1965, 3 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO. Confidential. Repeated to London, Beirut, Paris, Asmara, and USUN. 326. Editorial Note 327. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in South and Central America Washington, June 18, 1965, 8:12 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO. Confidential. Drafted by Robert H. Edwards (IO); cleared by Wagner (AF), Robert L. Funseth, Buffum, George N. Monsma (ARA), John L. Hargrove (L/UNA), Jack R. Johnstone (OES), and Gravatt (OA/AL); and approved by Sisco. Sent to Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Bogota, Panama, San Jose, La Paz, Quito, Guatemala, San Salvador, Mexico, Managua, Santiago, Lima, and Caracas, and repeated to Montreal. 328. Editorial Note 329. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Goldstein) to President Johnson Washington, April 26, 1968, 4:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Office Files of White House Aides, Ernest Goldstein, UN Conference on Human Rights, Box 15. Confidential. 330. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, May 3, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 14 US. Confidential. 331. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Ralph Abernathy, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference Washington, May 23, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 14 US. No classification marking. A typed note at the bottom of the first page reads, “This is a revised version of 9/22/68 delivered to WH by Peter Kreogh. Original of this letter to Mr. Kreogh for delivery to Justice Department. (Letter Delivered to Justice Undated).” A handwritten notation next to this text reads, “5/23/68.” 332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico Washington, June 3, 1968, 2118Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 14 US. Unclassified; Priority. Drafted by Maxwell Chaplin (ARA/MEX), cleared by Lieblich (L/ARA), and approved by Chaplin. 333. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, July 25, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Office Files of White House Aides, Ernest Goldstein, Human Rights—2, Box 8. No classification marking. Drafted by James F. Green (IO/HRY) and cleared by Anna Roosevelt Halsted, Ward Allen (IO), Robert G. Cleveland (P/PS), Funk (S/AH), and Margaret H. Williams (CU). 334. Editorial Note 335. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Abram) to President Johnson Waltham, Massachusetts, December 11, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, IT–47. A handwritten note on the last page of the letter reads: “I do hope we shall have the great honor of having you at Brandeis in the future.” 315. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 315. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 20, 1964. SUBJECT 1964 Human Rights Commission—Race Convention and Religion Declaration The Human Rights Commission wound up a four week session on March 18. Marietta Tree 2 has been in the U.S. Chair. Since the Commission's priority assignment was preparation of a convention against racial discrimination, following up on the race declaration adopted last fall, you may be interested in the following summary: 3 1. Race vs. Religion The U.S. has not opposed work on a race convention, but has taken a strong position that a draft declaration against religious intolerance, originally requested by the General Assembly for the same time as the race declaration, be ready for action by the General Assembly not later than 1964. The Human Rights Commission has succeeded in producing drafts for both instruments which ECOSOC can transmit to the General Assembly. Even though neither of these drafts is complete, they are adequate as working documents. 2. Free Speech vs. Race Hatred The issue that plagued us on the race declaration—i.e.—demand for suppression of hate organizations—arose immediately in the race convention. Thanks to Morris Abram's good work on a preliminary draft in the Subcommission on Discrimination and Minorities last January, and support gathered by our Delegation for a further adjustment in the Commission, we were able to vote for the draft provision as adopted on this point. Key wording—States agree to prohibit organizations, or the activities of organizations, as appropriate, which promote and incite racial discrimination. Article 1 defines “racial discrimination” as discrimination “in public life.” 3. Anti-Semitism Mrs. Tree took the initiative in proposing an additional article in the race convention condemning anti-Semitism. This was possible because the convention covers discrimination on ethnic as well as racial grounds. The USSR tried to add a reference to “nazism, genocide and neo-nazism” to this, but stated publicly that it would support an article on anti-Semitism. Reactions from Jewish organizations and others have been highly favorable. The Commission did not have time to complete action on this article, and has passed it on with the USSR amendment. 4. Race Convention—Can we support? What next? The U.S. voted for the preamble and articles as adopted in the Commission. Thus far we have not had to state an over-all position because the draft is not complete. We hope ECOSOC may have time to complete the substantive section (only anti-Semitism is outstanding) but even so, extensive proposals on implementation and the formal articles will have to be dealt with de novo in the General Assembly. The decision is therefore some time ahead. The language adopted thus far has not presented insuperable obstacles, and if Congress adopts the Public Accommodations Title of the Civil Rights Bill, these problems will be less. We were in about this same position on the race declaration draft when it came out of the Human Rights Commission last year, but amendments in the General Assembly created great difficulties. We anticipate a similar development. 5. Religion Declaration This draft is not so far along as the race convention since it was considered only in a working party. We hope ECOSOC can deal with proposed alternatives so that it can transmit a clean text to the General Assembly. It may require some pressure from the United States to accomplish this, but we had good support in the Commission from both the Europeans and the Latin Americans, also Lebanon. The USSR has filibustered against the declaration from the start, and will undoubtedly continue. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14 UN. No classification marking. Drafted by Rachel C. Nason (IO/OES). 2 U.S. Representative to the Human Rights Commission. 3 The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 1904 (XVIII) on November 20, 1963; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 152–155. The draft resolution referred to is a draft of UN General Assembly Resolutions 2106 A and B (XX), December 21, 1965, which adopted and opened for signature the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; for text, see ibid., 1965, pp. 160–169. The United States signed the Convention on September 28, 1966. 316. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs 316. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs 1 Washington, October 14, 1964. REVISED US OBSERVATIONS ON PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR Throughout its history the United States has attached particular importance to human rights, and welcomes the action designating 1968, the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as International Human Rights Year. We appreciate the efforts of the officers of the committee in preparing the working paper submitted by the chairman, 2 and offer the following preliminary comments on the issues before the Committee. Dividing the year into periods for emphasis on different aspects of human rights should help greatly in assuring attention in every country to the full scope of the Universal Declaration and the importance of each of the fundamental concepts which give meaning to human dignity and equality. The listing in paragraph 14 indicates a division by months and we would favor this approach. While the suggested headings provide basic coverage, we would like to see greater emphasis on ways individuals can seek protection and redress when they feel their rights have been violated. One possibility would be to associate “the right to effective remedy” with “equality before the law.” We hope that human rights year can strengthen concern for implementation through international as well as national measures. At the international level, Committee 3 discussion of implementation proposals during the 19th General Assembly may provide adequate study materials. We are not aware of any comprehensive survey of national machinery. Many countries have recently been moving for improvement, and the Committee should plan promptly to obtain an information document. A study might be undertaken by an expert body such as the Subcommission on Discrimination and Minorities, or the Secretary General might be asked to prepare an analysis of present institutions. Specific projects along the line of those proposed are the key to citizen participation in human rights observances, as well as to effective cooperation by the many agencies of government. In order to profit by the experience and capacities of both the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations in consultative status, representatives of these groups might be included in an informal working party to consider these proposals. The non-governmental organizations are in a particularly effective position to relate the objectives of human rights year to the needs of individuals; where these organizations have local programs, they may be able to initiate community audits. With regard to the specific suggestions put forward in the working paper, the US would like to add one proposal, namely, that a permanent human rights exhibit be given a prominent place in the public entrance to UN headquarters. Such an exhibit would contribute to the goal of increasing individual awareness of human rights. Also, with regard to UNESCO, we believe it might be asked to undertake a major effort to enlist the cooperation of academic institutions, in addition to promoting artistic events. We believe it is premature at this time, to make any recommendation with regard to a Conference on Human Rights in 1968. More thorough and careful consideration than has thus far been possible needs to be given to the type and form that the observance and celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration might take. We do believe, however, that steps can be initiated to prepare the way for an effective, realistic and meaningful celebration. The regional seminars, to be organized in 1966 and 1967 under the Human Rights Advisory Services Program, and which include representatives of non-governmental organizations as well as government representatives, can provide a broad base for consultation on the extent of progress and evaluation of techniques which have been useful in advancing human rights. As necessary, awards under the fellowship program could be used to assure adequate and meaningful documentation. We favor intensification of national efforts in connection with the 1968 Human Rights Year, and share the hope that these will aid in the achievement of longstanding objectives. However, we believe the form in which some of these objectives are stated in para. 40 of the working paper tends to diminish the scope and promise of these rights and freedoms. As was demonstrated in the supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery adopted in 1956, understanding of the varied forms of slavery has expanded greatly in the thirty years since the 1926 convention was developed under the League of Nations. Similarly, an enlarged understanding is apparent in the declarations and conventions on discrimination now under consideration in the United Nations, and has also been apparent with regard to the nature of self-determination and independence. One of the virtues of the Universal Declaration is that its implications grow as our understanding grows, and we should be careful not to cut back on its potential scope and increasing impact. For this reason, we suggest that the plan for 1968 take as objectives the organization of national advisory committees and the intensification of educational programs, as recommended in the later sections of Part III, and that the goals listed in para. 40 be made priority items for attention in these committees and programs. We would also favor listing, as a third objective, surveys in depth of the practical application of standards adopted in recent years for the elimination of discrimination, with a view to cooperation between governments and the UN, the ILO, UNESCO and other agencies in evaluating progress. We believe this approach is more realistic and will be more likely to produce the desired results. For example, since all Members of the UN have repudiated slavery as a legal institution, in most cases many years ago, elimination of slavery may be regarded as offering little opportunity for action at the national level. The need for additional measures is therefore more likely to be recognized through the findings of a national advisory committee. While the situation with regard to discrimination is quite different, the complete elimination of discrimination on all grounds, or indeed on any ground, calls for examination of attitudes and often changes in laws or customs which cannot be achieved without an on-going program of community education to counter ignorance and self-righteousness. In addition to leadership on the particular objectives discussed above, national advisory committees can provide grassroots guidance on special problems and opportunities within each country. The documentation assembled by the Human Rights Commission in 1962 is indicative of the variety and positive value of such committees. In many countries the National Commission for UNESCO can also provide leadership. While it is useful to establish a particular group as a national advisory committee in the field of human rights, experience in the United States has demonstrated the advantage of cooperation among a number of different committees and groups, both official and non-governmental. In the same way, educational campaigns at the national level would embrace the special interests of each country along with particular emphases in the international program. Many countries, including the United States have regularly observed December 10 as Human Rights Day, with cooperation from the mass media, schools, civic and other organizations. The Human Rights Year should stimulate still more vigorous educational programs. A new history of the Universal Declaration will be needed in connection with Human Rights Year. The plans for this history developed in connection with the Fifteenth Anniversary seem adequate and we have confidence in the Secretary General's capacity to prepare it on his own authority. We see no need for a special editorial board; if the Secretary General has questions regarding earlier human rights documents or other matters in which a particular member state has unique interest, he is free to seek the cooperation of the government concerned. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. No classification marking. Drafted by J. Sisco; cleared by Mark B. Trenary (OIA), Francis O. Allen (AF), Nathan A. Pelcovits (UNP), Richard B. Bilder (L/UNA), Edward B. Persons (OES), Means (Labor), Gates (HEW), Roger Pineau (CU/MPP), Constantine Warvariv (OES), Francis M. Rogerson (US–CRR); and approved by Sisco. This paper is an enclosure to airgram A–89 to USUN, which authorized using the paper in corridor conversations with colleagues but not submitted to the Secretary-General. 2 Not identified. 317. Editorial Note 317. Editorial Note During 1964 human rights issues in the form of racial discrimination and the policy of apartheid began to emerge as issues in multilateral bodies as many African states gained their independence and joined the United Nations. During ICAO's first major session of 1964—the Meteorology and Operations Divisional Meeting—African states reacted negatively to the presence of South Africa and Portugal. The United States expressed its dismay at the encroachment of political issues into technical fora and enlisted neutral nations to help. (Telegram 1018 to Bern and telegram 442 from Bern, both January 15, 1964; Department of State, Central Files, AV 3 ICAO) By July the Organization of African Unity announced a new policy of isolation of states that practiced apartheid, a position that threatened to disrupt the ICAO's upcoming African-Indian Ocean Regional Air Navigation Meeting in late November by excluding South Africa and Portugal. On November 10 the Department told the U.S. Mission to the United Nations that “Department understands ICAO Secretariat and ICAO Council President Binaghi well aware of problem, consider exclusion action illegal and undesirable, and are already taking steps to attempt head off expected African action.” The Mission was instructed to solicit the Secretary-General's intervention and to emphasize the “desirability of confining technical meetings to technical problems and leaving political issues to appropriate UN bodies.” (Telegram 1135 to USUN, November 10; ibid.) The Mission responded that the Secretary-General was getting “cold feet” on such matters and wished the ICAO “to handle the matter itself.” (Telegram 1646 from USUN, November 13; ibid.) 318. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 318. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 24, 1964. A–678 SUBJECT International Year for Human Rights REF USUN 1510, 1548. Dept's A–89, A–96; Deptel 1214 2 In highly charged atmosphere of closed Working Group Human Rights Year Committee, recommendations were made over strong United States opposition that (1) the General Assembly be asked to “convene a United Nations Conference on Human Rights” for various purposes, 3 (2) the General Assembly decide the composition of the Preparatory Committee and the question of finances. Prior to the meeting, the United States, after hard and long negotiations, convinced members of the Sub-Group dealing with the Conference (Costa Rica and Turkey) that the recommendations, such as above, were completely unacceptable to the United States if United States support for the conference was desired. Volio (Costa Rica) agreed and accepted the idea that the conference must be kept within the confines of the General Assembly, and financial implications, if any, must be kept minimal and within the resources of the advisory services program for human rights should ECOSOC desire to re-allocate funds for the conference. The Resolution, with specifications drafted and accepted by Costa Rica and Turkey and presented to the Working Group, has been pouched to the Department. At the beginning of the meeting, it became apparent that the Committee Chairman, Richardson (Jamaica), disliked the Sub-Group report and the contents of the Resolution. Whereupon, he proceeded to launch a vicious campaign to persuade the weak delegates that the Resolution was, in effect, designed to kill the idea of a conference. In the course of his remarks regarding this point, he called the United Nations Secretary-General “overlord of the Human Rights Commission who doesn't think much of it anyway.” He called the Human Rights Commission incompetent, ineffective, and said that it was killing United Nations initiatives in Human Rights, that it was unrepresentative of the United Nations, and that the best way to make sure that any conference on human rights was ruined was to let the Human Rights Commission participate in its organization. Furthermore, he stated that the present members on the Human Rights Commission had no interest in human rights. He refused to permit the delegates to ask questions of the Secretariat, and when questions were asked he refused to permit the Secretariat to answer if the answers might be contrary to the Richardson position. As on previous occasions, he insulted the USSR and refused to permit the USSR, under heavy fire by the United States, to withdraw the suggestion that the General Assembly be asked to decide the composition of any Preparatory Committee for the Conference. This incredible performance overpowered the weaker delegates, who folded completely, including Costa Rica and Turkey. The Mission Officer believes Costa Rican capitulation was due solely to Volio's unfortunate absence from the Committee Room. His alternate Redondo was not adequately briefed on the nature of the situation and did not know that the agreement was to stick to the carefully negotiated text. The Turkish Delegate (Tarlan), young and inexperienced in the United Nations, even said that his government would support the conference after the twenty-third General Assembly ended. The United Kingdom Delegate (Taylor) confessed that he had no idea what the matter was all about. Initially the Philippines supported the United States, but folded when other LDC's did. At USUN initiative today, Costa Rica and Turkey were contacted regarding the Friday fiasco. Redondo's ignorance of the agreed text was confirmed. Tarlan is reconsidering and will discuss the matter. The Philippines is also being contacted. The United States Representative is hopeful that the original text will prevail in the Committee despite Richardson tactics. The United States put forward, in no uncertain terms, its position outlined in Deptel 1214 and stated further its unalterable opposition to such procedures, tactics and recommendations now being accepted by the Working Group. It stated flatly that it could not support any attempt to hold another UNCTAD-style conference. Note: Ambassador Tree told the Mission Officer that Richardson told her the evening of November 19 that he is determined to hold the conference outside the General Assembly, and that the United States would now support the idea, although France and the Bloc would be against this. Richardson told Williams the evening of November 20 that “your boys” giving him hard time and that he (Richardson) wanted a specialized agency for human rights and the conference independent of the General Assembly, as this was the only way to get the SA. Richardson also told Williams that some Big Power had to support the idea, and he hoped the United States would. But since the United States did not, perhaps Lord Caradon (U.K.) would support the idea when he returned. This determination is now evident and Richardson seemingly will settle for nothing less. During a heated exchange between the United States and Richardson over the financial implications, Richardson gave figures of past conference. When the United States inquired of the Secretariat for further information, Richardson refused to permit the Secretariat to answer. Note: Figures quoted by Richardson had been shown to the Mission Officer earlier by Volio who admitted that they represented only what the United Nations paid and omitted the sums contributed by the host governments. Due to the United States' bitter opposition and the unavailability of the text in Russian, the Working Group must meet again to reconsider the Sub-Group report. Richardson is certain to offer bitter opposition to further discussion of the Resolution since it is highly satisfactory to him as now drafted. (Text being pouched.) During the meeting, Costa Rica announced that it would extend an invitation for a regional seminar in connection with the Human Rights Year. The Secretariat (Lawson) announced that the Secretariat is now negotiating with Hungary to host the 1966 seminar for the Protection of Human Rights in Local Administration, and with Poland to host the Seminar 1967 on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 4 Stevenson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Confidential. Drafted by J.E. Means, and cleared in draft by Marietta Tree and C. Blau. 2 Telegram 1510 from USUN, November 5; ibid., SOC 14. Telegram 1548 from USUN, November 6; ibid. Airgram A–89 to USUN transmitted Document 316 . Airgram A–96 to USUN, October 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Telegram 1214 to USUN, November 17; ibid., UN 6. 3 Although the U.S. delegation had been authorized to support a special governmental meeting during 1968 and to call it a “conference,” the United States only supported such a meeting if it took place in New York as a special session during the 23d General Assembly. The Department warned the delegation: “You should take all necessary steps to head off Committee decisions which would preclude arrangements along above lines.” (Telegram 1214 to USUN, November 18; ibid.) 4 On December 20, 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted unanimously Resolution 2081 (XX) and its annex, entitled “International Year for Human Rights: interim programme recommended by the Commission on Human Rights.” (UN Doc. A/6014, pp. 44–45) With this resolution, the General Assembly decided to convene an international conference on human rights in 1968. The UN General Assembly had previously designated 1968 as International Year of Human Rights by Resolution 1961 (XVIII) of December 12, 1963 (UN Doc. A/5515). See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 160, footnote 11. 319. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 319. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, November 26, 1964, 7 p.m. 1457. For Aviation Liaison: Attention Ferguson from Boyle. The possibility of exclusion of South Africa and Portugal from ICAO African meeting remains continuing threat despite conciliatory statement made at opening session by UAR on behalf of African states. 2 African states appear adopting technique of walking out of committees and working groups whenever the subject of discussion is a route, circuit, airport or other aeronautical facility connecting Portuguese territory or South Africa with any other African state or which supports an operation from or to Portuguese territory or South Africa which overflies any other African state. They hope by this to, in effect, black out of the regional plan all routes, circuits, etc. into and out of such areas. Not yet clear whether this technique will be completely effective. IATA may be willing and able in the committees and working groups to fill informational gaps. Additionally, attitude of Portugal and South Africa in these meetings may be of significance. So far it appears South Africa will generally remain silent and not initiate any proposals, but Portugal adopting much more aggressive attitude which could cause more difficulties. There are several possible consequences this action. First, black out may be successful, thus meeting can only produce a regional plan not including South Africa or Portuguese territory which obviously of doubtful value, not what meeting was convened for and, in fact, not responsive to ANC directives.UK urges us go along with this result calling it “limited success.” Binaghi also appears to want us to go along stating that while this activity violation of spirit of convention and directives, he does not consider it illegal. Binaghi further says defective plan would be to Council and ANC where it can be dealt with. Another possible outcome of walkout technique is that necessary information may be supplied by others such as IATA, South Africa and Portugal during absence of African delegates, and committees and working groups complete plan using this information. Since in all cases African delegates reserving decisions taken during absence, the reports of committees will then be subject to revision when referred to higher levels of conference or final plenary. Since African states have clear majority in these meetings, the plan will almost certainly be revised to again black out data for South Africa and Portuguese territory. However, in this situation, since basic plan had been produced, Council or ANC possibly could disregard action of final plenary and publish unexpurgated regional plan. Another possible alternative is that a committee or working group, being unable to proceed because of walkout, will refer matter to sub-committee one, highest level short of plenary, where basic issue of expulsion may again erupt. Binaghi urging that this not occur since in his view once it is necessary to take a position in public, all African states will vote for expulsion. Binaghi states that he has been able to keep meeting under control only through device of arranging private African states only meetings at which their differences can be aired in private and in which moderates can be most effective. It appears first test of last mentioned alternative may occur Friday. Working group referring to subcommittee one a table of aircraft operations and route map for region which singles out for separate decision 1) routes into and out of Portuguese territory and South Africa from other African states, 2) routes to and from such areas which overfly African states and 3) routes into and out of Israel which overfly Arab states. Binaghi does not believe expulsion issue will arise at this first test. US del proposes low key opposition to deletion of such routes on grounds that it contrary to directives of ANC, that their deletion would result in not planning for significant area of region, and that conference is not performing its technical function. 3 Further general instructions in view foregoing developments desired. Reinhardt 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Passed to the White House and FAA. 2 In telegram 1435 from Rome, November 23, the Embassy reported: “At first plenary session of ICAO African meeting the United Arab Republic read the following statement which represented the views of the African states informal meeting held prior to plenary. ‘The African states regret the presence of Portugal and South Africa and wish to place on record that they will not participate in any discussions initiated by these countries.'” (Ibid.) 3 The Department agreed with this approach, and cautioned the delegation to “avoid any situation that would produce walkout.” (Telegram 1337 to Rome, November 27; ibid.) 320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, December 2, 1964, 1:46 p.m. 321. Ref: ICAO African Regional Conference. Counselor Portuguese Embassy urgently called Dept November 29 on instructions GOP seeking strong and active USG support Portugal at ICAO regional conference Rome. Said conference action creates air safety hazard. 2 He was informed of USG actions against adoption of resolution and our assessment that while action unfortunate, info might still be inserted into regional plan by Air Navigation Commission and Council./3/ Also informed argumentation US delegation instructed use (Deptel 1337)./4/ 2 On November 27 the delegate from Tunisia introduced a resolution excluding both South Africa and Portugal: “Delegations of independent states of Africa request adjournment, sine die, of discussion on route segments between Portugal, African Portuguese territories, and South Africa, and in meantime request Secretariat to prepare a new table of aircraft operations on this basis.” (Telegram 1468 from Rome, November 27; ibid.) Discussion of the resolution was postponed until November 30 by which time an apparent compromise kept the conference in session. Citing previous statements, the Tunisian delegation withdrew the motion and asked the Secretariat to “indicate clearly at each pertinent point in report that they disassociate themselves from recommendation in question,” thereby allowing discussion to proceed. (Telegram 1489 from Rome, November 30; ibid.) Harriman 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO. Confidential. Drafted by R. Funseth (EUR) and L. Williams (EUR); cleared by Joan S. Gravatt (AL), Elizabeth Ann Brown (UNP), and Wagner (AFI); and approved by D. McKillop (WE). Also sent to Rome and Montreal and repeated to Pretoria and USUN. 2 On November 27 the delegate from Tunisia introduced a resolution excluding both South Africa and Portugal: “Delegations of independent states of Africa request adjournment, sine die, of discussion on route segments between Portugal, African Portuguese territories, and South Africa, and in meantime request Secretariat to prepare a new table of aircraft operations on this basis.” (Telegram 1468 from Rome, November 27; ibid.) Discussion of the resolution was postponed until November 30 by which time an apparent compromise kept the conference in session. Citing previous statements, the Tunisian delegation withdrew the motion and asked the Secretariat to “indicate clearly at each pertinent point in report that they disassociate themselves from recommendation in question,” thereby allowing discussion to proceed. (Telegram 1489 from Rome, November 30; ibid.) 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, December 9, 1964, 7:31 p.m. 1451. Subject: Proposed Human Rights Conference in 1968. Ref: urtel 2054; 2 Deptel 1214. 3 For Williams. Caradon position deeply disturbing. 4 It appears to Dept. drift is toward big human rights conference in 1968 with considerable risk irresponsible use conference platform for race and other propaganda issues. Quite aside from advantage in costs, which important in view many other demands on UN budget, we believe meeting along lines Deptel 1214 would be more likely provide responsible and practical discussions of how to advance human rights across the board in line Charter objectives. Decision by International Year Committee in favor conference-type meeting held during period GA and under its aegis would be important step forward; in light US-UK-Turkey-Costa Rica leadership in subcommittee discussion,UK withdrawal from GA framework position will greatly enhance prospects conference outside GA. Believe situation justifies your talking personally with Caradon to obtain his thinking and if necessary assure UK position remains flexible until further exchange views can be arranged. 5 We believe you should try out in particular variant described in last para of Deptel 1214. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by R. Nason (IO/OES), cleared by William J. Stibravy (OES), and approved by J. Sisco (IO). 2 Dated December 8. (Ibid.) 3 Dated November 18. (Ibid.) 4 U.S. diplomats learned from their British counterparts that the British delegation was “under firm instructions not to alienate Amb. Richardson (Jamaica), who is chief proponent of conf., though UK Govt. does not at present favor conf.” Richardson had made a strong démarche to Lord Caradon and, as a result, “UK 'running out' on US in regard to conf.” The State Department was disturbed since USUN had reported that there were indications that Richardson had been prepared to accept the U.S. proposal for a conference during the General Assembly. (Telegram 2054 from USUN, December 8; ibid.) 5 In a meeting on December 14, “Speaking for himself, Caradon expressed enthusiastic support for Amb. Richardson's (Jamaica) proposal, and indicated it difficult persuade him otherwise. He said it important UN be seen 'doing more' in field of HR… . He thought positive action in HR field would help image of UN in UK,” USUN reported. Like Richardson, Lord Caradon believed that a conference concurrent with the General Assembly session would not get enough attention. He told the Americans that he was going to London “to seek instructions in favor of independent conf, including commitment on financing.” (Telegram 2154 from USUN, December 14; ibid.) 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, January 20, 1965, 12:05 p.m. 1818. 1968 Conference on Human Rights. Ref: CA 6715; 2 USUN 2715. 3 In discussions with DepAsstSec Sisco Jan 15 British Minister of State Thomson referred to Caradon's strong advocacy of special conference proposed by Jamaica. 4 There was strong resistance to special conference in Foreign Office on basis of costs and likelihood it would become involved in black-white problems such as West Indians in UK and negroes in US rather than broader concepts of need for respect for fundamental human rights. 5 Sisco described US suggestion of GA Committee of Whole as set forth CA 6715. We were also continuing to seek some way to get UN involved in systematic world-wide program of human rights which would permit us to get away from straight racial problems. Thompson commented UK had been giving further consideration to idea of UN Commissioner for Human Rights. Sisco said we had also been studying this possibility. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Confidential. Drafted by Brown (IO/UNP), cleared by Buffum (UNP) and Nason (OES), and approved by J. Sisco. Also sent to London. 2 Dated January 4. (Ibid.) 3 Dated January 18. (Ibid.) 4 In late December the Embassy in London reported that Caradon was under instructions from the Foreign Office to oppose the conference, but that the Foreign Office was not certain that he would do so. The Embassy commented: “This probably not last time Foreign Office will have problems as result of appointment UN representative someone with prestige, experience and stubbornness of Lord Caradon. This particularly true during shakedown period Labor Government and preoccupation FonSec on by-election hustings.” (Telegram 3012 from London, December 31; ibid.) 5 USUN reported that, “Following US presentation Grondin [Canada] expressed view Afro-Asians might want 'whites' to attend seminars in order 'to get at us.' We agreed regional seminars might be abused politically but thought this could be controlled.” (Telegram 2659 from USUN, January 14; ibid.) 323. Memorandum of Conversation 323. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 21, 1965. SUBJECT Proposals for a UN Commissioner on Human Rights PARTICIPANTS Mr. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO Mr. Burke Marshall USUN—Ambassador Williams USUN—Mr. Montero USUN—Mr. Elmendorf Dept. of Justice—Mr. Schlei, Mr. Ulman Civil Rights Commission—Mr. Taylor Dept. of State—L—Mr. Meeker; IO—Mr. Kotschnig; L/UNA—Mr. Schwebel; Mr. Bilder; OES—Mr. Kiefer; Miss Bell; Mrs. Nason; Mr. Widenor; H—Miss Hogan; ARA—Mr. Monsma; EUR—Capt. Freeman; FE—Miss McNutt; NEA—Mr. Lee; Mr. Morrison Mr. Gardner invited participants to comment on the proposal, (1) in relation to the U.S. domestic situation and (2) in relation to our foreign policy. On the domestic side, Burke Marshall and others raised the possibility that U.S. groups agitating in the race relations field would take advantage of a UN Commissioner on Human Rights to seek further publicity. Ambassador Williams pointed out that such U.S. groups are already appealing directly to foreign delegations in New York, so that the establishment of a Human Rights Commissioner in the United Nations would not create a new situation. On the contrary, a balanced and objective human rights reporting system would be helpful and was urgently needed to offset the ignorance and disbelief in New York with respect to U.S. progress in eliminating race discrimination—the U.S. was already exposed and the situation could not be worse. Some thought the reports of a Human Rights Commissioner might naturally tend to focus on the “open” societies, such as the U.S., whose problems are a matter of public record and neglect the “closed” societies, such as the U.S.S.R., in which not even the existence of human rights problems is publicly acknowledged. In answer it was pointed out that there are many and various independent sources of information on the U.S.S.R. that the Commissioner could draw upon. Moreover, the Commissioner's report would be studied in the Human Rights Commission and in the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, as well as in ECOSOC, thereby giving both experts and government representatives an opportunity to criticize and rebut it. Throughout the discussion great emphasis was placed on drawing the terms of reference so as to definitively limit the powers of the Commissioner. Everyone agreed the Commissioner should function only as a reporter and not be allowed to become an investigator. On the foreign policy side, questions were raised as to the U.S. position in case a Commissioner report exposed serious human rights violations or malpractice in countries, such as the GRC, ROK and RVN, which are known to be receiving major support from the U.S. No final agreement was reached. Mr. Gardner indicated that the original memo would be revised in the light of the discussion and of proposals already in circulation at the United Nations. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Unclassified. Drafted by Nason and Widenor. 2 On December 13, 1965, the U.S. Representatives in Committee III of the UN General Assembly made a statement supporting the proposal to create the post of UN High Commissioner, and on December 16 the General Assembly adopted a resolution that referred the proposal to the Commission on Human Rights. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 156. On March 30, 1966, the Commission decided to establish a working group of nine states (including the United States) to study the proposal for a High Commissioner for Human Rights and report the results to the Commission at its 23d session in 1967; see ibid., 1966, pp. 93–94. Action was postponed through 1971; an alternative resolution was adopted in 1973. 324. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 324. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, February 18, 1965, 4 p.m. 3999. Embtel 3370 rptd USUN 244. 2 Human Rights Conference. Pridham (head UN Social and Econ Dept FonOff) told EmbOff yesterday Caradon had been given permission lobby and vote on HR Conference as he saw fit. This despite continued misgivings MinState Thomson and others FonOff who still adhere personally to position set forth reftel. 3 Pridham indicated change in Caradon instructions essentially for “Commonwealth reasons,” although admitted Jamaicans had put no pressure on FonOff in London. He also hinted at bureaucratic problem inducing high powered ministerial representative to adhere to party line in this case where he holds strong contrary views. Pridham admitted new Caradon instructions might well result in over-balancing opinion in wrong direction on HR Conference which he assumes will come to comite vote end this month. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14. Confidential. Repeated to USUN. 2 Dated January 20. (Ibid.) 3 See Document 322 . 325. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 325. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 1 Addis Ababa, April 1, 1965, 3 p.m. 1394. Communist Activities re ICAO.Deptel 1050. 2 Local soundings have turned up no information concerning alleged Communist plan to expel South Africa and Portugal from ICAO and to take over that organization. 3 We understand that, as usual, resolution was passed at Nairobi ministerial 4 condemning apartheid and Portuguese Colonialism. However, current indications are that it did not include concerted plan for ousting SA and Portugal from ICAO. At same time, according to our sources, there is considerable sentiment among African policy makers to continue policy of isolating SA and Portugal in international bodies, as sanctioned by heads of state at Cairo, July, 1964 in AHG/res. (I) conveyed our A–70. 5 Therefore “spontaneous” African participation in moves to expel SA and Portugal from the ICAO should be anticipated, and support from whatever quarter presumably will be welcome. 6 Air Transport advisor to ECA (protect source), addressing himself to African, not African cum Communist, role, has heard of no such takeover plans. Feels however that Africans, who have five of 27 seats on ICAO governing council would be ill-advised to stage walkout on SA/Portugal issue. Added he has confidence in Council Chairman Benagi of Argentina whom he believes could avoid an African takeover. Vance 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO. Confidential. Repeated to London, Beirut, Paris, Asmara, and USUN. 2 Dated March 25. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 1050 to Addis Ababa reported that the Department had learned from foreign sources of a “well-organized plan underway by Communist countries, working with Arab League and sympathetic African countries, to gain control ICAO at Assembly in Montreal next June. Action would include move at beginning first plenary session oust South Africa and Portugal with walkout planned.” It was also rumored that “Communist, Arab, or partisan African” candidates would be nominated for each post. (Ibid.) 4 Reference is to a meeting in February–March of the Foreign Ministers of members of the Organization of African Unity. 5 For extracts of the resolution pertaining to South Africa adopted by the OAU in Cairo on July 21, 1964, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 807–808. 6 Telegram 4800 from London, April 2, reported that the British confirmed that they had received a report from Walter Binaghi that mentioned only South Africa. The British had calculated that the “Communist-Arab-African bloc” could command close to 50 percent of the vote. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO) 326. Editorial Note 326. Editorial Note During the weeks prior to the opening of the ICAO Assembly in June 1965, South Africa and Portugal sought to rally support and prevent their expulsion from the organization. On June 2, 1965, the South Africans submitted an aide-mémoire to the Department of State, in part arguing: “The expulsion of a member state from such a technical organisation in circumstances where the United Nations itself has not attempted such a step would not only be contrary to the spirit and letter of the convention of ICAO, but most certainly also to the purposes to which ICAO was established.” (South African aide-mémoire, June 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO) Portugal also asked the Department for support. On June 17 Assistant Secretary Sisco assured the Portuguese Minister that the U.S. position was “to oppose political discussions in and attempts to preempt UN political powers by UN technical organs,” and “to oppose unconstitutional resolutions seeking to exclude members or otherwise encumber their membership.” (Memorandum of conversation, June 17; ibid.) Before the conference, on June 9 British officials visited the Department to lay out their intended course of action and to explain that they were making similar approaches to other European states and to other members of the Commonwealth. (Memorandum of conversation, June 9; ibid.) According to the Embassy in Bonn, the Germans expressed “apprehension” over the growing political activities of the LDCs within UN specialized agencies, but “US counter-action has been muted, however, by recognition that active initiative against African exclusion maneuvers in any one agency (over Afro-Asian-Communist voting bloc of nearly two-thirds members) likely result in cumulative Afro-Asian opposition to Western interests in more crucial situation. Our experience has shown most Western states have reached same conclusion and are most reluctant to take any lead to block Afro-Asian drive against Portugal and South Africa.” (Telegram 3826 from Bonn, June 18; ibid.) 327. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in South and Central America 327. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in South and Central America 1 Washington, June 18, 1965, 8:12 p.m. 2550. Subject: 15th Assembly of International Civil Aviation Organization. Anticipate African initiative in ICAO Assembly beginning Montreal 23 June to expel or suspend South Africa and possibly Portugal, or otherwise restrict rights of membership in ICAO. Given importance this UN technical agency to international air system standards and recommended practices and necessity insuring technical agency focuses on technical program, Embassy should as appropriate indicate US will oppose any such political action which is both improper and unconstitutional, as well as which pre-empts functions UNGA and SC, and expresses hope LA Dels will be doing likewise. Would hope negative vote be cast both on any res or motion attempting unconstitutionally expel or suspend member or otherwise restrict rights of membership and on any amendment to Convention which would have this effect. 2 Since amendment to Convention would require two-thirds majority of members present and voting, excluding abstentions, Latin American negative votes, rather than abstentions, likely determine outcome of issue. 3 Repeat telegrams reporting reactions to Montreal. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, AV 3 ICAO. Confidential. Drafted by Robert H. Edwards (IO); cleared by Wagner (AF), Robert L. Funseth, Buffum, George N. Monsma (ARA), John L. Hargrove (L/UNA), Jack R. Johnstone (OES), and Gravatt (OA/AL); and approved by Sisco. Sent to Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Bogota, Panama, San Jose, La Paz, Quito, Guatemala, San Salvador, Mexico, Managua, Santiago, Lima, and Caracas, and repeated to Montreal. 2 Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay all voted negatively or abstained in roll-call votes on South Africa. Venezuela “consistently” voted for expulsion, and Costa Rica changed its vote to one of support for the resolution after an appeal from Guinea. The United States and its allies were unable to prevent the motion to expel from the agenda. (Report of the U.S. delegation to the 15th session of the ICAO Assembly, June 22–July 16; ibid.) 3 When it became apparent that expulsion would be on the agenda, the U.S. delegation suggested that the Department again approach the South American states that had abstained. (Telegram 3857 from Montreal, July 6; ibid.) The Department declined. “In accord with US desire not get out in front this question, US not inclined make further approaches to capitals.” (Telegram 3199 to Montreal, July 7; ibid.) The Assembly rejected the amendment, which would have suspended or expelled any state practicing a policy of apartheid, by a vote of 39 in favor, 1 against (South Africa), and 40 abstentions. (Report of the U.S. delegation to the 15th session of the ICAO Asssembly, June 22–July 16; ibid.) 328. Editorial Note 328. Editorial Note During the long planning for the International Conference on Human Rights scheduled for April 1968 in Tehran, the United States and other developed nations raised budgetary issues and expressed unease with the direction the conference might take. In a meeting on May 6, 1966, Jamaican Ambassador Richardson “expressed concern about alleged foot-dragging of West, and assumed West feared review of progress at HR Conf. degenerate into political debate. Recognized risk was involved for West and suggested best way meet problem would be for West to take initiative and present new ideas. Indicated he personally did not want conf. concentrate on race and colonialism.” (Telegram 4802 from USUN, May 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SOC 14–3) USUN reported on May 25 on the “intensive” consultations on a draft agenda for the conference and its attempt to widen the scope of the agenda to avoid focusing on the politically sensitive issues of racism and colonialism: “We expressed unhappiness at negotiated text, particularly regarding balance and terms… . Result of our discussions on May 25 was agreement to withhold submission of text drafted May 24 … and to engage in further consultations May 26 with West present. We plan resist USSR language such as 'total and immediate' elimination of racial discrimination, and 'liquidation of colonialism.' However, we believe some form of these topics virtually certain to stay in draft agenda under item on future program. We plan try to expand it to cover matters of importance to West, such as freedom of speech and association and freedom of religion.” (Telegram 5027 from USUN, May 25; ibid.) On April 19, 1968, the White House announced the appointment of a delegation to attend the conference, which would begin on April 22. Chairman of the U.S. delegation was Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP, and the Alternative Chairman was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs David H. Popper. Other senior members of the delegation included Morris B. Abram, U.S. Representative to the ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights; and Bruno Bitker, member of the President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year. (White House press release, April 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Office Files of White House Aides, Ernest Goldstein, Human Rights) 329. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Goldstein) to President Johnson 329. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Goldstein) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 26, 1968, 4:30 p.m. Mr. President: One further comment from Tehran re Human Rights Conference impact of Roy Wilkins is worthy of note: “Much of what has been said here so far has been predictable. Major change from anticipated scenario, from our standpoint, has been virtually complete absence of criticism of U.S. over its racial problems and policies. We attribute this to Wilkins' statement and presence. Needless to say, it greatly facilitates our task. We believe impact of Wilkins' activities will continue to be felt throughout Conference.” Ernie 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Office Files of White House Aides, Ernest Goldstein, UN Conference on Human Rights, Box 15. Confidential. 330. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 330. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 3, 1968. SUBJECT My Meeting with Dr. Ralph Abernathy and Representatives of the “Poor People,” 2 Wednesday, May 1, 10:45–11:45 A.M. Dr. Abernathy opened the meeting, introduced a series of speakers who addressed their grievances to me, and stated that he and his followers would return in ten days to see what response was forthcoming. (Speakers listed at Tab A.) 3 At the close of the meeting, I promised to consider the grievances expressed, to consult with my Cabinet colleagues on points outside my jurisdiction, and to examine and respond to specific grievances that fell within the purview of my Department. It was apparent at the meeting that the spokesmen for the group were poorly informed and that the first need was to provide them with adequate information on the subjects of their concern. I propose that information relating to legitimate grievances be drawn up to serve as a basis for discussion with Dr. Abernathy and his group when they return. Grievances meriting a response are outlined below. U.S. Relations with South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal — Grievance : U.S. relations with these countries support racist societies and thereby serve to undermine national goals and policies of racial equality. — Response : The Department will prepare a statement and explanation of U.S. policy toward these countries for Dr. Abernathy and his colleague, the Rev. Andrew Young, who raised the issue. Immigration Policies — Grievance : Immigration policies which permit entry into the United States of foreign workers (particularly those from Mexico and the Caribbean) should be discontinued until poor Americans are gainfully employed. — Response : The Department will coordinate with the Departments of Labor and Justice in the preparation of a report on the displacement of lower class American workers by foreign immigrants. — Grievance : “Green card” holders should be prevented from acting as strike breakers in the Southwest. — Response : The Department will cooperate with the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the preparation of a statement of facts and of recent regulations designed to prevent strike breaking by green card holders. AID Policies — Grievance : Assistance should not be given to the poor in other countries when there is so much poverty at home. — Response : AID will prepare a statement on global interdependence and the dangers posed to our society of rampant poverty abroad. — Grievance : AID funds are used to support dictators in Latin America. — Response : AID will prepare a statement describing its programs in support of social and political development in Latin America and the reform criteria for AID assistance. — Grievance : AID is developing and dispersing abroad fortified foods which are not available to the poor people at home. — Response : AID will cooperate with the Department of Agriculture in the preparation of a report on AID programs in this area and their relation to domestic needs and programs. Spanish Speaking Americans — Grievance : Cultural and land rights guaranteed to the Spanish speaking people by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 4 have been denied to them in practice. — Response : A memorandum prepared for my earlier meeting with Dr. Abernathy on this subject is attached at Tab B 5 together with materials which describe progress made on behalf of Spanish speaking Americans under this Administration. This information will be used as a basis for any further discussions of this subject with Dr. Abernathy. I am also asking Mr. Ximenes to send Dr. Abernathy a supply of the brochure “The Mexican American: A New Focus on Opportunity” which describes your concern and constructive programs for the improvement of the condition of Mexican Americans. American Indians — Grievance : American Indians are being denied fishing and other rights guaranteed to them by treaty. Specific references were made to the Treaty of Medicine Creek and the treaty with Russia for the acquisition of Alaska. — Response : The Department will prepare a summary of U.S. observance of international treaties which affect the status of American Indians. — Grievance : Out of 6,000 Department of Defense local employees in Alaska only 71 were “Indians” (Eskimos). — Response : The Department will refer this question to DOD. Part of the meeting was taken up by angry criticism of the war in Viet-Nam, by intemperate indictments of other U.S. foreign policies, and by allegations that the U.S. was a warfare, not a welfare, state. These accusations were either too general, specious, or propagandistic to be subject to individual response. They can be addressed more suitably in a broad statement of foreign policy principles and goals. Dean Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 14 US. Confidential. 2 The “Poor People's Campaign,” a movement demanding equality and social justice for the poor, sponsored a march and encampment in Washington in May 1968. 3 Not printed. Prominent speakers included the Reverend Jesse Jackson of Operation Breadbasket and the Reverend Andrew Young, Executive Vice President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. 4 The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, signed February 2, 1848, ended the war with Mexico, set the Rio Grande as the southern boundary of Texas, and ceded the future states of California and New Mexico to the United States. A controversial clause in the treaty promised that the present landowners, their heirs, or “all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said property by contract,” should have equal protection as if the land were in the possession of American citizens. Spanish speakers claimed the loss of more than 5 million acres of land; a claim that the U.S. Government had attempted to settle through legislation during the 19th century. The issue was still an active political one. (Letter from Ximenes to Secretary Rusk, May 16, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 14 US) 5 Not printed. The U.S. position was that “Claims that the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo granted special political rights or sovereignty have no legal merit. Claims with respect to individual land holdings may, of course, be taken up in the courts.” 331. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Ralph Abernathy, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 331. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Ralph Abernathy, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 1 Washington, May 23, 1968. Dear Dr. Abernathy: At our meeting on May 1, 2 I took note of the grievances which were expressed and to which I felt this Department could respond. I am writing now to convey my response and to transmit to you selected background information on the subjects of concern to representatives of the Poor People's Campaign. A number of the representatives demanded an end to the war in Vietnam. As you know, the President on March 31 took a major unilateral action to de-escalate the conflict and, as a result of this initiative, talks with representatives of North Vietnam have now begun in Paris. One of the representatives stated that United States relations with South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal support racist societies abroad and thereby serve to undermine national goals and policies of racial equality. A careful reading of our policies toward these countries, which are explained in Attachment A, 3 will not support that view. The United States has supported fully, and will continue to support, the Security Council program of economic sanctions directed against the white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. The United States has maintained that the people of Portuguese territory in Africa are entitled to the right of self-determination and has constantly urged Portugal both publicly and privately to accept this principle. Department regulations for a number of years also have forbidden the supply of military equipment for use in Portuguese Africa by either public or private American sources and have prohibited Portugal from diverting to Africa any of the small quantities of military equipment which we sell or provide for use in the NATO area. The United States has taken every opportunity both in international forums and in bilateral relations with South Africa to express the view that the apartheid practices of that government are damaging to human relations in South Africa and to South Africa's own interests. Since 1963, the United States has stopped all sales to South Africa of arms, military equipment, and materials for their manufacture and maintenance. The Department has supported self-determination for the inhabitants of the former mandated territory of Southwest Africa and has expressed the view that proposals presently before the South Africa parliament to apply de facto apartheid to this territory are illegal. In sum, our policies in Southern Africa are based on support for majority rule, human rights, and self-determination. We are constantly seeking ways to strengthen the application of these principles. A series of grievances were aimed at our program of foreign economic assistance. It was stated that assistance should not be given to the poor in other countries when there is so much poverty at home. As explained in Attachment B, we do not believe that economic aid programs to the poor nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America (which now account for 1.5% of the federal budget) are conducted at the expense of programs to help the poor in the United States. Close to 90% of foreign aid appropriations are spent at home, creating jobs and expanding domestic production. You will understand that just as the majority of affluent in this country cannot isolate themselves from the minority of poor Americans, so the United States as one of the small minority of rich nations cannot isolate itself safely from the aspirations of the desperately poor majority. It also was stated that aid funds were being used to support dictators in Latin America. There is a popular misconception, discussed in Attachment C, that Latin America is a land of dictatorship when, in fact, 21 of the 24 governments now in office in Latin America were freely elected. United States assistance programs have given and will continue to give, overwhelming priority to economic and social development. As explained in Attachment D, less than four per cent of our aid consists of military assistance. Both the percentage of gross national product expended in defense budgets (1.7%) and the percentage of the population in the armed forces (.34%) in Latin America are among the lowest in the world. U.S. aid policy toward Latin America will continue to be carried out under the terms of the Alliance for Progress which call for serious efforts on the part of nations there to undertake social reforms and develop political and economic institutions which are responsive to the will and needs of the people. A third grievance relating to aid policy concerned the use abroad of fortified foods which are not available to the poor people at home. A memorandum examining this question is enclosed as Attachment E. It has been and will continue to be our policy, that no food (fortified or otherwise) will be sent abroad until distribution requirements of existing government domestic programs are met. Several representatives of Mexican American interests stated that land rights guaranteed to them by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo have not been enforced. This and related grievances are discussed in the letter to me from Mr. Vicente Ximenes, Chairman of the Inter-Agency Cabinet Committee on Mexican American Affairs, which is enclosed as Attachment F. These same representatives also expressed concern over immigration policies and the regulation of Green Card holders. In recent years the influx of both seasonal and permanent alien workers has dropped sharply. Green Card holders who commute from their homes in Mexico to jobs in the United States are being strictly controlled by recent regulation. Controls over resident Green Card holders would require legislation. On the general subject of Mexican American affairs, it should be noted that President Johnson has undertaken significant new measures, strongly supported by this Department, to improve the quality of life of Mexican American citizens. I am enclosing a brochure and statement of the President about these programs as Attachment G. One of the representatives, speaking on behalf of Indian interests, stated that the Department was not protecting Indian fishing rights guaranteed by treaty. With the exception of an article in the North Pacific Fur Seals convention, we cannot identify special Indian fishing rights guaranteed by international treaty. The Department endeavors to protect the fishing interests of Indian and Eskimo fishermen as explained in Attachment H. For example, continuing pressure has been maintained on Japanese fishing operations north of the Bering Strait which present a threat to the livelihood of natives of Northwest Alaska. As a result, the Government of Japan has not permitted the expansion of those operations. A special question was raised concerning Department of Defense employment of natives in Alaska. I can report, on the basis of information provided by the Defense Department and enclosed as Attachment I, that intensified efforts are being made by the Alaskan Command to locate a maximum number of Alaskan natives for anticipated job vacancies. The Defense Department is represented on the Committee on Alaskan Hire which is developing plans to overcome the difficulties of recruitment in remote areas and the lack of training of Alaskan natives. The proposal currently being considered by the Committee calls for establishing a number of training positions roughly equivalent to 10% of the current Federal work force in Alaska. Grievances concerning the draft have been referred to the Deputy Director of the Selective Service System who is preparing a response which will be transmitted to you shortly. I sensed throughout our meeting that the specific grievances to which I am now responding were symptoms of a much deeper, more general grievance concerning the allocation of this country's resources as between domestic and foreign affairs. In the parlance of the day, your representatives were concerned, as we all are, about “priorities.” In light of emerging domestic problems this nation will be debating anew what proportion of our resources should be allocated to the dual national purposes of protecting security and promoting our welfare. I hope that as this debate takes place it will be remembered that without security there can be no welfare, that our past investment in security has brought us all safely, through a dangerous passage, into the present day, and that it is neither easy nor inexpensive to help organize an enduring peace in the world. I hope you find this letter, and the materials we have taken care to prepare, responsive to the grievances which were directed to this Department. I will be transmitting additional materials to you and will be pleased to respond to any further inquiry or request that you may have. 4 Sincerely, Dean Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 14 US. No classification marking. A typed note at the bottom of the first page reads, “This is a revised version of 9/22/68 delivered to WH by Peter Kreogh. Original of this letter to Mr. Kreogh for delivery to Justice Department. (Letter Delivered to Justice Undated).” A handwritten notation next to this text reads, “5/23/68.” 2 See Document 330 . 3 None of the attachments is printed. 4 An enclosure to a June 14 letter from Marian Wright on behalf of Ralph Abernathy expressed the dissatisfaction of the Poor People's Campaign with the Department's answers: “Besides reiterating time-worn policies which have guided our foreign policies for the past few years, Secretary Rusk gave to us no evidence that he is willing to seriously consider the demands of the poor people of this nation.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 14 US) 332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico 332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico 1 Washington, June 3, 1968, 2118Z. 175252. Subject: Poverty Marchers Call at Mexican Embassy. 1. Mexican-American contingent poverty march requested and received appointment with Mexican Ambassador 11 a.m. June 3. An orderly group of approximately 50 Mexican-Americans, American Indians and Negroes arrived at the Embassy and were admitted under a watchful eye of discreet special police detail. Ambassador received delegation of approximately fifteen persons including only those of Mexican origin since he stated other representatives could have no issues to raise with the Mexican Government. Group leader Reies Lopez Tijerina presented document soliciting GOM support for Mexican-American land claims based on contention Treaty Guadalupe-Hidalgo illegal or improperly executed. 2 2. Embassy informed Department that interview was entirely cordial, Ambassador limited comments to greeting visitors and receiving memorandum. 3. As Embassy may be aware Department has previously stated that Lopez Tijerina's arguments involving Treaty Guadalupe-Hidalgo are without merit and that land claims are issues for US courts. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SOC 14 US. Unclassified; Priority. Drafted by Maxwell Chaplin (ARA/MEX), cleared by Lieblich (L/ARA), and approved by Chaplin. 2 See footnote 4, Document 330 . 333. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 333. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, July 25, 1968. SUBJECT Proposal for a White House Conference on the Advancement of Human Rights, December 4, 1968 The President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year 1968 recommends that a White House Conference on the Advancement of Human Rights be scheduled for Wednesday, December 4. The one-day conference would follow a Commission meeting on December 3, so that out-of-town members of the Commission could participate conveniently in the conference. The December 4 date would avoid any conflict with the celebration of Human Rights Day on December 10 at the United Nations. The Commission recommends that the President either address the conference, to be held in the Department of State, or receive the participants in the White House. The President's Commission had developed close relationships with many of the non-governmental organizations that are active in the field of human rights and United Nations affairs. One of its members, Mr. Bruno V. Bitker, 2 is Chairman of a Special Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, which provides liaison with these groups during Human Rights Year. The Commission hopes that representatives of many of these organizations, as well as the leaders of civil rights agencies, could meet together to commemorate Human Rights Year and to discuss the most urgent needs for the future. Participation in such a White House Conference would give the President, during his final weeks in office, an unparalleled opportunity to voice his views on future needs and problems in the field of human rights. 3 If announced sufficiently in advance, a White House Conference would attract several hundred leaders of many different organizations from various parts of the country. The Chief of Protocol would be asked to provide a luncheon, at which the President, Vice President, or some other senior official would be the principal speaker. The Commission's Chairman, Governor Harriman, or Vice Chairman, Mrs. Halsted, would preside at the proposed conference. Justice Tom C. Clark and other members of the Commission would participate. The program would include a plenary meeting in the morning, at which several senior officers of the Government and other prominent citizens would discuss issues concerning human rights, and panel discussions in smaller groups during the afternoon. Among the subjects to be discussed might be the following: 1. Continuing efforts for education about human rights; 2. Methods for relating the principles of human rights to the urban crisis in the United States; 3. The relationship of human rights to international peace; 4. The role of human rights in United States foreign policy; 5. The need for ratification of human rights conventions, particularly the six conventions before the Senate; and 6. International measures for implementation in the field of human rights. The proposed conference would be organized and staffed by the Department's Bureau of Public Affairs. The agenda and list of speakers would be developed by the Commission's staff in consultation with the Special Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. The only responsibility of the White House would be a personal appearance by the President and continuing guidance and advice by his staff (Mr. Goldstein). Benjamin H. Read 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Office Files of White House Aides, Ernest Goldstein, Human Rights—2, Box 8. No classification marking. Drafted by James F. Green (IO/HRY) and cleared by Anna Roosevelt Halsted, Ward Allen (IO), Robert G. Cleveland (P/PS), Funk (S/AH), and Margaret H. Williams (CU). 2 Bitker also served as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the UN International Conference on Human Rights; see Document 328 . 3 On December 4 President Johnson told the conference of the special ties between the American people and human rights, and said “Our greatest Presidents are remembered best for their successes in human rights, whether it was freeing an enslaved minority from bondage, or whether it was guaranteeing the self-determination of a small and a defenseless nation.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, p. 1162) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 334. Editorial Note 334. Editorial Note On August 1, 1968, President Johnson submitted the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to the Senate for ratification. This protocol was the eighth convention on human rights submitted to the Senate since the founding of the United Nations. Hearings were held on the Genocide Convention (1950); the Convention on Employment Policy (1966); and the Supplementary Convention on Slavery, the Forced Labor Convention, and the U.N. Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1967). No hearings had ever been held on the Inter-American Convention on the Political Rights of Women and the Convention on Freedom of Association. Of these, only the Slavery Convention had been ratified in 1967. (Press release of the President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year 1968, August 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Office Files of White House Aides, Ernest Goldstein, Human Rights—2, Box 8) The President urged the Senate to ratify the convention on refugees, which prohibited expulsion or return of refugees to any country in which they would face persecution, arguing that it was in the interest of the United States to do so: “Given the American heritage of concern for the homeless and persecuted, and our traditional role of leadership in promoting assistance for refugees, accession by the United States to the Protocol would lend conspicuous support to the effort of the United Nations toward attaining the Protocol's objectives everywhere.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, pages 868–869 ) The following week the President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year 1968 released a resolution publicly supporting the President's position and urging passage of all of the outstanding treaties: “It is generally recognized that peace is related to progress and ultimately depends on the quality of life of the people governed. The quality of that life depends on the interest and willingness and capacity of each country to assure and to respect human rights… . These human rights conventions are an expression of principles that have guided our own citizens in the development of a progressive and enlightened government… . The United States Senate should move forward on international human rights conventions, just as the Congress has moved forward on human rights legislation at home.” (Resolution of the President's Commission, August 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Office Files of White House Aides, Ernest Goldstein, Human Rights—2) On October 1 the Senate ratified the convention with reservations and it entered into force on November 1, 1968. 335. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Abram) to President Johnson 335. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Abram) to President Johnson 1 Waltham, Massachusetts, December 11, 1968. My Dear Mr. President: I am herewith respectfully tendering my resignation, effective immediately, as United States Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. 2 In so doing, I want to declare my heartfelt appreciation for the strong support you gave to the work of our delegation. I also would like to express my great respect for your deep commitment to the purposes of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights—the illumination and expansion of individual dignity, political freedom, and economic well-being. I have enclosed a memorandum 3 recording the accomplishments of your administration in the area of international human rights and some of my thoughts on the future. Your administration's policies have been laudably exemplified by an attempt at a more even-handed treatment of the problems of human rights. Under your leadership, we have taken the first steps in seeking from such issues not short-term political advantages but the establishment and, perhaps, the implementation of just principles which in the long-run will serve not our nation alone, but all mankind. Your administration has actively supported the proposal of a High Commissioner for Human Rights who could investigate and negotiate human rights controversies and, when necessary, turn the powerful searchlight of world attention on gross violations. Its delegates helped draft the Teheran Proclamation which committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that had not signed it in 1948— including the Soviet Union and the many new nations. Our Government has supported extension of the human rights concept to include provision for legal counsel and the right of the parents to decide the number and spacing of their children. You have given leadership to the fight against anti-Semitism in certain Communist countries, authorizing our delegates to speak openly and frankly about this age-old evil. Your administration and my tenure have seen real progress in the drafting and adoption by the United Nations of the Declaration and International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, and the drafting of a Declaration and Convention on Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, which, I hope, will eventually emerge in satisfactory form. You have vigorously used the initiative of your office to push for the ratification of certain human rights conventions, although both you and I have been dissatisfied by the response these efforts have received. Finally, your enthusiastic involvement in the activities of the International Year for Human Rights has been crucial in focusing public attention upon it. If one single thing must characterize my experience on the Human Rights Commission, it is this: for the first time in the history of the Commission, the men and women who speak for America no longer needed to apologize for or equivocate about our national policy in matters of race. 4 You and your administration—by your firm words, by your legislative program, and by your administrative actions—have made clear to the world the determination of the Government of the United States to end once and for all time the terrible burden of institutionalized or sanctioned racial discrimination. With these thoughts indelibly in mind, I want again to thank you for allowing me the honor and satisfaction of serving our country in these challenging times. Sincerely, Morris B. Abram 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, IT–47. A handwritten note on the last page of the letter reads: “I do hope we shall have the great honor of having you at Brandeis in the future.” 2 Abram served as U.S. representative from 1965 to 1968. 3 Not printed. In his memorandum Abram emphasized the continuity between the foreign and domestic policies of the Johnson administration. For example, he noted that Americans and other Westerners understood rights such as freedom of speech or the press that protected citizens from the state, but had difficulty accepting as basic rights other principles which flowed from the labor or socialist movements: “Americans have been unaccustomed to and have seriously questioned the notion that individuals also have a basic right to a job, to leisure, education, medical care, housing and social security. The Johnson Administration, through its 'War on Poverty' has taken strong economic and social steps to encourage wider public acceptance of this idea and to implement these rights. Nevertheless, some Americans still do not understand that the Universal Declaration's economic and social rights, like our own Constitution's political safeguards, are not luxuries, but necessities for a free and viable society.” 4 “One of the most significant arenas of human rights progress has been the American domestic scene,” Abram wrote in his attached memorandum. “For the first time in the history of the Commission on Human Rights, we have not had to apologize for or equivocate about our national policy in matters of race.” Abram also included a caveat: “Unless we succeed in solving our own racial and other human rights problems, we may find we are forfeiting our position of leadership and the respect of those many new States to whom questions of racism and exploitation are paramount.” Index Index Abram, Morris B., 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 335 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Index ] Abu Dhabi, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Acheson, Dean, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] Aden, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] Agger, Donald G., 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 129 ] -234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] Akins, James E., 387 n [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] -400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Alam, Amir Asadullah, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 217 ] Alexander, George H., 326 n [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Algeria, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Allen, Francis O., 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] Allen, Ward P., 199 n [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Alsop, Joseph, 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 250 ] Amstutz, J. Bruce, 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 224 n [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 124 ] -227 n [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Amuzegar (Iran), 394 n [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 215 ] Ansary, Hushang, 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 214 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 214 ] Apartheid ( see also Human rights issues), 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 331 ] Apollo program ( see also Space exploration programs), 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 76 ] Arab Federation of Petroleum Workers, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] Arab-Israeli crisis. See Six-Day War. Aram, Abbas, 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 193 ] Aramco. See under Oil embargo crisis , 1967; Petroleum issues) Arif, Col. Abdel Salam Mohammed, 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] Armstrong, C. Willis, 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 467 n [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Ashmore, Harry, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 271 ] Auger, Pierre, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] Australia, 92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] Austria, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 185 ] Aziz, Mustafa Abdul, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 196 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 196 ] Bader, Henri, 5 n [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Bahrain, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Baker, Howard, Jr., 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Ball, George W., 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] -217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 258 n [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 274 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 274 ] Ballough, Harding W., 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] Baraclough, William G., 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Barger (Aramco), 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 225 ] Barnett, Robert, 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 277 ] Bator, Francis M., 289 n [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Battle, Lucius D., 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 421 n [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -471 n [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Bazzaz, Abdul Rahman al-, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 200 ] Beal, William, 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Beckett, J. Angus, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] -338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Beckler, David, 10 n [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 24 n [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Beigel, Edgar J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Belaid, Abdelessam, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 210 ] Belgium, 92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] Bell, David E., 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Belman, Murray, 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 211 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Ben Artzi, Gen., 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 174 ] Ben-Gurion, David, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Benjamin, Robert, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 275 ] Bennsky, George M., 330 n [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 333 n [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 185 ] Beshore, Margaret E., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Bilder, Richard B., 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] Binaghi, Walter, 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 319 ] -565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 572 n [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Bitker, Bruno V., 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 333 ] Black, Eugene R., 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 111 ] Blackiston, Slator C., 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 324 n [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 326 n [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Blagonravov, Anatoli A., 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 68 ] Blake, Eugene Carson, 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 288 ] Blau, Clarence I., 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] Bogart, P., 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] -209 n [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 113 ] Boon, Hendrik, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] Bordelon, Monsignor Marvin, 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 288 ] Bowdler, William, 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] Bowie, Robert R., 10 n [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 14 n [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 10 ] Bowles, Chester, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] Boyd, Alan S., 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] -209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 113 ] Boyle, Robert P., 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] Brand, Robert A., 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 101 ] Brenchley, T. Frank, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] Brewer, William D., 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Bromell, William B., 344 n [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 189 ] Brosio, Manlio, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 36 ] Brougham, R. I., 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 257 ] Brown, Carol, 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] Brown, Elizabeth Ann, 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] Brown, George, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 193 ] Brown, Robert L., 197 n [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Bruce, Robert, 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 519 n [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 547 n [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] Buehler, Jordan, 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 101 ] Buffum, William B., 568 n [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 55 n [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 56 n [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 256 n [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 293 n [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 167 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 452 n [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 256 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 275 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 276 ] Bunker, Ellsworth, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Bushong, Jacquelin H., 130 n [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Califano, Joseph A., Jr., 130 n [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 210 n [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 154 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 273 ] Canada, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 314 ] Caradon, Lord, 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 321 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Carter, Gil, 158 n [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 85 ] Carter, William T., 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] Cary, Charles, 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 297 ] Cash, Harvey, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 219 ] Castro, Fidel, 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] -545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 310 ] Caswell, A., 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Cater, Douglass, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] -148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 258 n [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 278 ] -494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 291 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 252 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 252 ] Chaffee, Roger, 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Chaplin, Maxwell, 372 n [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 526 n [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 583 n [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Charyk, Joseph, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 130 n [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Chase, Gordon, 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 277 ] Chase, Milton, 306 n [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 172 ] Chayes, Abram, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 68 ] Chernyakov (USSR), 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 158 ] Childs, Timothy W., 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Claxton, Philander P., 494 n [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 291 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 519 n [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Cleveland, Harlan, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 315 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 315 ] Cleveland, Robert G., 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Cleveland, Stanley, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 124 ] Colombia, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] Communication Satellite Coordination Committee, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Communication satellite issues: African nations, assistance for, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Channel allocation, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 68 ] Communication Satellite Coordination Committee, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] Communications Satellite Conference, 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Department of Defense-Comsat memorandum of intent, 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] -134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Early Bird communications satellite, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] Earth station ownership formula, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 93 ] Earth stations, establishment in less-developed nations, 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 85 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 91 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 95 ] Educational potential, 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] European position, 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 76 ] European-U.S. cooperation: British position, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Channel rental, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] European Conference on Satellite Communication, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 63 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] European position, 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 90 ] French position, 123 n [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] German position, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 90 ] Technology transfer issue, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 90 ] FCC jurisdiction issue, 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 84 ] French position, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] Global vs. regional approach, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 97 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 97 ] British position, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Compatibility issue, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 97 ] -185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] European position, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] French-German Project Symphonie plan, 185 n [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] French position, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 94 ] -176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 101 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] International cooperation, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 73 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 90 ] International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT): Australian position, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] British position, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] Earth stations, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 85 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 91 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 95 ] European position, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] -204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] Financing, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 91 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 95 ] French position, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 101 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] INTELSAT II Pacific satellite, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 91 ] ITU membership requirement, 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] Italian position, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Latin American position, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] Membership, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] Procurement processes, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Soviet position, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] Swedish position, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] TRW construction contract, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 84 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 84 ] UN proposal, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] Katzenbach Committee of 1963 - 1964 , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Medium-altitude random orbit system, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 67 ] NASA required services, 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 76 ] -146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] NSC Action Memoranda: No. 252 , 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] No. 338 , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 94 ] No. 338 , revised , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 96 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 96 ] No. 342 , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 85 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Project Symphonie plan, 185 n [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] Soviet Union, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 148 n [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Intersputnik organization proposal, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] Molniya satellite communications system, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 100 ] Soviet-U.S. cooperation, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 102 ] Technology assistance policy, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 73 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 96 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 96 ] Technology compatibility, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 90 ] Technology transfer, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 90 ] UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), (see also Communication satellite issues), 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 63 ] -123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 65 ] -134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Concorde. See Supersonic transport development. Congress, U.S., 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] Hijacking of commercial aircraft, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 296 ] Legislation: Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] Defense Production Act of 1950, 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 245 ] P.L. 87–197 air piracy law, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 296 ] Saline Water Conversion Act of 1965, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 139 ] Population growth issues, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 278 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 334 ] Tokyo Convention ratification, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] Water desalination, 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 174 ] Connor, John T., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6 ] Conrad, Charles, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Constable, Peter D., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Cook, Philip R., 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Cooper, Gordon, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Cooper, Richard, 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Costa Rica, 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 318 ] Cottam, Howard, 429 n [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 240 ] Couve de Murville, Maurice, 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] Cox, Robert G., 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 258 ] Creel, Robert C., 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Crockett, William, 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] Crooker, John H., 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 128 ] Crowley, Edwin D., 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Crump, John, 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] Cuba, hijacking of commercial aircraft, 525 n [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 310 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Czechoslovakia, 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] Davies, Rodger P., 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 324 n [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 326 n [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Davis, Nathanial, 464 n [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 258 ] Davis, Richard H., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Dean, Jonathan, 14 n [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] Dean, Sir Patrick, 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 203 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 205 ] Debré, Michel, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 20 ] Dell, Edmund, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] Desalination. See Water desalinatio n . Dick, Edison W., 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 211 ] Dinsmore, L., 324 n [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Dixon, Sir Pierson, 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., 116 n [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 291 ] Dorticos, Osvaldo, 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 305 ] Dowell, Robert, Jr., 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 218 ] Doyle, Stephen E., 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] Draper, Gen. William H., Jr., 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 269 ] Dryden, Hugh, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 21 ] -46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 68 ] Dubs, Adolph, 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] Dux, M. J., 468 n [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Early Bird communications satellite (see also Communication satellite issues), 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] Edgar, William F., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Edmunds, Lester E., 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Edwards, Robert H., 573 n [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Egypt. See United Arab Republic. Eisenhower, Dwight D., 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 269 ] Eliot, Theodore, 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 359 n [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 414 n [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 227 ] Ende (FCC), 130 n [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] Enders, Thomas O., 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 405 n [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Energy problems. See Oil embargo crisis, 1967 ; Petroleum issues. Enke, Stephen, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 124 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 272 ] Ensor, Andrew, 324 n [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 333 n [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 250 ] Enthoven, Alain C., 221 n [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 121 ] Eqbal, 394 n [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 215 ] Erhard, Werner, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 39 ] -82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 39 ] Eshkol, Levi, 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 130 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 174 ] Eskimos, 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] European Conference on Satellite Communication, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 63 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 43 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] European Space Research Organization (ESRO), 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 38 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 39 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Faber, Richard, 92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, Prince, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 225 ] Faisal ibn Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, King, 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 421 n [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] Fallah, Reza, 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 227 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 227 ] Fanfani, Amintore, 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] -23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 48 ] Fearnley, John T., 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 193 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 193 ] Feehan, Harry, 528 n [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 306 ] -538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Feldman, Mark, 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] -541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 547 n [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -552 n [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Feldman, Myer, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] Findlay, Luke W., 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 211 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] Fischli (Switzerland), 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Fitzgerald, John F., 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 526 n [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 301 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 547 n [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 550 n [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Flores, Carillo, 528 n [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] Folmar, L. W., 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 219 ] Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] Foster, John S., 86 n [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 52 ] France: Algeria, relations with, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Anti-contraceptives legislation, 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 291 ] Communication satellite issues, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 123 n [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 94 ] -176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 101 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] European Launcher Development Organization, assessment, 92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Oil embargo crisis, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 236 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Oil Emergency London Advisory Committee, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] Petroleum issues, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 202 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 208 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Population growth issues, 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 291 ] Project Symphonie plan, 185 n [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 186 ] Space exploration programs, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 37 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] Supersonic transport development, 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 113 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 123 ] -226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 124 ] Technology gap issues, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 20 ] Water desalination research, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 172 ] Frank, Eugene, 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 101 ] Frank, Richard A., 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] Freeman, Christopher, 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Freeman, James B., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Fried, Edward R., 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 194 ] -360 n [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 228 ] -419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Friedman, Alvin, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 65 ] Frutkin, Arnold, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Fulbright, J. William, 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Funk, Howard V., Jr., 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Funseth, Robert L., 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Ganley, Oswald H., 14 n [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Gardner, Richard, 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 323 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Gatch, John N., Jr., 344 n [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 189 ] Gaud, William S., 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 519 n [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Gazdik, Julian, 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 301 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 305 ] Gemini space program, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] George, Scott, 61 n [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 164 n [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] Germany, Federal Republic of: Communication satellite issues, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 90 ] European Launcher Development Organization, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Gelensburg Oil Company takeover, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 219 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Human rights issues, 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Oil embargo crisis, 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Project Symphonie plan, 185 n [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] Space exploration programs, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 39 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 53 ] Technology gap issues, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] Water desalination research, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 172 ] Giraud (France), 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 236 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Glenn, John, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Goddard, Robert, 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] Goldberg, Arthur, 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 275 ] Goldstein, Ernest, 510 n [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] Goodby, James E., 85 n [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Goodpaster, Gen. Andrew, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] Gordon, Kermit, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 133 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 134 ] Gotzlinger, Leopold, 183 n [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 97 ] Grant, Lt. Gen. J., 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 326 n [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Gravatt, Joan S., 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Greece, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] Green, James F., 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Gregory (UK), 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Gremillion, Monsignor Joseph, 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 288 ] Grewe, Wilhelm, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 10 ] Grey, Robert, 183 n [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 97 ] Grissom, Virgil, 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Gromyko, Andrei, 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] Gruening, Ernest, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 270 ] Halaby, Najeeb, 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 213 n [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 119 ] Halsted, Ann Roosevelt, 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Hamilton, Edward, 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] Hammarskjold, Knut, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 297 ] -523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 300 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 307 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 309 ] Hammond, R. Philip, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Handley, William J., 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 202 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Hare, Raymond A., 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 359 n [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 194 ] Hargrove, John L., 573 n [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Harmel, Pierre, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Harrar, George, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 61 n [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 324 n [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 215 ] Harris poll, 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Harrison, Sir Geoffrey, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 176 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 192 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 192 ] Hart, Parker T., 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] Hartman, Arthur, 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Hathaway, William D., 303 n [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Held, C., 438 n [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Heller, Walter, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Helms, Jesse, 452 n [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 252 ] Henry, David H., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Herzog, Yaacov, 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 174 ] Hickenlooper, Bourke, 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] Higgins, Peter, 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Hijacking of commercial aircraft: Canadian diplomatic role, 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 314 ] Chicago Convention of 1944, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 296 ] Colombian position, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] Congressional position, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 296 ] Cuba-U.S. bilateral agreement, 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] -552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Cuban hijackings, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 298 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 307 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Cuban position, 525 n [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 533 n [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 310 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 311 ] El Al hijacking to Algeria, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 301 ] Extradition issue, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 309 ] -543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 311 ] International Air Transport Association, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 297 ] -523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 309 ] Jurisdiction issue, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 296 ] Mexico and, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 300 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] -534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 306 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 310 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Passenger repatriation, 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 310 ] -546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 310 ] P.L. 87–197 air piracy law, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 296 ] Refugee Airlift Agreement, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 301 ] Reward deterrent, 527 n [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] -532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 301 ] Tokyo Convention, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 296 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 309 ] Venezuelan position, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] Hilliker, Grant G., 324 n [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] Holifield, Chet, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Hollomon, J. Herbert, 66 n [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] Holum, Kenneth, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 250 n [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] Hornig, Donald F., 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 69 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 290 ] Technology gap, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 6 ] -13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] Water desalination, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 140 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 258 n [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 152 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 154 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 285 n [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 295 n [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] -301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Houghton, Robert B., 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 372 n [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 202 ] Hoveyda, Amir Abbas, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 227 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 227 ] Huffcutt, Gordon L., 185 n [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] Hughes, Thomas L., 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 226 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] Human rights issues: African states position, 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] American Indians' treaty rights, 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] Anti-Semitism, 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Index ] Apartheid, 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 331 ] Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 1968, 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] Costa Rican position, 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 318 ] Department of Defense employment policies, 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] Freedom of speech, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 315 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 315 ] Human Rights Advisory Services Program, 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 316 ] Immigration policies, U.S., 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 330 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] International Civil Aviation Organization meeting, 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 319 ] -565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] International Human Rights Year, 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Mexican-American treaty rights, 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 330 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Philippines position, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 318 ] Poor People's Campaign, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 330 ] -582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 331 ] Portugal, exclusion from ICAO meeting, 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 319 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Portuguese colonies in Africa, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 331 ] Poverty marchers, 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Presidential Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 334 ] President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 333 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 334 ] Race discrimination, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 315 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Index ] Racist nations, U.S. relations with, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 331 ] Refugees, 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 334 ] Religious freedom, 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 315 ] Slavery, abolition of, 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 316 ] South Africa, 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 319 ] -565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 331 ] -580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 331 ] Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo grievances, 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 330 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Tunisian position, 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] Turkish position, 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 318 ] UN Commissioner on Human Rights, proposed, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 323 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] UN Commission on Human Rights, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 335 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Index ] UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 315 ] UN International Conference on Human Rights, 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 321 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] UN International Human Rights Year, 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] UN Resolutions: 1961 (XVIII), 563 n [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] 2081 (XX), 563 n [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] White House Conference on the Advancement of Human Rights, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 333 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Humphrey, Hubert H.: Population growth issues, 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 288 ] Space exploration programs, 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 83 n [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] -89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 98 n [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 111 [ Pg. xml111 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] Soviet-U.S. cooperation, 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 62 ] Supersonic transport development, 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Technology gap issues, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6 ] Hyde, Rosel H., 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 110 ] Idris, King, 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 253 ] India, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] Indonesia, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 190 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] Inoue (Japan), 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] International Air Transport Association (IATA), 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 297 ] -523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 309 ] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 319 ] -565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] International Cooperation in Space, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] International Human Rights Year, 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT). See under Communication satellite issues. International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] Intersputnik proposal (see also Space exploration proposals), 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] Iran ( see also Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza Shah ; Iran and Iranian subheadings under Oil embargo crisis , 1967; Petroleum issues), 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 176 ] Abu Dhabi, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] British position, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 192 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 204 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 212 ] Earth station establishment, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 91 ] Economic situation, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 193 ] -356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 214 ] Export-Import Bank aid, 360 n [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 194 ] Kharg Island, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] Oil embargo crisis, 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] OPEC membership, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 178 ] Romania, relations with, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] Saudi position, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 198 ] Six-Day War, 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Soviet Bloc, relations with, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] U.S. military assistance, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 194 ] Iraq (see also Iraq and Iraqi subheadings under Oil embargo crisis , 1967; Petroleum issues), 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] Kharg Island, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] Kurdish question, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 197 ] Kuwait, threat to, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] Law 80, 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 207 ] Law 97, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 207 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] OAPEC membership, 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Political situation, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 197 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 223 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] Iraq Oil Company, 321 n [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). See under Petroleum issues. Israel (see also Six-Day War), 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] Dimona nuclear project, 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 163 ] Hijacking of El Al plane, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 301 ] Nuclear desalination project, see under Water desalinization. Italy, 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 172 ] Jacobs, George R., 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Jacobsen, Jake, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 275 ] Jacquet (France), 213 n [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 119 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 119 ] Japan, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] Jenkins, Roy, 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 213 n [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 119 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Jernegan, John D., 240 n [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 324 n [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 182 ] Jha, L. K., 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] John XXIII, Pope ( see also Papal encyclicals), 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Johnson, Charles E., 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 55 n [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 108 n [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] -148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -152 n [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 253 n [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 258 n [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] -262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] Johnson, John A., 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 110 ] Johnson, Lyndon B., 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 334 ] Communication satellite issues, 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] -130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 96 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 107 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 108 ] Soviet-U.S. cooperation, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 102 ] Technical assistance policy, 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] -151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] European-U.S. cooperation, 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 52 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Human rights issues, 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 335 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Index ] Mexican-Americans, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Oil embargo crisis, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 256 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Petroleum issues, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 184 ] Population growth issues, 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 483 n [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 274 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] -514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 334 ] Six-Day War, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 252 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 252 ] Space exploration programs, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 21 ] -49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 39 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 61 ] Supersonic transport development, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Technology gap issues, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] -9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Water desalination, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 133 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 155 ] Congressional resolution, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Economic feasibility, 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 173 ] Eisenhower initiative, 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] Israel nuclear project, 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 130 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 152 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 167 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 174 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] Soviet-U.S. cooperation, 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 130 ] -238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 132 ] UAR-Israel project, 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Water for Peace program, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 278 n [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] World food problem, 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 290 ] Johnson, U. Alexis, 86 n [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Johnstone, Jack R., 573 n [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Jordan (France), 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 236 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Jordan, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] Jorden, William, 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] Joyce, James W., 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] Jurgensen (France), 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 20 ] Justice Department anti-trust suit against oil companies, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] Kahan, Jerome H., 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 43 ] Katz, Abraham, 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] Keeney, Spurgeon, 4 n [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 108 n [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] Keldysh, M., 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Kelly, John M., 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Kennan, George, 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 111 ] Kennedy, John F., 45 n [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 269 ] Kerrigan, William M., 14 n [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Kharg Island, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] Khrushchev, Nikita S., 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] Kinsolving, Lucien L., 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 372 n [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 202 ] Kiselyak, Charles A., 547 n [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 57 ] Kling (FRG), 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Knight, William E., 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] Kohler, Foy, 116 n [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 285 n [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] Komarov, Vladimir, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] Komer, Robert W., 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -152 n [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 272 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 273 ] Korea, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 91 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Korry, Edward M., 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 76 ] Kosygin, Aleksey, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 291 ] Kotschnig, Walter M., 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Kovach, Eugene, 5 n [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Kreogh, Peter, 579 n [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 331 ] Kretzmann, Edwin M., 61 n [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] Krimer, William D., 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Ku'baazi, 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 253 ] Kurdish people, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 197 ] Kuwait ( see also under Oil embargo crisis , 1967; Petroleum issues): British position, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Iranian position, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] Iraqi threat, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] Oil workers' strike, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] OPEC, 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Political situation, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] Latin America, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 331 ] Lattes, M., 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] Lattu, Adm., 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 228 ] Lebanon, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 252 ] Leddy, Raymond G., 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Lee, Phil, 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] LeFevre, Theodore, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] Lesh, Donald R., 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Levy, Walter, 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 220 ] -406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] Libya ( see also under Oil embargo crisis , 1967; Petroleum issues), 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] Lieblich, William C., 583 n [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Lightner, E. Allan, Jr., 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Long, Richard G., 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] Lorenz, Joseph P., 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] Losada, Benito Paul, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 258 ] Lowenfeld, Andreas F., 324 n [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] Loy, Frank E., 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 164 n [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 185 n [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] , 199 n [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 110 ] Hijacking of commercial aircraft, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 297 ] -523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 547 n [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 550 n [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Water desalination, 222 [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] Luppi, Hobart, 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Luzio, Frank di, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Maaziq, Hussain, 430 [ Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 253 ] MacArthur, Douglas II, 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Mackey, Cecil, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] Makhus (Syria), 369 n [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 200 ] Malmborg, Knute, 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Mann, Thomas, 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Manned Orbital Research Laboratory, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 55 ] Mansfield, Mike, 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] Margolies, Daniel F., 24 n [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] Marks, Leonard H., 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] -151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 110 ] Marshall, Burke, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 323 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Maxwell, Gen. Jewell C., 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] McAvoy, Paul W., 306 n [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 172 ] McClelland, Donald H., 401 n [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] McCloy, John J., 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] McCone, John, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 252 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 252 ] McCormack, James, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] McDivitt, James, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] McGhee, George C., 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 459 n [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] McGrath, John B., 467 n [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] McKee, William F., 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] McKillop, David H., 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] McNamara, Robert, 85 n [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 210 n [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 145 ] McNaughton, John T., 210 n [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 221 n [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 121 ] Meadows, John, 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Means, John E., 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] Meehan, Francis J., 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Mendelsohn, Allan J., 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Mexico, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 144 ] Hijacking of commercial aircraft, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 300 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] -534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 306 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 310 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Mexican-American treaty rights, 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 330 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo grievances, 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 330 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Meyer, Armin H., 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] -343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 353 n [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 361 n [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] -390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Meyers, Howard, 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 43 ] Middle East Emergency Committee, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] Miller, William K., 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] Milner, James W., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 41 ] Mobil, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 211 ] Molkenboer, 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 186 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] Molniya satellite communications system, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 100 ] Mondello (Italy), 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] Monsma, George N., 573 n [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Moore, Hugh, 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 282 ] Moore, J. Cordell, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 439 n [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 267 ] Moose, Richard M., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Morgan, Thomas E., 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Monroney, A.S. Mike, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 111 ] Morris, Robert J., 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 46 ] Morris, Willie, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 193 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 193 ] Mosasdeq, Mohammed, 350 n [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] Moses, Henry, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 223 ] Moyers, Bill, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] Muhieddin, Zakaria, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 196 ] Mulligan, John P., 377 n [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 205 ] Murphy, C. H., Jr., 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 181 ] Murray, Percival, 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 43 ] Murrow, Edward R., 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 111 ] Muusa, Khalifah, 430 [ Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 243 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Myerson, Jacob M., 14 n [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] Nasher, Ray, 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 278 ] Nason, Rachel, 567 n [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 569 n [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 323 ] Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 183 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 228 ] -419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) ( see also Petroleum issues), 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 194 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] National Security Council Action Memoranda (NSAM): No. 252 , 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] No. 285 , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 26 ] No. 338 , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 94 ] No. 338 , revised, 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 96 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 96 ] No. 342 , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 85 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] No. 344 , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] No. 345 , 4 n [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] No. 354 , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 52 ] -105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] No. 357 , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] Nehmer, Stanley, 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Nelson, Thomas E., 158 n [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 199 n [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] Nesbitt, Trevanion H.E., 81 n [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 89 n [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 91 n [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 164 n [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 185 n [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] Netherlands, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] Neuman, Robert H., 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Newberry, Daniel O., 354 n [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] Newman, Joseph K., 185 n [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] Newton, David G., 407 n [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Nickerson, Al, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 256 ] Nigeria, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 186 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ( see also under Technology gap issues), 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 36 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] Novak, Alan, 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] O'Brien, Lawrence, 130 n [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Ockrent, Roger, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] O'Connell, Gen. James D., 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 69 ] -136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 74 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 158 n [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 110 ] Oil embargo crisis, 1967 (see also Petroleum issues; Six-Day War), 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 228 ] -421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] -468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 264 ] Algeria, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] 428–429, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 250 ] Apportionment issue, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Arab Heads of State conference, September 1967, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Arab Oil Ministers meeting, Baghdad, 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Arab Oil Ministers resolutions for embargo, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 232 ] Aramco, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] -421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 256 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Bahrain, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] Belgian position, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] British position, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 236 ] CIA briefing, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 252 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 252 ] Defense Production Act of 1950, 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 245 ] Department of Defense alternative sourcing, 416 n [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 228 ] Emergency Petroleum Supply Committee, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 267 ] Esso affiliates, 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee, 416 n [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 249 ] French position, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 236 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] German concerns, 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Greek position, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] Gulf of Aqaba sovereignty, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 232 ] Gulf of Aqaba transit arrangement, 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 252 ] Iran, 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Iraq, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 232 ] -423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 253 ] -458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Japanese position, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] Kuwait, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Labor strikes, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 253 ] Lebanese position, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Libya, 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 252 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 253 ] -458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Middle East Emergency Committee, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] Netherlands position, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] OECD Oil Committee, 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 236 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 249 ] -451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 259 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 267 ] Industry Advisory Group, 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 259 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Oil companies attempts to influence Western governments at request of producers, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 443 n [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 256 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] OPEC summit meeting, 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] Pipelines, effect on, 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] Portuguese position, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] Post-crisis studies, 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Resumption of exports, 429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -430 [ Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Saudi Arabia, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Swedish position, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] Syria, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 252 ] Texas and Louisiana East Coast allowables, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 252 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 252 ] Turkish position, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] U.S. concerns about emergency, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 252 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 252 ] U.S. response to European concerns, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 252 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] -468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Venezuelan position, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Western organization to deal with crisis, 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] World supplies, 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 228 ] -419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 248 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 267 ] Vietnam War oil supplies, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 252 ] Western Hemisphere production, increase, 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 258 ] Western supplies, effect on, 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 267 ] Oil Supply Advisory Committee, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] O'Leary, John F., 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] Oliver, Covey T., 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] Oliver, John G., 326 n [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 333 n [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 359 n [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 228 ] -419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 424 n [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -439 n [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 474 n [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 267 ] Ordaz, Diaz, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 310 ] Organization of African Unity, 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] Industry Advisory Group, 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 259 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Oil Committee Small Group, 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 186 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] Science Ministers Conference, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] Science Policy Committee, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] Special Committee for Oil, 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 236 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] -435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 249 ] -451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 259 ] -466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 267 ] Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ( see also Oil embargo crisis , 1967; Petroleum issues), 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] Aramco position, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 178 ] -324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] Austrian position, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 185 ] British position, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 176 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] Discounts, tax free, 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Establishment of, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 175 ] European position, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Iranian membership, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 178 ] Iraq Petroleum Company position, 321 n [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Kuwaiti position, 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Negotiations with oil companies, 312 n [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 186 ] Prices, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 190 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 190 ] Production programming, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 190 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Resolutions 71 and 72, 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Saudi position, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Tax liabilities reference prices, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 190 ] U.S. position, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 176 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 189 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Venezuelan position, 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Ortona, Egidio, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 65 ] -127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 65 ] Osborne, Stanley De J., 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 111 ] Outer space. See Space. Owen, Henry, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 102 ] Packard, Robert F., 103 n [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 57 ] Page, Howard, 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza Shah, 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 212 ] ,390, 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 215 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 227 ] Pakistan, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 91 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Papal Commission on Justice and Peace, 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Papal encyclicals: Humanae Vitae, 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Pacem in Terris, 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Populorum Progressio, 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Parkhurst, George, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 219 ] -403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 219 ] Parra, Alirio A., 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 258 ] Patman, Joseph E., 164 n [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Pauker, John, 519 n [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Paul VI, Pope, 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Pelcovits, Nathan, 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] Pendleton, John, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Percival, Leroy F., 14 n [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 81 n [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 91 n [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 439 n [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 467 n [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Perry, Jack R., 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] Persons, Edward B., 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] Peterson, Dean F., 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 286 n [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 306 n [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Petree, Richard, 510 n [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] Petroleum issues ( see also Oil embargo crisis, 1967; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; Six-Day War): Abu Dhabi, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Aden, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] Algeria, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Arab Federation of Petroleum Workers, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] Arab nationalism and, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] Aramco, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 225 ] Bahrain, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] British-U.S. consultation and coordination, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 175 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 193 ] ENI, possible entry into market, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 207 ] ERAP, possible entry into market, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 207 ] Esso and Mobil affiliates in Algeria, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 210 ] Financing the international oil industry, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 186 ] French policy, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] -340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 186 ] Indonesia, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 190 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] Iran, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 228 ] Offshore concessions, 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] Soviet interest in oil, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] Iranian Government (NIOC)-Consortium negotiations and settlement, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 198 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 203 ] Iranian Government-Consortium differences about production, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] -343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 212 ] -407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 226 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 227 ] Iraq: Offshore concession bidding, 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 181 ] Political situation and oil policy, 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 223 ] OAPEC membership, 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Soviet interest in oil, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] Iraq Oil Company, 320 n [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 321 n [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Iraq Petroleum Company, see Iraqi Government-IPC dispute below; Syrian Government-IPC dispute below Iraqi Government-IPC dispute over concessions, 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 182 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Law 80 issue, 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 207 ] Law 97 issue, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 207 ] -382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Kharg Island, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] Kuwait, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] Concessions, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] And Kuwait Oil Company, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Oil production and revenues, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 228 ] Political situation and oil policy, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 186 ] Labor issues, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] Libya, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 255 ] Maintenance of oil supplies, Western concerns, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] -335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 203 ] -376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 212 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 214 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 214 ] Nationalizations, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 183 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Natural gas pipeline, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Nigerian production, 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 186 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] North Sea production, 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 186 ] OECD Oil Committee and, 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 186 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 211 ] Offshore concession bidding, 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 181 ] Oil companies' position, 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 217 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 220 ] Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 176 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 189 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Negotiations with oil companies, 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] -324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 186 ] Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] Persian Gulf security, 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 219 ] -402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 220 ] Romania, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] Saudi Arabia, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 364 n [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 201 ] Oil production and revenues, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 228 ] Posted price system, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 190 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 190 ] State-Interior Departments, dispute over U.S. policy, 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 184 ] Socony Mobil affiliates in Syria, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 183 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Syria, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 183 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Syrian Government-IPC dispute, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 196 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 204 ] United Arab Republic, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Petroleum Security Subcommittee, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] Peyrefitte, M. Alain, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Philippines, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 318 ] Piercy, George, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 219 ] Pineau, Roger, 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] Piret, Edgar L., 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 101 ] Plimpton, Calvin, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] Pollack, Herman, 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] -70 n [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 39 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 91 n [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 98 n [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 158 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Pompidou, Georges, 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] Poole, Richard A., 519 n [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Poor People's Campaign, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 330 ] -582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 331 ] Popper, David H., 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] Population growth issues, 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 281 ] Anti-contraceptives legislation, French, 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 291 ] Birth control, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 282 ] British position, 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] Bureau of the Budget position, 488 n [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Congressional position, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 278 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] Family planning programs, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] -505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Fertility research grant, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 269 ] French position, 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 291 ] Indian position, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] Interdepartmental Working Group on Population Matters, 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] International Cooperation Year, 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 274 ] -486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 275 ] Japanese position, 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] Pacem in Terris conference, 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 271 ] Papal Commission on Justice and Peace, 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Papal encyclicals: Humanae Vitae, 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Pacem in Terris, 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Populorum Progressio, 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Population growth vs. production acceleration, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 272 ] Presidential Commission on Population, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Research, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 273 ] UN position, 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] Vatican and Catholic position, 480 n [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 282 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] White House Conference on International Cooperation, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 274 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 278 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 278 ] World Leaders' Statement on Population, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 284 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 291 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Portugal, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 319 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Post, Richard StF., 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] Powell, A. Barry, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 176 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Pratt, N. K., 475 n [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Pridham (UK), 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Prill (FAA), 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 115 ] Project Orion, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] Project Symphonie plan, French-German, 185 n [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] Puhan, Alfred, 442 n [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] Qatar, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Quesada, Gen. Peter, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 114 ] -211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Radius, Walter A., 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] Rambin, Howard, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 256 ] Ramey, James T., 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 250 n [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Ranger VII moon shot, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] Ravenholt, Reinert T., 510 n [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] Razzaq, Arif Abdul, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 223 ] Read, Benjamin H., 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 333 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Refugees ( see also Human rights issues), 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 334 ] Revelle, Roger, 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 132 ] Richardson, E.R., 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 567 n [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Rielly, John E., 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Rockefeller, John D., III, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 284 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] -511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 291 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Rockefeller, Laurence, 517 n [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Rockwell, Stuart W., 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 193 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 359 n [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Rogers, William D., 439 n [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Rogerson, Francis M., 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] Romania, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] Rooney, John J., 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] Rosa, Joseph, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Rosenberg, Martin, 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Rostow, Eugene, 435 n [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 460 n [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 264 ] Rostow, Walt, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 50 n [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106 ] , 199 n [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 278 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 333 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Petroleum issues, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 192 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 212 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 219 ] -406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] Water desalination, 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 152 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 163 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 298 n [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 174 ] Rothschild, Edmund de, 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] Rouhani, Fuad, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 176 ] -318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 176 ] Rowen, Henry, 253 n [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] Rubinacci (Italy), 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] Rueda, Richard, 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 306 ] Rusk, Dean, 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 52 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 210 n [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] Communication satellite issues, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 94 ] -176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 107 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] European launcher development crisis, 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 48 ] Hijacking of commercial aircraft, 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Human rights issues, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 315 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 330 ] -583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Petroleum issues, 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 202 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 226 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 227 ] Population growth issues, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 279 ] -498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 284 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] -512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Space exploration programs, 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 55 n [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] -67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 98 n [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 108 n [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 111 [ Pg. xml111 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 62 ] Technology gap issues, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 13 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Water desalination, 258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 170 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 173 ] International cooperation, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] Israeli nuclear project, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 163 ] UAR-Israel project, 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Water for Peace program, 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -286 n [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Salans, Carl F., 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 211 ] Salmon, William C., 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 250 n [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 258 n [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Sarabhai, 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Saudi Arabia ( see also under Oil embargo crisis , 1967; Petroleum issues), 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 364 n [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 225 ] Iranian position, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] OPEC participation, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 178 ] -323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] Six-Day War, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] -421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 421 n [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 257 ] United Arab Republic, relations with, 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Water desalination, 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 144 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] Saunders, Harold, 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 306 n [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 174 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 276 ] Sayre, Robert, 526 n [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] Schaetzel, J. Robert, 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 124 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Schiller, Karl, 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] Schnee, Alexander, 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Schoellhorn (FRG), 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 246 ] Schultze, Charles, 253 n [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 266 n [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 278 n [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 285 n [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 278 ] -493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 278 ] Schuman, Maurice, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] Scientific and technology related issues. See Technology gap issues. Scott, Joseph W., 552 n [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Seaborg, Glenn T., 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] -251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 173 ] Seamans, Dr. Robert C., 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 57 ] Sedov, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 61 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] Seidenman, Neil, 26 n [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] Sergiechuk, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 100 ] Sherman, Norman, 69 n [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] Shriver, Sargeant, 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Shuler, Robert L., 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] Silberstein, Joseph A., 178 n [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 95 ] Sinclair Oil Company, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 181 ] Sisco, Joseph J., 258 n [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 567 n [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Six-Day War ( see also Oil embargo crisis, 1967), 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] American University position, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] Arab demands for Israeli withdrawal, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Gulf of Aqaba transit arrangement, 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 252 ] Iranian position, 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] UAR provocation, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 228 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Saudi position, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] -421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 257 ] Syrian position, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] U.S. position, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 252 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 256 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Smith, Bromley, 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 288 n [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Smith, Michael E., 72 n [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 96 n [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Smith, Robert, 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Smythe, Hugh H., 369 n [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 200 ] Sneider, Richard, 176 n [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 95 ] Sober, Sidney, 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] Sobotka, Clement, 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 298 ] Solomon, Anthony M., 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 95 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 194 ] -360 n [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 205 ] -381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 212 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 214 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 424 n [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 439 n [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 460 n [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 312 ] -551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] South Africa, 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 319 ] -565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 331 ] -580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 331 ] Soviet Bloc, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] Soviet Union: Communication satellite issues, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 148 n [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] Oil, Middle East, interest in, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 191 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 216 ] Intersputnik organization proposal, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] Molniya satellite communications system, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 100 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 100 ] Soviet Bloc oil pricing, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 191 ] Space exploration programs, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 37 ] NASA-Soviet Academy of Science agreements, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 22 ] -49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] Soviet-U.S. cooperation, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 21 ] -49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] -59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] Soyuz 1 disaster, 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] Space biology and medicine, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] Space Treaty, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] VOSKHOD–1 manned flight, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] Supersonic transport development, 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 111 ] Syria, relations with, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Water desalination, 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 130 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 157 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] Space exploration programs ( see also Communication satellite issues), 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 50 ] Anti-satellite capability, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] Apollo program, 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 76 ] Atlas-Centaur system, 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 50 ] Atlas Standard Launch Vehicle, 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 50 ] British position, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] British-U.S. cooperation, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Canadian-U.S. cooperation, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Committee on National Security Policy Planning report, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] Communication satellites, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 50 ] ComSat corporation, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 41 ] Disarmament, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Echo II satellite, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 61 ] European launcher development crisis, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 43 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 50 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] European-U.S. cooperation, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 39 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 55 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Blue Streak technology sharing, 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] British position, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 53 ] Department of Defense position, 86 n [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 40 ] Erhard communiqué, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 39 ] -82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 39 ] European launcher development crisis and, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 43 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] European position, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 53 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] European Space Research Organization, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 38 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 39 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Nuclear weapons deployment, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 27 ] French position, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 37 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] French-U.S. cooperation, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Funding, 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] Gemini disaster, 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] Gemini manned flights, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] German position, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 53 ] German-U.S. cooperation, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 41 ] International cooperation, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] Italian-U.S. cooperation, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Jupiter probe, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 39 ] -82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Lunar exploration, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] -53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] -58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 49 ] Manned Orbital Research Laboratory, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 55 ] Meteorology, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] Military implications, 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 23 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 55 ] NASA position, 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 61 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] NASC meetings, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] National defense communications satellite system, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 96 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 96 ] NATO role, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 36 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 38 ] NSC Action Memoranda: No. 285 , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 26 ] No. 338 , revised, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 96 ] No. 354 , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 52 ] -105 [ Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Nuclear weapons deployment, 85 n [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 50 ] Post-Apollo program, 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] -99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] Project Orion, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] Public relations, international, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] -71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] Ranger VII moon shot, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] Reconnaissance satellites, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 27 ] Soviet policy, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Soviet Soyuz 1 disaster, 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] Soviet-U.S. cooperation, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 21 ] -49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] -59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] -118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] Gemini launch invitation, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Mars missions, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] Molniya communications satellite system, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] NASA-Soviet Academy of Science agreements, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 22 ] -49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] Space biology and medicine, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] Space Treaty, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 61 ] Soviet VOSKHOD–1 manned flight, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] Space law issues, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] -60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 27 ] UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] UN General Assembly Resolution 1884 (VIII), 60 n [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 27 ] U.S. program, concerns re, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] Spaey (Belgium), 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] Spain, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] Sparkman, John J., 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Spielman, Herbert, 333 n [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 185 ] Springer, James Van R., 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] Springsteen, George S., 5 n [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 14 n [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 246 ] Stabler, Wells, 547 n [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Starbird, Alfred D., 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 85 ] Starkey, Joseph F., 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 186 ] Stevenson, Adlai, 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] Stewart, Sir Michael, 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 205 ] Stibravy, William J., 567 n [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 321 ] Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 158 ] Stoltenberg, Gerhard, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Strauss, Adm. Lewis J., 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 166 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Stromayer, James, 474 n [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 267 ] Strong, Robert, 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 182 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 182 ] Styles, Michael, 231 n [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 306 ] -538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Suer, Rene, 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 101 ] Suez crisis of 1957, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] Sulzberger, Cyrus, 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] Supersonic transport development: Airworthiness standards, 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Anglo-French consortium, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 111 ] -208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 113 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 115 ] Costs, 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Engines, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 115 ] Environmental considerations, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 119 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 120 ] FAA airworthiness certification, 222 [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Fare cost, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 128 ] Financing, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 111 ] International aviation, political implications, 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 128 ] Marketability, 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 122 ] NSC Action Memorandum No. 344, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Sonic boom issue, 213 [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 119 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 129 ] -234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] Soviet program, 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 111 ] Technical problems, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 111 ] Tripartite talks (FAUSST group), 213 [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] -217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 125 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] British position, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 119 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 123 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] FAA opposition, 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 125 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] French position, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 123 ] -226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 124 ] Investment costs estimate, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 119 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 120 ] Soviet participation proposal, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 123 ] U.S.-Anglo-French consortium cooperation, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 117 ] -217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 121 ] -222 [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] U.S. prototype, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 125 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Sweden, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 241 ] Symmes, Harrison M., 326 n [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Syria ( see also Syria and Syrian subheadings under Oil embargo crisis , 1967; Petroleum issues), 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] OAPEC membership, 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Socony Mobil subsidiaries, nationalization of, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 183 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Six-Day War, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] Terrorist training, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 220 ] Talbot, Phillips, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 176 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 183 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Talib, Naji, 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 201 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] Tariki, Abdullah, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 179 ] Technology gap issues: Aeronautics industry, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] Belgian position, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Brain drain, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 6 ] British position, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] -25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Commercial Technical Advisory Board, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] Computer technology, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] Department of Defense procurement policy, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] Education expansion, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] Euratom cooperation, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] European mission proposal, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] European position, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 15 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] European-U.S. cooperation, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 6 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6 ] Fanfani proposal, 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] French position, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 20 ] German position, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] Greek position, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 10 ] Interdepartmental Committee on the Technology Gap, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] -13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 20 ] Italian position, 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] Japanese position, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] Marshall Plan for technology, 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] NASA Technology Utilization Program, 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Nationalism, influence of, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] Netherlands position, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] North Atlantic Council meeting, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 13 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Computer center proposal, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Conference of National Armaments Directors, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] Role, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] NSC Action Memorandum No. 357, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] Nuclear energy cooperation, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] Research and development, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 6 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] Science Ministers Conference, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] Space exploration cooperation, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] Special Working Group establishment, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 10 ] State Technical Service Program, 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Technological Information Service, 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] U.S. position, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] World trade balance, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] Thant, U, 483 n [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] Thompson, George, 92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 258 n [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 158 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 291 ] Thompson, Llewellyn, 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] Thomson, George, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] Tiger, M. Gordon, 326 n [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Tijerna, Reies Lopez, 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Torbert, Horace G., Jr., 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 330 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 332 ] Tree, Marietta, 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 318 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] Trenary, Mark B., 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] Trezise, Philip H., 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 447 n [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] Tunisia, 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] Turkey, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 318 ] Twinam, Joseph W., 344 n [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 189 ] Tyler, William R., 61 n [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Udall, Stewart, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] -251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 285 n [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] UN Commission on Human Rights, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 335 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Index ] UN Commissioner on Human Rights proposal, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 323 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 315 ] UN International Conference on Human Rights, 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 321 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] UN International Human Rights Year, 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] UN International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] United Arab Republic, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 183 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Desalination project, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 166 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 166 ] OAPEC membership, 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Six-Day War, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] Terrorist training, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 220 ] United Kingdom (see also British-U.S. consultation and coordination under Petroleum issues): Blue Streak technology sharing, 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Common Market entry, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] Communication satellite issues, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 98 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 109 ] East of Suez military withdrawal, 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Human rights issues, 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 321 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Nuclear power plants, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 172 ] Oil embargo crisis, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 236 ] Oil Emergency Advisory Committee, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 234 ] Population growth issues, 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] Space exploration programs, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Supersonic transport development, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 209 n [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -213 [ Pg. 213 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 119 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 123 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Technology gap issues, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] -25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Water desalination, 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] United Nations (see also UN headings): Nuclear weapons deployment in space, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 27 ] Population growth issues, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 483 n [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] Resolutions: General Assembly Resolution 1884 ( XVIII ), 60 n [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 27 ] General Assembly Resolution 1904 ( XVIII ), 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 315 ] General Assembly Resolution 1961 ( XVIII ), 563 n [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] General Assembly Resolution 2081 ( XX ), 563 n [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] Resolution on Population, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 284 ] Security Council Resolution 242, 405 n [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 220 ] Uquaily, Ghanum, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 223 ] Vaky, Viron, 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 547 n [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 312 ] -551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Valenti, Jack, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 140 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Van Nort, Leighton, 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 510 n [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 289 ] Vance, Cyrus, 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 130 n [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 210 n [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 114 ] Vanden Boeynants, Paul, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 13 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] Vatican: Papal Commission on Justice and Peace, 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Papal encyclicals: Humanae Vitae, 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 295 ] Pacem in Terris, 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Populorum Progressio, 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] -517 [ Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , Venezuela, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 190 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 301 ] Vergnaud (France), 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 124 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Vietnam War, oil supplies, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 252 ] Vinson, Fred, 543 n [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 309 ] Voge, Jean Paul, 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 101 ] Volio, Jimenez Fernando, 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 318 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 318 ] Vonier, John W., 344 n [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 189 ] Wacrenier, M., 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 20 ] Wagner, Joseph J., 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Waldheim, Kurt, 194 n [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Walsh, John, 3 n [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 205 ] Warner, Rawleigh, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 183 ] -331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Warvariv, Constantine, 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 316 ] Water desalination, 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 130 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] AID position, 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 143 ] AEC role, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 174 ] Baker resolution, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] British position, 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] Budget, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] California pilot plant, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 172 ] Capacity, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 166 ] Committee on Foreign Desalting Programs, establishment, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] Congressional position, 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 174 ] Consortium proposal, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 172 ] Economic feasibility, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 148 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 166 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 174 ] Eisenhower initiative, 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 166 ] Expanded program proposal, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 250 n [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 140 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] Financing and budgetary issues, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 150 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 172 ] First International Conference on Desalting, 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 144 ] Food factories concept, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] -301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Greece, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] IAEA role, 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 148 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] International cooperation, 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] International Symposium on Desalting, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 139 ] International Water For Peace Conference, 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 158 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Investment commitment, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Israeli nuclear project, 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 130 ] -236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 148 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 166 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] Italian position, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 172 ] Mexico, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 144 ] Nuclear proliferation issue, 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 146 ] Nuclear reactors, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 132 ] Nuclear safeguards, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 148 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 169 ] Oak Ridge demonstration project, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 169 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Research and development budget, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Rothschild proposal, 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] Saline Water Conversion Act of 1965, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 139 ] Saudi Arabian agreement, 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 144 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] Soviet-U.S. cooperation, 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 130 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 157 ] Spain, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] Technology, 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 139 ] -249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 140 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 172 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 172 ] Tunisia, 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 130 ] UAR project, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 166 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 166 ] UAR-Israel project, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 151 ] U.S.-Mexican desalting agreements, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 134 ] Water for Peace program, 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 158 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] Water for Peace program. See under Water desalinatio n . Watson, Barbara, 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 298 ] Watson, Marvin, 24 n [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] Wattari, Abdul Aziz, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 223 ] Webb, James E., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 45 n [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 69 n [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] -75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] Weinberg, Alvin, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 165 ] Welch, Leo, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Welsh, Edward C., 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 41 ] -89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 130 n [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 90 ] White, Edward, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Widenor, William C., 569 n [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 323 ] Wiesner, Jerome, 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Wilkes, John, 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Wilkins, Roy, 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] Williams, Franklin H., 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 323 ] -570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Williams, Margaret H., 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Williams, Thomas, 521 n [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 297 ] Wilson, Harold, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 292 ] Wilson, Henry, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 156 ] Wilson, Thomas W., 73 n [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 34 ] Wollam, Park, 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Wolle, William D., 326 n [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 182 ] Woods, George D., 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] -314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] Woodward, Robert F., 286 n [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Wriggins, Howard, 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 86 ] Wright, Sir Denis, 375 n [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 204 ] Wright, Marian, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 582 n [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 331 ] Wright, Robert, 475 n [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] Wynne, Hugh, 430 [ Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Ximenes, Vicente, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 331 ] Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, 364 n [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 408 n [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] -433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 268 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] Zjilstra (Netherlands), 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 289 ] Zu'bi (Syria), 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 200 ] Zwick, Charles E., 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ]