FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXXIII, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY; UNITED NATIONS Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XXXIII Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations Persons Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy The Department of State and the Coordination and Supervision of U.S. Foreign Policy (Documents 1-138) The National Security Council and the White House (Documents 139-182) The Director of Central Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, and the President (Documents 183-285) United Nations (Documents 286-437) The United Nations and the Cyprus Crisis (Documents 438-480) Index Sources Sources The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration. The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files for these years have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Virtually all of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to Archives II. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson, President John F. Kennedy, and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The editors of the series also have full access to the files of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the records of the Central Intelligence Agency. Sources for Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII In preparing this volume, the editors made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Numerous White House records, including memoranda to the President, testify to President Johnson's concern with management of foreign policy and the United Nations. The bulk of the foreign policy records at the Johnson Library are in the country files and other component parts of the National Security File. The Country File for the United Nations includes telegrams, memoranda, reports, and other material dated 1964 and 1965. Similar material on the United Nations dated 1966 through 1968 is found in the National Security File, Agency File, United Nations. Documentation on the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus is also found in the Cyprus Country File and the files of Robert W. Komer. Key documentation on the organization and management of foreign policy is located in several components of the National Security File, especially the Agency File, Memos the President, and in a number of other collections, especially the Office of the President File and the Papers of NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith. The Department of State arranged for access to the many audiotapes of President Johnson's telephone conversations that are held at the Johnson Library. These audiotapes include substantial numbers of telephone conversations between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and key members of Congress. The editors of this volume selected for publication 22 audiotapes of President Johnson's telephone conversations dealing with organization and management and three concerning the United Nations. Transcripts were then prepared. Although the transcripts give the substance of the conversations, readers are urged to consult the recordings for a full appreciation of those dimensions that cannot be captured fully in a transcription, such as the speakers' inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning. Second in importance only to the White House records at the Johnson Library were the records of the Department of State. The Department's central files contain the cable traffic recording U.S. diplomatic relations with the United Nations, memoranda of diplomatic conversations, and memoranda proposing action or providing information. Some important documents are found only in the Department's lot files. The files of Under Secretaries Ball and Katzenbach and the Executive Secretariat's files on the National Security Council and the Senior Interdepartmental Group contain valuable material on the organization and management of foreign policy. Equally important are the files of Deputy Under Secretary for Administration William J. Crockett at the John F. Kennedy Library. Also illuminating on management issues and high-level appointments are the memoranda of telephone conversations in the papers of Under Secretary George Ball and Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Thomas Mann at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. The Central Intelligence Agency provides Department of State historians access to high-level intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that Agency and at the Presidential libraries. This access is arranged and facilitated by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 2002 memorandum of understanding. Among the intelligence records included or consulted for the compilation on the organization and management of foreign policy were the files of the Directors of Central Intelligence, especially those of John A. McCone. Also of value were the Executive Registry files of the Director of Central Intelligence, the files of CIA's Directorates of Intelligence and Plans, the records of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Historical Files of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Intelligence Files of the Johnson administration, including Special Group/303 Committee files, and finally the Intelligence File in the White House National Security File. The compilation on the United Nations utilized intelligence reports and analyses in White House and Department of State files. Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. The following list identifies the particular files and collections consulted in the preparation of this volume. The declassification of the Department of State records for 1964–1968 has been completed and most of those records are already available for public review at the National Archives. Most of the documents printed or cited from the Johnson Library are declassified and are available for research at the Library in Austin, Texas. Unpublished Sources National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State Lot Files Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Documentation on trips taken and international conferences attended by the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials and on official visits to the United States by heads of government and foreign ministers, 1961–1964 Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347 Documentation on trips taken and international conferences attended by the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials and on official visits to the United States by heads of government and foreign ministers, 1965 Conference Files: 79 D 246 Microfilmed master chronology of international conferences attended by the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, 1953–1966 O/MS-Management Staff Files: Lot 70 D 474 Management Staff and BALPA subject files, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, 1965–1968 S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344 Senior Interdepartmental Group agendas, memoranda, and other papers, 1966–1969 S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272 Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961–1966 S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271 Files of Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, 1966–1969 S/S-Memos File: Lot 72 D 372 Memoranda from the offices of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State and the Executive Secretariat, 1966–1970 S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95 Administrative and miscellaneous documentation on the National Security Council, 1961–1964 S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 264 Follow-up reports on implementation of National Security Action Memoranda, 1961–1964 S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Memoranda, NSC papers, and other material pertaining to National Security Council meetings and NSC Standing Group meetings, 1961–1966 S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Files on National Security Action Memoranda #1 through #371, 1961–1968 S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318 Briefing and backup material for National Security Council meetings, 1966–1968 S/S-Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961–1969, including correspondence with the White House, memoranda of telephone conversations, chronological files, and texts of speeches S/S–SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263 Senior Interdepartmental Group administrative material and numbered memoranda, agenda, documents, and records of agreement, 1966–1969 S/S-Exdis-Limdis Microfilm (Eyes Only/Exclusive Distribution Telegrams, Airgrams and Dispatches) Microfilm copies of Department of State airgrams, telegrams, and dispatches marked eyes only, exclusive distribution, and limited distribution, 1953–1970 Central Files BUD, budget BUD 1, general budget policy ORG 1, organization and administration: general policy, plans, coordination ORG 1–1, country team ORG 8, agency reorganization plans; opening and closing of posts ORG 10, management improvement POL 9 UN, intervention POL 19 UN, United Nations Trusteeship Council POL 23–8 CYP, civil disturbances in Cyprus POL 27–4 UN, United Nations Emergency Forces UN 6, United Nations membership UN 10, United Nations budget and finance UN 10–4, United Nations assessments and contributions Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia DCI Files: Job 80–BO1285A Files of Directors of Central Intelligence John McCone and Richard Helms DDI Files: Jobs 79–01201A, 80–B01439R, 80–R01447R, 80–S00004A; Intelligence Information Cables Files of the Directorate of Intelligence DDO/IMS Files, Jobs 78–3805, 78–5505, 78–06423A, 79–207A Files of the Directorate of Plans D/ONE Files, Job 80–R01621R Files of the Office of National Intelligence Estimates Executive Registry, Jobs 80–B00269R, 80–B01284A, 80–R01580R, 80–1676R Files of the Director of Central Intelligence Department of State, Washington, D.C. INR/IL Historical Files Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York Subject Files National Defense University, Washington, D.C. Maxwell Taylor Papers National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia Plans & Analysis, PA Library, 104–01, DOP (Directives, Orders and Procedures) Plans & Analysis, PA Library, 105–0, Flax (DNRO) Chron File National Security Council, Washington, D.C. Special Group/303 Committee Files John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts William J. Crockett Papers Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson National Security File Agency File McGeorge Bundy Files Country File C. V. Clifton Files Intelligence Briefings Intelligence File Robert Komer Files Memos to the President Name File National Intelligence Estimates National Security Action Memorandums NSC Histories NSC Meetings File Subject File Walt Rostow Files Harold Saunders Files White House Central Files Confidential File Subject Files Office Files of the White House Aides S. Douglass Cater John W. Macy Bill D. Moyers Special Files Administrative Histories Meeting Notes File Office of the President File President's Appointment File (Diary Backup) President's Daily Diary Press Office Files Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings Reference File Personal Papers George Ball Papers Francis Bator Papers Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings Thomas Mann Papers John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President Dean Rusk Appointment Books Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey Adlai Stevenson Papers Published Sources Argyris, Chris. Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State . Washington: Department of State, 1967. Bacchus, William I. Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. Ball, George. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982. Campbell, John Franklin. The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971. Cline, Ray S. Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA. Washington: Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1976. Haines, Gerald K. NRO: The National Reconnaissance Office, Its Origins, Creation, & Early Years . Washington: National Reconnaissance Office, 1997. Hammond, Paul Y. LBJ and the Presidential Management of Foreign Relations. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992. Harr, John E. The Professional Diplomat. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Helgerson, John L. Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1992. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1971. Johnson, U. Alexis. The Right Hand of Power. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984. Johnson, Walter, ed. The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson . 8 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972–1979. Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., The Real CIA . New York: Macmillan, 1968. ——. The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities. New York: Hill and Wang, 1973. Leary, William, ed. The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents . Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984. Meyer, Jr., Cord. Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Mosher, Frederick C., and Harr, John E. Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Rostow, Walt W. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. New York: Macmillan, 1972. Rusk, Dean, as told to Richard Rusk. As I Saw It. New York: W.W. Norton, 1990. Smith, Bromley K. Organizational History of the National Security Council During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Washington: National Security Council, 1988. Smith, Russell Jack. The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades With the Agency. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989. U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964–1967. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967–1969. ——. Department of State Bulletin , 1964–1968. ——. Improvements in Administration, 1961–1964. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964–1968. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965–1970. Valenti, Jack. A Very Human President. New York: W. W. Norton, 1975. Abbreviations Abbreviations AA, Afro-Asians ABM, anti-ballistic missile ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ADDP, Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFSC, Air Force Systems Command AFTAC, Air Force Technical Applications Center AG, Attorney General; Arthur Goldberg AID, Agency for International Development ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ARA/CAR, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State Art, article ASAF, Asian-African, Asia-Africa ASAP, as soon as possible BOB, Bureau of the Budget CAS, controlled American source CASP, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper CCC, Contingency Coordinating Committee CCP, Consolidated Cryptologic Program CCPC, Critical Collection Problems Committee CCPS, Comprehensive Country Programming System DC, Christian Democratic Party (Italy) ChiCom, Chinese Communist Chirep, Chinese representation CI, Counterinsurgency CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CIAP, Central Intelligence Agency Program CIP, Consolidated Intelligence Program COMINT, Communications Intelligence Comite, committee COMOR, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance CS, Clandestine Services CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State Cyp, Cypriot D/DCI/NIPE, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation D/NRO, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office DCID, Director of Central Intelligence Directive DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DD/P, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency DD/S, Deputy Director for Support, Central Intelligence Agency DD/S&T, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence DDI, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency DDO/IMS, Deputy Director for Operations/Information Management Staff, Central Intelligence Agency del, delegate DG, Director General of the Foreign Service, Department of State DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DMZ, Demilitarized Zone DOD, Department of Defense DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State ECM, Electronic Countermeasures ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council EIC, Economic Intelligence Committee ELINT, Electronic Intelligence ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference EOKA, Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) EROP, Executive Review of Overseas Programs EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State Exdis, Exclusive Distribution FAA, Federal Aviation Administration FAPS, Foreign Affairs Programming System FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State FI, Foreign Intelligence FM, Foreign Minister fol, following FonOff, Foreign Office FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FSO, Foreign Service officer FSR, Foreign Service Reserve officer FSS, Foreign Service Staff officer FYI, for your information G, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs G/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs GA, General Assembly GMAIC, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee GOC, Government of Cyprus GOG, Government of Greece GOJ, Government of Japan GOT, Government of Turkey GRC, Government of the Republic of China GS, General Schedule H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations HMG, Her Majesty's Government IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICC, International Control Commission ICJ, International Court of Justice ICY, International Cooperation Year IDA, International Development Association IDC, Interagency Defector Committee INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INR/DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IPC, Intelligence Producers' Council; Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group IRG/NEA, Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense JAEIC, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff L, Legal Adviser of the Department of State L/O, Deputy Legal Adviser for Administration, Department of State L/UNA, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State LA, Latin America LAPC, Latin American Policy Committee LBJ, Lyndon Baines Johnson LDC, less developed country M, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam MAP, Military Assistance Program mbr, member MFN, most favored nation Misoff, Mission officer MLF, Multilateral Force MR, memorandum for the record NAC, North Atlantic Council NAM, National Association of Manufacturers NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development NIE, National Intelligence Estimate NIH, National Institutes of Health NIRB, National Intelligence Resources Board NIS, National Intelligence Survey NLF, National Liberation Front Nodis, No Distribution NPIC, National Photographic Interpretation Center NPP, National Policy Paper NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty NRO, National Reconnaissance Office NRP, National Reconnaissance Program NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council NSC/OCB, National Security Council, Operations Coordinating Board NSCID, National Security Council Intelligence Directive NY, New York O, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration O/DG, Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service, Department of State O/MP, Management Planning Staff, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration O/SO, Senior Officer Program, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration O/SP, Organization Studies and Procedures Program, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs OCB, Operations Coordinating Board OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ONE, Office of National Estimates ONUC, United Nations Congo Operation (Force de L'Organization des Nations Unies au Congo) OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OSI, Office of Scientific Intelligence para, paragraph PFIAB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board PKF, Peacekeeping Force, Cyprus P.L., Public Law PLA, Palestine Liberation Army PM, Prime Minister PMG, Politico-Military Group PNO, Program Number Polad, Political Adviser PPBS, Planning-Programming-Budgeting System Pres, President Q–S, Alex Quaison-Sackey R&D, Research and Development reftel, reference telegram rep, representative res or reso, resolution RMD, Related Mission Directive S, Office of the Secretary of State S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe SC, Security Council SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SecDef, Secretary of Defense septel, separate telegram SIC, Scientific Intelligence Committee SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group SIGINT, Signals Intelligence SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate SOF, Status of Forces SOP, standard operating procedure SOV, Soviet; Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of StateSPC Special Political Committee SVN, South Vietnam SYG, Secretary-General TSO, Truce Supervision Organization U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UAR, United Arab Republic UDI, Unilateral Declaration of Independence UK, United Kingdom UKUN, United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations UN, United Nations UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea UNDC, United Nations Disarmament Commission UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force UNFICYP, United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund UNIPOM, United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan UNOC, United Nations Operations, Congo UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organi-zation Affairs, Department of State UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine USDEL, United States Delegation USIA, United States Information Agency USIB, United States Intelligence Board USIS, United States Information Service USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations VC, Viet Cong WDC, World Disarmament Conference WEU, Western European Union Persons Persons Acheson, Dean, Secretary of State 1949–1953 Ash, A. Russell, member of the National Security Council Staff Baker, William O., member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Vice President for Researc., Bell Telephone Laboratories Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 30, 1966; Representative to the United Nations June 26–September 25, 1968 Barrett, Richard, Chief, Management Planning Staff, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, until May 1965; Director of the Office of Management Planning May 1965–1967 Bator, Francis, member of the National Security Council Staff from April 1964; Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs October 1965–September 1967 Battle, Lucius D., Ambassador to the United Arab Republic September 22, 1964–March 5, 1967; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs April 5, 1967–September 30, 1968 Belk, Samuel, member of the National Security Council Staff until 1965 Bernardes, Carlos Alfredo, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General in Cyprus September 1964–January 1967 Bross, John A., Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom Buffum, William B., Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of State, until September 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, September 1965–January 1967; thereafter Deputy Representative to the United Nations Bunche, Ralph J., United Nations Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs until 1967; thereafter Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 28, 1966 Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from March 16, 1964; title changed to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on November 1, 1966 Busby, Horace, Jr., Special Assistant to the President until October 1, 1965 Caccia, Sir Harold A., British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until 1964 Carroll, Lieutenant General Joseph F., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until April 28, 1965; thereafter Director of the National Security Agency Cater, S. Douglass, Special Assistant to the President May 8, 1964–October 1968 Chase, Gordon, member of the National Security Council Staff until January 1966 Chayes, Abram, Legal Adviser of the Department of State until June 27, 1964 Clerides, Glaufkos, Speaker of the Cypriot Parliament Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until September 8, 1965; thereafter Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Clifford, Clark M., lawyer and unofficial adviser to President Johnson; Secretary of Defense from March 1, 1968 Clifton, Major General Chester. V., USA, Military Aide to the President until July 1965 Cline, Ray, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency until January 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence Cooper, Chester, member of the National Security Council Staff 1964–April 1966 Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister until May 31, 1968; then Minister of Finance and National Economy until July 10; thereafter French Prime Minister Coyne, J. Patrick, Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Crockett, William J., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration until January 28, 1967 Dean, Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador to the United States from April 1965 Denktash, Rauf, Turkish Cypriot leader and Chairman of the Turkish Communal Chamber in Cyprus Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury until March 31, 1965 Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States 1953–1961 Fanfani, Amintore, Italian Foreign Minister March 5, 1965–June 24, 1968 Fedorenko, Nicolai T., Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations until March 1968 FitzGerald, Desmond, Deputy Director of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1965–July 1967 Foster, William C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fubini, Eugene C., Assistant Secretary of Defense and Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering until 1965 Goldberg, Arthur J., Representative to the United Nations July 28, 1965–June 24, 1968 Goldschmidt, Arthur (Tex), Director of Technical Assistance, United Nations Special Fund Operations Gordon, A. Lincoln, Ambassador to Brazil until February 25, 1966; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs March 9, 1966–June 30, 1967 Gray, Gordon, member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; former Secretary of the Army, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistant to Presidents Truman and Eisenhower Greenhill, Denis A., Minister in the British Embassy to the United States until 1964; then Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office until 1966; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State Grivas, George, former leader of EOKA; Chief of the Cyprus National Guard to December 1967 Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister Gyani, Lieutenant General Prem Singh, Commander, United Nations Cyprus Force, March–June 1964 Hamilton, Edward, member of the National Security Council Staff October 1965–December 1968 Hare, Raymond A., Ambassador to Turkey until August 27, 1965; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs September 22, 1965–November 30, 1966 Harlech, Lord (William David Omsby-Gore), British Ambassador to the United States until April 1965; Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Lords until 1967 Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 17, 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large Hartman, Arthur A., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Staff Director, Senior Interdepartmental Group, from August 1967 Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until April 28, 1965; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence April 28, 1965–June 30, 1966; thereafter Director of Central Intelligence Hitch, Charles J., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) until 1965; Vice President, University of California at Berkeley, 1965–1967; Chairman, Department of State Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, 1966 Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Hoover, J. Edgar, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Hughes, Thomas L., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Inonu, General Ismet, Prime Minister of Turkey until February 1965 Jessup, Peter, member of the National Security Council Staff and Secretary of the 303 Committee Johnson, Lyndon Baines, President of the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs November 1, 1965–October 9, 1966 Johnson, W. Thomas, Assistant Press Secretary to the President September 1, 1966–September 1968; thereafter Deputy Press Secretary to the President Karamessines, Thomas H., Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until June 1967; thereafter Director for Plans Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Attorney General September 4, 1964–September 30, 1966; Under Secretary of State from October 3, 1966 Kennedy, John F., President of the United States January 1961–November 1963 Kent, Sherman, Chairman, Board of National Estimates, until December 1967 Khrushchev, Nikita S., Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers (Premier) to October 15, 1964 Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., Executive Director-Comptroller, Central Intelligence Agency until June 1965 Klein, David, member of the National Security Council Staff until August 1965 Kohler, Foy D., Career Ambassador from October 22, 1964; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs November 29, 1966–December 31, 1967 Komer, Robert W., member of the National Security Council Staff; Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs October 1965–March 28, 1966; acting Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during March 1966; Special Assistant to the President March 28, 1966–May 1967 Kutchuk, Fazil, Vice President of Cyprus Kyprianou, Spiros, Cypriot Foreign Minister Land, Edwin H., member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; founder of Polaroid Corporation and inventor of Polaroid camera Leddy, John M., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 16, 1965 Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., USA, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe; also Commander, U.S. European Command Macy, John W., Jr., Chairman of the Civil Service Commission Makarios III, Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Cyprus and President of the Republic of Cyprus Mann, Thomas C., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs January 3, 1964–March 17, 1965; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs March 18, 1965–May 31, 1966 Martin, Paul, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs until April 1968 McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence until April 28, 1965 McMillan, Brockway, Director, National Reconnaissance Office until 1965 McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense until February 29, 1968 McPherson, Harry C., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs August 23, 1964–August 14, 1965; Special Assistant to the President August 1965–February 1966; thereafter Special Counsel to the President Meeker, Leonard C., Legal Adviser of the Department of State from May 18, 1965 Menemencioglu, Turgut, Turkish Ambassador to the United States until 1967; thereafter Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization Morozov, Platon D., Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Morse, Wayne, Democratic Senator from Oregon Moyers, Bill D., Special Assistant to the President until January 31, 1967; Press Secretary to the President July 8, 1965–January 31,1967 Murphy, Robert D., member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; former Ambassador and State Department official Narasimhan, Chakravarthi V., United Nations Under Secretary for General Assembly Affairs to 1967 Pace, Frank, Jr., member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; former Director of the Bureau of the Budget and Secretary of the Army Palmer, Joseph, II, Director General of the Foreign Service February 16, 1964–April 10, 1966; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Papadopolous, Tassos, Cypriot Minister of Labor Papandreou, George, Prime Minister of Greece until July 1965 Pearson, Lester, Prime Minister of Canada until April 1968 Pickard, Sir Cyril Stanley, Acting United Kingdom High Commissioner, Cyprus, 1964 Plimpton, Francis T.P., Deputy Representative to the United Nations until September 1965 Podgorny, Nikolai V., Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. from 1965 Popper, David H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from September 1965 Prebisch, Raul, Secretary General, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Quaison-Sackey, Alexander, President of the United Nations General Assembly December 1964–December 1965 Raborn, Vice Admiral William F., Jr., USN (Ret.), Director of Central Intelligence April 28, 1965–June 30, 1966 Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department Reedy, George E., Special Assistant and Press Secretary to the President March 19, 1964–July 8,1965 Rimestad, Idar, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration from February 3, 1967 Roberts, Juanita, personal secretary to President Johnson Rolz-Bennett, José, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, United Nations Secretariat from 1965 Rooney, John J., Democratic Congressman from New York Rossides, Zenon, Cypriot Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Rostow, Eugene V. D., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 14, 1966 Rostow, Walt W., Counselor for the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council until March 31, 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President Rowan, Carl, Ambassador to Finland until February 8, 1964; Director of the United States Information Agency February 28, 1964–July 10, 1965 Rowe, James H., Jr., lawyer and longtime friend and adviser to President Johnson Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Sandys, Duncan, British Colonial Secretary until October 1964 Saunders, Harold K., member of the National Security Council Staff Schelling, Thomas C., Professor of Economics, Harvard University Schwartz, Harry H., Special Deputy Executive Secretary and Staff Director, Senior Interdepartmental Group, March 1966–August 1967 Seydoux, Roger, French Permanent Representative to the United Nations until July 1967 Sieverts, Frank A., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until March 1966; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Deputy Staff Director, Senior Interdepartmental Group, March 1966–September 1967; thereafter Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from September 10, 1965 Smith, Bromley K., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Smith, Lieutenant Colonel William Y., USAF, member of the National Security Council Staff during 1964 Solomon, Anthony M., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from June 1, 1965 Sosa Rodriguez, Carlos, President of the United Nations General Assembly September–December 1963; member of the Venezuelan Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly December 1964–February 1965 Souvanna Phouma, Prince, Prime Minister of Laos and from May 2, 1964, Minister of Defense Stevenson, Adlai E., Representative to the United Nations until July 14, 1965 Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA (Ret.), Special Consultant to the President from September 17, 1965; Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from March 1, 1968 Taylor, Vice Admiral Rufus L., USN, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from October 13, 1966 Thant, U, Secretary General of the United Nations Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large until December 26, 1966; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from January 23, 1967 Thomson, James, member of the National Security Council Staff July 1964–September 1966 Tubby, Roger W., Representative to the European Office of the United Nations Valenti, Jack, Special Assistant to the President until May 15, 1966 Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of the Army until January 20, 1964; Deputy Secretary of Defense until June 30, 1967 Waldheim, Kurt, Austrian Representative to the United Nations June 1964–January 1968; Austrian Foreign Minister from June 18, 1968 Warner, John S., Legislative Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, until May 1, 1968 Wheelon, Alfred D., Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency, until September 1966 White, Lawrence K., Deputy Director for Administration, Central Intelligence Agency, until June 1965; Executive-Director Controller, Central Intelligence Agency, from July 1965 Wilkins, Fraser, Ambassador to Cyprus until April 6, 1964; Inspector General of the Foreign Service from July 23, 1964 Wilkins, Roy, Executive Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to 1965; thereafter Executive Director Williams, Eddie N., Special Assistant for Employment Practices and then Director, Equal Employment Practices (Equal Employment Opportunity Program from January 1967), Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, 1965 to 1968 Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until March 23, 1966; Ambassador to the Philippines from June 17, 1968 Yost, Charles W., Deputy Representative to the United Nations until August 6, 1964; thereafter Career Ambassador Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy Contents The Department of State and the Coordination and Supervision of U.S. Foreign Policy The Department of State and the Coordination and Supervision of U.S. Foreign Policy 1. Editorial Note 2. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Roy Wilkins Washington, January 16, 1964, 1:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Roy Wilkins, Tape F64.06, Side A, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 3. Editorial Note 4. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) Washington, January 25, 1964, 12:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Mann, Tape 64.07, Side B, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 5. National Security Action Memorandum No. 277 Washington, January 30, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1–1. Confidential. 6. Editorial Note 7. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 14, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1–1. Confidential. Drafted by Grant G. Hilliker (S/S) and Read on February 11 and cleared by Rostow (S/P), Allen Evans (INR), and Thomas Stern (O). An attached February 12 memorandum from Read to Secretary Rusk reads in part: “Bromley Smith has advised me that the President's purpose in this NSAM exercise is not to produce a major overall revision of existing procedures, but rather to obtain a briefing on existing procedures, and he has so advised Defense and CIA.” Secretary Rusk initialed his approval on this memorandum. 8. Highlights of Secretary of State Rusk's Meeting With the Policy Planning Council Washington, March 26, 1964, 10 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, (General) National Policy Papers. Secret. Drafted in the Policy Planning Council. The time of the meeting is taken from Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) No list of the participants at the meeting has been found. Before the meeting, a Policy Planning Council paper, “Foreign Affairs Contingency Planning,” December 5, 1961, which had been discussed with the Secretary in late 1961, was distributed with the suggestion that a “brief review” of the paper would “be helpful” in preparing for the meeting. (Memorandum from Stephen M. Block (S/S-O) to Carol Moor (S/S-S), March 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, (General) National Policy Papers) 9. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) Washington, April 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, Vol. II. Secret. 10. Memorandum for Record Washington, April 20, 1964. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 63–Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Taylor initialed the memorandum adjacent to the date. 11. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 4, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80S–00004A, National Policy Papers; Procedures, 1961–1969. Secret. Prepared by [name not declassified] of CIA's Directorate for Plans. 12. Letter From Everett Bellows and Edward L. Sherman to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 7, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Administrative. No classification marking. Bellows was Vice President of Olin Mathieson Corporation and a part-time consultant to the Department of State. Sherman was a member of the White House staff during 1964, first as Executive Assistant to Ralph Dungan and then as Assistant to John W. Macy. In an April 23 memorandum to Rusk, Crockett stated that his office had undertaken a study, under Bellows' direction, of the role and level of regional bureau desk officers. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, Box 32, Secretary-1964-Mr. Crockett's Book Copies) In a March 9 memorandum to Crockett, Management Planning Staff Chief Richard Barrett reported that he had discussed Olin Mathieson's “Management by Objectives Philosophy” with Bellows and that he was convinced it would work in the Department. (Ibid., MS 74–45, Name File 1965 'B,' BA to BK #2) 13. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 9, 1964. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, Box 32, untitled folder. Confidential. Under a covering memorandum to Rusk, November 9, Crockett stated that his memorandum was essentially the same as a November 6 draft given to Ball, which was attached. 14. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, December 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, Vol. 5. No classification marking. 15. Editorial Note 16. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, December 31, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Under Secretary Ball-1964. Confidential. Drafted by Ball. 17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Confidential. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 18. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Washington, January 25, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. Eyes Only. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 19. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the President's Special Assistant (Busby) Washington, January 25, 1965. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, WH Memos. No classification marking. Drafted in O/MP on January 24. 20. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Washington, January 26, 1965, 6:55 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Coversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 21. Memorandum From Terrence Scanlon of John W. Macy Jr.'s Staff to John B. Clinton Washington, January 26, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of John Macy, Box 693, State Dept-General-1965. No classification marking. Along with his duties as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Macy served as President Johnson's chief talent scout for Presidential appointments. Scanlon and Clinton were members of the staff that assisted him in that responsibility, the latter serving as Macy's Executive Assistant. The personnel files created in discharging that responsibility are at the Johnson Library. 22. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 12, 1965. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, ORG 1, CCPS. No classification marking. 23. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 17, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume I [2], Box 6. Secret. 24. Editorial Note 25. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Washington, February 26, 1965, 10:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 26. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 27. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) Washington, March 2, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 105. Confidential. Attached but not printed is a second memorandum from Mann to Valenti, March 2, explaining how a news reporter may have learned that Assistant Secretary of State Harry McPherson would be going to the White House on temporary assignment. Also attached but not printed is a note from Valenti to the President, March 3, that states: “Tom Mann sent these over. You might want to see them.” 28. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) Washington, March 5, 1965. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Robert Cox (O/MP). Crockett forwarded a copy of the letter to Rusk under cover of a March 10 memorandum in which he noted that Helms had been advised of his correspondence with McGhee. (Ibid.) For CIA's reaction to Crockett's letter, see Document 220. 29. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 11, 1965. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Lot 68 D 323. No classification marking. 30. Memorandum for the Record Washington, March 18, 1965, 8:30 a.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Memos for Record, Job 80–B01285A. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library. 31. Memorandum for the Record Washington, March 18, 1965, 8:30 a.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Memos for Record, Job 80–B01285A. Single Copy; No Distribution. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library. 32. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the President's Special Assistant (Busby) Washington, March 18, 1965. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book. No classification marking. 33. Editorial Note 34. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 7, 1965. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, ORG 8. No classification marking. Concurred in by Thomas of ARA. Copies were sent to Ball and Mann. The memorandum indicates it was seen by the Secretary. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in the State Department and the Bureau of Latin America in AID were combined in March 1964 (see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXI, Document 10. Crockett's memorandum is based on a study entitled “Critique of the Combined Organization for Latin American Affairs,” prepared by the Office of Management, Department of State, in January 1965. Fifty State and AID officers were interviewed for the study, of whom “few expressed serious doubts regarding the usefulness of combined operations.” The critique pointed out, however, that the effectiveness of combined organization in ARA could be “attributed, at least in part, to the unique combination of responsibility in Mr. Mann for the Alliance for Progress as well as for the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with Latin American countries”; and the critique submitted recommendations for “important and significant improvements that must be made” if the combined organization were to become “fully successful.” (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, Combined Organization for Latin American Affairs) 35. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 26, 1965, 8:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape F65.10, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 36. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) Washington, April 27, 1965. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Org 1, General Policy. Limited Official Use. Filed with the memorandum are five 1964 memoranda concerning relations between the Departments of State and Commerce: Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jack Behrman to Crockett, March 6, 1964; Crockett to Under Secretary of Commerce Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., June 6, 1964; Roosevelt to Crockett, June 16, 1964; Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges to Rusk, June 16, 1964; and Crockett to Rusk, October 22, 1964. 37. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) Washington, April 28, 1965, 9:55 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, People & Positions III. No classification marking. Drafted in Ball's office. 38. Letter From President Johnson to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (McCormack) Washington, May 6, 1965. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, PER 1. No classification marking. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 502–504. An identical letter was sent on May 6 to the President of the Senate, Vice President Humphrey. The background and fate of the measures discussed in the President's letter are described in John Ensor Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 84–93; and in “The Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson,” vol. II, chap. 2D, “Efforts to Establish a Unified Foreign Affairs Personnel System,” prepared in 1968 by Clifford Hailey of the Department of State's Office of Foreign Affairs Personnel Planning. (Johnson Library, Administrative Histories) 39. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (Battle) Washington, May 28, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1. Unclassified. Attached is a memorandum from the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration to Rusk, May 25, indicating that the same letter was sent to all 13 Chiefs of Mission participating in the Executive Review of Overseas Programs. For background on EROP, see Document 33. According to Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, p. 84, Rusk himself proposed sending this letter during a planning meeting on EROP with Crockett and Barrett in April. 40. Editorial Note 41. Editorial Note 42. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. Limited Official Use. Internal evidence indicates that the paper was prepared in July or August 1965 although it contains no drafting information. Handwritten notations on the paper indicate that the original was sent to Mann, with copies to Ball, Deputy Executive Secretary John Walsh, S/S Staff Director Herbert Gordon, and S/S Assistant Staff Director Jeanne Davis. 43. Editorial Note 44. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, August 18, 1965, 7:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. No classification marking. From 1:40 to 4:05 p.m. on August 19, the President met for lunch in the Madison Room at the Department of State with Rusk, Ball, Mann, Harriman, Goldberg, seven Assistant Secretaries of State, Chief of Protocol Lloyd Hand, and Valenti. (Ibid., Daily Diary) The Daily Diary indicates that Valenti kept notes of the meeting, which were turned over to Dorothy Territo of the White House staff, but the notes have not been found. Four months earlier, in a memorandum to the President of April 21, Valenti had proposed that the President go the Department of State to talk with “the assistant secretaries, their deputies, regional and area chiefs and some desk officers,” in order “to counter-attack the swiftly-building myth that the President is bored with foreign affairs and doesn't enjoy foreign visitors.” Valenti continued, “Let us show, visibly, the President's interest in the ideas, imagination and energy of State-as well as his support for State employees.” The President, however, responded by checking “No” at the bottom of the memorandum. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 105) 45. Editorial Note 46. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) Washington, September 14, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 277. Secret. A copy was sent to Yager (S/P). 47. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, November 5, 1965, 3 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 16. Confidential. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 48. Draft Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 5, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG. No classification marking. No indication has been found that the memorandum was signed and forwarded to Rusk, but at some point it was made available to Bromley Smith, NSC Executive Secretary. In Smith's files it is attached to a copy of a December 10 memorandum from Schwartz to Taylor, which refers to an attached draft of a reorganization plan. However, attached to the original of Schwartz's memorandum in the Taylor Papers at National Defense University is a different plan for reorganizing the Special Group that clearly is the plan to which Schwartz's covering memorandum refers. (Box 63, Folder II, NSAM 341 & Related Items)127 U. Alexis Johnson recounted his role in the development of the SIG-IRG system in The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 398–401. 49. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Bureau of the Budget Director Schultze to President Johnson Washington, December 3, 1965. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Taylor Task Force Report. Unclassified. Drafted by Barrett. The first page of the memorandum indicates it was not sent. The serious differences that developed between State and BOB over the draft memorandum's recommendations are described in Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pp. 108–114. The objections expressed by AID, Agriculture, and DOD are summarized in a memorandum from Barrett to Crockett, January 11, 1966. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, ORG 1) 50. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 19, 1966, 7:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG. No classification marking. The memorandum is marked with an indication that, together with the attachments, it was included in the President's Night Reading and that the President saw it. 51. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 21, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Gen Taylor. Secret. 52. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, January 21, 1966. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Taylor Task Force. No classification marking. Drafted by Ball. Sent through Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Special Assistant to the President. 53. Editorial Note 54. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to All Assistant Secretaries and Executive Directors Washington, February 17, 1966. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book. No classification marking. Drafted by Eddie Williams on February 14. 55. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 1, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. Confidential. A copy was sent to Ball. 56. National Security Action Memorandum No. 341 Washington, March 2, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs File, NSAM 341. Confidential. Taylor forwarded the NSAM to the President under cover of a March 2 memorandum in which he outlined the NSAM's “principal effects” and made several recommendations, including “the preparation of a new Presidential letter to Ambassadors to replace the President Kennedy letter of May 29, 1961.” (Ibid., Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG) In a March 2 memorandum to Rusk, Bromley Smith indicated that the President wanted Rusk to prepare such a letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative) A draft was prepared (see Document 130) but never sent. 57. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, March 2, 1966, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 312. Secret. A copy was sent to Moyers. According to a note attached to the memorandum the President told his secretary, Yolanda Boozer, at 9:45 p.m. on March 2: “Tell Bill Moyers to see me about this.” 58. Editorial Note 59. Notes of a Meeting Washington, March 4, 1966, 3:05 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. No classification marking. Drafted by Read. An attendance list is ibid., Instructions and Authority for SIG Documents. In addition to the Assistant Secretaries, attendees included Mann, U. Alexis Johnson, Crockett, Harriman, Hughes, Rostow, and several other State Department officials. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room. 60. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) and the President's Assistant Press Secretary (Fleming) Washington, March 4, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105. Official Use Only. Copies were sent to the Ranch and to Joe Laitin. 61. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 7, 1966, 3 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 66.12, Side A, PNO 4–5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 62. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 7, 1966. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Foreign Affairs Planning System 1966. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted by Rostow, Crockett, Barrett, and Robert T. Bonham on March 7 and forwarded to Ball by Springsteen, together with two draft documents implementing the proposal, for Ball's 3:30 p.m. meeting on March 7 with Crockett and Rostow. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous) A handwritten note on Crockett's letterhead attached to the copy of the memorandum in the Crockett Papers states: “These memos were prepared for discussion with the Secretary by WJC [Crockett], Rostow, Ball, [U. Alexis] Johnson, & Barrett. However, meeting did not take place. Rostow saw Sec privately Mar 8 and gave him copy of memo. Also subsequently sent Nodis telegram [to Crockett] from Panama [where Rostow was attending a conference]. However, Mar 9 meeting with BOB changed picture and agreement reached to work on experimental basis this yr. BOB was to send paper detailing understanding.” In Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pp. 128–143, Mosher and Harr discuss the background and substance of the memorandum, describe the March 9 meeting with BOB, and print BOB's summary of what, from its perspective, was concluded at the meeting. The memorandum itself is printed on pp. 252–257. 63. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, March 7, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous. Confidential. 64. Memorandum for Record Washington, March 8, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Agency File, State Department, SIG, Memos & Misc, IV, Confidential. Drafted on March 9 by Major General W.T. Fairbourn, Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, J–5 (Plans and Policy) Directorate, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A “backgrounder,” talking points, an agenda, and other material provided to Ball for this meeting are attached to a March 8 memorandum from Schwartz to Read. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative) 65. Editorial Note 66. Editorial Note 67. Memorandum From the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn Washington, March 15, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–R01580R, SIG. Secret. 68. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson Washington, March 16, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 600/S. No classification marking. 69. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 2, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–5505, US Govt-Policy Planning Group. Secret. Prepared by Godfrey on April 26. 70. Notes of a Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) and Dr. Charles Hitch Washington, April 6, 1966. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Foreign Affairs Planning System 1966. No classification marking. Drafted in Crockett's office. Copies were sent to Barrett and Sherman. Hitch met with Rusk, Lincoln Gordon, and a number of other Department of State officials in Washington on April 4 and 5 in connection with the possibility of his chairing a high-level advisory group on foreign affairs programming. Crockett informed Rusk by memorandum in late May that, before leaving Washington on April 6, Hitch told him “that he was not just willing, but very interested and anxious to help us develop a comprehensive and unified planning and programming system for foreign affairs.” (Undated memorandum from Crockett to Rusk, drafted May 21; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 63, Folder G, Papers Relating to NSAM 341) The Hitch Committee was formed in June. For more information, see Documents 75 and 80 as well as Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pp. 146–157. 71. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 19, 1966, 10:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt Rostow, Vol. 1. Confidential. Copies were sent to Moyers and Valenti. 72. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) Washington, May 9, 1966. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book. No classification marking. Drafted by Eddie Williams. 73. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 10, 1966, 10:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Walt Rostow. Secret; Eyes Only. 74. Editorial Note 75. Report Prepared by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) and Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff Washington, May 23, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, IRG. Confidential. For background to the report, see Document 74. 76. Editorial Note 77. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, May 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 8. Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of a May 30 memorandum in which Rostow proposed additional talking points. On May 31 the President met in the Cabinet Room from 1:25 to 2:32 p.m. with the following Department of State officers: Assistant Secretaries, Acting Assistant Secretaries, Presidential appointees with the rank of Assistant Secretary, and officers with the equivalent rank of Assistant Secretary. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. During a telephone conversation with Rusk that began at 12:45 p.m. on May 28, the President indicated that at the meeting he wanted the Assistant Secretaries to “give me their area of the world and what the problems are and what the solutions are as they see them.” (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.15, Side B, PNO 2) 78. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 31, 1966, 11:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966–. Confidential; Sensitive. 79. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Washington, June 2, 1966, 9:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. Extra-Sensitive. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 80. Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts Washington, June 7, 1966, 12:58 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1. Unclassified. Drafted by Barrett on June 4, cleared by Crockett, and approved by Ball. 81. Memorandum From James C. Falcon of John W. Macy, Jr.'s Staff to John W. Macy, Jr. Washington, June 18, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of John W. Macy, Box 693, State-Under Secretary. No classification marking. 82. Record of Agreements and Decisions of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Meeting Washington, July 26, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Vol. I, 13th Meeting, 7/26/66, Box 56. Secret. Drafted on July 28 by Harry H. Schwartz, SIG Staff Director. 83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 26, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966–. No classification marking. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 84. Editorial Note 85. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson Washington, August 4, 1966, 12:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966–. Sensitive. The memorandum is marked with an indication the President saw it. 86. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Country Director for Iran (Eliot) Washington, August 4, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1–1. No classification marking. The same letter was apparently sent to all Country Directors. The text of the letter was included in the appendix to A Management Program for the Department of State (see Document 84), under the heading Country Director Doctrine. For information on the development of the Country Director system, see William I. Bacchus, Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). 87. Editorial Note 88. Editorial Note 89. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Schultze) to President Johnson Washington, August 8, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341. Confidential. Typed at the end of the memorandum is the following note: “Walt Rostow has seen, and agrees with this memo. CLS [Charles L. Schultze].” 90. Editorial Note 91. Paper Prepared in the White House Washington, September 1, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 105. No classification marking. Drafted by Robert G. Cox of the White House staff. (Memorandum from Cox to Macy, September 1; ibid., Office Files of John W. Macy, Box 693, State-General-1966) It was handed to President Johnson by Macy during their meeting on September 1. (Memorandum from Macy to the President, September 19; ibid.) The paper indicates that the President saw it. Under cover of a September 19 memorandum, 2 days before Johnson announced his appointments to the three posts, Macy forwarded to the President a second list of suggestions consisting of 6 teams. Macy explained that the list was “based on the same general assumptions but with suggested names from outside of the government.” (Ibid.) 92. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (McPherson) to President Johnson Washington, September 13, 1966, 11:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105. No classification marking. Handwritten notations on the memorandum include the following: “recd 9/13/66, 12:17 p”; “from Pres' desk, 12/26/68”; and “From the President's middle desk drawer, 12/27/68.” 93. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 16, 1966, 10:18 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 66.24, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 94. Editorial Note 95. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) Washington, September 21, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FAPS. Secret. 96. Editorial Note 97. Letter From the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) Washington, September 30, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FAPS. Secret. 98. Editorial Note 99. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 3, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Hitch. Unclassified; Nodis. 100. Memorandum Prepared by Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105. No classification marking. Davis forwarded the memorandum to Cater under cover of an undated note stating, “This is a non-memo.” Under cover of a November 10 memorandum, Cater forwarded Davis' memorandum to Moyers, indicating that Davis had prepared it at Cater's suggestion after discussing “the problem of innovation in the State Department and, particularly, revitalization of the foreign services.” Cater asked Moyers if the memorandum was “worthy of pursuit with the President?” There is no indication that it was brought to the President's attention. 101. Editorial Note 102. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, undated. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–R01580R, SIG. Secret. The report was forwarded to Helms by Clandestine Services Special Group Officer [name not declassified] under cover of a memorandum dated November 25, 1966. (Ibid.) 103. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Schwartz) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, November 28, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1. No classification marking. 104. Memorandum From John J. Adams of the Foreign Affairs Programming System Development Office to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) Washington, December 30, 1966. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Rpt. on Recent Trips to Eur & Latin Amer Regarding Prospective For Affairs Program-Budgeting. No classification marking. Adams was a management analyst with the FAPS Development Program in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. Adams' report and a similar one by Mosher (Document 113) “received considerable circulation within the Department and in other foreign affairs agencies,” according to Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, p. 177. 105. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 71 A 4546, 381 1967 February. Confidential. An attached covering letter from Kohler to Vance, January 5, 1967, indicated that the draft paper was prepared in response to the SIG decision of July 26, 1966, to revise “U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy,” and asked for the early comments of the agencies that were members of the SIG. Regarding the July 26 decision, see Document 82. For other agency comments, see Documents 108 and 109. 106. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 5, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Department of State-Rusk. No classification marking. Drafted by Crockett. Copies were sent to Katzenbach, Steeves (DG), MacArthur (H), Lyerly (L/O), Hoofnagle (O/DG), and Stutesman (O/DG). 107. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 7, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt R. Rostow, Vol. 18. Confidential. 108. Editorial Note 109. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, January 9, 1967, p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, Vol. I, 13th Meeting, 7/26/66. Confidential. The memorandum is misdated January 9, 1966. An undated, handwritten note from Bator at the end of the memorandum reads: “Walt—I won't do a separate memo since the above is a fair representation of my views. I am especially concerned about the point in par. 3 of page 1.” 110. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 9, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Chron, Mr Katzenbach, 1966–67. Limited Official Use. Rusk initialed the memorandum at the top of page 1. 111. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, January 13, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Consultants Panels. Confidential. Rostow penned a note to Bromley Smith on the memorandum that reads: “Remind me to check again at, say, the end of April.” 112. Editorial Note 113. Report Prepared by Professor Frederick Mosher Washington, January 17, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 1–1. No classification marking. Mosher served as a consultant to the State Department during the summer of 1966 and then worked under contract to the Department. He also served on the Hitch Committee. In the introduction to the report he states that it was based on: his experience on the Hitch Committee; interviews with officials of the Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture, AID, USIA, BOB, and the Peace Corps; and interviews during October and November 1966 with officials at U.S. missions in Germany, France, Great Britain, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, conducted together with John Adams (see Document 104). The report is attached to a January 19 memorandum from Francis Lambert, Staff Director for the ARA Interdepartmental Regional Group, to Robert Sayre, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, in which Lambert makes a number of comments on the report and calls it “a first-rate paper. I have no quarrel with anything he says.” Regarding the report's circulation, see also footnote 1, Document 104. 114. Editorial Note 115. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, January 27, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Administrative & Personnel. No classification marking. 116. Memorandum Prepared by the Inspector General of the Foreign Service (Wilkins) Washington, January 30, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S–SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Documents—Instructions and Authority. Limited Official Use. Attached to a February 2 memorandum from John Steeves, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, to Katzenbach. 117. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 10, 1967, 1:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341. Confidential. The memorandum was included in the President's Night Reading. A handwritten note at the top of the memorandum reads: “Mr. Rostow notified Mr. Katzenbach.” 118. Notes Prepared by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) Washington, April 15, 1967. Source: Papers in Francis Bator's personal possession. Sensitive. 119. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 27, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, O-Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration: Lot 70 D 403, ORG 1. No classification marking. Drafted by C.E. Hulick on May 2. 120. Statement Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) for President Johnson Washington, June 27, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341. Confidential. Attached to a June 27 memorandum from Rostow to the President, that states: “Herewith the statement you wanted me to formulate.” The memorandum indicates that the President saw it. No information was found to indicate how the President used the statement. 121. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, July 21, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Chron File. Personal; Sensitive. 122. Memorandum for the Record Washington, July 21, 1967. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FAPS. Secret. 123. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 28, 1967, 7:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, SIG, Memos & Misc., IV. Secret. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Rosenthal) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, July 31, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Rosenthal, Jack. No classification marking. 125. Editorial Note 126. Memorandum From the Country Director for Laos (Hamilton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 28, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, O/MS-Management Staff Files: Lot 70 D 474, Department of State, 1967, Country Director Organization. Secret. 127. Final Report of the President's Task Force on Foreign Affairs Organization Washington, October 1, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, Task Force Reports. Administratively Confidential. The President's Task Force on Foreign Affairs Organization was a subgroup of the President's Task Force on Government Organization organized in late 1966 primarily to review domestic agencies (see footnote 2, Document 118). Ben Heineman chaired both groups. Heineman forwarded the report to the President under cover of an October 1 memorandum in which he noted that Katzenbach had attended and participated in all of the task force meetings and was in general agreement with the report's recommendations. Califano forwarded the report to the President under cover of an October 14 memorandum in which he summarized its contents and noted that the Task Force on Government Organization considered it “the second most important report they have submitted.” (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 749) 128. Editorial Note 129. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Farley) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, October 20, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, Political Military Group. Secret. Drafted by Joseph J. Wolf (G/PM). 130. Editorial Note 131. Letter From Donald R. Lesh of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Staff to Harlan Clark of the U.S. Army War College Washington, February 7, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, SIG Comment. Confidential. 132. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser to the Department of State (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 27, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 1–1. No classification marking. The memorandum indicates Rusk saw it. 133. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Rimestad) Washington, March 6, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, NK Chron 1968. Personal and Confidential. 134. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Katzenbach) to the Executive Chairmen of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the Chairman of the Political-Military Group Washington, June 12, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo #73. Confidential. 135. Report Prepared in the Department of State Washington, June 20, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, The Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. II, Documentary Supplement, The Foreign Affairs Personnel System. No classification marking. The Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, known as the Herter Committee and chaired by former Secretary of State Christian Herter, was organized in 1961 at Rusk's request. Although unofficial and privately sponsored, it worked in close association with State Department officials. Its recommendations were included in its report, Personnel for the New Diplomacy (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962). For more information on the Herter Committee and implementation of its recommendations, see The Department of State During the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, vol. I, chapter 2D, Efforts to Establish a Unified Foreign Affairs Personnel System, prepared in 1968 by Clifford Hailey of the State Department's Office of Foreign Affairs Personnel Planning; and John Ensor Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), especially pp. 76 ff. 136. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations (Jackson) Washington, July 15, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, BUD 1. No classification marking. Printed in the Department of State Newsletter, September 1968, pp. 12–13. 137. Memorandum Prepared by the Staff of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Washington, November 28, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/DOC #47. Confidential. Under cover of December 4 memorandum Arthur Hartman sent copies of the SIG Staff Study to the Staff Directors for each of the 6 IRGs. 138. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Duemling) to the Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Hartman) Washington, December 23, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. Confidential. A copy was sent to William Bundy. 1. Editorial Note 1. Editorial Note On January 6, 1964, Secretary of State Rusk forwarded to President Johnson the Department's first “Items for Evening Reading.” Four days earlier Benjamin Read, State Department Executive Secretary, had notified all Assistant Secretaries of State that “Items for Evening Reading” would be forwarded to the President each weekday, Monday through Friday, based on items that they thought “should be brought to the attention of the President that evening because of their foreign policy importance and possible political or news impact.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, President's Evening Reading) The President's State Department Evening Reading File at the Johnson Library contains 1- to 2-page reports (usually titled “Items for Evening Reading” through late 1966 and “State Department Activities Report” thereafter) for most weekdays from January 1964 through mid-December 1968. Many copies are marked with an indication that the President saw them. According to a memorandum to the President from National Security Council Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, March 31, 1966 ( Document 165 ), the report was sent to the President about 8 p.m. each weekday. On December 11, 1967, Read forwarded updated guidelines to the Assistant Secretaries of State, stating that the evening reading was “intended to give the President in highly compressed form significant and timely information on foreign affairs and the Department's activities” that was “not readily available from other sources.” Besides substantive matters, the President was interested in public relations activities and important Bureau meetings with members of Congress, special interest groups, and media representatives. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Memos File: Lot 72 D 372) 2. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Roy Wilkins 2. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Roy Wilkins 1 Washington, January 16, 1964, 1:20 p.m. [Omitted here is discussion of issues other than foreign relations.] President: Now let me ask you this. They tell me that we shouldn't send a Negro to an African country as an ambassador. Is that true? Wilkins: The Africans have strenuously denied it when we have confronted them with it. I don't know whether it's true or not. All I can say is that diplomatically they have said no. Some of them have been vehement in denying it. Others have said this is silly. And I don't know exactly how they feel about it. I would say that if you made a uniform practice of assigning Negroes—or such Negroes as you had—to African countries, they would resent it. You understand. President: I agree with that. But we've got'em in Scandinavia and we've got'em in other countries, and what I want to do is enlarge 'em a little more. They don't have their twelve percent. Now I'm not a percentage man, but if we can find some of the top people in this country—I mean you take either of the [unintelligible] would be wonderful ambassadors to some country, but top men. I would like to get'em up to where they are at least in walking distance of the rest of us. Wilkins: Exactly. President: I can't do it though if I've got twenty or thirty Latin American countries and thirty-odd African countries and they're just barred because somebody says so. Now I thought it was the Negro community in this country that was objecting to it. Wilkins: No, they wouldn't object like the Africans would object if it became a uniform policy. I don't believe they would object. The Africans are the ones. President: We've got one in Sweden now, and Goodman, on my Scandinavian trip, a Negro. So I'm going to try to have one or two, and you might get one or two of the most outstanding ones that you know in the United States. You ought to have me a list of that. You better just go to work, and if you want Whitney Young or somebody, get some real outstandingly—the worse job I can perform is to name one that's a failure. Wilkins: That's true. That's very true, and I agree with you one hundred percent. President: And I don't know this field as well as you do. I'm going to rely on you, so you get four or five of the top ones that are like Bob Weaver or like Carl Rowan. Wilkins: Very good, Mr. President. In the meanwhile I'll make additional inquiries among the Africans. President: You do that and you talk to anybody that you want to about Carl. 2 Just say wouldn't it be wonderful if he succeeded Murrow and see what their reaction is. If you get any different reaction call me collect. Wilkins: Very good, I'll do that. I'm home today doing a little paperwork because Mrs. Wilkins is not well and I want to be with her. I didn't want you to think I wasn't in my office cause I'm loafing on the job. President: Give her my regards. Tell her I hope it's nothing Lady Bird gave her to eat that made her sick. Wilkins: Not a chance of that. Thank you so much. I'll try out Rowan, I'll check on the African nations, and I'll get you a list. [Omitted here is discussion of issues other than foreign relations.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Roy Wilkins, Tape F64.06, Side A, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 President Johnson was considering naming Carl Rowan, then Ambassador to Finland, to succeed Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency. Murrow stepped down on January 20 and Rowan was appointed his successor on February 27. 3. Editorial Note 3. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation with Secretary of State Rusk that began at 9:25 p.m. on January 20, 1964, President Johnson revealed that he had offered Mary Lasker the Ambassadorship to Finland but she had turned it down. He then stated that “I want to get some real outstanding woman in this country pretty soon, so you think of that,” concluding that “I want to get that pretty soon before these women run me out.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Dean Rusk, Tape 64.12, Side B, PNO 2) At a midday news conference on January 25, the President announced that he expected a report the following week from his Cabinet officers regarding women in government service. Johnson stated that “you are going to find more attractive, capable women working for this government than you ever saw before.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book I, page 232) That evening the President had the following discussion with Under Secretary of State Ball during a telephone conversation that began at 6:29 p.m.: President: “Now are you all going to get some good woman for me over at the State Department in a relatively high position?” Ball: “Yep, we're working on that one.” President: “They're going to ask me for a report in about 2 weeks, and I want to get one in each Cabinet place that you can call your top woman, so she can [go] out and brief these women.” Ball: “Right.” President: “And you just get a good one. Now I know you got Katie Louchheim, but I want a real outstanding woman. I want a George Ball or a Dean Rusk.” Ball: “Well, we're working on it right now, and this one we have very much in mind.” Johnson then discussed with Ball the possible appointment of Aline Saarinen as Ambassador to Finland. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and George Ball, Tape 64.08, Side A, PNO 4) The President pursued the issue of appointing women to positions in the Department of State during a telephone conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Mann that began at 7:10 p.m. on February 3, 1964: President: “Have you got any good women that you can appoint as an ambassador? Haven't you got some woman that you can make an ambassador to Latin America? Don't you know somebody that you've kind of brought up other there or raised? Haven't you got some attractive, able, smart Spanish girl that you can put in one of those places?” Mann: “I don't have anybody able in the Latin American Division. Well, I don't know of any women that I can recommend now but I'll—” President: “Well I'm going to recommend some. If you don't I'll go back and get some of these Mexicans I taught down there in Cotulla, at that school, and get you one. Cause I'm going to appoint some women. You better come up with one or two.” Mann: “We'll come up with some.” (Ibid., Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Mann, Tape 64.10, Side A, PNO 5) In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on women in the State Department, February 18, 1964, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Crockett stated that “while there are more women in upper-level jobs in the State Department than in any other government agency, the Department is giving high priority to increasing the number of women in key positions, as requested by the President,” a claim for which Crockett then provided details. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, Secretary-1964-Mr. Crockett's Book Copies) Crockett gave the memorandum to Rusk for use at a Cabinet meeting that began about 4:30 that afternoon. On March 4, 1964, President Johnson announced the appointment of women to a number of positions in his administration, including Katharine Elkus White as an ambassador, the first of four women to be named ambassadors during the Johnson administration. White served as Ambassador to Denmark from April 4, 1964 until September 9, 1968. While at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on March 28, the President again raised the issue of appointing women as ambassadors during a telephone conversation with Rusk that began at 3:35 p.m. CST: President: “Have you got any women ambassadors in mind?” Rusk: “We've got one who is a Foreign Service officer we're hoping to put to you in a few days. We're working on that further.” President: “What's her name?” Rusk: “Gee, I don't have it in front of me. I'm out here at the—” President: “Call and give it to me when you come back. I don't guess we can say anything about it. Sure wish we could though. Look at it and see what country you've got her in mind for, and I might even give a hint that we'll have another one or something like that. I need something and I haven't got anything from the Department. You call me back around 5:30 or 5:15 [EST] or something. Bye.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 64.21, Side A, PNO 43) The portions of the conversations printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. Rusk called the President back at 4:21 p.m. CST, but no record of the conversation has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) At 4:30 p.m. CST the President opened his news conference at the LBJ Ranch and announced that “we have named, or planned to name, as Ambassador, Miss Margaret Joy Tibbetts, who is a Foreign Service Officer of the first class.” The President then announced the appointment of women to several other positions in the administration. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book I, pages 425–426) Margaret Joy Tibbetts was appointed Ambassador to Norway on July 31, the second woman ambassador to be named by Johnson. She served until May 23, 1969. 4. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) 4. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) 1 Washington, January 25, 1964, 12:20 p.m. [Omitted here is discussion of Panama.] President: And let's find some good top men. I am not at all happy with my Ambassador to Mexico. I want to get the greatest man in America. I had the greatest [Mann], and I pulled him up here. He got me in Panama right after he got here. 2 Now I want you to find me—I want a Marlin Sandlin. I want somebody that's 45 years old. Reckon he can get out of his business interests and give'em up and go down there? Mann: Well, you said you didn't want another Texan there. Marlin would be. Trouble with Marlin is he's Chairman of the Board of Pan American Sulphur. President: Well, couldn't he get out of that and resign it and give up his interest? Mann: He could but he'd be attacked and so would you. President: All right. Mann: He's one of the great guys [but it depends?] on your political judgment. President: He would be. What else can we get. Mann: Well, we can get him Colombia. You could move Freeman 3 to Mexico. President: I want to get some man I know in Mexico that's my friend, that is looking after me, that's my manager, that's damned able, and I want him to understand business, and I want him to be young and attractive. I want him to be a Sargent Shriver type. Mann: Well, why don't you pick a good lawyer with a good political sense, somebody you know and have confidence in. We've got some Foreign Service people. I know that Friday 4 the Secretary and Ball thought that they were going to—the Secretary said he was going to recommend Freeman, who is probably one of the two best you've got in Latin America, the other one being in Brazil. President: Okay. Mann: So, there's still Colombia, but if you want somebody you know personally—you don't know Freeman. President: No, I don't. Mann: We'll eliminate him, but he's good, and he would be loyal to you. President: Well don't you know somebody that I know that's good, like Marlin? Mann: Well, I really hesitate for you— President: I'm not talking about Marlin. I'm talking about somebody of his same qualifications, that's got his appearance. Mann: Let me then try. I'll talk to Marlin and see if we can't cook up two or three names for you. President: Do that. Mann: Probably be from Texas. That wouldn't bother you? President: No, but I'd rather get some other state—California might be good. Mann: I think a young lawyer with good political instincts is what you want. President: What about a Mexican? Mann: Well, I wouldn't recommend that to you. President: We got a hell of a good Mexican out there that's head of finance department, California. Mann: Well, you know him. He has a couple of strikes on him. The Mexicans don't like what they call pochos, that means— President: Okay. All right. Mexicans won't take a white man. I don't, goddamned if I can understand that. Mann: Well, it's a— President: Okay, that's all right. You go on and get me a good one. But get me one. I want to help 'em. We've been miserable to the Mexicans. I want you to get some in your department. If you know any smart ones, you hire some—the Alliance for Progress—you don't have to go to Puerto Rico. Mann: We could hire him up here, and that would be easy. If you got a fellow you want hired up here— President: Well, but hell, he gets more than you do. He gets $23,000 a year. Mann: Well, everybody gets more than we do, but— President: You find some way for [Johnson asks an aide for the name] Lueveno—Danny Luevano. He's the head of finance in the state of California, and they say he's a damned able citizen. He's coming in next week and I'll send him to see you. Mann: All right. Fine. President: Okay. 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Mann, Tape 64.07, Side B, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 Mann began his new assignment as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on January 3, 6 days before student demonstrations led to the crisis in Panama. 3 Fulton Freeman, Ambassador to Colombia. 4 January 24. 5 On February 29 Johnson announced the appointment of Daniel M. Luévano as Assistant Secretary of the Army. On March 4 Johnson appointed Freeman to be Ambassador to Mexico. 5. National Security Action Memorandum No. 277 5. National Security Action Memorandum No. 277 1 Washington, January 30, 1964. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence Because we may have to be dealing with a continuing series of fast-moving foreign developments. I would like to have an early review of our procedures for anticipating foreign crises. I am asking McGeorge Bundy to pull together for me any suggestions in this area which might be worthy of consideration. 2 Lyndon B. Johnson 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1–1. Confidential. 2 For the Department of State response, see Document 7 . The Director of Central Intelligence's response is Document 198 . Secretary McNamara reviewed the Department of Defense's crisis anticipation procedures in an April 15 memorandum to Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 277) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates President Johnson signed the original. 6. Editorial Note 6. Editorial Note On February 11, 1964, National Security Action Memorandum No. 281 was issued under McGeorge Bundy's signature, stating: “In keeping with his responsibilities for the coordination of foreign policy, the President has today vested in the Secretary of State the responsibility for the promulgation of certain National Policy Papers. Procedures and standard outlines for this series will be circulated promptly by the Secretary of State.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 281) The Secretary's ensuing procedures defined National Policy Papers as “comprehensive, authoritative and unifying statements of US policy” to which statements of policy and strategy in other country documents “will be brought into conformity.” (Procedures and Annotated Standard Outline for National Policy Papers,” June 17, 1965; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, General National Policy Papers) A draft of NSAM 281, prepared by Walt Rostow, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, had first been forwarded to Bundy by State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin Read on January 7, 1964. According to Chester Cooper, who was in attendance, Bundy indicated at his staff meeting on February 5 that he would try to get the NSAM through, “but it was clear that there was not much interest in this project in the White House these days.” It was pretty much a question of “doing something” for Rostow, continued Cooper, rather “than any firm conviction that this is a high priority activity.” (Memorandum from Chester Cooper to Ray Cline, February 5; Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos, 1964) Earlier, in a January 7 memorandum to Bundy, National Security Council Staff member Robert Komer had raised several questions about the draft NSAM, among them: “Might this new procedure, especially if publicized, lead people to conclusion President is delegating to SecState his foreign policy responsibilities and doesn't intend to take a very active role himself?” At Bundy's request, expressed in his February 11 memorandum to Rostow, the Department incorporated language into the procedures specifying that the President could initiate National Policy Papers, that the White House staff could participate in their preparation, and that the Secretary of State would satisfy himself that each paper reflected the President's purpose and policy. Komer's and Bundy's memoranda are at the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 281. 7. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 7. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 14, 1964. SUBJECT NSAM #277—Anticipation of Foreign Crises The President's memorandum of January 30 to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Director McCone called for a review of procedures in effect in this Department, Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for anticipating foreign crises. 2 I understand that you are coordinating the replies. Crisis anticipation procedures within this Department have been reviewed and revised periodically during the last three years, with particular attention to the early identification of situations which could develop into crises. Secretary Rusk, in the attached memorandum of July 2, 1962, described the procedure for strengthening our performance in “the systematic planning for crises”. 3 This directive is still in effect and has been utilized, for example, for the preparation of studies on possible succession problems in Ghana, Spain, France and Portugal. It requires members of the Policy Planning Council to consult regularly with the operating bureaus and other areas of the Department to review possible problems and to develop specific plans to avert or mitigate undesirable consequences. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research participates in the above mentioned review of problem areas. In addition, it prepares monthly a list of actual and potential trouble spots in all parts of the world and publishes them in the form of a monthly “Global Alert List”. The list for February 1964 is attached. 4 It serves as a useful method of briefing principal officers about expected crises. More generally, however, it is clear that our ability to anticipate crises rests on the continuous alertness and efficiency of the Department as an organization. Many officers and offices play important roles in this process. As you know, the Secretary considers the country desk officer the focal point for the identification of important policy implications of unfolding events. It is for this reason that he wishes to up-grade the desk officer's status. When crises develop with little warning, the Operations Center in the Secretariat puts into effect carefully worked out procedures for alerting the Department. These procedures tie in to the White House Situation Room, the National Military Communications Center and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Secretary's daily staff meetings, including both intelligence briefings and consideration of operating problems, are used frequently to flag possible crisis areas. Many other devices are used for the same purpose, but it would not seem desirable to prolong this memorandum with a detailed discussion of these procedures and practices. The Secretary of State has reviewed this memorandum and has advised me that he would be available to discuss these problems and to provide additional information and suggestions if desired. John A. McKesson 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1–1. Confidential. Drafted by Grant G. Hilliker (S/S) and Read on February 11 and cleared by Rostow (S/P), Allen Evans (INR), and Thomas Stern (O). An attached February 12 memorandum from Read to Secretary Rusk reads in part: “Bromley Smith has advised me that the President's purpose in this NSAM exercise is not to produce a major overall revision of existing procedures, but rather to obtain a briefing on existing procedures, and he has so advised Defense and CIA.” Secretary Rusk initialed his approval on this memorandum. 2 Document 5 . 3 Addressed to the Assistant Secretaries of State; not printed. 4 Not printed. In a February 11 memorandum to Read, Allen Evans offered comments on an earlier draft of this memorandum, which has not been found. He suggested the language in the first two sentences of this paragraph to make clear that the “Global Alert List” was “made up not from contributions by the geographic Bureaus, but from materials put together entirely within INR itself” as well as other minor changes. All his suggested revisions were incorporated into the final text of the memorandum printed here. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates McKesson signed the original for Read. 8. Highlights of Secretary of State Rusk's Meeting With the Policy Planning Council 8. Highlights of Secretary of State Rusk's Meeting With the Policy Planning Council 1 Washington, March 26, 1964, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Anticipation of Foreign Crises [Omitted here is a distribution list.] This meeting was called for the purpose of launching a new round in the Department's continuing efforts to improve its performance in the anticipation of foreign crises. The Secretary said that this is one of the most important matters before us. This has been brought about by the increasing pace of events during the last twenty years. We have involved here two different kinds of exercises. The first is of the short-term, watch committee type, i.e., an alertness to the Bloc, troop movements, and “time bombs already fused”. This area is under reasonable control. The second area involves looking ahead to determine what kinds of crises will be confronting us, and endeavoring to limit their adverse effects. Check lists of actions we might take in order to influence the situation in the direction of US interests, before some of these things happen, would be useful. We need to examine the anatomy of these problems and to determine the subsidiary questions which each involves. Detailed plans should not be drawn for specific events not yet known, but rather should focus on issues likely to arise. The pace of events has a very important bearing on the way we operate. Education before the event is essential, especially where quick decisions will have to be made. The Secretary lives continually under “the shadow of the missing factor.” That factor may be the decisive one so that there is a need to consider every important aspect of a problem. This may, however, result in a paralysis of decision. To help to avoid this, we need to select out the controlling factor, the most critical, important element, and proceed with it. The controlling factor, for example, may be the simple fact that “we cannot afford to let 'X' country do a certain thing.” Overly rigid contingency planning is to be avoided. What we want is a kind of check list of the factors to be taken into account should the crisis come. Intelligence priorities may be affected. We may wish to select for intelligence coverage, things which may not now look particularly urgent. This is not an exercise which S/P should exclusively undertake; it is primarily the work of the geographical bureaus. This work should be heightened and systematized. Much work has already gone forward, but there continues a real need for an S/P monitoring role. The criteria for the selection of problems for anticipatory planning are most important. These include a balancing of the importance of the problem, the probability of the crisis and when it is expected, and the resources available to study the problem. It was suggested that not enough use is made of our chiefs of mission in this work. Our orientation has been too much in terms of specific countries, and there has not been enough attention to regional problems. There is need for a more “institutional” approach to problems. We should attempt to build institutions to solve our problems. AID, it was urged, has a role in this process which is often overlooked. Many political officers regard aid as primarily useful as a bribe rather than as an institution building device. Another observation was that we do not adequately consider general trends and those problems which are cross-regional as, for example, the conferences of the non-aligned and Afro-Asian nations. Our thought processes seem less effective in this area. More effort also should be spent on what is happening and on what our tactics should be, particularly in Latin America. Our contingency planning was also said to be too apocalyptic, as for example, our tendency to focus on such events as the demise of some key figure. In addition, our approach is too negative. We should likewise focus on situations whose effects are good for our side. Since a great deal of our foreign policy emanates from speeches of the Secretary, there should be more pre-discussion of these speeches. The Secretary said he found the brief “intelligence notes” of INR to be very useful and suggested that these be distributed to the bureaus. The Secretary felt in the future his morning staff meetings might be used more frequently for policy discussions instead of concentration on bits and pieces of day to day information. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, (General) National Policy Papers. Secret. Drafted in the Policy Planning Council. The time of the meeting is taken from Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) No list of the participants at the meeting has been found. Before the meeting, a Policy Planning Council paper, “Foreign Affairs Contingency Planning,” December 5, 1961, which had been discussed with the Secretary in late 1961, was distributed with the suggestion that a “brief review” of the paper would “be helpful” in preparing for the meeting. (Memorandum from Stephen M. Block (S/S-O) to Carol Moor (S/S-S), March 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, (General) National Policy Papers) 9. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) 9. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 1, 1964. To prevent the National Policy Paper series from degenerating into just another bureaucratic paper mill (like all previous such efforts, most recently the “guideline” papers), we must avoid depreciation of the currency. To me, this means (a) rigidly limiting the number and type of NPPs to those which can and should engage the high policy level; (b) doing them only when we regard this device as the most effective way to push up a major policy issue (which is hardly the case with respect to France, for example); and (c) giving them your own personal loving care, which will be crucial both to getting the right kind of NPP and then getting it through. This adds up to shooting for 6–8 topnotch NPPs a year, not 16–20 of lower quality. 2 I'm perhaps unduly influenced by past experience in how the bureaucracy tends to inflate and pervert an exercise like this. First, there is the presumed need for regional symmetry (let's have a comparable number of papers from each area, so that none will be slighted). Second is the matter of keeping all the S/P types at their typewriters. Third is the inevitable agency or bureau desire to use these papers to resolve their own special problems. Fourth is the concomitant tendency for NPPs, like their predecessors, to cover the waterfront and deal with every aspect of a country policy, large or small. All of these tendencies are naturally at work in the NPP exercise. Yet if we permit them to dominate it, we will have another paper mill. Instead I envisage an NPP as a timely analysis of the type of problem area which would benefit from a searching look at major alternatives, presented in a form which would maximize the likelihood of top level attention. If so, we can use the NPP to move policy forward. Otherwise, it becomes rather pro forma regurgitation of the conventional wisdom or an exercise in futility. For example, a paper on China policy could provide an essential vehicle for review of critical options, but I doubt that the time is now. Better to start this paper in October for completion in January 1965, when the question might be ripe. Readjusting our policy toward Pakistan also seems to me the type of question on which a thoughtful analysis would pay dividends. What we should avoid, by contrast, is doing papers on issues which are not yet ripe for top level discussion (although even abortive efforts may on occasion have real educational value). Nor do I think that the “planners” can profitably tackle questions which are either largely operational or so sensitive politically that the planner's input gets lost in the melee. The reason I'm harassing you this way is my fear that the NPP exercise may run off the tracks if we're not careful. It still has to justify itself to all the skeptics. It will only do so if it avoids the errors of past such attempts. To avoid these will require a good deal of your own personal attention and, I'd argue, that of the Planning Group too. This simply can't be done if we overload the circuit. R.W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, Vol. II. Secret. 2 In a March 25 memorandum to Planning Group Members, Rostow indicated that he wanted to discuss the NPP program at a meeting on March 31 and appended a list of 11 NPPs to be completed in FY 1964 and 20 possible NPPs for FY 1965, out of which he anticipated doing 16. (Ibid., NSAMs, NSAM 281) In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, March 30, Gordon Chase reviewed NSC staff reaction to Rostow's proposed list for FY 1965, noting that both Klein and Forrestal were non-believers in NPPs. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 10. Memorandum for Record 10. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, April 20, 1964. SUBJECT Daily White House Staff Meeting, 20 April 1964 1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting. [Omitted here is material on Laos, South Africa, and the reduction in fissionable material.] 5. National Policy Papers . Today Bundy's staff had another of its periodic discussions on national policy papers, 2 this one prompted by Rostow's insistence that he will be able to get a China policy paper out which will be agreed and which will offend no one. Some people believe that if the paper can be agreed to, it will not say much, and thus hardly will be worth the effort. There are others who believe that if there is sharp disagreement over the paper, focusing on the issue of the Offshore Islands, the whole matter might become a campaign issue. The government faces a basic dilemma with respect to the policy papers. If they can be used as campaign fodder, that is not good; and everyone feels they will be leaked if they have potential political value. On the other hand, it would be equally unwise for the White House to send the word out that no one is to do any thinking for the next year. This dilemma was openly recognized at the meeting, and some discussion resulted on ways to deal with the matter. There was general agreement that it would be very useful, and indeed almost necessary, for the government to focus on policies and programs for use by the government in 1965. These papers would, of course, be useful to either the same or a new Administration. Cooper would handle this problem by setting small study groups to deal with particular problems. He was virtually the only one, however, who believed such work could be kept secret. Amory suggested that perhaps the groups like the Council of Foreign Relations could be useful. Bundy, who believed that the Council suffered essentially from the same inhibitions as the government in either getting a small group together or in keeping the discussion secret, preferred a more informal approach. He is thinking in terms of isolating some problem areas, e.g.—Cuba, East-West trade, perhaps China—for discussions among selected individuals. He wants problems that seem manageable and people that are knowledgeable. He asked the staff for any suggestions on either that they might have. Brubeck made an interesting point when he said that what often starts out as a new look at an old policy often ends up with the people who support existing policy being provided another opportunity to get a restatement. Bundy added that not only was that true, but that for most high level people in government, you could tell what door they would come out of by watching which one they went in. One other point worth mentioning came up. Forrestal and Bundy believe the Rostow paper on the consequences of a ChiCom nuclear capability 3 have defused the issue too much. They believe such a development would have far greater political consequences than does Rostow, and they are probably right since they are in a key position to influence our reaction. In the discussion today, however, the only consequence was that it seems clear the matter will be looked at again. WYS 1 Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 63–Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Taylor initialed the memorandum adjacent to the date. 2 In his report on Bundy's staff meeting on April 17, Chester Cooper stated that “there was a brief discussion of the National Policy Papers in general and the South African and Nationalist China papers in particular. Bundy and others on the Staff are just beginning to realize that the White House has a very considerable stake in the policies kicked around in this series.” (Memorandum to Cline, April 17; Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos, 1964) 3 Undated but attached to an April 17 memorandum by Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. 1) 11. Memorandum for the Record 11. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 4, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting at Department of State—4 May 1964—to Discuss National Policy Papers OFFICIALS PRESENT CIA: Mr. Helms [ name not declassified ] State: Mr. Rostow Mr. Yager Mr. Ford 2 The meeting was called at the request of Mr. Rostow to discuss National Policy Papers. Mr. Rostow suggested that the completion of a given National Policy Paper would be a good time to review the CIA ops program in that area with the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau, insofar as such program supported the National Policy Paper. Mr. Helms agreed to this since this is in accord with our present procedures. Mr. Rostow also suggested that at the time of the completion of a National Policy Paper, it would be a good opportunity for complete stock taking of our (CIA-State) position in this area. Mr. Helms agreed and said that we have been doing just that in the Clandestine Services with annual operational program reviews and believed it was a good idea. Mr. Rostow then brought up the Comprehensive Country Programming System saying he believed this would complement the National Policy Papers and was the logical means to check the application of money, assets, and manpower to carry out objectives in the National Policy Papers. 3 Mr. Helms agreed that we would cooperate but did not expect the Comprehensive Country Programming System to surface our personnel or operations. Mr. Rostow assured him that this was not the intention, and that security would be preserved. Mr. Rostow said that in the National Policy Papers there is some concern about the mention of the Agency (CIA) by name, but he saw no problem here. Yager or Ford said that James Critchfield referred to USIB Agency in the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] papers but that working groups were using a formula paragraph suggested by CIA members. Mr. Rostow saw no reason why this could not be worked out satisfactorily. Mr. Helms agreed. [ name not declassified ] said that CIA had agreed on a position which either [name not declassified] or Mr. Cooper would discuss with Mr. Ford or Mr. Yager at a later date. The position, briefly stated, is that CIA actions would be outlined only in covert annexes but not in the main paper. [ name not declassified ] [ title not declassified ] 4 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80S–00004A, National Policy Papers; Procedures, 1961–1969. Secret. Prepared by [ name not declassified ] of CIA's Directorate for Plans. 2 Joseph A. Yager, a member of the Policy Planning Council, and John W. Ford, Executive Secretary of the Council. 3 For a fuller discussion of the Comprehensive Country Programming System and its relationship to National Policy Papers, see Document 22 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates [ name not declassified ] signed the original. 12. Letter From Everett Bellows and Edward L. Sherman to Secretary of State Rusk 12. Letter From Everett Bellows and Edward L. Sherman to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 7, 1964. Dear Mr. Secretary: You have stated that in your judgment the organization of the Department involved excessive “layering,” that the position of the Office Director seemed to be unnecessary, that the position of desk officer was too low in status and rank, and therefore probably in competence; and that as the corollary of all this—if not indeed the result—reaction time in the Department is too slow and problems are not adequately anticipated and dealt with. We have talked out these matters with your regional assistant secretaries. Whatever the intrinsic merits of these organizational suggestions may be, they did not, on the whole, evoke an affirmative response. Before our first interview with you 2 we had begun to suspect that the real nature of the problem was not organizational in character and that the problem would not be solved by structural adjustments alone. After our interview with you it became quite clear to us that the premises upon which your regional assistant secretaries were operating were in some important respects different from your own. To begin with the regional assistant secretaries have assumed that they do their job best when they bother you least. Stated thus simply it would seem to be a proper assumption, but it has meant that communication between yourself and your regional assistant secretaries has been relatively poor—in both directions. Without assessing how much ferment there may be in the Department, it is nonetheless clear why much of it does not reach you and why you should be able to say that you have “no feel for the unfinished business of the Department.” Other administrative arrangements may be contributing to this relative isolation, including particularly the fact that the executive secretariat is operating on inherited instructions which we suspect serve to protect you more than to inform you. Second, the regional assistant secretaries appear to have differing views—and largely different from your own—as to the nature and extent of their authority in the totality of foreign affairs. The extent to which they are responsible for the execution of policy as well as its formulation is unclear to them and especially so when the resources or staff of other agencies are material to the action. One of the most significant by-products of this ambiguity is a tendency of subordinate staff to negotiate rather than to accept responsibility for decision and action. We are not, of course, suggesting precipitate action and no consultation; but it is axiomatic that negotiation to the lowest common denominator and the current practice of consensus through excessive clearances will erode the quality and timeliness of action. We believe that this supports your judgment that the Department works on the wrong things, broods too little, is unimaginative and slow in its responses. We believe ways can be found to improve communication between you and your regional assistant secretaries that would strengthen their relationship to you and improve their position as the line officers of the Department. In addition, if the delegation of responsibility from you to the regional assistant secretaries can be made explicit, it will help to establish their action responsibility and primacy in foreign affairs within the Department and by so doing in relation to other governmental agencies around the town. Finally we believe the value and relevance of those changes in the organization which you suggested in your testimony before the Jackson Sub-Committee 3 will then become apparent and that, as a result, the Department will evolve towards a simpler structure and will operate more effectively. To these ends, we respectfully offer these recommendations: I. Relationship and Communication 1. We believe you should consider meeting regularly and individually with each of the five regional assistant secretaries. These sessions should provide an informal but intensive review of activities, emergent problems and probable courses of action of concern to you and to that Assistant Secretary. Consequently these sessions should be long enough and often enough to provide a timely and common understanding and a sharing of points of view. 2. We believe it would be fruitful if you would direct that a re-examination be undertaken of all executive staff meetings to establish their purpose, agenda, frequency and necessary attendance. It has been suggested to us that the formal executive meetings are of unequal value and the purposes to be served are unclear. 3. We recommend that you direct that a reappraisal be undertaken of the role and procedures of the Executive Secretariat. It appears to us that the Executive Secretariat is operating on inherited procedures which do not reflect your needs and which may not be expediting the work of the Department. We believe also that you will not get the optimum service and value from the Executive Secretariat unless the Executive Secretary is in a confidential relationship to you. II. The Role of the Regional Assistant Secretaries 1. The regional assistant secretaries need to be told explicitly that you expect them to take the initiative in carrying out the responsibility that the President has placed upon you and the Department for “the framing and execution of the foreign policy of this country;” that you are looking to each of them to act on this premise and that you will support them when they do so. 2. To make clear that the regional assistant secretaries are the line officers of the Government for foreign affairs, we believe you should clearly establish their role as the line officers of the Department. Once your position on this matter is established with clarity and emphasis, steps could be taken to realign the specific functional authorities and organizational units of the Department so as to promote this concept and we recommend that studies to this end be undertaken at your direction. 3. It would be most helpful if you could direct that a study be made of alternative ways of stabilizing the assignment of authority of those senior officers between you and your regional assistant secretaries so that corrective actions could be taken when the proper opportunities arise. At the present time the delegation of responsibility from you to the regional assistant secretaries is impaired by the changing and informal assignments of authority to senior officers on the Seventh Floor. III. The Secretary's View of Management Within the Department If steps are taken to improve communication and the personal exchange of ideas between yourself and your principal subordinates, and if the line responsibility of the Regional Bureaus is firmly established, the specific views which you hold with regard to the way the Department should manage its affairs will be more widely understood and followed. To achieve this you should at the proper time make clear that: 1. You will accept an answer of “I don't know” occasionally if it is then followed by responsive action. 2. Clearances should be restricted and that you expect the action officer to proceed after a reasonable effort to obtain the proper clearances. 3. Knowledgeable and concerned officers should be present at top-level meetings irrespective of their rank or position in the hierarchy. Respectfully yours, Everett H. Bellows Edward L. Sherman 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Administrative. No classification marking. Bellows was Vice President of Olin Mathieson Corporation and a part-time consultant to the Department of State. Sherman was a member of the White House staff during 1964, first as Executive Assistant to Ralph Dungan and then as Assistant to John W. Macy. In an April 23 memorandum to Rusk, Crockett stated that his office had undertaken a study, under Bellows' direction, of the role and level of regional bureau desk officers. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, Box 32, Secretary-1964-Mr. Crockett's Book Copies) In a March 9 memorandum to Crockett, Management Planning Staff Chief Richard Barrett reported that he had discussed Olin Mathieson's “Management by Objectives Philosophy” with Bellows and that he was convinced it would work in the Department. (Ibid., MS 74–45, Name File 1965 'B,' BA to BK #2) 2 Rusk met in his office with Bellows and Sherman at 3:05 p.m. on June 17, 1964. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) 3 Rusk testified before Senator Henry Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Committee on Government Operations, on December 11, 1963. An abridged version of his testimony was published in Senator Henry Jackson, ed., The Secretary of State and the Ambassador: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on the Conduct of American Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pages 110–129. The full version appeared in Administration of National Security: Staff Reports and Hearings Submitted to the Committee on Government Operations by Its Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Eighty-Eighth Congress, United States Senate (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 386–412. 13. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 13. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 9, 1964. It seems to me that the opportune moment has now arrived for serious consideration on a number of management issues. I think we have a rare opportunity to put forth to the President some concrete proposals which should greatly enhance the effectiveness of the foreign policy operations of the Executive Branch. Just this past week, a couple of major issues have arisen which once again highlight the difficulties encountered by the Department in trying to force conformance by other agencies to its policy guidance. These issues concern the staffing of certain overseas posts. The Assistant Secretaries responsible for the areas involved were frustrated by their inability to move other agencies in the direction of reducing or eliminating their representations. This, as you well know, is an old story, but I believe should not be left unsettled for too much longer. In an effort to improve the effectiveness of our policy operational guidance I have a number of proposals that I would like to bring to your attention. If they appear to have merit, they all need to be completely staffed out. 1. State Department Organization I would like to have your approval to proceed on the studying of several specific recommendations intended to achieve the following objectives: a. Provide Secretary sufficient time and staff resources to enable him to perform primary function of leadership and policy direction to all foreign affairs activities. b. Provide Under Secretary sufficient time and staff resources to enable him to be “alter ego” to Secretary and to perform role as “operating head” of Department. c. Reduce to minimum number of officers reporting directly to Secretary and Under Secretary. d. Transfer to maximum extent operational responsibilities from staff officer to operating bureaus. e. Restructure regional bureaus in order to reorganize work-load of regional bureaus to reflect recent foreign policy developments and insure adequate direction. f. Reorganize and strengthen S/S to provide better information flow. g. Improve consular operations by abolishing SCA. At your convenience, I am ready to discuss some of the specific recommendations I have in mind. 2. Increase Delegation to the Assistant Secretaries and Ambassadors a. I would like to develop a Presidential message which would in essence give the Assistant Secretaries greater jurisdiction and control over the programs of other agencies. We find ourselves in the intolerable position of having provided Ambassadors with certain authorities which they can theoretically apply at the post level, but for which they cannot get equal support from the Assistant Secretary responsible for that area. b. I would like to attempt a rewrite of President Kennedy's letter to all Ambassadors of May 19 [29], 1961. 2 I believe in the first place it is essential for President Johnson to put his own stamp of approval of the way his personal representatives in the field can and should operate. Secondly, with the passage of over three years, we have learned through bitter experience that the 1961 letter is deficient in certain respects. For example, through some of the Comprehensive Country Programming Systems that we have installed, we have found that field representatives of other agencies have certain rights and prerogatives that have not been delegated to the Ambassador. Furthermore, in certain instances the Ambassador's views on certain issues are considered by other agencies only by sufferance, rather than as a requirement. We have also found that despite our best efforts, inequities still exist in the regulations governing the privileges and prerogatives of personnel of various agencies. We must if we can, enable an Ambassador to set a standard for all government employees at a post so that the odious comparisons that have been our albatrosses in the past can be eliminated. 3. State-AID Relationships Although this area is part of some of the ideas discussed above, it might be useful to view it as a unique and separate matter. Some discussions have already been held concerning the desirability of requesting Congress for permanent authority for the AID program. One of the possible avenues for such action would be to incorporate in the organic act authority for development programs. We should also keep in mind the possibilities of Chairman Rooney being assigned responsibility for Congressional review of the AID 1966 appropriations request. Should this come about it would mean that Mr. Rooney and his subcommittee would be reviewing appropriations requests for the Department, USIA, and AID. It is logical to assume, I think, that in making such a review the subcommittee will be interested in analyzing the activities taken by one agency in comparison with similar activities taken by the two other agencies. I know, for example, that Congressman Bow has always been critical of what he considers to be the duplicatory and overlapping administrative organizations of State and AID. In reviewing the State-AID relationships there are a number of specific issues that should be scrutinized. a. The integration of some AID functional offices with their State counterparts—starting perhaps with the areas of Public Affairs and Congressional Relations. b. The desirability of further back-to-back or integrated desk operations. c. The desirability of appointing more Ambassadors as AID Mission Directors. d. The role of an Under Secretary (or Deputy Under Secretary) for Economic Affairs, if such a position should be established. e. The desirability of delegating to the other Assistant Secretaries, authority similar to the one now possible to Mr. Mann. Before I depart, I would appreciate an opportunity to discuss these thoughts with you. I have a loose-leaf folder 3 which incorporates all the ideas on organizational changes that have been proposed in the last few months. I would like to leave this with you so that I could discuss some of the ideas with you when I return. 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, Box 32, untitled folder. Confidential. Under a covering memorandum to Rusk, November 9, Crockett stated that his memorandum was essentially the same as a November 6 draft given to Ball, which was attached. 2 For text of the May 29 letter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1345–1347. See Document 19 for a summary. 3 Presumably the six papers included in a report, “Aspects of Organization and Management of Foreign Affairs,” November 9, 1964. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, Box 31) 14. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 14. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 1, 1964. SUBJECT Statement Requested at Cabinet Meeting November 19, 1964 Your request, at the Cabinet Meeting of November 19, for new proposals and tough-minded reforms provides a particularly appropriate starting point for a brief outline of some of the more significant ideas we have been developing. Certain of them may be cited as accomplishments on which we shall build as a continuing operational matter. Others are of a magnitude which requires phasing over a relatively long period. The latter, for the most part, are of a type which should be peaked in 1965 at the start of a new cycle of accomplishment. At the outset I would emphasize again that the State Department (excluding AID and the Peace Corps) does not carry out large scale operating programs such as are found in most departments. The conduct of foreign affairs is improved as institutional arrangements are made more effective, as manpower is better deployed and utilized, and as the information basic to decision-making is more complete, accurate and immediately available. Given the unique nature of the Department's responsibilities, I am satisfied that we have pursued, during the past four years, a comprehensive, hard-hitting and consistent attack on inefficient, out-dated and marginal operations. This has included increasing productivity in passport and consular activities, closing marginal posts, automating routine processes, trimming publications and reports requirements, and the like. We estimate that improvements of this kind have made it possible to reprogram some $4.5 million. Efforts to interest other countries in sharing the cost of cultural exchange activities have been similarly successful. Agreements have been negotiated with five countries and are now pending with three others. Throughout this period I have personally maintained a policy of avoiding substantial increases in personnel. Indeed, despite the increased number of independent countries with which we now maintain diplomatic relations, and the growing complexity of foreign affairs, the Department's employment has remained stable. Against this background of solid progress and with necessary support and resources, we can be confident of solving the larger management problems that still require action. High on this list is further modernization of our world-wide telegraphic and voice communications facilities. We also have much to do to strengthen and tighten security protective measures domestically and overseas. With respect to our public services, the Department is drafting legislation to extend the period of validity of passports. This will save manpower, and, perhaps more importantly, make things simpler and more convenient for the taxpayer. In cooperation with the other foreign affairs agencies and the Bureau of the Budget we have begun a comprehensive study of the information needs, current handling processes, and filing and referral methods in State, AID, USIA, and ACDA. The study constitutes the initial effort in the design and development of a modern system for managing the flow, dissemination, storage and retrieval of information essential to sound and timely decision-making. At a number of posts in Africa we have combined administrative organizations which serve State, AID, USIA and other post elements. This program of consolidation is being expanded to other regions, with special focus in the coming year on Latin America. We have invited Defense to participate in planning for a single administrative organization at each post to include full support to military service missions and attachés. State, Defense and the Budget Bureau have joined in a study of the role of Defense representation at our embassies. We should now move aggressively to examine the larger question of total United States representation overseas, including the specialized missions, services and representatives of other agencies of Government. I view this as a most difficult task, but one which is too important to be ignored. This leaves one final matter I should like to bring to your attention at this time—the need for completing the development of a strong, simplified foreign affairs structure. In 1961 when AID, the Peace Corps and ACDA were created, there was clear affirmation that the Secretary of State has positive leadership responsibility for foreign affairs operations. Your own decisions with respect to policy and program leadership of activities affecting Latin America have had a profound influence on foreign affairs management. These two basic organizational developments have most certainly strengthened the conduct of foreign affairs. However, there continues to be more committee and liaison arrangements, more meetings, more collateral clearances, and more parallel operations than are acceptable in a world where timely, well-considered action on matters of foreign policy has become a vital necessity. I will have specific recommendations to further strengthen and unify the organization for your consideration shortly. Reports on the AID and Peace Corps programs are being submitted separately. 2 Dean Rusk 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, Vol. 5. No classification marking. 2 Not further identified. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 15. Editorial Note 15. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation on December 10, 1964, Under Secretary of State George Ball and McGeorge Bundy discussed a number of appointments under consideration by Secretary of State Rusk. Bundy indicated that the President was “in favor of finding fresh faces for Embassies” and wanted “to get some people who are his own-to have the same fresh look as happened four years ago.” (Memorandum of Conversation; Johnson Library, Ball Papers, People & Positions III) In a December 13 memorandum to the President, Rusk recommended candidates for five positions that, “apart from finding an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, [were] the most urgent personnel problems in the State Department”: Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Ambassadors to Indonesia, Spain, and the Netherlands, and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Rusk particularly emphasized the importance of filling the third-ranking post in the State Department with an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs rather than an Under Secretary for Political Affairs, noting that, among other things, it “would make it possible for George Ball to free himself from a great deal of inter-departmental economic business so that he could spend all of his time as my alter ego on the whole breadth of State Department problems.” Rusk recommended John Leddy for the post. (Ibid., National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 5) Ball and Rusk met with the President from 1:05 to 2:25 p.m. on December 20 to discuss the appointments, but no record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) 16. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 16. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 31, 1964. SUBJECT How the State Department Operates When George Ball and I were talking with you the other day, 2 you asked for a memorandum explaining how the State Department operates. With some over-simplification, the major elements of the Department's operations can be described as follows: Special Characteristics of Department 1. The most striking aspect of the Department is that it deals almost entirely with policy and negotiations. Except for its consular activities (passports and visas) and its cultural exchange program, it has no significant operating functions. AID, USIA, the Peace Corps, and the Disarmament Agency are separate entities, but receive policy direction from the President through the Secretary of State. 2. The State Department does not run armies or administer large spending programs. Its main responsibility is to recommend and administer foreign policy as the arm of the President. It does this by daily contacts with foreign governments through 293 posts abroad (111 embassies, 66 consulates general, 86 consulates, 17 consular agencies, 6 missions, 5 special offices, and 2 legations) and about 75 international organizations, and by constant discussions between 115 foreign embassies and legations and the Department in Washington. 3. Because the Department has no significant operating functions, it has one of the smallest budgets of any of the statutory departments. Because the Department is primarily concerned with policy, it has far more “field grade” officers than privates. 4. In spite of the vast growth of its responsibilities, the Department has kept a tight check on expansion. Although the United States maintains relations with 50% more countries than in 1952, and maintains a commensurate number of additional posts around the world, the State Department has approximately the same number of employees it had twelve years ago (15–16,000). 5. Most of the problems that concern the Department never reach the attention of the public. Those that do get into the newspapers are, for the most part, situations where the governments concerned have failed to prevent a controversy. The great bulk of the Department's business does not come to public attention. For example, in 1963, US Government representatives attended 548 inter-governmental meetings on a great variety of subjects; of these only 105 were ever named by The New York Times . Structure of Department I. The Secretary and Under Secretary George Ball and I operate on the basis that the Under Secretary is my alter ego. We organize our schedule so that one of us is present in Washington at all times. (During the past three years, there have been only a very few days when this has not been the case.) We each deal directly with the Assistant Secretaries. II. The Regional Assistant Secretaries 1. The heart of the Department consists of five regional bureaus, each headed by an Assistant Secretary of State: Bureau of African Affairs (Mennen Williams) Bureau of European Affairs (William Tyler) Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (William Bundy) Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Phillips Talbot) Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Thomas Mann) 2. In theory, each regional Assistant Secretary is a Secretary of State for his area. Subject to my broad direction, he gives the necessary guidance and makes the decisions that do not require the personal attention of the Secretary or of the President. The strength and effectiveness of the State Department depends very largely upon the competence and skill of the five regional Assistant Secretaries. 3. Other bureaus of the Department play essential but more specialized roles. United Nations problems are, for example, handled by the Bureau of International Organizations, headed by Harlan Cleveland. Foreign economic policy is directed on a day-to-day basis by the Bureau of the Economic Affairs, headed by Griffith Johnson. The Bureau of Congressional Relations is obviously basic to the success of the Department, and the same thing can be said of the Bureau of Public Affairs, now headed by James Greenfield. III. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs 1. The third officer in the Department—the second Under Secretary—may, under the law, be designated either as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs or Under Secretary for Political Affairs. 2. This post was originally created to make a place for Will Clayton as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. After the lapse of a few years, it was subsequently reestablished to provide a place for Douglas Dillon in the same capacity. 3. There are, I think, strong reasons for restoring this post to its economic origins. 4. The Department of State must of necessity provide central direction for economic policy. Not only are our foreign economic and political policies intertwined, but each of the other interested Departments (Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor) represents only a special sector of the economy. 5. During the eleven months that George Ball was Under Secretary for Economic Affairs in 1961, we were able to initiate a number of major economic programs—the Trade Expansion Act; the International Cotton Textile Agreement; the approval of the legislation creating the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the expansion of the functions of the Development Assistance Committee to provide an effective instrument for coordinating national programs of foreign aid. There has been no Under Secretary for Economic Affairs during the last three years however, and, as a result, the Department has not shown the same leadership in foreign economic policy. 6. There are other reasons also why I propose to change this post. As the Department is now constituted, the existence of an Under Secretary for Political Affairs tends to cloud the lines of authority. It is not practicable to interpose an additional officer between the Assistant Secretaries and the Secretary and the Under Secretary, and, as a consequence, the man occupying the third post (the Under Secretary for Political Affairs) has tended to concentrate on special problems. Mr. Harriman, for example, has assumed a particular responsibility for the problems of Africa, and to a lesser extent, the Far East. 3 IV. The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Contrary to a widespread misconception, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (the post held by Alexis Johnson and now temporarily by Ambassador Thompson) has no major line responsibilities. He performs the highly important task of relating foreign policy to our military and security operations around the world. He works in constant collaboration with the Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies. V. The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration 1. Mr. Crockett, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, is the man who, in one sense of the word “runs the Department.” He has charge of administration and all operating functions. He has prime responsibility, for example, for the offices issuing passports and visas and for the administration of security. He also has over-all supervision of personnel matters. The Department is peculiar in that it not only has Civil Service employees, but also a Foreign Service that administers itself with some measure of autonomy-subject, of course, to my overriding authority. 2. As the senior officer in charge of administration, Mr. Crockett has primary responsibility for personnel matters. In this capacity, he exercises considerable discretion in the assignment of officers to posts overseas and makes recommendations with regard to the filling of ambassadorial assignments. Handling the Department's Business 1. The Department conducts most of its business with foreign governments through its posts abroad, but the key decisions concerning this business are made in Washington. Only in Washington is it possible to develop our policy toward a particular country in light of all the factors that may bear upon it. 2. The Secretary and Under Secretaries direct and control the Department in a variety of ways: a. The Secretary holds a staff meeting every morning. Each bureau chief reports on the problems of principal current interest and receives the advice of the Secretary and other principal officers. b. The Secretary and Under Secretary meet throughout the day with the Assistant Secretaries and their staffs on specific problems of special current importance. c. The Under Secretary meets each day with one of the regional Assistant Secretaries for a full review of the work of his bureau. 3. A significant portion of the Department's affairs is handled through telegrams to and from the field. The Department now sends on the average 1,000 telegrams a day, and receives 1,300. In addition, there is a regular flow of letters, airgrams, despatches, etc. Of the telegrams sent by the Department, the vast majority are cleared at the bureau level. Only a small proportion require clearance by the Secretary or Under Secretaries. 4. The most important telegrams sent by the Department pass through the Secretariat, which is the nerve center of the Department. 5. Telegrams may reach the Secretary or Under Secretary for clearance for any one of several reasons: a. The relevant Assistant Secretary may decide that a particular matter is of sufficient importance to be brought to the attention of the Secretary or Under Secretary who may, in turn, wish to obtain the decision of the President; b. The problem may concern several bureaus that have different views as to the policy to be followed; c. The Secretary or Under Secretary is actively following a particular matter and has indicated a desire to see outgoing messages; or d. The head of the Secretariat, Ben Read, decides that, for any one of a number of reasons, a particular message should be cleared at the top level. Proposed Reorganization of the Department 1. With the beginning of your new Administration, I propose to adjust the structure of the Department to make it more responsive to present-day problems. 2. I plan to divide the present Bureau of European Affairs into two parts: (a) a Bureau of Western European and Atlantic Affairs; and (b) a Bureau of Eastern European and North Asian Affairs. 4 a. The Bureau of Western European and Atlantic Affairs would include: Austria Belgium Canada Cyprus* Denmark Finland France Greece* Iceland Italy Luxembourg The Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey* United Kingdom West Germany * Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey are now part of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, but, in my view, properly belong in a new Bureau of Western European and Atlantic Affairs. Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and each has recently been negotiating an associate membership in the European Common Market. Neither of these states is Arabic-speaking and each has a strong desire to be treated as part of Western Europe. b. The Bureau of Eastern European and North Asian Affairs would include: Albania Bulgaria Communist China* Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Rumania USSR Yugoslavia * Under present arrangements, Red China is being handled by an Office in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. This means that there is no single focus in the Department on the problems of the Communist world. In view of the tensions between Russia and China, there are real advantages in charging one bureau with attention to this central issue. The split countries—Korea and Viet-Nam—would, however, remain in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. 3. I also plan to transfer the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) together with Libya, from the Bureau of African Affairs to the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. These four countries are almost as much a part of the Arab world as the United Arab Republic. They should be treated as such. 4. Finally, I propose to eliminate the Bureau of Administration and the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. These Bureaus are presently under the general supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. After these changes, direct responsibility for the functions of both Bureaus will be carried out by him. 5 5. None of these changes will require the addition of personnel. While one new regional Assistant Secretary will be added, I propose to make this slot available by eliminating the position of Assistant Secretary for Administration. With the exception of legislation to eliminate the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and the position of its Administrator, no new legislation will be needed to carry out any of these changes. Dean Rusk 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Under Secretary Ball-1964. Confidential. Drafted by Ball. 2 December 20; see Document 15 . 3 On March 11, 1965, the President appointed Under Secretary for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman to the position of Ambassador at Large and appointed Thomas Mann to the position of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. 4 The changes proposed in points 2 and 3 were not implemented. 5 See Document 29 regarding implementation of this proposal. 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 21, 1965. SUBJECT The Organization of the Department of State 1. This memorandum is in response to your request for a paper on this subject. I have written with complete frankness, and perhaps with a certain presumption. On the other hand, I have probably watched the Department as closely as anyone outside it for the last four years, and I have been so careful to avoid comment to others that the temptation in reporting to you is irresistible. 2. The Department of State probably has more talented men incompletely used than any other department of government. There are all sorts of reasons for this weakness—the cautious and slow-moving personnel policy of the Foreign Service, the premium which is placed on safety and the avoidance of error, the mindless proliferation of committees and clearance processes, the inhibitions imposed by Congressional Committees which have not been properly cultivated, the inescapable difficulties of tension with other competitive departments, the tendency of all the rest of us to blame the State Department for the misbehavior of 120 other countries, and the Department's own dangerous tendency to see other nations, not the USA, as its preferred clients. 3. Yet with all these disadvantages, the fact remains that there is a great opportunity for effective management within the department which has been lost by default in the last four years. This is the product of the interlocking character of Dean Rusk and George Ball. 4. No man can have all the qualities of an ideal Secretary of State. Dean Rusk has more than his share. He has complete integrity and loyalty. He has discretion and experience. He is a master of exposition, both with diplomats and with Capitol Hill. He has the personal confidence of Committees of Congress and of representatives of foreign governments to a degree not matched since George Marshall, the man he most admires. 5. But he is not a manager. He has never been a good judge of men. His instincts are cautious and negative, and he has only a limited ability to draw the best out of those who work with him. His very discretion seems like secretiveness in his dealings with subordinates; it is a constant complaint in the bureaus that even quite high officials cannot find out what the Secretary himself thinks and wants. This same concern gives great trouble to administrators like Bob McNamara and to Ambassadors like David Bruce. 6. Moreover, the Secretary has little sense of effective operation. He does not move matters toward decision with promptness. He does not stimulate aggressive staff work. He does not coordinate conflicting forces within his own department. The most notable example may be the course of the Department's policy on the MLF. He has never approved of it but he has never taken control of it. 7. George Ball does not complement Dean Rusk's weaknesses, although he has outstanding qualities of his own. He is a brilliant lawyer, a lucid and persuasive draftsman, and a formidable debater. He has a sharp, if erratic, eye for talent. He serves the President and the Secretary with zeal. He is a man of honor. But like many lawyers, he is a lone wolf and does not use the departmental staff effectively. He spends an excessive amount of time with the press. His judgment is jumpy. He is self-confident to the point of breeziness, and he constantly reaches for more administrative authority than he knows how to use. Unable himself to administer the department, he has consistently made it impossible for anyone else to do so. 8. The third-ranking member of the department, Averell Harriman, is probably the one man of the first magnitude on the 7th Floor. On world affairs he has courage, insight and force (though in domestic politics he is often foolish). He is fanatically loyal to the Presidency, and would wish nothing more than to be President Johnson's most effective diplomatic instrument. Moreover, he has an outstanding record for picking colleagues. But he is 73. He was never very flexible and now he is becoming both rigid and unpredictable. Moreover, he no longer has the strength to discharge continuous operational responsibilities. And unfortunately he and Dean Rusk are quite unable to communicate with each other. 9. The rest of the Presidential appointees of the Department of State are a varied group. A new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs is essential. A new man for Europe is also needed. New leadership is wanted in international economic affairs. The Department still has not found the right Congressional Liaison officer. The Department needs a replacement for Abe Chayes as top lawyer. Most of all, the Department needs an “old pro” to fill the job Alex Johnson had as Deputy Under Secretary; Tommy Thompson hates it, does it very indifferently, and ought to go back to his real job as the best Kremlin-watcher there is. 10. On the other hand, the South American, Middle Eastern and Far Eastern Bureaus are led in different ways with competence and clarity. The Policy Planning Staff under Walt Rostow and Henry Owen needs more guidance from above but has the talent to become a major engine of initiative and imagination. The Cultural Affairs department under McPherson has too much luck to last. Public Affairs is well handled by Greenfield. Bill Crockett needs guidance and leadership but is good at his daily grind and very good with Rooney. Harlan Cleveland is the best UN staff officer since Dean Rusk. Tom Hughes is the best Intelligence Director ever. Part Two: Possible Solutions 11. You have made it clear to everyone that you wish to keep Dean Rusk. There are excellent reasons for this, at least in the short run. Moreover, if you were to choose a successor it would be important to recognize that administrative energy and effectiveness might not be the first things you would look for. On any possible successor you would be insisting on many of the qualities which Rusk has and which are rare. 12. Nevertheless it is essential to recognize that as long as you have Dean Rusk it will be very difficult for you to organize the Department of State around or under him. It cannot be done at all—and should not even be tried—except through men in whom he himself has real and justified confidence. 13. I make this very strong point because of the history of confusion and failure in the Department of State when a President has tried to move around his Secretary to the No. 2 man. Hoover sometimes went past Stimson to Castle. Roosevelt often went past Hull to Welles. In the Kennedy Administration there was trouble when Bowles tried to have policies of his own. 14. Even though your own intention is never to do business that way, it is of the utmost importance that any arrangement that is made to tackle the management problem in the State Department be one about which the Secretary himself is genuinely content. This will not be easy. What makes it hard is that any solution will involve a deep disappointment to the understandable ambitions of George Ball. The Secretary has a proper and real affection for George, and I fear that he will find it very hard indeed to believe that it is right and necessary to make arrangements that will hurt George. 15. Yet the absolutely essential requirement if any change is to work is that the Secretary should choose a man who shall be responsible directly to him—and specifically not to George—for the political and administrative management of the Department under his direction (in military terms, a Chief of Staff). Such an arrangement is conceivable through the use of the third-ranking job in the Department, but only if George Ball were specifically confined to the economic side, and if the arrangement were spelled out in writing and published to the Department. Otherwise the necessary authority simply could not be concentrated and used. 16. I do not know whether George Ball would consent to stay in such an arrangement, and I am honestly uncertain whether in fact it would be best from your point of view for him to go or to stay. From the immediate point of view of any man who might be asked to do this job, it would certainly be preferable to accept the immediate pain of his departure in the interest of long-run effectiveness. If that were done, then the new man should be given George's job, and still another man should be found to be Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. 17. Even aside from the problem of George Ball, I do not know whether there is a man whom you and Dean Rusk can agree on and to whom you can persuasively offer the confidence and the authority that a man would have to have for this assignment. The sooner you can find him the better. Every decision that is made before he is found will be a decision which would be better for the long-run effectiveness of the Department if he had sat in on it. Moreover, until you get this man, I think you will continue to find that the personnel recommendations of the Department of State are slow and uncertain and spotty. You and the Secretary need to begin the reconstruction of the Department as soon, and as near the top, as possible. Part Three: What Change Might Accomplish 18. What specific reforms are possible in the Department of State under stronger leadership? 19. First, we must recognize that the great international problems do not yield to departmental management. What the Department can do is to analyze the problems, develop alternative courses, offer choices, signal opportunities, and execute decisions. The President and the Secretary must make the decisions. Management cannot transmit to the troops decisions it does not receive—it cannot and it must not try to usurp the responsibilities which the Constitution and people have placed elsewhere. Thus, in Vietnam the basic policy must be the President's. 20. Within this limitation, many important improvements should be workable with proper preparation in the Department and around the Government and on the Hill—and with the President's support. (1) Most important of all, the Department can be given a sense of direction and self-confidence and pride and energy—all the things which leadership and direction and zest can communicate. (2) As a fundamental part of this effort, the personnel policies of the Department of State can be gradually shifted in two directions: toward more rapid promotion of outstanding men, and toward a substantial and continuing reduction in the size of the enterprise. If the Department of State could be cut in half, and if half of the money saved were used for deserved salary increases, there would be a real diplomatic revolution of quality and energy in that agency. Nothing like that can be done overnight, but work can begin. (3) The Department can be imbued with a sense that it is responsible to the President for the advancement of the national interest broadly construed. At present its influence is low in many quarters because it does not dare to think in terms of the effective coordination and harmonization of all the interests and concerns of the President's government. It too often defends only the immediate diplomatic interest—very often that of a complaining foreigner. It should have a larger view of its role. I am confident that in general the other great departments will welcome such a generous and broad assertion of the State Department's role, because such an assertion would enlarge their own effectiveness and their own work. One of the great qualities of Alexis Johnson was his understanding of this general proposition—and no Foreign Service officer is more admired in Defense and CIA. It needs support from higher up. (4) The Department can and should expand the good missionary work which Dean Rusk has done for himself as an individual on Capitol Hill. The Congress prefers strength to weakness as long as it is combined with courtesy and good faith. Much of the Department has been a frightened punching-bag since Joe McCarthy's time. There is no need for Dean Acheson's arrogance, but there is great need for intense and self-respecting attention to changing the Department's posture on the Hill. (5) A good Department of State can and should assume more responsibility than it has had in recent years for giving timely information to the President. President Kennedy wanted all this work done right under his own control, and my own office has tried to meet that interest. Moreover, in a measure the President's own staff can be expected to have a more intimate sense of his immediate interests than the Department of State. But there is really no reason why the State Department cannot do as well in keeping in touch with the President himself as Bob McNamara does with most of his important Pentagon problems. If my office is a bottleneck or a constraint on such activity, its own habits ought to be revised. (6) Finally, the Department can and should do a very much better and stronger job of explaining American policy to the Government, to the world, and to the American people. The Secretary needs both staff support and policy urging on this point. He should be pressed by both his President and his Department to a more vigorous role. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Confidential. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 18. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 18. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1 Washington, January 25, 1965. PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Mann The President called Mr. Mann and said that Bob Anderson had mentioned Covey Oliver as a possibility for a successor. 2 Mr. Mann said that he was one of his very best friends, but that he thought he had been away from Latin America so long that he has a lot to learn about it. Mr. Mann said that we had a couple of good people up here and mentioned Mr. Solomon and said he was awfully good in economics but a little weak on politics. Mr. Mann said he thought one possibility might be to promote him and have Mr. Mann sort of look over his shoulder for a while to guide him. He said another possibility would be to bring Ambassador Gordon back from Brazil, but Mr. Mann felt that it is almost as important to keep him there as this job here is. He said another possibility would be for us to go outside and get somebody like Eddie Miller, 3 if he is in good physical shape right now. Mr. Mann said he did not think that Covey Oliver could fill the bill. The President said another thought was that Mr. Bundy 4 could move over to his job and Mr. Mann could take Bundy's. Mr. Mann said he thought this would be a disappointment to Mr. Bundy. He says he thinks Bundy is higher up the ladder over there. Mr. Mann said he thought we could find somebody here for the President, especially if Mr. Mann could sort of look out after him for three or four months. He said he thought we had a very good staff now. The President asked Mr. Mann about ADELA and Mr. Mann explained what this was and said that Senator Javits and Pete Collado of Standard Oil had worked hard on this. Mr. Mann said that Pete Collado was a very able fellow too but the trouble is that he is identified with Standard Oil. Mr. Mann also mentioned Mr. Spaeth. He asked the President to give him an hour or two. The President said he would give him all day. The President asked Mr. Mann if he had any idea who could be put in Alex Johnson's spot. Mr. Mann said he was thinking that if the President wanted to move him, he could move him into that spot rather than Harriman's. The President asked which spot was the biggest and Mr. Mann said the Harriman job is the biggest. Mr. Mann said that it would have to be worked out with the Secretary and Ball exactly what they would want Mr. Mann to do. The President asked Mr. Mann what needed to be done to have a perfect Department and Mr. Mann said that he would be most useful in either the Johnson or Harriman job if he could get away from day to day things and spend a couple of months boning up on what is going on and trying to look at trends and policies and maybe talking with the Assistant Secretaries to get their views—not getting involved in the day to day operations. Mr. Mann said that he really believed that the reorganization or strengthening is not needed upstairs but rather at the Assistant Secretaries level. He explained that the Secretary does not have time to keep up with his Assistant Secretaries and their views and problems. Mr. Mann said he was convinced that the answer is finding people capable for the Assistant Secretaries and letting them run their Continents and only go to Secretary on necessary matters. The President asked if this was not what the Secretary was doing, and Mr. Mann said yes but that he thought this might be improved. The President asked Mr. Mann what the Johnson job is and Mr. Mann said in the past it has been the principal point of contact with Defense and CIA and essentially he assists the Secretary for those two Departments. He said the Harriman job has varied very much with personalities and that Harriman is sort of an advisor. Mr. Mann said he thought this was something that the President should talk to the Secretary about, how this job can be most helpful. The President said he had a high regard for the Secretary and wanted to save him. Mr. Mann said he agreed completely with this. Mr. Mann told the President that he thought he would have to find out how the Secretary and Ball feel about the number three slot and how they felt the person could be the most help. Mr. Mann told the President about his belief that we must put a price tag on actions backed by foreign governments that lower the prestige of our country. Mr. Mann told the President that he felt that a big problem might be lack of communication over here and suggested that it would be extremely useful if the President could sit down with the Assistant Secretaries and tell them his ideas and views. The President asked Mr. Mann what we were going to have Harriman do and said he wanted to be an Ambassador At Large. Mr. Mann said he had a high regard for Harriman and although he is garrulous and vain, he understands the Commies and he understands power and the importance of power. He said if the President could use him as a fellow to look around the world and come up with ideas he thought this would be useful. Mr. Mann said he would try to find something for Harriman if he were President, because Harriman could cause a lot of trouble on the outside. He said that was really the reason that he thought maybe he, Mr. Mann, could move into Johnson's job rather than Harriman but that in that case Johnson's job would have to be redefined. The President said he would give thought to it and in the meantime would start a check on Eddie Miller. He asked Mr. Mann for Miller's law firm and Mr. Mann said we would have to call the information over. The President asked that he give it to Mr. Valenti who is at the hospital. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. Eyes Only. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 2 Mann's successor as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. 3 Edward G. Miller. Jr., was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs June 1949–December 1952. 4 McGeorge Bundy. 19. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the President's Special Assistant (Busby) 19. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the President's Special Assistant (Busby) 1 Washington, January 25, 1965. This is in response to your request 2 for background on the role of the Ambassador in general and President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961, to all Chiefs of Mission in particular. 3 Presidential concern over the role of the Ambassador as a Chief of Mission began at least as early as the latter days of the Roosevelt Administration and has continued through each succeeding administration. The basis for this concern has been the President's need for direction and coordination of the variety of overseas programs and activities that emerged during the post-war years both as necessary ingredients of twentieth century diplomacy and also as logical and legitimate extensions of missions that prior to the war could and were for the most part carried out by domestic agencies without the need of permanently assigning personnel abroad. The body of doctrine resulting from Presidential concern with the role of the Ambassador in this regard is voluminous and has sometimes been contradictory and frequently ambiguous. One central trend, increasingly apparent in the last few years, is the need for strong executives with clear authority to oversee U.S. establishments abroad. This management need to assure effective and efficient conduct of all U.S. activities abroad is sometimes confused with the traditional diplomatic concept of the Ambassador as the personal representative of the President. This concept has diminished in practical significance in various parts of the world. In contrast, the Ambassador as a strong executive, with backing from Washington, has grown in importance. The letter issued by President Kennedy is the latest and probably clearest and strongest affirmation of this doctrine of Ambassadorial executive authority. Its effect was to elevate the Ambassador from chairman of the “Country Team” (a term never adequately defined and of dubious managerial usefulness) to the man in charge of enunciating the following precepts: 1. As a matter of personal authority and responsibility, with full support of the President when needed, the Ambassador as personal representative of the President is in charge of the entire U.S. diplomatic mission and is expected to supervise all its activities. 2. Agencies outside the State Department have the right to communicate directly with and appeal to their Washington offices but have the obligation to keep the Ambassador fully informed of their activities and to abide by his decisions until both he and they are advised to the contrary. 3. The Ambassador has virtually total disciplinary authority over individuals in the diplomatic mission, including the right to order the departure of any member. 4. The Ambassador's channel of communication to the President is through the Department of State (a fact which, by interpretation, gives the Department the responsibility of backing the exercise of the Ambassador's authority over representatives of other agencies and of acting for the President when he so wishes). Underpinning these precepts of Ambassadorial authority is the definition of the diplomatic mission to include all official U.S. personnel within the host country except for military forces under the command of a U.S. area military commander. Even in this case, the letter directs the Ambassador to assure exchange of information and, when necessary, to request a decision by higher authority when he believes military activities have an adverse effect on our foreign relations. The Kennedy letter, by implication, placed a special responsibility in the Department of State, for the authority of the Ambassador will have limited effect in its practical exercise unless it is generally understood by all concerned that when issues arise which require resolution in Washington, the Ambassador can look to a source of backing and support. Except on those issues on which the President chooses to act, that source is logically the Secretary and the Department of State, provided that the President wishes the Department to carry out this particular role. In addition to this responsibility, related foreign affairs planning and coordinating functions were also assigned to the Department when the National Security Council Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board were abolished at about the time the Kennedy letter was issued. The Department of State was not equipped to assume these tasks readily. However, we have developed techniques and procedures through which the Secretary, the Regional Assistant Secretaries, and the Ambassadors can, in fact, control the overseas programs and activities of the various agencies. I do not mean to imply by the use of the word “control” the usurpation of agency head authority or meddling in day-to-day business, but rather critical managerial influence over program and personnel levels and evaluation of performance and accomplishments—in short, effectiveness, efficiency, and economy. Two enterprises—the policy planning process that produces comprehensive and detailed strategies for the U.S. effort in selected countries (as well as other policy documents) and an information system designed to produce meaningful data on all U.S. operations (policy-directed and otherwise)—have been under development for the past two years. The capability for controlling U.S. overseas activities which these two enterprises can provide is based on concepts and techniques similar to those Secretary McNamara has used in asserting his authority over the disparate planning, programming, and budgetary systems of the three military service departments. The Defense Department programming system went through a ten-year developmental period, starting in the Rand Corporation, before its installation by Secretary McNamara. The results of recent assessments of the policy planning process and the information system and their potential usefulness for the control of foreign operations are being communicated to the Secretary this week as a basis for discussion upon his return to Washington. I mention all this (1) to demonstrate that, despite what you may read in the papers, the Department has been attempting to carry out its responsibilities in this area, and (2) to underscore the importance of the doctrine on the role of the Ambassador as a strong executive as an underpinning for the entire effort. I am confident that the President will wish to associate himself with this doctrine and perhaps expand and clarify it, especially with regard to the role of the Department as the logical backstop in the Washington community. One final note. The role of the Ambassador as the chief executive of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission has become reasonably well established and is, by and large, accepted by all of the Federal agencies operating overseas. We still have problems, of course, with getting individual Ambassadors to exercise the full scope of their authorities and responsibilities. In addition, we lack the same kind of clear delineation and enunciations of the role the President desires the Department to play in carrying out the executive function in Washington. There is a very real possibility that the progress made to date can be eroded and dissipated if in his proclamation the President does not make it absolutely clear that he has examined and agrees with the existing doctrine. You may be sure that agency personnel will compare his statement with those of his predecessors and will interpret any apparent omissions as retraction and retreat. This, in my judgment, should be the minimum standard for judging the new letter. Should the President decide that his interests would be served (and in my judgment they would) by expanding the concept with regard to the role of the Department of State, and making more specific the means by which the President wants the Ambassadors to exercise their authority, so much the better. There is attached for such use as you may wish to make of them, several paragraphs embodying the sense of this memorandum. 4 William J. Crockett 5 P.S. Also attached is a draft which embodies most of the principles I think the letter should contain. 6 I would like your candid impressions. 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, WH Memos. No classification marking. Drafted in O/MP on January 24. 2 Not further identified. 3 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1345–1347. 4 Attached but not printed. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 6 Not printed. In a January 25 memorandum to Rostow, Hughes, and the executive directors of the geographic bureaus, Crockett requested suggestions for revisions of the Kennedy letter. As of February 5 only one bureau had replied and that to the effect that no change was in order. Hughes responded to Crockett in a February 8 memorandum that he believed the letter “should stand, be reaffirmed, or reissued as nearly as possible as it is,” a position that reflected a memorandum to him of February 5 from his Deputy Director for Coordination, Murat Williams, who contended that the letter's authority was “stronger if it stands as a continuing charter, rather than something to be rewritten with each Administration.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, PFIAB Materials, 1963–1965) In a memorandum to Busby, July 15, 1965, Crockett again discussed “what might and might not be said in a presidential letter to our Ambassadors.” (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book) However, such a letter was never sent by President Johnson; see Document 130 . 20. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 20. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1 Washington, January 26, 1965, 6:55 p.m. PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Mann Mr. Mann called the President to tell him that he had talked to Bill Moyers and the Secretary and Mr. Ball, and he thought that everybody was in agreement and was waiting for the President's decision. Mr. Mann said he thought that he ought to tell the President that he was going up to New York to do a little work on coffee tomorrow and then tomorrow night he would be leaving with Secretary Ailes and his group to try to get the sea level canal talks going in Colombia, Nicaragua-Costa Rica and Panama. He said he would be back on Tuesday. The President said this was all right and asked what talks Mr. Mann had had with Secretary Rusk. Mr. Mann said he talked to him this morning and also to Mr. Ball and he gathered that he would have Economic Affairs, if that was what the President wanted. The President said he did not know about economic affairs. He said this was a title. He said that he wants somebody in there that can help him with the Assistant Secretaries and get his ideas across and get the policy planning group working. The President asked if they had made it clear that they wanted Mr. Mann in the Number Three place and Mr. Mann said he thought so. He said that State Department statutes say that two people can't be doing the same job and there is the political job and the economic job. Mr. Mann said he thought himself that they are indivisible and he did not think that a title determined what anybody did. He said that you just can't have two Under Secretaries and that it has to be for political affairs or economic affairs. Either one. He said he thought that the main thing was to have the President and Mr. Rusk and Mr. Ball have a clear understanding of what they want him to do and the rest will take care of itself. The President told Mr. Mann to figure out what had to be done. Mr. Mann said he did not think that a title is very crucial whether it is economic or political affairs. He said one of the things he will have to be following is economic policies and these two are really indivisible. He said he thought we could have an understanding with Crockett and that he would work with him and with the Assistant Secretaries. He said perhaps it would be easier to go in on the economic title. He said it would not inhibit him in any way. The President asked if Mr. Mann had talked about his successor and Mr. Mann said that he had mentioned to Bill Moyers that he thought the most political fellow who would have the best chance of getting along would be Jack Vaughn. Mr. Mann said he had been unhappy about him a year ago but he thought he has done a superior job. He said he has shown courage and also good political instincts. He said he has an excellent staff over here and he thought he had a liberal image and he might even be able to convert Schlesinger. He said it might work out fine-he is smart, young and active. He said it took 12 hours a day in the office so you have to have somebody who can go about 16 hours a day at full speed and he thought that Vaughn combined all of the qualities. He said we would lose a little in Panama because of his personal relations. Mr. Mann said that Mr. Moyers had somebody in the Peace Corps he thought could take Vaughn's place and Mr. Mann thought this would be an easier chasm to cross than Brazil. The President asked if Mr. Mann thought that Vaughn would be better than Mr. Miller 2 and Mr. Mann said he thought that he would be more stable. He said he would like to see Mr. Miller get a good Ambassadorial post but he thought the President would be less exposed with Vaughn than with Miller. He said that Dean Acheson and he both liked Mr. Miller but they may have their views colored by friendship and he did not think they should let friendship enter into their advice to the President. Mr. Mann said that you have the left and the right and all of these cross currents. He said that Vaughn has the advantage of having been identified with the Peace Corps, sort of liberal, but that he is as hard as nails underneath. The President asked Mr. Mann if he had spoken to Secretary Rusk about it and Mr. Mann said that he had told both the Secretary and Mr. Ball the same thing. The President asked what they had said and Mr. Mann said there was no objection. Mr. Mann said that they had asked about Ed Martin and Mr. Mann had replied that he was sure he would do a superb job but Mr. Mann thought that the President wanted sort of a Johnson approach and not the old approach and that this would be going back in that sense. Mr. Mann told the President that Bill Moyers could tell him much more about Vaughn than Mr. Mann can. 3 The President said he would see Mr. Mann on Tuesday. 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Coversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 2 See footnote 3, Document 18 . 3 Vaughn was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on March 11, entered on duty March 22, and served until February 28, 1966. 4 February 2. 21. Memorandum From Terrence Scanlon of John W. Macy Jr.'s Staff to John B. Clinton 21. Memorandum From Terrence Scanlon of John W. Macy Jr.'s Staff to John B. Clinton 1 Washington, January 26, 1965. This is the reply to Mr. Macy's request that we verify Congressman Adam Clayton Powell's statistics (attached letter of December 18 addressed to the President) 2 pertaining to the number of Negro executives in his selected departments and agencies. I have contacted HEW, HHFA, the Peace Corps and the State Department. Mr. Powell's Figures Department of State: Agency Reply The United States is currently represented in its diplomatic relations and international activities by 110 ambassadors, 2 ministers and 5 ambassadors to special missions. Of that total of 117, there are only two Negroes. They are Mercer Cook, Ambassador to Senegal and Clinton Knox, Ambassador to Dahomey. This represents a loss of one from the number of Negro ambassadors in the Kennedy Administration which not only achieved the highest number for the first time, but had assigned Negroes to important ambassadorial posts, Finland (Carl L. Rowan) and Norway (Clifton Wharton, Sr.). The third Negro ambassador then was Mercer Cook. Congressman Powell's criteria of “117” excludes Franklin Williams who is the United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council, United Nations who holds a personnel rank as ambassador ($27,000). There are also two Negro Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the Department of State: Samuel Westerfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and Charlotte Hubbard, Deputy Assistant for Public Affairs. Chester Carter, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, was promoted in May in 1964 as Deputy Chief of Protocol. There are currently 9 Negroes holding positions of GS–16 level and above in the Department of State. [Omitted here are similar discussions of African-Americans in the Peace Corps, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of John Macy, Box 693, State Dept-General-1965. No classification marking. Along with his duties as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Macy served as President Johnson's chief talent scout for Presidential appointments. Scanlon and Clinton were members of the staff that assisted him in that responsibility, the latter serving as Macy's Executive Assistant. The personnel files created in discharging that responsibility are at the Johnson Library. 2 Not found. 22. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 22. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 12, 1965. SUBJECT Comprehensive Country Programming System You asked that I give you a statement (in non-bureaucratic terms) of the concept and usefulness of CCPS i.e. the Comprehensive Country Programming System. That statement is attached. 2 I have added to the statement the following comments for your consideration: 1. The Acceptance and Limitations of Planning The idea of developing detailed U.S. policy statements (National Policy Papers) for a country has had only limited acceptance by our own bureaus and by other U.S. agencies. Some of our bureau officers still think of planning as “busy work” to be suffered with during the process and then to let lie unused. Some of our Embassy officers still think of planning as an inevitable but useless Washington exercise with little if any relevance to the real problems they face. Some of our Assistant Secretaries and their deputies still don't discern the value of having broad goals and lines of action when these plans don't contain the answers to their daily crises. But plans, even if fully accepted, do not in and of themselves produce action for programs, or measure effort, or establish priorities, or evaluate accomplishments, or even guarantee their use at all. Almost two years ago, Walt Rostow and I began to focus on the real shortcoming of the planning concept, i.e. plans won't result in action unless a means is found to make them “action forcing.” Bureaus, other U.S. agencies, and our missions must not be able to put them safely away in a drawer and forget them. We were determined to find a means of translating plans into programs. For only if this were done would plans (National Policy Papers) become, as we hoped they would, vital guidelines for determining the purpose, the size, the content, and the priority of U.S. programs in a given country. 2. The Relationship of Plans (National Policy Papers) to Agency Programs The National Policy Papers (plans) as presently written first set forth a number of U.S. policy goals or objectives for a given country. The plans also contain lines of action that set forth the things the U.S. establishment in the particular country should undertake. While the National Policy Papers are formally cleared with every agency involved before being approved by you, the papers themselves provide no means of forcing agencies to do anything about the plans or to make any commitment of budgets or programs for the attainment of goals suggested in the plans. At this juncture, it is apparent that each U.S. agency can pretty much pick and choose among the various goals and lines of action for those things they wish to undertake, or in fact, for all practical purposes, ignore them all in planning, budgeting, and executing their programs. There is simply no mechanism to ensure compliance within the planning process itself—nor, for that matter, to even find out the extent to which there is, or is not, compliance with the objectives and lines of action. 3. A Program Concept is Required By a Program we mean the things that agencies put money, people, and other resources into in order (presumably) to accomplish some ascertainable U.S. objective. Walt and I believed that we needed some means of relating the existing programs of agencies and the activities of their people to the goals and lines of action of the National Policy Papers. We believed that we needed some means of relating the establishment of new programs in a country to the policy paper. We believed that we needed some means of relating both old and new programs of each U.S. agency in a country to each other's programs. We believed that we needed some means of comparing agency programs in those cases where two or more agencies claimed their programs were carrying out the same or a similar objective. In short, we believed we needed a system for inventorying the quantity of effort and resources each agency had at its disposal in a given country and for comparing that inventory to the goals and the lines of action called for by the National Policy Papers. And thus the Comprehensive Country Programming System was born. 4. The Comprehensive Country Programming System CCPS was designed to provide the information required to ascertain whether or not anything was actively being done to carry out the National Policy Papers—the objectives and their lines of action. It is called comprehensive because it encompasses the total U.S. effort—all the activities and all the programs in a given country. It sweeps across agency barriers and agency lines. It is not State Department bound. It is called Country because it first measures all of the things (policy related or otherwise) that are actually being done by U.S. agencies in a given country. It is called a Program because it puts together similar activities of the various U.S. agencies into broad program categories in order to compare them to each other and to relate them to the goals and the lines of action of the National Policy Papers. It is called a System because it systematically aggregates like activities undertaken in any given country and support of any given plan. 5. What Does the Comprehensive Country Programming System Do? In the first place, the system in and of itself doesn't do anything. It is like a set of business books. They don't do anything. They provide information and insights that astute managers can use in order to ask questions and to make decisions and to evaluate results. That is all that is claimed for CCPS. What the system does do is provide information that the Ambassador and the Regional Bureaus can use to ask deep and searching questions about their operations; questions about what people are doing with their time; questions about the things that no one is doing anything about; questions about the reasonability of the plans themselves; and questions about the kinds and quantity of resources that are in a country to do the job. It does measure the effort (dollars, materials, and people) committed to each line of action. It does show up gaps and duplication in the application of resources. It does raise questions of priority. It does raise questions of reasonability of the objectives. It does provide an information bridge between plans and programs that for the first time permits the planners and the operators to communicate with each other in a meaningful way. It does show ($ and people) what each U.S. agency is expending in a country in order to accomplish each NPP goal and each NPP line of action. It does show those goals and lines of action that are receiving little or no resources. It does show the goals and lines of action where there are program duplications between agencies. It does show the goals and lines of action where there may be too many resources being applied. It does enable the Ambassador and Regional Bureaus and other agencies to consider the re-assessment of our objectives or a re-adjustment of our resources when the two are out of harmony. It does give Ambassadors the answers to such questions as: What are the U.S. programs? What are their relationships to each other? Where is the effort being applied? What U.S. objective is the effort supposed to be accomplishing? What priorities are agencies giving to their programs? What are people spending their time and effort on? When will an objective be accomplished? When will resource levels be changed? When will programs stop, start, be increased, or decreased? By providing this kind of information, it enables the Ambassador to ask questions of how and why, to evaluate techniques and performance, and to make qualitative judgments on people and programs. 6. Examples to Date In the course of installing the system in 23 countries during the past 13 months, we have seen many times the things that happen when people begin to think about what they are doing and why. We have heard Ambassador McGhee, for example, tell us that it was not feasible to relate the activity of his mission to lines of action contained in the policy paper that he and his staff had prepared for Germany. 3 This conviction has led the mission in Germany to re-examine the way policy papers are written and they are now being rewritten to contain the goals that he and his staff are pursuing. A CCPS installation was carried out in Ethiopia shortly after the approval of a National Policy Paper for that country. 4 (It had taken 18 months to produce the paper, much of the time being consumed by inter-agency negotiations and clearances.) After comparing what people were doing with what the paper said they should be doing (as shown by CCPS), Ambassador Korry made a series of recommendations both with respect to the paper and the activities of the various agencies in Ethiopia. As a result, the Ethiopia paper has been re-written, the office of the Agricultural Attaché has been abolished, and the Pentagon is continuing to struggle with a recommendation to reduce the military attachés. In Mexico, Tony Freeman and his staff reviewed and approved a LAPC policy paper. 5 A subsequent CCPS installation revealed several lines of action that were receiving little or no attention. Upon further review, the Ambassador indicated that he thought the lines of action were inconsequential and should be eliminated from the paper. Washington is now studying his recommendations. A similar process is now going on in Guatemala where the Ambassador has been looking at agency activities in support of an Internal Defense Plan. As a part of this study, Ambassador Bell asked agency and section heads to rate lines of action contained in a two-year old paper on a five-point scale ranging from “important and being carried out” to “unimportant and should be dropped.” Ratings from some 15 units on 20 of the 40 lines of action ranged from 1 to 5 with no apparent correlation among reporting units. The Guatemala paper is now being re-written. In fact, every one of the 23 installations has demonstrated in one way or another that plans don't become real until they are applied, that they aren't apt to be applied unless someone or something forces them to be, and that all individual effort benefits from being related to a higher purpose or objective. 7. State Department Leadership Capability Enhanced The National Policy Papers give substance to the principle that the Secretary of State is the President's principal instrument of coordination and of leadership in the field of foreign policy. The Comprehensive Country Programming System gives further substance to this same principle by providing a means for ensuring that the programs and activities of the other agencies as well as the State Department are indeed in harmony and in furtherance of those policy papers (NPP). Until we developed the Comprehensive Country Programming System there was no means by which an Ambassador or a Regional Bureau Assistant Secretary (or Desk Officer) or the Secretary of State, or the President, or the Bureau of the Budget, or the Congress could plan for, discuss, or evaluate the total U.S. effort in a single country. Such planning and evaluation as occurred was done piece-meal by program or by agency, i.e. AID, Peace Corps, USIA, Military, State, etc. There was no means for looking at the whole U.S. program for a single country. The Comprehensive Country Programming plan is designed to show the total U.S. program in a country and thus to give the Desk Officer, the Assistant Secretary, and you a chance to ensure that agency plans and programs, budgets, and resources are in harmony with the country policy objectives and courses of action that you have signed off on for a given country. Recommendations 1. That you meet with Mr. Rostow and me to discuss this in greater detail upon your return to Washington. 6 2. Following our meeting, we hold similar discussions with the regional Assistant Secretaries on a common approach to planning and programming. 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, ORG 1, CCPS. No classification marking. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Not found. 4 Dated December 19, 1963; an extract is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXI, Document 309 . 5 Not found. 6 In Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 68, Frederick Mosher and John Harr describe a February 1965 meeting on CCPS that Crockett had with Rusk alone, during which Rusk indicated “he was concerned that any effort in the programming field for the Department not be 'naive and overcomplicated.' He told Crockett that he had decided to convene a committee of five ambassadors to study the system and advise him what to do about it.” However, according to Mosher and Harr, pp. 68–75 [ Pgs. 68–75 include portions of Doc. 30 , Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , the committee, chaired by Ambassador Bunker, held only one meeting and never submitted a report, and programming efforts in the Department soon became focused on implementing the study mandated by the President on March 25, the Executive Review of Overseas Programs (see Document 33 ). Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library indicates that the Crockett-Rusk meeting on CCPS may have taken place on February 24. For a description of Crockett's first meeting with Rusk on CCPS, which took place a year earlier, possibly on February 5, 1964, according to Rusk's Appointment Book, see Mosher and Harr, pp. 54–55 [ Pgs. 54–55 include portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , and Doc. 25 ] . 23. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 23. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 17, 1965. Mac— [Omitted here is discussion of an upcoming March 8–11 conference at the Ministerial level with the United Kingdom on Africa.] New subject . Despite his new capacity, Harriman is quite anxious to carry on with C–I Group. 2 He likes it and there is nobody else who would run it. I also assume that he wants to keep as many oars in as possible. He says Ball is in favor, and Rusk said he'd think about it. 3 We have managed to put a little new life into this exercise and I'm inclined to feel it could still be useful if we gave it a new hunting license. There's little doubt that USG has not yet focused enough on preventive aspects of counter-insurgency. The Group provides a useful hortatory forum for this purpose. But we either ought to give it a bigger (though still advisory) mandate or gradually close it out. Until we decide, I'd suggest encouraging Harriman to stay on. RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Volume I [2], Box 6. Secret. 2 Reference is to Harriman's role in the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) after the impending announcement (March 11) of his transfer from the position of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to Ambassador at Large. President Johnson suggested this new position for Harriman as early as late 1964. (Memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson, November 30, 1964; ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7, Box 2) 3 In the margin next to this paragraph, Bundy wrote: “I'd like to play this very open with no firm commitment to Harriman.” 24. Editorial Note 24. Editorial Note According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation on February 24, 1965, between President Johnson and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann, the following discussion took place: “Mr. Mann said that on the subject of organization, he had had a talk with Ball and has begun work on how we can pull the Department together and get a better communication at the Assistant Secretary level and also make better recommendations to the President, both on the best men inside the Department and the best ones outside. He said that he was going to have lunch with Mr. Ball and Mr. Macy tomorrow. The President said that he should pull Crockett in on all these meetings that he can. He said that he should tell them that he likes Crockett and respects his judgment.” (Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ) 25. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 25. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1 Washington, February 26, 1965, 10:45 a.m. PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Mann [Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated issue.] Mr. Mann said that he thought we were making good progress on the organizational front. The President said that he had told the Secretary last night that from the point of worldwide affairs he was superb, in Congress even better and with the press he was wonderful, but that he wanted Mr. Rusk to let Mr. Mann take over the Assistant Secretaries and see that they give the President some ideas and implements and get him some good appointments and get some good men in there. The President said that we would look around and see what the business council recommends, and the Chamber of Commerce and labor. He said he thought we should mix these people up. Mr. Mann said that we have two concrete plans: 1) daily meetings with the Assistant Secretaries and to take as much time as necessary, in Mr. Ball's office. He said we will go into the whole thing and let them know that it will be their responsibility to handle relations between their part of the world and the US and get the job done. He said we are also going to set up in the next day or so a mechanism to find some talent for the President and that he hoped to bring Macy into the deliberations over here, where he had all the information at hand. Mr. Mann said we could get Mr. Merchant and others to suggest the good people inside and then get some good people from the outside. The President suggested Gene Black when he comes back and also Bob Lovett and that Dave Bruce could come in for consultation. He said if we can pick up one or two more around of that general type and meet with them and get together a list of all the people we have—a couple of hundred—where they can look at them and decide. The President said Mr. Mann should concentrate on people who would be available—like he himself had been available. The President said that we had to get Johnson men. He said that the people over in State are saying the wrong things to the press—that we are going to fail, etc. Mr. Mann said he thought this was a minority but agreed that they were saying the wrong things. [Omitted here is discussion of an unrelated matter.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 26. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 26. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1 Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:20 p.m. PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Mann The President called and suggested that Mr. Mann should, on his own and with no reference to the President, suggest to Mr. Ball and the Secretary that the Assistant Secretaries be called in and told about the seriousness of leaks and how the President felt about them. The President said they should do that right away and then in a week or so he will meet with the Assistant Secretaries and tell them how he regards this whole matter as their responsibility. The President said that the story about the war plans on Viet Nam is disgraceful. 2 He said the one last Friday 3 that was leaked out of the White House on the white paper 4 could be referred to by Mr. Mann. The President said that the Secretary wanted to meet with these men to find out what is generating, what the problems are and prepare for a press conference next week. The President said that was why we wanted a list of all the press people that are seen and information as to what questions were asked and what answers were given. He said we were, in theory, supposed to get this every Saturday by noon and that everybody does it right but the State Department. The President referred to the specific leaks on the Ball-MNF (?) report, 5 the white paper, the Marines going in and the battle plans. He said he believed three came out of the White House and one came out of the military so by using these as illustrations Mr. Mann would not be talking to guilty people. The President reiterated how strongly he felt about this and emphasized that he wanted each and every press person visited or talked to listed and what was said summarized. The President asked that Mr. Mann get this word across today or tomorrow, let it soak in for a week and see if we get what we want next Saturday. 6 The President said that whatever these officers say they should be willing to have in a gold-fish bowl and have attributed to them. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 2 Reference is to the lead article in The New York Times on March 1. 3 February 26. 4 The white paper, a Department of State report entitled Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam , was released on February 28. For text, see Department of State Bulletin , March 22, 1965, pp. 404–427. The New York Times reported on the white paper in its lead article on February 27. 5 Presumably a reference to a report concerning the Multilateral Force (MLF) and/or the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). 6 March 6. 27. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) 27. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) 1 Washington, March 2, 1965. Mr. Valenti: The Secretary and Mr. Ball have decided to rearrange their meetings with the senior officers of the Department. One feature of the new arrangement is that Mr. Ball will meet twice each week with the Assistant Secretaries for geographic areas and a very few other key officers. The reduced size of the meeting should make for better security. And this in turn will make it feasible for Mr. Ball to speak frankly to the Assistant Secretaries about assuming their full responsibilities. The first of these meetings will be held today. We are considering ways in which we can get a better control of State Department officers' contacts with the press. As soon as we have explored the various possibilities and the Secretary has reached a decision, we will let you know. Tom 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 105. Confidential. Attached but not printed is a second memorandum from Mann to Valenti, March 2, explaining how a news reporter may have learned that Assistant Secretary of State Harry McPherson would be going to the White House on temporary assignment. Also attached but not printed is a note from Valenti to the President, March 3, that states: “Tom Mann sent these over. You might want to see them.” 28. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) 28. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) 1 Washington, March 5, 1965. Dear George: I was pleased to receive your letter of February 152 concerning the role of the Ambassador in the planning and direction of CIA activities. The questions you raised are indeed timely. Background . To provide a context for my answers, let me refer to some of the historical background. You will recall that the extent of Ambassadorial authority has been a matter of concern to every President since the United States embarked upon complex multi-agency foreign operations during the 1940's. The last five Presidents have each affirmed the authority of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission over all U.S. programs except those carried out by the unified and specified military commands. President Franklin D. Roosevelt on May 20, 1940 wrote: “… The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in a foreign country is the officer of the United States in charge in that country under whose supervision are coordinated the activities there of all the official representatives of the United States… “All activities should be fully reported to the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission and be conducted under his advice and instructions.” 2 On January 13, 1949, a Hoover Commission Task Force on Foreign Affairs—consisting of two former Assistant Secretaries of State, Harvey H. Bundy and James Grafton Rogers, with the advice of former Secretary of State and War Henry L. Stimson—reported: “In 1939 the principle that all United States employees abroad should be responsible to the ambassador or minister in a particular country was recognized by the consolidation of the Commerce and Agriculture Departments' overseas service with the Foreign Service… “The presence of separate missions abroad, each with its own head, is confusing to the foreign governments and weakens the effectiveness of United States representation. Coupled with the present tendency to send other official and unofficial emissaries abroad, it is distinctly detrimental to the conduct of foreign affairs by the United States. “The establishment of a single American spokesman for all United States activities in a particular country can be accomplished without the assumption by the State Department of responsibility for the various operational tasks involved. These special operational tasks… can be separately administered in Washington, but it is both impractical and dangerous for them to have spokesmen and operators abroad who are not responsible to the American ambassador or minister for supervision and coordination. If the operational task should ever transcend the regular diplomatic job in importance, it may be desirable to make the head of the special mission the ambassador for the duration of the particular program.” President Hoover's Report to President Truman concluded that the Chief of Mission should have “the ultimate authority overseas with respect to foreign affairs aspects of program operations.” 3 On April 5, 1951, President Truman wrote to Secretary Acheson: “The Secretary of State, under my direction, is the Cabinet officer responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations, and will provide leadership and coordination among the executive agencies in carrying out foreign policies and programs… “At the country level all U.S. representatives to that country must speak and act in a consistent manner. The U.S. Ambassador is the representative of the President of the United States to the country and he is responsible for assuring a coordinated U.S. position. He should be fully supported in the exercise of this responsibility by all U.S. representatives to the country.” 4 President Eisenhower, on July 24, 1956, sent instructions to all Chiefs of Mission, which stated: “The representatives of all United States agencies in each foreign country are subject to the supervision and leadership of the Chief of Mission in connection with any of their activities which in his own judgment affect relations between the United States and the country to which he is accredited… “The ultimate responsibility of the Chief of Mission cannot be delegated, but when directing large complex operations he necessarily carries out his executive and coordinating functions in some degree through subordinates.” 5 President Kennedy wrote to Chiefs of Mission on May 29, 1961, as follows: “In regard to your personal authority and responsibility, I shall count on you to oversee and coordinate all the activities of the United States Government in [country]. 6 “You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United States agencies which have programs or activities in [country]. I shall give you full support and backing in carrying out your assignment… “As you know, your own lines of communication as Chief of Mission run through the Department of State.” 7 The Ambassador and CIA Coordination. To my knowledge, there is no hidden exception or reservation to the Kennedy letter. It applied, and applies, to all agencies, activities, and programs attached to U.S. Missions . Moreover, the entire fabric of Secretary Rusk's relationships with President Kennedy and President Johnson over the past four years has demonstrated consistent Presidential determination that all American employees abroad, except command troops, will be responsible to the Chief of Mission, not only for their personal conduct, but for the efficiency and economy of their activities and the relevance of those activities to American foreign policy. My staff and I have carried on a dialogue with CIA, at the Deputy Director level and below, over the past two years on the subject of integrated planning and direction of Agency activities in the field. CIA maintains that Chiefs of Mission now have access to most field program information and recognizes the Ambassador's responsibility for over-all program coordination and direction within his Mission. On June 23, 1964, Richard Helms, CIA Deputy Director for Plans, sent a memorandum to the chiefs of all stations and bases entitled, “CIA Positions on National Policy Papers and Comprehensive Country Programming System.” This letter was useful in: (1) clarifying for CIA field personnel the nature and inter-relationship of CCPS and the NPPs; (2) describing the part that the Agency plays in developing NPPs; (3) recognizing the parallel between CIA country operations programs and CCPS; (4) requiring the cooperation of CIA chiefs in discussing substantive country situations with CCPS field teams; and (5) indicating that CIA programming information will be made available on a need-to-know basis to show allocation of resources to support achievement of national objectives. However, the letter also instructed CIA chiefs to refer the team to CIA headquarters for information concerning Agency personnel, programs, and expenditures. It did not provide guidance on the question of responding to the Chief of Mission's own request for program information. 8 Situation [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. This background leads me to submit the following comments with respect to the specific questions raised in your letter. 1. The Chief of Mission's authority and responsibility under the Presidential letter of May 29, 1961 not only permits but requires him to supervise the CIA operations and programs in the country of his assignment and to coordinate those operations with the activities of the other components of his Mission. 2. This responsibility clearly requires that the Ambassador have access to program information at any level of generality, in any detail, and in any format he considers necessary. 3. My discussions with CIA/Washington indicate that top officials here recognize these principles and, if pressed, are prepared to authorize field personnel to furnish such information as the Ambassador may request. 4. The Helms June 23, 1964 memorandum is a reflection of the Agency's recognition and acceptance of the authorities and responsibilities conferred on the Ambassador by the President's letter. 5. There is no new authority beyond that expressed in the President's letter. 6. To my knowledge no Ambassador has yet fully exercised the authorities enunciated in the President's letter. 7. With respect to your question about your authority to take action, I believe that the President's letter and the statements of his predecessors make it clear that you not only can but must “take action” any time you believe the activities of a U.S. agency jeopardize the interests of the United States. At the same time, I think you would be well advised to reserve drastic action to the most serious situations, and to communicate your judgments concerning ongoing programs in the form of budgetary recommendations which, as you know, are subject to appeal and review in Washington before they take effect. 8. With respect to your question concerning involvement in CIA budgetary processes, the foregoing supports an affirmative answer. 9. I would suggest the following review procedure for [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]: a. Request and assemble program data using the CCPS format. This should be a relatively simple process in view of the claimed similarity between the Agency's country operational program and CCPS. b. Conduct formal review sessions with the senior CIA executive [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] for the purpose of: (1) relating CIA program activities and resource inputs to the objectives of U.S. foreign policy; and (2) evaluating CIA programs in terms of efficiency, economy, priorities, and possible gaps and duplications when juxtaposed with other U.S. programs. This should lead to your quantitative and qualitative judgments of both activities and resource levels, including staffing. c. Unless you feel this information reveals a situation requiring immediate action, request the CIA [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to reflect your decisions in [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] next budget submission. d. If at any point the CIA [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] informs you that [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] cannot abide by your decisions, make your own recommendations to the President through Secretary Rusk. Throughout the review process the Department and CIA would have a joint interest in protecting CIA program data by using prescribed special classification and communication channels and by not expanding access to this data. The data should not therefore be included in the CCP book, but should be set out in a properly classified and controlled annex to the book. There should be no objection to one member of your personal staff working with you and the CIA component to relate program data to the CCPS grid and to assist in interpreting and reviewing it. I assure you that the Department and I will support any efforts you undertake to exercise the authority assigned to you by the President. If you think it would be helpful, I will inform CIA at the Deputy Director level of your concerns and your intentions. But you should recognize that no official in Washington has as strong a mandate for supervising overseas programs as you have been given. I would, therefore, urge that you take the initiative in this matter and use our support if it becomes necessary. The matters you have raised are of concern to many Chiefs of Mission. The Department welcomes your inquiry and offers all possible assistance. With warmest regards, Sincerely, William J. Crockett 9 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Robert Cox (O/MP). Crockett forwarded a copy of the letter to Rusk under cover of a March 10 memorandum in which he noted that Helms had been advised of his correspondence with McGhee. (Ibid.) For CIA's reaction to Crockett's letter, see Document 220 . 2 Not found. 3 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs: A Report with Recommendations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 120–121. 4 Not found. 5 Department of State Circular 58. (Eisenhower Library, Records of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, Box 14, #98-Coordination in Overseas Missions) 6 Brackets in this and the following paragraph are in the source text. 7 Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1345–1347. 8 Not found. 9 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 29. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 29. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 11, 1965. SUBJECT “O” Area Reorganization 2 As you will recall, last December you approved the assignment of Dwight Porter as Ambassador to Lebanon, and the abolition of the position of Assistant Secretary for Administration. Upon approval of this recommendation, I initiated a number of studies to analyze the present practices of the administrative area of the Department and to recommend new approaches to our organization and operations in light of the abolition of the Office of the Assistant Secretary. I am now transmitting to you a paper 3 which outlines a new approach to the Department's administrative efforts. I understand that I will have the opportunity to brief you, Mr. Ball, and Mr. Mann orally on Saturday, March 13. 4 The first section of the paper describes the major objectives we intend to achieve in the new organization. The first objective is to institute a new management technique called “Management by Objective.” In very superficial terms this method will enable me to establish certain operational targets to be met by each of the operating areas, together with a system of reporting and monitoring established to measure progress of operators in meeting their targets. Other objectives are new to governmental administration. We have separated planning from operations, and deliberately structured the organization to produce competition in the planning phase and to eliminate competition in the operational activities. We have also consolidated all of the service functions of the “A” area 5 in order to make greater use of “assembly line” techniques and to further mechanization. This concept will also increase accountability since a single officer will now be solely responsible for one rational grouping of similar functions. We have stressed elimination of supervisory layers both to reduce costs and to increase responsiveness (and incidentally will be able to abolish about 250 to 300 positions in the “A” area alone). We have elevated the personnel and budget functions to a higher level in the organization-to a level immediately responsive to me—in order to give them appropriate status and permit greater control by the Department's leadership. The second section of the paper deals with the details of the new organization. Briefly, “O” would be composed of 9 major units (compared with today's 16) as follows: Current : (with no changes at present) 1. Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs 2. Office of Protocol 3. Office of Communications 4. Office of Security New: 5. Office of the Director General (operation of foreign affairs personnel system and Department's own personnel program) 6. Office of Budget and Compliance (budget preparation, and monitoring Departmental operations to insure conformity with stated policies and guidelines) 7. Policy and Plans Staff (development of administrative goals and policies and long-range plans to utilize technological innovations) 8. Office of Operations and Services (routine administrative services) 9. Community Advisory Services (improvement of Foreign Service image in U.S.) The third section discusses the functions we propose to assign to the Regional Bureaus. These shifts are again designed to reduce the number of decision points required in carrying out a function. The activities included are those that I believe should be under the control of the assistant secretaries to increase their management flexibilities and to achieve a cadre of personnel with deep regional knowledge and expertise. The fourth and final section deals with personnel administration and will probably be the main subject of conversation Saturday. As you know, at the same time we have also been developing proposals for a single, integrated and unified foreign affairs personnel system. Our Foreign Service Act amendments are intended to give this new system the appropriate legislative basis. This section of the paper outlines the philosophy behind this new and expanded personnel system and an organizational concept to put it in operation. 6 The basic objectives for the new personnel system and organization are: 1. Creation of a single, integrated and unified foreign affairs personnel system, operating under the general policy direction of the Secretary of State, sufficiently broad to meet the needs of all foreign affairs agencies. 2. Participation by all user agencies in policy development through membership on the Board of the Foreign Service. 3. Consolidation of common personnel functions under the Director General who would operate the system to provide the manpower requirements of all participating foreign affairs agencies-a Foreign Service of the United States. 4. Recognition and support of the separate missions and special needs of operating agencies (including regional bureaus and Washington offices) through delegation of maximum authority over utilization of personnel to operating agencies, within broadly stated career plans for each officer. 5. Improved personnel management in participating agencies by the development and installation of an effective manpower planning and utilization system designed to balance individual interests and skills with current needs of the operating agencies and the long-range interests of the United States. 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Lot 68 D 323. No classification marking. 2 The “O” area refers to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. 3 Attached but not printed. 4 Crockett did not meet with Rusk on March 13, but he may have briefed Rusk and Mann during a meeting the three men had in Rusk's office on Tuesday morning, March 16. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) 5 The “A” area refers to the Bureau of Administration, which was abolished together with the position of its head, the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. 6 In a memorandum to Rusk, March 25, requested by Rusk “during our meeting last week,” Crockett compared “the present personnel system with the proposed one,” highlighting “some potential benefits that other Departments might derive from the new system.” (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, Secretary, Jan-June 1965) 30. Memorandum for the Record 30. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, March 18, 1965, 8:30 a.m. SUBJECT Discussion with Secretary Rusk at Breakfast Meeting—18 Mar 65 [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 2. Reviewed in considerable detail my personal concern over U.S. inability to combat counterinsurgency. I stated that it was apparent to me that the Soviets, under the umbrella of the nuclear stalemate and the Chinese Communists as well, would pursue an aggressive program of political action, subversion and insurgency in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. I said there were abundant indications that Moscow was moving in this direction, which in reality was an implementation of their publicly announced policy and that Communist China was doing likewise. I said that neither the United States nor the Free World were properly organized to combat this sort of thing. With respect to the United States, the problem touched the area of responsibility of almost all the departments, i.e. State, Defense, AID, USIA and CIA. No one department could do it all, and furthermore some departments now were charged with responsibility which they could not discharge properly. As an example I felt AID, charged with internal security, were not motivated in that direction but on the contrary were more interested in raising gross national product, standard of living, etc. Therefore they were inclined to put internal security, police training, etc., at a very low priority and while this had been arrested somewhat by [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], he was forced to fight his way at every turn of the road. The Embassies could do a great deal but not the entire job; the military assistance groups could do conventional training but they were notoriously poor at anti-guerrilla activities, etc. The Special Group CI had in the past done some constructive work, however its position had eroded away during the last year despite efforts by Governor Harriman. Now Secretary Ball seemed to favor doing away with the Special Group because it encroached in his opinion on State Department authority and this, indeed, had been State's position ever since Special Group CI was formed. I said I thought this was wrong; that Special Group should be revitalized; it should have a dynamic Chairman; that the Special Group CI charter 2 should be reviewed carefully and thoughtfully and modified and strengthened, and the responsibilities of the departments and agencies reviewed and changed and reallocated when it was determined that departments were unable to execute their assignments because of either motivation or organization or custom. I gave many examples, i.e., saving Venezuela in '63, communication warnings about impending events in Panama, the election in Chile, the developments in Brazil, etc., all of which had been carefully husbanded by either the Special Group CI or the Special Group (303 Committee). I referred to Mr. FitzGerald's efforts to get approval of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and, while all agreed, weeks had been consumed securing interdepartmental approval of a rather simple telegram of instructions to the field. 3. The Secretary was very sympathetic to the purposes of my talk. He asked if Mr. Gaud would be a good Special Group CI Chairman and I replied affirmatively but stated he must be properly located in the chain of command in State. At this point I said that I felt State must have a strong Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs to serve as its authoritative voice in both Special Group forums. 4. I then turned to the necessity of encouraging and exhorting our Allies both in Western Europe and in the Far East to help. I said that I thought this was so important that we could make almost any kind of a concession to our European friends in such fields as nuclear weapons, Polaris submarines, etc., if it would resolve our differences and put us on a common front in dealing with this problem which we would all be required to face over the next 10 or 20 years. At this point Rusk said that he shared my views and my concern and agreed that we must organize both internally and with our Allies. He asked if I would prepare a memorandum outlining my views in a form which he might use in May in address to the North Atlantic Council of Foreign Ministers. Action: I should discuss this entire subject with Cline, Kent and others and arrange for the preparation of this memorandum. 3 [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Memos for Record, Job 80–B01285A. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library. 2 Presumably a reference to National Security Action Memorandum No. 124, January 18, 1962. For text, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. VIII, Document 68 . 3 Not further identified. 31. Memorandum for the Record 31. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, March 18, 1965, 8:30 a.m. SUBJECT Discussion with Secretary Rusk at Breakfast—18 Mar 65 1. In a personal vein, Secretary Rusk indicated that he was thinking seriously of leaving his post. He said that he was tired and felt that perhaps a new and fresh look at the frightening problems which face this country might be good. He indicated that he was encountering some difficulties in working with the President, seemed to feel the President did not focus on issues of very great importance to the Department, and refused to receive foreign visitors except when subjected to great pressure. Rusk commented on his own personal financial difficulties and gave me the impression he was seriously considering asking to be relieved. 2 2. I raised the question of his future, and when he indicated interest in academic life, I brought up the Presidency of the University of California. Rusk seemed interested but only after an extended period of rest and relaxation. I did not pursue this question very far; I intend to discuss it with the Regents of the University when I go West. 3. Rusk then raised the question of my successor and intimated there has been some discussion of General Taylor coming in for a short period. I explained to Rusk that this would be very bad indeed, and retraced some of the difficulties that Taylor has had in the past, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. I said that while I knew Taylor well and favorably, I thought the President could make no appointment that would be more harmful to the Agency than the appointment of Ambassador Taylor as DCI. 4. I then mentioned my discussion the evening before with Mac Bundy in which Mac raised the point of Max Taylor as an “out” for the President, stating that the President was in a difficult position with Max because “he could not get along with him or could not get along without him.” Rusk said this was not at all true, that Taylor had specified and had received an absolute commitment from the President that he would serve as Ambassador to Saigon for one year and one year only and that the President had absolutely no problem with Taylor. Addendum 3 5. I indicated my concern to Rusk over the qualifications of Assistant Secretary of State Vaughn to successfully handle Latin America. I based my views on my observations of Vaughn's conduct in Panama and the extraordinary statement he made to the Chiefs of Station meeting at Isolation. I told Rusk I brought the subject up merely to alert him and warn that in my opinion much of the good work accomplished in the last year or year and a half would be undone by Vaughn unless he was given very strong supervision and guidance by Rusk, Ball and Mann. Rusk indicated he had nothing to do with the appointment, inferred, but not mentioned, that the appointment was made by the President. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Memos for Record, Job 80–B01285A. Single Copy; No Distribution. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library. 2 In a New York Times column on March 21, James Reston praised Rusk for being “a superb witness on Capitol Hill” and “a good negotiator” but criticized him for “not running a planning agency but a fire brigade. He has little time for the over-all strategy of foreign policy, because he is dealing most of the time with the tactics and politics of whatever emergency some other country produces in Vietnam, the Congo or Indonesia. Meanwhile, Mr. Rusk has not mobilized the talents of his department. He is remote from many of his most creative associates, and has left them in doubt about what he wants and expects from them.” 3 Secret; Eyes Only; Personal; No Distribution. 32. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the President's Special Assistant (Busby) 32. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the President's Special Assistant (Busby) 1 Washington, March 18, 1965. Dear Buzz: Yesterday I sent you a nice, polite, bureaucratic note on how to prevent over-staffing of overseas operations. 2 Today I am giving you my views of the problem, particularly with regard to administrative staffing overseas. This is only one area of proliferation but of great importance since in many aspects it follows a pattern of program diffusion and confusion. I have been involved in this problem for almost 15 years, 7 years here in the Department and 8 years abroad as an Administrative Officer. I have seen the State Department make repeated efforts to consolidate administration in the field for the purpose of reducing over-all cost to the taxpayer and improving over-all efficiency. None of these efforts have really achieved more than monetary success. Why? Because the other agencies involved don't want to lose their own independence and the people involved don't want to lose their kingdoms. At the present time, we are like a candy shop offering our products (administrative support) to our customers (U.S. agencies) around the world. Instead of having a single, total package of administration, we permit them to come in and shop, some taking this service and some taking that and most of them not ever agreeing to the final price. We have some 10,000 people around the world who are paid from the services we render to other U.S. agencies and we must bear the overhead of supporting these people out of State Department appropriations until we know whether or not an agency will finally agree to pay its bill. In most instances they take the service and then chisel on the cost. Administration around the world is characterized by duplication, inequitable practices and policies among agencies, special privileges for the people of some agencies, public wrangling over bureaucracy, payments, costs, delays, and no thought for really saving money for the taxpayer. In this 15-year effort we have had lip support from the Bureau of the Budget and virtually no support from the Congress. The General Accounting Office has repeatedly pointed out the waste and the duplication to no avail. To somewhat the same extent, the substantive areas have the same problems of proliferation of responsibilities, duplication of efforts and, therefore, excessive staffing. There have been repeated studies and task force reports pointing up the “problem”—even pinpointing the specific locations and the specific over-staffing. But the results (correction of the problem) have been minimal. I certainly do not have the answers to these difficult problems, if in fact answers exist. But I do know that the lack of clear definition of agencies' missions (in military terms) and the lack of clear-cut authority to deal with them are two basic reasons for proliferation and excessive staffing. Where there is no guidance and a vacuum, everybody tries to fill it. My 15 years of effort in the administrative vineyard have convinced me that I am crying in the wilderness and that no reform will come about until one appropriation is made to the State Department for the support of all administration overseas. I would like to go beyond this and suggest that the final solution probably lies in an all-encompassing Department of Foreign Affairs. 3 I believe this is the only real way for the President to control the wasteful monster that we have built up abroad in the post-war era. Anything short of this will be makeshift and temporary and will last only as long as the pressure of attention is focused upon it. But once the pressure is released, fragmentation and growth will start again. Sincerely yours, William J. Crockett 4 P.S. For the most part the above remarks do not apply to USIA, where our relationship has been close for the last 10 years. W.J.C. 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book. No classification marking. 2 Not found. 3 In an April 28 memorandum to Bill Moyers, Crockett forwarded a collection of staff papers on various aspects of Department of State reorganization. The papers proposed creation of a Department of Foreign Affairs that would incorporate AID and USIA. (Johnson Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and the typed initials below. 33. Editorial Note 33. Editorial Note In a statement made to the Cabinet on March 25, 1965, and released to the press the same day, the President instructed Secretary of State Rusk and Bureau of the Budget Director Kermit Gordon to review U.S. overseas programs in 10 to 15 countries, on a country-by-country basis. The goal, he stated, was to “make certain that our people abroad and the money we spend abroad are used to achieve maximum support of the accomplishment of our foreign policy objectives.” For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, page 318. The President's directive resulted in the Executive Review of Overseas Programs (EROP), an in-depth review of all U.S. programs in each of 13 countries using the Department of State's Comprehensive Country Programming System. The Department explained the procedures of EROP in airgram CA–12444, May 21. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1) Secretary Rusk endorsed EROP in a letter of May 28 to the Chiefs of Mission of the 13 countries chosen for the review ( Document 39 ). In a June 12 memorandum to the President, Rusk and new Bureau of the Budget Director Charles Schultze reported on the status of EROP, noting that “each Chief of Mission has been instructed to propose a comprehensive program encompassing all United States agencies and activities in his country for fiscal year 1967.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Executive Review of Overseas Programs) A report documenting the “results, conclusions, recommendations, and evaluation” of EROP was prepared in the Department of State's Office of Management Planning in October 1965. The report recommended that “a foreign affairs programming system be established under the direction of the Secretary of State” and “that planning and programming procedures continue to emphasize country rather than agency or functional programs as the initial entity for program review and evaluation.” (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, October 1965-Executive Review of Overseas Programs) On December 3 Richard Barrett, Director of the Office of Management Planning, drafted a memorandum to the President from Rusk and Schultze ( Document 49 ) that reviewed EROP and incorporated the recommendations of the October report. However, the Bureau of the Budget and other agencies disagreed with the recommendations, and the memorandum was never forwarded. For an extended discussion of EROP based on first-hand experience, see Frederick Mosher and John Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , pages 74–114. During 1965 Harr was a member of State's Management Planning Staff and then Deputy Director of the Office of Management Planning. For reaction to EROP on the part of officials at the embassies involved in the review, see Documents 104 and 113 . For the Central Intelligence Agency's reaction to EROP, see Document 234 . 34. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 34. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 7, 1965. SUBJECT A Critique of the Combined Organization for Latin American Affairs We have completed a review of the combined State/AID organization for Latin American Affairs (normally called Back-to-Back). The review concluded that the experiment achieved worthwhile results such as: —Decisions can be made more quickly. The capacity exists and many officers find that decision-making time has been shortened. —State and AID now speak to U.S. Missions with one voice. —Side-stepping responsibility by buffeting issues between State and AID is stopped. —Joint approach permits better coordination. —State and AID personnel are better informed through greater exchange of information and attendance at common staff meetings. —Manpower is used with greater flexibility. —Issues are more comprehensively and sharply presented for decision by senior officials. —Personnel perspective, understanding, skills and interests are broader. —There is less memo writing. —We believe from these findings that it is worthwhile to move forward with this arrangement in AF and NEA. FE has been completed. 2 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, ORG 8. No classification marking. Concurred in by Thomas of ARA. Copies were sent to Ball and Mann. The memorandum indicates it was seen by the Secretary. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in the State Department and the Bureau of Latin America in AID were combined in March 1964 (see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XXXI, Document 10 . Crockett's memorandum is based on a study entitled “Critique of the Combined Organization for Latin American Affairs,” prepared by the Office of Management, Department of State, in January 1965. Fifty State and AID officers were interviewed for the study, of whom “few expressed serious doubts regarding the usefulness of combined operations.” The critique pointed out, however, that the effectiveness of combined organization in ARA could be “attributed, at least in part, to the unique combination of responsibility in Mr. Mann for the Alliance for Progress as well as for the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with Latin American countries”; and the critique submitted recommendations for “important and significant improvements that must be made” if the combined organization were to become “fully successful.” (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, Combined Organization for Latin American Affairs) 2 In 1966 Gladys Rogers (O/SP) and Harry Fite (AID) conducted a survey of the combined organization and produced an 82-page report. Rogers forwarded the report to Crockett under cover of a January 3, 1967, memorandum in which she stated that “briefly, the consolidated geographic offices are working out very well indeed [but] the consolidated administrative office has encountered more complex problems and has a long way to go yet.” (Ibid.) 35. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 35. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 26, 1965, 8:45 p.m. President: Hello? Rusk: Mr. President? President: Yes, sir. Rusk: I've looked and thought about this Dick Gardner thing more. I'm not prepared in view of the checking that I've done to cash that blank check you've offered me so I'll drop that. I do want to get Patricia Harris, but she's not the person for that particular post. We need somebody with a lot of foreign affairs experience in that, whether professional or non-professional. But I would like to get her in a top spot over here. I'm trying now to find out what we can offer her, but I'll be in touch with you again about that. President: Why don't we make her ambassador to one of the, ah, Luxembourg? Rusk: Well— President: What I've been doing is talking to these women and I want to move them up—women and Negroes. Rusk: Well, one thing, for example, if she were our deputy legal adviser, she'd do a lot more work and be more help to us than she would as ambassador to Luxembourg. President: Yes, but it wouldn't have the, ah, the honor and the standing and the status and the glory that all the Negroes want. And the women. Rusk: Well, let me look at it but— President: I don't want to send her to Jamaica. But I want to send her to some Scandinavian country or Luxembourg or— Rusk: Right, well, let me— President: Something like that. Rusk: She's got fantastic background. President: She's got excellent, and she's a good administrator and I thought that's what you wanted at Geneva? Rusk: Well, she's had no foreign affairs experience. We have 70 or 80 delegations a year in Geneva and that takes a person of really a great amount of foreign affairs experience. We need to improve on the man we've got there now. 2 That's the point. President: All right, now has he— Rusk: I'll work on this question. President: Has he not done a creditable job? Rusk: Well, he's done a creditable job but he hasn't made use of the opportunities there. President: Now, he didn't have much foreign affairs experience, did he? Rusk: No, he was here for about 2 years, 2–1/2 years, before he went over there. But he hasn't done the job we wanted him to do. President: Well, let's see if we can't move some ambassador out of some of these places, move him there, then move some of these people into some of those places. Rusk: All right. Well, I'll drop Dick Gardner and we'll pick up Mrs. Harris and see what we can do about that. 3 President: All right. Rusk: All right. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape F65.10, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 Roger W. Tubby was Representative to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva with the rank of Ambassador; W. True Davis, Jr., was Ambassador to Switzerland in Bern. 3 Patricia Roberts Harris was appointed Ambassador to Luxembourg on June 4, 1965, presented her credentials on September 7, and served until September 22, 1967. 36. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) 36. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) 1 Washington, April 27, 1965. SUBJECT State-Commerce Relations Although I realize you are burdened with the task of acquainting yourself with a host of operations and problems, there is one subject I would like to bring to your attention at this time-the general relationship between the State Department and the Department of Commerce and between the Foreign Service and the American business community. Traditionally, the Bureau of Economic Affairs has neither been deeply concerned about the modus vivendi between State and Commerce nor about the quality of services offered by our posts to the American businessmen seeking or developing markets abroad. It is imperative that your Bureau's interests in these areas be intensified. 1. State and Commerce —The history between these two agencies and the question of who has what responsibilities abroad has undergone a host of bureaucratic permutations. Suffice to say that in the past few years Commerce strongly insisted upon, and we grudgingly agreed to, a separation of the commercial function from the general activities of the economic sections of our posts. The creation of a commercial specialist program included a complex effort to develop officer specialists in commercial activities, to give them status through the use of appropriate diplomatic titles and to ensure that these officers were able to deal directly with the Department of Commerce. It is all summed up in the “Agreement” of November 15, 1961 between State and Commerce. 2 Some people felt that this separation of the commercial activity was the first step towards a separate commercial Foreign Service. Indeed, the bureaucracy in Commerce had long pressed for a separate Service. Therefore, we were somewhat surprised when Commerce reversed its position early this year. The new stance was that commercial and economic work were inextricably related, ergo, Commerce had to have a major interest in the operations of the Economic sections and in the choice of economic officers. Hodges, of course, departed the scene and Connor probably does not intend to take on this bureaucratic problem until he is firmly in the saddle. This problem bears directly upon you and your bureau since if Commerce is successful in this new bid you may very will find yourself the head of a bureau with limited responsibilities in foreign economic policy. 2. The Commercial Operation Overseas —Although it is difficult to evaluate many of the complaints businessmen raise about the lack of cooperation from our posts abroad and the general ineffectiveness of our commercial officers, there is no doubt in our mind that our commercial services are little more than surface gestures and that our commercial officers, for the most part, are engaged in amateur activities. And it is not just our fault. Commerce has failed to establish priorities for our people and has not come through with professional backstopping. The various bureaucracies within Commerce demand and thrive upon a multitude of reports, surveys and lists so that our officers are primarily involved in a paper production. What to Do We are moving on a number of planes to meet with and resolve the problems outlined above. (a) We intend to take the initiative from Commerce and urge them to establish a list of priorities for commercial activities overseas. Marginal activities, despite their benefits or traditions must be discarded. We have to get younger, more vigorous officers involved in commercial activities. We need to get them out of the routine of trade reports and into the streets where they can develop primary contacts. They need the time, impetus and encouragement to professionally analyze the problems and prospects for American business in their country. (b) We have to foster a more sympathetic attitude on the part of the entire Foreign Service towards business. We are approaching this through exchanges of personnel with industry, through meetings and through publicity within the business communities. Recently we have begun to establish systematically liaison with the major business groups (NAM, BCIU, etc.). We now use the BCIU as the vehicle by which newly appointed Ambassadors meet with the chief executives of major corporations with interests or potential interests in their country of assignment. In a real sense, and more so today than ever before, the responsibility for commercial activity is diffused throughout the Embassy and is a major burden of the Ambassador. We are beginning to encourage our officers to proudly use American products and to aggressively seek markets for American products-in the same manner and with the same intensity that our British, French and German colleagues do. (c) Your Bureau must begin to identify itself more closely with economic and commercial officers, to look after their interests, to ensure their professional development, to make them feel they have a Washington base that speaks their language and understands their problems. I suggest that you meet with and use the energy and talents of Benjamin Weiner, who has the somewhat opaque title of Director of the Office of American Business Services. Ben is assiduously cultivating the business community, and will serve as a point of contact and irritation between State and Commerce. William J. Crockett 3 P.S. I planned to refer to this on Tuesday, but now that you have this paper, we can discuss it in greater detail on Friday. 4 W.J.C. 5 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Org 1, General Policy. Limited Official Use. Filed with the memorandum are five 1964 memoranda concerning relations between the Departments of State and Commerce: Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jack Behrman to Crockett, March 6, 1964; Crockett to Under Secretary of Commerce Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., June 6, 1964; Roosevelt to Crockett, June 16, 1964; Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges to Rusk, June 16, 1964; and Crockett to Rusk, October 22, 1964. 2 Not found. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Crockett signed the original. 4 April 30. 5 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 37. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) 37. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) 1 Washington, April 28, 1965, 9:55 a.m. Just between Moyers and Ball, the President asked Moyers to spend a good bit of time trying to come up with a real Johnson appointee for the Assistant Sec for EUR. On the basis of reading a number of files, Moyers said he had about decided to recommend John Leddy. Moyers wanted Ball's opinion. 2 Ball said he had known him intimately for 20 years and he thought him the best in his field. He is the best in foreign economic policy but he has never had any real European political experience but he understands the background and he is sensitive to all of the problems. He is competent and would do a good job. Ball said he did not know whether he would take it or not because he might not feel himself sufficiently on top of the political question. Moyers thought he seemed to have an abundance of natural talents, and that he seems to have been very active in the economic field and it seems to Moyers, the economic field in Europe will be one of our serious problems. Also he “knows the crowd back here”. Ball said Leddy knows the government thoroughly and he knows the issues thoroughly. He is lacking in experience in the political field. Ball said his first choice, Bowie, is one he gathered is not universally popular. Ball said he thought some of the things said about him he just could not believe. Ball said Bowie had written a little book 3 which he would like for Moyers to read in order to make an independent decision. Bowie would be the first choice of Acheson, McCloy, Bruce. Ball worked with him in the past and he has worked very closely with Bruce. Moyers asked about Schulman 4 in this regard and Ball replied that he knew him but went no further. Moyers asked if Ball thought Leddy could do it and Ball said he could. Ball would be happy with him. It could be considered as a strong appointment for the President. Ball asked if Bowie was out and Moyers replied no; that the Secretary had recommended him, but Moyers has not yet had a reaction. Ball asked that before a final recommendation is made he would like to send over to Moyers for his reading a copy of a book by Bowie; Bowie would be Ball's first choice. Moyers said he would be happy to read the book first. 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, People & Positions III. No classification marking. Drafted in Ball's office. 2 McGeorge Bundy telephoned Ball “on the QT” to discuss Leddy 3 hours later. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., as is a memorandum of Ball's telephone conversation with Macy regarding Leddy on April 30. The President appointed Leddy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs on June 4. 3 Presumably Robert Bowie's Shaping the Future: Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). 4 Presumably a reference to Marshall Shulman, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. 5 This paragraph is a “continuation” of the memorandum and was prepared by a second drafter. 38. Letter From President Johnson to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (McCormack) 38. Letter From President Johnson to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (McCormack) 1 Washington, May 6, 1965. Dear Mr. Speaker: In my message of January 14, 1965, to the Congress relative to foreign aid, 2 I stated that we would develop “a program which is designed to strengthen the personnel capabilities of all the foreign affairs agencies of the Government.” As part of this program, I have already taken certain important steps. On April 13, 1965, I transmitted for the advice and consent of the Senate a list of 760 USIA career officers for appointment as Foreign Service Officers. By this action, we take a big step towards a unified and flexible career Foreign Service of the United States better equipped to meet the pressing needs of modem diplomacy. Today I have signed an Executive Order “Providing for the Appointment in the Competitive Service of Certain Present and Former Officers and Employees of the Foreign Service.” 3 This will permit qualified Foreign Service personnel to obtain appointments to Civil Service positions without re-examination. This will assist me in placing the right man in the right job. The appointment of U.S. Information Agency officers as Foreign Service Officers and the signing of this order are two steps in the plan to improve and strengthen the administration of personnel employed in the agencies whose business is foreign affairs. Additional reforms will require legislation. Towards this end, there is pending in the House of Representatives a measure (H.R. 6277) to provide much needed Amendments to the Foreign Service Act of 1946. That bill has been ably developed by Congressman Wayne Hays of Ohio, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, following discussions with Administration officials. Enactment of a bill along the lines of the Hays Bill is another vital step. 4 I urge the Congress to enact amendments to the Foreign Service Act this year. I say “this year,” so that the Secretary of State and I, and the other officials, can get on with the task of providing the very best personnel system we can produce for foreign affairs. Our ability to seize the opportunities and to use our vast resources to further the aims of the United States foreign policy must in large measure rest on the dedication and capabilities of people involved in our foreign activities. In no other area of governmental activity is it more vital to our national interest to develop and retain a corps of well-qualified men and women. It must also attract the outstanding youth of today so that tomorrow's work will be in capable hands. The new system we seek to establish will be based on the following principles: (a) There will be a single Foreign Affairs Personnel system, broad enough to accommodate the personnel needs—domestic as well as overseas—of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency, and to cover appropriate personnel of other agencies engaged in foreign affairs. (b) This system must be fully responsive to Presidential requirements and the changing conditions in our foreign relations. (c) Although certain basic policies and perquisites will be applied to all members of the system, full recognition will be given to the differences between the various categories of personnel and their respective conditions of service. (d) The heads of the participating agencies will be responsible for implementing personnel policies and for the management control of their own personnel. (e) Free interchange of personnel among the foreign affairs agencies and between these agencies and the other departments and agencies of the Executive Branch will be sought. (f) Maximum flexibility will be sought in the assignment process to enable management to meet unique requirements and crisis conditions with efficiency and at a minimum cost. (g) Increased coordination with the Civil Service system will be provided by closer liaison with the Civil Service Commission on various personnel activities. (h) Appointments, promotions and selection-out of personnel will be based on the principle of competitive evaluation. To carry out these principles, legislation is needed to do a number of things. Among these are: (1) Provide a new category of professional career officers who would serve in the Foreign Service without time limitation, primarily for service in this country. This category should be called Foreign Affairs Officers. They should have personal rank and be subject to the same merit principles with respect to appointment, promotion, and selection-out as the other categories. Provision should be made for Foreign Affairs Officers of classes 1, 2, and 3 to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and those of classes 4 through 8 to be appointed by the President alone or by the Secretary of State when directed by the President. (2) Provide a transitional period of three years during which civil service employees of the foreign affairs agencies may decide to become participants in the new system without screening and without loss of compensation. Those who do not wish to participate will be assisted in obtaining suitable employment in other Government agencies. But after the transitional period the dual Foreign Service-Civil Service personnel systems of the foreign affairs agencies would be ended, and only the unified Foreign Service would apply. The Secretary of State will be responsible for its overall management. (3) Eliminate restrictions on the periods of service of Foreign Service personnel in the headquarters of Government agencies. (4) Reduce the requirements regarding length of service in other Government agencies prior to establishing eligibility for appointment into the Foreign Service officer classes 1 through 7. (5) Eliminate present restrictions on reappointments of Foreign Service Reserve officers. (6) Permit extension of selection-out and severance pay provisions, now limited to Foreign Service officers to all officers and employees of the Foreign Service. To meet the present-day realities of service abroad, legislation also is needed to provide important changes in benefits available to Foreign Service personnel. These have been made necessary by trouble-spot situations of service, such as in the Congo or in Viet Nam. It is only right that we properly and compassionately look after the men and women whom we must send to such places to do our Government's business. These changes are: —Amendment to the Annual and Sick Leave Act to permit continuation of employees in duty status if they incur injury or illness arising from a hostile act in line of duty or stemming from the fact that they were located abroad. —Amendment to the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act to permit increasing the differential from the present limit of 25% to a limit of 50% when an employee is assigned duty in a foreign area where there is unusual danger of injury directly due to hostile activity. —Amendment to the Foreign Service Act, Section 911, to permit the payment of travel expenses of employees and dependents when warranted by extraordinary conditions, or circumstances involving unusual personal hardship. Representatives of the Department of State, the Civil Service Commission, and others are prepared to explain the Administration's position on this measure and to help in any way they can. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 5 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, PER 1. No classification marking. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 502–504. An identical letter was sent on May 6 to the President of the Senate, Vice President Humphrey. The background and fate of the measures discussed in the President's letter are described in John Ensor Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 84–93; and in “The Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson,” vol. II, chap. 2D, “Efforts to Establish a Unified Foreign Affairs Personnel System,” prepared in 1968 by Clifford Hailey of the Department of State's Office of Foreign Affairs Personnel Planning. (Johnson Library, Administrative Histories) 2 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 44–50. 3 E.O. 11219. (30 F.R. 6381; 3 CFR, 1965 Supp.) 4 The House passed H.R. 6277 (the Hays bill) by voice vote on September 9. Crockett noted in a September 27 memorandum to Macy, however, that “the Congressional Record for that day records the stiff opposition our supporters faced from those who represented unions and veterans' groups, and we may expect this same opposition when the bill is brought up in the Senate,” which considered the bill during 1966. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book) Crockett testified in support of the bill before a special subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 19, 1966. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 1131–1135. The Hays bill failed when the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations tabled it on September 15, 1966. No further action was taken either on the Hays bill or the list of USIA officers proposed for FSO status. In 1967 USIA submitted a new bill, providing for a career service comparable to the FSO corps, that became law in 1968. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates the President signed the original. 39. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (Battle) 39. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (Battle) 1 Washington, May 28, 1965. Dear Luke: You have probably received by now extensive guidance for the Executive Review of Overseas Programs, which I recently discussed with Kermit Grodon. I am writing you to emphasize the fact that the President attaches considerable importance to the project and has a strong interest in its success. I share his view fully. Two basic factors underlie both the concept and procedures of the Review. The first is the belief that the Chief of Mission, because he is in charge of the U.S. Mission in the country to which he is accredited and because he is in close and continuous contact with all of the programs and activities of the Mission, has a unique capability in the Executive Branch to assess the effectiveness of those programs and activities and assure their efficient management. The second factor is that the Chief of Mission is the representative of the President. As such, he has special responsibilities that are not limited to the Foreign Service establishment, but rather extend to the entire U.S. Mission. His concern and perspective, therefore, must be as broad as his responsibilities. He must understand the purpose of and need for activities of domestic agencies in his country and scrutinize them with the same objectivity that he applies to the activities of the community of foreign affairs agencies. These were the principal factors that led to the decision that the initiative for this project should be given to the Chief of Mission and that his recommendations for a comprehensive U.S. program for fiscal year 1967 will provide the foundation of the Review. The scope and requirements of the Review make it a demanding and difficult task for you and your staff, particularly in view of the necessarily tight schedule, but I am sure that you will give it the priority attention it needs. Sincerely, Dean 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1. Unclassified. Attached is a memorandum from the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration to Rusk, May 25, indicating that the same letter was sent to all 13 Chiefs of Mission participating in the Executive Review of Overseas Programs. For background on EROP, see Document 33 . According to Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , p. 84, Rusk himself proposed sending this letter during a planning meeting on EROP with Crockett and Barrett in April. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 40. Editorial Note 40. Editorial Note At 1 p.m. on July 9, 1965, President Johnson telephoned Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to discuss the appointment of Robert W. Kitchen, Jr., an African-American, to replace Harry McPherson as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. The President wanted McPherson, who was in the Oval Office during the telephone call, to join the White House staff. The conversation was recorded in the White House on a dictabelt but, due primarily to a problem with the dictabelt, some of Fulbright's comments are unintelligible. The conversation began as follows: President: (aside to McPherson) “Harry, get over there on the phone. Bill, this problem, I've got the man now that you want to specifications, but Harry tells me that you don't want him, that you've got some question about him, and hell, I'm going to have to let you select him if you won't take my man.” Fulbright: “Who are you talking about?” President: “I'm talking about the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Mr. Robert W. Kitchen, Jr. He was born in Brunswick, Georgia—” Fulbright: “Oh yeah, he [McPherson] told me about it, yes.” President (apparently reading from a dossier): “He received his A.B. in economics from Morehouse.” Fulbright: “It occurred to me that—” President (still reading): “He received his M.S. degree in business from Columbia. He got a Ph.[D.] degree at Columbia, an honorary Doctor of Laws from Chapman, California. He served in the Navy. Became Assistant to the Treasurer of Hampton Institute. He joined the Agency of International Development. He's been the head of many task forces, including the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Africa, First International Conference on Adult Education in Rome, Task Groups on Administrative Procedures in Cairo, Task Group on Community Developments in Bangkok. He received the highest meritorious service award for his work. His duties as director of the international training—he teaches international training at Howard University. He is married, has a daughter age 13, and here's what the analysis shows on him—that we've been thinking of him as Assistant Secretary of Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. He's been directing a program which in most respects is more complex and challenging as that of the educational and cultural operation in State. The comments we've received on his performance universally indicate that he does an outstanding job. He has a well-earned reputation for being an innovator and a doer. I'm personally acquainted with him and found him always to be imaginative and perceptive and diligent.” President (speaking on his own rather than reading): “Now here's what I can do. I can work with this fellow. And I don't believe that folks like Rooney can turn down this Negro that's able and can testify and do his job. Now Carl Rowan is going to leave the USIA, and go out and write, in journalism. And when he does, I want to announce this fellow as going in as Assistant Secretary, because the State Department just won't let any Negroes work over there.” Fulbright: “Well, Mr. President, you know whatever you want you can do—” President: “No, I can't do it here. I'm not going to do anything that you don't want. But you wanted me to pick the best man I could, and Harry said, well, you said 'they're gonna have two Negroes.' Well, they're not. Just going to have—not going to have any if we don't name this fellow. And I'll use him as my front and I'll do the rest of the work, with your help.” Fulbright: “Well, I don't know—I know I would be accused of bigotry if I didn't approve him.” President: “No, you wouldn't be accused of anything. Nobody would even know you'd been talked to. Now you and I don't deal that way. If you don't want the man, we just don't want him. If you want the program, I think this is the best thing we can do. But whatever you want, you get, as far as I'm concerned.” Fulbright: “Well, of course, that's what bothers me is that, you know, very few of these countries that we have [unintelligible] are Negro countries. I don't know how he would go down in the most important countries at all. A very delicate subject, but it's very delicate here at home. What struck me the other day when he mentioned it was that both of our—USIA and the cultural programs and the visits [?]—after all we are not predominantly a colored nation.” President: “Not at all. But the USIA man is leaving. And he has done a good job.” Fulbright: “It never occurred to me that they were outstanding in the cultural field in this country. I mean, after all they're not. The big [?] universities are not predominantly colored.” President: “No, but Bill, we have 120 Ambassadors and we only have two Negroes. We have a dozen Assistant Secretaries of State. We have a dozen Assistant Secretaries.” Fulbright: “I happen to think this is a hell of a lot more important job than anything the ambassadors do—” President: “That's right.” Fulbright: “—that deal with 48 countries.” President: “But I'm talking now—we've got all the Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries and we don't have one. And this fellow—” Fulbright: “I wouldn't object at all if you made him Secretary of State for that matter, but I have a rather personal interest in this post [unintelligible] in a bad way—” President: “That's right. And I think this is the best prepared, best equipped, best trained man we have. Because he's dealing in the international field. He's forgotten more about it than Harry ever knew. Hell, he's [McPherson's] a Tyler, Texas boy. But this fellow is dealing in this work now in all the country.” The President again reviewed Kitchen's credentials and the conversation continued. President: “Now where in the hell you got a man equal? Harry, you tell him what you think about it. You can find anybody that even comes close to him, I'm willing to take him on merit.” McPherson: “Senator, he's already been running the AID program, and they've got more foreign students here than we do. I suppose he goes to 60 universities a year. I know he's been to all 2 or 3 hundred of them—” Fulbright: “Harry, the AID and the military programs are not the same [unintelligible] at all.” McPherson: “No, but what I'm trying to indicate is that they're the nearest approximations of them.” (Fulbright's comments, made simultaneously, are unintelligible.) Fulbright: “It's not just handling a lot of people. He's supposed to have some standing with the people we deal with. The main purpose of this is to have people with [unintelligible] and the personality to get along with the major foreign countries. If they don't cooperate, well there's no hope for us. We can't just force a national program on them.” McPherson: “I know that.” Fulbright: “I don't know the fellow. I'll be very glad to meet him.” After further conversation, Fulbright agreed to see Kitchen on July 12. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Senator Fulbright, Tape FMISC.04, Side B, PNO 1) The portions of the conversation printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. In September 1966 the President appointed Charles Frankel to be Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. That same month, Kitchen became Agency for International Development Adviser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York City. 41. Editorial Note 41. Editorial Note According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation on July 15, 1965, between President Johnson and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Mann, the President asked Mann for the names of people for the position of Representative to the United Nations. “Mr. Mann said he could think of people who could do the job, but he thought they were needed more where they were. He added that off-the-cuff he would say Secretary Wirtz and George Ball. He explained that he really thought Mr. Ball was needed in the State Department and said that he made 90% of the decisions that had to be made. Mr. Mann told the President that the Assistant Secretaries have been weak in decision-making. He said that he thought this would improve greatly with the new appointments (Leddy and Hare).” Later in the same conversation, “the President asked about Secretary Rusk and whether he would be interested. Mr. Mann said he doubted it and besides he felt that we all need Secretary Rusk in his job where he is now. The President asked Mr. Mann who it was that keeps roughing him up trying to get him to resign.” Mann responded that “just between the two of them, George Ball had told him that he and Rusk were satisfied that it came from [Arthur] Schlesinger and [Richard] Goodwin and that crowd. The President said it may come from Schlesinger. Goodwin denies it.” Mann then “asked to have time to think about it some more. He said that he really felt that Rusk and Ball were needed here. He said that he felt that Ball is basically loyal to the President. He said that he will not always agree but he does get decisions made. He said the Secretary was a cautious man and does not make quick decisions.” (Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ) 42. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 42. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. IMPROVING STATE DEPARTMENT FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP IN MATTERS OF MAJOR USG CONCERN There have been significant changes in the method of conduct of foreign relations and in the demands placed on the State Department during the 20 months of the Johnson Administration. The Department has had to learn to operate with long-sustained, serious crises in SEA and elsewhere which take a substantial percentage of the time and thoughts of top officials. Military matters have required increasing attention. The NSC apparatus, which used to initiate a variety of foreign policy demands and initiatives, has become much less active. The Department is clearing far fewer matters with the White House staff than was the case before November 22, 1963. In short, a greater premium is now placed on effective, independent operation of the Department at all levels. None of these changing requirements has led to responsive changes in the Department's method of handling its business. This paper contains several suggestions for improving the Department's ability (1) to cope with key problems—at the bureau level, at the seventh-floor level, and interdepartmentally; and (2) to respond better to the President's needs. 1. Strengthening bureau leadership There is no disagreement with the view often stated by the Secretary that primary responsibility for the proper handling of foreign affairs must rest with the bureaus and the regional Assistant Secretaries. From the point of view of the 7th floor, however, it would seem fair to say there is increasing concern about the ability of the bureaus to fulfill their responsibilities under present circumstances. At least three main points of criticism can be cited. (1) The Assistant Secretaries and other bureau officers do not seem to be bringing to the attention of the 7th floor the major issues on which high-level information and attention is most needed in a consistent and timely fashion. (2) With one or two notable exceptions, the Assistant Secretaries do not appear to be exerting sufficient leadership among their counterparts in the other agencies dealing with national security problems. (3) The bureaus do not seem to be organized in such a way as to assure satisfactory handling of other affairs when seized with a major crisis which occupies most of the time of the Assistant Secretary. One method of improving the Department's leadership position in foreign affairs and of promoting more systematic consideration of major problems would be to set up interdepartmental regional policy committees in each of the bureaus under the chairmanship of the respective regional Assistant Secretary. In addition to the desired representation from the bureau itself, other functional bureaus and offices within the Department would attend when problems to be addressed affected their areas, and the Secretariat line officer for the bureau would be present to report the proceedings to the four principal officers of the Department. The Assistant Secretary would have full authority to limit the invitations to essential participants and unnecessary “professional meeting goers” would be excluded. Members would include, as the problems to be dealt with would dictate, the Assistant Secretary's counterparts from AID, USIA, ISA and CIA, and, as appropriate, representatives of Peace Corps, Treasury, Ex-Im, Commerce, Agriculture and HEW. Every effort would be made with seventh-floor assistance necessary to get the high-level counterparts from other agencies to attend regularly, and to combat the usual committee tendency to permit progressively lower-level representatives. The regional Committees would have jurisdiction over any and all aspects of US policy toward the countries covered by the bureaus, although subjects such as counter-insurgency and covert action policies would probably be better handled in subcommittee or small executive committee in the discretion of the Assistant Secretary. The bureaus would be directed to bring up for consideration in regular meetings of these Committees on a systematic basis the most significant short- and long-term policy problems confronting the USG in the area. The Assistant Secretaries would be asked to give the Committee process their close, personal attention and supervision as a matter of high priority. Advance agendas and timely records of action would be required. Only two of the five regional bureaus, ARA and AF, presently have established bureau-level machinery for addressing interdepartmental problems. The membership of these two committees is set forth as an attachment to this paper. 2 The Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) has met fairly regularly, usually weekly, to address country or regional problems with Government-wide implications. The African Policy Committee (AFPC), on the other hand, has met only once in 1965 and seven times last year. The two committees have varied greatly in effectiveness and objectives. The LAPC has tended to concentrate on long-range planning tasks, while the AFPC meetings have tended to be reporting sessions on recent events. Neither committee serves the broader purposes outlined above, but there is a general consensus that both have served a useful purpose in exerting State Department leadership and exhorting greater cooperation from the other agencies. NEA has attempted to coordinate interdepartmental problems in its area by fairly regular weekly luncheons including the Assistant Secretary, the regional Administrator of AID, the USIA Near East Deputy Director, and the Deputy Director of ISA for Near East Affairs. In addition a staff meeting has been held weekly to which other agency participants are invited, and send relatively junior representatives. These informal contacts, useful as they undoubtedly have been, cannot be considered an adequate substitute for a regular recognized forum for interdepartmental consultation and decision, where the hardest problems can be addressed systematically, differences of view presented and cooperation sought. When the Assistant Secretary has had a crisis to deal with or is absent from town, coordination has suffered, and the reporting back from the weekly luncheons has left much to be desired. FE lacks any established interdepartmental machinery, other than the Vietnam Coordinating Committee, and in recent months the Assistant Secretary has negotiated most important interdepartmental business personally on an ad hoc basis. The lack of a broader forum is said to have increased unnecessarily our difficulties in obtaining government-wide cooperation in such controversial areas as our economic relations with Japan and the increasingly difficult problems with Indonesia. Obviously, the existence of the everyday crises in SEA has made far more difficult the handling of other affairs. In European matters as well, interagency regional policy machinery is completely lacking, and there is no systematic organization for handling the numerous complex issues affecting Defense, Commerce and other agencies of government. Regional policy committees would be expected to function in time of crisis in the area as well as in normal periods, and could keep a watch over other problems which might presently escape the attention of an assistant secretary preoccupied with a given crisis. Acting or deputy assistant secretaries would chair meetings in the necessary absence of the assistant secretary. When confronted by a situation that might well develop crisis proportions, the policy committees would be directed to establish actual and standby interagency task forces to coordinate our policies towards the country in question and to serve as the focal point for requirements of and information needed by the 7th floor or White House . A full roster of operating task forces would be kept current at the White House and in S, U, M and G. Summaries of the major items of business dealt with by the regional committees and task forces would be prepared after each meeting by the secretariat for the information of the principal officers. By this means it should be possible for the Secretary and the Under Secretaries to have a better grasp of what the bureaus consider to be their principal business and what they were doing about it, and to let them give more effective and timely policy guidance to the assistant secretaries. G would have special responsibilities in this regard and these are spelled out in the next section. The Assistant Secretaries weekly individual and biweekly staff meetings with Assistant Secretaries would be utilized to seek guidance or approval for the actions of the regional policy committees in key areas and, as well, to keep the principal officers of the Department informed of major developments. In summary, it can be said that the Department of State is missing a good bet in not exerting leadership through the means of regional policy committees in NEA, FE and EUR and in not making the other committees more broadly effective. Such committees could provide a powerful impetus for forcing important problems to the fore in a comprehensive and timely fashion. 2. Strengthening 7th Floor Control Improvements in bureau operations should be accompanied by improvements in seventh floor conduct of business. Sustained serious crises have occupied an ever increasing percentage of the time of the Secretary and Under Secretaries, and utilization of their remaining time must be planned with increasing care. Several problems can be identified: (1) There is not enough information flowing to the bureaus from the principal officers. Decisions taken by them are sometimes learned about in the bureaus from contacts with counterparts in other agencies. Debriefing is rarely full or prompt enough. (2) There is no systematic means of bringing seventh floor leadership to bear on problems which are beyond the competence of a single bureau because they require the cooperation of other agency heads or because they affect all or more than one region. (3) Seventh floor knowledge of major bureau concerns seems spotty and sometimes even haphazard. The last problem cited should be partially solved at least by regular receipt of summaries from bureau regional policy committees. It would be desirable to supplement this information flow to the top officers of the Department with summaries of major developments at the regular bureau staff meetings, which could be prepared by the Secretariat officers who already attend such meetings. The first two problems cited could be tackled by the establishing of seventh floor machinery to help direct and coordinate the most important area and interregional problems. The only existing seventh floor committees—the CI Group and the 303 Group—have jurisdiction limited strictly to counter insurgency and covert intelligence matters. The great strength of these committees has been their ability to attract the highest level of other departmental representation; their weakness—the leadership role they have taken away from the regional bureaus on matters not always requiring attention at the highest levels. Ad hoc committees have been set up in the past, usually under the leadership of G, to wrestle with a variety of problems, but the desired high level of representation from other agencies has not been forthcoming, and there has been considerable dissatisfaction with the results. On a number of occasions in the past leadership has been taken away from the State Department by the White House by the convening of meetings in the NSC area. Frequently these meetings have been convened prior to the development of a policy within the Department, much less before any effort has been made by the Department to coordinate policy on a government-wide basis. It is recommended that a seventh floor State Coordinating Committee be established to deal with the most important problems requiring highest level inter-agency consideration . The chairmanship and membership on the State Coordinating Committee would be kept as flexible as possible to meet the widely varying demands which would be placed on the committee. Normally, however, the committee would be chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the represent-atives from other agencies would include the AID, USIA and CIA Director or Deputy Director, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the ISA Assistant Secretary of Defense, and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Assistant secretaries and area experts would be added as appropriate. US Ambassadors must be able to attend. When the nature of the problem warranted it, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Under Secretary or even the Secretary (if other Cabinet members were invited), would chair the meetings. G would have this responsibility normally, however, and it would be his primary responsibility to review regularly the reports of the Regional Policy Committee meetings to determine whether higher level consideration of problems was desired and to determine when other problems beyond the competence of any one bureau required such consideration. The State Coordinating Committee would consider only problems of major import which could not be resolved at lower levels, by G in consultation with one or more assistant secretaries, bilaterally with another department, or by other devices. It would not meet regularly unless the importance of business to be considered required it. In a major crisis the State Coordinating Committee might be asked to act as a top level task force , freeing the Cabinet level officers from many of the coordination problems they now face in time of crisis. Staffing for the seventh floor committee would be done by the bureau whose problems were being considered. The Secretariat would coordinate staffing responsibilities when the problems fell within the jurisdiction of several bureaus. The Secretariat would also have responsibility under G's supervision to set agendas and circulate records of action. Regular and appropriate dissemination of the records of action of the committee should go a long way towards meeting the urgent need of the bureaus for better information flow from above. 3. General Comments on Proposed Bureau and 7th Floor Machinery The proposals made above might be criticized as revival of the Operations Coordinating Board machinery in another form. The answer to such criticism lies in strict adherence to a few simple rules: (1) State responsibility for leadership would be retained, by a) chairmanship of the regional committees by State, b) provision of staffing services by the bureaus in State, and c) maintenance of the closest possible connection between committee deliberations and action processes; (2) Creation of ad hoc or country working groups with independent lives would be avoided by insistence on the informality and temporary existence of task forces; (3) Elaborate minutes or reports of meetings would not be required, other than those papers prepared to record decisions not otherwise incorporated in action papers or summaries written to inform the seventh floor of significant problems; and (4) Action would be completed and taken at the lowest possible level at which the agencies vitally involved could agree, except where the significance of the action required higher level approval. The purposes of the several groups proposed in this paper should be clearly distinguished for maximum economy of effort: (1) The regional policy committees would be the only groups meeting on a regular schedule for wide-ranging discussion, as well as for consideration of specific problems which may or may not be reduced in advance to written form; (2) The task forces would meet, or work separately or as a group, only in the pursuit of specific tasks assigned by the parent regional committees or by the State Coordinating Committee, upon completion of which their affairs would be returned to normal methods of operation and coordination as soon as possible; (3) The State Coordinating Committee would meet only for the consideration of specific problems on which the agreement or disagreement of vitally concerned agencies would be clearly identified in advance and, normally, circulated in written form prepared individually or in a task force. Problems affecting only two or three agencies might be discussed in these bodies but would not normally become the business of the full group when decisions had to be made. 4. Improving Information Flow to the President On at least four occasions in recent days the President has expressed dissatisfaction with the information flow which he received on Dominican problems prior to the April 28 crisis, and his concern about the adequacy of information reaching him about other dangerous contingencies. He has suggested the formation of high-level interagency task forces to deal with dangerous country problems such as Colombia, Guatemala and Bolivia and other countries as required. 3 As articulated, the purpose of these task forces would be to serve as the source of information and ideas to the highest level of Government officials. In developing plans of action a task force would: (a) Identify alternatives and contingencies (b) Identify local leaders' actual potentials (c) Identify the extent of Communist subversions and infiltration and means of coping with it. It would be concerned with briefing the appropriate subcommittees on the Hill and undertaking appropriate consultation with other governments. It is submitted that putting into effect the suggestions in Sections 1 and 2 of this memo would provide the best answer to the President's needs. The specific subjects which he has suggested for inclusion in “plans of action” would be part of the job given to the regional policy committees and task forces. When the urgency of the situation warranted, these plans of action and others on broader matters would be reviewed by the State Coordinating Committee at the highest levels of government. Since the White House would be provided with current lists of task forces in operation, the President would be apprised at all times of the focal point of action and information on urgent problems, and would know which assistant secretary or senior officer was charged with primary responsibility. If desired, the records of action of the regional policy committees and State Coordinating Committee could be made available to him regularly as well to give a fuller grasp of problems which were being wrestled with at the top echelons of the Department. If the State Coordinating Committee operated as outlined above, the President could be assured of far better coordination among the members of the National Security Community than now exists. The new procedures suggested for the bureaus and seventh floor would permit far greater confidence that problems of highest priority were being handled systematically and at the appropriate level within the Department itself. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. Limited Official Use. Internal evidence indicates that the paper was prepared in July or August 1965 although it contains no drafting information. Handwritten notations on the paper indicate that the original was sent to Mann, with copies to Ball, Deputy Executive Secretary John Walsh, S/S Staff Director Herbert Gordon, and S/S Assistant Staff Director Jeanne Davis. 2 Not found. 3 The President proposed forming such a task force during a telephone conversation with Mann on June 5. (Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, June 5; Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ) 43. Editorial Note 43. Editorial Note In 1965 the Department of State published Improvements in Administration, 1961–1964 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office). A revision of Changes in Administration, January 1961–January 1963 , the report summarized progress toward achieving eight goals for improved administration established in 1961 by William Crockett, then Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, plus a ninth goal added in 1964. The nine areas of concern were: overseas posts; the Department of State in Washington; the personnel program; support of overseas personnel; logistic, communications, and financial support; basic organization; and the security program. When forwarding a draft of the report to Crockett on May 18, 1965, E.A. Donovan, Chief of the Department's Administrative Support Division, noted in his covering memorandum that Crockett's original goals had been retained in the revised report even though “major emphasis for the past two years has been placed on strengthening the Department's and Ambassadors' leadership in interagency administrative matters and combining administrative servicing in Washington and field posts.” (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, ORG 2) 44. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 44. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 18, 1965, 7:45 p.m. SUBJECT Your Meeting at the State Department at 1:00, Thursday, August 19 You know better than anyone else what you want to say, but the following checklist may be useful: 1. The importance of unity in what we do. You expect frank, private advice and counsel before decisions are made and full and unified support after they are made. This point is fundamental, because the best policy in the world cannot be put into effect if the people who carry it out are not for it all the way. Once you have made up your mind, you expect the entire Government to pull in the same direction. Examples: Panama 1964, Ayub and Shastri 1965, and the Dominican Republic. 2. The importance of unity in what we say . The press are continually trying to divide the Government against itself and we simply must not play their game. Any officer who is in doubt of any policy ought to keep his mouth absolutely shut. These men are the ones who have the responsibility not only for their subordinates, but for themselves. The higher the rank, the more damaging the leak. The Department of State—except for Secretary Rusk himself—simply does not have the kind of discipline in dealing with the press that a President must expect. (Incidentally, President Kennedy used to feel at least as strongly as you do on this point.) 3. The importance of respect for the United States. We are not trying to throw our weight around, but we do not expect other people to take us and our help for granted. Examples: Panama 1964, Pakistan and India 1965, Harold Wilson and Lester Pearson. 4. The importance of dealing fairly with those who deal fairly with us. Examples: Panama 1965, Australia, Erhard of Germany, and, for that matter, the Soviet Union itself. 5. The importance of peace. —Secretary Rusk's job in Vietnam. —Ambassador Goldberg's job in New York. —Everybody's job on disarmament. My final thought is simply that no briefing paper is worth much for this meeting. The essence of it is that these people should feel at first hand the quality of their President and the flavor of what his State Department should be like. McGB 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. No classification marking. From 1:40 to 4:05 p.m. on August 19, the President met for lunch in the Madison Room at the Department of State with Rusk, Ball, Mann, Harriman, Goldberg, seven Assistant Secretaries of State, Chief of Protocol Lloyd Hand, and Valenti. (Ibid., Daily Diary) The Daily Diary indicates that Valenti kept notes of the meeting, which were turned over to Dorothy Territo of the White House staff, but the notes have not been found. Four months earlier, in a memorandum to the President of April 21, Valenti had proposed that the President go the Department of State to talk with “the assistant secretaries, their deputies, regional and area chiefs and some desk officers,” in order “to counter-attack the swiftly-building myth that the President is bored with foreign affairs and doesn't enjoy foreign visitors.” Valenti continued, “Let us show, visibly, the President's interest in the ideas, imagination and energy of State-as well as his support for State employees.” The President, however, responded by checking “No” at the bottom of the memorandum. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 105) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original. 45. Editorial Note 45. Editorial Note At a breakfast meeting with Cabinet members and agency heads on August 25, 1965, President Johnson directed each agency to introduce an integrated Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS). Once in operation, he stated, the system would enable each agency to identify its goals with precision, “choose among those goals the ones that are most urgent,” and “search for alternative means of reaching those goals most effectively at the least cost.” For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pages 916–917. On October 12, in Bulletin No. 66–3, the Bureau of the Budget issued instructions and set deadlines for establishing PPBS. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming & Budgeting, Box 70 Folder A) Unlike the Department of State's Comprehensive Country Programming System, which was a country-based system administered by State, PPBS was an agency-based system directed by the Bureau of the Budget. Each overseas agency, including the Department of State, United States Information Agency, Agency for International Development, Peace Corps, and Central Intelligence Agency, was instructed to prepare its own Planning-Programming-Budgeting System and submit the results to the Bureau of the Budget for review. The differences in the two approaches and the implications and consequences of those differences, which directly affected Documents 49 and 62 , are discussed in Frederick Mosher and John Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , pages 90–200. 46. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) 46. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) 1 Washington, September 14, 1965. SUBJECT Politico-Military Contingency Planning 1. In proposing the establishment of a Contingency Coordinating Committee 2 whose task it would be to see to it that coordinated politico-military contingency planning would be initiated, where the situation so demanded, I did so with full recognition that (a) the effort would not be easily accomplished and (b) that acceptance of the mechanism would come slowly and then only insofar as it demonstrated its value. While my reservations have been borne out, it does appear that the undertaking is moving into a new stage, typified by a considerably heightened interagency interest in utilizing the mechanism, in turn leading to planning activities for a larger number of countries, with pressures developing for more expeditious handling. Because I believe this will require more of your time and subsequently of the Secretary's, if the operation is to be successful, I am taking this opportunity of bringing you up to date and of suggesting that you acquaint the Secretary with developments. 2. At its last meeting, the Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC) decided to initiate a more active phase of contingency planning. Having launched two initial studies earlier this year (Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute now undergoing field review, and Arab-Israeli Dispute in final drafting stage), the CCC has now recommended that two studies be undertaken in each geographic area (with the exception of EUR where most urgent contingency planning is carried forward by other planning media). 3. Perhaps the most important point in assessing the CCC's activities so far is that all participating agencies are solidly behind its efforts and have fully accepted State's leadership in working out contingency papers. The cooperation of the Joint Staff has been especially heartening. The J–5, General Spivy, has taken over from Andy Goodpaster as the CCC's senior JCS representative. Working on a purely military requirement to assemble crisis management data banks for virtually every country in the world, J–5 has agreed to synchronize with the CCC outlines and procedures to assure a maximum pooling of effort. Joint guidelines were worked out which should facilitate the development of forthcoming studies. 4. There is agreement among all participants that what is wanted in a CCC study is a document which has relevance to the situation at hand or anticipated; paper exercises must be avoided; the studies should be reviewed and updated as required. Ultimately, they are to constitute basic source and operational documents in the event a crisis actually arises. In order to enhance their usefulness as crisis management papers, the contingency studies will contain rosters of key senior staff people that currently work on a situation and who could on very short notice form a task force to assist the policy level. 5. As the studies are completed I intend to propose that the Secretary convene a meeting of himself, Mr. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Admiral Raborn and General Wheeler for the purpose of reviewing the plans. I think it less important that the plans be formally approved by the group than that they indicate their general satisfaction or dissatisfaction and provide any additional guidance which may appear to be required. It should also serve a useful purpose to have the top leadership cognizant of the existence of these plans before a crisis is actually upon us. Finally, I think it would be desirable in our relations with Defense and the White House for there to be evidence of a top level State interest in this work. This would not only be in response to the apparent White House concern about the adequacy of plans for crises anticipation (NSAM 277 enclosed) 3 but it will assure an increasingly responsive attitude throughout the bureaucracy in such future contingency planning exercises as may be undertaken. 6. While the personal contact among representatives of agencies having primary responsibility for national security matters has been highly gratifying, any honest stock-taking should not slough over the fact that the process of preparing the studies so far has been slow, that the papers could be improved by providing more concise planning guidance, and that greater synchronization of political, economic, military and covert actions would be desirable. Particularly with regard to the first shortcoming, lack of speed, the military, especially the Joint Staff, are dissatisfied. Operational priorities and other requirements caused the State-chaired working groups repeatedly to exceed their original deadlines. One of the recommendations approved by the CCC is the appointment of a Primary Project Officer who would be held responsible for the timely production of the study, but it is clear from our past experience that interest and pressure at the Assistant or Deputy Assistant Secretary level must be maintained. 7. Attachment A 4 is a proposed memorandum from you to the Assistant Secretaries reviewing the Department's role in contingency planning since your memorandum to them of July 1, 1964, 5 outlining the road ahead in this field and informing them of operational requirements soon to be presented to them. Attachment B contains four memoranda to the regional Assistant Secretaries, except Mr. Leddy, requesting them to undertake the necessary studies in line with the CCC's recommendations. These are: (a) For AF: Libya; Ethiopia; (b) for NEA: UAR-Saudi Arabian Conflict over Yemen; (c) for ARA: Uruguay; Bolivia; and (d) for FE: Burma; Implications of the Singapore secession on the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation Issue. In setting deadlines, the CCC has attempted not to overload any one Bureau. 8. Attachment C is a memorandum from you to the Secretary, informing him of the progress made in Contingency Planning. 9. Recommendation : that you approve the memoranda in Attachments A, B, and C. 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 277. Secret. A copy was sent to Yager (S/P). 2 The Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC) was established in early 1965, following a proposal from Rusk to McNamara in an October 6, 1964, letter to create “a small State-Defense Working Group that would review existing contingency planning, establish an improved method of State-Defense coordination, and set priorities for the development of additional country studies.” (Ibid.) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs chaired the committee; also represented were the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Joint Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. A chart showing the status of the CCC's work undertaken through May 1966 is attached to an information memorandum on Politico-Military Contingency Planning Pursuant to NSAM No. 277, May 11, 1966. (Ibid., S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, Contingency Coordinating Committee) In a memorandum to McNamara, May 12, 1967, Rusk stated that he had recently reviewed the CCC's work and “concluded that constructive and useful work has been done in coordinating interagency planning to meet possible international contingencies. Cooperation in this matter between your staff, JCS, CIA and the State Department has been excellent.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–06423A, US Govt-Interagency) 3 For text, see Document 5 . 4 Attachments A and C are not printed. Attachment B was not found. 5 Not found. 6 Written in hand at this point is “Sent 9/23.” The recommendation was approved on September 15. 47. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 47. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 5, 1965, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Candidate for Ambassador to the Dominican Republic 1. In your absence, I have taken it upon myself to coordinate a recommendation on this subject. I have done this because of repeated and increasingly urgent pleas from both Tap Bennett and Ellsworth Bunker that we find a replacement for Bennett soon. Bennett is very near the end of his rope down there, and Bunker tells me that he asks about his reassignment every time Bunker goes back. Bunker himself thinks it urgent on both personal and political grounds that Bennett be reassigned. 2. There is general agreement on the right place for Bennett: Portugal. The Ambassador there is Admiral Anderson, who apparently never misses an opportunity to make snide remarks about our Administration, and we owe him nothing. (Indeed, some of us think that President Kennedy was too kind to him when he sent him there in the first place.) Lisbon is a most agreeable place to live, and is regarded in the Foreign Service as a major step up from Santo Domingo. Tom Mann and Ellsworth Bunker are convinced that the Bennetts will be pleased. 3. I have spoken to Senator Russell about this, and he tells me that he wants whatever Bennett wants. He also says that he thinks this is a good time to make the change from the point of view of public attitudes. I asked him what other Senators should be consulted, and he said that there was hardly one he would trust to keep his mouth shut, but after some discussion he agreed it would be safe and wise to check with Hickenlooper, and I have a call in to him. 4. After reviewing a large number of names, I have concurrences from Rusk, Ball, Mann, Crockett, Vaughn, Vance, and J. Edgar Hoover on the nomination of John Hugh Crimmins of the State Department to succeed Bennett. Moreover, this concurrence is warm and enthusiastic among those who know Crimmins best, regardless of political preferences. Tom Mann and I, for example, are equally sure that he is the man we now need. 5. We have looked at many other names. Some of us like Tony Freeman, but Mann and Dean Rusk are doubtful. We looked hard at a very able man from the Harvard School of Education (a Gardner and Keppel product), but most of us doubt that you should pick a man without previous diplomatic experience. Some of us would like to send Jack Vaughn, but Tom Mann insists that he is indispensable where he is. Over on the liberal side, people speak of Ralph Dungan, but Tom Mann thinks that this would be a disaster. Tom himself has mentioned one or two senior Foreign Service Officers like Parsons and Albert, but a number of the rest of us think that the older men from the Dulles age, without Latin American experience, would be at least as disastrous as Dungan. To put it another way, the problem is to find a man of tested judgment and balance who has the confidence of all hands. 6. Crimmins is such a man. From 1961–1963, he was the Director of the Caribbean Office and in that position, he had a lot to do with the Dominican Republic. But he did not get “burned” by any specific political decision. He knows the players and they know him, but he does not arouse violent feelings. 7. Since early 1963 Crimmins has been the Cuban Task Force Director. In this job he has won an outstanding reputation as a man who can get things done and who can make sound and effective policy recommendations. Most recently, he has been the organizer of our preparations for the new wave of Cuban refugees and he has deeply impressed us again. 8. In a separate memorandum, you will see that Buford Ellington reports he did a splendid job on his most recent trip to Florida. 9. I think the press both here and in the Dominican Republic will treat the appointment of Crimmins as a sound and strong professional decision. I think neither the far left nor the far right will be able to land any punches on him at the start. His reporting from Santo Domingo will be clear, and your Washington assistants will know the mind of the man they are hearing from. I do not think we can do better—or indeed nearly as well with anyone else. 10. I should add that Ellsworth Bunker is getting tired, and both Tom Mann and I are worried about him. He came back this week partly to have a bad ear treated, and we need to get Bennett's replacement on the spot within the next month if we possibly can. Crimmins himself needs about three weeks to brush up on his Spanish and to collect his wits after a tough five-year stint in the Department. Bennett needs time to pack, and of course we need to get the necessary agreements from Lisbon and Santo Domingo. I enclose George Ball's recommendation (Tab A) and J. Edgar Hoover's security clearance (Tab B). 2 Mr. Hoover has also told me on the phone that he hears very good things about Crimmins. Finally, John Macy has just reviewed his dossier and tells me that it looks good to him. 11. I will ask Jake Jacobsen to relay your judgment on this. 3 McG.B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 16. Confidential. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 2 Tabs A and B are attached but not printed. 3 Bennett was appointed Ambassador to Portugal on May 10, 1966, and Crimmins was appointed Ambassador to the Dominican Republic on June 27. 48. Draft Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk 48. Draft Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 5, 1965. SUBJECTS (1) Establishment of Interagency Regional Policy Committees chaired by geographic assistant secretaries (2) Reconstitution of Special Group (CI) to form a broad based Seventh Floor chaired high level interagency coordinating committee This memorandum recommends for your approval two levels of organizational moves designed to improve the Department's coordination and guidance to other agencies with foreign affairs concerns and to promote a more systematic handling of major policy questions. Messrs. Ball, Mann and Harriman concur in these recommendations. 1. Establishment of Regional Policy Committees —The memo at Tab A 2 from the Under Secretary to the regional assistant secretaries would request them to set up and chair interagency committees made up of their counterparts in AID, USIA, DOD and CIA, and on invitation when appropriate, similar level representatives from other departments and agencies. The bureaus would be expected to bring up in the committees on a systematic basis the most significant problems confronting the USG in their areas which involve substantial interagency considerations and to seek to insure interagency understanding and implementation of established policies. By this means it is hoped, leadership over area affairs can be centered more fully in the bureaus, where it belongs in the first instance, and the present rather haphazard approach to interagency relations would by systematized and strengthened. Approve Disapprove Discuss with U, M, G 2. Reorganization of Special Group (CI) —The second proposal at Tab B 3 is designed to take advantage of the study of the Special Group (CI) now being carried out by General Taylor to create a broader and regular forum, chaired by State, for consideration of the most important foreign policy problems requiring inter-agency coordination above the Assistant Secretary level. Normally G would chair the group; M would do so on economic matters; occasionally U or S would be asked to chair when warranted by the importance of the subject. We believe that the top officers in other agencies of the national security community would be glad to see State exert its leadership responsibilities in more regular ways than presently provided by various ad hoc arrangements. Reorganization of the Special Group (CI) is the procedure recommended. Much of the present work of that group could be turned back to the bureaus except for retention of higher level supervision by the reorganized Special Group. However as the present Special Group (CI) is a going entity with almost the same membership we would wish on a committee with wider jurisdiction, its reorganization provides a good vehicle for seeking to accomplish our larger objectives. Gov. Harriman would of course be asked to participate in the reorganized Special Group whenever it takes up CI problems or otherwise as he may desire. If you agree with this recommendation in principle, I think we could gain the support of McGeorge Bundy and Max Taylor and would attempt to do so before asking your final approval for the NSAM setting up the group. A NSAM signed by the President is the procedure we recommend, since that was the means used to set up the Special Group in 1961. Approve in principle Disapprove Discuss with U, M, G 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG. No classification marking. No indication has been found that the memorandum was signed and forwarded to Rusk, but at some point it was made available to Bromley Smith, NSC Executive Secretary. In Smith's files it is attached to a copy of a December 10 memorandum from Schwartz to Taylor, which refers to an attached draft of a reorganization plan. However, attached to the original of Schwartz's memorandum in the Taylor Papers at National Defense University is a different plan for reorganizing the Special Group that clearly is the plan to which Schwartz's covering memorandum refers. (Box 63, Folder II, NSAM 341 & Related Items) 127 U. Alexis Johnson recounted his role in the development of the SIG-IRG system in The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 398–401. 2 Dated November 5; not printed. 3 Attached but not printed is a November 1 draft NSAM reconstituting the Special Group and broadening its authority. 4 None of the options was checked under either numbered paragraph. 49. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Bureau of the Budget Director Schultze to President Johnson 49. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Bureau of the Budget Director Schultze to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 3, 1965. SUBJECT Report on the Executive Review of Overseas Programs At the Cabinet meeting of March 25, you instructed the Secretary of State and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to review the programs and activities of the Government in 10 to 15 countries to assure that our resources—manpower and money—are property allocated in support of our foreign policy objectives and that these resources are being managed efficiently. 2 This Executive Review of Overseas Programs was conducted in 13 countries: Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Guatemala, Greece, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of China. This is to report to you: (a) how the Review was carried out, (b) the results of the Review, and (c) the steps we intend to take to improve our capability to conduct regular reviews of this kind. Procedures Used to Conduct the Review 1. Each Ambassador was asked to examine in depth the programs and activities of all U.S. agencies represented in his country. Detailed State Department/Budget Bureau instructions required the Ambassador to identify the lowest priority activities in the mission and to recommend a total U.S. program which, in his judgment, was the minimum needed to carry out our objectives. 2. A programming system, developed experimentally by the State Department, was used by the Ambassadors for their review. This system collects and displays information on the activities of all agencies, country-by-country and in common manpower and dollar terms. The system thereby assists the Ambassadors and Washington managers in evaluating the level of each activity and its relationship to other U.S. activities in the country. 3. The recommendations of the Ambassador were then reviewed by the State Department, other agencies whose programs were affected, and the Bureau of the Budget. 4. Action decisions were then made and transmitted to each Ambassador for revision of field budget estimates. Results of the Review Program reductions and administrative savings totalling an estimated $7.8 million in fiscal year 1967 were identified , resulting from cutbacks of activities and from management improvements, out of a fiscal year 1965 total of $425 million for all U.S. programs in the 13 countries, excluding major military and economic assistance. These savings not only can permit allocation of our resources to higher priority needs, but also result in net budgetary savings . Many of these proposed savings are being realized by actions now being taken. Others will be reviewed in the context of the current budget reviews. The following are examples of some of the major Ambassadorial recommendations: —Ambassadors Bruce and Reischauer recommended organizational consolidation of U.S. scientific representation in London and Tokyo. —Five Ambassadors recommended either a reduction or elimination of the Travel Service Program at a savings of about $289,000, on the grounds that the host government regulations are the main barrier to travel to the United States or that promotional activities of private firms are adequate. —Eight Ambassadors recommended significant reductions in Military Attaché operations at their posts. Concentration of available manpower on priority intelligence requirements could save $300,000 annually in Germany, $700,000 in the United Kingdom, and $131,000 in Italy. Overall changes affecting the Defense Department's non-command overseas operations could save $2,900,000. —Eight of the thirteen participating Ambassadors are taking steps to consolidate the administrative activities of the various agencies. Motor vehicle operations and communication facilities are being pooled or reduced. Personnel, fiscal, and general services are being standardized and consolidated. Estimated annual savings of $3,000,000 in these eight countries can be realized. —Ambassador Bruce recommended a reduction of $361,000 in the United States Information Service program. In sum we believe that the Executive Review of Overseas Programs will result in: —significant savings — better allocation of our manpower and money to high priority requirements and objectives — more efficient management and organizational arrangements in our field missions — a greater understanding of the relationships among our programs overseas and how they, in concert, can better contribute to achieving our objectives — an enhanced capability of our Ambassadors to manage the total U.S. effort in the field. Next Steps to be Taken We believe that the results of the Review warrant establishing a permanent system to improve the efficiency of our foreign affairs activities. This system should be developed to facilitate both the (a) Government-wide planning-programming-budgeting system that you announced on August 25, 3 and (b) the responsibility of the Secretary of State to manage the nation's foreign affairs. The establishment of the system requires a coordinated effort by the Bureau and the Department in carrying out the following steps: 1. Programming Systems for the Foreign Affairs Agencies . As a part of the planning-programming-budgeting system announced on August 25, programming systems for each of the major foreign affairs agencies are now being developed under Bureau of the Budget leadership. These systems will include the State Department, AID, USIA, CIA, and the Peace Corps. The agency programming systems will be designed to: (a) improve the allocation of resources among agencies as well as within agencies, and (b) to assist the Secretary of State and the heads of other foreign affairs agencies in the execution of their responsibilities. By programming agency resources by country, these systems will, along with enterprises outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 below, permit the development of an over-all Foreign Affairs Programming System. 2. Refining and Expanding the Country Programming System . The experimental country programming system developed by the Department is designed to assist the Secretary and the Ambassadors in carrying out their responsibilities for the management of foreign affairs by relating individual agency activities to U.S. policies and objectives on a country, regional, and global basis. This year's review indicated that the country programming system can be improved by eliminating certain features and simplifying others. The Department will modify the present system to incorporate both these improvements and to reflect changes made in the individual agency programming and budgeting procedures resulting from the effort described in paragraph 1. The revised programming system will be used to conduct country and regional reviews (similar to those conducted experimentally this year) beginning with the FY–1963 budgetary cycle. 3. Strengthening Foreign Policy Planning . Clear statements of the objectives and operating strategy of the United States with respect to other countries are an essential underpinning for judgments on the kinds and levels of programs we require overseas. They are needed specifically to provide guidance for the programs under paragraphs 1 and 2 above. The State Department will improve and expand the National Policy Paper program and promptly develop statements of U.S. policies toward individual countries not covered by that program. These three steps will enable us to: —extend the benefits produced by this year's Review, and —develop a fully integrated planning-programming-budgeting system for the foreign affairs agencies. It is evident that the attainment of these planning and programming objectives in the field of foreign affairs will require the most intimate collaboration among the several foreign affairs agencies. For this reason, we recommend that the attached draft National Security Action Memorandum be issued. Dean Rusk Charles L. Schultze 4 Attachment 5 National Security Action Memorandum No. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Director of Central Intelligence The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director, United States Information Agency The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff SUBJECT Coordination of Foreign Policy In keeping with the Secretary of State's responsibilities for the coordination of foreign policy and as an extension of the responsibilities vested in the Secretary by NSAM 281, 6 the President has today instructed the Secretary to develop comprehensive planning and programming documents for all United States foreign affairs activities. In the development and installation of processes, procedures, and systems necessary to control the implementation of such documents the Secretary will coordinate his efforts with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in order to insure compatibility of the foreign affairs programming system with the development of the national planning, programming, and budgeting system announced August 25. 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Taylor Task Force Report. Unclassified. Drafted by Barrett. The first page of the memorandum indicates it was not sent. The serious differences that developed between State and BOB over the draft memorandum's recommendations are described in Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , pp. 108–114. The objections expressed by AID, Agriculture, and DOD are summarized in a memorandum from Barrett to Crockett, January 11, 1966. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, ORG 1) 2 See Document 33 . 3 See Document 45 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures. 5 Confidential. 6 See Document 6 . 50. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 50. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 19, 1966, 7:15 p.m. Here is an important memorandum on the organization of this government for foreign operations which Max Taylor has prepared, pursuant to your instruction to him of last September. He has gone beyond the field of counterinsurgency, and I think he has produced a very constructive set of proposals. He has also done a very workmanlike job of clearing them around the government. When you have had a chance to read his memorandum, I think you may want to talk with him directly, and I would be glad to join if you want me. It is quite possible that some new instructions along this line could be made to fit in very well with a plan to continue my office on a somewhat less visible scale. Max's plan in essence is to throw the responsibility at the State Department with enough White House participation to insure Presidential control and to keep other agencies from declaring their independence. McG. B. Attachment 2 Washington, January 17, 1966. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson Mr. President: My letter to you has the general concurrence of Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Schultze, General Wheeler and Mr. McGeorge Bundy. Admiral Raborn supports the purpose of the proposal but is concerned over the implementation as it may effect his sensitive intelligence activities. If you decide to act favorably on it, I recommend that you take the following actions: a. Approve the concept set forth in the letter. b. Direct Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Schultze to consider the draft NSAM (Annex 3) and to propose an appropriate implementing document for your approval. 3 c. Direct the Secretary of State to propose a new Presidential letter to Ambassadors. d. Direct the preparation of a plan for explaining this project to Congress and the public. e. Direct the Chairman, Special Group (Counter-insurgency), Governor Harriman, to take appropriate action on the matters raised in Annex 1. MDT Attachment 4 Washington, January 17, 1966. Letter From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson Dear Mr. President: In your letter of September 1, 1965, 5 you directed me to review all governmental activities in the field of counter-insurgency (i.e., the resistance to “wars of liberation”) and make appropriate recommendations to assure our readiness to cope with future situations similar to that in South Viet-Nam. Since that time, I have been engaged in complying with your instructions, assisted by four interdepartmental committees which have reviewed the counter-insurgency activities of the government in the fields of policy, organization, planning, training, resources and intelligence. In order to permit an early reply to your directive, the committees were given only two months to prepare their reports so that, of necessity, their review has been of the nature of a spot-check of the vast number of governmental programs related to counter-insurgency. 6 At the outset, we agreed that the problem which we were examining was inaccurately described by the term, “counter-insurgency” which suggests primarily the military aspects of the final phase of a “war of liberation,” and fails to emphasize the non-military preventive aspects of the problem. To avoid this pitfall, we have defined the purpose of our review as the evaluation of the adequacy of governmental policies, procedures, programs and performance for anticipating or coping with subversive aggression; i.e., the use of political subversion, sabotage, terrorist activities and guerrilla operations (singly or in combination) to overthrow a government which the United States has a cogent interest to maintain. It is considered that, in the normal case, the subversive aggression is likely to be Communist inspired and to receive support from sources outside the territory of the country under attack. A characteristic of such situations is that, by their critical or potentially critical character, they pose a requirement in Washington and in the field for a sharper focus of interdepartmental attention and for a closer coordination of interdepartmental efforts and resources than would be possible by adherence to normal governmental procedures. Based on the foregoing statement of the scope of the problem, the committees completed their reviews and have submitted their reports to provide a basis for my recommendations to you. No effort has been made to staff them among the interested agencies of the government or to reconcile the occasional differences of view which developed between committee members or between committees. I have been guided but not bound by their conclusions. This inquiry has developed many interesting facts bearing on the effectiveness of governmental programs dealing with what I shall henceforth call “subversive aggression” and its antidote “counter-subversion”. There is no question but that a great deal has been accomplished since the establishment of the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) in January, 1962, in developing means and procedures for defense against subversive aggression. However, there is considerable evidence that the missionary zeal of the early years has subsided to some degree and needs to be revived at a time like the present when the Communist leadership, particularly in Peking, is proclaiming a clear and serious intent to instigate further “wars of liberation” in such areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, after their anticipated success in South Viet-Nam. The evidence of their confidence in this technique gives us a strong incentive to review and revitalize our own programs, and to bring our procedures and resources into sharper focus on the problem. The committees considered that they found numerous inadequacies in government performance in the fields of organization, training, resources and intelligence which they reviewed. Guided by their comments, I have cited in Annex 1 those areas in which deficiencies may exist which seem important enough to call to the attention of the responsible departments and agencies of the government. I shall limit my comments in this letter to what I believe to be the basic problem—the need to improve the executive direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas. A short title for the problem might be “crisis prevention and management in overseas affairs”, with subversive aggression regarded as a particularly important kind of crisis with particularly exacting requirements for prevention or management. Because of the intensity of effort required to prevent or cope with subversive aggression, it seems a reasonable assumption that procedures adequate for dealing with it will also suffice for critical overseas problems which fall outside the normally defined limits of subversive aggression and, thus, should meet the needs of crisis management in general. As we have learned from our experience in Viet-Nam, there are three essential parts to coping with subversive aggression—the first is the prompt and timely identification of the threat; the second, the determination that the U.S. has a cogent interest in resisting this threat; the third, a prompt and effective interdepartmental response both in the country threatened and in the executive branch of the government in Washington. Hence, in this review, I have felt the need to examine closely the effectiveness of our Ambassadors and Country Teams overseas and the working of the overseas coordination function in the Department of State, since under the terms of President Kennedy's statement of February 19, 1961, 7 that Department is charged with the coordination of the work of the government overseas. Finally, I shall discuss the role of the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) which was established by NSAM No. 124, January 18, 1962 (Annex 2) as an instrumentality of the President for the purpose of “assuring unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.” Overseas, the Ambassador, assisted by his Country Team, is reasonably well equipped to cope with his interdepartmental problems. A series of Presidential letters to Ambassadors, the last that of President Kennedy in 1961, have clearly established the responsibility of an Ambassador to oversee, coordinate and supervise all U.S. activities in his country, except those related to military operations. Although this authority does not make the Ambassador directly responsible for the success or failure in the aggregate of the programs of his subordinates on the Country Team, it is probably sufficient authority to guide the United States effort in normal situations. I have doubts that it is broad enough in countries seriously threatened by subversion. There is a strong case, I believe, to review the role of the Ambassador, at least in critical countries, with a view to making him the representative of the President with directive authority over all agencies and activities (less exempted military activities) in his country, subject to the right of appeal of his subordinates to Washington. In this capacity, he would be viewed as concurrently the representative of the Department of State for political and diplomatic matters and your representative as overall coordinator and general manager, responsible for the success of all United States activities within the limits set by the resources made available to him. As noted above, his present responsibility for these matters does not extend beyond overseeing, coordinating and supervising. It would be comparatively easy to tighten up executive direction abroad; it is more complicated in Washington where only the President has full authority to adjudicate issues between the heads of departments and to assure the coordination and unity of their efforts. If the President and his senior advisers are to be protected from the distraction of relatively minor matters, there needs to be a filtration process at several points along the channel of responsibility reaching from the overseas embassy to the White House, for disposing of all interdepartmental matters not requiring the action of the next higher authority. If we are to disturb existing relationships as little as possible, it seems clear to me that the Secretary of State, acting as the agent of the President, should carry out this function of direction, supervision and coordination of overseas affairs (less exempted military activities) and should be responsible for the functioning of a coordination-filtration mechanism analogous to the Ambassador's Country Team both at the level of the regional Assistant Secretaries and just below his own level in the Department of State. I have deliberately added to the responsibilities of the Secretary the functions of supervision and direction in addition to coordination because of the firm conviction that decisive directive action must be encouraged—indeed insisted on—at all the focal points along the channel of responsibility cited above. In establishing the coordination-filtration mechanism, the first area to consider for strengthening is that of the regional Assistant Secretary of State (and perhaps also the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs) who, with his supporting managerial apparatus, should perform the function of a wide-viewing radar, sweeping and surveying the area represented by the countries for which he is responsible. Working with the Ambassadors of his area, he should be constantly on the lookout for critical situations, anticipating their needs and verifying that adequate interdepartmental plans and programs exist and are being implemented in each of the countries of his responsibility. He should be quick to spot and report the symptoms of subversive aggression. In my opinion, to discharge those important duties he needs an interdepartmental committee composed similarly to the Country Team but with White House staff representation on which he could occupy a similar position to that of the Ambassador on the Country Team. He should chair this committee himself and have the authority to decide all issues before the committee, subject to the right of appeal of its members to higher authority. It is convenient to refer to such a chairman as an “executive chairman” and the authority implied by the title must be wielded aggressively if a committee like this one is to be effective. At present, the Assistant Secretaries, generally speaking, do not have the assistance of such a committee which I shall tentatively call the Regional Coordination Group (RCG) to assist them in taking prompt interdepartmental decisions and actions. Thus, they must rely largely on ad hoc meetings and informal staffing procedures to achieve the necessary coordination. Even if supported by an RCG, the Assistant Secretaries will always have some interdepartmental problems—a limited number, we would hope—which will have to be carried to the level of the President or of the Cabinet for resolution. Again, as a part of the screening process designed to protect the time of top officials we would like to have a mechanism to dispose of as many of them as possible short of the Secretary. I have found my greatest difficulty in reaching a recommendation on this point but have found the suggestion of a solution in the present functioning of the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) mentioned above. The strength of the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) has been that, by the quality and seniority of its membership, quick and decisive interdepartmental action was possible on matters brought before it. Also, it has enjoyed the prestige of being a Presidential committee which can obtain White House directives as needed to carry out its purposes. It is my view that the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) with a broader directive and a new name, perhaps the Overseas Operations Group (OOG), could be converted into an agency for supporting the Secretary of State in discharging his broadened responsibilities for the direction, coordination and supervision of overseas affairs (less exempted military matters). While it should report to the Secretary of State in his role as coordinator and director of overseas affairs, to retain the advantages of a Presidential link and to serve as a reminder of the Presidential nature of the function being discharged, it may be desirable that, like the Assistant Secretaries and Ambassadors, the chairman be appointed by the President (although he could be concurrently an official of the Department of State if such an arrangement were desired). As in the case of the Assistant Secretaries, he should have the authority of an “executive chairman” over the OOG. In Annex 3, there is a draft NSAM which would effect the changes in Washington organization which have been described above. I have deliberately omitted from the draft any reference to the handling of sensitive intelligence matters which, by their nature, will continue to require special consideration and treatment. If, after appropriate coordination, such a NSAM is promulgated, I believe that a new Presidential letter to Ambassadors should be issued at the same time to set forth their duties and responsibilities under the new arrangement. There is a related matter of sufficient importance to mention in this letter. It is the need for an agreed procedure for establishing and maintaining a list of “critical countries” for use in assuring the proper priority of attention by all agencies of government with overseas responsibilities. At present, there are at least three such lists kept in three different places, none of which bears the stamp of formal governmental approval. I would like the OOG to be charged with recommending such a list (after considering recommendations from Assistant Secretaries and the United States Intelligence Board) for the formal approval of the Secretary of State and with keeping it up to date thereafter. Obviously, the term, “critical country”, will first require a careful definition if we are to avoid a dispersion of attention and effort over too many countries at any one time. A short summary of the foregoing proposal (Annex 4) is that the President assigns responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of overseas interdepartmental activities to the Secretary of State as his agent, who will be assisted in discharging this function by the Ambassadors and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State acting in an additional role separate from their functions as a State Department official; and that at these three levels there be established a strong interdepartmental committee on the Country Team model with an “executive chairman” having broad powers of decision and discretionary authority to settle all interdepartmental matters falling within his purview or capability. It assumes that the requirements for focusing concentrated interdepartmental attention on counter-subversion can be met by these arrangements which will, at the same time, be capable of dealing with other critical problems arising overseas which fall outside the definition of subversive aggression. A final comment bears on what the proposal is not intended to do. There is no thought of injecting some kind of impersonal automaticity into the process of decision-making. It does not affect in any way the individual, statutory responsibilities of the key executive officers of the government but undertakes to facilitate their timely personal intervention through the use of the procedures proposed. For example, the President and his principal assistants such as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense would have their personal representatives in attendance both in the Regional Coordination Group and in the Overseas Operations Group, serving as their eyes and ears and keeping them informed of the issues under consideration. Thus, they would be kept aware of the status of those issues so that they could intervene personally at any moment. Another purpose which might possibly be inferred but which definitely is not intended is that this proposal is to make it possible in the future for the United States to take a larger share in the policing of the world. I am aware of Marshal Lin Piao's comment last September that one virtue of a proliferation of “Wars of Liberation” would be to pin down and deplete our forces and I believe that there is always a real danger of dissipating our resources in this way. Rather than encourage such dissipation, I would hope that the proposed procedures would give an improved selectivity to our choice of areas and issues and, hence, to the application of our resources. At your convenience, I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss the foregoing matters with you and receive your guidance as to how to proceed hereafter. 8 Respectfully, Maxwell D. Taylor Annex 4 9 Organization for the Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas. (Less Exempted Military Activities) President Secretary of State (1) Seat of Government Executive Chairman Overseas Operations Group (OOG) (2), (3), (4) Overseas Executive Chairman (Assistant Secretary of State) Regional Coordinating Group (RCG) (2), (5) Executive Chairman (Ambassador) Country Team (2) Notes (1) Carries out responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities (less exempted military activities) of the United States Government overseas. (2) The Executive Chairman has the authority to decide all matters within the purview and capability of the Group or Team, subject to the right of appeal of members to higher authority. (3) Includes an Executive Chairman and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Administrator AID, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director CIA, Director USIA, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (if the Chairman is not a State Department official). Representatives of other departments and agencies may attend on invitation. (4) OOG has following duties: a. Takes over counter-insurgency responsibilities of Special Group (Counter-insurgency) which it replaces. b. Settles interdepartmental matters falling within purview. c. Keeps “critical countries” list. d. Assures effective governmental focus of effort on “critical countries” in accordance with extent of U.S. interest. e. Keeps President informed through the Secretary of State on unresolved interdepartmental problems overseas. f. Conducts spot-checks overseas and in U.S. of counter-insurgency and other interdepartmental activities. (5) Executive Chairman is Regional Assistant Secretary of State and is concurrently the State member. Same departments and agencies are represented as on OOG. Duties of RCG include: a. Assures adequacy of country statements of U.S. policy and adequacy of plans, programs, resources and performance to implement policy. b. Watches for emergent critical situations-particularly for indications of subversive aggression. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG. No classification marking. The memorandum is marked with an indication that, together with the attachments, it was included in the President's Night Reading and that the President saw it. 2 Secret. 3 Attached to Taylor's letter were four annexes: (1) a paper entitled “Areas of Possible Deficiencies in Counter-subversion: Plans and Programs”; (2) NSAM 124, January 18, 1962, printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. VIII, Document 68 ; (3) a draft NSAM, “The Conduct of the Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas”; and (4) an organization chart, which is printed here. 4 Secret. 5 The letter was written in anticipation of Taylor's becoming a Special Consultant to President Johnson on September 17. A copy is in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 63, Folder II, NSAM 341 (SIG) & Related Items. 6 Documentation on the review, including committee reports, is ibid., Boxes 60–63, and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 258, Special Group (CI). 7 For text of Kennedy's statement on February 19, 1961, upon signing an order abolishing the Operations Coordinating Board, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 , pp. 104–105. 8 In a covering memorandum to the President, January 21, under which Bundy returned Taylor's proposal to Johnson, Bundy noted that Taylor would be coming in to see the President the next day. Johnson wrote on the memorandum: “No-Not on this I hope.” (Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG) According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met with Taylor and Bundy from 12:12 to 1:01 p.m. on January 24 “to discuss organization for crisis management.” (Ibid.) 9 Secret. 51. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 51. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 21, 1966. Mac: Comments on Taylor Report . 2 Can't say I'm greatly impressed. I tried repeatedly to get him focused not just on the Washington organizational aspects but on the many inadequacies in our C–I 3 programs, particularly in fire prevention. These latter items are covered only in his Annex I (which is pretty good), and he has few practical suggestions for dealing with the inadequacies there described. One gut problem is that C–I itself is so hard to define. Broadly construed, it could cover all sorts of threats, and the programs to deal with them cut across every inter-agency line. So locating action responsibility for dealing with C–I is peculiarly difficult, as is the problem of developing sensible, well-defined programs. I can feel for Taylor, and would buy his prescriptions (as far as they go), subject to the following comments. 1. In attacking the “basic” problem of how to improve the direction, coordination and supervision of activities designed to cope with what he has renamed “counter-subversion”, Taylor suggests a prescription which seems to encompass crisis management and US overseas activities in general. The imprecise role he assigns the OOG (old C–I Group) can be interpreted as making it overall inter-agency body supervising just about everything. It may well be sound to strengthen SecState's responsibility for “supervision and direction,” rather than just “coordination,” of inter- departmental activities overseas. But this is a far broader question than that of supervising counter-subversion activities. It can raise inter-agency hassles with Agriculture, AEC, Interior, AID, and numerous others. 2. So the proposed NSAM needs rewriting to specify more precisely what the role of the OOG and its regional sub-groups should be. Are they to deal with all interdepartmental matters affecting overseas operations or just those with a counter-subversion aspect? Obviously, it is quite difficult to draw a line here, since it can be argued that almost any US overseas activity contributes in some measure to counter-subversion capabilities. 3. It is probably sensible to put the proposed OOG under SecState rather than in the WH. Logically, SecState should have this responsibility, and a better machinery for exercising it. But Taylor, you, and I know that putting this new machinery in State will not result in greater attention to the problem, but probably less. In fact, Taylor earlier told me that after six months this would become apparent, and the machinery could then be moved over to the White House. However, this thought fills me with no enthusiasm either. 4. Taylor skirts the question of who in State should be “Executive Chairman” of the new OOG. Charlie Schultze sees a possibility of combining this function with that of a new Under Secretary who would also be responsible for departmental administration, thus filling the function that Bowles and then Ball were supposed to fill. 5. The proposal for regional counter-subversion committees headed by State's Assistant Secretaries makes good sense. ARA already has one, and this should be duplicated elsewhere. 6. Taylor loves his list of “critical countries ,” which should get priority attention. Should this list include Vietnam, Laos, or even Thailand? My own view is that those countries where we already have active insurgency should be automatically removed from the list, and handled as special cases requiring drastic measures. In this case the new machinery's purview would be properly limited to countries where a greater preventive effort is required to forestall any Vietnams occurring in the first place. 7. I do not share Taylor's view that our organization overseas is relatively satisfactory, while the big problem is in Washington. As I watch them in practice, few of our ambassadors pay enough attention to counter-subversion and even fewer of their AID, MAAG, or CIA subordinates. So any new LBJ letter to ambassadors should not only strengthen the ambassadors' authority but give them a boot in the tail. By the same token, any new NSAM should not simply realign responsibilities, but also express the President's judgment that more effort is required both in Washington and abroad. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Gen Taylor. Secret. 2 See the attachment to Document 50 . 3 Counterinsurgency. 52. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 52. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 21, 1966. This is in answer to Mr. Califano's memorandum of January 15, requesting specific recommendations to “modernize and streamline” the Executive Branch. 2 General Taylor has recently discussed with me an organizational arrangement for tightening up the executive direction of our foreign policy. I understand he has now submitted his detailed recommendations for achieving this objective. 3 I entirely concur with the general lines of General Taylor's proposals and, if they are approved by you, I will do whatever is necessary to put the Department of State in the position to effectively carry out the increased responsibilities we would have to assume. In addition to the measures proposed by General Taylor, we have other projects in train for strengthening our policy planning for overseas operations, including the installation of a comprehensive foreign affairs programming system designed to relate all the available resources of the Federal agencies operating overseas to national objectives. Dean Rusk 4 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Taylor Task Force. No classification marking. Drafted by Ball. Sent through Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Special Assistant to the President. 2 The memorandum specified that each agency in the Executive Branch submit by January 22 recommendations for actions to promote more effective management, provide a more logical and efficient grouping of agencies and functions, eliminate duplication, improve coordination, abolish obsolete offices and functions, eliminate unnecessary restrictions on management authority, reduce expenditures, and promote economy. (Ibid.) 3 See Document 50 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 53. Editorial Note 53. Editorial Note Following a meeting on February 1, 1966, with Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary of State Ball, and General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy produced a new draft National Security Action Memorandum to implement General Taylor's report to the President of January 17, 1966 (attachment to Document 50 ). Bundy's draft underwent substantial revision during February following circulation to key officials and meetings organized by General Taylor. Among the many changes was the deletion of a clause in a February 11 draft specifying that the Senior Interdepartmental Group should “assure the best allocation of manpower and resources between geographic regions in accordance with approved foreign policy priorities and objectives, by use of comprehensive planning and programming techniques and other means,” a deletion that soon troubled proponents of programming in the Department. (Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG; Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , pages 124–125) Texts of the drafts of NSAM 341 and related correspondence are at the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Report to President Johnson, 1/17/66, Box 63, Folder E; at the Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG. 54. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to All Assistant Secretaries and Executive Directors 54. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to All Assistant Secretaries and Executive Directors 1 Washington, February 17, 1966. SUBJECT Assuring the Equal Consideration of Minority Applicants in Outside Recruitment of Officers I have today directed our Budget Office to require that requests to the Employment Control Committee for Outside Officer Recruitment be accompanied by an indication of whether minority applicants have been given equal consideration for the position in question. The purpose of this action is two-fold: 1. To encourage more consideration of minority applicants for the positions we have to fill and to urge bureaus to automatically include minority candidates in their talent hunt as soon as vacancies are known; and 2. To provide a basis for briefing the Secretary on equal employment opportunity, “as a fact and a result,” in the Department of State. The first point flows naturally from a statement the Secretary has often repeated: “Key talent is located by a sort of chain of conversation-gossip, if you like. You get hold of people whom you know and you say, 'Do you know someone who can do this?' They get hold of someone else, and it is in this sort of informal chain of conversation that the most significant part of the talent hunt goes on. In this respect, the minority groups in this country are somewhat out of the circles of gossip. We must find some way to tie our minority groups into the realistic processes through which talented individuals are located.” As you know, in 1961 I created the Office of Employment Practices to help us locate qualified minority candidates for employment. Since that time we have scouted out hundreds of applicants, but only a relative few have been given any realistic consideration and even fewer have been employed. The Bureaus, as well as our central recruiters, should make better use of the reservoir of minority talent which is available. At the same time, the bureaus, through their own seeking out of candidates, should be more aggressive in finding and employing qualified minority applicants. I am attaching for your information a recent survey of the number and location of Negro officers in the Department. 2 We had a total net increase of only 15 officers in 1965, the lowest since 1961. We actually had a net decrease of FSO's due to attrition. The prospect for more Negroes entering the Foreign Service is much brighter now, however, thanks to the Foreign Affairs Scholars Program. Also attached for your information is a status report on this program. 3 Through an accelerated equal employment opportunity program, we hope to substantially improve our minority employment record this year. We will also intensify efforts to provide better personnel support and services for our employees in the lower grades. To do this, however, we will need the support and cooperation of every bureau and every supervisor. The Special Assistant for Employment Practices, Eddie Williams, is always available for consultation on minority applicants. I hope that you will take advantage of his expertise in minority recruiting and of the numerous files which he has collected. I will keep you personally informed of our activities in the EEO field, and will continue to look to you for support and suggestions. William J. Crockett 4 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book. No classification marking. Drafted by Eddie Williams on February 14. 2 Not attached, but see Document 66 . 3 Not found. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Crockett signed the original. 55. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk 55. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 1, 1966. SUBJECT Presidential Directive for State Department Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas Attached is the final draft of the foregoing directive which Max Taylor is sending forward to the President tomorrow. 2 It is the result of long negotiations and has the concurrence of McNamara, JCS, Dave Bell, Admiral Raborn, and Leonard Marks, as well as Charlie Schultze. I have concurred for the Department. While some of the language is the result of compromise, I feel that it is satisfactory and fully workable. 3 Max is recommending that, if the President approves this, Congressional leadership be informed (I believe that it would be especially important and courteous that Senator Jackson also be informed), and that it be launched by the President at the Cabinet meeting. (Max is aware of your reservations on a Cabinet meeting.) Following a Cabinet meeting, there could be a brief statement by Bill Moyers in the usual form of stating what was discussed at a Cabinet meeting. Max has asked me to do a draft. 4 I believe that the Department should be prepared to respond immediately following the approval of the NSAM in the following manner: 1. The issuance of a Departmental Order covering the required organizational changes. 2. A meeting by you with the Assistant Secretaries at which you would discuss what you expect of the bureaus with respect to implementation of the NSAM and the organizational changes. 3. If there has been a White House statement on the NSAM, a brief statement by a Department spokesman at the noon briefing outlining what the Department has done to respond to the President's directive. Mr. Ball, Mr. Crockett, Joe Palmer, Ben Read and I have worked out, and I have discussed individually with each of the geographic bureau Assistant or Acting Assistant Secretaries, the major organizational change within the bureaus, which involves replacement of the present two levels of desk officers and Office Directors with the concept of “Country Directors”. The concept is that, contrary to the somewhat limited scope of authority and responsibility of the now relatively junior “desk officers”, all of the responsibility for U.S. Government affairs in a single country (or, in the case of minor countries, a small group of countries) would be focussed in a single senior officer (FSO 1 or 2) directly responsible to the Assistant Secretary. Everyone is in thorough accord with this change, which is in pursuance of your concept of reducing “layering” in the Department. The detailed papers on this are being prepared for your approval. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. Confidential. A copy was sent to Ball. 2 Approved by President 3/2/66. [Footnote handwritten on the source text. For text, see Document 56 .] 3 In a March 4 memorandum to the President, Taylor reported that Secretary of the Treasury Fowler favored the new plan but was “concerned over practical ways and means of assuring Treasury representation on the Senior Interdepartmental Group when important fiscal matters are involved,” while Secretary of Agriculture Freeman favored the plan but feared that it would create problems in Congress which would “arise from fear that all U.S. business abroad is being turned over to the State Department.” Secretary of Commerce Connor favored the plan “without reservation.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Report to President Johnson, 1/17/66, Box 63, Folder E) In letters to Fowler, Freeman, and Connor, April 9, Rusk assured each Secretary that his representative would participate fully in meetings of the SIG and the IRGs when his Department had an interest. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG, Miscellaneous) 4 See Document 58 for more information on the activities noted in this and the next paragraph in connection with the promulgation of NSAM 341. 56. National Security Action Memorandum No. 341 56. National Security Action Memorandum No. 341 1 Washington, March 2, 1966. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Administrator of the Agency for International Development The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of the United States Information Agency SUBJECT The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs, I have assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. Such activities do not include those of United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander and such other military activities as I elect as Commander in Chief to conduct through military channels. The Secretary of State will discharge this authority and responsibility primarily through the Under Secretary of State and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State, who will be assisted by interdepartmental groups of which they will be executive chairmen, i.e., with full powers of decision on all matters within their purview, unless a member who does not concur requests the referral of a matter to the decision of the next higher authority. Activities which are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and which are not of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall U.S. overseas program in a country or region are not considered to be interdepartmental matters in the meaning of this NSAM. If disagreement arises at any echelon over whether a matter is interdepartmental or not in the meaning of this NSAM, the procedure set forth herein will be invoked which permits a dissenting department or agency to appeal from the decision of an executive chairman to the next higher authority. 1. The Senior Interdepartmental Group To assist the Secretary of State in discharging his authority and responsibility for interdepartmental matters which cannot be dealt with adequately at lower levels or by present established procedures, including those of the Intelligence Community, the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) is established. The SIG shall consist of the Under Secretary of State, Executive Chairman, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the United States Information Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Representatives of other departments and agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman. The Senior Interdepartmental Group will assist the Secretary of State by: a. ensuring that important foreign policy problems requiring interdepartmental attention receive full, prompt and systematic consideration; b. dealing promptly with interdepartmental matters referred by the Assistant Secretaries of State or raised by any of its members, or, if such matters require higher level consideration, reporting them promptly to the Secretary of State for appropriate handling; c. assuring a proper selectivity of the areas and issues to which the United States Government applies its resources; d. carrying out the duties and responsibilities set forth in NSAM 124 2 and related subsequent NSAMs of the Special Group (counterinsurgency), which is hereby abolished; and e. conducting periodic surveys and checks to verify the adequacy and effectiveness of interdepartmental overseas programs and activities. The SIG will meet in the Department of State regularly and specially at the call of the Chairman. The Chairman will be supported by a full time staff of personnel furnished on his request by the departments and agencies represented on the SIG. 2. Interdepartmental Regional Groups To assist the Assistant Secretaries of State, an Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) shall be established for each geographic region corresponding to the jurisdiction of the geographic bureaus in the Department of State. Each IRG shall be composed of the regional Assistant Secretary of State, Executive Chairman, and a designated representative from Defense, AID, CIA, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USIA and the White House or NSC staff. Representatives of other departments and agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman. Meeting and staffing procedures will be patterned on the SIG. The regional Assistant Secretaries, in their capacities as Executive Chairmen of the IRGs, will assure the adequacy of United States policy for the countries in their region and of the plans, programs, resources and performance for implementing that policy. They will be particularly watchful for indications of subversive aggression directed at the overthrow of governments in the region which the United States has a cogent interest to maintain, and, when such matters require higher level consideration, will recommend appropriate measures to higher authority for dealing with emergent critical situations in their regions. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs File, NSAM 341. Confidential. Taylor forwarded the NSAM to the President under cover of a March 2 memorandum in which he outlined the NSAM's “principal effects” and made several recommendations, including “the preparation of a new Presidential letter to Ambassadors to replace the President Kennedy letter of May 29, 1961.” (Ibid., Bromley Smith Papers, Organization of SIG) In a March 2 memorandum to Rusk, Bromley Smith indicated that the President wanted Rusk to prepare such a letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative) A draft was prepared (see Document 130 ) but never sent. 2 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. VIII, Document 68 . 57. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 57. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 2, 1966, 6:30 p.m. Vietnam Czar . Without barging too far into a matter with which I'm largely unfamiliar, let me point out the possible contradiction between the Taylor plan you just approved and the Vietnam czar concept. As Gen. Taylor wrote you, he feels that the VN director should be faired [ merged? ] into the new State structure by putting him under the Senior Interdepartmental group headed by the Under Secretary; 2 in words, he'd function as an assistant secretary on the same level as Bill Bundy. To make an exception just at the time we're laying down a new rule would be bothersome. Many at State would agree with Gen. Taylor. On the other hand, the more we downgrade the civil czar, the more difficult it is for him to crack the whip as is intended. Moreover, the harder it will be to get the right kind of talent. Gen. Taylor hopes that this issue could be decided before we publicize the broader NSAM, lest the contradiction later be exposed. I doubt that this is sufficient reason to press you for an early decision, which in the last analysis should probably depend on the calibre of man you pick. 3 R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 312. Secret. A copy was sent to Moyers. According to a note attached to the memorandum the President told his secretary, Yolanda Boozer, at 9:45 p.m. on March 2: “Tell Bill Moyers to see me about this.” 2 In a March 1 memorandum to the President, Taylor wrote the following regarding the appointment of a “Director of Viet-Nam Programs”: “I would think it most desirable to relate the action on this matter to my proposal since Viet-Nam is the most important 'interdepartmental activity' we are conducting overseas. In my judgment, the designation of a Director can be made in consistence with the terms of the new interdepartmental organization but the two matters are so interrelated that they should be acted on at the same time.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Report to President Johnson, 1/17/66, Box 63, Folder E) 3 The issue of whether to place the “Vietnam czar” in the State Department or the White House was discussed further by Chester Cooper in a March 5 memorandum to the President. Cooper opposed locating the position in the State Department and argued that, if it were assigned to State, it be placed directly under Rusk and not incorporated into Taylor's reorganization plan. For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. IV , the attachment to Document 90 . The issue was resolved with the issuance of NSAM 343, March 28, which located the position in the White House; see ibid., Document 102 . 58. Editorial Note 58. Editorial Note On March 4, 1966, the White House and the Department of State implemented an elaborate scenario to announce the issuance of NSAM 341 ( Document 56 ) and explain its implications. Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Komer briefed the President on the scenario in a memorandum of March 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341) Department of State Executive Secretary Read briefed Secretary of State Rusk in a March 4 memorandum to which he attached draft comments and other material for use by the President, Rusk, and Taylor at a Cabinet meeting, by White House Assistant Press Secretary Fleming at a press briefing, and by Rusk at his meeting with the Assistant Secretaries. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, Instructions and Authority for SIG Documents) For Rusk's remarks to the Assistant Secretaries, see Document 59 . Congressional leaders were informed about NSAM 341 by letter and telephone. Presidential Administrative Assistant Mike Manatos' letter of March 4 to Senator Henry Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, is at the Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FO. A memorandum of Rusk's telephone conversation with Senator Fulbright is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons. Rusk told Fulbright that the White House was “sharpening the responsibility of the SecState and we would try to do a little more in Washington than in the field. This tightens up State's responsibility. It isn't earth-shaking but was being done in an effort to get a better job done.” The Secretary of State and the Problem of Coordination: New Duties and Procedures of March 4, 1966 , a committee print issued in 1966 by the Senate Committee on Government Operations, includes six documents explaining NSAM 341, the first four of which are dated March 4: the White House press release; a transcript of the press briefing by General Taylor and U. Alexis Johnson; Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Circular No. 385; Rusk's message to his colleagues in the Department of State and abroad; U. Alexis Johnson's article in The Foreign Service Journal , April 1966; and Taylor's Speech to the American Foreign Service Association, March 31. Circular 385 and Rusk's message are also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 1128–1131. Newspaper articles and columns reporting and discussing NSAM 341 are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, Public Statements/Press. 59. Notes of a Meeting 59. Notes of a Meeting 1 Washington, March 4, 1966, 3:05 p.m. Notes on Secretary's and Under Secretary's Remarks at Meeting with Assistant Secretaries concerning NSAM 341 and Implementing Actions The Secretary advised the group of the President's action in assigning to him and to the Department of State additional responsibility for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the USG overseas. The President's action made explicit what had been implicit to date and made more clear the responsibilities of the Department. The Secretary noted that the actions to implement this directive were principally (1) formation of the senior interdepartmental group, chaired by the Under Secretary which would become the principal policy supervision group. It would be responsible to call in other agencies seriously affected or needed to carry out the subject under discussion; (2) the interdepartmental regional groups chaired by the Assistant Secretaries; and (3) the institution of “Country Directors” be a focal point for interdepartmental leadership at the intrabureau level. The Secretary said he had three principal comments he would like to make: 1. The machinery created by NSAM 341 does not affect existing statutory responsibilities, e.g., the responsibilities accorded to the Secretary of Agriculture in PL–480; to the Secretary of the Treasury for balance of payment problems and the Secretary of Commerce under the Export Control Act. 2. The Secretary urged the regional Assistant Secretaries to approach their tasks with a spirit of genuine leadership which fell well within the two extremes of simply following majority dictates and not becoming a martinet. The job would require a serious effort at persuasion if possible but precipitation of decisions if need be. The success of the entire venture would depend on the calibre of leadership. 3. The Assistant Secretary and Country Directors should do their best to comprehend the full range of the President's concerns and the entire USG involvements. The Department should accept as part of its responsibility making missions of other agencies such as NASA and Commerce successful. In the larger sense the mission of all USG agencies overseas have now become part of the mission of the Department of State. Each Executive Chairman and Country Director would have a duty to take into account the views of other agencies where they had a proper concern. Taking into account the entire USG interest is far more than simply promoting cordial, serene and peaceful relationships. The statutory responsibilities of other agencies would have to be taken into account and national interests pressed at the expense of good relations on many occasions. The Secretary stressed that the success of the system will depend heavily on the non-geographic bureaus for ideas and support for carrying out the larger and more complex mission of the Department. The Secretary stressed hope that the SIG, IRG's and CD's would do their best to anticipate crises better than we had been able to do in the past and would call on the Policy Planning Council for assistance as appropriate. He noted the importance of the planning function. In the Secretary's view the conduct of foreign relations in the world would continue to accelerate and our success in the affairs of the Department in our ability to anticipate crises and our ability to act expeditiously in making decisions would be tested to the utmost. We should “clear the desks for action”. The Secretary said these moves would not affect his relations with the Assistant Secretaries. He hoped that the Assistant Secretaries would try to stabilize opinion in their bureaus about the changes involved in setting up the Country Director concept in order to allay concern. No one would be out of a job next Monday. In concluding his initial remarks the Secretary said that he did not want them to be interpreted as “watering down” the NSAM; rather they were intended to illuminate the leadership he hoped the Department would bring to its broader tasks, i.e., avoiding leadership by fiat or letting others run with the ball. The Under Secretary said he hoped that the changes made would result in a better cross fertilization of ideas rather than a stifling of dissent. For the Department this was an opportunity to “put up or shut up”. The machinery contemplated can be one of great potential usefulness and he approached the task of Chairmanship of the SIG with the sense of challenge uppermost. 2 The Secretary stated that he would expect a higher standard of performance of the completed work to be done henceforth. Under Mr. Bundy's able tutelage the White House staff had given us a comfortable feeling that they might pick up our errors and now we must catch them ourselves, especially when drafting for the President we must make sure that our writing is better and improving our coordination with the other agencies and departments of the Government. Those interests must be taken into account. The Secretary had found that where the State Department is prepared to take over the assumed leadership there is considerable inclination on the part of other departments and agencies to accept it, but we must earn that acceptance over and over. The Secretary said he wanted the Assistant Secretaries to be aware of two commitments he had given to his Cabinet and other agency colleagues: 1. That the Department would welcome their initiatives in tendering to us new ideas and giving them serious consideration; and 2. —to the President: we would not let the new machinery conceal issues or important divergent views. We do not make our production that of the lowest common denominator but would clearly identify important alternatives. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. No classification marking. Drafted by Read. An attendance list is ibid., Instructions and Authority for SIG Documents. In addition to the Assistant Secretaries, attendees included Mann, U. Alexis Johnson, Crockett, Harriman, Hughes, Rostow, and several other State Department officials. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room. 2 Ball met with Lincoln Gordon on March 8 and with the four other regional Assistant Secretaries on March 9 to discuss SIG-IRG operations. Schwartz prepared briefing material, including major bureau suggestions for problems to be handled in SIG and IRG, and guidelines for Assistant Secretaries entitled “Dos and Donts.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous) 60. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) and the President's Assistant Press Secretary (Fleming) 60. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) and the President's Assistant Press Secretary (Fleming) 1 Washington, March 4, 1966. Announcement of the NSAM 341 reinforcement of State's policy supervision responsibilities went quite well. There was one persistent area of questioning at the White House and State briefings, however, to which we should be alert. The question constantly arose of the President delegating his responsibility, and of the replacement of the NSC. The clear and unequivocal answer to this is that the new procedure deals with activity at a level below the President and the NSC. It is in effect a new interdepartmental coordinating mechanism at the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary level, not at the Cabinet level (which would be the NSC). This point was not adequately brought out by General Taylor's briefing yesterday. 2 The future role of the Bundy staff is of less consequence. It could be pointed out, however, that the White House will be represented on the senior group (SIG) by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and at the regional level by members of the National Security Council Staff. This memo is to provide some sensible answers if you are harassed along these lines. R. W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105. Official Use Only. Copies were sent to the Ranch and to Joe Laitin. 2 According to Raborn's memorandum for the record, at the Cabinet meeting on March 4 Fowler “asked about the position of NSC in relation to NSAM #341. The reply was that NSC would continue to function as formerly.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01284A, ER Files—DCI Meetings with the President, 22 Apr 65–30 June 66) At his regular morning meeting on March 7, Raborn was asked by L.K. White about the implications of NSAM 341. According to White's memorandum for the record, Raborn “said all top officials in Washington considered this a good move. It creates a decision-making body for U.S. overseas efforts and will permit more decisive work at the Washington level. Existing responsibilities of the various agencies and departments will not be impinged. It does not affect either the NSC or the 303 Committee.” (Ibid., Job 80–B01676R, Morning Meeting Minutes, February 1966 thru May 1966) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 61. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 61. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 7, 1966, 3 p.m. [Omitted here is discussion of the resignation of Abba Schwartz and of Australian participation in the Vietnam War.] President: Now, on Palmer, I talked to him this morning. I rather like him, but the Negroes are coming in and urging Fredericks. I don't know whether—I guess Mennen Williams is for Fredericks. 2 Rusk: I think he would be, yes. I don't know whether he's spread the word or who's [inaudible]. President: It may be somebody. [Roy] Wilkins is in, and others urging Fredericks. 3 Palmer told me that he got one little problem with 'em, that he was talking to 'em about getting extra Negro employees and he said to 'em one day—he's telling 'em about some fellow that he served with they called “chicken Charlie” and he's a Negro—and they thought it was derisive and he didn't intend for it to be, but some of 'em called him, some Negro educators. I just don't want us to get hung with somebody they'd say is an “Uncle Tom” or something. Rusk: Right. President: I assume that a Negro for this post you would think is out? 4 Rusk: I would think that a Negro in almost any other post would be preferable. In other words, an assistant secretary of some other area as a Negro. President: Well, but we haven't found any. Rusk: Yeah, well— President: We've been at it 3 years. And that's the problem. If we had one, we might bring in somebody that's real good if you could find somebody. They say Knox 5 in the service is pretty good. They say this Williams 6 you just sent to Ghana is pretty good, according to Crockett and according to this fellow that was over here this morning, Palmer, but they say that Williams had a little problem at the United Nations and was a little—chip on his shoulder. They're competent but they might bring him in as an underling and let him train there for a year or two under somebody like Ray Hare. They might take his area. They all seem to think it'd be better that they have him in Africa. But we're not going to turn him over Leddy's job and we're not going to turn him over Pan-American job and we're not going to turn him over African job—so where are we going to put him? It would almost have to be kind of under— Rusk: Uh huh, uh huh. President: And we ought to find out where, so we can say to 'em that we're training one like we're training Thurgood Marshall over at the Solicitor General's office for the Court. And we are training Weaver 7 for the Cabinet office, and we're training a man here to be assistant secretary. But they say, “Well, 5 years, you haven't ever got one.” Rusk: Well, I wonder if we can't make that statement to them in terms of his being Ambassador in Ghana. This is a pretty key place right now. And, I must say, he's been doing pretty well out there. President:Williams? Rusk: Right. President: Well, we are. But, the ambassadors are no longer in the—they're good, but they feel like they are entitled to some assistant secretaries, too, you know. Rusk: Uh huh. President: And you got this damn fellow, Diggs, that's on the African subcommittee in the House. He's sending wires around. 8 He says there are a dozen—let me give you an illustration of what he says is—there a dozen Negroes that are qualified for this like Nabrit; 9 and I told him he's at the United Nations but [ 5 seconds excised by the Johnson Library under the donor's deed of gift ]. Well, anyway, I gather that you think that Palmer is the man. Does George [Ball] feel that way? Rusk: I think so. But, I must say, it's pretty close. It's between Palmer and Wayne Fredericks. Mrs. Bolton called me this morning, by the way, and urged that we give Wayne Fredericks serious thought. I think it's a pretty close business between the two of them. Let me talk further to George about it to see whether he has a clear preference between the two. I know he was very strong on Palmer at one stage. I think we'd lose Wayne Fredericks if we didn't make him this, give him this job. He's been around for 5 years now, in effect, waiting for it. But let me talk further to George and call you back. President: Well, I think we could put him in an embassy. I don't much want to give it to him. It's a question of whether to give it to Palmer or somebody else. Rusk: Right President [consulting Diggs' telegram]: Here's George Carter, they suggest, Near East Peace Corps; John Davis, now they say he's good, American Society of African Culture; Dr. John Hope Franklin, University of Chicago; Robert Kitchen, member of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy; Dr. James Nabrit; Dr. James Robinson, they say he's good, Director of Crossroads Africa. Rusk: Oh, James Robinson, I think, would be almost impossible on this job. I know him from foundation days and he's pretty far out. President [reading selectively from Diggs' telegram]: “George L-P Weaver, at Labor. There are advantages of having him just like John Gronouski as our Ambassador to Poland. 10 There are others, of course, like Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who can carry out this responsibility with competence. But I do wish to emphasize my strong feeling a Negro should not be overlooked.” Rusk: Uh huh, uh huh. President: There are some of the suggestions. Now, if we could get it and get by with it, without too much hell, I would sure be inclined to name Palmer, because I like the cut of his jaw, I like his loyalty, I like his experience, I like what he did in that Congo operation. I don't think he's going to get us involved too deeply in— Rusk: Right. President: I think he's got a caution that some of these other fellows haven't got. Rusk: That's right. President: Fredericks doesn't have it, does he? Rusk: Well, he doesn't have quite as solid a sense of caution as Joe Palmer has, and he's pretty far out on the African side, and there have been times when we've had to wrestle with him a bit about where the United States' interests lies in some of these— 11 President: That's Fredericks? Rusk: Yeah, that's right. President: Now what about Palmer? Rusk: No, Palmer's much more solid on that. President: That's what I would think. That's the impression I have of the two. Rusk: You see, one of our problems is that if we are going to have to spend a good deal of our time wrestling with the Africans, we don't want to have to wrestle with our own assistant secretary at the same time and have the gossip going around town here that the assistant secretary wanted to do “X” and “Y” but the Secretary of State and the President wouldn't let him, and if we get the wrong fellow in that job, that's the kind of thing we run into. 12 [Omitted here is discussion of unrelated matters.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 66.12, Side A, PNO 4–5. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 On March 7 G. Mennen Williams announced that he was resigning as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He stepped down March 23. The two leading contenders for the position, both white, were Joseph Palmer II, Director General of the Foreign Service, and Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. In a March 3 memorandum to the President, Watson reported that he had met with Crockett and Palmer (whom Crockett had heartily endorsed in an attached letter of February 28) and had found Palmer “to be a Bill Crockett type: honest, forthright, and a Johnson supporter.” Asked in the memorandum if he wanted Watson to move forward with Palmer's appointment, the President checked yes. (Ibid., Office Files of John Macy, Box 674, African Country) 3 In a telephone conversation with President Johnson that began at 1 p.m. on March 14, Rusk stated the following regarding the appointment of Palmer versus Fredericks: “I understand from some of your colleagues that a good many people have been weighing in. The only person who's been in direct touch with me is Mrs. Bolton [Republican Representative Frances Bolton of Ohio], who, on the day that Mennen's resignation was announced, called me and strongly urged Wayne Fredericks. But I understand the AFL has now come in, and a good many businessmen as well as the Negro community. I don't have any information myself that Wayne has stirred this up, although if I had to guess I would suggest that maybe Mennen has been a little busy here in one or two places. But if you feel that there'd be some point in taking into account the Negro community and the AFL–CIO, it won't be all that much of a mistake-in other words these are names that were very close to start with.” (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape F66.12, Side B, PNO 3) 4 According to a memorandum of Ball's telephone conversation with Crockett on March 7, during which they discussed the issue of Williams' replacement, Crockett raised the question of “the pros and cons of a Negro for the area. Ball replied he was personally opposed to this and C said that Soapy was also.” (Ibid., Ball Papers, People & Positions III) 5 Presumably Clinton E. Knox, appointed Ambassador to Dahomey on July 9, 1964. 6 Franklin H. Williams, appointed Ambassador to Ghana on October 20, 1965. 7 Robert Weaver, appointed Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1966. 8 Democratic Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr., from Michigan sent a telegram to the President on March 4 in which he said that Williams' successor was “a matter of extreme concern to those of us who understand the importance of our policies toward that continent. I am disturbed, however, that there appears to prevail a school of thought within the State Department which has reservations about a Negro serving in that role. It would certainly be unfortunate if several Negroes, whose training, experience and understanding eminently qualify them to hold the aforementioned office, were excluded from serious consideration.” Diggs then listed some names for review. (Ibid., Office Files of John Macy, Box 694, Asst. Sec. for African Affairs) 9 James M. Nabrit, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations. 10 This sentence in Diggs' telegram actually reads as follows: “As a matter of fact, all other things being equal, an American Negro could offer an extra dimension of considerable utility, somewhat analogous to the advantages of having John Gronouski as our Ambassador to Poland.” 11 In a memorandum to the President, March 8, Komer strongly backed Fredericks' candidacy, stating that he regarded Fredericks “as a lot more toughminded” than Palmer. Moreover, Komer continued, “the answer to the charge that Fredericks is too 'African' is that this is the posture which is really in the best interests of the U.S. Though I have frequently had to badger Soapy and Fredericks to be tougher, I submit that their line is basically right, and that the proof of this pudding is in the eating—our African policy has been remarkably successful over the last five years for largely this reason.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. 2) 12 The President appointed Palmer Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on April 1, Fredericks remained as Deputy Assistant Secretary. 62. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 62. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 7, 1966. SUBJECT The Future of Planning and Programming Pursuant to your 1962 instructions, 2 we have undertaken in selected countries around the world a program of National Policy Papers that analyze United States interests and provide comprehensive statements of United States strategy, objectives, and courses of action. To date we have completed NPPs for thirteen countries. Another six are in preparation. When the latter are completed we will have authoritative detailed policy documents for the countries in which 42 per cent of all U.S. expenditures (except military) are made. You have now been assigned additional responsibilities for the over-all direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of our Government overseas by the March 3, 1966 NSAM. We propose the following steps as essential to rapid and effective implementation of the President's directive in the fields of national and regional policy planning and programming: a. An acceleration in the NPP program through revision and streamlining of the methods and procedures used in their preparation and approval. b. The design and prompt provision of authoritative interim policy papers for those countries where a completed NPP cannot be expected within the next six to twelve months and where we intend (as in the case of the Latin American countries) to establish foreign affairs programming. c. The installation as rapidly as possible of a foreign affairs programming system in successive regions to complement the policy planning actions. We have from the beginning recognized that we must examine the actual use of resources in each country and region before we can be confident that our efforts overseas are being sensitively related to established policies, objectives, and courses of action. For this reason we have been working for three years on a programming system that will display in a common language present and proposed uses of all U.S. resources in relation to official objectives and purposes. Various versions of this system have been experimentally installed in thirty-two countries throughout the world, thirteen of which used the system as the basis for last year's Executive Review of Overseas Programs. On the basis of this experience, we have prepared further simplifications and improvements which we now believe give us a workable system. Two problems confront us. The first is the negative reaction to these continued efforts expressed to a greater or lesser extent by working levels in all the foreign affairs agencies except the Department of Defense. The second is a similar but much stronger response from the working level of the Bureau of the Budget. Several of the foreign affairs agencies, notably AID and FAS, view our planning and programming activities as a potential constraint on their discretionary authority and a threat to their institutional autonomy. They point out that these inferred invasions are inappropriate so long as they are being held individually accountable for their programs by the President and Congress. While we can understand and to an extent sympathize with these concerns, we believe the issue has been settled by the President's directive which both establishes the responsibilities of the Secretary of State and provides a forum for resolving interagency issues. Although we established agreement earlier with Mr. Schultze, the working level of the Bureau of the Budget has continued to oppose the Department of State's developing a capability to examine foreign affairs programming on a country and regional level involving the resources of all U.S. agencies. They believe the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems (PPBSs) being installed by all agencies under Bureau of the Budget Circular 66–3, 3 are sufficient for the President's and the Department's purposes, and that the Department of State should cease its efforts to develop a comprehensive country and regionally-based system. It is perfectly clear to us that the programming system we envisage is a necessary complement to the various agency PPBSs. The analysis by the Bureau of the Budget of agency budgets and programs in terms of their specific functions cannot be intimately related to country and regional policies and cannot, therefore, meet our needs and responsibilities. A foreign affairs program must be built from the ground up, from individual country and regional policy objectives, and with full knowledge in each country of the role of each agency in fulfilling national objectives under the guidance of the Ambassador. The working levels of other foreign affairs agencies are attracted to the more traditional Bureau of the Budget approach because it avoids the assessment of their programs in the light of all pertinent national objectives. They may also see in this approach a way of diluting the Ambassador's responsibilities for the orchestration of all country programs. Ironically, the Budget Bureau's views represent a movement away from the tested and successful Pentagon approach that has placed the national defense above service interests and systematically arrayed service programs against specific national defense objectives. It is the essence of modern programming that the use of resources be related to objectives and purposes; not to agency functions. In working level debates with the Budget Bureau, three major arguments are advanced against the Department's planning and programming system: a. The NPPs are not sufficiently precise to provide a base for budget programming . The NPPs go further than any previous national policy papers in relating to policies and objectives to specific courses of action. They do not-and they should not-pretend to specify in full detail, aid, information, counter-insurgency, and other operational programs. They do, however, provide a single authoritative instrument for relating the use of resources in a country (or a region) to high priority tasks and thus help assure “a proper selectivity of the areas and issues to which the United States Government applies its resources.” Put another way, the National Policy Papers were never designed to do the work of the various agencies for them, nor to do the work of the Bureau of the Budget in critically reviewing agency operations. But they do fill a gap which cannot be fulfilled by any other means known to us-a gap made vivid for us all in 1962 when we confronted a proliferation of uncoordinated national policy papers arising from the several agencies. b. The Department of State programming system does not meaningfully array resource data, nor do foreign affairs programs compete for resource allocations . In part this is a reflection of the functional vs. purpose argument cited above. As we indicated there, the BOB's current approach to programming is to develop PPB systems for each major department and agency. In the foreign affairs area, this approach will result in vertical reflections of agency programs that are closely tied to the financial structure and the organizational and functional delineations of each agency. Our approach, on the other hand, has been to design a horizontal array of inter-agency programs closely tied to policy objectives and national purpose. We believe both views-the vertical and the horizontal-are desirable and will provide valuable insights into trade-off possibilities, alternative solutions to problems, and program gaps, overlaps and duplications. The second half of the BOB contention, namely that foreign affairs resources are not competitive, in our opinion is simply not true. The authorized programs of the various agencies engaged in foreign affairs do offer alternatives and options when viewed from the standpoint of national objectives. An unfavorable U.S. balance of payments situation with a given country may be improved more by the visit of a trade mission or a trade fair than by the work of a U.S. Travel Service office. Successful negotiations to remove travel and currency restrictions may have more impact than either. Rural development in a given country may be more effectively and economically performed by Peace Corps volunteers than by AID technicians. Educational development may be more effectively accomplished by supporting local institutions than by financing study in the U.S. All three of these examples involve program decisions that cut across existing agency lines. The problem is not lack of competition but rather the absence of techniques and mechanisms for identifying and resolving competition. Cost benefit analysis in defense relates resources to our ability to kill people. Foreign affairs does not provide any simple mathematical equivalent. A simple quantitative approach to student exchanges or, even, to agricultural credit, or other AID operations would be illusory. To say the problem of adjusting resource use to foreign affairs objectives is difficult-and requires wisdom and intimate knowledge of each country-does not mean that we are justified in abandoning our effort to feel our way towards a matching of resource use to country and regional objectives. An effort to manage foreign affairs resources by agency budgeting in Washington, without examining carefully their use in each country, abandons the problem; it does not solve it. c. The absence of provable budgetary changes flowing from the experimental review of agency programs in last year's thirteen country exercise (EROP) . This assertion is only partially true. A number of program changes are being made by the various agencies themselves as a result of Ambassadorial recommendations. It is true that the Budget Bureau (largely because of time factors) did not include EROP recommendations in their consideration of agency budgets. For example, the budget for the U.S. Travel Service was increased by some $1,700,000 despite firm recommendations for reductions totaling $350,100 from Ambassadors in four of the eleven countries in which the Travel Service operates. It is fair to say that the missing element in EROP was an institutional mechanism that could effectively implement the decisions which resulted from the analysis of data collected across agency lines. The President's action creating the SIG and IRGs in each region solves that dilemma. In spite of these differences, we believe we must maintain the closest possible cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget to insure that we achieve a maximum of reciprocal benefits and a convergence between the two systems. In fact, our system can provide each agency PPBS with such data as they may desire due to the built-in flexibility of the computer program. To summarize: we have invested a considerable effort in the development of integrated planning and programming systems covering the entire foreign affairs spectrum, based, as a Department of State system must be, on country and regional objectives. These systems are now ready for full application. The prospect of such action is being opposed in some quarters on essentially bureaucratic grounds. Our response is that we have learned much in the past three years. We know we don't have all the answers to an evolving and complex problem for which there is no precise precedent. We are convinced that the resolute carrying forward of the effort begun three years ago is a vital link in fulfilling your responsibilities under NSAM 341. We are equally convinced that an abandonment of these efforts now will go far toward gutting the essential purposes of that document. We therefore recommend that you: 1. Officially endorse these efforts in appropriate notifications to the executive departments and agencies and our Ambassadors; 4 and, 2. Authorize us to proceed with our plans for the immediate installation of the foreign affairs planning and programming system in the Latin America region. We respectfully urge prompt consideration of these recommendations. We believe the lead time permitting a review of the FY–1968 budget cycle from the Latin America region requires your decision by March 11, 1966. 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Foreign Affairs Planning System 1966. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted by Rostow, Crockett, Barrett, and Robert T. Bonham on March 7 and forwarded to Ball by Springsteen, together with two draft documents implementing the proposal, for Ball's 3:30 p.m. meeting on March 7 with Crockett and Rostow. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous) A handwritten note on Crockett's letterhead attached to the copy of the memorandum in the Crockett Papers states: “These memos were prepared for discussion with the Secretary by WJC [Crockett], Rostow, Ball, [U. Alexis] Johnson, & Barrett. However, meeting did not take place. Rostow saw Sec privately Mar 8 and gave him copy of memo. Also subsequently sent Nodis telegram [to Crockett] from Panama [where Rostow was attending a conference]. However, Mar 9 meeting with BOB changed picture and agreement reached to work on experimental basis this yr. BOB was to send paper detailing understanding.” In Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , pp. 128–143, Mosher and Harr discuss the background and substance of the memorandum, describe the March 9 meeting with BOB, and print BOB's summary of what, from its perspective, was concluded at the meeting. The memorandum itself is printed on pp. 252–257 [ Pgs. 252–257 include portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] . 2 Not further identified. 3 See Document 45 . 4 Attached to the copy of the memorandum in the National Archives are (1) a draft letter from Rusk to heads of executive departments and agencies with significant operations overseas and (2) a draft circular telegram from Rusk to all diplomatic posts. The draft letter notified recipients that the Department was expanding its National Policy Paper program and moving forward with its Foreign Affairs Programming System, starting in Latin America. The draft circular conveyed a briefer but similar message. 63. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 63. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, March 7, 1966. I am much gratified that as Chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group you will be “carrying on other duties and responsibilities of the Special Group (Counter Insurgency) which has been abolished.” I have been chairman of this group for the past three years and believe that real progress has been made in that field. We have learned from mistakes and know considerably more about the matters on which to concentrate. The problem requires constant and detailed attention to see that where local governments are under attack or potential attack our country teams develop sound and adequate plans and that these plans are promptly and effectively supported in Washington. Viewing the world as a whole, with the exception of Vietnam, things have been going relatively well in recent years. This is partly due to foresight on the part of the United States, increasing awareness of the dangers on the part of local governments and heavy handedness by the Communists. The split within the Communist Movement has contributed to their difficulties. Communist action follows two main courses: a) subversion, terrorist activity, leading to guerrilla action; b) political action of various types including efforts to develop popular or united fronts. I think the most serious threat at the present time is in Thailand. In this case although much good work has been done, I feel that there is not as yet either a government or US program adequate to prevent the situation from spreading. Although the military and police programs are being given attention and are vital, the psychological and political programs have not been adequately thought through or implemented. As you know Peiping has announced that there will be a war of liberation mounted before the end of the year and the Communists are hard at work. Charlie Maechling who has been my assistant and entire staff in this operation is assembling the papers in an orderly manner to turn over to Harry Schwartz whom I understand is to be your staff director. In passing, I might say it has been my feeling that the Committee of Assistants has been an effective body. Each Agency has wanted to get a job done before the subject hit the Special Group (CI) and we have found that this pressure has been a useful stimulus for needed action in Washington. I am pleased that the Assistant Secretaries are to have a regional group as this is the level at which much of the work must be done. On the other hand, a number of matters are of Department-wide, Government-wide, and world-wide significance that cannot be dealt with adequately on a regional basis. Among those are the education and training of U.S. personnel going to the field, the police training program, labor and youth problems, etc. Overall, it is essential that the spotlight of the top side of government attention be given to these activities or else important or even vital matters get overlooked. I would like to have a general chat with you about this one day this week at your early convenience. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous. Confidential. 2 Harriman apparently met with Ball on March 11, according to a March 11 briefing memorandum from Schwartz to Ball. (Ibid.) No other record of the meeting has been found. Documentation on the disposition of Special Group (CI) responsibilities, including implementation of the agreements and decisions reached at the key SIG meeting on July 26, are ibid., SIG Minutes and SIG Agendas, and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Special Group (CI) Assignments to Other Departments and Agencies. A 10-page March 17 memorandum for the record, prepared by Harriman's assistant Charles Maechling, Jr., details the many principal subjects that were still pending before the Special Group (CI) at the time of its termination. (Ibid., Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), Memos and Misc. [I], Box 60) For the record of the agreements and decisions reached at the July 26 meeting, see Document 82 . In a July 14 memorandum to Rostow, Saunders detailed how the IRG/NEA was going about handling “the old CI Group's business.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Interdepartmental Regional Group) 64. Memorandum for Record 64. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, March 8, 1966. SUBJECT First Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) held at 1500, 8 March 1966 1. PRINCIPALS: Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secy of Defense Mr. David E. Bell, Administrator, AID Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State Dept VAdm W.F. Raborn, Director, CIA Mr. Leonard H. Marks, Director, USIA LtGen A.J. Goodpaster, OJCS Mr. H.H. Schwartz, Staff Director, SIG Attending: MGen W.T. Fairbourn, J–5, Joint Staff Mr. Frank A. Sieverts, Dep Staff Dir, SIG 2. Under Secretary Ball opened the meeting with the statement that the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) would not be a place for casual conversation, but rather a group where hard decisions would be made. Every attempt will be made to keep down the paper work. He looks upon the SIG as having the function of being a “ court of appeals ,” so to speak, from the decisions made by the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG). He visualizes that about 75% of the work will be done by the IRG and 25% of the work by the SIG. He considers that the SIG, while discharging the task of solving all interdepartmental problems promptly, should be selective in accepting problems. He noted that the SIG would take on functions of the Special Group (CI problems). He stated that he intended to organize no elaborate staff or complicated organization, but rather would start with Mr. Schwartz as the Staff Director and Mr. Frank Sieverts as his assistant. This staff would then be augmented when and as required. 3. He stated that an immediate requirement was for each agency to designate a point of contact for the Staff Director to commence his staff work. Later in the meeting, Major General W.T. Fairbourn was indicated as the point of contact for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 4. Mr. Ball further stated that each Assistant Secretary of State would run his IRG and that the majority of decisions would be made by the Assistant Secretary of State on the IRG level. Each Assistant Secretary, as Executive Chairman of an IRG, would have one deputy. Mr. Ball hoped that principals would attend each meeting whenever possible. He stated that other interested agencies outside the SIG and IRG would be invited to sit in when matters under their cognizance were discussed. 5. Mr. Alex Johnson then commented on a departmental reorganization. He stated that Country Directors who would be senior officers (FSO–1 or 2) would be appointed for each country. The Country Director would provide a single point of contact within the Department for the Ambassador of each country. Mr. Johnson stated that each Country Director would relate himself to other agencies represented on the IRG, but that the Assistant Secretary of State's authority would not be delegated to the Country Director. He further stated that this would abolish the next higher level (Office Director) since the Country Director would report directly to the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State. He visualized this reorganization as a gradual process with each bureau working out its own reorganization. However, each bureau would have a Secretariat in charge of IRG business. This Secretariat would have a point of contact with each agency sitting on the IRG. 6. After some discussion, it was decided that the SIG should meet each Tuesday at 2:30 p.m. The agenda and papers for each meeting would be prepared and forwarded to the principals by the close of business on the preceding Friday. IRG meetings would be coordinated with SIG meetings. 7. Mr. Bell raised the question of appeal to the next higher level. After some discussion, it was decided that, while there would be decision on the Assistant Secretariat level (IRG), it could form the basis for an appeal to the next higher level. No conclusion was reached on the matter of appeal from a decision of the SIG. 2 8. Admiral Raborn asked a question concerning 303 business. It was decided that 303 business would be processed outside the SIG. It was noted that there would be IRG decisions requiring 303 action. These actions would go the 303 route. 9. General Goodpaster raised the question as to the future of existing committees such as the Latin American Policy Committee and the Vietnam Coordinating Committee. It was decided that each member of the SIG would give a listing of these committees to the Staff Director (Mr. Schwartz) who would prepare recommendations in concert with Ambassador Johnson for action by the SIG. 3 General Goodpaster then asked what record of meetings would be kept. It was determined that the Staff Director would maintain a record of meetings which would be circulated with the papers and agenda for the next meeting by the close of business on Friday. Parenthetically, Mr. Schwartz has since stated that the record of meetings would take the form of a “Record of Actions and Decisions.” 4 10. A discussion followed as to the relation of EROP actions to be taken. Ambassador Johnson stated that these would be considered separately from the SIG. 11. Admiral Raborn raised the question as to who would accomplish the unfinished business of the Taylor Committee. It was decided that this would be considered by the Staff Director, with the work being done at the IRG level wherever possible. 12. It was noted that there was unfinished business with respect to the Special Group (CI). This would be addressed in a memo from Ambassador Harriman with subsequent action by the SIG. 5 13. It was further noted that General Taylor had made seven proposals to the President in his recommendations. These will be considered by Mr. Schwartz and proposals made to the SIG with respect thereto. 14. Mr. Ball noted that any decision taken by the SIG should include a timetable for its execution. 15. With respect to the unfinished business of the Special Group, Mr. Vance raised the question of the Thailand problem, stating that in his judgment we had now reached a fork in the road with respect to Thailand-that what was needed was a population control program. He defined “population control” as being true pacification, similar to that accomplished by the British in Malaysia, noting such things as universal ID cards, dossiers on certain individuals, and an adequate police force. He noted that the question of a survey to Thailand was still not resolved. Ambassador Johnson stated that the matter of the survey in Thailand would be left to Mr. Sam Berger to decide, and that the Thailand problem would be referred to the appropriate IRG for recommendations to the SIG or a report with respect to what is being done. 16. Mr. Ball then raised the question of the new regime in Ghana. After some discussion, it was decided to ask the appropriate IRG for a policy statement with respect thereto. 17. The meeting adjourned at 1600. W.T. Fairbourn Major General, USMC Deputy Director for Plans and Policy 1 Source: Johnson Library, Agency File, State Department, SIG, Memos & Misc, IV, Confidential. Drafted on March 9 by Major General W.T. Fairbourn, Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, J–5 (Plans and Policy) Directorate, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff. A “backgrounder,” talking points, an agenda, and other material provided to Ball for this meeting are attached to a March 8 memorandum from Schwartz to Read. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative) 2 Schwartz addressed Bell's concern about the referral of dissents from the IRGs to the SIG in a memorandum to Ball, March 9. (Ibid., S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344) 3 Schwartz' recommendations were incorporated in SIG Memorandum #16 to SIG members, March 17, and agreed to at the SIG meeting on March 22. (Ibid., S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263) 4 Official numbered SIG documents, including Records of Actions, Agendas, Memorandums, and Documents are ibid. 5 See Document 63 . 65. Editorial Note 65. Editorial Note In telegram 1623 from Geneva, March 8, 1966, Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, expressed his concern that his bureau was not represented in the new organization created by NSAM 341, even though it was “intimately involved in the substance of the work of all of the geographic bureaus.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 8) Earlier, in a March 3 memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary for Administration Crockett, David Popper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, had raised much the same objection. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Senior Interdepartmental Group, 1966) In a March 10 memorandum to Crockett and U. Alexis Johnson, Popper elaborated on the “serious gap” in the new structure. “In modern diplomacy, there is an increasing tendency to engage the interest of the entire international community in crisis situations anywhere, through the UN or in other ways.” Popper proposed the creation of an International Organizations Interdepartmental Regional Group. (Ibid.) In a March 18 memorandum to Under Secretary Ball and U. Alexis Johnson, Sisco seconded Popper's proposal and claimed the right to participate in SIG and regional group meetings when UN matters were under consideration. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, SIG Miscellaneous) On March 18 Popper and William Buffum of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs met with SIG Staff Director Harry Schwartz and reached an agreement. An International Organizations regional group would not be formed, but IO would be included in regular IRG meetings when UN matters were under discussion and, as far as participation in SIG meetings was concerned, would be given the same consideration as all other bureaus. (Memorandum from Schwartz to U.A. Johnson, March 18; ibid.) 66. Editorial Note 66. Editorial Note In a March 10, 1966, memorandum William Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, included the following figures on employment in the Department of State: GS 9–18 FSO's FSR's Totals Total Negro Total Negro* Total Negro* All Negro 2/28/61 1542 25 3732 17(1) 1140 3 6414 45 10/1/63 1880 55 3706 20(1) 1365 27(2) 6951 102 10/1/64 1719 71 3660 21(2) 1328 33(2) 6707 125 10/31/65 1631 78 3498 19(1) 1510 43(5) 6639 140 (8/31/65) * Ambassadors are included in parentheses (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–287, WJC Book) FSRs were members of the Foreign Service Reserve, temporary specialists given grades and pay identical to those of Foreign Service Officers but without tenure. 67. Memorandum From the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 67. Memorandum From the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 1 Washington, March 15, 1966. Under date of 8 March, the Clandestine Services sent to our field stations copies of NSAM 341 and background material pertaining to General Taylor's study and the implications of the establishment of Washington-level machinery to improve coordination and decision-making in the foreign policy field. Advice to the field was that the statutory responsibilities of the DCI and the Agency are not affected; nor does the new machinery invalidate the NSCID's or the work of the 303 Committee in its review of our programs and projects. Field stations were also advised that their relationships with the ambassador and other U.S. mission components remain unchanged. LKW 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–R01580R, SIG. Secret. 68. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 68. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 16, 1966. SUBJECT White House/NSC Staff Relations with New Interdepartmental Committees In response to your recent directive, the Secretary of State has established six interdepartmental committees to assist him in directing, supervising and coordinating U.S. activities overseas. A White House/NSC Staff member will sit on each of these committees. The existing White House/NSC Staff pattern is well suited to meet this new requirement without additional personnel. a. The White House member of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) is the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. For the present, the regional White House/NSC Staff officers can back-stop the Special Assistant on papers and proposals to be considered by SIG. 2 Experience will show whether he will need later a personal assistant working solely on SIG problems. b. To date, the Assistant Secretaries of State have established five regional committees-Europe, Latin America, Near East, Far East and Africa. Five officers now on the White House/NSC Staff have been assigned to these committees. They are: African Affairs—Ulric S. Haynes European Affairs—Francis M. Bator; assisted by Edward Hamilton Far Eastern Affairs—Chester L. Cooper (until his departure); assisted by James Thomson); Donald Ropa Inter-American Affairs—William G. Bowdler Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs—Robert W. Komer; assisted by Harold Saunders; Ulric S. Haynes Each officer will be responsible for ensuring that appropriate White House interest is reflected in regional group meetings. Each will serve as an information channel to the Special Assistant and through him, to you. He will be able to follow interdepartmental problems at the Assistant Secretary level, alerting the White House to future problems, learning of departmental differences which at some later date may be referred by the Secretary of State to you for decision. He will be in a position to keep in close touch with situations in his region which may suddenly require your attention. He will advise the Special Assistant of problems he believes are not receiving adequate attention by the departments and agencies and recommend White House intervention, either through SIG or directly by you. His role will be that of a staff officer and he will not speak for you unless, in an unusual case, he is authorized to do so by the Special Assistant or by you. 3 No additional personnel will be required to handle the new work resulting from the establishment of the regional groups. It is expected that these groups will simplify the task of the White House/NSC Staff member in some instances. c. Many problems in the national security area will not, at least in the beginning, be dealt with by the new machinery. These problems, such as those involving only one department or agency, or functional problems, e.g., disarmament, will continue to require the attention of White House/NSC officers now handling them. Current assignments will remain unchanged until experience shows how the new interdepartmental system is working. Conclusion: No change in the NSC Staff budget request for FY 1967 need be made to meet additional requirements on the Staff arising out of the establishment of the new interdepartmental committee structure. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 600/S. No classification marking. 2 According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation that began at 9:40 a.m. on March 16, Moyers told Ball that the President was “trying to maintain his flexibility” on the question of McGeorge Bundy's successor and therefore “thought he would have someone just sit in and not be appointed” to SIG meetings. Ball responded that “he would be delighted to have Komer attend but thought the press would interpret this as a step toward further crystallization of the situation.” (Ibid., Ball Papers, General II) 3 In a memorandum for the record, April 18, Saunders outlined four principles that, at an NSC staff meeting that day, Rostow had suggested should guide NSC representatives at IRG meetings. These included: “generally, do not vote on controversial issues-unless we have a clear Presidential position”; “observe and report”; “open up options not being considered”; and “see that issues are moved up to the SIG and higher and not buried in the bureaucracy.” (Ibid., National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC, SIG, IRG) 69. Memorandum for the Record 69. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 2, 1966. SUBJECT Interdepartmental Planning Group Meeting IN ATTENDANCE Ambassador Thomson (State) Henry Owen (State) Walt Rostow (WH) Francis Bator (WH) John McNaughton (DOD) Fred Weyl (DOD) General Goodpaster (JCS) Drexel Godfrey (CIA) 1. A meeting of what has for some years been an informal Thursday luncheon group, was called April 2 by the new chairman of State's Policy Planning Council, Henry Owen. Its purpose was to determine the group's future following Walt Rostow's departure to the White House. 2. Messrs. Owen and Rostow presented a well orchestrated proposal to turn the group into an active producer of interdepartmental long-range planning papers. Rostow revealed that he had secured the President's approval for such a metamorphosis. 3. There was considerable discussion about the risk of poaching on IRG territories. Bator stirred up a little silent outrage by remarking that some of the IRG's (he mentioned specifically the European) were not doing their jobs, but only counter-punching in already well developed situations. 4. It was finally decided that the group would concentrate on those long-range problems that did not fall properly into any one of the existing IRG's, those that overlapped IRG's, and those with built-in military considerations. It was also decided to invite representatives of Treasury, USIA, and AID to attend when they had relevant interests in the subjects under consideration. Rostow said that the President was deeply concerned lest situations develop on which little or no planning had been done in any systematic fashion. 5. Rostow compared the purposes of the new group with those of the old NSC Planning Board, but he indicated that he hoped it would not develop into such a formal institution. He remarked that he would, when the paper merited it, put issuances of the group before the President. Alexis Johnson urged that the SIG be spared consideration of most of the papers, but it was not at all clear what would happen to those neither worthy of Presidential consideration nor of reference to an IRG. There was a general concensus that papers which detailed the differences of view between departments would be more valuable than those which fudged distinctions in basic premises and conclusions. Rostow suggested that each paper should contain an inherent draft of a NSAM. 6. All Agencies represented were asked to produce three or four subjects for papers within two weeks when the next meeting will be held. Several proposals were made for immediate attention and accepted by the group for early attention: “Long Term Trade and Commodity Policy” “Nuclear Proliferation after India” “Long Term Policy toward White Africa” “Long Term AID Policy” “The ABM Problem” E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr. 2 Director of Current Intelligence 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–5505, US Govt-Policy Planning Group. Secret. Prepared by Godfrey on April 26. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 70. Notes of a Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) and Dr. Charles Hitch 70. Notes of a Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) and Dr. Charles Hitch 1 Washington, April 6, 1966. Call from Dr. Hitch to Mr. Crockett Linc Gordon is completely willing to try to program his region as an experiment this year. Somebody will have to work out program element list for him. He would be glad to consult on it but he can't do it. Think it important you and Rowen get together and join forces and work out common approach and program on that list. This is something that could easily then be applied foreign affairs-wide next year. Mr. Crockett said did he think it is better to go regionally than to select some countries. Dr. Hitch said yes, because country problem is only part of the problem. Only touches on the intra-country allocations and not inter-country allocations. If you do it for region, that gives experiment with both. This is one of your great problems in this programming that makes it different from Defense. Have to handle it both from country review and regional review end. Will be quite difficult problem. If you concentrate on three different countries, will not have any experience with that problem. Mr. Crockett said BOB is filled with hostility. Don't know whether—can try but have tried in past and not achieved very much satisfaction. Dr. Hitch said he called Rowen this morning and told him pretty much what he had just said—must get together with you and work out… Having two rival systems is too much. Mr. Crockett said he couldn't agree more. Unless he has changed mind he sees no virtue in this system. This is part of our problem, whether we just go on our own or try to convert as we go. Dave Bell is another difficult one too. He thinks systems analysis ought to be an absolute integral part of the programming system. This is minimum of what he would buy. Dr. Hitch said he has nothing against using a lot of systems analysis but it ought to be integrated—must get information first. He said Linc Gordon is, in effect, Asst. AID Administrator… Dr. Hitch said he is coming to Washington next week to give lecture. Mr. Crockett said he greatly appreciated his calling. He will move heaven and earth in this direction. 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Foreign Affairs Planning System 1966. No classification marking. Drafted in Crockett's office. Copies were sent to Barrett and Sherman. Hitch met with Rusk, Lincoln Gordon, and a number of other Department of State officials in Washington on April 4 and 5 in connection with the possibility of his chairing a high-level advisory group on foreign affairs programming. Crockett informed Rusk by memorandum in late May that, before leaving Washington on April 6, Hitch told him “that he was not just willing, but very interested and anxious to help us develop a comprehensive and unified planning and programming system for foreign affairs.” (Undated memorandum from Crockett to Rusk, drafted May 21; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 63, Folder G, Papers Relating to NSAM 341) The Hitch Committee was formed in June. For more information, see Documents 75 and 80 as well as Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , pp. 146–157. 71. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 71. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 19, 1966, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Ideas for Foreign Policy: Inside and Outside the Government You asked: how can we get more new ideas for foreign policy? I propose the following program: 1. Outside Consultants. a) Each regional bureau of the State Department would be instructed to develop a group of outside consultants, along the lines of those used by the Treasury, AID, the Policy Planning Council. b) These consultants would be used for two purposes: (i) to initiate new ideas, as the spirit moved them; (ii) to consider and staff out specific problems and ideas put to them individually and collectively by the relevant Assistant Secretaries. 2 c) Members of my staff would be instructed to ensure that these consultants were effectively used and their ideas followed up in the bureaucracy. 2. Planning Inside the Government. a) The Inter-Departmental Planning Group, which has met every week informally, should be converted into a group which would formally staff out problems which cut across the Departments; produce action recommendations; forward those recommendations to the Senior Inter-Departmental Group (SIG) or to other higher authority for decision and action. Starting this Friday the Inter-Departmental Planning Group will be considering a list of such possible planning problems and possibilities. b) Members of my staff have been told that we shall be devoting a somewhat higher proportion of our time to generating ideas and planning proposals. They will each be submitting to me an initial list of such ideas and proposals. When we have screened them together I shall arrange to have those we select put into the governmental machinery at appropriate points. c) Against this background, we shall try to use the influence of the White House foreign affairs staff to ensure that the work of the Inter-Departmental Regional Groups (IRG's) is not merely addressed to inter-departmental negotiation and debate of current operational issues, but also to planning against contingencies and for the creative exploitation of opportunities for forward movement. 3. The Use of the President's Panel of Consultants on Foreign Affairs. I have reviewed the history of this group. I have concluded that they are not likely to be useful to you meeting as a whole, except under exceptional circumstances. They could be useful if broken into sub-panels, for particular occasions to examine specific major problems; for example —Viet-Nam; —major international monetary decisions; —critical decisions on NATO; —changes in China policy, should circumstances justifying such change arise. The purpose of such sub-panels would be these: to render to you additional advice; to engage the support of influential citizens for major changes of direction in national policy. There is one issue on which the whole panel might be concerned and engaged: the completion of Robert Bowie's report to Secretary Rusk on the problems of the 1970's. 3 I started this at State. Bowie should be reporting by June 1. After we in the government have sorted out the major implications we might present these to the Panel as the start of a campaign of public discussion, at home and abroad, looking beyond Viet-Nam, Mao, and De Gaulle, to the world of the 1970's. You will recall that Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, and I raised this theme in connection with your State of the Union address in January 1966. 4. The questions, therefore, are: —May I raise with Secretary Rusk the proposals for outside consultants to be attached to each regional bureau? Approved 4 Disapproved See me —May I proceed with planning inside the government along the lines indicated in Para. 2, a-c? Approved 5 Disapproved See me —In light of Para. 3, how do you wish to proceed with use (or non-use) of President's Panel of Consultants on Foreign Affairs? 6 Instruction awaited. W.W. Rostow 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt Rostow, Vol. 1. Confidential. Copies were sent to Moyers and Valenti. 2 According to Saunders' April 20 memorandum for the record, Rostow explained to his staff that “the dual purpose of this group would be to do work in depth on concrete problems that the bureaucracy just does not have time to do and to look into matters that everybody knows are important but are a little farther down the road.” (Ibid., Saunders Files, NSC, SIG IRG) In an April 23 memorandum to Rusk, Rostow indicated that the President had “reiterated his desire that the regional Assistant Secretaries develop new constructive proposals with the assistance of the best brains that can be mobilized from outside the Government.” (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 51) 3 Entitled “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Next Decade,” dated December 1966. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Next Decade) 4 The President checked this option and wrote “Excellent.” In a memorandum to Rostow, September 16, 1966, providing a status report on the State Department's foreign policy consultants, Moose reported that the list of proposed consultants was still undergoing checks by the State Department and John Macy's office. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos 1966) For information on the consultants' meetings, see Documents 111 and 125 . 5 The President checked this option. 6 Written in hand below this paragraph is: “as outlined, see 1a.” 7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 72. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) 72. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) 1 Washington, May 9, 1966. SUBJECT Urgent Need to Increase Minority Group Representation at African Posts In a recent memorandum addressed to me and Ben Posner, Assistant Director for Administration, USIA, Bill Hall of AID passed on some cursory impressions from his recent visits to the Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria and the Congo. 2 He made a number of observations and recommendations which we will no doubt be discussing in the days ahead. I would like to share with you at this time his observations on the question of civil rights: “None of the foreign affairs agencies has adequate minority representation on its staffs. AID and USIA are better than State, but all are completely inadequate. We need to consider how we can improve this situation.” Bill Hall's views are substantiated by the report 3 which you sent to Congressman Adam C. Powell last December concerning Negro-Americans assigned to our posts in Africa. At the 40 AF posts to which Americans are assigned there are a total of 21 Negro officers in State, 25 in USIA, 36 in AID, and 21 in the Peace Corps. Twenty-six of the 40 posts have no Negro officers at all. At the 4 posts visited by Bill Hall, we have 2 Negro officers in the Congo, 1 in Nigeria, 2 in Ethiopia and none in the Sudan. This is a problem which both you and I share, and I think we ought to start planning now on providing some remedy. One approach might be to focus on all positions we now have vacant in the African area overseas and for which we do not have presently qualified and available FSO's and FSSO's and give priority to finding, recruiting, and employing minority group candidates who can fill these positions. I would hope also that we might be able to utilize some of our promising Foreign Affairs Scholars at the R–8, R–7, or Staff Corps levels. I have asked Eddie Williams to submit to you any files he feels are worthy of your personal consideration. I am willing to do all I can to expedite this matter; I would suggest that appropriate members of your staff rely heavily upon Eddie Williams in developing the names of additional candidates. 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, WJC Book. No classification marking. Drafted by Eddie Williams. 2 Not found. 3 Not found. 73. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 73. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 10, 1966, 10:30 a.m. You ask: Who are your candidates for the next Secretary of State? The most important element in the answer is: with whom will you feel most comfortable? The Secretary of State must be the most sensitive instrument of the President's interests and policy, plus all the other things he must be. All other considerations should be subordinated to your personal feeling in the matter: choosing a Secretary of State is a little like getting married. Having said that, my first choice would be the team of: Secretary: McNamara Under Secretary: Clark Clifford The job of Secretary of State is now so exhausting, it should be thought of as a team. Alternatively, of course, Clark Clifford could be a great Secretary of State. He would need a tremendous work-horse as Under Secretary. My choice would be: Cyrus Vance, in that case. Although he probably would not accept the job, I think Mac Bundy would be an excellent Under Secretary of State under a strong boss. From a quarter-century of knowing Mac-and liking him-I cannot yet recommend him as a Secretary of State. Douglas Dillon would be my third choice for Secretary. A fourth candidate crossed my mind-no more than that-Senator Gale McGhee. He has shown guts on Vietnam. He is articulate. But I simply do not know enough of his real fiber to judge whether he belongs on the list or not. Although you probably can't spare him, Bill Moyers should be considered as Under Secretary with McNamara, Clifford, or Dillon. If I have any further thoughts, I shall forward them. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Walt Rostow. Secret; Eyes Only. 74. Editorial Note 74. Editorial Note On May 10, 1966, President's Special Assistant Rostow asked NSC staff members to prepare interim reports on a number of organizational and policy initiatives in foreign affairs, including the Interdepartmental Regional Groups. The report prepared by Edward Hamilton and Francis Bator is Document 75 . In a May 18 memorandum to National Security Council Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, Harold Saunders reported on the IRG for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He stated that the discussions had been “meaty” with the “meetings devoted so far to major short-run issues.” Assistant Secretary of State Hare had “indicated interest in discussing one or two longer term general issues, but we haven't yet.” Saunders observed that “IRG/NEA has yet to sign off on any finished paper” and concluded that it was “not yet a decision-making forum.” (Johnson Library, Agency File, State Department, IRG) James Thomson reported on the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Far Eastern Affairs in a May 20 memorandum to Bromley Smith. He stated that “ on the plus side , this IRG has surfaced some major inter-agency disagreements and misunderstandings which might otherwise have gone undetected for some time” but that “ on the minus side , the IRG involves a considerable expenditure of executive time (up to 2–1/2 hours for each meeting) on items of business that could be dealt with more speedily via the telephone, lower echelon meetings, etc.” In his summary comment, Thomson stated: “FE is a bureau in which a strong Assistant Secretary habitually takes the lead on policy and operational questions; the IRG is therefore only a supplementary device which he uses twice a month to aid and review issues that require no immediate action. The institution's future is doubtful.” (Ibid.) 75. Report Prepared by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) and Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff 75. Report Prepared by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) and Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, May 23, 1966. Organizational and Policy Initiatives—European and Economic Affairs European IRG On the whole, the IRG for Europe is not a smashing success, but it has had its uses. The lessons of experience thus far are as follows: 1. The IRG is not much use in crises (either short or protracted), or with respect to the broadest European issues. These matters simply must be handled (a) by a very small group of very senior people, and (b) in a smaller forum—without AID, USIA, CIA, and non-OSD/DOD. 2. On smaller, more specialized issues—e.g., the proposed NATO Defense Payments Union—the IRG can be useful as a forum for discussion and for needling the bureaucracy into movement. 3. With John Leddy flat on his back, and NATO/France occupying topside attention, the IRG hasn't really had a fair test. [Omitted here are brief discussions of the Planning Group, Formalization of Bureau External Contacts, AID, and Presidential Initiative—Canada.] Budget—State Programming Experiment This is a two-front proceeding: 1. Theory . We are now reaching the latter stages of a long controversy between BOB and Dick Barrett concerning the proper conceptual basis of a foreign affairs programming system. The attached BOB paper summarizes the questions at issue. 2 The hardest-fought question, aside from the practical problems of measuring output in foreign affairs, is how to deal with the fact that the foreign affairs establishment consists of several semi-autonomous agencies. Barrett proposes a system which would be appropriate to a single Department of Foreign Affairs, with the Assistant Secretaries of State responsible for all decision-making on objectives and resource allocations. The Budget Bureau argues that the existence of other agencies is a fact that we must live with for the foreseeable future and that the system should recognize it by making them responsible for initial planning and decisions, to be reviewed by State. To deal with these issues, Crockett and the BOB are proposing establishment of an Advisory Group to meet during the Summer and make recommendations to the Secretary in the Fall. The Group would be asked to develop a system which could be installed for the 1969 budget cycle. Present candidates for membership are as follows: Charlie Hitch (Chairman), Dave Bell, Henry Rowen, Alain Enthoven, Livingston Merchant, Ellsworth Bunker, Stewart Blake, Frederick Mosher, Rensis Likert, and Chris Argyris. They would be backstopped by a contract with Stanford Research Institute which would supply whatever technical help and staff support is necessary. 2. Practice . While the planning of an overall system proceeds, each agency (State, USIA, AID, Peace Corps) has, at BOB direction, tried pilot programming in a few key countries employing PPBS principles. Basically, this involves reassessments of programs with special emphasis on alternatives to present approaches. In general, the BOB conclusion (which we share) is that the methodology has not really taken hold. There are exceptions, but for the most part the products are distressingly similar to past budget justifications. (Surprisingly, the most notable exception is the Peace Corps, where it appears that a fairly rigorous re-thinking is taking place.) We have been and will continue to be involved in critiques, but our general conclusion is that real progress will probably await a new general system which will force the field posts to take the new mode of thinking seriously. EH FMB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, IRG. Confidential. For background to the report, see Document 74 . 2 Attached but not printed. The Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, known as the Hitch Committee, addressed these questions in its report to Secretary Rusk; see the attachment to Document 99 . 76. Editorial Note 76. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk that began at 5:11 p.m. on May 27, 1966, the following discussion took place regarding a replacement for Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Mann, who had indicated that he planned to step down: President: “I really want a good new person in Mann's place, but I haven't found one. What has been your thinking on it? Has it jelled any more?” Rusk: “Well, I think the key qualification for a man on that spot is someone who is utterly loyal to you and to me. Now, in terms of running this Department and people familiar with it and government and that kind of thing and on the inside part of the job, I don't think of anybody better than or even comparable to Luke Battle. In terms of somebody who might help more on the public side and with some of these liberal Senators, we might be able to better that. This is one of the reasons I thought about our friend in the Philippines, Bill Blair. I would be interested in the name Gene Rostow, whose name has come up in different places.” President: “I only saw that in a column. Who originated it?” Rusk: “I don't know. I don't know. Since I saw it in a column, I suppose that somebody's been talking about it around town. Nobody's spoken to me about it.” President: “Nobody has to me.” Rusk: “But George and I have talked about recruiting this fellow for some time. He is an able fellow. It wouldn't have been too easy while Walt was over in this Department to have two brothers at the top spots here, but he's an extraordinary able fellow, Dean of the Law School, you know, at Yale. So that's a new name and a fresh person here that would be, I think, well received by a lot of people. And he's helped us I think generally on our foreign policy problems. But I think that's something that-now the other possibility is to just leave it open for a bit until we feel out what you want to do about the number two spot and how that shapes up.” The President and Rusk then discussed candidates to replace George Ball as Under Secretary of State. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 66.15, Side B, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 77. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 77. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 30, 1966. In your meeting tomorrow with the Assistant Secretaries you might wish to make some of the following points: 1) Your conversation with them is confidential. If anything is to be said to the press about it, you will do it yourself. 2) Presidential appointees represent the Administration—your Administration. As far as the Career Service is concerned, they have a major commitment to the full support of the Government of the United States. The people have elected the present Administration as its government. The British experience with the Civil Service and a Career Foreign Service illustrates a central idea of great importance: a professional service is not expected to be neutral, that is without loyalties; a professional service is expected to be loyal to the government of the day. In your case, that loyalty is a two-way street. No President has relied upon or called upon a Career Service more than you have. 3) The duty of the Department of State is to represent the interests of the American people and the American Government. When we have major problems such as Viet-Nam, a balance of payments problem, or other matters of major national importance, our diplomacy must support United States interests in every possible way. We are the representatives of the American people and Government to the foreigner; they have representatives of their own to represent their interests to us. 4) There are some problems on which we must exact a high level of discipline from other governments if they and we are to achieve the desired results. Unless we are tough on food production, for example, the human race simply cannot feed itself over the next ten years. Unless we are tough on such matters as self-help and foreign aid, our resources will be wasted in a swamp. We should not be reluctant to be tough in order to get the job done-at least if we are to make any contribution toward the job. We cannot use American resources simply to create feelings of amiability toward the United States. 5) The Assistant Secretaries occupy a crucial position of leadership and judgment. They are the ones who know about the one thousand cables a day. They are the ones who ought to alert the Secretary of State and the President to oncoming crises. They are the ones who should spend twenty-four hours a day thinking about new ideas and new approaches to solve some of our problems. The Assistant Secretaries will be given full confidence but we expect them to occupy fully the horizons of their responsibility. 6) There is always a need for talented people. The Assistant Secretaries should be engaged in a constant search, inside and outside of Government, for people of talent who can help us do our job better. 7) The President does not have a single dollar or a single man which is not provided by the Congress and the American people. The Assistant Secretaries should not rely upon Douglas MacArthur to do their work in the Congress. Each one of them should spend a considerable amount of time and effort in cultivating and developing the support required in the Congress if our programs are to succeed. Dean Rusk 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 8. Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of a May 30 memorandum in which Rostow proposed additional talking points. On May 31 the President met in the Cabinet Room from 1:25 to 2:32 p.m. with the following Department of State officers: Assistant Secretaries, Acting Assistant Secretaries, Presidential appointees with the rank of Assistant Secretary, and officers with the equivalent rank of Assistant Secretary. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. During a telephone conversation with Rusk that began at 12:45 p.m. on May 28, the President indicated that at the meeting he wanted the Assistant Secretaries to “give me their area of the world and what the problems are and what the solutions are as they see them.” (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.15, Side B, PNO 2) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk's Special Assistant, Arthur Borg, signed the original for Rusk. 78. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 78. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 31, 1966, 11:30 a.m. Mr. President: One reason I have difficulty supplying you names for State Dept. 7th floor is this: I believe the new Under Secretary you are looking for should have a considerable voice in building the 7th floor team. That team should be well balanced between old professionals and first-rate, lively outsiders; but he should have an important part in the choice. Therefore, you may wish to focus first on who this man is; and then, taking him into your confidence, go to work on rebuilding the whole top echelon with him. W.W. Rostow 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966–. Confidential; Sensitive. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 79. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 79. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1 Washington, June 2, 1966, 9:45 a.m. PARTICIPANTS President Johnson Mr. Mann [Omitted here is discussion of the Dominican Republic and other Latin American issues.] The President asked who is the best man for Mr. Mann's job, Alexis Johnson? Mr. Mann said he thought he may be on the theory that nobody can do an effective job unless he has the complete confidence of the Secretary, and he thinks Johnson has it. This job is an assistant to the Secretary and if someone is in who he doesn't select he will be out in left field. He said he thought the number 2 job should be a fellow that could some day take over and should be selected with more care than the number 3 job. Mr. Mann said he thought Cy Vance would be awfully good but didn't know if he could be spared. The President asked what job, and Mr. Mann said either one. The President said the ideal thing would be to move McNamara in. Mr. Mann said he thought McNamara would do a good job, but he mustn't jump too fast-rely more and more on staff. Mr. Mann said the Assistant Secretaries should be built up, get Congress to understand they are responsible-don't expect one man to keep up. He said he thought Bundy was good, and Gordon, the others kick up problems to the 7th floor. The President said he needed someone to take Hare's place, and Mr. Mann agreed. He (Mann) said he was not sure that Foreign Service Officers are the best people to select for Assistant Secretaries, he thinks you can get better judgment, better administration from the outside. The President told Mr. Mann to come over to see him, come in some Saturday and they can talk. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. Extra-Sensitive. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 80. Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts 80. Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts 1 Washington, June 7, 1966, 12:58 p.m. CA–11929 SUBJECT Planning and Programming in Foreign Affairs Many Chiefs of Mission are acquainted with the Department's experimental work of the past three years in developing a programming system for the United States foreign affairs program. Others will become acquainted this year through involvement in the planning-programming-budgeting systems of each foreign affairs agency, being developed at the direction of the President and under the leadership of the Bureau of the Budget. The issuance in March of National Security Action Memorandum 341, placing added responsibilities on the Secretary of State and the Department for directing overseas operations and creating the Senior Interdepartmental Group, provides added urgency to our need to make full use of such management tools as policy planning and programming. Accordingly, the Department intends to take further steps during this year to improve the capabilities of the foreign affairs community in this field. The other foreign affairs agencies and the Bureau of the Budget will participate fully and actively in this effort. The first step will be to define the requirements for a foreign affairs programming system and its relationship to the planning-programming-budgeting systems being developed in each agency, as well as to address other key issues that will define the nature and scope of such a system. The second step will be to develop the system and put it into operation at the earliest practicable date. To assist in these tasks, the Secretary is establishing an advisory group on foreign affairs planning-programming-budgeting. Dr. Charles Hitch, now Vice President of the University of California and formerly Comptroller of the Department of Defense, has consented to serve as Chairman. Dr. Hitch was an architect of the Department of Defense programming system introduced by Secretary McNamara. The Stanford Research Institute will provide staff resources to Dr. Hitch, the advisory group, and the Department of State. The advisory group will present its analysis and recommendations to the Secretary. 2 The developmental work will be carried on jointly by the advisory group, the Stanford Research Institute, and Deputy Under Secretary Crockett's staff in close association with the first regional bureaus to be involved. Maximum participation of other agencies and close coordination with the planning-programming-budgeting systems of individual agencies will be sought. The Secretary is, therefore, requesting Deputy Under Secretary Crockett to establish an interagency group to advise us in the development and implementation of the overall system. 3 As we proceed with this work, the individual agency PPBS efforts will continue in selected countries and should receive your full cooperation. Following the development and approval of a foreign affairs programming system, it will be installed region-by-region and will be improved as we gain experience in its use. We will start with Latin America and follow with Africa in view of the interest and request of Assistant Secretaries Gordon and Palmer. We hope to be able to proceed in Latin America for a full planning-programming-budgeting cycle for fiscal year 1969. As these efforts proceed in those missions where Executive Assistants have been assigned, I urge their use to assist you in your review and analysis of mission programs and operations. The content of this airgram should be discussed with your staff and representatives of all agencies at your mission. Concurrent discussions will take place with agency heads in Washington. Your own ideas and conclusions concerning the best means of developing and using these management tools and making them most effective will be welcomed. A programming system for foreign affairs will permit the Department and other agencies in Washington to better support your efforts in each country and to become the means of giving increased scope and flexibility to the country team concept you are already effectively utilizing. Over the next several years, virtually every Chief of Mission will become involved in these new developments in planning and programming. Your cooperation in this effort will be an important contribution to its success. Ball Acting 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1. Unclassified. Drafted by Barrett on June 4, cleared by Crockett, and approved by Ball. 2 The formation, meetings, and report of the Hitch Committee are discussed in detail in Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , pp. 146–171. Mosher was a member of the committee. See also Document 99 . 3 The Interagency Working Group's first meeting on August 11–12 is discussed in a Department of State paper, Background Information, drafted August 18. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Foreign Affairs Planning System, 1966) 81. Memorandum From James C. Falcon of John W. Macy, Jr.'s Staff to John W. Macy, Jr. 81. Memorandum From James C. Falcon of John W. Macy, Jr.'s Staff to John W. Macy, Jr. 1 Washington, June 18, 1966. SUBJECT The Requirements to be Met in Replacing George Ball 2 Harry Schwartz, Executive Director of SIG, tells us that we should give utmost attention to finding a first class, dynamic, and uncommitted executive to replace George Ball. Schwartz suggested we consider the following profile: 1. The replacement should have all the generally desired personal and intellectual qualities that would constitute him as a first-class person. 2. The person should be dynamic and energetic-the work-load on Ball is enormous. One of Ball's main reasons for leaving is that he is bone-tired. 3. The replacement should be uncommitted and have no particular interest in any given region of the world nor any identification with particular causes (MLF, keep China in or out of the UN, increase or decrease our role in Viet Nam, etc.). 4. The replacement should be totally dedicated to being a Chief of Staff for the Secretary of State and be able and willing to do everything that the Secretary either will not do or is unable to do. 5. The replacement should have a clear understanding of how to be an effective modern manager. Schwartz said that National Security Action Memorandum 341 laid down the framework for the establishment of SIG and gave to the Secretary of State and the Department of State the authority “to direct all foreign affairs” and authorized the Under Secretary of State to make decisions as Chairman of SIG. The need for the right kind of person to pull this off is paramount. We should only consider persons who meet the above profile. James C. Falcon 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of John W. Macy, Box 693, State-Under Secretary. No classification marking. 2 Ball discussed his decision to resign in his memoirs, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), pp. 424–433. For additional information on the decision, see David L. Di Leo, George Ball: Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 156–158; and James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) p. 75. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 82. Record of Agreements and Decisions of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Meeting 82. Record of Agreements and Decisions of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Meeting 1 Washington, July 26, 1966. PRESENT The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Chairman) The Director, CIA The Director, USIA The Acting Administrator, AID General Brown for General Wheeler, JCS Mr. Yarmolinsky for Mr. Vance, Defense The Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Walt W. Rostow The Staff Director Treasury—Under Secretary Barr O/FSI/NIS—Ambassador Kidder A) Transfer of Duties and Responsibilities of the Special Group (CI) The SIG approved the recommendations attached to the agenda for the 13th meeting 2 after making the following changes: 1) In recommendation 2 of the responsibilities assigned to the SIG, the SIG is to establish a Committee on Training, not a Sub-Committee. 3 Also, there will be established a review board whose chairman will be appointed by the Chairman of the SIG, the review board to make a separate report directly to the SIG on the adequacy of training for countersubversion. 2) The language of paragraph 2 of the responsibilities assigned to the Department of State to be redrafted. 3) Paragraph 2 of the responsibilities assigned to DOD to include USIA among those agencies to be consulted. 4) In the responsibilities assigned to AID, paragraph 1, the report to be made by November 1. The SIG also agreed to request the Assistant Secretaries of AF, ARA, FE and NEA to bring to the attention of the SIG each month those “emergent critical situations in their regions” which might require action by higher authority. 4 “Summary of Recommendations Listed by Action Responsibility”, reflecting the changes mentioned above, is attached. HHS Staff Director (SIG) Attachment SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS LISTED BY ACTION RESPONSIBILITY To SIG: 1) Annual review of activities of the Public Safety (AID) Office. (NSAM 177—Tab D, and Point 5—Tab J) 5 2) The SIG to establish a Committee on Training. The Committee will be under the chairmanship of the Director of the FSI and be made up of representatives of the departments and agencies on the SIG. It will include, in addition, the Coordinator of the NIS. Initially, it will have the responsibility of surveying the field of instruction in Government educational institutions in subversive aggression and internal defense, with a view to (a) possible revision of NSAM 283 6 and (b) initiation of any action considered desirable and feasible based on a review of General Taylor's Point 3 (“Defects in Training”) 7 and the Taylor Committee II (Training) Report. 8 In addition to the survey mentioned immediately above, a Review Board consisting of competent persons from within and without the government, and with the chairman appointed by the Chairman of the SIG, will be asked to review the work in this field of instruction and submit its recommendations directly to the SIG. The Committee on Training will also draft a directive under which it will operate in its continuing responsibility for guidance and direction of training in the field of subversive aggression and internal defense. It will submit this draft, along with any recommendations concerning (a) and (b) above, to the SIG for approval, no later than October 1, 1966. (NSAM 283—Tab F, and Point 3—Tab I) 9 3) Agencies represented on the SIG to be asked to review the Taylor Committee reports which are relevant to their responsibilities with the object of adopting any recommendations therein that they find desirable and feasible. (Taylor Committee reports—Tab N) 10 To IRGs: 1) Review of DOD's and AID's activity in the field of Civic Action. (NSAM 119—Tab A) 11 2) Periodic review of country internal defense programs. (NSAM 162—Tab C) 12 3) Give special attention to the adequacy of police programs in reviews of regional and country requirements and programs; specifically determine the basic security objectives to be met through the police programs, taking into account their relationship to the objectives of military assistance programs. (NSAM 177—Tab D; Point 5—Tab J) To State (by assignment from the Under Secretary): 1) The Department of State, in consultation with the other agencies represented on SIG, to revise the OIDP and to submit it to the SIG for approval. The Secretary to promulgate the revised document. (NSAM 182—Tab E) 13 Pages 7–11 and 98–100 of the Report of Taylor Committee I 14 are relevant. The Department of State to have the continuing responsibility, in consultation with the other agencies represented on SIG, for keeping the revised document current. (Tab III, Annex A) 15 2) Under the direction of the Under Secretary of State there will be a consolidation and integration of the presently excessive number of policy, strategy, planning or programming papers now required of or sent to missions abroad. Such consolidated or integrated papers will include a section on “Internal Defense” for appropriate under-developed countries. 3) The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs to be charged by the Chairman of SIG with the task of assuring that emphasis is specifically maintained on matters of internal defense and subversive aggression. (Point 1—Tab G) 16 To DOD: 1) To review, with AID, the concept and application of civic action and report conclusions to the SIG by October 1. (NSAM 119—Tab A) Pages 100–103 of the report of Taylor Committee I are relevant. (Tab III, Annex A) 2) The responsibility for assuring progress in R & D for counter-subversion requirements lies with DOD (and CIA). DOD is to determine, in consultation with CIA, State and USIA (G/PM), (a) whether the military hardware needs for countering subversion are being adequately met and (b) whether drawing up a separate package for procurement and R & D as a way of assuring adequate budgetary support for counter-subversion needs is feasible and desirable. The DOD is to report its conclusions on those two matters to SIG by October 1 and to submit annual reports to SIG on new developments in R & D for counter-subversions. (NSAM 162—Tab C) 3) On the Chairman's request, the Deputy Secretary of Defense to insure that General Taylor's proposal relating to the attaché system be considered in the DIA's current review of attaché staffing. (Point 7—Tab L) To CIA: 1) The responsibility for assignments of qualified counter-insurgency specialists with paramilitary skills to impending crisis areas remains with CIA and AID. (NSAM 162-Tab C) 2) The agency shares with DOD the responsibility for assuring progress in R & D for counter-subversion. (NSAM 162—Tab C) 3) On the Under Secretary's request, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to ensure appropriate action by the Intelligence community on General Taylor's proposal relating to NSA capabilities. (Point 7—Tab L) 17 To AID: 1) To review with DOD the concept and application of civic action and report conclusions to the SIG by November 1. (NSAM 119—Tab A) Pages 100–103 of the report of the Taylor Committee I are relevant. (Tab III, Annex A) 2) Retain, with CIA, the responsibility of assignment of qualified counter-insurgency specialists with paramilitary skills to impending crisis areas. (NSAM 162—Tab C) 3) Submit an annual report to the SIG on the activities of the Public Safety Office. (NSAM 177—Tab D) 4) The problem of the adequacy of police programs including U.S. personnel to be referred to AID for action in consultation with G/PM. Regional reports to be submitted to the IRGs semi-annually. (Point 5—Tab J) Pages 60–75 of the report of Taylor Committee I are relevant. (Tab III, Annex A) 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Vol. I, 13th Meeting, 7/26/66, Box 56. Secret. Drafted on July 28 by Harry H. Schwartz, SIG Staff Director. 2 The agenda and attached analyses, comments, and recommendations for the consideration and approval of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, which resulted from a survey made by Randolph A. Kidder, Coordinator of the National Interdepartmental Seminar (NIS), at the request of Under Secretary George Ball, the SIG Chairman, dated July 21, are ibid. This package was attached to an undated transmittal memorandum from Schwartz to Bromley Smith and representatives of AID, CIA, USIA, JCS, and DOD. 3 In a July 25 letter to Bromley Smith commenting on the recommendations, General Maxwell D. Taylor suggested this change. (Ibid.) 4 See last sentence of NSAM 341. [Footnote in the source text. NSAM 341 is Document 56 .] 5 Tabs A–N are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), Memos and Misc. [I], Box 60. NSAM 177, August 7, 1962, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. IX, Document 150 . Tab J is a summary and discussion of Point 5, “Adequacy of Police Programs,” set forth in Annex 1 to Taylor's January 17 report (see footnote 3, Document 50 ). 6 Document 191 . 7 See footnote 9 below. 8 Not found. 9 Tab I is a summary and discussion of Point 3, “Defects in Training,” set forth in Annex 1 to Taylor's January 17 report. 10 Tab N summarizes the reports of Committees I–III and recommends follow-up action by agencies. 11 For text of NSAM 119, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. VIII, Document 65 . 12 NSAM 162 is printed ibid., Document 91 . 13 NSAM 182 is printed ibid., Document 105 . 14 Not found. 15 Tab III to Annex A is the Report of Taylor Committee I. 16 This is a summary and discussion of Point 1, “Need for greater emphasis on the prevention of subversive aggression,” in Annex 1 to Taylor's January 17 report. 17 This is a summary and discussion of Point 7, “Intelligence to Support Countersubversion Planning and Programming,” in Annex 1 to Taylor's January 17 report; see footnote 3, Document 50 . 83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 26, 1966. Mr. President: You asked for my views on State Department personnel. They are as follows: 1. The Rusk-McNamara combination is in many ways exceedingly attractive. Moreover, both men are of such character that it could be done. You may wish to explore it further. On the whole, however, I recommend against: —We need Bob McNamara in Defense until we are over the hump in Viet Nam; —It would be exceedingly difficult for Secretary Rusk to appear other than a lame duck, despite BOB's best efforts. 2. Assuming the Rusk-McNamara arrangement is set aside, our task is to build a 7th floor team which has two characteristics: —It is comfortable for Secretary Rusk. This we owe him, given the burdens borne by the Secretary of State. —It commands enough energy and cohesion to assure that the State Department is strongly led from the 7th floor even though the Secretary of State must be heavily engaged on the Hill, overseas, and over here in the White House. 3. I propose, therefore, that the Under Secretary be either David Bruce or Clark Clifford. On the whole, I lean to David Bruce if he would take the job, because he would not raise the problem of the succession to Secretary Rusk. However, given Bruce's age, I propose that the new Counselor, Robert Bowie, be made to work in tandem with Bruce, with special responsibility for managing the Senior Interdepartmental Group. This committee of Under Secretaries is not going badly; but it could be made a much more powerful instrument of initiation, coordination, and program budgeting in the government. Bowie could also take responsibility for overseeing the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, chaired by the Assistant Secretaries; he could be assigned to oversee new initiatives; for example, in East-West bridge building, Alliance for Progress, Africa, Asian regionalism, arms control, etc. His task here would not be to substitute for those bearing the operational responsibility in these fields; but to make sure that the hard-pressed bureaus really looked for and staffed out new ideas, whether they were generated in the Policy Planning Council, the White House, or outside the government. As I know from my own experience, the men on the 7th floor are generally so taken up by crises and operational duties that they must struggle for time to examine and stimulate new initiatives. There ought to be a man paid to do this. Bowie could also be liaison with us for NSC meetings. I propose, then, a Bruce-Bowie team to do the Under Secretary's job. 4. For the Alex Johnson slot, the best single man would be Foy Kohler. As you pointed out, this raises the question of who could succeed him in Moscow. I may be wrong, but I have tentatively concluded there is no Foreign Service officer in the Soviet field sufficiently mature now to take that post. I recommend, therefore, that if we wish to bring Foy Kohler home to take Alex Johnson's post, we go outside the government. My number one candidate would be Professor Philip E. Mosely of Columbia, who, aside from his scholarly stature, has had important practical experience during and after the Second World War in Soviet affairs. He is up to date, through his research and government advisory contacts. Moreover, he is extremely well balanced and level-headed about the Soviet Union. A second possible outside choice would be Professor Marshall Shulman of Harvard. I would rate Bill Bundy as second to Foy Kohler in this post. 5. In the other Under Secretary slot, I would take Luke Battle, if that is the choice of Secretary Rusk. I would keep Tony Solomon as the economic Assistant Secretary and not put an economic Under Secretary over him. In general, I should point out that in Kohler and Bowie you would have two strong-minded men; but they would, I believe, work well with each other and the Rusk-Bruce team. Similarly, I think Luke Battle would work with them efficiently. There would be a problem, however, in sorting out their respective roles on the 7th floor. Here their common respect for David Bruce, as well as Secretary Rusk, should give you a fairly harmonious operation. If you wanted Bob Komer in Bill Bundy's job, we could make Bill Ambassador to London or substitute Foy Kohler for Luke Battle in the old Tom Mann slot, putting Bill in Alex Johnson's. As for NEA, here are three candidates in order of preference: —Win Brown, able, well-balanced Ambassador in Korea. —Joe Johnson, President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. —Tom Hughes. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966–. No classification marking. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 84. Editorial Note 84. Editorial Note In August 1966 the Office of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Crockett issued A Management Program for the Department of State consisting of 29 pages of text and a 75-page appendix. The introduction noted that there had been “a number of actions taken during the past five years to improve management of the Department of State and the leadership position of the Department in the foreign affairs community.” The purpose of A Management Program was to review “what has been done, what has been started, and what is planned for the remainder of this fiscal year in the general area of 'management improvement.'” National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 10) Part I of the text, “Leadership in Foreign Affairs,” discussed the leadership roles of the Ambassador, the Department of State, and the Country Director, the role of positive administration and the administrative officer, the development of managers as leaders, national policy papers, and the foreign affairs programming system. Part II, “Department-wide Management Improvement,” sketched 16 projects and programs instituted to improve management in the Department as a whole, such as Action for Organization Development (ACORD), a long-range organizational development program designed to increase managerial effectiveness and improve interpersonal relationships by applying the knowledge of the behavioral sciences to the workings of a complex organization. Part III, “O Area Improvements,” focused on seven projects and programs primarily affecting the Office of the Under Secretary for Administration. The appendix included key documents, a discussion of “Management by Objectives and Programs,” an index of State Department studies in the administrative area, and other material. In September 1966 the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration issued a very slightly revised version of A Management Program for the Department of State . (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–28, Box 31) 85. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 85. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 4, 1966, 12:30 p.m. SUBJECT Senior Economics People in the State Department I hesitate to comment on your State Seventh Floor problem, especially since I do not know what the Secretary is recommending. However, I would like to flag for you one organizational matter, which has nothing to do with personalities. I understand that the Secretary is thinking about shifting the No. 2 Under Secretaryship from the economic to the political side. If that is done, and nothing else is changed, the senior economics man in the Department would be Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. Even with as strong and effective a man as Tony Solomon in that job, I am afraid this would put State at a great disadvantage in the inevitable bargaining with Commerce, Agriculture, Interior and Treasury, and also to some extent vis-á-vis the Congress, industry and labor. Most international economic issues—trade, commodity policy, etc.—touch on the primary, and sometimes parochial, concerns of one of the major domestic departments. On serious issues their Secretaries become quickly and personally involved. State is handicapped by the fact that its top management is often quite properly preoccupied with foreign crises which cannot be shunted aside. A full time economic Under Secretary in the Dillon, Ball, Mann tradition, can balance the scales. Also, having someone of Seventh Floor rank in the economic business can strengthen State's hand in dealing with the Congress, the business community, and the unions. You know better than anyone what yeoman service Tom Mann did on this front—I think he was much more valuable in that job than he himself ever realized. I understand that George Ball has mentioned to you one possible solution. This would involve converting Alex Johnson's Deputy Under Secretaryship from political to economic affairs. I think that might well do the trick. If that were done, I would vote for putting Solomon in that job. As you know, he is skillful, loyal, energetic and has worked very well with the rest of us on the economic circuit. Further, this would open up Tony's Assistant Secretaryship for another senior economic man. For that, it might be possible to keep Richard Cooper, now Tony's deputy, who is also absolutely first rate . Yale is literally forcing Cooper to return to New Haven this coming September. If we could tell Kingman Brewster that we wanted Cooper badly enough to promote him, it might be possible to get them to relent. It is even conceivable that Dick might be prepared to resign his professorship. I do not know about the Secretary, but I know that George Ball and Solomon would be all for Cooper, despite his youth (32). So would Ackley, Schultze, Fowler (who recently tried to hire him), Deming, Komer (whom Cooper has helped on Vietnam), Dave Bell, Kermit Gordon, Walter Heller—and everybody else Dick has worked with. But in any case, I think the organizational point —that one of the Under Secretaries or the Deputy Under Secretary should specialize in economic affairs—is valid, independent of personalities. 2 FMB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966–. Sensitive. The memorandum is marked with an indication the President saw it. 2 Walt Rostow wrote in hand below Bator's signature: “I concur. We must keep Solomon in State and effective.” 86. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Country Director for Iran (Eliot) 86. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Country Director for Iran (Eliot) 1 Washington, August 4, 1966. Dear Mr. Eliot: I have been asked by many officers to make clearer what the Country Director is, what is expected of him, and how he should operate. I would like you and your staff to have the following thoughts on this subject. These thoughts reflect the Secretary's deep and personal interest in and support of the Country Director concept, as well as my own views. The Country Director is not mentioned in the President's directive to the Secretary, but the need for the Country Director is implicit in the interdepartmental responsibilities placed on the Secretary and the Department. The Secretary spoke to that need when he referred to establishment of the Country Director position in his statement to the Department and the Foreign Service. Full understanding of the Country Director starts with an understanding of the action requirements placed by the President on the Department and the Foreign Service. 2 First, the Department is clearly committed to action—with leadership responsibilities for insuring that programs of other foreign affairs agencies are not only well-conceived to carry our policy, but do, in fact, succeed in their purpose. This broader action responsibility requires a Presidential point of view—a concern for the success of all U.S. agencies' missions abroad. The Department is not a competitor in conflict with other agencies, but the President's representative looking at foreign affairs across the board and across programs. The Department has special responsibility for broad policy development and for sensitivity to the international political impact of U.S. actions. It must also take into account possible domestic effects of foreign affairs activities. But these responsibilities are not to be viewed as the specialized interests of one Department in competition with the specialized interests of other agencies. Rather, the Department's policy considerations must accommodate the totality of U.S. objectives, including foreign affairs operating programs, so that they are truly Presidential in outlook—not parochial and bureaucratic. The Department must look outward for ideas. Officers at all levels should seek suggestions and ideas for foreign policies and programs from other agencies. They should urge their colleagues throughout the government to contribute to their thinking. Their antennae should constantly be out in search of the hitherto unexplored approach. The broader responsibility of the regional bureaus requires them to make full use of the ideas and assistance of the functional bureaus and offices, which play vitally important roles in interdepartmental leadership. This is particularly necessary in the areas of policy planning, economics, public affairs, science and technology, cultural and educational affairs, international organization affairs and administration. One more thing. Leadership does not imply stifling of important divergences of views. There is no justification for delay based on purely bureaucratic rivalries. There is, however, a great and over-riding need to ensure that divergent views of substance and importance be sharply identified and promptly submitted to higher authorities for decision. New organizational responsibilities may not be used to shield the Secretary and the President from controversy which can properly be resolved only at the highest level. Against the background of these basic principles, the Country Director's reason for existence, his role and his responsibilities can be briefly outlined. International relations are in large part carried out on a bilateral country-to-country basis. It is at the country level that most crisis-related issues first become visible, at which interrelated programs must be developed for the most effective use of all government and domestic resources, and at which implementing action starts. It is in the country context that the Ambassador and the field mission must be served and backstopped. Informed, timely focus on day-to-day interdepartmental activities in the country context is necessary for timely accurate definition of major issues requiring action at the level of the regional bureau and the Secretary. The Country Director thus is the essential block on which Assistant Secretaries, the Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the Senior Interdepartmental Group build. The Country Director, for assigned countries, must exercise the same leadership, foresight, government-wide overview and wisdom that the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries exercise at their levels and that the Ambassador exercises at the diplomatic mission. To meet this challenge the Country Director must— —have insight into and appreciation of the total range of the President's interest, concern and responsibility for all U.S. activities both at home and abroad —appreciate the objectives and potentials of the entire spread of programs which implement foreign policy —understand the meaning and techniques of leadership —have a profound sense for timeliness and decisiveness in action, and for anticipating and heading off problems —know the difference between serving as a focus of action in contrast to acting as a supervisory layer in a hierarchical structure —be able to distinguish between decisions which should be made at the Country Director level, and those which can be made only at a higher level The Country Director sees that the Ambassador's needs are served both within the Department and government-wide. He assures that the mission is fully supported in the full range of its requirements: policy, program, resources, operations and administration. For example, the Country Director must— —provide policy guidance on which operating agencies will base their programs —insure that recommended programs of the various agencies are consistent with and support U.S. policy objectives and provide the most effective total use of proposed U.S. resources —develop devices for ensuring interdepartmental implementation of decisions requiring interdepartmental action —maintain continuing purposeful contacts with other agencies' representatives, and establish channels for prompt interchange of information on policies, country developments, potential crisis situations and similar matters —marshall his interdepartmental team to meet IRG and SIG requests, and bring his detailed knowledge to IRG discussions when his assigned country is concerned —maintain constant readiness on an interdepartmental basis to anticipate and meet crises, and serve as the base for crisis task force operations when necessary It is for the Country Director to decide when to meet with other agencies' representatives or with members of functional bureaus; how to bring them into problems; what mechanisms to establish; how to inspire officers to work as a team. The essential is that he rise to the challenge of creating a Government-wide approach characterized by intelligence, imagination and timely action. The Country Director must learn to think, act and provide leadership for his team in much the same sense as the Ambassador does for his. I am certain that you personally realize how crucial the Country Director is to the Secretary's and the Department's new responsibilities. The way in which this concept evolves in the next months and years will depend on you, and on other officers assigned to Country Director positions. In the words of the Secretary, “no organizational chart can substitute for the abilities and attitudes of people.” In the period immediately ahead, my staff and I will welcome your frank comment and reactions. Particularly, let me know in what ways I can be useful in this effort. Sincerely, William J. Crockett 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1–1. No classification marking. The same letter was apparently sent to all Country Directors. The text of the letter was included in the appendix to A Management Program for the Department of State (see Document 84 ), under the heading Country Director Doctrine. For information on the development of the Country Director system, see William I. Bacchus, Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). 2 For text of Rusk's statement on March 4, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 1128–1129. 87. Editorial Note 87. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and investment banker Sidney Weinberg that began at 1:12 p.m. on August 5, 1966, the following exchange took place: President: “I want you to think about all the men in this country you know that you would make Secretary of State if you were President. Now that's just a standard I want you to use, that's the criteria, because I need about a half a dozen men that are top flight in that field and I'd like for you to think about 'em.” Weinberg: “In the diplomatic field?” President: “Yeah. They ought to be men, if they could be, between 50 and 60. Could be 40, and they could be 65.” Weinberg: “Preferably 50–60.” President: “They ought to be men that have traveled. If they could, it would be good if they had a language. If they didn't they ought to be good executives. They ought to be reasonably diplomatic, understanding people. They ought to have some grace and some culture and some background, and they ought to have some judgment. They should have been successes as business people or academic people or lawyers or bankers or something. I don't care whether they're Republicans or Democrats. I just want 'em to have integrity, to have judgment. Judgment's the most important thing a man can have.” Weinberg: “I agree with that, Mr. President.” President: “And I might put 'em in Under Secretary George Ball's spot. I might put 'em in Tom Mann's spot. He's the Economic Under Secretary. I might put 'em in Crockett's spot. He's the Deputy Under Secretary that runs the Department. He picks 120 ambassadors.” Weinberg: “I know him.” President: “And he gets the show on the road. I might put 'em in Alex Johnson's spot, which handles military, Defense, CIA. He is the Deputy Under Secretary. He's really the straw boss of the State Department. I might put 'em in Ambassador to France or to Moscow or some other place.” Later in the conversation Weinberg told the President: “I think if you used enough influence you could get Doug Dillon back if you wanted.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Weinberg, Tape F66.19, Side B, PNO 1 and 2) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 88. Editorial Note 88. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation that began at 12:38 p.m. on August 8, 1966, President Johnson asked Douglas Dillon to accept an appointment as Under Secretary of State. In urging Dillon to take the job, Johnson stated “by the end of September we're going to try to remake that department over there, and I would hope very much that you could be in on it.” The President went on to say: “in effect you will have two secretaries of state. I would like to select a third secretary and the fourth man in the department and a new personnel man and some of the other things that I could, but I would like to do it after I select you. I don't know what the Secretary's plans are. I have not asked him, Obviously I don't know. He has not stated them to me. I know he doesn't want to feel, I wouldn't think, that he would be leaving under any fire or anything. On the other hand, I know he had rather have you than anybody in the United States for this particular assignment.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Dillon, Tape F22.35, Side A, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. Dillon declined the appointment during a telephone conversation with the President the next day. (Ibid., Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Dillon, August 9, 1966, 10:05 a.m., Tape 66.20, Side A, PNO 2) 89. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Schultze) to President Johnson 89. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Schultze) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 8, 1966. SUBJECT Management Responsibility of the Secretary of State Based on General Taylor's recommendations in March, you assigned to the Secretary of State “authority and responsibility, to the full extent permitted by law, for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas.” (National Security Action Memorandum 341, attached) 2 This was a major step in strengthening the Secretary as a focal point of assistance to the President —in surveying and managing our growing overseas operations, now conducted by many Departments; —in insuring that U.S. programs effectively meet our interests and objectives in overseas areas. My review of overseas programs in the 1968 Budget Preview has convinced me of the importance of having a top official of the Department to assist the Secretary full time in (1) managing the Department , (2) coordinating the foreign affairs activities of the several agencies, and (3) providing leadership to the interagency committees and procedures established under NSAM 341. Specifically, as a next step in strengthening our foreign affairs operations, I recommend that the number three man in the Department (the Tom Mann job), who is titled in statute either “Under Secretary for Political Affairs” or “Under Secretary for Economic Affairs”, be assigned to this management role . Acting for the Secretary, he would: — manage the resources of the Department of State , with Foreign Service officers and other employees totaling 25,000, and an annual budget of $400 million ($700 million with reimbursements from other agencies). —be responsible for the effective translation of policy decisions into action . — direct, coordinate, and supervise interdepartmental activities overseas as specified in NSAM 341. These activities include programs of economic and military assistance, food aid, the Peace Corps, and USIA, cost about $5 billion annually, and involve about 37,000 employees in addition to State's. — chair the Senior Interdepartmental Group established by NSAM 341. To be effective in this task, he will need a strong program review and analysis staff and a foreign affairs programming system which would relate agency programs in countries and regions. He also should be a main point of advice to the Secretary on programs and budgets for foreign affairs activities. The recommendation assumes that the Secretary will continue to use the Under Secretary as his “alter ego” in advising the President, conducting diplomatic relations, and dealing with Congress and the public. I do not believe the Under Secretary can perform this demanding role and also give the necessary sustained attention to the management job I am proposing. The Mann vacancy provides an opportunity to restructure the assignment as recommended herein and to find the right man to fill it. No legislation would be needed. I believe the recommended assignment backed by the right staff and procedures would contribute materially to —clearer and earlier identification of objectives and requirements in countries; — more effective planning and execution of agency programs to meet total U.S. interest in a country, especially in insurgency and other crisis situations; —better management of foreign affairs personnel , a critical resource, to improve quality and utilization among agencies; — more effective operations at least cost , by eliminating lower priority activities and consolidating administrative support; — reductions in the number of people abroad . I believe that this proposal would be well received in the Congress and strongly supported in the executive branch. I recommend —that you discuss it with Secretary Rusk and request him to plan for a restructuring of assignments; —that the proposed assignment be the basis for selecting the Mann replacement. Charles L. Schultze 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341. Confidential. Typed at the end of the memorandum is the following note: “Walt Rostow has seen, and agrees with this memo. CLS [Charles L. Schultze].” 2 Document 56 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Schultze signed the original. 90. Editorial Note 90. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation with Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach that began at 7:50 p.m. on August 11, 1966, President Johnson discussed the appointment of an Under Secretary of State and reviewed a number of possible candidates. Among the President's comments was the following: “This man has got to rejuvenate that Department like you have brought in at Justice-all different new men, young men, competent men, quiet men that don't spend all their time leaking but a good deal of it working. And then I've got to have somebody that's got some judgment. You have no idea how taxing and depressing it is to me-it just nearly breaks my spirit every day. If I have a conversation with the Secretary the damn thing is leaked and it's in the paper, and it's twisted. They just got no morale over there, and they got no imagination. They got no initiative. They got no ideas. You have to ask four or five times to get a report. I called you today on this thing, told you to look into two angles of it. Now I got my report and I can go on home. Sometimes I call four or five times to get things over there, and it's a serious thing.” Katzenbach indicated that he would be willing to undertake the position. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Katzenbach, Tape 66.21, Side A, PNO 1) During a telephone conversation that began at 10 a.m. on August 24, President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk had the following exchange regarding the appointment of an Under Secretary of State: President: “I'll tell you the most interesting possibility that we have had, aside from the Vance thing, which I kind of want to use as a fallback, kind of like you said about Bunker. We have Vance, for a while anyway, and we wouldn't have him very long over there, but we may need him as a fallback if we are unable to interest anyone else, under the circumstances. Now it looks to me like the best prospect we have-but I don't just know whether to gamble on the cities and the riots and everything else-would be Katzenbach.” Rusk: “Um-hm. Um-hm. Well as you know I'd be tremendously interested in him.” President: “I just think he'd be the best because everything he does he seems to do so well.” (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 66.21, Side B, PNO 1) The portions of the conversations printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 91. Paper Prepared in the White House 91. Paper Prepared in the White House 1 Washington, September 1, 1966. Alternative Teams to Fill the Top Sub-Cabinet Positions in the State Department General Assumptions. 1. Dean Rusk will remain Secretary of State for the foreseeable future. 2. The Under Secretary—Ball's replacement—will function as his alter ego and the principal coordinator of inter-agency efforts abroad. 3. The Under Secretary for Political (or Economic) Affairs—Mann's replacement—will be the principal management officer of the Department, the general supervisor of the regional and functional Assistant Secretaries and the administrative programs. He will be assisted by the two Deputy Under Secretaries. 4. The Deputy Under Secretary for Political (or Economic) Affairs—Alex Johnson's replacement—will be the direct supervisor of the regional and functional Assistant Secretaries. He will be the Department's principal director of substantive processes, including program planning, intelligence, politico-military affairs, and economic policy. 5. The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration—Crockett or his replacement—will be the principal supervisor of administrative processes, including budgeting, personnel, inspections, communications, and logistics. 6. Since Secretary Rusk will remain, vacancies in the number 2, 3, and 4 jobs will probably be filled partly or entirely from inside the Government. The following are some of the possible combinations of men currently serving in the Executive Branch that would be worthy of consideration, given alternative specific assumptions or objectives. Tab A is a more comprehensive list of men, in and out of Government, who could be considered as substitutes for those specified below. 2 TEAM I Specific assumption . The President wants to select a Rusk team, one that presents no problem of relationships with an heir-apparent, and one that has a strong link to the Defense establishment. Ellsworth Bunker , Under Secretary. Lucius D. Battle , Under Secretary for Political Affairs. John T. McNaughton , Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. TEAM II Specific assumption . The President wants a team that can bring maximum focus to our international politico-military affairs, that can work with Defense to bring the Vietnam war to a successful conclusion. Cyrus R. Vance , Under Secretary. William P. Bundy , Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Jeffrey C. Kitchen , Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (since 1961, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs). TEAM III Specific assumption . The President wants a team that can develop and implement a series of imaginative foreign policy initiatives, with emphasis on our relationships with the underdeveloped world-systematically putting to work our accumulated experience in economic aid, counter-insurgency, and military assistance as a single package of coordinated programs. Paul H. Nitze , Under Secretary. Ralph A. Dungan , Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Alternate: James W. Clark , now Chief of Budget Bureau International Division. Anthony M. Solomon , Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. TEAM IV Specific assumption . The President wants to emphasize the continuity between his foreign policy and that of previous Administrations, using a prominent Texas diplomat, a Kennedy aide, and a seasoned Foreign Service officer. George C. McGhee , Under Secretary. Ralph A. Dungan , Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Edwin M. Martin , Deputy Under Secretary for Economic (or Political) Affairs. TEAM V Specific assumption . The President wants to appoint a team of mature professionals, men who understand the art of diplomacy and the world of politics. W. Averell Harriman , Under Secretary. Ellsworth Bunker , Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Alternate: Samuel D. Berger (former Ambassador to Korea, now Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far East). Philip H. Trezise , Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. TEAM VI Specific assumption . The President wants to rejuvenate the State Department by appointing a team of young, dynamic activists who are compatible with Secretary Rusk and can build the kind of solid, responsive staff support that Rusk, as senior diplomatist and foreign policy advisor, needs. Lucius D. Battle (age 48), Under Secretary. William P. Bundy (49), Under Secretary for Political Affairs. James W. Clark (43), Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 105. No classification marking. Drafted by Robert G. Cox of the White House staff. (Memorandum from Cox to Macy, September 1; ibid., Office Files of John W. Macy, Box 693, State-General-1966) It was handed to President Johnson by Macy during their meeting on September 1. (Memorandum from Macy to the President, September 19; ibid.) The paper indicates that the President saw it. Under cover of a September 19 memorandum, 2 days before Johnson announced his appointments to the three posts, Macy forwarded to the President a second list of suggestions consisting of 6 teams. Macy explained that the list was “based on the same general assumptions but with suggested names from outside of the government.” (Ibid.) 2 Attached but not printed. 92. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (McPherson) to President Johnson 92. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (McPherson) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 13, 1966, 11:30 p.m. After a night's reflection on the proposed State Department appointments. 2 I have these reflections: 1) They are all exceedingly competent. They are sharp and quick to the point of impatience with those who are not so quick. 2) They are all pros. They would move into their new positions without the need for handbooks on government organization. 3) They all support your policies in the areas of their competence. 4) Not one of them is identified with U.S.-European policy, U.S.-Soviet relations, or U.S.-U.K. relations. Bundy is exclusively Asia-oriented. Battle has been in Egypt, Korry in Africa. Cy has worked 5–1/2 years for a Department whose overwhelming concern (despite NATO policy problems and armament sales to Europe) has been Vietnam. I do not mean to suggest that they will be unable to master the problems of U.S.-European relations in time. But they lack extensive experience in the field now, and some editorial writers and columnists are bound to mark the absence of a senior man who knows the Common Market, pound, and NATO problems. A lot of people think diplomatic relations with Europe are the only ones that count. We don't think so; we are re-orienting our foreign policy interests toward Asia, and that is all to the good; but Europe cannot be ignored. It is infinitely more powerful and important than Asia, and will be for a long time to come. I am sure Cy is as smart as George Ball, and I am sure he will prove his equal in comprehension of Europe, given time. But as neither he, nor the other top appointees have a background of dealing with European problems, there will be a short-term gap, and we can depend on the European diplomatic circuit here to point it out to correspondents. 5) Finally, not one of the new appointments has a reputation for unorthodox thinking, or indeed for challenging the “conventional wisdom.” I do not mean there should be a house pacifist on the seventh floor at State. But perhaps there ought to be somebody (or there ought to be thought to be somebody) who says “no” on occasion. Ball's reputation for doing this, deserved or not, was in my judgment a great asset to you. It made the doves feel their case was being made to you, and that even if you did not agree, the advice you received on the issues of war and peace did not come out of an IBM machine labeled Rusk Monolithic. Cy, Bill Bundy, and Luke Battle are able men with strong minds, but they are certainly not known for their tendency to dissent on policy. They are very, very, damned competent organization men. Do you need them, in order to show that all arguments on Vietnam are over and the only questions now are about how to beat China and the North? Maybe so. But coupled with a Secretary who almost is that policy himself, physically and intellectually, they will not seem to bring much intellectual ferment to a place that (whatever one feels about our foreign policy successes of recent months) needs a frequent shaking upside down by the heels so that all its blood does not go to its tail. Several officers in the lower echelons of State, several university people who deal with the Department, and a number of journalists who observe it say that it is like a morgue over there; in the language of the day, nothing's “happening.” The possibility of something unorthodox, daring, and true, being said or done, seems quite remote. After these very intelligent men are appointed, I am afraid it will continue to seem so. That may not be unfortunate. I rather think it is. In any event it seems sure that this choice—the benefits of quiet competence versus those of unorthodox imaginativeness—is involved in the new appointments. Harry 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105. No classification marking. Handwritten notations on the memorandum include the following: “recd 9/13/66, 12:17 p”; “from Pres' desk, 12/26/68”; and “From the President's middle desk drawer, 12/27/68.” 2 Presumably (see numbered paragraphs 4 and 5) the President proposed to McPherson appointing William Bundy, Lucius Battle, Edward Korry, and Cyrus Vance to top positions in the Department of State. The President may have presented the proposals to McPherson during one or more of their three telephone conversations on September 12. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Bundy, Battle, and Vance were all included in the alternative teams proposed to Johnson by Macy on September 1 (see Document 91 ). 93. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 93. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 16, 1966, 10:18 a.m. [Omitted here is discussion of U.S. relations with the Philippines and China.] President: I'm told that all the writers are getting ready to mob us because we don't—that you're basically oriented towards the Pacific area and other parts of the world instead of Western Europe, and the Jews and all of them think we're going to hell over there, and NATO and Lippmann and Fulbright and Mansfield—we're too much Asia. So we ought to have somebody in here that can kind of be known as Ball has been as the European man. Now I don't know we take this but we got to think about it. I thought about it a good deal yesterday. Do you think this might be a good combination? Consider the Katzenbach. Rusk: Uh huh. President: Number three: Rostow, Gene. Rusk: Uh huh. President: That would put two of you above him, and Katzenbach thinks very highly of him. He says he thinks this other story is exaggerated about his being too impulsive. Said he does have ideas and said we ought to be having ideas. Rusk: Right. President: And we need someone like that. He thinks he's very good. Said he ran a hell of a good law school. Rusk: Uh huh, uh huh. President: And, Kohler, if for no other reason, to give us some fresh—for the Alex Johnson thing—give us a fresh voice in there that's kind of in the Moscow. Then we might see if we couldn't shift Lodge to Paris, and Westmoreland to Vietnam, and Bohlen to Moscow, if he'd go there for a year or two. He's a very perceptive fellow and a hell of a good reporter and very experienced and I think that this crowd here that wants to play with Moscow so much is a little bit down on Kohler, and Kohler—I was quite impressed with him during the Berlin problem and I think he's a pretty good workhorse in that job. Defense likes him, CIA likes him, you like him. I think then, if we could take Katzenbach and Rostow and Kohler and then look for the good Hill man. If we can't find a good aggressive one that can make some headway, we might ought to give some thought to that fellow that married your secretary under the Republicans and check him out with Bill Fulbright again— Rusk: Macomber? President: Yep. [Inaudible] Somebody told me, some senator, that they considered him very good. Rusk: Very quiet and very effective. President: We might give thought to that. Now, what is wrong with this combination, as you see it, of Katzenbach, Rostow, and Kohler? Rusk: Well, I'm very enthusiastic about Katzenbach. And, the sooner we could do that, the happier I would be. The Gene Rostow name, I think the only really negative comment I've had on that was from Dean Acheson, who feels that he's unpredictable and sort of unmanageable—that he had worked with Rostow before. I think it's Rostow's views about De Gaulle that has bothered Dean most of all. But— President: What are his views on De Gaulle? Rusk: Well, he seems to be pretty strong pro-De Gaulle, and thinks that we ought to follow the De Gaulle line, at least he's indicated that privately. But he'll take policy guidance on things like that. No, I think this is a combination. I wouldn't do the Lodge—Westmoreland thing right away. Kohler will be here within the next couple of days to be here for my talks with Gromyko, and I'll have a chance to talk about that with him. He was a little reluctant at the beginning, but now that he's been confirmed as a Career Ambassador, I think he'd probably be more relaxed. President: He agreed to, though, didn't he? Rusk: Well, he did agree if we wanted him to but he was a little resistant on it. However I don't think that will be a problem and he certainly is a superb operator as far as moving the papers through and staff work and things of that sort. He's a very efficient guy; one of the best organized men I know. We could run into a little flak. I think it's pretty much in the background of that incident about twenty years ago—about losing some secret papers. But I doubt that Bill Fulbright and Mansfield will be very enthusiastic about him. President: No, they're not. But they thought he ran a poor embassy. But I think down in that spot, the fact that they've got somebody that's not just Vietnam in it, would give them a little hope. Rusk: Right. And he certainly ran a very efficient Bureau of European Affairs when he was here in the Department. President: That's what I'm told. Everybody tells me that, so, then you would consider favorably Katzenbach, Rostow, Kohler, and Macomber if we could work it out? Rusk: Yes, yes I would. President: Have you ever had any contact with Gene Rostow? Rusk: No, I don't know him well. I've met him two or three times. President: I wonder why you don't call him and ask him to come down to see you and just say— Rusk: All right. President: Now, somebody tells me that Ball has been urging him for number-two place and tells him that he's his choice to succeed him and stuff like that. That may upset him. But you might just say that you believe the President has made a commitment— Rusk: Right. President: Has some obligations to this other, but you would like to talk to him about his views and tell him you think it's very essential that men come in here like they go to Vietnam, and make a real pitch to him, and then if it looks good, call me and then I'll see tomorrow— Rusk: [inaudible] Fine, let me get hold of him. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 66.24, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 94. Editorial Note 94. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Walt Rostow that began at 5:39 p.m. on September 17, 1966, the following comments were made: President: “I don't want a human to know this, but what I'm trying to do, I've made arrangements some time ago, if it works out, for Nick [Katzenbach] to resign as Attorney General and go in Ball's place and do most of the work up there testifying and just take on the committee. He's the best I've seen in the government for the Congress, and he wants Gene [Rostow] over there to handle Europe and handle a lot of other things, and he's the strongest man for him. I think that will relieve Rusk of a lot of the testifying, and I don't think he does that as well as he does other things in my judgment. I think Nick's the best we have in this government in that field. I don't know what the hell I'll do at Justice, but I've watched him handle these civil rights and I've watched him handle Jim Eastland and I've watched him handle Bill Fulbright and I've watched him handle all of them, and he's the best man on the Hill that we've got in the Cabinet, and then I think that puts all of them on a pretty high level when a Cabinet officer leaves the Cabinet to come into the State Department.” Later in the same conversation: President: “Well, am I wrong in your judgment? Do you know anybody better in this town to take on these people than Nick?” Rostow: “No, I really don't. He's sat in on a lot of foreign policy. He'll pick the issues up fast.” President: “But what I'm talking about—yes, that too—but I think that the issues and things, I think Dean and Gene can work on those a whole lot. But I think all this hell-raising every day about clearing these damn treaties and about discussing these things with Thailand with Fulbright, that's where our trouble's coming from, Walt.” Rostow: “Well, the one thing I'd say, sir, is that you mustn't expect the best lawyer we can send up there to make Fulbright happy.” President: “No, but I think that he can keep us out of trouble more than anybody—” Rostow: “I think that's right.” President: “And I think they won't regard him as a great big hawk.” Rostow: “I think that's right.” President: “Mansfield told me he considered him one of the ablest men he'd ever talked to.” Rostow: “That's a good start. [inaudible] a new approach up there. I don't despair of anyone up there, really.” President: “Dean's a scholar and able man, and he didn't like to go up and waller around with those folks. Nick don't mind it much. Nick told me, he said that 'I just decided one thing, that they said I was a professor of international law, and I was a little sensitive about it. I just decided, by god, I wanted to show 'em I could get along with Jim Eastland.'” Rostow: “That's what you've gotta do.” President: “That's what he told me. He said, 'I wanted to prove that I could do that to them.' And I think that's one of the important things about whether we save this situation or not, is whether we can keep those fellows on board a little bit. Don't you?” Rostow: “Oh you bet. There's no doubt. And this is exactly, I think, all that Hanoi's got going for it—the possibility that we [inaudible], so that this is not just normal politics. This is fightin' war. So I just look forward to this.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Walt Rostow, Tape 66.24, Side B, PNO 2) The portions of the conversation printed here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 95. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) 95. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) 1 Washington, September 21, 1966. SUBJECT Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS) REFERENCE Letter from Deputy Under Secretary Crockett Requesting CIA Comments 2 1. You will note that by letter of 11 August 1966 to Deputy Under Secretary Crockett, 2 you assigned Mr. Bavis of my office to represent the Agency on the Inter-Agency Group established to develop a Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS). On 8 September 1966, he received the attached letter from Mr. Crockett. The letter, which was sent to all Inter-Agency Group representatives, requests that CIA identify to Mr. Crockett's office those overseas Agency activities and programs which are “interdepartmental” in character under the terms of reference of NSAM 341. It is implicit in the letter that activities and programs identified as such will be subject to review in any foreign affairs programming system that may be developed. 2. Background: FAPS represents a renewed effort by the Department of State to devise an overall program review system for foreign affairs agencies. It is a departure from the earlier effort known as the Comprehensive Country Programming System (CCPS) and the pilot scheme that evolved from it, i.e., the Executive Review of Overseas Programs (EROP), in that whereas State and BOB shared the sponsorship of the earlier effort, State itself appears to be carrying the principal burden on FAPS. Our involvement in the EROP exercise was basically counter-productive, a view that was shared by BOB. State was so advised, albeit in rather low key, at its conclusion in the fall of 1965. 3. The new factor present in FAPS that was absent in the CCPS/EROP effort is NSAM 341. It is the principal peg on which State will hang its renewed efforts to coordinate foreign affairs programming. 4. Without specific reference at the moment to the question of whether or not NSAM 341 contravenes the National Security Act, 3 the NSCID's flowing from it, or NSC 5412/2, 4 an effectively pursued FAPS poses a much more serious security problem than EROP did, because it would continuously expose collection and covert action programs to staff-level groups in the State regional bureaus and/or Mr. Crockett's office. It would certainly result in the imposition of an increased workload on CS components which already respond to the Agency's PPBS requirements as well as to the Budget Bureau's reviews. It would also represent a potential for the erosion of the Director's responsibility for CIA's programs. 5. Alternate Courses of Action: There are several ways in which we might respond to Mr. Crockett's letter: a. ignore it; b. prepare a response which indirectly, and by implication, begins to make a case for exemption of CIA from full participation in FAPS; this response would not make reference to exemption per se, but would merely cite the recognition in the NSAM of the special status of the intelligence community and the existing procedures for policy guidance and review; c. request exemption for CIA in clear and unmistakable terms, either in a response to Mr. Crockett's letter or in a conversation by you with Mr. Crockett or between the Director and Secretary Rusk. We are inclined toward the position stated in b., and the tone of the proposed reply (Tab C) is a reflection of this. 5 6. Comment: We should not ignore the letter since it raises the fundamental issue of whether CIA identifies its activities and programs as “interdepartmental” and thereby makes them subject to FAPS review, or not “interdepartmental” and therefore to be excluded from FAPS review. It was something of a surprise for us to see this issue trotted out so early in the game. Given the fact that the Inter-Agency Group has met only once, and then only perfunctorily, it is difficult to predict with any certainty what the conceptual basis will be for a FAPS. The publication in early October of the “Hitch Report” will give us a better reading on what program review in a FAPS will involve. Our best estimate, based primarily on our interpretation of the deliberations of the two-day Inter-Agency working group held in mid-August in Easton, is that Mr. Crockett will try to have the Inter-Agency Group adopt proposals to establish an institutionalized staff program review capability under each regional Assistant Secretary of State. Under the circumstances, the Director may find it impolitic to declare for CIA exemption in unequivocal terms at this time, in which event we should respond by indirection and thus retain our options on the manner and extent of our participation. 7. Mr. [ name not declassified ] has worked with John Bross, Larry Houston, and [ name not declassified ] in developing an Agency position. They have concurred in the attached reply. Desmond FitzGerald 6 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FAPS. Secret. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Approved July 26, 1947; for text, see Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 131–135. 4 NSC Directive 5412/2, December 28, 1955. For text, see William Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 146–149. 5 Not attached. For White's reply to Crockett, see Document 97 . 6 Printed from a copy that indicates FitzGerald signed the original. 96. Editorial Note 96. Editorial Note At a news conference on September 21, 1966, President Johnson announced that he would appoint Nicholas Katzenbach to replace George Ball as Under Secretary of State. He also announced that he would appoint Eugene Rostow Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Foy Kohler Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, replacing U. Alexis Johnson. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pages 1045–1052. Appointed Under Secretary on September 30, Katzenbach entered on duty October 3 and served until January 20, 1969. The President made the Rostow and Kohler appointments on October 13, the same day he also appointed Ellsworth Bunker Ambassador at Large and Llewellyn Thompson Ambassador to the Soviet Union, replacing Kohler. Rostow entered on duty October 14 and served until January 20, 1969. Kohler entered on duty November 29 and served until December 31, 1967. Bunker entered on duty November 8 and served until April 11, 1967, when he became Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Thompson entered on duty January 23, 1967, and served until January 14, 1969. 97. Letter From the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) 97. Letter From the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) 1 Washington, September 30, 1966. Dear Bill: With reference to your letter of 8 September 1966 to [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], 2 we have received NSAM 341, 3 particularly those parts of it which refer to “interdepartmental activities.” The latter term is not specifically defined; therefore, your desire to initiate a process of definition is understandable. As you are aware, our collection and covert action programs are discussed regularly in considerable detail with the various regional assistant secretaries throughout the year. These briefings are designed to ensure that these programs are not only responsive to U.S. policy needs but also compatible with other ongoing programs conducted by the Department of State or other agencies over which the Department of State has some cognizance. Similar comprehensive briefings are given by our Chiefs of Station to Ambassadors. As you will recall from the EROP of last year, these evoked very favorable comments from them. Additionally, significant covert action programs and activities are reviewed in great detail by the 303 Committee. Our programs are also given detailed review by the Bureau of the Budget. Other procedures and forums for policy guidance or review, such as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), similarly provide opportunities for review of our programs. Concern for the protection of sensitive CIA overseas activities and programs is a continuing one. Indeed, this concern was the basis for the decision to create the 303 Committee and its predecessor, the Special Group. Since the conceptual basis for a Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS) has not yet been established, I think it would serve no useful purpose for the Agency to go into the matter of defining what is or is not “interdepartmental” at this time. We note in this connection that the special status of the Intelligence Community was recognized in numbered paragraph 1 of NSAM 341. We would therefore prefer to withhold comment on the manner and degree to CIA participation in a FAPS until we have an opportunity to examine the concept and the concrete proposals flowing from it that may be generated by the Inter-Agency Group and the Hitch Advisory Group. Sincerely, L.K. White 4 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FAPS. Secret. 2 See Document 95 and footnote 3 thereto. 3 Document 56 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates White signed the original. 98. Editorial Note 98. Editorial Note In a March 29, 1966, memorandum to the President, General Taylor proposed that implementation of NSAM 341 be reviewed about September 1. The President indicated that Taylor should raise the issue again in about three months. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Papers Relating to NSAM 341, Box 63, Folder E) Taylor next raised the issue in an October 3 memorandum to the President, stating that with the appointment of Nicholas Katzenbach as Under Secretary of State it would be “timely and helpful” to start the review soon in order to make the results available for Katzenbach's guidance. “Also, it would be timely to estimate the strength of this organization as State is presently considering the possibility of superimposing on it the planning, programming and budgeting of overseas activities.” The President directed Walt Rostow to ask Katzenbach how he felt about it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341) Katzenbach proposed to Rostow that Taylor's review take place in November, but, according to a memorandum of Rostow's telephone conversation with Secretary of State Rusk on October 13, Rusk indicated that he “thought Nick and Gene Rostow and Kohler and Sec should have a crack at that ourselves first.” Taylor's review was put on hold. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1) 99. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk 99. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 3, 1966. SUBJECT The Hitch Committee Report I was unusually interested in the letter and report of the Hitch Committee, 2 which you asked that I review, because the kinds of problems to which they are addressed are precisely those that have struck my attention as a recent arrival in the Department. My conclusion is that the recommendations of the committee offer a sound conceptual base—perhaps the only sound base—for rational foreign affairs planning and control among the various federal agencies. I would, however, express two hesitations: 1. Making all due allowances for the fact that programmers talk in an alien tongue, I would have hoped for a report which was more illustrative, if only in a hypothetical way, to us laymen. And I would have hoped for something rather more elaborative. I suspect any decision to go ahead would have to be grounded in large measure on faith—and I am prepared to offer that faith now—but I would be more comfortable if there were some narrowing of the theological gap. (This is said principally on the basis of the covering letter and not from the appended questions and answers. The questions evidently were intended by the Bureau of the Budget to be taken more seriously as a prod than for intrinsic interrogative purposes and it would be either unfair or irrelevant to gauge the committee recommendations on the basis of the answers it has contrived to a list of questions which appears to be, by and large, redundant and imprecise.) 2. The optimism of such a distinguished committee is impressive and encouraging. I understand, however, that neither Ambassadors Bunker or Merchant were able to devote significant time to the study and hence it might be fair to ask whether it encompasses sufficiently the knowledge or sensibilities of foreign affairs professionals. 3 Neither of these hesitations is meant to diminish in the slightest my strong favorable inclination to the committee recommendations; it's just that I would like to know a bit more. In summary: 1. I recommend, that we accept the recommendations of the committee in principle and tentatively agree to: a. Move ahead immediately with the pilot installation visualized in paragraph 3 of the covering letter (especially in an effort to begin affecting the PPB plans of other relevant agencies before they are cast in concrete); b. Organize the program, as the committee recommends, within the terms of NASM 341—that is, through the SIG-IRG mechanisms; c. Provide the degree of high-level attention which the committee believes is mandatory by avoiding the creation of still another management or planning body in the O area, but instead by attaching it directly to my office to operate in concert with the SIG; d. Begin seeking, immediately, a systems analyst of exceptional sophistication and skill—even Mr. Hitch if that is conceivable—to serve as the architect of the program and support him with whatever staff is necessary. 2. I would, however, also recommend that we withhold final approval now and instead accept the committee's generous offer to continue its advisory role and ask it to prepare a supplementary report 4 for us. This paper would be intended to outline more explicitly how a foreign affairs programming system might work. It should embody the advice of foreign affairs professionals. Preferably, this would be done with minimum technical language and might take the form of a step-by-step description of how the system would apply to a specific real or hypothetical decision. I would strongly urge that the preparation of this paper not be permitted to derail our concern and that it be done as promptly as possible—within two weeks, if that is practical. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Attachment 5 Washington, October 5, 1966. Letter From the Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming, and Budgeting to Secretary of State Rusk Dear Mr. Secretary: We are pleased to submit the first report of your Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming, and Budgeting. We believe that a well designed programming system, including the necessary program planning and analysis, can provide you with a major tool for carrying out your responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of the foreign affairs activities of the U.S. Government. While a great deal of careful, step-by-step development will be needed, we see no technical obstacle to an integrated programming system within the federal government that will meet your requirements in the management of foreign affairs, while adequately providing for the diverse needs of other agency heads as well. In addition, we should like to offer a general recommendation that the State Department exercise the role in the U.S. foreign affairs community envisioned in NSAM 341 by assuming leadership in the early establishment of an integrated foreign affairs programming system. This report is based on the initial meeting of the Advisory Group on June 13, 1966 (separately reported on June 29); our second meeting on September 19, 1966; and the considerable work by and on behalf of the Advisory Group since its establishment. 6 Primarily, this report sets forth our views regarding the “several major issues” raised by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in his letter to you of June 8, 1966. 7 Our recommendations concerning each of the ten specific questions are presented in detail in the attachment. 8 We hope that these answers will provide you with a basis for responding to the Budget Bureau. Our consideration of these questions has convinced us that any such list of questions is necessarily dynamic, and that new issues must be addressed to sustaining progress in establishing the foreign affairs programming system. In addition, we should like to offer the following suggestions as to the next steps to be taken following your decision to proceed with the establishment of a foreign affairs planning, programming, and budgeting system. 1. We believe that the key initial step to the successful installation of such a system is the selection of a qualified Director to develop the kind of professional analytic capability required and to guide the early evolution of the system. He should be placed at the head of a staff of analysts and programmers in the immediate office of the Under Secretary of State, who serves also as the executive chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group. 2. The development of the system should be an inter-agency effort under State leadership within the framework of the Government-wide requirements defined by the Bureau of the Budget. The other foreign affairs agencies should be solicited for inputs to the final system design. A start in this direction has been made through the several meetings of the Inter-Agency Working Group. 3. We have studied alternative schedules for installation of the system. One doctrine suggests a thorough, relatively slow approach hopefully requiring little future modification of the system once it is established. Another view stresses the desirability of sustaining the present momentum and the value of early application to the FY 69 budget review. We recommend the latter approach, and we further recommend that an actual pilot installation of the system (not a trial run) be made in at least one region, such as Latin America or Africa, as part of the FY 69 budget cycle. Included should be the preparation of program memoranda on specific countries and the region as a whole. Because of time constraints, work on this pilot installation should be started immediately. 4. We see the need for several simultaneous efforts of a technical nature, including (a) identification for inclusion in the system of those activities of the federal government whose primary function is the support of foreign affairs; (b) development of an integrated foreign affairs program structure; and (c) preparation of a detailed, time-phased development plan for the installation of the system. 5. To explore the question of how best to establish a management system of this kind in the foreign affairs environment, we have asked Dr. Chris Argyris to head a special subcommittee of the Advisory Group. He will study and report on a number of facets of this subject, including the need for training programs and seminars and ways to minimize internal resistances and generate positive support. While the management of the technical tasks can and must be the responsibility of permanent staffs, we are willing to continue to serve in an advisory capacity if you so desire. The Advisory Group believes that it can usefully continue its examination of some of the foregoing matters, the problems assigned to Dr. Argyris' subcommittee, and other issues that are likely to develop as you proceed with the development of the system. We fully realize that the tasks that lie ahead will not be easy. Accomplishing them will require the combined efforts of the major foreign affairs agencies and the Bureau of the Budget. We feel that personal participation and involvement by you and your principal deputies is essential to achieve this objective, particularly to ensure cooperation of other agencies with the State Department. Indeed, we believe it important to emphasize that, contrary to widespread misunderstanding, the effective use of the programming instrument is not a simple administrative matter but calls for the most penetrating understanding of foreign policy and the foreign affairs process. It will challenge the most competent officers of the Department and Foreign Service. Your Advisory Group believes that it is worth the effort and that an integrated foreign affairs programming system can be a most useful tool in achieving the objectives of NSAM 341. We want to express our pleasure in having the opportunity to be of assistance to you on this vital and urgent matter. Respectfully submitted, Charles J. Hitch, Chairman Chris Argyris David E. Bell Stewart P. Blake Ellsworth Bunker John Diebold Alain Enthoven Rensis Likert Livingston T. Merchant 9 Frederick C. Mosher Henry S. Rowen Maxwell D. Taylor 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Hitch. Unclassified; Nodis. 2 Both attached, only the letter is printed. Hitch met with Rusk on October 13 and presented a copy of his committee's report. In a briefing memorandum for Rusk's meeting with Hitch, October 13, Read recommended that Rusk get Katzenbach's views before agreeing to the report's recommendations. (Ibid., Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1) In an October 20 memorandum for the record, [ name not declassified ] reported on a conversation with Robert Bonham on October 18, during which Bonham stated that, “as he understood it,” Hitch considered his meeting with Rusk a “very successful one.” Rusk “apparently had understood the thrust of the Hitch Report, appreciated the ins and outs of the problem and was prepared to act personally at an early opportunity to implement the recommendations in the report.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FAPS) 3 Merchant's involvement in the Hitch Committee is discussed in a September 29 note to Hitch from Fisher Howe, who had “talked at some length” with Merchant about the issue, telling him that his signature on the report was of critical importance to its acceptance among Foreign Service officers. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Hitch Committee File-Binder of Comments on Draft, Box 70, Folder C) 4 Not found. 5 No classification marking. 6 Documentation of the committee's activities, including background papers and comments by committee members on drafts of the report, are at the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 70. 7 Schultze's letter defined the “several major issues” in terms of ten questions and proposed that the Hitch Committee address them. Schultze stated that the principal issue, in his judgment, was “the relationship between the Secretary of State's needs and those of other agency heads in carrying out their respective responsibilities for management and program decisions.” (Ibid., Advisory Group on Foreign Affairs, Planning, Programming & Budgeting, Box 70, Folder A) 8 The attachment, Discussion and Recommendations on The Ten Questions Concerning The Foreign Affairs Programming System, is not printed. 9 Because of official duties, Ambassador Merchant was unable to participate in the work of this Advisory Group. [Footnote in the source text.] 100. Memorandum Prepared by Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff 100. Memorandum Prepared by Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, undated. A KATZENBACH COMMITTEE FOR INNOVATION AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT The Problem It is said that there are old bureaucrats and bold bureaucrats, but no old, bold bureaucrats. Some unkind soul has suggested that a foreign service officer experiences a change of life at 27. Fair or not, the State Department is the object of constant criticism for rigidity, conservatism, and pedestrianism. This is an increasing political problem for the Administration. The Opportunity The new team of Katzenbach, Rostow and Kohler is an opportunity for initiative. Katzenbach has already shown interest in administering the Department, and in the people who work there. He is a fresh outsider, with a lot of prestige. Katzenbach might assemble around himself a small staff or working group to examine ways to encourage initiative and innovation. A committee which included some bright outsiders, willing to devote full time to the project, might also be considered. Still further afield, foundation or other professional assistance might be invited. (For example, the newly formed Arthur Vining Davis Foundation is investigating how institutions can “stay young.” It might be willing to put up a sum of private money to help in such a project.) Regardless of structure, it would be important to have the new State team, plus Crockett, directly and responsibly involved. A Few Lines of Inquiry The project might look for institutional levers to redirect the Department toward greater innovation, imagination, creativity, and freedom of constructive dissent. The key is people and attitude. Exhortation is not enough. Possible levers: Promotion: Could the Performance Rating Report be revised to force the rating officer to expose the good, decent, ingratiating, dependable, conscientious officer as being no more? “Accuracy” and “dependability” are among the qualities listed for rating on the form. “Readiness to dissent” and “Innovations this officer has been responsible for” are not. The man of great peaks-and-valleys suffers in competition with the smooth, round stone. Besides the ratings, promotion process can be influenced through precepts to the promotion boards, instructions to foreign service inspectors, etc. Assignments: It has been said of the Foreign Service that promotions are based on a man's dossier and assignments on his reputation. The assignment of men to jobs is a second key lever for redirecting the spirit and thrust of the Department. With determination and high-level support, personnel assignment policies could be enforced which would encourage innovation. The Inspection System: The Katzenbach project might consider divorcing the inspection system from the regular Service. The senior inspector knows that in a few years he may be dependent on the goodwill of the Ambassador he is inspecting. Conversely, the inspector may simply be the grizzled old dog about to retire. The Role of the Policy Planning Staff: Can its creative role be enhanced? Non-Institutional Devices: A look at the devices worked out by the White House might provide some ideas—such as the confidential task forces. At the White House, speech writing is a major instrument of policy innovation. The Clearance Process: The labyrinthine clearance process at State needs review. Perhaps advisory clearances, with authority to override vested in a country director, would be worth examining. Is there any way that the blocking of a cable in clearance can be made more onerous? Can the institutional odds be shifted, ever so slightly, against the inaction compromise? The Career-Non-Career Ratio: Some jobs are too much a career preserve (e.g. the geographic desks) and some are probably not enough so (a year or two ago the Congressional relations staff had not a single Foreign Service Officer). The Foreign Service is too much shielded from the Congress, the press and the pressure groups. Assignment of Foreign Service Officers to other agencies—Defense, Commerce, AID, the Peace Corps, etc.—can only be made ineffective if the best officers are assigned and clearly rewarded for that service. Rand: Rand may not be the answer for the State Department, but non-official satellite organizations of that general type might be explored. These are only a few possibilities. Katzenbach and his men could do far better if they give the project some attention, determination, and time. 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 105. No classification marking. Davis forwarded the memorandum to Cater under cover of an undated note stating, “This is a non-memo.” Under cover of a November 10 memorandum, Cater forwarded Davis' memorandum to Moyers, indicating that Davis had prepared it at Cater's suggestion after discussing “the problem of innovation in the State Department and, particularly, revitalization of the foreign services.” Cater asked Moyers if the memorandum was “worthy of pursuit with the President?” There is no indication that it was brought to the President's attention. 101. Editorial Note 101. Editorial Note On November 18, 1966, James Marsh of John W. Macy, Jr.'s Staff telephoned Warren Christopher, lawyer and State Department consult-ant, to “ascertain under what circumstances and for what types of positions he would be available.” When asked about the position of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, which William Crockett was expected to vacate soon, Christopher responded as follows, according to Marsh's memorandum for the record: “He said that, given the present leadership of the State Department, it was difficult to see how anyone could handle that post successfully. He believes that until the leadership at State (the Secretary and the Under Secretaries) is ready to correct the shortcoming of the Foreign Service, both as an instrument of policy and as a career system, no Deputy Under Secretary will be able to carry out his duties effectively. Further, Christopher stated that he was not convinced that the recent State Department appointments indicate any disposition by the President to see that these problems are faced.” (Johnson Library, Office Files of John Macy, Box 693, State-General-1966) 102. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 102. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, undated. Summary of DDI and CIA Representatives' Views on the IRGs with some comments on the SIG 1. This is a summary of the coincident views on the Interdepartmental Regional Groups expressed by the CS Division Chiefs who are the CIA Representatives on the IRGs. Because of special considerations relating to the IRG/Europe, the comments on the Chiefs, Europe and Soviet Bloc Divisions are attached but not incorporated in the summary. Significant comments, relative to the IRGs and SIG, other than those reviewed in this summary of coincident views, were made by the DDI and the CIA Representatives. These have not been lifted from context but are to be found, underlined , in their memoranda which are attachments. 2 2. With regard to CIA —The IRGs have not been used, nor are they considered a proper body for the discussion of CIA operations. Nor are they used as substitutes for the weekly meetings with the regional Assistant Secretaries. The IRGs are, however, considered a unique forum where relevant intelligence can be brought to the attention of the policy-makers—particularly that intelligence dealing with communist penetration and subversion. Moreover, the IRGs keep the CS Division Chiefs informed on regional situations and USG operational problems, permitting CIA to identify, in broad terms, requirements and policy support for covert action proposals and to target its operations more selectively. Further, the IRGs provide CIA with a formal representation at a reasonable level in the councils where inter-agency problems and some foreign policy questions are reviewed. 3. In general —The IRGs are believed to be a useful instrument for the consideration of inter-agency problems and some short-term foreign policy problems. There is recognition that there are limits to what the IRGs can accomplish and that they cannot usurp the policy-making responsibility of the Department of State. At a minimum, however, problems considered by the IRGs—even those without measurable results—are believed to be better understood by the members as a result of the IRG discussions. Attachment 3 Washington, undated. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Critchfield) to the Clandestine Services Special Group Officer ([ name not declassified ]) SUBJECT Implementation in the Near East and South Asia of NSAM 341 Creating the SIG and the IRG REFERENCE CS/SGO Memorandum, 26 October 1966, Subject: The Senior Interdepartmental Group 4 1. In terms of theory of organization and management, NSAM 341 offers a solution that is significantly better than any of the arrangements which have been used since WW II . In both intelligence and counterinsurgency matters it offers a distinctly advantageous arrangement for the Central Intelligence Agency. 2. Role of the Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) a. In theory the IRG offers CIA: (1) official representation at the regional level in USG foreign policy councils. (2) a forum, a mechanism and the occasion (IRG meeting) to place before the IRG relevant intelligence . (3) a forum for the timely consideration of evidence of communist subversion and penetration of friendly or neutral countries. (4) an appropriate forum at the right level of the USG for consideration of The U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Program, i.e., counterinsurgency measures. (5) a mechanism which permits and encourages a closer integration of the intelligence function into the formulation of foreign policy. b. In practice, the IRG/NEA has: (1) been the forum in which every significant short-term policy problem in the Near East and South Asia has been considered since the issuance of NSAM 341. (2) provided a forum—unique in my ten years as a Division Chief of the Clandestine Services—for focusing the attention of policy makers on available relevant intelligence. (3) provided CIA official representation in the policy-making councils for the Near East and South Asia. (4) provided the Departments and Agencies represented on the IRG/NEA with an official channel for taking the initiative in proposing to the Assistant Secretary of State timely consideration of specific problems. (5) provided a forum in which the CS Division Chief can establish, in broad terms, the existence of requirements and policy support for covert action proposal separately submitted to the 303 Committee. (Covert action operations and sensitive intelligence matters such as “facilities” have been alluded to but not discussed in IRG/NEA.) 3. NSAM 341 has, as a by-product, stimulated a high degree of cooperation between the CS Division Chief, who represents the Agency, and the elements of the Agency responsible for intelligence production. I am confident this can evolve into an effective arrangement, at the regional level, for ensuring that intelligence production is efficiently geared to policy making . It is inevitable that CIA will present, as we gain experience with the IRG, more integrated intelligence appraisals to the policy-makers. 4. We have not yet evolved within CIA an adequate arrangement for relating IRG activity to that of the SIG. This is partly attributable to the fact that NSAM 341 has not, at the SIG level, been vigorously implemented . 5. I am aware that the implementation of NSAM 341 has varied greatly in the different regions. Also, I have the impression that my decidedly positive views on the theory and practice of the provisions of NSAM 341 are not fully shared by my colleagues. I do, however, feel strongly that CIA, as an organization, can benefit by participation in and support of this organizational arrangement. If for no other reason, the IRG seems to me the proper customer for intelligence dealing with communist penetration, subversion, covert political and paramilitary actions and potential limited wars—the particular mission given the IRG in the final two paragraphs of NSAM 341. James H. Critchfield Attachment 5 Washington, November 16, 1966. Memorandum From the Chief of the European Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([ name not declassified ]) to the Clandestine Services Special Group Officer ([ name not declassified ]) SUBJECT The Senior Interdepartmental Group REFERENCE Memorandum dated 26 October 1966, same subject 1. The undersigned believes that the European IRG is somewhat atypical in that it has only met a half dozen times since its formation . This can be explained in part by the protracted illness of Assistant Secretary Leddy which kept him out of the Department for many months. However, the more fundamental reason is probably the fact that the European IRG cannot function in the same way as other regional IRGs, namely as a decision-taking body . 2. The problems confronting the United States in Europe are in many ways different from those with which we are faced in other parts of the world . Europe is an area of developed cultures generally similar to our own, and for that matter much older than our own. We are allied with most of the governments concerned. There exist economic relationships in depth and in several instances the nationalities or groups of nationalities constitute important political minorities in the United States. The senior officials of our government are either familiar with the region by indirect exposure or by direct personal travel. Many of the leading European politicians and officials are personally broadly acquainted in Washington at the senior levels of our government. The European area is militarily stable, the United States maintains major military elements there and enjoys military base rights which are critical to U.S. national security. 3. Given the above circumstances, there are very few problems arising which require interdepartmental coordination and which at the same time are subject to the decision-making process or even the advisory process at as low a level as the Assistant Secretary . Rather, the great majority of significant problems are hammered out by extensive exchanges at the Secretary and Under Secretary level or even by consultation between the Chief Executives involved. Those issues which are left over for possible examination by the European IRG prove more often than not to be highly specialized and of interest to not more than two agencies among the membership of the committee . 4. Accordingly, the European IRG has not constituted an instrumentality assisting the solution of any of EUR Division's problems, nor has it appeared to be either a desirable or effective forum for the tabling of EUR-produced intelligence. Finally, EUR has not been called upon by the group to provide intelligence backup for any matter so far examined by the group . In short, EUR has not found the group a problem, nor has it gained any benefit from it. [ name not declassified ] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–R01580R, SIG. Secret. The report was forwarded to Helms by Clandestine Services Special Group Officer [ name not declassified ] under cover of a memorandum dated November 25, 1966. (Ibid.) 2 Attached are memoranda from five CS Division Chiefs and the Deputy Director of Current Intelligence. 3 No classification marking. 4 Not found. 5 Secret. 103. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Schwartz) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 103. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Schwartz) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, November 28, 1966. SUBJECT The Hitch Report Herewith my comments on Bill Crockett's memorandum to you of November 17 on the same subject. 2 Bill recommends that (1) we try out a PPBS for FY69 in Latin America, borrow personnel from other agencies after consulting in SIG, and that Mr. Hitch and his group be asked to continue in an advisory capacity. Bill also suggests that all five regional bureaus be canvassed to determine the most appropriate bureau for the initial experiment. I generally agree with these recommendations with the exceptions noted below. (1) I see no useful purpose to be served by canvassing the regional bureaus on something which to most of them is both mysterious and malevolent, particularly as ARA is the obvious choice. (2) I think that Mr. Hitch or some part of his committee such as Dr. Argyris should be asked to serve in the capacity of auditors in reserve rather than on a regular basis. In other words, when we have some ideas which would benefit from their counsel, we can ask for it. (3) I prefer to think of the ARA experiment as a trial rather than as a first step. I.e., if the trial produces no net gain, I do not believe we should be fully committed to forcing the system on the other bureaus. The gentlemen in O 3 have quite a different view, to wit! this system is going to be put into effect world-wide in the next few years whether or not the experiment in ARA is a success. (4) I believe it would be useful if we agreed—at least among ourselves in this house—that we are talking about a system which is to encompass only those countries where our relations are dominated by the transfer of U.S. resources. In general such a definition would eliminate Canada, Western and Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Communist China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. It seems to me that a system where quantification is a highly important ingredient can usefully be applicable only to the less-developed countries to whom we give some sort of assistance. It is this assistance that can be broken down into programs which in turn, hopefully, can be better controlled by the foreign affairs command in Washington through the proposed FA/PPBS. Nothing I have been able to learn about the PPBS makes me believe that it would be helpful in handling problems such as Britain's chronic foreign exchange deficits, German offset, the reluctance of the Japanese to build up their armed forces, trade with Canada, the loosening of the Warsaw Pact ties, the Kennedy Round, etc. After all, the SIG/IRG system can be an extremely useful device in producing clear cut decisions on interdepartmental problems and disputes whether or not there is an additional system for analyzing and controlling the transfer of U.S. resources abroad. (5) For the next 12 months it seems to me that the function of any central staff should be to assist ARA with its experiment and to draw conclusions and lessons from that experiment. I would not now set up a central PPBS staff beyond what is already in O to run some world wide machinery which may never come into existence. I do think, however, it is a good idea to borrow a few good personnel from other agencies to help with the ARA experiment. (6) I do not agree with the belief apparently firmly held in O that country programs must be preceded by a national policy paper for that country. Such documents invariably take too long to produce and just as invariably are filled with statements about “political stability”, “orientation to the West”, “viable economies”, etc. I would simply instruct the Ambassador to state in English prose and in detail the reasons why the United States should give any assistance to his country and to demonstrate how each and every type of assistance in any given amount furthers the interests of the United States. The review, alteration, approval or disapproval of his arguments by the Assistant Secretary or his Regional Group or the SIG or the President would become the policy of the United States toward that country in concrete terms. Further, at the end of the process those American officials could better understand our concrete policy than if they read it in a document with a hard cover. (7) As a general proposition, and specifically with respect to the ARA FY69 experiment, I would ask the Bureau of the Budget to drop their requirement for a “spring review”. Doing so would shorten the time period between the Ambassador's recommendation and Executive Branch final action by about five months and thus bring the Ambassador five months closer to reality. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 1. No classification marking. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 Office of the Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett). 104. Memorandum From John J. Adams of the Foreign Affairs Programming System Development Office to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) 104. Memorandum From John J. Adams of the Foreign Affairs Programming System Development Office to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) 1 Washington, December 30, 1966. SUBJECT Report on Recent Trips to Europe and Latin America Regarding Prospective Foreign Affairs Program-Budgeting Introduction This memorandum sets forth my Findings and Recommendations regarding Foreign Affairs Program-Budgeting which are based upon interviews conducted by Frederick Mosher and myself in three European Missions and four Latin American Missions in October and November of 1966. The European Missions were London, Paris and Bonn. (Mosher alone went to Bonn.) The visited Latin American Missions were Guatemala, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and to a limited extent, Mexico City. A list of the interviewees in these Missions is attached. 2 The purpose in conducting the interviews was generally to ascertain each Mission's experience with previous programming techniques, the attitudes of the personnel toward future programming efforts and the present methods for coordinating agency activities within the Mission. Particular attention was focused upon the nature of the decision making process implicit in country program development. Paramount consideration in this regard was given to the effect, if any, of NSAM 341. Two comments seem appropriate on the Findings stated in this memorandum. First, little or no attempt is made to comment upon the Findings or to indicate any responses either Mosher or I made at the time to the statements used in support of the Findings. To have done so would not only unduly lengthen this memorandum but possibly convey the impression that the statements supporting the Findings were either unwarranted in their expression or dispelled by our responses. Whether or not such is the case is not germane. What is important is that the Findings are intended to reflect as accurately as possible whatever attitudes, impressions or statements were conveyed to us, as it is within such a frame of reference that any future foreign affairs programming must be conducted. Second, more lengthy consideration is accorded the Findings in Latin America than in Europe. This is for two reasons: (i) more Missions were visited and more time was spent in those Missions in Latin America than Europe, affording a greater exposure in depth, and (ii) in terms of future foreign affairs programming, as this memoranda will indicate, Latin America is preeminent. I. Findings in European Missions Previous Program Experience 1. EROP experience was regarded in both Great Britain and Germany as failure, if not a disaster . Universal feeling existed throughout the Missions that in EROP the State Department put Ambassadors in an impossible position—requiring them to recommend curtailments in other agency activities and thereafter failing to support them and their decisions when chips were down. As a result, this exercise defined “programming” in minds of field officers as essentially a mammoth paper, data-collection operation used as an “administrative” device for budget-cutting, but in which the recommended cuts were eventually applied only to State and USIS. 2. Other agencies viewed EROP as solely a State Department exercise to limit other agency presence without an intense and thorough examination and understanding of the activities and programs of the affected agencies . No EROP hearings were conducted by Ambassador in Britain prior to the submission of his recommendations, but agencies were generally advised of Ambassador's recommendations; hearings were held in Germany, but agencies were generally not advised of recommendations. (Germany continues annually with a comparable field review, focused solely on efficiency and without complete CCPS data; CCPS efforts have been dropped entirely in Britain.) 3. Section chiefs and agency representatives in Great Britain found CCPS data of no use in assisting them in their operations, except in isolated cases where data was used to support pre-conceived notions. Present Organization—Integration 4. Because the predominance of other agency activity is primarily not in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives but in service of domestic agency requirements and therefore principally concerned with overseas staffing levels, in Great Britain and France there is no State Department review of other agency program-budget proposals prior to their submission to Washington, except for a limited USIS review of essentially a budgetary and non-programmatic nature . Consequently, while Ambassadors are deeply concerned by the extent of U.S. presence in their countries, they feel unequipped to review program-budgets of other agencies because of insufficient knowledge of domestic agency requirements. This view of the Ambassador's inability to conduct an effective and knowledgeable program review is strongly voiced by the other agency representatives. 5. No Mission was found to be truly integrated with respect to non-State agencies . While widely used locally with reference to the relationship of other agencies to the Embassy, the term “integration” really meant the presence of “coordination” or, more often, “liaison”, not State Department direction or management. For example, while in Paris the Office of the Scientific Attaché has reporting to it for coordinating purposes the representatives of NASA, AEC and NIH, no program-budg-et review or management activities with respect to these agencies are undertaken by this Office or the Ambassador. Thus, while coordination or liaison channels are established, other agencies tend to operate generally as independent “fiefdoms” in pursuit of their myriad activities. Understanding and Attitudes Towards Planning, Programming and Budgeting 6. Ambassadors and ministers feel generally that their primary mission is not to program, direct, and control U.S. operations abroad but to further general U.S. foreign policy objectives, which they consider are not programmable, and to establish and maintain effective relations between the two governments . Only a limited number of officers are directly involved in activities related to this described mission. 7. Any need for and an understanding of programming, i.e., rational relationship of programs and resources to objectives, is virtually absent . Due to the absence of large dollar programs directed toward attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives, no expression of need for programming is found. Consequently, and because of prior experiences, programming is generally identified with data collection, work measurement, efficiency studies, and budget cuts. 8. Most section heads and agency representatives (other than political and some economic officers) felt they could project programs some years in advance, but, because programs were largely of a service or reportorial nature, some were not convinced it would be worthwhile . The most favorable, but guarded, response to programming was where there had been no EROP experience, i.e., France. There a majority of Foreign Service officers interviewed tended to be favorably disposed to “country” versus “agency” programming. 9. There is a present absence of any systematic measurements of effectiveness to determine program composition in substantial non-State agency activities directed at local population . While this was noticeably the case with respect to USIS, it can be attributed also to the activities of USTS and, to a lesser extent, the agricultural and commercial trade fairs. 10. General feeling exists throughout the Missions that the structure of agency appropriations, White House domination and congressional committees is decisive in program budgeting, and that the State Department will never be able to direct foreign affairs programming through NSAM 341 or anything else . Moreover, strong cynicism and skepticism expressed that State Department would ever desire to assert such a leadership role, even if it could. II. Findings in Latin American Missions In the interval between our European and Latin American trips, there had begun to be developed within the Department a new concept of arraying programs against country objectives. While this concept was still in its early stages of development, in our Latin American interviews we sought to solicit responses to this new design. In summary form, this portion of our presentation included the following elements: (1) Simultaneous submissions of proposed program by agencies to the Ambassador; (2) Submissions to the Ambassador by agencies of proposed programs in an interagency adopted format which would array all agency proposed programs in common categories against commonly adopted U.S. objectives for that country; (3) Recommendation by the Ambassador through State Department channels of the total U.S. proposed program within the aggregate agency budget guidance received in the field, but (i) allowing for Ambassadorial re-direction of proposed program composition within the limits of any agency's budget guidance, and (ii) permitting the Ambassador to recommend shifts of resources from one agency's proposed budget request to another agency's to support the total proposed program mix for the country; (4) Reporting by the agencies through their channels the program composition approved by the Ambassador, first, for regional aggregation by their agencies in preparation for individual agency appropriation requests, and, second, as an appeal channel for agency field exceptions to the Ambassador's recommended program composition; and (5) Absent a decision in Washington by any concerned agency to present an appeal of an Ambassador's decision on that agency's proposed program and budget to either the appropriate IRG or the SIG, the concerned agency would comply with the Ambassador's position on program composition in development of its appropriations requests. Previous Program Experience 1. In the two posts which had had CCPS experience, there existed a universal reaction against CCPS-type data . The criticisms generally fell into one of two categories: (i) the data collection excessively focused upon minutiae or (ii) was unrelated to budget dollars and, therefore, of little or no use. The feeling of lack of utility of CCPS data as weighed against the extensive time devoted to its collection, continues today to have an adverse influence upon attitudes toward any future programming effort. (This attitudinal concern is more expansively discussed hereinafter.) Ambassador Freeman did favorably comment upon the use of CCPS data on his arrival in Mexico City in familiarizing him with the activities of the Mission, particularly in comparing the activities of the seventeen Consulates. 2. The EROP experience in Guatemala caused strong resentment among affected agencies and increased doubts among State Department officials as to whether basic decisions implicit in any foreign affairs programming system would ever be made in Washington . Agency resentment particularly focused upon their being unable to present their own case prior to the Ambassador having reached his decision on the recommendations he would make regarding their activities. Present Organization-Integration 3. Each Ambassador visited readily and forcefully acknowledged his role as manager of the U.S. foreign affairs community . They view themselves primarily in this capacity (as opposed to the more traditionalist view) and evidence a conscious effort in trying to increase their managerial capability. For example, Ambassador Dungan in Chile this year assigned to the four political officers a geographical region of Chile for which they are responsible to advise the Ambassador “how to oversee and coordinate” all U.S. operations in their respective areas. Specifically, he has directed these officers to investigate and make recommendations for guiding the programs and activities of other U.S. agencies. The Political Counselor expressed genuine enthusiasm on the part of his officers toward this new responsibility. The Ambassadors presently conduct fairly extensive program and operational reviews, particularly in AID and MAAG and, to a lesser extent, USIS and Peace Corps. Hindrances toward more effective program review and, more importantly, direction include (i) limitations of time for Ambassadorial review between field program development and its submission to Washington, (ii) too extensive documentation in a format meaningful to the agency but considerably less so to the Ambassador, (iii) budget guidance constraints imposed by Washington agencies (particularly USIS) which inhibit field flexibility in program development, and (iv) Ambassadorial realization that any unresolved differences between himself and other agencies in the field over program composition will, with rare exception, be decided adverse to his position once they leave the field. 4. Other agency representatives acknowledge the leadership role of the Ambassador in program development and operation . Their greatest difficulty is reconciling the views of the Ambassador with guidance they receive from their agencies in Washington. This recognition of the Ambassadorial leadership exists, though to a lesser extent, even with those agency representatives whose activities may generally be characterized as foreign extensions of domestic activities and over which the Ambassador exercises little, if any, program review. 5. While agencies share a feeling of common purpose and ad hoc interagency working relationships frequently occur upon convergence of agency programs, there is no conscious effort nor formalized procedure for integrated program development . Agency review of other agency program proposals varies from Mission to Mission, but it is of a limited nature and nowhere is there a conscious effort for an agency to develop its programs in active coordination with other agency program development. During current year operations, of necessity, operational programs often dictate a degree of interagency coordination. 6. During current year operations there is extensive shifting of resources by agencies in which little or no Ambassadorial concurrence is sought . While this is true of all the foreign affairs agencies, it is particularly pronounced in AID. In that agency no “thresholds” have been established to determine when Ambassadorial concurrence is sought in reallocating resources from sector to sector or project to project. One AID Mission Director estimated that these shifts would amount annually to approximately forty percent of his three million dollar technical assistance funds. Understanding and Attitudes Towards Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 7. All of the Ambassadors visited expressed extremely favorable responses to the described program-budgeting system and to the expanded management role of the Ambassador implicit therein . Central to this favorable attitude was the proposed ability to see all agency programs at the same time and acceptance by the agencies that, absent their taking affirmative action through the described appeal channels, an Ambassadorial decision adverse to their interests would be followed by the agencies in their program development. 8. With few exceptions, the attitude of other agency representatives interviewed was generally receptive to the described system . As one AID Director said, “It's long overdue.” Or as another AID Director stated, “While this system would ultimately diminish the role of the AID mission, it is certainly in the best interests of the entire U.S. Mission.” Such expressions of genuine receptivity, however, were conditioned upon allaying certain concerns and apprehensions hereinafter described. The clearest negative notes were heard from representatives of the Department of Defense. MAAG Commanders evidenced either explicit or implicit concern over the capability of an Ambassador, as compared with knowledgeable military personnel, to determine the degree and nature of military assistance to the host country. Implicit, but not expressed, concern existed with DIA personnel regarding the ability of an Ambassador to evaluate their field requirements necessary to meet the reporting and other requirements imposed upon them by their agency. While not found elsewhere in Latin America, in Brazil apprehension was expressed by the Peace Corps Representative that the described system presented a possible means for an Ambassador in the development of an integrated country program to distort the unique mission of the Peace Corps. Central to this expression of concern was the long standing view that the Peace Corps is not an arm of U.S. foreign policy and that the apparent intimate association with the Embassy inherent in the described programming system would run counter to this view. 9. Universal disbelief and cynicism exists throughout the entire U.S. Mission that the State Department in Washington will ever espouse the leadership role necessary to make any program-budgeting system in the foreign affairs community truly operational, NSAM 341 not withstanding . This attitude was unquestionably the single strongest one expressed throughout the visited Missions. It can be summed up in a question posed by one Foreign Service Officer, “You don't think this is really going to happen, do you?” 10. Strong resistance was expressed by all other agencies, as well as the Ambassadors, to any program-budgeting system which would impose yet an additional submission requirement upon the field . Because of the earlier State Department efforts, there is real apprehension among other agencies that any new system will be but another “paper-exercise” and would not supplant, but be in addition to, present program submissions. This attitude prompted one AID program officer to state in the following vein: “Unless this has utility to me and my agency, you will get my least experienced personnel working on this and the allocation of resources to objectives is liable to be pretty fictitious.” The extent of present submission requirements imposed upon the field is illustrated by a recent study conducted by Ambassador Dungan in Chile which determined that thirty percent of the time of AID personnel was devoted to preparation of various submissions required by Washington. 11. There presently exists among all Ambassadors a lack of appreciation for the need of an analytical capability, either in the field or in the State Department in Washington, available to them in the development of their proposed program composition . Each Ambassador strongly resisted increasing his own staff beyond, at most, one additional officer. In contrast to the development of a State Department analytical capability responsive to their needs, the Ambassadors tended to prefer to rely upon the admittedly limited resources of the Country Team. This lack of appreciation for the necessity of a State Department analytical capability was perhaps one of the most disquieting aspects of our conversations with the Ambassadors. In marked contrast were the views of most AID personnel who were quick to realize that it was imperative that the State Department develop such a capability and that in doing so it would probably be at the expense of AID in drawing upon that agency's present analytical staff. 12. Because of the earlier programming efforts, the uncertainty of the implications of NSAM 341, the individual agency PPBS efforts, and a general lack of understanding of program-budgeting, certain general concerns and apprehensions in varying degrees of intensity will confront the inauguration of any new program-budgeting system . In addition to those already mentioned, the following seem pertinent: (i) There exists a fear that current-year operations will become inflexible under a predetermined program composition. (ii) Considerable apprehension was expressed over the role of the computer as a “decision maker,” thus eroding the position of the Ambassador in the development of program composition. (iii) Though seldom vocalized, implicit in many of the reactions to the described system was concern for retention of agency identity and apprehension over the prospect of agency competitiveness inherent in country-wide program development. Generally, however, there was little appreciation of the fact that interagency competitiveness would, as it does not today, occur in the program planning stages. (iv) Limited concern was expressed regarding the susceptibility in any programming system of stress upon quantification to the detriment of securing objectives which, by their very nature, are not quantifiable. (v) Considerable concern exists in the other agencies regarding the ability of the Ambassador and his staff to make knowledgeable decisions on program composition in highly technical areas. 13. With the exception of limited resources in AID, there exists no real field analytical capability nor is there any significant utilization of meaningful measurements of effectiveness in the development of program composition . The absence of meaningful measurements of effectiveness is particularly pronounced in USIS. One PAO stated that the selection of U.S. activities he sought to publicize was largely by hunch and ad hoc judgement wherein no measurements of effectiveness were employed. This absence of measurements of effectiveness became the focal point of discussion at a dinner meeting of various agency representatives in one of the Missions visited. A frank and honest concern was expressed that we really don't know if all of our program efforts to date are achieving the affects we desire. The agency representatives present felt that the U.S. knew little or nothing about the forces, power structures, and institutions which really decided the course of the host country's people. This mutual expression of doubt as to the effectiveness of the entire U.S. effort in that country was not only revealing to all those present, but generated a high degree of receptiveness for the described country-wide programming system as possibly developing meaningful objectives and effective programs. 14. A majority of the Ambassadors visited viewed the role of the Country Director in the described programming system as the advocate for the Ambassador, not as an independent voice in the determination of program composition nor as an appeal point for an agency to reverse the Ambassador's decision on program composition . The one dissenting Ambassador felt that his Country Director should be independent to the extent that if he opposed the Ambassador's program composition he should voice his objections to the Assistant Secretary and, if necessary, the Ambassador would have to come to Washington to defend his position. This Ambassador, however, did not consider the Country Director as an appeal point for agencies to reverse Ambassadorial decisions on program composition. The majority of the Ambassadors felt that the Country Director's objections to the Ambassador's program composition should, except in extreme cases, be expressed not to the Assistant Secretary but to the Ambassador for his consideration in program modification. They looked to the Country Directors to advise them on factors they may not have considered, as well as to furnish a Washington perspective on program composition. The question of the Country Director serving as an agency appeal point arose in one meeting with both the Ambassador and Country Director present. The Ambassador initially suggested that possibly the Country Director should serve in an appellate capacity. The Country Director voiced immediate objection and stated that he thought of himself as an advocate for the Ambassador, principally for two reasons: first, the appeal point concept would place an unbearable strain upon the relationship of the Ambassador and his Country Director and, second, the absolute necessity for an advocate of the Ambassador in the Washington forum. The Ambassador acknowledged the merits of the Country Director's arguments and concurred in his conclusions. [Omitted here are: Section III. Recommendations; a partial list of persons interviewed; and an appendix that presents a “design mechanism for undertaking foreign affairs programming.”] 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Rpt. on Recent Trips to Eur & Latin Amer Regarding Prospective For Affairs Program-Budgeting. No classification marking. Adams was a management analyst with the FAPS Development Program in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. Adams' report and a similar one by Mosher ( Document 113 ) “received considerable circulation within the Department and in other foreign affairs agencies,” according to Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , p. 177. 2 Attached but not printed. 105. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of State 105. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. U.S. OVERSEAS INTERNAL DEFENSE POLICY I. Introduction 1. National Security Action Memorandum NSAM No. 182 of August 24, 1962, 2 promulgated the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy (USOIDP), and charged the Department of State, in consultation with other agencies with responsibility for publishing revised editions. NSAM No. 182 provided that the USOIDP is to serve as basic policy guidance to U.S. diplomatic missions and military commands abroad, as well as to government departments and agencies in Washington and to the government educational system. 2. This revised edition of the USOIDP has been prepared at the direction of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, and reflects developments that have occurred since 1962 in the U.S. Government's thinking and action in dealing with the problem of subversive aggression. It is a policy directive controlling on all U.S. Government agencies and personnel associated with the formulation or execution of U.S. programs in foreign affairs whether in the U.S. or abroad. The Departments of State and Defense, the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as other departments or agencies involved in foreign affairs programs, should assure it is read by all appropriate personnel in the U.S. or abroad who are associated substantively with the formulation or execution of U.S. overseas programs or who plan or conduct related training programs. II. Policy Considerations 3. It is U.S. policy to anticipate and thwart subversive aggression designed to overthrow governments which the U.S. has a cogent interest to maintain by stimulating and supporting programs of those governments for healthy political and economic growth, social progress, and internal security. The totality of these programs constitutes internal defense. 4. Subversive aggression is defined as calculated action initiated or supported by an external government or political organization to undermine or overthrow an established government by political or psychological subversion, agitation, sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla operations, singly or in combination. Purely indigenous insurgency, free of foreign direction or support, is not subversive aggression. In making this distinction, the U.S. Government relies upon the intelligence community to provide information upon which sound political judgments may be made. 5. In the social and political environment that exists in the world today, subversive aggression represents a major form of conflict, equal in importance to conventional warfare. This is likely to present a threat to developing countries throughout the foreseeable future. The strategy of subversive aggression is attractive to communist powers because their objective of world domination is not reasonably attainable through nuclear or conventional warfare; because it involves minimum risks and requires relatively modest resource expenditures; and because the social and political ferment taking place in many countries presents exceptional opportunities to encourage popular unrest and to exploit human discontent. In addition, the tactics of subversive aggression are selective and flexible; they may consist merely of propaganda and minor sabotage designed to incite insurgency, or of organized terrorism and paramilitary operations on a limited or national scale, accompanied or unaccompanied by selective or wholesale kidnappings and assassinations. Subversive aggression, varying somewhat in its nature and the doctrine in which it is clothed, is thus a tool of importance for Moscow, Peking, Havana and other communist elements. 6. To forestall and overcome the threat that subversive aggression poses to developing countries, and thus to regional stability and to U.S. political and security interests, it is established U.S. policy to assist developing countries in their efforts toward removing the root causes of justified discontent among their people. To that end, U.S. programs should: a. Support indigenous efforts for the creation of progressive societies and viable economies; b. Encourage developing countries to initiate and pursue reasoned programs for political and social progress and economic growth; c. Encourage governments and political organizations in developing countries to seek increasing popular participation in and support of indigenous political, economic and social programs; d. Strengthen the intent and capability of developing countries to remain free of communist or other extremist domination, and contribute to the development of police and military establishments capable of maintaining law and order and internal security in support of legitimate government; e. Cultivate in developing countries popular and official attitudes conducive to the development of free institutions responsive to indigenous aspirations and to the exercise of political rights by the people; f. Develop to the extent possible the indigenous capability and purpose which, together with all forms of U.S. influence and assistance, will preclude situations requiring the intervention of U.S. combat forces to deny the success of subversive aggression; g. Encourage other free countries and regional and multilateral organizations to participate in foreign assistance programs and collaborative actions to strengthen economic and social development and internal security in developing countries and to stimulate regional cooperation. 7. It is recognized there is no simple or universally applicable solution to the threat that subversive aggression may present at a given place or time. The particular conditions in each country must determine the nature of the activities and programs required to protect and advance U.S. interests. In addition, U.S. resources are not unlimited, and they must be applied carefully in light of the inhibitions and constraints inherent in local circumstances. The attitude and capability of the host government will be the most important factor in the success of any country program. 8. It is therefore U.S. policy that a united effort by all elements of the U.S. Government with overseas programs and operations be directed, coordinated, and supervised abroad by the Ambassador, and in Washington by the Secretary of State. III. Chief of Diplomatic Mission and Country Team 9. Each Ambassador, as the personal representative of the President, is responsible not solely for the coordination but also for imaginative planning, timely initiation, and effective execution of all programs needed to achieve U.S. goals within the country of his assignment. The Ambassador, working in conjunction with his Country Team, is responsible for: a. Determining the nature of any latent or active threat that subversive aggression presents to the local government and to U.S. short and long term interests; b. Identifying specific objectives that must be attained to reduce or eliminate this threat; c. Recommending specific courses of action necessary to achieve such objectives. 10. Programs should be designed to stimulate the indigenous constructive forces essential to national development toward the fulfillment of popular aspirations. It is a primary function to encourage the government of a developing country to identify, mobilize, and apply indigenous resources in a manner which will suit the particular requirements of the country concerned. The local government should be made to understand that U.S. programs can only be ancillary and supplemental to indigenous programs. 11. In assisting the local government to focus its resources on constructive national development as its best hope for security in the long view, the Ambassador and Country Team should take special account of the critical sectors in the society, and of the impact that national development and the modernization process exert on these. The Country Team should have a conscious and coordinated plan for its members or their staffs to use as a continuing base of reference and, through program formulation and all Country Team action, to bring discreet influence upon these sectors. The latter include, among others, the civil bureaucracy; the military and police establishments; the business community; the informational and communications media; the intelligentsia; artistic and performing groups; teachers and professors at all levels of the educational system; youth and student groups at the primary, secondary, and university levels; religious leaders and organizations; labor unions; worker and peasant organizations; ethnic or tribal majority and minority groups; high, middle, and worker class spokesmen; foreign communities; and political parties of all complexion. 12. The Country Team, at the direction of the Ambassador, should also consider the extent to which the resources of U.S. business firms and philanthropic foundations may be applied in support of U.S. objectives. Many private U.S. firms and foundations engage in programs to improve social and economic conditions in countries abroad, but these often are not coordinated with the programs of other firms, the local government, or the U.S. Government. If the Ambassador considers it appropriate, the Country Team should encourage U.S. firms and foundations to ascertain whether their programs may lend themselves to coordination, and to expansion, in support of U.S. goals in the country. Whenever the Ambassador considers it appropriate, private U.S. firms and foundations should be encouraged to undertake collectively or on a coordinated basis projects that will identify them with popular improvements and aspirations. IV. Internal Defense Planning 13. In countries where the U.S. has a cogent interest to maintain a government threatened latently or actively by subversive aggression, the Ambassador should examine periodically all programs of all U.S. agencies in the country to assure that they are mutually complementary, and that they include appropriate objectives and adequate courses of action to support U.S. goals. The Ambassador should review and approve all programs submitted by members of the Country Team to their parent department or agency. He should supervise the effective application of funds, personnel, and equipment used to implement U.S. programs in the country. 14. In formulating new programs for internal defense, the Ambassador and his Country Team should consider the following guidelines: a. Subversive aggression depends ultimately upon gaining support of a significant part of the people if it is to succeed. Programs to anticipate and thwart subversive aggression should be designed to reduce popular discontent and to strengthen popular allegiance to the established government; b. The world is undergoing vast and rapid changes through the expansion of medical and educational facilities; through the extension of communication and transportation facilities (permitting the exchange of ideas and culture and providing increasing access to and egress from hitherto remote areas); and through the phenomena of population growth, the trend toward intensive urbanization, and the restructuring of world population, with persons under 25 years of age in the majority. In many countries, historic tribal and similar group social structures are breaking down, and regulatory institutions that have governed individual and group conduct are being replaced by new institutions still in a formative stage. These include among others youth, student, and university organizations, labor organizations, trade and cooperative societies, cultural organizations, and governmental departments and agencies being created or improved to exercise the functions of sovereignty. In these circumstances, it is essential that the U.S. be identified as dedicated to constructive change and popular welfare, sponsoring stability through growth; c. Internal defense depends upon the totality of policy and programs in a particular country. Programs to reduce popular discontent and to accelerate social, economic, and political development depend for successful implementation upon an environment of law and order, based on popular consent in matters of local concepts of justice and government, but this environment often is characterized by the political instability and social turbulence existing in many developing countries. Hence, it often is essential that such programs be supplemented by concurrent programs to provide an enlightened and dependable intelligence, police, and military capability to assure a political climate in which constructive national development may thrive; d. Constructive national development requires the effective mobilization and judicious application of indigenous resources to remove the causes of popular discontent, to fulfill popular aspirations, and to secure the allegiance of the population. 15. The preparation of a formal Internal Defense Plan or other specific reporting may be required by the pertinent Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) or the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). If so, the content and format of such plans or reports will be specified by them. In any event, the objectives and courses of action that constitute internal defense planning should be reflected in regular program submissions by all posts at which there is an internal defense problem. Internal defense planning, where it is required, thus should be regarded as an integral part of the regular country program. 16. The adequacy of country programs for internal defense will be assured by the Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups. National Security Action Memorandum No. 341, issued by the President on March 2, 1966, 3 requires each regional Assistant Secretary of State, as Executive Chairman of an Interdepartmental Regional Group: a. To assure the adequacy of U.S. policy for the countries in their region; b. To assure the adequacy of plans, programs, resources, and performance for implementing that policy; c. To be particularly watchful for indications of subversive aggression directed at the overthrow of governments in which the U.S. has a cogent interest to maintain; d. To recommend appropriate measures to higher authority for dealing with emergent critical situations when these require consideration at higher level. 17. NSAM No. 341 provides for the Senior Interdepartmental Group: a. To assure a proper selectivity of the areas and issues to which the U.S. applies its resources of personnel, funds, and equipment; b. To carry out the functions and responsibilities previously attaching to the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) which has been abolished; c. To verify the adequacy and effectiveness of interdepartmental overseas programs and activities. V. Courses of Action 18. In planning U.S. efforts to assist other countries in their internal security and constructive national development, the Ambassador and his Country Team and the responsible officials in Washington should consider courses of action that will: a. Identify the U.S. with youth through programs to: (1) Improve and expand the educational system; (2) Support and strengthen moderate youth organizations; (3) Identify and cultivate youth leaders; (4) Expand vocational opportunities; (5) Facilitate communication and contacts between local and U.S. youth groups and organizations; b. Identify the U.S. with social and economic development through programs to: (1) Expand low cost housing construction; (2) Improve sanitation facilities; (3) Reduce adult illiteracy; (4) Encourage the construction of roads and communications facilities; (5) Assure the development of independent and responsible labor and peasant organizations and leaders; (6) Assist the operation and expansion of small business; (7) Create or expand institutions to extend low cost credit; (8) Contribute to increased agricultural productivity and diversification and to industrial development; c. Identify the U.S with enlightened public administration through programs to: (1) Assure an equitable tax and tax collection system; (2) Encourage land reform and the distribution of land to the peasant population; (3) Contribute to the development of the middle class; (4) Train the civil bureaucracy; (5) Create a professional career service capable of administering government efficiently and impartially; (6) Stimulate and strengthen the executive, legislative, and judicial functions in countries where the institutional framework makes this appropriate. 19. Depending upon local circumstances, specific courses of action may be required to improve the capability of indigenous police forces as the first line of internal defense. These courses may involve: a. Intelligence collection, especially at the village level; b. Intelligence evaluation, dissemination, and coordination; c. Border surveillance and immigration control; d. Mob and riot control; e. The prevention of crime and of juvenile delinquency; f. The protection of the people and especially of village officials against terrorists and assassins; g. The projection of an image to identify the police with the populace and its welfare. 20. The armed forces of a government constitute the means for protection against external attack and internal insurrection beyond the capability of civilian police to control. The existence of loyal and well-equipped, trained, and led troops, competent in internal security operations, constitutes an important deterrent against large scale terrorism or guerrilla warfare. An internal defense capability on the part of friendly armed forces, balanced with and complementary to that of the indigenous police forces, is regarded as an important element in internal defense planning, meriting U.S. support. 21. Consideration should be given to courses of action to improve the utilization of military resources. In many countries, the military establishment possesses equipment and skills representing a major national investment and resource. If in the judgment of the Ambassador local circumstances permit, it is imperative that actions be taken to assure the use of this resource in the nation building process if this can be done without detracting from the capability of the military to perform its primary defense function. Such actions may require flexibility in funding to permit mutual support of AID and DOD projects, and may take into account: a. Military cooperation with social and economic agencies to perform civic action in: (1) Adult literacy and vocational instruction; (2) Construction of low cost housing and municipal buildings at the village level and in urban slums; (3) The construction of roads and water and sanitation facilities at the village level and in urban slums; (4) The extension of medical facilities; b. Military cooperation with the police in: (1) The collection and exchange of intelligence; (2) The exchange of communications and transportation facilities, including air lift; (3) The production of joint contingency plans identifying police and military roles and missions. VI. Training 22. Internal defense planning has been much improved by the training being provided to official personnel. NSAM No. 283 of February 13 1964, 4 directed that training programs with foreign affairs interests should include study of the USOIDP; that all officers assigned to key positions receive special instruction at the National Interdepartmental Seminar on Problems of Development and Internal Defense; and that efforts be aimed at influencing and gaining the support of USOIDP policies and programs from as many local official personnel as possible throughout the underdeveloped countries. 23. The National Interdepartmental Seminar serves as the focal point of U.S. overseas internal defense and development training efforts. Personnel assigned to key positions abroad and who attend this Seminar are made aware of the need to include internal defense requirements in country programs when appropriate. Departments and agencies in Washington should take action to assure that all senior personnel attend the National Interdepartmental Seminar before assignment to key positions abroad. This applies especially to Ambassadors who are responsible for the supervision of multi-agency resources in a coordinated program to achieve U.S. goals in developing countries. 24. Departments and agencies with in-house training programs within the purview of the USOIDP and the Coordinator of the National Interdepartmental Seminar should consult informally at their discretion to assure that official curricula are mutually complementary, and that in-house training programs reflect adequate and correct coverage of the USOIDP. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 71 A 4546, 381 1967 February. Confidential. An attached covering letter from Kohler to Vance, January 5, 1967, indicated that the draft paper was prepared in response to the SIG decision of July 26, 1966, to revise “U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy,” and asked for the early comments of the agencies that were members of the SIG. Regarding the July 26 decision, see Document 82 . For other agency comments, see Documents 108 and 109 . 2 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. VIII, Document 105 . 3 Document 56 . 4 Document 191 . 106. Memorandum for the Record 106. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, January 5, 1967. When I met last week with John Macy he informed me quite categorically that he did not intend to support any new legislation to modify the Foreign Service personnel system this year. 2 Although he would support the so-called Viet Nam amendments as a separate legislative package, he believed that other proposed modifications required a great deal more study before being submitted to the Congress. Macy said that he was strongly opposed to the establishment of separate personnel systems for the several Foreign Affairs agencies unless the overall authority of the Director General were clearly established to provide a unifying bridge as well as centralized personnel policy determination. Macy believed that new legislation should be preceded by a study which would determine: a. The kind of personnel system or systems required to fulfill the broad requirements of the government in the foreign affairs field (as opposed to parochial needs of individual agencies). b. The kinds and number of jobs required. c. The type of legislation required to obtain these people. WJC 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Department of State-Rusk. No classification marking. Drafted by Crockett. Copies were sent to Katzenbach, Steeves (DG), MacArthur (H), Lyerly (L/O), Hoofnagle (O/DG), and Stutesman (O/DG). 2 For background on this issue see Document 38 and footnotes 1 and 4 thereto. 107. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 107. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 7, 1967. You asked me to look into the qualities of Mr. Idar Rimestad as replacement for Bill Crockett. I find Rimestad has an excellent and consistent record as an administrative officer. In particular, he did distinguished work in three complex operations; the Moscow Embassy, the Paris Embassy, and setting up ACDA. There is every reason to think that he could do the housekeeping job at State with efficiency, and handle his relations well on the Hill. (In ACDA he had the responsibility of presenting a separate budget.) [ 4 lines of source text excised by the Johnson Library under the donor's deed of gift ] He 2 sounds like the right man, if the idea Nick Katzenbach is working out with Secretary Rusk comes to life. That idea is to find a first-rate man to help Nick lead the way in programming systematically the use of resources and personnel in all aspects of foreign affairs. That is not a job which, on the record, Rimestad could handle. Therefore, I think we have found a good successor to Bill; but Secretary Rusk and Nick should be encouraged to set up soon the coordination of foreign affairs resources. W.W. Rostow 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt R. Rostow, Vol. 18. Confidential. 2 Rimestad. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 108. Editorial Note 108. Editorial Note After the Department of Defense received the draft paper on “U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy,” along with Foy Kohler's covering January 5, 1967, letter asking for agency comments ( Document 105 ), Commander J. Fitzgerald of the Policy Planning Staff (DOD/ISA) sent a January 10 tasking memorandum to the directors of military assistance and of the geographical regional areas within DOD/ISA, asking for comments on the paper and indicating that the Joint Staff was preparing a reply for General Wheeler that would be coordinated with that of Deputy Secretary Vance. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 71 A 4546, 381 1967 February) In a February 10 memorandum to these same directors, Colonel John G. Wheelock III, Director of the Policy Planning Staff (DOD/ISA), noted that on the basis of internal replies a suggested DOD revision of the State Department draft had been prepared that recommended “among other things the formation of an interagency working group to deal with the question of roles and missions in our overseas internal defense programs.” (Ibid.) A copy of this 15-page revision prepared by Colonel Lindjord and Commander Fitzgerald on February 9 is ibid. Attached to it is a draft letter from Vance to Kohler. Memoranda from Philip E. Barringer, Acting Director of Near and South Asia Region (DOD/ISA), and Maurice J. Mountain, Director of the Office of Military Assistance Policy Review (DOD/ISA), to Colonel Wheelock, both dated February 15, which generally approved of the proposed response to Kohler and offered a few additional suggestions, are ibid. Neither the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this draft paper nor a final approved version of Vance's reply to Kohler has been found. Meanwhile the National Security Council Staff was reacting to the draft paper. In a January 7 memorandum to Francis Bator, William Bowdler, Edward Hamilton, William Jorden, and Howard Wriggins, Bromley Smith requested their views on the draft paper. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, Vol. I, 13th Meeting, 7/26/66) A handwritten note from Bowdler on this memorandum indicates that the paper looked “OK” to him and that he had no comments on it. In a January 13 memorandum to Smith, Jorden said he had “no particular problems with the proposed revision” but did not like its emphasis on thwarting aggression designed to overthrow “'governments which the U.S. has a cogent interest to maintain.'” He thought the “main concern” of U.S. policy should be “not the continuation of any particular 'government' but rather of a given political or social structure.” In a January 16 memorandum to Smith, Wriggins thought the paper had “merit,” but added that the Department of State and AID budgeting processes were “not adequately related to intricate and discriminating involvement in other societies” to provide for effective follow through, and he believed that “more careful research” and budgetary rethinking might be needed. (Ibid.) For the views of Hamilton and Bator on the draft paper, see Document 109 . No response to Kohler offering White House comments has been found. 109. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 109. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, January 9, 1967, p.m. WWR: SUBJECT Comments on Proposed Internal Defense Policy General: I may be fighting the problem, but I seriously doubt that the bulk of this document 2 is necessary or desirable. Specifically: 1. When placed in the spectrum of U.S. foreign policy directives, this one contains only three fundamental points not better spelled out elsewhere: —subversive aggression is a serious problem which deserves our attention; —every mission should have a plan to deal with it; —every officer should receive special instruction in these matters. These points are legitimate. I have no serious quarrel with the way they are put. 2. However, a good deal of the statement is devoted to the non-insurgency side of things. It is certainly true that the best long-term attack on the causes of insurgency is an economic development program. But it seems to me that this paper should either confine itself to that observation or make a serious effort to incorporate all of the reams of instruction which now exist to guide our State/AID personnel. The present paper does neither—it lists, in extremely general and opaque language—some of the activities which some of our programs involve. Even if the terms were precise enough to exclude anything, all of this guidance would not be relevant to any one country; neither would it be sufficient to any. 3. The paper draws an extremely fine and partially implicit distinction between support for a particular Government (or governing group) and support for a non-communistic system of government. Unless one reads with a microscope, it is very easy to derive the impression that it is U.S. policy to resist any movement to change an existing Government if there is any sign that external forces may be involved. I doubt that this is what is intended. (If this is the intent, I don't believe the policy is workable.) 4. The document contains a good deal of Cold War jargon which will make it difficult for many officers abroad to take it seriously. Parts of it look as though they were written in 1949. I am referring particularly to paragraph 5. Thus, my general prescription would be a drastic shortening aimed at making the three points mentioned above, together with the policy principles which underlie them. I would leave the development business to other papers. I would also try to reduce the sleep-inducing quality of the language. Specific 1. If we really want internal defense plans, with some action content and effect on the real world, we cannot be as ambitious as paragraph 3 suggests. Such undertakings simply don't get done in most missions. Thus, I would limit internal defense plans primarily to internal security. 2. In paragraph 6, the distinction between points (a) and (b) escapes me. 3. We should decide on what adjective describes the kind of government we will support. Paragraph 6(d) says “legitimate”; paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 use “local”; paragraph 14(a) says “established”; and the phrase “where the U.S. has a cogent interest” is liberally used. We should try to be clear about whether we are talking about (1) the present Government, or the system of government, (2) which, if any, current Governments we will stand and die for, and (3) how we go about deciding where we have a “cogent interest”. 4. Paragraph 14, except for point (c), is straight boiler-plate-and redundant at that. 5. Section V (in connection with point general 2 above) has all the standard disadvantages of a list; it states too much, but is far from exhaustive. In particular, the priorities implied by the order of points under 18(b) are not in accord with any approved development strategy of which I am aware. Indeed, the only part of Section V which seems to me to add anything useful to the current body of doctrine consists of paragraphs 19, 20 and 21. EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, Vol. I, 13th Meeting, 7/26/66. Confidential. The memorandum is misdated January 9, 1966. An undated, handwritten note from Bator at the end of the memorandum reads: “Walt—I won't do a separate memo since the above is a fair representation of my views. I am especially concerned about the point in par. 3 of page 1.” 2 Document 105 . 110. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk 110. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 9, 1967. SUBJECT Idar Rimestad I am attaching papers 2 for the President to submit Mr. Rimestad's name to head the Administrative Bureau. Alternate papers are attached designating the job as it presently is designated, Deputy Under Secretary, or as it was previously designated, Assistant Secretary. Whichever designation the President should approve, the job description would remain unchanged and the salary is the same. As you know, I strongly prefer the designation of Assistant Secretary with respect to this job. I feel this way for the following reasons: 1. While I think Mr. Rimestad is a good administrative officer on his record, I don't believe he has the personal or professional stature of Bill Crockett and I would be reluctant for this reason to designate him Deputy Under Secretary. 2. I would like to hold the Deputy Under Secretary's job vacant for the next three or four months while I see if I can establish a policy programming exercise here in the Department, similar to what Mr. McNamara has accomplished in Defense. I think it is essential that we program on a Government-wide basis if we are to get a more rational picture and control of our foreign policy objectives throughout the world. Performance of such a job would require a lot of interdepartmental work and for this reason it would be helpful to use the Deputy Under Secretary designation for the man responsible. It would also help to attract the right man. It is clear to me that Mr. Rimestad could not begin to perform the programming function. I had believed that Congressman Rooney 3 would not feel strongly about the change of designation of the job, but in my conversation with him Friday, he indicated a strong preference to having Rimestad's job designated as Deputy Under Secretary rather than as Assistant Secretary. The reasons he gave for this were not particularly relevant to the issue (mostly he objected to somebody being put between Rimestad and yourself, which would not occur under either designation) but he stated his views strongly. Since both Crockett and Rimestad know my views on the subject, and the reasons for them (as well as Rooney's opposition), for the President to designate him Deputy Under Secretary inevitably undercuts some of my objectives. In view of Rooney's position, I can fully understand the reasons for designating Rimestad as Deputy Under Secretary, but I continue to oppose it. 4 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Chron, Mr Katzenbach, 1966–67. Limited Official Use. Rusk initialed the memorandum at the top of page 1. 2 Not found. 3 John Rooney (D-New York). 4 Rimestad was appointed Deputy Under Secretary for Administration on January 26 and entered on duty February 3. He served until October 2, 1969. In Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , pp. 185–188, Mosher and Harr characterize his period as Deputy Under Secretary as “a return to administrative business as usual, pre-Crockett.” They note the death of the Comprehensive Country Programming System by summer 1967, the departure of the programming staff, and the demise of other Crockett innovations. 111. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 111. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, January 13, 1967. SUBJECT Status Report on Panels of Outside Advisers The panels of advisers to the Department's regional bureaus, and to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and Policy Planning Council, are now constituted, and all but one have been publicly announced. Announcement of the panel of the Bureau of African Affairs has been deferred pending the security clearance of one member (Dr. Martin Kilson of Harvard), whose case is being expedited but may still present problems. Although new, these panels promise to serve as an extremely useful source of new ideas and comment on current and long-range problems. 2 Our present plans for their utilization can be summarized as follows: East Asian and Pacific Affairs . This bureau has formed two panels. Its ten-member China panel will meet for the first time on February 1–2 to discuss the major problems bearing on U.S. policy towards Communist China. The East Asian and Pacific panel, under the Chairmanship of former Ambassador Reischauer, will hold its first meeting on February 3–4. Sixteen of the nineteen members (including two who are also on the China panel) are expected to attend this initial discussion of our Asian policy; in the future smaller groups drawn from the panel as a whole may meet to discuss particular questions. European Affairs . In view of the broad range of European problems, the bureau does not at this time plan to convene formal meetings of its 22-member advisory panel. Instead, it is scheduling meetings with smaller groups of three to five specialists at which particular problems can be discussed. The first such meeting, to consider the US/UK/FRG Trilateral negotiations, NATO problems and Atlantic military affairs, was held on December 2, 1966. Two further meetings are planned for this Spring to examine the question of British entry into the Common Market and the problem of East-West relations. Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs . This bureau is also planning to convene initial meetings of groups of advisers drawn from its panel, rather than a formal meeting of the panel as a whole. The first group will meet for two days in mid-February to discuss some of the central problems of U.S. policy in the Eastern Arab world. Shortly thereafter, a second meeting will be held to consider the problems of the South Asian subcontinent. International Organization Affairs . Formation of this advisory panel was announced in mid-October, and the group held its first meeting at our UN Mission in New York on November 3 to discuss Southwest Africa, the mini-state problem and planning for the 1968 UNCTAD Conference. Another meeting is planned within the next few weeks to consider the Rhodesia and Southwest Africa problems. Policy Planning Council . The Council has formed two panels of advisers, composed of experts on the problems of developed nations and on food and population matters. Neither group has yet convened, but initial meetings are scheduled within the next two months. The developed nations panel will consider a paper (being prepared for the Spring meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group) on relations in the 1970's between Western Europe and (1) the United States and (2) the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; the food/population panel is being asked to assist in a study of the world food problem. African Affairs . The panel will hold an initial meeting as soon as Dr. Kilson's security clearance problem has been resolved. Thereafter, its work will be harmonized with that of the African Advisory Council formed in 1961. While formal meetings of the new advisory panel and Council could later be scheduled, none are contemplated at this time. Instead, the bureau plans to convene small meetings of experts drawn from both groups to work on specific African problems. Ultimately it is hoped that the two groups can be merged. In addition to the foregoing, the pre-existing Council for Latin America continues to function effectively. Its Board of Trustees will hold a meeting in New York on March 6, and the Council's various geographic subcommittees are planning to meet in Washington this Spring with appropriate Country Directors and staff personnel of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Informal, ad hoc meetings between Assistant Secretary Gordon and selected members of the panel of academic consultants to this bureau have also been held in recent months. At the last such meeting the subjects discussed were education, proposals for the establishment of multi-national institutes, and ways to improve scientific and technological training in Latin America were discussed. We have been pleased with the interest shown in the new panels, and will continue to report on their more significant activities and contributions to the work of the Department. BHR 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Consultants Panels. Confidential. Rostow penned a note to Bromley Smith on the memorandum that reads: “Remind me to check again at, say, the end of April.” 2 See Document 125 regarding evaluations of the panels by NSC staff members. 112. Editorial Note 112. Editorial Note In January 1967 the Department of State published Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State by Professor Chris Argyris of Yale University. A condensed version appeared in the January 1967 issue of the Foreign Service Journal under the title, “Do You Recognize Yourself?” Argyris based his report on tape recordings he made of three Airlie House management conferences held by the Department in 1965. Attended primarily by Career Ministers and Class I Foreign Service Officers, their purpose, according to Argyris, “was to help the participants enhance their competence in dealing with people and managing systems (such as embassies, regional bureaus, functional departments). During the discussions the men diagnosed with earnestness and commitment their personal limitations as leaders of people, as well as the problems of the Department of State as an organization.” Argyris concluded that the Department's interpersonal milieu, its “living system,” predisposed it to ineffectiveness and destined reform efforts to mediocre success at best and failure at worst. Among the system's norms, according to Argyris, were “withdrawal from interpersonal difficulties and conflict, minimum interpersonal openness and trust, [and] mistrust of one's own aggressiveness, and aggressiveness of others.” The result was a Foreign Service culture that discouraged forthrightness and risk-taking and encouraged those who played it safe and did “not make waves” either in their behavior or their writing. Argyris offered a series of recommendations for altering the living system so that it would reward risk taking and initiative. (Ibid., pages 21–26) Readers' reaction to Argyris' report was printed in the March, April, and May issues of the Foreign Service Journal . Prior to publication of the report, Robert Peck of the Department of State's Office of Operations objected to a number of quotations in the report by Foreign Service Officers. He argued in a December 30, 1966, memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary of State Crockett that they presented “a rather dismal picture” of the Department and would incur publicity that would affect it adversely. Therefore they should be deleted. (Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, Argyris Report, 1966–67) Crockett decided not to delete any material, however, noting in his preface to Argyris' report that the decision “to publish it without censoring the quotations was not taken lightly” but that “being honest and open about the problems dealt with in this study offers the best beginning for dealing with them effectively and constructively.” ( Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness , page iv) 113. Report Prepared by Professor Frederick Mosher 113. Report Prepared by Professor Frederick Mosher 1 Washington, January 17, 1967. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS [Omitted here is the Introduction.] Findings I. General Although tremendous efforts in the past and at present have been directed to the development and justification of budgets for American activities overseas, there has been and is no mechanism whereby all American undertakings in any given country or any given region can be authoritatively evaluated comparatively and together at the same time. From the initial development of a budget estimate for an overseas operation in a given country, through all the executive and legislative processes, reviews, and decisions to the allotment and expenditure of funds, it is considered and evaluated as an extension of a particular department, bureau or other agency in Washington. At no point in the entire process, which usually runs one and a half to two years, is it considered in relation to programs of other agencies in the same country or region. At no time is its effectiveness evaluated against that of other agencies in the same country or region. The various Federal agencies have directed a great deal of effort to the planning, the programming, and the budgeting of their activities, but rarely have these efforts been effectively related to one another, to the comparable activities of other agencies, to the comparative costs of alternative actions which might be beyond their agency jurisdiction, or to a total view of American objectives in any given country or region. American objectives in some individual countries have been described in policy documents of the Department of State, but few of these have been sufficiently specific to provide guidance for the development of operating programs. Despite various expressions over the last several years that each Ambassador should “take charge” of activities of all agencies in his country, and despite the fact that aggressive Ambassadors can inject, and have injected, their own views on programs and activities of non-State Department agencies from time to time, there is little in the budget system to encourage a broad, overall view of all programs and to meld them into a “country program.” In fact, the system of individual agencies, as they have developed and congealed, militate against it; they are more likely to encourage, even require, a parochial agency view. II. Developing Countries versus Developed Countries There are striking and relatively consistent differences between the developing countries (A) where the United States has substantial programs to assist in development and countries which are already developed (B). These include: a. a stronger sense of unity and identity of purpose among different sections and agencies in A than in B; b. a stronger development of the country team idea in A than in B; c. a greater recognition of ambassadorial leadership in A than in B; d. a greater preponderance, in B than in A, of programs which are viewed as extensions of domestic activities and purposes and as only tenuously related to foreign policy; e. greater ease in identifying “packageable” programs in A than in B; f. greater concern about evaluating effects and outputs in A than in B; g. far greater receptivity to the concepts of program budgeting in A than in B. All of the countries visited in Europe fall clearly in the B category. All in Latin America except Mexico are in the A category. In most of the dimensions noted above, Mexico is clearly in the B category. III. The CCPS and EROP Experiences With a few noteworthy exceptions, the current feeling about both CCPS and EROP, in those posts which experienced either or both, and among those officers who had experienced them at other posts, is critical and negative. Among some officials in all agencies, this feeling is reflected in cynicism about any future efforts toward systematic programming. In fact, there seems to be an inverse correlation between receptivity toward a new system and amount of experience with an old one. The principal complaints about CCPS and EROP are: a. they involved a tremendous amount of time and effort and paper work; b. they were of little or no local use; c. they formented much restiveness and low morale among personnel who feared for continuance of their jobs; d. recommendations growing out of them affecting other agencies (other than State and USIS) were not backed in Washington, causing friction, embarrassment, and frustration in the field; e. the only results were cuts in budget and personnel, in State and USIS. My own assessment of these complaints is that a and c are considerably exaggerated; that b results in part from an absence of interest and capability of some top officers in the field of management, and that d and e are substantially, but not entirely, true. (Some reductions in other agencies were made at a later date than the exercises themselves, often by Congress.) There was also some feeling among officers of agencies other than the State Department that the Ambassadors had inadequate knowledge, competence, or true authority to look into their business, but this was usually only hinted in open conversations. Against these arguments, some officers advanced advantages of CCPS and EROP: a. they forced individuals to look at and assess their own and their section's work against objectives; b. they provided information useful to top managers in their total managerial job; c. they identified problem areas and surpluses in personnel. At least one Ambassador is continuing an annual CCPS-type review on his own authority. My personal reaction to all these reactions of others is that CCPS was probably a useful and perhaps necessary exercise preparatory to a program-budgeting system, even though it aroused antagonism in many quarters. It provided at least a beginning prod toward looking at the foreign affairs job as a whole and at management as a significant factor in overseas Missions. It produced a number of young FSO's motivated and knowledgeable in this field—the Executive Assistants—who can be a great asset to future efforts. And it pointed up certain pitfalls which should be avoided in the future. Those which I think were basic shortcomings of CCPS and EROP include: a. there was not enough other agency participation in Washington in the development of the system and the grid; b. there was virtually no support or follow-through from the top and from the substantive bureaus in the State Department; c. neither CCPS nor EROP was tied in with the budget process; they were extra and outside the normal procedure for the allocation of resources; d. CCPS and particularly EROP were or became in the field closely identified with reductions in complement; they were oriented toward economy rather than program and output—cuts rather than trade-offs, transfers, increases (as well as decreases) where warranted; e. the system required altogether too much detail, particularly in the allocation of manhours to activities; f. there was too much attention to many activities for which there is little realistic measurement or even judgment of output—such as “presence,” direction, representation, reporting. Of these, I understand that e and f have already been corrected in the new FAPS; modification of both c and d is implicit in the Hitch Committee recommendation; a can be corrected if the interdepartmental group once again becomes operative; and b remains crucial. IV. The Role and Organization of the State Department in Washington Over the last thirty years of serving in or observing large-scale organizations, I have learned that field suspicion and distrust of headquarters is a standard, expectable phenomenon. Field personnel commonly feel that headquarters does not understand their local problems, fails to delegate sufficient authority, demands too much paper work in terms of reports and justifications, issues directives with insufficient knowledge of their probable effects on the firing line. Though this feeling is prevalent also in the foreign affairs agencies, it seems less virulent than in many large organizations, perhaps principally because almost all of the leadership personnel have themselves served in their headquarters and are familiar with, and somewhat sympathetic toward, the constraints and pressures that abound in the Potomac Jungle. By and large, these people seem to me pretty sophisticated. Yet, there is a rather special kind of cynicism toward the State Department—held both by those within and outside the Foreign Service—on matters of organization and management. Even when it officially delegates new authorities to the field, there is doubt that the Department really means it and will support officers in the field if they dare to give it expression. One Ambassador said that the letters of Eisenhower and Kennedy really brought no change in the roles of Ambassadors. Most of them did not agree about this, but most had interpreted the letters within quite narrow parameters involving little break with precedents. The feeling of some at least that the Department had failed to back them up on their EROP recommendations as they applied to other agencies strengthened their skepticism. Few seemed to attach much importance to NSAM 341 which, on paper at least, looks like the most momentous document in relation to foreign affairs administration in American history. The attitude that “I'll believe it when I see it” toward NSAM 341 is fortified by the absence of any visible change, other than the establishment of a new group of committees. And the equanimity and “academic” interest of representatives of other agencies to reflect their confidence that the State Department would not really do anything about it. A country-based program-budgeting system seems today the most likely device to attach some muscle to the skeleton of NSAM 341. But it cannot be done from the field. The key is decision from the very top of the Department and implementation through the regional bureaus, commonly referred to as “substantive.” It will surely fail if viewed as an administrative exercise initiated and carried out by a group perceived by others as efficiency experts. There has been a certain unreality in much of what has been said about the SIG and the IRG's. Part of this lies in the frequent consideration of these committees, which is after all what they are, as responsible decision-making organs. My reading of NSAM 341 suggests that they are advisory, not decisive, and that the responsibility for decisions rests in their respective chairmen. They should be useful in helping him to arrive at constructive and viable decisions and providing a forum for better communication and for the airing and discussion of plans and differences in points of view. Their purpose is to enhance the ability and authority of their chairmen to reach sound, balanced, and forward-looking decisions—not to dissipate that authority among a group of agency representatives. A second kind of unreality lies in the tendency to assume that these committees will in fact have time to consider and discuss all the significant problems in their respective jurisdictions. Literally, this would mean meetings around the clock seven days a week. In light of the heavy responsibilities of their numbers, it is unrealistic to suppose that they could or should meet more than occasionally except, perhaps, at certain critical periods in the program-budget cycle. Most of the intensive study and most of the interagency negotiation must be carried out before questions reach the IRG's and the SIG. This suggests that the respective chairmen should each have a small but high-powered permanent analytical staff to which could be co-opted staff members from the various agency members on detail. It also suggests that negotiations at the country level be conducted in Washington under the direction of the appropriate country director, whose responsibility in this regard should be comparable to that of the Assistant Secretary for the region as a whole and to that of the Ambassador in his relation to the country team. The third unreality lies in the assumption of NSAM 341 that the Under Secretary can in fact allocate very much of his time and energy to foreign affairs management. In this regard, the findings of the Herter Committee are still relevant: 2 The Under Secretary is as pressed as the Secretary by immediate problems on the international scene. He acts as an alter ego to the Secretary, and frequently serves as Acting Secretary. Neither man can give continuous attention to the management of programs and activities of the Department of State and to their coordination with the programs of other Government agencies engaged in foreign affairs. The relative inactivity of the SIG since it was established in March, 1966 suggests that these observations remain true. V. Ambassadors and Country Teams Judging by the posts visited on this project and in historical perspective, I would say that the concepts of ambassadorial leadership and the country team have made significant strides over the past two decades and even during the last three or four years. Just about everyone gave them more than lip service. There were, in general, real efforts to keep the Ambassador informed, to seek his approval and support on proposals and problems, to communicate up and down and across. At most of the posts visited there were regular, sometimes daily, country team staff meetings which served at least the limited purposes of keeping all informed and establishing inter-personal acquaintanceship across agency lines. Most of the Ambassadors and/or DCM's exercised—though in varying degree—direction and supervision over many if not all American activities in their respective countries. There is of course a great deal of variation among different countries and, within each, among different agencies. 3 A great deal depends upon the Ambassadors—their style, interests, and particularly their view of their own role and that of the DCM. Those whom I saw fell into about three rough categories: 1. the Ambassador is primarily the personal representative of the United States (President); he is concerned with those parts of the American Mission that can help him most immediately on problems of concern to him; he is concerned with other parts only sporadically when their actions do or threaten damage to the American “presence”; 2. the Ambassador is “in charge” of all American activities in the country but differentiates among different agencies in the degree of his surveillance and control; he respects the internal “sovereignty” of agencies in technical fields other than foreign policy and doubts his own competence or authority to pass judgment on their internal programs and operations; 3. the Ambassador is the commander of U.S. undertakings in the country; the initiative is (or should be) his on most matters—all those that directly affect foreign policy; he should view his scope as complete and his job as managerial. As suggested earlier, the Ambassador is more likely to incline toward the 3 end of the spectrum in Latin America, the 1 end in Europe. Partly this affects the nature of the American goals in industrial and in underdeveloped countries. In the former, the more traditional and more limited view is stronger. Partly it reflects the personalities of the individuals, but this may in turn reflect the considerations which entered into their assignments. In spite of the above, it cannot be said that we found anywhere that the Ambassadors could effectively manage the substance of most operating programs, even where they wanted to. Contributing to this are a number of factors: 1. the feeling—and to a degree the fact—that agency representatives in the field operate under laws, authorities, appropriations, allotments, directives, and procedures which they receive from Washington, principally from their own agency headquarters; initiative and discretion among the different agency representatives is more or less severely circumscribed though there is considerable variation among different agencies; 2. during the operating year, there seems to be remarkably little flexibility in the use of agency funds and almost none available to the Ambassadors; 3. primary loyalty of agency personnel as well as their orientation to objectives is to their agency, not to the total country job; there are exceptions to this, but by and large I feel it is true; most of them were brought up in their own agency, were assigned to country X by their agency, and will still be with their agency long after they leave country X; 4. with the rotation policies of the different agencies, there is a continuous turnover of leadership personnel, and an accompanying absence of long-term commitment to the total program in a country; I would guess that the majority of those we talked to expect to leave their present countries within a year and a half; 5. the feeling on the part of most concerned that, in event of major disagreement between agency representative and Ambassador, the former would be backed up in Washington and would prevail—that the Ambassador would not be backed up; (as one Ambassador put it, in connection with one of the other agencies, “When I really put it on the line with them, I always lose”); 6. the mechanics of programming and budgeting whereby each agency operates on its own premises, guidelines, classifications, and schedules; even where the Ambassador undertakes seriously to review, criticize, and make recommendations on projected programs and budgets, he must deal with them on a piecemeal basis as they reach him at various times through the year; and their categories prevent effective comparisons and aggregations across agency lines, (in this connection, I feel sure that if PPBS continues and becomes congealed along the agency lines currently pursued, it will serve to weaken the managerial role of the Ambassador and make more difficult the elevation of his role in the future); 7. the lack of confidence of some agency representatives—and indeed of some Ambassadors themselves—in the ability of the Ambassadors to deal knowledgeably and effectively with the specialized and technical content of agency programs; in this connection, there is some doubt, which I share, that the Chiefs and deputies have either the time or the qualified staff to carry through on a full-scale program-budgeting and management job. Added to these obstacles, as suggested before, is that some of the Ambassadors and their deputies do not consider this kind of activity appropriate to their role. They lack either the experience or the inclination to take real command of the total American Mission. [Omitted here is the balance of the report.] 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 1–1. No classification marking. Mosher served as a consultant to the State Department during the summer of 1966 and then worked under contract to the Department. He also served on the Hitch Committee. In the introduction to the report he states that it was based on: his experience on the Hitch Committee; interviews with officials of the Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture, AID, USIA, BOB, and the Peace Corps; and interviews during October and November 1966 with officials at U.S. missions in Germany, France, Great Britain, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, conducted together with John Adams (see Document 104 ). The report is attached to a January 19 memorandum from Francis Lambert, Staff Director for the ARA Interdepartmental Regional Group, to Robert Sayre, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, in which Lambert makes a number of comments on the report and calls it “a first-rate paper. I have no quarrel with anything he says.” Regarding the report's circulation, see also footnote 1, Document 104 . 2 The committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, Personnel for the New Diplomacy , 1962, pp. 11–12. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 A separate discussion of several agencies is included below in VIII. [Footnote in the source text.] 114. Editorial Note 114. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation with Senator Fulbright that began at 5:30 p.m. on January 20, 1967, President Johnson raised the issue of a replacement for Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Lincoln Gordon, who had indicated he was going to resign. The President then stated: “I want to get a good man that can move forward and be progressive and I have nobody to reward, as you know, in the State Department, and never have had, and I've just looked at 'em, and I'm tellin' you, the Foreign Service from a Latin American standpoint's awfully weak. As matter of fact it's weak everywhere, Bill. We've got to find some way to go into these universities. Some of these lectures you give, you ought to go out here—we ought to try to bring in some young people into this place. The ones we got are just, they're just—I just pick 'em over just like eatin' second day turkey.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Senator Fulbright, Tape F67.03, Side A, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 115. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 115. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, January 27, 1967. Dear Nick: Today is my last official day in this job and I write this note to say goodbye, to thank you for your interest and support, and to express my personal keen regret that we did not have an opportunity to work together longer. I have the impression that from the managerial and organizational standpoint at least, our aims and interests have to a large degree coincided. My efforts over these years in the Department, particularly during the last three and a half years as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, have been directed at freeing up the organization, decentralizing authority, encouraging independence, enabling people to fulfill the horizons of their jobs and, hopefully, to expand them. 2 The State Department may have some of the aspects of the jelly bowl or the fudge factory, 3 but at the same time it is also a group of remarkably intelligent, capable, and dedicated people. I am convinced that there are means by which we can make them more effective, more satisfied with their jobs, and more productive in the interests of our country. I know you have devoted considerable time and thought to the problems and I feel sure you will be able to go a long way toward solving them. I'm confident that Idar Rimestad and the O staff will give you the maximum cooperation and support. For my part, if there is any time in the future when you feel that I could be of any use, I would be delighted to serve in a consultant capacity or in any other way that you consider suitable. I am leaving my friends and colleagues here with a great deal of nostalgia, but firmly convinced that change is in itself a stimulating factor in organizational development and that new faces will bring with them new and valuable ideas. I am confident you will find the ways to use them. With warm regards and the good luck without which none of us would ever survive. Sincerely, Bill 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Administrative & Personnel. No classification marking. 2 Before leaving office, Crockett prepared for publication a manuscript of approximately 240 typed pages entitled “Management in the Department of State and the Foreign Service.” In his introduction Crockett wrote that the “Department of State and the Foreign Service, although they may have been late in joining it, are now in the forefront of the management revolution” and thus he prepared the manuscript “in order to give to the public, and to our own people, a description in layman's language of what the management of the Department and the Foreign Service consists.” Crockett circulated the 13 chapters among members of his office for review, comment, and approval. The manuscript was never published. A copy is in the Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 74–28, Book-Personal, W.J. Crockett. 3 President Kennedy called the State Department a “bowl of jelly” in 1961. (John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory . New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1971, p. 6) Joseph Kraft called the Department a “fudge factory” in a May 20, 1966, Washington Post column that stated: “The fact is that the Department has not been run primarily as a decision-making instrument. It has been run as a fudge factory. The aim has been to make everybody happy, to conciliate interests, to avoid giving offense and rocking the boat.” 116. Memorandum Prepared by the Inspector General of the Foreign Service (Wilkins) 116. Memorandum Prepared by the Inspector General of the Foreign Service (Wilkins) 1 Washington, January 30, 1967. SUBJECT Inspection Corps' Views on Policy Management In their partial inspections November 21–December 16, 1966 of EUR, AF, ARA and NEA, the Inspectors focused their attention on two specific subjects: (1) the functioning of the new Country Director system in terms of foreign affairs management within the Department and (2) the effectiveness of the new arrangements for inter-departmental policy coordination and decision-making through the SIG-IRG-Country Director machinery. Conclusions reached are regarded as tentative in view of the short period the new system had had to gather momentum. Country Director System (within Department) In general the new system is functioning within the Department quite smoothly under able, experienced Country Directors. The greater knowledge, understanding, and judgment that the Country Directors have brought to the problems of each country have in some cases resulted in more timely and effective handling of operational problems, particularly in the context of bilateral relations with single countries. In these instances, the Country Directors have been able to make more decisions at the country level than was true under the previous system. In single-country Country Directorates, a supervisory layer has been eliminated with beneficial effects, but in Directorates having responsibility for two or more countries the vertical layering problem is essentially the same as before. A commonly observed debit factor is that the proliferation of basic units has made additional horizontal clearances necessary and in some cases tended to impede two-way communication between the Assistant Secretary and his Deputies on the one hand and the Country Directors on the other. In the case of at least one Bureau (ARA), the new system seems to have contributed on the administrative side to the creation of additional support positions. In contrast to the beneficial effects with respect to bilateral relations with single countries, the ability to deal with area-wide issues and multilateral relations may have been impaired. In cases such as the Near East, where four Country Directorates have replaced the former Officer or Near Eastern Affairs, area problems which before were handled by the Office Director must now often be referred to the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. In another Bureau, ARA, the Inspectors specifically recommended that an Office of West Coast Affairs be reestablished. Finally, looking beyond the pres-ent initial stage of the new system, there are two potential developments which could have injurious effects. First, the narrowed focus of the Country Directors' responsibilities could well engender a more parochial outlook on their part than was the case with Office Directors. Second, the importance and attractiveness of the desk or country officer position are likely to be downgraded. Recommendation That consideration be given after the shake down period, to the recreation of area-wide offices in certain cases (e.g. ARA-West Coast Affairs and NEA-Near Eastern Affairs). SIG-IRG-Country Director Inter-Agency Machinery The utility of the new inter-agency coordinating and decision-making machinery can be evaluated only partially and tentatively, because it has been used relatively little. That the SIG, the capstone of the structure, has not met since July 1966 has undoubtedly been a major factor behind the relative lack of activity at the IRG level. To the extent that the new machinery has been employed at the IRG level, it has generally worked quite effectively. The Regional Groups have considered both policy and contingency planning papers and some action-oriented problems, but more of the former than the latter. They constitute potentially useful forums for coordinated inter-agency examination of major policy and operational matters, and the result generally has been a somewhat speedier and more clear-cut decision- making process than existed previously. It is our conclusion that the SIG-IRG-Country Director System has great potential for the management of Government-wide foreign affairs. However, this potential has not to date been exploited. Below the IRG level there has been no appreciable practical change in inter-agency relations. The Country Directors do not and cannot function as the leaders in Washington Country Teams, in the fullest sense as ambassadors in the field, because they have not been given decision-making authority. Under the NSAM and the Secretary's statement of March 4, 1966, they are, in effect, more like DCMs than like Chiefs of Mission and they are DCMs whose authority has not yet been established as such. Moreover, their agency counterparts are not empowered to commit their principals and generally regard the Assistant Secretary as the first decision-making level in the Department. Lacking the requisite authority, the Country Directors have to rely, as their predecessor Office Directors did, on their persuasiveness and personal prestige in seeking to gain the agreement and cooperation of other agencies. Country Directors in ARA, who speak for AID as well as the Department, have of course much greater ease in this effort. The role of the Country Directors in inter-agency relations should not be limited solely to one of coordination and clearance. As a minimum, they could be charged with responsibility for refining issues before they are brought to the IRG and ideally they should reach decisions at least of a preliminary nature. To enable the Country Directors to perform this latter function more effectively, their position and authority will have to be strengthened by action at the SIG and IRG levels. Fraser Wilkins 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S–SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Documents—Instructions and Authority. Limited Official Use. Attached to a February 2 memorandum from John Steeves, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, to Katzenbach. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 117. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 117. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 10, 1967, 1:10 p.m. Mr. President: Nick Katzenbach asks your approval to get Tom Schelling for the State Department as a Presidential appointee to drive forward the programming work in foreign affairs. A slot is available. I strongly recommend that you approve this request for two reasons. —The work will simply not be done unless a man like Schelling is brought into the State Department. —Schelling is just about the best man I could conceive of for this, if Nick can hook him. I would recommend to you a condition in granting Nick's request; namely, that you will grant it only if Nick personally guarantees that he will hold a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) meeting every two weeks at the minimum, and that he will personally assure that the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs) will press forward. 2 My reason is this; and it derives from more than 4 years as a working stiff in the State Department: Unless the Under Secretary will find the time to insure this interdepartmental leadership is exercised from day to day, it won't happen; and if it doesn't happen, the programming effort that Schelling is being brought in for won't be worth a damn. Walt Approve getting Schelling on proposed basis 3 Disapproved Approve Schelling appointment with SIG-IRG conditions 4 See me Attachment 5 Washington, March 7, 1967. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson SUBJECT Foreign Affairs Management I thought you might be interested in some observations and recommendations about which I perceive to be some of the management problems which exist among the foreign affairs agencies. First of all, I am impressed by the number of steps which you and the Secretary have taken to improve the overall management of foreign affairs. The following steps, in particular, seem to me to have been significant: 1. Improvement of communications facilities; 2. The establishment of the Operations Center as part of the Executive Secretariat and the clear benefit it has provided to intragovernmental communication and effectiveness. 3. The Secretary's sound insistence that operational responsibility rest primarily with the Assistant Secretaries; 4. The recent reorganization of P.L. 480 mechanics; 5. The directive 6 which puts ambassadors in charge of all United States governmental operations abroad. (Incidentally, less than 20% of our governmental representatives abroad are otherwise responsible to the State Department or on its payroll); 6. The provisions of NSAM 341 which established the Senior Interdepartmental Group, whose potential I have, as its chairman, come to prize, and the Regional Interdepartmental Groups; and finally 7. The study done by the Hitch Committee, 7 at the request of the Secretary, to make recommendations with respect to programming for foreign affairs. It is with respect to implementing this last recommendation that I call particular attention. I do so for two reasons. The first is because the Secretary directed me personally to take charge of the Hitch Committee effort. The second, more fundamental reason is that we are not yet on top of problems which, fundamentally, stem from the greater overall United States governmental involvement in the post-World War II world. The Hitch Committee pointed out that there was relatively little benefit to programming foreign policy activities of the Department of State, but potentially great possibilities in programming activities of the government as a whole relating to foreign affairs. This was, I believe, the same concept which led you to issue NSAM 341. The problem is now to implement it fully. We cannot now do so because we are unable, in sufficient detail, to relate the main programs—AID, P.L. 480, MAP, Peace Corps, CIA, USIA, and others—and our foreign policy objectives in particular countries. We cannot now allocate our resources on the basis of sensible and moderately long-range priorities. Granting that it would be far more difficult for foreign policy than it has been, for example, in the Department of Defense, I am persuaded that programming can provide a rational framework within which decisions can be more intelligently framed and decided. And I believe such a framework is urgently necessary . At present, programs tend to be oriented more towards their agencies than towards the countries or regions which they are designed to assist or influence. While the Department of State does coordinate such programs to a greater or lesser extent, I think it fair to say we do not use them sufficiently or efficiently in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. To take one example, a study this fall of eight overseas missions 8 found that, “…even where the Ambassador undertakes seriously to review, criticize, and make recommendations on projected programs and budgets, he must deal with them on a piecemeal basis as they reach him at various times through the year; and their categories prevent effective comparisons and aggregations across agency lines…if PPBS continues and becomes congealed along the agency lines currently pursued, it will serve to weaken the managerial role of the Ambassador and make more difficult the elevation of his role in the future….” In short, we must make greater effort to organize and distribute our resources, not according to agency objectives, but according to overall United States objectives. This is what programming might be expected to accomplish. I believe the SIG mechanism provides a ready framework under which to undertake programming. Our budget requests include a modest amount (I assume Rooney will give us about $300,000) to hire a small group of skilled professionals who have experience in the substance of foreign affairs—and who have the technical expertise in programming. This background is critical, because any such effort will fail unless we are able to do it well enough to involve all bureaus of this Department and all interested and affected government agencies. This will take both superior skill and time. I have spent considerable time trying to locate the man who would be best equipped to assist the Secretary and myself in this endeavor and I have sought names from many people inside and outside of government. The unanimous view of all those consulted is that the two best men would be Charles Hitch himself or Tom Schelling, now Professor of Economics at Harvard. Hitch would not be available, but I believe I could get Schelling to take on this assignment as a part-time consultant from now until June and full time after June. To do so, I would have to act quickly and be in a position to promise him a presidential appointment. You will recall that there is presently a vacant Assistant Secretary position, last used for Administration. Schelling has remarkably varied foreign policy and interagency experience and now simultaneously serves both the Departments of Defense and State. He worked for the-then AID agency from 1948 to 1950 and on the White House staff as an economic adviser to Averell Harriman and Linc Gordon from 1950 to 1953. He taught economics for five years at Yale, spent a year at RAND, and has been a Professor of Economics at Harvard, on the faculty of the Center for International Affairs there since 1958. Schelling is an expert on military policy, is a member of the Defense Department's Air Force science board, and has held a variety of advisory positions at Defense. I understand Bob McNamara has tried to lure him to Washington several times, without success. In addition to his AID and Defense background, he also is highly regarded in the Department of State, which he now serves as a member of the Panel of Advisers for European policy, and he has been an adviser to the Disarmament Agency. Schelling is 45. He was born and raised in California. He has a current security clearance. I would like your approval to make an offer to Schelling on the above basis. The Secretary concurs in this recommendation. Respectfully, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 9 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341. Confidential. The memorandum was included in the President's Night Reading. A handwritten note at the top of the memorandum reads: “Mr. Rostow notified Mr. Katzenbach.” 2 Nick has thus far been busy and hasn't given this high enough priority; and the machinery is beginning to rust, with considerable disappointment over your NSAM 341. [Footnote in the source text, handwritten by Rostow.] 3 The President checked this option. 4 The President checked this option. Attached to Rostow's memorandum is a memorandum from Rostow to Katzenbach, March 18, indicating the President's approval of hiring Schelling and stating: “It is the President's understanding that you will also drive forward other elements in NSAM 341 and, in particular: hold a Senior Interdepartmental Group Meeting approximately every two weeks and personally see to it that the Interdepartmental Groups are actively carrying out their responsibilities under NSAM 341.” 5 Confidential. 6 A reference to President Kennedy's May 29, 1961, letter, printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1345–1347. 7 See the attachment to Document 99 . 8 Not further identified. 9 Secretary Rusk's initials appear in his own hand below Katzenbach's signature. 118. Notes Prepared by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) 118. Notes Prepared by the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) 1 Washington, April 15, 1967. DRAFT NOTES ON PRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 2 I. Introduction A. Having rashly accepted this assignment—rashly in view of the experience and knowledge represented on this committee—I have tried to collect my thoughts around four sets of questions: 1. Should we move back towards formal standing committees—along the lines of the pre-1961 structure—for managing the interdepartmental aspects of defining strategic choices, structuring the process of decision, and overseeing execution? And if not—my vote would be strongly against it—how can one improve the present less structured arrangements : the overlapping aggregations of ad hoc task forces, the informal networks of sub-cabinet and cabinet officers, and the occasional formal but limited standing committees? And what role is there for the one across-the-board committee of fixed membership at the under secretary level, the SIG? 2. Second, what is the foreign policy role of the White House Staff? 3. Third, what could be done to strengthen the State Department's hands, to improve its performance both in its internal operations and in imposing foreign policy considerations on the other departments? 4. Fourth, a perhaps less conventional question: how could one improve the foreign policy performance, and make more responsive to foreign policy considerations, the non-foreign affairs departments—Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture? Is there anything one can do to improve the foreign affairs sensitivity of these Departments—besides simply making the Department of State more effective? The fourth question reveals, I am afraid, a second prejudice: I think it's high time to give up the fiction that even in principle the Department can and should get exclusive control under the President of foreign policy formulation and management. It cannot—and it would be wrong if it did. I think the right strategy for the Department is to focus less on its jurisdictional prerogatives, and to try to be more energetic and skillful in engaging the right people in the other agencies at the sub-cabinet level in the foreign policy process, thereby imposing foreign policy considerations on the workings of the other departments. B. Before getting into the substance of these questions, I should say that I will take advantage of the knowledge and experience of this committee and not waste time in qualifying the applicability of the points that follow. It is clearly more useful to you if your witnesses freely allow themselves to be captives of their experience: in this instance European affairs and non-regional international economic matters (trade and commercial policy, international money, balance of payments)—with a special lookout for Presidential issues. A lot of what I should like to say is far less relevant to policy formulation and management vis-à-vis those parts of the underdeveloped world where we engage in long-term development with a lot of money. And perhaps my views are also overly colored by the peculiarly interdepartmental quality of foreign economic issues and the consequently intense White House role even in issues which are just barely Presidential. C. Further, my experience is largely restricted to a period during which President, Sec. State and Sec. Def. necessarily preoccupied with Vietnam. I will defer to McNamara and Bundy on applicability to handing any overriding issue of the day, where in effect the ruling ad hoc task group which manages the issue on a continuing basis consists of the President himself and his principal senior advisors in security affairs. D. Last, I worked only for one President, one with very firm views on the general rules he wants enforced. The following two are particularly worth keeping in mind: 1. The President's options must be kept open as long as possible. It is expected that other costs will be paid to this end, even sometimes substantial costs. And the President will wish frequently to protect or exercise his options personally by continuing tactical control, especially where bargaining or correspondence or contact is involved with other heads of government, or when issues raise a domestic-political question, especially with Congressional content; or when his checkbook is involved. 2. Any important controversial recommendations for Presidential action should originate with a named individual whom the President feels he has calibrated by past experience. With the exception of recommendations which bear the certain mark of deep personal engagement by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or at most two or three other people with whom the President is in continuing personal contact, it must be certified or commented upon by members of the White House Staff. (These may be very special rules. I suspect not and that, to a point, most Presidents will want them followed.) II. Government by Task Groups A. I might now spend a few minutes on the first set of questions: formal broad-purpose standing committee structures versus management by more or less informal networks and ad hoc task groups. 1. It is an overriding fact of life in foreign affairs—and a commonplace—that virtually no issue of any importance involves interests and responsibilities of only one agency. Especially true of Alliance politics. But also to lesser degree true even of Soviet relations, and obviously of foreign economic matters. 2. To avoid total immobility, a great deal of decentralization is essential, with each department (and sometimes even offices and bureaus) carrying on in their areas of primary responsibility—sometimes directly with their overseas counterparts—informed by general conception of Presidential policy, but inevitably heavily influenced by priorities which are more narrowly the concern of that department or bureau. 3. Until choices must be made between goals—or priorities established among them—or hard international bargaining engaged in across a front involving several of our objectives in order to test how much freight the situation will carry—this sort of decentralization is entirely legitimate and essential for effectiveness. B. Two crucial questions for organization emerge: 1. What sort of mechanisms or procedures will have a high batting average for identifying and surfacing situations where such decentralization begins to cause serious trouble, or to lose out on major opportunities—where it becomes grossly ineffective to allow each department independently to keep operating its own set of buttons without central guidance? What are workable mechanisms for identification and early warning (before lower-level tactical decisions have seriously narrowed Presidential options)—identification of clusters of issues when centralized structuring of choices for Presidential decision and centralized strategic management become necessary or fruitful? 2. The second question: once such identification is made of a particular cluster of issues, situations—what mechanisms and procedures are appropriate for managing the process whereby options are formulated, laid out, brought to high-level decision and, further, in an open options regime, subjected to appropriate and continuing strategic management? C. The first question—early warning, identification, surfacing—is I believe the harder one. Right now, we have no formal interdepartmental machinery with that as its priority job (except with respect to certain very specialized areas and issues). The system has, nevertheless, worked out not too badly in Europe and on international economic matters—I have no basis for judgment elsewhere—because of the informal network of sub-cabinet officials who keep up a running conversation on the state of their business. [But haphazard. We were OK on this count vis-à-vis the UK in early '65. Not so good—too late—on FRG '66. Rather poor on NATO crisis (but not because of non-identification).] 3 This identification job may be one place where SIG, supported by a strong executive director, could play an enormously useful role. (This is also an area, incidentally, where White House foreign affairs staff has and will have, I think, a continuing significant role.) D. I would like to say rather more about the second question, which I think is perhaps easier to answer. Once it is clear at sub-cabinet levels that we have hit a situation where important choices are possible or necessary, what is the best management structure—especially under “open options” ground rules? 1. I would argue that no single across-the-board committee of senior officials should be counted on to manage or supervise all these situations. Further, I think there are very few cases where a fixed formal standing committee of limited purposes is the right way to work: —By definition the situation is one which requires the sustained and close attention of high-level sub-cabinet people; —Such a group must be sufficiently acknowledged as authoritative to command the bureaucracy and to minimize the temptation to end-run; —What is needed is the smallest number of people who are (a) senior enough to marshall the resources of their agencies; (b) not so senior as to make it impossible for them to keep up with detail, or spend the time needed for comprehensive and substantial exploration of each other's minds; and (c) close enough to their Secretaries to serve as double-edged negotiators (operating for the Secretary in Task Group jockeying, and in turn representing the group's recommendations to the Secretary). E. In my judgment these criteria do not lead to an elaborate superstructure of standing committees through which decisions filter upward. Rather they suggest a need for mechanisms which assure timely formation of ad hoc groups charged with management and forward planning on specific issues or clusters of issues. I don't wish to overstate the distinction. Choice never clear-cut or exhaustive. And I am not addressing here a question of external usefulness of high-level committees, e.g., textiles, balance of payments, on problems of special public and Congressional concern. Often not easy from table of government organization to discern which way choice has been made. Almost reduces to matter of style, but stylistic difference which has great impact on substance. F. Some nostalgic feeling in town the other way—we should move back towards the arrangement of the 50's. This feeling, I think, inevitable consequence of combining ad hoc style with “keeping options open” ground rule. 1. Formation of ad hoc groups always resembles accident, guaranteed to make bureaucracy nervous. (In fact there is element of accident in assuring strategic consideration at the right time. But that will not be eliminated by fixed superstructure.) 2. Ad hoc task groups often appear consumed in tactical and operational aspects of crisis, unconcerned with longer-term implications. 3. “Open options” involve no “established policy,” no general guidance,” no written 1-year, 2-year, 5-year strategy which can give a sense of assurance, continuity and guidance to bureaucracy; it severely limits the number of people who know the plans, goals, and strategies in heads of the President and the Secretaries; it creates a sizable crowd close enough to problems to see them disappear into the black box, but not privy to subsequent handling and susceptible to presumption that no smoke means no fire. G. These are real costs, and not merely because of anxiety on the edges. But the alternative costs of the fixed membership superstructure are, in my judgment, far greater, even apart from the open option ground rules: 1. Serious work just doesn't happen in a crowd. Blue chips are not played if marginal people present, records kept, etc. Also they do not get played for subordinates representing their superiors. You are all familiar with what happens to quality of discussion when participants wrapped in their institutional roles and surrounded by a constituency of committed and watchful retainers. 2. Fixed committees have fixed tendency to expand, and no capacity for shrinkage. Rule of relevance very difficult to enforce. Further, they are very hard to kill off. They have to be superseded and that's always painful, especially if they are superseded by another formal committee. I am sure all of you have played Brutus to moribund committees—doing it the way we did it with LRIPC…. 3. Fixed committees tend to breed special staffs divorced from ongoing operations. People with time enough to keep up with involved intramural politics of large fixed committees almost disqualified for serious business by definition. (Examples: NAC for International Financial and Monetary Problems.) 4. Fixed committees make problem of reasonable press security impossible. 5. The result of all above is that when fixed committees exist—except when limited functional role as board of directors is absolutely clear, and numbers kept rigidly limited—bargaining takes place outside committee framework. 6. Problem of structuring fixed committees presents Hobson's choice between groups with general foreign affairs mandate and large membership to match, and groups with specialized charters which usually turn out to be too narrow for most major issues. (Examples: Balance of Payments Committee, European IRG.) H. “Open options” make the case against fixed committees even more powerful: 1. Multiplies the importance of selective and flexible club membership. Demands that at least some members of Task Groups on important Presidential issues be personally known to President and feel themselves under Presidential discipline. 2. Rules out extended agendas, widely circulated written arguments, and other paraphernalia. 3. Requires constant contact and collegial action that makes limited and highly knowledgeable membership an administrative necessity. Unwieldiness not just complicating, but intolerable. One can make 5 calls a day to only a very small number of people. 4. Requires—and I think this is an absolutely key point—unusually frank and open discussion of long-term context and background of immediate policy choice. This is by far the best—and virtually the only relevant—form of forward planning. Essence of “open options” rule is that this thinking can rarely be written down. Thus, enormous premium on discussion. Simply cannot risk inhibiting forum. 5. To do its work properly, task groups must be privy to most subterranean kinds of problems and constraints, and unthinkable intentions. Must be capable of political as well as policy bargaining. Such bargaining never appears in minutes of fixed committee, and never will. 6. Presidents who are sensitive to their flexibility—which I think includes most Presidents—simply will not entrust management of delicate issues to something that looks like a machine. It is in their nature to regard visible fixed committees as repositories for problems on which the President has decided to give up some of his flexibility in return for the substantive quality of advice expected and/or the benefits of spreading responsibility. Presidents just will not trust fixed groups to manage the playing of their own hands, or to handle really delicate issues. (Examples: Post-Kennedy Round Planning; P.L. 480.) I. How, then, to proceed in thinking about structure? Is it feasible to devise a system which gives reasonable assurance that right clubs will be formed around right issues at right time with right connections above and below? Confess to bias that determining factor will not be so much the “system” as particular people making effective use of personal and bureaucratic ruts worn by past experience. J. Yet, some structural steps can help: 1. SIG could be charged with ferreting out issues requiring task force treatment before tactical moves close options. To serve effectively for this purpose, I would think it would be useful to make its membership more flexible and more subject to the problem at hand. SIG might be charged with identification of issues, and help in establishment of appropriate task groups. 2. Implicit premise here is quite deliberate: SIG itself will not in my judgment, prove proper club for most issues—its membership is too senior in some cases, and in any case too broad and too fixed and too visible. Further, it is important that SIG not layer task groups on important issues. For instance, the Trilateral Task Group simply could not have functioned if it conceived of its task as reporting to any broad, fixed committee other than the committee of the three Secretaries. 4 3. Central to improving the work of the government is that heads of departments and their senior people should give up the notion that any single agency can or should be exclusively responsible for strategic choices and strategic management (as against tactical management) of the important broad-cutting foreign affairs issues. This does not run counter to the leadership role of the Secretary of State or his Department. In my judgment, it suggests a strategy to make that leadership more effective. —But State cannot alone manage the NATO crisis, or the NPT. —Treasury cannot and should not alone manage policy on money, balance of payments and multilateral aid. —Even together, Defense and Treasury cannot manage such things as the German offset. —Commerce—textiles. —Agriculture—food aid. 4. Task group formation should be the expected and sought after method of handling such issues. 5 For State, the tactical bureaucratic rule should be: you can't beat them by trying to isolate them. The way to beat them is to get them to join you. III. Role of the White House Staff A. Might make a few points on function of White House staff beyond obvious duty to serve President's immediate and self-generated needs. B. My observations not directly relevant, I suspect, to one or two issues on which President and senior Secretaries are their own desk officers. C. White House staff role on first-level issues—which require heavy but intermittent Presidential involvement—has been organization, active membership in, and, sometimes informal, sometimes formal (e.g., Kennedy Round Control Group) management of ad hoc task groups. Have already suggested that setting up of appropriate groups may in future be proper role for SIG, but no substitute, in my opinion, for active White House membership: 1. Someone on President's staff who does his job, can bring feel for knowledge, instincts, priorities, style and preferences of President which are very hard for any Assistant Secretary and most Undersecretaries to acquire and maintain. (Brief description of life of Assistant Secretary, emphasizing value to White House man of simply living with President—osmotic transfer, etc.) 2. President faces similar problem with most Assistant Secretaries—can't know and calibrate them all, or most of them. Cannot imagine any President enduring situation in which there is no one on his personal staff current on important issues, versed on positions of his senior advisers, and prepared to give him full rundown on subject at moment's notice. 3. White House man's beat usually much broader than Assistant Secretary's. If any good, likely to be more sensitive to full range of constraints on President, and to try to think of whole spectrum of U.S. interests in problem area—including U.S. domestic politics. This right and proper. 4. White House staff role in part to provide insurance for all parties which holds ad hoc task group together. Useful to everybody to have someone with strong professional interest in meticulously fair solicitation and presentation of all relevant views. This does not imply neutrality on substance—White House man may have strong views. But if he is any good, recognizes main job is to shepherd process whereby President is given full map of real choices. 5. White House staff officer useful and, if he is any good, dependable link with respect to atmosphere and detail between Presidential/Cabinet decision councils and senior sub-Cabinet people who must execute, but are rarely present when decisions are made. (This calls for delicacy and tact—must not cut into chain of command. But this perfectly manageable.) 6. White House man consultant on vital matter of form of communication with President. Much of task group's effectiveness depends on ability to convey findings and recommendations in concise, rigorous, complete, and reasonably readable form. Also, often valuable to group to have available neutral drafter to whom all members willing to entrust group presentation—or a systematic, independent neutral presentation. 7. White House man can also play useful stimulant and “scapegoat” role. Important gain of Kennedy/Johnson years has been explosion of mystiques surrounding military, business community in budget balancing, etc. In Defense, Secretary, backed by two Presidents has overpowered vested interests with sheer personal force. In other areas—e.g., Secretary of Treasury vs. international banking community—necessary for Secretary to keep foot in charmed circle while nudging community in constructive direction. Combination requires that some such nudging appears to happen over Secretary's objection. Thus, need for radical devil to whom sin can be attributed. Careful White House staff man can play this role without embarrassing President or subverting Secretary. 8. Particularly when concentration of three principals focused on single great issue of war and peace which exhausts many hours of each day, immense pressures develop in senior levels of both key Departments to avoid head-to-head collisions. Sometimes, in my judgment, this cannot but tend to obscure arguments of which the President really must be aware when making a decision. White House staff officer with tact and discretion can fill this need. D. On lesser issues, where President required only to make discrete, one-shot decision—and when Secretary cannot be fully and personally involved—White House staff's main job is to be sure he gets rounded view representing full canvass of relevant people, and that execution takes place according to letter and spirit of President's wishes-which may change when outside pressures—such as domestic politics, to which system is not sensitive—are generated as a reaction to a decision. E. Much of secondary-level job is constant refereeing of technical debate between agencies which President couldn't and shouldn't do himself, but which cannot effectively be done from anywhere but White House. Part of judgment of White House man's effectiveness in this area is infrequency with which he must bother President. F. On low-level issues which never rise above Assistant Secretary level, White House staff role is to help keep informal networks going and open, gently—or, when President's wishes clear and it is necessary, un-gently—steering substance in direction consistent with President's desires, and keeping vigil for President to see that he gets shot at decisions which merit his attention. (Again, this is relevant to issues on which Secretaries can't spend serious time.) IV. Notes on the State Department Some random propositions: A. True interest of Assistant Secretary of State is not served by games of bureaucratic chicken with his counterparts in other Departments. He cannot win often, and Government often suffers later if he does. Rather than grasping issues to his bosom and seeking to keep his colleagues out, he would do much better to try to establish dependable lines with good people in other outfits and operate as a primus inter pares. (He has information and other advantages to sustain leadership on most programs if he makes effort.) B. Other main point penetrates to mode of thought which pervades State. For long-standing, structural reasons, Department has overwhelming tendency toward pre-cooked solutions rather than spelling out of choices, arguments, and recommendations. Notion of rigorous analysis just now sinking in to most superficial level of Department routine when serving Assistant Secretary or sometimes Secretary. In three years, have rarely seen a Department product for President which is really first class example of analytic mode. C. Preference for description and moralism is partially result of entrenched tradition which rewards flight from responsibility and renders most of Department substructure irrelevant to major issues. Risks of advocacy much greater than benefits. Ordinary desk officer (a) probably not inclined to serious analytical staff work on issues, (b) aware that there is only minor chance his work will rise more than two floors even if he does spectacular job, (c) given very little guidance as to what constitutes good analysis, and (d) is privy to only slightly more information on topside thinking than a careful newspaper reader. D. There are no quick answers. Believe most necessary reforms have been identified by Herter and other exercises. PPBS useful in rationalizing resource allocation and should have fallout which will help on this front. Schelling group should also help, in part by making clear what is expected and appreciated by Seventh Floor. 1 Source: Papers in Francis Bator's personal possession. Sensitive. 2 The President's Task Force on Government Organization, chaired by Ben W. Heineman, was organized in October 1966 and worked from November 1966 until October 1967, producing several reports. It devoted most of its time to reviewing domestic agencies, but during spring 1967 a subgroup, chaired by Heineman, focused on foreign affairs. McNamara, a Task Force member, had strongly recommended from the outset that the group look into the foreign policy formulation process. (Memoranda from Califano to the President, September 30 and October 10, 1966, February 3 and 25, October 11, 1967; Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 749) The subgroup's final report, forwarded to the President in October, is Document 127 . Bator's presentation provided the basis for his more extensive testimony on managing foreign economic policy on July 25, 1972, before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. For text, see the Committee Print, U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: Implications for the Organization of the Executive Branch (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 107–121, 129–137. 3 Brackets in the source text. 4 The Trilateral history is most instructive on this score. No time here to go into detail-in any case very delicate. Suffice it to assert that apparent “disorder” reflected the “state of play” among the principals, served the President's purposes, was creative in its results. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 For case studies of two special groups created in 1965 to deal with foreign economic policy (the Deming Group, and Special Committee on U.S. Trade with East European Countries and the Soviet Union), see Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, June, 1975: Appendices (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 72–85, 127–132. For text of President Johnson's memorandum to Secretary of the Treasury Fowler mandating establishment of the Deming Group, June 16, 1965, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. VIII, Document 64 . 119. Memorandum of Conversation 119. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 27, 1967. PARTICIPANTS Deputy Under Secretary Rimestad O-Mr. Jules Bassin O/DG-Mr. James E. Hoofnagle O/DG-Mr. William Belton O/FPP-Mr. Robert Hennemeyer O/SO-Mr. William O. Boswell O/SO-Mr. Charles Hulick SUBJECT Briefing on Status of FSR-1 and FSR-2 Officers in Domestic and Overseas Positions Without attempting to provide a full account, the outcome of substantive interest of an hour's discussion was the following: 1 —Failure to obtain passage of the Hays Bill was interpreted by Mr. Rimestad as meaning the end for practicable purposes of the concept of staffing the Department's positions exclusively with Foreign Service personnel (FSO, FSSO, FAO and FSS); that consequently it was a mistake to have replaced Civil Service hire with FSR hire for domestic positions; that we must return to a system of staffing Departmental officer positions with a mixture of Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel; and that as a target date we should attempt to be in a position by July 1, 1967, to have new outside hires for domestic positions to be in the Civil Service category, noting that by this date he wanted in a broader sense to have a clearly defined personnel policy and classification system. 2 —With respect to the position set forth in (1) above, Mr. Rimestad stated that even if the Department should decide to go back to Congress three or four years from now to obtain a Foreign Affairs Personnel system such as contemplated in the Hays Bill, we could not afford to adhere in the interim to the present unsatisfactory system of using the Reserve category, which is a temporary system with no career status, to fill permanent positions in the Department. He rejected the idea of utilizing annual legislative authority to extend Reserve commissions for one year beyond the maximum of 10 years. 3 —Mr. Rimestad said there should be an identification bureau by bureau of which areas of the Department should be staffed primarily by Foreign Service personnel and which ones by permanent Civil Service officers. By way of illustration he said the geographic bureaus would be almost exclusively staffed by Foreign Service officers, the P area just the reverse, and E and INR with a more even mixture of both, recognizing that in E most of the top level positions probably would have to be Civil Service to get the kind of specialized expertise required and which the Foreign Service by its nature could not produce. In response to Mr. Hoofnagle's inquiry, he said O/DG should prepare a memorandum for him with its conclusions and recommendations in three copies with no lateral distribution. 4 —With respect to the FSR-1 and FSR-2 officers, he said he was not interested in numbers and charts. As to those with reemployment rights (half of the total of 345) he stated there is no urgency to do anything about them at this time, indicating his recognition that there was the problem of supergrades, for which there was no immediate solution. With respect to reconverting to Civil Service, he said he had no objection so long as it was done in such a way as to avoid posing a potential public relations problem with Congress. As to the Reserve officers without reemployment rights, Mr. Rimestad wants them handled on a case-by-case basis. He is not concerned whether extensions are for one, two or five years. However, in every case where it can be demonstrated there is no further need for the services of the officer or where perform-ance is unsatisfactory, he wants their commissions terminated with reasonable notice of three to six months. 5 —Mr. Rimestad emphasized his interest in having the best man for the job, irrespective of his personnel classification (FSO, FSR, FSSO or GS). He dwelt at length on his concern at the inability of the Service to terminate the services of senior FSOs who had peaked. He described this as our most serious problem and not that of the Reserve officers, stating that we would find no sympathy at the Assistant Secretary level on terminating Reserve officers' commissions, so long as they had officers of the latter category on their staffs who were better performers than senior FSOs. Although he thought reduction of the time-in-grade would go a long way to solving the problem of too many officers at the senior level, he expressed his disappointment with the functioning of the Selection Boards. He said something would have to be done to insure a higher rate of selection-out of those officers who had peaked. Mr. Belton suggested that one way to help the Selection Boards would be to provide them with material which is available but not contained in the performance files; i.e., information available concerning factors which have made it difficult to place certain FSO–2 and FSO–1 officers in senior level positions. Mr. Rimestad agreed this might help. 6 —In the foregoing connection, Mr. Boswell explained that over the past year and one-half he has talked frankly to about 200–250 officers concerning their standing in the Service; and that to all those who had reached their plateau (about 100) he had explained they could not expect to get better or more responsible position assignments. Mr. Rimestad expressed his surprise that this had not produced more voluntary retirements. He thought that once an officer is told he has no future in the Service, his pride alone would lead him to retire. Both Mr. Boswell and Mr. Belton explained that it was pride in part which motivated most officers' decisions, under these circumstances, not to retire. Other considerations were financial. It was pointed out that unlike the military whose annuities were calculated on the basis of the base salary at the time of retirement, the FSO's base was the average of his salary over the last five years. Mr. Boswell pointed out that with the pay increases of 1964 and 1965, waiting two to three more years would make a substantial difference for many officers in their annuity. Mr. Belton explained that there were steps which could be taken which would make for more honorable and dignified conditions of retirement which undoubtedly would lead more officers with twenty or more years of devoted service and recognized performance of quality to elect earlier retirement. In addition to improving the retirement annuity and out-placement service, Mr. Belton mentioned meaningful retirement ceremonies which gave the officer recognition for his contributions in the Service. 7 —The meeting was concluded with Mr. Rimestad suggesting that the same group meet again Friday, May 5, 1967; and that SO bring to this meeting some documented cases of senior Reserve officers and FSOs whose services were no longer required or who had plateaued with respect to performance. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, O-Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration: Lot 70 D 403, ORG 1. No classification marking. Drafted by C.E. Hulick on May 2. 120. Statement Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) for President Johnson 120. Statement Prepared by the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) for President Johnson 1 Washington, June 27, 1967. I issued in March 1966 NSAM 341, after a thoroughgoing review of governmental organization in the field of foreign affairs conducted by General Taylor. My decision was to assign responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of overseas interdepartmental activities to the Secretary of State. A key part of that decision was to activate the Senior Interdepartmental Group, which was to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State and to include those at the Under Secretary level from the various departments and from the White House. The simple fact is that for 15 months now NSAM 341 has not been implemented. I have felt the lack on many issues; for example, the Middle East, Viet Nam, counterinsurgency problems in Latin America. I have come to the conclusion that either the Department of State must now energetically and effectively implement NSAM 341—and, especially, make the Senior Interdepartmental Group perform its functions—or I shall have to organize this kind of leadership and coordination out of the White House. Attachment 2 Washington, May 20, 1967, 11:40 a.m. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Mr. President: Herewith Gen. Taylor raises a real and serious problem. We thought we had it solved with the Schelling appointment—after great delay. But he's bailed out. Gene tells me he has recommended Franklin Lindsay for the Schelling job; but action apparently awaits Nick's return. I believe it essential that Sec. Rusk understand your personal concern that NSAM 341 has not been effectively implemented. Walt Attachment 3 Washington, May 17, 1967. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson SUBJECT Implementation of NSAM-341, dated March 2, 1966 Shortly after my return from Saigon in 1965, you directed me to review all governmental activities in the field of counterinsurgency and to make appropriate recommendations to assure our readiness to cope with other situations similar to that in South Viet-Nam. The principal outcome of this review was the promulgation of NSAM-341 in March, 1966. The effect of this decision on your part was to assign responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of overseas interdepartmental activities to the Secretary of State as your agent who was to be assisted by the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) chaired by the Under Secretary of State and including as members the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator, AID, Chairman, JCS, Director, USIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The SIG was to absorb the responsibility in the field of counterinsurgency which, since 1962, had been concentrated in the Special Group (CI) and, in addition, was to serve as a focal point for decisions on all important interdepartmental matters arising overseas. During the past year, I have naturally watched the implementation of this decision with great interest, hoping that the procedures directed by NSAM-341 would bring method and flexibility into the conduct of our overseas business and remove our dependence on the initiative of individual officials or on ad hoc committees which, in the past, have often been improvised to deal with critical overseas issues. I regret to say that it is my opinion as a bystander that the SIG and the supporting interdepartmental committees at the level of the Assistant Secretaries of State have not fulfilled the hopes which we had for them more than a year ago. Far from being a forum regularly used by senior officials to discharge expeditiously their interrelated overseas problems, the SIG has met with decreasing frequency during the last year. In the last six months of 1966, the SIG met three times and has met only twice in 1967. It is significant that it has taken no part in the conduct of our most serious and complicated overseas operation-Viet-Nam. I find little indication on the agenda of its infrequent meetings of any serious attention to counterinsurgency and matters related to “Wars of Liberation,” a task which required almost weekly meetings on the part of the old Special Group (CI). My overall impression is that the intent of NSAM-341 has been only partially fulfilled and that whatever vitality the new system had at the outset is apparently on the decline. Rather than allow the NSAM concept to die from atrophy as it seems to be doing, I would suggest at least one final look to see whether we should formally abandon it, try again to set it in motion, or seek a better alternative. There are several courses you might consider. (1) One would be to ask the heads of all departments and agencies represented on the SIG to comment to you on the effectiveness of the NSAM-341 concept, the desirability of its retention, and the possibility for improved implementation. (2) Another would be to ask only the Secretary of State to make such a report. (3) A third would be to ask some outsider with government experience to review the situation for you. Personally, I would be inclined to recommend the first course with Walt Rostow charged with getting the views of the SIG members. I prepared a memorandum for you of this nature in March of this year 4 but withheld it because of information which I had received that Dr. Tom Schelling of Harvard was being sought by State to become an Assistant Secretary with the primary mission of assisting in the implementation of NSAM-341. As I am now informed that Dr. Schelling has declined the position, I would feel remiss in not calling this situation to your attention. Maxwell D. Taylor Alternative______approved 5 No action now See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 341. Confidential. Attached to a June 27 memorandum from Rostow to the President, that states: “Herewith the statement you wanted me to formulate.” The memorandum indicates that the President saw it. No information was found to indicate how the President used the statement. 2 Confidential. 3 Confidential. 4 Taylor forwarded this memorandum, dated March 27, to Rostow, who drafted a covering memorandum for the President on March 30, but did not forward either memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen Taylor) 5 None of these options was checked. 121. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 121. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, July 21, 1967. SUBJECT Lawrence Eagleburger Attached is a copy of the efficiency report 2 I have just completed on Lawrence Eagleburger, FSO–4, who has been working with me for the past year. I send it to you because it seems to me that Eagleberger's case is an example of some of the things that are wrong with the present Foreign Service personnel system. I know this is not a simple problem and that it is not entirely within your control, but it may be useful for you to have object examples in order to argue for reform. As the report indicates, Eagleburger is a first class young officer. He was Dean Acheson's assistant during the 1966 exercise on European policy, and has worked effectively for me for the past year. I think he is more than ready for a serious, responsible position in one of our major European embassies. But I know this will mean swimming up-stream. At age 37, after more than ten years in the service and excellent efficiency reports throughout, he is in Class 4. Under normal circumstances, he must look forward to another five years or so of subordinate positions before he is ready to head up a section in a major embassy. What is so sad about this is that, far from lagging behind, Eagleburger is among the very few in his entering group who have reached Class 4. He was barely eligible to be promoted to Class 3 in the last annual series; I recommended him very strongly. In its wisdom, however, the Department elected not to recommend a promotion because of the large number of people who had spent more time in Class 4. In my judgment, this is the practice which is losing the Foreign Service many of its best young people. I wonder how you or I might choose if we were in our late 30s with 10 years of experience in our craft and were faced with a further 5–7 years of apprenticeship before we could count on running even one section of an embassy staff in a country that mattered? Obviously, for the really good people, the chances that they will choose Foreign Service in these circumstances—over the many alternatives in and out of government—are just terribly small. The proof of the pudding is the exodus of good, middle-rank officers which, I understand, has now been going on for several years. I don't wish to preach, cushioned by the fact that I am not responsible for running a sensible personnel operation. But I strongly believe that in Eagleburger's case—and in others I know about-failure to make special arrangements for especially good people costs the Department and Foreign Service much more than they gain by their current “even-handedness.” There have been many attempts to grapple with this problem, and no outstanding successes. I hope you'll have better luck. End of speech. Consider it my valedictory—with the license accorded those about to depart. Francis M. Bator 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Chron File. Personal; Sensitive. 2 Not attached. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 122. Memorandum for the Record 122. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, July 21, 1967. SUBJECT Latest Developments in Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (FA–PPBS) (Formerly Foreign Affairs Programming System) 1. In a conversation on 20 July 1967 with Mr. Robert Bonham, Director of the Office of FA–PPBS, Department of State, the latter confirmed what I had already heard a week ago, i.e., that Mr. Tom Schelling had turned down Under Secretary Katzenbach's job offer. Schelling was, with White House approval, to have become an Assistant Secretary of State for FA–PPBS. 2. Bonham had expected Schelling to accept the appointment and to push for the realization of some form of programming system under the auspices of Mr. Katzenbach. Schelling explained his decision to Bonham in terms of his conviction that the Department of State was simply not organized and managed enough along Defense Department lines, where PPBS had originated, and that it would be impossible for the Department to call the turns on foreign affairs agencies in the McNamara manner. McNamara had sought out a system (i.e., PPBS). However, FA–PPBS was unfortunately, in his view, a system in search of a leader. He also felt that Mr. Katzenbach was unwilling to give him enough latitude for independent action and that under the circumstances he would be in a difficult position from the very start. He had no alternative but to opt out. 2 3. Bonham further advised me that his office had just been formally disestablished and that he was looking for other employment. What time he has left before his departure would be taken up with the interment of FA–PPBS, which he claimed would be without benefit of obituary notice or funeral service. A small PPBS office, which he felt would be a “window dressing” effort by the Department, would be set up either under Mr. Katzenbach or in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. 4. With regard to the ARA originated programming system which began operation in January 1967, a series of Country Analyses and Strategy Papers (CASP) have been prepared by the various Country Teams in ARA and are now being reviewed. Bonham characterized them as “uneven” in their approach. He did not know what ARA intended to do about further refining its programming system and ventured the guess that if the Assistant Secretary for ARA found the data produced thus far useful, he would probably continue it for another year. 3 [ name not declassified ] 4 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FAPS. Secret. 2 Katzenbach's efforts to hire Schelling and Schelling's decision to withdraw are also discussed in Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership , pp. 181–184. According to Mosher and Harr, Schelling had a number of discussions with officials at State, BOB, and the various foreign affairs agencies and decided that the situation offered little prospect of success within the year he planned to serve. 3 For more information on CASP, see Document 136 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates [ name not declassified ] signed the original. 123. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 123. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 28, 1967, 7:40 p.m. Mr. President: Inside your government I have two constructive things to report. 1. Nick Katzenbach is now making SIG move, and is getting a first-rate foreign service officer in to help him—Art Hartman. Today we reviewed Haiti and Bolivia. At your instruction, I had gotten solid work going on this and other Latin American insurgency problems; but it was good to see them reviewed at the Under Secretary level. We can expect, I think, steady initiative from now on. I have held back from doing it not because I'm shy, but I do not think this town works properly for the President unless State assumes its responsibilities. I now hope—and begin to believe—it will happen. [Omitted here is discussion of a meeting of the Vietnam Group.] I report this not because we solved any great problems for you today but because I felt better about the working of your government in foreign affairs than for some time. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, SIG, Memos & Misc., IV. Secret. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Rosenthal) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Rosenthal) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, July 31, 1967. Nick: Here are a few personnel thoughts. 1. Insularity might be typed as the largest of the obvious personnel problems. This embraces the following: a. Insularity as reflected in the premium placed (esp. by promotion panels) on straight political work within the Department. As a consequence it is difficult to get officers into other foreign affairs agencies (e.g. your conversation with Vaughn, AID, even Agriculture). This problem is of course paralleled by the problem those agencies have of getting able people. b. Insularity as reflected in lack—almost absolute lack for most officers—of any contact with Congress. c. Ditto for press and public relations, although a fair number of officers get PAA (Public Affairs Adviser) type assignments from time to time. d. Insularity as reflected in the low priority and low percentage of time devoted to further education—as I recall the comparison with DOD is something like 5 percent versus 12 percent for the amount of time spent on outside education during an average officer's career. N.B. the fact that Tony Lake had to sweat to get leave without pay, and will take a financial beating to do so. e. Insularity as reflected in the isolation from private industry, whether in terms of business thinking, modern management methods, or in serving as an emissary to dinosaurs. 2. Size is an equal problem, which I put second only because it could be largely if not completely solved with the solutions to the Insularity point (i.e. farming out officers to school, private industry, other agencies, and the Hill would take a good deal of the pressure off). a. One manifestation of the problem is the overage in class 1 and 2, which is reason for concern in and of itself (because of makework, phony titles, increase of layering, and morale). b. Probably the more damaging manifestation is with respect to younger officers (e.g. the observation of one AF Country Director that he was doing the same thing as country director that he did as desk officer 20 years ago, only under a different title). Under this heading should come both the expressed and unarticulated damage—the almost open revolt of the Junior Foreign Service Officers Club (J'FSOC), as well as the painful lack of responsibility by comparison with bright young men in other agencies (e.g. Henry Ruth or Bill Pittman at age 35 vs. any FSO at age 35). 3. Recruiting cannot help but be damaged by these factors. I don't know of a quantitative measurement but I would strongly suppose the present quality of younger officers is diminishing. Some of this surely would be because of Viet-Nam disenchantment on the campus. But is that the only reason? Another facet of this question is whether we make implied, dishonest promises about where a Foreign Service career will lead. What proportion become Ambassadors? Why, in view of the low proportion, do some Ambassadors get two or three posts? A more specific aspect is Negro recruiting, about which Eddie Williams has written a comprehensive report 2 with the problems cleanly stated but with rather far-out solutions recommended. 4. Responsibility for selection of subordinates is possibly separable as a topic. You know my nutty thoughts about this in extenso. Whether one agrees with the solution or not, I believe the problem is unarguable. Why do we go through the motions of a centralized system when assignments are by and large the subject of private negotiations between bureau heads? Why a Senior Assignments Board except to ratify what has already been decided? 5. You may or may not wish to bring up the question of politicizing Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries (with a fallback to the top of GS-15). JR 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Rosenthal, Jack. No classification marking. 2 Not further identified. 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 125. Editorial Note 125. Editorial Note Under cover of an August 3, 1967, memorandum Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, forwarded to President's Special Assistant Walt Rostow evaluations of the panels of outside advisers for the State Department's five regional bureaus and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. The evaluations were prepared by members of the National Security Council staff who had attended meetings of the panels. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Consultants Panel) The evaluations included both positive and negative comments. For example, in an August 2 memorandum William Bowdler stated that the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs had “made extensive and effective use of its advisers” and that the consultations had been “substantive and not pro forma,” while in an August 3 memorandum Edward Hamilton called the African Bureau's advisory panel “too large to provide any real help as a body.” In a memorandum of July 18 reporting on the panel for the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Howard Wriggins summarized “three unambiguous advantages” of the panels: “(a) they impose an occasion for which the State Department operators have to state or write succinctly what they are trying to do, forcing a review which, in the normal course of bureaucratic pressures, is often avoided; (b) it faces qualified and influential outsiders up to the ambiguous and difficult choices we have to face. This should contribute in the long run to a clearer understanding among their constituents of how narrow are our margins of policy choice; and (c) sometimes their questions penetrate beneath to the assumptions of the bureaucrats and provoke second thoughts about intentions, capabilities and means. This most useful outcome, however, is very rare.” 126. Memorandum From the Country Director for Laos (Hamilton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 126. Memorandum From the Country Director for Laos (Hamilton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, August 28, 1967. SUBJECT The Country Director—One Year After 1. Although it would be more appropriate to comment on experience as a Country Director after a longer period in the saddle, I wish before departing on field assignment to record something of the satisfactions and frustrations of this newly established position. I expect that the satisfactions are relatively widely shared by other Directors and that the frustrations are largely peculiar to my own assignment on Laos affairs. 2. Within the Department, I believe the Director system is working well. It is a great satisfaction to the officer immediately charged with the business of a single country to know that he is directly responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of knowledge about his country and its problems presented at the Bureau level. Working laterally with other bureaus, I have found cooperation and responsiveness without exception. 3. Similarly I think that removal of the Office Director layer has increased satisfaction to Country Officers, who have much more frequent direct relationships at least to the level of the Deputy Assistant Secretary. 4. In my own case at least it has been possible to keep the Laos problem “on the fifth floor” except with respect to policy or program questions directly relating to conduct of the Southeast Asian war. I take it that this is what the Secretary desired in establishing the system, and I believe there is great scope for a Director to exercise judgment and leadership. The exception noted above is obviously a large one. It is also a completely proper one. In arguing against various proposals from the parochial standpoint of their potential impact on Laos, I have recognized throughout that larger considerations were frequently apt to lead to decisions contrary to my recommendations. In these matters I have considered my obligation discharged if argument helped to insure that all factors bearing on the question were taken into account in reaching frequently difficult decisions. 5. There have been no large differences as to policy or program emphasis between the Ambassador and those of us who seek to support him in Washington. By heavy reliance on informal communications, I believe that I have maintained good understanding between the Department and the Mission. 6. It is not surprising to me that establishment of the Country Director system has made less difference inter-departmentally. There have been some gains, principally in two respects: 1. the generally more senior Country Directors are able to deal across agency lines on a wider basis than the former “Desk Officers”, i.e. with policy officials to the Assistant Secretary level as well as at the working level; 2. there is to some degree an aura of responsibility around the Director's head and inclination to respect the care with which Country Directors are assumed to have been selected, which facilitates the exercise of leadership and program management. But there is nothing in NSAM 341 which endows officers of other agencies, at any particular level, with authority larger than that which they previously exercised to commit resources or to take policy positions. The key battles are therefore fought at the same, more elevated levels as before. I have had all the support to which I could aspire in such instances. But there may be more frequent opportunities for you and your Deputies to avoid entanglement in specific problems simply by indicating to your other-agency counterparts that, with reference to the particular question, your Country Director will exercise Bureau responsibility. 7. It does not seem to me that the Director system has resulted in changes in ritual behavior comparable to the actual changes in working procedures. I have seen no recent contributions to a series of memoranda between Protocol and 'O' dealing with the admissibility of Directors to White House functions, but have the impression there has been no significant change. When Ambassador Sullivan was last in Washington, Secretary McNamara thought the Country Director should not accompany him on his call. I understand that this decision was born of a desire to obtain Ambassador Sullivan's views on sensitive Vietnam questions, but as a result I have been unable to resolve practical problems that were discussed because of differences between Ambassador Sullivan's and DOD's understanding of what was said. I am somewhat disappointed to have seen the Secretary only twice and the Under Secretary only once in the course of a year's service—on all three occasions merely to accompany a visitor, but to the extent that this means that Laos has not been a frequent item on the Secretary's grievously long list of problems, it is a source of satisfaction. 8. One frustration quite peculiar to Laos has been the distortion of effort on the part of my entire staff in the direction of concentration on military-type questions. In addition to a stream of fairly significant policy matters, there has been the daily necessity to monitor on-going programs in detail to insure or to restore compliance with agreed procedures. 9. The result of this distortion is that I am somewhat dissatisfied with my own performance in the area of forward planning. I think we have achieved effective inter-agency coordination of operations, but this becomes a matter of watching trees instead of the forest unless the Director can devote a meaningful portion of his time to ensuring that current activities contribute to realization of regularly re-examined future goals. This has simply not been possible to the degree I consider desirable under the weight of daily requirements. [Omitted here are comments on Laos.] 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, O/MS-Management Staff Files: Lot 70 D 474, Department of State, 1967, Country Director Organization. Secret. 127. Final Report of the President's Task Force on Foreign Affairs Organization 127. Final Report of the President's Task Force on Foreign Affairs Organization 1 Washington, October 1, 1967. ORGANIZATION FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations I. To provide day-to-day leadership in policy and to insure that the diverse programs and activities of the agencies concerned with foreign affairs support established policies, the President needs a strong chief subordinate—an individual, not a committee—who can both advise him and act for him across the whole range of his international responsibilities . II. In our judgment the Secretary of State should do this job. He should be the President's first adviser on foreign and national security affairs, and under the President he should coordinate the programs of all U.S. agencies which support our foreign policies. III. If the Secretary of State is to discharge these massive responsibilities regularly and systematically, organizational changes must occur. These changes fall into two categories: A. Those which require direct Presidential determination, and B. Those which should be left to the executive judgment of the Secretary of State. IV. At the level of Presidential determination, we recommend that : A. Secretaries of State, now and in the future, be authorized to free themselves personally, to the maximum extent possible, of social and ceremonial functions and participation in overseas conferences. They should also be encouraged to reorder their relations with Capitol Hill so as to reduce their pro forma appearances and increase their real political effectiveness. B. The second-ranking position in the Department of State be elevated to “Deputy Secretary.” This proposal, which would require Congressional approval, would provide the Secretary with a true “alter ego” and provide the President support from a top team. C. The Secretary and his Deputy be authorized and instructed to establish a substantive, analytic staff to serve them directly, somewhat comparable in character and function to the White House/NSC staff. D. The Department of State be directed to establish, over time in close consultation with BOB, programmatic budgetary review of the proposals of other agencies whose activities support U.S. foreign policies to insure that all available resources are programmed to support priority foreign policy objectives and requirements. The Task Force believes that the process of establishing a Foreign Affairs budget should be evolutionary in character. The group unanimously recommends that the President direct the State Department to develop the analytic capacity and procedures at the regional level at an early date to discharge this assignment vis-à-vis the AID, MAP, USIA, and Peace Corps programs. V. At the level of decision by the Secretary of State, we make the following recommendations , recognizing that one or more of them may be subject to sharp modification in the light of the President's broader decisions and the specific preferences of the Secretary of State. A. The Secretary rely upon regional officers even more heavily than presently for inter-departmental coordination and operations within their geographic jurisdictions and provide these officials with planning and analytic staffs unburdened by day-to-day operating responsibilities. B. Several independent functional activities now in State be regrouped under the Department's two Under Secretaries. C. The current system for training foreign service officers be opened up to transfer out of the system and admit into the system more individuals at the middle and upper grades and to provide a broader apprenticeship in operating foreign affairs agencies and Executive-Legislative Affairs for those persons destined to assume major executive responsibilities in foreign affairs. Conclusions The Problem In response to the President's invitation, we have reviewed the organization of the government for the conduct of foreign and national security affairs. In our judgment, that organization is not presently adequate. There are several related deficiencies : (1) Neither the White House nor the State Department is equipped to provide continuous, clear-cut policy leadership and guidance to all the various agencies of the government engaged in foreign affairs. (2) No agency in government systematically and regularly provides the President and other key decision-makers with comprehensive analysis of foreign affairs issues—with analyses which rigorously specify U.S. objectives, identify what various U.S. agencies think and why, and assess probable advantages and costs of alternative courses of action. (3) Outside the annual agency by agency budget review conducted by the Bureau of the Budget, no office or institution reviews the budgets of the foreign and national security affairs agencies from the perspective of the priorities, commitments and requirements of foreign policy. The Results of Organizational Weakness As a result of these weaknesses, the policies and programs of agencies concerned with foreign affairs frequently diverge—not because there is any intentional departure from policy approved by the President, but because internal inconsistencies are not resolved by prompt and firm decision. There have been difficulties of this kind in our policy toward the multilateral force, toward the Erhard regime, toward India and Pakistan, toward Africa, and toward arms control. The Objectives of Organizational Change We think the U.S. can do much better: —in establishing, in a timely and orderly fashion, policies understood and accepted across the government; —in planning ahead to take advantage of potential opportunities and to meet foreseeable crises; —in applying the large budgetary resources now involved in our foreign policy towards identified and consistent goals. Organizational Improvement in Perspective Obviously reorganization alone will not solve all the problems of our foreign affairs. The international environment will remain volatile and unpredictable. We have scores of allies and adversaries in a world complicated by change in ways which cannot be readily predicted. We also face internal constraints—set by public and congressional opinion and by the human limitations of any government, however well organized. Yet within this larger perspective we still believe that organizational improvement is a prerequisite for improved U.S. performance in world affairs. Defining the Organizational Requirement There are many instruments of American foreign policy. They include policy declarations, diplomatic persuasion and pressure, military strength, technical assistance, provision of food, capital lending, propaganda, arms deliveries and covert operations. The agencies and individuals that operate these instruments inevitably have differing perspectives as to priority of competing regions, functions, and policies. An effective foreign policy requires that the conflict among those perspectives be resolved by reference to broader considerations, and that the uses of those instruments be made consistent with each other and with the dominating purposes of national policy. No such consistency and coherence arises automatically. It must be imposed. In large part, the imposition of order and cohesion must come personally from the President. Accordingly , since the late 30's every President has been deeply and continuously immersed in foreign and national security decision-making, and future Presidents will give the same priority to these problems. But the problems have grown and are growing . In 1945 there were 55 countries. The crucial questions related very largely to one region—Europe. The U.S. alone had nuclear weapons. Our foreign policy aims, though challenging, were conceptually simple: to contain one great adversary and to aid in the reconstruction of half a continent of exhausted but advanced and cohesive societies. In 1967 there are 135 nations. The events of three regions vitally affect us. Five nations possess nuclear weapons. And U.S. purposes are more complex and more ambitious: to check several adversaries, themselves in shifting relation, and to aid in the development of three continents of largely backward, fragmented and unstable societies. The future is likely to pose even more complex tasks for U.S. foreign policy. The consequence is that no President, faced as he will be by other demands on his attention, can alone produce the direction, the integration and the consistency which U.S. foreign policy must have . To be sure, the President will be available in crisis situations. In our judgment, crisis has often produced especially good U.S. performance precisely because it commands the full engagement of the President, who is then available to probe, to monitor, and to decide. To produce clarity of policy and a coherent relationship of resources to policy in the absence of crisis, however, responsibility short of the President must be assigned to some person or institution. No such person or institution now exercises that responsibility . The Legacy of Organizational Weakness The organizational deficiencies that we have identified are not of recent origin. They can be explained, in large measure, by the massive growth of U.S. involvement in world affairs in the last quarter century and by the inability of our institutions to adjust fully to America' s new world role. There have been other attempts to address these organizational problems. President Eisenhower relied without notable success on formal, multi-layered inter-agency committees. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have formally asked the State Department to provide interdepartmental leadership and coordination, and tended to rely on informal groups, frequently led or strategically managed in the White House. We do not believe that either the formal arrangements of the 1950's or the informal approaches of the 1960's have yet met our fundamental organizational needs. We do believe that earlier efforts to strengthen the Secretary of State and to energize and redirect his Department have been correct in their aim. In our judgment they have failed because they have not produced the basic changes in the State Department which are required. We believe that a transformation of the State Department is both necessary and possible , and we have set out below the major actions required to produce it. Recommendations I. The General Objective: to make the Secretary of State a Presidential leader and coordinator. Both the powers and the responsibilities of the President in foreign affairs have grown enormously since World War II. Only a strong President can hope to exercise these powers effectively. But, in our judgment, even a strong President must have a top subordinate—an individual, not a committee—who can both advise him and act for him across the whole range of his international responsibilities. We are convinced that this individual must be the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State must assume these responsibilities because his office alone, of all the positions in the government short of the President, possesses the stature and authority to discharge them. There is no alternative. No lesser office could attempt the task. It is politically impossible to create a new position of supra-departmental authority. And, while the President's personal (NSC) staff can attempt this function, it would perform it only at the cost of an expansion in size and an absorption in general operations that would both diminish the stature of the Secretary and Department of State and compete with its own obligation to serve the personal requirements of the President. We do not agree with those who argue that narrow, institutional perspectives of the Office of the Secretary of State will inevitably prevent any Secretary from assuming a Presidential perspective. To be sure, there are issues—food aid, international finance, trade policy, the balance of payments—which frequently involve deep conflict between domestic and international interests. Not all of these conflicts can be resolved at the level of the Secretary of State, and some will come to the White House for independent assessment by the President's own staff and decision by the President himself. But subject to such inevitable limitations, we strongly believe that the Secretary of State is the best possible Presidential subordinate for the coordination of the activities of the agencies concerned with national security and foreign policy—State, Defense, CIA, ACDA, Treasury, AID, and USIA. He must enjoy the President's confidence and possess a recognized mandate to exercise power in the President's name. He must be a man whose knowledge and insights equip him to do much of the President's work himself, who knows when to act on his own and when to refer problems to his chief, and who can be the President's first adviser on those decisions which only the President himself can make. 2 II. Specific Recommendations for Presidential Determination A. To redefine the role of the Secretary. The principal task of the Secretary of State must be changed. The Secretary of State must become not primarily a diplomat, a defender of policy, or an international negotiator (although he will on occasion be all of these) but pre-eminently the director and coordinator, for and on behalf of the President, of all U.S. foreign and national security policy . If a Secretary is to provide this kind of policy leadership and coordination, he must, to the maximum extent possible, delegate social and ceremonial functions, rationalize his personal appearances before the Congress, and minimize his personal participation in intergovernmental representation and in overseas conferences . These activities currently consume 70% of the Secretary's extraordinary work week, and leave him little time to act as the President's chief agent. Much of the work of high-level representation at overseas conferences might be delegated to the Secretary's Deputy or to a new official appointed explicitly by the President (with the active concurrence of the Secretary) as a chief negotiator. Such a man might be named our one Ambassador-at-large, or given another appropriate title, if this one has been devalued through overuse. The role and performance of recent U.S. Ambassadors to the United Nations, despite the relatively limited importance of many of their duties, is evidence that prestigious appointees with a recognized personal relationship to those in the highest councils of policy can be accepted as speaking for the United States Government on important and delicate matters. Ceremonial functions, overseas conferences and, to the extent possible, congressional presentations of a clearly regional nature should similarly be delegated to the Department's ranking regional officials, particularly if these offices are enhanced in stature, as we recommend. B. To establish a Deputy Secretary—a new position with a new role . However his job is reshaped, the heavy pressure on the Secretary's time will make it essential that he be provided a true deputy, an alter ego across the whole range of Secretarial responsibilities. This deputy must be a man of stature, personally congenial to the Secretary (who should have a full share in his selection) and fully capable of sharing the Secretary's responsibilities across agency lines. He should be given the appropriate title: Deputy Secretary. This will both symbolize the change and provide the needed mandate. This change will require legislation . Such a true alter ego relationship is never easy to achieve. It requires determination and judgment in both men to make it work. But it produces a very large increase in the effectiveness of each. Moreover, despite organizational ambiguities, the position of Under Secretary of State has traditionally been filled by men of conspicuous ability who have commanded considerable authority. We believe the redefinition of title and scope would be readily accepted. Strong internal management is vital to departmental effectiveness. Either the Secretary or Deputy Secretary, therefore, should have a demonstrated effectiveness in such management. But we are not proposing a “Mr. Outside-Mr. Inside” relationship with management of the Department delegated to the Number Two man. While the top men will doubtless agree to some ad hoc division of labor, we think the Deputy must remain a true alter ego, with coterminous authority and responsibility . C. To establish a senior staff for the Secretary and his Deputy . With a single exception, we believe that organization below the Secretary and Deputy Secretary should not be a matter for immediate and direct Presidential action. Presidents who have tried to organize the Department of State around or behind their Secretaries of State have not usually been successful. But on one matter of organization we feel so strongly that we believe the President himself should insist upon it. It is the establishment of a senior substantive staff able to give effective direct support to the Secretary and his Deputy in the discharge of their enormous personal responsibilities . We recognize that able and experienced men believe that the whole Department, from desk officers upward should be the Secretary's staff. In one sense these men are obviously right. But in a larger sense, we are certain that they are wrong. The Secretary and his Deputy must be able to call upon analytic resources of their own—free from the perspectives of country desk officers or even of Assistant Secretaries . These staff officers must be wholly free of ordinary day-to-day line responsibilities—on the cables, on the Hill, or elsewhere. Moreover, if thoughtful policy planning and analysis is to affect decisions and actions, the key officials charged with this responsibility cannot be viewed as a “council of wise men” outside the regular chain of command. They must communicate and report directly—in a staff relationship—to the Secretary and his Deputy . The elements of such a senior substantive staff now exist in the Policy Planning Staff, in the growing staff of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, and in the Staff Secretariat. We do not presume to say in just what way these and other resources should be combined to establish an effective senior staff. Nor do we venture to recommend that the Secretary and his Deputy co-opt senior staff members from other agencies and departments, although many of us believe such a practice would be wise. What we do assert, unanimously and energetically, is that the Secretary cannot serve the President in the terms which this report recommends without a new order of staff work in his own immediate office . D. Establish and develop an inter-agency “Foreign Affairs Budget,” managed and recommended to the President by State . If the Secretary of State assumes the integrating role in foreign affairs, we believe he and his key subordinates will have to become more deeply involved than they presently are in the review of the budgets of other key foreign affairs agencies. The development of a capacity in the Department of State to analyze major issues of budgetary choice in the foreign affairs community would insure, we believe, greater clarity of purpose and consistency of priorities than now exists, in addition to providing State with a powerful instrument to insure coordination. Budget-making is the action-forcing process par excellence. As large and complex a task as it is, it must be completed each year on rigid schedule. Budgetary influence is power, and modern techniques of budget analysis orient the use of that power toward the allocation of resources in accordance with an explicit set of priorities, and a long-range plan or program of action. The review of budgets, in short, now implies the systematic and routine review of policy and programs. Moreover, budget review conveys an undoubted influence over issues not involving resources, as the evolution of BOB's power demonstrates . We believe unanimously that State's budgetary role and authority can and should be initially established at the regional level, vis-à-vis the programs of other agencies that are organized regionally—AID, MAP, USIA, Peace Corps. 3 With support from the President, we urge establishment of a regular procedure whereby these agencies, plus those domestic agencies operating international programs that are regionally organized automatically submit budgetary proposals for these programs to State for comment before they are finally reviewed by BOB. 4 E. To Create a Team at the Top . The ability of the Secretary of State and his Deputy to lead in the development and coordination, throughout the government, of overseas policies and programs will depend upon their relationship with the President. The relationship must be direct and personal, and sufficiently intimate to enable the President to maintain a steady sense of what major issues are emerging, which are approaching decision, and what decisions are likely to be made, unless he intervenes. The President will then be able to engage in problems selectively at moments of his choosing and to prevent decisions he does not approve . Even if the job of the Secretary of State could be redefined as we propose, and even if the Department of State were restructured to support the Secretary, the role of the President in foreign affairs will still be large and decisive. For the Presidency is the only office of the government which can finally assess the relative weight of conflicting foreign and domestic interests on the major issues and challenges facing the nation. Even with an expanded role being played by the Secretary of State, the President—any President—will want to push and probe, to keep open many sources of advice and analysis, and to reserve a wide range of decisions to himself . If issues are to flow to the President through the Secretary of State, the President must be thoroughly confident that he will have early and ample warning of changes in the international environment, of emerging international crises as well as emerging intra-governmental disputes and splits. The President must retain the freedom to change standard operating procedures, to get advice from external sources, and to handle some issues in a collegial forum, rather than through standard hierarchical channels centering on the Secretary of State. Therefore, the supporting staffs in State must be organized to serve the President and his staff, as well as the Secretary and his Deputy . Both the Secretary and Deputy, in turn, must receive broad grants of authority from the President, a clear understanding of his personal definition of the limits of that authority, and assurance of support in heavy weather. From the point of view of the Presidency, the measures we recommend would change the foreign policy machinery in two respects. First, with a control mechanism short of the White House, that machinery would be able to function (except in crises) with less active Presidential participation than is now required. Second, and again because of the existence of leadership short of the White House, Presidential control could be applied more effectively when needed. The machinery, at last, would include a handle. As a result, some Presidents might wish to deal in foreign affairs problems more selectively, concentrating only on the crucial issues. Alternatively, they might wish to exercise greater authority across the board. In either event, the President would, as he must, remain deeply engaged in foreign and security affairs, and in either event the White House will still require personal staff of the highest caliber. Concluding Comments In the preceding pages, we have advanced essentially unanimous conclusions and recommendations for consideration by the President. We believe that our report advances and develops a new concept of the role of the Secretary of State, and of the way in which Presidents, today and in the future, might organize the most important dimensions of the Presidency—the conduct and control of Foreign and National Security Affairs. In the preceding pages, and in the attached appendix, 5 we have advanced concepts and recommendations for today and for the years ahead. We have tried to outline the structure and intellectual capacity at the pinnacle of government that we believe essential in the years ahead if the Nation and its Chief Executives are to handle the international challenges that are clearly foreseeable, and to order and control the increasingly complex array of program instruments available to support international objectives. We have looked at the organization of the Department of State in the course of this study. In addition to what we have said above, we believe a first-class Department of State, well-organized and stocked with talent at all echelons is also essential to the Nation's future success in international affairs. We believe that internal organization of federal Executive departments is pre-eminently a matter for determination by top line executives—the members of the President's Cabinet. With clear recognition, therefore, of the primal role of the Secretary of State in ordering the internal affairs of his Department, we have advanced in the attached Appendix one possible approach to Departmental organization that appeals to a majority of us, and that seems consistent with our concept of the government-wide responsibilities of the Secretary of State as the President's first advisor and coordinator in international affairs . We commend these suggestions for review by the Secretary and others who have day-to-day responsibilities for managing the Department. We concede, in closing, that the management of U.S. foreign affairs will never be tidy or easy . Our necessary engagement with scores of allies and adversaries in a world riven by conflict and complicated by change can never be perfectly ordered. Moreover, it is beyond the power of any government, however manned and however organized, to foresee all events, to prepare for all contingencies, or even, in all situations, to see clearly its own best interests. But the stakes are high. They are high in opportunities. They are high in responsibilities . They are high in resources. And they are high in risks. If the complexity of foreign relations makes consistent wisdom impossible, the importance of foreign relations makes consistent adequacy essential. We do not believe that U.S. performance in world affairs has been consistently adequate. We believe, moreover, that improved organization and management of foreign affairs can produce far better performance . For these reasons, and in spite of existing obstacles to change, forward movement on many of these proposals should begin as soon as possible. Ben W. Heineman Chairman McGeorge Bundy William Capron Kermit Gordon Bayless Manning Robert S. McNamara Charles L. Schultze 1 Source: Johnson Library, Task Force Reports. Administratively Confidential. The President's Task Force on Foreign Affairs Organization was a subgroup of the President's Task Force on Government Organization organized in late 1966 primarily to review domestic agencies (see footnote 2, Document 118 ). Ben Heineman chaired both groups. Heineman forwarded the report to the President under cover of an October 1 memorandum in which he noted that Katzenbach had attended and participated in all of the task force meetings and was in general agreement with the report's recommendations. Califano forwarded the report to the President under cover of an October 14 memorandum in which he summarized its contents and noted that the Task Force on Government Organization considered it “the second most important report they have submitted.” (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 749) 2 The internal logic of our view of the Secretary of State suggests the desirability of transferring from the White House to State the responsibility for chairing the special inter-agency committee which oversees covert action operations. Whether this change is made or not, we recommend strongly that the President direct the Chairman to provide this special committee with a larger staff, without ties or loyalties to any agency. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 State and BOB have recently agreed on limited State participation in the BOB review process and on joint staff work to precede the review. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 In time, a majority of the Task Force believes that involvement of the State Department in the budgets of foreign affairs agencies should be extended to include participation in the development of Defense and Intelligence budget programs. The extension of the concept of a Foreign Affairs Budget to include Defense and Intelligence would necessarily evolve slowly, and only as State's analytic and programming abilities develop and there is more acceptance in the Congress and in the foreign affairs community of the Secretary's leadership role. But undertaken progressively, and evolving informally over time, the development in State of the analytic competence which informs budgetary choices across agency lines would become the strongest single instrument of the Department's coordinating charter . Secretary McNamara states that the complete Force Structure Program of DOD is submitted each year to the State Department for review before it is sent to the President. He doubts the necessity for expanding the Force Structure review into a detailed examination of the Defense Department budget by the Department of State. He also has reservations about State review of the CIA budget. Some other members of the Task Force, notably Mr. Bundy, Director Schultze and Dean Manning, have some reservations about the feasibility of the proposed extension of State's budgetary review to the DOD and CIA budgets, but join the majority on the ground that this managerial innovation can be tested by experience as it develops. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 Attached but not printed. 128. Editorial Note 128. Editorial Note On October 5, 1967, the 1967 Career Principals Committee of the American Foreign Service Association forwarded its interim report to Lannon Walker, Chairman of the association's Board of Directors. The committee's chairman, Ambassador William Leonhart, also forwarded the report to State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin Read under cover of an October 10 memorandum in which he proposed that Read forward it to Secretary of State Rusk if he thought Rusk would like to see it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 1 State) Quoting from one of its working papers, the committee defined its aim in the report as follows: “The fundamental question to be considered is how the foreign affairs of the United States can best be organized and conducted consistent with NSAM 341 and various other directives related to the pre-eminent authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State… [The Committee] believes that the psychological moment is at hand for a reexamination of the role of the Department of State and the Foreign Service in the over-all 'foreign affairs community' and the structure and organization of the career service or services required to carry out that role.” The report was printed as a supplement to the November 1967 issue of the Foreign Service Journal, pages 30A–30D. In a November 26, 1968, memorandum to Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Leonhart explained that the report was “prepared when we thought Senator Fulbright was about to launch Congressional hearings to reform—or revise—the Foreign Service and the foreign affairs community.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 8 State) 129. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Farley) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 129. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Farley) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, October 20, 1967. SUBJECT Weekly Activity Report 1. Establishment of an Interagency Politico-Military Group As a result of an exchange of correspondence between Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke and Mr. Kohler, 2 there has been established an Interagency Group to handle politico-military problems which will report to the SIG in a manner similar to the IRGs. For some time both State and Defense staffs have felt that the variety of committees dealing with various politico-military problems constituted an inefficient and irrational organization, and was inadequately related to the work of the SIG. On October 14 Paul Warnke proposed in a letter to Mr. Kohler the establishment of a politico-military group which would take over the functions of several existing groups. Mr. Kohler replied in a letter dated October 18 agreeing to the establishment of the new group which would normally be chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs. In this letter he proposed that the first item to be taken up be the foreign policy implications of ABMs. As indicated in last week's report, G/PM is preparing a detailed scenario of events which may be affected by the ABM decision and a policy paper on providing ABMs to foreign countries which will be discussed by the Politico-Military Group in early November and is scheduled to come before the SIG on November 16. It is anticipated that this committee will be the focal point for consideration of a variety of politico-military policy problems in the future. 3 [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, Political Military Group. Secret. Drafted by Joseph J. Wolf (G/PM). 2 Not found. A memorandum of a luncheon conversation on October 3 during which Arthur Foley and John Ausland of G/PM discussed formation of the Political-Military Group with Morton Halperin of OASD/ISA is ibid. 3 In a letter to John Barrow of the Armed Forces Staff College, August 9, 1968, Donald Lesh of the SIG Staff stated: “Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, with representation from ISA, JCS, CIA, AID, USIA, and other interested agencies, the PMG has been very active since its foundation in late 1967.” (Ibid.) Under cover of a memorandum for PMG members, November 20, 1968, Arthur Foley provided a tabulation of major items considered by the PMG in 1967–1968. (Ibid.) 130. Editorial Note 130. Editorial Note On January 19, 1968, Department of State Executive Secretary Read forwarded to Walt Rostow a draft Presidential letter to all U.S. Chiefs of Mission abroad. In a covering memorandum, Read described the letter as “restating their fundamental role and stressing several themes which the Secretary is anxious to have our Ambassadors abroad urge with greater vigor and effectiveness.” Read also noted that both Secretary of State Rusk and Under Secretary Katzenbach had concurred in the draft letter. Rostow forwarded it to the President on February 27, with about half the lines crossed out. In a covering memorandum, Rostow characterized the letter's purpose as two-fold: “1. To state clearly the Ambassador's responsibility as your agent to supervise and coordinate all the work of his Embassy. 2. To instruct each Ambassador to speak up often and firmly about our role in Southeast Asia and the importance to the entire Free World of our commitments in Vietnam.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Filed by LBJ Library) Several times during 1964 and 1965, Deputy Under Secretary of State Crockett had urged that a new Presidential letter be sent to Ambassadors restating their authority and responsibility as the President's representative (see Documents 13 and 19 ). In 1966 Special Consultant to the President Taylor proposed that the President send such a letter in connection with issuing National Security Action Memorandum 341, and the President indicated that he wanted Secretary of State Rusk to draft one (see the attachments to Document 50 and footnote 1 to Document 56 ). A letter was drafted in March 1966 and revised (see Document 248 ); however, no such letter, including the letter proposed in January 1968, was ever sent during the Johnson Presidency. 131. Letter From Donald R. Lesh of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Staff to Harlan Clark of the U.S. Army War College 131. Letter From Donald R. Lesh of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Staff to Harlan Clark of the U.S. Army War College 1 Washington, February 7, 1968. Dear Mr. Clark: I must apologize for my delay in responding to your inquiry about the recent activities of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). I hope that the enclosed brochure 2 published by the Jackson Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, although almost two years old, will provide useful information on the background and organization of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs) and the SIG, and therefore I will confine my comments to the more recent activity of those bodies. Additional copies of the brochure, incidentally, are available from the Government Printing Office, if you should feel that they would be suitable for use in courses at the Army War College. I am especially happy to provide some current information about the work of the SIG for two reasons: first, I realize that there is very little on the subject available from any other source for use in research or teaching, and second, there is a widespread misconception that the SIG has been either ineffective, inactive, or both. I think that the record will show that the SIG and the IRGs, particularly during the past six months, have come closer to living up to the expectations of NSAM 341 than ever before. Admittedly, the history of the SIG since the issuance of NSAM 341 has been somewhat mixed. In fact, the irregular pattern of its activity almost justifies the use of such terms as the “First and Second Incarnations” of the SIG. What one might call the First Incarnation began with Meeting #1 on March 8, 1966, just four days after the appearance of NSAM 341, and continued through Meeting #13 on July 26, 1966. These first thirteen meetings, under the chairmanship of Under Secretary Ball, dealt with a wide range of problems from purely organizational questions to discussions of trouble spots in Asia and Africa, and from an analysis of possible NATO military balance of payments union to the arrangements required by the SIG's assumption of the responsibilities for counterinsurgency formerly carried out by the Special Group (CI). In general, during this initial period the work of the SIG appears to have emphasized its appellate court function of providing a high-level forum for the resolution of interdepartmental disputes. After thirteen meetings in roughly five months, the SIG then entered a period of quiescence. From late July 1966 until mid-July 1967 the SIG met only three times; Meetings #14–16 were held in September 1966 and January and February 1967, respectively. It was this hiatus in the operations of the SIG, without doubt, which gave rise to the not uncommon impression that the SIG was dead or dying. This was not altogether the case. Under Secretary Katzenbach was anxious, before finally adopting SIG as his “chosen instrument,” to explore other ways of “managing” foreign affairs and achieving interdepartmental coordination. It was during this period that Professor Schelling examined these other possibilities. In the end, the decision was made to use the SIG mechanism with some change of focus and emphasis. I should point out, however, that two of the IRGs remained active in this period and built a solid record of achievement. Meeting #17 on July 19, 1967 marked the beginning of what might be called the Second Incarnation of the SIG. A new Staff Director was appointed 3 and a small staff gradually reconstituted during the fall of 1967. With the active interest, participation, and support of Mr. Katzenbach, the SIG met a total of 14 times during the past six months (Meeting #30 was held on January 25, 1968.). Furthermore, the SIG now is operating in a decidedly activist manner, i.e., the staff—now comprising four officers under the Staff Director—is engaged in seeking out problems which logically ought to be addressed in the SIG, regardless of whether a given matter has been taken up previously in an IRG or whether any interagency dissent has been registered. Much of the time of the SIG in recent months has been devoted to the wide range of problems posed by severe Congressional cuts in the Foreign Assistance Act, and to the development of an Executive Branch position responsive to Congressional intent in the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments to the FAA of 1967. This SIG also has begun to assume an increasing role in the management end of foreign affairs. One meeting was devoted to a study of the worldwide implications of the so-called “Operation Topsy” being carried out under the direction of Ambassador Tuthill in Brazil, 4 and most recently the SIG was assigned responsibility by the President for implementation of his program on the reduction of personnel in overseas missions and restriction of official travel. A special joint State-Budget task force has been created under the auspices of the SIG, and has been in operation for almost three weeks. 5 In addition, the SIG has dealt with such matters as developing a unified United States posture on the future of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, examining the pros and cons of the sale of jet aircraft to Latin American countries, and defining United States arms supply policy to Middle Eastern countries in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli conflict of June 1967. In practice, all SIG members are now asked to hold each Thursday at 4:00 p.m. for a SIG meeting, with the expectation that there will be roughly two a month. As you can see from the record, that frequency has been achieved in practice since last July. Furthermore, there has been an extremely good record of attendance by all members. As envisaged by NSAM 341, the principals themselves virtually always come in person, sending deputies only in the event of illness, travel, or real emergency. Mr. Katzenbach has personally chaired every meeting during his tenure as Under Secretary. I have every expectation that in the future both the IRGs and the SIG will play an increasing role, in cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget, in the planning and programming of overseas operations by all foreign affairs agencies. As a first step in this direction, there was a series of joint State-Budget consultations during the fall of 1967, in the course of which State Department Country Directors and regional Assistant Secretaries (the latter in their roles as IRG chairmen) were given an opportunity to review the draft budget submissions for Fiscal Year 1969 from AID, MAP, USIA, Peace Corps and CU. These materials were made available by all agencies in order to permit the Country Directors and Assistant Secretaries of State to review the plans for their respective countries and regions, to ensure that the programs were compatible and aimed toward agreed foreign policy goals, and to verify that the supporting data was sufficiently complete and properly organized to make a convincing case to the Congress. I emphasize that this was the first time that such an opportunity had been available while the budget submissions were still in draft, before the final Bureau of the Budget package had been prepared for Presidential attention. This type of review is needed as agencies prepare their budget justification in the new PPBS form. Each agency must state explicit objectives and these clearly must be part of our overall foreign affairs program. The consultations, carried on under SIG auspices, culminated in a series of lengthy and informative meetings with each regional Assistant Secretary and his IRG Staff Director and other advisors, together with the Staff Director of the SIG and the head of the International Operations Division of the Budget Bureau. While there were some justified criticisms of this operation—in particular, that it came too late in the budget cycle to allow anything more than a quick look and some hurried observations—there was widespread agreement that this kind of interdepartmental coordination is highly desirable, and that a greater effort will be made to involve the responsible State Department officials earlier in the FY budget cycle, especially at the Country Director and IRG level. In this context, I should also mention the work of the IRG/ARA, which has been working closely with the staff of the SIG in developing and refining the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) program. This subject is too broad for detailed discussion in this already overly-long letter, but you probably know that the CASP program was carried through its first complete cycle in ARA during calendar year 1967, and that the second cycle has just begun. The exercise is an attempt to obtain from each of our Ambassadors in Latin America an annual coordinated country plan—not merely a summary of the operations of various agencies, but a unified plan. Each of these plans is reviewed and debated in the IRG/ARA, and ultimately approved by the Assistant Secretary as revised or corrected. The goal is that the CASP should become the primary planning document for all foreign affairs agencies for any given country in the area. The experiment has not been undertaken in other bureaus, and in fact the CASP in its present form may not be suitable for direct transplantation, but the concept of unified planning through the interdepartmental mechanisms specified in NSAM 341 almost certainly will spread to other regional bureaus in time. I cannot do full justice here to the activities of the other IRGs, but they certainly deserve some separate mention since, even with an active SIG, the great burden of the work of interdepartmental coordination will continue to be done on the level of the regional groups. Here again, as might be expected, the record could be called mixed but promising. Even during the period when the SIG virtually ceased to function, some of the IRGs, as I have mentioned, continued to operate actively and effectively. A host of factors influence the degree to which any IRG is used, chief among them being degree of determination of a given Assistant Secretary to employ this medium of interdepartmental coordination. The most active of the IRGs have been in NEA and ARA, which have met over 50 and 80 times, respectively, since their formation in March 1966. The IRGs in other areas have met less often but, owing in large part to the strongly expressed interest of the Under Secretary, the regional groups in EUR, EA and AF are now being used with greater frequency. I think you will agree that the picture I have described does not support the conclusion that the mandate of NSAM 341 has been allowed to languish. And there is every expectation that the coming year will see an even higher level of activity in the SIG and IRGs. Those of us on the SIG staff of course are well aware that improvements can be made in the functioning of the SIG. Nevertheless, I feel that the mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination of foreign policy outlined in NSAM 341 are now at the stage where their effectiveness and productivity will become more apparent. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance in this regard. Also, as I am sure you recognize, some of the above should be treated as classified—particularly the exact nature of SIG topics. But otherwise feel free to use any of this information as you see fit. Sincerely, Donald R. Lesh 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files-SIG Papers: Lot 74 D 344, SIG Comment. Confidential. 2 Not attached. See Document 58 . 3 In an August 4, 1967, memorandum Katzenbach notified SIG members that Arthur Hartman was replacing Harry Schwartz as SIG Staff Director. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Chron. Mr. Katzenbach-1966–67) 4 Operation Topsy was an exercise instituted by Ambassador Tuthill in 1967 to trim U.S. programs and reduce U.S. personnel in Brazil. 5 In a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk and Bureau of the Budget Director Schultze, January 18, 1968, President Johnson directed that, as part of his program for dealing with the balance of payments problem, the number of American personnel overseas under the jurisdiction of U.S. diplomatic missions (except for Vietnam) be reduced by 10 percent and that “very large U.S. missions” undergo “bigger reductions.” For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69, Book I, pages 34–35. SIG played an active role in the ensuing exercise, known as BALPA. Documentation on BALPA is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, O/MS-Management Staff Files: Lot 70 D 474, BALPA Subject Files, 1968. 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 132. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser to the Department of State (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk 132. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser to the Department of State (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 27, 1968. SUBJECT Allocation of Resources—A Budget for Foreign Affairs and the Relation to National Goals Sinews for the Department of State The urgent requirements voiced by President Johnson for reductions in U.S. Government expenditures compel a searching scrutiny of the budgets of the foreign affairs agencies of the Government, 2 along with all the rest. This must, of course, include efforts to prevent or eliminate waste. It must include also a rigorous assessment as to whether there are activities and functions that can and should be pared, or pruned away entirely. Ambassador Tuthill's launching of Operation Topsy for the United States Mission in Brazil exemplifies the kind of evaluation that each and every element of the foreign affairs agencies should consider a continuing responsibility. Within the Department of State, presumably the Corps of Foreign Service Inspectors and certain other officers reporting to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration have as part of their responsibility the overseeing of personnel and funds in relation to functions expected of the Department. Other foreign affairs agencies doubtless have inspectorates and management experts. But no rational judgments can be made about functions and budgets except in relation to standards fixing what the foreign affairs agencies are to accomplish. These standards in turn are related to the view one is going to take of the role of diplomacy in the contemporary world, of the part the United States is to play, of our objectives in foreign affairs, of the human values we aim to protect and increase. Thus, simply to take the existing budget of the already undernourished Department of State, for example, and make flat percentage cuts in personnel and funds strikes me as irrational. When the Department of Defense requests additional billions of dollars for an F–111, for an ABM system, or for the war in Viet Nam, the Administration very properly considers the requests in relation to needs, and the Congress appropriates funds on the same basis. There may be debate as to whether the requested funds fit the needs and will meet them. This is proper, and puts the consideration and decision in the right framework. Department needs in relation to function Have the needs of the Department of State really become less? Is the current relationship of needs to personnel and funds such that a percentage of both should be cut? I very much doubt it. The level of waste is probably low, and the percentages decided on for cuts bear, apparently, no relation to waste or any other rational factor. 3 Let us look at the needs. The United States has diplomatic relations today with 120 countries; ten years ago the number was 84; in 1945 it was 57. Part of the expense of fulfilling the increased foreign affairs responsibilities reflected by these statistics has been pieced out by closing a large number of American consulates in many parts of the world—an economy that is obviously very costly in political terms. Moreover, the range now covered by diplomatic relations has greatly enlarged. The U.S. Government has need to know a great deal about the economies of other countries and their trade; about scientific research, developments, and new technological undertakings abroad; the requirements for knowledge and understanding of the political life of other national societies continue to grow. There is a further area for consideration. At a time when the United States is spending such enormous sums on the activities of our military establishment, we need to ask ourselves whether the allocation of resources we are making strikes a rational balance. 4 Can some of our specific objectives in different parts of the world be better pursued through means other than the presence or use of military forces or programs of military assistance? What would be a rational level for foreign aid? To what extent do U.S. military expenditures and activities stimulate military escalation by the USSR? Have we related our military levels too much to Soviet capabilities, without taking proper account of Soviet intentions? Is there more that we can do in the political field to advance toward some measure of disarmament? Taking account of totalitarian purposes in the USSR, China, and Cuba, are there new measures we can adopt to promote stability and progress around the world and frustrate revolutionary “wars of national liberation”? I should suppose the Department of State ought to have continuing task forces at work on a whole range of questions such as these. They are the Department's province. The operating bureaus are too pressed with the despatch of current business to address the longer problem systematically and effectively. The Policy Planning Council should be at work on them, but should be supplemented by the efforts of task forces drawn from the universities, business, and public life as well as from the current Government service. In order to fulfill its foreign affairs responsibilities, even when broadly rather than narrowly conceived, the Department of State would not require great appropriations. The amounts would still be minuscule in comparison to the Department of Defense appropriations. But there will be no hope of fulfilling foreign affairs responsibilities unless the resources available to the Department of State are rationally related to its proper needs. A flat percentage cut in existing personnel and funds can only remove to a greater distance the possibility of the Department's doing its job. Some false economies Some of the subsidiary devices currently being used in the name of economy deserve to be mentioned here. I have referred already to the closing of consulates. Next, there is the substantial reduction in travel funds. The foreign affairs arm of the U.S. Government needs to be able to travel from this country to places abroad; within foreign countries from our missions there; and to attend all kinds of international gatherings. Loss of mobility is disabling. Ability to travel is essential to the Department of State before all other parts of Government. If gaps left by this Department are filled by Defense and CIA—whose appropriations are relatively much more generous—there is an inevitable effect on the power over foreign affairs within the U.S. Government; there is also an effect abroad in the image of the United States thereby created. Then there is the freeze on promotions. Recently, in trying to bring about the much deserved promotion of a younger colleague in L, I was told that all promotions were frozen until May 15. 5 If there is one thing above all that is important to the Department of State, it is quality of personnel. We have difficulty in remaining competitive with private enterprise for the services of the ablest young Americans. Differentials in pay have long existed and will doubtless never be eliminated. But the Government should be moving in the direction of narrowing the gap, not widening it. A freeze on promotions—particularly one that has uneven impact and seeks to finance a tiny fraction of Government expenditure through sacrifice made by an individual in the withholding of a deserved promotion—runs counter to the Government's interests. Issues of politics and national goals The foregoing discussion has a budgetary point of departure. It soon becomes involved with large questions of policy. This seems to me intrinsically appropriate. I recognize the deep political problem created when Congressman Mills says he will not proceed with fiscal measures requested by the President until the Administration has made cuts in non-military expenditures running into the billions of dollars. I wonder if the President would not be wise to reject such blackmail, particularly when it means the sacrifice of funds urgently needed for a meaningful war on poverty in the United States. This seems to me the kind of case that should be taken to the people of the country and made a great campaign issue in this election year. In fiscal terms, the additional amounts of money properly needed by the Department of State are small—apart from foreign aid. But an excellent Department of State should be seen as national necessity of the first order. If there is difficulty in persuading Congress to increase appropriately the resources available to the Department, it might be helpful to have a survey, report and recommendations by a Presidential task force—on the range of functions the Department ought to be engaged in and the resources appropriate for the enterprise. I believe the very waging of the war in Viet Nam makes it the more imperative that we improve and strengthen the arm of diplomacy. We need it at its best now and in the future. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 1–1. No classification marking. The memorandum indicates Rusk saw it. 2 Authorized expenditures for fiscal year 1968 were as follows: the Department of State: $428.19 million; the Agency for International Development: $1.214 billion; the United States Information Agency: $187.32 million; the Peace Corps: $107.9 million; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: $9.3 million. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 The State Department budget requests are carefully prepared—we are all urged to cut our budgets to the bone before they are even sent to the Bureau of the Budget. The treatment accorded State Department budget requests in the Congress needs no elaboration. When the budget process is completed, our requests for resources have been refined again and again into smaller figures. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 The Government's budget for the next fiscal year is $186.1 billion. Of this, military expenditures account for $82.3 billion. The total for all the foreign affairs agencies and their programs is $4.7 billion. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 The choice of May 15 as the date has the effect of discriminating against Civil Service personnel in the Department, since the Foreign Service promotion lists are issued only in the late spring. [Footnote in the source text.] 133. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Rimestad) 133. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Rimestad) 1 Washington, March 6, 1968. SUBJECT Personnel Administration Now that your congressional hearings are out of the way, I would like to push ahead with some real speed on a number of matters in the personnel field. On several of these I am frankly disappointed that we are not further along already. The first three are these. 1. Several months ago I asked for your comments on a proposal regarding assignments to key positions, the heart of which was that competition for our most important jobs should be open to all our best men—to FSO–3s and 4s, as well as to FSO–1s and 2s. I know you have already been thinking, and to some extent moving, in the direction suggested by the proposal. In my view, the statistics speak for themselves. As the middle of last year we had only seven officers above the level of FSO–3 who were forty years old or younger, although almost half of our 3,500-man officer corps was less than 40 years old. It simply makes no sense to exclude almost all of the most able officers under 40—and there are some extraordinary ones—from the most responsible positions in the Department. Specifically, we have to be able to tap the 1300 FSO–3s and 4s for any job we have available if, notwithstanding less experience, the best man is an FSO–3 or an FSO–4. The President, who has been pressing vigorously for younger ambassadorial candidates, wants to review personally assignments to a number of our key positions (DCM and Deputy Assistant Secretary levels). We have to be able to show him that ability is the sole criteria as to assignments, even at this level, and that we haven't created “no poaching” preserves in the Department for part of the Foreign Service. Finally, unless we adopt ability as the sole criteria, we are going to rule ourselves right out of the market for the most ambitious, talented and able young men graduating from colleges in the next years. I am, of course, not suggesting a preference for youth; I am saying that we will have to end discrimination against youth. The memo I sent 2 included several other suggestions as well. I would like your comments on all of them, as well as concrete proposals on how we can proceed. 2. Several weeks ago I asked for target figures for temporary and permanent out-placement of FSOs; for proposals as to the steps we would have to take to meet these targets; and for comments on the desirability, as a first step, of setting up a separate operation in “O” to handle reimbursable assignments, training assignments, assignments with universities, etc. I want to push ahead with this promptly and would like your specific proposals. 3. If we're really going to deal with the problem of too slow advancement in the Foreign Service and if we want to increase the confidence and independence of our officers, then—far more than incentive retirement legislation—we are going to need a phenomally effective and aggressive out-placement service that can find all-but-irresistible outside opportunities for any Foreign Service Officer, but especially for those in the senior grades. Everything I hear indicates that our present operation, even expanded as it now is, is in the “horse and buggy” stage. In particular, as far as I know, we have no professional assistance and are not systematically calling on the advice and help of businessmen and educators who could assist us in setting up a truly effective operation. I would like some dramatic proposals from “O”, as well as your views on whether we will not have to give some general retirement counseling to all officers of retirement age (and encouragement to many) if we are going to really deal with our present problems. I'd like to discuss these three issues with you at your convenience next week. Then we can move on to additional personnel matters. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, NK Chron 1968. Personal and Confidential. 2 Not found. 134. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Katzenbach) to the Executive Chairmen of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the Chairman of the Political-Military Group 134. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Katzenbach) to the Executive Chairmen of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the Chairman of the Political-Military Group 1 Washington, June 12, 1968. SUBJECT Planning in Anticipation of Foreign Crises On May 23, 1968 the SIG approved the draft paper on contingency studies and crisis management, entitled Planning in Anticipation of Foreign Crises, with minor amendments. The approved text was circulated as an attachment to SIG Memo #71 dated June 4. 1968. 2 As you know, this directive has the effect of dissolving the Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC) and placing responsibility for contingency planning and crisis management directly on the regional Assistant Secretaries of State and the IRGs. The mandate for contingency studies is broadened to encourage examination of possible political or economic crises even if involvement of United States military forces is not anticipated. These studies often may require the participation of functional bureaus, such as IO and E, as well as other government departments and agencies which are not regularly represented in the IRGs. Finally, to assist the SIG, the Political-Military Group (PMG) will be responsible for reviewing interagency studies which anticipate possible use of United States military forces in situations where the United States national security requires it. In the near future the Staff Director of the SIG will provide you with more detailed information on the current status of contingency planning. Under the terms of the approved directive, quarterly reports on such planning will be prepared by the SIG Staff Director with the assistance of the Staff Directors of the IRGs and the PMG, and I propose to submit these reports to the SIG not later than the fifteenth of April, July, October, and January to cover the preceding quarter in each case. The first quarterly report, therefore, will be submitted on July 15. 3 Attached is a procedural guide 4 designed to assist the regional bureaus in their organization for crisis management. The guide sets forth in some detail the definitions and responsibilities which henceforth will be observed within the Department of State. I would appreciate your ensuring that all responsible officers under your supervision are acquainted with the new directive and the procedural guide. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo #73. Confidential. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., SIG Memo #71) 3 Studies in Anticipation of Foreign Crises, Quarterly Status Report, July 15, was circulated as an attachment to SIG Memo #77, 7/23/68. (Ibid., SIG Memo #77) 4 Attached but not printed. 135. Report Prepared in the Department of State 135. Report Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, June 20, 1968. SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN ON HERTER COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS Rec No. Gist of Recommendations Action Taken Legislation Required 1. Strengthen the Department's capacity to assist the President in providing leadership and coordination in foreign affairs. No specific action indicated. 2. Establish a new position of Executive Under Secretary of State as third ranking officer in the Department responsible for assuring that resources of the Department and other principal foreign affairs agencies are giving maximum support to the Secretary in his leadership and coordinating role in foreign affairs. As a consequence, consolidate the present positions of Deputy Under Secretary for Administration and Assistant Secretary for Administration under either title. No action taken to establish position of Executive Under Secretary. See NSAM 341 of March, 2, 1966, re responsibilities of Secretary of State in foreign affairs. Position of Assistant Secretary for Administration abolished in July, 1965. Yes 3. Develop a system for translating foreign policy objectives into projected programs to be used as a basis for estimating future personnel and other needs. A “Comprehensive Country Programming System”(CCPS) was developed and installed in selected posts in Latin America, Africa, and Europe on a trial basis. This programming system covered programs of all civilian agencies in the country. After a trial of more than a year it was abandoned. The PPBS system involves a similar concept, but on a broader basis. This system is being used experimentally in two of the Department's bureaus by agreement with BOB. No 4. Provide a career Foreign Information Service for permanent professional personnel in overseas informational and cultural activities comparable to that of the Foreign Service Officer Corps. USIA has attempted on several occasions to obtain passage of career service legislation. In 1964 the Secretary of State and the Director of USIA signed an agreement under which USIA Career Reserve officers would be given lateral entry appointments as FSO's. In 1965 a USIA lateral entry nomination list was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but was not voted on by the Senate. In 1965 the Hays bill was passed by the House. USIA was covered under the provisions of the Hays bill. In 1966 both the Hays bill and the USIA lateral entry nomination list were considered by Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and both failed to be approved. In 1967 USIA submitted a new bill providing for a career service comparable to the FSO corps. This bill was passed by the Senate in 1968 and is pending action by the House. 2 Yes 5. Provide a career Foreign Development Service for core professional personnel of the foreign aid and development programs. Exclude from this group specialized and technical personnel employed on a project basis. Assure that present personnel are screened on the basis of an appropriate in-service examination. The Hays Bill included career service provisions for AID. AID has not proposed separate career legislation since the Hays Bill failed enactment. Yes 6. The Foreign Service, the Foreign Information Service, and the Foreign Development Service should constitute a family of compatible services governed by uniform statutory provisions regarding personnel management, substantial uniformity in personnel policies and conditions of service, joint conduct of personnel operations where possible, systematic exchange and transfer of personnel, and filling top posts by personnel drawn from all three services. The Hays Bill included provisions for a uniform statutory framework for the personnel systems of State, AID and USIA. Other items in this recommendation were substantially implemented by administrative action: A joint State-AID-USIA board has been in operation for several years to achieve maximum uniformity of regulations. Joint or compatible personnel policies are developed whenever feasible. Exchanges of personnel and the staffing of key positions by officers from one of the other two agencies have been increased in each of the three agencies. Yes 7. Establish an interagency Board of Foreign affairs Personnel to assist in achieving parallel personnel policies and joint personnel operations. This Board should be chaired by the proposed Executive Under Secretary of State and should include representatives from State, AID, USIA and the Civil Service Commission, and such additional members from other Federal agencies as the Secretary determines appropriate, such as the Departments of Commerce and Labor. The new Board should replace the present Board of the Foreign Service. Its functions should be advisory, but should include periodic assessment of senior career personnel of all three agencies for the purpose of making recommendations to the Secretary for promotion to career minister and career ambassador and of preparing rosters to be used by agency heads in filling executive and other high-level positions in all three agencies. Each agency head should have primary responsibility for personnel actions affecting individual employees. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 abolished the statutorily established Board of the Foreign Service. By Executive Order 11264 of December 31, 1965, the President reestablished the Board of the Foreign Service with expanded membership which includes CSC, USIA and AID. Yes 8. Bring present Civil Service employees of the three agencies within the structure of the foreign affairs service but do not require them to serve abroad. Stress availability for overseas service in future recruitment. Work out appropriate agreements with the Civil Service Commission to insure harmonious personnel relationships. The Hays Bill included provisions for the voluntary transfer of Civil Service employees of State, AID and USIA to the Foreign Service without obligation to serve abroad. In 1965 the Department and the Civil Service Commission concluded an interchange agreement providing for the transfer of career personnel between the Foreign Service and Civil Service systems by non-competitive appointment. EO 11219, May 6, 1965 formed the basis of the interchange agreement. USIA has concluded a similar agreement. Yes [Omitted here is the report of action taken on recommendations 9–43. Recommendations 35–43 related to AID and were not discussed in the report.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, The Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. II, Documentary Supplement, The Foreign Affairs Personnel System. No classification marking. The Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, known as the Herter Committee and chaired by former Secretary of State Christian Herter, was organized in 1961 at Rusk's request. Although unofficial and privately sponsored, it worked in close association with State Department officials. Its recommendations were included in its report, Personnel for the New Diplomacy (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962). For more information on the Herter Committee and implementation of its recommendations, see The Department of State During the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, vol. I, chapter 2D, Efforts to Establish a Unified Foreign Affairs Personnel System, prepared in 1968 by Clifford Hailey of the State Department's Office of Foreign Affairs Personnel Planning; and John Ensor Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), especially pp. 76 ff. 2 The bill, S. 633, became law on August 20, 1968, as PL 90–494 (82 Stat. 810). 136. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations (Jackson) 136. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations (Jackson) 1 Washington, July 15, 1968. Dear Senator Jackson: The Secretary and I appreciate this opportunity to provide you and your Subcommittee with an evaluation of the relationship between planning-programming-budgeting (PPB) and the foreign affairs decision-making process. 2 This is a subject in which I have been deeply involved since I came to the State Department almost two years ago, and many of the comments which follow are based on my own experiences with PPB over that period. As you will see, the major thrust of my comments will indicate that I believe we need more systematic analysis of: —the factors (including costs) upon which policy decisions are based; —alternative courses of action and their possible consequences. But I do not argue that when we have found a method of improving our analysis we will, thereby, have changed the world we live in. Foreign affairs is inherently an area in which there are a few absolutes and many variables. It is a field in which the measurable and quantifiable can seldom be the determining elements of a decision. Objectives Somehow the very simple and clear ideas announced by the President in August of 1965 3 have been obscured by misunderstanding and bureaucratic excesses. I want, therefore, to begin by recalling exactly what it was the President directed. He ordered each Department and Agency to: —identify national goals precisely; —choose the most urgent from among those identified; —search for alternative means of reaching those goals more effectively at least cost; —determine accurately both the short and long term cost implications of the choice between alternatives; and —measure the performance of programs in terms of objectives attained. Our success in using PPB techniques will depend on staying as close to these concepts as possible. They are, after all, what we should insist upon in any well-staffed analysis of a problem for decision. Admittedly, PPB techniques lend themselves more readily to those areas of foreign affairs that are most amenable to quantification. But they can help us arrive at a: —better and clearer definition of our objectives; —much more systematic analysis of priorities (getting people to put down on paper some of their often unstated assumptions); —better interagency policy control and coordination (by looking at all US Government programs across-the-board in particular countries or areas); and —check on past performance (by relating programs back to our objectives and then testing the validity of those objectives). Our purpose, therefore, in examining these and other techniques is to find ways to raise issues for decision in a timely and explicit fashion, and to present alternative courses of action for decision up to the Presidential level. We also want to find ways to relate and evaluate agency programs to our over-all foreign policy objectives. Organization of the Foreign Affairs Community The Department of State is essentially the consumer of the programmed documentation of other agencies. We have been assigned the role by the President of coordinating the activities of other agencies. PPB documentation can become an essential tool in this coordination. By requiring an explicit statement relating the specific program to a broader foreign policy interest, PPB—properly applied—forces into the open conflicting agency objectives and thus helps the senior officers to locate, understand, and resolve these differences. Abroad, the coordinating role is accomplished under the leadership of the Ambassador. He bears ultimate responsibility for the programs of all agencies in his country; the Washington agencies look to him-as leader of the country team—to present programs and suggestions for activities, as well as to review their effectiveness once approved. In Washington, the President has asked the Secretary of State to exercise a similar leadership and coordinating role. The President has also established a Senior Interdepartmental Group, which I chair, to advise the Secretary and the President on matters affecting more than one agency. The Senior Interdepartmental Group includes all of the principal agencies 4 and, when the occasion requires, other responsible officers can be invited to its deliberations. Our main effort over the past year has been directed at producing the kind of analysis that will make for better decisions by the Secretary of State and the President. We are particularly interested in establishing guidelines and policy objectives which can then be used as a framework by the individual agencies with programs abroad. Below the SIG level, each Assistant Secretary of State in the five geographic regions chairs an Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG), with representatives from the same agencies and departments that sit on the SIG. Our effort in the IRGs over the last year has been to make them as management-minded as possible. The natural first step has been for the interagency group to examine objectives, determine priorities and look at the cost implications of their policy choices. Once an Assistant Secretary understands that he has been given responsibility for coordinating major programs in his area, he will actively seek to create the necessary tools to do the job. Developments Over the Past Year The SIG has attempted to develop statements of US policy goals and an agreed inter-agency analysis of situations in several specific geographic areas. We have—over the past year—reviewed the situation in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. When an area analysis has been discussed and agreed, it becomes the basis for the broad outlines of policy for the area. It helps the program agency to decide where to place emphasis, and what specific actions to take in support of that focus. In the Latin American Bureau, the Assistant Secretary has set up a more formal—albeit experimental—program review system. A Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) is prepared by each of our Latin American Missions at the beginning of the calendar year. The purpose of the CASP is to: —put together a descriptive analysis of the situation in the country; —relate the country situation to specific US interests and objectives. These papers—which suggest future programs and review and evaluate past programs—are then discussed in March and April by the Latin American IRG, under the Chairmanship of our Assistant Secretary. The approved paper constitutes general guidance to the separate agencies operating in that particular country. The agencies, in turn, use this guidance as they prepare their program documentation for presentation to the Bureau of the Budget. The CASP procedure is still in the experimental state. Its strength is that it forces senior officials—first the Ambassador and then the Assistant Secretary—to review all our activities in a particular country. Such a review will, we hope, help us point our programs at key targets, thus getting at an old bug-a-boo of bureaucracy—the continuation, through inertia, of programs that are either marginally important to our purposes or, in some cases, opposed to them. It will, as well, help us link US efforts to self-help programs of recipient countries. As a review document, the CASP is weakest in hard analysis (this may well be an inherent difficulty of applying PPB techniques to foreign affairs). To measure program effectiveness there should be a direct link between shared US-recipient country objectives. Yet, in most cases, our programs are marginal to the total effort, e.g., a small agricultural loan in a country with major agricultural deficiencies and large programs of its own. But these marginal inputs can be important, and our analytical tools ought to be designed to tell us where it is most useful to concentrate our effort. Even more important, PPB techniques should make it possible more easily to demonstrate to busy senior officials that a decision or choice is necessary on a particular issue. I have emphasized the Latin American country review experience as an illustration of our tests of PPB-type techniques. The CASP is systematically applied to the whole area because there is the general framework of the Alliance for Progress. Elsewhere, where we do not employ the area-wide approach, we have analyzed all our programs in particular countries in ways tailored to the particular issues involved. The most recurrent problem requiring systematic country review, for example, is a conflict between military security objectives and economic development. Where we are giving both military and economic assistance it is essential that the mix of our own efforts and the country's programs is right, and that US agencies are not pulling against one another. The Bureau of the Budget and Program Review Techniques In earlier years agency submissions to the BOB were reviewed by Budget Bureau officials and officials of the agency concerned. Only occasionally was State asked for guidance on matters relating to foreign policy. Last August—as a result of an agreement between the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and me—BOB and State jointly reviewed agency submissions for FY 69. We will conduct a similar review of FY 70 submissions next fall. The documentation used in these reviews is the PPBS submission of AID, Defense, etc. But this documentation, alone, has proved insufficient for our needs. By offering alternatives, good analysis and stress on issues, PPB material can vastly improve the stuff from which policy decisions are made, but we also need an analytical brief that raises issues more starkly. Program memoranda alone do not provide the vehicles for raising policy issues—further staffing is needed. I have, therefore, set up a small staff that does for me what the staffs of the Budget Bureau Director and the AID Administrator do for them. I can readily associate myself with Tom Schelling's statement 5 that applying PPB in the foreign affairs field is to move from an area of relative simplicity (Defense systems) to one both complicated and disorderly. A group of highly qualified theoreticians worked for some eight years to develop the techniques which Bob McNamara brought into the Defense Department in 1961. I see no reason to believe that it will take less time to develop techniques that we—working with far less quantifiable material—can use to help us in making our policy decisions. Finally, when I argue for a more systematic approach to policy making, this does not mean that I believe that the development of such a “system” is an end in itself. Nor do I believe that the “system” should make the policy decision. What it can do is clarify issues, thus giving the policy-maker greater confidence that he has the information necessary to make the right choice. I personally have no fear that the use of PPB as a management tool will lead to a breakdown in human and political control of the decision-making process. Quite the contrary. What I do fear is that as our lives—and the world in which we live—become more complicated we will be overwhelmed by the very complexity we have ourselves created. Sincerely, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, BUD 1. No classification marking. Printed in the Department of State Newsletter , September 1968, pp. 12–13. 2 Jackson requested the evaluation in a June 13 letter to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, BUD 1) 3 For full text of the President's statement, August 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson , 1965, Book II, pp. 916–917. 4 SIG Membership: Under Secretary of State (Chairman); Deputy Secretary of Defense; Chairman-JCS; Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistant to the President for NSC Affairs; Administrator-AID; Director-USIA; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; often attending-the UnderSecretaries of Treasury and Agriculture. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 Presumably a reference to Schelling's memorandum, PBS and Foreign Affairs, December 14, 1967, published as a Committee Print by the Senate Committee on Government Operations under the title Planning-Programming-Budgeting: PPBS and Foreign Affairs (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968). 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original. 137. Memorandum Prepared by the Staff of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 137. Memorandum Prepared by the Staff of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 1 Washington, November 28, 1968. SUBJECT The Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Coordination of Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy I. An Overview The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), established by the President in 1966, is the principal mechanism for the coordination of foreign affairs below the NSC. A policy group at the Under Secretary level, its function is to advise and assist the Secretary of State in his responsibilities under NSAM 341 to oversee, coordinate and direct interdepartmental activities. 2 The SIG has five regional subcommittees, the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs), which are at the Assistant Secretary level, and a recently created interdepartmental group for Political-Military Affairs. Despite its sweeping mandate, the composition and membership of the SIG have determined the scope and nature of its program of work. 3 Most of the issues considered in this channel fall under the jurisdiction of State, Defense, AID, and CIA. SIG has dealt only peripherally with international economic policy and matters involving international scientific cooperation or cultural affairs. The SIG has operated without a new bureaucratic super-structure. Rather, it utilizes the existing staffs of the various agencies. A major part of its work is accomplished through the IRGs. But not all of its work is done through meetings—particularly meetings of the senior group. Occasionally, documents are approved simply by memorandum or telephone when there is agreement that the facts and issues are well understood and there is unanimity on the recommendations. During its relatively brief existence, the SIG has concerned itself with major operational problems requiring immediate decision; broader questions of general policy guidance; problems of resource allocation in foreign affairs; and a number of managerial and planning functions cutting across agency lines. The product of SIG deliberation frequently has been a memorandum to the President outlining alternative courses of action. At times, consideration of an issue by the SIG has been the prelude to an NSC discussion. The SIG's operating philosophy has been to search out and articulate policy disagreements—rather than burying them in a mistaken effort at bureaucratic harmony. Its objective has been to provide the President and the Secretary of State with a greater range of facts and options on which to base final decisions. The SIG has not attempted to cover the full range of operational and policy issues requiring interdepartmental concurrence or coordination. To do so would overwhelm it. Rather, it has been deliberately selective—dealing with those major issues where senior policy guidance is called for and leaving to other established procedures the bulk of the day-to-day interagency business. Similarly, once an issue is defined and conclusions are reached in the SIG, its disposition is returned to normal line-operating channels. The SIG continues to monitor the issue in only a general way, watching for possible changes in conditions that would render the recommendations inappropriate and ensuring that recommendations, once approved, are promptly and effectively carried out. More specifically, the focus of the SIG's work has been on the following: —To work toward a clearer concept of priorities—of what is essential, important, or merely desirable in United States foreign policy; —To encourage a more critical attitude throughout the foreign affairs community towards the claims made for particular programs, activities, policies and actions; —To stimulate more thorough, careful and considered analysis, both in Washington and in the field, of alternative courses of action before particular programs and policies are recommended for adoption; —To give greater coherence and consistency to our numerous programs overseas, carried forward by a multiplicity of agencies; —To encourage more and better forward planning for future contingencies and crises; —To foster greater cost consciousness in the Department of State and focus attention on the problem of resource utilization and management across geographic and agency lines. (In this latter activity, the SIG has worked closely with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.) Two important aspects of the SIG should also be noted—its relations to the Armed Services and to the White House. The JCS participates in its own right, both in the SIG and in the IRGs. While this has led on occasion to some debate within Defense on the primacy of the civilian voice, it has on the whole been useful to allow the JCS to express its point of view at all stages of policy making. The JCS representatives have exercised their role constructively and with discretion. (In fact, there is some evidence that the SIG/IRG structure may have been, at times, a useful tool—and catalyst—for the coordination of positions within Defense.) The other aspect concerns relations between the SIG and the White House/NSC Staff. The SIG/IRG channel is one way in which the White House Staff keeps itself informed and influences the handling of major interdepartmental issues before they reach the NSC or the President. The President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is a member of the SIG, and members of the NSC Staff sit on the IRGs. The NSC Staff has often suggested topics it would like the SIG to take up, and SIG discussion has been useful in defining an otherwise amorphous subject prior to NSC discussion. In other cases, issues are taken directly into the NSC without first going through the SIG. The SIG is the outgrowth of efforts of the last three Presidents to prod the Secretary of State and his Department to provide leadership in the formulation of interdepartmental policies and recommendations in foreign affairs and national security policy. The foreign affairs community in Washington has come to accept—and indeed encourage—this pattern of policy formulation and review under Department of State leadership. Equally important, Chairmanship of the IRGs has enhanced the stature and authority of the regional Assistant Secretaries. This, in turn, has given them a stronger position: —To provide more vigorous policy leadership; and, —To approach foreign affairs programs and activities from a managerial-executive point of view. In sum the SIG/IRG structure has played a complementary and supporting role to the Secretary of State and the NSC. It has achieved this without requiring a large additional staff. At the same time, it has been successful in easing the burdens of the White House/NSC Staff with respect to interagency coordination and follow-up, permitting them to concentrate on their principal and most important function of meeting the President's needs. II. The SIG: What it is in Detail and How it Works A. Background and Composition The SIG, established in 1966, represents the extension of the Country Team concept from our overseas missions to the Washington foreign affairs community. It has long been accepted that in missions overseas it is the Ambassador—as the personal representative of the President—who bears responsibility for the coordination and direction of all policies and programs in that country, regardless of lines of agency subordination and responsibility. 4 In effect, NSAM 341 accorded to the Secretary of State, and through him to the Executive Chairmen of the SIG and the IRGs, similar Presidential authority to coordinate and direct interdepartmental matters in the field of foreign affairs and national security policy. Activities of concern to one department only, as well as those of the Armed Forces operating under direct military command, are exempt from the authority of the SIG and the IRGs. The need for a focal point for foreign affairs coordination at a level below the White House has become increasingly apparent since World War II as our commitments have grown in scope and complexity. Our overseas operations, comprising a vast array of programs managed by independently constituted and sometimes competing agencies—each with a separate Congressional mandate, a separate budget, a specific policy orientation, and a somewhat different domestic constituency—demand a central point of coordination and control. The SIG offers one solution to the problem, centered on the role of the Secretary of State as the principal foreign affairs advisor to the President. The Senior Interdepartmental Group has as its regular members: The Under Secretary of State, Chairman The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, United States Information Agency The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs In addition, other departments and agencies may participate when an issue affects their interests. Treasury and Agriculture do so regularly. The Department of Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Justice, NASA and the Bureau of the Budget have participated from time to time. In the SIG as well as the IRGs, the presiding State Department officer has the role of Executive Chairman: he is empowered to rule, even in the absence of a consensus. To protect the interests of the other members, agencies may dissent from the ruling of the Chairman and force consideration of the matter to the next higher level—from an IRG to the SIG, from the SIG to the Secretary of State and, ultimately, to the President. B. Mode of Operation Several points are worth noting: First, the SIG's dual function. The SIG/IRG is both an interdepartmental committee structure and a channel for the orderly interdepartmental clearance and review of important policy documentation. Meetings are generally reserved for topics where there is disagreement or the Chairman feels a discussion is needed to explore the issue. Even without a meeting, processing of a document through the SIG channel ensures that the recommendations have been reviewed in the various agencies at an appropriately high level. Second, preparations for a SIG meeting . The emphasis is on the sharpening of issues, the identification of options for required decisions. Before the SIG meets, there is an “in-house” meeting in the State Department (including AID). Offices other than the bureau charged with operational responsibility—such as Policy Planning, L and INR—are encouraged to submit their views. Drawing on this “in-house” discussion and on informal soundings in other agencies, the SIG Staff (attached to the Under Secretary's office) prepares an “issues” paper which is circulated to SIG members. This paper focuses on the points in dispute or matters which otherwise require discussion. Third, informality and confidentiality . These are essential if senior policy officers are to give their views openly and candidly. To this end, attendance at SIG meetings has been limited to the principals and a few aides directly concerned with the SIG. The Under Secretary of State personally has chaired all meetings. Attendance of deputies in place of the SIG principals has been the exception. The SIG Staff's record of meetings, while reporting fully on the discussion, generally avoids attribution of particular views unless the SIG member clearly enunciates an agency position. There have been very few leaks to the press. The SIG's work program—much of it highly sensitive—has remained largely unknown-as, indeed, it should. Fourth, the question of staff support . The SIG's objective has been to mobilize the existing line-staff structure—rather than to duplicate it. Hence, the SIG Staff has been kept small, mobile, unspecialized—just large enough to meet essentially four functions, viz.: —Monitor the foreign affairs community for significant developments warranting SIG discussion; —Coordinate the preparation of appropriate SIG documentation; —Draft “issues” papers for SIG meetings; and, —Prepare appropriate records of SIG action and discussion. This approach has had two advantages: On the one hand, it has precluded the staff from specializing along regional or functional lines, with the attendant risk that staff members would themselves become advocates of a particular point of view. On the other, it has made it more difficult for the staff members to yield to the temptation of undertaking extensive substantive work assignments on their own. The various projects directly under SIG auspices are undertaken by ad hoc task forces and study groups. In this way, the SIG has been able to draw widely on all the agencies to assemble the best available personnel for the particular studies undertaken. Staffing practices at the IRG level vary. In several cases, the IRG Staff Directors are drawn from the Assistant Secretary's immediate staff—usually a Special Assistant. In the others, while designations nominally vary, the IRGs in effect are supported by the existing regional policy staffs (all of which predate the SIG and the IRGs). This latter approach has considerable merit. Assistant Secretaries need a strong central regional staff office to assist them in evaluating embassy and country office recommendations and meet staff and planning functions cutting across country lines. It seems reasonable to combine this function with the staffing of the IRG. Fifth, the SIG's relations with the IRGs . The guiding principle has been to give the IRGs as much autonomy as is compatible with overall policy control. Major issues discussed in the IRGs are submitted for review and approval to the SIG—and, where required by the importance of a subject, through the SIG to the Secretary of State and, ultimately, the President. But most of the IRG's business should be settled in that regional forum. To require submission of all IRG actions to the senior group would undercut the authority of the regional forum and make it impossible for the Assistant Secretary to settle any controversial matter at his level. Conversely, the SIG is more than a board of review. One of its roles has been to provide leadership. The SIG raises issues on its own, and commissions studies and policy recommendations, relying on special task forces when necessary. Such an approach is compatible with an active IRG pattern so long as the IRG has the opportunity of comment and review. III. The SIG's Program of Work Excepting Viet-Nam 5 and international economic relations the SIG has over the past year considered most of the major foreign policy issues confronting the American government (see Annex B). The SIG's program of work can be conveniently discussed under several headings: —“Threshold decisions”: i.e., operational problems being dealt with for the first time in a particular context and having important domestic and foreign policy implications; —Preparation for major international negotiations; —Long-term policy guidance; —Foreign affairs management; —Resource allocation. Threshold Decisions : In any evaluation of the SIG's utility, its effectiveness for dealing with important policy decisions is a key issue. As shown in Annex B, the SIG has been a useful forum for such decisions on a variety of occasions. For example: —Before King Hassan's State visit in February 1967 the SIG considered the question of how the President might respond to the King's request for military assistance—taking into account the developing arms balance in the Maghreb and United States relations with these countries. —In 1966, when Fiat announced plans for construction of an automobile plant in the Soviet Union, the Senior Group considered the Italian concern's request for Export-Import Bank financing of United States-made equipment which the Italians proposed to install. —In 1967, following De Gaulle's decision to withhold delivery of Mirage aircraft to Israel, the SIG considered the merits of a favorable decision on the Israeli request for United States Skyhawk aircraft and Phantom jets, taking into account the Middle East arms balance, the likely Soviet response, and the attitudes of the Congress. —In early 1968, after an urgent request from Panama's National Guard for tear gas supplies from stocks in the Canal Zone, the SIG reviewed this matter against the background of Panama's then precarious domestic political situation (including the Presidential election and the danger of a coup—which subsequently materialized). —Following the Tet offensive, when there was mounting concern about our knowledge of the insurgency threat in Northeast Thailand, the SIG commissioned a special study concerning the reliability of our intelligence data. —More recently, while Jarring negotiated with Israel, Jordan and the UAR in New York, the Senior Group met with our Ambassadors to Amman and Tel Aviv to consider the future of Jarring's mission and what, if anything, the United States might do to enhance prospects for a settlement. These examples illustrate the variety of action issues considered in the SIG. In the usual case, the result was a firm decision and recommendation. On a few occasions, the SIG felt that the decision was a marginal one between the several options and confined itself to outlining the alternatives for higher-level review. A good many of these policy issues will require further consideration by the new Administration in terms of its own priorities and objectives. For example, the SIG in recent months discussed and recommended alternative courses of action to the President on arms supply policy to India and Pakistan and whether and at what level to resume arms shipments to Greece (the latter having been suspended after the Colonels coup). In both cases interim measures were recommended in order to leave a new Administration free to make its own decisions. (See Annex C 6 for pending SIG business and past policy decisions under the SIG program of work which the new Administration might wish to review.) Preparation for International Negotiations : A recent example was the package we offered Spain for a five-year renewal of our base rights facilities. As their price for renewal, the Spanish originally proposed a five-year $1 billion program of military assistance, a strengthening of the 1963 communiqué setting forth the common security interests of the two countries and the relaxation of our controls on direct investments in Spain. The SIG recommended a counter-proposal (later approved by the President) that we hold military assistance to about $100 million but offer phasing out one of the two air bases. The Spanish Government rejected this proposal but talks are continuing. Final decisions on this matter will have to be made by the new Administration. Long-Term Policy Guidance : The purpose of these studies has been to lay out a policy framework for specific operational decisions, reach interagency agreement on general lines of policy, and provide a critical assessment of the judgments of value and fact on which our policies are based, together with an examination of feasible alternatives. Major studies in process or completed on behalf of the SIG include: —United States policy in the Middle East (completed); 7 —United States security policy in Latin America (Martin Study; 8 follow-on studies are under way); —United States policy toward southern Africa (completed); 9 —Review of United States worldwide overseas base requirements (reporting date December 15, 1968); —Analysis of United States strategy in Korea and possible future alternatives (first stage completed; second stage due in early 1969). These studies have generally revealed—as indeed they should—sharp policy differences both between and within foreign affairs agencies. An example is the proposed policy guidance towards the southern Africa region (encompassing the ten-country area south of the Congo and Tanzania): Our policy must balance conflicting interests such as our ideological commitment to human rights and racial equality, the importance of black African votes in the United Nations, and our substantial economic and logistical interests in southern Africa. Not surprisingly, different agencies with different policy perspectives strongly disagree on our priorities. One other aspect of these studies should be noted: They are developing a genuine interdepartmental planning effort, which: a) Is carried out by an interdepartmental staff; (In the case of the Korea Study, each of the three services as well as the JCS are represented. Analytical techniques are drawn freely from all the agencies and departments.) b) Deals with policies and programs across agency lines (such as the mix of local military forces structures and United States deployment patterns, or the inter-relationship of political and economic development strategy). Studies ready for review early next year include: our worldwide base requirements; the new interagency study on Korea; possibly, two new studies on Latin America. Foreign Affairs Management : The SIG has also been a good forum for managerial problems affecting the interests of several agencies. One task in this area is the program for the reduction of overseas personnel—directed by President Johnson as part of his balance of payments message in January 1968. The first phase of the program, which was completed last August, reduced American personnel by 18 percent and local personnel by 16 percent. Follow-on efforts to achieve additional savings continue, including possible reductions in our military assistance/advisory groups in Latin America and East Asia, and the combining of Western European MAAGs into regional units serving several countries. Finally, a study now under way examines our massive government-wide overseas reporting requirements to determine where further economies can be made. A serious policy issue concerns United States efforts to combat insurgency situations overseas. Profiting from the experience of the past eight years in Viet-Nam and elsewhere, the SIG last spring approved new policy guidance, which reemphasized the socio-economic bases of insurgency and the need to determine whether strategic United States interests are affected. Under the new policy, the SIG must specifically review and approve those military and economic programs whose principal justification is counterinsurgency (i.e., the Foreign Internal Defense Action List). An evaluation of seven country programs justified on this basis is now under way. Recommendations for the final list will be submitted to the new Administration early next year. Finally, the SIG also provides the steering mechanism for forward planning against contingencies and crises. Responsibility for crisis planning and management has now been lodged firmly with the regional Assistant Secretary and his IRG. The new procedures paid an early dividend when the European Bureau, using such advance planning, was able to deal quickly and effectively with the operational problems created by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. A series of studies for major contingencies is now under way in the various IRGs. The more important of these will be submitted to the SIG. Resource Allocation : Another facet of this managerial focus is the SIG's work on allocation of resources. The SIG obviously is not qualified to review technical questions of program development and effectiveness—this being the responsibility of the particular agency charged with these programs—but it is a suitable forum to consider: a) broad choices and priorities as reflected in the allocation of appropriated funds by country, region or type of program; and, b) the political, military and security implications of these allocations—especially the broader implications of steadily declining military and economic assistance appropriations. To this end, the SIG and the SIG Staff have been working closely with the Bureau of the Budget. Each fall, representatives of the Bureau and the SIG Staff jointly discuss with the five regional Assistant Secretaries the budget submissions of AID, MAP, USIA, the Peace Corps and the Bureau of Cultural Affairs. Before the Budget Bureau submits its own recommendations to the President, major issues arising from these discussions are considered at a meeting of the SIG, in which the Director of the Bureau of the Budget participates. IV. Critical Appraisal Experience shows, in our view, that the SIG/IRG structure while by no means a panacea, can be an important instrument of policy control, both intra- and interdepartmentally. Used selectively and judiciously, it is well worth the cost in time and effort which is involved. But conversely, an attempt to expand its scope to the bulk of day-to-day interdepartmental business would produce intolerable duplication and waste. With respect to urgent business of the day, the SIG has been most useful when dealing with “threshold” decisions, i.e., those relatively few major action issues having wide domestic and foreign policy implications. On a problem of this nature, a properly prepared SIG meeting serves a useful purpose as a vehicle for pooling the diverse appraisals, interests, and considerations which each of the SIG principals brings to the issue. Under the best of circumstances, such a meeting refines the alternatives, options and criteria on the bases of which the Administration—often the President—must make a decision. Experience also indicates that tabling an issue in the SIG or its regional sub-groups can be a powerful device for forcing into the open hidden disagreements—provided the members are prepared to discuss their views candidly and the Chairman is willing to sharpen the issues rather than engaging in a search for vague compromise. Furthermore, taking an issue into the SIG can—and has been—an effective way to demonstrate weaknesses in the staffing of policy recommendations and to compel operating desks to submit issues to higher policy levels for review. Needless to say, not all meetings have been a complete success—either at the SIG or the IRG level. But this does not, in itself invalidate the concept. A meeting may be unsuccessful because the subject matter is not suited for—or does not require—a group discussion, such as when there is general agreement on the facts, appraisal and recommendations. Alternatively, preparations for a meeting may have been inadequate—or the group may have been unwilling to discuss the issue candidly. On the other hand, an inconclusive result—despite best efforts—may simply reflect the intractability of the problem—our limited understanding and knowledge about many aspects of foreign affairs and national security policy. Most issues that come before the SIG are controversial. Therefore it should not be surprising that a good many SIG decisions have not been universally popular. The SIG has not hesitated, on a number of occasions, to rule against the recommendations of the initiating operating bureau or agency. And many of its decisions have evoked a strongly negative response from one part or another of the Washington foreign affairs community. The SIG has devoted much time and talent to various long-term studies. Has this effort been justified? These studies have attempted to provide both a general policy context and some specific guidance for particular operational problems. Also, they have been designed to reappraise situations, programs, and policies. The studies have not always lent themselves easily to discussion in committee. But in our view, they have confirmed the value of comprehensive planning by an integrated interdepartmental staff, at least for those countries and areas where major political, military, and economic-developmental programs and objectives are present. In two respects, however, this planning process under SIG auspices could be improved: —Greater care should be taken in drafting terms of reference. In several cases, the studies attempted to cover too wide an area of subject matter. A better design, a more restricted focus, might have produced better results. —Greater thought and effort should be devoted to linking policy and program development. The general policy framework, however persuasively articulated, remains ambiguous, unless it is clearly linked to specific program objectives and these in turn form the basis for military and economic assistance plans (and, ultimately, US military planning). (While not wanting to prejudge the final results of the follow-on work, we believe an approach notably successful in this respect is the Korea policy study undertaken on the recommendation of Mr. Vance after the Pueblo crisis .) There are also a number of legitimate criticisms of the SIG's performance to date. Essentially, these reduce to two: - Uneven, sometimes sporadic, coverage of issues : Many of the issues, which under orderly operating procedures should have gone through the SIG, have been handled on an ad hoc, more personal, basis. There still is considerable reluctance to take complex, highly controversial issues into the SIG. This reluctance can be seen in all the constituent agencies, including the Department of State. Senior policy officers are reluctant to do so because they believe that the SIG, even under its pres-ent restricted membership and attendance rules, is still too public and diversified a forum for the discussion of highly sensitive matters. Similarly, there frequently is resistance from working levels. Review by the SIG cuts into the desired margin of operating and policy autonomy, and it reduces flexibility in seeking a predictable, hopefully sympathetic, forum for appropriate policy review at higher levels. From the operator or country expert's point of view, the decisions taken by the SIG are somewhat unpredictable precisely because the SIG represents a pooling of broader, more varied, policy perspectives. - The uneven performance of the IRGs : Activity in the regional interdepartmental groups has varied considerably from region to region, depending on the personality of the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State, his work style, and his vigor and energy in pressing his mandate for interagency coordination. Several of the IRGs, notably those for Latin America and Near East/South Asian Affairs, have met regularly to consider virtually all the major policy issues requiring interagency consultation. Senior policy officers for these regions have developed a pattern of close cooperation across agency lines. In other regions, use of the IRG has been more limited in scope. Some of these difficulties could be overcome by more flexible arrangements for attendance and participation. Issues are of varying interest-in terms of their statutory and policy mandate—to the SIG principals. One possibility would be to give the AID Administrator and the Director of USIA the option of not attending meetings that do not significantly affect their interests. Alternatively, the SIG might formally constitute an Executive Committee, consisting of State, Defense, JCS, CIA and the White House representative, that would deal with sensitive security and intelligence matters (similar to the informal group which now discusses Viet-Nam). Another subcommittee might deal with issues having a security-economic component (such as balance of payments implications of United States military deployments overseas). In conclusion, the SIG can meet the responsibilities and requirements levied upon it by the Secretary of State and, ultimately, the President, both directly and in support of an active NSC, provided two conditions are fulfilled: First, the Department of State must represent more than a parochial interest in foreign affairs: When the Department acts as Executive Chairman of the SIG/IRG, it must learn to adjust its vision to the problem of decision-making at the Presidential level. Second, there must be clear and unambiguous encouragement and support from the highest levels of government. The mechanism cannot be really effective unless the Secretary of State and the President keep up steady pressure on the several agencies to staff recommendations through this channel. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/DOC #47. Confidential. Under cover of December 4 memorandum Arthur Hartman sent copies of the SIG Staff Study to the Staff Directors for each of the 6 IRGs. 2 Annex A contains text of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 341. [Footnote in the source text. Attached but not printed.] 3 Annex B describes major items. [Footnote in the source text. Attached but not printed.] 4 Annex D contains a copy of President Kennedy's letter to all Ambassadors making these responsibilities crystal clear. [Footnote in the source text. Attached but not printed.] 5 Viet-Nam, while not formally on the SIG agenda, has been considered regularly and systematically by an informal subcommittee of SIG members, chaired by Mr. Katzenbach and including Mr. Nitze, General Wheeler, Mr. Walt Rostow, and Mr. Helms. While not a decision-making body, this group—encouraged by the Secretary of State—has provided an important forum for the pooling of information and views and the preparation of operational recommendations to the President. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 “Estimate of Major Items on SIG Agenda As of January 1, 1968”; attached but not printed. 7 “U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” circulated to SIG member agencies on July 19. (Department of State, IRG/NEA Files: Lot 70 D 503) 8 “Latin America, a Recommended U.S. National Strategy, April 1968,” prepared by a Special State-Defense Study Group under direction of Ambassador Edwin M. Martin. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: FRC 73 A 1250, Latin America 319.2 (12 Apr 68) 1968, Attachment 91) 9 “National Policy Paper on Southern Africa,” 3rd draft (Revised), November 1968, prepared by William Witman of the Policy Planning Council. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Memo #98) 138. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Duemling) to the Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Hartman) 138. Memorandum From the Staff Director of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Duemling) to the Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (Hartman) 1 Washington, December 23, 1968. SUBJECT Staff Study on the Role of the SIG I found your paper 2 on the SIG's role in the coordination of foreign affairs and national security policy to be quite a fair appraisal of the SIG/IRG mechanism, with respect to both its potentialities and current level of performance. The paper will be most useful in briefing new principals in this Bureau; a copy is also being circulated to Mr. Bundy and his Deputies. I have only three specific comments on the paper: 1. Like the SIG (see your page 4, first paragraph), 3 we have found that the IRG/EA can serve as a forum for ventilation of issues on which there is disagreement within Defense. 2. The IRG/EA, perhaps in contrast to the SIG, has often functioned as an exploratory body. We have therefore welcomed participation by representatives of offices and agencies outside the stipulated membership, to a degree well beyond the limits mentioned on page 8 of your paper. 4 A measure of candor and confidence may be sacrificed thereby, though we have not been aware of it. In any case, this difference points to a functional variation within the SIG/IRG mechanism. 3. I would dissent mildly from your view (page 5) 5 that the stature and authority of an Assistant Secretary is enhanced by his being concurrently Chairman of the IRG; in this Bureau, the opposite has been true. My own view is that the principal value of the SIG/IRG mechanism, and of the SIG's action on the IRG, derives from its catalytic function. Without exception an expression of SIG interest has resulted in more intensive efforts by EA operating levels to explore the ramifications of problems and to identify more clearly the options available. This procedure might be enhanced if the SIG staff directed more of its efforts through the IRG/EA staff (such as it is!) rather than obliquely and sometimes ambiguously to the Country Desks concerned. I would even expand the point by observing that SIG/IRG relations—both on the formal, and informal staff levels—should be a two-way street, and that past performance could certainly be improved. Another plus is the multiplier effect resulting from SIG or IRG interest. Let me illustrate. In attempting to produce an SAFC on the Taiwan Straits, the IRG/EA discovered that greater elucidation and precision was required on certain matters involving intelligence estimates and current policy. Accordingly, the IRG/EA directed preparation of ancillary studies which will be valuable not only in preparing an SAFC on the Taiwan Straits, but in connection with a concurrent policy review on force levels and structures in Taiwan. Finally, I would stress the usefulness of the IRG as an open forum for discussion of problems often dimly perceived. Some of the most fruitful meetings of the IRG/EA have not resulted in specific decisions or in approval of action papers, but rather have clarified and advanced collective thinking within that area of the Government charged with responsibility for U.S. policy toward East Asia. The experience of this Bureau clearly supports the continuation and strengthening of the SIG/IRG mechanism. The imperfections of the system are as clear to us as they are to you. But the mechanism has had a rationalizing effect on the decision-making process and has helped guard against decisions flawed by imprecision or parochialism. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Administrative. Confidential. A copy was sent to William Bundy. 2 Document 137 . 3 Part I, paragraph beginning: “Two important aspects of the SIG should also be noted…” 4 Part II B, paragraph beginning: “Third, informality and confidentiality.” 5 Part I, paragraph beginning: “The SIG is the outgrowth of efforts of the last three Presidents…” The National Security Council and the White House The National Security Council and the White House 139. Memorandum of Discussion Between General Eisenhower and Director of Central Intelligence McCone Pasadena, California, December 31, 1963. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA. No classification marking. Prepared by John McCone. The meeting was held at the Huntington Hotel. 140. Editorial Note 141. Memorandum for Record Washington, January 27, 1964. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 63–Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. 142. Editorial Note 143. Memorandum for Record Washington, February 10, 1964. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 61–Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Colonel Smith. 144. Memorandum for Record Washington, February 28, 1964. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 63–Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Colonel Smith. 145. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 14, 1964, 12:50 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F64.23, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 146. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 29, 1964, 4:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret. McCone dictated the memorandum on April 30. 147. Editorial Note 148. Memorandum From the President's Personal Secretary (Roberts) to the President's Press Secretary (Reedy) Washington, July 2, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, Press Office Files, Box 135, Bits and Pieces of Useful Information. No classification marking. 149. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, November 2, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Management. No classification marking. 150. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Cater) to President Johnson Washington, November 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of S. Douglass Cater, Memos to the President. No classification marking. 151. Memorandum for the Record Washington, December 4, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Klein Memos. Secret. Prepared by David Klein. 152. Editorial Note 153. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, February 2, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Confidential. 154. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 10, 1965, 6:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, Tape F65.47, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, August 2, 1965, 6:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13. No classification marking. 156. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, September 14, 1965, 5:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 14. No classification marking. 157. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) Washington, November 13, 1965, 12:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 158. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, December 1, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Management. Personal and Confidential. 159. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, December 4, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. Eyes Only. 160. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson Washington, December 13, 1965, 9:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking. 161. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, February 27, 1966, 9:10 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, Tape 66.09, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 162. Editorial Note 163. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson Washington, March 1, 1966, 2 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking. 164. Editorial Note 165. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson Washington, March 31, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, BKS Chron. No classification marking. Smith sent a less detailed memorandum to Bundy on October 6, 1965, outlining national security information sent to the President each day. (Ibid.) 166. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966—. No classification marking. The document was presumably written soon after April 1, 1966, when Rostow succeeded Bundy. Rostow wrote numerous fragmentary notes on the memorandum, presumably reflecting his thoughts and reactions while reading it. Some have been noted below. At the top of page one of the memorandum Rostow wrote “Talk to Brom” (Bromley Smith). 167. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 8, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. No classification marking. At the top of page 1 is a handwritten note from Rostow to Bromley Smith stating “good memo.” 168. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 29, 1966, 4:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11–5. Confidential. Copies were sent to Moyers and Kintner. 169. Memorandum From the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) to the President's Special Assistant (Kintner) Washington, May 5, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Bill D. Moyers, BDM Memos. No classification marking. The memorandum is an unsigned copy. 170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson Washington, May 25, 1966, 1:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3. Confidential. A copy was sent to Jim Jones of the White House staff. 171. Editorial Note 172. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to All Assistant Secretaries Washington, May 30, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, Notebook on NSC Meetings, 1966. Confidential. Lot 72 D 318 contains three notebooks with State Department briefings and other backup material for NSC meetings from June 9, 1966 through November 25, 1968. 173. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 12, 1966, 12:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 11. No classification marking. 174. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 3, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC Personnel. Personal and Confidential. 175. Editorial Note 176. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, May 3, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Hamilton Memos. Eyes Only. 177. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 11, 1967, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Rostow Memos. No 178. Editorial Note 179. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 25, 1967, 9 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 43. No classification marking. 180. Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff Washington, March 15, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC, SIG, IRG. No classification marking. In a March 15 covering note Saunders indicated that the paper consisted of his notes for a presentation to Career Trainees at CIA. 181. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 24, 1968, 6:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC, SIG, IRG. No classification marking. In a March 15 covering note Saunders indicated that the paper consisted of his notes for a presentation to Career Trainees at CIA. 182. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 5, 1968, 10:15 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Rostow Memos. No classification marking. 139. Memorandum of Discussion Between General Eisenhower and Director of Central Intelligence McCone 139. Memorandum of Discussion Between General Eisenhower and Director of Central Intelligence McCone 1 Pasadena, California, December 31, 1963. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 6. Turning to the matter of Government organization, General Eisenhower spoke, as he has many times in the past, that there exists a serious void in the organizational structure of the President's advisors and staff, and this he believes is unwise and dangerous. He reviewed the organizational structure of the OCB and the Planning Board which supported the NSC during his Administration, and while he felt that this organization was cumbersome and needed some streamlining, he feels that the absence of such an organization places the President in a position in which he is forced to make decisions without the benefit of all of the background that bears on the situation under consideration. General Eisenhower also strongly urged that the President study this organization problem seriously, and recommended he consult with those who are thoroughly familiar with the past organization and its operation, including General Goodpaster and Mr. Gordon Gray. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA. No classification marking. Prepared by John McCone. The meeting was held at the Huntington Hotel. 2 In a January 5 memorandum for the record regarding his meeting with President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch on January 4, McCone stated: “The President agreed with Item #6 in the December 31 memorandum on the organization of his own staff and the reinstitution of some type of a Planning Board. He said that he had discussed this subject in some detail with Eisenhower and was convinced Eisenhower was right. He indicated an intention to discuss this subject with Mr. Gordon Gray.” (Ibid.) See also Document 146 . 140. Editorial Note 140. Editorial Note The 521st meeting of the National Security Council took place on January 7, 1964. This was the first NSC meeting in 1964 and the second since Lyndon Johnson's accession to the presidency on November 22, 1963. The final meeting—the 594th—took place on November 25, 1968. Summary notes for 73 of the 75 NSC meetings during the Johnson Presidency, taken mainly by NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, are at the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Director of Central Intelligence John McCone's notes for NSC meetings prior to his resignation on April 28, 1965, are at the Johnson Library (John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President) and at the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI (McCone) Files). Additional notes for five meetings (July 27, 1965, January 29, 1966, September 13, 1967, June 5 and October 31, 1968) are in the Meeting Notes Files at the Johnson Library. Additional notes for nine meetings, taken by Assistant (and then Deputy) Press Secretary W. Thomas Johnson between July 1967 and November 1968, are in Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings at the Johnson Library. Backup material for NSC meetings is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 (1964–1966) and Lot 72 D 318 (1966–1968). At the Johnson Library backup material for NSC meetings is located principally in the NSC Meetings File and the NSC Agency File (both part of the National Security File), the Meeting Notes File, and the President's Appointment File under dates of meetings. Walt W. Rostow, President Johnson's National Security Adviser from April 1966 to January 1969, discusses NSC meetings and the more general topic of “The Organization of National Security Affairs” under Johnson in The Diffusion of Power, pages 358–368. Additional information on NSC meetings can be found in David C. Humphrey, “NSC Meetings During the Johnson Presidency,” Diplomatic History, 18 (Winter 1994): 29–45. 141. Memorandum for Record 141. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, January 27, 1964. SUBJECT Daily White House Staff Meeting, 27 January 1964 2 1. Bromley Smith presided throughout the meeting. [Omitted here is material on several foreign policy issues and on Colonel Howard Burris' staff responsibilities.] 7. NSC Staff . During the meeting Bromley Smith mentioned Bundy's return next week, 3 and made some comment that Bundy might have trouble “finding his operation.” This hit home to more than one staff member because Bundy's operations are clearly not the same as they were. Consequently, those staff members who worked primarily for Bundy have little or nothing to do. This includes everyone on the staff except Komer and Forrestal, who sometimes work directly with the President's office. It is hard to judge how these two are doing. Forrestal is out of town, and Komer tries to give the appearance of being in on the know. One major difficulty is that no one is moving in to take charge of White House operations. Neither Jenkins, Moyers, nor Valenti are really managing the President—or even parts of him, insofar as preparation for visits of foreign dignitaries and other affairs with foreign policy implications are concerned. The result is continued confusion and uncertainty. It looks as though this may last for some time, however. WYS 1 Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 63–Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 McGeorge Bundy held regular (though not necessarily daily) meetings with his staff. In Bundy's absence, Bromley Smith chaired the meetings. General Maxwell Taylor's aide, Major William Y. Smith, attended the meetings and took notes August 1961–August 1964. His memoranda for the record are ibid.; copies are at the Johnson Library. Chester Cooper of CIA attended 45 staff meetings January 6–July 15, 1964, and summarized the proceedings in memoranda to CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline. The memoranda are at the Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos 1964. Peter Jessup attended 24 staff meetings between January and June 1965 and provided CIA with information on each meeting orally, which CIA then put in a memorandum for the record. The memoranda are ibid., White House Staff Meetings 1965. On August 30, 1965, Jessup telephoned CIA and, according to the memorandum for the record, “apologized for not having reported more frequently, explaining that the White House Staff was rather disorganized, the situation was disjointed, and that there had been few Staff meetings.” (Ibid.) 3 Bundy was on vacation. 142. Editorial Note 142. Editorial Note On February 4, 1964, President Johnson held the first of more than 150 Tuesday lunch meetings with his senior foreign policy advisers. The discussion focused on U.S. policy in Vietnam. (McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the record, February 5, 1964; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of State, Vol. 1) No notes were kept of the meeting, nor, prior to July 1967, were notes normally made of Tuesday lunch discussions. From July 1967 to December 1968, Assistant (later Deputy) Press Secretary W. Thomas Johnson kept notes for about 45 luncheon discussions, which are located in Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings at the Johnson Library. White House Press Secretary George Christian and President's Special Assistant Jim Jones took notes at another six luncheons during the same period, which are located in the Meeting Notes File at the Johnson Library. Agendas for Tuesday luncheons are found in a number of files at the Johnson Library but principally in the following locations in the National Security File: Bundy Files, Luncheons with the President; and Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, and Tuesday Luncheon—Suggested Agenda. Rostow's file on Meetings with the President also contains records of decisions made at some of the luncheons. Attendance at the luncheons is documented in the President's Daily Diary at the Johnson Library. Attendees normally included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the White House Press Secretary starting in 1966, and, starting in 1967, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and note taker W. Thomas Johnson. Commentary on the Tuesday luncheons by participants and by those closely associated with the sessions is in Walt Rostow's The Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pages 359–360; Dean Rusk's As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), pages 519–520; and the oral histories at the Johnson Library by William P. Bundy, Richard Helms, Benjamin Read, Dean Rusk, Bromley Smith, and Walt Rostow. Additional information on the luncheons can be found in David C. Humphrey, “Tuesday Lunch at the Johnson White House: A Preliminary Assessment,” Diplomatic History , 9 (Winter 1984): 81–101. 143. Memorandum for Record 143. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, February 10, 1964. SUBJECT Daily White House Staff Meeting, 10 February 1964 1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting. [Omitted here is material on foreign visitors and Panama.] 5. Bundy's LBJ Ranch Visit . Bundy several times mentioned his discussions at the LBJ ranch over the weekend. 2 He and the President evidently ranged over many subjects, both substantive and on methods of operation of Bundy's staff. On substantive matters, Bundy said he now had a much clearer picture of the matters the President wanted to handle directly and those on which the staff could have a freer hand. Rather than list them he said he would handle them as matters came up. He did say at the present time the President considered there were only two major crises: Vietnam and Cuba. These were explosive situations. The remainder of our current problems were difficult ones, but not of the same order of magnitude. With respect to White House staff procedures, the President reiterated he was very pleased with the support he was getting. (At this point Bundy half-jokingly commented that it proved again how unnecessary he was, and he felt like leaving things in Bromley Smith's hands.) The President expects disagreements from his staff, and flaps. He knew the Bundy staff was different because there were no leaks and no sniping criticism. He wanted this to continue. As to the type of function the staff performs, the President considers these necessary. He had talked with Rusk about it, who agrees. Rusk said he believed Bundy's staff performed a very important function for the President and that he and Bundy had learned to live with the backlash from various levels of government. All in all, the LBJ ranch visit seems to have been very useful in that probably for the first time Bundy and the President talked alone on matters that will guide the NSC staff operations in the future. [Omitted here is material on Venezuela.] WYS 1 Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 61–Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Colonel Smith. 2 Bundy spent Saturday evening, February 8, and most of Sunday at the LBJ Ranch before returning to Washington with the President by airplane on Sunday evening. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) 144. Memorandum for Record 144. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, February 28, 1964. SUBJECT: Daily White House Staff Meeting, 28 February 1964 1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting. [Omitted here is material on several foreign policy issues.] 5. NSC Meeting . There will be an NSC meeting tomorrow and, in discussing it, Bundy made an interesting comment. He was wary of bringing up certain matters because the Speaker of the House would be in attendance, 2 and there might be some conflicts between the legislative and executive approach. This being the case, it seems the NSC can play no crucial role until after the election at least, and by then the pattern will have been set to live without it, assuming the President is re-elected. [Omitted here is material on the command and control system and the Kennedy Library.] 8. The President's Work Habits . Bundy said that experience has taught him that the best way to do business with the President is probably in writing rather than talking with him, as Bundy originally tried to do. The reason is that not only is it difficult to get to the President, but when one does it is usually at the end of the day when the President does not go into things thoroughly. At night, however, the President evidently works through his papers thoroughly. Bundy's suggestion was that the procedure most desirable now seems to be to write a brief explanatory memorandum with issues to be resolved and a recommendation. The paper should also leave space for the President to indicate whether he agrees or prefers something different or needs more information. Complicated issues, of course, cannot be handled this way, but Bundy feels a goodly number of things that the President must see can be. WYS 1 Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Nov 63–Aug 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Colonel Smith. 2 The President asked the Speaker to attend in place of the Vice President, whose office was vacant during 1964. 145. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 145. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, April 14, 1964, 12:50 p.m. [Omitted here is discussion of several foreign affairs issues.] President: I never talk to Tom [Mann]. I haven't talked to Tom. I always talk to Rusk. Bundy: Yup. President: But, maybe I ought to talk to Tom more. Do you think I ought to? Bundy: I think that when we get issues up, that Tom should be in where you and he can hear each other. President: Oh yes, I think that's right with issues up. But I'm talking about— Bundy: No, I think you ought to conduct your business either with Rusk or on a staff basis through my office. I think that's easier and more efficient really. President: You know, it's mighty easy for me to call Mike Forrestal on say Vietnam, but I wonder what his boss thinks when the President's calling him every hour. Bundy: It doesn't bother me, Mr. President. President: No, it wouldn't bother you, but don't you think a boss ought to normally feel like that he's entitled to be on top of the job? Bundy: Well, I think if it's something you want hot information on, Mr. President, you ought to call where you can get it fastest. When it's a decision or an organization problem, then I think-but I don't think you need any lessons on that. [Bundy laughs] President: Well my judgment—I follow the charts pretty well, and I think a man that's sure of himself doesn't hesitate to have Komer sitting in here with me right now. He's not afraid Komer's going to get his job. But, I think the boss pretty well ought to deal with the other boss if he can. [Omitted here is discussion of Walter Lippmann and relations with the press.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F64.23, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 146. Memorandum for the Record 146. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 29, 1964, 4:45 p.m. SUBJECT Discussion with President Johnson—Wednesday afternoon—29 Apr. 4:45 in his office PRESENT The President and Mr. McCone 1. I reviewed in detail, and item by item, my memorandum of my discussion with General Eisenhower (memorandum dated April 27th). 2 President Johnson made the following comments: a. With respect to the organization of the Executive Office, the holding of frequent NSC meetings, the supporting of NSC with an Operations Coordinating Board and Planning Board, President Johnson said he had never heard of the idea before. He said that Eisenhower had never mentioned it to him nor did he recall that I had ever spoken about it. He said he thought the NSC was functioning satisfactorily, that it met when important or critical issues required a meeting, that the staff work was adequate and he was satisfied. He said the only thing that Eisenhower proposed to him was the replacement of McGeorge Bundy with Gordon Gray. I said that I did not wish to belabor the point; I thought he had probably forgotten the discussion; that Eisenhower told me he had suggested that Johnson talk with Gordon Gray and General Goodpaster concerning the Eisenhower concept of a proper organization, 3 but did not think that he had advocated placing Gordon Gray in the Executive Office nor had he advocated the removal of McGeorge Bundy. President Johnson said he did not recall any of this and therefore I dropped the matter. 4 [Omitted here are summaries of other subjects discussed with the President.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret. McCone dictated the memorandum on April 30. 2 Not found. 3 See Document 139 and footnote 2 thereto. 4 In a telephone conversation with McGeorge Bundy that began at 5:22 p.m. on June 18, the President mentioned a report “raising hell about the way we reorganized [the] Security Council.” Bundy responded: “Yep, this is straight Eisenhower. He feels this personally and strongly. It was an affront to him when we abolished the Operations Coordinating Board, and he's taken my hide off personally about it a couple of times.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape 64.34, Side B, PNO 3) The report mentioned by the President has not been identified. 147. Editorial Note 147. Editorial Note The final NSC Standing Group meeting on record during the Johnson Presidency was held on April 30, 1964, to discuss Israeli requests for U.S. tanks. (Memorandum for the Record, April 30, 1964; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Standing Group) The Standing Group was established by President Kennedy to deal with planning and operations problems and met approximately 31 times during his Presidency. It was convened six times between December 1963 and April 1964. Documentation on Standing Group meetings is ibid. At the Johnson Library a small amount of material is contained in the National Security File, Agency File, NSC Standing Group. Additional information on the Standing Group can be found in Bromley K. Smith, Organizational History of the National Security Council during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (Washington: National Security Council, 1988), pages 51–53. 148. Memorandum From the President's Personal Secretary (Roberts) to the President's Press Secretary (Reedy) 148. Memorandum From the President's Personal Secretary (Roberts) to the President's Press Secretary (Reedy) 1 Washington, July 2, 1964. Reedy, Rick Smith (NY Times) called saying he had been talking with you, Jack Valenti, Walter Jenkins about how the President works and how information flows to him. He said he wanted to check with me on some specifics about the “Night Reading Envelope” that had been mentioned to him— I told him I was on a “rush” and couldn't take a minute right then to talk—could I call him back. FYI, the night reading comes about this way: All day long papers come into the office to my desk, from various sources—from WH staff members, from Cabinet, from various Depts and Agencies, from mail, telegraph and from notes resulting from telephone messages and/or conversations. All day, in the light of the day's program and demands on the President's time, I sift, sort and shift—taking in some items through the day and giving them to the President in person or putting them in various spots on his desk (spots having meaning as to urgency) and into my “stack” for consideration at end of day for night reading. I try to keep the night reading from getting too bulky—sometimes hold items not requiring a decision or a response (nor needed as information for decision making) to a night when bulk is less, evening schedule lighter for example—I try to keep Monday nights' night reading lighter because of the early hour of the regular Tues Legislative Leaders b'fast and particularly so if there is a late evening event on Monday night. Intelligence reports, position papers, reports that have tedious detail and need uninterrupted time for reading and study make up the body of the night reading envelope. And I try to lighten this “load” by putting in the thank-you notes, happy little items of information etc. that are good to go to sleep on. In addition, items needing decisions for early the next day which have not been made today go in—each covered with a “brief” with a space for him to check his desired action to save him time from writing (since he has no secretary to dictate to when going thru his night reading). 1 Source: Johnson Library, Press Office Files, Box 135, Bits and Pieces of Useful Information. No classification marking. 149. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 149. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 2, 1964. SUBJECT Some comments on Post-election Problems I am drafting this memorandum before Election Day. 2 Right now it looks as if you are about to have the biggest victory of the century. But this memorandum will be valid also if we get exactly 270 electoral votes. The immediate problems of the Presidency are not sharply affected by the size of the margin—however big or small the victory, the immediate problems will be there. The victory itself will be the culmination of 347 days of really extraordinary achievement, perhaps the most important set of accomplishments that any President has ever racked up in a period of less than a year. (1) The country has been held together, with growing prosperity and unexpected civic peace. (2) An Administration set up by another man has been taken and used with extraordinary little strain and friction. (3) A large and precedent-shattering legislative program has been passed. (4) A lot of small but tricky international tests have been met. (5) A campaign of unusual meanness has been met by one of unusual breadth and generosity. (6) The policies and prospects defined in the winner's campaign have much more breadth and quality on foreign and domestic issues than critics have yet noticed (although I hope Walter Lippmann may do a piece on our foreign policy Tuesday). This overwhelming achievement will be seen for what it is after Election Day, and many people—both here and abroad—will have increasingly large expectations of future accomplishment. Insofar as these hopes give support and strength to your new administration, they give a solid base on which we have some time to build. But the brightness of this achievement and the hopes it offers are threatened in a number of important ways, and the real purpose of this memorandum is not so much to celebrate what you have accomplished as it is to suggest some of the difficulties that must now be overcome. The first problem is that while the victory may be very big, it will also be somewhat thin. A large part of the margin will be due not to us but to Senator Goldwater. Moreover, the very meanness of the Goldwater campaign has had as a consequence a certain clouding of the Presidency—a shadowing of the White House. And in the press, which has given us a degree of support unprecedented for a Democratic Administration, there is going to be backlash. It is foreshadowed in the Washington Star editorial of Sunday, and it is almost foreordained in the determination of newspapermen to be independent and critical. Reporters and publishers alike believe that they have been very generous to us during the campaign, and they are just waiting for a chance to even the score. This attitude will probably seem wholly unfair and inhuman to you, but I am sure it is a fact of our future life. The second problem is that the White House needs to be organized for the long pull. Your miraculous performance in the last 11 months has been supported by literally super-human efforts by Valenti and Moyers—and by Jenkins until he cracked. This cannot go on for the long run. Moreover, great as the achievement has been, it has been sharply limited in the following ways: (1) The legislative program was already in existence; (2) There was an election year stand-down on major new initiatives, both domestic and foreign; (3) The primary business of the Presidency was to legislate and to campaign, and these jobs were overwhelmingly the personal responsibility of the President himself. Not even Valenti and Moyers can go at the rate they have been going, and there is more to be done in the next six months than even they have been doing. A third and more general problem is that of manning the Administration beyond the White House. Very few major appointments have been made in the last 12 months, and the morning of the 4th of November will bring a stirring toward change of many sorts. A number of men have stayed simply in order to help beat Goldwater; a number of others are ambitious for promotion which they may or may not deserve; still others have not done very well and ought to be changed. And all this is in addition to your own imperative need to get the men you want where you want them—which your victory will permit and your needs demand. A fourth and still more general problem lies in the field of national security, in a set of major decisions which have been deliberately deferred. There are five big ones and a number of little ones. The big ones are: (1) Vietnam; (2) European policy—the MLF and the Kennedy Round and De Gaulle; (3) Cuba; (4) Nuclear spread, Red China, and the UN; (5) Foreign aid in all its aspects. The marginal troubles, any one of which could become explosive, include Cyprus, the Congo, Indonesia-Malaysia, and Article 19. Taken together, these problems are very serious indeed, and my own judgment is that if we do not now take time to get organized and to make certain basic decisions about operations and policy, we could very easily make a mess of things at a time when a great many people will be waiting to jump on any mistakes. Like other men I have views on these general problems; I think they are all tough but manageable. But my present point is that they need attention. And the conclusion I reach is that you should take a very deep breath and walk around these problems, carefully and quietly, for about two weeks after Election Day. The country and the government will understand and expect a period of quiet and a period of preparation, and the people who have carried the major burden of the last months—Moyers, Valenti, Reedy—need time off almost as much as you and Mrs. Johnson do. Since you are probably incapable of doing nothing—even for two weeks—my suggestion is that you should use this period to have very frank and private talks with the men you trust most, about the general business of organizing the Presidency for your administration. This is the job which we have not attacked in the last 11 months, and getting it right is absolutely indispensable if the Johnson Administration of 1965 is to escape the frustrations that overtook Truman in 1949 and Roosevelt in 1937. The people who can help you most in such a process of reflection and planning are those whom you trust most, whoever they may be. There are two kinds of people on whose insight you can draw with particular advantage—those who know you best and those who know the Presidency best. Men who know both, like Clifford and Moyers, can be especially helpful. What I think you might want to do is to set up a process by which the people you want to talk with are brought to the ranch at your convenience whenever you are ready to talk. I think most such talks should be with one man at a time, as far as possible. It's the only way for a President to get unvarnished and honest opinions. None of the men you want would object to coming in groups and then being interviewed as individuals. Occasionally there will be, as in the case of Rusk and McNamara and myself, people who need to come in a group for business problems and can be talked to separately at whatever length you want. Such private conversations can also help your Cabinet and your staff more than you may think. Nothing is more important for them than to know as much as possible of your own desires and thinking—and these will be new and different, I am sure, after the election. My fundamental point is simply that I think some such process of reflection and discussion is the one thing that is needed above all others— before you make final decisions about any of the great questions before you—and before you settle definitely on your own basic plans for manning the White House and the new Administration. If you take the time now, you can put together a team and a program that will be strong and stable and effective for the long pull. If instead we try to charge ahead with only what we have now, in the White House and in the Administration, we can expect sharp disappointments and failures, and even further crack-ups of overstrained individuals. McG. B. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Management. No classification marking. 2 November 3. 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 150. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Cater) to President Johnson 150. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Cater) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 28, 1964. Recent interpretive stories in the press (Chal Roberts on MLF and Joe Kraft on Vietnam) suggest that you are not seriously engaged in foreign policy crises. The problem, I believe, goes beyond the press itself. There needs to be better visibility given to your role within government itself. Otherwise, those with axes-to-grind are encouraged to circulate their own policies as official. That is why the National Security Council, despite the secrecy of its proceedings, has value in giving a partially visible face to Presidential involvement in policy making. Two benefits accrue from its regular use for reviewing problems and policies. 1. The press and public have evidence that all the principal sources of advice—including, particularly, the Joint Chiefs have been properly consulted. (The press is always quick to seek out and solicit news from any who feel neglected.) 2. A wider audience within government get at least an indirect view of the President at work. I realize that formal meetings of the NSC are not always helpful to genuine decision-making. But during a period such as the present when you need breathing time to deliberate on the whole range of foreign policy, the NSC offers a useful forum for holding systematic reviews. By making clear to reporters that these sessions are not limited to any one crisis, you may be able to reduce their excessive preoccupation with your “decision” on Vietnam. At the same time, you can judiciously apply the reins to those in government who are anxious to launch unwise initiatives. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of S. Douglass Cater, Memos to the President. No classification marking. 2 In a follow-up memorandum to the President, December 26, Cater stated that he believed that Cabinet and NSC meetings “can be developed into more systematic instruments of Presidential business” than they had been under Eisenhower and Kennedy. “By holding the NSC on a regular basis, you can reduce press speculation over crisis sessions. Regular meetings, with serious agenda, can have beneficial effect in making your Cabinet members work as a team. I would recommend alternate weeks for the Cabinet and NSC.” (Ibid.) 151. Memorandum for the Record 151. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, December 4, 1964. As I see it, the NSC staff officer's function is to attempt to identify as early as possible those national security problems (within his area of responsibility) which require presidential attention, decision or action. As a corollary to this—and here there are hard and fast limits—he should try to convey to the appropriate sections of State and Defense (ISA), and sometimes AID, presidential thinking on issues with which they are concerned. The staff officer has no independent authority. Operating under guidelines set by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Mr. Bundy), he must insure that identifiable problems get to the President on time, that the issues are defined and the alternative courses of action posed in a way that facilitate presidential action. He must also try—and this, too, is under Mr. Bundy's direction—to insure that presidential wishes and decisions are carried out efficiently, expeditiously, and in the way the President intends. The staff officer must be more than a paper shuffler and a transmitter of messages. He must have creative ideas of his own, injecting suggestions (with approval of Mr. Bundy) into the bureaucratic mainstream to stimulate ideas, thought, and projects of interest and import to the presidency. By definition the staff officer must be a team player. This does not stifle initiative or opportunity for independent and creative thought. Indeed, because of the simple structure of the NSC and direct access to the Special Assistant this is encouraged. However, the staff officer must never forget where the responsibility for making policy resides and confuse his own views and prejudices with governmental policy. Despite the relatively easy access to the President's Special Assistant, the staff officer must maintain a sense of proportion in dealing with the front office—staying in touch with it but not burdening it; keeping Mr. Bundy fully informed of all developments without taking up a disproportionate amount of his time or demanding unnecessary attention. Whether questions are handled by memoranda, telephone or personal discussion are matters of judgment, depending upon the urgency and complexity of the problem. The principal point is that if the staff officer is to be of any use to Mr. Bundy, he must help and not bother him. It is incumbent upon the staff not to duplicate or poach on the bureaucracy, but to insure that the enormous resources of the bureaucracy are at the disposal of the White House. In this process it is important to avoid an easy pitfall in the bureaucratic game of playing on the physical and even intellectual gaps between the White House and the Executive Departments. That is a useless and counterproductive enterprise. The basic assumption must always be that all parts of the government are deeply interested in giving maximum help to the President, and that all the parts of the Executive Branch must be fully synchronized to accomplish this. People working close to the White House—this includes the NSC staff—have a special responsibility of focussing on problems in presidential terms. But this should not make for conflict with other parts of the bureaucracy, so long as the members of the governmental team understand their respective roles and recognize their complementary nature. To be of maximum use to Mr. Bundy, it is important to have continuing and effective contacts with the operating officials in the Executive Departments concerned with our relations with Europe—in the Secretariat, the Politico-Military Affairs office, the Planning Staff, the European Bureau and the Intelligence and Research Section in State; OSD and ISA in Defense; Ray Cline's office in CIA; the Foreign Affairs side of the Bureau of the Budget; and the Public Affairs sides of State and Defense. These people are knowledgeable and can be helpful. Indeed, only with their fullest support can the staff officer hope to remain on top of his situation, and keep Mr. Bundy abreast of foreign developments on a continuing basis. The fact of the matter is that the presidency must be fully informed at all times, and this requires the close and coordinated support of many people. The importance of close working relations with the bureaucracy cannot be overstressed. But for this relationship to work, the staff officer must in turn be available to these people and, within the limits of propriety and discretion, be as helpful as possible to them. This brings up an obvious but most important point which is that the NSC staff officer must not only have great integrity; he must also be absolutely discreet in his relations with other government officers and people outside the government. It is not sufficient to deal effectively with the substantive phases of one's work. It is equally important to protect and preserve the role and image of the presidency. There is no more sensitive area in government than that around the White House. And those privileged to work in its environs bear the greatest personal and professional responsibilities. On all national security matters requiring presidential attention, the President must be aware of the issues under debate, the points of agreement and disagreement, the options open to him. The problems must be posed in their starkest reality, for only in this way can hard and necessary decisions be taken. This in turn requires that the President have the prob lems presented to him in the clearest and precisest form, with appreciation of the full range of views, as well as the rationale for them. Staff work takes on many forms. It runs the gamut of routine presidential messages and papers to substantive state pronouncements of the greatest import. It requires preparation of staff studies and recommendations; directives to various parts of the government; presidential public and private statements. It calls for the organization of interdepartmental meetings to discuss problems of presidential interest and follow through actions. It entails setting up arrangements for meetings and discussions between the President and other heads of government and leading foreign and American dignitaries. There are also the very routine operations—which in practical terms mean relieving Mr. Bundy, and in turn the President, of trivia, but insuring that however trivial a problem may be, if there are Presidential interests, these will be fully protected. But whatever the problem, whatever its importance, each must in some way come under the guiding hand of Mr. Bundy to insure synchronization and coordination with other presidential activities. The area of endeavor is wide. The opportunity for initiative and creative enterprise is great. The satisfaction in contributing to the most important enterprise in government is enormous. DK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Klein Memos. Secret. Prepared by David Klein. 152. Editorial Note 152. Editorial Note National Security Action Memorandum No. 322, the 46th and last NSAM issued during 1964, was issued on December 17. Used to notify agencies of Presidential decisions and to require follow-up action, NSAMs were issued far less frequently during the next 4 years. Sixteen NSAMs were issued during 1965, 18 during 1966, 10 during 1967, and 4 during 1968. NSAM No. 371, October 18, 1968, was the last of the 39 NSAMs issued during the Johnson Presidency. Copies of NSAMs and supporting material are located at the Johnson Library (National Security File, NSAMs). Copies of NSAMs and some follow-up reports are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316. Follow-up reports dated from June 20, 1961, through October 21, 1964, are ibid., Lot 70 D 264. 153. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 153. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 2, 1965. SUBJECT A Deputy or Potential Successor in my Office Some weeks ago you asked me who should take over if, for any reason, I were no longer on this job, and I told you I had thought some about it. Since then I have thought some more, and I think I have some good suggestions. 1. The ideal man for this job is Bill Moyers. I do not know what his plans and yours may be, but I do know that he has an abiding interest and talent for foreign affairs. I believe that he would be extremely good at this job, and I think he would like it. Obviously he could not be spared at once from where he is, but if an assignment in this job were to keep him at your side longer than he might otherwise be willing to stay, it would be well worth considering. 2. Another possibility is Abram Chayes. He performed with great brilliance as Legal Adviser in the Department of State, and in the process he won the unreserved confidence of Dean Rusk, who had little or nothing to do with his initial appointment. 3. A third possibility is Tom Hughes, whom I have mentioned before. He is currently the head of Intelligence in the State Department, and I continue to be deeply impressed by the range and fairness of his mind. Like Moyers and Chayes, he would have an instinctive understanding for the requirement that the man in this job must protect the President's right to hear both sides of the hard cases. If and when you get the State Department organized to your satisfaction, the main function of this office should be just such careful review, rather than the initiation or monitoring of operational policy. 2 If you were to think well of the possibility that Moyers might move in here sometime, that would be my first preference. If not, I would like to think in terms of persuading Chayes or Hughes—or some third party that would suit you—to come in as Deputy in this office with a prospect of succession as and when a vacancy occurs. I have no present intention of quitting, but I doubt very much that it would be in your interest for me to go on here until 1973. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Confidential. 2 During a telephone conversation with Ball that began at 5:25 p.m. on February 7, the President said that “Bundy's department should not replace the State Department. He [President] has a little feeling about the White House running Defense or State. The boss must say no when he feels no but Valenti should not be telling Harriman to be jumping the hoop. They are not over them but with them.” (Memorandum of conversation, February 7; ibid., Ball Papers) 154. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara 154. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, June 10, 1965, 6:40 p.m. [Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.] President: One other thing. I've got to see Reston in the morning. He is very concerned about the narrowing of the basic decisions of government. Now our old friends are feeding some stuff out—where it's been, ah, it's too concentrated. In a matter of a decision like this this morning [regarding Vietnam], Mac [Bundy] says that the decisions or recommendations are made by these same people—the field people, the Joint Chiefs, the McNamaras and the Vances, and the Rusks and the Balls, the Bill Bundys and the Mac Bundys, and the President—that they've been making this type of decision all along. Do you have any people in your outfit that are contributing anyway or feel that they made decisions that they're not in on now? McNamara: No, I don't think so, Mr. President. McNaughton contributed to this of course. And the Chiefs meet fully, they don't all appear before you but their representative does— President: How does it vary from the decisions you've been making for years? McNamara: Well, I don't think it does, and this is what I would— President: That's what Bundy says. McNamara: I'd be inclined to ask Reston, “who is it that you,” Reston, “think's left out?” I don't know who's left out. I'll tell you two, maybe. One is the Office of Emergency Management Director, and I don't see what the hell he can contribute to it. President: Well he'll be in here tomorrow [for the National Security Council meeting]. McNamara: That's right. He will be. That's right. But he is a statutory member of the NSC. And the other one is the USIA Director, and frankly I don't think he ought to be deciding whether we're at war or going to war. President: The deployments—they will decide on what our policy is [unintelligible] participate but this is— McNamara: This is a military deployment. Apart from those two, I don't know who it is that's left out. President: Well, in our small groups, as I remember, our Executive Committee amounted to seven in the Cuban crisis, and I don't see that there are any people in the departments or any career people that are left out. McNamara: Well, I think at times Chip Bohlen or Tommy Thompson were present— President: Well isn't he there? Tommy's here quite often now. McNamara: He's here quite often now, and an important point now is that George Ball and Dean talk to him beforehand and bring his views into the decisions. I don't see that's any different either. President: He seems to be a man of impeccable integrity, though, and honor. I don't believe he'd be contributing. McNamara: Oh no, oh I'm sure— President: Some of them are contributing to it, though. Some of them are saying this to Scottie [Reston]. He went in and gave a big round to George Ball I understand earlier today. McNamara: I'd just ask him who he thinks ought to be in the decisions. President: Only one I know that might not be is the Attorney General. And he's not my brother. [Both McNamara and the President laugh.] So, but if there is anybody in your shop that you think ought to be, you know you're at liberty to bring them— McNamara: There isn't anybody I think ought to be, and I don't think there's anyone over here who thinks he should be. President: Do you know anybody that knows anything in the other place— McNamara: No, no, I certainly don't. President: Dominican Republic—we've had the Balls, we've had the Manns, and we've had the Martins. I think we might be over-advised but not under. [Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, Tape F65.47, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 2, 1965, 6:45 p.m. SUBJECT Organization of the National Security Staff 1. Once or twice you have asked me about the people who work on the National Security side here, and I have the impression that you may wish to know more about who they are and what they do. You may even think there are too many of them. 2. When I took over this job in 1961, there were 71 people assigned to the NSC/OCB. Currently there are 48 people, and the real reduction is greater still because a number of the present people are shared with outfits like the Office of Science and Technology and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 3. About one-third of these people (plus a CIA-supplied group of rotating watch officers in the Situation Room) constitute a classified message center for the whole White House and Executive Office Building. We handle all classified papers for the NSC staff, most of your own classified stuff, and also cable traffic for the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Science and Technology. This is a matter of keeping proper control and distribution of several hundred items a day. It is a service which we could turn back to the State and Defense Departments, and to CIA, but only at the price of losing our own grip on the flow of information. 4. The real heart of the office is in 17 professional officers with their secretaries. Of these, two are here in the White House keeping track of the daily business—Bromley Smith as executive manager, and Gordon Chase as my assistant (and UN liaison). The remaining 15 are in the Executive Office Building. There the three top men are Bator on Economics and Europe, Komer on the Middle East and Africa, and Cooper on the Far East, especially Vietnam. These three officers have a total of six junior professionals to assist them. 2 5. The remaining professionals are essentially liaison officers and monitors for specific agencies and offices—one (Bowman) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; one (Jessup) for CIA covert operations, one (C.E. Johnson) for the AEC and NASA; one (Bowdler) for Latin American Affairs; and one (Keeny, half-time) for military technology and disarmament. Finally, we have one FBI graduate (Ash) who does our security checks with one finger and uses the other nine to assist Pat Coyne in the work of Clark Clifford's Intelligence Board. (If Ash were not on the NSC payroll, he would have to be carried by the White House.) 6. Three of these liaison officers (and several of the other junior professionals) are paid by the Departments with which they work 3 —but I think I can claim that all of them have demonstrated that their first loyalty is to you, and not to any one agency. 7. Man for man, I would not trade this staff for any other in Washington. Its one present weakness is that there is no all-around Deputy. There are a couple of ways of dealing with this problem, but they tie into State and Defense personnel questions. Perhaps we can discuss them at one of our Tuesday lunches soon. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13. No classification marking. 2 In a July 19 draft memorandum to the President, Bromley Smith stated that Bator was assisted by Edward Hamilton, on detail from BOB; Komer was assisted by Harold Saunders and Ulric Haynes, on detail from State; and Cooper was assisted by James Thomson, on detail from State, and Donald Ropa, on loan from CIA. (Ibid., Bromley Smith Papers, BKS Chron) 3 Bowman was on detail from DOD, Jessup on detail from CIA, and Bowdler on detail from State. 156. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 156. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 14, 1965, 5:45 p.m. SUBJECT Promotions in your National Security Staff 1. I am now in a position to recommend formally that you appoint Robert Komer as Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 2 I also recommend that, at the same time if possible, you appoint Francis Bator as Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Economics), (a cumbersome title, but one which is precisely accurate). I have cleared these recommendations with John Macy. 2. The best reason for recommending Bob Komer is that I do not have to tell you anything about him you do not already know. After wartime service in combat intelligence in Italy, he joined the CIA in 1947 and has been a career public servant ever since. But he is a career serv-ant of a very unusual and energetic sort, as befits a graduate of Valenti's favorite business school. He has extraordinary range, and a steadily growing mastery of the processes of international politics. He is a tiger for work, and he has a temperament which allows him to bounce back easily when his advice is not taken. This makes him the kind of staff officer one dreams of and seldom finds. 3. Moreover, Komer is discreet. He has been dealing with knowledgeable press people for four years, and I have never known him to make a serious slip—something which I could not claim for myself. He has the respect of the best of them, like Phil Potter. 3 He also has the high regard of the ablest men in the Diplomatic Corps in his areas. 4. What is much more important is that he has the confidence of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, both of whom have tried to lure him away from the White House. 5. More important still is that Komer is enthusiastically loyal to you. He will give you arguments, but he will always do his energetic best to carry out your orders just as you want them executed. He will be still more effective in this latter task with the additional rank and visibility which this new appointment will give him. 6. Finally, and most important of all, Bob Komer is one of the handful of men in the Government upon whom you can rely for sound and prompt judgment in the event of a sudden crisis. He will instinctively alert the right officers and ask the right questions, and he will never hesitate to turn to you directly when he is in doubt. This set of qualities makes me confident that it is right to recommend him for an appointment which will make him the senior officer on this side of the White House when I am not here. In my judgment, it is highly important that there be such an officer here, and I believe Komer is plainly the best qualified man in sight. After this new appointment is made, I expect that either Komer or I will always be on the spot here, and I would expect him to be fully informed on the broad range of National Security issues so that he can always act for me in my absence. Komer is 44. 7. The case of Bator is somewhat different and the need for a promotion somewhat less compelling. Nevertheless, I strongly recommend that the proposed appointment be made and announced at the same time as Komer's. Francis Bator, at 40, is probably the best all-around international economist in the Government, and he has fully earned the recognition which this appointment would give him. He has won the extravagant admiration of men as different as Joe Fowler 4 and Walter Lippmann. In the last year Bator has had a major role in the defense of the dollar, the defense of the pound, and the coordination of the Kennedy Round. Working with Joe Fowler, he has helped to make Treasury-White House relations closer and more effective than ever before. He has an analytic intelligence of a high order, but he is also a man of good practical sense. He firmly understands the role of a White House staff officer in defending and advancing the President's own interests, and he is wholly loyal to you. His promotion has the warm support of Joe Fowler and Tom Mann, who are the men he has to deal with most. 8. Bator has one disadvantage, which is that for personal reasons his family have been unable to join him in Washington. He therefore goes regularly for weekends to Massachusetts. He compensates for this disability by working morning, noon and night five days a week down here, and he has always been willing to stay over when there is any immediate economic issue to be dealt with. But there is a sense in which this arrangement, coupled with his relative lack of intense political experience, makes him more a staff than a line officer, and for that reason I think it important to distinguish his assignment from Komer's by the parenthetical word (Economics). 9. Finally, I should say a word about the administrative aspects of these appointments. Ideally, I would wish that the Deputy Special Assistant should have a salary in the range of Category IV, and a Deputy for Economics in the range of Category V. When Walt Rostow and Carl Kaysen held the Deputy's post they had the salaries of Assistant Secretaries, which would correspond to these categories. But neither Komer nor Bator is in immediate financial need, and there is no way to get such high-level appointments without putting their whole salaries directly on the White House budget, which I am reluctant to recommend. It is therefore my suggestion that their salaries continue to be paid, at the present GS-18 level, from the National Security Council budget, unless and until it becomes convenient to make a change. I am confident that this arrangement will be acceptable to them. 10. Both Komer and Bator have up-to-date security clearances, and neither has ever had any trouble whatever on this score. 11. I attach a brief statement 5 which might be put out by Bill Moyers at such time as is convenient to you although I doubt there is much news value in these appointments, except within the Government and among local Government-watchers. Alternatively, you might wish to save these announcements for your next press conference. McG. B. Go ahead 6 Speak to me Have Moyers put out Save for press conference 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 14. No classification marking. 2 In a March 15 memorandum to the President, which Bundy signed but decided not to forward, he proposed that Komer be made an Assistant to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, explaining that “I would like to make him a member of the White House Staff, while keeping his pay and administration in the National Security Council. This would end an anomaly which has troubled him and two or three of my other senior people ever since 1961—they work directly for me and at least indirectly for you, but their official standing is that of staff officers of the National Security Council, and unfortunately the term 'NSC Staff' has no real weight in the government. Actually, knowledgeable people already think of them as members of the White House Staff, or at least the 'Bundy staff,' and that is what I would now like to make official.” (Ibid., Vol. 9) 3 Washington Bureau Chief for the Baltimore Sun. 4 Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury. 5 Attached but not printed. 6 The President checked the first and third options. Moyers announced the promotions at his news conference on October 19. (News Conference #160–A; Johnson Library, President's Appointment File, October 19) 157. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) 157. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) 1 Washington, November 13, 1965, 12:15 p.m. [Omitted here is a lengthy conversation on copper prices in Chile, concluding with a discussion of whom to send to Chile as an emissary.] The President asked Mr. Mann what he thought of Rostow and Mr. Mann said he thought Rostow was useful to the President; had a liberal image, big head, the Latins love him. Mr. Mann said he thought by staying with Rostow we could keep him on the track. The President asked if he were a Johnson man and Mr. Mann said he never heard anything anti-Johnson. [ 2 lines of text excised by the Johnson Library under the donor's deed of gift. ] He was very close to Kennedy. The President asked who Mr. Mann would put in Bundy's place if he left. 2 Mr. Mann said he did not know. The President asked Mr. Mann if he would do it. Mr. Mann said he did not think he was physically up to it. He asked if Mr. Mann thought Clifford could do it and Mr. Mann said maybe. [ 2 words of text excised by the Johnson Library under the donor's deed of gift. ] The President asked Mr. Mann if that job was essential and Mr. Mann said he did not know if it was essential to center it around one person. Mr. Mann said that this was one thing that he wanted to talk to the President about next Tuesday. 3 He said that the President needed somebody who can deal with Cabinet officials and speak for the President and make the right decisions for the President without bothering the President. The President asked who was handling this now and Mr. Mann said that Bundy was who usually turned them over to Bator. He said that it was too much for Bundy to handle because he works mainly on security. Mr. Mann said there are a hundred little day to day decisions that have to be made. The President asked about Bill Bundy to succeed his brother. Mr. Mann said he did not know him well. He said he thought he was an opinionated fellow and he thought the President needed somebody who would do what the President wanted done and not what that person wanted done. The President agreed. The President asked about McNaughton and Mr. Mann said he was an awfully bright boy. That was all he knew about him. [Omitted here is discussion of Chile and the Dominican Republic.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ. No classification marking. Prepared by Patricia Saunders, Mann's secretary. 2 McGeorge Bundy informed the President on November 8 that he had been offered the presidency of the Ford Foundation; see Document 159 . 3 November 16. Mann did not speak with the President on November 16, but he did meet with him alone in his office from 4:14 to 4:50 p.m. on November 15. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found. 158. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 158. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, December 1, 1965. On Sunday you asked me for a memorandum on members of my professional staff, and here it is. 1. Deputies My principal deputy is Robert Komer (age 43), who has been here for nearly five years. Before that he worked in the Central Intelligence Agency in intelligence evaluation. He is a graduate of Harvard College and the Harvard Business School, and served in the Army in World War II. You know Komer well enough to make your own judgment, I am sure. To me he has been an invaluable colleague. He is able, energetic, quick and highly knowledgeable. While he presses his point of view with energy, he is disciplined in the execution of decisions, whether or not they accord with his recommendations. I believe him to be, in many ways, the most suitable candidate to succeed me here, and I think that if he were the principal officer, he would accept the need for insuring fair and complete presentation of other points of view than his own. It is indeed precisely because of his alertness and reliability in moments of tension and uncertainty that I initially recommended him to the President for appointment as my Deputy. He is a man upon whom we can rely in times when I am out of town or otherwise unavailable. Francis Bator (age 40) is my deputy for economics. He came here in early 1964, after a year as consultant to David Bell in AID. Before that, he was an associate professor of Economics at MIT, where he did his graduate work after taking his Bachelor's degree at Harvard. I think him to be the most gifted analytical student of international economics now working effectively in the bureaucracy. He has played a quite critical role in all of our balance of payments work. In addition, since the departure of David Klein, he has been the principal staff officer here for European problems, and has established close relations with John Leddy and John McNaughton. I think you will find that George Ball knows him well, and thinks highly of him. Bator does not have the experience or the breadth of political knowledge to take over the top job here, and in some ways he might be still more valuable to the government in a sub-Cabinet post in the Treasury. As a practical matter, he does extremely good work where he is, and the President has found him quick and helpful in a number of important matters. 2. NSC veterans The Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, as you know, is Bromley Smith (age 54), and I think he would like to leave his present job, in good time. The NSC as a formal council has had even less to do under President Johnson than it did under President Kennedy. But Smith is not sure just where he would want to go if he does leave. I was wrong in telling you the other day that he would be ready now for a chance at an Embassy. As you suspected, his wife's architectural undertakings make such a move impractical in the near future. Bromley Smith is one of the most experienced and loyal of professional bureaucrats. He has chosen not to develop a taste for active participation in the making of policy, but he runs a clean, thorough, and highly knowledgeable shop. Two other staff members have great seniority on the National Security Council staff—(1) Charles Johnson, age 53, who is the liaison officer for space and telecommunications, and some parts of atomic energy; and (2) Russell Ash (age 51), who spends most of his time supporting Patrick Coyne in the staff work for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but also has responsibility for our internal security. These two men have long-standing civil service status within the NSC. They are both loyal public servants of real ability. Neither of them is likely to move to substantially higher responsibilities, as far as I can tell. 3. Far East The next senior member of my staff is Chester Cooper (age 48), who works on Far Eastern affairs. He came to us in 1964 from CIA, where he ranked just after Ray Cline on the “open” side of the house. He has done extraordinarily devoted and useful work here, but both he and I agree that, for reasons which are hard to explain, his service has not been quite up to either his hopes or mine. I believe he intends presently to seek an academic leave of absence from the Central Intelligence Agency, and I believe that this arrangement would be very much in his interest and also in ours. I think the timing of this move can be adjusted so that my successor would have the opportunity which he deserves to pick his own principal Far Eastern staff officer. My instinct would be to concert a choice with my brother Bill. Under Cooper, in Far Eastern affairs, there are three more junior staff officers: (1) Mr. James Thomson (age 34), FSR-3, came to us from the Far Eastern bureau two years ago. He was brought into the Department by Chester Bowles, and is a gifted young man, but not perfectly suited to the bureaucracy. My hunch is that in due course he should go back to academic life (he has received regular feelers from Yale, where he did his graduate work in Chinese). (2) Don W. Ropa (age 38), GS-14, came to us from CIA only last July when the expanding struggle in Vietnam placed heavier requirements of coordination upon Cooper's office. Ropa has shown great energy and determination, and I think my successor would probably wish to keep him here, with a more senior officer, after Cooper's departure. If not, I am equally confident that the CIA would be glad to get him back. (3) Miss Ruth Nicalo is a veteran of the National Security Council staff, and I am ashamed to have to say that I do not know much about her work, although I know she has been very helpful to a number of my colleagues in the Executive Office Building. 4. Middle East and Africa Under Komer in Middle Eastern and African affairs are two able young men: (1) One is Hal H. Saunders (age 35), a GS-13, who came to us three years ago from CIA. He is unusually thoughtful and hard-working, and I think he has the confidence and trust of the working levels in all departments. Where Komer goes Saunders is likely to go, and he is an admirable staff assistant to his able boss. (2) Ulric Haynes (age 34), FSR-4, handles African affairs. He is the ablest young Negro I have met in ten years of fairly constant looking. He has both judgment and energy. He is also unusually clear-headed about African affairs. He came to the Department from the Ford Foundation, and an intelligent Foundation executive might well try to get him back. 5. Economic and European Affairs Under Francis Bator in economic and European affairs is Edward K. Hamilton (age 26), GS-13. Hamilton came to us from the Budget Bureau, where he established an extraordinary reputation as the most effective young man to join that bureau in recent years. He has done outstanding work here, and while his life has been clouded in recent months by family troubles, I feel confident that he will go on to make a record as one of the best public servants of his generation. If for any reason he should decide to leave the government, I am equally confident that he would succeed in private life. 6. Latin American Affairs Our Latin American affairs are handled by William Bowdler (age 41), an FSO 2. Bowdler was picked out by Jack Vaughn, and has done genuinely outstanding work over here. He handles the entire Latin American account, and he does it in the closest cooperation with ARA. I see no reason why he should not continue sympathetically and effectively in the same work in the future. 7. Disarmament and Technology I get great support here from the half-time service of Spurgeon Keeny, who divides his time between Don Hornig's office and mine. Keeny is a really extraordinary public servant, and almost nothing happens in this complex field that he does not hear about from his wide circle of trusted colleagues in every department. He tends to know about sensitive new developments in weaponry before Cy Vance and Bob McNamara, and he knows about tricky issues in technical intelligence before Helms and Raborn. But he is much more than a source of information-he also has good judgment and broad experience in his subject. If he did not look like an undergraduate, I think he would already be emerging into the level of Presidential appointments. 8. Finally, I should mention two special liaison officers: (1) Mr. Peter Jessup (age 45), who handles the staff work for our supervision of covert intelligence. He came from the CIA and he, or an officer like him, should be here as long as the 303 Committee continues. Jessup does this work with great skill and sense. (2) Colonel Richard Bowman (age 39) is our liaison officer with the JCS. He is an able and hard-working officer, even if he sometimes has trouble in separating his Air Force allegiance from his staff obligations here. 9. And last of all, I should mention my personal assistant, Gordon Chase (age 33), GS-15, although he is leaving any day now to accept a double promotion in AID. Chase came to us from the Foreign Service and has proved himself to be fully first-rate as a staff assistant. He now wants a chance to spread his wings in a job with more direct responsibility, and he has fully earned it. McGeorge Bundy 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Management. Personal and Confidential. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 159. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 159. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 4, 1965. SUBJECT Letter of resignation 1. I attach a revised letter of resignation. 2 John McCloy is out of town, so I have spoken to his successor, Jay Stratton, who is a deeply discreet man. Stratton immediately undertook to agree, in the name of the Trustees, to the condition which I have stated in the next to last paragraph. 3 I hope it is stated in a way that is acceptable to you. 2. If you think well of it, you might wish to add the fact that we asked for this condition and that the Ford Foundation granted it, to any background account which Bill Moyers might give of our discussions. The month in which we have worked on the matter might then look something like this: November 7—McCloy offered Bundy the job. November 8—Bundy reported the offer to the President. November 11—At the Ranch the President told Bundy he would talk with him the following week in Washington. November 19—The President and Bundy had a thorough talk in Washington. The President told Bundy he was free to make his own decision in the light of his judgment of what he could most usefully do, and Bundy told the President that he would like to accept the Ford offer if the Ford Trustees would allow time for an orderly transfer of his duties at the White House. The President authorized Bundy to report this decision to Mr. John McCloy personally, and asked him to work out a time schedule for the transfer in terms of the national interest alone—and then to see if that schedule was acceptable to Mr. McCloy. Between November 20 and 28, Bundy studied this problem and consulted about it with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. He reached the conclusion that he ought to stay on his present job through February, 1966. The President has agreed with this judgment, and Mr. McCloy, for the Ford Foundation, accepted the delay it involves on November 29. On December 2, the President and Bundy discussed the matter further and began the consideration of a successor. The President asked Bundy to obtain assurance from the Ford Foundation that he would be available to undertake special assignments, and on December 3 Bundy obtained such assurance from the Ford Foundation. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. Eyes Only. 2 Attached, together with his initial letter of resignation, but not printed. 3 “I have asked the Trustees of the Ford Foundation if I may accept their invitation on the understanding that I shall always be free to accept any special assignments from you, and they have generously agreed to this condition.” 160. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 160. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 13, 1965, 9:30 a.m. SUBJECT Organization of the Bundy shop What Should Duties Be 1. Alternative plotting . The key, essential responsibility of your foreign affairs group in the White House ought to be cataloguing, illuminating, bringing forth alternative courses of action to every recommendation from State and Defense. Every recommendation from State and Defense ought to be put under a coldly appraising eye: What else can we do—what other paths can we take—what are the alternative costs in money, treasure, prestige results? 2. Planning . There ought to be a small cadre in your Bundy shop who do nothing but try to figure out how to solve a particular problem. For example, there ought to be a small group thinking, all day and all night, on how we can break the Viet Nam logjam. 3. Briefing and digesting. This is an obvious task, briefing down cables, digesting reports—in other words making available to the President a full flow of information. Does This Conflict with State and Defense No matter how much the President relies on his Secretaries, he ought to have, indeed must have, a checking mechanism, a competitive force that gives him flexibility. (State and Defense will perform with more agility and imagination if they know they are being counter-checked by someone else. This is the reason many business firms have two or more advertising agencies—it keeps each agency working harder to outdo the competitor—no one grows lax or lazy.) Is The Bundy Shop Too Large Now The large majority of people now in the Bundy shop are technicians, custodians who deal with cables, the Situation Room and all its paraphernalia. There are less than two dozen professionals and their assistants. This is a small price to pay for an indispensable Presidential asset. No doubt the hangers-on could be eliminated. But the hard-core thinkers and planners ought to be kept or even added to, if after a thorough search it was found to be useful. The decisive point : Anything or anybody that helps the President come to sound foreign policy decisions is worth the price, whatever it is. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking. 161. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara 161. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, February 27, 1966, 9:10 a.m. [Prior to and following the exchanges below, the President and McNamara discussed the appointment of Robert Kintner to a position in the White House.] President: We have this Bundy thing we're going to have to face up to. I like Rostow, but I don't want to get started off here and get everybody to thinking we're going back to war and a hard-liner. McNamara: I still like Moyers for that, Mr. President. President: Well, that's like liking Cy Vance to be General Counsel. [McNamara laughs.] You'd like to have him General Counsel of the Army, wouldn't you? McNamara: Yeah, yeah. But I need him more where he is, and I would say you need Moyers more in the Bundy job now that you've got the other one bucked up a little bit. President: Do you think so? I don't know. My number one problem—I think you can do the Bundy job. You'd just raise hell and do the Bundy job yourself, if you have to, with Komer and the groups you got around there, just processing the papers. I doubt that these wolves, although there a hundred of them every day—I just think about how much time you'd take on correcting some mistake in the press. Doesn't about half your time go to trying to clean up stuff that somebody— McNamara: That's right, and I don't have a Moyers and hence I don't get it done the way you do. So I realize the function's important. It's essential to you and I know it's being done beautifully. I would think Moyers could spend a little time—25 or 30 percent of his time—on the press and the other 60 to 70 percent on the other, and have maybe Komer work for him or something like that. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, Tape 66.09, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 162. Editorial Note 162. Editorial Note McGeorge Bundy's resignation as the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was effective on February 28, 1966. At 7:20 p.m. that evening he telephoned Secretary of State Rusk. According to a February 28 memorandum of the conversation, prepared by Rusk's secretary, Carolyn Page, “B wanted to be sure Sec knew Pres planned to keep freedom of choice with regard to what he does with B's job and has asked Komer to hold the staffing together as of now; B asked Sec's help in keeping things in line; B had lectured Komer on procedure. Sec said ok.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) In a February 19 memorandum to the President, Bundy had stated that if there was to be an “interregnum” before a permanent successor was named, his inclination was “to deal with this problem by saying unless and until you make another appointment, Bob Komer should act in my place and have the same authority over members of the NSC staff that I have had.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 20) Komer acted in Bundy's place until the appointment of Walt W. Rostow on April 1. On March 28 Komer himself was named President's Special Assistant in charge of U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construction in Vietnam. 163. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 163. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 1, 1966, 2 p.m. Mr. President: Here are some thoughts and suggestions that you may want to consider in regard to the Bundy operation. I. I suggest that you install Bob Komer as Acting Special Assistant in Charge of National Security . I think it important that the job not go vacant for more than several days else we will incite stories about unfilled positions in the White House—such as Congressional relations and National Security. I have been probing throughout the basement staff over the last several days and I think the Komer appointment would meet with approval of all the people now in the group. There is no doubt that Komer has the ability to do the job. The principal drawback that I have found is he might feel some concern about not being able to talk at the level of Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk. Also, there is a petulance about him that causes some concern with his co-workers. Moreover, there is the feeling that Komer lives close to the surface of these problems and sometimes becomes emotional about them. But in general, my probings have brought forth the information that Komer is tough and able—and with the assurance that the President has confidence in him he would be able, I am persuaded, to disavow all these liabilities and do the kind of job that you would want to have done. Once Komer was established in his own mind as your man, in whom you repose confidence and trust, he would be able to function with efficiency and dispatch. II. Bright young men in the basement. a. Ed Hamilton . He is 27 years old-a graduate of the University of Minnesota—did his Doctoral work at Harvard. He is a Political Scientist by trade and right now engages in European and Economic Affairs in the Bundy shop. For a time he was assistant to Kermit Gordon at the Bureau of the Budget. He is an excellent writer, whose mind is quick and daring—the kind of young man that I think could serve you well. I have talked to him at great length and I think that he would be loyal as well as energetic. b. Jim Thomson . He is 34, with a PhD from Harvard in Chinese history. In 1959 he was an assistant to Chester Bowles when Bowles was in Congress and moved with Bowles to the State Department. After that he worked for Roger Hilsman and Bill Bundy and then came to the Mac Bundy Operation. Thomson is by all odds the most imaginative and brainiest of the group downstairs. He and Hamilton would rank as No. one and two. Harvard has been trying to get him to come back to teach there. But I think that he would stay and do the kind of work that you need done if there was some indication that he was needed. c. Rick Haynes . A young Negro and Yale lawyer who has been working on African affairs. From every source that I have investigated, Haynes comes out as being one of the smartest men in the shop. He has done an exceptionally good job working under Komer's tutelage for a year. He is an excellent man and his credentials seem to be valid. He is the kind of man that you would certainly want to keep in the operation. d. Francis Bator . Bator, of course, is a deputy along with Komer. He gets very high marks from his associates as an extraordinarily competent man in the economic field. There is little doubt what he ought to be kept on for his loss would produce a real void in the operation. He has your best interests at heart and from all I can gather has been totally loyal in every respect. There are other bright young men in and around the government that we might want to consider bringing into the Bundy operation, such as: Nick Farr, who is now on the Near East and Southeast Asia desk at AID is one such man. He is 40 years old and extremely competent. Al Puhan —on the German desk at the State Department is another young man who seems to fit the bill as bright and able and imaginative. Allen Whiting , who is the Chief of the Far Eastern Bureau of Intelligence. He works for Tom Hughes at the State Department and is considered to be one of the foremost scholars on China. Tom Hughes , who is 40 years old—in charge of the Intelligence operation at the State Department. He comes up with high marks from everyone I talk to. He seems to be one of the ablest men at the State Department and someone that you may want to consider bringing over here. David Klein used to work for Bundy in the European Affairs. Klein was with me at the Harvard Business School and is a very bright and able man. Spurgeon Keeny , who is the Science and Technical representative on the Bundy staff has been favorably talked about by nearly everyone with whom I had conversation. Bundy depended upon him greatly in matters of Science and Technology. III. The next stop : What I would choose to suggest is that the next week or so you might gather all these bright young men together in your office or in the Situation Room and chat with them about their views on Vietnam and the world in general. I think it might prove very beneficial to let these young daring minds explore with you some of the problems that are troubling you. Sometimes it's very good to have access to new thinking, particularly from young people who aren't constricted by tradition or bound by circumscribed limits. The point is that a really formidable team can be enlisted to carry on in the wake of the Bundy departure. The more imaginative and able people that you can gather in your national security shop in the basement, the more options are open to you. I attach a memorandum 2 that I wrote recently about what I thought the outlines and dimensions of the job ought to be for this shop to carry out. From my conversation with a number of the bright young men these dimensions seem to fit. IV. I would suggest you might want to consider naming Walt Rostow as the equivalent of Ambassador Porter in the State Department . Rostow had great ideas about the viability of the Vietnamese political system and how to move from a position of war into peace with the least possible discomfort. From what I have been able to gather, if Rostow is given a specific job like this, he would do a very competent job. Moreover, by putting him in charge of the peace operation it would cover up the so-called “hard line” that he is expected to take in matters of military policy. V. In my probings I have found that the idea of a military adviser to the President meets with very good favor. It is good for the President to have not only diplomatic options, but he ought to have military options also. Bringing General Goodpaster over in the Bundy operation as military adviser to the President would be a good move and would allow you to have someone to digest and brief down all the military recommendations . In this way you again widen your options and alternatives. Jack Valenti 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking. 2 Not attached but presumably Document 160 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 164. Editorial Note 164. Editorial Note On the morning of March 31, 1966, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Francis Bator drafted a memorandum to Bill Moyers, the President's Press Secretary, in which he outlined the points Moyers might want to make at a National Security Council staff meeting scheduled for noon that day, including the fact that “as long as [there was] no final appointment of new Special Assistant for National Security, Moyers will act in that capacity.” (Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Chron File) The meeting, however, was not held. At a news conference that began at 12:30 p.m. March 31, the President announced that he was naming Walt W. Rostow, who had served since late 1961 as Counselor for the Department of State and Chairman of its Policy Planning Council, as Special Assistant to the President. The appointment became effective the next day. The President indicated that Rostow would “come to the White House to work principally, but not necessarily exclusively, in the field of foreign policy. I will especially look to him for the development of long-range plans in that field, as well as special coordination of Latin American development.” When asked by a reporter whether it could be said that Rostow would “take over all or many of the duties and assignments handled by McGeorge Bundy,” the President responded: “it could be, but that would be inaccurate. It would not be true. Most of the men play any position here. We hope—I hope Mr. Rostow can. Part of the work Mr. Bundy did we will say will now be done by Mr. Komer. Some of the work Mr. Bundy did is now being done by Jack Valenti and Bill Moyers.” For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pages 384–392. Within 4 days of appointing Rostow, the President designated both him and Moyers as Bundy's replacement on the National Security Council's 303 Committee, which reviewed and approved covert actions (see Document 249 and footnote 4 thereto). However, Moyers attended only one 303 Committee meeting as a regular member, while Rostow attended regularly. (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes) In reporting Rostow's appointment in its April 1 issue, The New York Times stated that the President seemed “reluctant to put in the hands of one man the kind of power within Government that Mr. Bundy had. In effect, Mr. Bundy created within the White House a little State Department that rode herd on many aspects of foreign policy. The President apparently intends to shift many of the policy-making aspects of the post back to the State Department, using a number of men inside the White House as personal advisers to him on foreign affairs.” 165. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 165. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 31, 1966. SUBJECT Intelligence and Information on National Security Problems 1. Classified information and intelligence is now being sent to you in the following forms: a. Morning Report from the Situation Room is delivered to the Usher in the House at 7:00 A.M. every day. It is a one-page summary of military developments in Vietnam during our nighttime based on MACV reports from Saigon relayed by the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon. If there has been a major civil or military development in any foreign area it is summarized in an additional paragraph. b. Important cables from Heads of State, Prime Minister, U.S. Ambassadors or U.S. Commanders in the field which we think would be of interest to you. These include special field reports written for you and substantive messages addressed to you personally. They are typed here and sent to your office with explanatory notes. c. Daily CIA Report for the President 2 is reviewed and sent to your office at about 6:30 P.M., Monday through Friday, Saturday at 2:00 P.M. It is a 3 to 7-page highly classified capsule report based on intelligence from all sources and written especially for you. It includes maps and photographs when appropriate. Editorial guidance is given here to ensure that it focuses on your interests. d. State Department Evening Reading 3 is sent to you at about 8:00 P.M., Monday through Friday. It is a 2-page report from Secretary Rusk summarizing Department actions and policy information received during the day. e. National Security information on major problems consisting of selected cables, intelligence documents and reports. These are sent to your office throughout each day as they are received here by courier, classified teletype or classified facsimile transmission. Special reports on critical situations are prepared here during the day on the basis of information from State, Defense, CIA, NASA, etc. After office hours there is on duty in the White House Situation Room a Watch Officer always on call. He has available to him information and intelligence reports forwarded by teletype and courier from the State Department, the Pentagon, and CIA. 2. For some time we have not checked with you to find out whether the information and intelligence we send up is meeting your need. Any suggestions or guidance would be very helpful. For example: Cables —We are sending too many too few 4 about right Summaries —We are sending too long too brief about right 4 Foreign Situations -We are reporting on too many too few 4 about right Intelligence Estimates — I want to see the full version of intelligence estimates 4 I prefer short summaries of them The Vietnam War — Continue to report entirely in writing Schedule a weekly oral briefing 4 Evening Reading — I prefer more reports during the day 4 Less for evening reading Continue as now Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, BKS Chron. No classification marking. Smith sent a less detailed memorandum to Bundy on October 6, 1965, outlining national security information sent to the President each day. (Ibid.) 2 See Document 214 . 3 See Document 1 . 4 The President checked this option. 4 The President checked this option. 4 The President checked this option. 4 The President checked this option. 4 The President checked this option. 4 The President checked this option. 166. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 166. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, undated. WWR SUBJECT Internal Communications I promised you a memo on this, because—for an operation which lives on speed and wits—it is obviously important that there be minimum slippage in communications. Physical separation makes the problem more important. (If we were all sitting in the basement, the chance of not getting hold of relevant papers would be much reduced. Although I enjoy the exercise, foraging expeditions across West Executive Avenue are only a partial substitute.) In any case, I would suggest the following—most but not all of it already SOP: 1. Outgoing Cables for Clearing : We will have to work out what cables State does and does not send over for clearance as we go along. This is obviously a delicate question. As regards the European and non-regional economic cables which do come over, I suggest that they be routed automatically to me. I will clear, haggle, check with you, check with the President (routing through you), as appropriate. But primary responsibility for the cable-clearing business on Europe and non-regional economics should, I think, be here. 2. Incoming Memoranda to the President (or from Read to Rostow) : Again, on Europe and non-regional economic matters, all such memoranda should come here for processing. If very quick action is needed, an alert by telephone might be the first step. 2 (We should watch out for, and discourage as appropriate, foreign policy memoranda going elsewhere in the White House.) 3 3. Nodis and Exdis Cables : This has worked very well recently. I would suggest that copies of European and non-regional economic Nodis/Exdis cables be given simultaneously and automatically to you and myself. 4 (It is exceedingly irritating and even costly when one finds out about important incoming or outgoing cables inadvertently, on the telephone with Ball, Leddy or whoever.) 4. Correspondence with Heads of State : Harold Wilson is, of course, the major correspondent. The present procedure: Bromley sending the message up to the President, with simultaneous copies to you and me (as a matter of automatic rule) makes good sense. 5 It would even be worthwhile to have the Situation Room telephone my office when anything comes in. (I assume that distribution to the Secretary of State is automatic, except when the subject is sterling. In that case, there should be no distribution outside the building and I will personally manage the problem with the Secretary of the Treasury.) 6 5. My Memoranda to the President : Except on balance of payments and international money—where I have been sitting on the Cabinet Committee for over a year—I will send everything I send to the President through you, subject to our side agreement of yesterday. On balance of payments and money, you will of course have a copy at the same time the original goes to the President. 7 (The only exception to the above would occur if something has to go up in a great hurry, when you are not available. This was the procedure I followed with Mac.) 6. Your European and Economic Memoranda to the President : It would be helpful, and avoid crossed wires, if you could let me see copies of your memoranda to the President on Europe or non-regional economic matters. 7. Exdis Daily Summaries, State Evening Report, President's Schedule : Because the inflow of relevant cables is enormous, the Exdis Summaries are useful in giving a quick lead to what is hot. As regards the Secretary's Daily Report, it is important and useful to know what information the President is getting. I am aware that these are delicate documents, but rather less delicate than a lot of the standard business for which I have responsibility. (If these were held for me in the Situation Room on a routine basis, I would be prepared to read them over there. This is a nuisance, but less of a nuisance than foraging, which is what I do now.) 8. SIG and IRG Papers: 8 9. Return Memoranda from the President's Office : Obviously, either the original or a Xerox copy of my own memoranda should come back here for execution 9 via White House messenger. In general, on Europe as well as non-regional economics, action instructions especially at the Assistant Secretary level ought to continue to go out from here. It should be clear to John Leddy as well as to my Economic Assistant Secretary network that their incoming and outgoing White House link continues to be right here. (Obviously, exceptions prove the rule—sometimes speed and availability must govern. However things would get entirely out of hand if there developed any ambiguity about who is the primary contact. Even Mac, who was hardly an organization man, was very careful about this.) 10. Weekends : Ed Hamilton, who is really a gem—as discreet and sensible as he is able—will continue to be my stand-in and communication center on weekends. For some months he has been privy to everything going on in my office and, whenever I am not available, should have full access to all the above. He will be in close touch with me on the telephone. I put all this on paper because it is critical to our providing the President with efficient and effective service. Every one of us is operating on very, very thin margins on speed, wits and 12-plus hours worth of energy per day. If our own internal information system bogs down the job becomes entirely unmanageable. Francis M. Bator 10 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Personnel, April 1, 1966—. No classification marking. The document was presumably written soon after April 1, 1966, when Rostow succeeded Bundy. Rostow wrote numerous fragmentary notes on the memorandum, presumably reflecting his thoughts and reactions while reading it. Some have been noted below. At the top of page one of the memorandum Rostow wrote “Talk to Brom” (Bromley Smith). 2 Rostow wrote “if possible—we'll try real hard” above the line at this point. 3 Rostow wrote “I know” in the margin next to this sentence. 4 In the margin next to this sentence Rostow wrote “in general yes-but can't guarantee 100%. I will decide.” 5 Rostow wrote “Decision made here” in the margin next to this sentence. 6 Rostow wrote “me” after “Treasury.” 7 Rostow wrote above the line at this point “no—all.” 8 Bator left this section blank. 9 Rostow circled “for execution” and wrote in the margin “reserve—check with me.” 10 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 167. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 167. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 8, 1966. WWR: You asked for my thoughts on the staff . 2 I look forward to talking them over with you, but meanwhile here is a combination of those and some personal thoughts on my own role. I'm very happy to be part of the new Rostow team. Having been here over four years, I'd like this to be as much a new start for me as it is for you. One needs a new lease on life every once in a while. As I see it, this staff has three very clear but often distinct functions : 1. To frame decisions and other actions for the President in the broadest possible perspective . Actions range from big—how to move next in India-Pakistan—to small—simple letters and minor loan decisions. No one but a small staff close to the President sees things from his point of view. A paper cleared through the bureaucracy rarely tells the President what the real choices are or all the reasons pro and con. Those papers usually recommend. Only staff that has participated in the debate on an issue from beginning to end can take the President behind those recommendations to see what his real choices and their consequences are . It can also protect him from oversight. In all humility, I doubt the President himself realizes the extent to which the Departments don't do that for him. 2. To put the President's stamp on policy by injecting his viewpoint into deliberations early. As Schlesinger says, this government is a “sprawling” affair “filled with strong men eager to go into business on their own.” This staff can be a major tool in bringing the town into line with the President's thinking. It can be a device for strengthening his grip. Using the staff this way also makes government more efficient by putting its vast resources to work on the problems the President wants solved in ways he wants them solved without a lot of waste motion. 3. To generate new initiatives and concepts . Line officers don't readily swallow planners' ideas. The best are good at plotting a course of action, but even they fear rocking the boat with innovation. A small staff close to the President can get new ideas into the mainstream and force their consideration where intra-departmental planners may have trouble. Moreover, only this level can see where opportunities are falling between the stools. But no small staff at this level can come up with all the new ideas there are on all the problems we face. So the staff's job is partly to spark the imagination of experts everywhere and to focus their thinking on the President's problems. The main problem in combining these functions is that, here at the top, planner and operator must become one. At one extreme, it's possible to get so immersed in tactics, cables and operational problems that there's no time to think. At the other, a really good think-project can cost you the advantage of staying ahead of events. (This suggests that one advantage in having two people work on an area is the flexibility to divide the labor ad hoc and give each a crack at both phases of the job without sacrificing either. ) To function effectively, staff members need three things : 1. They must know the President's thinking . The only reason the rest of the town listens is because it thinks it may be hearing the President. This doesn't mean that every staff member has to talk to the President. It does mean that every staff member must talk to his chief who does. (When two people work on an area, both must have this access.) 2. They must take part in the town's debate . The moment they lose touch, their thinking loses its sharp edge. Instead of leading debate to the next step, they run behind, trying to catch up. (In practical terms, this means that when two people work on an area, some way must be found to keep both in the mainstream.) 3. They should be in touch with the frontiers of thinking outside government as well as in . We have done least of this in the past. What imperatives does this suggest for the staff's future? 1. Stay operational . In my view, it would be a mistake to make it purely a long-range thinking outfit . It must stay in the middle of the dialogue between the President and the town. Its job—if it serves the President well—is not just to come up with ideas. Its job is to put ideas to work. So it must stay with the stream of daily business to have any effect. This may seem overly tactical, but an administration imparts a particular flavor to its policy as much through a persistent posture in tactical matters as through dramatic decisions. Also policy most easily runs off the rails on tactical questions. If this staff has failed in any way, it has been not “overly operational” but “not think-oriented enough.” For instance, we (at least on Near East matters) have had very little contact outside the executive branch. So one area for new activity would be more active and broader outside contacts (conferences, touch with interest groups, etc.) 2. Staff members must play more than a staff role in its purest sense and become advocates . This would be a slight shift in character. The staff has always tried to force consideration of new ideas, but it has sometimes been wary of peddling them too hard. There is danger in this because the President's men must be able to give him a balanced view of his choices without grinding their own axes. But new ideas die quickly unless pushed hard. 3. The staff must be willing to wrestle certain decisions into the White House . It may be putting things backwards, but the staff's influence depends almost exclusively on the President's desire to hold tight the decision-making reins . I assume he intends to because that's the way he works, but the moment he stops, the staff loses its wedge into the policy-formulating councils. Maybe one reason the Eisenhower NSC staff gained a reputation as a paper mill was that many of the real decisions weren't made in the White House. This may all seem self-evident; but it's a fact that a staff like this not willing to engage will soon be cut out and just become a paper-handling outfit. What's this have to do with me? Let's be blunt. Where two people work on an area, both need contact with you and jobs of their own to do. This means a vertical division of labor with each man running his own projects with you and with the town. If the division is exclusively horizontal, the junior member ends up getting only the crumbs that fall from the senior's table. That just kills the victim's usefulness to the staff. I realize this is a two-way proposition—that each member must justify having an independent voice via his contribution. But the setup also has to encourage it. Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. No classification marking. At the top of page 1 is a handwritten note from Rostow to Bromley Smith stating “good memo.” 2 The composition of the NSC staff as of March 31, including individual responsibilities and types of appointments, is described in an attachment to a memorandum from Bator to Moyers, March 31. Also attached is a second memorandum from Bator to Moyers, March 31, that describes the NSC staff as of August 1965 and notes that, since that date, the staff had lost Bundy, Komer, Klein, Cooper, and Chase, none of whom had been replaced. (Ibid., Bator Papers, Chron File) 168. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 168. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 29, 1966, 4:10 p.m. General Eisenhower made a reference 2 to our lack of use of the formal NSC machinery. It could be picked up this year as a political issue. One way to head it off would be to budget for a few formal sessions. My first suggestion is: a formal NSC session on Vietnam at the end of Lodge's visit, when all the major issues are settled between us and we can control what matters do and don't get into play. 3 W.W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11–5. Confidential. Copies were sent to Moyers and Kintner. 2 Not further identified. 3 An NSC meeting on Vietnam, in which Lodge participated, was held on May 10. Lodge returned to Washington for consultations in early May and departed May 17. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 169. Memorandum From the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) to the President's Special Assistant (Kintner) 169. Memorandum From the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) to the President's Special Assistant (Kintner) 1 Washington, May 5, 1966. In response to your memo of the 4th 2 concerning a chart of the White House organization, let me briefly say such an exercise is a gross misuse of a good man's time; nothing useful can come from it, since the White House staff reflects the personal needs of the President rather [than] a structural design. If there is a design, it is radial—like the spokes of a wheel radiating out from the hub. Each person has a special relationship to the President and does what the President needs done; you can define very briefly what each man does, but it is impossible to catch the full scope of his duties. Work, furthermore, flows not from one layer to another, but directly from the President's needs. There is no pattern to it that can be fitted to a chart. Harry McPherson, for example, is Chief Counsel, handling legal matters, speeches, and programs of civil rights and natural beauty; but he does a hundred of special assignments each week which go beyond those general descriptions, which transcend other people's responsibilities, and which can't be fitted into a box. So does everyone else on the staff. In his own mind the President knows what each man does; he doesn't need an organization chart to show him. In our minds, we know what the President expects of us; a chart is irrelevant. Every time a new man has come to the White House, the President has asked him to prepare a chart: Moyers, Watson, Valenti, and Califano have all tried. It is an irrelevant operation which never produces anything useful. Nonetheless, since the President has asked you to prepare something, you should proceed to carry out his instructions. I do not believe it would be wise to have Milt Semer talk to the White House staff about what they do, since Joe Califano did this only a few months ago. If anyone talks to them, you should, because you are clearly the senior man in experience. But I believe it would be misuse of your time. I recommend you get the chart Joe Califano prepared following his exercise, revise it somewhat if necessary, and submit it to the President. Alternately, you could prepare a chart as I suggested the other day, showing the radial nature of the staff. Next point : Thanks for the point about Mike Foster. I'll look into him. If the President asks you about briefers, simply tell him we're scouting for men, but it is hard to find someone who can come in cold and do better than Fleming. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Bill D. Moyers, BDM Memos. No classification marking. The memorandum is an unsigned copy. 2 Not found. 170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 170. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 25, 1966, 1:15 p.m. I am informed that you wish to schedule regular NSC meetings at two-week intervals. I have taken stock with Brom Smith, George Ball, and Bob McNamara 2 —and reviewed my own knowledge and experience of NSC workings on and off since 1947. We believe you will still wish to use formal NSC meetings from time to time as you have in the past; i.e., for the presentation of recommendations on major problems like Viet Nam and NATO. But the following appear the conditions for making a regular NSC series a success. —We must not pretend the NSC meetings are the occasion when you will actually be making your major foreign policy decisions. —On the other hand, we must avoid creating a paper mill that would produce unimportant or uninteresting briefings for you. There are two areas for successful regular NSC meetings, within these limits: 1. Well staffed presentation of issues which will, in the fairly near future, be coming to you for decision and on which your principal advisers should exchange views in a preliminary, informal way, against the background of a paper defining carefully and precisely the elements in the problem. 2. Intelligence briefings based on information not to be found in either the New York Times or in the normal flow of intelligence (this might include briefings on new technical developments of far-reaching implication). With respect to the first type of subject, a good example is the Indian nuclear question. I would like to suggest this as the subject for a meeting of the NSC late next week (or the following, if you do not wish both a Cabinet and NSC session in the next week). The problem is complex. It has been well staffed out at the planning level. There is no agreed view in the town as to whether we can do anything—or what it is we can and should do. The subject is hot because the third Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has increased the pressure in India to go for a nuclear device. Chet Bowles has sent us a cable outlining the alternatives. I would propose that the meeting consider what alternatives are open to us and their implications. The end product of the meeting, aside from a common look at the problem, would be your instruction as to next steps in policy. It would not be a final decision. 3 Another subject might be the Israel de-salting project. I also propose that we go to work immediately to produce for you a list of other such important, foreseeable problems, plus possible intelligence problems; submit that list to you; and, on the basis of your reaction, set in motion systematic staff work in the town on the basis of a schedule looking, say, four or five sessions ahead. Only on the basis of such a reliable schedule can we assure that the staff work will be serious and worthy of your attention at an NSC meeting. One implication is that, within the limits of your schedule, we must try very hard to be regular about these meetings. This is desirable because Council members can plan their advance schedules so as to avoid conflicts or absences from Washington on the regular Council meeting day. Walt BKS 1. The Indian nuclear subject is OK for an NSC meeting next week 4 the week after The Israel de-salting project is better 5 See me 2. Prepare a schedule of other possible subjects for submission to me 6 See me 3. In principle, could we think in terms of every other Thursday, beginning June 2 beginning June 9 7 See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3. Confidential. A copy was sent to Jim Jones of the White House staff. 2 Rostow's May 24 telephone conversation with Ball regarding NSC meetings, during which he discussed McNamara's proposals, is summarized in a memorandum of conversation, May 24. (Ibid., Ball Papers, India) 3 An NSC meeting on Indian nuclear weapons was held on June 9. At the beginning of the meeting the President “indicated that this was the first of a series of NSC meetings to be devoted to the discussion of complex problems requiring careful exploration before they were to come to him for decision.” (Summary notes of the 558th NSC meeting; ibid., National Security File, NSC Meetings File) 4 The President checked this option. 5 The President crossed out “better” and wrote “good also.” 6 The President checked this option. 7 The President checked both dates. 171. Editorial Note 171. Editorial Note From 12:02 to 12:45 p.m. on May 27, 1966, the President and Vice President met in the Cabinet Room with Special Assistant Walt Rostow and 16 members of the National Security Council Staff. The President outlined major themes of his administration, and various NSC staff members presented subjects on which they were working. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A memorandum for the record summarizing the meeting, prepared by NSC staff member Harold Saunders on June 13 and printed in volume X of Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, Document 129 , indicates that “the President said he was very happy with the memos, analyses, and recommendations coming from the staff. What he would like to see more of now is 'ten new ideas' in his reading folder every night. He said these were beginning to flow but he wanted more and more of them.” In a memorandum for the record prepared January 24, 1992, and based on notes taken during the meeting, Rostow stated that he requested that the President meet with the NSC staff because “they wrote a flow of memoranda which he read and on which he depended, but they rarely saw him.” According to Rostow's memorandum, the President's remarks included the following comments about the staff's work: 1) “I expect of you three things: information, analyses, and recommendations. But I expect you to bring to your technical work a sense of concern, responsibility, and obligation”; 2) “In developing proposals for me I want you to unlock your brains; let your proposals reflect new ideas and your visions. I don't need a staff to maintain the status quo”; and 3) “As for your jobs on the NSC staff, each of you has the most challenging assignment a man can have. Your President wants ten ideas a week from each of you. Cut it to nine, but one will give me satisfaction. Dream your dreams and let me have them.” (Johnson Library, Reference File, Walt Rostow) 172. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to All Assistant Secretaries 172. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to All Assistant Secretaries 1 Washington, May 30, 1966. SUBJECT Regular NSC Meetings; Request for Suggested Agenda Items The President has instructed the White House staff to schedule NSC meetings every other Thursday, starting Thursday, June 9 at 1:00 p.m. The meetings are scheduled to last 45 minutes, and every effort will be made to hold them on a regular schedule. According to the White House staff the NSC meetings will be as they have been in the past, for “the presentation of recommendations on major problems like Vietnam and NATO”, but they will not be the occasions when the President will be asked to make major foreign policy decisions. Emphasis will be placed on the presentation of and exchange of views on issues which may shortly thereafter be coming to the President for decision. The NSC members will be expected to exchange views against the background of papers defining the elements of the problem and discussing available options for the USG and their implications. It is envisaged that the end product of most of these meetings, aside from a common look of the problem, would be Presidential instructions as to the next steps in policy formulation, rather than “final decisions”. Meetings will also be used for briefings on important intelligence matters not adequately covered in the normal flow of current information, such as “significant, new technical developments.” In order to make the NSC meetings useful to the President and to the participants, the White House will need the papers to be considered 4 or 5 days in advance of the meeting whenever possible, but never less than 48 hours ahead of time, so that the President and the Council members will have an opportunity to study the submissions in advance. The White House has requested the Department (and each NSC member) to submit a list of appropriate subjects for early NSC consideration. If there are any such issues in your area please let me have your suggestions by c.o.b. Wednesday, June 1, for review by the Acting Secretary and forwarding to the White House. BHR 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, Notebook on NSC Meetings, 1966. Confidential. Lot 72 D 318 contains three notebooks with State Department briefings and other backup material for NSC meetings from June 9, 1966 through November 25, 1968. 173. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 173. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 12, 1966, 12:15 p.m. Mr. President: I take two weeks leave starting tomorrow. I do so with some trepidation, although: —leave is necessary for year-round efficiency; —It is always good for a bureaucrat to be reminded that the U.S. Government can operate very well without him; —I am confident that your National Security Staff is geared to serve you for this time without me. Brom Smith will be the central point of communication, as well as for intelligence, AEC, military and related matters. He will also fill in on Latin America for that part of the two weeks when Bill Bowdler will be away, and coordinate with Bob Kintner on speech raw materials our staff will be generating. On other substantive matters, you have a sturdy senior team: —Francis Bator, of course, on Europe and foreign economic policy; —William Jorden, Viet Nam and the Far East; —Howard Wriggins, India-Pakistan and the Middle East; —Bill Bowdler, Latin America; —Ed Hamilton, Africa. As you know, I run the staff without a single deputy; but they all know their business now; work well together; and are looking forward to serving you in any way you may direct. We've gone over together carefully how they will operate without me. I've also spoken to Bill Moyers, who is ready to lend a hand if needed. I figure I'm a pretty poor administrator if I can't organize the shop to operate in my absence. On the other hand, I would be greatly distressed if you didn't feel wholly free to telephone me or whistle me back. (Everyone has my Martha's Vineyard telephone number.) This is a pretty lively time in foreign affairs; and, to my great pleasure, right now I'm your boy. I shall complete my three drafting assignments for Bob Kintner before the day is out. Looking ahead, we have three major foreign policy issues for which we should prepare our minds: —the German-UK-US offsets-troop issue on which Francis filed a good memorandum last night; —the arms limitation-spare parts problem with India and Pakistan; —a review at one time of all the various possible arms control measures, including where we go with non-proliferation. On all I advise against haste. The staff work on the third needs most attention; but I've left instructions to get this in shape in my absence. W.W. Rostow 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 11. No classification marking. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 174. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 174. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 3, 1967. SUBJECT Ideas on Staffing Before we get into specific names of possible people to work with me after Howard 2 leaves this summer, there are several basic questions I would like to discuss with you. The answers will set the criteria we are trying to meet: 1. Should this person be from inside or outside the government? Are we seeking someone of independent stature or someone from within the ranks who knows both the NEA area and the bureaucracy? My own feeling is that, although it may limit our scope, it's extremely important to have someone who knows his way around the bureaucracy. Right or wrong, much of our role is knowing how to get the best possible job done for the President rather than staking out the far-reaching guideposts of strategy. We try to inject as much of the latter as possible, but I believe we lead chiefly by our ability to influence week-to-week proposals as they're formulated for the President. 2. If we pick somebody within the Government, what background? There's a good argument for staying away from Foreign Service officers because they may be reluctant unless unusually well connected at State to push the Department very hard. People like Bill Bowdler manage this pretty well because of their personal relationships. However, an honest skepticism of the Department's approach to things does no harm in this job. I think the problem would be less so getting someone from Defense or AID, although they're specialized agencies and it would take a pretty broad-gauged person to meet our needs. The one other possibility is CIA. My mind naturally runs in that direction since I know people there and came from there myself. Obviously a good man can overcome minor handicaps, but I'd like to know whether you have strong feelings. 3. What level officer do you have in mind? The choice, as I see it, is between a junior assistant (such as I was when I came to work for Komer in 1961) and an alter ego. In practical terms this choice is between (a) a fellow 28–33 with 7–10 years of experience (maybe GS 11–13, O–4–6) and one with ten plus years of experience (around GS-14 or O–3–4). Obviously we want the strongest person possible. On the other hand, experience in this job shows that one person must clearly be in charge of the whole show and that it's impossible to divide up the area in any way except by dividing the daily work load. This suggests a clearly senior-junior relationship. Although the supervisory relationship is largely a matter of personalities, it's important to me not to have any question about who is in charge simply to avoid friction. Once we've had a chat on these questions, I'll run up a list of candidates for you, and we can be more precise. [Omitted here is discussion of a minor administrative matter.] Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC Personnel. Personal and Confidential. 2 Howard Wriggins, an NSC staff member whose areas of responsibility were South Asia and the Middle East; Wriggins left the NSC staff in July. 175. Editorial Note 175. Editorial Note On April 15, 1967, Francis Bator, President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, testified before the President's Task Force on Government Organization. During a presentation that focused on the larger issue of managing interdepartmental foreign pol icy-making, Bator also commented on the specific foreign policy role of the White House staff. For text of his notes on that part of his presentation, see Document 118 , Part III, Role of the White House Staff. 176. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 176. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, May 3, 1967. WWR: SUBJECT Division of labor after Francis Bator departs 2 I have thought hard about the things we discussed last Friday. 3 My conclusions are summarized below. They are offered in the full understanding that—particularly on cross-cutting economic issues—pre-drawn lines of responsibility neither can nor should be entirely controlling. This staff is not a bureaucracy; it cannot be if it is to serve the President well. Thus, for example, I very much support your idea that you, Ed Fried and I could work as a team on issues with some economic content. My thoughts should be read as encouraging that kind of arrangement. Geographic Responsibility I think it makes sense for me to continue handling sub-Saharan Africa. I have invested a fair amount of effort in learning the Continent and the segment of the foreign affairs establishment assigned to it. It would take time for another man to duplicate my relations with Joe Palmer & Company; this cost should only be incurred if there is some offsetting benefit. However, except for crisis periods, visits, etc., the Black Africa account is not a full-time job. It can be made into one, but I don't think that the dividends to the President justify expenditure of a full-time slot for Africa alone. Moreover, if I am to continue and expand my activities in the area of AID policy and programs, the African account alone is not a very good base. It is small and clearly at the bottom of Bill Gaud's totem pole. My relations with Gaud are excellent, but it would be much easier to swing weight on major issues if I had strong direct responsibility in one of the areas where AID's heart is. This, together with other factors, leads me to a preference for South Asia. My responsibilities in the Budget Bureau, before my tenure as Assistant to Kermit Gordon, included economic programs in Near East/South Asia. I have spent some time in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; I have been somehow involved in most of the major policy questions in those areas in the past five years. It seems to me that this would be the optimal base from which I could operate with AID, and with Agriculture and other Departments on food aid and related programs. Let me repeat that if you have decided on, or are considering, assignment of Hal Saunders to cover South Asia as well as the Near East, I do not want to stand in the way. Hal is first-rate and very experienced in this area. He has my strong support for whatever responsibility you want to give him. I raise the above possibility only because you suggested you may be thinking of splitting the account. It could be argued that splitting off South Asia will present a bureaucratic problem with State/AID in that two people would be dealing with Luke Battle and Maury Williams. I doubt that this would be a serious problem. With Hal handling the Mahgreb, we now have two people dealing with Joe Palmer without difficulty. The Near East/South Asia has always been a shotgun marriage; the Near East—including North Africa—is a reasonably coherent region, but South Asia is an entirely different problem. Moreover, I have spent enough time on South Asia to have a fair working knowledge of the NEA/NESA personnel, and would expect to begin with something of a running start. In summary, assuming you have decided to split the NESA account, I would propose that I use the time I have previously devoted to Europe (at least half-time, on the average) to South Asia, while continuing to handle Black Africa. Economic Matters I would group our economic business under four heads: trade, aid, international money and balance of payments. If Ed Fried were to come over, I would think he would be a natural for trade, that it makes sense for me to continue with aid, and that we might split the other two problems, perhaps allocating money to him and the balance of payments to me. (This assumes Ed would also be carrying a regional account. If he isn't, he should have both money and balance of payments.) It may be useful for me to take each of these categories in turn and comment on the special problems involved in each: 1. Aid : It is very difficult to have a strong and continuing impact on aid matters unless one has a regional base which involves him in a healthy portion of the specific issues which occupy the Administrator. There are a few general problems each year—the Message, the Bill, etc.—but most AID policy gets made in regional contexts, usually in South Asia or Latin America. Thus, it makes sense to marry the general AID mandate with one of those regional charters. I might add that the aid franchise inevitably, and rightly, also includes most of the work pertaining to the regional development banks and the World Bank/IDA, as well as food aid. In these cases as well, a strong regional base is an invaluable asset. 2. Trade : This account presents a spectrum running from customs conventions and air agreements to the general problem of post-Kennedy Round trade policy. It is already clear that the latter will involve a public committee which will require a fair amount of staff work, much of it done here. Ed Fried will bring much more knowledge and experience to these problems than I, and should certainly have the primary responsibility in this area. 3. International Money : Depending on when Francis leaves, we may be just approaching the hump or be just over it when Fried arrives. This is probably the most difficult economic account to pick up quickly. Again, I would recommend that Ed have the lead, but it may make sense for us to work together until he is comfortable with continuing alone. 4. Balance of Payments : It could be argued that the responsibility for this can of worms should go along either with money or with aid. My own feeling is that, unfortunately, it more often involves aid than money. Thus, I am perfectly willing to take it on—but also perfectly willing to give it to Ed if he has strong feelings on the subject. Again, there would be more togetherness than separation in any division. We would have to live a good deal with each other. I, for one, would look forward to it. The European Account As I have said to you, and implied above, I do not think that I should be assigned to handle Europe. This is not so much a professional judgment as a bureaucratic one. With all his assets—ranging from his immense ability to the leverage provided by his Presidential appointment—Francis has had to overcome enormous resistance in order to play the effective and independent White House hand on Europe which I think is necessary. I think it would be a disservice to the President to gamble that someone of my age and relative juniority could pick up where he left off. At best, it would be a long shot and it would take time. When one adds in the fact that my primary interests are the problems of the less-developed world, it becomes a bad idea all around. I certainly agree with you that there is a powerful case that the trade and money accounts go with the man responsible for Europe. Most issues in these fields are closely interlocked with European politics and are handled by the same people in State and Treasury. Thus, the optimal solution is certainly a man who can handle both. Ed Fried may well be that man. He probably stands well enough in the Department to gain quick admission to the right clubs, and he is eminently qualified to hold up his end in the policy debate. Thus, if he will take the job, he has my strong support; I would be happy to help him in any way possible. However, there are very few Ed Frieds. If he decides against coming over, you may want to consider splitting off Europe. In that event, I think Mort Halperin (Special Assistant to John McNaughton) is the best candidate I know for the European account. He is very bright, well balanced and would, I think, keep firmly in mind who is President. I would strongly recommend him if the Fried thing falls through. Whoever takes the European account will need help. Specifically, he will need a middle-level Foreign Service officer who knows the European Bureau. Larry Eagleburger has been of invaluable assistance to Francis; if he did not exist, it would surely be necessary to invent him. Thus, I would suggest you think of the replacement problem as a two-man parlay. I have that Polonius-like feeling of peddling bromides. My apologies for the lecture. EH 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Hamilton Memos. Eyes Only. 2 Bator's resignation was announced on July 20 and became effective September 1. 3 April 28. 177. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 177. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 11, 1967, 6:30 p.m. Mr. President: As you may recall, we had a word on the phone just as I was about to see the three men from the Washington Post 2 on government organization, and you instructed me to make clear to them that our foreign policy was not overwhelmed by Viet Nam. I made this point quite vividly by getting out the file of Tuesday lunch meetings and, without giving anything away, indicated the extraordinary range of issues that are dealt with at lunch. I also gave them some sense of how the meeting is organized and how it proceeds. Beyond that, I made these fundamental points: —The whole national security machinery is, must be, and always will be organized to serve the particular needs of a particular President. There is no single, correct formula; but only what helps a President do his job the way he wants it done. —In the case of President Johnson, a great deal of business is done through orderly paper work flowing to him for decision. In fact, 90% of the job of our staff is to make sure that we are an effective and reliable means of communication two ways: to the President and from the President. —Beyond that, the President relies on a number of different types of meetings with the senior advisors to assess problems and to make decisions: the Tuesday lunch; special ad hoc meetings on particular subjects (tripartite negotiations, Punta del Este, India food, balance of payments, etc.); and NSC meetings of the anticipatory type we are now regularly mounting. —I then described the particularly close relation between the President and his two senior advisors—Sect. Rusk and Sect. McNamara . I noted that we had only rarely in our experience—if ever—so close and confident relations among the three men at the apex of national security affairs. —In response to their questions, I explained at some length the job we do here and drew a sharp distinction between the task of a Cabinet officer who has to run one of the great departments and deal with the Congress, present himself before the country and the world, and a White House aide. —In response to specific questions, I said there was no sharp split in the government on Viet Nam policy or bombing: we all looked at the facts together; listened to each other's arguments, and then carried out as a team the President's decision. —When further questioned about my own views, I said that I had no very special views to press, contrary to those of my senior colleagues; but that if anyone tried to use the post I now hold for lobbying, he would soon be out of his job—and properly so. —I took some pains to emphasize by concrete example what you have been able to accomplish in foreign affairs in Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, Africa, and East-West affairs, despite the heavy burdens of Viet Nam. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Rostow Memos. No 2 Chalmers Roberts, Carroll Kilpatrick, and Murray Marder. Presumably they interviewed Rostow in connection with the preparation of the article, “At Tuesday Lunch, Decisions Are on the Menu,” that appeared in The Washington Post on May 21. 178. Editorial Note 178. Editorial Note On June 7, 1967, President Johnson established a Special Committee of the National Security Council to coordinate United States policy in the Middle East in the wake of the Six-Day War, which began on June 5. The President named McGeorge Bundy, who took a leave of absence from the Ford Foundation, to be the committee's Executive Secretary. The committee ended its formal work in mid-August. In a memorandum to the President, August 24, 1967, McGeorge Bundy recommended arrangements for continuing the work of the committee through the normal machinery of government. The files of the Special Committee are in the National Security File at the Johnson Library. Selected notes of committee meetings and memoranda of its decisions are printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIX . 179. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 179. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 25, 1967, 9 a.m. Mr. President: Our National Security Staff is now reorganized in the wake of the departure of Howard Wriggins and Francis Bator. The attached sheet shows the assignments of responsibility. Rather than having a single deputy, I regard the senior men as my deputies, each in his own field. Filing their materials through Brom Smith, they have proved they can operate smoothly when we are travelling or I am otherwise absent. In a number of cases they have junior officers working with them, as indicated. I think we are now set up to cope with the tasks ahead. Specifically: —Dick Moose is not only serving to help link George Christian's shop to State and Defense press operations, but also keeping an eye on quick responses to Congress by State and Defense. —Kaplan's shop, under Bill Jorden, is beginning to function on Viet Nam public relations issues. —We should be capable of quick responses, speech drafting, and other foreign affairs backstop work in the course of the campaign; although that we shall have to prove. I would greatly welcome any thoughts you have at this stage about improving the work of the shop. If you can spare the time, one of these days, it might be useful for you to meet with them and give them your philosophy and their marching orders for the year ahead. 2 Your meeting with them about eighteen months ago was not only memorable but inspiring. 3 Walt Have Marvin Watson set up meeting 4 No See me Attachment National Security Council Staff Executive Secretary Bromley Smith Western Europe; Balance of Payments; International Trade Policy including East-West Trade Edward Fried Richard Ullman Eastern Europe ; USSR; UN Nathaniel Davis Africa (except North Africa); South Asia; Economic Assistance Policy Edward Hamilton Roger Morris Latin America William Bowdler Middle East and North Africa Harold Saunders (an assistant being recruited) Southeast Asia and Far East William Jorden Alfred Jenkins: Communist China Harold Kaplan: Public affairs re Viet Nam Marshall Wright Scientific matters; weaponry, Arms Control, Atomic Energy and Space Spurgeon Keeny Charles Johnson JCS Liaison Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh CIA Liaison Peter Jessup Press and Congressional Liaison Richard Moose Communications and Operational Intelligence Arthur McCafferty 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 43. No classification marking. 2 No record of such a meeting has been found. A meeting was scheduled for September 28 but not held. Rostow's briefing memorandum for the meeting is at the Johnson Library. (Bromley Smith Papers, Memos Written by Mr. Smith, Signed by Others) 3 See Document 171 . 4 None of the options is checked. 180. Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff 180. Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, March 15, 1968. ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY [Omitted here are an introductory discussion and a discussion comparing Eisenhower's “institutional system” for organizing national security with a Kennedy system, the key to which “was a few important people and the groups and committees they set up.”] III. It's obvious from what I've already said that President Kennedy chose the less institutional approach. But what about President Johnson and the system as it operates today. A. The simple answer is that President Johnson is between the two extremes I've described but much closer to Kennedy than to Eisenhower. There is, of course, the obvious historical fact the President Johnson developed his system from what he inherited from President Kennedy. But there is the far more important fact that President Johnson, like President Kennedy in this way, determined to keep his own hand on the foreign policy helm. B. President Johnson's system didn't really emerge until spring 1966. Two concurrent events precipitated it—McGB's departure and Maxwell Taylor's return from Vietnam and review for the President of our organization to backstop overseas operations. C. President Johnson has acted on two principles: 1. He personally wants to make a large number of decisions. a. For example, aid and PL 480 approvals. These are good examples of the President's problems of coordination—aid, diplomacy, domestic economics and politics. 2. However, short of his own decision-making, he wants the State Department—not an especially large staff in the Executive Office—to coordinate our foreign policy and programs. a. Set up the SIG and IRGs as the mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination. b. Interesting to look back at some of the press comment when these groups were formed. The main comment then was that Bundy would not be replaced and that the President was strengthening the real State Department and killing the “little State Department” in the White House. But the idea was rather to strengthen State's mandate and machinery for coordinating the activities of the other foreign affairs agencies. State could have done this before but it didn't, so this gave it the formal mandate. Meanwhile, the small White House staff remains strong because the President keeps his own firm hand on the wheel. D. What machinery does this leave the President to help him? 1. The Rostow staff —that “small personal staff” the Jackson Committee spoke of to provide “help and protection.” Through this group of about a dozen principal officers flow the great majority of decisions the President must make. From here, too, flow the themes that set the tone for national policy. (For instance, Rostow regionalism, State of the Union—the Great Transition.) This staff also presides over a continuing dialogue between the President and the professionals. 2. Where discussion between the President and his cabinet officers is required, two institutions: a. Tuesday lunch. b. NSC in present format. 3. To deal with emergencies, the Special Committee of the NSC on the Middle East. Why it was needed and what it accomplished. IV. So where do we find policy in a system like this? You find it principally in the views and wishes of the President and those who effectively implement or block them. 1. Real lifeblood of this “system” is the deep personal involvement of President in details of major policy decisions and often implementation. Behind this is a complex of “interlocking directorates.” A small number of key men—under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and key staff members backstopped the President. To this nucleus is added a further group of key people responsible for specific areas and problems. If anything can accurately be described as “the invisible government” it is not the insidious CIA but this small group of key policy-makers. 2. Still find written guidance in NSAMs, State Policy Guidelines, and new series of national policy papers. The collection of papers is not so neat as the old book of NSC papers, and the bureaucracy—especially in the Pentagon—often complains. The new NPP's are designed to fill this gap (responsible officer idea). 3. However, equally important concept is that you don't find policy on paper . It's a “mix of people and ideas.” From the President's point of view, this requires continual prodding and needling from the White House. The problem recognized in 1947 is still with us—someone must wrap up the many loose ends in the complex foreign policy field. Some people feel SecState should do this, but it doesn't always work out that way. I'm sure you see my peculiar approach in this statement. I'm deeply conscious that the President is a man elected to take the country along a certain course. When he takes office, the bureaucracy may not always agree with him. His job is to move it, or at least to apply enough pressure so that a good balance between new directions and old realities evolves. The organization for national security is no less than the machinery each president modifies or builds to help him do his job. So you really find policy in the views and wishes of the President and those who effectively implement or block them . V. Where does CIA fit into this structure? A. Set up by the National Security Act to provide intelligence basis for realistic policy—both collection and analysis. What does this mean? 1. There must be a place in government where the policy-maker's tough questions can be answered. So the intelligence community's job is to collect the data on which answers can be based and then to apply those data to those questions. Much of the intelligence function is simply to report what is going on, and that's important. But the real job is to add enough analysis to the reporting to make it relevant. (I may be talking out of school to say this, but some of the community's product is irrelevant today.) a. In this connection, it can provide a detached source of information—a sort of touchstone against which to measure policy. All other sources of info—foreign service, attachés—also have policy axes to grind. CIA—at least the intelligence-producing side of it as contrasted to the spook side—the ivory tower of government. 2. There must also be an organ of government that can compete with our adversaries on their own ground. The Communists have a unique instrument in the Communist parties. Our intelligence operations provide our only organizational counter. B. What is the Agency's chief product? 1. It has its formal channels of communication—regular publications (some especially for WH), briefings, etc. 2. I think its more important product is the people it sends into policy-making councils. In a sense, the Agency's chief product is its director or whoever represents the intelligence viewpoint in meetings where policy consensus emerges. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC, SIG, IRG. No classification marking. In a March 15 covering note Saunders indicated that the paper consisted of his notes for a presentation to Career Trainees at CIA. 181. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 181. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 24, 1968, 6:35 p.m. Mr. President: While I am away on leave, Brom Smith will manage the office, the flow of intelligence, the Tuesday lunch agenda, etc. As you know, he is knowledgeable, wise, wholly discreet, and reliable. He works well directly with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, Dick Helms, etc. The substantive issues are distributed as follows in the senior staff which is now experienced and used to team-work. Ed Fried: Western Europe; NATO; money; trade, including East-West trade. Nat Davis: Russia; Eastern Europe (including Czech crisis); UN. Bill Bowdler: Latin America. Hal Saunders: Middle East plus North Africa. Spurg Keeny: Arms control; scientific aspects of weapons. (Works with Bob Ginsburgh on preparations for Soviet missile talks.) Bob Ginsburgh: Military and negotiating aspects of Vietnam. Military aspects of NATO and Czech crisis. Marshall Wright: Far East in general, plus political-economic aspects of Vietnam. Ed Hamilton: Africa; India-Pakistan; aid problems in general. They will file, via Brom, their memoranda directly to you. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, NSC, SIG, IRG. No classification marking. In a March 15 covering note Saunders indicated that the paper consisted of his notes for a presentation to Career Trainees at CIA. 182. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 182. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 5, 1968, 10:15 a.m. Mr. President: Herewith notes for your talk with Henry Kissinger. 2 1. There are only a few points of advice that one Administration can give another with respect to organizing the business of government; but there are a few based on hard-won experience which relate to the task which Henry is about to undertake. 2. First—and above all—the organization should meet the working style and convenience of the President. No two Presidents are the same. The only right way to organize is to serve the President's needs. 3. Before making changes in the national security field, study carefully how things are done. The system that exists in 1968 is the result of the accumulative lessons of the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years; that is, the period when this nation has become a world power. 4. For example, the Tuesday lunch is, in effect, a regular NSC meeting with carefully prepared staff work, plus the advantage of bringing together in a human setting the President and his chief national security advisers: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Chairman, JCS; Director of CIA; Special Assistant for National Security; plus others— including the Vice President—when the President decides that they can contribute. Nothing is more important than that this group be close; feel free to debate openly with each other in the presence of the President; be loyal to each other as well as to the President. We have seen in this town times of great difficulty in this respect; for example, between Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson. There were serious problems when Mr. Wilson was Secretary of Defense. The President's National Security Assistant can play one of his most important roles in keeping this decisively important group close to each other and to the President. 5. Rostow will explain to you how we now use formal NSC meetings and the other instruments of coordinating our policy. Each has a history. It is what it is as a result of hard-won lessons. That does not mean that things should not be changed. It only means they should be studied carefully and their history understood before they are changed. 6. The President's National Security Adviser should be prepared to put aside all personal feelings and ambitions and to ignore criticism in the press. Because he is close to the President, the press—and others in Washington—will inevitably be getting at him from time to time. He must be a spokesman with the press for the President's views; but he must never become concerned about his own status with the press. 7. The task of Special Assistant for National Security can be one of the most rewarding in government, because, in serving the President he is also serving the great departments of government in their relations to the White House. It is possible in this job for the man who holds it to be regarded not merely as the President's agent but also the friend and channel of communication to the President with respect to State, Defense, JCS, CIA, etc. It is a challenging but rewarding job. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Rostow Memos. No classification marking. 2 The President met with Kissinger and Rostow from 12:40 to 1:51 p.m. on December 5. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The Director of Central Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, and the President The Director of Central Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, and the President 183. Editorial Note 184. Editorial Note 185. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) Washington, January 13, 1964, 11 a.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCl McCone Telephone Calls. Eyes Only. Transcribed in McCone's office from a tape. Parentheses apparently indicate words about which the transcriber was uncertain. 186. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 13, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, NRO File, 06 Sept 1961–30 March 1965, Box 8. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Typed notations at the end of the memorandum indicate that Assistant Secretary of Defense Fubini dictated this memorandum in McCone's presence and that the original was handcarried to Fubini. 187. Editorial Note 188. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 29, 1964. 189. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 11, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, (McCone) Memo for the Record, 01 Jan-5 Apr 1964, Box 2. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. A 53-page verbatim transcript of this meeting, which took place in the East Building of CIA Headquarters from 10:35 a.m. to 12:25 p.m., is ibid., Transcripts DCI McCone, 18 Feb 64–15 Apr 64, Box 7. 190. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Fubini) Washington, February 13, 1964, 3:25 p.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Telephone Calls-E.O., 04 March–19 May 1964, Box 10. No classification marking; Eyes Only. 191. National Security Action Memorandum No. 283 Washington, February 13, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/PC Files: Lot 70 D 199, National Security Action Memos (NSAM). Secret. 192. Draft Memorandum From the Executive Director of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Chronological File. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned. Its filing location suggests it was prepared between February 21 and 24. 193. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carter) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, March 2, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Memoranda Originated by General Carter. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads “DCI has noted.” 194. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, March 4, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Transcripts DCI McCone, 18 Feb 64–15 Apr 64, Box 7. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to the paper is a March 12 covering note from Henry Knoche, the DDCI's Executive Assistant, to Walt Elder, the DCI's Executive Assistant, indicating that this summary of McCone's views on the NRO was derived from a transcript of a conversation between McCone and Baker and that General Carter made use of this summary during his recent appearance before the Baker Panel. Knoche was referring to Dr. William O. Baker, vice president in charge of research with Bell Laboratories and a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The Baker Panel was a special PFIAB committee charged with reviewing the National Reconnaissance Program. 195. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, March 10, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume I [1 of 2], Box 5. For Official Use Only. 196. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the United States Intelligence Board (Lay) to the United States Intelligence Board Washington, March 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA. Secret. 197. Department of Defense Directive Washington, March 27, 1964. Source: National Reconnaissance Office, P & A, PA Library, 104–01, DOP (Directives, Orders and Procedures). Top Secret. 198. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 6, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 277. Secret. 199. Editorial Note 200. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) Washington, April 24, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1. Top Secret. The memorandum was forwarded via Patrick Coyne. 201. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) to President Johnson Washington, May 2, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Talent; [codeword not declassified]; Keyhole; [codeword not declassified]. 202. Editorial Note 203. Memorandum From Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 19, 1964. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Meeting, February 21, 1964. Secret. 204. National Security Action Memorandum No. 303 Washington, June 2, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, General. Top Secret. 205. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 2, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume 2. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Copies were sent to Clark M. Clifford, McCone, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 206. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 11, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume 2 [4 of 4], Box 6. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 207. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 23, 1964. 208. Memorandum for the Record Washington, July 9, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, NRO File, 06 Sept 1961–30 March 1965, Box 8. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on July 12. 209. Memorandum for the Record Washington, July 14, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI McCone Memo for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. 210. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, July 15, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Office of General Counsel, 1964–65. No classification marking. 211. Memorandum for the Record Washington, July 31, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Memoranda Originated by General Carter. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The memorandum indicates that McCone noted it. 212. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 9, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI McCone Memo for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. 213. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 22, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office on October 24. 214. Editorial Note 215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President Washington, November 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11–2. Confidential. 216. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson Washington, December 3, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, White House, July–Dec 1964. Secret. Drafted by Bross on December 2. 217. Memorandum for the Record Washington, December 16, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI McCone Memo for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone on December 17. A copy was sent to Wheelon. A note on the memorandum indicates it was noted by Carter. 218. Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kirkpatrick) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, December 21, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Evaluation of DIA 1964. Secret. A copy was sent to the DDCI. A note on the memorandum indicates it was noted by McCone and Walt Elder. 219. Letter From President Johnson to Vice President Humphrey Washington, January 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11–1. Secret. Drafted by Johnson, Clifford, and Moyers. 220. Editorial Note 221. Memorandum From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Carter) to All Chiefs of Stations and Certain Bases Washington, March 27, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, DIA 1965. Secret. The top of page 1 of the memorandum is stamped “Book Dispatch.” 222. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 2, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Memoranda Prepared in O/DCCI for MSC Signature. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Carter on April 5. 223. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Admiral Raborn Washington, April 6, 1965, 4:26 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Admiral Raborn, Tape FMISC.04, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 224. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson Washington, April 26, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. No classification marking. 225. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 28, 1965, noon. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. 226. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 21, 1965, 2:30 p.m. 227. Editorial Note 228. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 29, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–3805, US Govt-Dept. of Defense. Secret. 229. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the Director of the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (Kent) Washington, August 5, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Helms Chron as DDP and DDCI. Secret. A note on the memorandum reads: “On 6 Aug Mr. Helms showed this memo to the Director.” Helms sent Kent another copy of his August 5 memorandum under cover of a December 10 memorandum in which Helms wrote, referring to the August 5 memorandum: “I know you will agree with me that the importance of this subject has not diminished, and I do not mean to suggest for a moment that you have not given it thought. I simply wish to underline that we must not lose sight of this objective at a time when the request for meaningful answers to serious problems are coming thicker and faster than ever before. I continue to be concerned that an estimate which is discursive and interlarded with 'uncrisp' footnotes will not receive the attention it deserves.” A handwritten note on the original of the December 10 memorandum, in Kent's files, reads: “Dick has not forgotten.” (Ibid., D/ONE Files, Job 80–R01621R, Box 1, Folder 15) 230. Agreement Between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense Washington, August 11, 1965. Source: National Reconnaissance Office, P & A, PA Library, 104–01, DOP (Directives, Orders and Procedures). Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 231. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 8, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Confidential. 232. Editorial Note 233. Memorandum From President Johnson to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn Washington, September 24, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry; Job 80–B01580R, DCI/Admiral Raborn. Confidential. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, and Clifford. In a memorandum to the President forwarding this memorandum to the President for his signature, Bundy recommended that the President sign it and send it to Raborn “as a reflection of your personal interest in his efforts to improve the organization, management and effectiveness of our over-all foreign intelligence system.” (Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, BKS Chron) 234. Report Prepared in the Directorate for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, undated. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–3805, US Govt-Interagency Correspondence. Secret. The report was forwarded to Richard Barrett of the Department of State by Desmond FitzGerald under cover of a September 29 memorandum. 235. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 30, 1965. 236. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn Washington, October 1, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry: Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB Committee 1965. Secret. Copies were sent to Helms and White. 237. Presentation by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) Washington, October 4, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01284A, DCI Speeches 1965–1967. Top Secret. The presentation was made in the CIA Auditorium to students of the National War College. Helms forwarded the transcript of his remarks to Enright on November 11, asking him to “please read my poor prose and decide whether it is worth cleaning up for use as basic doctrine for other speakers on other occasions.” (Ibid.) 238. Editorial Note 239. Memorandum From President Johnson Washington, October 19, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Intelligence and Handling Disclosure. No classification marking. Coyne forwarded this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy for the President's signature under cover of a September 29 memorandum in which he stated that, unlike the President's September 24 memorandum (Document 233), this one was “not controversial. It causes no new problems for State, Defense, CIA and the rest of the intelligence community. It merely reiterates the substance of President Kennedy's older Executive Order.” Such a “restatement of the Board's mission in this way and at this time will better enable the Board to do its job for the President.” (Ibid.) 240. Editorial Note 241. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts Washington, January 17, 1966, 8:08 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, INT 6. Top Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by William McAfee (INR/DDC), cleared by Ambassador Johnson (G) and John P. Walsh (S/S), and approved by Henry L.T. Koren (INR/DDC). Also sent to Hong Kong and Singapore. 242. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn Washington, January 20, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB Committee 1966. Secret. 243. Memorandum From the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn Washington, January 20, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–5505, US Govt-State. Secret. 244. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 26, 1966, 10:30 a.m. 245. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) Washington, February 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11–2. Secret. The letter indicates the President saw it. Moyers forwarded it to the President under cover of a February 14 memorandum in which he stated: “Admiral Raborn wanted you to see this. He was concerned, obviously, about the Washington Star story.” On February 13 the Star reported that, according to “informed circles,” Johnson intended to appoint General Maxwell Taylor to be DCI. “There reportedly has been some dissatisfaction with the operations of the present director,” continued the Star. “Johnson apparently feels he needs a prestige man in the CIA job now, and Taylor fits the bill.” 246. Editorial Note 247. Editorial Note 248. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, March 22, 1966. 249. Draft Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson Washington, March 24, 1966, 10 a.m. Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, The 40 Committee. Secret; Eyes Only. 250. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, June 1, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA, Vol. II. Secret. 251. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson Washington, June 6, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 11–2. No classification marking. 252. Editorial Note 253. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) Washington, September 20, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB 1966. Secret. Drafted by Bross. 254. Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Taylor) Washington, undated. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79–01201A, SIG Procedures and Support. Secret; Eyes Only. A log in the folder in which the memorandum is filed dates it September 1966. The recipient of the memorandum, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, was appointed DDCI by the President on September 20, confirmed by the Senate on October 7, and sworn in on October 13. The memorandum was sent to Taylor via the Deputy Director for Plans, but it contains no drafting information. 255. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 29, 1966. 256. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) Washington, October 10, 1966. 257. Memorandum From Donald Macdonald of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to William McAfee of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, October 10, 1966. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, NSC 5412, 1957–, Basic Document. Top Secret. Both Macdonald and McAfee worked in the Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination. 258. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, October 24, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, United States Intelligence Board. Secret. 259. Memorandum From the Legislative Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Warner) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, December 16, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–5505, US Govt-Congress. Secret. 260. Editorial Note 261. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, February 15, 1967. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Committee, Jan-June 1967. Secret. Drafted by Denney and William McAfee of INR/DDC. The memorandum is an unsigned copy. 262. Editorial Note 263. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, February 23, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Report of the Committee. Secret; Sensitive. The paper was prepared for the Katzenbach Committee (see Document 260) and was Appendix C to the committee's report but was not made public. 264. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to All Staff Chiefs and Division Chiefs Washington, April 14, 1967. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–06423A, US Govt-State Dept. Secret. 265. Editorial Note 266. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, April 17, 1967. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, CA-Coordination and Review. Top Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is an unsigned copy marked “Number 3 of 6 copies, Series A.” 267. Editorial Note 268. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) to President Johnson Washington, July 20, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, INT 8 US. Confidential. An attached September 21 memorandum from Rostow to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara requests comments on the report. Reaction to the conclusions and proposals are in memoranda prepared by Director of Central Intelligence Helms, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research George Denney, Jr., Director of the National Security Agency Carter, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 368) 269. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to All Staff Chiefs and Division Chiefs Washington, September 30, 1967. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–06423A, US Gov't-Special Group. Secret. 270. Sixteenth Report of the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State Washington, October 1967. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, PFIAB Materials, 1966–68. Top Secret. The report was prepared for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and forwarded to Clifford by Hughes under cover of a November 9 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson Washington, November 10, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, INT 8 US. Confidential. An attached November 6 covering memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes (INR) to Katzenbach indicates that his staff had revised the memorandum and its attachment in accordance with Katzenbach's guidance provided in his October 14 memorandum to Hughes. In that memorandum, also attached, Katzenbach complained that the Department of State paper had “an overly bureaucratic tone,” and he suggested it should be revised to “stress the substantive necessity of having such a system as our intelligence resources increase. The means we choose to achieve control over our resources should be secondary to the fact that we must find some way to create a common data base. This data base must enable us to distinguish between the relevant facts from the mass of information flowing into the Government.” He also proposed deletion of discussion about foreign service reporting which, he felt, was “a problem to be dealt with at a much later stage when we discuss how information from the common data base is to be distributed.” 272. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne) Washington, February 8, 1968. Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, The 40 Committee. Eyes Only. 273. National Security Action Memorandum No. 368 Washington, February 9, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 368. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, and the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 274. Editorial Note 275. Précis Prepared by the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) Washington, undated. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Professional Manpower Comm. Secret. White forwarded the précis, together with the full Report of the Committee on Professional Manpower, March 1968, to Helms and Taylor on March 29. The report, a copy of which is ibid., was prepared by an internal, four-person committee, chaired by the Director of Training, John Richardson. 276. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 8, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Presidential Program. Secret. 277. Memorandum by President Johnson Washington, May 1, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Box 41. No classification marking. In an April 15 memorandum to President Johnson, Maxwell D. Taylor, whom the President appointed on February 23 to succeed Clark Clifford as Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, wrote that at its April 11–12 meeting the Board discussed “ways and means to discharge more effectively its responsibilities,” and its members agreed that it would be “most timely” for the President to issue a statement reaffirming the importance of the board. Taylor enclosed an undated draft memorandum that the President might send. Under cover of an April 20 memorandum to President Johnson, Rostow forwarded Taylor's memorandum and draft statement. “In my judgment,” Rostow wrote, “a reinforcing memorandum of this type would be timely and helpful.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the President apparently did not act on this initiative, so Rostow forwarded it to him again under cover of a May 1 memorandum. This time Rostow added: “He (Taylor) is convinced—and I agree—that he should confer with the major users of intelligence, notably the regional Assistant Secretaries of State, to check on whether the intelligence material being generated is appropriate to their operational needs and being well and fully used. For that reason, as well as to give a general impetus to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under its new Chairman, I recommend that you go forward with this memorandum.” (Ibid.) The memorandum printed here is identical to the draft memorandum submitted with Taylor's April 15 letter. 278. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) Washington, May 17, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA, Vol. III. Secret. 279. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, June 6, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, 303 Committee. Top Secret. 280. Memorandum for the Record Washington, August 12, 1968. 281. Letter From the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, October 24, 1968. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FBI. Secret; Personal. William C. Sullivan was FBI Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division. 282. Editorial Note 283. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor) Washington, November 25, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt Rostow, Vol. 108. Secret. 284. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 16, 1968. 285. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 2, 1969. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FBI. Secret. 183. Editorial Note 183. Editorial Note The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) was established by Executive Order 10938 of May 4, 1961, to “advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States which are required in the interests of foreign policy and national defense and security.” (26 Federal Register 3951) According to Clark Clifford, Chairman of PFIAB from April 1963 until the beginning of 1968, President Johnson met with the Board less frequently than President Kennedy had, but relied on individual members to fulfill special missions in various parts of the world. ( Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York, Random House, 1991), pages 350 ff.) For information on the activities of PFIAB during the Kennedy administration, including the full text of Executive Order 10938, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, volume XXV, Document 87 . 184. Editorial Note 184. Editorial Note On December 27, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence McCone met with President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch. According to McCone's memorandum for the record, “at breakfast the President immediately brought up his desire 'to change the image of the DCI from a cloak and dagger role' to the role of an adviser to the President on world situations derived from intelligence sources which were of importance to the President in reaching policy decisions. For this reason he intended to call upon me for a great many activities which would be different from those of the past.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with President Johnson) McCone himself made a similar point in a memorandum for the file, January 13, 1964: “I have felt, and expressed myself to the late President Kennedy, to President Johnson, and to Secretary Rusk and others, that the DCI and CIA image must be changed. Its basic and primary responsibili ties by law are to assemble all intelligence, analyze, evaluate, estimate and report such intelligence for the benefit of policy makers. This function has been submerged and CIA has been consistently referred to as a 'cloak and dagger' outfit whose activities involve (almost exclusively) operations designed to overthrow governments, assassinate Heads of State, involve itself in political affairs of foreign states, and none of these activities are either controlled or coordinated with the White House or the State Department. This is entirely wrong, both with respect to the activity and the coordination and control, and I wish to attempt to change this image.” (Ibid., DCI McCone Memo for the Record) In a meeting with McCone on February 20 President Johnson reiterated his position, saying that “he wanted to do everything possible to get me out of the cloak and dagger business. That he was tired of a situation that had been built up that every time my name or CIA's name was mentioned, it was associated with a dirty trick.” The President, according to McCone's memorandum for the record, “was most emphatic in his feelings that we should get away from the cloak and dagger image and expressed a determination to bring this about by statements he would make from time to time.” (Ibid., DCI Meetings with the President) 185. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) 185. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) 1 Washington, January 13, 1964, 11 a.m. DCI?: Ros? G: Good morning, John. DCI: Good morning. You starting your last lap? 2 G: Last week. DCI: I'll write you a letter and tell you how sorry I am. Because I really am. Really very regretful you are going, but understanding. It will be a great loss to the Govt., to the Dept. of Defense and a great loss to me personally. G: Well, that part of it is one of the hardest parts. I started in working with you when I came into this Dept. and I don't like to—of course you preceded me out the last time—I know personally we will continue to… DCI: Oh sure. G: Before I do go a week from today are there any things, in your judgment, that I could address myself to together with you before then. DCI: I would like to see if you could work out so that the continuity of the responsibility in our interdepartmental affairs would continue in your office rather than either being—rather than going to the Secretary's office which in effect would mean that they would be in Fubini's hands. Now Gene is—leans over backwards to do what he can but there are two things about him. One is he is volatile and in matters of management not always the—thoroughly sound and secondly, there seems to be some considerable question as to whether he has the type of authority which you need in a (pinch) to handle others who might have a statutory and presidential appointment confirmed by the Senate and all that. G: From that point, he doesn't have enough authority over the Air Force. DCI: I would hope that Vance could continue on. G: And as soon as Cy gets back from Panama, probably tomorrow, I would like for the three of us sit down—I would like to have him here and you and I discuss the things that we see that he might address himself to. It is absolutely essential that he step in and we continue to have these two offices the poles of the axis because BOB is being increasingly asked to do more things, both within and without the Dept. Well it would just work better if Cy does what I have been trying to do and there is no reason why he can't. He'll have to learn more about it that's all, but we all do that. He alone, other than BOB, has the broader view. Gene Fubini obviously isn't in on the policy aspects. DCI: That's right. G: So as soon as Cy gets back one of the first orders of business I have before I leave is to—I have already gone over this with him. BOB agrees. He agrees. It is just a matter, I think, of it would be helpful if first session, the three of us meet together and we could do that this week. DCI: All right. Good. Now, the second thing is that I have a letter from you on this USIB matter. What you say is, inclosed is a copy of the JCS position paper 3 on your proposal to reconstitute the membership of USIB by removing the Service representatives. As I understand it you plan to proceed with the move after notifying the Chiefs of your intent to follow the procedures referred to in the ultimate paragraph of that paper. In my last letter 4 I proposed that this be done but I was aghast to find out after having written that letter that Maxwell Taylor called me and said, the matter [had] never even been discussed with him. The Chiefs are opposed to it. Really your letter referring to my last letter is correct but referring to the discussions over a period of a year and one-half, this proposal was-is McNamara's proposal. It was he who proposed the reducing of it. He has brought it up time and again only to defer it until Congress got out, knowing it was going to cause some flak which he didn't want to take. Now,… G: Well, Max told us, John, that—and I think the paper makes it plain, they are not fighting this. They don't like it but they are not fighting it as long as these two conditions which you have always intended, as I understand it, are observed. One is that (dissenting) positions will be noted. There will still be footnotes, still be brackets if two or more of the Chiefs Services differ on a particular estimate which consequence you now reflect in an NIE or SNIE and secondly that on some particular issue that if they want to have a Service J–2 present when it is discussed—not as a voting member but just to be sure all issues are laid before the Board—you are willing to do that. DCI: Of course we made that arrangement when they reorganized the NSC and removed the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs. The first guy that came in was a unilateral protest as—Symington with his first few days he was over running the Export-Import Bank. I think there is something a little illusory about this. G: Well, I don't know. You have… DCI: But I really feel this. That this is going to cause a stir up on the Hill. No question about it. I am perfectly willing to carry my end of any stir. On the other hand, this was in—this is more of an internal Defense decision than it is mine. G: No, this really came from the Kirkpatrick report 5 —it is one of the unfulfilled recommendations of that report… DCI: But the facts of the case are, when the NSC had decided to recommend to President Eisenhower on January 18th 1961 that this particular part of the Kirkpatrick report be implemented there were two dissents. One by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and one by Allen Dulles. And he again dissented when Kennedy reconfirmed it. Because, and as far as I am concerned, I can live and benefit by those three Service Chiefs being on there forever. I can sit and argue the points with them and get something out of it. FYI: and strangely enough in this 11–14 paper 6 which was the Soviet Ground Forces, I was not here during the debate, but held up until I personally approved the paper and modified it the ways I thought it should be changed in certain aspects. The real contributions came not from DIA, but came from Army and Air Force. G: Well, whatever contributions they can make, you will get through DIA and through individual J–2 who might be heard at a particular time. All I can say is that after 3 years I feel just the way I did when jim Douglas and Tom Gates strongly urged BOB and me three years ago to go through with this particular recommendation. They urged it very strongly and they felt it would be—as soon as we had a DIA going and as soon as DIA could handle it which we think it can. We can't make you do it, obviously, John, if you don't want to do it, but we think it is a good thing. Apparently Eisenhower did, Kennedy did. It hasn't come up to Johnson, but—and we are perfectly willing—BOB is perfectly willing, I won't be here—flak that comes from it and Max Taylor has told us that other than going on record that they don't like it. Obviously they don't like it. They go on record with us all the time about things they don't like. If we are going to do things they like only we would never get anywhere. DCI: Well, I know that. G: And this paper is so worded. They are not saying they demand to be heard by the President, the NSC, they simply say (a) we don't like it, (b) if it goes into effect, we think [it] ought to contain these two face jobs, provisos and (c) we are going to look at it come April. They can look at it all they want and the provisos are perfectly satisfactory at least from McNamara's and our standpoint. DCI: Well, don't you think then you should say that since this is an internal matter of the Defense Dept. primarily that you should recommend it to me? G: If you want to get some kind of a paper record here, John, but God you had this Kirkpatrick report which you voted for, you told me when you were a member of the NSC. DCI: Yes, as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission I voted for it. G: Well, your name was still John A. McCone and… DCI: I don't know whether it is anymore or not. G: I mean—I think if you don't agree with it now, in your present position, you ought to say so, but I understood you were in favor of it and you were holding it up until we thought it came at a time we could live with. We can live with it now and we haven't got so many other issues cooking that we can't take this from Congress. DCI: Let me take it under consideration. O.K. Ros. 7 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCl McCone Telephone Calls. Eyes Only. Transcribed in McCone's office from a tape. Parentheses apparently indicate words about which the transcriber was uncertain. 2 Gilpatric left office on January 20 and was replaced on January 28 by Cyrus Vance. 3 Neither the letter nor the paper is further identified. 4 McCone made the proposal to remove the intelligence chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in a letter to the President, December 21, 1963. The change, he explained, was “warranted in the interest of better management and more effective administration” since the military services were now represented by the Director of DIA, whose agency had been “created in 1961 to coordinate and supervise all intelligence functions in the Department of Defense” (except for those under NSA). For text of the letter, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Document 114 . 5 Reference is to the report of the Joint Study Group on the “Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government,” chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick of CIA. It was prepared during 1960 and presented to President Eisenhower on December 15. A copy is at the Eisenhower Library, Records of the White House Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing Notes, Intelligence Activities in Government, Study of. At a meeting on January 18, 1961, the National Security Council approved most of the report's recommendations. For more information, including a discussion of reorganizing the USIB, see Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 216–232. 6 Presumably a reference to National Intelligence Estimate 11–14–62, “Capabilities of the Soviet Theater Forces,” December 5, 1962. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11–62, USSR) For text of the summary and conclusions, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. VIII, Document 117 . 7 Regarding the reorganization of the USIB, see Document 196 . 186. Memorandum for the Record 186. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, January 13, 1964. This memorandum summarizes the discussion that I had with Mr. McCone at lunch on the afternoon of January 13, 1964. I expressed to Mr. McCone my interest in arriving at an early resolution of some of the problems which interfere with the proper relationship with the elements that compose the NRO. 2 I suggested that one way of resolving this problem would be to assign to the CIA the responsibility for the research, development, engineering and the early flights of a new payload aimed at achieving the maximum resolution permissible with the present state of the art without compromising the breadth of coverage to the point which has been done in the past [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and is planned now with [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. I sug gested that this program come about as a natural consequence of the basic studies now being carried on by the Drell Committee. 3 I further suggested that, after the first 4 or 5 successful flights, a smooth transition take place between CIA management of the payload and payload integration into a “routine” operational set-up under the detailed control of the Air Force but still subordinate to Plans and Policies direction from both the Director of Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense (utilizing the intermediary of the NRO). I further suggested that as a part of this agreement the same rule be applied to the Corona program that I was proposing for this follow-on broad coverage system; by this it is intended that the “keep well” steps necessary to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the Corona program be made unmistakably part of the Air Force's responsibilities. To the extent however that additional research, development and engineering work appears necessary in the existing payloads to eliminate defects or make substantial improvements, that the capabilities of the CIA must be employed. Thus, the principle would be established that, despite the fact that transition to the Air Force of a project has taken place, still the development team maintains both an interest and a responsibility toward major improvements (as contrasted with routine, “keep well” engineering operations). The above plan is designed to utilize to the maximum extent (as provided in the NRO Agreement) the unique capability of CIA which has been demonstrated in the past in various advanced developments as well as the strength, organization and capability of the Air Force which is uniquely equipped to carry on operations which have reached a character of routine. As part of this over-all reassignment of responsibilities in the NRO management, I stated that it would be expected that the Air Force would apply itself to the research, development, engineering and early test flights of a [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] with exactly the same procedure toward the NRO that the CIA has in the broad coverage program. Eugene Fubini 4 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, NRO File, 06 Sept 1961–30 March 1965, Box 8. Top Secret; [ codeword not declassified ]. Typed notations at the end of the memorandum indicate that Assistant Secretary of Defense Fubini dictated this memorandum in McCone's presence and that the original was handcarried to Fubini. 2 For a brief history of the NRO, see Gerald K. Haines, NRO: The National Reconnaissance Office, Its Origins, Creation, & Early Years (Washington: National Reconnaissance Office, 1997). 3 The Drell Committee was a committee of experts in optics established in October 1963 to provide a technical evaluation of the prospects for improving satellite photography. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 187. Editorial Note 187. Editorial Note In early January 1964 General C.V. Clifton, the President's Military Aide, expressed concern at the meager volume of intelligence reaching the President. According to a memorandum for the record prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency on January 9, Clifton “again” reported that “while the President does get up on situations demanding an immediate solution, he is not getting a steady feed of intelligence on world situations. He reads the papers and occasionally asks questions. He gets what Clifton and Bundy can tell him orally when they see him, which, Clifton says, isn't much.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Records, Job 80–R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos 1964) Clifton did report, however, that following the departure of President Erhard of Germany on December 29, he had managed to get the daily President's Intelligence Checklist to Johnson “with some regularity.” (Memorandum for the Record, January 6; ibid.) Under cover of a January 9 memorandum to President's Special Assistant Walter Jenkins, Clifton forwarded for Johnson a new effort by CIA “to bring the President up to date on intelligence with a minimum effort on his part,” the President's Intelligence Review. The President approved Clifton's proposal to produce it twice a week. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence Briefings) On January 21 Clifton reported to CIA that the President was such “a painfully slow reader” that “he just cannot afford the time to digest a daily book. A bi-weekly, kept short, blunt and easily read will do 'just fine.'” (Memorandum for the Record, January 21; Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Records, Job 80–R01447R, White House Staff Meeting Memos 1964) A week later, however, Clifton reported that he had given up on hopes to dispense with the daily Checklist, even though the President found the bi-weekly report “very valuable” and wanted it “kept up without change.” Clifton felt that Johnson expected Bundy, Smith, and him to read the Checklist each day and, in any case, “the first day you stop, the President will ask for the Checklist or query us about something, and we will not have the answer.” (Memorandum for the Record, January 28; ibid.) The CIA continued to provide the Checklist through November. On December 1 it was replaced by the President's Daily Brief (see Document 214 ). Production of the bi-weekly Intelligence Review also ceased in November. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence Briefings) For additional information on CIA briefing material provided to President Johnson, see John L. Helgerson, Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates , 1952–1992 (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), pages 69–77. 188. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 188. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 29, 1964. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.] 189. Memorandum for the Record 189. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, February 11, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting with Dr. McMillan on 11 February 1964 Dr. McMillan stated he desired to review with me the information given to the Clifford Board. He proceeded then to discuss an elaborate organization chart 2 designed to show the complexities of the present management arrangements for the Corona project. Without attempting to discuss the chart in detail, it is apparent that the Thor booster (Douglas), the standard Agena D (Lockheed), modifications of Agena D (Lockheed 162) and the launching services and operations (6595 ATW Vandenburg) and the on-orbit control and recovery (6954 ATW Sunnyvale) are under the control of General Greer. The camera (ITEK), reentry vehicle (General Electric), the payload superstructure and its integration with the camera and reentry vehicle (Lockheed, Sunnyvale SK) are contracts under the control of CIA. A technical Committee coordinates the work of these various contractors but is limited because of provisions calling for unanimous consent. Note : I stated that no Committee should have such authority. The final judgment of what should be done, when and how, should be made by an individual after receiving advice of committees, specialists, etc. McMillan then turned to a new plan of organization, the effect of which was to center all of the above functions under General Greer who has collateral responsibility for the Thor and Agena. General Greer would have an operating director in the procurement division. The procurement division would assume responsibility for all contracts for Corona M & J projects. I stated that the present arrangement seemed cumbersome. It had grown that way because the Air Force had refused to develop the Corona but had insisted on developing the more sophisticated Samos and hence CIA undertook the job and this got them into the business of buying cameras, reentry vehicles, etc. The moving of the operational center from CIA to NRO had complicated things and in fact the setup which made sense originally did not fit comfortably into the NRO concept. I then made the following points, briefed in the attached memo copy of which I gave to McMillan: 3 1. It seemed logical that there should be a fully integrated organization under competent management to provide all necessary management functions including procurement, supervision of contractors, scheduling and operations of a proven article. Corona was a proven article (although the J was still somewhat doubtful), and I would like to see such an organization established forthwith. Note : With respect to procurement, I thought it might be well for the project to have CIA procurement officers, administrators and security personnel who would issue CIA contracts because secrecy was respected under these circumstances and not with Air Force contracts. This however did not change the authority of the project manager. 2. In addition to all else the management organization had to be equipped with a technical division which could make improvements to the proven article which would increase its utility and most particularly its dependability. These I envisaged would be routine types of engineering improvements which would evolve from the system engineering components and the purpose of which would be to provide a more dependable Corona system producing more useful results. Note : The management of the Corona project envisaged in 1. and 2. above would schedule operations to meet the needs of USIB and its COMOR Subcommittee. USIB would have the final say on requirements. 3. Outside and apart from the above management organization would be a sophisticated technical organization charged with the responsibility to study, recommend and to effectively carry out by contracts and otherwise extensive advancements in the system designed to get the maximum product. I spoke of research of the type discussed Saturday afternoon, 4 the necessity of having every frame equal the best frame, the need to “milk the system dry” by improved film, film intensifiers and a variety of other scientific and engineering innovations designed to perfect the system. I said that these changes should not be injected into the operations of the “proven devices” because they would involve such extensive changes that the system would revert to the R&D phase, therefore when we were ready to go with these innovations, we could consider how to introduce them into the system without jeopardizing schedules considered essential from an intelligence requirements point of view. 4. Developing a new system designed to give better resolution than can possibly be obtained from the Corona system. Note : I said that it appeared to me that 3. and 4. should be assigned by D/NRO to CIA who should use all of its resources to accomplish these two objectives as promptly as possible and with as little interference to the operation of the proven system as possible. 5. A Board of technical advisers should be established by the D/NRO composed of men engaged in 2. above and those engaged in 3. and 4. above and they should be charged with the responsibility of seeing that there are no overlaps or gaps, and with advising the D/NRO on steps which should be taken. This Board should meet as frequently as necessary and should consider the broad spectrum of problems which arise in implementing the above. Dr. McMillan did not object to the above. He feels there is a good deal of sophistication in the Air Force as evidenced by the successful [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. He also indicated the difficulty of differentiating between 2. and 3. above. I stated if the above procedure were adopted and adhered to, then I thought that the resources in both CIA and Air Force could contribute to the success of our reconnaissance program. Any plan which did not utilize the resources of both organizations would not be agreeable to me. I took the occasion to tell Dr. McMillan I remained convinced that he, as Under Secretary, is making a mistake to attempt to run a line organization because of his varied statutory responsibilities from which he could not escape and for that reason I urged he consider some different “in-house” arrangement for directing the NRO. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, (McCone) Memo for the Record, 01 Jan-5 Apr 1964, Box 2. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. A 53-page verbatim transcript of this meeting, which took place in the East Building of CIA Headquarters from 10:35 a.m. to 12:25 p.m., is ibid., Transcripts DCI McCone, 18 Feb 64–15 Apr 64, Box 7. 2 Not found. 3 Attached but not printed. 4 No record of this February 8 meeting has been found. 190. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Fubini) 190. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Fubini) 1 Washington, February 13, 1964, 3:25 p.m. DCI: What is the problem of Wheelon going out… F: The problem is the fact, in my judgment, this is an internal affair of the person who is running that particular program… (tape picks up) …to eliminate that one is one of the reasons for that agreement. DCI: Well, I tell you, I am getting sick and tired of this kind of thing and I am just about ready to tell the Secretary of Defense and the President they can take NRO and shove it. I am not going to monkey around with this thing any more and I'll take this thing over and run it. Now, you fellows can have all the rows you want at the Pentagon building, but this is of prime importance to me and I'm responsible and I don't want anymore monkeying around. I told McMillan what I would do and I told him he could draw up the memorandum and we would finish it before I left tonight. 2 I haven't heard a word from him. He went over to the Clifford Board and fed them the greatest line anybody ever listened to and I am just about fed up with the whole business. So I'll cancel Wheelon's trip and I'll take him out there myself and when I get through with outfit you will know that somebody has moved into it. And I am going to call the Secretary now and I am going to tell him to tell the Pentagon bureaucrats that they had better watch their step or they are going to blow the roof off the building. Now I know all about it. I know about this deployment of all these planes and crews and everything else out in the Philippines. I know everything that has gone on and as far as I am concerned I'm getting pretty well fed up with it. F: Mr. McCone, may I interrupt. DCI: Yes you can interrupt. F: Let's separate the Philippine episode, which I think I would prefer not to talk, it's pretty bad. It has nothing to do with McMillan. McMillan didn't even know it was going on and I will plead guilty anytime you want. I think you are right. I don't want to debate it. The fundamental point here is I am trying to establish a position whereby Wheelon, McMillan, McCone and Fubini get along and work together. DCI: Well, my patience is gone! F: Well, Mr. McCone, I would like for you to give me a little bit more of your patience, because, frankly, I have as you know gone a long way toward reaching something of an agreement and it is a matter of a very few days before we accomplish that agreement which will help eliminate this friction. DCI: Well, I think the thing I should do is call up the President and tell him to get a new Director of Central Intelligence, that the bureaucrats in the Pentagon are trying to screw things so that nobody can run the intelligence business. I won't have any more responsibility for it. That's what I'm going to do. I'm not going to monkey around with this anymore, Gene. I appreciate your help; I appreciate your friendship-but that one upstairs I'm not going to monkey around with for 5 minutes. Tell the Secretary to get a new man in charge of NRO and I want to be the Executive Agent… F: Can't you forget that I have even mentioned this problem… DCI: What ? F: Can you not forget that I even mentioned this problem. Do you have to make a big todo about this one? Can't we just forget about the whole thing? DCI: Sure. I'm going down to Cat Cay for a few days and I'll be back. F: Mr. Mc Cone, let's forget about this whole episode, please. DCI: All right. O.K. fine, Gene, anything you want. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Telephone Calls-E.O., 04 March–19 May 1964, Box 10. No classification marking; Eyes Only. 2 According to the transcript of this February 11 meeting (see footnote 1, Document 189 ), McCone wanted McMillan to draft a memorandum in the next day or two that McMillan, Fubini, McCone, Carter, and Wheelon could approve, but McMillan remarked: “I'm at this point not too sanguine about completing it in two or three days. I haven't changed my views…since the end of October when I first made my views known.” McCone replied, “Well, my views haven't been changed either.” 191. National Security Action Memorandum No. 283 191. National Security Action Memorandum No. 283 1 Washington, February 13, 1964. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, United States Information Agency SUBJECT U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Training Policy and Objectives This supersedes NSAMs 131 and 163. 2 I. General The President has noted with approval the considerable progress made in the Government's internal defense/counterinsurgency training effort and would like to be assured that this effort is sustained in the future. He desires that personnel of each of the addressees with or to be assigned foreign affairs responsibilities (hereinafter foreign affairs officers) continue to receive comprehensive instruction on U.S. policy and strategies, and on the resources and techniques available to the United States in assisting underdeveloped countries cope with the problems of development and internal defense. II. Training Policy and Objectives A. U.S. Officer Personnel The President has directed that all career-development training programs offered by each agency with major foreign affairs interests include study of the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy. This instruction will be tailored in accordance with the specific overseas internal defense role and mission of the particular agency as well as to the career level of the officers receiving training. B. U.S. Officers With Internal Defense/Counterinsurgency Responsibilities In addition to this broad training for all foreign affairs officers, the President has approved specific training objectives for those officer-grade personnel indicated below who are scheduled for relevant assignment to the underdeveloped world or to headquarters or instructor positions related thereto. 1. For officers of the ranks GS-9 through 13 (FSO–8 through 4, 2 Lt (Ensign) through Lt. Colonel, Commander USN): (a) Background A comprehensive understanding of the history of insurgency movements, especially those in which the U.S. interest was involved. This will include instruction on the background and environmental factors—political, economic, social and psychological—of subversive insurgency, the means utilized to prevent, deter or defeat such movements, and the related problems of economic development. (b) The Threat A basic knowledge of communist ideology, organization, goals, and the strategy and techniques employed by communists in the underdeveloped world, including the doctrinal approaches of the Soviets and Red Chinese to political power. Particular emphasis will be placed on the various problems of development and communist methods of exploiting these problems. (c) U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Programs A basic knowledge of the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy, its strategy of employment, U.S. internal defense (civilian and military) resources and programs, and the techniques and methods through which these programs are implemented. (d) Departmental Tactics and Techniques A thorough understanding of the tactics and techniques of the parent department, agency or military branch which have an application in detecting, combatting and defeating insurgency. 2. Officers of the ranks GS-14 (FSO–3, Colonel, Captain USN) and above will receive training in addition to instruction required by paragraphs A and B above, to prepare them for departmental, command, and staff responsibilities. At this level, special attention will be given to the unique resources and capabilities of all U.S. Government departments and agencies and of the need to combine these assets into effective programs. (a) Situation Assessment and Evaluation Develop an ability to identify the critical factors in internal security analyses of underdeveloped areas; how to recognize manifestations of dissidence and subversion. (b) Program Planning Detailed knowledge of the resources and capabilities of the parent department/agency or military branch which contribute to the overall USOID effort; the methodology of program development and internal defense planning to include inter-agency coordination of planning at the national level and abroad. (c) Program Implementation A thorough knowledge of the methods and techniques of implementing and executing programs of the parent department and related agencies; techniques of cooperation with the host government and third countries. C. Officers Assigned “Key Positions” All officers assigned to “key positions” (as determined by the Special Group (CI)) in the underdeveloped world or in headquarters positions related thereto, will receive special instruction at the National Interdepartmental Seminar. This training will be considered as a prerequisite for assignment to designated “key positions” although it will be available to other selected personnel on a case by case basis. Exception to this training as a prerequisite to such assignment may be made only by the head of the department or agency concerned. While this training will include coverage of those items outlined in paragraph B above, emphasis will be given to the problems faced by the U.S. in assisting in the development and internal defense of the underdeveloped countries. Additional coverage will include: 1. The growing interdepartmental nature of U.S. foreign policy problems and programs. 2. The development and coordination of policy and program implementation. 3. The concept and operation of the Country Team. 4. The Washington organization for overseas internal defense. D. Official Personnel of Foreign Governments It is in the interest of the U.S. to provide training corresponding to the above to selected officials, both civilian and military of foreign governments. While emphasis should be placed on training officials from those countries actively threatened by an active subversive threat, our efforts should be aimed at influencing and gaining the support of USOID policies and programs from as many official personnel as possible throughout the underdeveloped world. To the extent practicable, this training should be given in the following places: 1. In facilities operated by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency which are available to foreign nationals. 2. In special facilities operated by the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and other available U.S. Government training centers operated for the benefit of foreign nationals. 3. U.S. MAAGs/Missions and USOMs in underdeveloped areas. 4. At private U.S. institutions, where feasible. III. Action Responsibilities A. Departmental The Department of State will be responsible for developing and conducting such courses as may be necessary for officials of State, AID, and USIA and when appropriate for other civilian agencies with limited foreign operations. Each of the other addressee agencies will be responsible for the organization of appropriate training programs for its own officers. Each of the responsible departments and agencies will seek to coordinate its training programs and to the extent practicable and necessary, make available spaces for the cross-training of personnel from other U.S. agencies with development and internal defense responsibilities. While the Foreign Service Institute will be responsible for the administration and presentation of the National Interdepartmental Seminar, each of the addressee agencies will provide financial, faculty and student support to it. B. National Interdepartmental Seminar The National Interdepartmental Seminar will be the inter-agency training center for those officers assigned to “key positions”. In performing this function, the Seminar will undertake research, develop case studies, and offer instruction on the manifold problems of development and internal defense and improve the U.S. capability to assist underdeveloped countries overcome these problems. In addition, the Seminar will serve as the focal point of the U.S. overseas internal defense training effort. Accordingly, it will undertake to assist other more specialized U.S. Government institutions engaged in related training activities by developing instructional materials on the non-technical aspects of internal defense and counterinsurgency. C. Special Group (CI) It shall be the responsibility of the Special Group (CI) to oversee and support this entire training effort, and to report to the President periodically upon the degree to which the training objectives outlined above are being achieved. The inter-agency Subcommittee on Training, established by the Special Group (CI), will assist the latter in overseeing and supporting this training effort. Further, it is desired that the Special Group (CI) determine the adequacy of the effort we are making to train selected foreign official civilian and military personnel in the problems of development, internal defense and counterinsurgency and seek to insure the effective coordination of these programs. Where deficiencies are determined to exist, the Special Group (CI) will direct appropriate corrective action. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/PC Files: Lot 70 D 199, National Security Action Memos (NSAM). Secret. 2 Entitled, respectively, “Training Objectives for Counter-Insurgency,” March 13, 1962 (ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 131); and “Training Objectives for Counterinsurgency,” June 14, 1962 (ibid., NSAM No. 163). 192. Draft Memorandum From the Executive Director of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 192. Draft Memorandum From the Executive Director of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, undated. I have seen a copy of Ray Cline's memorandum 2 regarding the President's Intelligence Checklist and would like to offer my opinions. One of the most important functions of the Checklist is the open invitation for the Director of Central Intelligence and his boys to comment on everything in the Government they want to talk about. Furthermore, it gives them an avenue of written approach to the President and to you, and to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, where they can put in highly sensitive material which they could be sure no one else would see and yet wouldn't have to brief individually men who are hard to catch. A third and most important factor is that a small group of people can prepare this, it can be prepared rapidly without any detailed coordination in the Government, and if there is a mistake in it, or if there is something in it which the President might see and not want to have disseminated, it is very easy for us to go back to the originators of the material and turn off the water before it gets spread over town. Last but not least, if there is to be criticism of the CIA on things which are put out from the Director's office, this certainly would enlarge the number of people who can shoot at the CIA and its material. As far as I can see, this just makes it another intelligence paper which has lost most of its value to the President. If they are going to enlarge it to this extent, I would suggest that we drop our subscription and settle for the Central Intelligence Bulletin, and then have only individual reports, summaries and analyses from the Director to the President as we see a need for them. Perhaps you will recall some of our problems with a simple Eyes Only message and how we try to keep the distribution down. With this many people fumbling with the Checklist, disseminating it, [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] we might just as well print it in The New York Times . I think we will reach more people faster, but not much. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, Chronological File. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned. Its filing location suggests it was prepared between February 21 and 24. 2 Under cover of a February 21 memorandum to Bundy, Cline forwarded a new distribution list that included the President and 12 other U.S. Government officials. (Ibid., National Security File, Clifton Files, CIA) 193. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carter) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 193. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carter) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 1 Washington, March 2, 1964. 1. There are several basic factors to consider: a. The NRO has developed into an essentially Air Force owned and operated component, one of whose aims is to get the CIA out of the reconnaissance business, both satellite and aircraft. b. The Air Force, the D/NRO, and the staff of the NRO have never been oriented to the intelligence collection responsibility for which NRO was set up. c. The bulk of those things that have been undertaken by the Air Force component of NRO have been sloppily done. d. Large numbers of actions taken by the NRO are not coordinated with appropriate elements of the Agency and in many cases are done without the knowledge of Mr. [ name not declassified ]. 2. We could list a large number of gripes by item to prove the foregoing. What is needed, however, is a solution to the problem rather than more discussion of the shortcomings. 3. I am personally convinced that as long as the Director, NRO, is the Under Secretary of the Air Force or has any allegiance to anyone other than the DCI and SecDef jointly, these jurisdictional matters will continue. 4. The Air Force and the CIA and any other Governmental agencies having a capability for NRO must be considered as operational assets in their entirety and must not be broken down into small components as part of a line organization under D/NRO. 5. We must have a D/NRO whose principal orientation is toward intelligence collection and who can utilize through a small staff on a managerial basis only, the assets of the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole. MSC Lieutenant General, USA 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Memoranda Originated by General Carter. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads “DCI has noted.” 194. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 194. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, March 4, 1964. DCI VIEWS ON NRO MATTERS I. If US Government department heads not capable of organizing national reconnaissance operation, they are not competent to do their job. II. Problem is deep bureaucratic row— A. CIA has done its part of job with flair, imagination and surprising secrecy. B. AF has made great contribution also. But, at working level, AF has maneuvered to eliminate CIA from the reconnaissance effort. C. Within USAF there is unhappiness that D/NRO is running a line operation which is outside exclusive AF plans and the AF Systems Command. D. AF spokesmen have told contractors not to talk to CIA. This worries the contractors. III. CIA also holds views on these bureaucratic aspects. DCI, however, looks at problem as DCI, not as head of CIA. A. As DCI, with his responsibility as intelligence advisor to President, DCI must be satisfied that reconnaissance facilities are operating for maximum intelligence benefits. 1. Of extreme importance to DCI is developing systems improvements for future. B. Collection and analysis of intelligence is a full-time DCI concern—his primary mission. This is not true of SecDef or Chairman, JCS. This primary DCI responsibility cannot be diluted. 1. History of progress in reconnaissance fields shows that the gathering of intelligence has not always been a primary objective of SecDef. 2. Same history shows need for secrecy. CIA shines at this. It is extremely difficult for DOD. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy were quite conscious of this. 3. CIA compartmentation and flair have built an atmosphere which seems to bring out the best in contractors. This is not always true in DOD projects. 4. CIA has demonstrated flexibility in procurement procedures as contrasted with rigidity in DOD. SecDef has pointed to successful Oxcart development at lower costs than unsuccessful, costlier programs such as the B–70. IV. The history of the U-2 demonstrates CIA flair and imagination. A. CIA adopted the J–75 engine for better altitude. USAF did not. CIA had to give two J-75-equipped U-2's to SAC for Cuban reconnaissance. B. CIA equipped its U-2's for aerial refueling. USAF did not do so until quite recently and only three have been so modified. C. CIA put improved ECM equipment aboard U-2's for use when overflying near SAM's. USAF has not. D. CIA has made successful tests for flying from carriers. USAF, for obvious reasons, has not. V. Main point is, modifications such as these are undertaken to protect and improve intelligence sources and methods. To the USAF, budg-et considerations give intelligence aspects a back seat to operational considerations. VI. Much can be said for using USAF planes, even sanitized, in reconnaissance operations, but there is a certain sophistication that CIA has acquired in this regard. A. CIA gets approvals, within US, and from high authority abroad. B. USAF could probably develop this sophistication, but the recent sudden deployment of a SAC U-2 detachment to the Philippines without approvals very nearly caused a major international incident. VII. DCI foresees problem with Oxcart, which can be detected by the Soviets. A. This fact changes the Oxcart role from a regular collector to that of a standby vehicle for emergency collection. B. Maybe this means the Oxcart should be a part of the USAF inventory. C. DCI has not yet personally resolved this in his mind. VIII. This, then, takes one to the matter of improving satellites for reconnaissance purposes. A. History shows that the Samos failure would have left the US bereft of a satellite capability. B. The CIA decision to go black and procure a re-entry vehicle, camera systems, film, etc., has led from a useful capability by stages to improved resolution and a highly trustworthy system. IX. In future, we must have an ever-improving search system that cuts a wide swath with maximum resolution: A. We will want to use the search system to pick targets for coverage with a special system of narrow scope and high resolution. B. It is in matters like this that bureaucratic maneuvering is most intense. X. DCI is not prepared to relinquish operation of principal assets for intelligence collection to an agency outside his control. Neither is he prepared to remove CIA's “cutting edge” in reconnaissance. A. Arguments on this score broke Scoville's back and present Wheelon with his headaches. B. Maybe there shouldn't be an NRO. Possibly these tasks could be worked out between various agencies on a case-by-case basis. 1. Another way to tackle the thing is to establish an NRO that has fullest input from both CIA and DOD, while remaining responsive to the DCI's statutory responsibility. 2. In this respect there was a good deal of soul searching in Washington as to whether there was adequate photography of Cuba in the months leading up to the missile crisis, but nobody in Washington other than the DCI went up on the Hill day after day to explain the situation. If there were to be a sudden surprise development in the USSR, it wouldn't be the D/NRO, the SecDef or the SecState who was responsible for the surprise. It would be the DCI. C. Perhaps we can allocate these tasks, while they are in the development stage, with the appropriate agency fully and unilaterally responsible for the development. Then when systems become operational, an operating organization could take it over and run it in response to the requirements of the Chairman of USIB. 1. In this manner we might provide an official like General Greer with a purchasing organization to keep procurement contracts covert after the system has become operational. The agency responsible for the development phase could be made responsible for future improvements and follow-on systems. D. Whatever is done must provide for the depth of experience and manpower that exists in the military and for the flexibility and initiative of CIA. This couldn't be done below the level of SecDef and DCI. Below this level, departmental warfare is deep and determined. XI. DCI never conceived of NRO becoming a line organization. In his view it should be a management organization which would call on the resources of the Air Force, the CIA and maybe NASA and others. It would consist of a small group of people to parcel out assignments, see that the assignments were carried out, and operate under the direction of SecDef and DCI. It hasn't turned out that way. A. It is a line organization. This is entirely wrong. It should not be administered by an Under Secretary of the Air Force operating within Air Force channels. B. The problems that beset NRO now are dangerous because they are affecting a national intelligence resource of the greatest importance—so much so that it should be beyond any parochial approaches. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Transcripts DCI McCone, 18 Feb 64–15 Apr 64, Box 7. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to the paper is a March 12 covering note from Henry Knoche, the DDCI's Executive Assistant, to Walt Elder, the DCI's Executive Assistant, indicating that this summary of McCone's views on the NRO was derived from a transcript of a conversation between McCone and Baker and that General Carter made use of this summary during his recent appearance before the Baker Panel. Knoche was referring to Dr. William O. Baker, vice president in charge of research with Bell Laboratories and a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The Baker Panel was a special PFIAB committee charged with reviewing the National Reconnaissance Program. 195. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 195. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, March 10, 1964. SUBJECT Measures for Strengthening the Counterintelligence Posture of the United States This is in reply to your memorandum of February 8, 1964, subject as above, in which you requested that this Department submit its views and comments on recommendations numbers 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to your office by March 10, 1964. 2 You further requested that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency report jointly concerning recommendation number 7. In view of the importance of this measure and its ramifications in the Department of Defense it will require further study. Members of my staff are working informally with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency in the development of this proposal. Our final joint proposal will be submitted to you as soon as possible. We have adopted recommendation number 1—“That the National Security Agency be given the complete personnel security responsibility for all personnel employed by and assigned to it.” I have, therefore, approved changes (tab 1) 3 to Department of Defense Directive 5100.23 (tab 2) which would specifically authorize the Director of the National Security Agency to conduct counterintelligence and personnel security investigations relating to civilians who are employed in, and members of the armed forces who are assigned to, the National Security Agency. In addition, we have instructed the Director of the National Security Agency to revise the present agreements between the National Security Agency and the Security Cryptologic Agencies to reflect this change in policy. In recommendation number 2, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board urged that all efforts be made to insure the passage of H.R. 950, a bill to provide for maximum personnel security in the National Security Agency. We are very happy to report that as a result of our efforts, on February 28, 1964, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill favorably and on March 2, 1964, it was passed by the Senate. Because of a minor amendment by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill must again be acted upon by the House. We have every reason to believe that the House will approve the Senate amendment in the very near future. We therefore can anticipate that this measure will become law very shortly. 4 There is attached (tab 3) a copy of Senate Report No. 926 5 which summarizes the legislation. Recommendation number 5—Deals with concentrating our investigative effort of questionable security cases, proceeding with “across the board reinvestigation of all personnel as resources then permit.” This recommendation has been fully implemented by the National Security Agency and action has been taken to institute this policy throughout the Department of Defense. We are in complete accord with the objectives of recommendation number 3. The Secretary of the Army has instituted a series of actions including necessary studies to reach the objectives of this recommendation. As soon as these actions and studies are completed a further report on this recommendation will be submitted to you. Cyrus Vance 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume I [1 of 2], Box 5. For Official Use Only. 2 Not found. 3 None of the tabs is printed. The directive is dated August 25, 1959. 4 By voice vote on March 19 the House agreed to the Senate amendment, which limited the delegation of the powers of the Secretary of Defense summarily to dismiss employees from the National Security Agency. H.R. 950, which specified requirements for both the employment and dismissal of National Security Agency employees, was signed into law on March 26. ( Congressional Quarterly Almanac , XX (1964), p. 468) 5 88th Congress, Second Session. 196. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the United States Intelligence Board (Lay) to the United States Intelligence Board 196. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the United States Intelligence Board (Lay) to the United States Intelligence Board 1 Washington, March 16, 1964. USIB-D–1.1/1 SUBJECT Reorganization of USIB REFERENCE USIB-M-315, Item 1, 4 March 1964 2 1. As announced and explained by the Chairman of the USIB in the referenced minutes, the President has directed that the composition of the USIB will be as follows: Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency A representative of the Atomic Energy Commission A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 2. In accordance with the President's directive, the above reorganization was put into effect at the close of the USIB meeting on 4 March 1964. 3. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was also authorized to effect the changes in existing directives necessary to implement the President's order. Appropriate amendments to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 will be issued shortly. 3 4. In consultation with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Director of Central Intelligence has approved the following arrangements and actions in order to accomplish the efficient implementation of this reorganization: a. The Director, DIA, will represent on the USIB all elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) with the exception of the National Security Agency (NSA). However, the Military Departmental Intelligence Chiefs are invited and encouraged to attend as observers all USIB meetings which are of interest to them collectively or individually. b. The intelligence chiefs of the military departments retain the right to express divergent or alternative views which they deem significant and to have such views footnoted in appropriate USIB documents such as National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), and Watch Committee reports. They are also encouraged to make such views known to the Board of National Estimates during the coordination of draft NIEs and SNIEs. To this end, the service intelligence chiefs will have access to the drafts of NIEs and similar USIB documents and their representatives may continue as active participants at the usual interagency sessions at the working level. c. No immediate changes will be made in respect to DOD representation on USIB committees. The Director, DIA, intends to make recommendations to the DCI concerning DOD representation following discussions with the military departments on a committee-by-committee basis. Upon receipt of the DIA proposals the Chairman will then ask each of the committee chairmen for his suggestions. Meanwhile the USIB committees and working groups should retain their present membership. d. Procedures are being initiated to permit the Director, DIA, to delegate to the service intelligence chiefs authority to continue existing arrangements for administration of certain sensitive security matters and for the releasing of certain classified information. This refers, for example, to such arrangements as are presently established by paragraph 28.a. of DCID No. 6/3. 4 The Executive Secretary of the USIB has been directed to review with the DIA staff those arrangements and any other categories of intelligence which might be subject to the same delegation and to draft appropriate changes in the DCIDs. e. It is not proposed to make any changes at this time in the distribution of USIB documents in connection with this reorganization. The Chairman, however, believes that it would be useful to have each member re-examine the distribution of USIB documents within his department or agency and he has directed the Executive Secretary to request such a review. This will be done in a separate memorandum. 5. The above information on the subject is circulated herewith for information and guidance of all concerned. James S. Lay, Jr. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA. Secret. 2 Not found. 3 A copy of NSCID No. 1 as revised January 18, 1961, and March 4, 1964, is at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA. 4 Not found. 197. Department of Defense Directive 197. Department of Defense Directive 1 Washington, March 27, 1964. No. 5105.23 SUBJECT (S) National Reconnaissance Office REFERENCE (a): DoD Directive TS 5105.23, subject as above, dated June 14, 1962 (hereby cancelled) I. General Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, including the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a (S) National Reconnaissance Office is hereby established as an operating agency of the Department of Defense, under the direction of and supervision of the Secretary of Defense. II. Organization and Responsibility The (S) National Reconnaissance Office will be organized separately within the Department of Defense under a (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office, appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director will be responsible for consolidation of all Department of Defense satellite and air vehicle overflight projects for intelligence, [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] into a single program, defined as the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and conduct of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the Secretary of Defense. III. Relationships A. In carrying out his responsibilities for the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office shall: 1. Keep the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) personally informed on a regular basis on the status of projects of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program. 2. Similarly inform other Department of Defense personnel as he may determine necessary in the course of carrying out specific project matters. 3. Establish appropriate interfaces between the (S) National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. 4. Where appropriate, make use of qualified personnel of services and agencies of the Department of Defense as full time members of the (S) National Reconnaissance Office. B. Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, and other DoD agencies shall provide support within their respective fields of responsibility, to the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office as may be necessary for the Director to carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions. Streamlined management procedures will be utilized whereby individual project directors will report directly to the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office will be given support as required from normal staff elements of the military departments and agencies concerned, although these staff elements will not participate in these project matters except as he specifically requests, and these proj-ects will not be subject to normal Department of Defense staff review. IV. Authorities A. The (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection with his assigned responsibilities for the (S) National Reconnaissance Office and the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, is hereby specifically delegated authority to: 1. Organize, staff, and supervise the (S) National Reconnaissance Office. 2. Establish, manage and conduct the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program. 3. Assist the Secretary of Defense in the supervision of aircraft, drone and satellite reconnaissance, [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] photographic and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] projects, and be his direct representative on these matters both within and outside the Department of Defense. 4. Review all Department of Defense budget requests and expenditures for any items falling within the definition of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, including studies and preliminary research and development of components and techniques to support such existing or future projects. B. Other authorities specifically delegated to the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office by the Secretary of Defense will be referenced in numbered enclosures to this directive. V. Project Assignments All projects falling within the definition of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program are assigned to that program and will be managed as outlined herein unless specific exception is made by the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Announcements of any such exceptions will be made by numbered enclosures to this directive. VI. Security A. The (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office will establish the security procedures to be followed for all matters of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program, including suitable unclassified names and functions to protect all elements of the (S) National Reconnaissance Office. B. All communications pertaining to matters under the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program will be subject to special systems of security control under the cognizance of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, except in those instances specifically exempted by either (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office or the Secretary of Defense. C. With the single exception of this directive, no mention will be made of the following titles or their abbreviations in any document which is not controlled under the special security control system(s) referred to in B. above: (TS) National Reconnaissance Program; (S) National Reconnaissance Office. Where absolutely necessary to refer to the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program in communications not controlled under the prescribed special security systems, such reference will be made by use of the terminology: “Matters under the purview of DoD TS–5105.23.” VII. Effective Date This Directive is effective upon publication. VIII. Cancellation Reference (a) is hereby cancelled. Cyrus Vance Deputy Secretary of Defense 1 Source: National Reconnaissance Office, P & A, PA Library, 104–01, DOP (Directives, Orders and Procedures). Top Secret. 198. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 198. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, April 6, 1964. SUBJECT The Anticipation of Foreign Crises REFERENCE NSAM 277 2 1. The anticipation of foreign crises is a fundamental problem, running across the whole range of political, economic, sociological and even military intelligence. It is also an exceptionally intractable one. Furthermore, unlike the specialized problem of providing warning of impending military action, it cannot usefully be attacked by the methodology of “indications intelligence”. A nation preparing to go to war normally must do certain things; a pattern of these things may sometimes be detectable. Political crisis, however, arises from the complex interaction of all-too-human beings and political and social dynamics which they do not necessarily understand or control. This is not to say that detection of impending military action is any less difficult, but only that it is different. Examination of the most recent crises with which the US Government has had to deal—Vietnam, Cyprus, Panama, East Africa, Malaysia—shows few patterns or similarities. Specifically, Communist policy cannot be singled out as a unifying element; only in Vietnam is the crisis primarily a result of deliberate Communist action. 2. CIA believes that the anticipation of crises depends less on simplistic mechanical approaches, “quick fixes”, or organizational questions than on the general quality of intelligence produced, and essentially on the caliber of intelligence personnel. Within this framework, and recognizing that no system can guarantee the US Government that it will not occasionally be surprised by foreign developments, there are elements in the present system which can and should be strengthened. a. Collection : An effective country team, with reporting responsibilities clearly determined and vigorously pursued, is essential if political warning is to be provided. b. Analysis : In general, present procedures seem adequate. The difficulty is to get and keep the best possible people. Warning is as likely to come from a trained analyst's visceral reaction to a seemingly innocuous bit of information as from a circumstantial field report of high evaluation. c. Reporting : The most important problem, and one that has never been adequately solved, is that of communications between the intelligence producer and the national policymaker, notwithstanding the number of intelligence publications devoted to this purpose. I am giving this subject fuller treatment in the following paragraphs. 3. Both producer and policymaker are at fault. The intelligence officer may take out cheap insurance by publishing extensive “laundry lists” of potential crises in which genuine warnings are buried, or may coordinate his product until warning is effectively camouflaged by qualifiers and over-formal language, or may lose focus on his audience by treating the dramatic and immediate in one publication and the dull and gradual in another. The senior policymaker may be too reluctant to accept warnings that go counter to his own policies, or too dulled by cumulative exposure to read his intelligence perceptively, or too preoccupied with the immediate to respond to the longer-range. More often than not, an extraordinary number of administering, reviewing, coordinating, editing, and sometimes operating echelons insulate him from the intelligence desk officer. 4. To the extent that there is an answer to these difficulties, it lies not in creating additional publications or repeating warnings by rote in existing ones, but in sharpening intelligence warning and aiming it more directly at responsible officials. For instance, consideration might be given to holding regular National Security Council meetings limited to examination of crises which can be expected in the months ahead. Such a meeting would give the intelligence community the opportunity to ensure that the highest levels of the government have been warned, in specific and direct terms, of problems which it foresees. 5. Our widening of the distribution of the President's Intelligence Checklist is one effort to tighten the crucial relationship between policymaker and intelligence analyst. Another, perhaps less direct, is the increased attention we are giving in National Intelligence Estimates to warning of developments which are realistic possibilities, even if less probable than others. We continue to highlight the main lines of probability, but attempt to convey greater awareness of variations and contingencies. 6. Beyond these measures, I would propose within CIA to: a. Conduct more systematic periodic reviews of the raw intelligence received on each target country to make sure we know what is going on there. b. Conduct similar reviews of our finished reporting on quiescent but inflammable situations with a view to providing more sharply focussed warning to responsible senior officials, perhaps by personal memorandum. c. Circulate with occasional issues of the Central Intelligence Bulletin selected longer-range articles from the Current Intelligence Weekly Review which deal with potentially dangerous situations not susceptible to normal daily reporting. John 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 277. Secret. 2 Document 5 . 199. Editorial Note 199. Editorial Note Following a breakfast meeting with the President on April 22, 1964, Director of Central Intelligence McCone told McGeorge Bundy, according to McCone's memorandum for the record, that “I was highly dissatisfied over the fact that President Johnson did not get direct intelligence briefings from me as was the custom with President Kennedy and had been the Eisenhower custom in the prior administration. Bundy recognized this and thought that I should discuss it directly with the President.” (Memorandum for the Record by McCone, April 27; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President) McCone met with the President on April 29 and told him “that I was concerned that the President was not getting sufficient and adequate intelligence briefings; that I was not seeing very much of him, and this disturbed me. He said he was available any time that I wanted to see him. All I had to do was call up. I said this had not been the case on several 'attempts.' He mentioned that he had been very busy the last two weeks but he did not think this would be a recurring situation, therefore he invited me to bring to his attention any matters of special and particular interest; however he did not wish to be briefed just for the purpose of being briefed. He said that the Checklist summary was perfectly adequate, that he went over it carefully, and that it gave him a satisfactory feeling of the world situation.” (Memorandum for the Record by McCone, April 30; Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President) In a May 1 memorandum to the President, Bundy remarked that he and Clark Clifford “had agreed on the ideal method of keeping John McCone really happy about the level of his contact with you: Golf. McCone is an energetic and agreeable golfer.” (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 4) Three weeks later, on May 24, Johnson played eight holes with McCone at Burning Tree Club, but they did not play again prior to McCone's resignation on April 28, 1965. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) While meeting with the President on July 24, McCone asked him “if he was receiving satisfactory intelligence reports and he said, yes he was very satisfied. I said I would like the opportunity to sit down with him occasionally to exchange views on matters of importance to him, that he had in the CIA the most competent group of intelligence experts and analysts that existed anywhere in the world and that he was not getting the full benefit of their views and judgments through the written word. I said that any time that his calendar would permit and he was so disposed, I would like to discuss personally with him any problems of interest to him which were within our competence.” (Memorandum for the Record by McCone, July 24; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President) 200. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) 200. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) 1 Washington, April 24, 1964. I thought it might be helpful if I recorded briefly one substantial reservation with respect to the draft paper on the National Reconnaissance Program which Mr. Coyne has shown me informally. 2 I think it is quite important not to appear to close off the traditional responsibilities of the CIA in the broad area of research on intelligence methods, responsibilities which I believe have statutory support under the National Security Act of 1947 as amended. I share the report's view that large-scale operations and probably large-scale development enterprises can usually be done best somewhere else, but I would be sorry to see the research role of the Agency limited to the photographic field, since it is possible to imagine many other aspects of information gathering in which imaginative research might be productive, and which might not be surely covered in the alternative assignments of your draft report. To put it another way, I believe in competitive spirit at the fringes of thinking on these subjects, and I do not believe that we should neglect the fact that the Agency has been in the past, and may be in the future, a very fertile center of such work. My other general point is that the report might usefully put more emphasis upon the second hat of the Director of Central Intelligence in all these matters. As the President's senior intelligence officer, with certain community-wide responsibilities, the Director can and should have a very large role in setting priorities and in reviewing progress, and it should not be beyond the wit of man that in the field of intelligence there should be developed the kind of relationship between him and the Secretary of Defense which has been developed in recent years between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in political matters. There will always be slips and rough spots in both these relationships, but that is not an excuse for neglecting the effort. I think there would be both tactical and strategic value in emphasizing this point in this important report. McGeorge Bundy 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1. Top Secret. The memorandum was forwarded via Patrick Coyne. 2 A reference to a draft of PFIAB's report on NRO; the final version is Document 201 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 201. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) to President Johnson 201. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 2, 1964. SUBJECT National Reconnaissance Program The National Reconnaissance Program for the collection of photographic and signals intelligence through aircraft and satellite overflights is of vital importance to the national security and is likely to become increasingly so. The Program has produced most of our Government's information on Soviet deployment of land-based nuclear missiles and a great deal of highly valuable intelligence on other subjects. Beginning with a small, closely-knit organization and operation concerned with relatively infrequent overflights by a few aircraft, the Program now encompasses the following: (1) a billion-dollar-a-year activity involving hundreds of Government and contractor personnel; (2) the development and production of aircraft and their operation on reconnaissance missions on a scale far in excess of that which marked early stages of the Program; (3) the procurement of boosters, orbital vehicles and camera payloads, and their integration for launching; (4) the launching of complex satellite mechanisms and the air-catch recovery by Air Force teams of payloads upon re-entry into the atmosphere; and (5) the technical processing, interpretation and analysis of the quantities of intelligence information obtained. A special Panel of the Board, with the Board's Executive Secretary, has made an intensive examination of the organization, management and operation of the National Reconnaissance Program. The Board and its Panel have had consultations with officials of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency—the two Government agencies primarily engaged in the Program. Representatives of the Board have conducted on-the-scene examinations of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance installations and activities on the West Coast and elsewhere. Conferences have been held with key officers of private companies holding Government contracts for the development and production of elements of the reconnaissance systems employed—including boosters, orbital engines, aircraft and camera payloads. We have been thoroughly briefed on all significant aspects of the Program. As a result of its studies the Board has found that the National Reconnaissance Program, despite its achievements, has not yet reached its full potential. Basically, the problem is one of inadequacies in the present organizational structure and support of the national reconnaissance effort. Also, the Program is complicated by the absence of a clear, authoritative delineation and understanding of pertinent roles and missions of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and of the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as principal intelligence officer and coordinator of the total U.S. intelligence effort. In our opinion, action must be directed from the Presidential level in order to correct these difficulties, and to assure that this vital national asset is preserved and strengthened. Based on our review, the Board submits the following conclusions and recommendations. Conclusions: 1. The National Reconnaissance Program must be conducted as a national effort geared to meet as effectively as possible over-riding national intelligence needs in support of the President, members of the National Security Council, and other officials concerned with matters of national security significance. The national character of this vitally-important intelligence enterprise must be maintained through a joint endeavor on the part of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United States Intelligence Board-with a clearly-established delineation of the roles and responsibilities which each is to perform in support of the Program. It is essential that there be an effective mechanism to accomplish close and continuing collaboration between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, and to assure recognition of the intelligence needs and capabilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Unified and Specified Commands. 2. The Director of Central Intelligence (as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board responsible for providing coordination and guidance to the United States intelligence effort) has a large and important role in the establishment of intelligence collection requirements and priorities to be met through the National Reconnaissance Program, and in ensuring effective exploitation of the intelligence product. Under his leadership the United States Intelligence Board must provide the necessary base for the scheduling and targeting of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions over areas which are virtually inaccessible to us through other forms of intelligence coverage. Of equal importance is the function of ensuring that the intelligence “take” from the National Reconnaissance Program is effectively processed, analyzed and fed into the estimating process—in order that timely consideration may be given to the product at highest Government levels. (We note an analogy in the National Signals Intelligence Program where that complex collection activity is conducted by elements of the Department of Defense, with guidance as to intelligence requirements and exploitation provided by the United States Intelligence Board under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence.) 3. Historically, both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have made important contributions toward the achievement of an effective, national reconnaissance capability. The Central Intelligence Agency in the aircraft reconnaissance field has contributed imaginative planning, technical competence, security guidance, and flexibility in the negotiation of “black” contracts for the production of systems components in instances where secrecy is required in the contracting process. The value of the Central Intelligence Agency's contributions of personnel, skills and other resources in this effort is demonstrated by previous successes in the development and operation of the U-2 Program, and more recently in the Oxcart Program which is presently in the flight-test stage. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency has contributed importantly to the development and production of some of the camera payloads used in the satellite reconnaissance program. The Department of Defense has demonstrated competence and effectiveness in the management and utilization of the vast military resources which are involved in the development, procurement and operation of both satellite reconnaissance systems and aircraft reconnaissance programs, including extensive support of programs in the latter category which have been managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. (We are informed that the Air Force provides over 90% of the personnel and resources involved in the satellite reconnaissance program, and that it provides over 50% of the manpower and 90% of the other resources utilized in support of the aircraft reconnaissance program.) Notable examples of achievements by the Department of Defense are the recent photographic intelligence successes in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] satellite project, and the successful emulation by the Air Force of the Central Intelligence Agency's capability for secure handling of “black” covert contracting procedures. In our judgment both of these successes are directly attributable to the centralized management and control practices which are being applied by the Department of Defense under the National Reconnaissance Office structure. 4. It is essential that the National Reconnaissance Program include the fullest use of science and technology in the conduct of long-range, forward-thinking research and development leading to the advancement of our reconnaissance intelligence collection techniques, and to more efficient means for processing and analyzing the intelligence obtained. The multi-dimensional growth of the National Reconnaissance Program has been accompanied by increasing intelligence demands upon the collection systems involved. Under conditions of heightened emergency these demands would be intensified. Furthermore, should present systems become unavailable to us as the result of the defensive capabilities of governments whose territory we are now overflying, or as the result of restrictions imposed by national policy considerations, the need for advanced reconnaissance capabilities must have been anticipated and provided for within the National Reconnaissance Program. 5. We believe that fuller use should be made of the potential of the Central Intelligence Agency in meeting the vital need for advance planning and research which must be maintained on a high priority basis if our Government is to continue to benefit from uniquely valuable intelligence returns available from overhead reconnaissance operations. The Central Intelligence Agency, in keeping with its traditional responsibilities in the broad area of research on intelligence methods, should continue to serve as a fertile center of imaginative scientific exploration looking to increased capabilities for information-gathering and intelligence exploitation. In the reconnaissance intelligence field the Central Intelligence Agency has already acquired invaluable experience, and has assembled a nucleus of scientific and technological talent, all of which can be brought to bear in introducing into the National Reconnaissance Program more effective means for the collection and processing of intelligence data. New methodologies for using and interpreting film, and for analyzing the total intelligence meaning of it, must be acquired. This latter need, including the application of modern information theoretic, exploitation of photographic images, and even of new information processing of the intelligence derived from this product, lies in the special domain of the Central Intelligence Agency. This subject, unlike the large operational projects cited above, fits the extensive skills and special interests of the intelligence expert. We believe that a brilliant new capability for the handling of huge volumes of photographed knowledge could be stimulated by a major effort of the Central Intelligence Agency. Also evident are obviously wide opportunities for research and development regarding the photographic process itself, and the science and technology associated with it are now timely since there has never really been a planned assault on deep understanding of photography on this scale. 6. Effective development and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program require that it be a streamlined operation under strong, centralized management and control within the Department of Defense, with ready access to personnel and resources of the Department of Defense and of the Central Intelligence Agency. The cost, complexity and size of the Program, particularly the large scale of satellite operations, and even of experiments such as the forthcoming [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] make earlier management schemes archaic. 7. We consider that, with modifications which we will propose, a sound organizational concept for the National Reconnaisance Program is set forth in certain parts of the March 13, 1963 Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence which (although sometimes honored more in the breach than in its execution) contains these basic provisions: a. Designation of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the development, management, and conduct of the entire National Reconnaissance Program. b. Authorization to the Secretary of Defense to establish within the Defense Department a National Reconnaissance Office directed by a Defense Department official responsible to the Secretary for carrying out the Program. c. Authorization to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to utilize the personnel and other resources of the Department of Defense and of the Central Intelligence Agency as required for the conduct of the Program. d. Provision by the Central Intelligence Agency of security guidance for procedures required for protection of sensitive National Reconnaissance Program activities. e. Assignment to the National Reconnaissance Office of responsibility for complying with the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. f. Planning and conduct of research and development of future national reconnaissance projects, utilizing appropriate resources and capabilities of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency and private contractors. 8. Departures from the basic concepts enumerated above, and differing interpretations of the responsibilities involved, are illustrated in part by the following: a. The opinion of the Director of Central Intelligence that “The problem is to eliminate the conflicts, misunderstandings, personality differences, and organizational ambiguities which continue to plague the program and threaten its future. These result largely from poorly defined interagency responsibilities.” b. The Board's study reveals that the use of monitors by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to review the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program has interfered with the direct chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and from the National Reconnaissance Office Director to the Central Intelligence Agency elements engaged in the Program. c. The authority and responsibility of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office are further diluted by the operation of an inter-agency committee which provides technical direction to some aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program on the basis of decisions which must be unanimous and which are unduly time-consuming. d. There is a lack of firm, unified direction of the entire National Reconnaissance Program with the result that: (1) centralized systems engineering and technical direction are lacking in the satellite reconnaissance program, (2) one contractor stated that decisions which once took minutes now require months, (3) contracting authority is diffused between officers of the Department of Defense and of the Central Intelligence Agency, (4) the operations of the National Reconnaisance Program are badly fragmented and confused, (5) progress in the research and development of advanced reconnaissance intelligence systems is not sufficiently pursued, and (6) the economy of the Program is not the subject of coherent cost reduction or production gain efforts. Recommendations: We recommend the issuance of a Presidential directive which will provide guidelines for the centralized direction, management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program, and clarification of the departmental and agency responsibilities involved as follows: 1. Definition of the National Reconnaissance Program as a single program, national in character, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long-range, for the collection of intelligence, mapping and geodetic information through overflights (excluding normal peripheral reconnaissance operations). 2. Designation of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program, having primary responsibility and authority for (a) the management and conduct of reconnaissance activities involved in the Program and (b) the tasking of personnel, facilities and other resources of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies as required to carry out that responsibility. 3. Establishment within the Department of Defense of a National Reconnaissance Office to function as a separate operating agency of the Department of Defense, and to be headed by a Director responsible solely to the Secretary of Defense for discharging the Secretary's responsibility as Executive Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program. 2 4. Assignment to the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, of the function of sharpening and expediting the efforts of the United States Intelligence Board with respect to: (a) the establishment of realistic intelligence collection requirements to guide the national reconnaissance effort in the scheduling and targeting of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions; (b) ensuring prompt processing, analysis and reporting to appropriate users of the photographic and signals intelligence obtained from the national reconnaissance effort; and (c) the fullest utilization of such intelligence in the preparation of national intelligence estimates. 5. Direction that there be a coordinated, comprehensive budget for all elements of the National Reconnaissance Program, and that there be established fiscal control and accounting procedures to assure appropriate utilization of funds by the agencies concerned in support of the Program. (We suggest that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Budget jointly review this matter with a view to achieving the best formula for the accomplishment of these objectives.) 6. Direction to the heads of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies concerned that full utilization be made of the resources of each of those agencies as required for the conduct of research projects looking to the development of new and improved aircraft and satellite reconnaissance vehicles, photographic and other sensors, and advanced methods for improved processing and exploitation of the intelligence obtained therefrom. 7. Assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency of the responsibility for providing the Executive Agent with security policy guidance required for the maintenance of a uniform system of security procedures for the National Reconnaissance Program. 8. In lieu of the monitor and review functions provided for in the present National Reconnaissance Program Agreement, periodic reporting by the Executive Agent for the Program to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, concerning all aspects of the Program, including organization, management, funding, programming, security, advance planning, research and development, production, and operations. 9. Authorization to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to establish a Scientific Advisory Board, to include experts in the fields of science and technology from outside the Government, to provide the Director with technical advice and guidance relating to the achievement of national reconnaissance objectives. We recommend further that if the President approves a directive along the lines proposed above, its implementation within the framework of the National Reconnaissance Office include the following actions (along with such others as the Secretary of Defense may authorize as Executive Agent for the Program): 1. Close and continuing collaboration on the part of the Secretary of Defense (as Executive Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program) and the Director of Central Intelligence (in his capacity as principal intelligence officer and coordinator of the over-all U.S. intelligence effort) with a view to ensuring (a) the most productive possible utilization of national resources and skills in meeting the critical intelligence objectives involved; (b) opportunities for the Director of Central Intelligence to survey periodically progress made under the Program; and (c) evaluation of the need for proposed reconnaissance systems prior to the undertaking of development and testing. 2. Continued designation of the Under Secretary of the Air Force as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. 3. Contributions by elements of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency of personnel required to provide staff support to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, in the performance of the mission, functions and operations of the National Reconnaissance Program—such personnel to serve solely under the direction and supervision of the Director while so assigned. 4. Delegation by the Secretary of Defense (as Executive Agent of the National Reconnaissance Program) to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, of the authority for the issuance of directives to elements of the Department of Defense, and for the levying of requests upon the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies involved, as required for the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program. 5. Assignment to the Department of Defense (Air Force) of responsibility for the management, over-all systems engineering, procurement and operation of all satellite reconnaissance systems. 6. Elimination of the interagency Configuration Control Board as a decision-making entity within the satellite reconnaissance program. 7. Continued assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency of the Oxcart Program. With respect to manned intelligence-collection aircraft of an advanced character, we recommend as general principle that, following the development stage, the responsibility for their operational use be determined by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. 8. Continue for the time being present management arrangements with respect to the A–11, the R–12 and the Tagboard Projects. (We note in this regard that the recent surfacing of the A–11 and the initial deliveries of the R–12's starting in August 1964 will undoubtedly require review and possible adjustment in their management structure.) Respectfully, For the Board Clark M. Clifford 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Talent; [ codeword not declassified ]; Keyhole; [ codeword not declassified ]. 2 Pending the outcome of studies now under way in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Board reserves judgment on the advisability of (a) designating the Director of the Joint Reconnaissance Center as Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, in order that the reconnaissance resources of the military commands may be made readily available to the National Reconnaissance Program, and (b) designating the Commander, Air Force Systems Command, as a Special Assistant in the National Reconnaisance Office to provide immediate coupling of the National Reconnaissance Program with the full resources of the Air Force Systems Command. [Footnote in the source text.] 202. Editorial Note 202. Editorial Note On May 4, 1964, the Central Intelligence Agency's Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms met at the Department of State with Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, to discuss National Policy Papers and their implications for CIA. Agreement was reached on several issues, including Rostow's proposal that completion of a National Policy Paper involve a review of CIA operations in the area. For a memorandum for the record summarizing the discussion, see Document 11 . 203. Memorandum From Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 203. Memorandum From Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 19, 1964. SUBJECT Proposed Name Change for Special Group (5412) There seems to be some merit in changing the name of the Special Group (5412) 2 to something utterly drab and innocuous. Following the publication of the Wise/Ross book 3 additional interest may be focused on it. Since the Group does make highly classified decisions, its working methods and the people who compose it should be protected. If it is surfaced as an elite policy command, its members will be more vulnerable to speculative publicity, i.e., “The second most powerful man in Washington, Alexis Johnson”, “Bundy's Secret Task Force”, “McCone's Three Musketeers”, “The hand inside McNamara's glove, Cy Vance”, “The Four Horseman”, etc. etc. Therefore, the mildest, most easily forgotten or confused description would be best. Anything clever, startling, or attractive should be avoided. No SMERSH men, we. The words “Special” and “Group” and any number should be dropped. The following banalities come to mind: Positive Actions Board (PAB) Periodic Decisions Unit (PDU) Executive Review Committee (ERC) Security Review Staff (SRS) Joint Committee on National Security (JCNS) Subcommittee on National Security (SNS) Plans Review Board (PRB) The Invisible Group (IG) International Affairs Problem Unit (IAPU) Periodic Review Directorate (PRD) International Affairs Council (IAC) Interim Decisions Council (IDC) Interdepartmental Decisions Unit (IDU) National Policy Decisions Forum (NPDF) Executive Action Adjustment Unit (EAAU) All of these are repulsive but might suit our purpose. 4 Peter Jessup 5 1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Meeting, February 21, 1964. Secret. 2 Special Group 5412 was the name given to the group assigned responsibility for the planning and conduct of covert operations, as set forth in NSC 5412, “National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations,” March 15, 1954. See footnote 5, Document 263 . 3 Reference is to David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964). 4 A handwritten notation, probably by Bundy, in the left margin just below this sentence reads: “McC[one] v. any change.” Nevertheless, at a meeting of the Special Group on May 21, the members agreed after a brief discussion to issue an NSAM redesignating the Group “as a committee with the number which will be assigned to the NSAM.” (Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Meeting, May 21, 1964) For text of this NSAM, see Document 204 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 204. National Security Action Memorandum No. 303 204. National Security Action Memorandum No. 303 1 Washington, June 2, 1964. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Change in Name of Special Group 5412 1. Henceforth, the Special Group 5412 will be known as the 303 Committee. 2 2. This change in no way alters the composition, function or responsibility of the Special Group 5412 as authorized by NSC 5412/2, dated December 28, 1955. 3 McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, General. Top Secret. 2 An undated list identifies the members of the 303 Committee as the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thompson, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 2, Document 257 . 205. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 205. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 2, 1964. SUBJECT Memorandum for the President, by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, re National Reconnaissance Program I concur with the recommendations contained in the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board memorandum of May 2, 1964. 2 Upon issuance of the Presidential directive recommended by the Board, and noted on page 7 of the Board's memorandum, I intend that the Board's “implementing recommendations” be promptly pursued; in particular, I will request the (S) Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to make the necessary detailed arrangements regarding the “implementing recommendations” 5. through 8. in accordance with recommendations 3. and 4. in the same paragraph. Cyrus Vance 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume 2. Top Secret; [ codeword not declassified ]. Copies were sent to Clark M. Clifford, McCone, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 2 Document 201 . 206. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 206. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 11, 1964. SUBJECT National Reconnaissance Program 1. You have asked for my comments on the report submitted by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on May 2, 1964 concerning the National Reconnaissance Program. 2 2. In many respects I have found the conclusions of this report constructive and helpful. However, the proposed Presidential Directive contains certain organizational proposals which do not seem to me calculated to provide the most productive possible utilization of national resources for the reconnaissance effort of the government. If these proposals are adopted, I do not believe that it will be possible to discharge the responsibilities which the report itself envisages for the Director of Central Intelligence or that the Central Intelligence Agency can perform the mission which the report apparently contemplates for the Agency. 3. I believe that certain basic principles must be established and recognized if, as the conclusions of the report state, the reconnaissance program is to “be conducted as a national effort geared to meet as effectively as possible overriding national intelligence needs.” The conclusions of the report correctly characterize the National Reconnaissance Program as a “vitally important enterprise” which must be conducted as a “national effort,” the national character of which “must be maintained through a joint endeavor on the part of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United States Intelligence Board.” The problem is to delineate clearly the roles and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department in support of a national program while maintaining its character as a “joint endeavor.” 4. Some of the principles which I have in mind find support in some of the language of the report but appear to be obscured and contradicted elsewhere in the report, particularly by the implications of provisions in the proposed Presidential Directive. I consider it important to identify these principles as clearly as possible as I am convinced that their adoption is an essential prerequisite to a reconnaissance effort conducted for national intelligence purposes on a collaborative basis which makes maximum use of all resources available to the government. 5. These basic principles involve (a) clear recognition of the Director of Central Intelligence's joint responsibility with the Secretary of Defense for the development of the reconnaissance program and (b) assurance that the capabilities of CIA, in both the operational and the research and development fields are fully utilized. I believe that the President's Board agrees with these objectives. In order to make sure that there is full understanding of these principles, however, they are defined and discussed in the following paragraphs. A. The Director of Central Intelligence should participate fully in the formulation of the plan for the National Reconnaissance Program and in decisions relating to the assignment and implementation of responsibilities and the allocation of resources under the program . The effectiveness of our reconnaissance program depends upon an intimate interrelationship between intelligence requirements and priorities, and the development and utilization of the effort and resources necessary to satisfy these requirements. Essential ingredients of the program are (in addition to the identification of targets, the establishment of collection schedules and processing of the take): (a) assignment of responsibility for research and development to produce new and improved collection systems, (b) allocation of responsibility for specific operational activity, (c) budgeting and programming to finance individual activities, and (d) review and correction of operational or technical deficiencies in the implementation of program responsibilities. Decisions in all of these areas contribute to a vital intelligence effort and require the participation of the Director of Central Intelligence. It is essential that these decisions should not be influenced by other considerations than the need for maximum effectiveness and efficiency in the reconnaissance program, and that this program should not suffer for lack of informed support from the official of the government primarily charged with responsibility for intelligence activities. The ultimate responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for identifying and evaluating Soviet weapons technology, strategic military deployment and other threats of critical significance to national security, makes it essential that he should have an adequate voice in basic decisions relating to the reconnaissance program which is the basic source of intelligence on these matters. The conclusions of the Board's report are generally consistent with these views and certain paragraphs are in full consonance with them. For example the report enjoins (page 9) “close and continuing collaboration between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence with a view to ensuring” (a) the most productive possible utilization of national resources; (b) opportunities for the Director of Central Intelligence to survey progress under the program; and (c) evaluation of the need for new reconnaissance systems. The responsibilities and prerogatives implied by this language, however, are not sustained by other provisions of the report which have contradictory implications and are not adequately reflected in the proposed Presidential Directive. For one thing, the program is defined as “a single program…for the development, management, control and operation of all projects” (Recommendation 1, page 7) and primary responsibility and authority for “the management and conduct of reconnaissance activities” and “the tasking of personnel, facilities and other resources of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies” is vested in the Secretary of Defense (Recommendation 2, page 7). Recommendation 3 (page 8) provides for the delegation of the Secretary of Defense's responsibilities to “a Director responsible solely to the Secretary of Defense.” The reconnaissance program will be a successful intelligence effort which produces the hard information essential for the intelligence estimates on which strategic judgments are based only if there is full participation by the Director of Central Intelligence in the development and direction of the program. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence must include an adequate voice in decisions which affect the utilization of resources, the allocation of responsibilities and funds, and the scheduling and direction of missions. The agreement governing activity under the program should include an unequivocal affirmation of this principle. In this connection Recommendation 8 (page 9) of the Board's report refers to the provision of the present NRO agreement relating to monitors. To the extent that this recommendation can be understood as proposing to eliminate the staff required by the Director of Central Intelligence for normal support and advice it is clearly incompatible with the exercise of his responsibilities. To ensure effective participation in the development and direction of the program, the Director of Central Intelligence (and presumably also the Secretary of Defense) must be free to utilize deputies, assistants and staff to any extent necessary. B. Provision must be made to ensure that research and development potentialities of CIA are fully utilized . The Board's report recognizes the importance of full utilization of the facilities developed by CIA for the invention and development of new systems. It speaks of the “invaluable experience” of the Central Intelligence Agency which “has assembled a nucleus of scientific and technological talent, all of which can be brought to bear in introducing into the National Reconnaissance Program more effective means for the collection and processing of intelligence data.” (Conclusion 5, page 5.) The report further recommends appropriate action to ensure “that full utilization be made of the resources of” the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the Department of Defense “for the conduct of research proj-ects looking to the development of new and improved aircraft and satellite reconnaissance vehicles, photograhic and other sensors,” etc. (Recommendation 6, page 9.) An important responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence acting jointly with the Secretary of Defense (as I have pointed out above) is to see that assignments for research and development are allocated with a view to making the best use of the talents and capabilities of individual agencies. One of the reasons for making his right to participate in decisions of this nature explicit is to ensure that assignments of research responsibility will be made to the Central Intelligence Agency when appropriate. A point which I would particularly like to urge is my belief that the “cutting edge” of advance thinking cannot be preserved within the Central Intelligence Agency if its role is confined to research and if the “responsibility for the management, over-all systems engineering, procurement and operation of all satellite reconnaissance systems” be assigned to the Air Force as proposed (Recommendation 5, page 10) in the Board's report. If this procedure is followed, we should recognize that we have decided as a matter of policy to place responsibility for future reconnaissance operations and improvements on a “single instrument basis” in the hands of the Air Force. The Central Intelligence Agency should be charged not only with advance planning and research in specified areas of overhead reconnaissance, both satellite and aircraft, but should maintain a continuing responsibility for the development and production of the new systems developed. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] Under such an arrangement continued growth and improvement in the systems can be expected, comparable to the process we have witnessed in the U-2 and Corona programs. In both these systems very significant growth has taken place as they have developed and matured. The U-2's operating characteristics were improved with new engines as they were developed, equipment for electronic countermeasures was provided as equipment became available and the planes were modified to operate from aircraft carriers (with recent impressive results) as it became apparent that foreign bases would be denied us. Cameras and films likewise have been improved. The Oxcart vehicle is of course a follow-on to provide the replacement for the U-2. Similar progress has been made in the Corona program which has been radically altered and improved since its initial introduction. If responsibility for production of the system is removed from those responsible for its initial invention and turned over to others, motivation for continuing improvement will be seriously impaired. I am not impressed with the arguments of those who maintain that the organization responsible for actual operations must have control of production of the “payload.” Many years of practical experience in business and government have convinced me that operations can be successfully conducted using components (in this case the “payload”) which are furnished to the operating entity by some other organization. In the context of a discussion of the continued contribution to be expected from the Central Intelligence Agency, it seems to me important to make clear that program responsibility and operational assignments should be levied upon the Central Intelligence Agency through normal command channels. Recommendation 2 (page 7) confers upon the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the program, authority for “tasking of personnel, facilities and other resources of… the Central Intelligence Agency.” Any ambiguity occasioned by this recommendation should be clarified and the principle established that instructions relating to tasks or assignments should be transmitted to the Central Intelligence Agency through normal command channels although informal working relationships should of course be encouraged. 6. I believe that establishment of the principles which I have described above is an essential prerequisite to an effective national reconnaissance program. I therefore recommend that these principles be accepted for incorporation in a revised agreement governing the national reconnaissance effort and that instructions be issued accordingly. John A. McCone 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Volume 2 [4 of 4], Box 6. Top Secret; [ codeword not declassified ]. 2 Document 201 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 207. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 207. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 23, 1964. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 2. Top Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.] 208. Memorandum for the Record 208. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, July 9, 1964. SUBJECT Discussion on NRO matters on Thursday, July 9, 1964, between McGeorge Bundy, Secretary Vance and McCone The meeting was called at Bundy's suggestion to dispose of the PFIAB report on NRO. 2 The meeting was very brief because of the lateness of the hour and my departure for Europe. 1. Secretary Vance stated that he and McNamara had read the President's Board report and had concurred in it as they thought it was representative of what the President wanted to do and they had no alternative except to go along. Furthermore he said he thought that the procedure outlined in the Board's report was thoroughly practical and would resolve the problems in the NRO. Bundy stated he could not go along with this. That he thought the Board's recommendations would seriously reduce the role of CIA and he questioned whether this was in the national interest. He furthermore corrected Vance with respect to the authoritativeness of the report stating the President had not accepted it and that he, Bundy, was not inclined to ask him to “sign off” on it because he felt there was considerable validity in the views I had expressed. I stated that the recommendations of the Board's report were unsatisfactory to me for the reasons expressed in my letters to Bundy 3 and my proposed changes outlined in a letter to McNamara, 4 that I could add very little to what was said in those two letters which I had written myself and which were representative of my personal views as well as the CIA organization. Vance said that my proposed changes would create some serious “managerial problems” within NRO and the Department of Defense and therefore they were unsatisfactory to McNamara and himself. He did not go into detail. 2. The following matters arose. a. In discussing [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] Vance made the point they were duplicative and that we therefore were working on “two tracks to accomplish the same end”. I expressed surprise, quoting Dr. McMillan's statement to Dr. Land that the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] system was in no way duplicative of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] anything else that NRO contemplated and that Land had exacted this kind of a statement from McMillan prior to examining [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Vance said that very possibly the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] project had been expanded in its scope after the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] briefing. I countered by saying that this was a very good reason why we should keep at least two organizations in this very important business. b. I reviewed a few of my personal complaints against McMillan's operations, details of which are well-known and are recorded in other memoranda, but involved failure to inform me of developments, failure to work cooperatively with COMOR, failure to present budget figures for review and study, failure to brief on [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] other programs, continual changes of schedules and postponement of events without consent of USIB, etc., etc. Vance said all of these were inexcusable and they would see that McMillan sent budget papers and other information over to me forthwith. Bundy then said that he felt that probably the seat of the problem was the parochial ambitions of the Air Force and perhaps the whole situation would be ironed out if the NRO was located in the SecDef's office and not in the Air Force. Vance concurred with this view, stating that this was a matter which he and McNamara had under serious consideration but they did not wish to move on it until after the election because there would be some consequences, a possible flare-up by Zuckert and Gen. LeMay which would be somewhat embarrassing, and furthermore McMillan would quit. Bundy recognized that all of these things should be avoided but repeated his feeling that he preferred the SecDef arrangement. Vance left me with the impression that such a change is definitely in the Defense Department program but will not take place immediately. Bundy stated that what is clearly needed is a Director of NRO who is acceptable to both SecDef and DCI and is anxious to utilize the resources, ingenuity, etc., of both the Air Force and the CIA. He said that a man of Dick Bissell's type would be ideal because he had that breadth of vision. I said if such a man were in charge of NRO and equipped with a staff which reflected the same philosophy, the April 13, 1963 agreement 5 would work without a change of a single word. Complications were due to the parochial ambitions of the Air Force, the fact that McMillan could not help but be to some extent, witting or unwitting, a captive of such ambitions, and the interpretation of words, meaning and intents in the light of this conflicting definition of purpose. It was left that the subject would be placed high on the agenda after Vance returns from his leave on July 17th. The first order of business would be the review of the budget and the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] briefing scheduled for that afternoon. After the meeting Bundy and I had a brief talk alone. He said he thought we had made some progress in “moving the Defense Department over a little and getting them to take a more reasonable viewpoint”. He seemed personally committed to keeping both organizations in the business and finding a solution to the existing problems, deliberately and carefully, and to avoid at all costs emotionalism and personalities. 3. During the discussion with Bundy and Vance and also in a later discussion with Bundy, the question of the introduction of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] in the Corona project was briefly commented upon. I stated that it seemed to me this was a very questionable move because the project had been going along for several years under Lockheed management and the introduction of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] who, while competent, were unfamiliar with the project, its background, problems, etc., would probably involve more confusion than help and might be counter productive. I pointed out that the SAMOS project had suffered from just this kind of an arrangement and that the idea of a direct relationship between Lockheed (the producer) and the responsible authorities (CIA for the payload and Air Force for the boosters) was developed in order to avoid the managerial problems that developed in the SAMOS project. There was no final conclusion. Note: The SAMOS management was explained to me in detail by Kelly Johnson 6 who attributed much of the delays and difficulties to the presence of an independent systems engineer company which contributed nothing of a constructive nature. I would like verification of these facts. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, NRO File, 06 Sept 1961–30 March 1965, Box 8. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on July 12. 2 See Document 201 . 3 Presumably reference is to McCone's letters to Bundy of June 11 ( Document 206 ) and June 19. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI McCone-Department of Defense) 4 Presumably reference is to McCone's June 19 letter to McNamara. (Ibid.) 5 The text of the March (not April) 13, 1963, CIA-DOD agreement on the management of NRO is ibid., NRO File, 06 Sept 1961–30 March 1965, Box 8. 6 Clarence L. Johnson, vice president of advanced development projects, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. 209. Memorandum for the Record 209. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, July 14, 1964. SUBJECT Discussion with Mr. Clark Clifford at luncheon—14 July 1964 A large part of the discussion centered around recent political developments, the evolving situation in San Francisco, 2 Clifford's views on the dangerous aspects of the Republican platform, the preoccupation of the President with political matters including the selection of a Vice President and a variety of related subjects. With respect to NRO, Clifford had read my communications to Bundy and McNamara. 3 He was not willing to concede President's Board's report should be modified. However he did state that his role was advisory to the President and that neither he nor the Board felt they were in any way involved in the implementation of the recommendations of the report. He further stated that after some discussion of NRO problems, there appeared to be some problems within the Pentagon between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force and these issues were not considered by the Board as they were not within the province of the Board' s competence. I explained to Clifford the course of action agreed to with Bundy last night, as outlined in my memorandum of this morning. 4 I briefly reviewed the Dillingham matter 5 and the issue that had arisen with Senator Symington so that Clifford would be informed because of his intimate personal relationship with the Senator. Clifford expressed appreciation of knowing the background of this issue with Symington as he was convinced Symington would bring the matter to his attention at some future time. There followed a long discussion of the organization of the Office of Director of Central Intelligence. Clifford said that he had proposed in 1961 that the DCI, as principal intelligence officer to the President, be separated from his intimate relationship with CIA and thus he could render more effective assistance to the President and also could more effectively give guidance to the community as a whole. He said that at one point at a special Board meeting, he had made such a proposal to Allen Dulles, then DCI, but Dulles absolutely refused to consider any such plan. I said there might be considerable merit in such a plan but it presented a difficulty because the DCI was so heavily dependent upon CIA for staff support. In effect, CIA was the DCI's only staff and organization and I pointed out that the original legislation provided that CIA be the coordinating agency within the intelligence community and that this role had been transferred to DCI with the passage of time. I then made the point that perhaps the DCI should be the executive agent of all national intelligence resources, i.e. NSA, NPIC, NRO and AFTAC with an organizational arrangement that operational management of these agencies would rest with CIA and Defense. Furthermore I pointed out that CIA was the only unit which could be considered as completely objective with no “axe to grind” or no parochial interests outside of intelligence. I said this was particularly true of the DDI side of the house and it might be that parochialism might, in time, enter into the thinking of DD/S&T and DD/P. Clifford asked if I would give some thought to a practical operational plan along the above lines as he felt the existing arrangement was not a good one and did not represent a precise and therefore satisfactory plan of organization. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI McCone Memo for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. 2 Presumably a reference to the Republican National Convention, held in San Francisco in July. 3 See footnotes 3 and 4 , Document 208 . 4 Not found. 5 Not further identified. 210. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 210. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Houston) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 1 Washington, July 15, 1964. SUBJECT Position of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Executive Branch 1. This memorandum is for information. 2. I was most interested in your comments on your talk with Mr. Clifford 2 about the role of the Agency and the Director. A historical note on this might be of interest. 3. The two functions have gone in almost opposite directions. Starting in 1947 there was a determined effort, particularly by the military services, to establish the concept that the Director was merely one among equals. It was not until the rewrite of NSCID No. 1 in 1958 3 that this struggle was finally abandoned and the pre-eminence of the DCI accepted by the other intelligence components of the Government. I believe his role as the intelligence adviser to the President has now been well established by you. 4. The Agency in 1947 started with the concept that it had the sole responsibility for the production of National Estimates. Thus, the old Office of Reports and Evaluations proceeded with the theory that it should have the competence to take the raw intelligence, and intelligence data in all fields of interest, analyze it, correlate it, and evaluate it for the production of National Estimates. This was bitterly opposed, particularly by the military intelligence services. As an example, they asserted that the Agency had neither the competence nor the responsibility to produce finished intelligence relating to weapons. Towards the end of Admiral Hillenkoetter's regime the dispute broke down the estimative process to where literally a National Estimate could not be produced. I participated in the negotiations between Admiral Hillenkoetter and General John McGruder, trying to resolve this impasse, but no solution was in sight. Before General Smith arrived he asked me what I saw as the primary problems with which he would be faced, and I told him I thought this was No. 1. He assigned this problem to his first Deputy, William H. Jackson, who proposed a concept that the National Estimates were the common responsibility of all the intelligence community. I objected strongly, and General Smith modified this to say, in effect, that the responsibility was in the Agency under the DCI and required the combined effort of the intelligence community. This led to the establishment of the present system of contributions by other intelligence components in their assigned fields with the correlation and evaluation done through ONE and USIB structure. 5. There is no question of the statutory responsibility. This is the only specific function assigned to the Agency by the National Security Act of 1947, 4 and the legislative history makes it quite clear that the Congress intended to look to one place and one place only for intelligence success or failure and would hold the Agency responsible. The Director, as head of the Agency, is of course the focal point for this responsibility, to which is added his over-all responsibilities as Director of Central Intelligence. 6. The present concept tends to downgrade the intelligence function of the Agency to the position of one among equals and to widen the split between the Agency's intelligence functions and the DCI, which cannot, of course, be completely separated. Present organization with the Office of National Estimates in rather an anomalous position under the DD/I but processing its material through USIB, contributes to the problem, and the emergence of DIA tends to underline the situation. Some move to upgrade ONE and tie it in more closely organizationally with the Director might be one move that could be considered in the near future. Lawrence R. Houston 5 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Office of General Counsel, 1964–65. No classification marking. 2 See Document 209 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 221 , and footnote 4, Document 271 . 4 For text, see Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman , pp. 131–135. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Houston signed the original. 211. Memorandum for the Record 211. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, July 31, 1964. 1. The DCI gave me the following policy position for NRO and reconnaissance programs as of this date: a. It is his fixed and unalterable position that the national interest demands the continuation of two organizations in instigating reconnaissance capabilities thinking independently but eventually working together at the management level when hardware is imminent; b. There is no question in his mind but what the contribution of CIA in the past and its current assemblage of talent with great enthusiasm and high competence bears this out, particularly in the light of the stagnation in this field elsewhere. 2. He says that if the straightening out of this matter requires a Presidential decision, he insists upon it and he insists upon it now. He is not going to see the CIA capability frittered away by fiat or by decisions at a lower level. 3. If the President is not prepared to make this decision now or if the nittering and frittering away continues, it would be his position that the whole reconnaissance operation be turned over to the Department of Defense along with all the responsibilities and the dangers of such a decision. I got the distinct impression this would also include the Director's suit if such action were taken. 4. As to [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] the DCI wishes us to develop plans for the construction, assembly, testing, and contracting of a [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] reconnaissance space craft which would then be delivered as a piece of Government-furnished equipment to whatever operations people are designated to launch and recover the payload. This would include whatever intelligence community inputs are required to schedule and approve launchings and nominal orbits as well as targeting. 5. What he has in mind is CIA as a Government agency delivering a totally completed and checked out space craft to either NASA or the Air Forces for launching by them by an appropriate booster system. Recovery would likewise be done by the launching agency and the payload would then be returned to CIA and the intelligence community for further action. Marshall S. Carter 2 Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Memoranda Originated by General Carter. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The memorandum indicates that McCone noted it. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 212. Memorandum for the Record 212. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, October 9, 1964. SUBJECT Luncheon Meeting Attended by: Messrs. McCone, Carter, and Bross for CIA. Messrs. Kermit Gordon, Elmer Staats, Bob Amory and Bill Thomas for BOB—9 October 1964 This memorandum does not attempt to review intimate details of the rather extended discussion of this meeting, it merely treats the highlights. 1. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Gordon asked McCone's views on such an appointment. McCone responded that he had recommended this to the SecDef eighteen months or two years ago and suggested that a man holding such a position should be a regular member of USIB. McCone had suggested that an Assistant SecDef/Intell could represent the Secretary's views at USIB, could serve as the link between SecDef and DIA, could administer the NRO, execute SecDef's responsibilities as Executive Agent for NSA and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], and also would be a focal point between DCI and DoD on all intelligence matters. McCone said the idea was turned down by McNamara for unexplained reasons; however, McCone assumed that such an arrangement would create problems on the interrelation of SecDef and DIA, would remove NRO and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] from the Air Force, and would exacerbate existing serious problems with the Air Force. McCone concluded that from the standpoint of administering intelligence and considering the enormous intelligence assets under the authority of SecDef, this arrangement would be highly desirable and urged a reconsideration of the proposal. 2. With respect to NRO , McCone expressed very great displeasure with the NRO organization, reading the referenced paragraph in the DCI report to the PFIAB. Copy of which is attached. 2 McCone dealt at length on the improper organization of the NRO and the fact that as presently organized, the research and developments of the Air Force under General Schriever were totally excluded and every effort was made, both overtly and covertly, by the D/NRO and the NRO Staff to exclude CIA from participation. DCI claimed that the objective of the D/NRO was to establish the segment of the Air Force that fell under his direct command within the NRO staff as a single instrument for all NRO activities. McCone complained that the McMillan organization lacked competence and breadth and its present structure cannot serve the fundamental interest of the United States. Thus as DCI, McCone said, he could not discharge his responsibilities for intelligence collection, evaluation and analysis with this type of organization, including the satellite reconnaissance. 3. This led to a discussion of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] McCone said that for a year and one-half he had been pressing the D/NRO to develop an [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Nothing was done and no recognition was made of the DCI's request. In March, D/NRO was asked to brief USIB on his plans for an [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. The briefing was perfunctory. The briefing boards were hurriedly put together the night before the briefing and the briefing evidenced that no research contracts had been considered, authorized or awarded to meet this objective. McCone stated that the reason for this was that the NRO organization was oriented exclusively towards the spot system which it had developed and it appeared to be its primary and only interest. Hence, the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] most important to the intelligence needs, was a stepchild. McCone said he then asked the DD/S&T to explore the field. After several months, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and a considerable amount of in-house work, the very ingenious system was presented which offered [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] with Corona KH–4 area coverage. A panel chaired by Dr. Land reviewed the program and reported it as entirely feasible and within the state of art and recommended approximately [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] for research and development along four specified lines. The D/NRO has obviously made every attempt to frustrate this development and to block it, and this is still going on. Unfortunately Secretary Vance has been taken in by McMillan and Fubini and has joined in the attempt to hold up [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. McCone said despite all of these frustrations and bickering, which appear to him to be bureaucratic and absolute nonsense, he had authorized the work to go forward and demanded that it be financed out of the NRO budget. Gordon questioned DCI as to availability of funds. McCone said an excess of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] was appropriated in 1965 for research and development by CIA and that he didn't think that SecDef or anyone else had the authority to exercise a veto on the expenditure of this fund, and he had no intentions of stopping. McCone then engaged in a discussion of the equivocation of the term “technical direction,” stating that he would not, under any circumstances, turn over final decision on a project of this type to a contractor but would employ system engineer contractors to the maximum extent for the supervision of the work, thus minimizing the requirements for in-house staff. Gordon stated that a number of Defense missile projects had delegated complete technical direction to contractors. McCone replied that that probably accounted for repeated failures and the fact that the New York Times in a blistering editorial on October 5th criticized the Defense Department for its failure to produce anything new in the past four years. In fact the editorial stated that the whole Defense structure was based on invention and development originated and advanced, much of it to an operational status, by the Eisenhower Administration. McCone said that in AEC he had insisted that the Director of Military Application and his staff assume final responsibility for technical direction, with the laboratories doing all the work. This, he said, was the proper way to run a government operation and the responsibility for final decision should not be delegated to others. During the conversation the question arose about launchers and boosters. McCone said this was not the issue, as there was no intention in his mind or anyone in CIA to become involved in the development or operation of launchers and boosters since this could be adequately done by the Air Force. What he was talking about was development and production of an improved payload which involved a space craft, a camera and recovery vehicle, all of which could be delivered to the organization responsible for the launch and proper exchange of technical and scientific information could readily be accomplished. No attempt was made to gain BoB's support in this argument, however, McCone made it abundantly clear we were proceeding and we intended to use NRO research and development funds and he did not respect the veto rights or privileges of SecDef. 3. Mr. Gordon raised the question of separating DCI from CIA, placing him in position as principal intelligence officer for the government, to be free of parochial views of CIA. McCone said he had given a great deal of thought to this arrangement which had been frequently suggested by Mr. Clark Clifford. Indeed he had recently studied the British setup under which the Chairman of the JIC was removed from operations and had concluded that the Chairman, because of his remote position, was of little value to the Prime Minister as his J–2. McCone said the same is true in France. However, in Germany General Gehlen, J–2 for the Prime Minister, was of real value because he directly controlled the analytical and estimating process and coordinated the intelligence in the Military, Foreign Office and elsewhere. McCone said he felt the law as written was pretty good and that he could not function as DCI if he were cut off from access to several hundred specialists in CIA whom he conferred with on problems as they arose. Gordon then said perhaps a change as important as this could only be made by people who are not captured by parochial views and McCone responded that of course any government structure could be changed. Unification could be abolished and the three services could exist independent of one another. The Air Force could be merged back with the Army, etc.; however, it was his judgment and his views not to attempt such a change until and unless a better plan which did insure better functioning of the community was produced. Gordon then said that he felt an independent DCI, functioning as McGeorge Bundy, was feasible. McCone replied that Bundy's success was due to his unusual ability and that no other man in Bundy's position had been able to do what Bundy had done. In other words, the current situation was due to Bundy's being an extraordinary fellow and maintaining a close liaison with Secretaries of State and Defense which gives him access to the resources of both Departments. McCone noted there was a day when this was different. For instance, at one time the only contact between State and Defense was from the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to the Secretary of State, and no other people in either organization were permitted to discuss their respective affairs with one another. 4. Throughout the luncheon there was considerable discussion of the functioning of USIB. McCone contended it was working well and that his dual role did not foreclose open discussion and unprejudiced rulings by him. In fact, he said, he had ruled against CIA more often than in favor of it. He commented on the managerial problems which USIB is now dealing with in addition to estimates and reports and viewed in some detail the manner in which ELINT and NRO operations are controlled. 5. The meeting concluded at 2:30 p.m., permitting the attendance of a USIB meeting. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI McCone Memo for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. 2 Attached but not printed. 213. Memorandum for the Record 213. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, October 22, 1964. SUBJECT Discussion with The President—22 October 1964 On 22 October I prepared to depart with Mrs. McCone to attend the funeral of Herbert Hoover, Sr. I was called by the White House and advised that the President requested specifically that we accompany him. I drove to Andrews Air Force Base and proceeded in the Presidential party to New York, to the services, and to the Presidential suite, 35A in the Waldorf, remaining there two hours, and returned with the Presidential party. While traveling with the President I was able to discuss a number of matters with him. The principal items were: 1. The President stated that he did not know too much about CIA's organization but he had heard from many sources that we had a great many unusually competent people in the Agency. I responded by giving him briefly my appraisal of the quality of the personnel in the Agency from the standpoint of education, intellectual qualities and continuity of service. I emphasized the objectivity of the organization, the fact it had no parochial “axe to grind” in any field most particularly those relating to foreign policy and defense policy. The Agency looked upon its responsibility as that of collecting intelligence by every possible means and evaluating our own intelligence and that gathered by all other Community members carefully and objectively. The President asked the size of the organization. I told him our budget was about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and said we had about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] employees. He asked about the future outlook. I said that I thought the organization was pretty well shaking down, the five-year forecast indicated no increases in personnel and the increases in the budget were minimal and attributable largely to the wage and salary increases and other escalations. I said this resulted from very careful management and that we hope to “hold the line” unless new tasks were assigned to the Agency. This would necessitate additional people and money. The President asked what part of our budget went for operational activities such as political action, paramilitary, etc., and I said about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] out of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. This was the first opportunity I have had to discuss the Agency with the President. I thought he was interested and impressed. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office on October 24. 214. Editorial Note 214. Editorial Note During November 1964 the Central Intelligence Agency again addressed the issue of the best way to provide the President with daily intelligence information. At a meeting with Director of Central Intelligence McCone on October 30, Secretary of State Rusk raised concerns about the security of the President's Intelligence Checklist given its distribution (see footnote 2, Document 192 ). In a November 3 memorandum, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Carter asked Ray Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence, to follow up on the matter, keeping in mind McCone's points of view: “The Checklist is and must continue to be comprehensive and capable of containing the most sensitive intelligence in a condensed form”; and “the President should read it or have it read to him daily and should not depend on the bi-weekly summaries [the President's Intelligence Review].” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, DCI “Eyes Only” File, 01 July–31 Dec 1964) Cline conferred with McGeorge Bundy, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Bundy informed the President in a December 1 memorandum that he and Cline had worked out a “new form of daily intelligence briefing on the premise that it is more useful to you if it comes in your evening reading. Our thought is that this may run parallel to Dean Rusk's daily report (see Document 1 ) and be more nearly responsive to your own interests than the papers we have been sending heretofore.” Bundy attached a copy of the new summary, the President's Daily Brief. President's Special Assistant Valenti later noted on Bundy's memorandum: “Mac, The President likes this very much.” The President's Daily Brief replaced the President's Intelligence Checklist as of December 1 and was provided to President Johnson daily (6 days a week prior to 1966 and 7 days a week thereafter) for the rest of his administration. While both the Checklist and the Daily Brief provided brief intelligence notes organized by country, the Daily Brief was initially much shorter. Whereas the Checklist was usually about 6 to 8 pages (on 8 x 8 inch paper), the Daily Brief started out with one 8 x 13 inch page. From late 1965 on, however, it was typically 2 to 4 standard-sized pages plus maps and occasion al photographs. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence Briefings) At the request of the White House, in 1967 CIA shifted from providing it late in the day for Johnson's Evening Reading to making it “available to the President wherever he may be at the start of each day before he reads his morning newspapers.” (Annual Report to PFIAB, 1966; Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–B01447R, DDI Annual Report to PFIAB, 1966, 1967) President Johnson saw both the Intelligence Checklist and the Daily Brief regularly, according to a spot check of the President's file of Intelligence Checklists and Daily Briefs at the Johnson Library. Almost all copies examined are marked with an “L” or a “ps,” indicating that Johnson saw them. President's Special Assistant Bill Moyers reported in May 1965 that the President read the Daily Brief “avidly.” (Richard Lehman, Memorandum for the record, May 25, 1965; ibid., White House and Executive Offices, 1966) The shift to the Daily Brief did not, however, dispose of more general concerns about getting intelligence reports into the hands of the President. In a memorandum for Cline, May 19, 1965, Helms stated: “We still have quite a problem at the White House getting material to the President. Mr. Bromley Smith spoke to me about it again today. Upon Mr. Bundy's return, we have all got to get together and see if we can solve this crucial problem.” (Ibid., DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Helms Chrono as DDP and DDCI) 215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President 215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President 1 Washington, November 17, 1964. SUBJECT Your meeting with John McCone today at 1:15 2 Mr. Bundy asked that the following information be brought to your attention prior to your meeting with CIA Director McCone this afternoon: 1. Mr. McCone has repeated to Mr. Bundy his desire to be relieved as Director of CIA in due course. His reasons include the necessity of attending to family business, as well as his and his wife's West Coast responsibilities. 2. Mr. McCone has given no clear indication as to the time of his leaving his post, and a question as to his intentions would be appropriate. 3. Mr. McCone has said it would be highly useful if his successor were named far enough in advance so that McCone could introduce his successor to his intelligence colleagues during the course of a familiarization trip of some two months to the Far East and Europe. 4. McCone has thought about who should succeed him. His preferred candidate is apparently Roswell Gilpatric, who is also strongly supported by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. 3 5. Mr. Bundy recalls the special knowledge which Clark Clifford has in this area, and suggests you may wish to telephone him prior to your discussion with Mr. McCone. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11–2. Confidential. 2 The President met with McCone on November 17 from 2:30 to 2:44 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) 3 Rusk's intimation during a discussion with McCone on March 18, 1965, that Maxwell Taylor was under consideration elicited a comment by McCone that Taylor “would be very bad indeed.” For text of McCone's memorandum for the record, see Document 30 . 216. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson 216. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 3, 1964. Dear Mr. President: This letter is in response to your request for a statement from the head of each department and agency concerning desirable reforms in on-going programs as indicated in your statement to the Cabinet on 19 November, a copy of which was transmitted to me by Mr. Kermit Gordon. 2 At my direction the Central Intelligence Agency has intensified its program of management control designed continually to improve efficiency within the Agency, to eliminate marginal or outmoded activities and to stabilize, and if possible reduce, the Agency's budget as well as its manpower. I believe that this program has been successful. The five-year forecast for the Agency's budget contains only very moderate increases which reflect the costs of conducting operations in foreign countries where rising price levels prevail; and the cost of pay raises already granted. These increases will be offset to some extent by actual reductions in the Agency's manpower. We are actually budgeting in 1966 for 558 fewer permanent positions than we had included in our 1964 budget. Many new and costly programs calling for additional funds and manpower have been successfully absorbed within established ceilings. Programs considered redundant or of lesser priority have been screened out to make this possible. I see no reason why the five-year forecast should not prove to be accurate unless unanticipated tasks are assigned to the Agency. Two points of importance, however, should be noted. One is that CIA must be prepared to take action required by policy makers on short notice to meet new political crises which are essentially unpredictable. A second point is the fact that CIA performs certain services which call for both manpower and appropriations over which it does not have exclusive control and which may involve increases over estimates projected in the five-year forecast. I have in mind certain communications responsibilities for the Department of State. Turning to the question of the Intelligence Community as a whole in which I, as Director of Central Intelligence, by Presidential Directive have responsibility for coordination and guidance, I feel a continuing effort is indicated. The recognized budget for all intelligence activities is about [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. CIA costs account for roughly [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. The Defense Intelligence Agency, including intelligence components of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, accounts for [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]; the National Security Agency, including the collection activities of the Services, for approximately [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]; and the National Reconnaissance Organization for [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. A small amount is attributable to the Department of State. I have created a small but highly qualified staff to assist me in my coordinating capacity, which has undertaken a series of studies and evaluations of programs conducted by the Intelligence Community. With this assistance, I have made and will continue to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, who is the Executive Agent for the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Organization, concerning the extent to which economies might be effected without impairing the collection, analysis and dissemination of essential intelligence. My concern has been to identify the priority objectives of the United States intelligence effort and to make sure that intelligence programs are as responsive as possible to these objectives. Over the past two years the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) has increasingly been providing guidance and managerial direction to the Community through the refinement of intelligence requirements and by careful scheduling of overhead reconnaissance activities, the allocation of ELINT and COMINT responsibilities, and review of the needs of the Community for research and development of new collection systems and sensors. The cost of the U.S. intelligence effort, as I have said, runs about [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and employs about [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] men. This effort will continue to be substantial and is obviously essential for the national security. It is also a necessary factor in containing the military budget within realistic limits. In the absence of an intelligence system capable of identifying probable military and political developments, the cost of the forces required to meet all possible contingencies would clearly be prohibitive. Accurate information about enemy strengths and dispositions enables us to avoid excessive, as well as inadequate, expenditures for forces and armaments. The cost of this effort can be minimized by insisting that activities be confined to what is essential to the intelligence mission; that efforts be carefully screened to avoid duplication; that national intelligence assets, such as the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Organization, created and operating at great cost to the benefit of all departments of the Government, be used to the fullest extent by the entire Intelligence Community and not be duplicated; and that the resources of the CIA, in areas of its special competence, in the field of covert collection of intelligence, the collation, analysis and reporting of intelligence, be utilized to the fullest by policy makers and members of the Intelligence Community and should not under any circumstances be duplicated. Effective coordination along the lines which I have suggested depends upon the existence and assertion of centralized coordinating authority. Under the terms of a Presidential letter, dated 16 January 1962, 3 the responsibility to ensure effective guidance and coordination to the U.S. intelligence effort as a whole was entrusted to the Director of Central Intelligence. Acting under the authority of this direc tive, very considerable progress has been achieved. If, however, there is to be further improvement reaffirmation by Presidential Directive of the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence would be desirable. No new legislation appears necessary as an adequate statutory basis for the coordination of national intelligence programs exists in the provisions of the National Security Act of 1946. 4 I consider the relations of the Central Intelligence Agency with the Congress as reasonably satisfactory. During the three years of my tenure of office, I have met approximately once a month with a subcommittee of the House Armed Forces Committee chaired by Chairman Vinson and reviewed in depth our estimates of the world situation and details of the Agency's operations. Similar meetings have been held with a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee chaired by Chairman Russell, although because of the demand on the time of the members of the Committee, these meetings have been less frequent. Also, it is our practice to meet periodically with subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees for the purpose of reviewing our budget which involves discussion of our activities and, in addition, to present a substantive briefing. I have recommended to both Senator Russell and Chairman Vinson that these Committees be expanded to include the senior Majority and Minority members of the Foreign Relations Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee and it is my hope that early action will be taken on this subject. Frequently members of the Senate or the House visit the Agency headquarters at Langley and thus are acquainted with the organization and activities of CIA. Respectfully yours, John A. McCone 5 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, White House, July–Dec 1964. Secret. Drafted by Bross on December 2. 2 Text of the President's statement is in the Johnson Library, Statements File, 11/19/64, Statement of the President at a Cabinet Meeting: The Great Society. 3 Printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Document 99 . 4 For text of the National Security Act of 1947, see Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman , pp. 131–135. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates McCone signed the original. 217. Memorandum for the Record 217. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, December 16, 1964. SUBJECT Discussion with Mr. Vance, 16 December 1964 The purpose of my call was to lay the foundation for the talks with McNamara and Vance on NRO. Prior to this discussion I called his special attention to the COMOR study on Mission [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and the CIA forecast of French nuclear capabilities through 1980, both of which I said would be delivered to him by special messenger. 2 With respect to NRO, I made the following points: 1. DCI must have a continuing and positive voice in all of the reconnaissance operation, including research and development directed towards new systems, as well as operational details, schedules, targeting, etc. I said that aerial photography represented such an important input to the intelligence inventory that the DCI could not function responsibly without a strong voice in these activities. 2. I agreed there must be an NRO and a D/NRO as reconnaissance was [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] a year operation and could not be managed by a committee or a group. However, some changes had to be made. a. I questioned whether the D/NRO should be the Under Secretary of the Air Force. b. The D/NRO should utilize to the fullest extent available scientific, technical and operational resources of the entire Air Force (not just a very narrow compartmented section of the Air Force) and CIA. In this regard I said that General Schriever, of whom Vance spoke most highly, appeared very dissatisfied with the present NRO setup. c. That if D/NRO was to operate a “line operation”, the line operating responsibilities should be limited to the Pentagon and the field and that he should task CIA to perform assigned responsibilities in research, development, procurement, etc., should set up a procedure for reporting on the performance of the assigned tasks and should hold the CIA responsible for its performance. The D/NRO should not go “through the side of the building”, direct personnel within CIA, attempt to control contracting and fiscal procedures in CIA, attempt to remove and reassign men within the CIA organization, as all of these actions were highly disturbing and unnecessary. d. I did not feel it necessary to duplicate the Air Force's booster program or its management of it. I envisaged a plan under which CIA would deliver to the Air Force operating unit a payload properly checked out and enough technical assistance to insure the interface between the payload and the booster, and the Air Force could do the job from there. e. I did not feel it possible to maintain a competent organization which could do the imaginative things, such as the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], the U-2 operating from a carrier, the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] camera (which I briefly discussed with Vance) and dozens of others which require a highly competent technical organization, oriented towards the intelligence mission, unless they are authorized to carry through on the development, thus encouraging close liaison arrangements with the contractors, scientific groups, etc. f. All camera systems are subject to evolutionary improvements. No one payload exactly duplicates another. History of the continual improvements of the U-2 camera, Corona camera, etc., have proven to me that evolutionary improvements are made by the organization responsible for the development. Thus, I think a plan under which the R&D developing agent, i.e. Air Force or CIA was responsible for supplying to the Air Force operating unit the payload as suggested, would insure the maximum evolutionary development. I told Vance that all this philosophy had been spelled out in my letters to Bundy and McNamara 3 and that I would like him to review the whole NRO program against the background of our talk and my letters and the three of us would meet. Vance was non-committal. It was obvious my views did not conform to his, which I felt reflected McNamara's desire to create a “single instrument.” Finally, in discussing the single instrument, I pointed out that the military have a mission which requires “instantaneous readout.” CIA has a mission of acquiring “maximum input into the intelligence inventory for estimative and analytical purposes.” Therefore I reasoned that if the Air Force became the single instrument of reconnaissance, we would revert to a condition where all R&D and development programs would be oriented to meet the requirements of the military mission. This could not be changed as it was traditional and correct that the military should so plan. There would evolve, therefore, a situation in which essential intelligence would be lost. I pointed out this was the history of the SAMOS development in which the Air Force insisted on a “readout system” against the advice of almost everyone because the military mission demanded instantaneous readout. The NSC (and I was sitting on it) finally had to insist on a new approach, the military fought it, and finally CIA picked up the Corona and made a great success of it. It is against this background that I feel the program proposed in my letters is logical, in the national interest, will probably save money, and will satisfy both the needs of the SecDef and the DCI. One essential ingredient of a successful NRO would be the maintenance of the NRO Executive Committee although I would not feel it required weekly meetings if a properly oriented D/NRO was running the show. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI McCone Memo for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone on December 17. A copy was sent to Wheelon. A note on the memorandum indicates it was noted by Carter. 2 Not further identified. 3 See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 208 . 218. Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kirkpatrick) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 218. Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kirkpatrick) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 1 Washington, December 21, 1964. SUBJECT CIA/DIA Relations 1. In response to your instructions we have asked the CIA Chairman of the principal USIB committees and the heads of the CIA Directorates to advise us concerning the relations with DIA and of any suggestions they may have for improving CIA/DIA relations. 2 In general, considerable satisfaction is expressed by all concerning relations with DIA, and there appears to be a close and cordial working arrangement between the two agencies. Although some areas are noted in which it is felt DIA could make a greater contribution, there is general recognition that it is still a young agency and that it has been having the usual growing pains, particularly as it has taken over some established service responsibilities. Summarized below are the principal comments received. DD/P DIA has helped the Clandestine Services in its relation to the military services and their participation and support of clandestine operations. DIA has provided a unified channel for intelligence requirements to all DOD components which has helped to eliminate duplication. DIA evaluations and assessments have assisted clandestine operations. There has been some delay in Clandestine Service reports reaching DOD elements, but DIA is working on this. DIA has assisted in considerable improvement in the coordination of clandestine operations between the services and CIA, but there has not been similar improvement in the counterintelligence areas. DD/I DIA contributions to substantive intelligence in such fields as order of battle, geographic intelligence, industrial intelligence and photographic interpretation have been good. In the scientific and technological intelligence areas we believe improvement is needed. This is dealt with later under DD/S&T and the specialized committees of USIB. We believe there could be further clarification of the distinct roles of the Central Intelligence Bulletin and the Defense Intelligence Summary as there are still occasional overlaps and duplications which create some problems. Further, we urge that DIA accelerate its efforts for an effective retrieval system in close collaboration with CIA and the CODIB. 3 DD/S&T In the research and development areas DIA has proved an effective focal point for coordination of R&D in intelligence areas between CIA and Defense Intelligence components. The information exchange is today effective and meaningful. In the collection and analysis areas, DIA is responsive and effective in the ELINT advisory group and the SIGINT evaluation subcommittee. It could be better coordinated with CIA on [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] ELINT operations. The creation of the Defense Special Missile and Astronautic Center at Ft. Meade under the joint direction of DIA/NSA has greatly improved the task of DOD collection assets. In the production and estimating areas the Directorate of Science and Technology in DIA, in our opinion, needs more in-house intelligence production and estimative capability and less dependence on such units as the Foreign Technological Division of the Air Force Systems Command, the Foreign Scientific and Technological Center of the Army Materiel Command and the Scientific and Technological Intelligence Center of ONI. DD/S The primary areas of relations between our support directorate and DIA are in the security and training fields. There is close coordination and exchange between our Office of Training and the DIA training effort including a full-time CIA officer at the Defense Intelligence School. DIA has been most cooperative and effective in the security field in such matters as special security control systems, surveys, etc. ONE DIA's work in the estimative field has been responsive, cordial and cooperative but reflects a need for experienced officers in the estimative fields with depth and continuity in substantive intelligence. (It is recognized that this is hard to achieve in a relatively new organization dependent on the services for its personnel and we are well aware of General Carroll's intensive efforts in this field.) DIA is responsive to spot requests for specific information and briefings in the production of estimates. Good lines of communication have been established and the CIA/DIA working group has been a good device. However, contributions to military estimates are uneven in quality and we are consequently shaky on a myriad of military questions in the Far East, with considerable uncertainties on the reliability of our Order of Battle on Communist China. Finally, more and more dependence is being placed on CIA's Office of Research and Reports for estimates of production of military equipment, which perhaps they are best qualified for, in relation to DIA, because of their depth in the economic area. Watch Committee (Sheldon) DIA's widespread Indications organization provides rapid and effective screening of indicators and assists the overall effort. The DIA 24-hour watch is energetic, consistent, and operates on the highest priority basis. We would urge closer coordination between the DIA representatives on the Watch Committee and the producers of the Defense Intelligence Summary for the purpose of reaching unified analytical judgments. COMOR (Reber) DIA has facilitated COMOR action by serving as a focal point for DOD in all collection matters and the DIA representatives have been cooperative in the coordination effort. JAEIC (Chamberlain) DIA has been rebuilding the competence in the nuclear energy intelligence effort and has hired some good civilians and hopefully is getting some good military personnel. There is a need for depth and analysis and for closer coordination between the production center and the Directorate for Science and Technology. CIA has helped train DIA analysts and we will continue to give all the assistance we can. SIC—Scientific Intelligence Committee (Weber) DIA has made a good effort to speak with a unified military voice in this area, but there is still a question as to where the true expertise rests. This was graphically illustrated on NIE 11–8 4 with regard to the submarine capability where the expertise rested exclusively with the Navy. CIA is not so much concerned as to where the expertise resides as it is with how quickly this can be made available in the estimative procedure. GMAIC (Duckett) The basic Missile and Space Analysis capability still resides in the departments, which are cooperative in providing special studies, and CIA is appreciative that the channels are kept open for this purpose. As mentioned above, there is a need for greater in-house capabilities in DIA in the missile and space field. CODIB—Committee on Documentation and Information (Borel) DIA is responsive and active in this field and we noted above the requirement for retrieval capability. CCPC (Reynolds) DIA has provided a dynamic and constructive approach to the efforts of the Critical Collection Problems Committee. [ 1 heading and 3 lines of source text not declassified ] EIC—Economic Intelligence Committee (Guthe) DIA has provided an excellent job at the EIC level and promptly assists in providing members to the subcommittees. Security (Osborn) DIA has provided a central point for cooperation and has developed considerable expertise in this field. NIS—National Intelligence Survey (Bower) DIA has absorbed the responsibilities for all service inputs to the National Intelligence Surveys and is meeting its deadlines in a satisfactory manner as to time and quality. Lyman Kirkpatrick 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Evaluation of DIA 1964. Secret. A copy was sent to the DDCI. A note on the memorandum indicates it was noted by McCone and Walt Elder. 2 McCone requested the information for a meeting on December 22 with Admiral Wellborn. Following a discussion with McCone about the upcoming meeting, John Bross of CIA wrote Kirkpatrick a memorandum on December 15, in which he stated that “the DCI supports the concept of DIA and feels that it ought to be strengthened” but “will take the position that DIA should concentrate on essentially military intelligence activities and should leave to CIA the responsibility for activities which extend beyond strictly military implications.” (Ibid.) 3 In a December 4 memorandum to Kirkpatrick, on which this section is based, Paul Borel, Assistant Deputy Director, Intelligence/Management, also stated that “the establishment of DIA has provided CIA with one focal point to which to turn on matters requiring collection by Department of Defense resources. In this regard, DIA has effected noteworthy improvements in responsiveness and effectiveness, which have resulted in more timely and valuable DOD reporting on significant intelligence problems.” Borel noted, however, that “it is our impression that DIA has not yet developed an effective methodology for integrating the views of the various elements of DOD on intelligence matters. On occasion, DIA seems to have sought a surface unity among the military by incorporating, as its own, views which otherwise would have emerged as individual service dissents; on other occasions, the result has been a suppression of differences which, if submitted as individual service views, would have been more fully explored on a community-wide basis.” (Ibid.) 4 NIE 11–8–64, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack,” October 8, 1964. For text of the summary and conclusions, see Donald Steury, ed., Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983 , pp. 191–198. 219. Letter From President Johnson to Vice President Humphrey 219. Letter From President Johnson to Vice President Humphrey 1 Washington, January 22, 1965. Dear Mr. Vice President: I have studied with great interest your thoughtful memorandum 2 giving me your observations concerning the Central Intelligence Agency and your suggestion that a task force be established to review the Agency's organization, operations and leadership. First, let me say that I am in general accord with your constructive suggestions, and that I appreciate very much the genuine interest which prompted you to write to me. With respect to your principal recommendation that a task force be established to review briefly the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, I am pleased to advise you that I presently have, in operation, a review and advisory committee whose functions include, but are not limited to, the several CIA problem areas outlined in your memorandum. This body is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, established by Executive Order No. 10938. 3 The Board was constituted by President Kennedy in 1961, immediately following the disaster suffered by the United States at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. The major responsibilities of the Board include: (1) conducting a continuing review and assessment of all functions of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the other executive departments and agencies having foreign intelligence responsibilities, and (2) providing advice and recommendations to the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States which are required in the interests of foreign policy, national defense and security. (Attachment No. 1 is a copy of the Executive Order which established the Board.) 4 The Board's review functions include not only the organization, management and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency but also the review of all the intelligence activities of the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Unified, Specified and Component Commands, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Service Cryptologic Agencies. It seems to me that this broad assignment is preferable to an approach which would confine review functions to the Central Intelligence Agency alone, particularly since the CIA is but one segment of our foreign intelligence structure and its current budget is only about one-seventh of the total foreign intelligence budget. In my judgment, because of their size, cost, complexity and crucial importance, the various foreign intelligence agencies should be the subject of intensive and continuing review within the Executive Branch, rather than the object of examination by an ad hoc task force having no responsibility for following up the recommendations which such a task force might submit. (The ad hoc study group approach was tried and found wanting by earlier administrations with the result that a continuing review body was first established for this purpose by President Eisenhower in 1956.) Further, it is my belief that the reviewing board should be composed of experts whose specialized backgrounds and experience can, on a continuing basis, be brought to bear on the consideration of significant foreign intelligence problems. An added requirement is that the review groups should perform its sensitive responsibil ities objectively and impartially, with a minimum of public fanfare and with no organizational ties to any of the intelligence agencies. In my opinion the present Board has clearly demonstrated that it meets the above requirements for a review body charged with the task of continually appraising the coordination, organization, management, objectives and conduct of the intelligence and related activities which make up the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort. (Attachment No. 2 identifies the individuals who compose the Board and includes a thumbnail sketch of the specialized knowledge and experience which each brings to the Board's deliberations.) 5 Since its establishment in 1961 the Board has held 30 separate meetings covering a period of 47 working days. In between its regular meetings it has carried out its review and assessment functions through: (1) special panels, composed of two-to-three Board members who undertake responsibilities on behalf of the full Board to keep abreast of specialized segments of the over-all intelligence effort; and (2) the Board's Executive Secretary who devotes full time to review of the foreign intelligence effort both in the United States and throughout the various countries where our intelligence operations are conducted. When I first met with the Board in January 1964, I was briefed on the highlights of a series of reports, including some 170 recommendations, which the Board had made to President Kennedy during the preceding three-year period. Many of its recommendations had been fully implemented, while others were in the process of being carried into effect by the agencies concerned. Reports which I have received from the Board subsequent to my initial meeting in January 1964 have singled out for continued, specialized attention a variety of problems including a number of subjects set forth in your memorandum. Within the next two weeks I expect to meet again with the Board to receive further reports and recommendations involving existing problem areas within the intelligence community. With respect to other comments in your memorandum, I concur in your view that the CIA has made some progress in cutting down on superfluous employees, in bringing in talented specialists, in working more closely with the Department of State and its Ambassadors, in bringing in more modern scientific equipment and in accumulating an impressive library of useful data. I also subscribe to your view that the examples of Vietnam, the Congo and Cuba underline the need for developing much-improved indigenous, clandestine agent assets to augment the highly valuable intelligence which is now acquired through advanced scientific and technological means. The problem of developing such improved clandestine agent assets has been a matter of deep concern to the Board since its creation; indeed, the Board has repeatedly reviewed this problem with CIA and the military intelligence services in an effort to devise new means to meet this age-old and increasingly difficult situation. With respect to the need for some basic institutional reform in the CIA, I can report that a number of worthwhile modifications have been made in the internal organizational structure of the Agency over the past four years. Other changes are under intensive review, including the very difficult problem of reaching a suitable solution to the “overt-versus-covert” questions to which you refer. I believe that over the past four years, as a result of the combined efforts of the Administration, the Board and the heads of the several agencies concerned, considerable progress has been made in our total foreign intelligence effort. However, the situation today is not by any means perfect. With the aid of constructive suggestions such as yours, and with the assistance of the Board, I will continue to seek ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of all our intelligence agencies. I thank you sincerely for your very useful and highly valued comments. Sincerely, lbj 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11–1. Secret. Drafted by Johnson, Clifford, and Moyers. 2 Attached is Humphrey's undated memorandum to Johnson. Also attached is Clifford's January 18 memorandum evaluating Humphrey's memorandum together with a draft reply. 3 Dated May 4, 1961. (26 Federal Register 3951) A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 2. 4 Not attached, but see footnote 3 above. 5 Not found. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates the President signed the original. 220. Editorial Note 220. Editorial Note In a March 5, 1965, letter to Ambassador to Germany McGhee, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Crockett responded to several questions McGhee had raised concerning the role of ambassadors in the planning and direction of Central Intelligence Agency activities ( Document 28 ). McGhee raised the questions in connection with implementing the Department of State's Comprehensive Country Programming System. Crockett sent a copy of the letter to Richard Helms, Deputy Director of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency, which Helms acknowledged in an April 6 letter to Crockett. Helms noted that he “was about to dispatch my detailed reply when our meeting of 1 April took place.” No record of that meeting has been found, but Helms commented that it “tended to bring us closer together on how to handle the problems presented by the CCPS.” Helms noted further that he would send a representative to meet with Richard Barrett, Director of the Department of State's Office of Management Planning. In that meeting on April 16, and at a second meeting with Robert Cox of Barrett's office on July 6, CIA representatives pointed out (according to an October 5 draft letter from Helms to Crockett) that portions of Crockett's letter were “in conflict with standing agreements and suggested that there be no further distribution of the former.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–3805, US Gov't-Dept of State) For information on the standing agreements, see Document 243 and footnote 3 thereto. In a March 27 memorandum to all Chiefs of Station, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Carter reviewed the coordination of clandestine intelligence activities abroad ( Document 221 ). CIA concerns over Crockett's letter were raised anew by a CIA representative at a meeting on October 8 with Koren, Deputy Director for Coordination of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (see Document 238 ). For the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's view of the role of ambassadors in CIA activities, see Document 248 . For additional discussion of the issue, see Documents 234 , 237 , 243 , 257 , 261 , 263 , and 267 . 221. Memorandum From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Carter) to All Chiefs of Stations and Certain Bases 221. Memorandum From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Carter) to All Chiefs of Stations and Certain Bases 1 Washington, March 27, 1965. SUBJECT Coordination of Clandestine Intelligence Activities Abroad REFERENCES A. NSCID 1 2 B. NSCID 5 3 C. Presidential Letter to the DCI, dated 16 January 1962 4 D. Book Dispatch dated 16 February 1962 5 1. The purpose of this dispatch is to give station chiefs current guidance concerning the implementation by them of the responsibilities which they carry on behalf of the Director for coordination of clandestine intelligence activities. 2. References A, B and C place upon the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for insuring that clandestine intelligence activities of the U.S. Government abroad are fully coordinated. On 8 December 1959, the Director issued four directives (DCID 5/1, 5/2, 5/3, and 5/4), 6 after consultation with the United States Intelligence Board, setting forth the principles and procedures for implementing this responsibility and including the provision that the Director shall designate representatives in the field to carry out this responsibility locally on his behalf. Reference D was issued for the purpose of giving added guidance and instructions to insure effective efforts to implement this responsibility. 3. During the three years since Reference D was issued, a large volume of experience has accumulated concerning the appropriate methods for effecting the Director's responsibility to coordinate all clandes tine collection intelligence activities abroad. Considerable experience has also accumulated concerning the problems that exist in implementing this responsibility. 4. The responsibility which has been placed upon the Director of Central Intelligence by the President for coordination in this field has in no way been lessened during these three years. Experience reinforces the position that this responsibility can be carried out primarily through our station chiefs in the field, backed up by the Deputy Director for Plans and his respective Area Divisions and Staff personnel at Headquarters. We have, however, found it wise to retain in our hands at Headquarters initial decisions in the coordination of certain types of clandestine collection activities, and appropriate instructions have been issued concerning those activities. (See paragraph 10 of Reference D, and Book Dispatch of 1 December 1964.) 7 5. I have carefully reviewed the guidance in Reference D, and I hereby reaffirm what is said therein, with the following comments: a. Chiefs of Station are the DCI's representatives abroad for carrying out the DCI's responsibilities for coordination and approval of all U.S. clandestine intelligence activities. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] These activities include espionage and counterintelligence (including double agent operations), and also U.S. liaison with foreign clandestine services and with foreign intelligence and security services concerning clandestine activities. b. There is still too great a variation in the degree of effectiveness with which the station chiefs have carried out this responsibility. The responsibility in this field is a most serious one and the highest level of the Government expects it to be carried out effectively. c. To avoid any misunderstanding concerning the nature of the coordination role which the station chief exercises, I want to make it clear that he should apply generally the same judgment concerning the operational features of the proposals of the military services as he applies to his own, and that it is his responsibility either to approve or disapprove of each proposed activity according to his view as to its operational soundness. His decisions are, of course, subject to appeal to the Director of Central Intelligence by the military services through the established channels. d. In exercising a judgment leading to an approval or a disapproval of a proposed activity, not only is the station chief to consider the harm to the U.S. clandestine intelligence effort if the activity should be comprised, but also he is to consider the harm to the U.S. national interest in the broadest sense. In any instance where there is inherent in a pro posed operation a risk of compromise, yet where the objective in the judgment of the station chief appears to warrant such a risk, he should make every effort to insure that the degree of risk is kept to a minimum through sound planning. e. It is the responsibility of the station chief to decide how much detailed operational information he needs on each proposed activity to make a judgment as to whether to approve or disapprove the proposed activity. If the details provided are not sufficient, the station chief should refuse to approve the proposed activity. f. The examples of harmful or duplicative activity which are mentioned in paragraph 8 of Reference D are hereby re-emphasized. g. When the station chief withholds approval of a proposal, he must inform the service representatives of the reasons for this decision, and point out to them that they may refer the case through military channels to Headquarters for consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence. 6. The President, in a letter to all U.S. Chiefs of Mission dated 29 May 1961, 8 has reminded his Chiefs of Mission of their responsibilities for keeping abreast of all U.S. Government activities in their respective areas and for exercising a judgment as to the kinds of activities which are acceptable. In order that each Chief of Mission may carry out this responsibility concerning the clandestine collection activities of the U.S. Government, it is the responsibility of our station chiefs to keep them appropriately informed not only of our own activities, but of the clandestine activities of the military services as well. Guidance as to the extent to which the Chiefs of Mission are kept informed of military services' activities is the same as that which you have received concerning keeping them informed of our own activities. 7. The military clandestine collection activities are concentrated largely in a few areas, such as Western Europe, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], and specific areas of the Far East, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. However, the services do have activities in certain countries of the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. Because of this pattern of concentration of effort, some station chiefs have found it necessary to devote a great deal of the time and manpower of their stations to carrying out these responsibilities on my behalf. On the other hand, for a large number of stations, there has been no occasion for the station chiefs to exercise this responsibility because the services have not programmed clandestine collection activities in their countries. In any event, the station chiefs must devote whatever amount of time and manpower is required to carry out these responsibilities. 8. It is my desire that Headquarters be kept regularly informed in regard to the coordination activities of our station chiefs. In the past, we have required quarterly reports, but I find that this requirement is somewhat unrealistic, in that for those stations which have no coordination work to perform from one year to the next it is an unnecessary burden to send in negative reports every three months. On the other hand, experience has shown that for [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] regular monthly reporting is more desirable than quarterly reporting and this practice has been found very useful. Consequently, I have the following guidelines for the reporting of coordination activities to Headquarters: a. Those stations which have a regular volume of business should report a summary of the routine cases on a monthly basis. [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] In addition, all cases of outstanding significance or which involve unusual problems or difficulties should be reported promptly to Headquarters. b. Those stations which do not have a regular volume of business and only an occasional activity to coordinate should report promptly to Headquarters as each coordination takes place. 9. I also wish to remind you of the principles and procedures of DCID 5/2 and DCID 5/4 concerning the coordination of liaison and cover, respectively. We have asked the stations to obtain reports from the local U.S. units having local liaison as to their current liaison arrangements. I understand that some station chiefs have not complied with this request, and I wish them to do so at once and to forward these reports to Headquarters. In addition, I request that those stations which have previously obtained such reports have them brought up to date and forward them to Headquarters. 10. The military services are under an obligation to cooperate with the Director and our station chiefs in our efforts to carry out this coordination responsibility. I am confident that the services intend to do so. The efforts of all of us will be made easier and more effective if we all understand and appreciate the principles and the procedures which have been established to accomplish this end. I urge that you take all reasonable measures to insure that the military components which are charged with responsibilities for conducting clandestine activities in your areas understand the principals and procedures for coordination as set forth in the directives to you, and that they also understand that the purpose behind this coordination effort is to insure a better and more effective U.S. clandestine intelligence effort. In the event that, after reasonable efforts on your part to obtain full cooperation, an element or elements do not cooperate you should make it clear to them that their activities will be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence for his further action at the command level in Washington. I wish to be personally informed of such situations if any should arise. 11. I am forwarding a copy of this dispatch to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, with a suggestion that he send copies of it to appropriate military units. A copy of my letter to him is attached. 9 Marshall S. Carter 10 Lieutenant General, USA 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, DIA 1965. Secret. The top of page 1 of the memorandum is stamped “Book Dispatch.” 2 A copy of NSCID No. 1 as revised January 18, 1961, and March 4, 1964, is at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA. 3 Dated December 12, 1947, and revised August 28, 1951. The earlier version is printed in Foreign Relations , 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 423 . The revised directive is scheduled for publication in a Foreign Relations intelligence retrospective volume for 1950–1955. 4 Printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Document 99 . 5 Not found. 6 Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 5/1, December 8, 1959, is scheduled for publication in a Foreign Relations intelligence retrospective volume for 1956–1960. 7 Not found. 8 Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1345–1347. 9 Attached but not printed. 10 Printed from a copy that indicates Carter signed the original. 222. Memorandum for the Record 222. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 2, 1965. 1. On Friday afternoon, 2 April, at my request. I met with the Honorable Robert Murphy. 2 During the course of the conversation, Mr. Murphy asked me what I knew about Mr. McCone's plans and a replacement for him. I told Mr. Murphy that I knew Mr. McCone would be leaving very shortly and that, to the best of my knowledge, no replacement had yet been selected. I told him that I had been Acting Director for an appreciable part of the time during the past three years, and that there would really be no problem in maintaining continuity if a Director was not selected prior to Mr. McCone's departure although this would create a sizable morale problem within the Agency because of uncertainties, and certainly would present the President with more problems than it would solve. I told him that I had made my position abundantly clear to Mr. McCone and to others (specifically Mr. McGeorge Bundy) that it would be a grave error to put a military man in as Director, either retired or active, regardless of his competence and regardless of his stature. I told him that the Agency was more than 17 years old and that if it had not by now developed an in-house competence to provide a Director from its own resources, then they had best close up the place and turn it back to the Indians. I told him that there was within the Agency a competence for the position greater than in any of the names I had heard mentioned from outside. I told him that if the President had to have a name which would light up public lights, then the Agency would certainly be prepared to fall in line and support this selection, and live with it regardless of the competence of the individual chosen. I reiterated, however, that any selection from the Washington community (unless it were of the stature of Cy Vance or George Ball or McGeorge Bundy) would be a disaster, and particularly if it were someone who had been formerly employed by the CIA or the FBI or the military services. Upon questioning, I stated that there were at least three people in the Agency whom I considered qualified to perform the job in an outstanding manner and for whom I would be perfectly prepared to stay on as Deputy for as long as they might wish. Specifically, I listed Mr. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Bross. 2. Mr. Murphy, commented that Mr. Kirkpatrick had probably been around the world more times as Inspector General of the Agency for eight years than any other officer in the Agency, and had probably visited more Stations and Bases on these trips than anyone in the entire history of the Agency. 3. There was no substantive discussion of qualifications of any of the officers mentioned, nor did Mr. Murphy express any views other than as indicated. He did, however, seem to be sympathetic to the proposition that the selection criteria enumerated above were the best in the long run for the Agency and the national interest. MSC Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Memoranda Prepared in O/DCCI for MSC Signature. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Carter on April 5. 2 In a separate memorandum for the record regarding the same meeting, Carter noted that Murphy indicated that “he was greatly dissatisfied with the operations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He felt that the agendas prepared for these meetings were sterile, reviewed over and over again the same bureaucratic jungle of NRO and the highly technical aspects of NSA, and inadequately covered the problems or classical intelligence collection and classical intelligence analysis. He felt that everybody was carried away with exotic collection and analysis means and was losing sight of the tried and true systems that had been so successful for so long.” (Ibid.) 223. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Admiral Raborn 223. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Admiral Raborn 1 Washington, April 6, 1965, 4:26 p.m. [Omitted here are opening remarks.] President: I want to talk to you confidentially about a matter, and I don't want anybody to know it but you and me. I know your health problem and I know your financial problem and all those things, but we're getting in a pretty serious business up here now, and I've been giving very earnest consideration to asking you if you couldn't come back and help us a little while. Raborn: Yes sir. Well, I'm terribly honored to have you think of me. You know of my strong affection for you sir, and strong support any way I could, but I do have a continuing health problem. President: I thought I might take a young man over here and make him your deputy, and you kinda handle it. I don't think you got much more health problem than I have, and ah— Raborn: That's a little different. President: Well, my blood pressure went to zero—can't go any lower—when I had my heart attack. Raborn: That's cause you would land on the other side. Yeah, I agree with you there. President: I don't want you to just, ah—. John McCone's out there now, and he's spends some time away, and he's—. We can't have but one military man, or one man with military background, but I want somebody that McNamara has great respect for, and he does for you, and somebody that I can-whose judgment, J-U-D-G-M-E-N-T, you can trust. Mr. Rayburn used to say, “I don't give a damn how smart a man is if he hasn't got judgment.” And I think we got a fella that in a year or two would be real good to succeed McCone. He's in charge of Plans out there now. He's a career man. His name is Helms. Do you know him? Raborn: Helms? President: Yeah, CIA. He's a young, attractive fella, but I would like to give thought to moving him into the deputy's spot, and giving him some training and some seasoning there, but doing it for a period until we thought he was ready, under, rather, a man with seasoned judgment and somebody that could deal pretty well with Russell and the House committee and Mahon, appropriations people, and let them feel during this critical period that we had somebody that was an old war horse and knew what he was doing and just wasn't a civilian out of the service. Raborn: Yes. President: Now I need you and need you awful bad awful quick. I've thought of that, and I don't think it's something that you've got to go to war about or around the clock. I think you can just take about it as easy as you want to, as long as you're satisfied that things are going. I think it's in pretty good shape. I think it, ah—you might want to take a little trip once in a while, but I believe he'd be a very good deputy, and I would almost make him the director, but I'm not quite that close to it at this moment. Raborn: This is your suggestion—that I would relieve Mr. McCone? President: Yeah. I'd want you—what we'd do is that's a pretty closed corporation. Raborn: I understand sir. President: And when you—it's pretty worldwide, and it's pretty heavy in its appropriations, as you know, many hundreds of millions. But they've got a good organization. They've got good men. They need a top man that can keep the Congress pretty well informed without [unintelligible] in the newspapers, and they go up and see Russell once a month, spend an hour with him, and kinda of tell him what's going on, and Harry Byrd, and the same thing with Mahon. But every Tuesday his principal job is bringing in his little briefing for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the President. We have lunch, the four of us, every Tuesday, at my dining room at the White House. He's responsible for the show, but McCone the last few months has been away quite a bit. His wife's had some trouble. He's out there now. He's got some folks sick, and he's been at it 4 or 5 years, and he will be available to us anytime we want him to use for anything. The main thing for me to do is try to get a man in the spot that I have confidence in when he comes in and says, “Now here's what we see coming down the trail here. Here's what our judgment is. I want you to bear in mind that this could happen and this could happen, but our best information this morning so and so.” Because my judgment's no better than the information it's based on. And I need someone that I can have respect for and that I've watched through the years, and it's a very critical period right now. I hate to ask you to do this, but I just don't know of anybody that I think is better equipped or better able to do it. I've looked over all what the doctor said about you and over your whole record, and they just don't want you playing twenty-eight holes of golf. Raborn: I think with that job you wouldn't. President: No! You could take you a nap every day after lunch, and you could have you a good deputy, and you've got a good bunch of people running it. John doesn't take it too hard. He's gone out and got married, and traveled all around the world, and he's had a pretty good thing, and I would like to have General Carter, who's there now, go back to the Defense Department with a good assignment. I would like for you to take over and be the boss and I'd like for Helms to be your deputy and you train him to when you can turn him loose. And I think there's a good many of them want him now. Good many of them think he'd be all right—some of the boys in my own shop. I'm not quite ready for that, and this is a pretty touchy period, and even if they go wrong, I want to have somebody of my own complexion and my own knowledge. Raborn: How long can I have to make up my mind? [unintelligible] consider this? President: Just as long as you want to. I need to know. The quicker the better, and he wants to leave this month. And he's gonna leave. And I don't want an acting there. But, you just take whatever time you think about it. Course, if you're going to come the first of the month, I won't have any problem. If you don't, I'll be in a hell of a shape. And I've looked the whole country over. I've looked at the jackets, and I've talked to the people that I've considered. I've talked about promoting folks from within and without, and I think you just have to tell your company that you have to come up here—I wouldn't want it in the paper—on this basis. But I think you have to tell your company that you just got to come here and stay a few months, and they've got to make a little sacrifice too and give you leave. We won't overwork you and we won't overdo it, and I think you'll enjoy it and I think it'll be a great experience for you, and I think you'll be worth a hell of a lot more to anybody after you leave, including yourself, than you are now, and you just got a wonderful record. I'd just like for you to sit across from Bob McNamara and give him your views and hear mine and listen to Rusk's and then all of us try to make a judgment, because, ah—. You can't stay out there when you hear that fire bell anyway if these damn red Chinese—about 35 divisions of 'em start coming down there. I know what the old war horse does when he hear the bell ring. Raborn: Well you certainly do me high honor, Mr. President. About how long do you think this would be? President: I think it would be up to you. I would come without anybody ever knowing it might not be the rest of your life. But I would take Helms in there, and I have a couple—. McNamara thinks Helms is about ready to do it now. Rusk is ready for Helms now. Mac Bundy thinks that Helms ought to go in now. I don't feel quite that sure, although he's been with the Agency a good many years. I just want to have somebody—he's a Brooks Brothers looking fella. He's a real attractive fella, black hair and olive skin and wears a little pin in his collar, and stuff like that. But I think that in our meetings here, you can bring him with you anytime that you want him or need him and have him around. McCone [unintelligible]. I think in our meetings and with the things as they are now and with Russell sick and with [unintelligible] and Vincent gone over to the House and with Byrd, I just rather think I'd rather have you for a few months and see how we come out on this Vietnam thing and see what your evaluation of him is, and then, and I think, anytime you felt like if you wanted to go back, first of the year, October, September, anytime you thought, well, this is going all right now, or if it's working too much on you—and I wouldn't expect you to spend your nights and your Saturdays and things like that. I think the show runs itself pretty well if it's got a man that everybody respects and thinks is impartial and that there's nobody [unintelligible], and they wouldn't be that way about you. I had lunch—I haven't talked to anybody about it but McNamara and John Macy, and John Macy thinks that your background, your acceptance, your respect would just be the best we can get, and McNamara went and got your jacket and went over it all, and I did ask John Connally and Fred Korth what they thought of you. I didn't mention CIA at all because I don't want it to get in the paper, and John said if he's worth a billion dollars he'd put you in charge of all of it. He thought you were the most competent fellow that he'd ever run into, and that you had the best management job he'd ever seen, and it was the best managed project he'd ever seen, and you were on top of it every minute, and Fred said substantially the same thing. So nearly everybody that's worked with you feels that your name is what I know it to be and what I believe, but I'm not getting into these things lightly. Raborn: [unintelligible] Well, sir, I take it then it will be something 6 months to a year. President: Well, it will be as long as you want it and as soon as you can get out of it if you think it's all right. I don't want you to leave unless you think this fella's all right. If you get in there and stay awhile, you can stay here as long as I'm President or go leave as soon as you think it will run itself. Raborn: Mr. President, I couldn't ask for a better deal, and I certainly thank you for your confidence, and I will be in touch with you right quick. President: Thank you, Admiral Raborn: Thank you. President: Goodbye. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Admiral Raborn, Tape FMISC.04, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 At 10:07 a.m. on April 8, Raborn telephoned the President and accepted the job. A recording of the conversation is ibid. Raborn served as DCI from April 28, 1965 to June 30, 1966. Helms served as his deputy and succeeded him. For Helms' recollections of what he was told by Johnson about the decision to appoint Raborn, see John Ranelegh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. Revised edition. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 448. “The Raborn Interlude” is discussed by DDI Ray Cline in his memoir, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington: Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1976), pp. 210–215, and “The Raborn Episode” is discussed by Cline's successor as DDI, R. Jack Smith, in his memoir, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989), pp. 165–177. 224. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson 224. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 26, 1965. Dear Mr. President: On January 16, 1962, President Kennedy addressed a letter to me outlining his views as to how I should discharge the responsibilities of Director of Central Intelligence. 2 He wished me to concern myself with the entire Intelligence Community by coordinating and providing effective guidance to the community as a whole. To do this, he suggested that the Deputy Director serve more or less as a general manger of CIA, thus relieving me of the burden of responsibilities within the Agency. I believe President Kennedy's views as expressed in the letter developed from the advice given to him by individuals or committees who investigated Intelligence Community activities during the first year of his Administration. I have followed the instructions in this letter. General Carter has represented CIA on the United States Intelligence Board and thus I, as Chairman, could serve the broad interests of the Intelligence Community. Also, General Carter has carried much of the detailed operation of CIA. This has worked very well. I believe that the Community has benefited from the results of coordination and certainly the Intelligence Board has been both more active and more effective because of these arrangements. I recommend to you that you issue to Admiral Raborn a similar letter, assuming of course that you agree with the concept of the DCI as expressed in the January 1962 letter. This letter, a copy of which is attached, 3 was carefully coordinated with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs before issuance. Respectfully yours, John A. McCone 4 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. No classification marking. 2 Printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Document 99 . In January 1964 McCone sought to get President Johnson to reconfirm the Kennedy letter. According to a set of “Notes for the DDCI,” January 14, 1964, drafted by H. Knoche, the “DCI decided on his own he would seek such a confirmation and left with the President one day last week a copy of the Kennedy letter. The President told DCI he would go to work on this.” However, there is no indication the President officially reconfirmed the letter. (Ibid., Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676, Daily Notes for DCI) 3 Not attached. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 225. Memorandum for the Record 225. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 28, 1965, noon. SUBJECT Discussion with the President alone on 28 April 1965—12:00 Noon 1. I told the President that time had not permitted me to take Admiral Raborn abroad to introduce him to our counterparts with whom we work very closely in a number of European and Asian countries. I explained to the President that in discussing this subject with Secretary Rusk, he had felt that the trip might well be postponed for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the need for Admiral Raborn to be close by during the next few weeks. We therefore plan to make the trip about the middle of June, assuming that indications at that time are such that a trip of this nature would be useful from the standpoint of the Government and the Agency, and desired by Admiral Raborn. It was agreed this was probably a good idea; final decision was left to a later date. 2. I raised the question of the importance of the President receiving intelligence information in person, and orally, in addition to receiving it through a written report, and recommended that some plan be worked out so that this could be done in the presence of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy. I said that if this were done, then he would receive the benefit of the opinions of the individuals and the interpretations that they placed on the intelligence reports and estimates and I thought this would be very much more valuable for him rather than only accepting the written report. I then recommended that Admiral Raborn appear at the Tuesday luncheon meetings, that they be scheduled so that items of interest to him would be first on the agenda and once disposed of, he could leave, because I recognized that a great many subjects arose at the Tuesday meetings which were not within the Admiral's area of interest or province of activity. The President agreed with the suggestion and indicated his intention to work something out along the above suggested lines, or some alternative thereto. 2 However, obviously, he could not be totally committal without discussing the idea with the interested parties. 3. I then called the President's attention to the letter I had written him 3 in reference to the January 1962 letter from President Kennedy. This had been transmitted to President Johnson on 26 April 1965. I said that if Johnson concurred in the concept of President Kennedy with respect to the role and activities of the DCI, then a similar letter should be issued. The President felt this would be in order and this subject was subsequently discussed with Mr. Bundy. I would expect the President would act in this regard promptly although he will wish to coordinate the letter carefully with Messrs. Rusk, McNamara and Bundy. [Omitted here is unrelated material.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. 2 Raborn attended five Tuesday luncheons during 1965 and one during 1966 prior to leaving office on June 30. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) 3 Document 224 . 226. Memorandum for the Record 226. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 21, 1965, 2:30 p.m. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB Committee, 1965. Secret. 9 pages of source text not declassified.] 228. Memorandum for the Record 228. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 29, 1965. 1. During the course of a conversation with General Carroll on 23 June, General Carroll discussed certain aspects of the new Defense Attaché System. 2 General Carroll said that he is at work on a plan to arrange for a joint collection plan which would put an end to the practice of individual collection plans for Army, Navy, and Air Force attachés. He hopes to be able to coordinate collection plans for the attachés with theater collection plans such as those of USARPAC, for example. 2. After some of his current planning has ripened, General Carroll hopes to get together with us to see what might be done to make attachés and CIA collection plans more “compatible and mutually supporting.” 3. General Carroll said he hopes in time that a closer relationship can be promoted and developed between the Defense Attaché and the CIA Station Chief in missions abroad. He said he thought that the CIA Station Chiefs will find a new system more simplified in that the Station Chief will have to deal primarily with one rather than three separate individuals. [Omitted here is a discussion of other intelligence issues.] Richard Helms 3 Deputy Director 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–3805, US Govt-Dept. of Defense. Secret. 2 A member of CIA's Departmental Coordination Group advised the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans in a May 11 memorandum that the new Defense Attaché System (DAS) plan, phased to be completely effective by June 30, “calls for a single integrated attaché system to handle intelligence requirements and relationships with foreign defense establishments, directly responsive to the needs of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” At each post “service attachés will be under the direction and control of the Defense Attaché,” who “will be the military advisor to the Ambassador on intelligence and coordinate all DAS intelligence activities with other U.S. governmental agencies.” (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original. 229. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the Director of the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (Kent) 229. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the Director of the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (Kent) 1 Washington, August 5, 1965. SUBJECT National Intelligence Estimates 1. As you take off on holiday, I want to leave with you some thoughts which we can discuss on your return. This is nothing more sinister than my initial reactions after three months in this new job. 2. National Intelligence Estimates have long been, and correctly, regarded as that single intelligence document which best summarizes the trends of a given situation so that the user can foresee the most likely course of future events. The Director and I are the penultimate users of all our intelligence publications, of which the most important are the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates. The ultimate user must be the President and his small circle of advisors—including the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. 3. My purpose in writing this note is to raise, frankly, the question of whether the estimates are so written as to serve the ultimate user best. 4. Estimates include a great deal of basic information and argumentation which are needed by staff people to shore-up the conclusions and judgments which are then highlighted in the summaries of the estimates. Estimates are carefully coordinated; the main instrument of coordination seems to be agreement on shadings of verbal meanings. Estimates are on special occasions directly responsive to specific requests, such as the recent series of projected United States courses of action in connection with Vietnam. 5. Granting all the above, I should like to offer up ways in which we can make the estimates more useful. How about the following: a. Estimates do not lend themselves to oral presentation. Often a briefing is the first and only chance that the Director and I have to make the main estimate point to the President and his advisors. b. Estimates are seldom, if ever, responsive in advance. There does not seem to be an organized effort to identify in advance those courses of action open to the United States which will provide reactions by the Communists. For example, in the Director's instructions to Peer de Silva in establishing the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, the Director asked specifically that Peer try to keep “at least one step ahead” where United States actions were contemplated or planned. (I believe the Director's purpose in defining a range of options open to the United States in connection with Vietnam was a good first attempt to try to define in advance those actions or lack of actions by the United States which we needed to consider to the exclusion of certain others.) c. I recognize that the oral presentation which I have mentioned above must be supported by written argument. I suggest that an “executive summary”, if it may be so termed, be prepared. This would state very briefly the exact nature of the problem and single out the most likely judgment which the estimate is advancing. d. There must always be a complete separation of policy and intelligence. I believe it is this thesis which underlays Abbot Smith's statement that no NIE has or will say that the Communists are winning in Vietnam. On the other hand, there has always been and should be the closest possible contact between policy and intelligence, and it is one of the heaviest responsibilities of the Director to make an intelligence presentation closely responsive to United States policy and considerations. Therefore, I believe that an intimate knowledge of United States policy can only improve the quality of the estimate. Such knowledge would also permit the estimators to keep “one step ahead”. e. In connection with the above, I believe that the senior members of the Board of National Estimates can be most useful in their conversations with senior Government officials by identifying those problem areas where a course of United States action seems likely and needs to be estimated. 6. As you can see, although I have long regarded the estimates as a bulwark of our knowledge of forthcoming situations, I am now concerned about presenting this product to the President and his advisors who need short, sharp answers. I know that the estimates are often answers to long and fuzzy questions. I do believe, however, we can do much more to refine the questions and thus refine the nature of our answers. Richard Helms 2 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Helms Chron as DDP and DDCI. Secret. A note on the memorandum reads: “On 6 Aug Mr. Helms showed this memo to the Director.” Helms sent Kent another copy of his August 5 memorandum under cover of a December 10 memorandum in which Helms wrote, referring to the August 5 memorandum: “I know you will agree with me that the importance of this subject has not diminished, and I do not mean to suggest for a moment that you have not given it thought. I simply wish to underline that we must not lose sight of this objective at a time when the request for meaningful answers to serious problems are coming thicker and faster than ever before. I continue to be concerned that an estimate which is discursive and interlarded with 'uncrisp' footnotes will not receive the attention it deserves.” A handwritten note on the original of the December 10 memorandum, in Kent's files, reads: “Dick has not forgotten.” (Ibid., D/ONE Files, Job 80–R01621R, Box 1, Folder 15) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 230. Agreement Between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense 230. Agreement Between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense 1 Washington, August 11, 1965. AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM A. The National Reconnaissance Program 1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the Government under a strong national leadership, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U.S. technology and all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the Government's intelligence needs and objectives. 2. The National Reconnaissance Program shall be responsive directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. Targeting requirements and priorities and desired frequency of coverage of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee. B. The Secretary of Defense will: 1. Establish the NRO as a separate agency of the DoD and will have the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP; 2. Choose a Director of the NRO who will report to him and be responsive to his instructions; 3. Concur in the choice of the Deputy Director of the NRO who will report to the DNRO and be responsive to his instructions; 4. Review and have the final power to approve the NRP budget; 5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when necessary, to reach decisions on issues on which committee agreement could not be reached. C. The Director of Central Intelligence will: 2 1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the establishment of their frequency of coverage; 2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend, if appropriate, steps for improving such results; 3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee; 4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year; 5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the whole NRP area. D. National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee 1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is hereby established to guide and participate in the formulation of the NRP through the DNRO. 3 (The DNRO will sit with the Executive Committee but will not be a voting member.) If the Executive Committee can not agree on an issue the Secretary of Defense will be requested to sit with the Committee in discussing this issue and will arrive at a decision. The NRP Executive Committee will: a. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations. b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program and its budget. c. Approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems. Funds shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense and CIA to design and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by both CIA and DoD. d. Approve the allocation of development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. Assignment of responsibility for engineering development of sensor subsystems will be made to either the CIA or the DoD components in accordance with the above criteria. The engineering development of all other subsystems, including spacecraft, reentry vehicles, boosters and booster interface subsystems shall in general be assigned to an Air Force component, recognizing, however, that sensors, spacecraft and reentry vehicles are integral components of a sys tem, the development of which must proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements for overhead reconnaissance. To optimize the primary objective of systems development, design requirement of the sensors will be given priority in their integration within the spacecraft and reentry vehicles. e. Assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to the CIA or DoD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee. f. Periodically review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP. 2. The Executive Committee shall meet on the call of either the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All meetings will be attended by the DNRO and such staff advisors as the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director the Central Intelligence consider desirable. E. National Reconnaissance Office 1. To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish the NRO as a separate operating agency of the DoD. It shall include the SOC which shall be jointly manned. 2. The Director of the NRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director of NRO will: a. Subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee as set forth in Section D above, have the responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP. b. Subject to review by the Executive Committee, and the provisions of Section D above, have authority to initiate, approve, modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP. Ensure, through appropriate recommendations to the Executive Committee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the invention, improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to meet USIB requirements. c. Have authority to require that he be kept fully and completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP. d. Maintain and provide to the members of the Executive Committee records of the status of all projects, programs and activities of the NRP in the research, development, production and/or operational phases. e. Prepare a comprehensive budget for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program. f. Establish a fiscal control and accounting procedure to ensure that all funds expended in support of the National Reconnaissance Program are fully accounted for and appropriately utilized by the agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately those funds to be applied to research and exploratory design development, systems development, procurement, and operational activities. Funds expended or obligated under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted for by CIA and will be reported to DNRO in accordance with agreed upon procedures. g. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP. 3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full time in the line position directly under the Director NRO. The Deputy Director shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO during his absence or disability. 4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion as to reflect the best talent appropriately available from the CIA, the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will report to the DNRO and DDNRO and will maintain no allegiance to the originating agency or Department. F. Initial Allocation of Program Responsibilities 1. Responsibility for existing programs of the NRP shall be allocated as indicated in Annex A attached hereto. 4 Cyrus Vance 5 Deputy Secretary of Defense W. F. Raborn Director of Central Intelligence 1 Source: National Reconnaissance Office, P & A, PA Library, 104–01, DOP (Directives, Orders and Procedures). Top Secret; [ codeword not declassified ]. 2 In an October 1 memorandum, following up the new NRO agreement, Helms informed NRO Director Alexander Flax that CIA's National Reconnaissance Program activity would now “come to a management focus in the person of a Director of CIA Reconnaissance Programs,” who would report to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology. “This will provide you with a single authoritative point of contact within the CIA for all our programs.” (Ibid., P & A, PA Library, 105–0, Flax (DNRO) Chron File, Miscellaneous) 3 Due to the deterioration in relations between CIA and Air Force representatives to the NRO during 1964, resulting in an impasse in decisionmaking, an Executive Committee was formed during the latter half of 1964. McCone and Vance met in Executive Committee sessions with the CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology, the Air Force Under Secretary/DNRO, and the DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering. (Donald Welzenbach, CIA and the National Reconnaissance Office, working paper, 3/18/87 draft, chapter VII, pp. 45–46; National Reconnaissance Office) 4 Attached but not printed. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Vance and Raborn signed the original. 231. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 231. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 8, 1965. For some time Clark Clifford has been recommending a new, general letter of instructions from the President to the Director of Central Intelligence on the coordination of our foreign intelligence efforts. I attach a draft which has been discussed back and forth between his group and my office. 2 The only question in my mind is whether the language of the third paragraph 3 trespasses on your prerogative, and I would be grateful if you would give it a personal look. I am quite sure Tom Hughes would be inclined to rewrite it, but I am not sure his judgment should control in this case simply because within the intelligence community as such, I think the Director of Central Intelligence should indeed be the senior official and this has been the general rule since preparation of the National Security Act of 1947. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Secretary of State has final responsibility for advice to the President on matters affecting the conduct of our foreign relations, and I don't think the President would wish to do anything that would undercut this basic responsibility of yours. My question, then, is whether there is language that would protect Dean Rusk without giving INR a bureaucratic veto on all efforts on intelligence coordination. I would be grateful for your comments. McGeorge Bundy 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Confidential. 2 Attached but not printed. In an August 12 memorandum to Clifford forwarding Clifford's latest draft with suggested amendments by Eugene Fubini of DOD, Bundy stated: “My own reservation about the somewhat more sweeping language of your current draft relates to the question of whether we want to affirm this mandate at this time with this particular DCI. I think there may be a case for a simple reaffirmation of the document of 1962 in a time when there are some of the uncertainties that you and I discussed at lunch last month.” Bundy wrote in hand on his copy of the memorandum, presumably reflecting Clifford's response to it, “Yes a letter. Likes his letter better than '62 letter.” (Ibid.) For text of Kennedy's letter, January 16, 1962, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Document 99 . 3 The third paragraph in the attached draft is identical to the third paragraph in the final version ( Document 233 ). 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original. 232. Editorial Note 232. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell that began at 8 p.m. on September 14, 1965, the following exchange took place. Material just preceding the exchange, presumably dealing with Director of Central Intelligence Raborn, was excised by the Johnson Library under donor's deed of gift. Russell: “Let me tell you, if you ever decide to get rid of him, you just put that fellow Helms in there. He got more sense than any of them.” President: “Well, I've got Helms. I'm trying to build Helms where he—” Russell: “He's been there since that thing was organized, and he's familiar with all those operations, and he can explain them more clearly. I had a hearing here this morning, for an hour and a half before our own subcommittee, Stennis and Saltonstall and old man Hayden, Young, and I guess it wasn't [inaudible] Democrats because they were all there, and Helms had a better understanding of all the operations in the CIA everywhere than even old man Allen Dulles had and he helped set it up. Raborn is a good man. Raborn has got one failing that's going to get him in trouble. He won't ever admit he don't know. He assumes sometimes. You ask him a question a man don't know in his position, you ought to say, Senator I don't know exactly the details on that. I'll have to get up a memo on that and let you have it. He's knows it all, and that may get him in trouble one of these days. But he's a damn good man. And I think's doing a good job. Of course he's got an impossible job. That crowd can't hit back. You can just slaughter them at will and there's no way they can possibly hit back.” President: “You reckon I ought to ask Raborn to leave?” Russell: “No!” President: “He didn't want to come in, but they're all taking after him now.” Russell: “What's the basis of their attack?” President: “No basis.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Russell, Tape 65.03, Side A, PNO) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 233. Memorandum From President Johnson to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 233. Memorandum From President Johnson to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 1 Washington, September 24, 1965. SUBJECT Coordination of the United States Foreign Intelligence Effort Our Government is making a substantial effort and is expending large sums of money to obtain timely intelligence vital to our national defense and security. This effort requires the most efficient possible organization of the activities of the various departments and agencies concerned. It is essential that these activities be conducted as an integrated endeavor best suited to meet both current and longer-term national intelligence needs. One of the essential objectives of this integrated effort is to give timely notice to me and to other officials of critical developments which have an important bearing on our national security. In view of the urgent necessity for maintaining effective coordination of all U.S. foreign intelligence functions, I request that you serve as the Government's chief intelligence officer, and that you pursue as a primary responsibility the task of coordinating and guiding the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort in accordance with National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number One of March 4, 1964. 2 In the performance of your responsibility I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of U.S. Government departments and agencies having foreign intelligence responsibilities, with a view to assuring the proper coordination, correlation, evaluation and prompt dissemination of intelligence obtained from all sources. You are authorized and directed to establish, in consultation with member agencies of the intelligence community, such arrangements and guide lines as are necessary for this purpose. It is my wish that you receive from the departments and agencies concerned the full cooperation and assistance which are essential to the success of your coordinating responsibility. I will continue to look to your efforts as a means of achieving significant improvements in the organization, management, and effectiveness of our over-all foreign intelligence system. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry; Job 80–B01580R, DCI/Admiral Raborn. Confidential. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, and Clifford. In a memorandum to the President forwarding this memorandum to the President for his signature, Bundy recommended that the President sign it and send it to Raborn “as a reflection of your personal interest in his efforts to improve the organization, management and effectiveness of our over-all foreign intelligence system.” (Johnson Library, Bromley Smith Papers, BKS Chron) 2 Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA) 234. Report Prepared in the Directorate for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency 234. Report Prepared in the Directorate for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, undated. GENERAL ISSUES RAISED IN EROP REVIEW OF CIA PROGRAMS CIA Comments 1. EROP—Type Annual Reviews of CIA Operations. 2 a. It is evident, from the tenor of their reports, that in most instances the recent EROP review of CIA programs has been of some benefit to the U.S. chiefs of missions concerned. It has, to varying degrees, provided new insights into the rationale of covert action and especially of clandestine intelligence collection. It has prompted examination and confirmation of the function and value of covert political action, and has indicated at least two broad areas in which interagency communications and activities of mutual concern can be improved. Similarly, EROP has occasioned useful discussion of these subjects at the Washington level. b. It is equally evident, however, that these gains have been derived primarily from the joint discussions between ambassadors and station chiefs on the occasion of the ambassadors' reviews of local CIA programs, and not from the meager data presented in the CCPS format. CIA shares the view, expressed by a number of mission chiefs, that the statistical data contained in the green sheets did not contribute much to useful program analysis, although some gross comparisons could be made. In part, this may have been because of the restrictive ground rules governing the selection of data. The principal reason, however, is that the CCPS grid (The Elements of the Comprehensive Country Programming System, April 15, 1965), 3 although admirably designed for analysis of USIA or AID-type programs, simply does not lend itself to realistic and meaningful description of clandestine CIA activities. The very nature of clandestine operations sets them apart; their special infrastructure, interrelationships and modus operandi necessitate the most arbitrary kind of allocations to the elements of the grid. Analysis of this data can therefore be misleading and subject to misinterpretation unless carefully explained. True, new categories could be developed, but they would be uniquely applicable to CIA, and hence not useful for comparative analysis. c. For internal CIA purposes, the EROP-type annual review has not proved to be a useful addition or modification to the present, more comprehensive and detailed annual internal review of programs conducted by the Agency. CIA programs are also subjected to exhaustive review by the Bureau of the Budget, in terms of allocation of resources. It should be noted, too, that the 303 Committee and Special Group (CI) provide for review of covert programs, whenever appropriate. Means exist also for current assessments of clandestine intelligence reporting (please see also paragraph 7, below, in this regard). d. In sum, CIA recognizes a duty to keep U.S. chiefs of mission and the most senior officers in the Regional Bureaus aware, in considerable detail, of clandestine activities particularly in the political action and related fields, and by no means ignoring the policy implications of certain intelligence collection operations. To this end, periodic oral briefings and frequent discussions, including an annual summary briefing if appropriate, are preferred over an annual EROP-type review. They should provide ample opportunity to relate CIA activities to overt mission programs, and to secure the views of ambassadors and Regional Bureaus concerning CIA programs and reporting in their respective areas. These views are welcomed and given full consideration. [Omitted here are sections 2 and 3 of the report.] 4. Briefing of Political Officers by CIA in Washington. a. A CIA briefing in Washington on the general nature of the Agency's operations in the country of assignment should generally be confined to the Ambassador and DCM. Any further briefing of Political Officers should be conducted in the field at the discretion of the Chief of Station, often after consultation with the Chief of Mission or Principal Officer. These additional field briefings will vary as to their nature and depth, and as to the need-to-know of the officers concerned. b. A more generalized briefing, perhaps in the appropriate FSI course, may be feasible. If so, it might cover such points as the relationship of the station to Mission, its basic missions and rationale of operational methods, the wide variety of station responsibilities, problems of cover and security, and the apparent conflicts and contradictions with other, short-range U.S. Government programs. 5. Ambassador's Role in Establishing the Agency's Priorities in this Country. a. The problem here is the conflict between locally and nationally established tasks and priorities. The Ambassador has at all times access to the station chief to discuss these matters, and the latter will keep his headquarters informed of the Ambassador's wishes. After this, decisions must be reached as a result of examination of the problem in terms of conflicting priorities and available manpower. CIA will always see to it that an ambassador's wishes are given full weight and consideration. b. The Ambassador can also, of course, present his views and requirements to the Regional Bureau or INR for their action through Washington liaison and intelligence requirements channels. 6. Advance Information to Ambassadors on Covert Programs. An ambassador will always be advised in advance of covert action operations unless otherwise stipulated by the White House or Secretary of State and normally these operations would not be submitted for approval without prior joint discussion in the field. The Ambassador will be advised in general terms or in detail, depending on his individual interest in the program. In most cases, ambassadors would also be advised of CIA intelligence targets or objectives, although usually without the operational detail which would identify sources or potential sources. Ambassadors are provided the information product, of all operations which affect their missions. The station chief must exercise his good sense and discretion in apprising his ambassador of those intelligence operations or proposed initiatives which are politically sensitive and could adversely affect the Mission. [Omitted here are sections 7–9 of the report.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–3805, US Govt-Interagency Correspondence. Secret. The report was forwarded to Richard Barrett of the Department of State by Desmond FitzGerald under cover of a September 29 memorandum. 2 For the establishment of EROP, see Document 33 . 3 Not found. 235. Memorandum for the Record 235. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 30, 1965. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB Committee, 1965. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.] 236. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 236. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 1 Washington, October 1, 1965. SUBJECT Proposed Issuance of New Terms of Reference for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) 1. Issuance of proposed new terms of reference for the PFIAB along the lines of the memorandum delivered by Bromley Smith to Mr. Helms 2 seems to me to pose somewhat of a dilemma. On the one hand, it can be said that the new terms of reference only serve to confirm the existing situation and reaffirm the authority which already exists in Executive Order 10938. 3 The Agency has lived with this relationship for many years and has never, as far as I know, actively sought to modify or limit the authority exercised by the Board or its members. On the other hand, relations with the Board have been strained and a certain antagonism between the Agency and the DCI on the one hand, and the Board on the other, has developed largely, it seems to me, because of the way the affairs of the Board are administered and conducted. The DCI does not attend meetings of the Board, except insofar as they relate to the Central Intelligence Agency and is not privy to any of their deliberations or discussions. He receives no copies of minutes of meetings of the Board or any of its panels, except insofar as memoranda for the record are written by representatives of the Agency who attend these meetings. Reports of other components of the community are solicited, prepared, submitted and considered by the Board without reference to the DCI. Conclusions and recommendations to the President are formulated and submitted without any substantial opportunity on the part of the DCI to review or comment upon the information upon which many, at least, of these recommendations are based. 2. The foregoing appears to me to reflect a basically unhealthy situation, given the expressed Presidential mandate to the DCI to serve as the principal intelligence officer of the Government and exercise responsibility for the over-all coordination and guidance of the intelligence effort as a whole. On the one hand the Board has constantly pressed the DCI to assert a greater and more effective measure of authority over the affairs of the community. On the other hand, the proposed letter of authority to the Board 4 appears to degrade and erode the DCI's position by making it apparent that it is the Board and not the DCI which has the ultimate authority for evaluating and determining the relationships appropriate for the community and its over-all level of effort. It would seem to me that some redefinition of the relationship between the Board and the DCI would be desirable as a prerequisite to concurrence in the issuance of the new terms of reference. 3. Specifically, I would recommend that the DCI indicate his concurrence in the issuance of a new letter of authority provided there be agreement that: a. The DCI attend all meetings of the Board at which representatives of any component of the community testify concerning the affairs or activities of the community. 5 b. All reports from individual components of the community be submitted to the Board through the DCI with the understanding that they will be forwarded as initially submitted but that the DCI reserves the right to comment. c. A record of all hearings before the Board be kept by the Executive Secretary of the Board and that a copy of these minutes be provided the DCI for his retention. John A. Bross 6 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry: Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB Committee 1965. Secret. Copies were sent to Helms and White. 2 Not further identified. 3 See Document 183 . 4 See Document 239 . 5 Thomas Parrott of CIA raised this issue with General Taylor, noting that he understood Raborn had suggested it to Clifford. Parrott summarized the ensuing discussion in a memorandum for the record, October 7: “General Taylor demurred, saying that there could well be cases where the Board would want to have frank, 'internal discussions' and that the presence of 'an outsider' might inhibit them. I replied that sessions of that kind would of course be privileged to the Board, but that the idea would be that the DCI would be present when other major components of the intelligence community are making presentations, in order to help him in carrying out his coordinating responsibilities and perhaps avoid having some of them pass by default to the Board.” After further discussion, Taylor said he would think about it and perhaps discuss it with Clifford. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB Committee 1965) 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 237. Presentation by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) 237. Presentation by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) 1 Washington, October 4, 1965. [Omitted here are Helms' opening remarks.] One of the principal charges made of the Central Intelligence Agency is that it tends to make policy, on the one side, and tends to freewheel in carrying out some of its operations, on the other. We do not make policy, and we do not freewheel. Those are two rather flat statements, but they are also truthful statements. Foreign policy is made by the State Department, defense policy is made in the Defense Department, and other policies are made elsewhere, but they aren't made in this Agency. When we are carrying out an operation overseas we carry it out with the full authority of the United States Government or we don't carry it out at all. The Director reports to the National Security Council, which in effect means that he reports to the President. By law he's not beholden to any other department of Government, and in the minds of the Congress this was the only sensible way to establish this Agency so that it was not obliged at any time or at any place to do anything which was other than either objective or at least the way it saw conditions in various parts of the world. In other words, departmental intelligence is not part of our job, nor are we interested in being influenced by the various competing demands for money or manpower that various departments have up with the Congress from time to time. But this also has to do with the policy making aspects of life, because the President, sitting as he does in our form of government and under our Constitution, has a variety of responsibilities, and these responsibilities in turn have nothing to do with individual departments, or at least the parochialism of individual departments and agencies. Now as far as our overseas operations are concerned, there is a mechanism which has been devised, and has been in existence for some time, which is designed to provide the approval or the clearance or the authority-whatever word you choose to use-for each and every one of these operations. This little group that does this has been variously known as the Special Group, the 303 Committee-it has had various names and various incarnations, but through the months and years has sat essentially as it sits today. It is composed of McGeorge Bundy as the Chairman, who represents the President. Sitting for the State Department these days is Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who represents the Secretary of State. Deputy Secretary Vance sits for the Defense Department and represents the Secretary of Defense. And Admiral Raborn sits representing the Agency. These four gentlemen meet approximately once a week with an Executive Secretary who keeps the minutes, and they are agreed minutes, and each and every operation which the Agency is going to conduct overseas in the political field, paramilitary field, economic warfare, any of a whole host of things, is presented to this group and secures the group's approval, otherwise it does not go forward. There are times when there are disagreements in the group, or there are varying points of view, and, depending on the circumstances, the decision may in the end be made by the President himself. But since in our form of government this type of thing should not be put on the President's platter, the 303 Committee is there not only as a group to sit in judgment on the validity and wisdom of these projects but even, and equally important, to protect the President from criticism for something that goes wrong, even though he may have been privy to the fact that it was going on all the time-and he is normally kept very well informed on these matters. In addition to this group, we appear before the standard number of Congressional committees-we appear before the same number of Congressional committees that everybody else in Washington appears before, and that's four-two in the House and two in the Senate. We appear either every week or every couple of weeks before our principal subcommittees-and of course less frequently before the Appropriations Committees-but nevertheless, they are kept currently informed not only as to the state of the world as seen through the Director's eyes but also as to the various operations and types and kinds of things we are doing around the world. Lastly, there is an organization known as the President' s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which is chaired by Mr. Clark Clifford and has a distinguished group of public citizens sitting on it-such individuals as General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral (Sides), Gordon Gray, Frank Pace, William Baker of Bell Labs, Edwin Land from Polaroid Camera Company, Robert Murphy of ambassadorial fame, William Langer, Professor of History at Harvard, and so on. And this group meets periodically with various members of the Agency, usually for two or three days at a time, goes over the various programs, organizational matters, operations, things that have gone right and things that have gone wrong, and on behalf of the President conducts a type of watchdog function, if you like, in addition to all the other watchdog functions which are performed. So when you take these three elements-or if you include the National Security Council, four elements-the Central Intelligence Agency and its work is really well supervised, and supervised to a degree that apparently has not conveyed itself to many people in the American public at large. Tied into this, of course, is the role of the Ambassador overseas, who, as the principal representative of the President and the Chairman of the country team indeed has a good deal to do with operations that are being carried out in his area. The normal way to get an operation started is to have it recommended by our field station, concurred and approved-or recommended for approval by the Ambassador, brought back to the State Department where it is examined by the proper Bureau-if it has a military aspect or any other kind of an aspect it's referred to the proper department or agency-and finally ends up, as I said a moment ago, in the 303 Committee. So that in effect an Ambassador has a veto over any of these things in his area which he thinks would be counter to the U.S. interest or which for any reason he feels should not go forward. It is obvious, I think, to anyone that if an Ambassador is against something in his area it would be pretty hard to get it through. I know of only one instance in my years around here where there was a difference of opinion between the Ambassador and the Administration in Washington, so the matter was referred to the President, who decided what the final position should be. But as you can imagine, under those circumstances only the President can decide. Thus, briefly, I have tried to outline the approval authority and the supervision under which we operate. I could go on at much greater length, of course, and in much greater detail, but I think that this should suffice to convey to you what I said at the outset-that we do not go off on our own, that we do not freewheel, and that we are well and carefully supervised. [Omitted here is the remainder of Helms' presentation.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01284A, DCI Speeches 1965–1967. Top Secret. The presentation was made in the CIA Auditorium to students of the National War College. Helms forwarded the transcript of his remarks to Enright on November 11, asking him to “please read my poor prose and decide whether it is worth cleaning up for use as basic doctrine for other speakers on other occasions.” (Ibid.) 238. Editorial Note 238. Editorial Note On October 8, 1965, Henry Koren, the newly appointed Deputy Director for Coordination (DDC) of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, held his first staff meeting. In a memorandum for the record prepared on October 11, [ text not declassified ] of the Covert Action Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency reported that Koren said “he felt there could be no exception to the complete knowledge of an Ambassador in the field concerning any CIA activity being run in or into his country. If DDC is aware of such an activity of which the Ambassador is unaware, it is DDC's responsibility to see to it that he is made witting; Koren indicated that he would depend upon us and specifically on the undersigned to assure that DDC was not itself uninformed.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–3805, US Govt-Dept of State) At a meeting with Koren on October 15, CIA's Acting Deputy Director for Plans Karamessines raised the issue of the Crockett-McGhee letter ( Document 28 ). “I mentioned the misunderstandings it was causing at various places overseas. I told him of our having raised the matter with Mr. Barrett and later with Mr. Cox earlier this year. I explained how Mr. Crockett's letter was inconsistent with our written and oral agreements with the department. I then solicited Ambassador Koren's assistance in taking whatever action would be appropriate to eliminate these misunderstandings and the problems they are causing.” Koren promised to review the issue, continued Karamessines. “He feels strongly about the full authority of an ambassador overseas, but he also volunteered that he did not think that this necessarily meant that an ambassador would want or need to know the names of sensitive agents and sources.” (Memorandum for the Record, October 15; ibid.) 239. Memorandum From President Johnson 239. Memorandum From President Johnson 1 Washington, October 19, 1965. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board SUBJECT Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States The interests of national defense and security require sustained effort on the part of the intelligence community to support me and other officials having policy and command responsibilities. It is therefore my desire that priority attention be given to ways and means of strengthening the Government's capabilities in the foreign intelligence and related fields through concerted action to improve the organization, conduct and effectiveness of the major intelligence-related programs in which U.S. departments and agencies are engaged. Efficient management and direction of the complex activities which make up the total foreign intelligence effort are essential to meet day-to-day national intelligence requirements, and to ensure the development and application of advanced means for the collection, processing, analysis, estimating and reporting of intelligence information. In this connection, you have already seen my letter of instruction to the Director of Central Intelligence dated September 24, 1965. In keeping with Executive Order No. 10938, I will continue to look to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for advice and recommendations concerning the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States. I shall expect represent-atives of the Board to continue the practice of making on-the-scene reviews of significant intelligence activities carried out in the United States and at appropriate locations abroad. To facilitate the work of the Board I shall expect the heads of all departments and agencies concerned to make available to the Board any information which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to me. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Intelligence and Handling Disclosure. No classification marking. Coyne forwarded this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy for the President's signature under cover of a September 29 memorandum in which he stated that, unlike the President's September 24 memorandum ( Document 233 ), this one was “not controversial. It causes no new problems for State, Defense, CIA and the rest of the intelligence community. It merely reiterates the substance of President Kennedy's older Executive Order.” Such a “restatement of the Board's mission in this way and at this time will better enable the Board to do its job for the President.” (Ibid.) 240. Editorial Note 240. Editorial Note In January 1966 Ray Cline stepped down as Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency, a position he had held since April 1962. R. Jack Smith succeeded him. Published memoirs by top CIA officials during the Johnson administration are rare, but the DDI is an exception. Cline discusses his experiences as DDI during the Johnson administration in Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA, pages 199–214. Jack Smith describes his tenure as DDI under Johnson in The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency, pages 170–199. 241. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 241. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 1 Washington, January 17, 1966, 8:08 p.m. 1339. For the Chief of Mission. The President has directed priority action on recommendations recently submitted to him by his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 2 Pertinent to all Foreign Service Posts in final recommendation as follows: “That the Secretary of State emphasize to each US Chief of Mission overseas that, in supervising and coordinating all activities of the US Government in his country of assignment, he ensure as a primary responsibility of his office that: (a) a consistently high level of effort is maintained by Foreign Service Officers in the overt collection of intelligence information of significance and value to the President and other officials having policy and command responsibilities; and (b) the personnel and other resources within his cognizance are allocated and utilized as appropriate for the furtherance of US foreign intelligence objectives.” In connection with this recommendation report further notes: “We are aware that the responsibility and authority of US Chiefs of Mission (including those pertaining to foreign intelligence activities) are dealt with in President Kennedy's letter to each American Ambassador abroad dated May 29, 1961. 3 We are not proposing at this time any revisions in the basic authority and responsibility of US Chiefs of Mission with respect to US foreign intelligence activities. However, we believe that the provision of adequate intelligence support to the President and other key Government officials is so critically related to the national defense and security as to warrant renewed emphasis at this time.” The Secretary desires that you give your personal attention to implementing the Board's recommendation and take whatever measures you deem appropriate within your mission and subordinate posts to achieve the goals listed in sub-paras a and b. In order that the Secretary may make an interim report on implementation request by February 7 brief summary of actions taken by you in compliance this message. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, INT 6. Top Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by William McAfee (INR/DDC), cleared by Ambassador Johnson (G) and John P. Walsh (S/S), and approved by Henry L.T. Koren (INR/DDC). Also sent to Hong Kong and Singapore. 2 The full report has not been found. 3 See footnote 8, Document 221 . 242. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 242. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 1 Washington, January 20, 1966. SUBJECT DCI Appearance Before the PFIAB, 25 January 1. Proposed as item 1. for discussion with the PFIAB at their 25 January meeting: Major problems affecting over-all coordination of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort, and prospects for their timely resolution. 2. Some of the more important problems of immediate interest are: a. Improvement and strengthening of totality of intelligence effort in priority areas. Probably the DCI's most important responsibility in the coordinating field is to ensure a concerted intelligence effort, involving all existing or potential resources of the community, against priority targets. This problem has two elements: (1) The first element of the problem is to determine what the priority objectives of intelligence ought to be. The procedures and competence of the community to accomplish this purpose have greatly improved in the course of the past few years and function smoothly. For example: (a) USIB continues to review the list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIOs) every three months for the purpose of ascertaining the most important geographic areas of current intelligence interest. (b) The Board of National Estimates reviews National Intelligence Estimates from time to time to ascertain retrospectively the validity of these estimates. These “Post Mortems” identify gaps which appear to have existed in the information available during the formulation of particular estimates. (c) The attention of the community is directed to specific problems by senior officials of the Government concerned with the formulation of national policy. We are responding to an increasing number of requests from the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and others for coordinated studies, many of which involve concerted effort by the community. The most recent example of such a request, which involves an evaluation of our collective capabilities for intelligence coverage, is a request, addressed to me personally by the Secretary of Defense and concurred in by the Secretary of State, which calls for an expansion and intensification of intelligence programs aimed against Cambodia. (d) In this general connection I have recently initiated a searching review of the process by which requirements are identified and formulated in the Central Intelligence Agency and will extend this study to include a review of the adequacy of community procedures in this field. (2) The second element of the problem of achieving a concerted effort against an important target is the adequacy of the arrangements for reviewing and evaluating existing programs and activities of all components of the community; ensuring their appropriate interrelationship and stimulating additional activity, including the redeployment of existing resources and, where appropriate, the development of new resources. We have assigned this responsibility to the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) of USIB which functions as a senior committee under the Chairmanship of a senior and experienced staff officer, Major General John M. Reynolds. It was to this committee, for example, that the problem of evaluating and improving our intelligence effort against Cambodia, referred to above, was referred. Another area with which the CCPC has been particularly concerned recently is China. As part of its charter responsibilities, it has developed and maintains a complete inventory of all U.S. foreign intelligence installations and activities. (3) The CCPC is not the total answer to the organization required to ensure appropriate focus and total coordination of the intelligence effort against a given target. This is partially because the CCPC is concerned exclusively with collection and is therefore not competent to deal with the analytical or production aspects of intelligence problems. Secondly, although functioning with increasing effectiveness, it is inevitably subject to some of the weaknesses of committee action. In important areas, therefore, requiring staff action to review all aspects of the intelligence effort in a given area, I have adopted the device of designating a senior officer to act as my personal representative. For example, I have designated General Reynolds to be responsible for a continuing review and evaluation of the intelligence effort focused on China. As required, I can appoint other members of my personal staff to act in this capacity or, if desirable, can assign qualified and senior officers of the community to this staff to serve as long as may be required. b. Audio surveillance. 2 The new committee which has been constituted to improve the community effort and resources required to counter hostile technical surveillance activities against American installations is functioning smoothly and effectively under the Chairmanship of Mr. Cornelius Roosevelt. c. Programming and resource management. For a number of reasons, it does not appear desirable or practical to try to combine the budgets and programs of the Central Intelligence Agency with the intelligence budgets and programs of the Defense Department into a single consolidated intelligence program or budget presentation. On the other hand, the DCI has participated with increasing effectiveness in the formulation of the two large Defense Department intelligence programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and the Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP). As a result of this participation, the DCI is now able to afford rather specific and effective guidance to the Defense Department concerning the level of effort required to meet important intelligence objectives. A very thorough review of requirements for COMINT has recently been completed and recommendations are now pending before USIB which, if adopted, will establish USIB as the sole source of intelligence guidance for COMINT programming. The DCI of course participates through the Executive Committee of the NRO in the development of the NRP. In addition to participation in the formulation of the large individual intelligence programs of the Government, the DCI has, on an informal basis, proceeded with the centralized collection and collation of data concerning the size, deployment and objectives of all the national intelligence programs of the Government. 3. An organizational development of interest which relates to the coordinating responsibilities of the DCI concerns the Board of National Estimates. As the Board is the vehicle for achieving coordinated estimates it performs a coordinating function of the highest importance. In view of the ever increasing pressures on the DCI and the community to provide national intelligence estimates on a variety of strategically important subjects, I have recently established the Board as a separate component of CIA, reporting directly to me. 3 The Board will of course continue to function in very close collaboration with the DDI and the substantive intelligence components which are under the DDI. 4 John A. Bross 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB Committee 1966. Secret. 2 For documentation on the issue of audio surveillance, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume X . 3 The Office of the Director issued a notice on January 20 stating that, “effective immediately, the Board and Office of National Estimates are established as a component reporting directly to the Director of Central Intelligence” and thus no longer through the DDI. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files: Job 80–B01439R, Organization-DDI-1966–67) The change followed by just a few days R. Jack Smith's accession to the position of DDI, replacing Ray Cline. Smith discusses the change in The Unknown CIA, p. 171. 4 A handwritten note underneath the last line reads: “DDI&OCI Op's Center.” 243. Memorandum From the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 243. Memorandum From the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to Director of Central Intelligence Raborn 1 Washington, January 20, 1966. SUBJECT Operating Relationships with Ambassadors 1. This is in response to your request, passed on to me by Mr. Warner, for a statement of our operating relationships with Ambassadors. 2. There are several documents setting forth guide lines for these operating relationships. Principal of these the agreement between the State Department and CIA which was [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] sent to all Diplomatic and Consular officers, 10 October 1957. 2 Subsequent to this, President Kennedy's letter of May 1961 reaffirmed the Ambassador's overall responsibility for all U.S. Government activities in his area. Shortly after President Kennedy's letter, and in order to resolve any possible ambiguity which might have been caused by that letter when taken together with [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] clarifying instructions, worked out jointly between State and CIA, were sent to our field stations on 10 August 1961. Among other things, they directed all Chiefs of Station, if they had not done so before, to brief their Ambassadors on the substance of their operations with particular reference to intelligence operations and to all major covert action operations. 3 3. The above documentation is attached for your convenience. 4 In practice, our operating relationships with Ambassadors are completely in accord with the principles and general requirements enunciated in this documentation. We divide our operational activity into two general sectors as far as the briefing of Ambassadors is concerned. In the first of these, covert action, we work very closely with the Ambassador and frequently with one or more members of his senior staff since we are operating in an area in which policy plays a major role. We almost never recommend to Headquarters from the field a covert action operation of any importance or magnitude without first securing the approval of the Ambassador. This is essential because the Director of Central Intelligence will normally be reluctant to go before the 303 Committee with a proposal for such an operation unless it has the sanction of the Ambassador. Furthermore, the Department of State will normally not favor an operational proposal which does not enjoy the Ambassador's support. It should be pointed out that, on occasion, the operational proposal originates with the Ambassador and is proposed to the 303 Committee by us at his request. Thus, in the area of covert actions, there is an almost intimate working relationship with an Ambassador although we reserve unto ourselves as a general rule the selection and the protection of sources and methods. 4. Such misunderstandings as do infrequently arise between a Station Chief and an Ambassador these days will usually be found in the area of clandestine collection as opposed to covert actions. In this area, we have occasional difficulty along one or more of the following lines: a. An Ambassador may feel that our reporting on the internal political situation is unnecessary or troublesome. In such cases, we point out that the Ambassador, who invariably receives an immediate copy of all such reports, has the right to file a “dissenting opinion” if he does not agree with the report or with the field's comments on the report. b. An Ambassador may demand to know the identity of the source of our information. Although this does not happen often, we have had one or two instances of it within the past few months. In such cases, we cite the responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 of the Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of sources and methods and, if he presses the matter, it is referred to Headquarters for resolution. We take the position that only the DCI can empower our field representatives to reveal the identity of a source. c. An Ambassador may feel that we are employing an agent or clandestine source who is so highly placed in the local government that compromise of the operation could well result in a major diplomatic incident affecting not only the Ambassador but the existence of the Embassy itself. We recognize the extreme sensitivity of such exceptional cases and where these occur the Ambassador is made aware of the identity of the source. 5. The recent study 5 of the comments of some 60 or 70 Ambassadors on our Chiefs of Station shows an overwhelming majority expressing confidence and trust in our Chiefs of Station and full satisfaction with the manner in which we keep them informed of our activities. We do have occasional difficulties with Ambassadors [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] but these instances are rare. Occasionally, an Ambassador [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] will demand to see our files on a given operation. We regularly decline to comply on the grounds that compliance would tend to compromise sources and methods. In almost all such cases, when the problem is explained by our Chief of Station with Headquarters guidance and support, there is no further difficulty. 6. Recent initiatives, ostensibly stemming from budgetary and managerial considerations, have been made to codify and systematize the budgetary and manpower aspects of all our civilian overseas activities taking place within the cognizance of an Ambassador. Our participation in these efforts has been granted special protection in the form of separate highly classified annexes to the main studies and plans. Nevertheless, it will continue to require diligence if we are not to be caught up in such exercises in a way which would make it virtually impossible to keep our budgetary and manpower figures as well as our operations from being compromised. Thomas H. Karamessines 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–5505, US Govt-State. Secret. 2 Scheduled for publication in a Foreign Relations intelligence retrospective volume for 1956–1960. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/MS Files: Lot 60 D 220, 1957/61, Inter-Agency, CIA. 3 The instructions specified that the Ambassador “be made sufficiently aware of them so that, in his capacity as principal officer responsible for the United States position in the country to which he is accredited, he is enabled to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved.” The instructions stated further that “in many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these, and in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington.” Also, “there will be occasions when an objectively discussed problem will result in an honest difference of opinion between you and your ambassador regarding whether an operation should be carried on. President Kennedy's letter makes clear that you have your own channels of communication and may use them to refer your problem to higher levels here. While the ambassador also has his own channels to Washington, he will normally expect you to convey his views on such matters via your channels.” (Attachment to draft memorandum from Helms to Crockett, October 5, 1965; ibid., Job 78–3805, US Gov't-Dept of State) 4 Not found attached. 5 Not further identified. 244. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 244. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 26, 1966, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT The CIA I had a farewell meeting yesterday with the members of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and this morning Clark Clifford called me simply to thank me and to bring me up to date on the proceedings of the Board. In the course of the conversation, it became very clear that the Board is genuinely and deeply troubled about the leadership problem in CIA. These are men who have learned over the years how to keep their mouths damn well shut—people like Bob Murphy and Bill Langer and Gordon Gray, and Clifford himself. So they are not the source of the gossip. But they see the same things in the Agency that some of the gossips hear about, and they are troubled about their obligation as your advisers. In this situation, I think it might be wise if you were to get hold of Clark on your own terms and in your own good time, and talk with him about it. He has a good, clear sense of the shape of the problem and the degree of the urgency. (I myself do not think that any catastrophe is imminent, although I do think the situation is serious.) I also believe that if you should wish to execute a change skillfully and silently at any time, Clark is the man who can help most to get it done right. He has been extremely careful to maintain good human relations with all concerned. McG. B. 1 Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 11–2. No classification marking. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 245. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) 245. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to the President's Press Secretary (Moyers) 1 Washington, February 14, 1966. Dear Bill: In response to your invitation to come over and talk things over some time, I am taking the liberty of putting some ideas down on paper regarding the Agency which you may find interesting and possibly so will the President. In reviewing the stewardship and administration of Dick Helms and myself the past 10 months, it is quite clear that some very consid erable progress and improvements have been made in the Agency as a whole. I should like to list them for you because they are constructive and are entirely in line with the President's wishes that we “spare no effort to make this the best intelligence agency in the world.” a. Last July we completed a four month planning study which was conducted by some 40 people representing all elements of the Agency under the direction of one of our most senior officers. 2 This study looked 10 years in advance to determine the Intelligence Objectives which we wanted to have the capability of accomplishing. We then applied these objectives to various geographical parts of the world to sketch out what would probably be the most efficient ways to obtain these objectives in those portions of the world. We then took the first 5 years of this 10 years and by fiscal years identified the efforts which, if accomplished, would give us the capabilities to obtain the objectives which we had set for ourselves. We were able to identify many operations which were relatively non-productive. These were cut out or back. Other and higher priority work areas were similarly identified. b. We have installed a modern management system which has built on the successful management principles used in the Polaris program. This has done much to identify and weed out obsolescent and less effective programs and permits us to emphasize the higher priority ones and be responsive to the intelligence objectives which we had previously brought into focus. Permanent planning and evaluation groups were established in each of the Directorates of the Agency. These follow the progress of the work during the year and compare the progress of the Directorates with the previously announced fiscal year goals and thereby provide day-by-day good management and planning for the next year's budget. This has been enthusiastically accepted and endorsed, as well as utilized by the entire Agency. The Bureau of the Budget has complimented us on our management system because it permits us clearly to justify by-line items in our requirements and enables the Bureau to obtain a better conception of the validity of our needs. This is drawn together in a modern management center located in the Headquarters Building of the Agency. c. We have installed a 24 hour Operations Center manned with seasoned intelligence officers who receive intelligence inputs around-the-clock from all parts of the world and Agency. They evaluate the news and give prompt service to the White House, Defense Department, State Department, etc., as well as to the DCI. This, too, has been enthusiastically endorsed within the Agency and our people are quite proud of it. d. We have settled the “NRO problem.” As you may recall, one of the most distressing and difficult problems was the difficulty in reconciling the respective differences of the DoD and the CIA in the management of the overhead reconnaissance programs. Working with Mr. Cyrus Vance, it was my pleasure to draw up an organization and modus operandi which he gladly endorsed. Today, both the Agency and the Defense Department are working harmoniously together for the best interest of Uncle Sam and have reduced the previous differences and frictions to miniscule size. Mr. Vance and I form an Executive Committee to over-see this most important part of our intelligence program and we resolve all questions on the basis of “what is the best way to do it and what is best for our country!” e. We have initiated some striking new innovations in intelligence production. We have “systemized” the approach to determining the existence, or the incipient existence, of new important developmental programs by foreign countries. Basically this takes the various elements, say of a weapons system or nuclear rocket engine development, and breaks them down into component parts. We make models of what the various major components of the system component or production facilities would look like. We take pictures of these as they would appear from overhead satellites or reconnaissance aircraft and, utilizing the skills of the most competent photo-interpreters, collate these elements so that we high-light the missing pieces that we are looking for to “fit into the jigsaw puzzle” and thus give organized guidance for the technical collection of intelligence. f. We have formed a Vietnam Task Force within the Agency with associate members from the various other members of the intelligence community. This Task Force is headed up by our former Chief of Station at Saigon and its members are from every part of CIA plus other elements of the community. The announced mission and purpose of this Task Force is to insure top coordination of all of our efforts and to high-light areas in which we should perhaps increase our efforts and in the main to be responsive to the stepped-up American efforts in Southeast Asia. g. We have established China, within the intelligence community, United States Intelligence Board, as a co-equal highest priority intelligence target, equal to Soviet Russia. Similarly we have established a China Intelligence Task Group under one of CIA's top intelligence officers and staffed it with representatives from all elements of the intelligence community within Washington. This China Task Force is working full time to give coordinated direction to the intelligence efforts against China to ensure that we are optimizing our efforts relative to this long-time and very dangerous threat. It is working very well indeed and we are already seeing good results from their efforts. h. We have re-emphasized and rededicated the mission of CIA to its principal mission, which is to collect, digest, interpret and disseminate intelligence. The lure of paramilitary efforts and similarly exciting facets of our over-all responsibilities have been appropriately subordinated and more emphasis has been given to the primary job of obtaining by every means intelligence on the activities within foreign countries, which we consider our primary mission. i. We have more than doubled the political action team effort in South Vietnam. As you will recall, this pacification effort, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], has received the unqualified and enthusiastic endorsement of Ambassador Lodge, General Westmoreland, the Defense and State Departments. They have gone so far as to say this is equally as essential as the military effort there. As you know, the training school at Vung Tau is [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]- operated through native instructors [ 1 line of source text not declassified ]. j. We have more than tripled our intelligence efforts in South Vietnam. This includes counterintelligence efforts under deep cover. The latter has been successful in ferreting out VC spies, one of whom was a regular South Vietnam Army officer in the South Vietnamese J–2 Section of the General Staff! This effort is continuing and we will beef up the straight intelligence efforts in South Vietnam as the situation indicates and as we can prepare the manpower. k. We have recently established Dr. R. Jack Smith, vice Dr. Ray Cline, as Director of Intelligence. This is our most senior intelligence job within the Agency and the resultant team is working most harmoniously together. l. And finally, we have established most friendly and constructive relations with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We appreciate the fine guidance and assistance of the Clifford Board very much indeed, and are responsive to it. I am told by many people who volunteer the information that the morale of the Agency has never been higher and there seems to be a new sense of purpose as well as dedication on the part of our wonderful people here. Mr. John McCone visited me about two weeks ago and reported that his several days' visit to Washington clearly indicated to him that the regard for the Agency's performance had never been higher. While this was most welcome news, we are not resting on our laurels because the intelligence business is a dynamic one and we can never become smug or complacent. I shall be very pleased to discuss with you any of the above or other topics at your pleasure. I am proud to serve the President and will continue to dedicate my management efforts to insure optimum performance of the CIA and its outstandingly competent personnel. Respectfully, Red 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, FG 11–2. Secret. The letter indicates the President saw it. Moyers forwarded it to the President under cover of a February 14 memorandum in which he stated: “Admiral Raborn wanted you to see this. He was concerned, obviously, about the Washington Star story.” On February 13 the Star reported that, according to “informed circles,” Johnson intended to appoint General Maxwell Taylor to be DCI. “There reportedly has been some dissatisfaction with the operations of the present director,” continued the Star. “Johnson apparently feels he needs a prestige man in the CIA job now, and Taylor fits the bill.” 2 Presumably a reference to the Long Range Plan of the Central Intelligence Agency, prepared by representatives of CIA's four directorates and the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower, under the direction of CIA Executive Director Kirkpatrick. Kirkpatrick presented the Long Range Plan to Raborn under cover of a memorandum dated August 31, 1965. (Central lntelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, Long Range Plan of the Central Intelligence Agency, September 1965) 246. Editorial Note 246. Editorial Note The following exchange took place during a telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, that began at 9:04 a.m. on February 22, 1966: President: “Raborn's recommendations and judgments to me—and I have seen a good deal of Raborn, alone, just sit and talk to him—and if anything he has too much confidence in his people, and he's too complimentary of 'em, and he feels that they're doing too well, and he is totally oblivious to the fact that he is not highly regarded and he is not doing a good job. He thinks that he's made a great improvement and he's a great success. And I'm afraid Helms lets him think that and I'm afraid that others tell him that, and I think that—” Bundy: “That's a better way for it to be though. It makes it easier to deal with when and if you get ready to. Clark [Clifford] is your best counselor on that. He's very thoughtful about it, very watchful.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Bundy, Tape F66.08, Side A, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 247. Editorial Note 247. Editorial Note On March 2, 1966, President Johnson issued National Security Action Memorandum 341 ( Document 56 ), which “assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas.” On March 8 the Central Intelligence Agency advised its field stations that the statutory responsibility of the Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence were not affected by NSAM 341 and that relationships with Ambassadors and other U.S. Mission components were unchanged (see Document 67 ). On September 30 CIA notified Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Crockett that it saw no useful purpose “at this time” in identifying which of its activities were interdepartmental within the context of NSAM 341 and that CIA was not prepared to participate in the Foreign Affairs Programming System (see Documents 95 and 97 ). For a briefing memorandum prepared by CIA in September 1966 that outlined the agency's relationships to the Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Groups under NSAM 341, see Document 254 . For CIA views on how cooperation worked, see Document 263 . 248. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 248. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, March 22, 1966. [Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 63, Folder E, Report to President Johnson, 1/17/66. Confidential. 1 page of source text not declassified.] 249. Draft Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 249. Draft Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 24, 1966, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Need for White House Representation on 303 Committee The 303 Committee, the small four-man group consisting of Cyrus Vance, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Raborn, and formerly McGeorge Bundy which has been meeting weekly since 1963, is in need of a White House representative to continue its vital work. This group, as you know, (set up by NSC 5412) 2 reviews and approves the most sensitive covert operations involving largely overhead reconnaissance and political action. When agreement is not reached, the proposals are referred to Rusk and McNamara and occasionally to yourself. It was thought for a time that Robert Komer would take Mr. Bundy's place on this committee, but his new assignment would seem to preclude this. 3 According to the Executive Secretary, Peter Jessup, a number of important and sensitive matters awaiting decision have backed up and need attention. These include deployment and possible use of the A–12 aircraft, support to the Congo, Dominican Republic election, etc. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, in its first meeting, agreed that it would not deal with the most highly classified matters presently under 303 cognizance. The White House representative should hopefully have some background in these sophisticated matters as well as interagency relationships and be able to sit as a coequal with Messrs. Vance, Johnson, and Raborn. 4 B. Smith 5 1 Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, The 40 Committee. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 See Document 263 and footnote 5 thereto. 3 On March 28 Komer was named Special Assistant to the President in charge of U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construction in Vietnam. 4 Helms informed Raborn in an April 4 memorandum that he been told by Moyers that the President had decided to have both Moyers and Rostow sit on the 303 Committee. Rostow would be chairman, since “Moyers feels that he should not be locked into this position in view of his other duties and responsibilities.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, DDCI) However, Moyers attended only one 303 Committee meeting as a regular member, on May 5. (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes) 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original. 250. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 250. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 1, 1966. SUBJECT Admiral Raborn's View of Compromise on CIA Watchdog Committee Admiral Raborn wants you to know of his very strong opposition to a compromise proposal to create a sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to receive any information it requests from the Director of Central Intelligence. 2 He believes the effectiveness of the Central Intelligence Agency will be badly hurt if the new sub-committee is author-ized to get deeply into CIA's business. Admiral Raborn wanted you to know his views because he has learned that Senator Mansfield will be seeking an appointment with you to talk about the “compromise” proposal. 3 Admiral Raborn has heard that Senator Mansfield wants to avoid a floor fight on the CIA “watchdog” issue and, therefore, is ready to recommend to you acceptance of the compromise. Senator Russell opposes the new suggestion because he shares Admiral Raborn's view that Fulbright's group wants not only information, but also knowledge of sources and methods used by CIA. Admiral Raborn said that recently he agreed to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the situation in 44 countries. However, Senator Fulbright was uninterested and insisted on being told the source of information and the methods used by CIA. When Admiral Raborn said that he was unable to make such information available, Senator Fulbright said, in effect, the Director was refusing to testify before his Committee. Admiral Raborn understands that Fulbright is very unhappy that full information is given to Clark Clifford's Committee and doesn't understand why his Committee members should not be given the same treatment as the members of your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 4 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA, Vol. II. Secret. 2 Senator Fulbright raised the issue directly with Raborn in a June 13 letter: “What I wish to know is whether a Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, created for the purpose of keeping itself informed of the activities of the CIA in fields related to the foreign policy of the United States, would be able to receive without restriction information on the same basis as that now supplied to the Subcommittees” of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–B01439R, Congressional Relations, 1966–1968) 3 See Document 251 . 4 The President wrote by hand: “Because they leak! See Dominican Rep. testimony.” 251. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson 251. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 6, 1966. SUBJECT C.I.A. and the Senate As a result of your meeting with Senator Dirksen and me on Thursday, June 2, 2 I have given some further consideration to the matter of the C.I.A. and its reporting to the Senate. As I see it, there are three or four possibilities in connection with the question which has been raised: (1) Enlarging either the Appropriations or the Armed Services Subcommittee on the C.I.A. by including at least two members of the Foreign Relations Committee in one or the other. This is not going to work as a solution at the present time because of the determined opposition to enlargement of these subcommittees by the Members comprising them; (2) Calling up for floor consideration the resolution which has been approved by the Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 14–5. If this is done, there will be considerable debate on the Floor with the result that the C.I.A. will suffer, the Senate as an institution will suffer. No party to this dispute will, in any way, shape or form, derive any benefit from this debate except the newspapers and they will, of course, naturally give it the headline-treatment. This will furnish, in turn, further grist for the mill insofar as the C.I.A. is concerned. It will create greater suspicions about it both at home and abroad. The issue is not likely to die even after a debate or vote on the floor. The matter, in my opinion, will continue to simmer, creating more and more suspicion and the position of the agency is likely to become much more difficult in the months and years ahead. (3) Creating a special C.I.A. subcommittee in the Foreign Relations Committee to be composed of not less than two nor more than four members. Those members would be chosen on the basis of seniority. Creation of such a subcommittee is within the authority of the Foreign Relations Committee. If it is not treated by the Director of the C.I.A. on the same basis as the other two special subcommittees, however, it would only be a C.I.A. subcommittee in name; it would not be one in fact or knowledge and the impasse would remain. To overcome this factor, I met with the members of the other two subcommittees and asked for their reaction to a suggestion that the President consider the possibility of directing the head of the C.I.A. to give to a proposed special subcommittee in the Foreign Relations Committee the same type of information he gives the other two subcommittees. The Democratic members of these two subcommittees took the suggestion with open mind, realizing that the responsibility was yours. Some of the Republican members, however, expressed opposition to having the C.I.A. responsibilities in the Senate spread in this manner although all of them, I am sure, realize that it would be a question for you to decide on the basis of the law setting up the C.I.A. I realize, as I stated to you, that this possibility involves passing the buck but it was the only way I could think of at the time to achieve a compromise which would avoid a bitter Floor fight on the resolution which has been agreed to by the Foreign Relations Committee. (4) In view of the difficulty which faces you with the above suggestion, it would be my present feeling that a two-man subcommittee should be created in the Foreign Relations Committee to be composed of the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member. As I have stated previously, it is within the authority of the Foreign Relations Committee to set up a Subcommittee on the C.I.A. It would be my further suggestion that the Director of the C.I.A. should be requested by the Chairman to furnish to the Foreign Relations Subcommittee the same information he furnishes to the other two subcommittees. If this was agreed to by the Director of the C.I.A. and if, during the course of meetings held between this subcommittee and the Director of the C.I.A., questions arose which he felt he could not and should not answer because of the security involved, he should make that plain to the committee. If the committee was insistent, then and only then ought he to clear the matter with you. If this suggestion meets with your approval, it would obviate your becoming directly involved as the original suggestion would not. It would allow some flexibility and it might break this impasse in a way which will be better for all concerned. I have not discussed this suggestion with anyone but you. 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, FG 11–2. No classification marking. 2 No substantive record of the meeting, which lasted from 5:01 to 6 p.m. was found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) 252. Editorial Note 252. Editorial Note In a letter to the President, June 8, 1966, Director of Central Intelligence Raborn indicated that he “would like to leave government service at your earliest convenience.” (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX FG 11–2) The President discussed the issue briefly with Senator Mansfield during a telephone conversation that began at 8:45 a.m. on June 10: President: “Just between us, Mike, our friend Raborn is leaving us. He's kinda like Mann and he's quitting, and so I rather think I might put in Helms. Do you have any reaction?” Mansfield: “Oh I don't even know the fellow. I have no reaction to him. He's the one you said that's the old pro down there?” President: “Yup. I don't know how he'd get along with the Hill. He doesn't know a thing in the world about politics. Never got elected.” Mansfield: “Well that's an important factor you have to consider.” President: “Yes it is. Yes it is. He's a newspaper man, and he gets along with all the press, and they all like him, and all the folks like him and seem to trust him more than they do a fellow with a military background. They didn't like McCone much.” Mansfield: “Yes, they liked McCone. He was pretty good.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Mansfield, Tape 66.16, Side B, PNO 1) The portion of the conversation printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. Raborn's tenure as Director of Central Intelligence ended on June 30, 1966. He was succeeded the same day by Richard Helms, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. 253. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) 253. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) 1 Washington, September 20, 1966. Dear Clark: [ 3 paragraphs (23 lines of source text) not declassified ] The letters from President Kennedy to Mr. McCone 2 and from President Johnson to Admiral Raborn 3 have created a precedent for the issuance of an express Presidential directive to each individual DCI. I believe these letters have helped to clarify the role of the DCI as a coordinator and have served a generally useful purpose. Significance has been attached in some quarters to differences in the language as between the letters issued by President Kennedy and President Johnson. This suggests the need for considerable care in drafting the language of a new letter, if it is decided that a new letter is desirable. 4 The most important question to decide is the extent and limitations of the responsibilities of the DCI, particularly insofar as they have managerial implications for programs functioning under agencies of the Government other than CIA, particularly under the Department of Defense. Specifically the questions are to what extent the DCI should be held responsible and accountable and given authority: a. To determine the needs of the Government for information derived from intelligence channels; b. To determine the scope, character and level of collection and analytical programs and facilities required to meet those needs; and c. For the efficiency and economy of these programs (now costing in excess of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] a year). Under existing arrangements the DCI, supported and advised by USIB, tends to be regarded as primarily responsible for validating and determining the needs of the Government for intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense to be responsible for the control and management of a very large preponderance of programs and facilities calculated to meet these needs. The precise delimitations of authority and responsibility as between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI remain vague and ill-defined although practical working relationships are satisfactory. It may very well be that there is no practical alternative to the present dichotomy and that we should continue to work under current authority, recognizing the somewhat nebulous nature of the DCI's commitment “to provide effective guidance and coordination,” but recognizing also that there has been very considerable improvement in the coordination of the national intelligence effort and that further progress under something comparable to the existing authority can be reasonably anticipated. Before expressing my final views on this subject, however, I should appreciate further time for reflection and suggest that this matter be scheduled for further discussion some time towards the end of this year. I am attaching a memorandum on the subject which may help further to clarify the issue. [Omitted here is discussion of unrelated items.] Sincerely, Richard Helms 5 Attachment Washington, undated. DISCUSSION OF ADEQUACY OF DCI AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT As a minimum, the DCI must have the authority to find out anything he wants to know about all activities which contribute to national intelligence. He must have the ability to form an independent judgment as to whether intelligence programs are generally responsive to national needs. Institutional arrangements must exist which ensure that he can communicate an authoritative view, if necessary to the President and the President's immediate advisers, as to which programs of the Government are redundant or marginal and what should be done to fill intelligence gaps. The law and NSCID No. 1 6 provide, in a general way, this authority and institutional arrangement. The law provides that the Agency, of which the DCI is the head, shall advise the NSC on intelligence matters and recommend ways to improve intelligence coordination. NSCID No. 1 provides that the DCI “shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States in accordance with existing law and NSCIDs.” NSCID No. 1 confers other authority on the DCI, generally subject to consultation with USIB, to do various things. For example, the DCI or his representatives “in consultation with the head of the intelligence agency concerned” is authorized to make surveys of departmental intelligence activities. The two Presidential letters, respectively to Mr. McCone and Admiral Raborn, constitute at least a clarification and probably an extension of the DCI's authority. Certainly the Kennedy letter constitutes a mandate to the DCI, acting jointly with the heads of departments, to review the activities of all U.S. agencies “with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness…” It has been argued that the Johnson letter is weaker because it directs the DCI to coordinate and guide the total United States intelligence effort “in accordance with NSCID No. 1.” Certain of the provisions of NSCID No. 1 imply a certain obligation on the part of the DCI to act, in some respects at least, with the advice and consent of USIB and to deal with heads of agencies and departments through their intelligence representatives. The Johnson letter also uses language which appears to emphasize the DCI's responsibility for coordinating intelligence output, rather than intelligence programs and activities. In view of the practice that has developed of giving the DCI a personal mandate from the President, a new letter of authority, emphasizing the President's concern with the need for effective guidance to the over-all intelligence effort and directing the new DCI to ensure the provision for this guidance, may be desirable. It remains to be asked whether the Board expects the DCI to be responsible for more than general guidance and coordination for intelligence activities. Do they expect to hold him accountable for the efficiency of all intelligence activities. Do they expect him to be responsible for the elimination of all waste and extravagance in any intelligence program run by the Government. As of today, there is no central mechanism in the Government for an over-all budgetary or program review of all intelligence activities as a whole. The four basic programs: CIA, and CCP (SIGINT), the CIP (DIA and the Service intelligence programs), and the National Reconnaissance Program are all reviewed separately with somewhat different representation through somewhat different channels. It should be recognized, however, that the DCI's right to participate in the review and have a say in the formulation of all three DoD programs is now firmly established. Consideration has been given in the past to the desirability of establishing a National Intelligence Resources Board, to be chaired by the DCI or jointly by him and the Secretary of Defense which would be responsible for the consolidated review and approval of all intelligence programs. There are many practical considerations, however, which suggest that such an arrangement may be unwise or, in any event, premature. A basic factor affecting the coordination of intelligence activities is the necessary division of authority amongst individual departments and agencies of the Government. It is inevitable and appropriate that heads of departments having responsibilities in the foreign policy fields and commanders of major military commands should have the personnel and facilities required to assemble and analyze the information needed for their parochial and departmental purposes. Information which they legitimately require is also, in most cases, relevant to national decisions which affect “national security.” Moreover, intelligence data of national significance is collected by individuals, diplomats for example, as part of their official responsibility for carrying out normal departmental activities. Intelligence, whether national or departmental, is very often a by-product of some essentially non-intelligence activity controlled and conducted by non-intelligence components of the Government. It follows that all of the activities and components of the Government which serve national intelligence purposes can never be totally subordinated to the direction, control and management of a single central authority. Added efficiency would be given to the DCI as a coordinator by subordinating NSA and, through NSA, the cryptologic military services, to the DCI. This was the original recommendation of the Brownell report, 7 but was rejected as impractical by the then DCI (General Bedell Smith). Exhaustive reviews of the constituent responsibilities of the NRO served to emphasize the impracticability of totally subordinating reconnaissance programs, including their support facilities, launch pads, tracking and recovery facilities, etc., to the managerial authority of the DCI. Even if these two large and probably indigestible ingredients were added to the DCI's personal command, he would still have to cope with the problem of coordinating a number of activities which cannot, under any circumstances, ever be placed under his direct managerial supervision. The net result of all this suggests that we are stuck with the present concept under which the DCI “guides and coordinates” the community but does not manage or command it. If so, the various institutional arrangements through which the DCI provides guidance and coordination (USIB, intelligence agency program and budget reviews, the NRO, etc.) should be examined to ensure that they provide an adequate basis for the assertion of his influence but do no imply responsibilities which extend beyond the limitations on his authority. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB 1966. Secret. Drafted by Bross. 2 Dated January 16, 1962; printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Document 99 . 3 Document 233 . 4 [ text not declassified ] 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original. 6 A copy of NSCID No. 1, January 18, 1961, indicating the revisions incorporated in the revised NSCID No. 1 issued March 4, 1964, is at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA. 7 Brownell report on communications intelligence, June 13, 1952. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B00269R, Box 10, Folder 62, and Box 14, Folder 130) 254. Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Taylor) 254. Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Taylor) 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT The 303 Committee, Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups 1. This memorandum and its book of attachments 2 are for your information. It contains no action recommendations. Its purposes are to review the responsibilities of the 303 Committee and the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) including its subordinate mechanisms and to describe CIA's relationships with those groups. Policy approval of covert action is the concern of the 303 Committee; interdepartmental activities overseas are the concern of the SIG. 2. The 303 Committee The National Security Council has placed the responsibility for covert actions on CIA and has required that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United States foreign and military policies and with overt activities, and correlated with espionage and counterespionage operations. Further, the NSC has stipulated that, except as the President otherwise directs, designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, and a representative of the President designated for this purpose are to be advised in advance for policy approval of major covert programs initiated by CIA or otherwise directed. This directive is NSC 5412/2 (Attachment A). These designated representatives, together with the DCI are known as the 303 Committee, after NSAM 303 (Attachment B). Formerly they were referred to as the Special Group 5412. Proposed paramilitary operations, either overt or covert, are also approved by the 303 Committee (NSAM 57, Attachment C). The present membership is: Mr. Walt Rostow, Chairman and the President's Representative Mr. Foy Kohler, State Mr. Cyrus Vance, Department of Defense Mr. Richard Helms, DCI The Chairman briefs the President on the Committee's decisions. 3. CIA Procedures Relative to the 303 Committee The decision to submit an operational program or activity to the 303 Committee is made by the Director . However, guidelines have been established which, along with internal procedures, are reviewed in Clandestine Services Instruction 50–20 (Attachment D). Coordination within CIA of the proposals includes review and approval by the DDP, the Executive Director-Comptroller (for fiscal authorities) and the DCI before being presented to the representatives of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The DDI also reviews the proposal for the validity of the intelligence base underlying it and may comment directly to the DCI. This internal coordination is managed by the Special Group Officer [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], a member of the Staff of the DDP. Coordination, external to CIA, of the proposals for covert operations is accomplished in two steps. First, the Chief of the Clandestine Services Area Division advancing the proposal secures the approval of the regional Assistant Secretary of State concerned with the proposal. Ordinarily, this has been preceded by the approval of the Ambassador to the country concerned with relevant communications between the Ambassador and State Department and the CIA Station Chief and CIA Headquarters. In some instances, the proposed covert action has been suggested by the Ambassador or the Country Team. Second, with approval of the proposal by the DCI, the proposal in the form of a “303 Committee Memorandum” is referred to the other Committee principals. The DCI's representative at the Executive Office Building (Mr. Peter Jessup), who is also the Secretary of the Committee, transmits the proposals to and briefs the representatives of the President and is in liaison with the representative of the Secretary of State. The DCI's representative in DOD [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] briefs the representative of the Secretary of Defense. Normally, the proposals are “staffed” by Defense and State on a high executive level. The 303 Committee ordinarily meets weekly on late Thursday afternoons in the White House Situation Room to consider proposals released by the DCI and circulated in the previous week. 4. The Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups The President has assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. The Secretary of State is empowered to discharge these authorities through the Under Secretary of State and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State. The enabling Presidential directive, NSAM #341 (Attachment E) established a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) to assist the Secretary of State and regional interdepartmental groups (IRG's) to assist the regional Secretaries. The SIG also was assigned the responsibilities of the Special Group (CI). The Under Secretary of State is the Executive Chairman of the SIG and the regional Secretaries are Executive Chairmen of their interdepartmental groups. The Executive Chairmen have full powers of decision on all matters within their purview. Individual members of the SIG and the IRG's, however, who do not concur may request referral of a matter to the decision of the next higher authority. The regional Assistant Secretaries, as Executive Chairmen, have the responsibility for assuring the adequacy of U.S. policy and programs for the countries in their regions. The DCI is a member of the SIG and has designated the Chiefs of the CS Area Divisions as the CIA members of the five Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG's) whose jurisdictions correspond to those of the geographic bureaus of the Department of State. Attachment F lists the members of the SIG and the State and CIA representatives on the IRG's. The authorities assigned in NSAM #341, related as they are to interdepartmental activities overseas, do not affect the DCI's authorities and responsibilities arising from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended or invalidate other executive directives, i.e., the NSCID's and NSC Directive 5412/2. Consequently, the participation of the CS Division Chiefs on the IRG's is separate from their liaison and coordination with the regional Assistant Secretaries of State on covert action and related intelligence matters. Further, covert action matters which fall within the purview of the 303 Committee are not considered in the SIG, the IRG's and their subcommittees. 5. CIA Procedures Relative to the SIG and IRG's Normally, the Staff Director, SIG prepares and circulates the agenda and related papers to the members in the week preceding the SIG meeting which is scheduled routinely on Tuesday afternoons in the Under Secretary's Conference Room. Agenda items are recommended to the Executive Chairman by the SIG members and the Executive Chairmen of the IRG's. Those from the latter are frequently in response to earlier directives from the SIG. The Special Group Officer [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] is the point of contact in CIA for SIG matters for other member agencies and, in CIA, provides staff support to the DCI to accomplish internal coordination on SIG papers. Normally, this means analysis of the SIG paper by appropriate elements of the DDP and DDI and the preparation by the Special Group Officer of an “Agency position” on the matter which is presented to the DCI in a briefing book. On Monday of each week, the DDI prepares an Intelligence Report exclusively for the SIG. The substance of the Report is not necessarily related to the agenda of the SIG meeting for the following day. Rather, on a world-wide scale, the Report attempts to forewarn the SIG of developing situations in countries or areas where there are signs of potential crisis or subversive aggression. Attachment G is a recent Report. The Chiefs of the CS Area Divisions, as CIA representatives on the IRG's, coordinate IRG matters with other CIA components and keep the DDP and the DCI advised of IRG matters and decisions made by the IRG's. The DDI has designated Regional Contact officers to provide intelligence support to these CIA representatives. Pertinent internal CIA directives relative to these procedures are Attachment H (HR 50–9) and I (CSI 50–25). 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79–01201A, SIG Procedures and Support. Secret; Eyes Only. A log in the folder in which the memorandum is filed dates it September 1966. The recipient of the memorandum, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, was appointed DDCI by the President on September 20, confirmed by the Senate on October 7, and sworn in on October 13. The memorandum was sent to Taylor via the Deputy Director for Plans, but it contains no drafting information. 2 None of the attachments is printed. 255. Memorandum for the Record 255. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 29, 1966. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB 1966. Secret. Extract-4 pages of source text not declassified.] 256. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) 256. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) Washington, October 10, 1966. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, PFIAB 1966. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 257. Memorandum From Donald Macdonald of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to William McAfee of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 257. Memorandum From Donald Macdonald of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to William McAfee of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1 Washington, October 10, 1966. SUBJECT Department of State Responsibility and Organization in the Covert Action Field The purpose of this memorandum is to put down a few preliminary thoughts on State's role in covert action of the sort contemplated in NSC Directive 5412, 2 and more specifically the role of INR/DDC. I would welcome your comments on these thoughts, and particularly on the suggestions for further study at the end. It is assumed that the necessity for appropriate covert action is accepted and requires no further argumentation; and that State Department concerns focus upon appropriateness. 1. The nature of covert action. NSC 5412 (Top Secret) establishes six objectives of covert action (which it terms “covert operations”). All but one of them are directly aimed at “International Communism,” the covert activities of which, according to the directive, make necessary the undertaking of such activities by the U.S. The remaining objective is concerned with promoting Free World support for the U.S. as well as strengthening Free World resistance to International Communism. Covert operations are defined in NSC 5412 as those for which U.S. Government responsibility is not evident, or can be plausibly disclaimed if they are uncovered. They include propaganda, political action; economic warfare; preventive direct action including sabotage, etc.; escape, evasion, evacuation; subversion and assistance to resistance groups; support for indigenous and anti-communist elements in threatened Free World countries; and activities to accomplish these categories. Responsibility for all these actions is given to CIA by NSC 5412, in preference to the creation of a separate agency for the purpose. Excluded are armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations. 2. The bases for concern. The State Department's concern for covert action might be listed under the following headings, listed in a rough priority order: a. Short-term risks . Covert action, however necessary and promising of success, risks jeopardy of U.S. foreign relations and frustration of U.S. foreign policy objectives if it is exposed. b. Consequences . Since the risks of covert action multiply, with scope and time, it follows that each such action if successful must have a phase-out point at which overt methods and social forces are depended upon to carry the objective forward. If these methods and forces are inadequate when the phase-out point is reached, the success of the covert action will be jeopardized or nullified. c. Long-term risks . One of the basic long-run objectives of U.S. foreign policy, frequently reiterated, is to achieve the rule of law in international as well as domestic affairs. It is difficult to conceive of covert action, however necessary and justifiable, which is not in some measure antithetical to the rule of law (although the antithesis is less to the extent that the source of law in the target area is weak in popular support). d. Action v. intelligence . The line between action and intelligence, although drawn by the National Security Act, the exclusions of NSC 5412, and other directives, is sometimes difficult to maintain in practice. There is a consequent concern that intelligence may be biased by the action to which it is related, and that policy will show a resultant bias. e. Institutional bias . A large and highly qualified organization naturally has professional enthusiasm for projects in its competence. Covert action often promises (and can achieve) quick results. But objective scrutiny may indicate that such projects are not as necessary or desirable as their proponents believe when weighed against the costs and risks. f. Civic concerns . Covert action is obviously not subject to the usual checks and balances of a free society. Witting officials concerned with covert action should therefore endeavor through their own judgments to represent the legitimate civic consciousness of the community. 3. State Department authority. The National Security Act empowers the National Security Council to “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security … .” and makes the Secretary of State a member of NSC. It makes CIA subject to NSC in the intelligence coordination field. NSC 5412, in giving CIA its covert action responsibilities, says that CIA is “subject to directives from the NSC.” The Secretary of State shares this NSC responsibility as a statutory member of it. In respect to covert action, NSC 5412 provides that designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of the President shall be advised in advance of major covert programs and shall be the normal channel for approval and coordination. The Department also has preeminent statutory authority, under the President, in the foreign affairs field. This has been made explicit in Presidential NSAM 341 of March 2, 1966 (Confidential): “… I have assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of inter-departmental activities of the United States Government overseas.” 3 In the field, the Chief of Mission, reporting through the Department, has authority to “oversee and coordinate all the activities of the United States Government” in his country of assignment (President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961). 4 This authority has been interpreted to mean that in respect to espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs, in addition to covert action projects, the Ambassador is to be made sufficiently aware of them by CIA station chiefs so that he can make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved. Differences of opinion as to whether an operation should be carried on may be referred to Washington for decision. 4. State Department organization. At present there are three main channels between the Department and CIA in respect to covert action: the so-called “303 Committee,” the periodic conferences of regional Assistant Secretaries with their CIA counterparts, and field relations between the Ambassadors and CIA station chiefs. 5 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs is the usual Department representative on the 303 Committee; in his responsibilities toward this Committee, he looks toward the Director of Intelligence and Research for staffing, and more specifically to the Operations Staff of the Deputy Director for Coordination (INR/DDC). The Operations Staff also participates in most meetings between regional Assistant Secretaries and the CIA. The regional bureaus of the Department, and the country directors concerned, are naturally involved in decisions on covert action, since they are primarily responsible (under the Secretary and Under Secretary) for policy coordination and decision. The working contacts between Ambassadors and CIA station chiefs are the finest screen for covert action projects of minor dimension. 6 5. Current problems. A quick reading of the files and of current literature, plus my own field background, would indicate that the Department's problems in the covert action field are the following: a. How to insure that the Department's concerns, as listed in Section 2 above, are fully taken into account in undertaking covert action projects. b. How to insure that the Ambassador's overall authority in the field is safeguarded. c. How to insure coordination between covert and other actions in the field of foreign policy. d. How to utilize the Department's own talents in initiating appropriate covert action projects. e. Whether there are types of action, less drastic and risky, or undertaken by other agencies, which might reduce dependence upon covert action by CIA. 6. Suggestions for further study. The following suggestions are listed in a rough priority order, in terms of what seems to me to be their significance and their likelihood of leading to useful results. They are admittedly slanted toward specific results, but study of each of them could lead to a decision to accept, reject, or investigate further. a. An SOP for INR/DDC to backstop G's primary responsibility in State for passing on covert action projects before the 303 Committee, and to monitor Assistant Secretaries' decisions in lesser projects. I would emphasize that any really meaningful SOP should be more in terms of a consensus among the people involved than a formal detailed directive, and that it would be useful only if it were used with flexibility and imagination. Elements of such an SOP might be: (1) A set of questions, based upon the concerns listed in section 2 above and the evaluation in (2) next below, and agreed upon by members of the Operations Staff, which would be asked by INR/DDC in respect to all covert action projects. The significant answers to these questions might well be recorded. (2) An evaluation of all, or a significant cross-section of, covert action projects heretofore undertaken to determine whether they measured up to expectations and whether alternative approaches could have done better in terms of cost, effectiveness, and risk. (3) A continuing procedure to review projects in progress or completed, along the lines suggested in (2). The review could be of all projects or, more likely, of those designated for review by appropriate authority. (4) Establishment of criteria, in terms of risk, cost, or otherwise, to determine at what level a covert action project should be approved, and whether it merited a review procedure-either within State or by an interagency mechanism. (5) Communication between Ambassadors and INR on covert action projects. This might be based on (i) initial briefing of Ambassadors along the lines of the set of questions in (1) above, to help them in their own review of projects in the field, and (ii) application of the criteria in (4) above to help the Ambassador decide whether or not a given project should be referred to Washington for decision. b. A policy paper on initiation of covert action projects , addressed to State's proper role in their initiation as distinguished from their critical evaluation. My own preliminary reaction is that State should move very cautiously in encouraging any of its people to initiate such projects, because it is very difficult for an organization to approach such a sensitive subject from two opposed viewpoints at the same time, and because if covert action is really needed, the policy officers will probably come up with appropriate suggestions anyway. There are possible lines of approach: (1) an officer or a small group within INR, or possibly in another unit of State, might be charged with initiative for planning covert action projects and submitting them to the regional bureaus, the regional bureaus could be encouraged to turn to them for such projects; (2) a small group of CIA people might be physically located within State for the same purpose; (3) all Country Directors in State as they are assigned to duty might be briefed as to the general nature of covert action and encouraged to make whatever suggestions they deem appropriate directly to a designated office (e.g., INR/DDC) for evaluation, at the same time informing the Assistant Secretary concerned or his designated representative. Such initial briefings might be followed up occasionally by INR/DDC officers, although such a sensitive subject should not be put on a basis of recurring and formalized routine. c. A review of NSC 5412 , to determine whether State should recommend revision in the light of the concerns in Section 2 above. Three specific points might merit revision: (1) the present language which authorizes covert action not aimed at the Communist threat; (2) provisions regarding paramilitary action, recommendations for which were advanced by the Taylor Committee in 1961 and reduced to a draft by CIA; (3) the apparent exemption for inter-agency control of other than “major” covert action projects. In addition, there are miscellaneous minor changes in language which might be made, some of which were in the 1961 CIA draft revision. For example, the term “covert action” might replace “covert operations” to sharpen the distinction between intelligence and action; and some of the terms used to characterize the Communists and their activities are outdated. The decision whether to ask for NSC action to revise 5412 could be made on the basis of a draft revision and a weighing of the advantages to be derived from it against the difficulties of the exercise. 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, NSC 5412, 1957–, Basic Document. Top Secret. Both Macdonald and McAfee worked in the Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination. 2 See footnote 5, Document 263 . 3 Document 56 . 4 Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1345–1347. 5 NSC 5412 also provides that in certain cases the Secretary of State may approve covert action projects without reference to other agencies, provided the President is notified. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 In a November 14 memorandum to CIA Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, CS/Special Group Officer [ name not declassified ], addressed the issue of “Coordination of 303 Committee Proposals with the Department of State.” He noted, among other things, that frequently DDP Division Chiefs and regional Assistant Secretaries were unable to get together to review a proposal prior to its consideration by the 303 Committee. “Coordination then is with an official of the Bureau authorized by the regional Assistant Secretary to act for him. This, of course, means more often than not, that it is the CIA Desk Officer dealing with the Country Director. In these instances, it is often difficult for the CIA officer to find out specifically if the regional Assistant Secretary or anyone else up the line has been briefed on and has approved the proposal.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–5505, US Govt-Special Group) 258. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 258. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, October 24, 1966. SUBJECT DCI Control of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) Committees 1. As has been sometimes said of CIA, the achievements and successes of USIB committees go unheralded while their inadequacies and mistakes are well known. I think that COMOR, for example, over the past four years has done an impressive job of sorting out the various requirements for coverage by different systems and providing general program guidance. It deals with complicated programs and conflicting and contentious customers and the record, in my opinion, is nothing to be ashamed of. No committee, however, is likely to achieve a very impressive record in the systems analysis/cost effectiveness field. Dissatisfaction with USIB committees stems in large measure of course from the existence of a built-in military majority which on a straight basis of votes will determine most issues in which there is a conflict between the military and civilian views in favor of the military. 2. A pivotal question in assessing the value of USIB committees as managerial tools for use by the DCI in guiding and coordinating the community is the attitude of committee chairmen towards the DCI and the degree to which decisions of a committee are determined by majority vote or reflect the desires of the DCI. This question tends to become confused in the metaphysics surrounding the relations between the DCI as head of the community, the DCI as Chairman of USIB and the DCI as head of CIA. 3. As a practical matter, it seems to me that our objective should be to ensure that committee chairmen do in fact act as representatives of the DCI and that their responsibilities for developing a committee report, or a consensus, which is compatible with the DCI's views and objectives should be established and enforced. In this connection, the concept of an “Executive Chairman” as advanced by General Maxwell Taylor has some validity. As in the case of an “Executive Chairman,” it should be the chairman of a USIB committee's responsibility to determine a policy or reach a decision. The burden then falls upon other members of the committee who disagree to register a formal dissent. If things are working properly, the views of the Chairman and the views of the CIA member are unlikely to be in conflict. Assurance in this respect would be improved if Jack Smith's suggestions with respect to the importance of improving arrangements for internal coordination within CIA of matters coming before USIB were adopted. 4. Much of the answer to the problem lies, it seems to me, in the selection and indoctrination of committee chairmen, to which the following is relevant. a. All committee chairmen should be CIA employees and housed permanently in Langley where they are available to the DCI. GMAIC, for which Howard Stoertz has been proposed, is the only chairmanship open at the moment. All other chairmen are in fact CIA or DCI (General Reynolds and Mr. Roosevelt) employees. b. Individual committee chairmen should be advised of the importance of soliciting general DCI guidance concerning the policies and objectives which they are to pursue in committee deliberations. This does not mean that they should not listen to or attempt to accommodate the views of other departments or military services. On the contrary, one of their functions is to keep the DCI and his immediate staff informed about community attitudes and developments in the area of a particular committee's jurisdiction. A committee chairman would be acting within the scope of his authority in presenting service views to CIA senior offi cials or to the DCI very forcefully, even if these views are opposed to those of an element of CIA. Where, however, there is a difference, it should be resolved in such a manner as to conform to DCI policy and philosophy, which must be ascertained and then made effective. c. It is essential to establish through whom, how and when guidance shall be provided to individual chairmen. Under existing procedures, as I understand them, guidance is provided to the CIA members of USIB committees by the DDI. The chairmen of certain committees (notably SIGINT, WATCH, CCPC and TSCC) all now have more or less immediate direct personal access to the DCI. I believe that the chairmen of COMOR and CODIB should be added to this list and located so that personal access to the DCI will be facilitated. DCI guidance concerning positions to be taken by committee chairmen should be provided under circumstances which afford the DDI an adequate opportunity to express views (which presumably would be identical with the views of CIA committee members). Responsibility for providing DCI guidance to the other committees (EIC, SIC, IPC, IDC, JAEIC, etc.) could be delegated to the Deputy Director in whose directorate the particular chairman is located. John A. Bross 2 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, United States Intelligence Board. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Bross signed the original. 259. Memorandum From the Legislative Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Warner) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 259. Memorandum From the Legislative Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (Warner) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, December 16, 1966. SUBJECT Report on CIA Relations with the Congress-1966 1. This memorandum is for information only. The purpose of this report is to record the significant events and facts with regard to the Agency's relationship with Congress. This includes not only our subcommittee relationships but all others. It also includes legislative efforts both Agency-sponsored and otherwise. There is no attempt to set forth all the factors in this relationship but only those that are believed significant in reviewing where we have been and looking ahead to where we are going. 2. CIA Subcommittees . This year has seen an intensification of our informal relationships with our subcommittees, its members, and the staffs. While the number of meetings dropped off slightly from 34 last year to 26 in 1966, it is believed that in some ways our relationships are closer and the subcommittees are more informed about the Agency itself. (a) House Armed Services . There were eight formal meetings with this subcommittee. [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] This is the first time a CIA subcommittee has taken such action. In addition to the Chief Counsel, Russell Blandford, participating in briefings and activities involving the Agency, the Chairman also brought Mr. Philip Kelleher into this area. The informal assistance provided the subcommittee and the staff resulted in a statement in the final report of the full committee that there was almost daily contact between the subcommittee and the Agency and on more important matters there were eight meetings with the subcommittee. On those occasions when the Agency met with the subcommittee and offered them information on Agency organization, activities and programs, this was well received and the members expressed a desire to have more of this type of briefing. (b) House Appropriations . The Agency had ten meetings with this subcommittee. They received detailed briefings on the 1966 supplemental appropriation and the 1967 appropriation. In addition, Mr. Lipscomb, at the request of the Chairman, visited the Agency twice and Mr. Bow accompanied Mr. Lipscomb on one occasion. Mr. Michaels, the staff man for this subcommittee, visited the Agency on several occasions. The purpose of these visits was to examine not only our budget programs but also the programming and systems analysis and control mechanisms. The subcommittee, unquestionably, is better informed today on the Agency and its budget needs than ever before and this is believed to be an important factor in their almost immediate approval of our full budget request. (c) Senate Armed Services and Appropriations . These two subcommittees continued to meet together as a matter of convenience and held eight meetings during the year. Two of the meetings were solely devoted to developing positions on Senator McCarthy's proposals concerning CIA which emanated from Senate Foreign Relations. The Chairman also brought an Appropriations Committee staff man into the picture for the first time. This individual, Mr. William Woodruff, was thoroughly briefed and visited the Agency for more details on the Agency and its budget request. The subcommittees also afforded the Agency the opportunity of giving detailed presentations on the 1966 supplemental and the 1967 appropriations. The subcommittees approved the Agency's full request without any effort to reduce the amount in discussions with the House Appropriations Committee Chairman, Mr. Woodruff, as well as Mr. Darden, accompanied Senator Milton Young on a month-long trip to the Far East and examined budget and financial controls in depth at several of the installations. Senator Young has expressed himself as well satisfied with what he saw and stated he believes the Agency gets more for its dollar than any agency of the Government. 3. Other Committees . Briefings of other committees of the Senate and House fell to eleven as contrasted to nineteen last year. Among the committees briefed were the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Defense Subcommittee of House Appropriations, Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of Senate Foreign Relations, and Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. There were other informal briefings such as the two briefings of the Chairman and senior members of the Senate Space Committee and briefings of individual members. Further, there were numerous briefings of certain of the staff members of these other committees as requested by the Chairmen in order that the staff could be of greater assistance to the committees. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] was surfaced routinely through the House Committee on Un-American Activities. There were also indications of greater interest in the Agency by the Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information of House Government Operations Committee. Both believe they have some claim to jurisdiction over certain aspects of the Agency's activities. This matter did not come to issue but seems likely to be raised again in the coming year. [Omitted here is section 4, Legislation.] 5. Congressional Oversight . Generally there have been about 20 resolutions in each Congress calling for a joint committee for intelligence matters. The strategy changed this year and Senator McCarthy first introduced in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a proposal to investigate whether or not there should be a joint committee for intelligence matters. Eventually the Foreign Relations Committee reported out a resolution to establish a new standing committee to encompass all intelligence activities of the Executive Branch. Senator Richard Russell served notice that he would object to this effort and would attempt to block consideration by procedural means. Efforts at compromise failed. One such compromise would have been to have two or three members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sit with the Senate CIA subcommittees. This was rejected by the CIA subcommittees and during the floor debate, Senator Russell pointed that an earlier offer of such representation made to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had been rejected by that Committee. Another compromise was to establish a subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations to which CIA and other intelligence components would report. This failed when the President informed certain of the Senate leaders that he would not authorize CIA to report to this additional group in the same fashion it reported to the existing subcommittees. There was a spirited debate in open session and then, in an unusual move, the Senate moved to a secret session of approximately three and one-half hours. The final vote was 61 to 29 in favor of the technical point of referring the matter to Armed Services for further consideration. As expected, no action was taken by that Committee. The true issue was not approval or disapproval of CIA or its relationships with the Congress. Much more pertinent in determining the votes was Russell's personal prestige which he clearly put on the line and the time-honored rules and procedures of the Senate which Russell charged were being circumvented. Undoubtedly, the Administration's Vietnam policy was also a factor in the equation. While there may be efforts to nibble at this problem, it seems unlikely to come to issue again for some time. [Omitted here is section 6, General.] 7. Conclusion . Despite the considerable publicity concerning the Agency, a great deal of it being adverse, I believe the Congress, as a whole, is better informed about the Agency than ever. This is particularly true with our own subcommittees. Further, I believe the standing of the Agency with the Congress as a whole is better than ever before. Being relieved of responsibilities as Deputy General Counsel should enable the office to be better prepared for the expected ABM gap legend which is beginning to arise and for the ensuing battle between the Congress and the Pentagon. It is to be hoped that the Agency can avoid being caught in the middle on this one. John S. Warner 2 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–5505, US Govt-Congress. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Warner signed the original. 260. Editorial Note 260. Editorial Note On February 14, 1967, Ramparts magazine published full-page advertisements in the New York Times and Washington Post announcing that its March issue would “document how CIA has infiltrated and subverted the world of American student leaders over the past fifteen years” through covert ties to the National Student Association. The same day both the Times and the Post devoted front-page stories to covert CIA funding of the National Student Association. The next day the wire services, enlarging on a story in the Washington Star , carried reports that CIA was covertly supporting other youth organizations operating abroad with funds channeled through foundations. On February 15 President Johnson appointed a committee to review the relationships between CIA and private U.S. voluntary organizations operating abroad. Composed of Under Secretary of State Katzenbach (Chairman); Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner; and Director of Central Intelligence Helms, the Katzenbach Committee (as it was known) recommended in its March 29 report to the President that it “be the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations.” For text of the public report, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , pages 1214–1217. The report's notes and appendices, which were mostly classified and not made public, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Ramparts-NSA-CIA. Upon receipt of the report, President Johnson stated: “I accept this committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all agencies of the Government to implement it fully.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book I, pages 403–404) For documentation concerning the Ramparts exposé and its aftermath, including implementation of the Katzenbach Committee's report and the review of coordination and policy approval for covert operations, see Documents 261 , 263 – 265 , 267 , 269 , and 272 , and the following files: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 13–2 US; ibid., Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, CIA, Rusk CIA Committee, Report of the Committee, and Katzenbach Committee; Department of State, INR/IL Files, State-CIA Relations (1957–1968), NSC 5412 (1957-Basic Document), and 303 Committee; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Ramparts-NSA-CIA; ibid., Agency File, CIA; ibid., Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, 12/2/68, re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations; National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes for 1967; and Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–R01580R, Katzenbach Committee Report, and NSA. In his memoir, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) pages 85–109, Cord Meyer, Jr., recounts the background of the Ramparts exposé and its consequences from his perspective as Chief of CIA's Covert Action Staff and, after July 1967, as Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. 261. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) 261. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) 1 Washington, February 15, 1967. SUBJECT State-CIA Relations with Respect to Clandestine Activities Directives on Covert Operations . NSC Directive 5412 2 provides for the coordination of covert operations abroad such as subsidizing student organizations, newspapers, labor unions or political parties, and establishing proprietary business organizations. It was required that CIA coordinate all such activities with the Department. INR/DDC is the unit in State through which these operations are to be coordinated. Directives on Clandestine Collection . NSCID 5, 3 originally approved in the late 1950's, provided for notification to the Ambassador on clandestine collection activities after consultation with the Secretary of State, but despite this directive such notification took place only in rare circumstances. President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961 4 made clear the Ambassador's responsibility for all activities of all US agencies abroad and CIA on August 10, 1961 5 instructed its station chiefs to provide the Ambassador information on clandestine collection activities so he could judge the political risks. Normally, the State Department remains uninformed, and the question of principle as to CIA's obligation to inform the Department remains unsettled, though the Department has not for at least 4 years sought to force the issue. Necessities if State policy guidance is to be adequate. Adequacy of review on either covert operations or clandestine collection activities requires the following: 1. Provision by CIA of enough detail not only on the general purpose of an operation but on how it is to be carried out. 2. Timely notification i.e. well ahead of 303 or other meetings in which approvals are given. 3. Regular status reports on programs underway. 4. Full information and below the 7th floor level, i.e. INR/DDC, to insure appropriate working level coordination and staffing of proposals for the benefit of 7th floor. Adequacy of Review Procedures for Clandestine Operations (5412) Current procedures on 303 Committee items are not too bad except for shortness of time for staffing. INR has been concerned about what may be a trend by CIA officers to bypass INR in the Department to clear operations on a piecemeal basis with Country Directors or Assistant Secretaries. On some of these we lack adequate detail on how certain programs are to be carried out and we lack continuing review of major ongoing programs in the light of changing circumstances. The NSA story is an example. Recommended Action: 1. Propose in the 303 Committee a detailed substantive review of current programs under CIA/DDP jurisdiction. 2. Reissue in revised form the March 16, 1956 directive from the Secretary on Special Procedures within the Department for Handling 5412 Operations. The original document is attached. 6 3. Notify CIA through the 303 Committee of the tightening up of Departmental procedures for the handling of 5412 activities and request that their contacts with State conform to the directive. Adequacy Clandestine Collection Review Procedures . Field coordination is not bad, although there is nearly always a current glaring exception. [ 8 lines of source text not declassified ] Recommended Action: 1. A new reminder to CIA that the President's letter requires notification to the Ambassador on collection activities which might have political impact. 2. CIA has not admitted to a responsibility for clearing important clandestine collection activities in Washington. It is not easy to draw the line in these cases but we think the principle should be agreed and that we should undertake a process of developing adequate clearance procedures. Chairmanship of the 303 Committee Should the question of 303 chairmanship be reopened? When Mr. Bundy left the White House there was a period of doubt on the question. Since then Presidential directive establishing the SIG and the IRG's has placed greater responsibility for policy guidance on the Department. Other issues which might be thought about while NSA flap directs high level attention to CIA 1. Should State seek to review all or parts of the CIA budget? Bureau of the Budget officers charged with such duties have discussed with INR the inadequacies of the present system. No proposal for change has, however, come from BOB. 2. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] 3. Should State seek review of DOD clandestine activities, rather than rely on the present system in which the DCI is supposed to coordinate DOD activities? 4. How much of CIA's usefulness in the clandestine field has been impaired? Is it time for a new agency? For decentralization of such activities for existing agencies? For parallel actions by increasing confidential funds of existing agencies? 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Committee, Jan-June 1967. Secret. Drafted by Denney and William McAfee of INR/DDC. The memorandum is an unsigned copy. 2 See footnote 5, Document 263 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 221 . 4 Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1345–1347. 5 See footnote 3, Document 243 . 6 Not attached, but a copy is in the Department of State, INR/IL Files, State-CIA Relations, 1957–1968. 262. Editorial Note 262. Editorial Note On February 18, 1967, President's Special Assistant Rostow forwarded to the President copies of minutes of 303 Committee meetings that referred to “CIA connections with support for youth and student groups.” Noting in his covering memorandum that the last reference was December 3, 1964, Rostow observed that “the basic work of the 303 Committee is to examine new programs; although, in the period I have been here, I have asked for reexamination of certain programs when current issues arose.” For text of the memorandum and attachments, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume X, Document 171 . In a February 24 memorandum to the 303 Committee, Peter Jessup proposed that the committee “reexamine the criteria under which the 303 Committee approves of future, current, and long-standing projects.” Jessup continued: “Rather than examine each and every project of the type presently under public scrutiny, the committee should, at the earliest opportunity, give its attention to those activities which are recommended for continuation. The committee in the future should at no time approve an umbrella of projects or extensive programs in principle but should pass on each subordinate proposal which has an allocation of funds.” Jessup noted that the committee had been briefed several times on youth and student activities prior to 1965 but that “since that time-some 26 months ago-the subject has not again been raised except indirectly” on July 8, 1966. In concluding his memorandum, Jessup stated: “The Executive Secretary will undertake in the immediate future to reexamine all existing approvals to see if there are any projects 'coasting' on earlier approvals. We should try to examine each continuing project no less frequently than once a year.” (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes) At the 303 Committee meeting on May 5, Rostow “asked that the committee undertake its top-to-bottom review of projects on a steady basis between now and December and with first consideration due to those efforts which have a direct Katzenbach Committee connotation. This would include those which might eventually be transferred, terminated, or whose status results in any current ambiguity.” (Minutes of 303 Committee Meeting; ibid.) 263. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 263. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, February 23, 1967. COORDINATION AND POLICY APPROVAL OF COVERT OPERATIONS A. Historical Evolution 1. The first formal authority for what is now called “covert action” in the post-World War II era was the National Security Council (NSC) directive NSC 4–A, which was approved on 19 December 1947. 2 Without elaborating coordination procedures, it directed the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake covert action and to ensure that the resulting operations were consistent with U.S. policy. The DCI was to ensure through liaison with State and Defense that operations were consistent with U.S. policy. 2. NSC 4–A was refined and superseded by the issuance on 18 June 1948 of a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2. 3 This defined more clearly the aims and methods of covert action and spelled out with more precision the procedures for ensuring that covert operations conducted under it were consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies. “Designated representatives” of the Secretaries of State and Defense comprised the “Senior Consultants,” or “10/2 Panel,” which included civilian representatives of State and Defense and a military representative of the JCS. These Senior Consultants met with the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, the CIA office responsible at that time for planning and conducting covert operations, and reviewed proposed new covert projects to be conducted by CIA. 3. NSC 10/2 was further refined and superseded by the issuance on 23 October 1951 of NSC directive NSC 10/5. 4 This new directive authorized an expansion of world-wide covert operations and changed policy coordination procedures. The Psychological Strategy Board, which had been established on 4 April 1951, was charged with determining the “desirability and feasibility” of proposed covert programs and major covert projects. A new and expanded “10/5 Panel” was established, comprising the members of the earlier 10/2 Panel but adding staff representatives of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). It functioned much as the 10/2 Panel had, but the resulting procedures proved cumbersome and potentially insecure. Accordingly, when the PSB was replaced by the Operations Coordination Board (OCB) on 2 September 1953, coordination of covert operations reverted to a smaller group identical with the former 10/2 Panel, without OCB staff participation. 4. There subsequently was some retrogression toward the broader 10/5 Panel principle. On 15 March 1954, the issuance of NSC 5412, 5 which superseded NSC 10/5, required that the DCI consult with the OCB and with other U.S. Government departments and agencies as appropriate to ensure that covert operations were consistent with U.S. policies. NSC 5412/1, which superseded NSC 5412 on 12 March 1955, directed the DCI to consult with the Planning and Coordination Group (PCG) of the OCB and made the PCG the “normal channel” for the policy approval of covert operations. (In March 1955, the DCI briefed the PCG of the OCB on those CIA covert action operations which he had previously approved under NSC 4–A, 10/2, 10/5, and 5412.) 5. Covert coordination procedures reverted once more to a smaller and a more streamlined coordinative group with the issuance on 28 December 1955 of NSC 5412/2, superseding NSC 5412/1. NSC 5412/2 has remained in force up to the present. It removed the policy coordination and approval functions from the OCB and transferred them to “designated representatives” of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense to meet with the DCI as the “normal channel” for policy approval of covert operations. The coordinative body came to be known as the “5412/2 Designated Representatives” or the “Special Group.” It comprised (and comprises) representatives of the rank of Assistant Secretary or above. It was charged with reviewing in advance all major covert programs initiated by CIA or otherwise directed. 6. NSC 5412/2 coordinative procedures were slightly modified on 26 March 1957 with the issuance of an annex to the directive. The annex authorized approval solely by the Secretary of State of particularly sensitive projects that did not have military implications. This special authorization has not been utilized to date. It also required, however, that CIA keep the Departments of State and Defense advised on progress in implementing all approved covert action programs. 7. With the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration in early 1961, the Special Group (which changed its name to the “303 Committee” in June 1964 in accordance with NSAM 303) 6 meetings were transferred to the White House under the chairmanship of the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. (This was first McGeorge Bundy, then General Maxwell Taylor, then back to Bundy, and finally to Walt Rostow, the present chairman.) Prior to early 1961, the State Department member had been the “informal” chairman. B. Policy Doctrine 1. From the brief description of the evolution of coordination and approval procedures affecting covert operations, it is apparent that prior to March 1955, the governing NSC directives (5412, 10/5 and 10/2) provided for consultation with representatives of State and Defense but these individuals had no approval functions; nor did they include a representative of the President. Many of CIA's continuing covert action projects and programs were therefore begun when responsibility for policy conformity rested with the DCI in accordance with existing NSC directives. These projects and programs were in general discussion with State and Defense representatives, but the representatives were not called upon—nor were they authorized—to take affirmative action. (Normal Bureau of the Budget review procedures, of course, represented a measure of outside Executive control.) During this period certain decisions involving vital interests of the U.S. were, of course, referred to the President at the initiative of the DCI. 2. Even under NSC 5412/2, particularly in the early years (1955–1958), criteria governing submission of projects to the Special Group were never clearly defined, being left to the discretion of the DCI. During these early years, however, a considerable body of policy doctrine was established, which has been followed ever since. 3. At the beginning of 1959, regular weekly meetings of the Special Group were instituted, with one result that criteria for submission of projects to the Group were in practice considerably broadened. 4. Not until CIA's own internal instruction, dated 4 March 1963, 7 on Special Group submissions, however, did the criteria for submissions become more formal and precise. The 1963 CIA directive noted that the decision to submit an operational program or activity to the Special Group would be made by the DCI, and that political sensitivity would usually be the chief criterion for submission. The instruction also noted that where unusually large sums of money are involved, the DCI may decide to submit a program or activity on the grounds of funds alone. The instruction detailed the following types of programs or activities which, as a general rule, require Special Group action: Political and propaganda action programs involving direct or indirect action to influence or support political parties, groups or specific political leaders, including operations which use labor, youth, students, and influential military organizations as political pressure groups. Economic action programs designed to influence governments to support U.S. national policy objectives, or to prevent Bloc countries from obtaining some strategic politico-economic advantage in countries or areas of importance to U.S. global strategy. Paramilitary action programs. CIA clandestine and covert action annexes to U.S. Country Internal Defense Plans. The instruction also dealt with cases requiring resubmission to the Special Group: where there is need for a new policy determination or to reaffirm the previous policy decisions; when developments or changes are such as to make the subject a matter for re-examination by the Group; and if specifically required by the Special Group in its approval of the program or activity. 5. These criteria have remained unchanged in subsequent CIA internal directives. C. Comparative Numerical Approvals of CIA Proposals 1. Statistical reflection of the action of approval authority on CIA programs early in its life are difficult to offer on a comparative basis because of the steady refinement of “programs” into individual “projects”, but the best recapitulation available shows: a. Projects approved by DCI on internal authority: (1949–1952)—81—Truman Administration b. Projects approved by DCI in coordination with Operations Coordination Board or Psychological Strategy Board: (1953–1954)—66—Eisenhower Administration c. Projects approved or reconfirmed by Operations Coordination Board, the Special Group or 303 Committee: Eisenhower Administration—104 Kennedy Administration—163 Johnson Administration—142 (March 1955–February 1967) 2. As the sophistication of the policy approval process developed so did the participation of the external approving authority. Since establishment of the Special Group (later 303 Committee), the policy arbiters have questioned CIA presentations, amended them and, on occasion, denied them outright. The record shows that the Group/Committee, in some instances, has over-ridden objections from the DCI and instructed the Agency to carry out certain activities. [Omitted here are discussion of specific proposals that were turned down, and section D on special briefings of BOB, White House, and other officials.] E. State Department Coordination 1. Newly-appointed principal State Department officers and outgoing ambassadors are briefed in depth by CIA Headquarters officials on broad objectives and CIA's activities within the country. Shortly after an Ambassador arrives at his post, the CIA Chief of Station gives him a detailed and specific briefing on the Agency's covert action activities in the country. Covert action matters growing out of CIA's responsibilities under NSC directives provide for full participation and review by State Department and Ambassadors in the formulation of specific programs, with the decision on them being made at appropriate policy levels. In the field, this means full details on the substance and objectives of the activity, and, depending upon circumstances, clandestine means and methods to the extent that they are related directly to the substance of the activity. The purpose is to allow the Ambassador to judge the desirability of the program and inherent political risks. Instructions to Agency field stations with respect to CIA's field coordination with Ambassadors are frequently re-stated, the latest in January 1966. 8 2. CIA representatives participate in the mission Country Team meetings and are often requested to draft proposals for forwarding to Washington for policy review and approval, especially in the fields of internal security and covert action. 3. All 303 Committee programs or activities are coordinated with the Ambassador, as well as the Assistant Secretary of State of the area concerned. This coordination process has to be accomplished before the proposal is submitted to the 303 Committee. A number of approved programs or activities originate with the Ambassadors or the Department of State. 303 Committee proposals and other covert action matters are discussed between CIA Area Division Chiefs and their State Department counterpart Assistant Secretaries at regular, usually weekly, informal meetings. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Report of the Committee. Secret; Sensitive. The paper was prepared for the Katzenbach Committee (see Document 260 ) and was Appendix C to the committee's report but was not made public. 2 For text, see Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman , pp. 173–175. 3 For text, see ibid., pp. 213–216. 4 For text, see ibid., pp. 437–439. 5 NSC Directives 5412, 5412/1, and 5412/2, and the annex to 5412/2 are at the Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records. NSC Directive 5412/2 and its annex are printed in William Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 146–149. 6 See Documents 203 and 204 . 7 Not found. 8 Document 243 . 264. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to All Staff Chiefs and Division Chiefs 264. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to All Staff Chiefs and Division Chiefs 1 Washington, April 14, 1967. DDP 7–1521 SUBJECT Guidelines on the Katzenbach Committee Report The following guidelines will apply for CS operations in the light of the Katzenbach Report, 2 the next couple of years: 1. The most sensitive area is that of U.S. educational institutions and U.S. students. Where absolutely necessary, contracts with U.S. universities may be made for research and other similar specific services either (a) overtly by the Agency, or (b) using the Department of Defense or a commercial entity as a cut-out. These contracts should be kept at an absolute minimum. If necessary and as a result of university rules, grants may be substituted for such contracts. 2. Although the basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Agency, we should be particularly careful to exclude, wherever possible, U.S. students and U.S. university professors. If, in the recruitment process, any reluctance is shown on the part of the individual, drop the matter. This does not bar such relationships completely but very thoughtful consideration should be given before any approach is made to anyone within the student or professorial category. Any such arrangements must be passed on by the DDP. 3. We will, under no circumstances, publish books, magazines or newspapers in the U.S. Fallout in the U.S. from a foreign publication which we support is inevitable and consequently permissible. Should a defector publish a book in the U.S., he may do so on his own; publication will not be supported by CIA. 4. Covert relations with commercial U.S. organizations are not barred. [ 1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified ] 6. “Twilight Zone” voluntary organizations, such as the Rand Corporation, Rotary, etc., are barred. This includes trade or professional associations. When dealing on the edges of the Katzenbach rulings, and within the above guidelines, we should always pay particular heed to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these guidelines—and there should be, often—consult with the DDP. The following specific projects which fall in the gray area will have to be taken to the 303 Committee as soon as possible: [ 6 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified ] The Katzenbach Committee, in reviewing our CA program, decided that certain of our activities must be discontinued and others must be transferred from CIA to public or legitimate private funding or, in some instances, a mix of public-private funding. Terminations and transfers must be accomplished, largely, by 31 December 1967. Each component will be provided with a specific listing of activities under its control which fall within the above guidelines. Desmond FitzGerald 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–06423A, US Govt-State Dept. Secret. 2 See Document 260 . 265. Editorial Note 265. Editorial Note In an April 17, 1967, memorandum to Thomas Hughes, Director of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, William McAfee of INR summarized the results of a survey of covert operations considered during 1966 by the 303 Committee and by the periodic meetings of regional Assistant Secretaries with their CIA counterparts: “The records [of INR's Deputy Director for Coordination] indicate that 87 covert operations of the type covered under NSC 5412 were considered during 1966. Of these, 34 were discussed in 15 303 Committee meetings; 46 were discussed in 110 Assistant Secretaries' meetings; 7 were reported by CIA as undertaken unilaterally (NSC 5412 provides that the Director of Central Intelligence must obtain the concurrence of State and Defense for major operations). Of the 87 operations, 9 were disapproved, 1 was redirected to a non-CIA action, and 23 were postponed, remanded for further study, noted, or abandoned.” Among McAfee's conclusions were the following: “Proposals for covert action are carefully weighed, and prudently decided upon. The present procedure is very far from a rubber-stamp process. However, proposals are sometimes made by CIA on very short notice to the 303 Committee, with little or no opportunity for thorough staff work in State”; and “There was very little review of on-going projects, other than those proposed for extension.” (Department of State, INR Files, CA-Coordination & Review) In an August 24, 1967, memorandum, William Truehart, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, reviewed procedures for approving small scale covert operations: “According to NSC 5412/2, paragraph 7, all major covert operations are normally to be approved by designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and a representative of the President. Thus 303 Committee action is not mandatory in all cases. In practice, CIA has sometimes checked out small covert action proposals in meetings with regional assistant secretaries or their deputies, which are also attended by officers of the Operations Staff of INR/DDC. Sometimes CIA has simply gone ahead on the recommendation of the Chief of Mission and Station Chief. The [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] limitation mentioned by Mr. Helms in the August 22 [303 Committee] discussion has been the usual yardstick of small scale, but political sensitivity has also been considered. In recent months, CIA has appeared to bring most if not all proposed covert operations to the regional meetings; here it has sometimes been decided to approve them without 303 Committee action as not major, and at other times to refer them to 303 Committee for approval.” Truehart's memorandum then proposed a change in procedures for approving small scale covert operations. Intended for Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Kohler, the memorandum was prepared but not forwarded. (Ibid., 303 Committee, July–Dec 1967) 266. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) 266. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) 1 Washington, April 17, 1967. SUBJECT Draft Revision of NSC 5412 As we agreed orally, INR has drafted a revision of NSC 5412 which is attached (Tab A), in response to Walt Rostow's memorandum of March 29, 1967. 2 I also attach a question-and-answer sheet discussing the changes in the draft, as compared with NSC 5412 (Tab B), and a tabular comparison of the texts of both versions (Tab C). 3 As stated in Tab B, there would appear to be four reasons for revising NSC 5412: a. To make its language accord with the text and spirit of the report of the President's Review Committee; b. To deal more explicitly with the risks, consequences, and alternatives of covert operations; c. To plug loopholes; d. To get rid of anachronistic cold-war language. There are admittedly disadvantages to undertaking a revision. A good deal of discussion and inter-agency negotiation will be necessary, probably in an amount disproportionate to the objective. On balance, however, I think it would be advisable to try it. At least twice before, revisions of NSC 5412 were seriously considered. Not to revise it now, when the whole question of covert operations is under review in public as well as in private, might be hard to explain at some later time. Moreover, there seems to be no more promising time to make needed revisions. 4 I realize that, as pointed out in the 303 meeting on April 7, CIA's platter is rather full at the moment. I would therefore suggest that we consider handing copies of the attached draft to Walt Rostow, Cy Vance, and Dick Helms, suggesting that it be discussed at a convenient future time. Tab A Washington, undated. DRAFT NSAM 1. Covert operations are defined as actions in furtherance of United States foreign policy which are so planned and executed (a) that United States Government responsibility for them will not be revealed, and (b) that if revealed, the United States Government could plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Excluded from this definition are armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations. 2. The United States Government has undertaken covert operations as a necessary response to covert operations by major hostile powers, or the threat of such operations. Nevertheless, covert operations involve varying degrees of contradiction to basic legal and social principles. They therefore carry the serious long-term risk of eroding or negating these principles, which are fundamental to the achievement of long-range United States objectives. 3. It is therefore United States policy to keep covert operations to an irreducible minimum, and to undertake a covert operation only when it is determined, after careful consideration, that the prospective results (a) are essential to national security or national interests; (b) are of such value as significantly to outweigh the risks, both immediate and long-term; and (c) cannot be effectively obtained in any other way. 4. A Special Group is established under the National Security Council to approve and review covert operations, acting on the basis of unanimity. The Special Group shall consist of the Secretaries of State and Defense, or representatives designated by them; a representative of the President designated by him; and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget participates in periodic reviews of operations in progress, and may participate in other Special Group proceedings. 5. The Special Group shall specifically approve each covert operation before it is undertaken, review and evaluate each operation at not less than twelve-month intervals, and note (or may direct) its termination or its conversion to a less sensitive form of action, with the following exceptions: a. The Special Group may delegate to representatives of any two of its members, of the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary or above, its responsibilities with respect to minor covert operations under guidelines it establishes. All decisions reached by such representatives shall be promptly reported to the Special Group. b. The Secretary of State may approve a particularly sensitive project which has no military implications. The fact of such approval shall be reported to the Special Group, as well as the termination of the operation so approved. 6. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for planning, conducting, and terminating covert operations which are approved by the Special Group of the National Security Council. He will provide the Special Group with all information concerning such operations that the Group deems necessary to its responsibilities. In exceptional circumstances, such as those in paragraph 7, covert operations may be assigned by the Special Group to the Secretary of Defense. 7. In theaters of war or areas in which United States armed forces are engaged in combat operations, (a) the Secretary of Defense shall assure that plans for covert operations are in consonance with and complementary to approved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (b) the conduct of covert operations will be under command and control relationships approved by the Secretary of Defense. 8. The Special Group may authorize an agency of the United States Government, other than the Central Intelligence Agency, to conduct an operation in support of national interests or national security without disclosing Government responsibility. The proposed operation must be such that overt Government sponsorship would largely negate its expected benefits, but at the same time must be of such nature that disclosure of Government responsibility would not be a significant embarrassment to the United States. Approval, review, and appraisal of each non-disclosed operation shall be either by the Special Group itself or by delegation in the same way as provided in Paragraph 5a above. The executing agency shall provide the Special Group with all information concerning such operation that the Group deems necessary to its responsibilities. 9. The Chief and Deputy Chief of each diplomatic mission shall be informed in advance of covert and non-disclosed operations affecting the country or organization to which they are accredited, and shall be kept informed on such operations until they are terminated, unless the Special Group determines otherwise. 10. The Director of Central Intelligence will recommend to the Special Group the procedures needed to ensure that the security of covert operations is maintained. Members of the Special Group will take special precautions in their respective agencies so that only those employees who must know are informed of each covert operation or have access to documents concerning it. 11. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget will assist the Special Group in arranging the financing of covert and non-disclosed operations. 12. No federal agency shall provide any covert assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations, except in individual cases specifically approved by the Special Group and by the Secretaries of State and Defense in unusual contingencies where overriding national security interests so require, and where open sources of support are shown to be unavailable. In no event shall any future exception be approved which involves any educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization. 13. This directive does not modify the responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of the Director of Central Intelligence under existing laws and Presidential directives. NSC 5412/2, December 28, 1955, with the associated Memorandum and Annex of March 26, 1957, and NSAM 303 of June 4, 1964, are rescinded. 5 The Special Group shall exercise its responsibilities over all continuing covert operations approved under these or other previous directives. 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, CA-Coordination and Review. Top Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is an unsigned copy marked “Number 3 of 6 copies, Series A.” 2 Tab A is printed below. Rostow's memorandum to Rusk stated: “In view of the President's acceptance of the Katzenbach Committee report on CIA covert support of private organizations, we should proceed promptly to revise the now outdated National Security Council Paper 5412/2, dated December 28 , 1955.” (Johnson Library, NSAMs, NSAM 303) 3 Tabs B and C are attached but not printed. 4 NSC Directive 5412 was not revised during the Johnson administration. 5 See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 263 . 267. Editorial Note 267. Editorial Note From 11:10 a.m. to noon on May 5, 1967, a meeting was held in Secretary of State Rusk's office to discuss “actions which should be taken concerning covert operations and clandestine activities, in the light of recent disclosures of CIA involvements.” Present were Rusk, Katzenbach, Kohler, and four members of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Director Hughes, Deputy Director Denney, Robert McAfee, and Donald Macdonald. The latter prepared a memorandum of the conversation on May 9. (Department of State, INR/IL Files, State-CIA Relations, 1957–1968; Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book for time and date of meeting) Following some “initial general discussion,” Rusk “said there was need for far-reaching policy discussion. For example, he thought that in the countries with whom we are close friends, we should be doing only those things we would allow them to do with us. Mr. Hughes noted the particular problem of CIA contacts with opposition leaders: should these contacts be retained when the opposition became the government? The Secretary spoke of the need to take some action on these issues.” Hughes then “listed a number of examples of recent problems” and, upon concluding, “noted that the press had been aware of many operations, but had been sitting on the story before Ramparts blew it. There was a change of climate, and a de-stabilizing effect on the consciences of writers and others. Mr. Katzenbach noted that the CIA had been 'hardlining' so long that such publicity bothered them less than it did us.” Hughes then “noted that excellent personal working relations existed between CIA and INR, despite INR's burden of representing both sides.” A general discussion of the “relative concerns of State and CIA” ensued, following which Hughes indicated “that he was not saying necessarily that for State to be fully informed of covert operations and clandestine activities would eliminate the risks. The Secretary noted the need to ensure that if we take risks we take them consciously. Mr. Katzenbach added that the risks should be worth taking,” and Hughes agreed. “Hughes then briefed the results of the INR/DDC survey of 1966 5412 cases” (see Document 265 ), noting that “support to international activities of voluntary organizations had always been an exception to the normal procedures. He pointed out the problems of considering 5412 actions—how to weigh them and budget them.” He observed that “when CIA made payments for information, such cases did not go through the 303 procedure at all” and “we don't know how much of this happens. Many cases which 'blow' are clandestine intelligence situations.” “As for inter-agency relations, Mr. Hughes said that some matters were procedural and mechanical, but the problem was basically a state of mind. He noted the CIA predilection for dealing directly with the policy officers. Although the CIA had acknowledged responsibility to inform Ambassadors of clandestine activities, the Department is as usual not informed, although NSCID 5 called for consulting the Secretary of State. The Secretary said that when he saw Foreign Ministers and other officials, he should know as much as the ministers themselves about their involvements with the U.S. Government. Mr. Hughes pointed out that the CIA quoted statutory authority to support its position on clandestine activities. The Secretary observed that there was no need to be paralyzed by statutory authority; that there was no activity touching on foreign affairs that he did not feel authorized to inquire into. Mr. Hughes said there was a question as to how much the Ambassador and others should know about involvements with high officials. This would require a revision in the NSC directive. The Secretary observed that not all Ambassadors should know everything. He didn't want to generalize about this subject in any direction.” “At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that the Secretary would see Mr. Helms alone, after which the same group would meet again to discuss the problem further.” Rusk met alone in his office with Director of Central Intelligence Helms on May 20, but no record of the discussion has been found. No record has been found of a follow-up meeting of the same group. 268. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) to President Johnson 268. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 20, 1967. SUBJECT The Intelligence Information-Handling Problem This is the second report submitted by your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning the serious problem faced by U.S. intelligence agencies in physically handling the huge volume of intelligence information which is collected, stored, drawn upon, digested, analyzed and disseminated within the Government on a continuing basis. In June 1965 you approved the Board's preliminary recommendations 2 for action to resolve this information-handling problem, including (1) the establishment of specialized training programs for personnel of the intelligence agencies, and (2) an experimental, inter-agency system utilizing computers for the storage of intelligence information accessible to user agencies at remote locations over secure communications circuits. Over the past two years the Board has followed closely the implementation of these recommendations, and we are pleased to report that the beginnings of progress are being made by the member agencies of the U.S. intelligence community. However, we find that much more must be done. The third recommendation of our report of two years ago, which you also approved, called for a broad study of the information-handling problem by a select panel of outside experts in related scientific fields, under the joint sponsorship of the Board and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Dr. Donald F. Hornig. This study, which was completed recently, included a thorough examination of all aspects of the information-handling problem confronting the intelligence agencies of our Government. 3 Based on our review of this study, supplemented by an independent review of the subject by the Board's Communications Panel, we have reached the following conclusions: 1. Although individual agencies have taken noteworthy steps to improve their information-handling capabilities, the problem is not being addressed adequately on a concerted community-wide basis. 2. In recent years there has evolved a steady and tremendous growth in the input and output of intelligence information within and among the agencies making up the U.S. intelligence community. (As examples of the volume of intelligence input, one agency makes 30 copies of incoming reports from overseas posts; another agency distributes copies of incoming documentary messages to more than 200 different recipients; and a third agency's yearly total of 125,000 incoming reports is distributed in almost 5 million copies. The output of digested intelligence adding to the “information explosion” is illustrated by the Central Intelligence Agency's production of 35 million pages in 1965, representing more than a two-fold increase in four years. The immensity of the reservoir of intelligence information is indicated by the estimated total of 300 million documents, reports and other items of intelligence information which are on hand, and which require the services of over 7,000 people engaged in the handling of this store of material at a cost of around $100 million a year.) 3. The U.S. intelligence community has not yet exploited modern methods and technologies for information-handling, including automation techniques, as promptly or as widely as could be done to meet the problem, except for some significant steps taken by individual U.S. agencies. (As one example of this deficiency in the intelligence community as a whole, the current systems for handling and processing biographics intelligence files are inadequate in the following ways: (a) large numbers of duplicative biographics files are maintained by various member agencies of the intelligence community (b) in most cases these duplicative files have been inadequately cross-checked (c) there are differing procedures among agencies, and even within agencies, with respect to such fundamental matters as the organization, updating, and formats used in maintaining the files (d) as presently constituted the biographics files of the various agencies do not satisfy the needs of intelligence analysts with respect to prompt availability, completeness or reliability of the information sought, and (e) the actual service provided by these various files does not justify the current cost of maintaining them.) 4. In the absence of a modern information-handling system operated on a community-wide basis under strong and effective management, the U.S. intelligence community will not achieve a satisfactory capability to provide the President and other Government officials with discriminating, adequate and timely intelligence support. (We believe that another crisis situation such as the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba would most likely require improvised information-handling arrangements because of inadequacies in the present system.) 5. An effective community-wide intelligence information-handling system, designed and carried out under strong central management, should result in long-term, significant improvement in the over-all management and coordination of U.S. intelligence operations as a whole. 6. The extensive experience and particular competence of the Bureau of the Budget in the management and organization field are such as to warrant participation by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in top-level Executive Branch guidance and support which should be provided to the U.S. intelligence community in its efforts to resolve the intelligence-handling problem. Based on the above conclusions, we are of the opinion that a basic action is required in the form of a Presidential Directive which will establish the responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (within his statutory mission relating to coordination of the overall foreign intelligence effort) for the creation and central management of an efficient, automation-supported intelligence-handling system with participation by all intelligence agencies of the Government. We believe that such a directive should also make provision within the Executive Offices of the President for top-level monitorship and guidance of the development of the over-all system in the interest of the national security. Should you approve the basic action which we have just proposed, we also propose certain supplementary actions which we believe should be considered by the Director of Central Intelligence and member agencies of the intelligence community for inclusion in initial steps taken toward establishment of the ultimate system. The Board's recommendations for action at the Presidential level, and within the U.S. intelligence community, are attached hereto. In submitting these recommendations the Board wishes to emphasize the great importance which we place upon the timely achievement of the objectives involved, as an essential element of actions required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall United States intelligence effort. In the course of our study of the subject the Board has had the benefit of the views and comments of Dr. Hornig concerning the nature of the problem and actions which should be taken to remedy the situation. This report has the approval of Dr. Hornig and he joins in its submission to you. Respectfully yours, Clark M. Clifford Attachment Recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to President Johnson on the Intelligence Information-Handling Problem Basic Recommendation The Board recommends the issuance of a Presidential Directive, pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 4 as amended, providing as follows: 1. That the Director of Central Intelligence (a) undertake as a high-priority assignment the responsibility for the design and management, within the U.S. intelligence community, of a unified information-handling system to ensure on a community-wide basis the secure and efficient processing, storage and retrieval of intelligence information which is acquired and maintained by the U.S. Government in the interests of national defense and security; (b) in discharging this assignment, exploit to the maximum practicable extent scientific and technological advances in the field of information-handling; (c) establish the Office of a Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence to assist him in discharging his responsibility for design and management of the community-wide information-handling system; (d) produce a phased plan for the definition and implementation of the unified information-handling system, with an identification of costs and benefits for each phase, for review in connection with the Fiscal Year 1969 budget (a detailed proposal for the first annual increment and overall estimates for the total system should be made available by November 1, 1967); and (e) submit semiannual reports to the President on progress toward implementation of the plan. 2. That the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, serve the President as a review body within the Executive Office of the President, having responsibility for (a) lending assistance to the Director of Central Intelligence in the implementation of his responsibilities pursuant to this directive, and (b) performing a monitoring function, including periodic follow-ups, with respect to the establishment and operation of the community-wide system. 3. That the member agencies of the U.S. intelligence community develop and operate information-handling systems meeting the requirements established by the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to the community-wide system for which he has design and management responsibility; and that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency establish in their respective offices a central focal point having responsibility for management and resources review of their internal intelligence information-handling systems, and for working with the designated Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the achievement of the community-wide system. Supplementary Recommendations Contingent upon the issuance of the Presidential Directive proposed above, the Board recommends that the following actions be included among the initial steps to be taken by the Director of Central Intelligence toward the achievement of a community-wide information-handling system, and by the respective intelligence agencies in support of that system: 1. The creation, on a priority basis, of a community-wide pilot system for the handling of intelligence information which compromises the biographic files on Soviet “elite” personalities; the tasking and funding of the experimental COINS project currently being conducted under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, in order to accommodate the pilot biograhpics system; and the subsequent steady expansion of this pilot system to include other important biographics areas. 2. The conduct of an experimental program to provide automated support to those functions of the intelligence community's National Indications Center having to do with the timely processing, evaluation, and reporting of current intelligence indications; and utilization of the results of this experimental project, to assist in the further development of automated support to the total U.S. intelligence effort. 3. The establishment in each U.S. intelligence agency, in addition to the office of the Director of Central Intelligence, of a staff function to be concerned with operations research and systems analysis directed toward the formulation of new and improved information-handling methods and procedures, based on an objective evaluation of the needs of individual agencies and of the intelligence community as a whole. 4. The conduct of community-wide studies, under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, to determine how automated data storage and recall and improved information-handling procedures might assist other elements of the community which perform evaluations of (a) the adequacy of the intelligence product to meet intelligence users' needs, and (b) the formulation and validation of intelligence collection requirements which generate that product. 5. Action by the Director of Central Intelligence to provide over-all policy guidance to U.S. intelligence agencies with respect to the establishment and conduct of experimental research facilities for the development of improved information-handling techniques. 6. Action by U.S. intelligence agencies, under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, to develop an automation-supported system providing increased efficiency and economy in the control, dissemination and accountability of classified documents which are generated by the U.S. Government in great quantity and at great expense, and are presently inventoried and controlled by manual methods. 7. The development by the Director of Central Intelligence of new physical security regulations, procedures and guidelines to be implemented by U.S. intelligence agencies on a community-wide basis, with a view to providing adequate security protection for sensitive intelligence data within information-handling systems utilizing automatic data processing techniques. 8. Establishment of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, having responsibility with respect to the community-wide information-handling system, as a focal point to act as an interface between the intelligence agencies and the scientific and technical community, to ensure that information-handling techniques wherever developed are applied to information processes in the intelligence community. The Board also recommends action by the Department of State, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, to improve significantly the effectiveness and efficiency of the usage of intelligence information in the formulation of foreign policy, through such means as (a) better integration of the information produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research into the overall information system of the Department as a part of the policy-formulating process, and (b) exploitation of modern systems and information-handling technology applicable to the acquisition, processing, analysis, and evaluation of substantive foreign affairs information and intelligence information, and their joint use in policy formulation. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, INT 8 US. Confidential. An attached September 21 memorandum from Rostow to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara requests comments on the report. Reaction to the conclusions and proposals are in memoranda prepared by Director of Central Intelligence Helms, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research George Denney, Jr., Director of the National Security Agency Carter, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 368) 2 Dated June 15, 1965. (Ibid.) 3 The study has not been found. 4 P.L. 253, approved July 26, 1947. (61 Stat. 497) 269. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to All Staff Chiefs and Division Chiefs 269. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to All Staff Chiefs and Division Chiefs 1 Washington, September 30, 1967. DD/P 7–4201 SUBJECT Criteria for 303 Committee Submissions REFERENCE [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] 20 May 1966 2 1. Recent developments require that the Clandestine Services look more carefully at what operational programs or activities should be submitted to the 303 Committee. The 303 Committee and its predecessor Special Group were established by a National Security Council Directive to be comprised of designated representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the President, for the purpose of acting as the normal channel for giving policy approval in advance of major covert programs initiated by the CIA, as well as for securing coordination of support for such programs among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. Under the terms of the NSC Directive, specifically excluded from the Committee's consideration are operations involving armed conflict by recognized military forces, cover and deception for military operations, and, of special importance to CIA, espionage and counter-espionage operations. 2. The Katzenbach Report 3 brought new submission requirements for certain [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] projects and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] programs. Mr. Rostow has recently made clear his desire that in all our political action projects we err on the side of presentation to the Committee. I have noted that the guidelines [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] may be variously interpreted by Division and Staff chiefs, with resultant unevenness in the overall scope of our submissions. 3. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] is still valid, and I wish to emphasize that the amount of money involved should not be the criterion controlling submission to the 303 Committee. No Division or Staff chief should preclude submission to the Committee solely because the sum involved is small. Our paramount considerations must be the political sensitivity of the activity and its consistency with U.S. foreign policy. 4. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] makes it quite clear that political and economic action programs involving direct or indirect action to influence or support political parties, groups or specific political leaders, including operations which use labor, youth, students, and influential military organizations as political pressure groups require 303 approval. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] also is quite explicit that resubmission to the 303 Committee will be made when operational or other developments or changes are such as to make the subject a matter for re-examination by the Committee. Previous 303 Committee authorization may not be used to justify the funding of new or different activities. 5. As a supplement [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and as an aid in pinpointing political sensitivity, the following are likely to require 303 Committee approval. If there is doubt about the need for policy review, you should err on the side of recommending presentation to the Committee. a. Foreign politicians, both governmental and opposition, as well as certain military leaders, on the U.S. covert payroll who are used in any significant and continuing way for influence should be brought to my or the ADDP's attention for determination as to whether the case should be submitted to the 303 Committee. Projects involving foreign officials with whom we have relationships solely for espionage will not normally be submitted to 303. In those cases where use is made of a foreign political contact and he is receiving funds both for intelligence collection and covert action purposes, the area division chief will make a recommendation to me or the ADDP for final determination. b. Activity having a political influence. An activity should be judged in terms of impact on the present or future government, impact on the leadership of a political party, and influence during an election. If a functional organization is used for other than intelligence collection, organizational or training purposes, we must assume that its use involves political influence, in its broad sense. c. Certain counterinsurgency programs. Where our involvement in a counterinsurgency program is limited solely to the support and improvement of the local government's intelligence collection capability, 303 submission is not required unless special circumstances make it politically sensitive. Where our covert involvement encompasses civic action and other forms of nation building operations, 303 submission will normally be required. 6. Since a determination of what projects are politically sensitive obviously requires a value judgment on our part, I ask that you again review all projects which are in any way politically sensitive. I suspect that your review will uncover projects which have changed sufficiently to warrant submission to the Committee [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ]. 7. I have asked the ADDP to review such marginal cases as may exist, discuss them with you, and advise me as to any such cases requiring submission. TH Karamessines 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 78–06423A, US Gov't-Special Group. Secret. 2 Not found. 3 See Document 260 . 270. Sixteenth Report of the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State 270. Sixteenth Report of the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State 1 Washington, October 1967. A. Organizational Arrangements The Interplay of Intelligence and Policy With the exception of the renaming and reorientation of what is now the Office of Strategic and Functional Research (discussed below), there have been no significant changes since last year's report 2 in the over-all make-up of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, an organizational chart for which is appended as Annex A. 3 Rather than discussing “organizational arrangements” in the traditional, administrative sense, this report will therefore concentrate on the functional aspect. More specifically, it will describe the way in which INR, as the particular intelligence arm of the Department of State, is organized to fulfill one of its primary responsibilities, that of making available to the Secretary of State and other policy-making officials of the Department at all levels the information and the judgments of INR and of the intelligence community and of bringing the fruits of the national intelligence effort to bear on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. 4 In its recent memorandum for the President on the intelligence information-handling problem, 5 the Board concluded with a recommendation, calling for certain internal changes in the Department of State, which suggests a concern on the part of the Board that intelligence is seriously divorced from operations in the Department. It is with this apparent concern in mind that we have thought it timely to prepare for the Board this discussion of the principal mechanisms by which INR makes its work usable by its “customers.” There are basically two such mechanisms, and the Board is generally familiar with the first—the production by INR of finished intelligence, primarily in the form of “Intelligence Notes” and “Research Memoranda.” These products provide support at three levels: essential background information on foreign policy developments and problems, analytical judgments based on continuing study of all information available to the intelligence community, and estimative projections into the future. Often they give the Secretary a viewpoint different from that of the regional bureaus charged with policy responsibility, thus confirming the rationale for the existence of a separate intelligence organization within the Department. Less well known, it would seem, is the second major mechanism, and this report presents a fuller description of it than has been provided in previous years. It may be a failure to clarify the various aspects of the rather extensive intelligence briefing mechanism in the Department that accounts in part for what we have interpreted as a manifestation of concern on the part of the Board. For it is this highly personalized, extremely flexible briefing process that in fact drives home the conclusions of the intelligence process and insures that the policy maker receives the intelligence “message” by means surer than the automatic and impersonal circulation of paper. Intelligence Briefings at State At the opening of business each day the Director of Intelligence and Research or his Deputy gives a private, all-source briefing to the Secretary. In preparation for this briefing the Director has read and excerpted significant items from the highly-classified summary prepared the previous afternoon by INR, from CIA's evening Situation Report on Vietnam, and from the morning publications of CIA, DIA, and NSA. To avoid duplication, he has read the “Staff Summary,” which is published by the Department's own Operations Center to give the Secretary a quick reading on items of operational importance from Departmental telegrams. During the half hour immediately before the Secretary's arrival in the Department, the Director then meets with an analyst from each of the several regional offices of INR to read and discuss with them the briefing notes they have just prepared on significant information selected from the full overnight flow of Foreign Service reports, TDCS reports, FBIS and the wire services, and NSA traffic. He is thus able to give the Secretary, in the shortest possible time and with an eye to the Secretary's appointments calendar and a knowledge of the most immediate problems before him, a distillate of worldwide current intelligence from the entire community along with interpretative commentary, including any differences of opinion that may exist within the community. While the Secretary is being briefed, a similar individualized briefing is being conducted for the Under Secretary. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs also receive private, all-source briefings each morning. To make possible so many nearly simultaneous briefings, INR's briefing panel has been expanded during the past year to five officers, the Director and Deputy Director now being assisted by three ranking officers from the Bureau. All-source or simpler intelligence briefings are also conducted at other levels in the Department throughout the day. INR's regional office directors have standing arrangements for briefing the assistant secretaries of their counterpart regional bureaus, while nearly a score of analysts from INR regularly bring items of significance to the attention of the country directors concerned and to key officers in the functional Bureaus of the Department. Over the past several years the number of officers in the Department indoctrinated for access to special intelligence has expanded to include almost all country directors, and procedures for screening and bringing such intelligence to their attention on a timely basis have developed accordingly. Statistically, INR personnel each year conduct approximately 8,000 person-to-person special intelligence briefings within the Department. The number of ambassadors and other key personnel at overseas missions having access to special intelligence has also increased in recent years, and, as an additional means of assuring the fullest utilization of intelligence in the foreign policy process, INR analysts assist in the identification of pertinent reports for relay to the United States Mission to the United Nations in New York and to the seventy-five or eighty diplomatic missions now capable of being serviced through SSO [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] channels. Aside from keeping the policy officer informed, the individual briefing system has the highly important additional benefit, through discussion between briefer and briefee, of keeping INR informed of the current needs and concerns of the policy officer. INR is thus able more effectively to gear its production of “policy-oriented” research papers to known needs and interests and to relay current requests for specific information to other agencies. To the extent possible, these regular briefings are also used for discussion of those national intelligence estimates and special studies from other agencies requiring compartmented handling, but special briefing sessions are arranged as required. Last fall, for example, the Director of INR and the INR office directors concerned met with the Secretary and about a dozen other top officials of the Department to go over the annual estimates on Soviet strategic capabilities shortly after their approval by the USIB. In addition, numerous activities of semi-liaison, semi-briefing character further expand the effectiveness of INR in bringing intelligence into communication with policy. INR office directors attend the staff meetings of their related policy Bureaus, other officers attend meetings at lower levels, and INR country officers are required to be in contact with their operational desk officers. The relationship with S/P is particularly close and effective. The INR Deputy Director for Research attends all regular meetings of the Policy Planning Council (S/P); he takes along any INR expert appropriate to the subject under discussion, arranges for experts to attend special discussions of S/P, and insures that members of S/P are aware of the INR officers who can help them in their individual projects. The Director of the Office of Strategic and Functional Research attends meetings of the politico-military staff (G/PM). In connection with both G/PM and S/P, INR officers have participated in both of the major studies undertaken in the last two years by the State-Defense Study Group, on China and the Middle East: for the second, INR contributed one full-time member to Ambassador Holmes' staff. Finally, INR is becoming integrated with the mechanism of the SIG and IRGs. There is difficulty because the Department is naturally chary of crowding the sessions with its own officers. A modus operandi is, however, evolving satisfactorily. The relevant office directors keep in touch with the Bureau-IRG executive secretaries, and share in Departmental discussions of papers before the meetings. The INR Director regularly receives documentation and agenda of the SIG, and also regularly attends the briefing of the Under Secretary that takes place before each meeting of the SIG, while the SIG Executive Secretary debriefs to INR any pertinent information after the meeting. In this way INR has opportunity both to make its intelligence views heard before the meeting and to learn afterwards in what way it can assist in implementation of the SIG's decisions. These individualized briefings and personal exchanges are, of course, merely supplements to, and not substitutes for, the continuous flow of intelligence information throughout the Department. The INR Communications Center not only handles the dissemination of incoming documents within INR and of INR's own products to other parts of the Department, to other agencies in Washington, and to overseas posts. In addition, it serves as the focal point for distribution throughout the Department of intelligence information from the other members of the intelligence community. Last fiscal year, for example, of the over 800,000 individual documents received by the Communications Center, just over half were Foreign Service reports and miscellaneous State Department publications intended for INR's own use. The remainder were from CIA, the military agencies, and miscellaneous sources. Copies of all of these were rapidly disseminated throughout the Department. Thus, while restrictions on the flow of intelligence information may be at the root of the belief, to which the President's Board has apparently subscribed, that there is a schism between intelligence and operations within the Department, in actuality it is only documents containing special intelligence that do not circulate freely and promptly within the Department. Such documents are, to be sure, not left with the officials to whom they are taken for briefing; they are hand-carried to the designated recipients and immediately returned to one of the two areas in the building which meet the standards for controlling and protecting sensitive compartmented intelligence information. Given the fact that foreign diplomats, the press, and the general public have relatively free access to the entire building, it has never been considered feasible from a security standpoint to ease this admittedly cumbersome but nonetheless vital requirement. The fact remains that officers with need to know do without cavil have access to the material. [Omitted here is the remainder of the report.] 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, PFIAB Materials, 1966–68. Top Secret. The report was prepared for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and forwarded to Clifford by Hughes under cover of a November 9 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) 2 Fifteenth Report of the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State, October 1, 1966. (Department of State, INR/IL Files, PFIAB Materials, 1966–68) 3 Attached but not printed. 4 The organization, roles, and function of INR were described for the public in a 19-page pamphlet published by the Department of State in 1973, INR: Intelligence and Research in the Department of State. 5 Dated July 20, 1967; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. X, Document 183 . 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 10, 1967. SUBJECT The Intelligence Information-Handling Problem The Secretary has asked me to examine the present and prospective needs for information handling in the Department of State in the light of the welcome initiative and recommendations recently made by your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 2 I am enclosing a memorandum which sets forth our position on those recommendations. In essence, the Department strongly favors new efforts to improve information handling within the intelligence community and shares the view of the Board that immediate, concerted action is required. Our objective is to provide the leadership in the foreign affairs agencies with a common data base of relevant facts. We believe that, to assure the adoption of complementary elements of a unified system by all members of the community, thorough coordination is called for, and that the Director of Central Intelligence should be designated as coordinator. Until further study has been made of the needs of each agency and the scope of the proposed system, it seems premature to determine the extent to which centralized management may be required in either the design or the operation of the eventual system, and we believe that the recommendations of the Board should be amended in this respect. We realize that until the present financial uncertainties facing the Government are resolved, designs and plans for a comprehensive information-handling system must be considered tentative and preparatory. The costs will be considerable, and our memorandum discusses the need for a carefully-formulated funding plan and Congressional strategy. Nicholas deB Katzenbach Attachment THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION-HANDLING PROBLEM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE POSITION ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD The Department of State strongly favors new efforts to improve the intelligence community's information-handling system, so as to insure better methods for the dissemination, use, and retrieval of foreign affairs information. The Department of State is the prime user of the increasing flow of materials which constitute intelligence and foreign affairs information. Thus, in designing any information-handling program, apart from technical military data, the information requirements of the Department of State are preeminent and the system must serve the needs of the Secretary of State as the principal adviser to the President in the formulation and execution of the foreign policy of the United States. The adequacy of the Government's information base for foreign policy formulation is obviously one of the matters falling within the general supervisory authority assigned to the Secretary of State by NSAM-341 of March 2, 1966. 3 The Department agrees fully with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in its description of the urgency of the problem, aggravated by the tremendous growth in the collection and distribution of intelligence information, and in its view that immediate concerted action by the intelligence community is required. The Department has long felt the need for an effective community-wide intelligence information-handling system which would not only cope with the anticipated proliferation in intelligence and foreign policy information but would also permit the timely retrieval of primary foreign affairs documentation long consigned to archives. Thorough coordination is required to assure the adoption by all members of the United States intelligence community of complementary elements of such a system. It nevertheless seems premature, at this embryonic stage in the development of a complex system, to make a determination that strong, centralized management will be required or even feasible. We are far from knowing what the information needs of the respective agencies will be in the future. Under the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, 4 the Director of Central Intelligence has the responsibility of “coordinating” intelligence community activities, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board. This cooperative relationship has worked well, and the Department believes that it is within this context that the information-handling effort should be undertaken. Accordingly, for the purpose of initial system design and program presentation, the Director of Central Intelligence should be designated with USIB participation to coordinate intelligence community action and Basic Recommendations No. 1 and No. 3 should be amended accordingly. The degree of centralized management which may ultimately be needed will become clear only as the design of a compatible community-wide system takes shape and its constituent elements are identified. With this change, the Department would have no difficulty with the additional provision of Basic Recommendation No. 1 which charges the Director of Central Intelligence with the coordination of a phased plan for review with the Fiscal Year 1969 budget. A great imbalance exists among the several Departments and Agencies as to the current level of development, and a special effort will be necessary to upgrade some components of the system, including those of the Department of State. The Department has recently employed a small staff of information-handling experts to develop a program for a modern substantive information-handling capability. We now have a proposal for a five-year program of technological modernization with an initial program in Fiscal Year 1969 calling for fifteen additional positions and $334,000 in operating and contracting funds. The entire five-year plan for the Department in Washington might be in the magnitude of eight million dollars. Substantial additional sums would be required for installation of the system at field posts. This program has been designed to meet the Department's own internal requirements. The costs to the community as a whole of the information-handling system proposed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board will undoubtedly be many millions, and consequently a most carefully formulated funding presentation for Congressional consideration will be required. Fundamental budgetary and strategic considerations are involved, and questions of how to budget for common-use elements of the system as well as for departmental components of the unified community system should be left for subsequent high-level decision. Equally important is the issue of whether there should be a composite intelligence community program, presented as a single budget request for funding outside the normal appropriation cycle, or whether the program should be presented in pieces as regular parts of the annual budget of each community agency having responsibility for providing a facility or service which will be a part of the community program. The best solution may be a combination of specially-provided community funding for central and common components, plus identified departmental budget items for departmentally-operated components. Finally, the Department agrees with the rationale for the creation of a high-level review body within the Executive Office of the President and wholeheartedly supports Basic Recommendation No. 2. The Department also agrees that, contingent upon the issuance of the recommended Presidential Directive, early consideration should be given to such actions as those listed in the form of Supplementary Recommendations by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. No discussion of these recommendations is deemed necessary at this time. In a final recommendation, the President's Board proposes that the Department seek to improve its internal procedures for using intelligence information in the formulation of foreign policy. Before commenting on this recommendation, it would be useful to have the benefit of the Board's thinking as to the nature of present deficiencies in this regard. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, INT 8 US. Confidential. An attached November 6 covering memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes (INR) to Katzenbach indicates that his staff had revised the memorandum and its attachment in accordance with Katzenbach's guidance provided in his October 14 memorandum to Hughes. In that memorandum, also attached, Katzenbach complained that the Department of State paper had “an overly bureaucratic tone,” and he suggested it should be revised to “stress the substantive necessity of having such a system as our intelligence resources increase. The means we choose to achieve control over our resources should be secondary to the fact that we must find some way to create a common data base. This data base must enable us to distinguish between the relevant facts from the mass of information flowing into the Government.” He also proposed deletion of discussion about foreign service reporting which, he felt, was “a problem to be dealt with at a much later stage when we discuss how information from the common data base is to be distributed.” 2 Document 268 . 3 Document 56 . 4 Dated January 19, 1950; printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 432 . 272. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne) 272. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to the Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Coyne) 1 Washington, February 8, 1968. SUBJECT Minutes of 303 Action in 1967 Dealing with Projects Coming under the Scope of the Katzenbach Committee During 1967, the 303 Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Rostow, charged the CIA with the task of submitting to the 303 Committee every project which might, under the widest interpretation, come under the Katzenbach Statement of Policy: “No federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy specifically applies to all foreign activities of such organizations and it reaffirms present policy with respect to their domestic activities. “Where such support has been given, it will be terminated as quickly as possible without destroying valuable private organizations before they can seek new means of support.” 2 Approximately 34 major projects (some of which served as umbrellas for additional subsidiary activities) were examined. The committee approved, in most cases, so-called “surge funding” solutions by which terminal monies were allocated to these organizations for a fiscal year or so until they could establish themselves independently or find their own sustenance in the private sector. In a few select instances, projects were reestablished abroad in order to continue without violating the Katzenbach guidance in fact or in spirit. Needless to say, each determination had close coordination with the Bureau of the Budget. In a few complex instances, the committee determined that a project did not by definition come under the Katzenbach committee injunction. The greatest amount of time was spent on the decision, approved later by higher authority, to continue Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. 3 Peter Jessup 4 1 Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, The 40 Committee. Eyes Only. 2 Report of the Committee on Government Assistance to Educational and Private Voluntary Organizations. [Footnote in the source text. For full text of the statement, December 29, 1967, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , p. 1235.] 3 For minutes of the 303 Committee meeting on December 15, 1967, at which agreement was reached on how to proceed with respect to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. X, Document 197 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 273. National Security Action Memorandum No. 368 273. National Security Action Memorandum No. 368 1 Washington, February 9, 1968. TO The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Intelligence Information Handling System The Director of Central Intelligence is requested to consider the recommendations in the attached memorandum from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and take such actions as he deems appropriate to improve information handling in the intelligence community. 2 In this connection, the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare a proposal for the phased implementation of a community-wide information handling system to insure the secure and efficient dissemination, processing, storage, and retrieval of intelligence information. The proposal should discuss alternative ways to manage such a system and present the Director's recommendation. The plan should identify the costs and benefits of each phase of the program and include a specific detailed proposal for the first annual increment as part of the FY '70 budget. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board should be consulted in the preparation of the Director's report. The plan, with the concurrence or comments of the State Department and the Defense Department, should be submitted to my office by May 1, 1968. 3 W.W. Rostow 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 368. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, and the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 2 Document 268 . 3 A preliminary plan developed by the Intelligence Information Handling Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board was approved by the USIB at its meeting on October 17. The plan and accompanying memoranda are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 368. 275. Précis Prepared by the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) 275. Précis Prepared by the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White) 1 Washington, undated. PRÉCIS OF PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER COMMITTEE REPORT 1. Summary . The quality of the Agency's current cadre of junior officers (i.e., those entering duty between FY 1963 and FY 1967) is equal to or better than previous junior officer groups. CIA's recruitment effort and competitive position are generally satisfactory, although there are recruitment impediments which need remedying and some tentative signs that reactions to anti-Agency publicity and the Vietnam War may pose problems in the future. Finally, all directorates are experiencing difficulties—some unique to particular directorates and some common to all—in the area of purposeful career management and the retention of the ablest junior officers. The above conclusions and the following observations were derived from surveys of over [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] Agency supervisors and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] junior officers. 2. Quality and Sources of Junior Officers . Eighty-six per cent of the Agency supervisors surveyed believe that the FY 1963–67 group of junior officers equals or surpasses those officers entering duty before 1963. (The 14% who felt the contrary all were DD/P or DD/I supervisors.) The Career Training Program is the principal source of DD/P junior officers, an important source for the DD/S (which relies equally on direct hire from business), incidental for the DD/I (which draws 40% of its employees from universities), and irrelevant for the DD/S&T (which relies heavily on universities and industry). Recruitment data and a study near completion by the Office of Medical Services suggest that job performance and career potential bear a strong correlation to the quality of educational institution attended by junior officers. (See Tab J for a brief discussion of this observation.) 2 3. Recruitment . CIA's university recruitment efforts are proceeding satisfactorily, although some indications that CIA recruiters spread themselves too thin suggest the need to weed out unproductive institutions and to concentrate on some 100 “quality” institutions. Each directorate, but especially the DD/I and DD/S&T, have developed “unilateral” access to the academic community and increasingly rely on such access for recruitment. Recruiters observe that some highly promising prospects are lost because of the lengthy waiting period that ensues between initial interviews and tentative acceptance. Finally, it is believed by some recruiters that the Vietnam War may be negatively affecting recruitment; and DD/I supervisors feel that adverse publicity about the Agency may be affecting the attitudes of good prospects, as well as impairing Agency-academic relations in general. 4. Career Management . Career planning is not practiced in the Agency with the possible exception of the DD/I which has consistently effected the five-year plans conceived as an aspect of the Midcareer Development Program and which has a centralized system for identifying and developing “comers.” The Midcareer Course is viewed more as a “battery recharge” than a development program for the ablest officers. The over-all attrition rate of junior officers entering duty during FY 1963–67 is [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. (The attrition rate of junior FSO's for FY 1966 and FY 1967, by contrast, was slightly under [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ].) The separation rate is [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] in the DD/S&T where industry constitutes an economically attractive alternative and where the fact that the middle and senior grades are occupied by relatively young officers induces some junior officers to conclude that advancement will be slow. DD/I's attrition rate is [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], accounted for in part by a [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] turnover in females. DD/P's loss rate is [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], and the reasons cited include the relative lack of promotion headroom caused by a serious congestion at the senior levels of the CS. Concern is expressed that the CS may be losing some of its ablest young officers. 5. Major Recommendations . a. Agency intercourse with the academic community needs to be encouraged and improved, including greater substantive exchange between DD/I analysts and key faculty and graduate students, more selective campus recruitment with concentration on “quality” institutions and exploration of ways to counteract or reduce adverse publicity. b. The Midcareer Program requires both greater review and higher priority. “Comers” need to be spotted and encouraged by the directorates. Individual career plans, especially for the most promising, require more attention and greater follow-through. c. Additional attention should be given to the congestion at senior levels of the CS and further means developed to induce or compel early retirement or reassignment within the Agency. d. Centralized procedures should be developed to analyze the high attrition rate among junior officers. Directorates should determine the real reasons why officers leave, and report annually the rate and causes of separation. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Professional Manpower Comm. Secret. White forwarded the précis, together with the full Report of the Committee on Professional Manpower, March 1968, to Helms and Taylor on March 29. The report, a copy of which is ibid., was prepared by an internal, four-person committee, chaired by the Director of Training, John Richardson. 2 Attached but not printed. 276. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 276. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 8, 1968. SUBJECT Presidential Initiatives and Actions At your request, I have prepared the following list of Presidential initiatives and actions which the President might consider during the balance of his term: [Omitted here is material unrelated to intelligence.] 6. Strengthening the Director of Central Intelligence . The President might undertake by appropriate executive actions to strengthen the position of the Director of Central Intelligence so that he can carry out more effectively the functions supposedly associated with his office. For a variety of reasons, the Director of the CIA has never been able to perform the over-all intelligence coordinating role assigned to him as Director of Central Intelligence. Strong institutional opposition has developed within the various intelligence organizations of the DOD to any external role for the DCI. The President now has the opportunity working with Secretary Clifford, who as former Chairman of the PFIB was in a unique position to understand this complicated organizational problem, to take certain actions which, although desirable, might be quite controversial in the intelligence community. General Taylor, acting either as Chairman of the PFIB or as head of a small task force, could be assigned the job of coming up with specific proposals. If this problem is not sorted out now, it will be a long time before a new Administration comes to grips with it. [Omitted here is material unrelated to intelligence.] Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Presidential Program. Secret. 277. Memorandum by President Johnson 277. Memorandum by President Johnson 1 Washington, May 1, 1968. MEMORANDUM TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board SUBJECT The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Effort Pursuant to my appointment of General Maxwell D. Taylor to serve as Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as successor to Secretary Clark M. Clifford , I wish to emphasize the importance which I attach to the foreign intelligence function in government and to the mission of the Board. In this period of rapid political and economic change, the operation of government is more dependent than ever before on reliable, timely intelligence leading to a wise evaluation of the world situation. Under the coordination and guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence, all members of the U.S. foreign intelligence community contribute to this essential service. I shall continue to look to the Board for a continuous review and assessment of all aspects of the activities of the foreign intelligence community and shall expect to receive recurrent recommendations from it for strengthening the effectiveness of these activities. In accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 10938 of May 4, 1961 2 and of my memorandum of October 19, 1965 on this same subject, 3 I wish the Board to be able to assure me at all times of the quality, responsiveness and reliability of the intelligence which reaches the decision-makers of Government. To assist it in this mission, I ask the heads of Departments and Agencies concerned to cooperate fully and freely with the Board in the discharge of its mission. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Box 41. No classification marking. In an April 15 memorandum to President Johnson, Maxwell D. Taylor, whom the President appointed on February 23 to succeed Clark Clifford as Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, wrote that at its April 11–12 meeting the Board discussed “ways and means to discharge more effectively its responsibilities,” and its members agreed that it would be “most timely” for the President to issue a statement reaffirming the importance of the board. Taylor enclosed an undated draft memorandum that the President might send. Under cover of an April 20 memorandum to President Johnson, Rostow forwarded Taylor's memorandum and draft statement. “In my judgment,” Rostow wrote, “a reinforcing memorandum of this type would be timely and helpful.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the President apparently did not act on this initiative, so Rostow forwarded it to him again under cover of a May 1 memorandum. This time Rostow added: “He (Taylor) is convinced—and I agree—that he should confer with the major users of intelligence, notably the regional Assistant Secretaries of State, to check on whether the intelligence material being generated is appropriate to their operational needs and being well and fully used. For that reason, as well as to give a general impetus to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under its new Chairman, I recommend that you go forward with this memorandum.” (Ibid.) The memorandum printed here is identical to the draft memorandum submitted with Taylor's April 15 letter. 2 See Document 183 . 3 Document 239 . 278. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 278. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 1 Washington, May 17, 1968. Dear Paul: In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am going ahead with the organization of a National Intelligence Resources Board to be chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence with the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State as members. The purpose of this Board is to assist me in developing my judgments concerning the need for resources to support the foreign intelligence effort. The Board will evaluate the responsiveness of individual projects and activities to the intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities established by USIB and provide me with recommendations concerning the level of funding generally appropriate for such projects and activities. I shall look to it for advice in connection with questions which arise during the course of the review of the four major national intelligence programs (the CCP, NRP, CIP and CIAP) concerning needs for the procurement, development or utilization of resources. One of the important functions of the Board will be to examine the inter-relationship of intelligence programs and determine relative needs for coverage of particular intelligence objectives as between different sources or systems. In formulating its recommendations, the Board will utilize USIB committees as well as my staff for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation, which will of course continue to work closely with the staff elements of the Defense Department responsible for the review and supervision of Defense Department intelligence programs. My recommendations will be brought to you and the Secretary of Defense when and as formulated. Sincerely, Richard Helms 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA, Vol. III. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original. 279. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 279. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, June 6, 1968. SUBJECT Notes on 303 for PFIAB [ 2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ], what do we do about projects once we have approved them to maintain some sort of check. The answer is quite simple: We call explicitly for progress reports as frequently as we want them, and since projects are approved on a yearly basis their renewal automatically comes before us. We have had some 18 status reports specifically requested during the past 18 months and 30 project renewals. The minutes handed to the Board members give an indication of this. We also feel free to request summaries of certain situations such as Haiti where an unstable situation exists, and from time to time the committee recommends some action. To the question: Are there any activities which should come under the committee which for one reason or another evade the committee's scrutiny?, we can answer: Following the Katzenbach committee explorations in December 1967, the 303 ordered that all projects involving covert action programs not specifically considered by the Katzenbach committee should be rounded up for review by the 303. We are satisfied that this has been done with complete goodwill, and in those areas where there may be laggards (projects approved earlier but not reviewed recently) we can direct that they be placed on the agenda. 2 The only countries to which I would not give a complete clean bill of health as of this moment are [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. In each of these instances, appropriate persons are aware of the covert activities there but the committee as such, with its present makeup, cannot be said to have signed off on them. Examples of the gradual tightening noose on all activities of potential embarrassment are twofold. First, the Chief of Naval Operations Binnacle program, a long-standing extensive U.S. submarine reconnaissance program which had semiannual briefings for the committee, is now considered mission by mission on a monthly basis and has been incorporated into the JRC forecast. Second, certain U.S. Coast Guard and Geodetic Survey nonreconnaissance missions have been brought into the monthly schedule since they have a small embarrassment potential. I think you can emphasize that this is one of the less cumbersome, more effective, tight working groups in government with Rostow, Bohlen, Nitze and Helms, men who have worked closely over the years and understand each other's problems. There is no friction and a sense of accomplishment. Two trends might be noted: One is the “platter is full” attitude of Secretary Rusk, who is reluctant to entertain additional new risks at a time of sensitive talks, problems like the Pueblo and an election year. This is to say that Secretary Rusk takes a very careful look and is “from Missouri” as far as requirements are concerned-they had better be of an urgent nature in these times. The second trend is that of the heavy hand of the Bureau of the Budget which increasingly, due to its Presidential directives, does not necessarily accept the unanimous approval of the 303 without taking issue in its battle to cut costs. 3 PJ 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, 303 Committee. Top Secret. 2 [ text not declassified ] 3 [ text not declassified ] 280. Memorandum for the Record 280. Memorandum for the Record Washington, August 12, 1968. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, PFIAB. Top Secret; [ codeword not declassified ]. 3 pages of source text not declassified.] 281. Letter From the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 281. Letter From the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, October 24, 1968. Dear Dick: Reference is made to my desire to discuss with you matters affecting the American intelligence community. As you know, I mentioned this to you some months ago and you said you would like to have Rufe Taylor in on the discussion. This, of course, is most acceptable to me. To give you a very brief general idea of what I have in mind, a few thoughts are being set forth below as follows: First, rightly or wrongly I do not believe that the American intelligence community is functioning at the peak of its efficiency. In fact, as a whole I think we are considerably below this level. (Naturally I am much better able to substantiate this view relative to my own work than I am with the work of others.) The community has but one basic objective and that is the security of the United States. We should let no stone go unturned in achieving this end. Second, as we exist now I think we suffer from (1) lack of effective coordination; (2) inadequate knowledge of each other's operations; (3) obsolete administrative procedures and relationships; (4) thinking which is geared at times to past decades; (5) conflict of organizational interests; (6) on occasions unnecessary organizational and personality clashes and rivalries; (7) certain negative overtones in delimitations agreements; (8) failure to use fully each other's resources; (9) duplication and, at times, working at cross-purposes with each other; (10) a too limited use of the great scientific resources that could be applied to intelligence problems; (11) an inadequate sharing of highly specialized skills, talents, and abilities of certain employees of our respective agencies; (12) fixing of definite responsibilities individually, collectively and organizationally; etc. Third, there is no need to tell you that we are living in an age of profound and rapid flux. It has been well said that the recurrent shock of our age is the discovery that concepts and patterns of action of a more secure past no longer fit present reality. It is suggested that the entire American intelligence community might do well to start with this as a premise and conduct a most searching, honest, and exhaustive analysis of our respective agencies for the purpose of re-structuring them to meet the great changes of our age. Your own thinking was in this context some weeks ago when at USIB you mentioned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the need for all of us to engage in penetrative self-examination. Fourth, with a new Administration of one kind or the other coming to the White House in January, it would seem this is the time for the American intelligence community to reassess its position, its policies, procedures, goals, etc., with the idea in mind of moving ahead of the winds of change instead of being blown by them later on willy-nilly. Fifth, I am not certain just where and how we should begin, or the course to be set, or the means to pursue it. This is one reason I would like to have a talk with you. Sixth, attached you will find some fragmentary thoughts relating to the type of thing that comes to mind when I examine our own operations here in the FBI. Obviously this is very incomplete and sketchy, but it may give you a working clue to what I have in mind and the over-all context to which I allude. This week I must go to Iowa Wesleyan College to lecture. On my return I intend to take some annual leave and will not be back into the city until around November 10. When convenient for you and Rufe Taylor, I would like to get together following my return. It may be that this could be arranged after a USIB meeting. Sam Papich is familiar with the contents of this letter and will be in contact with your secretary to work out the necessary arrangements. With all good wishes, Cordially, Bill Sullivan Attachment 2 Washington, October 22, 1968. Recognizing that other agencies have resources such as files, equipment, overseas coverage, experienced intelligence officers, technical specialists, linguists, and research capabilities, we have conducted a self-examination of our current efforts in order to determine what constructive steps could be taken to improve on existing coordination and/or dialogue with other agencies. Set forth are some suggested courses of action. 1. Do more to utilize selected Negro personnel, including ROTC members attending Negro colleges where manpower problems exist. 2. Utilization of selected and appropriate ethnic military personnel previously trained for the development of information in riot areas. 3. Increasing the screening of Negro military service personnel preparatory to their discharge as potential sources in racial areas and related fields. 4. The utilization and exploitation of military personnel with foreign backgrounds in whom hostile nations have expressed interest. Institution of steps to insure that such personnel are assigned to the continental United States rather than transferred to other areas throughout the world where their potential cannot be utilized to the best advantage of the United States. 5. Expand the use of Communist Party sources under Bureau control where foreign travel would bring the sources in contact with the communist leadership in foreign countries. 6. The reinstitution of sophisticated mail coverage between the United States and selected foreign countries. 7. The development of a program whereby all agencies making up the intelligence community would exchange lecturers at various training schools. 8. Improve the exchange of technical information between the FBI Laboratory and counterparts of other agencies making certain we take advantage of the research facilities available to those other agencies. 9. The utilization of professional intelligence officers in various colleges and universities under the cover of graduate students. 10. Revise the Legal Attaché system so our foreign service men can better assist foreign operations of The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military intelligence. 11. Work as a unit to extract from the best brains in science concepts which can be translated into practical devices relevant to the gathering of intelligence information. 12. Develop a program for utilizing the United States as a base and source for developing persons who can be utilized in foreign intelligence operations of CIA. 13. Dovetailing specific practical programs to help accomplish the ends of item 12. 14. Pooling the best brains and individuals with the greatest amount of specialized experience for the purpose of helping to solve each other's problems and to arrive at solutions for difficult courses of action. Working out a joint program for developing intelligence information on investigative subjects who are constantly traveling into and out of the United States. 15. Designating personnel from respected members of the intelligence community to perform joint research and analysis on highly specialized operational matters. 16. Utilization of the total resources of the American intelligence community for penetration in various forms of the countries and the communications of hostile nations. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FBI. Secret; Personal. William C. Sullivan was FBI Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division. 2 Secret. 282. Editorial Note 282. Editorial Note In a 15-page report to the President on November 25, 1968, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board reviewed the highlights of its activities since its establishment on May 4, 1961, summarized 11 significant areas of progress to which PFIAB had made an important contribution, and provided current views on selected long-term intelligence problems deemed worthy of continuing attention. Chairman Maxwell Taylor presented the report to President Johnson on January 6, 1969. For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume X, Document 222 . 283. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor) 283. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor) 1 Washington, November 25, 1968. SUBJECT Reflections on National Security Intelligence and the President As requested, herewith some rather simple impressions based on my experience—notably that of the last eight years. 1. In the contemporary world, there is no way for the President to avoid a highly personal responsibility in national security affairs since: —there are bound to be a substantial number of crises which involve the possibility of conflict, financial expenditure, or domestic political repercussions; —the President (and the Vice President) are the only men in the Executive Branch who have a mandate from the people. 2. Therefore, the President must be able to operate with a full flow of detailed intelligence, carefully evaluated, sensitive to the exact questions which are on his mind, in what is inevitably an operational command post. 3. The first requirement is a flow of regular materials from the intelligence community tailored to meet the President's tastes, habits, and working style. 3. The second requirement is that the President develop with the Director of Central Intelligence a close personal working relationship of confidence which allows the Director of Central Intelligence to be present at the Tuesday lunch or its equivalent. The Director of Central Intelligence should, in his personal capacity, be part of the President's innermost circle in national security matters even if what he knows is not fully transmitted to his agency. 4. A third requirement is that the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs work with the Director of Central Intelligence and the other intelligence agencies in a wholly fraternal way to assure that the intelligence community is focusing on the issues most relevant to the decisions before the President or likely to come before the President. So far as the President is concerned—but he is not the sole consumer—the greatest “wastages” of intelligence take the form of papers which happen to come forward at a time when the President is focusing on another matter or where the form in which a question is posed in the intelligence community is not relevant to the precise issue to which the President is addressing himself. To generate maximum relevance, therefore, for the product of the intelligence community, the President's Special Assistant must steadily throw questions back at the intelligence community in the form which will make the responses of the intelligence community bear most directly on the President's decisions. 5. Since a great deal of the President's business in the field of national security policy will inevitably be conducted—as it has, in fact, been conducted in the post-war years—within a relatively small group of the President's closest advisors, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that relations of greatest mutual confidence should be cultivated-as they have been in recent years-between the Director of Central Intelligence and the other members of that small advisory group. 6. A final observation. The intelligence community should understand that on truly great matters the President himself, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will form their own intelligence assessments. This has happened, for example, on questions such as these: —What has been the character and the order of magnitude of the effect on North Vietnam of bombing attacks? —What were Hanoi's intentions in the winter/spring offensive of 1967–68? —What were Hanoi's motives in going to Paris? —Would the Warsaw Pact forces assembled around Czechoslovakia move into Czechoslovakia? —What are Soviet intentions towards the Middle East? 7. Just as a division commander in the field will form his own view of the enemy's capabilities and intentions, so will the senior men in our government. This is a fact of life. What is essential is that two conditions be satisfied: first, that all these men have available to them the intelligence and the evaluations made by the intelligence community as an essential part of the information on which they will form their judgments; and, second, as I have tried to emphasize, the Director of Central Intelligence himself be a working member of that central group. W.W. Rostow 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt Rostow, Vol. 108. Secret. 284. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 284. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 16, 1968. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Intelligence Handling and Disclosure. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 285. Memorandum for the Record 285. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, January 2, 1969. SUBJECT Discussion with Mr. William Sullivan of the FBI re matters raised in his letter of October 24, 1968 2 1. We discussed in rather general terms all of the items mentioned in subject letter. 2. Bill Sullivan expressed the view that there is inadequate coordination between the FBI and CIA in matters of counterintelligence operations, both at home and abroad. He expressed the view that it might be worthwhile to establish a small Board for the purpose of over-seeing counterintelligence operations, rendering decisions for cooperation therein or making policy recommendations to higher authorities if and as necessary. I asked him in this connection about the status of the ICC which he declared to be moribund but said that he would look into the possibilities of reviving it in somewhat different form. I suggested that a small group composed perhaps of the DCI, the Director of the FBI and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency might be worth considering if, organized under it, were suitable regional groups of counterintelligence people from those 3 agencies. The idea would be to supply detailed operational and staff advice for action as appropriate by the above mentioned counterintelligence group. By way of illustration I outlined the idea of the SIG and the IRG's in the development of foreign policy. I indicated that I thought any initiative in this direction ought to come from the new Attorney General inasmuch as the objective would be the security of the United States, principally at home. I took this occasion to point out that the restrictions imposed on the FBI by the Attorney General are at present a major factor in inhibiting counterintelligence operations within the United States and that they have their reflection in opportunities that might arise abroad but can't be seized if the FBI is inhibited from following through once the operation gets across U.S. borders. Before leaving this subject I suggested that Bill might wish to talk to Mr. Hoover with the idea of having a three-way chat between Mr. Hoover, the new Attorney General and the DCI at an early stage in the new Administration. 3. With regard to positive intelligence matters I outlined to Bill Sullivan some of the difficulties faced by the DCI in coordination of the use of assets, most of which are under the direction and management of the Department of Defense. The discussion ranged over difficulties with the National Security Agency, the inability of the USIB structure to compel compliance or even to follow up effectively on its recommendations. In this connection I said I thought it might be helpful if the position of the DCI as the principal intelligence officer of the President was more generally known and understood than is now the case. The only way I could see to accomplish this would be to have the charges laid on the DCI in the Presidential letters to him issued as a NSAM so that all members of the Community would be well apprised of what the President expects of the DCI. I explained to Bill the workings of the NIRB and our hopes for it as a means of achieving better knowledge of and coordination of one another's efforts in the positive intelligence field. 4. With the exception of paragraphs 8, 10, and 14 we did not touch on the 16 items mentioned in the enclosure to Bill's letter. 3 Even as regards paragraphs 8, 10 and 14 our conversation did not go into specifics except as otherwise outlined elsewhere herein. 5. Bill suggested the idea that a careful and thorough look at the entire Intelligence Community and its works might be undertaken by a special group of senior and knowledgeable officers in the Intelligence Community. I said that I did not think that such a procedure would be effective because of the conflicting loyalties and parochial views that would inevitably creep into such an examination, and gave as an example the difficulties which beset the Eaton Study Group. I said that I thought a better way of doing business of this sort would be for a stream-lined Board such as the PFIAB to establish, under a strong and knowledgeable Executive Secretary, a permanent working group of knowledgeable individuals whose function would be to determine by inspection and inquiry whether the DCI's instructions and recommendations for coordination of the national intelligence effort were being followed by the various members of the Intelligence Community and, if not, why not. Such a group would be in essence a sort of Inspectorate General of the PFIAB, totally supra-agency or department. I said that as far as I could tell, only the Bureau of the Budget conducts such surveys under the present organizational scheme of things and that their point of view, being oriented towards dollar savings, is not helpful in many cases. I expressed further the view that lack of mechanisms of the kind that we were discussing has permitted the Bureau of the Budget to become much more knowledgeable and influential than it ought to be in substantive affairs for which it has no responsibility. 6. We ended on the note that if Bill would take the initiative in the Department of Justice for suggestions to emanate from the Attorney General with regard to better coordination of the U.S. counterintelligence effort as it affects domestic tranquility, the DCI would be, and in fact is, addressing himself with the new Administration to those improvements which might effect the accomplishment of the purposes outlined in Bill's letter. 7. All in all, the discussion was rather general and agreeable from the standpoint that we both agreed that there certainly ought to be improvements but neither of us was sure just how to go about achieving them. We agreed that the thoughts expressed above were useful if for no other purpose than to provoke better thoughts. Rufus Taylor Vice Admiral U.S. Navy Deputy Director 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FBI. Secret. 2 Document 281 . 3 Attachment to Document 281 . United Nations United Nations 286. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, China Representation. Secret. The memorandum is marked “Hold for Bundy.” 287. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous. Confidential. Drafted by Nathan Pelcovits and Elmore Jackson (IO) on January 31 and cleared by Tyler and Meeker (L). 288. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 7, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential. 289. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, March 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential. 290. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, March 3, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, UNCTAD. Limited Official Use. 291. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State Washington, March 6, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow. 292. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson Washington, March 30, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, UNCTAD. Confidential. 293. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 11, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous. Confidential. 294. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, April 21, 1964, 9 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow and London. 295. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the President's Special Assistant (Jenkins) Washington, April 22, 1964. Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, WJC Book, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. No classification marking. Drafted by Richard Fox (O). 296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, May 7, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol 1. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Pelcovits and Jackson on May 6; cleared in CIA, L, EUR, SOV, UNP, and IO; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Geneva for Gardner. 297. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 7, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. No classification marking. 298. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, July 10, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. II, Part 5. Confidential. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–4 UN. 299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, July 11, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential. A note on the memorandum reads: “For Information Only.” 300. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 13, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 79 D 246, United Nations. Confidential. Drafted by Polansky and approved in M on August 31. The meeting took place in Harriman's office. 301. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, August 4, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, U Thant Visit. Confidential. A memorandum of the President's conversation with U Thant on Southeast Asia is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Document 298. 302. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 25, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Confidential. 303. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 18, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Limited Official Use. 304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, October 9, 1964, 8:37 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow. Drafted by Sisco, Buffum, and Cleveland; cleared in G, L, EUR, and IO; and approved by Rusk. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. 305. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, October 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Confidential. 306. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 20, 1964, 6:10 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 79 D 246, United Nations. Secret. Drafted by Polansky. A note on the memorandum reads: “uncleared. never distributed.” The memorandum is “Part 2 of 4.” The meeting took place in Rusk's office. 307. Memorandum From Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to Samuel Belk of that Staff Washington, October 21, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. No classification marking. 308. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 26, 1964, 11:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: CF 2440. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and approved in S on November 9. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room. 309. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 9, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Confidential. 310. Memorandum From the Director of Public Affairs of the Mission to the United Nations (Fritchey) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) New York, November 17, 1964. Source: Princeton University, Stevenson Papers, Correspondence, Fritchey. No classification marking. 311. Memorandum for the Record Washington, November 18, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Memos of Conversation, 1964–1966. Secret. 312. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) Washington, November 18, 1964. Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 141, Frame 104. Confidential. The date is handwritten on the letter. 313. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State Washington, November 20, l964, 11 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Secret. Repeated to Moscow. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. 314. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, November 27, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. 315. Memorandum of Conversation New York, November 30, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential. Drafted by Alexander Akalovsky on November 30 and approved in S on December 8. The memorandum is Part I of VI. The meeting took place at the Secretary's Suite in the Waldorf Astoria during a luncheon. 316. Memorandum of Conversation New York, November 30, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on November 30 and approved in S on December 8. The memorandum is Part VI of VI. The meeting took place at the Secretary's suite in the Waldorf Astoria during a luncheon. 317. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memos, Vol. 1. Confidential. 318. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, December 1, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. Confidential. Drafted by Richard Pedersen on December 1. 319. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 2, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 7. The memorandum is Part V of V. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission. 320. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley (IO/UNP). 321. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 19, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, CF 2449. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 21 and approved in S on December 30. The memorandum is Part V of VI. The meeting was held at a luncheon in the Secretary's Suite at the Waldorf Towers. 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, December 24, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. Confidential. 323. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memos, Vol. 1. Confidential. 324. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 28, 1964, 3:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Judd. The memorandum is Part I of II. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 325. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 5, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. 326. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 7, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. 327. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, January 13, 1965, 8:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority. 328. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, January 15, 1965, 9 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USUN. 329. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 18, 1965, 11 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on January 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is Part I of III. 330. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 18, 1965. Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 142, Frames 506–509. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco on January 18. 331. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 25, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memos, Vol. 1. No classification marking. 332. Memorandum by Ralph Bunche of the United Nations Secretariat New York, February 2, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. No classification marking. The memorandum was given to Bill Moyers of the White House staff who forwarded it to President Johnson on February 5. (Memorandum from Moyers to Johnson, February 5; ibid.) The President passed the memorandum to Bundy. In a March 2 memorandum to the President, Bundy commented, “I don't think there is anything for us to do on this one right now.” (Ibid.) 333. Memorandum From William Buffum of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) Washington, February 5, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. Drafted by Virginia Hartley (IO/UNP) on February 5. Handwritten annotations on the memorandum read: “Very interesting JJ [Sisco]” and “Might be useful to have this document translated into form usable for educating Hill and public. But it raises question—'How and when did we get into our extreme position?'” 334. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) February 6, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ambassador Stevenson, Tape 65.06, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. The President was in Washington; Stevenson was in New York City. There is no indication of the time of the conversation. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 335. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, February 6, 1965, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to New York and passed to the White House. 336. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 8, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret. Bundy wrote “Good work” at the top of the memorandum. 337. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 12, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential; Eyes Only. Pages 2 and 3 of the memorandum are dated February 13. 338. Editorial Note 339. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, February 25, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. No classification marking. 340. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant (Moyers) Washington, March 1, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. No classification marking. 341. Intelligence Information Cable New York, March 3, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 342. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, March 8, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential. 343. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, March 11, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential. 344. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions Washington, March 12, 1965, 8:19 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, International Year of Human Rights. Confidential. Drafted by Louise McNutt of IO on March 10; cleared in IO, EA, SEA, FE, SPA, ACA, AF, and EUR; and approved by Marshall Green (FE). Sent to Bangkok, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Saigon, Seoul, Taipei, Vientiane, and repeated to Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, and USUN. 345. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, March 19, 1965, 4:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Sisco. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10. 346. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 22, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2482. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in S on March 31. The memorandum is Part 1 of 5. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room. 347. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 20, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department. Limited Official Use. 348. Intelligence Information Cable Washington, April 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 349. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Eyes Only. 350. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Johnson New York, April 28, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, U.S. Representative—Stevenson. Confidential. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads: “Dictated via telephone.” Printed in the Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, vol. VIII, pp. 746–748. 351. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, May 4, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. 352. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, May 12, 1965, 2200Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority. 353. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, May 26, 1965, 2130Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Exdis. 354. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, June 4, 1965, 2200Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis. 355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, June 13, 1965, 5:41 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4. Confidential; Priority. Drafted on June 13 and approved by Cleveland, cleared in substance by Plimpton, EUR, and in draft by Rusk. Also sent to London and Ottawa. 356. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, June 22, 1965, 1815Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. 357. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, July 6, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. 358. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 19, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol . 2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by S on July 23. In a July 22 memorandum attached to a copy of this memoranda of conversation sent to Arthur Goldberg, Cleveland wrote: “I think you will find it useful as a summary of the kind of dialogue we have been having with the Secretary General right along. But this was the sharpest confrontation yet.” (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject File, Reel 127, Frame 302) 359. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, July 23, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The charts included in this report are not printed. 360. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 26, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential. 361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, July 31, 1965, 2:24 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Stephen Schwebel (L), cleared in L and UNP, and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to London. 362. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 2, 1965, 5:05 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on August 10. The memorandum is Part 2 of 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 363. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson New York, August 5, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Goldberg Correspondence. No classification marking. President Johnson appointed Arthur Goldberg as Permanent Representative to the United Nations on July 26 and Goldberg presented his credentials on July 28. Goldberg's nomination took place against the background of a further escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Documentation relating to the escalation and Goldberg's initial efforts to seek a solution through the United Nations is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. III, Documents 82, 99, 106, 114, 116, 119, and 129. 364. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, August 12, 1965, 2350Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow. 365. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts Washington, August 16, 1965, 4:26 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Pelcovits on August 16; cleared in AF, NEA, EUR, ARA, UNP, and L/UNA; and approved by Sisco. 366. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, September 10, 1965, 2312Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4. Confidential; Limdis. 367. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 13, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Secret. Copies were sent to Bator, Cooper, Johnson, Keeny, and Komer. 368. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) September 18, 1965, 1:27 p.m. Source:Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg, September 18, 1965, 1:27 p.m., Tape 65.04, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. Goldberg called the President from New York City. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 369. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, September 20, 1965, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Confidential. 370. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, IT 47 UN. Confidential. 371. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, October 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential. 372. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson New York, October 27, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol 3. Confidential. 373. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 20, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret. For additional documentation on the U.S. position on a world disarmament conference, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XI. 374. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 7, 1965, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco. 375. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson New York, December 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, IT 47 UN. Confidential. 376. Letter From Secretary-General of the United Nations U Thant to President Johnson New York, January 10, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, U Thant, Vol. 1. Personal. 377. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, January 12, 1966, 2322Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential; Exdis. 378. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs (Sisco) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 25, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Confidential. Copies were sent to Rusk, U, G, FE, H, and S. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 379. Intelligence Information Cable Washington, April 21, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 380. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 23, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential. 381. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson New York, May 4, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. No classification marking. 382. Intelligence Information Cable Washington, May 6, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad, Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 383. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, June 3, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential. 384. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, June 24, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty. Confidential. A copy was sent to Charles Johnson. For text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, signed January 27, 1967 and entered into force for the United States on October 10, 1967, see 18 UST 2410. Documentation relating to the negotiation of the treaty is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XI. 385. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations European Office to the Department of State Geneva, July 6, 1966, 1958Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Top Secret; Exdis. A note on the telegram indicates it was forwarded to President Johnson. 386. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Consulate in Geneva, Switzerland New York, July 15, 1966, 1521Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to the Department. 387. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations European Office to the Department of State Geneva, July 28, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Repeated to NASA, DOD, USUN, and Moscow. 388. Text of Telegram From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson and Secretary Rusk Geneva, August 5, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty. Confidential. The copy printed here was retyped in the White House for the President. 389. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, August 10, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Confidential. 390. Text of Telegram From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson New York, August 17, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; Nodis. The copy printed here was retyped in the White House for the President. 391. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; Nodis. 392. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 27, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret. Drafted in IO on August 27. 393. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Confidential. Drafted in IO on August 31. 394. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 2, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret. 395. Intelligence Information Special Report Washington, September 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad, Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 396. Notes of Meeting Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. No classification marking. Drafted by Nathaniel Davis. The President met with the National Security Council on September 15 from 11:19 to 11:55 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) 397. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, September 16, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. 398. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, September 27, 1966, 2242Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol 5. Confidential; Exdis. 399. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 4, 1966, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Bator and Keeny. 400. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 6. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Toon on October 18 and cleared in S and S/S on October 19. 401. Intelligence Information Special Report Washington, October 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 402. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 7, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Bator. 403. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 10, 1966, 0045Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Confidential; Exdis. 404. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 23, 1966, 0130Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; Nodis. 405. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 30, 1966, 0340Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; Limdis. 406. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, December 1, 1966, 0122Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; Limdis. 407. Minutes of Meeting Austin, Texas, December 17, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings, Dec. 17, 1966. Top Secret. 408. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 31, 1967, 10:15 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Rostow Memos. Secret; Eyes Only. 409. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 8, 1967, 7:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 6. Confidential. This memorandum was included in the President's night reading. 410. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, February 17, 1967, 3:55 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Arthur Goldberg. Confidential; Eyes Only. 411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, February 24, 1967, 7:33 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 9 UN. Secret. Drafted by Jones; cleared in EA, H, L, ARA, UNP, EUR, and the Department of the Interior; and approved by Popper. Repeated to London, Wellington, and Canberra. 412. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 1, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 9 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Hargrove on March 23. 413. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, March 15, 1967, 5:42 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 37–4 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits; cleared in OIA, USUN, UNP, and EUR; and approved by Sisco. 414. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, March 17, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol 7. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bromley Smith. 415. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson Washington, March 29, 1967, 7:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret. An annotation on the memorandum indicates President Johnson saw it. 416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, May 1, 1967, 7:02 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by William Gleysteen (UNP); cleared in AFI, EA, ARA, UNP, and EUR; and approved by Sisco. 417. Editorial Note 418. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Secret. Forwarded to members of the National Security Council by Bromley Smith under cover of a september 8 memorandum. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File) 419. Notes of a Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, September 13, 1967, 12:32 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Secret. The notes were forwarded to the President in the form of a memorandum from Jim Jones of the White House staff. 420. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, September 20, 1967, 1404Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 8. Confidential; Exdis. 421. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, October 2, 1967, 2142Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. 422. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, October 29, 1967, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 8. Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis. An annotation on the telegram indicates President Johnson saw it. 423. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson New York, November 7, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 9. No classification marking. 424. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 27, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Gleysteen. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary. 425. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 10, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Edward T. Long (ARA/CAR). Copies were sent to ARA, IO, UNP, L, USUN, and the White House. 426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, January 25, 1968, 1430Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Popper and Donald 427. Editorial Note 428. Notes of President Johnson's Meeting with U Thant New York, April 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting took place at United Nations headquarters. It lasted from 3:47 to 4:30 p.m. Another set of notes of the meeting taken by President's Special Assistant Jim Jones is ibid., Meeting Notes File. 429. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, June 14, 1968, 2015Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 10. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 430. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, June 25, 1968, 1831Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–4 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits; cleared in OIA, UNP, and L; and approved by Sisco. 431. Notes on a Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk September 23, 1968, 9:37 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation of September 23, 1968 with Secretary Rusk. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The President called Rusk from the LBJ Ranch. A tape of the conversation is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F MISC. 05. 432. Summary Notes of the 591st Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, September 25, 1968, 12:05–1:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 6. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Another set of notes for this meeting, prepared by Tom Johnson, is ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. 433. Notes of the President's Weekly Luncheon Meeting Washington, September 25, 1968, 2:04–2:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. A copy of the statement and transcript of the subsequent press conference in which Ball outlined the reasons for his resignation are in the Princeton University, Ball Papers, Speeches. 434. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, October 1, 1968, 2052Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 11. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 435. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, October 4, 1968, 2343Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 11. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 436. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, November 26, 1968, 2318Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. 437. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 26, 1968, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Confidential; Exdis. Contents The United Nations and the Cyprus Crisis (Documents 438-480) 286. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 286. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 23, 1964. Mac— The likelihood of a real Chirep crisis in UNGA this fall, as result of French recognition 2 and what it will trigger, underlines importance of postponing GA session till after US election. Desirability of postponing Arab-Israeli hassle in UN is an additional good reason. I've pushed Sisco on this (Cleveland is in Europe) and was told they fully agreed. Rusk had already made decision to seek GA delay before French problem hotted up. SYG seems sympathetic; he and our own people are making soundings with an eye to a decision in June. I'm a bit concerned about slow pace of this exercise. The sooner we get GA delay taped down, the happier we're going to be. Ergo, you might want to do a little prodding on this too. 3 RWK 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, China Representation. Secret. The memorandum is marked “Hold for Bundy.” 2 France announced its recognition of the People's Republic on January 27. Documentation relating to the U.S. position on Chinese participation in the United Nations is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XXX . 3 In a January 31 memorandum to Bundy, Samuel Belk of the NSC Staff reported that “We will have no difficulty in getting a postponement until around November 14.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations Miscellaneous) 287. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 287. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Ambassador Stevenson's Talks with Soviets on Future of United Nations Peacekeeping To carry forward the momentum of your January 18 letter to Khrushchev, 2 I recommend that you authorize Ambassador Stevenson to open discussions in New York with the Soviet Ambassador on the financial-peacekeeping problem of the U.N. Ambassador Stevenson would make it clear that any future arrangements on peacekeeping, such as those foreshadowed in your letter, must presuppose settlement of Soviet arrears. Unless they settle they face a showdown. The Soviets are subject to loss of their General Assembly vote under Article 19 of the Charter at the first meeting of the Assembly in 1964. Our strategy and discussions would proceed on two parallel lines: On Article 19 , 3 we believe the Soviets will be moved, if at all, by our determination to apply Article 19 strictly to all defaulters and by our ability to marshall the necessary General Assembly majority to back a ruling that their vote is suspended. Our strategy is to mount a major effort with other UN members to muster support for such an outcome—and to convince the Soviets that we have the votes. We believe our persuasiveness with third countries will be helped if we make a serious effort to reach an accommodation with the Soviets on practical and reasonable arrangements for future peacekeeping. On arrangements for future costly UN peacekeeping operations , we would initially explore Soviet reaction to the two features mentioned in your letter: —to strengthen the role of the Security Council in peacekeeping. We might suggest that all major peacekeeping operations be considered first by the Security Council. The General Assembly would undertake them only if the Security Council had been unable to take action; —to take account of the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries (particularly the Permanent Members of the Security Council) in meeting the United Nations' financial problems. This might be done by establishing a new peacekeeping financing committee of the General Assembly, weighted in favor of the larger contributors, to determine the most suitable financing plan in each situation and to apportion expenses. Under such an arrangement, the General Assembly would need to adopt a rule of procedure that it would pass no financing plan for the more costly peacekeeping operations without the prior approval of two-thirds of this committee. There are two other interrelated elements of importance. A UN Working Group of 21 members is scheduled to meet this spring and will almost certainly recommend a special scale of assessment under which big contributors would pay more than the regular scale for expensive peacekeeping operations. The “special scale” would be available to the peacekeeping finance committee as one of the alternative financing plans. The preferred formula from our viewpoint would be that the special scale apply only after the first $5 to $10 million needed for peacekeeping operations in any given year had been assessed at the regular scale. We would seek to hold our share on the special scale to less than 40%. A change by Congress in the present legislative ceiling of 33–1/3% for our assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping would be required before we could accept a General Assembly resolution applying the special scale to a particular operation. We plan also to discuss with the Soviets a formula permitting selective assessment. Under the arrangement we have in mind, the General Assembly (or the peacekeeping finance committee) could decide to apportion expenses among members in such a way as to exclude from assessment under the special scale a permanent member that has fundamental political objections to a UN peacekeeping operation. The Soviets may insist on a formula which would, in effect, give the permanent members a right to “opt out” rather than to leave this decision to a two-thirds majority of the peacekeeping finance committee or the General Assembly. [ Alternative I . I recommend that we consider such a formula if it proves to be essential to reaching an agreement with the Soviets on a package that includes payment of its arrears.] 4 [ Alternative II . I recommend that Governor Stevenson be authorized to discuss such a procedure with the Soviets if in his judgment it is a necessary part of reaching an agreement with the Soviets on a package that includes paying up its arrears.] If you approve of our exploring the above approach with the Soviets, we would plan to consult with appropriate Congressional committees to outline our proposals and to explain why we believe they are in our national interest. If the Soviets do not settle their arrears before the next General Assembly session (we might be faced with a special session at any time) we would press for a ruling on suspension of the Soviet vote if we are confident of the votes to support a favorable ruling. If not, as a means of building greater support, we would consider having the General Assembly refer to the International Court of Justice the question of whether suspension of vote under Article 19 is automatic and mandatory. Dean Rusk 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous. Confidential. Drafted by Nathan Pelcovits and Elmore Jackson (IO) on January 31 and cleared by Tyler and Meeker (L). 2 A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, USSR-Khrushchev. Also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1964, Book I, pp. 153–155. 3 Article 19 of the UN Charter states: “A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of the arrear equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.” For text of the United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco, June 26, 1945, see 59 Stat. 103. 4 All brackets in the source text. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 288. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 288. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 7, 1964. SUBJECT United-Nations Peacekeeping and Article 19—Memorandum to the President from the Secretary of State (Attached) 2 The Secretary's memorandum begins as though the Department's proposals on the problem are solely to carry forward the momentum of the President's January 18 letter to Khrushchev. The truth of the matter is, of course, that the situation we now face would have been the same even if the President had not written the letter. As for strengthening of the Role of the Security Council , it is in the long-range interest of this country, as well as the USSR, that important matters such as peacekeeping go through the Security Council channel due to the present nature and composition of the General Assembly. In this, the US and USSR have a common interest. We will not, of course, mention this in our negotiations with the Russians, but it will be a consideration both sides will be taking into account most seriously. As for the attitude of the less-developed countries, there will be no objection because they ultimately will be represented on an enlarged (15) Security Council. Also, in order that greater account can be taken of the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries, we would support the creation of a new Peacekeeping Finance Committee of the General Assembly, weighted in favor of the larger and middle countries, which would, determine how a particular peacekeeping operation would be financed. In this way, those countries who pay the larger amounts would also have a larger voice in how it was spent. We also would be willing to accept a special scale of assessment under which large contributors would pay proportionately more than the regular scale for an expensive peacekeeping operation (i.e., in excess of $5–10 million). This would be advantageous because those who have the greatest responsibility and concern for peacekeeping would have greater control through the membership of the new finance committee, heavily weighted in their favor. The less-developed countries would approve of this because they would pay less than they now do. On the matter of selective assessment (allowing a permanent member of the Security Council to opt out of a particular peacekeeping operation of which it does not approve), it might be that our accession to such an arrangement could be traded for payment by the USSR of its arrears. If this works, the less-developed countries, who shudder at the prospect of a confrontation with the USSR on Article 19, would be greatly relieved. Such a provision might, at some time in the future, be desirable for this country, let us say, if the wrong kind of government came to power in Puerto Rico accompanied by internal strife. The USSR's total arrearage is $54.5 million; breaking down into $2 million in regular assessments, $15.6 million for UNEF and $6.9 million for the Congo operation. 3 Moscow would have to pay $8 million (arrived at by a rather complicated method) to retain its GA vote. The Department believes that if it takes the “reasonable” approach outlined in the Secretary's memorandum, rather than a “Cold War” one, there is a good chance to make progress. It is also believed that such an approach will line up more votes in favor of our interpretation of Article 19. This, only time will tell. The Russians have indicated to us that they are concerned about the problem and have indicated to the SYG that they expect bilateral negotiations with the US to begin soon. You will recall that the ICJ ruled in the summer of 1962 4 that peacekeeping expenses were the responsibility of the Organization; but what they did not rule on was the automaticity of the application of Article 19. Some countries, especially the smaller ones, have doubts about the application of this Article and it may be necessary to get an additional ruling by the ICJ if this group becomes strong enough. As for the difference between the Department and Governor Stevenson on the approach we take in negotiating with the Russians, 5 i.e., do we offer the opting out idea at the beginning or make the Russians work for it, there is an increasing belief in the Department that the matter can be easily resolved; probably by the Secretary advising Stevenson that we must at least take a careful sounding of the Russian position before capitulating on the matter. I think Abe Chayes' letter to Stevenson and his memorandum to the Secretary—both of which I sent you 6 —are the most eloquent statements supporting this view. SEB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential. 2 Document 287 . 3 Reference is to the United Nations Emergency Fund (UNEF), created to support emergency peacekeeping operations, and the special allotment established in 1961 to support peacekeeping operations in the former Belgian Congo. 4 The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice issued July 20, 1962. For text, see ICJ Reports, 1962, pp. 151–308. 5 In a February 13 memorandum to Bundy, Belk reported that having failed to find support for his approach Stevenson had accepted the approach recommended by Rusk and that negotiations with the Russians would probably begin the following week at the United Nations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1) 6 Neither found. 289. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 289. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 1, 1964. SUBJECT U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on UN Problems The Secretary of State has authorized Ambassador Stevenson 2 to begin exploratory negotiations with the Russians on (1) future UN peacekeeping arrangements, and (2) UN financial problems. Stevenson will explore the following areas with the Russians: 1. Strengthening the Security Council so that peacekeeping operations first come to the Council, and go to the General Assembly only if the Council cannot act because of a vote. Also, Stevenson will propose the creation of a new finance committee, heavily weighted in favor of permanent Council members and large contributors, so that financial arrangements for peacekeeping will be controlled by those who pay the most. 2. Stevenson will propose a new scale of assessments for peacekeeping operations by which large contributors would pay a larger percentage than for the regular budget. We believe we could keep our share to less than 40%, which would represent a saving over the approximately 46% we have paid for the Congo and the Middle East operations. 3. Another financial arrangement we would be willing to consider would allow a permanent member of the Council to be excluded from any assessment for a peacekeeping operation of which it did not approve. 4. We plan to stick to our policy of insisting that the Soviet Union lose its vote in the General Assembly if it is still two years financially in arrears when the next General Assembly convenes. The Secretary and Ambassador Stevenson believe that if we take this reasonable approach rather than a “Cold War” one, there is hope for resolving some parts on these problems. The Congress is being kept fully informed. Assistant Secretary Cleveland has individually briefed Senators Aiken, Church, Hickenlooper, Sparkman and Fulbright. Ambassador Stevenson, accompanied by Cleveland and Chayes of the Department, met with the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 26. The meeting went satisfactorily, and the Department plans to keep the Senators informed as the negotiations progress. On the House side, Cleveland already has briefed Representative Fascell (Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on International Organizations), who thought it would be helpful if Cleveland briefed the full House Foreign Affairs Committee next week. Cleveland plans to do so. McGeorge Bundy 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential. 2 Authorization was transmitted in telegram 2207 to New York, February 14. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 290. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 290. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, March 3, 1964. SUBJECT UNCTAD In accordance with our telephone conversation, 2 I am enclosing a strategy paper 3 prepared for the UNCTAD meeting in Geneva. The problems posed by this conference result from the lamentable fact that the less-developed countries have been the victims of a high-class confidence game conducted in elegant economic jargon. When they finally open the package and find it contains old newspapers they will be mightily upset. Almost alone among the economically competent countries, we have tried to be realistic and honest. We have not been rewarded with smiles of gratitude but we have kept expectations from soaring too far into the stratosphere. Moreover—as was shown at the last OECD Trade Committee meeting—we have brought several of our European allies toward sobriety and responsibility. The tactical problems at the conference will be: 1. How to continue to play a responsible role without appearing overly negative; 2. How to avoid the appearance of sympathy with commercial policies that could give comfort to the enemy in the forthcoming political campaign; and 3. How to steer the conference in a manner that will be instructive to the participants, yet permit the conference to end with a whimper and not a bang. This will not be easy. The best tactic, I think, is for us to play a relaxed role during the early weeks of the conference while it generates its own confusions. There will be well over 100 countries represented from both sides of the Iron Curtain and the speech-making will be interminable. I propose to appear for the first three or four days when ministers from most countries will be in attendance. 4 I plan a bland opening speech that will contain sympathy for the problem of the LDCs and emphasize the need to free LDC products from discrimination in markets of economically advanced countries. With the exception of cotton textiles and certain raw materials, our own record in this area will stand comparison with that of almost any other Western country. Our skeptical attitude toward special preferences and some of the other Prebisch gimmickry 5 is well enough known and can, I think, be let alone without any further public utterance for the time being. In the meetings of the Gargantuan working committees—each of which will contain representatives of every member country—I think we should, during the early phase, pursue the Socratic method—attempting to draw the other countries out so far as possible. We can be reasonably confident that chaos will result since the interests and views represented will be many and diverse. At the end we should try to pick up the shards and put together all that is good and salvageable. We have some sane and positive ideas and in the end they should prevail. George W. Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, UNCTAD. Limited Official Use. 2 A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., Ball Papers, UN. 3 Not attached and not found. 4 Ball visited Geneva for the opening of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, March 23–June 15. 5 Reference is to a paper submitted by Dr. Prebisch, Conference Secretary General. It was summarized in an attached but not printed February 24 strategy paper. 291. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 291. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 Washington, March 6, 1964, 7 p.m. 3303. Article 19 and Future of U.N. Financing. 1. Stevenson and Plimpton, together with Dean (U.K.), met with Fedorenko and Morozov (USSR) this morning to make our presentation on Article 19 and financing. 2. Stevenson opened by referring to fact we had been in consultation with U.K. for several months. Said common views had now emerged and we wished express ideas which we thought would be of joint interest to USSR and ourselves. He then expressed U.S. position in close paraphrase talking paper pouched Department. 2 3. Dean followed with similar statement from U.K. talking paper (also pouched Department)./2/ Only difference in emphasis between two papers was that Dean's paper stressed more that ideas were “tentative and far from final”. Fedorenko then replied that U.S. and U.K. were in favorable position in this meeting in that we had had opportunity be fully prepared, including talking papers. Stated Soviet position so simple it was not necessary make specific efforts to express it. Thanked Stevenson and Dean for their thoughts and ideas. Stated Stevenson had stressed our ideas dealt with “future” but actually had spoken mainly of present. Said he wished confirm present Soviet resolution re finance issue. This had been expounded at many conferences and meetings, including special General Assembly and Security Council. Soviet position was clear and it was not necessary repeat it in detail. 4. Fedorenko said present financial situation not created by USSR. Financing of peace-keeping belonged to competence of Security Council. This was avoided not by USSR but by western powers. Full responsibility for present situation therefore rested with western powers. Said principal position of USSR “had not been changed” and “we do not see any reason to change”. 5. Re application of Article 19, stated USSR knew procedure and order of its implementation, including competence of General Assembly. Stated USSR considered it was right and had acted in accordance with Charter. Western approach to financing had not been reasonable nor lawful. USSR could not accept it and was not afraid of any meeting, including General Assembly. 6. Fedorenko stated this was the past. As to future, it was difficult to consider proposals just after hearing them and proper consideration was necessary. One matter was clear. Every step had to be taken in accordance with Charter. Security Council had privilege and right to decide problem of financing. USSR would bear in mind this simple procedure, that everything done must be in full accord with Charter. If you say you are interested in strengthening Security Council we would understand this to be in accordance with Charter. Said some elements of our proposal were not clear. Understood from what Stevenson said we had further elaboration in mind. Needed time to report to Moscow and receive their views and wondered if we had something in writing to give him. Stevenson and Dean said presentation had intended be oral. In response Fedorenko's elaboration Stevenson recapitulated position as follows: We wish keep U.N. peace-keeping operations going. We were prepared to consider new arrangements for future under which major peace-keeping operations would be authorized by Security Council only in first instance and would go to General Assembly only when Security Council could not act; there would be weighted peace-keeping committee to consider and make recommendations to General Assembly re financing; if other aspects agreeable we were prepared to consider means to take into account special position of permanent members, possibly to exempt from assessment, by recommendation of committee or some other device, permanent members who fundamentally politically opposed to operation. Stevenson said all this was premised on clearing up past, including arrears. Noted Fedorenko had said USSR would not change position on past, therefore we must be confronted by Article 19. Regretted to hear this reply before he had given careful consideration to our proposals. Whether it would be useful to consider future before there was reconsideration of past he did not know, but he hoped USSR would consider our whole proposal. He should understand that U.S. was clear on relationship of proposals to past. 7. Fedorenko said he had expressed Soviet position just to avoid illusions. We must be realistic and we must be precise. Again expressed preference for piece of paper, with understanding it would be entirely informal. Stevenson and Dean said we would prepare one of these lines which would constitute “series of headings”. Dean then stated he wished to associate U.K. with Stevenson's position about importance past problem as well. Proposals must be considered as whole. 8. Fedorenko then asked whether we had talked to French. Plimpton said we had given French general outline of views but had received no answer. Said we noted certain similarity of French and Soviet views but hoped they would both come around. Said we had also given general statement of our views and intention to talk to USSR to western group and LDCs in group of 21. Had asked them to keep it confidential. Stevenson added it was just as well not to have public discussion now. If our ideas offered possibility for solution we felt they should be pursued first among three delegations present. Fedorenko strongly endorsed importance conversations being kept confidential. 9. At end of meeting it was agreed that if press found out about meeting we would all three say it was discussion of general U.N. issues without elaborating on any of the details. Also understood U.S. and U.K. agreed would give French paper similar to that we would give USSR but would not do so with anyone else. Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow. 2 Not found. 292. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 292. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 30, 1964. SUBJECT United Nations Trade and Development Conference I returned last night after attending the first week of the United Nations Trade and Development Conference (UNCTAD) in Geneva. These are my impressions: 1. This Conference was originally inspired by the Communist Bloc as a device to demoralize trading relations among the industrialized Western countries and gain a propaganda advantage with the less-developed countries. The leadership was subsequently taken over by a small group of intellectuals from the less-developed countries headed by Dr. Raul Prebisch of Argentina. 2. As it has developed, the Conference has become an organized pressure campaign designed to force a massive transfer of resources from the industrialized countries to the less-developed countries by pegging prices and manipulating world trading patterns. 3. Dr. Prebisch, who has been working on this Conference for over a year, has managed to whip up a high degree of enthusiasm among his clients. The less sophisticated of the less-developed countries have been led to regard the Conference as the dawn of a golden age. These expectations have been encouraged by the fact that some of the Western industrialized countries—particularly France—have given the appearance of sympathy to Dr. Prebisch's ideas-although with no intention of adopting them. 4. We have pursued the opposite tactic. We have tried to bring about the deflation of expectations by directing the attention of the Conference at the hard facts of the development problem and the need to be quite clear as to what each country is talking about. 5. My speech last week 2 was designed as the first step in this deflationary and educational process. It was not intended to gain us any cheap and transient popularity that would lead later to disenchantment and that, meanwhile, could embarrass us on the Hill. As I had hoped, the speech was accepted by the less-developed countries for what it was—an honest statement of the realities. While we did not tell the less-developed countries what they wanted to hear, they seemed generally to accept the fact that we were being straightforward with them and that we intended to be helpful. 6. Except for a captious and ignorant editorial in The Washington Post, 3 the press treatment in the United States has, on balance, been satisfactory. In Europe, including France, the press reaction has been even more favorable; in fact our statement has received more friendly treatment than that of the French Finance Minister. A canvass of the less-developed countries reveals little editorial comment of any kind so far. 7. In the next few weeks the deceptively solid position of the less-developed countries will crumble as they begin to realize that their individual interests widely differ. As the chief Indian representative has already told me, we can also expect a spreading recognition that the Prebisch gimmickry is not the answer to their problems. 8. At that point, the United States can and should step in to pick up the pieces and put together a constructive set of proposals that will be both economically sensible and politically feasible. We should be in good position then to take the leadership since the less-developed countries will know that we have held out no false hopes and that, from the beginning, we have told them the truth. 9. One interesting point was the behavior of the Soviet Delegation. I sent word to the Soviet Minister through the Yugoslavs that we were not going to take the lead in turning the Conference into an East-West confrontation. I said I hoped that the Soviets would follow this same course, but that, if they didn't, we were loaded for bear and they would wish they had never come. 10. The next day the Soviet Minister assured me that they would not attack the United States and, in fact, his speech was the mildest Soviet statement I have seen in years. Quite clearly they recognized that, in this particular Conference, their interests were on the side of the industrialized countries. 11. Che Guevara, on the other hand, delivered a 1–1/2 hour tirade. His speech might have been effective had it been short, but, in the end, it bored the delegates and a number expressed their gratitude to us for not taking Guevara on and making the Conference an East-West donnybrook. George W. Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, UNCTAD. Confidential. 2 Ball's March 25 speech is in the Department of State Bulletin , April 20, 1964, pp. 634–640; excerpts are in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 141–149. 3 “Dutch Uncle at the UNCTAD,” March 28, 1964. 293. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 293. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, April 11, 1964. SUBJECT Committee of 24 Consideration of United States Territories Enclosed for your information is a copy of United Nations Resolution 1970 (XVIII) of December 16, 1963 2 which will affect United Nations activities regarding non-self-governing territories including the United States possessions of Guam, Samoa, and the Virgin Islands. By this resolution the General Assembly dissolved the United Nations Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, on which the United States has served as an administering authority, and transferred the principal functions of that Committee to the United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, generally referred to as the Committee of 24. The Committee of 24 will probably undertake its initial consideration of United States non-self-governing territories within the next few weeks. By Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, the United States agreed to transmit information to the United Nations on our non-self-governing territories. Since the beginning of the United Nations the United States has transmitted such information to the Secretary-General and cooperated throughout its existence with the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, which was established by the General Assembly to review these data. The Committee of 24 is much different in composition and emphasis from the Committee on Information. Its membership is weighted heavily in favor of the Afro-Asians, and Soviet Bloc, in contrast to the balanced composition of the Committee on Information, and its basic thrust thus far has been rapid independence for dependent areas. While the Committee of 24 has on a number of occasions taken unrealistic and unwise actions, it should be noted that the issues involved (e.g., Portuguese Territories, South West Africa, Aden) have been mainly those having high emotional and political content for the Afro-Asians and involving disputes between the metropoles and important elements of the indigenous peoples in the territory. We, of course, have no such problem in the United States territories, and the Committee's approach to our territories may pose no difficulties for us. However, we do not know yet how the Committee will approach the subject of our territories and believe it desirable to inform you of the Committee's upcoming discussions in case problems arise. The United States objective regarding our territories in the Committee is to prevent or minimize any harmful or embarrassing Committee action (e.g., call for Committee Visiting Mission to U.S. territories, criticism of fact U.S. territorial governors are not elected). We believe the best way to achieve our objective is by making an effective presentation of the United States accomplishments of territorial administration as we successfully did in the more favorably composed Committee on Information. The Departments of State and the Interior are now preparing these presentations and undertaking appropriate Congressional consultations. Benjamin H. Read 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous. Confidential. 2 Not attached to the source text; for text, see Yearbook of the United Nations , 1963, p. 438. 3 J.W. Davis signed for Reed. 294. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 294. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, April 21, 1964, 9 p.m. 3826. Discussions with Soviets re payment of arrears and new peacekeeping financing arrangements. Fedorenko (USSR) and members his staff met with Stevenson, Dean (UK), and staff members at USUN today on request Fedorenko. Fedorenko said he had instructions make oral statement in response to UK-US initiative of March 6 2 and would like read from English text in order make certain statement fully understood. Fedorenko said Soviet Government had given consideration to suggestions made by Stevenson March 6. They had paid particular attention to statement President Johnson desired avoid hampering relations between US and USSR on UN financial issue. Similarly, USSR Government had no intention strain relations between two countries and there no basis such strain if both parties proceeded in spirit of mutual cooperation and in conformity with Charter. Charter laid down procedure for UN action for maintenance peace and security, including financing of UN operations, those of Middle East and Congo in this case. Unfortunately, Fedorenko said US had taken steps which could not be qualified but as complicating situation and aimed at deterioration in relations between US and USSR. Responsible representatives of USG, while giving arbitrary and biased interpretation to Charter provisions, came out with threats to USSR and statement intent to win application Article 19. This action has given impression that US determined facilitate situation which will undermine UN as instrument for safeguarding peace and for creation of peaceful cooperation and compel USSR re-examine attitude re UN activities. Fedorenko said Soviet position re financing peacekeeping operations in Congo and Middle East and application Article 19 is clearly stated in statement of March 21, 1964, 3 and letter to SYG of June 10, 1963. 4 Fedorenko then quoted from March 21 statement that USSR shall consider any actions aimed at exploiting UN machinery including application provisions of Article 19 of Charter for ends alien to Charter as actions of those who do not care for UN and who do not take into account prospectives of its break-up of UN as result such actions. If anyone has illusions USSR may reconsider refusal pay expenditures for UN operations in Middle East and Congo and can be forced do so by pressure, USSR can only warn these speculations not only groundless but that, if there any attempt act along these lines, USSR may be obliged reconsider attitude towards UN activities. USSR stresses that attempt make groundless charges against it in connection with its position of principle will be considered as unfriendly act towards USSR. Fedorenko went on say, if Article 19 on legitimate grounds is to be spoken of at all, this must be done in strict conformity with Charter in conformity with provisions re suspension rights of members. This means application is not automatic but requires two-thirds vote under Article 18(2) as indicated in Soviet statement of June 11, 1963. (Then quoted 18(2).) Then Fedorenko proceeded make statement which we find most interesting, despite generality of its terms, because it seemed be request for us to make proposals to solve current financial problem. Fedorenko said: As stated in our letter of June 10, Article 19 provides no basis for automatic deprivation of rights of members to vote in GA. If US Government is really interested in finding way to overcome financial difficulties of UN as stated by you, Governor, then such ways should be sought not on basis of methods of cold war where one party is not taking account of position of other but through recognition mutual interests of all parties. In this connection, would like to stress that attention has been given in Moscow to Stevenson's statement of March 6 that attempt should be made find solution not detrimental to positions of principle of parties. If USG has any concrete proposals based on precisely such approach which is thoroughly appropriate to interests of such case, Soviet Government is prepared to consider such proposals. US memo of March 6 5 is being studied in Moscow. Even now it can be said that those provisions of proposals contained in that memo which are contrary to Charter cannot be accepted. Dean stated briefly that USSR in error if it believed any threat to it had been intended by US and UK. Said fact that UK stands on its position re applicability of Article 19 should not be considered such threat. Added that no progress in talks possible if there are threats on either side. Believed our view of principle right but this not question of threat at all. Fedorenko responded by saying impression had been created and that we should know it was fact Moscow had such impression. Stevenson said it appeared to him we had arrived at serious and important crisis in life of UN. He regretted Soviet statement not because it was statement of old positions but because it implied that US and UK had consciously created situation threatening undermine possibilities of international cooperation and threatening break up UN. No one else believed this was true and he was concerned that Soviets appeared believe it. US record in support UN did not justify such belief and he wished make it clear he completely resented implications of Soviet statement. Stevenson went on say our approach in March was attempt find solution through consultation to problems posed by different positions of great powers and was attempt see what could reasonably be done to meet Soviet positions. He noted text our memo of March 6 was being restudied but believed that further talks would not be useful if USSR proceeded from assumption we trying destroy UN or threaten USSR. We trying to make UN effective and circumvent conflict on Article 19. He hoped we could proceed on assumption that both sides trying preserve UN and he hoped Soviets would either react to our proposals or put forward any others they had in mind. Stevenson said Soviet Union knew our position which we consider based soundly on Charter. Since there seemed no point in repeating debates on past positions, he suggested we discuss future arrangements, recognizing that, in our view, it was essential that Soviet indebtedness to UN must be liquidated. Finally Stevenson said, if Soviets had no new proposals put forward, we were apparently at point where we could only wait for Soviet study and reactions to our memo of March 6. Fedorenko suggested that perhaps Stevenson had not taken fully into account evaluation in his statement of Stevenson's suggestion of March 6 on Article 19 that attempt be made find solution to UN financial problem which was not detrimental to positions of principle of both sides. Said USSR had noticed this and taken into consideration his explanation. Then requested three key sentences of statement on “positions of principle”, “concrete proposals”, and Soviet-Government willingness to consider such proposals (above). Stevenson and Dean responded by saying that U.S. and U.K. had already made proposals and could not understand why any of them had been considered contrary to Charter. Said we had no new proposals now. Fedorenko simply reread sentence re Soviet position on proposals contrary to Charter. Then said that, if we considered proposals of March 6 serious and constructive, then adequate time must be given USSR for study. Stevenson then pointed out that six weeks had passed since our approach March 6 and that other members of working group were formulating proposals re peacekeeping financing and that question arose how long could they be excluded from talks re these matters. We had thought desirable see how far U.S. and U.K. could progress with USSR towards some agreement before inviting others participate in talks but delay now made situation difficult. Plimpton emphasized fact that was important for Moscow react to memo of March 6 in reasonably short time because other working group members becoming restive. Fedorenko said he would report U.S.-U.K. reaction his government immediately. He added, however, that U.S. and U.K. had obligation study and present specific constructive proposals to USSR. When reply was given that proposals had been presented, Fedorenko asked whether we had any new suggestions. Stevenson and Dean replied in negative. Stevenson pointed out to Fedorenko that we were reasonably satisfied with existing UN procedures and that we had been trying meet some Soviet objections to these. We were prepared give further consideration if Soviets had any suggestions to make. Our proposals had not been worked out in detail and were not final. Soviets should also be aware that our proposals required only changes in rules of procedure and not Charter amendments. Fedorenko then raised question as to what to say to press about today's meeting. He said that, of course, he expected we and U.K. would immediately give full account to New York Times and Tribune and question really was what he would say. Stevenson and Dean pointed out that we had informed no one else of today's meeting and did not intend give any publicity to discussions which had taken place. Fedorenko indicated skepticism. As Fedorenko left, Stevenson repeated request he had also made earlier request for copy of text of Fedorenko's statement, and latter said he would consider request. Comment: In subsequent discussion U.S. and U.K. delegations agreed Soviet reply softer than we had expected and that Soviets were asking for our proposals on arrears problem as well as on those for future. If Fedorenko gives us written text his statement, we can examine it closely with this in mind. However, Fedorenko statement as given above virtually verbatim, especially this aspect. Also agreed with U.K. delegation we would say to other delegations, in response to inquiries only, that U.S. (not U.S. and U.K.) had “been in touch” with Soviets couple of times and Soviets said they still studying our proposals. Nothing to be said to press, and we not to indicate there had been specific meeting at which we had received Soviet reply. Idea is to avoid press interest to maximum extent. Soviet revealed extreme sensitivity re press attention to last meeting, and we believe Department should take care to avoid leaks. 6 Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow and London. 2 See Document 291 . 3 For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press , 26 (April 15, 1964), p. 18. 4 UN doc. A/5431. 5 Summarized in U.S. Participation in the UN, 1964 , p. 2. 6 In telegram 3257 from Moscow, April 24, the Embassy in the Soviet Union commented that “Stripped of its rhetoric and imputation of motives to the US, we believe Fedorenko statement designed to say that: (1) Sovs absolutely inflexible in refusal to pay Congo and ME arrearages and (2) within that limitation, Sovs anxious find accommodation on Art 19 issue and future peacekeeping operations.” (Department of State, S/S-S Exdis/Limdis Telegrams, Reel 40) 295. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the President's Special Assistant (Jenkins) 295. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the President's Special Assistant (Jenkins) 1 Washington, April 22, 1964. You will recall that I have mentioned to you my concern about the staffing at USUN with particular reference to the utilization of Negroes. At the present time there are only two Negroes in professional jobs—Carmel Marr and Frank Montero, both at the ES 14 level; moreover, Mr. Montero may be leaving shortly. There may be one or two other Negroes serving in clerical or semi-professional positions, but, by and large, the prevailing pattern of employment at the Mission has been a failure to utilize minorities in the higher level professional positions. Over the past several years Ambassadors Mercer Cook, Carl Rowan and others professionally employed in the foreign affairs field have been appointed as alternate delegates to the General Assembly. Not since the Eisenhower Administration has there been a Negro serving as a full Delegate. The continuing absence of Negroes in senior level positions and on the Delegation at USUN has drawn mounting criticism from the Negro community and particularly from the politically sensitive minority organizations in New York City. If unchanged this will culminate in strong criticism of the Department and the Administration. The immediate appointment of a Negro as a full Delegate probably would not stop it, but would certainly soften the effect. I understand that the President is considering having Sidney Yates fill Jack Bingham's former position at USUN. We think we can offer a qualified Negro candidate for this job. However, if the President believes it important that Yates get the position, perhaps we can have a Negro take Yates' present job. I would appreciate your raising this possibility with the President. William J. Crockett 2 1 Source: Kennedy Library, Crockett Papers, MS 75–45, WJC Book, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. No classification marking. Drafted by Richard Fox (O). 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Crockett signed the original. 296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, May 7, 1964, 3 p.m. 2875. Ref: USUN 3956. 2 Subj: Soviet Position on Payment Arrears. Re methods for handling arrears problem following is for your guidance in talks with Sovs and Secretariat. Dept concurs in general with line you propose take on arrears problem in event Fedorenko makes another approach. Our understanding is that you do not propose to take initiative for any meeting on this subject but are preparing contingency position. In next talk, if Sovs renew request for proposals on settling arrears you would adopt position described this telegram. Also, our understanding that in any discussions with Sovs (or informal exchanges with Working Group) on financing arrangements, you would adhere to line in comment B of reftel and guard against any weakening of essential and inherent link between problem of future and satisfactory settlement of arrears. Following are points we suggest you emphasize in event next discussion with Sovs turns to arrears problem: 1. We are flexible on accounting devices for settling arrears, and will not make issue of modalities. We believe several possibilities can be designed which would allow Sovs to settle their debts without appearing to abandon their position. (FYI. We suggest that you do not get into question of how particular solution relates to Sov “principles”. We will try to be accommodating but feel that question of whether settlement is detrimental to their principles is matter basically for them and not for us. End FYI.) 2. Particular devices are matter Sovs will want to work out with Secretariat. We are willing to go along with any reasonable scheme that does not violate Financial Regulations and is consistent with Charter. We would not want to leave impression (para 3 of reftel) that we would be satisfied with minimal payment just to avoid Article 19 hassle at this time. This may well be outcome but we are concerned with satisfactory settlement arrears and not simply resolution Article 19 issue. We recognize that Sovs may be concerned about possibility that after they have worked out apparently viable scheme with Secretariat we might pull out rug from under them by rejecting it as unsatisfactory. If this becomes apparent in conversations with Fedorenko you are authorized to outline in very general terms methods we might regard as satisfying requirements, using as illustrations the consolidated account and ex gratia devices described below. You should avoid, of course, being drawn into any negotiations with Soviets on modalities to pay off arrearages. We would like this aspect kept between USSR and UN. End FYI. 3. FYI. We want to avoid any suggestion of US–USSR deal in which we appear to abandon principle of financial integrity UN and wink at violation of financial rules to avoid showdown. For this reason Dept believes you should not at this time seek informal exchanges with Sovs, even at working level, on methods of arrears payment. End FYI. 4. Sovs may be concerned by prospect that after they pay they will suffer prestige loss and that US public and press will picture result as backdown from showdown. We cannot of course control what others and press will say but believe that world will applaud satisfactory outcome and that Sovs will not suffer from policy of support for UN. If satisfactory arrangement can be worked out we would in public statements indicate our gratification at settlement and would not seek to exploit it to their detriment. In meantime, as suggested USUN 3847, 3 you are authorized carry on consultations with Narasimhan and Turner, 4 on assumption Sovs may be open some means paying debts and will seek Secretariat advice. (We would want to avoid putting this in context that would lend credibility to Sov complaint we are compromising confidential nature of US–UK-USSR discussions on future financing.) You can say we are flexible on modalities Secretariat might work out with those in arrears, including Sovs, in such fashion as not to compromise Financial Regulations. You should emphasize to Secretariat we believe they in position to discuss proposals for alleviation immediate financial crisis in light GA Res 1877 (S–IV) 5 which “Appeals to Member States … to pay their arrears, disregarding other factors …” and request SYG to work out with Members “arrangements as to the most appropriate modalities within the letter and spirit of the Charter.” Key elements of Res are payment “without prejudice to their respective positions” and “possibility of payment by installments.” Following are three illustrative devices that have been suggested and that might meet problem. You can tell Secretariat we believe any of these offer possibilities satisfactory financial settlement and might be politically acceptable. All of them assume that Sovs pay Working Capital Fund assessments and will not object to UN crediting their regular budget payments to cover arrears for items for which payment withheld in 1963. 1. Consolidated account . All arrears as of June 30, 1964 would be consolidated in a single account. Payments would then be made by those in arrears not to separate accounts but to consolidated one. Barton (Canada) has already surfaced this idea in his paper 6 and Secretariat already familiar with it. Idea would be that UN would start International Cooperation Year with clean slate, with arrears paid and new agreements in hand on authorizing and financing future peacekeeping operations. We believe this might have atmospheric possibilities in view of Gromyko-ICY letter July 15, 1963 7 pointing out UN successes and calling for solution of important international questions during the year. Consolidated account formula might also have particular appeal to French. FYI. While consolidation might raise some legal and perhaps accounting problems, we believe such solution would readily obtain GA endorsement. End FYI. 2. Ex gratia payment, covering total arrears, in single contribution or in installments . Sovs would not pay on peacekeeping accounts but make ex gratia contribution to UN to mitigate UN's financial crisis and avoid situation which could prejudice prospects for international understanding. Sovs might couple this payment with reservation of their legal position. Sovs would not attach such conditions to ex gratia contribution that comptroller unable credit contributions to peacekeeping arrears. In subsequent years Sovs would make further voluntary contributions in requisite sums and with similar reservations. 3. Voluntary Payments for Peacekeeping (UNOC & UNEF) Arrears . Sovs would make “voluntary” payment to settle all or part of their peacekeeping arrears, probably after UNOC withdraws, at the same time reserving their legal position. Soviets might arrange pay in installments if they wish. Apart from tie to International Cooperation Year, Dept does not believe that, at this stage of discussion with Sovs, linkage of arrears problem with other issues, either in UN context or outside, is likely be fruitful approach. We have already made logical tie with future of peacekeeping and in that connection emphasized our common interest in strengthening UN peacekeeping capacity. Department aware that in broader context in which this was in President's January 8 reply to Khrushchev, strengthening of peacekeeping encompasses wide range of common objectives in putting limitations on nuclear weapons, reducing risks of war, and moving toward effective disarmament. We will continue to study possibilities of linkage to some of these broader questions but believe that to bring any of them in now would be premature. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol 1. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Pelcovits and Jackson on May 6; cleared in CIA, L, EUR, SOV, UNP, and IO; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Geneva for Gardner. 2 Dated May 1; it set out proposals for future discussions with the Soviets on Article 19 issues. (Ibid.) 3 Dated April 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4) 4 Bruce R. Turner, Under Secretary, Office of the Controller, UN Secretariat. 5 For text, see United Nations Yearbook, 1963 , pp. 575–576. 6 Not found. 7 Printed in Izvestia July 18, 1963. 297. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 297. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 7, 1964. SUBJECT Soviet Memorandum to Japan on “Measures to Strengthen the Power of the UN for Securing International Peace and Security” (Unofficial Japanese Translation Attached) 2 We have now received an unofficial translation of the Soviet note from the Japanese news media and, according to press reports, all other UN members will receive the same note. Governor Stevenson, who has returned early from Illinois, is scheduled to see Ambassador Fedorenko late this afternoon, when it is assumed the note will be delivered. If the Japanese translation can be depended on—and I think it can—the Russians have made still another strong pitch for strengthening the Security Council. We, of course, want to do the same thing, but in a different way. The Russian approach would take away the prerogative which the General Assembly gave itself in 1950 when faced with a Security Council deadlock on the matter of going into Korea. (At that time, the GA, under the “Uniting for Peace Resolution”, decided that there were two ways to by-pass the Council when faced with a deadlock because of the veto: 1. any problem could be sent to the Assembly by an affirmative vote of any seven members of the Security Council, and 2. the GA could, by a simple majority vote, decide to take up an issue at a special emergency session.) There is a strong argument that the Resolution violates Chapter VII of the Charter, which relegates peacekeeping to the Security Council, not to the General Assembly. The US, however, is in favor of retaining the Resolution because it provides the only escape hatch from a deadlocked Council. Our hope for strengthening the Council would come through our proposals for controlling financing through the Council (a weighted Finance Committee of Council members) and increased Soviet cooperation in the Council because of the make-up of the GA. On the problem of financing, the note alludes only to the future, but at least the way is cleared for further discussions. Stevenson is going to probe Fedorenko on the matter of past financing when he sees him today. The Peacekeeping Force proposed by the Russians would be under Security Council jurisdiction and, therefore, the use of such a force would be subject to the veto. This shouldn't worry us very much. If we and our allies decide to put a peacekeeping force into a country we can do it just as we did in Lebanon and inform the Security Council that we have done it or that we are going to do it. The tone of the note is reasonable and holds promise at least for extensive negotiations on matters that need much to be negotiated. There certainly will be more to be said when we get the official text with whatever remarks Fedorenko makes to Stevenson. Sam Belk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. No classification marking. 2 Summarized in an attached but not printed July 10 memorandum from Read to Bundy. The translation was not found. 298. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 298. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, July 10, 1964, 6 p.m. 100. Western Group mtg re Sov memo on UN Peacekeeping. 2 Twenty members Western Group met today to discuss USSR memo on UN peacekeeping. About half of members had copies (we confidentially made copies available to others), but only Japan and Sweden indicated their govts had received copies directly from USSR. Stevenson stated USSR memo, while apparently in response US–UK initiative, reflected USSR's own proposals and did not comment on suggestions made by US and UK on Mar 6. He said US is attempting discover whether USSR desire hold fruitful negotiations, but memo appears be only reiteration standard Sov position on exclusive rights SC to establish and finance all peacekeeping operations. USSR want make every phase of operations subject to veto which appears contrary to membership desire retain reserve powers GA. USSR proposal would also inhibit SYG executive role and did not mention resolving of arrears situation. Amb Dean (UK) said UK giving memo careful study, but “troika” implications clear in suggestion that “socialist” countries supply troops and participate in command of operations. He saw memo as careful restatement USSR views on Chap 7 plus introduction further restriction that SC Perm Reps should not participate in operations. Plimpton added that memo goes back to Sov views expressed in consultations on Art 43 3 which foundered in the 40's. Reps attending indicated they had no instructions, but in general found little in USSR note on plus side; raised numerous questions about what USSR really means in substance—especially on what operations USSR considers could be carried out under Chap 7 and Art 43 concept; expressed considerable skepticism about motivation of USSR on timing of making note widely available; and considered in some detail best ways of countering USSR offensive by educating UN membership quickly so appropriate action by OAU and during SYG trip to Moscow not be aborted. Another Western Group mtg scheduled for Wed, July 15. Amb Loridan (Belgium) believed USSR memo talking only of Chap 7 operation and would exclude such operations as Congo, Cyprus, and UNEF. He questioned whether Congo is an operation of aggressor under Chap 7 in USSR view. Plimpton supplied that, when US had queried Fedorenko about Kashmir-type operations, reply had been SC had exclusive jurisdiction in such cases. Loridan said memo led him to conclusion it addressed only to Chap 7 situation, especially aggression, and that this might exclude action by SC under Chap 6. Stevenson agreed matter should be further explored with USSR. Amb Cremin (Ireland) saw gap in memo between peacekeeping operations like Cyprus which Sovs had not opposed and peace “enforcing” operations under Chap 7. Dean said Sovs see Cyprus as past operation and memo addresses itself to future. Barton (Canada) averred USSR position was Cyprus should be left to Cypriots and UN should not take role unless Turks invade. If Turks invaded, Cyprus then it becomes Chap 7 operation. Stevenson at this point expressed personal concern how SC could draft and deal with res as complicated as USSR prescriptions at bottom page 3 of note. Amb de Beus (Netherlands) felt press version of memo gave more favorable first impression than official document, and perhaps Tokyo leak planned. In analysis he attempted find something new and mentioned: (1) tone of memo more favorable to peacekeeping than Izvestyia article; 4 (2) contributions of troops of Perm SC Members were excluded; (3) USSR recognition that peacekeeping operations might be authorized within UN framework; (4) members should make troops available to UN; and (5) costs should in first instance be borne by aggressor, but USSR prepared share some costs. Negative aspects of memo which de Beus felt membership unable accept were: (1) exclusive jurisdiction of SC (on this Netherlands be firmly opposed); (2) peacekeeping operations envisaged only under Chap 7, not Congo, Cyprus, or New Guinea; (3) exclusion of SC Perm Reps, so no Korea or Cyprus; (4) inclusion of Communist forces and command in all operations; (5) reduction SYG role “to stooge” of SC and Military Staff Comite; and (6) failure mention financial crisis and arrears. He concluded by querying whether main elements open up chance for negotiations and expressed view that on whole paper not hopeful. Stevenson interjected additional negatives: USSR planning to substitute permanent UN force for earmarking of national units and difficulty of negotiating treaties with individual members. Pointed out that flexible call-up more fruitful approach to problem. Matsui (Japan) said he knew of no particular reason Tokyo selected for first Sov presentation. When Sov Chargé delivered memo on Jul 6 he gave only short explanation and indicated all members would receive it. Japan since learned memo given Laos and Sweden same day. Matsui said GOJ had received text in Japanese, which probably reason for slight difference between press report and document received by US and UK. Japan was studying memo and had reached no conclusion on its value. Amb Vinci (Italy) expressed personal view that all chances of negotiation should be explored. Saw timing of memo presentation as attempt influence Africans before Cairo mtg and indicate Sov position before SYG visit Moscow. Vinci felt US and UK should continue explorations with Sovs, present opinions to SYG before he leaves, and utilize Working Group 21 as means of expressing Western views and drawing more backing for our position. Stevenson said we hope see SYG before he leaves and summarize for him preliminary views Western Group indicating that dels presently without instructions. Principal danger is that Sov memo calculated stimulate long discussions and divert attention from more realistic proposals and obscure Art 19 before Nov 10. Stevenson agreed Vinci analysis Sov tactic re timing and reflected personal opinion that memo was obviously in part for propaganda purposes. Amb Tabor (Denmark) saw little progress on face of memo, but felt it best not be too negative since we all want arrive at some plan for future. To counter Sov propaganda, US might consider making public statement before Cairo mtg (which should not concentrate on Art 19) but point out Sov proposal would take away GA powers. Tabor inquired whether SC Perm Reps exclusion included logistic support for operations. Stevenson thought it applied only to troops. Amb Corner (New Zealand) saw memo as another attempt of Sovs to plug up leak in what they had thought was water-tight control over activities of organizations as established in 1945. ASAF's with whom he had spoken (mentioned UAR, India, Nigeria) had been able see through memo, and West need not react too negatively in public. Patricio (Portugal) said he had not received text, but would pass it on to his govt. His first reaction was that it was composed of generalities to attract “certain majorities.” Stevenson expressed agreement with Tabor suggestion that public statement might be desirable, but questioned advisability of it coming from US and UK. Facts of situation were that it problem of entire membership and we don't want situation appear as bilateral confrontation or extension of cold war. Tabor agreed, but saw timing problem in reaching Western consensus and having it cleared with govts for prompt issuance. Vinci suggested that each member make statement to own press. Dean pointed out US–UK must have mtg with USSR first. Stevenson suggested it important get around corridors and make views clear to USSR. Important Western Group members make comments to LDC's. Corner read excellent statement made in New Zealand parliament. (Copies pouched Jackson/IO.) Amb Hay (Australia) concerned if all Westerns publicly comment, this likely enhance importance of memo and upgrade it to status of document on which to base negotiations. Hay inquired of Chief Adebo's reactions to memo. Plimpton reviewed appropriate info contained USUN 87. Amb Waldheim (Austria) suggested that another mtg be held next week after guidance received from Western govts. Mtg tentatively scheduled Jul 15, 10:30 a.m., US Mission. Tine (France) urged (and all concurred) advisable not mention these mtgs to press. Stevenson stressed there much missionary work be done with other dels, and asked that Western Group urge countries make views known to Sovs. Comment : Corner comment at end mtg quite accurately characterized Western reaction: He stated seeking positive aspects USSR proposal like looking for needle in haystack. Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. II, Part 5. Confidential. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–4 UN. 2 For text, see UN doc. A/5721. 3 The article that specified that members undertake to provide armed forces, assistance, and facilities to maintain or restore international peace and security. 4 Apparently the June 7 article in Izvestia “Concerning a Vicious Undertaking,” translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press , July 1, 1964, p. 15. 299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 11, 1964. SUBJECT Soviet Memorandum on UN Peacekeeping Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko on July 7 handed Governor Stevenson a memorandum on UN peacekeeping 2 which clearly brings us into the next stage of negotiations involving the use of UN forces, financing and the application of Article 19 (the denial of a vote in the General Assembly to members which do not pay their dues on time). The Soviet memorandum was in response to proposals of our own which Governor Stevenson, with the UK, made to the Russians in March. 3 At that time, we pressed for greater use of the Security Council in authorizing the use of UN forces and in controlling UN finances. Both we and the Russians feel that the General Assembly has been playing too strong a role in these areas at the expense of the Council. We outlined to the Russians specific ways the Security Council might be strengthened, but we always maintained that, in the event the Security Council could not act, there should be recourse to the General Assembly. We also outlined a formula for a special scale of assessments for major peacekeeping operations which would be fairer than the way operations have been financed in the past. We suggested, also, that it might be fruitful to examine the possibility of not assessing a Permanent Member of the Council if it strongly objected to a specific operation. However, in proposing these new approaches to the Russians we made it clear that our agreement to any new arrangements for the future would depend upon the payment of Soviet financial arrearages. We have told the Russians and other UN members that unless arrearages are paid, the Soviet Union—or any other member in the same situation—must lose its vote in the General Assembly when it convenes next November. The Soviet memorandum just received—which is very reasonable in tone—is by no means a full response to our March proposals. It especially makes the following points: (a) It mentions future financing, but Ambassador Fedorenko told Governor Stevenson that the USSR had not altered its position of refusal to pay its past debts. (b) It reiterates Moscow's long-standing view that the Security Council has exclusive jurisdiction over UN peacekeeping, including financing, thus precluding any recourse to the General Assembly. (There is not the slightest chance that the UN membership will buy such a proposal.) (c) It implies that the Russians are more willing to accept some sort of peacekeeping role for the UN than they have been in the past. The major significance of the memorandum is that it opens the door just far enough to make possible a further exchange of views on these long-standing problems. The next step is to find out exactly what the language of the memorandum means and, if it means what it seems to mean, then to see how far the Russians are willing to fall back—if at all—from their stated position. Peacekeeping, financing and Article 19 all are hard problems and they are interconnected in such a way that if you negotiate on one, you have to negotiate on all three. On the assumption that talks with the Russians will begin soon, Governor Stevenson may have some hard probing—and perhaps negotiating—to do in the coming weeks. We are fortunate in having the UK solidly with us on these issues. The first reaction to the Soviet memorandum from other non-bloc UN members has been very near our own, although it is still too early to get a dependable reading. You will be seeing U Thant on August 6 when he will report to you the results of his trip (London, Moscow, Paris, Geneva and Cairo) and these are some of the problems you may wish to discuss with him at that time. McG B. SEB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Confidential. A note on the memorandum reads: “For Information Only.” 2 See footnote 2, Document 298 . 3 See Document 291 . 300. Memorandum of Conversation 300. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 13, 1964, 6 p.m. SUBJECT Soviet Aide-Mémoire on Election of President of General Assembly PARTICIPANTS Mr. Georgi M. Kornienko, Chargé d'Affaires, Soviet Embassy Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary—EUR Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary—IO Mr. Sol Polansky—EUR/SOV Mr. Kornienko stated that he wished to read from an Aide-Mémoire from his Government 2 on the subject of the election of President of the General Assembly. He referred to GA Resolution No. 1990 of December 17, 1963, 3 which contained an annex stating that the election of GA President should follow “just geographical representation.” In the opinion of the Soviet Government, inasmuch as a representative of the Eastern European socialist countries had never held the GA Presidency since the founding of the UN, one had the right this year to be nominated for the position. Governor Harriman asked whom the Soviet Union was nominating. Mr. Kornienko replied that the Soviet Government had no one in particular in mind, but added that the Soviet Union was willing to support an African candidate for the coming 19th GA session since African countries had already proposed candidates before Resolution No. 1990 had been adopted. In turn, the Soviet Union would expect that an Eastern European representative will be supported for the GA Presidency at the 20th session in 1965. Mr. Kornienko replied that the Soviet Union had observed that the French and the United Kingdom were circulating a memorandum to the effect that the GA Presidency at the 20th session should be held by a Western European. He then reviewed the geographic distribution of past GA Presidents: 6 from Western Europe, 5 from Latin America, 1 from Africa, and 6 from Asia. Mr. Kornienko concluded by pointing out that the Soviet Government believed that the U.S. Government, in accordance with Resolution No. 1990 and in the spirit of improving relations and mutual understanding among countries, would support the candidacy of a representative from an Eastern European socialist country at the 20th session of the General Assembly. Governor Harriman replied that the U.S. Government would give the Soviet proposal “weighty thought and consideration.” Mr. Sisco pointed out that more and more countries are throwing their hats into the ring earlier for chairmanships of UN committees and other elected offices. Mr. Kornienko asked “informally” if the Soviet Union could count on U.S. support. Governor Harriman replied that we would give it consideration. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 79 D 246, United Nations. Confidential. Drafted by Polansky and approved in M on August 31. The meeting took place in Harriman's office. 2 Not found. 3 For text, see GA 1990 (XVII), December 17, 1963. 301. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 301. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 4, 1964. SUBJECT Your Working Meeting with U Thant, August 6, at 11:30 A.M. U Thant will arrive in Washington immediately following visits to London, Cairo, Paris, Geneva, Rangoon and Moscow. U Thant will be eager to review his recent trip with you—especially his meetings with De Gaulle and Khrushchev. Foremost in his mind will be (1) the three-fold problem of financing; peacekeeping; and the application of Article 19 of the Charter (under which a member loses its vote in the General Assembly if it is more than two years behind in its dues); (2) Southeast Asia; (3) Cyprus, and (4) Cuba. Financing, Peacekeeping and Article 19 Background : De Gaulle received U Thant warmly but offered no hope that the French intend to pay the approximately $15 million they owe the UN. Under Article 19 the French would lose their vote in the General Assembly after January 1, 1965 if no alternative—such as a “voluntary contribution”—has been found. Contrasted with De Gaulle's noncommittal attitude toward financing, Khrushchev was adamant against paying the $55 million of Soviet arrearages. Khrushchev told U Thant that if the USSR were deprived of its vote, it would leave the UN. This may be merely a bluff, but it probably has made U Thant more eager than ever to find a compromise and avoid an Article 19 showdown. There will be further exploratory exchanges of views between the U.S. and the Soviet missions in New York before the General Assembly opens on November 10. Response : It would be helpful if you would emphasize to U Thant that we are firmly committed to the application of Article 19 under which the Soviet Union and other countries will lose their votes when the next General Assembly opens. U Thant should be left with no doubt that future support of the UN by the U.S. and other free world democracies—which supply 3/4 of the UN budget—will be seriously impaired if the law of the Charter is not upheld. U Thant should understand that it is not our objective to deny the Soviet Union its vote but rather to find, with them, a workable formula for past and future financing. Southeast Asia Background : U Thant has tended in the past to speak as a Burmese, rather than a UN official, and has been critical of our present military effort in this area, expressing strong views in favor of an early Geneva conference. He also has been doubtful of the value of UN observers on the Cambodian-Viet-Nam frontier. He thinks much like De Gaulle on this. Response : U Thant should be reminded that the U.S. has taken the lead in seeking the establishment of a UN Commission to deal effectively with the Cambodian-South Viet-Nam border difficulties. We continue to favor this approach provided it can have sufficient mobility, freedom of movement and means of communications to operate effectively. However, there seems little hope that Sihanouk will accept a UN border group of any kind. On the broader question of Southeast Asia, emphasize to U Thant our continued willingness to participate in a Geneva conference on Laos if Souvanna Phouma's conditions can be met (primarily the withdrawal from the Plain of Jarres). Cyprus Background : U Thant is deeply concerned about the overall Cyprus problem, and specifically about the recent arms and personnel buildup in Cyprus and Cypriot interference with the UN forces freedom of movement which has inhibited the UN from detecting the buildup more accurately. Makarios has shown contempt for the UN. While using it as a shield against Turk action, he flouts its efforts to control the Greek military buildup and harasses the peacekeeping force. U Thant may submit a report to the Security Council expressing his concern over these developments. U Thant has been kept informed by Dean Acheson and the UN Mediator on the status of the talks in Geneva. Response : We have to convince U Thant not only that we continue to support the UN effort but that he should be as worried as we are about Makarios. We want to convince him that he must be tough with Makarios, because it will help us box him in—the best argument (to avoid suspicion that we are pro-Turk) is that we think UN prestige suffers and a bad precedent is set when the UN is “used” in this fashion. We continue to believe that a Security Council meeting would not be helpful at this time because of the adverse effect it might have on the Geneva talks. Cuba Background : U Thant probably will tell you Khrushchev told him that continued U-2 flights over Cuba were unacceptable and that if one were brought down, and there were difficulty, the USSR would then come to the aid of Cuba. Khrushchev said he could wait until after the elections in the hope that a better attitude would prevail. Khrushchev confided to U Thant that he might visit Cuba in December or January if the atmosphere had improved following the elections. The Cubans have asked U Thant to take some action (unspecified) with regard to the overflights. Response : As Governor Stevenson already has informed U Thant, the Cuban failure to permit safeguards against the re-entry of offensive weapons required the U.S. and OAS members to develop other means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The U–2 flights over Cuba are necessary. They will continue until other effective means are found. We are ever ready to explore this problem. Samuel E. Belk, III 2 McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, U Thant Visit. Confidential. A memorandum of the President's conversation with U Thant on Southeast Asia is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, Document 298 . 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures. 302. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 302. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, August 25, 1964. SUBJECT Contingency Planning for Problems that May Arise in the UN before November 3 The worst thing that could happen would be an Emergency Special Session of the GA. You may recall that the Department in mid-June went through this exercise and their contingency planning at that time still is about as good as can be done. A paraphrase of the Secretary's June 13 Memorandum to the President 2 follows: The regular session of the UN General Assembly will start November 10th. So far this year, no situation has arisen that brought us close to having an out-of-season General Assembly. Most of the UN's members, and especially the US, would prefer to avoid an out-of-season Assembly, because it would touch off major difficulties over the Article 19 issue, and there might be difficulties over Chinese representation. If a sudden emergency should develop requiring UN consideration, the US would try to get it brought first into the Security Council. If a UN peacekeeping operation should be required, our first approach would be to have it authorized by the Security Council and financed by voluntary contributions—in the manner of the Cyprus operation. Only if the Security Council could not deal with the matter—presumably because of an impending or actual great power veto-would there be general support for an Emergency Special Session. At an Emergency Special Session, the best guess is that the Chinese representation question would be disposed of in the traditional way—that is, by turning down Communist proposals to substitute Peking for Taipei in the China seat. As for the Article 19 issue, we would hope to have marshalled, previous to any such session, at least a simple majority of the votes to apply Article 19 to any member two years in arrears. If the Soviets are convinced that they would lose on this issue, the US believes they will find some way to pay up. If, on the other hand, it appears that we do not have the votes on Article 19—perhaps because some Members would want to set aside this issue in view of the crisis for which the Emergency Session was called—there are two escape hatches: 1. We could work for a deferment of the application of Article 19 so that the Emergency Session could deal with the urgent business before it. This would put the loss-of-vote issue over to the regular session of the Assembly in November, without prejudice to the merits of the question. 2. The General Assembly could submit to the ICJ one or more questions on the application of Article 19. (The previous Court decision covered the binding character of the Congo and Middle East peacekeeping assessments, but did not rule on the procedures for applying Article 19.) Which of these escape routes would do the least damage to our position on the merits of the issue could be better judged when we are nearer to the need for an Emergency General Assembly. If there developed a serious possibility of an Emergency Session of the General Assembly, the Department would immediately consult with Congressional leaders, particularly on the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees. In consultations on UN questions in Washington at the end of May we discussed with the British our general approach to an Emergency Session of the Assembly. There is some doubt of the value or wisdom of wider consultations on this contingency in the absence of an emergency that might require a quick meeting of the General Assembly. In addition to the foregoing, there is a possibility of Security Council meetings on one or several outstanding problems—the Congo, Cyprus, SEA, Cuba, etc. All of these will have to be played by ear in the light of the situation prevailing at the time. But, at this writing, none of these seem probable with the exception of a Council meeting already scheduled for mid-September to handle the problem of financing the Cyprus operation. In the absence of a serious crisis, the mood of UN Delegations will not be one of favoring an Emergency Session. Many of the delegates already have left New York for the summer holiday. Some of them plan to attend the Second Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo during the first week in October, which they regard as important as the UN, and they would be most reluctant to come back to New York before it ended. As of now, the prospects are good for a relatively quiet period in New York, but we should not and we do not count on it. Sam 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Confidential. 2 A copy is ibid. 303. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 303. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 18, 1964. SUBJECT The Soviet Letter of September 11, 1964 on UN Financing The Soviet Legal Case Reiterated . Moscow's letter to the UN Secretary General 2 puts in one document the Soviet legal case on the UN financing issue. The arguments have all been presented by the Soviet Union before (i.e., that the UN operations in the Middle East and the Congo—UNEF and ONUC—were illegal; that even had they been legal, the Soviet Union was under no obligation to pay for them and is therefore not in arrears in its contributions to the UN; and that consequently Article 19, under which defaulters can be deprived of their vote in the General Assembly, cannot be applied to the USSR). The new document should be viewed as the legal companion piece to the Soviet memorandum of last July, 3 in which Moscow presented its broad position that the Security Council has exclusive jurisdiction in peacekeeping matters and that as long as this principle is complied with the USSR is prepared to support UN peacekeeping operations. Preparing for a Collision . The two Soviet documents and Moscow's adamant defense of its position in propaganda and private conversations all indicate that the Soviets are preparing for a head-on confrontation on the financing issue at the coming General Assembly. They evidently calculate that a combination of sober legal arguments, expressions of interest in peacekeeping operations under the Security Council, and threats of dire consequences if Article 19 is applied will work to dissuade a substantial number of UN members from acting against the USSR. Moscow may hope that by increasingly making the Article 19 issue a US-Soviet confrontation (the letter stresses the responsibility of the Western powers, “and especially the United States,” for alleged Charter violations), non-aligned states will wish to contract out of the dispute or seek compromises which accommodate Soviet views. Moscow might conceivably calculate that its legal argumentation will generate pressures in the UN to delay action under Article 19 pending renewed recourse to the International Court. It should be noted, however, that the question of whether Article 19 can be applied automatically or requires a two-thirds vote—an issue some countries might seek to refer to the Court—is not addressed at all in the Soviet letter. Longer-Range Soviet Intentions . Since the entire Soviet position seems currently geared to a confrontation in November, little or nothing can be gleaned from Moscow's latest statement regarding its ultimate intentions should its present tactics prove unsuccessful. Whether at that point Moscow would seek a face-saving way out or let Article 19 action take its course and leave at least the Assembly will depend significantly on the general international climate then prevailing, and we doubt whether the Soviets have reached a fixed decision. We continue to believe that the chances of getting the Soviets to relent are probably improved to the extent that the Soviets are convinced that their failure to relent will have results damaging to their interests. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 1. Limited Official Use. 2 UN doc. A/5729. 3 UN doc. A/5721; see Documents 297 and 298 . 304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, October 9, 1964, 8:37 p.m. 861. From Secretary for Stevenson. Re Urtels 1034, 1041, 1044, 1046, 1048, 1049. 2 I am greatly concerned at the extent to which view apparently prevails in UN circles that US position on Article 19 will change after our elections and that a postponement of GA until next year would be desirable to permit further efforts at compromise. Judging by all available evidence, and despite Narasimhan's protestations that Secretariat is neutral on question of postponement, I assume SYG is encouraging postponement apparently in expectation that a meeting between President and Khrushchev could solve this issue. You should make it plain that application of Article 19 has nothing whatsoever to do with US elections, nor is it bilateral US–USSR problem suitable for disposition at summit. US policy will remain firm on issue after elections as it is now. Moreover, from technical point of view, review of postponement shows such course not technically feasible. Article 20 aside, there are two important items of business which require voting during calendar year 1964: 1) either a budget must be adopted for 1965 or some form of authorization enabling the Organization to continue to incur expenses would have to be passed; and 2) elections must be held for the Security Council seat of Members whose terms expire or there would be serious question as to Council's legal competence to function in 1965. An additional and strong consideration of a political character militating against postponement of the issue until 1965 is that in January the ranks of delinquents will swell, to include so important a Member as France; this would probably further erode our voting support. The GA must meet in 1964 and the Article 19 problem must be faced this year. I am glad to see that you took a strong line with the Western Ambassadors yesterday on the need for firmness and confidence in opposing postponement and that most of this group agreed the issue must be faced this year. In reviewing the entire problem, I conclude there are five major fallacies which need to be exploded: 1) That the US position will suddenly soften after our election, leading to some compromise in which the Soviets do not pay and do vote. I agree with your recommendation that you make publicly clear that the US position has nothing to do with election politics and will be the same a month after the election as it is a month before the election. As occasion offers, I will take the same line publicly here. 2) That the issue itself can be postponed in the coming GA. It cannot be postponed in the sense that if the Assembly convenes and conducts normal business pending study of the question or during referral to ICJ, the battle will have been lost by simple failure to apply Article 19. 3) That the session can be postponed until 1965. The comments above deal with this. 4) That more time is needed to work out an accommodation with the USSR. We have been trying since last March to do just this, and the Soviets have not budged. That is not to say that we should not make one last major effort with the USSR in the very near future which will give them an opportunity to accommodate themselves if they wish, or at a minimum demonstrate to the rest of the Members that we have gone the last mile. I would appreciate your view on this. 5) That a Johnson-Khrushchev meeting would resolve the Article 19 issue if it is delayed pending a summit. This is not a US–USSR problem; it is, rather, a problem between the UN membership as a whole and that handful of States which refuses to abide by the clear terms of the Charter and the clear opinions of the ICJ. It is a test of will between those who advocate a dynamic, operational UN and those who shrink from support of international peacekeeping forces. It is not the type of issue which is appropriate for a summit exchange between the US and the USSR. As a next step, I think you should talk to U Thant personally. Bunche must obviously have been acting under U Thant's instruction in suggesting GA postponement until 1965, and they should both know our appraisal of situation, including consideration that such activity impairs the prospects of getting the Assembly membership to uphold the Charter when GA convenes. In particular, I think that they are doing no one a service if they are suggesting that a resolution of this issue should await a Johnson-Khrushchev meeting. Moreover, the SYG more than any other individual should appreciate fully the need to protect the integrity of the ICJ which has expressed itself clearly on this issue. Finally, the SYG and others should understand that I see no prospect that the Executive Branch would propose or the American people support appropriations for the UN as in the past if financial issue not resolved satisfactorily. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow. Drafted by Sisco, Buffum, and Cleveland; cleared in G, L, EUR, and IO; and approved by Rusk. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. 2 Telegram 1034 from New York, October 8, is ibid., UN 3 GA. Telegrams 1041, 1044, 1046, 1048, and 1049 from New York, October 8, are ibid., UN 10–4. These telegrams discussed the Article 19 controversy and possible postponement of the 19th General Assembly. 305. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 305. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, October 16, 1964. SUBJECT UN Matters 1. As you know, Governor Stevenson saw the SYG yesterday 2 and took the line that, since there is no indication the USSR is prepared to negotiate on Article 19, there was no point in postponing the GA. Now, in the light of events in Moscow 3 and the nearness of the British elections, 4 the Secretary, Stevenson and Cleveland have decided that a postponement might not be a bad idea. Stevenson has been instructed, therefore, to go back to U Thant and say that because of recent developments on the international scene, the U.S. would not oppose a two or three week postponement. Also, behind the decision to leave the door open for postponement was the fact that U Thant himself and a growing number of Afro-Asians favored postponement. 2. The Secretary's letter to Foreign Ministers on Article 19, which has been in the works for 10 days, is now being held up until about Tuesday of next week so that it will be clear that we seriously assessed the change of Soviet leadership before the letter was sent. 5 3. I think there is no question that the nuclear explosion in Communist China 6 now throws the whole Chirep problem wide open. It will be very hard indeed to convince Afro-Asians, as well as the Labor Government in Britain, that a nuclear power should not be admitted to the world body. You may recall that, as we approached the GA last year, President Kennedy approved a fall-back position on Chirep in which we would urge that the whole problem be given to a study group which would report back to the GA the following year. This plan may still have merit if we can push it through. But I doubt that we can. Sam 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Confidential. 2 This meeting was reported in telegram 1171 from New York, October 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4) 3 Reference is to the removal of Nikita Khrushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on October 16. 4 On October 16 the Labour Party won a majority in parliament. 5 It was transmitted in circular telegram 935, November 16. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Department of State Administrative History, Vol. 2, part 5) 6 On October 16; for text of President Johnson's statement on the detonation, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 , Book II, pp. 1357–1358. 306. Memorandum of Conversation 306. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 20, 1964, 6:10 p.m. SUBJECT Article 19 PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin—USSR The Secretary Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, USUN The Secretary stated that the United States was intrigued by comments coming from the new leadership in Moscow calling for an improvement of relations. He felt that we should explore all avenues toward this end. In this connection, the Secretary stated that it was important that Moscow should understand fully our concern over the Article 19 issue and the matter of payment of arrearages. One aspect of the matter was payment for the Congo operation. The Secretary noted that the USSR had, in the Security Council, voted for four of the five resolutions authorizing the Congo operation. Therefore, we felt the USSR had committed itself to pay for this operation. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that the USSR had never intended to pay for UNOC, and could not understand why the U.S. was under a different impression. Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that this was definitely not our understanding of the Soviet action in voting for the Congo resolutions. Little mention was made of UNEF. The Secretary stressed that the principle of Article 19 and collective financial responsibility were of the gravest concern to the U.S. Government, both from the standpoint of the development of the United Nations as an effective international institution and also with respect to U.S. public opinion. He added that the USSR could not hope to win on this issue, and suggested that it might make a voluntary payment in some form as a way of avoiding a confrontation The Secretary pointed out that the United States does not look on this as a cold war issue, and added that there were so many important issues between us that we should not let this one interfere with or cloud them. Ambassador Dobrynin was generally non-committal and indicated no change in the Soviet position on Article 19. He stated that he was certain Moscow fully understood our position on this matter, and would report back fully to his Government the substance of the discussion. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 79 D 246, United Nations. Secret. Drafted by Polansky. A note on the memorandum reads: “uncleared. never distributed.” The memorandum is “Part 2 of 4.” The meeting took place in Rusk's office. 307. Memorandum From Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to Samuel Belk of that Staff 307. Memorandum From Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to Samuel Belk of that Staff 1 Washington, October 21, 1964. I won't labor the obvious point, already referred to in your covering memo, 2 that many aspects of the paper 3 will require revision in the light of the momentous developments of last week. However, there is one point which I think the paper glosses over even if there hadn't been a change in the regime in Moscow and which becomes all the more important to look into in the light of that change. It has to do with the “North-South”, “rich-poor” polarization that is mentioned at several points in the paper. Whether it is the rich against the poor or the north against the south, the Russians and ourselves will be on the same team. Despite the vast difference in the standard of living in the US and the Soviet Union, the USSR is regarded by much of the world as a “have” country; its aid is expected just as our aid is expected; and they get as little thanks as we do. Are we in short likely to find ourselves at this session or in a session in the not too distant future with many of the same problems and facing many of the same problems in dealing with the unaligned countries? Does this have important implications in terms of a modus vivendi in connection with some of the major structural changes that might be made in the UN? Does it imply greater cooperation when confronting some of the international problems that the UN might have to deal with? The change of the regime in Moscow might put the USSR to an even greater test in connection with the “south” and the “poor.” It can hardly be expected to resign from the competition it is now waging with the Chinese in this arena, and it may feel under even greater pressures to score some important political and propaganda victories against Peiping. In short, I think the paper should reflect much more of this than it does now. Even recognizing that the paper does not take into account the nuclear detonation in China, I have a feeling that not enough attention is paid to the Chinese representation issue. Time is getting short for any major changes in US policy (and even the slightest softening of our position on this issue will be interpreted as a major change). Some further thought should be given as to the reservoir of control and bargaining power we have in connection with keeping the Chinese out for at least another year. If, after a careful inventory, we find that we are short of either or both of these, we should take steps to avoid suffering what can be widely regarded both in the US and the world generally as a major diplomatic defeat. I recognize that it is difficult to even hint at a possible shift in US policy toward China for another two weeks but the whole matter should be looked into on the highest priority basis starting at 0800 on 4 November. C 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. No classification marking. 2 A memorandum from Belk to Bundy, October 21, discussing strategy for the 19th UN General Assembly. (Ibid.) 3 An undated paper prepared by Harlan Cleveland of the Department of State. (Ibid.) 308. Memorandum of Conversation 308. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 26, 1964, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT UN Matters PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary The Under Secretary William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Adlai E. Stevenson, Ambassador to the UN Richard I. Phillips, P/ON Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA UK Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador Sir Eric Roll, Economic Minister, British Embassy Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office Michael Stewart, British Minister Reginald M. Hadow, Head of Foreign Office News Department John N. Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary Richard Faber, First Secretary, British Embassy Article 19 The Secretary led off by saying we don't want a confrontation on that issue. But a wrong answer by the General Assembly would create trouble for us. He said if Article 19 were not sustained, “I literally don't know if we could get an appropriation from Congress at all.” The British asked whether that applies to the Regular Budget as well as to the peacekeeping expenses, and the Secretary replied that the Court had decided that these were not really two different categories of UN expenses. The Secretary went on to say that he could not, of course, predict what an American administration would do in an unpredictable tactical situation. But he certainly could not guarantee that if the Article 19 issue came out wrong, we would be able to get funds for the UN until we ourselves were as far behind in our dues as the Russians were. Governor Stevenson added that on the present basis it looks as if we would win a straight challenge to Article 19, even on the basis of a two-thirds vote, but there would probably be massive abstentions. (A little later in the discussion, the Secretary handed Mr. Gordon Walker our present estimate of the voting on Article 19 showing 47 yeas and 23 nays. The British looked at it for several minutes with great interest and then handed the document back to the Secretary.) Gordon Walker responded to the Secretary's comments by saying flatly “We will continue to back you on Article 19. Some solution needs to be found, but it would not be a solution for us to give way.” He added that there would obviously be some tactical discussions at the very last moment. If the Soviets show some sign of movement, we (US and UK) will obviously have to be in close touch on how to handle negotiations with them. But if they don't budge, we certainly are not going to budge. The Secretary suggested to Mr. Gordon Walker that it would be helpful if the UK would pass along to other countries a sense of alarm based on what he had heard in Washington about the vigor of the U.S. position. He referred to the double standard in the UN, one illustration of which was the contrast between world attitudes on U.S. nuclear testing, and the general reaction that the Chinese Communists nuclear test qualified the Chinese for admission to the UN. Mr. Gordon Walker agreed that the double standard was “tiresome”. Mr. Gordon Walker asked whether there wouldn't be some trouble about the automatic application of Article 19. He had the impression that a number of countries thought the General Assembly should vote Article 19 up or down. Governor Stevenson said there were indeed a number of delegations that had this feeling. Mr. Gordon Walker referred to the conversations he and Harold Wilson had had in Moscow on their last visit, in which the Russians made mention of this point. In the same discussions, he said, the Soviets put most of their emphasis on essentially legal arguments, emphasizing the view that peacekeeping actions taken outside the framework of the Security Council constitute illegal amendments to the UN Charter. There followed for a few moments a wide ranging discussion of the basic constitutional issues involved. With respect to the past, both the United States and United Kingdom sides were agreed that there was no particular difficulty in finding some satisfactory method of payment that enabled the Soviets to maintain their position of principle on the peacekeeping operations as long as an actual payment was made. As Mr. Gordon Walker put it, “they could pay to the General Fund or something”. With respect to the future, the Secretary said that we might want to explore the revival of procedures in Chapter 7 of the Charter and present the Soviets with the opportunity of doing as much as possible of the peacekeeping job in the Security Council, while maintaining the emergency escape hatch to the Assembly. Our own proposals of last March were recalled, and various possibilities canvassed by which the Security Council would become in fact the major organ for peacekeeping problems, and might share with the General Assembly some responsibility even in cases where the veto was an obstruction to action. In this connection, for example, the Secretary suggested that an issue might start in the Security Council and then, when action was frustrated by a veto, would go to the General Assembly, which could by a two-thirds vote send it back to the Security Council for action, with the previous vetoes becoming abstentions in the second go-round. In this connection, Mr. Cleveland mentioned we would probably be looking for arrangements that amounted to an increased degree of bicameralism between the General Assembly and the Security Council. Mr. Gordon Walker said that moving in this kind of direction made sense to him and acknowledged that we shared with the Soviets some interest in building up the restraints on the Assembly and the position of the Security Council, short of making everything subject to the Soviet veto. The China Seat in the United Nations The British Foreign Secretary led off on this subject. He said that the UK: (a) Would continue to vote for the substitution of Communist China for the GRC in the UN. (b) Was not very clear what ought to be done about Formosa. (c) Would definitely not lobby for a change in the Chinese representation in the 19th General Assembly. (d) Could not guarantee not to lobby in the 20th General Assembly. He said the one argument they were now using on this subject was the importance of China being subjected to the pressures of world opinion. The Secretary said that there is no doubt in our minds about the existence of Communist China as an important political fact, and we do in fact deal with Communist China on various subjects; we even have regular conversations with Peking through Ambassadors in Warsaw. These talks are not very productive. But the Secretary said he wanted to put this problem in the larger context of the world's security situation. He thought there was a reasonable prospect of developing favorable relationships with the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries, which would lead away from war. But the same could not be said about Peking. The Politburo in Peking must be trying to decide whether they are on the right track in pursuing the rather primitive, truculent, and aggressive policies of these veterans of the Long March. “Anything that helps them decide they are on the right track is a step toward war in the Far East”. This is, the Secretary said, why we were bothered by the French recognition of Communist China, and by the growth of free world trade with the Chinese mainland, even by countries like Australia which have a considerable stake in the security of the Far East. The ouster of Khrushchev was presumably read in Peking as confirmation of the wisdom of Chinese policies and plans. If they can achieve admission to the UN without modification in their behavior, then this will be further confirmation that their kind of toughness pays. We do not, he said, think that Chinese admission under present circumstances would have a taming effect on Peking; the UN cannot operate as reform school. Mr. Gordon Walker said that, of course, the British policy on Chinese representation could be interpreted in Peking as confirmation of present Chinese policy although the Labour Government will be merely carrying on a long-standing policy of its predecessors in London. The Secretary referred to the “important question” tactic, and Mr. Gordon Walker said that he “thought” he agreed that the UK should maintain its previous position that a change in Chinese representation requires two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. He said he hadn't fully studied the brief or discussed this matter with his colleagues in the new government, so he was not prepared to give us a definite answer on this subject, but from what he knew about it, he thought he agreed that that should continue to be the UK position. Mr. Gordon Walker said we should know that Douglas Jay, new President of the Board of Trade was going to Peking. The reason was that his Conservative predecessor, Ted Heath, had planned a trip to Peking, and was even thinking about extending more credits to Peking, while he was there. “We won't do that, for the time being”, he said. The UK wishes, however, to establish fuller diplomatic relations with Peking and to try to get an Ambassador there with better access to the Peking authorities than their present Chargé has. Sir Harold Caccia mentioned that this would be rather difficult because, he said, one of the three grounds for refusing a UK Ambassador in Peking had been the “important question” issue in the UN. The Secretary ended this phase of the meeting by mentioning that in our judgment, if we're going to discuss practical steps toward peace with the Chinese Communists, Laos would be a good place to begin. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: CF 2440. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and approved in S on November 9. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room. 309. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 309. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, November 9, 1964. SUBJECT UN Topics for the Ranch Joe Sisco and I have discussed at great length the best way to involve the President in UN affairs in the post election period and, unless you or the Secretary object, our thought now is to proceed generally along the following lines: First of all, the President's press briefing book has now been updated and revised on several UN matters—especially on Article 19—so that he can deal with these topics that are almost certain to creep into questions at news conferences from here on out. As a second step, it seemed to us that a memorandum to the President from the Secretary, 2 to be on hand when the President returns to Washington, briefly outlining all the important aspects of the upcoming GA, including items other than the two obvious ones, would be in order. This would serve to focus the whole US position with respect to the United Nations and also serve as a backdrop for specific and more intense handling of the Article 19 and Chirep issues later. (In view of your and the Secretary's trip to the Ranch, this step probably can be eliminated.) As a third step, the President should square-off in detail on Article 19. This should take place around the middle of the month and it should be done with the Secretary and Stevenson on hand. This is serious business and there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that he fully understands and agrees with the strategy we now are pursuing. (Stevenson is interested in having a swearing-in ceremony and this could be done either before or after this meeting.) A fourth step should be a similar meeting on Chirep, but chances are that we will not have to face up to this one until after the GA's Christmas recess—probably around mid-January. On this problem, the situations will change almost daily and we will not know where we stand until after Christmas. Article 19 In the handling of this problem at the Ranch, I would suggest a detailed discussion be postponed until the President returns to the White House. However, he should be assured that we have adopted our present strategy with our eyes completely open. The language of the Charter (Article 19) is clear: “A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote [italics mine] 3 in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years …” The President should know that the best legal opinion in and out of Government supports our strategy. A resolution by the House and concurred in by the Senate also supports our position. An opinion handed down by the World Court in the fall of 1962 and adopted by the GA in December 1962 stated that UN peacekeeping expenses were the responsibility of the entire organization. If a vote were taken in the GA today, the chances are good that our interpretation of the Charter would prevail. But there would be many abstentions. There still are too many GA members who do not have the guts to stand up and be counted. Statistics on USSR Arrears: -The total 1964 arrears are $52,623,137. -The amount the USSR must pay before the GA convenes on December 1, 1964 is $5,793,331. -For the 1965 Article 19 arrears, the USSR must pay an additional $20,740,905. As of January 1, 1965, we will face a similar situation with France unless its arrears are paid. There is more optimism about the French finding a way out than there is about the USSR. There has been a considerable amount of dialogue between the French and other delegations on the problem. However, it still is too early to predict with any confidence what the French may do. Statistics on French Arrears: -The total arrears are $17,752,565. -The amount France must pay before January 1, 1965 is $1,666,676. -The bulk of the arrears for France are in the Congo account; the amount for the Congo is $17,031,152. Chirep You already have received so much on this problem that I hesitate to push more at you for this meeting. Much thought is going into the matter but it has not yet been brought together at a high enough level for me to see where we are going. My guess is that your brother and Harlan Cleveland have moved further along than anyone else. My own belief is that we should follow through on the tactics we have used in the past for the time being. The latest estimate for a resolution that would expel the GRC and seat the Chicoms shows a very narrow margin in our favor: 50 against seating; 48 for seating; 17 abstentions. The estimate for sustaining Chicom admission as an “Important Question” is somewhat better: 59 for sustaining; 46 against; 10 abstentions. It is my guess that we will have to fall back on the “Important Question” ruling to carry the day. On the assumption that we do carry the day on one of the above approaches the matter should not be allowed to stop there. I continue to come back to establishment of a Committee under the SYG and the Security Council that would study the question for a year and report back to the 20th GA; probably recommending that the Chicoms be admitted. This would have the advantage of educating the full membership on exactly what they are doing (this is badly needed on many issues) and straightening out the difficult legal problems that are involved in unseating one Security Council Member and giving the seat to another country. But also, and perhaps more importantly, the Chicoms should be invited (through a third country) to join in the deliberations of the ENDC during the coming year. This would serve as an excellent sounding board for the Chicoms and an even better listening post for ourselves and others. I hope this kind of approach to the problem might be put into the hopper for the President to think about, for it will be one of the most important problems he will have to deal with in the coming year and it is highly important that he do whatever he does with great deliberation and, I hope, with style. There is even another reason why the Chicoms ought to be brought into the ENDC. As I read it, very little is being accomplished in the disarmament field for the time being. Chicom participation would lend a new importance to the whole approach to disarmament and would serve to emphasize whatever new initiatives we might wish to make. President's Appearance at the United Nations This is something we will wish to decide later and our decision will largely depend on how the Article 19 problem is handled with the USSR and possibly France. Other Items Much hard work is going on in the Committee of 24 (Colonialism), the Committee of 21 (Financing), the Outer-Space Committee, on ECOSOC problems, Cyprus, etc. But I do not think these are worthy of the President's time, or yours, at the moment. Some of them will be quite important later on, but we can deal with them then. Sam B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Confidential. 2 A memorandum from Rusk to Johnson, November 18, is ibid., Office of the President File, McGeorge Bundy. 3 Brackets in the source text. 310. Memorandum From the Director of Public Affairs of the Mission to the United Nations (Fritchey) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) 310. Memorandum From the Director of Public Affairs of the Mission to the United Nations (Fritchey) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) 1 New York, November 17, 1964. Rightly or wrongly, I have never known the UN press corps to be so unsympathetic as they are on the U.S. approach to Article 19. The gist of their reaction comes down to this: 1) The amount of money involved is insignificant, and therefore a disruptive showdown can hardly be justified on that score. 2) If our justification is the “principle” of peacekeeping, how is it that we are not apparently willing to compromise this principle by partly (if not largely) accepting the long-held Soviet view? For example, the correspondents now see us coming around (to some extent at least) to a greater emphasis on the Security Council in peacekeeping matters. Also, they see us giving some heed to the Soviet position that it is not realistic or practical to try to force a major power to support peacekeeping efforts it disapproves of. 3) If we are now willing to put future peacekeeping efforts on a basis that is, at least partially, along Soviet lines, why should the Soviets be required to pay arrearages for past peacekeeping tasks? 4) In view of the above, is the issue so basic and clear-cut as to justify risking the destruction or serious impairment of the UN? The upshot of all this is that the press corps, after hearing most of the arguments pro and con, feel that the U.S. has unnecessarily magnified the issue. C.F. 2 1 Source: Princeton University, Stevenson Papers, Correspondence, Fritchey. No classification marking. 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 311. Memorandum for the Record 311. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, November 18, 1964, 1 p.m. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON UNITED NATIONS MATTERS PARTICIPANTS The President, Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland, Ambassador Stevenson, McGeorge Bundy, George Reedy, Samuel Belk Article 19 Ambassador Stevenson opened by saying that we were faced with a particularly difficult problem with the Russians on the matter of Article 19 and that one of the main reasons for our coming to the President was to impress him with the largeness of the problem that confronted us; that it was the worst confrontation we had faced with the Russians since Cuba. The Soviets were in a position of losing their vote in the General Assembly—but not in the Security Council—if they did not pay up, and they had threatened to walk out of the UN if Article 19 were applied. All of this would have to be faced beginning on December 1. Stevenson noted that France also would face a loss of its vote on January 1, 1965, if its bills were not paid. This would mean a severe deterioration in French relations with the UN; there was a danger that both the French and the Russians would cease paying their bills. Stevenson said that a number of ways-out were being explored. If the GA continued to allow the Russians to vote, this would be interpreted as a defeat for the U.S. rather than the UN. There were procedural problems also which were being worked upon. The important thing for the U.S., in any case, is to follow a course that would not weaken the Organization. Our prestige in the UN is high but we must continue to look at our approach to financing so that we give only our proper share. In talking with Congressional leaders, Stevenson thought the President should remind them that winning out on Article 19 might prove to be a pyrrhic victory. In the long run it might be a loss. Stevenson said some Afro-Asian countries were trying to act as go-betweens on the financial problem. There was a proposal for a fund to which everyone would contribute to save the UN financially; a Soviet payment to this fund could substitute for its arrears. However, there was still a question as to just how to do it. We certainly would have to make it clear to Congress that any money the U.S. might contribute would not be used to pay off Soviet arrears. Hopefully, Stevenson said, we would have this matter worked out by December 1. We would need a 2/3 majority vote to support our proposal and he was not sure we had it. The President asked how we could get the 2/3 vote. Stevenson said we were working on it; that the smaller countries were somewhat intimidated and also rather casual about constitutionality. Many did not believe in the automaticity of Article 19. He thought this represented more than the majority of the membership. The President asked if there was anything we should be doing that we are not doing to get the 2/3 vote. Secretary Rusk reminded the President that he had only on Monday sent out a letter to foreign ministers 2 explaining our position on Article 19. He also pointed out that we already had a vote of 75–19 (sic) in the GA in support of the World Court opinion on financing and it might be helpful to go back to those 75 again. The Secretary said it was a difficult issue and recalled the difficulties involved when we took the bond issue to the Congress. We had told other governments of this problem and warned them that they should not take us for granted. He hoped the matter might be successfully dealt with before the GA. He recalled the “troika” proposal which was presented to the GA by Kruschchev himself 3 but, when faced with an overwhelming vote against it, the Russians gave it up. The President then asked what might be said to the press and it was agreed that George Reedy would say that the meeting was a periodical review of what our approach would be to a number of subjects that were on the UN agenda, but avoid any emphasis being placed on any one item; especially Article 19, lest the President appear in the press as fighting the Cold War with the Russians. (Reedy left the meeting at this point.) Stevenson said there was a growing feeling at the UN that payment for peacekeeping should not be imposed on a power over its objection. There was some validity to this view, but this was a matter of future planning. He did not think this was understood by the Congress. The fact was that we are not confident of the 2/3 vote. We might win but there would be many abstentions—exactly what we did not want. He noted that one of the late reports had said that Thailand would vote against us. The Secretary felt we must stay strong and that the Russians might change—we must hold out right down the line until December 1. Stevenson felt that the Congressional leaders should be cautioned not to cut off their noses to spite their faces; that we must not take the position that we will not support peacekeeping just because the Russians don't. However, Stevenson felt the tenor of the meeting with the President had been that of a “lost cause”; this was not the case. It was not easy to handle. The newspapers would interpret any move the U.S. or the USSR made as a loss of prestige, the weakening or strengthening of one side or the other. [Omitted here is discussion of the Chinese representation issue; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XXX, Document 66 .] Samuel E. Belk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Memos of Conversation, 1964–1966. Secret. 2 The text was transmitted in circular telegram 934, November 16. (Ibid., Department of State Administrative History, Vol. 2, part 5) 3 For the text of Khrushchev's September 23, 1960, speech to the United Nations that included a proposal to replace the Secretary General with a three-man executive composed of representatives of the Eastern, Western, and neutral blocs, see UN doc. A/PV. 869. 312. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) 312. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) 1 Washington, November 18, 1964. Dear Adlai: If we can get through the next few days with some plan for a non-prejudicial postponement of regular Assembly business, we will then need to focus again on the methods through which the Soviets make the contributions which will get them out from under the application of Article 19. It is possible, of course, that some additional attention will have to be given to this question as a means of getting through the next few days. The enclosed memorandum, prepared by Elmore, 2 bears directly on this question. I find especially useful his suggestion of the manner in which we can re-establish the dynamics of a political bargain on the creation of the Special Finance Committee, and his suggestion of the need in the future to avoid “overspecialized assessments”—and perhaps also “overspecialized” voluntary contributions. I would be most interested to have your reactions to the proposal. Presumably, there would have to be some consolidation of the arrearage accounts within the Peacekeeping Fund (with the Soviet contribution being applied to that part of the Fund), and with our own contribution being earmarked for future operations. 3 Warmest regards, Sincerely, Harlan 1 Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 141, Frame 104. Confidential. The date is handwritten on the letter. 2 Not printed. The memorandum was prepared by Elmore Jackson. 3 In a November 20 reply, Stevenson outlined the latest Afro-Asian proposal and suggested that an accord among the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Soviet Union on how to operate under a “no objection” agreement was the best means to arrive at an ultimate settlement of the Article 19 controversy. (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 141, Frames 138–139) 313. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 313. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 Washington, November 20, l964, 11 p.m. 1796. Article 19. Stevenson and Plimpton had informal conf with Fedorenko and Fedoseev (USSR). No others present. 1. Stevenson made earnest statement as to two ships being on collision course and necessity taking steps to avoid collision. Pointed out in mutual interest of two countries to reduce tensions and have rapprochement, to enable progress on really important matter such as Germany, China, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, etc. 2. Sovs had suggested postponing whole Art 19 problem and appointment of a comite to consider future. However, they had suggested that future be considered only on their terms. US felt future should be considered, that Sov suggestions should be carefully weighed, but that our March 6 suggestions and any other suggestions should likewise be considered. US, too, would have difficulties as regards a peacekeeping operation of which we disapproved. 3. However, Sovs had said they would not pay, which caused the trouble. The challenge to both of us was to find a way in which money could be forthcoming, reserving the legal positions of both the Sovs and the US, and involving no defeat for the Sovs or the US and no demoralization of the UN itself. Once this was done, we would look toward the future. There must be some way to do it. 4. The informal comite of four had proposed a rescue fund which had seemed to us a real possibility. 2 Pending working out the details, we could not agree to making a contribution but certainly would consider it. Of course we could not pay Sov arrears. 5. Furthermore, the Sovs could stipulate that their contribution could not be used for the payment of UNEF or ONUC indebtedness, but only for general purposes of the organization. 6. A solution along these lines could make it much easier for both of us to move forward in other areas. An indication from the Sovs that new directions are encouraged would help. 7. Fedorenko said he had closely followed Stevenson's statement and that he thought the tune was better than the last time, and that he was glad the manner was different. Had, however, expected a more constructive approach to the problem. 8. There had been too many sharp exchanges and pressures, too many ultimatums, and bad atmosphere. This had not been created by Sovs. He could understand this during our election, but it existed even now. 9. Under such pressure and in such atmosphere, it is difficult to have negotiations, and Sovs certainly cannot accept dictates and demands. Quiet was necessary. 10. He shared our ideas as to the necessity of improving relations, both bilaterally and generally, and his govt had made this clear in Wash and in Moscow. 11. It was important to agree with US as to future peacekeeping operations. It was a key point in the mind of the Sov Govt. It was for this reason they had suggested a comite to look into the future. However, they do not separate the present and the future. They had suggested a postponement of everything to the 20th GA Session, but possibly it could be concluded at the end of 19th Sess. That was still their stand; nobody loses by a postponement. We should proceed in a good spirit to the common task and they were quite sincere, but would not yield to pressure. 12. Any covering of their arrears in part or in full would amount to a concession that the GA can adopt obligatory decisions as to financings and this they cannot agree to. 13. Their proposed comite would examine all ideas, those presented by US and by several states. They could then be presented to the GA at end of this session. This is best that their side could produce. Comment : This is a definite change from their last attitude which insisted negotiations be based on their July 10 memorandum. 3 14. Stevenson said he had no trouble with the comite considering all ideas; there might be a discussion as to the make-up, but the problem was not insuperable. Perhaps the comite of 21 would be appropriate or perhaps a small comite. It ought to be able to report by end of this sess. This was exactly what we hoped to do with them bilaterally and why we had started our proposals in March. 15. However, our problem was how to get over Art 19 question at opening of GA. How could one avoid the collision? A payment was necessary so that there would be nobody in arrears and the issue would never arise. Conditions of payment should be divided which would not prejudice anyone. 16. Fedorenko said it would be impossible to get rid of problem of the arrears or the debts and to contribute for any such purpose would be impossible. 17. Stevenson asked even if the contribution provided that it could not be used for UNEF or ONUC indebtedness? 18. Fedorenko said that would be same thing, that it would be just a cover prepared by diplomats; Sov people would know the origin of so-called arrears and debts which created by illegal decisions. The Kremlin does not control public opinion; the Sov Govt cannot say one thing and do another. Why should not one postpone the conflict? Why is that not acceptable? 19. Stevenson said trouble was that Art 19 says that they shall have no vote and that cannot be postponed. 20. Fedorenko said that might be so if there were no controversy, but that here there was a controversy as to whether there were arrears or not. The ICJ advisory opinion was not unanimous, and was not binding nor was GA acceptance. 21. Stevenson said even if one could postpone some now and work out future arrangements, what about the Art 19 problem at the end of the road? What good would a postponement do in that regard? 22. Fedorenko said they would earnestly try to overcome all difficulties. He had formerly been pessimistic but now he sensed some progress. 23. Plimpton said if Sovs made free will offering to solve UN financial problem, universal applause from UN members and everyone else should certainly please Sov public opinion. Fedorenko said this would make no difference. 24. Fedorenko asked what would happen if all of the members wanted a postponement of the Art 19 issue. 25. Stevenson said that possibly could be done without any voting, with some general debate and perhaps adoption of budget and election of SC and ECOSOC by acclamation which would take GA into Christmas. Second half of assembly might take place in March or so which would give two or three months for talks but then issue would have to be faced. Perhaps the whole GA could be postponed although probably members would not like this. 26. Fedoseev said one might hold a symbolic GA and then go ahead with negotiations. 27. Plimpton wondered how one could get along without voting. Fedoseev said anything was possible under heaven. Comment : Sov attitude seemed at least a little interested in possibility of proceeding without vote. 28. Stevenson said public opinion should not be the master and that it was task of statesmanship to guide public opinion and that public opinion should not stand in way of a proper policy—witness the US administration's determination to abandon 95 mil establishments. 29. Fedorenko said what should he consider was conclusion. 30. Stevenson said there were many major problems ahead as to which we hoped for progress and a rapprochement, and that we should avoid aggravating our difficulties by the present issue. Our interests were identical as to the preservation of the UN. The comite of four suggestion as to a rescue fund was in principle a good one; they could stipulate that their contribution was not to be used for purposes they considered illegal. There would no report from the SYG as to any arrears and Art 19 issue would not arise. In meantime we could agree on talks, bilateral or other, as to future. We too had many objections to present situation, and we ought to be able to reconcile our view for a livable future. Neither would have to support an operation which was against its interest. 31. Fedorenko made no reply and meeting broke up amicably, with no reference to future getting together. Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Secret. Repeated to Moscow. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. 2 Reference is to an informal group of representatives of four member states, Nigeria, Venezuela, Norway, and Afghanistan, who had suggested the creation of an “emergency fund” to redress the financial difficulties of the United Nations. 3 See footnote 2, Document 298 . 314. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 314. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, November 27, 1964. SC No. 00647/64C ISSUES BEFORE THE 19TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY For many months the UN membership has been preoccupied with avoiding a crisis over the Article 19 payments issue. Unless a last-minute solution is found, a serious confrontation is in prospect when the General Assembly convenes on 1 December for its 19th session. The outcome is still in doubt, and even if a showdown can be avoided—perhaps by adjourning the assembly for a few months—the UN's role in future peacekeeping operations appears bound to be modified. Another critical question facing this session is the perennial Chinese representation issue. For the first time, a resolution to seat Communist China in place of Taiwan could receive a majority. Among other issues, Southeast Asia's problems may receive increased attention, Cuba may launch a diplomatic offensive against the US from the floor of the assembly, and disarmament and colonialism will be spotlighted. Such perennial issues as the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Korean item will also appear. All told there are already over 90 items scheduled, and this session's debate is certain to be unusually important and difficult. The Arrears Problem The Soviet Union's refusal to pay its share of the cost of the UN operations in the Congo and Middle East has cast a heavy shadow over the session. Moscow and others in the bloc risk losing their vote in the assembly when it convenes on 1 December. Soviet officials have indicated they do not want to see Soviet relations with the UN or the US seriously damaged, but thus far they have adamantly refused to pay their arrears. The possibility of a last-minute token payment by Moscow cannot be totally discounted, but the Soviets would probably insist that their stand “in principle” has not changed while negotiations continued. The war of nerves seems likely to come to a head on the opening day of the assembly. The outcome may affect the entire future of the UN. The last few weeks have seen intensified efforts by both great and small UN members to avoid a showdown. In addition to the original 21-member group appointed to deal with a wide range of problems bearing on financing and peacekeeping operations, a number of smaller groups have also taken up the problem. Because of the strongly prevailing fear of being caught in a US-Soviet squeeze and provoking a Soviet walkout, however, only one proposal of any promise has been put forward. This formula, promulgated by four UN ambassadors, calls for creation of a “voluntary rescue” fund to which all members would be asked to contribute in order to alleviate the UN's financial problems. This would give the USSR and France—which also faces possible loss of its vote in January—a face-saving method to pay their arrears before the assembly convened. Serious divisions have appeared among the four ambassadors, however, and their plan may be modified along lines not acceptable to the US. If no solution is reached in advance of the session, current General Assembly President Sosa-Rodriguez has the unenviable task of ruling on whether the USSR will be deprived of its vote. He is reluctant to do so, but may not be able to avoid the issue. There is considerable uncertainty as to how events will unfold on 1 December. The US UN mission believes the US has sufficient support to deprive the USSR of its voting rights in the assembly but expects wholesale abstentions. The USSR has told some UN delegations it would consider a vote against it an unfriendly act, and has threatened to leave the assembly and perhaps withdraw from the UN if subjected to an adverse ruling. Not only is the voting situation unclear, but the timing and wording of one or many resolutions that may be put to a vote will probably remain in doubt until the assembly convenes. Even if a last-minute compromise solution can be arranged, the United Nations and particularly its peacekeeping functions will have been significantly affected by the prolonged struggle over the payments question. Even if the USSR made a contribution, it still in a sense will have won its point that the Security Council must be given more authority over peacekeeping operations. Henceforth it will be considerably more difficult for the General Assembly to institute and levy funds for such operations under powers deprived from the 1951 “Uniting for Peace” resolution unless the great powers concur. It will probably be impossible to force a permanent member of the Security Council to pay for an operation it finds politically objectionable. Conversely, a shift back to the authority originally envisaged for the Security Council promises to displease many smaller UN members which collectively make their weight felt through action initiated by the General Assembly. This may in time result in a greater cohesiveness among the smaller UN members and could force the great powers into countermoves to strengthen their own community of interests. Chinese Representation The Chinese representation question may be the most crucial one before the assembly if the Article 19 issue is surmounted. It now appears that a strong resolution calling for the seating of Peiping and the removal of Nationalist China from the UN will for the first time come precariously close to, or even achieve, a simple majority vote in the assembly (see page 4). 2 While no UN member has officially indicated it would switch its support from Taiwan to the mainland as a result of Peiping's nuclear detonation, that event has enhanced Communist China's prestige among many nonaligned countries and could provide an additional incentive for certain wavering countries to vote for it admission. Whether Peiping actually attains a majority will hinge on the decisions of only a few African and Middle Eastern countries. France, Congo (Brazzaville), the Central African Republic, Kenya, and Zambia seem certain to add new votes to Peiping's total. Dahomey is probably also in Communist China's column now. Cyprus, Malaysia, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Malta, Chad, Senegal, and perhaps a few other West African and some Arab states are still uncertain and presumably open to persuasion. At any rate, last year's 41 to 57 vote against seating Peiping is certain to be considerably closer this session. Some countries have indicated unwillingness to vote for a strongly worded resolution like the one introduced by Albania last year which made no provision for Taiwan's continued membership. Kuwait, for example, has indicated that if separate votes are taken it would vote to seat Peiping, and against removing Taiwan; and if the resolution called for both, Kuwait would not support it. Thus the wording of this year's resolution, which will be introduced by Cambodia and co-sponsored by a few African countries, could be a key factor. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] De Gaulle may be actively maneuvering on Peiping's behalf and he may soon make public his intentions. Paris may introduce a moderately worded amendment to the expected strong resolution. French officials have reportedly been abroad laying the groundwork for seating Peiping. Although the Chinese Communists have shown an increased flexibility in their drive for international recognition, they remain adamant in their opposition to a “two-Chinas” solution. They appear content to bide their time, convinced they will be seated on their own terms, probably before too long. In 1961 the General Assembly voted 61 to 34 to consider the Chinese representation issue an “important question,” thereby requiring a two-thirds vote to seat Peiping. In the US view, this ruling stands unless formally reversed by a subsequent vote in the assembly. Should the assembly decide to reconsider, the ruling could presumably be overturned by a simple majority. It appears that some countries which plan to vote for Communist China are willing to uphold the two-thirds requirement should that be put to a vote. France, however, will vote against the important-question ruling. Even if the 1961 rule is maintained, but Peiping receives a majority, Chiang Kai-shek might withdraw from the UN. Laos and Southeast Asia Certain Laotian officials have shown interest in appealing to the UN as a means of securing an end to the military intervention of Laos' Communist neighbors. Laotians generally are disillusioned with the International Control Commission, and there is a growing feeling that a remedy for the prolonged instability in the country must soon be found. A prominent Laotian has sounded out US officials on the advisability of asking the Security Council, or failing there, the General Assembly, for a detachment of UN forces to help seal the frontiers. Premier Souvanna Phouma has sounded out Moscow on whether it would lend support to such a request, but he has apparently received no response. The UN probably would find it difficult to respond effectively to a Laotian appeal unless a crisis situation—as a major offensive by Pathet Lao—existed at the time. Under these circumstances the UN might find sufficient support to dispatch an observer group. In 1959, the Security Council, responding to a Laotian request, had authorized the sending of a four-member observer team to investigate charges that North Vietnamese troops were moving into the country. The introduction of a UN observer presence into Laos—although unlikely at the present time—could open the way to an even deeper UN involvement in other crisis areas of Southeast Asia. In recent years, the UN has assisted in the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia, sent a team to “ascertain” the popular will in Sabah and Sarawak prior to the formation of Malaysia, and sponsored the 1962 Gusing mission designed to ease strained Thai-Cambodian relations. Cyprus The United Nations' responsibilities for keeping the peace and mediating the dispute in Cyprus promises to come up several times during the 19th session. As long as the security situation on Cyprus remains relatively stable, the focus of the dispute will be the assembly debate which will probably start after the first of the year. President Makarios or his foreign minister is expected to attend the debate, for which the President has laid the groundwork by his moderating tactics toward the Turkish Cypriots. Makarios will probably seek support for the unrestricted independence of Cyprus, and judging by the ardent pro-independence sentiments of the great majority of UN members, he is likely to receive strong backing. Turkey for its part will try to have the treaties on Cyprus recognized as valid but may find itself on the defensive. The Security Council faces the question of extending the mandate for the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) when the present one expires on 26 December. The operation requires voluntary financing and the Scandinavians have indicated willingness to maintain their contingents on the island. Although the operation is generally recognized to have been instrumental in preventing civil war on the island, it has nevertheless not been popular in various parliaments and finance ministries, and it may be necessary to reduce the 6,000-man force, perhaps even to an observer group. Makarios has indicated his willingness to keep a UN force on Cyprus, but he may believe that a reduced force and a more restricted mandate would give him greater maneuverability. The most important development in the Cyprus matter is expected about March, when UN mediator Galo Plaza submits a report on his efforts to find a permanent solution to the dispute. Plaza has indicated that unless the principal parties can reach an agreed solution he will recommend an independent Cyprus with minority guarantees. He may also suggest a subsequent referendum on self-determination. Plaza personally believes union of Cyprus with Greece would best serve Western interests, but in the absence of agreement to it he apparently feels unfettered independence is the only alternative. Makarios will know how to use a UN report along these lines to support his own efforts to achieve a fully sovereign Cyprus. Cuba and Latin America Heartened by support from the nonaligned countries at the recent Cairo conference, from the Soviet Government, and from Algeria, Cuba is expected to take its promised diplomatic offensive against the US to the floor of the General Assembly. Cuba apparently hopes thus to use world opinion to force Washington to move toward acceptance of the Castro regime. The Cairo conference denounced US economic pressures on Cuba and called on the US to evacuate Guantanamo and settle its differences with Havana. Cuba can be expected to repeat these demands and perhaps call on the General Assembly, in addition, to denounce US violations of Cuban airspace. Among other Latin American issues, Bolivia may present its case against Chile for alleged interference with Bolivia's right of passage to the sea. Argentina may embarrass its Western friends by pressing its claims to sovereignty over the British-held Falkland Islands. Colonialism The Afro-Asians are determined to pursue in the coming session their bitter attacks on all forms of colonialism. The communiqué of the Cairo conference of nonaligned nations 3 gave greatest attention to the condemnation of colonialism, neocolonialism, and racial discrimination—calling for economic sanctions and even use of force to defeat the colonizing powers. Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia will come under particularly heavy attack. The Arabs will probably state their case against Britain for its refusal to implement UN resolutions on Aden, Oman, and the South Arabian peninsula. The US, UK, and France may come in for criticism for not granting independence to their Caribbean possessions, and to their Pacific trust territories. South Africa's apartheid policies and its hold on South West Africa will again be denounced, and pressures for sanctions against Pretoria are likely to increase. The Security Council has established a special committee to study the effect various economic measures would have on the economy of South Africa, and the committee is considering everything—up to a complete embargo enforced by a blockade. Even if Rhodesia does not unilaterally declare its independence, the Salisbury government and possibly the UK will come in for heavy criticism. If Ian Smith's government does declare its independence, it will find itself faced with the same violent opposition now being experienced by South Africa. Portugal rounds out the list as one of the least popular governments in the eyes of Afro-Asians. Already in trouble for its Angola policy, Portugal may now face even greater problems in the UN as a result of the recent stirrings in Mozambique. As before, majority sentiment in the UN will urge the US to support sanctions against a NATO ally. Disarmament The UN membership is likely to exert heavier pressure than ever for progress on disarmament. The General Assembly will probably offer substantive recommendations and show a greater reluctance to leave issues with the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where so little has been achieved. There are already six items on the assembly's agenda relating to disarmament, including proposals for general and complete disarmament, further restriction of nuclear testing, a ban-the-bomb conference, and agreement on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. In addition, U Thant has called for disarmament talks among the five nuclear powers and there already is growing feeling that Peiping should be included in any disarmament talks under UN auspices as a result of the Chinese nuclear detonation. Nondissemination proposals are likely to be of chief interest. The Cairo conference urged all states to conclude nondissemination agreements, and proposals for the denuclearization of Africa, the Indian Ocean area, and Latin America may be discussed. The Soviet Union will have ample opportunity to exploit this sentiment by launching a campaign against the multilateral nuclear force (MLF). India and the UAR have already indicated some opposition to the MLF on grounds it may constitute nuclear proliferation. France for reasons of its own may be able to increase UN opposition to the MLF. Cuba may take advantage of the disarmament discussions to attack the presence of foreign bases on its soil. Rich vs. Poor As on such political questions as colonialism, the West may also find itself under fire on economic matters. At the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva last summer, a group of 75 (now 77) less developed countries formed a surprisingly cohesive bloc which at times produced overwhelming majorities for panaceas for their problems which were largely unpalatable to the more developed. In effect UNCTAD took on the appearance of a confrontation of the poor and the rich, with the latter on the defensive. The “haves” were constrained to argue that the “have-nots” must focus more on their responsibilities and cannot expect, for example, to attain higher prices for their goods merely by producing large votes. In UNCTAD the less developed nations have erected within the UN framework a piece of machinery geared primarily to considering the formulation of new trade and development programs for their benefit. During the current session the prospects are that resolutions will be passed formalizing institutional arrangements and endorsing the recommendations made by UNCTAD last June. In brief, the poorer countries desire higher prices for their commodities and lower prices for manufactured goods and they may try to commit the wealthier countries to transfer capital to them, to provide greater access to their primary products, and generally to eliminate discriminatory measures against the developing countries. UNCTAD could also provide a springboard for an assault on trade principles such as most-favored-nation treatment as embodied in GATT—a forum allegedly serving the rich nations at the expense of the poor. Hardy Perennials The assembly will again be faced with several “hardy perennial” issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Korean item, Kashmir, and Tibet. The Arabs may be confident this year that they will win greater support for their case against Israel, and the recent Israeli-Syrian clash may add heat to the debate. Specifically, the Arab states will again resist efforts to rectify abuses of the refugee relief program, claiming such moves are in reality designed to reduce the UN's role in supporting the refugees. The Arabs will try to obtain recognition for the new “Palestine Liberation Organization,” which aspires to represent all Palestinians. In opposition to Arab maneuvers, the Israelis can usually expect either the support or the neutrality of the Western powers and of many African, Asian, and Latin American countries. As a countermove, Israel may sponsor or encourage another resolution advocating direct negotiations between it and the Arab states—a proposal the Arabs have consistently rejected because of the implicit recognition of Israel such negotiations would involve. Each year since 1954 the General Assembly has voted for a resolution calling for the “achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and full restoration of international peace and security in the area.” The resolution has not brought unification any closer, and the annual debate may even prove disadvantageous to South Korea. The Seoul government is still anxious to uphold the UN's competence in unification even though it is increasingly doubtful that the UN can accomplish anything. If the resolution achieves fewer votes this year than last, opposition elements in South Korea may accuse the government of allowing international support to dwindle away. Other governments will want pet resolutions passed either to bolster support at home or give themselves a lift on the international scene. The Dalai Lama will have such sympathizers as Nicaragua and El Salvador sponsor a resolution regretting the Tibetans' loss of human rights, Tshombé may provoke an African walkout if he appears before the assembly to present his case on the Congo, and the landlocked nations may declare for their right of passage to the sea. The issues are endless, often tiring, if not seemingly ludicrous, but nevertheless ever present and sometimes even vital to the governments concerned. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Miscellaneous Memos. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. 2 Not printed; page 4 contains a country-by-country vote estimate, that concluded the vote would be 51 for seating Communist China, 49 opposed, and 15 abstaining. 3 A summary of the conference, October 5–10, together with pertinent portions of the text of the communiqué is in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1964, pp. 20433–20434. 315. Memorandum of Conversation 315. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, November 30, 1964, 1 p.m. SecDel/MC/6 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, November 1964 SUBJECT UN Charter PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Stevenson Ambassador Thompson Mr. Cleveland Mr. R.H. Davis Mr. A. Akalovsky U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko Mr. Semenov Ambassador Dobrynin Ambassador Fedorenko Mr. Smirnovskiy Mr. Sukhodrev At one point during the conversation at the table, Mr. Gromyko asked Governor Stevenson whether, in his view, the UN Charter could be negotiated today if a hypothetical situation requiring such action were to arise. Governor Stevenson responded in the negative, to which Mr. Gromyko said that he was of the same opinion. He believed that only in the atmosphere prevailing right after the war had it been possible to succeed in drafting a Charter. The Secretary observed that he was also of the same opinion, but noted that obviously some improvements could be made in the Charter in the light of experience to date. He thought it might be useful to have very informal conversations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to see what changes, if any, might be desirable. Mr. Gromyko did not respond to this. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential. Drafted by Alexander Akalovsky on November 30 and approved in S on December 8. The memorandum is Part I of VI. The meeting took place at the Secretary's Suite in the Waldorf Astoria during a luncheon. 316. Memorandum of Conversation 316. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, November 30, 1964, 1 p.m. SecDel/MC/6 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, November 1964 SUBJECT Article 19 PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Stevenson Ambassador Thompson Mr. Cleveland Mr. R.H. Davis Mr. A. Akalovsky U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko Mr. Semenov Ambassador Dobrynin Ambassador Fedorenko Mr. Smirnovskiy Mr. Sukhodrev The Secretary referred to his private talk with Mr. Gromyko before lunch 2 noting that no clear picture had emerged from it. He said he had explained to Mr. Gromyko the great difficulties which would arise if the Assembly did not adopt a procedure which would not prejudice the respective positions on the big issue before us, and emphasized that we did not relish confrontation on this question. We had considered the Soviet suggestion for a study group with the Secretary General's active participation and we would be prepared to participate in such a group and to help find a solution to the problems involved in both present and future peace-keeping operations. But what the Assembly did in the interim was very important since it could not decide one of the key issues before agreement was reached on it. We could not determine how quickly such a group could reach agreement although, of course, the sooner the better. As soon as such a solution was found the Assembly could proceed with its work. We hoped that Mr. Gromyko, in his conversation with the Secretary General, would find a procedure which would not prejudice the central question. As soon as a solution was found which was acceptable not only to our two sides but also to other members, the General Assembly could get on with its regular business. Mr. Gromyko said that the course suggested in the US press and by the Secretary, namely, to postpone the General Assembly's work on the most important political questions, was not acceptable because it would mean a unilateral interpretation of the situation in accordance with the US position. The same applied to the voting procedure as suggested in the US press and by US representatives. The Soviet Union believed, without prejudice to the position of either side, that it would be useful to create a committee to consider all questions relating to peace-keeping forces, such as their formation, command, complement, and finances, including expenditures already incurred. While such a committee was working the Assembly should proceed in a normal fashion without imposing any solution. However, this suggestion would not resolve the problem and there was another proposal advanced by the Afghan and some other Asian delegations. The Soviet Union had learned of the proposal only two days ago and was not quite clear who the other sponsors were. However, it believed that it might constitute a better solution. As the Soviet Union understood the proposal, it provided for the creation of a special fund to which all UN members would contribute. It had been said that this proposal merely stated the desirability of creating a fund, but the Soviet Union could accept a resolution specifically providing for the creation of a fund. It would be prepared to agree to such a resolution at any time and to regard it as an agreement. The Soviet Union was prepared to accept this solution in an effort to meet the US half way. The Soviet Union proceeded on the assumption that the US wanted a solution which would be mutually acceptable and not prejudicing the position of either side. If this assumption was wrong, then of course even the Afghan suggestion would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's own position was known and it was in accord with the UN Charter. Thus, Mr. Gromyko continued, there were two alternative courses: (a) to adopt the Soviet suggestion, and (b) to accept the suggestion advanced by the Afghan delegation. The latter would in fact resolve the main problem. But in any event, the work of the GA must not be crippled and the Assembly should proceed with its business in a normal fashion. Under either of these two courses neither side would have to state that it had abandoned its long-held views, and under either procedure the GA work would proceed in a normal manner. When the US said that no voting was possible, that was based on a unilateral interpretation of the situation but somehow the US did not seem to notice this. Mr. Gromyko continued that obviously the GA President had to be elected and also some Vice Presidents in order to permit temporary absences of the President from the Chair. Committees would also have to be established. He did not know how all this could be accomplished and he did not wish to say that the committees would have to be established right away since in the past the committees had started their work usually at the end of the general debate. He pointed out, however, that he was not necessarily proposing this since the committees might, of course, start even before that. But the main point he wished to make was that all this should present no problem and that we should seek a mutually acceptable procedure which would not prejudice the position of either side or cripple the GA's work. The Soviet Union did not want a confrontation. Mr. Gromyko said he would see the Secretary General later in the day. He did not know what he would hear from him but what the US press was attributing to him was based on a lopsided interpretation of the situation. What disturbed him was that there had been no denial of these press reports. The Secretary commented that Mr. Gromyko appeared to feel that if we did not proceed with the voting in the GA while the committee was trying to work out a solution, that would mean a one-sided procedure. However, we for our part believed that if there was voting in spite of the advisory opinion of the International Court, that would be prejudicial to our position. An exception to this could be election of the President and perhaps Vice Presidents on a no objection basis. The Secretary General's suggestion avoided prejudice to the position of either side while attempts were made to find a solution to the main problem. The Secretary then asked Ambassador Stevenson whether he thought anything could be done now, given the fact that Mr. Gromyko was to see the Secretary General very shortly. Governor Stevenson referred to Mr. Gromyko's assertion that the Secretary General's suggestion, as he understood it, was one-sided. But as we saw the Soviet proposal, it appeared to be one-sided to us. We said that voting would prejudice our position, whereas the Soviet Union said that requirement for payment of debts was prejudicial since the Soviet Union regarded it as illegal. What we were doing now was to try to find a solution which would not be prejudicial to either side. The Secretary General was suggesting that there be no voting and that the matters requiring action be taken care of on a no objection basis. This should be easy to do since the selection of the GA President and admission of new members were in fact agreed-upon matters. Election of new Security Council members would have to be completed some time in December, but there was no particular hurry about this right now. The Secretary General's suggestion envisaged the GA proceeding on this basis and then if no solution to the basic problem were found, the Assembly would recess until agreement was reached. Mr. Gromyko inquired when the GA would resume its work. The Secretary said that this would be as soon as possible, but perhaps one could state that it should not be later than, say, March 1. Governor Stevenson said he believed the Secretary General had been thinking in terms of February. Mr. Gromyko wondered how in such a case the GA could be kept together. The Secretary pointed out that tomorrow was December 1 so that we could have two or three weeks of general debate or of debate on the main question. Thus we would have two to three weeks of GA debate anyway. Perhaps a solution could be found in December, hopefully before Christmas; if not, the GA would recess until February or until a solution was found. The Secretary also pointed out that this year there was no contest for the GA Presidency and that consequently no voting was really needed on this point. Mr. Gromyko wondered how other general political matters would be handled. If they were put aside this year's GA would not be an assembly but a disassembly. The Secretary responded that the GA had never met as late as it had this year so it would be not abnormal to have the general debate in December and the rest of the GA's work later. Mr. Gromyko reiterated that he did not wish to say that the committees should start their work right away. He concluded the discussion by saying that he was going to see the Secretary General and that he would also have another talk with the Secretary later in the week. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on November 30 and approved in S on December 8. The memorandum is Part VI of VI. The meeting took place at the Secretary's suite in the Waldorf Astoria during a luncheon. 2 No record of this conversation was found. 317. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 317. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 1, 1964. SUBJECT The 19th General Assembly Opens The SYG's language as he opened the GA is interesting: “In view of the differences of opinion which have arisen among Member States regarding the conduct of the Nineteenth Session I have been in consultation with several delegations for the past week with the sole purpose of avoiding a confrontation. In this connection I may mention that there is an understanding to the effect that issues other than those that can be disposed of without objection will not be raised while the General Debate proceeds. [Italics mine] 2 I hope all delegations will agree with this procedure. As far as today's meeting is concerned there is general agreement that on the above basis we may proceed with the following items of business: 1) Appointment of the Credentials Committee. 2) Election of the President. 3) Admission of new members. I would recommend that the Assembly may proceed accordingly.” Following this, a highly nervous Sosa Rodriques managed to get the Credentials Committee appointed by the Assembly “without objection” (interpretation: “I don't care”). Next, Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana became President of the 19th GA “without objection” because (1) the other two candidates withdrew and left him as the only candidate, and (2) Quaison-Sackey reportedly had $150,000.00 to spend on behalf of his candidacy from the coffers of Accra. This is not a happy choice for us, but what can you do when it was already agreed that an African would be the GA President for this session, and the other two African candidates withdrew. Quaison-Sackey, as a first order of business made a sharp, anti-colonial speech that might have been drafted by Nkrumah himself. He then proceeded to get three new members admitted (Zambia, Malawi and Malta) “without objection”. Quaison-Sackey then adjourned the Assembly until 10:30 tomorrow. At that time representatives of the new member states will speak and most likely a number of other welcoming speeches will follow. That should occupy the day. Next, the Assembly will go into the general debate which could easily occupy the time between now and Christmas recess. So much for the non-voting General Assembly for the time being. The important work now at hand is what the Secretary can accomplish with the Russians beginning with another lunch with Gromyko tomorrow. There are four items—requiring no vote—on which there could be forward movement and, as of now, it is the Secretary's plan to propose them to Gromyko: 1) The establishment of a voluntary fund into which the Russians can make a contribution and take care of their debt to the Organization. The Russians have agreed to this in principle, but the terms of reference have not yet been worked out. 2) The creation of a Committee to take a new look at long-range-financing or, alternatively, refer the matter to the already existing Committee of 21 (Finances). 3) An agreement with regard to the membership of councils—the membership of the Security Council and ECOSOC will change at the end of the year and this should not be delayed. 4) A means whereby the SYG can continue to expend funds at the current rate until a new budget can be agreed upon. This is where we now stand. The key to where we emerge is in the Secretary's pocket. A mildly humorous sidelight on the afternoon's procedures was the dropping of the language “by acclamation” for “without objection” because it was argued that the former could be interpreted as a unanimous affirmative vote. Therefore, the business accomplished was “without objection”, but with applause. One purist in Harlan's office yelled: “Oh no! They can't applaud! They're voting!” End of report. SEB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memos, Vol. 1. Confidential. 2 Brackets in the source text. 318. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 318. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, December 1, 1964, 8 p.m. 1937. Re: Article 19. 1. Early this morning Stevenson called SYG to suggest that SYG have meeting today in his office including US, USSR, UK, France, Sosa (Venezuela) and Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) to try to reach final agreement before GA opened. SYG agreed and called meeting at noon, SYG adding chairmen LA and Afro-Asian Groups. 2. Prior to meeting we drafted statements for possible use by SYG and Pres in which SYG would refer to consultations he had undertaken on crisis and their continuation and Sosa would then suggest GA start its work “on such basis that no voting would be involved.” 3. When meeting convened SYG noted he had been consulting members with “sole motive” of avoiding confrontation and asked for this meeting to discuss conduct of opening session. Stated that USSR yesterday had proposed fol procedures to avoid confrontation and facilitate negots outside chamber: GA would meet as scheduled, Pres would be elected and new members admitted by acclamation or without opposition; General Debate would subsequently proceed as scheduled; USSR would then discuss future business with colleagues, including Vice-Preses, chairmen of Comites, elections to Councils, and budget. 4. Stevenson then said that as presented by SYG Sov position was not satisfactory. There must be no voting until such time as agreement was worked out. Otherwise Art 19 could arise at any minute. If there were agreement on no voting and SYG said so something along suggested lines might be all right. But it would have to be explicitly clear there would be no other business and no votes taken. 5. Caradon (UK) said purpose of meeting was to avoid confrontation and we must not fail. As he understood position shared objective of those in room was that we go through period of no vote so we could find solution. Issue was how this was to be stated. Public impression was very important and we must act openly and not risk dangers of misunderstanding. 6. SYG then said he thought positions were very close. It was now question of formulations and procedures. With spirit of give and take he thought we could reach agreement. 7. Stevenson then read draft statements he thought SYG and Pres might make, which would refer to continuation of consultations and to GA proceeding on such basis that no voting would be involved. 8. SYG said that in principle he was prepared to make such statement if it acceptable to all. He had had impression Gromyko would prefer that Pres make any statement. 9. Sosa noted proposal on no voting meant waiving of rules. Believed this should be raised by SYG, not by outgoing Pres. He would then put issue to Assembly to obtain Assembly's concurrence. 10. Fedorenko (USSR) said SYG had expressed main Sov points in clear terms. He wished to stress that USSR's only idea was and is to have clear understanding among ourselves. It would then be satisfactory to open session as described by SYG and elect Pres by acclamation; then to admit new members in same way. If some states wished to make statements there would be no objection but there would be no controversial aspects for today's work of GA. GA would then proceed with General Debate. No other steps would be taken until consultations were completed. He noted Gromyko and Rusk intended to have further talks. Beyond this there was no necessity to take up other aspects now, especially those of interest to one side. When meeting was ended we should tell other members of GA what we have agreed. No special statement by SYG was needed. This would be one-sided. We should simply go ahead with this understanding as there was no real problem now involved. Statement would be a “precondition” to further work of session, and this would not be right. 11. Seydoux (France) said it would be difficult to postpone opening of GA further. GA would lose prestige and it would be shock to public opinion. He thought confrontation should be avoided. But election of new Pres and admission of new members could be accomplished today. Position of future would be reserved. Perhaps a suspension of GA should follow this afternoon's session for several days during which consultations would continue. 12. Sosa said if no agreement reached on procedure it might be wise to adjourn as Seydoux had suggested. GA could be adjourned either after election of Pres and admission new members or before these two items. 14. Stevenson said he understood Fedorenko as suggesting we go ahead with General Debate, while Seydoux suggested recess. Noted GA rules required election of new Pres to be without nomination and by secret ballot. Election without objection would therefore require waiving of rules. If there was agreement we could proceed on all these items without voting we could agree, but there needed to be explicit understanding on basis of which we could proceed. He failed to understand Fedorenko's view that statement on non-voting would complicate matters. We needed to have precise understanding on procedure under which controversial business would be avoided and we would proceed without objection. On Seydoux's suggestion of recess US had no firm views. 15. Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) said he wished make appeal. There was nothing fundamentally different between views of US and USSR. One wanted statement; one did not. He stated everyone knew about discussions which had taken place and about today's meeting. He therefore thought some kind of statement was called for so that GA would know we were not following normal procedure. Statement of SYG might avoid word voting but get same meaning with other suitable language. He did not favor further suspension of GA procedures. 16. Vidaurre (Dominican Republic) stated LA group would have no objection to SYG's proposal and appealed to all to agree to it. 17. Bouattoura (Algeria) agreed with Quaison-Sackey that we were close to agreement. Question was how to express this to membership. Quaison-Sackey's proposal was a good way and he was sure SYG could do this. Problem was how to proceed with GA work without disturbing consultations going on outside. We should go ahead into General Debate with understanding no voting should take place. Consultations would continue with parties concerned, following which GA could follow its normal procedure. But GA should be convened. Two postponements had already been a blow and further postponement would be another. 18. Fedorenko then asked questions about Credentials Comite, to which we had referred in our statement. Stated he understood this was appointed by Pres. Sosa said Credentials Comite in fact had to be confirmed by GA but that there had never been vote on confirmation. 19. SYG said that it might be useful for him to make short statement as suggested by Quaison-Sackey, avoiding contentious phraseology, to explain why new procedure adopted. 20. Fedorenko stated he wished members to understand that anything beyond what SYG had suggested at start of meeting must be studied by his Del. He must see text of any statement that SYG would make and decision on it would be “in competence of Chief of our Del.” 21. SYG then produced one-sentence statement to effect that there was “an understanding” that controversial issues would be avoided while consultations were taking place. Plimpton suggested this might be modified to add something like “issues other than those which can be unanimously agreed upon.” 22. Fedorenko stressed again that USSR had to study anything new. SYG said he could have draft available by 2:30 PM. Fedorenko said the sooner the better. SYG then said he would have revised sentence available in five minutes. Short discussion on scenario of opening moments of GA followed, after which Narasimhan (UN) distributed revised text as fols: “There is an understanding to the effect that issues other than those that can be disposed of without objection will not be raised while the General Debate proceeds.” SYG suggested meeting reconvene at 2:45 for 15 minutes. In meantime he would draft rest of statement. 23. Stevenson asked whether SYG's sentence was intended to be applied to procedural questions as well as to substantive items on agenda. Noted procedural question might arise at any time without notice and precipitate issue in spite of intention of agreement. He assumed Chair could handle such issues without vote. SYG said his statement was definitely applicable to procedural problems as well and Quaison-Sackey indicated he would handle them in accordance with the statement. Fedorenko added that if anyone who did not understand situation should try to raise such problem he was sure Chair could handle it. 24. Meeting reconvened at 2:45 at which time SYG distributed full statement contained USUN 1938. 2 Only change in key sentence, as Dept will note, is substitution of “while General Debate going on” for “while consultations take place”. Fedorenko had draft copy of SYG's full draft statement when he walked into room with several ink changes on it. When meeting started SYG said last minute corrections had been made and statement would be distributed shortly. Thus it appeared Fedorenko had already seen and agreed to full statement. Comment: It was interesting that Shukodrov (Gromyko's interpreter) joined Fedorenko, Morozov and Fedoseev in afternoon meeting, while only latter three were present in morning. 25. In response SYG's request for views Fedorenko promptly said Sov position was that it would be best if there were no statement. If there had to be one USSR had “no objection to this text.” 26. Stevenson said he understood opening day procedure under statement would be on these lines: After SYG's statement Sosa would say, “I assume there is no objection and we can proceed on these lines; there being no objection it is so decided.” Appointment Credentials Comite, election of Pres, and admission of new members would then be accomplished on no objection basis. On this understanding he agreed to draft statement. SYG and Sosa both said this was correct understanding of procedure. SYG then distributed short statement for Sosa under which he would say if there were no objections it was so decided. Fedorenko said that if others agreed to this statement USSR had no objections. 27. Seydoux said that if understanding involved budget and elections to Councils he would have reservations, but if statement was agreed around table he would be reluctant to oppose it for today's procedures. SYG said he took it from Seydoux's comments that he had reservations but was not objecting. Meeting then adjourned. 28. US participants in meetings were Stevenson, Plimpton, Yost and Pedersen. Stevenson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. Confidential. Drafted by Richard Pedersen on December 1. 2 Not printed. (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 142, Frame 9) 319. Memorandum of Conversation 319. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 2, 1964, 1 p.m. SecDel/MC/7 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, December 1964 SUBJECT Article 19 PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Stevenson Mr. Cleveland Ambassador Yost Ambassador Kohler Mr. Tyler Mr. Akalovsky U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov Ambassador Dobrynin Ambassador Fedorenko Mr. Smirnovskiy Mr. Sukhodrev The Secretary wondered whether Mr. Gromyko had any views on how we should proceed with respect to the UN problem. He believed, and he thought Mr. Gromyko was of a similar opinion, that the Secretary should take considerable part in discussions of problems related to peacekeeping operations, both past and future. We were interested in both those aspects and we would like to know what Mr. Gromyko's views were on them. Mr. Gromyko thought that there was agreement to continue consultations and inquired whether Ambassador Stevenson had any comments to make. The Secretary commented that, as a general observation, he believed we would need quite detailed consultations in New York and that the Secretary General should be involved in them. As to the aspects of the problem relating to the future, we were interested in the Charter's provision for “primary responsibility” of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and international security. However, the Charter did not state that the Security Council had exclusive responsibility and we believed that the General Assembly had important powers in this respect. Those powers were perhaps residual inasmuch as they resulted from a situation where the Security Council may be unable to act. In any event, we believed that the Security Council was important and the United States and the Soviet Union, as members of the Security Council, were interested in its having primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security. The Secretary then noted that the membership of the United Nations had considerably changed over the past years. For example, there were some members today who contributed as little as .04% of the total UN budget. Indeed, one could construct a hypothetical two-thirds majority in the General Assembly whose total contribution to the UN budget would amount to something like 5%. For these reasons, we believed that those who carried a larger financial burden should have a greater voice in financial decisions. Thus there were two points of interest to us: (a) the Security Council's primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security, and (b) that those who carry a heavier financial burden should have a greater voice in financial decisions. Mr. Gromyko asserted that the question was not as the Secretary had formulated it. The question was not of the Security Council's having primary and the General Assembly a non-primary responsibility. This was a quantitative rather than a qualitative approach, i.e. it was placing the question on the basis of the degree of responsibility. In fact, the point was that under the Charter the Security Council had authority to pass binding decisions whereas the General Assembly had no such authority. The General Assembly could take only consultative decisions, in other words, make recommendations. Thus the question should not be turned upside down. There was no point in breaking into an open door. The Soviet Union knew, and had so stated, that the General Assembly could discuss matters relating to the maintenance of peace and international security. No one had any objection to that. But the General Assembly could not take binding decisions whereas the Security Council could both discuss problems relating to the maintenance of peace and international security and take binding decisions on them. The Soviet Union had itself participated in the drafting of the relevant provisions of the Charter. Mr. Gromyko suggested that actions and decisions be based on the Charter and that everything be kept in perspective in the process of analyzing the situation. Ambassador Stevenson recalled that, as Ambassador Fedorenko would probably remember, way back in March it had been agreed to discuss all questions arising from the past and also those related to new arrangements for the future. The question now was how, where, and with whom we should discuss peace-keeping operations and finances. As far as we were concerned, we were prepared to start from either end, from the past or from the future. As to the past, he understood that the Soviet Union was willing to make a voluntary contribution to some rescue fund. He wondered whether we should discuss that first or whether future arrangements should be taken up as a first order of business. He reiterated that the U.S. was willing to proceed either way. He noted that the duration of Mr. Gromyko's stay in New York might be a factor in this respect. Regarding substance, Ambassador Stevenson said it was hard for him to say anything now and he thought that perhaps it would be better to settle procedure first. Mr. Gromyko said there were two ways of proceeding: a) to discuss the past, which would be simpler, or b) to discuss the past, the present, and the future, i.e., all questions relating to peace-keeping, including finances. Obviously, the latter was a much more complex problem and apparently the range of differences in the positions on it was much greater. The Soviet Union was prepared to proceed either way, but the two of us and others as well should keep in mind that one method is simpler and the other more complex. Regarding the question of contribution, the U.S. side had already been informed that the Soviet Union would be willing to discuss this matter either in a committee set up for the purpose of discussing all questions relating to peace-keeping, or on the basis of the Afghan proposal. The latter covered only the past and consequently it involved a narrower range of problems. The Soviet Union accepted the language of the Afghan proposal as a whole. That proposal stated that all UN members would voluntarily contribute to a fund, and obviously the Soviet Union was not excluded. As to the amount, the Soviet Union understood the term “voluntary contribution” to mean only one thing, namely, that the Soviet Union itself would determine the amount of its contribution, without anybody else's diktat or even advice, to which the Soviet Union would never agree. If the Afghan proposal was accepted by common agreement, the Soviet Union would take part in such an arrangement. However, in such an event, it would be the Soviet Union's understanding that the entire question of the Soviet contribution would be disposed of and no one would have any more claims in the future. He also noted that the question of the form of a contribution would have to be settled. Governor Stevenson wondered whether we should discuss bilaterally the question of a voluntary contribution or the broader complex of questions, or whether those questions should be taken up with the Secretary General and other powers. In addition, of course, there was the Committee of 21 where these matters could be discussed. This was a procedural question, but he thought its solution would accelerate our work. Mr. Gromyko said he did not exclude bilateral discussions like the current one. Neither did he exclude discussions with the Secretary General; indeed, such discussions were desirable. Discussions could also be held in the various groups which had been formed recently, and all these discussions could proceed in parallel. Perhaps some special committee could be formed. Thus there was a whole series of fora, but he wished to point out that in those groups already in existence no socialist states were represented. Those groups included mostly representatives of the various blocs. Therefore, perhaps it would be better if a special, more representative committee were created. However, the Secretary General would be consulted in any event, and of course nothing ruled out U.S.-Soviet bilateral consultations. It went without saying that, whatever the forum, decisions would not be taken by a vote, but only on the basis of agreement. The Secretary commented that the question of a fund was not a very suitable subject for bilateral discussions. The Soviet Union had never asked the U.S. for money, and the U.S. had never asked for money from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Secretary General asked both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for money. Therefore, perhaps the Secretary General should take a more active role in this matter. He would surely want to consult the major powers—the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and France—both as regards the fund and the problems of the future as related to the Charter. The Secretary said he wished to point out that the reason he had not mentioned China in this connection should in no way be interpreted as an indication of a change in the U.S. position. Governor Stevenson also said the Secretary General should be in charge of the rescue operation. However, he believed that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should inform the SYG of their bilateral discussions and of their intention to discuss the problems relating to the future. Mr. Gromyko then raised the General Assembly's order of business. He said the Soviet Union was firmly opposed to any indefinite postponement of the major political issues before the Assembly. He wanted to make clear that consultations should move promptly. Perhaps it would be simpler to take up the past first, because discussion of the broader range of questions might take more time and might go even into the next GA. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, it hoped this would not be the case, and it wished agreement on all these questions as soon as possible. In any event, the broader complex of problems could be discussed in parallel with the discussion of the past. Ambassador Stevenson noted there was an understanding not to have any voting until the general debate ended. If the fund question was resolved, the General Assembly would proceed with its normal business. The procedure suggested by the Secretary would take care of that. Governor Stevenson then summed up the suggested procedure, saying that the Secretary General would chair the discussions on the voluntary fund, for which there had been several proposals, including one by the four and another by the Afro-Asians-the so-called Pazhwak proposal. 2 Thus, the Secretary General could convene a meeting with the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and with any other party as he deemed necessary. Meanwhile, whenever useful, bilateral discussions could take place regarding the future. Those discussions would cover such questions as the primacy of the Security Council, limitation on the General Assembly, etc. Mr. Gromyko said we should not impede the work of the non-aligned delegations, because they wanted to help. Therefore, we should ask the Secretary General to consult with any delegations he wanted to invite, and he probably would not exclude the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Then, in a couple of days, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could meet to review the situation. Ambassador Fedorenko wondered whether there was any point in going far into the history of the various proposals. He thought it more useful to concentrate on what was before us today: (a) the Soviet suggestion for a committee to discuss all peace-keeping questions, and (b) the Pazhwak proposal. He said the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the Pazhwak proposal. It has been developed by twelve Afro-Asian delegations and advanced by Ambassador Pazhwak. The Soviet Union accepted the proposal in an effort to meet the U.S. halfway. It regarded the proposal as a mutually acceptable compromise solution of the UN's financial difficulties. The proposal certainly did not reflect the Soviet position as it had been stated both in New York and Washington. Ambassador Fedorenko did not see any point in taking up those proposals which were already dead and which had never deserved serious consideration, let alone implementation. He would, therefore, wish to see the U.S. concentrate on the Pazhwak proposal, which he believed was feasible and which had been made in an effort to help out of the situation. He thought the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should be able to get together on its basis. Ambassador Stevenson thought it was now agreed that the Secretary General should be informed that the two sides had had bilateral discussions and that they believed, subject to his approval, that he should take up with whoever he wanted the question of a fund. Mr. Gromyko suggested that the two sides review the situation in a couple of days. Meanwhile, the Secretary General would consult with the various delegations, but not necessarily with all of them at the same time. We should not prescribe any procedure for the Secretary General. Ambassador Stevenson agreed and then asked whether Mr. Gromyko could help him understand the proposal which the Soviet Union said it was willing to accept. Mr. Gromyko had said that the Soviet Union was prepared to agree to the creation of a fund. It would be very helpful if he could describe his conception of such a fund, the form of the contribution, and the purpose for which the money would be used. Mr. Gromyko said the UN would be saved by contributions from all, not just the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would not contribute for the operations in the Congo or in the Middle East, but rather to the UN as a whole. As to the size of the contribution, he reiterated that it would be strictly up to the Soviet Union to determine. The Soviet Union would contribute as much as it believed to be necessary. This was a matter of policy rather than money. Ambassador Stevenson commented that since the contributions would be voluntary, somebody might not wish to contribute. Ambassador Fedorenko quoted from the text of the Pazhwak proposal that contributions would be made by the entire UN membership. Ambassador Stevenson remarked that the more members contributed, the better. The conversation ended at about 4:30 p.m. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 7. The memorandum is Part V of V. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission. 2 A non-aligned nations draft proposal being circulated by the representative from Afghanistan. 320. Memorandum of Conversation 320. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 17, 1964. SUBJECT Charter Amendment PARTICIPANTS Mr. Michael N.F. Stewart, Minister, British Embassy Mr. John K.E. Broadley, Second Secretary, British Embassy Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary Mrs. V.F. Hartley The Minister called at his request to discuss ratification of the pending Charter amendments. He referred to an earlier conversation last May when we had indicated that we had no intention of proceeding with ratification at this time since this was likely to trigger an across-the-board review of the UN and all its works. The UK had accepted this position. However, the UK now saw no advantage in further delay and its UN delegation saw certain positive advantages in an early announcement of the UK's intention to ratify, particularly before the USSR had acted. The inclusion of such an announcement in the British general debate speech at the General Assembly was therefore being considered. However, the British wished to know the US view before making a final decision. The Minister noted that if the general debate speech is in January, it will probably be made by the Prime Minister and will be a major foreign policy statement. He also recalled that the new Government has repeatedly indicated that it considers the UN of primary importance. Mr. Sisco pointed out that the situation is still unclear with respect to the Article 19 problem and that while the Rescue Fund idea would probably be pushed ahead, details with respect to it were likely to remain unclear for some time. If the Article 19 problem has been resolved when the British make their general debate speech, then an announcement of their intention to ratify would create no problems. If the situation is still uncertain, however, such an announcement would create certain difficulties for us. We simply cannot proceed toward ratification so long as the Article 19 problem is with us and British ratification is almost certain to increase pressure on us to act. Moreover, it is likely to create the impression that there is a split between the US and the UK over Article 19. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley (IO/UNP). 321. Memorandum of Conversation 321. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 19, 1964, 1 p.m. SecDel/MC/45 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, December 1964 SUBJECT Article 19 PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Stevenson Ambassador Thompson Mr. Akalovsky U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov Ambassador Dobrynin Ambassador Fedorenko Mr. Sukhodrev Mr. Gromyko wondered how long the GA recess for the holidays should be. He asked whether it should be three or four days. Governor Stevenson commented that if the financial situation were resolved, it had been suggested that the recess be from December 23 to January 11. As far as we were concerned, we had no particular views on this point. Mr. Gromyko wondered why the recess could not end earlier. Governor Stevenson said there was no particular reason except that a longer recess would give more time to the Secretary General to do his work. There would be no difficulty from us on the recess if the financial problem were resolved. However, it would be quite difficult to resume before January. Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Union did not like the draft resolution prepared by Quaison-Sackey and publicized in the press. 2 He did not know whose initiative this was, but the Soviet Union did not like it. The Secretary observed that the Soviet Union had suggested certain amendments to that resolution, some of which we accepted. Mr. Gromyko asserted that no formal amendments but rather only a few suggestions had been put forward by the Soviet Delegation. Governor Stevenson said we had told Quaison-Sackey that some of the Soviet suggestions were acceptable; for our part, we had also given him some suggestions. Thus Quaison-Sackey now had both Soviet and U.S. views. He wondered whether the Soviet Delegation had been in touch with Quaison-Sackey today. Mr. Gromyko replied in the negative. He said that in any event the Soviet Delegation did not like Quaison-Sackey's draft and was not optimistic about it. Governor Stevenson inquired what the problem was. Mr. Gromyko replied that Quaison-Sackey's draft was different from the non-aligned draft, 3 which the Soviet Union accepted. If we were to work on the basis of Quaison-Sackey's draft, the Soviet Delegation would have to keep amending it until it was brought back to the non-aligned draft. He did not see any point in following such a procedure. The Quaison-Sackey draft as a whole was not acceptable to the Soviet Union, whereas the non-aligned draft, which provided for voluntary contributions, was acceptable. Governor Stevenson commented the Soviet Union apparently did not like the idea of a fund. We did not particularly care about this point; nor did we care about the provision regarding the future. The main point now was to avoid a confrontation. Mr. Gromyko stated the easiest way to proceed was to accept the Pazhwak draft. Governor Stevenson said the Pazhwak draft would make us buy a pig in a poke. He wondered whether Mr. Gromyko could explain his understanding of it. Mr. Gromyko said that when the General Assembly started working normally, all parties would make their contributions. However, the Soviet Union could not make any commitment because this would be contrary to the concept of voluntary contributions. The Soviet Union believed it had made a step of good will by accepting the idea of voluntary contributions, and he hoped that step would be appreciated. He reiterated that Quaison-Sackey's draft was not acceptable, even though some of its provisions seemed to be all right. For example, the Soviet Union would not object to having a report by the Secretary General, even though it was not quite clear why such a provision was necessary since the Secretary General was free to report at any time. The Secretary suggested that the Soviet Delegation discuss the matter with Quaison-Sackey, who might have some further ideas. Ambassador Fedorenko noted the U.S. had suggested a different wording for the reference to Article 19. He wondered what the point was. Governor Stevenson said there was a difference between saying that Article 19 would not be raised and a wording merely referring to our desire to avoid confrontation. We did not see how one could state that a provision of the Charter should be ignored. The Secretary pointed out it would be risky business if the Assembly were to be allowed to amend the Charter by a resolution of this kind. Mr. Gromyko said he did not attach particular importance to phraseology, but he did wish to repeat that Quaison-Sackey's draft was unacceptable. Governor Stevenson asked again what the Soviet Union's difficulty was with the draft which we believed met the points made by the Soviet side. Mr. Gromyko said that as far as the Pazhwak draft was concerned, he did not wish to create constitutional difficulties and now saw the point raised by the U.S. regarding reference to Article 19. He said he would consider the U.S. suggested wording on this point. As to a report by the Secretary General, he reiterated he did not see why such a report was needed but was not strongly opposed to it. He thought perhaps provision for such a report might be included in the Pazhwak draft. He suggested that the Pazhwak draft be adopted as the basis for proceeding further and repeated that the Quaison-Sackey draft was not acceptable. The Secretary said his impression was that Quaison-Sackey's draft included a great deal of what was in the Pazhwak draft. Perhaps with amendments both sides had suggested the Quaison-Sackey draft would not create difficulties. Mr. Gromyko reiterated the Quaison-Sackey draft was not acceptable. However, he did now understand the U.S. point regarding reference to Article 19. We should take the Pazhwak draft and perhaps change the language of the reference to Article 19 if the U.S. attached importance to that point. Moreover, if the U.S. believed it was important to have a report from the Secretary General, that could be considered too. The U.S. should think this over. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, it had understood long ago the difficulties the U.S. had and this was why it had made this step of good will. The Secretary pointed out we had also made a step to meet the Soviet Union in moving from compulsory to voluntary contributions. Mr. Gromyko argued that the Soviet step was greater because the Soviet Union now agreed to make a voluntary contribution. The discussion then turned to Europe (see separate memorandum of conversation). 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, CF 2449. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 21 and approved in S on December 30. The memorandum is Part V of VI. The meeting was held at a luncheon in the Secretary's Suite at the Waldorf Towers. 2 The General Assembly president had been circulating various informal proposals for settlement of the Article 19 controversy. 3 Reference is to one of a series of drafts being circulated by a group of states led by Afghanistan. The Mission to the United Nations had forwarded the latest version in telegram 1722 from New York, November 18. (Department of State, Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 141, Frames 161–163) 4 A copy of this memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, CF 2449. 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, December 24, 1964, 7 p.m. 1632. Subject: Article 19. On basis of most recent developments, situation can now be summed up as follows: Over past two weeks UN has been engaged in exercise to find formula under which Soviets could make early payment without loss of face and without sacrifice their publicly announced position of principle. This effort has now broken down because Soviets apparently insist that whole Article 19 question be dismissed from consideration, and that Assembly decide to take up business as usual, before sufficient payments are made by delinquents to avoid application of Article 19. US and others, on other hand, have been unable to agree that Article 19 has no application, until sufficient payments have been made to bring about this result under terms of article itself. In light of foregoing, Department believes we should defer any further US initiatives on planting shrubbery to serve as face-saving rationale for action by USSR and other delinquents. We should now concentrate on adopting US position most likely to produce necessary payments to avoid application of Article 19. In next few days mission should reiterate our fundamental view in corridor discussions: We wish GA to get on with normal business as soon as possible, but this can only be done—without Article 19 confrontation—if sufficient amounts forthcoming from delinquents to remove loss-of-vote issue. Perhaps Soviets could now be persuaded to concentrate on private commitments which might be given either to SYG or GA President. We have no need at all for statement by GA President re contributions, so any further initiative on this score should come from USSR or others. But in all discussions we must make clear no statement will be acceptable to us which tends load scales in favor of conducting GA business by voting prior to satisfactory resolution of Article 19 problem. While we do not insist on statement by GA President affirming our position and indeed question need for any statement, we can not accept one which prejudices it. Accordingly, most realistic course would seem to have statement which is totally neutral on the point, if in fact Soviets wish any such statement at all. Suggest you inform Quaison-Sackey we do not consider any statement necessary but if he believes otherwise, suggest you tell him that statement next Tuesday 2 should be brief and comprise two simple elements: (1) an appeal for voluntary contributions, and (2) announcement of Assembly recess until January 11 (or 18). Following is what we have in mind for content of such statement. “Since the opening of the 19th Session of the General Assembly on December 1, members of the Assembly have engaged in useful discussion of ways to meet the present financial difficulties of the United Nations. As the Assembly now recesses the 1964 part of its 19th Session, I am addressing an appeal, as President of the General Assembly, to all member states to make voluntary contributions to the United Nations in a cooperative effort aimed at bringing the financial situation of the organization to solvency, with the clear understanding that such contributions would not be construed as changing the basic position of principle of any individual member. Having made this appeal, which I commend to the most earnest consideration of all member states, I declare the 19th session of the General Assembly recessed until January 11 (or 18).” As part of closing statement, we assume Quaison-Sackey would read to GA appropriate language of authorization of continuing expenditures by SYG. While it is possible that another delegation (such as Sweden) might usefully discuss above course of action with Quaison-Sackey, we inclined to think it desirable for mission to take this matter up with him direct. In any event, it is most important to discuss on basis of precise text for presidential statement, our suggestion for this is given above. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. Confidential. 2 December 29. 323. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 323. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 28, 1964. SUBJECT Developments at the UN Stevenson returned from Lebertyville this afternoon (I think at the Secretary's insistence) in order to attend a meeting with Quaison-Sackey at 3:45. Quaison-Sackey had met with Fedorenko earlier. At the 3:45 meeting, it appeared that the Russians had become more reasonable on several counts: 1. They now are willing to have Quaison-Sackey take informal soundings from the members in order to ascertain whether Mali or Jordan have a majority for a contested Security Council seat. Earlier it had seemed the Russians might be willing to risk a vote. (There is a widespread feeling among the members that new Council members should take their seats before the end of the year on a “no objection” procedure. Actually, the Charter does not require this.) 2. The Russians are willing for the SYG to make a simple appeal to the GA for funds, but they are attempting, at the same time, to get the SYG to say that, when the GA reconvenes, business will proceed normally. This we cannot buy and we have said so—firmly. We would have to know that the Russians had paid—not merely pledged—enough to accept such language in the SYG's appeal. 3. The Russians also have agreed to allow the SYG to continue spending at the present level, on a “no objection” procedure, until the new budg-et can be voted on. They have said, however, that they will wish to record a reservation following the “no objection” procedure. This reservation presumably would have to do with expenditures for UNEF. Quaison-Sackey now plans to convene the GA on Wednesday 2 afternoon for the above activities and then adjourn until January 11. This, of course, could easily change. If you fly down with the Secretary, and should this subject arise, you might express strong suspicions about accepting pledges instead of cash from the Russians. I mention this because no one has been able to find out just where the Secretary stands and we are afraid he might be a bit soft on this one point. In direct answer to your question about a head-count on the Article 19 matter, should it come to a vote within the next day or two, both the Department and New York believe we are still safe in getting an easy simple majority, but are increasingly less sure that we could get an easy 2/3 vote to support enforcement of Article 19. It is unclear just how much erosion there has been among the African states because of the Congo affair. The Department has asked New York today for a hard count and we should have their reply tomorrow. SEB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memos, Vol. 1. Confidential. 2 December 30. 324. Memorandum of Conversation 324. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 28, 1964, 3:40 p.m. SUBJECT Article 19 PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA UK The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador Michael Stewart, British Minister Lord Harlech said he had had a call from London. The British Government would like to know before tomorrow's discussion what the current attitude of the U.S. was on the Article 19 question. It seemed to HMG that if the Soviets maintained their present position of saying they would pay but not how much or when, this would be unsatisfactory from the British point of view. The problem would be holding the waverers in line. The Secretary said that we had made major concessions to the Soviets. There had been some slight movement on their part as well. The major problem was how to get more time, perhaps two or three weeks, to try to get things settled. A plan was currently being discussed for an adjournment, perhaps combined with an appeal for voluntary contributions. The trouble was that a resolution was needed to provide funds for continuing operations, including UNEF. The Soviets might not let a “no-opposition” resolution go through. If not, we would have a nasty row on our hands. Lord Harlech said he had the impression that the Soviets have been losing ground with the neutrals. Secretary Rusk replied that it did look that way but we would still prefer that Article 19 not come to a vote. However, we were not sure that the Nineteenth General Assembly could continue if the problem were not settled. Lord Harlech asked if he was correct in assuming that the U.S. position was that ordinary business within the Assembly should not go on unless the Soviets made a payment of $17 million or more. The Secretary affirmed that this was our position. Lord Harlech then asked if the UN authorities were aware of how much the U.S. thought the Soviets should pay. The Secretary answered that neither Quaison-Sackey nor U Thant had mentioned to us any figure less than $17 million. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Judd. The memorandum is Part I of II. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 325. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 325. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 5, 1965. SUBJECT Situation Report on the UN Financial Crisis Harlan Cleveland spent the day with the Mission in New York yesterday drawing up plans for the period between now and January 18 when the GA is scheduled to reopen. With U Thant in the Virgin Islands and Quaison-Sackey in Palm Beach, it was agreed that we should begin this week to work hard bilaterally with the Russians in both Washington and New York. Stevenson and Plimpton have been in town today working out further details with the Department. The following views will be taken to the Secretary this afternoon: It was agreed that we should begin immediately to destroy any hope on the part of the Afro-Asians that the Pazhwak Plan (which would set aside Article 19) will be acceptable to us. In addition, it was agreed that a Department Circular 2 or a message from the Secretary should be sent out within the next day or so making it fully clear that there will be a confrontation when the GA reconvenes unless an adequate payment has been made. The circular also would say that if there is a confrontation and Article 19 is not upheld—i.e., if we lose—then we will be compelled to make a reassessment of our entire financial relationship to the UN; but avoid getting into details because Congress would have to be consulted. Foy Kohler and Stevenson dined with Dobrynin last evening when the whole matter of Article 19 was discussed. According to Stevenson, the pitch he and Kohler took was to impress upon Dobrynin that the time had come, during the GA recess, to solve the problem if a confrontation was to be avoided. Dobrynin listened and said he would report their views to Moscow. (Kohler returns to Moscow later this week and hopes to see Gromyko next Tuesday.) 3 There also has been some discussion of requesting the President to intervene by sending a message to Kosygin. I have discouraged this, for the time being, on two counts: (1) the Department must once again, here and in posts abroad, make our position clear to the members of the Organization; (2) January 18, when the GA is scheduled to reconvene, is on the eve of the Inauguration and this is scarcely the time to involve the President personally in a confrontation with Russians. On the assumption that the Russians do not pay up by January 18, my prediction is that the Afro-Asians again will find a way to avoid a confrontation with the Russians. This they could do either by postponing the opening of the GA until later (March 1 already has been mentioned) or by continuing to do what business they can do on a “no objection” basis. Neither course embues the Organization with very much nobility, but short of adequate Soviet payment, this is probably what will happen. I also should add an encouraging note from the French Delegation (the Financial Counselor) who has said that the French intend to pay up. However, whether this intention is shared by De Gaulle remains a crucial unknown. Samuel E. Belk 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. 2 Circular telegram 1225, January 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4) 3 January 13; see Document 328 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 326. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 326. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 7, 1965. SUBJECT UN Miscellany Article 19: As you probably know from the press, the Committee of 12 (Afro-Asians) have called on the U.S. and the USSR to get together and solve the problem bilaterally. This is typical of this group who seem to become more and more uninformed on what is going on. U.S.-USSR bilaterals have been going on for the past ten months and are continuing still. When Stevenson met with the Secretary on Tuesday, 2 the latter was very bearish about pursuing the bilateral angle in New York until we get a response from Moscow either as a result of Dobrynin's dinner 3 or a meeting between Kohler and Gromyko. Both in New York and in a circular to all posts, we already are making a strong effort to knock down the Pazhwak Plan (the Afro-Asian formula for side-stepping Article 19). Another circular is being prepared instructing Ambassadors to make another démarche to foreign ministers emphasizing our determination to apply Article 19 if adequate payments have not been made. The Secretary apparently had a very easy time with the Foreign Relations Committee on this problem. 4 He told Stevenson that the Committee was quite satisfied as long as it was understood that those countries in arrears would either pay enough money or lose their vote. The Committee members apparently alluded on several occasions to the joint resolution on the matter. The Secretary seemed unworried about getting the necessary funds from the Congress for UN activities as long as we held firm on Article 19. There is no further word from the French. Stevenson: Those who know him well were worried about what they described as his “rather bad performance” in the Department. In a word, he does not want to face up to a confrontation. The short time I saw him he certainly did not look at all well. As you know, he saw the President for about forty-five minutes at the end of the day. 5 The short press statement from the Star (attached) 6 is the extent of my information on that meeting. Thank the Lord it didn't get any greater play than it did. Actually, his remarks to the press were very much in the same mood of his pitch in the Department. Stevenson is still determined to give a speech during the remaining part-about one week-of the general debate. The Department quite correctly is holding him off for now. This is a statement we will wish to examine closely if and when it is made. SEB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. 2 January 5; no record of the meeting was found. 3 See Document 325 . 4 For text of the briefing, see Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVII, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, 1965 . (Washington, GPO, 1990), pp. 1–34. According to The New York Times , January 7, Senator Fulbright, upon exiting the meeting, told reporters that Rusk had not been hopeful of resolving the Article 19 impasse. 5 January 5; Stevenson's notes of the meeting are in Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, vol. 8, pp. 667–668. 6 Not attached. Replying to reporters questions following his meeting with the President, Stevenson commented that he intended to stay on at the United Nations through the end of the current General Assembly session and had not discussed his future with Johnson. On the Article 19 issue, he commented: “I think it would be well to avoid a confrontation on this, win or lose,” adding that the U.S. position would win the support needed to prevail but its victory might not be as conclusive or unanimous as the United States would like. (Washington Star, January 6, 1965) 327. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 327. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, January 13, 1965, 8:35 p.m. 2647. Article 19—Conversation with SYG. Stevenson, Plimpton and Noyes called on SYG, Bunche was present. 1. SYG said Amb Bouattoura (Algeria), on Dec 30, had presented him with text of draft statement which he said had been unanimously agreed to by AA group, 2 and suggested that SYG, if such a statement could be agreed on, should make it to the Assembly on Jan 18. If there were no agreement on this statement, AA group would table a reso along same lines. SYG had received a different story from Amb Barrington (Burma) who told him AA group had not agreed that it would table any reso and that many delegations had indicated they needed instructions. In any case SYG had circulated this paper and was awaiting reactions. 2. SYG understood US did not agree to second para of statement and Russians did not like last para. There were 21 speakers remaining in general debate which should take up first week of resumed session. This would allow time for further discussions if necessary. SYG understood from Suslov (UN) there was no change in Soviet position, but was seeing Fedorenko in few minutes and would then find out. 3 3. SYG understood US position to be if Fedorenko would pledge privately to SYG the payment of sufficient amount to clear Art 19, and SYG would pass this privately to US, we might be able to get over present difficulties. Stevenson responded that it was not necessary for SYG to pass details of Soviet position to us but only to advise us that he personally was satisfied that amount was sufficient and there were no unacceptable conditions attached to the pledge. Stevenson said we could find way to resume voting as soon as USSR gave him private pledge in satisfactory amount and form. 4 4. SYG said his hunch was USSR would pledge less than $25.2 mil which was necessary. He didn't know how much less. Stevenson said if SYG was not satisfied, there would then be no bais for settlement, to which the SYG agreed. 5. Stevenson indicated our view that a simple appeal by the SYG would be a better procedure than a statement based on Algerian text. He thought SYG was probably right in estimating that USSR was not prepared to contribute enough to satisfy Art 19. SYG indicated there was also the problem of the French. In this connection he said they had instructions not to participate in any discussions or negotiations. If there were a system for whispering pledges, he felt it would have to apply to all the states subject to Art 19, since they would all have to be treated alike, to which Stevenson agreed. 6. Stevenson asked what we could do in present situation if there were no agreement. SYG replied that we would presumably have a showdown although there was talk of a postponement. Quaison-Sackey (GA Pres) was strongly opposed to postponement because it gave a picture of UN as a paralyzed, futile organization in the jaws of death. As a practical matter SYG thought there were many difficulties in working out a postponement until the next session on a no objection basis, and said there were ten important items which had to be dealt with, including assessments to the regular budget and UNEF, UN Institute, International School, ECOSOC elections, UNCTAD and UNWRA. SYG also pointed out a single state could destroy the whole plan by objecting to one or more of these actions being taken. 7. Stevenson said that postponement was not a wise course. We felt it would discredit the UN by indicating that it was unwilling to face the issue and to apply the Charter. It could also mean that we would have to get along without the Assembly in case of an emergency requiring UN peacekeeping activities. We had deferred confrontation since Dec 1 and now were in the same situation we were in then. We did not see any point to further delay. He understood full well that a confrontation was serious and might do damage to UN but we felt that postponement would also damage UN. Bunche interjected it seemed to be six of one and half dozen of another. 8. There was discussion of motives for USSR position. Stevenson indicated we thought their face could be saved by going along with any one of the proposed plans which had been put forward. Bunche expressed the view that issue was fundamental and was the same one that arose in the troika fight, i.e., whether the UN should be an action organization or not. Stevenson agreed and speculated that the USSR preferred to fight not on the question of future procedures where they were opposed by the majority, rather than on the question of Art 19 where they had some support from the AAs. Those AAs who supported the Pazhwak plan did not understand what was at stake. If Art 19 were not applied, all assessments would be put on a voluntary basis where everyone would pick and choose what he wished to support. Peacekeeping of UN would be seriously diminished, the organization would be discredited, and the implications were very serious. 9. Stevenson asked SYG his personal views as to what course should be followed. SYG said if arrangements could be made to dispose of the 10 essential items of business, he would personally prefer a postponement to a confrontation. He did not plan to press this position on others, however. There was a discussion whether a postponement to June 1 or to the fall would be preferable from this point of view. He agreed that the June 1 date would enable GA to proceed without a new budget, ECOSOC elections, UNWRA and perhaps other items. Stevenson said that while some might favor postponement to one of the other dates and it was arguable that smaller countries needed time to realize the full implications of the issue we faced, we felt it was better to go to a confrontation which we expected to win. 10. SYG indicated he preferred to talk to Fedorenko before recommending a course of action. He said the Russians had paid $3.5 mil more towards their 1964 regular budget assessments. It was agreed that this left about $21.7 mil which needed to be paid to satisfy Art 19. SYG said Turner (UN Controller) had asked him whether he would accept a pledge of payment over a two-year period if the amount was satisfactory. Stevenson said Soviet credit was good and if the payment was to be made in days or weeks this would be one thing if over a period of years, it would be more difficult. He thought it would be for SYG to decide. Plimpton pointed out that this would involve next year's assessment and that in interim before payment by SYG's books would show arrears beyond Art 19. It would take a GA decision to get any assessments off the books. 11. Stevenson said he was concerned that the USSR really wanted a showdown rather than that they were simply trying to save their face. He thought they hoped they might win on the issue and having won would produce a situation in which all assessments were voluntary and peacekeeping activities would have been eliminated except for those approved by the SC. They had been talking about voluntary contributions primarily to minimize AA reaction. SYG felt this was possible. Stevenson said if this was true state of affairs we faced a major crisis in which further documents and paper work would be useless. We had to face this crisis and we thought we could get a two-thirds vote. If we won we would have saved the structure of the organization. We could then be magnanimous about reaching a solution. If we lost the confrontation, the structure of the UN would be undermined. We had recognized in our proposal to the Russians that we needed new procedures for the future which did not involve enforcing peacekeeping assessments against major powers. We ought to be able to solve these problems if we could get over the immediate issue. He thought the AAs would also be willing to negotiate new arrangements for the future along the same lines. 12. Discussion returned to the Pazhwak plan. Plimpton indicated that we had been told that there was a firm understanding that contributions would be substantial. He had also been told by some members of the Comite of 12 it was part of their plan that private assurances would be given to the SYG as to the amounts and nature of the payments to be made by the states in arrears. SYG indicated he had never been informed of this fact. 13. Plimpton suggested that if no agreement could be reached on the Pazhwak plan, the SYG should make an appeal anyway on 18th. SYG said Fedorenko had earlier objected to his making an appeal unless it was in same terms as Pazhwak plan. Stevenson said he thought it would be difficult for USSR to disregard an honest plea from SYG. SYG did not commit himself but said he would get in touch after his discussion with Fedorenko. Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority. 2 The informal proposal was being circulated by the African-Asian group. 3 In a handwritten note on the telegram, Belk commented, “Still no report of this meeting. SB” 4 In an attached January 14 memorandum to Bundy, Belk commented: “The critical paragraph is number 3 where Stevenson badly erred. The Department (Sisco) quite rightly has told him that we cannot buy his position as stated for all the obvious reasons. The Department's position has been and continues to be that the amount contributed by each country must be made public.” 328. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 328. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, January 15, 1965, 9 p.m. 2052. In accordance instructions Deptel 1931 2 I raised Article 19 question with Gromyko in my meeting with him this afternoon, noting initially that Secretary somewhat discouraged at the lack of progress resolution impasse. Gromyko said he failed understand why Secretary should be disappointed since Sovs have accepted proposal of non-aligned nations which he felt was in line with Secretary's suggestion as to how problem might be solved made to Dobrynin before beginning GA. Sovs were prepared to make voluntary contribution but insisted that this should be purely voluntary and no one should tell the Sovs how much they should pay or purposes for which their contribution should be spent. Sovs felt strongly these matters their own business. Gromyko felt suggestions as to size of Sov contribution were both “unrealistic and ridiculous” and in any case represented wrong approach to problem. He felt US should recognize that the Soviet agreement non-aligned nations proposal represented major concession and hoped it could form basis for realistic solution of problem to permit us get on with discussion more important questions. I said we recognized that both we and Sovs have made moves to reconcile strongly held positions of principle and each should recognize these as concessions by other side. This problem is to agree on a compromise solution which would permit both sides maintain substance their positions—i.e. Sovs position would be met by voluntary payment agreement and our position to be met by assurance that payment was sufficiently large obviate Article 19 application. Briefly our position is that the Sovs are entitled to decide the form they prepared to pay and objectives for which contribution should be spent but such sum must be large enough to meet arrearages problem. Gromyko said obviously we in best position to know how our requirements can be met but equally the Sovs in best position to know how their requirements can be met. One thing is clear: “We know what we can do and what we can't do; we have made concession and we cannot go further.” He admitted that the latest version of non-aligned nations proposal was not completely satisfactory to Sovs. They objected particularly to clause calling for “substantial” payment and provision that contribution would result in solvency of organization. Amended to meet these points the proposal would be acceptable. Gromyko felt US should stop raising impossible demands, agree to the substance of proposal and help to remove problem from agenda in order to permit us tackle really important questions either under UN aegis or in other channels. He would note that while President and Secretary speak of need to improve relations situation in UN is becoming aggravated and this somewhat inconsistent with professed aims US leadership. I noted that the latest version non-aligned resolution was not totally acceptable to US, particularly clause providing for suspension of Article 19. To US basic problem is to discover solution which would not violate position of principle either side. UN was drowning man but no use throwing preserver only half way. Gromyko ended conversation by noting that it was Sovs who had life preserver and pointing out that he felt not much purpose carry on conversation since both sides could only repeat initial positions. Kohler 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USUN. 2 Dated January 2, it reported on the contents of a 25-page letter from Khrushchev to President Johnson, December 31, 1964, regarding the use of force in the settlement of disputes. The letter was delivered on the morning of January 2 by Dobrynin to Rusk. The telegram summarized Rusk's initial response. (Ibid., POL 32–1) No instructions were transmitted in this telegram. Subsequently, circular telegram 1255, January 14, transmitted the draft text of a Johnson response and circular telegram 1254, January 14, provided instructions for its presentation. (Both ibid.) 329. Memorandum of Conversation 329. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 18, 1965, 11 a.m. SUBJECT Article 19 PARTICIPANTS The Secretary The Undersecretary William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Ronald I. Spiers, EUR:RPM Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister of The Netherlands Ambassador Carl W.A. Schurmann, Dutch Ambassador to the U.S. Foreign Minister Luns alluded to a New York Times report of this morning that U Thant intended today to issue an appeal for funds, propose that normal procedures (including voting) be reinstituted and that the subject be considered further in the light of the amount of money received. 2 The Secretary said that we would be disappointed if this report were correct. Our position on this issue has not changed. Essentially we believe that the Soviets should come up with enough money by one means or another to avoid the voting problem. We do not see the outcome very clearly, and we do not know whether the Soviets, if they are outvoted, will stage a walkout. We do not believe, however, they would withdraw from UN membership. Luns said that since his last talk with the Secretary the Dutch position had hardened. The Netherlands would not pay one dollar under any voluntary contributions formula. This would only serve to bail the Soviets out. The Secretary noted that we and the Dutch had different assessments as to the outcome of a vote, and the Dutch and US delegations in New York were now comparing notes. He recalled that the US judgment was that the vote would be approximately 58–28–28. The Dutch estimate was less favorable. Luns asked what the US position would be if a 2/3 vote were not achieved. The Secretary said that a severe view is taken of this issue, and at minimum support for the UN would become “voluntary” for everybody, including us. The General Assembly might be confronted with an amendment to the Charter explicitly removing the obligation in Article 17 and making an appropriate change in Article 19 in the event this question is unfavorably resolved. Luns said that he had been giving this matter careful thought. He thought it would now be better for the UN to face a real test and that the Afro-Asians should feel the heat of this problem. This would be healthy for the organization in the long run. The Netherlands might elect, without reducing the amount it spends for technical assistance, to pay the same sums it now channels through the UN through other bodies. He asked what the US position would be if the Soviets, after winning a vote, paid their contribution voluntarily. The Secretary said the US would probably find some way to put proportionate amounts into a general fund, provided the Soviets “pay enough.” This might be accomplished in part by canceling some bills due. Luns said that the Netherlands would not follow this course. The Secretary said this was a very disagreeable problem. If the UN's financial base is changed from a mandatory to a voluntary one, the result is certain to be resentment and uncertainty. Mr. Ball noted that the UN would have to be sustained by a succession of charity drives. Luns noted that he disagreed with the point made by the Italian representative in the Western European group discussion in New York to the effect that a firm position could not be taken because of the French. The Secretary noted that the problem for France was only a matter of a million dollars, when possible refunds and reductions were considered. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on January 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is Part I of III. 2 The text of U Thant's statement in the UN General Assembly, January 18, is in Public Papers of the Secretaries General of the United Nations, U Thant, 1965–1967 , pp. 27–29. 330. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 330. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 18, 1965. SUBJECT Session with Ambassador Stevenson on Article 19, 3:00 p.m. January 19th We are in a difficult bind. If we press the confrontation and succeed in denying the vote to the Soviets, this would satisfy American public opinion. Moreover, perhaps this sort of a defeat of the Soviets might force them to make a contribution of a more substantial character than presently seems contemplated. The Moroccan Foreign Minister, for example, said to me yesterday that the Indonesian withdrawal 2 has placed the USSR in a much more vulnerable position regarding the UN in relationship to Communist China. He contends that there is now more pressure on the Soviets to accommodate itself to the UN and to stay within it rather than to find itself ostracized and thereby give added ammunition to the Chinese Communist vilification of the UN and possible future moves to set up some rival mechanism. On the other hand, the more likely situation is that once the Soviets have been denied the vote, the Assembly will be paralyzed by at least a walk-out, there will probably be appeals for the Soviets to return, there would probably not be any kind of a Soviet contribution, and the onus and the pressure will in considerable measure be on us. Of equal importance, Article 19 and the principle of collective financial responsibility will have been confirmed but without making progress on future arrangements to increase the role of the Security Council in peacekeeping and to set into train procedures designed not to deny the residual power of the Assembly but to promote the more responsible exercise of that power. If we press the confrontation and lose the vote, in the words of Senator Frank Church, we will have the worst of both worlds and there will be a sharp diminution of support in this country for the UN. More important, the Johnson Administration will have taken a licking on a fundamental foreign policy issue just a few days after the Inaugural. Our tentative voting estimate is 58 in favor of application of Article 19, 28 against, and 28 abstaining. USUN is making a final check of the accuracy of this estimate. This is too close and uncertain for us to be confident of winning the vote. Equally relevant is the question of whether we have the simple majority required to insist that a vote on the application of Article 19 be taken, even if we wanted confrontation now. USUN is not sure we have this simple majority, believing the pressure will be strong for postponement. In these circumstances, I believe we should: (a) Continue to maintain the posture in favor of applying Article 19; and (b) Be prepared to acquiesce in an unprejudicial postponement, preferably until June, if a majority desires. During the period of postponement we would then have to make a major effort in linking the past debts with future arrangements, even though prospects for an Agreement are admittedly very slim. If it is agreed that we should proceed along the above lines, we should give advance notice to key members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. Before arriving at the above judgment, we have explored the following other options singly or in combination and found them wanting one way or another. 1. Future Peacekeeping Operations by Voluntary Payments. Ambassador Thompson has suggested we might promote or sponsor a General Assembly consensus or resolution which would declare that any future peacekeeping operations to which the major powers have not given their assent or acquiescence would be financed by voluntary means. Such a proposal could be given quietly to the Secretary General for negotiation or announced by Ambassador Stevenson in a general debate speech. This would get the Assembly as well as the American people focusing on future arrangements and help to get us away from the present “no-pay no-vote” straight-jacket we are in. Such an Assembly decision has the obvious advantage that we would be in no danger in the future of being assessed for a UN Force in the South Africa, the Portuguese Territories, or Cuba if established by a 2/3rds GA vote contrary to our wishes. The difficulty is that this proposal is unlikely to work. It meets the Soviets only part way and therefore is not likely to result in a contribution to meet the Article 19 minimal limit. More important, it might well cause a crisis of confidence among our closest European and Latin American allies who, while not precluding such a proposal as the ultimate outcome of negotiations, would see this as a sharp reversal of our position in favor of Articles 19, 17 and collective financial responsibility and a move of weakness. Finally, it is unlikely that the Assembly would be willing to adopt this proposal, since a good many small countries would not distinguish between this proposal (which seeks to separate out the financial aspects) from the kind of proposals the Soviets have made intended to negate entirely the future power of the General Assembly in the peacekeeping field. 2. Amendments to the UN Charter. If the Assembly gives us the wrong answer on Article 19 we could submit an amendment to the Charter designed to formalize the result-ant reinterpretation of Articles 19 and 17. A discussion of the pros and cons of this proposal as well as the form such amendments might take are attached (Tab A). 3 In short, we feel that if the Assembly has failed to sustain Article 19, a preferable alternative would be for the United States to announce we would no longer consider Article 17 binding and that no Charter amendment would be necessary to make this position stick. It is doubtful whether such Charter amendments would in fact be approved by enough UN members to enter into force. Finally, the adoption of such Charter amendments would remove an element of flexibility for the future which it might not be in our interest to discard. 3. Provisional Voting. I have previously sent you a brief memorandum regarding this possibility (Tab B). While some awkward circumstances would result, it is technically feasible. Its weakness is that it would be a further retrogression from the position we have taken on Article 19 without any real prospect that this would in fact bring forward the required financial contribution from the USSR. 4. Substantial Soviet Payment Combined with Reduction in Soviet Arrears. In order to avoid Article 19, the amount of payment required from the USSR was $26.5 million—$17 million for peacekeeping expenses and $9.5 million on the regular budget. In the last two weeks, the USSR has paid $4.9 million on the regular budget, which leaves a required payment of $21.6 million in order to escape Article 19. The UN Comptroller has been examining the availability of ONUC and UNEF surpluses, made up of the excess of these assessments over the actual obligations incurred, with the thought that the surpluses might be applied in some form to all UN members. Our estimate is that this could reduce the overall Soviet arrearage by a minimum of $2.2 million. If the Soviets were willing to make a substantial payment of about $20 million (which is still below the minimal figure it now owes in order to escape Article 19) it could contend that its contribution was not related to the removal in principle of the application of Article 19. The $2.2 million reduction could them be applied subsequently and thereby eliminate the Article 19 problem without the Soviets having made the minimal payment directly. While I see no objection to having the Secretariat explore this proposal, provided it is clearly understood it is not a US suggestion, my judgment is that it is unlikely the Soviets would be willing to make such a substantial contribution and lend itself to this kind of a bookkeeping device. 1 Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 142, Frames 506–509. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco on January 18. 2 On January 2 President Sukarno announced in a speech that his nation was withdrawing from the United Nations. 3 None of the tabs is printed. 331. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 331. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 25, 1965. SUBJECT Developments at the UN A member of Stevenson's staff has telephoned to say that the SYG had met with Fedorenko and subsequently called Stevenson to report that the Soviet position was so vague and ambiguous that he (the SYG) had no idea how much or when the Russians would pay, even if voting were allowed before the payment was made. 2 (In other words, it sounds as though the GA would have no greater assurance from the Russians if the Pazhwak Plan were adopted than it has now.) The SYG felt that the GA was headed for a confrontation on Wednesday if not sooner. When the SYG questioned Fedorenko about a possible postponement, he said they would want to know more about it and that they would have to talk to the Afro-Asians about it. The Assembly did not meet this morning as a tribute to Churchill, 3 and this has set the agenda back. Because of this, Stevenson probably will speak tomorrow morning instead of this afternoon. The text of his speech is attached. 4 It is interesting that the Secretary re-wrote parts of the Stevenson-Sisco draft (see marked portions) in order to retain, as he put it, “a maximum of flexibility.” The real meat of the speech begins on page 12. Other than the fact that, it seems to me, it is a bit wordy, I have no trouble with it. If you do, please let me know. SEB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Memos, Vol. 1. No classification marking. 2 Reported in telegram 2876 from New York, January 25. (Ibid.) 3 Churchill died January 24. 4 Not found. 332. Memorandum by Ralph Bunche of the United Nations Secretariat 332. Memorandum by Ralph Bunche of the United Nations Secretariat 1 New York, February 2, 1965. This a purely personal statement. The viewpoints are my own. U Thant has not been consulted about it, nor is he aware of it. The same applies to Adlai Stevenson. The plight of the United Nations today is desperate; its future is gravely threatened. Never in its history has the Organization been in such dire trouble, the representatives of its Member States so frustrated or its effectiveness so diminished. This critical situation must be weighed against the indispensability of the United Nations if peace is to be saved and the world is to survive in civilized form. The salient facts of the deep United Nations crisis over the arrears in payments and Article 19 of the Charter are the following: 1) The General Assembly has been in session for two months but has been unable to take up any of the urgent work on its agenda. Consequently, the United Nations has already suffered a severe loss in both effectiveness and prestige throughout the world; and it could be reduced before long, if the present impasse continues, to a completely ineffectual body which would sooner or later wither away. 2) The conviction is growing, I believe rapidly, amongst the Members of the United Nations that there is very little basis for hope that an accommodation can be achieved on the issue of the arrears and the application of Article 19 through negotiations at the ambassadorial level here at the United Nations. This unavoidably leads to the conclusion that only the President of the United States and the leaders of the Soviet Union, acting either separately or in direct communication as in the case of the Cuban crisis, can resolve the difficulty and thereby save the United Nations. 3) Although the problem itself is important in terms of principle and morality, of Charter interpretation and application, it does not affect directly any vital security, political or economic interest of the United States as, for example, Cuba, nuclear testing or Panama would and did, or of France and the Soviet Union. 4) After prolonged negotiation, the specific issue on which the future of the United Nations now depends is the following: The Russians, although refusing to admit any legal obligation to pay the special assessments for the United Nations peace-keeping operation in the Congo and in Gaza-Sinai, have stated a willingness to make a substantial voluntary contribution of an unspecified amount which, however, would not be pledged or paid until the General Assembly actually resumes its “usual procedure” (meaning voting) and until assurance is given that the question of the applicability of Article 19 will not be raised during the current session of the General Assembly. But they flatly refuse to disclose to anyone beforehand the amount they intend to contribute. They say to do so would be submitting to unacceptable “pressure”. The United States, on its part, refuses to accept as good enough the Soviet promise of a contribution, even though publicly declared, since no indication is given of the amount to be contributed and no assurance is provided as to when anything will be paid. The United States insists that at least the Secretary-General and/or the President of the General Assembly must be informed of the amount which the Soviet Union intends to pay and must determine this to be satisfactory in the context of Article 19 before any voting can take place in the General Assembly without Article 19 being invoked. The United States, as Adlai has put it, doesn't take to the idea of buying a “pig in a poke.” Almost everyone at the United Nations, Delegates and Secretariat officials alike, has been seeking intensively to find a way out of this dilemma with, regretfully, no success. I have not the slightest doubt in my own mind about the soundness, legal and moral, of the United States position on Article 19. I have great doubts, however, that the United States position can attract enough votes in the General Assembly to sustain it conclusively. This is because it is almost certain that many member states will abstain on a show-down vote, even though they accept the United States interpretation of Article 19 and are sympathetic to the American position. They would be motivated, I believe, not by lack of courage or principle, but by a conviction that if France and the USSR and other financial delinquents should be actually deprived of their vote under Article 19, they would walk out of the Assembly if not the entire Organization, rather than pay up their delinquencies under what they would consider to be conditions of duress and humiliation. This would reduce the General Assembly, and possibly the whole Organization, to futility, since it would no longer be representative of the main groups of powers in the world. The membership of the United Nations, of course, is sharply divided over the proper interpretation of Article 19, with a significant number, including France and the Soviet Union, vigorously opposing the American interpretation of the Article. It is not, therefore, an open and shut case. The United States has made important concessions on the issue. It has gone along with two postponements of the Assembly. It did not force the issue at the outset of the Assembly's session and permitted it to get partially organized and under way through actions by consensus, acclamation and informal procedure. The United States does not demand actual Soviet payment in advance of the resumption of the formal voting, if a formal pledge of an adequate size is made. It is not insisting that the Soviet Union pay up to the very last cent of its arrears. The United States has also declared its wish to avoid a confrontation on this issue. The Soviet Union contends that it also has made important concessions, but can go no further. Soviet spokesmen assert that the original Soviet position, as stated emphatically to U Thant by Mr. Khrushchev himself last August, was that the Soviet Union would pay “not one kopek” to the United Nations for the “illegal” United Nations peace-keeping operations. Subsequently, the Soviet Union agreed to make a voluntary contribution for an amount which would not be disclosed until the Assembly resumed its normal procedure. Later still, the Soviet Representative indicated that this would be a substantial contribution; and then announced it publicly. A Soviet contribution of any amount in this context does, it would appear, compromise the original Soviet position. He also agreed to the postponements of the Assembly and he claims to wish to avoid a confrontation on the issue. There are not a few at the United Nations who reason that the present paralysis of the General Assembly suits quite well the inner policies of the Soviets in that they have always favored the Security Council with its veto over the Assembly, and therefore they could be only happy at seeing the United States at least sharing the blame for the Assembly's plight, if not taking the major part of it. Contrary to popular notion, no formidable sums of money are involved. The United Nations indebtedness to Governments and for replenishing the Working Capital Fund, other than the unamortized principal of the United Nations Bonds, amounts to 86.7 million. Of this amount, $6,642,000 is owed to the United States, principally for the Congo operation. A contribution of $21.7 million from the Soviet Union would meet the existing requirements of Article 19. This is not primarily a financial problem, therefore, although because of the impasse over this issue of Article 19 the United Nations is in most serious financial shape. It is tragic that the bright future of the United Nations should thus be darkened by an issue that derives from its past. The arrears relate primarily to the huge Congo operation, which is over, since the United Nations Force left the Congo at the end of last June. The Gaza-Sinai Force remains, but is not very costly. There is ample reason to believe that agreement between the United States and the USSR on future peace-keeping operations and their financing could be reached in time once the issue of the arrears on past operations would be settled. France, presumably, would then come along, albeit reluctantly. In the prevailing circumstances, there would seem, on this issue to be mainly the following courses of action open to the United States Government: a) To proceed to a direct confrontation on the issue in the Assembly, bearing in mind, however, that any clear-cut “show-down” on this issue is unlikely since it is certain to become enmeshed in an endless and acrimonious procedural wrangle, with confusion compounded by the injection into the debate of a multitude of inefficacious proposals for solution of which there is already a profusion. Moreover, the voting, when ultimately reached, would almost certainly be inconclusive in resolving the issue, which-ever way it went—and it might well go against the United States because of the necessity of mustering a two-thirds vote. b) To accept, although not initiate, another extended postponement which, however, may not hold much promise while holding the United Nations up to ridicule, unless the purpose would be to afford an opportunity for a direct appeal to the President of the United States and to the leaders of the Soviet Union to collaborate in finding a solution. c) To adopt a possible “summit” approach to the Soviet Union, with a view to a dialogue between the President and the Soviet leaders, as there was between Kennedy and Khrushchev in the Cuban crisis. d) To test the good faith of the Soviet Union on its promise of a substantial contribution by announcing a willingness, in the interest of preserving the United Nations and reviving the General Assembly, to accept the Soviet announcement of their intention at its face value and act accordingly. This would mean agreeing, before the Soviet contribution is actually made or formally pledged, not to invoke Article 19 for the rest of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly. There would, naturally, be those who would decry such a course as a “surrender” to the Soviet Union, particularly if the Soviet contribution should then turn out to be not substantial enough to be satisfactory in the context of Article 19. But there would be many others, including, I believe, the overwhelming majority of the Members of the Organization, who would consider this to be an act fully justified by its purpose of salvaging the international organization, and who would see it as a gesture of magnanimity and statesmanship worthy of the richest and most powerful country in the world. There can also be little doubt that the Soviet Union would be the target of severe disfavor from the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations should it not then live up to the expectations aroused by its promise to contribute. In taking such a step, the United States could, in fact, largely cover and safeguard its position on Article 19 by an explanatory statement which could include all necessary reservations and which could emphasize that from the beginning the sole purpose of the United States in raising the issue of Article 19 has been to protect the Charter and the strength of the Organization in its peace-keeping role, and that its present step is a continuation of this policy. At the worst, the United States would be holding up on Article 19 only until September, when the next session of the General Assembly convenes. The principle of collective financial responsibility should, naturally, be strongly reasserted. The supporters of the United States position would need to be consulted so as to avoid any feeling by them that they were being “let down”. Fully recognizing the risks in pursuing this latter course, I would nevertheless think it worthy of serious consideration. The United Nations unquestionably has been, and will be further, weakened because some of its members fail to meet their Charter obligations by refusing to pay some of the assessments due. But the very nature and existence of the United Nations is rooted in the fact that some states, members as well as non-members, cannot always be relied upon for good and honorable conduct. The “good guys” seem always to carry more than their share in any organization or institution, domestic and international alike. Moreover, it is only realism to face the fact that a United Nations, even with some delinquent members, particularly if these should be France and the Soviet Union, is still preferable by far to no United Nations at all, or to an ineffective one, as it would surely be without those two countries. The domestic political repercussions to the suggested course would probably be strong, at least for a while. For even in the United States today, magnanimity can be mistaken for weakness and statesmanship for lack of nerve. In this case, however, so much is at stake that risks of some kind are not only inescapable but justifiable. After all, twenty years of achievement and advance in international organization and order, as well as the future effectiveness of the United Nations, are in serious jeopardy over an issue which does not directly affect the vital interests of any of the countries mainly concerned. It would not avail very much to save the Charter and lose the Organization. Ralph J. Bunche 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. No classification marking. The memorandum was given to Bill Moyers of the White House staff who forwarded it to President Johnson on February 5. (Memorandum from Moyers to Johnson, February 5; ibid.) The President passed the memorandum to Bundy. In a March 2 memorandum to the President, Bundy commented, “I don't think there is anything for us to do on this one right now.” (Ibid.) 333. Memorandum From William Buffum of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) 333. Memorandum From William Buffum of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) 1 Washington, February 5, 1965. SUBJECT Background on the Financing of UN Operations We have recently made a new search of our early files to see if there is any additional light that can be thrown on the thinking with respect to the financing of UN operations in the peace and security field at the time the Charter was drafted. We have found nothing that would in any way tend to invalidate the Court's Advisory Opinion or acceptance of this opinion by the Assembly (with U.S. concurrence). Neither, however, have we found anything indicating that the “Founding Fathers” actually contemplated the financing of such operations through the budgetary powers of the Assembly. Rather, it appears, there was not any real consideration of this question. In connection with the Article 19 impasse and your interest in how we handle forthcoming Congressional consultations on the subject, the following analysis of early Charter developments relating to this question may be helpful. Strangely enough, at no time were the budgetary arrangements for the future organization a matter of serious controversy or lengthy consideration by the Department, by the U.S. Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, or in connection with ratification. Discussion in the Department prior to Dumbarton Oaks revolved almost entirely around whether the League precedent should be followed and all budgetary powers vested in the Assembly or whether these powers should be shared with the Council. This question was resolved by providing, in the U.S. Proposals at Dumbarton Oaks, for a system of weighted voting in the Assembly on budgetary matters. However, we did not press this proposal at Dumbarton Oaks, and the question of budgetary arrangements presented no problem there. Similarly there appears to have been practically no discussion at all of budgetary matters by the U.S. Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, despite the fact that two members of the House of Representatives (and two Senators) were on the Delegation. Nor did the question of the Assembly's budgetary power arise in the Big Five consultations during the Conference. In the Department's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in connection with ratification, the Assembly's powers under Article 17 are noted but not elaborated on and gave rise to no questions from the Committee members. Budgetary discussions at the San Francisco Conference itself centered around whether the method of apportionment should be specified in the Charter, whether the method of preparing and examining the budget should be specified in the Charter, and whether a penalty should be provided for members that failed to meet their financial obligations, (which the League Covenant had not done). Given the fact that any operation involving substantial numbers of troops is bound to be costly, this general lack of concern on the part of the U.S. and others with the financing of such operations can only be explained in terms of the difference between the powers of the Assembly and of the Security Council and in the context of Article 43. The only discussion of use by the Organization of armed force was in connection with preventive and enforcement measures undertaken by decision of the Security Council. While the Assembly was given residual powers of a recommendatory nature in the peace and security field, on which it was later possible to build the Uniting for Peace procedure, there is nothing in the early record to indicate that it was ever contemplated that the Assembly would undertake, on a recommendatory basis, actual military operations even of a peacekeeping character. Therefore, we can only conclude that the possibility was not foreseen that Assembly recommendations involving costly operations might be given a mandatory character so far as their financing involved the Assembly's power to assess. So long as the use of armed force was thought of solely in the context of Security Council action, where the veto applied, the United States and the other great powers had no reason to be concerned about the financial implications for them of such action. This safeguard was reinforced for the great powers and extended to other members by Article 43 of the Charter which made the actual provision of “armed forces, assistance, and facilities” to the Council contingent upon the subsequent conclusion of “a special agreement or agreements” between the Council and Members or groups of Members subject to ratification by the signatory states. The legislative history of this article seems to indicate that the question of the financing of any military operation by the Security Council was also deferred pending the conclusions of these agreements. The US Proposals at Dumbarton dealing with the provision of forces stated that the Council “should be empowered to call upon the member states for economic, financial, and commercial and other assistance necessary to support and to supplement international action involving the use of armed force”, and that member states should undertake to give such assistance, “the terms to be determined in consultation between the executive council and member states.” This provision is dropped in the Proposals as agreed to at Dumbarton Oaks but the paragraph dealing with the special agreement or agreements, which in the original US proposal referred only to “forces and facilities” now refers to “forces, facilities and assistance” as it does in Article 43 of the Charter. The original US proposals also stated that members should agree “to join in mutual efforts to afford relief and aid to states assuming undue burdens through participation in security measures involving the use of armed force instituted by the executive council.” This provision is broadened in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and in the Charter (Article 49) to declare the members should (shall in the Charter) “join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council”. Thus, while the principle of common responsibility for collective action was recognized, there appears to have been no effort made to spell out exactly how the burden of such action was to be shared. The only amendment offered at San Francisco was South Africa's unsuccessful proposal to put the burden on the aggressor state. An interpretative statement by a Canadian Delegate at San Francisco declares that in his opinion it was not possible to draft a text on the payment of the costs of enforcement action that could lay down definite rules for application in all types of cases that might arise. He thought Article 49 quoted above and Article 50 (providing for recourse to the Council in the event of “special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures”) “taken together would permit arrangements to be made for sharing the costs of enforcement action among the members if this proved desirable. Otherwise an inequitable financial burden might be placed on certain members who were acting on behalf of the Organization.” In reading this statement it must be borne in mind that when the Charter was drafted it was thought that the principal burden of any enforcement action would fall on the five permanent members of the Security Council. Moreover, under the Charter, decisions of the Security Council are to be carried out by all members or only some members as the Council may decide and carried out by the members “directly.” The contemplated Article 43 agreements have never been concluded but the UN action in Korea, of all UN actions to date, seems most closely to approach the type of enforcement action contemplated in the drafting of the Charter. Here the United States controlled the action and paid the lion's share of the costs. The idea of trying to assess the UN membership generally for the costs of the Korean operation was never contemplated, since members participating in the action were doing so on the basis of a recommendation of the Security Council, not a decision (in the absence of Article 43 agreements). Had the Assembly's budgetary powers been generally recognized as clearly extending to the costs of the Korea action, it seems unlikely that the US would have willingly assumed such a large share of the costs or that John Foster Dulles, who played an active role at San Francisco, in answering criticism of the Korea action in the Foreign Relations Committee, would have said: “ … If, for instance, the expense of that could be spread over the United Nations in the same way that the budget is met, or something of that sort, some formula might be found so that if an emergency came, nations could act knowing that that would not necessarily involve them in an expense which they could not foresee, or perhaps could not bear if they did foresee it.” From the above it seems clear (1) that, as originally contemplated, preventive or enforcement action under a Security Council decision was not to be financed through the Assembly's power of assessment, and (2) that preventive (peacekeeping) or enforcement action under an Assembly recommendation was not contemplated at all and that therefore no thought was given to the financing of such action. On this basis, it might be argued that although the Assembly does have the power to assess under Article 17, to consider this power mandatory in the case of the costs of operations undertaken on the basis of an Assembly recommendation is within the letter but goes beyond the original intent of the Charter. This would apply in the economic and social as well as the peace and security fields. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. Drafted by Virginia Hartley (IO/UNP) on February 5. Handwritten annotations on the memorandum read: “Very interesting JJ [Sisco]” and “Might be useful to have this document translated into form usable for educating Hill and public. But it raises question—'How and when did we get into our extreme position?'” 334. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) 334. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) 1 February 6, 1965. LBJ: Yeah. AES: Hello? LBJ: Yeah, yeah. AES: —and we're not going to have to ask you whether-to take any political heat because there isn't any… LBJ: I got a very distressing memo from Bunche. 2 I wish you'd talk to him. Tell him that you have thoroughly gone over this with me and that I shared your view that we ought to go just as far as we could with any self-respect to find an area of agreement, and you had done that. And you'd touch base with Fulbright ahead of time and … AES: Well, the trouble with that is … LBJ: …tell him I'm just as distressed as he is. AES: I would have gone further, as you know, as I told you yesterday 3 that the State Department was ready to go and anxious to do that, uh, what, just ten days ago and I talked to Mac Bundy about it. You were ill at the time. And he didn't take it up with you. I would have gone further and accepted the $15(?) million payment and made a big play to the General Assembly that while we were, ah, while we were, ah, conceding[?] 4 this point, for the present[?], at least until next September, we were doing so in order to preserve the organization without prejudice to our position, but I could never get any support for that at the State Department, and I also rather have the feeling that they wanted me to take the preliminary measures, the preliminary proposals first. Having made them, I don't think now I can well go back and capitulate further. LBJ: Well, you know the situation there better than I do. Let me transfer you and you dictate this memo. I've got a group here … AES: I will, I will, Mr. President. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ambassador Stevenson, Tape 65.06, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. The President was in Washington; Stevenson was in New York City. There is no indication of the time of the conversation. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 Document 332 . 3 No record of a February 5 telephone call or meeting was found. However, according to the President's Daily Diary, Stevenson and Johnson met on February 4 at the White House between 12:19 and 12:24 p.m. “The President and Mrs. Johnson presented him a small cake, decorated with one candle, reading, 'Happy Birthday Adlai.'” (Johnson Library) No further record of this meeting was found. 4 All brackets in the source text. 335. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 335. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, February 6, 1965, 7 p.m. 2270. Embtel 2270. 2 On further reflection and after rereading entire file recent messages on Article 19 exercise, I have come to conclusion that perhaps we should make final high-level approach to Sovs before showdown in GA, not in Moscow but in Washington. I continue to believe, as indicated reftel, that postponement is not in our interest and obviously in putting suggestion outlined below I assume we are both willing and able block any GA ground swell in favor of postponement. As Amb Stevenson points out in USUN 3107, 3 Fedorenko's unyielding posture would seem rule out any change in Sov position. Same was certainly my conclusion after my last discussion of subject with Gromyko Jan 15. However, seems possible Soviets may still not be persuaded we prepared to face showdown or that we could bring UNGA around to this if we wished. In this light, recent lower-level approaches (reminiscent of Soviet behavior at time Cuban crisis) and hints by Sov spokesmen from time to time that we should bypass Fedorenko may have been feelers, indicative what Soviets might be prepared to do if question really came to crunch. I suggest, therefore, that Secretary may wish to summon Dobrynin in final effort break log-jam. At such meeting, I would think it essential that Dobrynin be told unequivocally that Sovs have choice between fair settlement (on terms put by Stevenson) or showdown with inevitable implications for our bilateral relations and that they must make up minds without delay. Posing problem in this way could not be read by Sovs as weakness and while approach may net us nothing it may conceivably smoke out ultimate Sov position. Kohler 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10–4. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to New York and passed to the White House. 2 Dated February 6, it read: “I agree with Ambassador Stevenson conclusion no point pursuing UN finance question further with Gromyko here. Personally feel forward prospects for agreed solution negative and showdown in UNGA better now than after adjournment present session without settlement this question.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2) 3 Dated February 5; it reported on Stevenson's discussions with Fedorenko regarding a compromise on the Article 19 issue. (Ibid.) 336. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 336. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 8, 1965. SUBJECT Article 19 The following reports on Article 19 events over the past few days and indicates where we now seem to be heading: 1. On Wednesday , 2 there was a bit of a flurry in the U.S. Government when the Russians in New York seemed interested in finding solution to the Article 19 controversy. Tab 1 3 reflects the apparent Russian interest. 4 (Stevenson saw the President alone at noon on Thursday and, reportedly, the Article 19 situation was reviewed.) 5 2. With a break in the dispute seemingly a possibility, on Thursday evening, the Department instructed USUN to approach the Russians 6 (to be followed by an approach in Moscow) to see whether, in fact, the Soviets were seriously interested in any of three possible solutions. The Department's instruction are attached at Tab 2. 3. On Friday, Stevenson talked to Fedorenko and proposed the three possible solutions. The upshot of the talks was a cold shower for our side; Fedorenko knocked down immediately and forcefully all three solutions and ruled out a possible change in the Soviet position. In its report of the Stevenson/Fedorenko conversation (at Tab 3), 7 USUN went on to recommend that Ambassador Kohler not take this matter up with Gromyko since such a step would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. 4. On Saturday , Ambassador Kohler reported (Tab 4) 8 his agreement with the USUN view that he should not take the matter up with Gromyko. On the same day, Kohler had second thoughts (Tab 5) 9 and suggested that Rusk talk to Dobrynin in Washington. (As of this writing, State was still considering this possibility.) 5. As of noon on Saturday (before the second cable from Kohler), State's rough guess for the future scenario was as follows: (a) On Monday (February 8), the Assembly will convene at 3:00 P.M. The Secretary General will recommend that the General Assembly take action, by the “no objection” procedure, on 4 or 5 items (e.g., elections to fill 6 vacancies in ECOSOC; appeals for payments towards the 1965 budget). (b) The Assembly will then probably recess for a few days. During this period 2 items will be thrashed out: First, the General Assembly will have to decide on how long the adjournment should be. If there must be an adjournment, we, the Latinos, and West Europeans are generally in favor of a short adjournment with a specific end in sight (May 1); we want to keep pressure on the Russians. U Thant seems to prefer to not set a date. The Africans, who once seemed to want a short adjournment, now seem to be favoring a longer adjournment; they feel that it will cost too much money to meet in May, go home, and then come back again for the fall session. The Russians probably don't care as between May or September; their primary concern (as is ours) is to not get tagged with the blame for causing the adjournment. Second, the group will have to decide on the type of forum to be used to carry on the talks about Article 19. The Western group prefers that the Committee of 21 take on the Article 19 problem—because the membership could simply not be better from our point of view. For roughly the same reasons, the Soviets prefer to have Article 19 discussions held in a smaller group. The General Assembly will probably meet on Friday and decide to adjourn until May or September. 10 GC 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret. Bundy wrote “Good work” at the top of the memorandum. 2 February 3. 3 None of the tabs was found attached. 4 Reported in telegram 3059 from New York, February 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2) 5 See footnote 3, Document 334 . 6 Telegram 1945 to New York, February 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2) 7 See footnote 3, Document 335 . 8 See footnote 2, Document 335 . 9 Document 335 . 10 The General Assembly adjourned its work on February 18 and set September 1 for renewal of its discussions. No agreement had been reached on the Article 19 dispute. 337. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 337. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 12, 1965. SUBJECT Article 19, Harlan Cleveland, and Meeting with President Early this week I went over to State to meet Harlan Cleveland. We talked at some length about Article 19. I think the following represents the bare-bones of his present thinking on the subject, which, in general, still seems to be quite fluid. 1. If there were a confrontation at the UN, we could get our 2/3 majority and win it. It is, of course, debatable whether we “win” if we take away the Soviet Union's vote. 2. The important point, however, is that a confrontation will never take place. The GA will simply not give us the majority of votes we need to get to the point of having one. (Dick Gardner, to whom I spoke later in the week, disagrees. He feels that, by September, the Afro-Asians will see that the GA is being hamstrung indefinitely, and will probably be willing to face a confrontation.) 3. Interminable postponements suit the Russians just fine. In effect, it makes the General Assembly a “no power” unit and leaves all the power with the Security Council; this, of course, is what the Russians have wanted all along. On the other hand, interminable postponements don't suit us—we want the GA to have a peace-keeping function. 4. How do we get out of our dilemma? One possibility—we let the present impasse continue for a while and then make a unilateral statement to the effect that if the GA is not willing to enforce compulsory contributions from its reluctant members, then we, too, will have to work on a voluntary contribution basis. While we would say this in sadness, in fact, this voluntary system, once achieved, has a distinct silver lining. First, a voluntary system will make it easier for international development and international peace-keeping operations to be undertaken; put another way, getting everybody to participate in UN operations is possible only at the costs of drastically limiting the size and scope of UN operations and of limiting such operations to those which the Soviets are prepared to back. Second, a voluntary system will allow us to avoid paying for a UN operation to which we fundamentally object. 5. If we decide to go ahead on this tack, we are faced with some tactical problems. For example: (a) Won't the Hill say that we've caved to the Russians? Probably—but there would be several mitigating factors. First, there is a strong feeling on the Hill that no one wants to see the UN bust up for “a lousy $20 million bucks.” Second, a system of voluntary contributions will be very appealing to some. Senator Lauche, for instance, is always throwing up the bugaboo that the UN, some fine day, is going to force us into some peace-keeping venture to which we fundamentally object. These built-in mitigating factors plus a series of strong consultations with appropriate Congressmen to argue the logic of points 1–4 above could make the Hill problem a tolerable one. (b) What about the American public? We would probably have to begin quietly playing a somewhat different tune than we have been playing (no more—“put the Russians' feet to the fire”). It is pertinent to note that the same built-in factors which will tend to mitigate Congressional reaction against a caving on Article 19 and a system of voluntary contributions will also mitigate the public's reaction to it. 6. In closing, Harlan indicated that a meeting with the President on this subject and on other basic UN subjects might be useful. For one thing, it might be good to expose the President to some of the above-type argumentation; this has not yet been done. For another thing, with his long parliamentary experience, the President might have a real contribution to make on this problem, which involves a parliament in New York and a parliament on the Hill. 7. My view —From a couple talks that I have had in IO, I get the sense that the people there feel that the UN is at an important crossroads (e.g. power of the GA vis-à-vis the SC; the balance of power in the UN between little and big nations); that the President is not entirely up on these issues; and that, in general, he is not being exposed enough to non-Adlai-type UN thinking. While I have no real way of knowing the state of the President's UN education, I am persuaded that there are in the air some important basic UN issues and that it might be well for the President to put aside an hour, sometime during the next couple weeks, to hear about these issues and the possible U.S. options for dealing with them. If you agree, I think the first step is to get informally from State a clear idea of exactly what the substance of such a meeting with the President would be. We can then decide whether or not we want to go through with it. GC Talk to Cleveland informally about exact nature of possible meeting with President but, at this point, making no firm commitment on such a meeting. 2 Let's leave it alone for now. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential; Eyes Only. Pages 2 and 3 of the memorandum are dated February 13. 2 Bundy checked this option. 338. Editorial Note 338. Editorial Note Ambassador Stevenson and Secretary General U Thant discussed the possibility of a Security Council meeting on the Vietnam issue on February 16. The U.S. Permanent Representative sought to discourage the idea of a public discussion at that point. In a February 17 memorandum to the President, Stevenson outlined his talks with U Thant and suggested alternative means to utilize the United Nations to advance the search for a peaceful resolution of the Vietnam crisis. The Stevenson-U Thant memorandum of conversation and the Stevenson memorandum to the President are printed in the Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson , vol. 8, pages 700–704. Additional documentation relating to the Secretary General's role in the Vietnam crisis is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume I, Document 427 , and ibid., volume II, Documents 161 and 164 . 339. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 339. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 25, 1965. SUBJECT U.S. Pledge to the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund Recommendation: With the recent recess of the General Assembly until September, I recommend that we proceed to make our pledge for calendar year 1965 to two related UN development programs—the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. 2 Background: While most other countries previously contributing to these programs have announced their pledges for 1965, the U.S. deferred making its pledge, pending developments with respect to the resolution of the UN constitutional and financial crisis. Now that the General Assembly has recessed without prejudice to the application of Article 19, I believe that we should go ahead with our pledge of up to $60 million. These funds are available within the FY 1965 appropriation in the A.I.D. program for voluntary contributions to international organizations. Any further delay in the pledge is likely to produce a considerable amount of disorder in the implementation of technical assistance projects already underway. It will likewise inhibit the program planning process of the Special Fund. I believe that the point has been made that the United States should not be taken for granted. I feel that any further delay will only complicate our position rather than helping it. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. No classification marking. 2 President Johnson checked the approve option. 340. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant (Moyers) 340. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant (Moyers) 1 Washington, March 1, 1965. SUBJECT U.S. Pledge to the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund 1. As per our phone conversation on Saturday, 2 here is the memo from Dean Rusk to the President, 3 which came to us on Friday and which recommends that we proceed to make our pledge ($60 million) for calendar year 1965 to two UN development programs. The pledge, which normally would have been made in November 1964, was held up to provide us with leverage in the Article 19 negotiations. 2. With the General Assembly adjourned and with the Article 19 discussions deferred, I agree that we probably have to go ahead with the pledge. At the same time it might be worthwhile to emphasize to State that they should be careful to explain this one publicly in such a way as to minimize the possibility of a charge that our pledge means that we have given up on Article 19. Accordingly, unless you have any objections, I will pass this word to State if and when you get the President's approval on the Rusk memorandum. Bromley Smith 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. No classification marking. 2 February 27. 3 Document 339 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 341. Intelligence Information Cable 341. Intelligence Information Cable 1 New York, March 3, 1965. TDCS DB–315/00729–65 COUNTRY United Nations DATE OF INFO. Late February 1965 SUBJECT 1. Activities Affecting the United Nations 2. Views of the United Nations Secretary General and Assembly President on Chances for a Successful Negotiation of UN Financial Problem PLACE & DATE ACQ. 1 March 1965 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] SOURCE AND APPRAISAL [8 lines of source text not declassified] 1. United Nations General Assembly President Alex Quaison-Sackey and Secretary General U Thant are currently wondering if the newly-formed United Nations Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations (Committee of 33) will be able to operate effectively in the atmosphere created by the Vietnam crisis. United States military operations in Vietnam seem to be bringing about a hardening of the Soviet attitude toward the United States. The situation appears to be getting worse despite the fact that the United States made a major concession to the Soviets by agreeing to exclude Nationalist China from participation on the Committee. 2. U Thant and Quaison-Sackey originally planned to contact personally the French, Soviet, British and United States permanent missions to the United Nations in order to lay a solid groundwork for the Committee of 33 prior to the Committee's meetings. However, U Thant and Quaison-Sackey now feel that in view of the Vietnam crisis, it is pointless to approach the Soviet Union because the Soviets will probably not be very cooperative. Under these circumstances, Quaison-Sackey and U Thant feel that the Committee of 33 will not accomplish anything. ( [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Comment: According to the intermediate source, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] heard that an unknown country has already advised U Thant and Quaison-Sackey that the Soviets will not be receptive to any approaches on peace-keeping matters at this time.) 3. Field Dissem: Sent USUN. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 342. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 342. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, March 8, 1965. SUBJECT UN-Miscellaneous 1. Article 19 —Preliminary thinking seems to be that the best way to get out of the present financial crisis is to set up a voluntary fund to collect about $105 million (i.e., the UN owes member governments about $45 million; about $40 million is owed to the Working Capital fund; the cost of UNEF this year will be about $20 million). While this fund will not be ostensibly related to the Article 19 problem, the Article 19 problem will be avoided if the Russians come through with at least $20 million. The chances are about 50–50 that the Russians will come through. In any event, the establishment of such a voluntary fund is probably the best way to build up pressure on the Soviets. The best guess as to the scenario over the next couple months is as follows: First , the Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly would meet individually and informally with members of the Big Four and with other key parties. These key parties would agree to the establishment of a voluntary fund; even the Russians would have a hard time refusing. Second , the Secretary General and the President of the Assembly would then propose to the Working Group (the 33-member monstrosity set up to deal with Article 19) that a fund be established. Third , the Working Group, by mid-April, would have studied the proposal and reported back favorably on it. Fourth , the Secretary General and the President of the Assembly would then make a pitch to members for voluntary contributions. The fund concept might have implications for future peacekeeping operations. For the future, however, we might conceivably want to depart from the voluntary concept and go for a different format in building up the fund—e.g., a combination of voluntary contributions and assessments. 2. Chairmanship of UN Day and Presidential Proclamation —State will be sending over to the White House, at the end of the week, a Presidential proclamation regarding UN Day (in October) and an announcement regarding the appointment of Robert Benjamin as Chairman of UN Day (already approved; Benjamin notified). 3. Charter Amendments —State is still working on a Presidential Message regarding charter amendments. I expect to get a copy of the draft message Tuesday. The problem—When to send the Message to the Hill? 4. Labouisse and UNICEF —Labouisse will resign as Ambassador to Greece and be chosen as the Director General of UNICEF. 2 I am told that Bill Crockett is already in touch with the White House on the matter of the announcement. The announcement will probably be made this afternoon on the grounds that it will leak by then if it is not announced. 5. ICY 3 -President/Robert Benjamin Meeting—From all reports, the President-Benjamin meeting last week went off splendidly. Both Benjamin and Harlan Cleveland were walking on air after the meeting. Through Busby I learned that the President was also pleased with the meeting. GC 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential. 2 Labouisse left Greece on May 8. 3 The International Cooperation Year, designated as 1965 by the General Assembly on November 21, 1963. For text of G.A. Res. 1907 (XVIII), see Yearbook of the United Nations , 1963, pp. 117–118. 343. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 343. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 11, 1965. SUBJECT UN Problems On Friday afternoon, 2 you will be meeting with Rusk, Stevenson, and Cleveland to discuss some basic UN problems. Pending receipt of what is likely to be substantial State documentation, 3 you might want to scan the following brief preview. 1. State will recommend that you transmit to the Senate, for ratification, the first amendments to the UN Charter since 1945. The amendments, primarily of benefit to the Afro/Asians, would enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 Members and ECOSOC from 18 to 27 Members. In support of the substantive case, State will probably cite such factors as the following: First, the UN has grown from 51 to 114 Members in the past 20 years and the new Members demand more adequate representation. Second, the U.S. has consistently supported enlargement since the matter was first raised in 1956. Third, if there is no enlargement, the Afro/Asians will increasingly “raid” W. European and Latin American seats in the two organizations. Fourth, the new voting alignment in the Security Council will not differ materially from the present line-up and is probably the best we can get. As for ECOSOC, while the alignment could be better, we are not really worried, especially in view of the fact that all ECOSOC can do is make recommendations. 2. State, in discussing the tactical side of this issue, will recommend that you send the amendments to the Senate in early spring. First , the General Assembly, which adopted the amendments in December, 1963, has set a target of September 1, 1965, for ratification by Members. Second , ratification by other countries is proceeding apace. 60 of the necessary 76 have already ratified; of the Permanent Members of the Security Council (all of whom must ratify), the Russians have reversed their previous position, primarily because of Afro/Asian pressure, and have ratified; the British are willing but, out of courtesy, are presently waiting for us; the Chinese and French, in the end, will also probably ratify. Third , if we fail to submit the amendments to the Senate this spring, we are likely to bear exclusive blame for delaying the coming into force of the amendments and for the Afro/Asian “raids” which are likely to ensue. Fourth , there is bound to be a debate on the Hill this year about the UN; the Charter amendments in the Senate provide a better framework for this debate than, say appropriations in the House. Fifth , recent consultations indicate that the Senate will probably ratify the amendments. 3. State will probably also want to brief you on the Article 19 situation. Present thinking seems to be that the best way out of the present financial crisis is to set up a voluntary fund to collect about $100 million. While this fund will not ostensibly be related to the Article 19 problem, the Article 19 problem will be avoided if the Russians come through with a sufficiently substantial contribution. Some say the chances are about 50–50 that the Russians will come through. In any event, the establishment of such a fund is probably the best way to build up pressure on the Soviets between now and the reconvening of the 19th General Assembly on September 1. If the Soviets do not pay enough, we must then face the issue of whether or not to try and apply Article 19 when the Assembly convenes in September. Since experience in the last session showed that practically no one wants a confrontation, our wisest course in September might be simply to indicate (a) that this is a decision for the Assembly to make, (b) that we hope the Assembly will uphold its mandatory financial authority and impartially apply Article 19, and (c) that, if the sense of the Assembly is otherwise, we will draw the consequences for our own future contributions. In short, we would not invoke Article 19 and assume no one else would do so. McG.B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential. 2 March 12. 3 Not further identified. 344. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions 344. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions 1 Washington, March 12, 1965, 8:19 p.m. 1682 1. Dept. has under consideration proposal for establishment new UN post of High Commissioner for Human Rights (HC). It envisaged that HC would be in position remedy current imbalance in UN consideration human rights issues. Presently most of almost all focus is on racial discrimination. Little attention given progress we have made or to human rights violations other fields, such as Soviet treatment Jews. Moreover HC might be able to highlight violations in closed societies which by their very nature do not get same attention as human rights problems free world. Character incumbent any such post obviously crucial to above purposes. Plan calls for him be nominated by SYG and confirmed by GA for term of possibly 5 years. It also proposed that SYG choose network of 10–20 experts in all parts world who would report to and assist HC as appropriate. 2. Functions of HC would be three fold. Firstly prepare annual report to Human Rights Commission (and thence to ECOSOC and GA) on situation on human rights in states members of UN system. Report would be based on variety of sources, governmental, reports from UN specialized agencies, info from UN Secretariat, contributions from correspondents, communications from non-governmental organizations, writings of recognized scholars and experts and other public sources. In order safeguard member states it planned that prior publication HC's report governments would have reasonable time comment on reference to their countries. Also report would follow outline articles in Universal Declaration Human Rights in order avoid undue concentration any one country. Moreover HC would not make on-spot-investigations (unless invited by State concerned) nor would he hold hearings or initiate queries to governments. Secondly it is planned that HC would assist SYG in “critical situations” and give advice both on “human rights aspects of peacekeeping” and on economic and social development programs. Finally he would be available at SYG's direction, to provide his good offices on request from member states. 3. As presently conceived plan does not cover situation in unrecognized Communist regimes. On other hand such coverage, while bringing within HC's purview some of worst offenders human rights, would raise problems for ChiRep and other representation issues since extension HC's scope might involve communications between UN and regimes and efforts have regimes participate in any discussions relating their areas. Precedent thus created for other bodies. 4. It of course not at all certain that proposal would eventually emerge in above form or with presently sought safeguards. It also possible Soviets and/or militant neutralists might seek mold this idea or use it to detriment free world in order deflect attention from situation in their own countries. At same time it probable that if US does not take such initiative, others will; specifically at forthcoming meeting UN Commission on Human Rights opening March 22. If plan approved by Commission, it would then have be considered in ECOSOC and by GA before being put into effect. 5. In view uncertainties as to how this proposal will actually evolve and in view politically sensitive minority problems in many FE countries, request your views ASAP as to potential effects of this idea in your country, without reference to host government at this stage. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, International Year of Human Rights. Confidential. Drafted by Louise McNutt of IO on March 10; cleared in IO, EA, SEA, FE, SPA, ACA, AF, and EUR; and approved by Marshall Green (FE). Sent to Bangkok, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Saigon, Seoul, Taipei, Vientiane, and repeated to Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, and USUN. 2 In telegram 2261 to USUN, March 20, the Department of State authorized the Mission to the United Nations to support the proposal for a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. (Ibid.) 345. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 345. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, March 19, 1965, 4:20 p.m. 2224. We have reviewed material pouched by Bender 2 to Sisco, March 17. 3 We have specific language changes which are contained septel./3/ Following are overall considerations which Dept wishes US representative to be guided by in current drafting sessions. Developments which bring drafting work outside following framework should be reported promptly to Dept for further consideration. We are deeply concerned that nothing come out of Committee of 14's work that will permit political conclusions to be drawn: (a) that juggling-of-figures exercise has in effect put Committee on record as writing-off past arrearages of Soviets, French, and others; and (b) that figure arrived at as contributions still required to restore solvency (in range of about $50 million in majority view) not be used to pressure US to match any voluntary contributions by Soviets and French on more or less comparable basis. In other words if political effect of Committee 14 report were to lead to notion that all that is needed to bring UN to solvency is about $50 million and that a $5 or $10 million contribution by Soviets and French respectively requires that US do similarly, it would turn pressure on us in a context where the Committee and subsequently Assembly will in effect have forgotten that cause of deficit and those really responsible for restoring solvency are countries which have not paid their duly levied assessments. FYI. As USUN recognizes we have always assumed that if we get to point where it proves desirable for a US voluntary contribution to be made we would in first instance consider waiving credits due US from surplus accounts and/or possibility of waiving reimbursement from UN for approximately $5 million owed us on peacekeeping accounts. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Sisco. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 10. 2 Albert Bender of USUN. 3 Not found. 346. Memorandum of Conversation 346. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 22, 1965, 10 a.m. SUBJECT UN Peacekeeping PARTICIPANTS UK Side Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office Michael Stewart, Chargé d'Affaires a.i., British Embassy R.S. Crawford, Assistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office Michael Hadow, Counselor, Foreign Office J.N. Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary John Harris, Special Assistant to the Foreign Secretary US Side The Secretary Ambassador Bruce William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary, IO Richard I. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary, P J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA Foreign Secretary Stewart gave his impressions of the current Soviet position on UN peacekeeping and Article 19 in the light of his conversations in London last week with Gromyko. Mr. Stewart said that Gromyko had made it quite clear that the Soviet Union is not disposed to take advice from anyone on the size of its voluntary contribution and is adamant in its insistence that there can be no peacekeeping operation against the will of a permanent member of the Security Council. The Secretary commented that what the Soviet Union is attempting to do is to amend the Charter by interpreting the “primary” responsibility of the Security Council in peacekeeping to mean “exclusive” responsibility. He reiterated our view that the General Assembly should retain its residual peacekeeping powers. Mr. Cleveland said that there is a danger that the General Assembly may be prepared to downgrade its authority in return for a Soviet payment. The Secretary called attention to the problem which would be created if the Soviets were to make a substantial contribution but a contribution insufficient to satisfy the Article 19 requirement. The Secretary emphasized the importance in any discussions of peacekeeping arrangements under Article 43 of the Charter of keeping within the existing UN framework. Otherwise the discussions could be used by the Russians to strengthen their contention regarding exclusive Security Council responsibility for peacekeeping activities. Mr. Stewart repeated his view that the Soviet Union will stick to its position on the question of exclusive jurisdiction. Mr. Cleveland commented that in his opinion it is not in our interest nor in the interest of the Soviet Union to negotiate a peacekeeping compromise based on Article 43. The Uniting for Peace resolution still permits a majority of the General Assembly in a given situation to recommend peacekeeping action when the Security Council fails to do so. Mandatory assessments for peacekeeping, however, probably would not be practicable for the immediate future. In discussing whether there should be two separate peacekeeping funds to take care of the existing situation, the Secretary and Mr. Stewart agreed that it might be helpful to the Secretary General to confuse the situation by having one rather than two funds. Mr. Stewart recalled that Gromyko had implied the Soviet Union in making its voluntary contribution would prescribe the purpose for which it was to be used. At the same time Gromyko had made a vague reference to the ability of the Secretary General to make exchanges between his right and his left pockets. It was agreed at the suggestion of the Secretary that Mr. Cleveland would talk with the British about the best means of handling the fund question. The Secretary recommended a pragmatic Anglo-American approach to the problem. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2482. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in S on March 31. The memorandum is Part 1 of 5. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room. 347. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 347. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, April 20, 1965. SUBJECT Proposal for a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights On March 20 the Secretary authorized the U.S. Representative to the Commission on Human Rights to support, if there was a broad consensus in the Commission, a Costa Rican proposal to create an office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2 Our delegation was instructed to refrain from taking any initiative in introducing or pressing the proposal, and to try to assure that any resolution adopted would be compatible with United States interests. The Commission on Human Rights ended its 1965 session without taking any action on the proposal. However, there is a possibility that the proposal will be considered again later in the year, either at the summer session of the Economic and Social Council or in the General Assembly. We consider it inevitable that the United Nations will become more deeply involved in human rights problems. The question becomes therefore, not whether the United Nations should concern itself with human rights questions but how it will do so. The United Nations' involvement with human rights in recent years has been characterized by a heavy preoccupation with race issues. Too little attention has been given to the fundamentals of human justice everywhere and the record of our own progress has not had the consideration it deserves. The Costa Rican proposal envisages the appointment of a distinguished elder statesman as United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to advise the Secretary-General, provide good offices in response to requests from member governments, and prepare an annual report to serve as a focal point for United Nations human rights discussions. While there is some risk involved, if the issue is raised, we intend to support this initiative. We believe participation in the development of the proposal will give us a good chance to steer the institution into a pattern acceptable to us. On the other hand, opposition or aloofness would entail unfavorable consequences for us in the United Nations, quite apart from the adverse repercussions among domestic organizations interested in human rights. Benjamin H. Read 3 Executive Secretary 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department. Limited Official Use. 2 The authorization was transmitted to New York in telegram 2261, March 20; see footnote 2, Document 344 . On July 6 Costa Rica formally requested inclusion of the High Commissioner position on the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights. Text of the Costa Rican proposal is UN doc. E/L. 1080. 3 Grant Hilliker signed for Reed. 348. Intelligence Information Cable 348. Intelligence Information Cable 1 Washington, April 21, 1965. TDCS DB–315/01286–65 COUNTRY United Nations, USSR DATE OF INFO. 20 April 1965 SUBJECT 1. Activities Affecting the United Nations 2. U Thant's Attitude on United Nations Peacekeeping Activities and on the Application of Article 19 PLACE & DATE ACQ. 20 April 1965 REF IN 48716 [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] 1. In private U Thant is very critical of United States policy on Article 19 and the peacekeeping questions. He believes the United States has assumed much too rigid a posture and thus has lost its freedom of maneuver. He believes there have been too many public statements by too many United States spokesmen and that American policy is unclear and apparently confused. 2. U Thant does not believe the Soviets will contribute enough to moot application of Article 19 at the next United Nations General Assembly. He states the Soviets definitely do not want Article 19 to stand. He believes Article 19 is almost dead as far as peacekeeping is concerned and considers that in the future all efforts must be directed toward voluntary contributions from the Soviets. U Thant believes there is some possibility of success for voluntary Soviet contributions for past peacekeeping operations, but little or no chance of contributions for future peacekeeping operations unless there is a settlement in Vietnam. 3. U Thant several times has asked Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko about the amount of the “substantial contribution” to the voluntary fund which the Soviets promised during the 19th General Assembly. Fedorenko has been unwilling to make any definite statement and U Thant believes Fedorenko himself does not know. Tewfik Bouatoura of Algeria has volunteered to U Thant the statement that the Soviets will contribute up to twenty million dollars. 4. U Thant and his staff consider the “opting out” concept for peacekeeping satisfactory, certainly better than the veto. U Thant believes that in a crisis such as Cyprus, countries will pay. U Thant is against long term peacekeeping operations as in the Gaza Strip. 5. Field Dissem: None. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 349. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 349. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, April 22, 1965. SUBJECT My Day at USUN On Wednesday, 2 I went up to New York to meet and talk to some of our UN players. Among others, I talked to Stevenson, Plimpton, Yost, and Dick Pederson. Here are a few items of possible interest. 1. Disarmament Commission —In the morning I dropped in on a Stevenson/Foster meeting being held to prepare for the opening session of the UNDC, scheduled for Wednesday afternoon. A good deal of attention was devoted to discussing (a) the tactics of handling a possible Albanian initiative on Nationalist Chinese exclusion from and Communist Chinese admission to the disarmament arena and (b) the tactics of handling Russian attacks on the U.S. about Vietnam. There was also some discussion on an Irish nonproliferation resolution 3 which Foster thought was too weak. Foster mentioned that the Principals would be meeting soon to discuss the substance of the U.S. position. In fact, the opening session of the UNDC turned up no surprises by the Albanians or anyone else. The only business was the election of a chairman from the U.A.R.; the chairman is tolerable and we couldn't stop it anyway. Pederson felt that the chances are good that the Chinese participation issue and Vietnam will come up next week. With regard to the Monday session, the Russians are expected to lead off, with us second. If the Russians bring up Vietnam, Stevenson's follow-up will probably be in two parts—a Vietnam rebuttal and then a talk about disarmament. If the Albanians bring up Chirep, we will probably be able to fend it off. 2. Article 19 —The Committee of 33 will hold its second meeting on Thursday afternoon. The Russians insisted that it be held and that it be public. Plimpton feels that it probably will be used to sound off again on Vietnam. In this regard, it should be noted that the Russians talked about gas 4 at the first meeting of the Committee of 33. From Stevenson on down, there is pretty general agreement that we are probably not going to resolve the Article 19 question, by September 1, in a manner satisfactory to a hard U.S. position. Pulling the various views together, a rough consensus scenario seems to be as follows: First, the present consultations on future peacekeeping will poop along for a couple more months until it is obvious that nothing regarding the future will get settled by the fall (U.S.S.R. and France insist we talk about the future before we talk about past). Second, renewed pressure will build up again this summer to resolve the arrearages problem through voluntary contributions. Third, at the last minute, the Russians will probably contribute $10 to $15 million which will not be enough to settle Article 19 but which will be enough to ensure that the Afro/Asians won't be too mad at the Russians. The chances of a Russian cave-in are not good. In this regard, Stevenson feels that Vietnam and the deepening cold war make a cave-in even less likely. On the matter of what we should do, USUN and IO seem to be unanimous in the view that we should not go to the mat with the Russians on arrearages—we would probably not be able to win; the issue isn't all that big; the American people are not demanding a confrontation “over a measly $20 million”; and, in fact, some Americans might like the flexibility a more voluntary system would give the U.S. Yost thought that we might have a chance of getting $30 million from the Russians (enough to avoid Article 19 for a couple years), if the pitch is made purely on a financial solvency basis, if we make a big contribution ourselves, and if we stay away from constant reiteration about Article 19. Note: I have been holding off on a memo to the President until I could see a little more clearly the direction we are heading in. I think I shall do the memo after we get the results of today's meeting of the Committee of 33. 3. Vietnam —Stevenson mused unhappily about Vietnam and made such points as the following in a very low key (I put them down a bit reluctantly because he speaks very softly and I had a hell of a time hearing him). First , it might not be such a bad idea for U Thant to call for a cease-fire. We could stop bombing for a few days. If the Communists don't obey, we can resume bombings and, to boot, be in a much better position before the world. Second , we should have started the talks about peace at the time we started the bombing—not weeks later. Third , we should talk more peace and bomb “more in sorrow than anger.” Also, we should not beat our chest publicly that we are “stepping up” our effort; in this regard, McNamara's recent statements do not seem wise. Fourth , the real issue in the world is the cold war—the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Vietnam is driving the U.S.S.R. and China together and the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. apart. The deepening cold war is disturbing. Fifth , it is disturbing that the Japanese and Indians, the people who flank China, are getting more and more unsympathetic with our policy. Sixth , it might be conceivable to negotiate with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese jointly. We should look into this possibility. 4. Mekong —I attended a meeting with Tex Goldschmidt 5 and the AID people at the UN. For some reason, Tex's participation was supposed to be held closely. The purpose of Tex's visit was to make a plea on behalf of a Mekong tributary project in Laos. Tex said that the IBRD does not want to finance the project because it is in an unstable area. He added that the project itself seems worthwhile. First , it might help stabilize the area. Second , all of the factions in Laos agree that it should be done. Third , it will provide electricity to Vientiane and other places (including parts of Thailand). It will also provide irrigation to substantial areas. Fourth , all the surveys have been done and the project is all ready to go. Fifth , if we get involved, we would show the doubters that we are ready to put our money where our mouth is. The project will probably cost about $35 million. As Tex sees it, the U.S. could provide about $18 to $20 million and get countries like Japan, Canada, the U.K., and West Germany to provide the rest. Some grant money would probably be best. However, if this is not possible, very low-interest-rate money would also probably do the trick. The project could be done under a UN umbrella. Note: I will pass on this item to Francis Bator. GC 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 April 21. 3 Information on the drafts submitted is in Report of Conference of Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, UN doc. A/5986 (DC/227). 4 Reference is to charges of U.S. use of gas warfare in Vietnam. See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. II, footnote 2, Document 210 , and Document 216 . 5 Arthur “Tex” Goldschmidt, Director of Technical Assistance, UN Special Fund Operations. 350. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Johnson 350. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Johnson 1 New York, April 28, 1965. SUBJECT Secretary General's proposal for temporary cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam Although the Secretary General has so far deferred to our wishes by delaying his appeal for a cease fire in Viet Nam, I cannot be sure that he will defer some action indefinitely following his return from Europe on Friday, May 7th. He is acutely conscious of his responsibilities as Secretary General, troubled by criticism that he as Secretary General and the UN as an institution have not been able to contribute to a solution in Viet Nam, and strongly convinced that the continued use of force holds no promise for a settlement but only the ever-increasing danger of wider warfare, as well as a re-orientation of Soviet foreign policy from limited détente with the West to close cooperation with Communist China. Given this estimate of the Secretary General's mood, we have set down below some of the advantages and disadvantages of acquiescing in an appeal by the Secretary General for a cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam. Advantages 1. If we are receptive to the idea of the Secretary General's appeal, we will obviously be in the best position to influence its contents and timing. While we do not exclude an appeal to cease all hostilities , the Secretary General may not think it wise to make an appeal broad enough to cover the fighting within South Viet Nam because North Viet Nam could more easily reject this appeal on the grounds that it does not control the Viet Cong. Moreover, we doubt if it would be in our interest to accept an appeal which would prevent us and the South Vietnamese from continuing the war against the Viet Cong. We believe the Secretary General would be willing to make an appeal which principal paragraph would be along the following lines: “Therefore, I now appeal most earnestly and urgently to your Government to agree, along with the other two governments directly concerned (SVN and DRV), to: (a) A cessation or a period of ___ all military activity in Viet Nam, both overt and covert, across the boundaries, land, sea or air, of either of the Zones established in the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam of July 20, 1954, 2 such cessation to take place as of the date of the acceptance of this appeal by the three parties to which it is addressed; (b) immediate discussions in whatever manner the parties prefer, designed to strengthen and maintain the cessation of military activity and to seek the basis for a more permanent settlement”. The Secretary General proposed a three months cessation but would take a shorter period if we prefer. 2. A favorable US response to the Secretary General's appeal (conditional on a favorable response from North Viet Nam) would greatly reinforce and add the improved US image which stemmed from the President's April 7th speech. 3 3. Rejection of the Secretary General's appeal by North Viet Nam would do serious damage to the Communists' international posture and, at the same time, provide us with further justification in the eyes of the world community for continuing our air strikes against the North. 4. An appeal from the Secretary General would place him on record as implicitly admitting that North Viet Nam is engaged in the use of force against South Viet Nam. 5. The Secretary General, by making such an appeal, would become the center of the effort to terminate hostilities in Viet Nam, a fact which would facilitate a later move on our part—should we so desire—to involve the UN in the role of supervising or policing a negotiated settlement. Disadvantages 1. International pressure on the US to cease its air strike against the North will probably increase rather than decrease, and a favorable US response to the Secretary General's appeal might be interpreted by some as a sign of weakness. This would not, however, be the case and could be counteracted by vigorous prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong. 2. Another possible disadvantage, one we are unable to assess, is the adverse effect the temporary cessation of air strikes against the North might have on the morale of the South Vietnamese. 3. If air strikes against the North were stopped in response to the Secretary General's appeal, I suppose we would be subjected to pressure not to resume them even if we subsequently found that the North was continuing its infiltration of the South. 4. In this connection, our judgment (and the Secretary General's) is that unilateral surveillance by the US and South Viet Nam is the only practicable means available for the immediate future. To police a cessation of hostilities an effective international police force could not be agreed on and established fast enough to deal with this situation. We are also frankly dubious that surveillance by some international body—whether the UN or some other ad hoc body—would serve our interests at this stage. While it could easily check whether air strikes against the North had been halted, it would find it very hard, if not impossible, to check whether infiltration from the North had stopped. We might find ourselves in the position of claiming that the North had not lived up to the cease-fire bargain without confirmation from the international body. However, an international force to police an agreed settlement would be quite a different thing. There is one fundamental strategic and political factor which underlies the whole problem. The border objectives of US policy are, in general, to demonstrate that Communist conquests, labeled as “wars of liberation”, cannot be carried out successfully and, in particular, to “contain” Communist Chinese ambitions to dominate Southeast Asia and North Vietnamese ambitions to absorb South Viet Nam. The United States has the force to carry out these tasks, if the American people have the steadfastness to pursue them over many years. Experience in Europe shows that the job can be done, but also shows that it can be done much more successfully as a cooperative venture by many threatened states than by the U.S. alone. The same applies in large degree in Asia. One vital practical factor must be so to carry out our operations there as to contribute to rather than to inhibit the eventual creation of a great defensive coalition. Essential members of an effective coalition in Asia would have to be, among others, Japan and India, the absence of which has made SEATO of limited value. Our tactics in Viet Nam so far, necessary as they are from other points of view, have not generated wide-spread Asian support, except among the small, weak states directly under the gun. This may not seem to matter at the moment, but how long will the American people be willing to carry almost the whole burden of containment in Asia. On the other hand, our bold, determined action in Viet Nam in the past three months has probably already persuaded the major Communist powers that they can no longer pursue “wars of national liberation” in Asia, even in a relatively covert form without very grave risks to themselves; the risk for the Soviets of a total breakdown of their policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West, the risk for the Chinese of an unequal direct conflict with the United States. This realization is too recent to have yet produced a visible effect, but it is probably there and will give some pause to further Chinese expansionist plans. It may be, therefore, that the lesson has already, or will soon, be driven home sufficiently so that we might begin to tailor our tactics more specifically to the longer run objective, that is, to creating an Asian consensus and eventually an Asian coalition for the containment of China, a coalition in which the United States would of course participate heavily but which it would not have to carry almost entirely on its own back. Another paramount political consideration is, of course, to reverse as quickly as we can, without other major drawbacks, a situation which tends willy-nilly to drive the Soviets into following a common policy with the Chinese, rather than Khrushchev policy of open hostility to the Chinese. This of course works against our interests everywhere and, inter alia, inhibits the Soviet Union itself from participating in the containment of China, as it might otherwise wish to do to some degree. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, U.S. Representative—Stevenson. Confidential. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads: “Dictated via telephone.” Printed in the Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, vol. VIII, pp. 746–748. 2 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505 – 1546 . 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 394–399. 351. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 351. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 4, 1965. SUBJECT Financing of UN Peacekeeping-Status Report 1. When the 19th General Assembly adjourned in February, the Members generally agreed that an energetic effort should be made to settle the impasse brought about by the U.S.S.R.'s refusal to pay its share of past peacekeeping assessments. Accordingly, over the past couple months, there have been some talks about the problem in two UN forums—(a) in private consultations by the Secretary-General and President of the General Assembly with the leading powers and (b) in the Committee of 33, a large, bulky group, expressly set up by the General Assembly to deal with the peacekeeping/financial problem. 2. The substance of the talks can be divided fairly neatly into two parts—future peacekeeping, and arrearages for past peacekeeping. With respect to the talks about future peacekeeping, the effort essentially has been to find a system which would define, in a manner acceptable to the leading powers especially, the respective roles of the Security Council and General Assembly in future peacekeeping operations (including financing). Generally speaking, the Russians have been sticking to their line that the General Assembly has no action role in peacekeeping operations while we have been sticking to our line that the General Assembly does have a role even though the Security Council's role is primary. As for financing, the Russians generally say that this is also a matter for the Security Council to decide, while we say that all options on financing should be kept open, including assessments as laid down by the General Assembly. The upshot of the discussions on future peacekeeping is that we don't expect the question to be solved any time soon. This does not bother us very much—e.g., we don't think there is a direct relationship between this question and an Article 19 solution; also, the General Assembly will be able to operate without coming to an early agreement on future peacekeeping operations. 3. But the question of arrearages for past peacekeeping operations does bother us since this, of course, is the essence of the Article 19 impasse. Up to now, there has been some talk, but no real action, about setting up a voluntary fund and getting a large enough contribution from the U.S.S.R. to settle the Article 19 problem. 4. To guess about the future, the scenario at the UN on the peacekeeping/financial problem may turn out to be roughly as follows: First , the talks on future peacekeeping will tail off when it becomes obvious that nothing will be settled soon. Second , as the September deadline gets close, real UN pressure will build up to solve the arrearages problem through voluntary contributions; this is beginning to happen. Third , if we are getting nowhere by mid-summer, we may try to work out some sort of package deal with the Russians—e.g., in return for adequate, Soviet contribution, we would promise to insure that the Russians will not be assessed for future peacekeeping operations to which they fundamentally object. Fourth , if the Russians do not buy our package, they will probably wait until the last minute and then contribute $10 or $15 million to the voluntary fund—which will not be enough to settle Article 19 to our satisfaction but which will tend to persuade many UN Members that the “reasonable” Russians should not lose their General Assembly vote. 5. If the Russians fail to contribute enough and the General Assembly appears unwilling to invoke Article 19, what then? The most prevalent view these days is that we should probably not try to force a confrontation with the Russians, which we probably couldn't get and which we well might lose if we did get it. Instead, we should probably indicate, before or during the debate, (a) that the decision about applying Article 19 is one for the General Assembly to make; (b) that we hope the Assembly will uphold its mandatory financial authority and impartially apply Article 19; and (c) that, if the decision is otherwise, we will draw the consequences for our own future contributions. In short, we would not invoke Article 19 and assume no one else would. 6. The reaction to such a U.S. posture might be relatively tolerable. In general, most foreign countries would welcome it as an end to General Assembly incapacitation. Domestically, we could probably sell the line, either publically or on background, (a) that the decision not to invoke Article 19 is a General Assembly, and not a U.S., decision, (b) that it does not make good sense to “ruin” the UN over a few million dollars, and (c) that this particular cloud may have a silver lining—i.e., there may be times when we, too, will not want to pay assessments for certain UN peacekeeping operations. McG.B. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 352. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 352. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, May 12, 1965, 2200Z. 4464. Subject: Peacekeeping. Reference: USUN 4339. 2 Stevenson, accompanied by Plimpton, Yost and Finger, 3 met afternoon May 11 with SYG, Quaison-Sackey, and Vellodi. They had during two days consulted all other members committee; 4 USSR, France and UK individually Monday, 5 29 other members in two groups yesterday. Quaison-Sackey started meeting with statement along lines described reftel. Said SYG intends to present draft report to committee by June 1 and President expects committee hold intensive meetings, perhaps twice a day, in order reach agreed report by June 15. Content of such report with respect to future might be “few paragraphs of guidelines” which might be general enough to achieve acceptance. It was clear SYG and Quaison-Sackey expected little progress re future and concentrating principally on achievement solvency. They said all members of committee agreed there should be “normalization” of work of GA. Small countries urged US and Sovs agree on formulation. In reply Stevenson query re Sov and French willingness to contribute toward solvency, Quaison-Sackey said Fedorenko reiterated Sov readiness make “substantial” contribution on basis Afro-Asian proposal and on understanding contribution should fully eliminate question of “so-called arrears.” French position much more difficult; Seydoux maintained peacekeeping operations, past or future, not subject to GA assessment and agreement on future must precede any French contribution. He was not explicit exactly what agreement on future required nor did he promise any French contribution even if their conditions met. SYG and Q–S affirmed Sovs attached no such condition re agreement on future. Q–S also impressed by difference in French and Sov reactions to his presence in Vienna June 15. French reply very formal, pointed out occasion is purely ceremonial and other matters had no place. Gromyko sent Q–S message that he looking forward to meeting him in Vienna and to talking. Yost queried whether Sovs would, as Afro-Asian text of Dec 30 6 implied, accept agreement not to raise Article 19 only for remainder of 19th session or whether they want assurance for all time. Q–S responded that Sovs clearly want arrears question settled once and for all. Vellodi read exact language Fedorenko had used as follows: “However, taking into account the financial difficulties of the UN, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to make a voluntary contribution on the basis of the proposal of the African and Asian countries of 30 December 1964, on the understanding that our voluntary contribution, the size of which will be decided by the Soviet Government itself, should fully eliminate the question of the so-called arrears of the Soviet Union and the question of the application of Article 19 of the UN Charter to the Soviet Union.” Fedorenko first set adoption of res by Comite of 33 as precondition but, when Q–S suggested statement by Pres embodied understanding as proposed in comite by Argentina, Fedorenko did not reject this possibility. In optimistic vein Q–S said he was sure Sov contribution wld really be substantial. Told Stevenson “you hold whip hand.” Stevenson said he was not sure what SYG and Q–S were asking US to do and how we held whip hand. Sovs were clearly asking we renounce for all time application Article 19 in connection their past arrears and in advance of our knowing how much they wld contribute, whether or not UN involvency wld be overcome, how UNEF wld be taken care of and whether Sovs wld support regular budget including servicing of bond issue, UNTSO, UNMOGIP, etc. SYG said latter subjects not yet discussed with Sovs but indicated he might explore them shortly. Stevenson also pointed out Congress aiming for adjournment July 15. US hopes be able make contribution but before discussing with mbrs Congress we would have to know other elements of package. We wld need this in latter part June in order hold necessary Congressional consultations. SYG made clear he did not feel he could launch appeal for contributions until requested do so by Comite of 33. He and Q–S agreed appeal shld be launched during latter part June. Q–S said most comite mbrs expressed preference for ltr of appeal from SYG rather than pledging conference. (Obviously he held that view.) Q–S then expressed view key to solution might be omission any ref to Art 19 but stress on “normalization.” He then read from notes on proposal made earlier same day by Pazhwak (Afghanistan) based on three points: (1) “we” must do everything in our power before resumption GA so that “it should function normally”; (2) solvency shld be achieved through voluntary contributions; (3) comite shld try develop “guidelines” for future peacekeeping, then submit them to all mbr govts of UN for comments and resume to discuss these comments. Q–S had impression Pazhwak formula discussed with other African and Asian dels. (Earlier in day mbr Indian del had urged US consult Pazhwak.) We expressed interest in this Pazhwak formula but also noted it unlikely Sovs would be satisfied with it. (Later Vellodi told MisOff Pazhwak wld not provide text nor wld he confirm Vellodi notes; he said he had just been speculating out loud.) While vague on total contributions expected, contributions Sovs might make and any understanding concerning UNEF and bonds, SYG and Q–S seemed unaccountably suphoric [sophomoric?] about possibility solving financial crisis. This based on feeling Sovs showing signs of desire to solve crisis. In response our query, SYG said Sovs had said nothing directly to him about $108 million target figure but noted he had heard from several quarters that Sovs talking in terms of total required as less than half that amt. Apparently SYG and Q–S do not consider much more difficult French position as insuperable obstacle, their main concern being agreement by “two super-powers.” On question of future, Q–S said French del had requested comite meet May 17 when it wishes make policy statement. Mtg, which will be chaired by Argentina, may also hear from Iraq, UAR, Netherlands and Algeria. Seydoux had mentioned possibility of establishing a finance comite responsible to the SYG and this will probably be in French statement. Seydoux expressed opposition to collective responsibility for financing any peacekeeping operation. Said there must be no compulsion to pay, whether operation mounted by SC or GA. In curious twist of logic Seydoux said UNEF operation might be considered collective responsibility because it is observation, not peacekeeping, whereas UNFICYP involves contingent use of force, is peacekeeping and therefore not collective responsibility. SYG noted there has actually been more shooting in UNEF than in UNFICYP and suggested French position is rationalization of their payment for operation arising out of Suez. Comment: It is obvious that we risk deadlocking in old chicken-egg controversy which stymied GA. SYG and Q–S apparently think agreement by Comite of 33, to be embodied in its June 15 report, on Sov stipulation concerning normalization work of GA and waiver application Art 19 is likely to be essential prelude to SYG launching appeal for vol contributions shortly after June 15. They probably will seek further info from Sovs regarding related financial problems but would not expect receive any notification of size Sov vol contribution until it is made. We urged they concentrate in talks with Sovs and French on adequate assurances UN solvency will be restored as necessary prerequisite to Art 19 waiver. However, unless new Pazhwak formula proves firmer and more salable than we expect, chicken-and-egg seems to lie directly in our path. Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority. 2 Dated May 3, it discussed the latest maneuvers by “African nationalist states” seeking to resolve the Article 19 impasse. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 19 RHOD/UN) 3 Seymour Finger of USUN. 4 Reference is to the Committee of 33. 5 May 10. 6 Reference is to General Assembly Resolutions 1994 (XIX) and 1995 (XIX), adopted unanimously. For texts, see GA docs. A/C. 2/224 and A/C. 449. 353. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 353. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, May 26, 1965, 2130Z. 4694. For Secretary from Stevenson and Foster. 1. As our reports indicate, there is mounting pressure in DC for Yugoslav resolution on calling world disarmament conference, latest draft of which sent USUN 4652. 2 As we see it, Afro-Asian plus Soviet bloc support and lack of opposition by our friends will probably produce strong majority for this proposal. Decision to convene world conference would be seriously inimical to our interests. Not only would it threaten ENDC, but such conference would provide effective forum for Soviets and Chicoms in which we would find ourselves in small minority on disarmament and other questions certain to be raised. 2. In considering ways to head off world conference, we have considered several possibilities: A. Our main hope has been that resolution being prepared by eight non-aligned members of ENDC (see USUN 4606) 3 could be made acceptable to US and would achieve sufficient support, so that with its adoption we might buy the time while question of world conf is first considered at ENDC. But at best this would only buy several months, since issue is certain to be put before GA next fall. Furthermore, there is growing doubt that Sovs will permit an ENDC session prior to GA. Moreover, there is strong trend, even among the eight, to endorse Yugoslav proposal which would bypass ENDC and recommend that GA organize world conference. B. Another possibility is to let it be known that we would be prepared to see an enlargement of ENDC to include Chicoms and one or more others for balance. Since it is generally assumed here Chicoms and French would continue boycott ENDC even if enlarged, however, this would not strike many as a viable alternative. Moreover, once ENDC membership opened up, there is no telling how long it would take to get agreement on new composition, nor what composition might ultimately emerge. These considerations will occur to most representatives here and, while we feel this idea needs further study, we strongly doubt that ENDC enlargement proposal here will serve to head off a call for a world conference. Indeed proponents of world conference view it, inter alia as aimed at reconstituting disarmament negotiating forum. C. As we see it, our broad objectives in present situation should be: (1) to deprive Soviets and Chinese of forum which would be responsive to their propaganda on disarmament as well as other issues, and (2) conversely, to attempt to engage both of them in a dialogue, preferably private, on the various outstanding problems. Neither A. nor B. above would in our opinion meet these objectives. Therefore, a third possibility which we believe should be explored is to consider a five power conference along lines mentioned in Franco-Soviet communiqué in Paris. 4 This has advantage of being perhaps the only effective counter to a world conference. French and Sovs would find it difficult to object and Chicoms might be attracted. Involvement of Chicoms has been principal argument for world conference. Moreover, it occurs to us that there is at least a possibility that a five-power meeting called to consider nuclear disarmament questions might serve as a forum for quiet exploration of other current questions in which the five have, or at least have asserted, an interest. 3. Our support for a five-power meeting would, of course, irritate India which dislikes the prospect of Chicoms being “rewarded for their nuclear tests.” It would also risk conjuring up image of “big five” which would be unsettling in terms of ChiRep situation in UN. We should therefore seek to have India included in such a meeting. However, we must recognize that efforts to include India from the outset would make it easier for the Chicoms to reject such a meeting, would probably not be acceptable to the French, and would raise questions with other would-be participants, e.g., Japan or Sweden. Therefore, we should also be prepared to exclude India at the outset. Once a five-power meeting was in progress, we could seek broader participation, including India, in light of matters under discussion. 4. Septel fols analyzing implications for ChiRep issue at next GA of above. 5 Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Exdis. 2 Dated May 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 15 UN) 3 Dated May 20. (Ibid., E 5 SEADP) 4 No copy of the communiqué was found. A Pravda article summarizing the Soviet delegation May 19–31 visit is in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 17 (June 23, 1965), p. 19. 5 Not found. 354. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 354. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, June 4, 1965, 2200Z. 4856. Subj: Canadian Position Article 19. On personal and confidential basis (protect source and US knowledge of information) Dobell (Canada) 2 advised MisOff that Pearson has “reluctantly and after months of urging” concluded that as far as UNEF and ONUC are concerned Art 19 is “dead.” Moreover, by mid or late next week Canada plans send personal note to Secretary Rusk 3 indicating US can no longer count on Canadian support on Art 19 and urging us, possibly thru constructive statement by President at San Francisco, to agree to Afro-Asian plan for restoring solvency with any such qualifying statements as might be helpful to US and allies at UN and in problem of public opinion. (Canadian suggestions about constructive statement would be “face saving” rather than any real qualifications of Afro-Asian res, because Canadians fear real qualifications might impair plan's usefulness at UN and cause USSR to reject plan which USSR has accepted.) Plimpton 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis. 2 Peter Dobell, a member of the Canadian delegation. 3 A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. 355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, June 13, 1965, 5:41 p.m. 2927. In recent days British have approached us both in New York and Washington. 2 They propose to launch a campaign for voluntary contributions to help unlock UN financial problem. Apparently they intend to offer an unconditional ten million dollars and would like to round up contributions from European and Commonwealth countries that may (with UK contribution) amount to 25 million dollars or so. While timing British move still unclear, British may move early this week prior to their Commonwealth meeting later in week. Some Commonwealth members may prefer that British float this idea first in Commonwealth meeting so that initiative can be by group of Commonwealth countries. Canadians have been wanting to take similar initiative and have in addition said they could no longer support invoking of Article 19 against current delinquents. Dept now considering possible moves on Article 19 issue as such, and hopes Canadian and British Governments will not publicly break that line without further consultation. We see no objection to, and some advantages in, initiatives by British, Canadians, and others to offer voluntary contributions restoring UN to solvency. Addresses are authorized convey this word to UK and Canadian Governments. However, those governments and others approached by them should realize we have not yet decided on circumstances that would make it possible for us to make comparable offer, and there should be no implication that they are serving as bellwethers for US contribution to a solvency fund. Indeed, there are grave difficulties in asking Congress for funds to meet crisis produced by refusal of other members to pay. In discussing matter with British and Canadians, you should make clear that we see little prospect of US voluntary contribution that can be applied in any way to past peacekeeping expenses. Any US contributions for peacekeeping would have to consist mostly of further bond purchases and/or provision of support for current and future peacekeeping operations of UN in conjunction with other UN members, such as in strengthening UN's working capital fund. Sense this cable conveyed by Harlan Cleveland to British Ambassador Sunday. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4. Confidential; Priority. Drafted on June 13 and approved by Cleveland, cleared in substance by Plimpton, EUR, and in draft by Rusk. Also sent to London and Ottawa. 2 The Department of State reported on the British approach in telegram 7833 to London, June 11. (Ibid.) 3 June 13. 356. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 356. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, June 22, 1965, 1815Z. 5112. For the Secretary from Stevenson. Caradon (UK) told me this morning Stewart had instructed him by telephone to make emphatic confirmation of Caradon's representation yesterday that UK would be deeply disappointed if President in San Francisco speech “gave away anything.” 2 Urged me to request President to say in effect that GA should resume normal business and means must be found to do so during summer. In other words UK strongly urges US to make unconditional voluntary contribution as UK has already done and leave questions of setting aside Article 19 or cancelling unpaid assessments for UNOC and UNEF for later bargaining for concessions from Soviets and France. British feel strongly that to make any concessions at this time would be a mistake. Save for UK unanimous view expressed to USUN is that statement by President leaving no doubt US will not object to GA resuming business as usual, whatever happens during summer, would break deadlock, increase pressure on Soviets and France for large contributions, prove US determination to save UN and be widely welcomed by membership. USUN believes UK position animated by desire to avoid blanketing their initiative by more dramatic US initiative. Also only pressure on Soviets that would work is Afro-Asian pressure, which would be set in motion only by US agreeing to normalization GA and in effect agreeing not raise Article 19. USUN accordingly still urgently recommends President announce 25 million dollar voluntary contribution plus either a) support for cancelation UNOC and UNEF arrears when GA determines UN solvent (thus avoiding impairment of Article 19) or b) agreement no raise question applicability Art. 19 in language form proposed by USUN. If deadlock not broken now, convinced we will miss chance to dissipate present depressed and anxious situation and to get universal credit for doing so. Our firm judgment is that we cannot win vote in either Committee of 33 or in GA on enforcing Art. 19 and that continuing uncertainty will not budge Soviets from their refusal to contribute voluntarily until assured that Art. 19 will not be invoked. Hence we will have to face reality later and yield on Art. 19 to get any Soviet contribution. Therefore we repeat that we should do now what we will have to do grudgingly later, when we will derive no advantage. Further bargaining, in our judgment, would get us nowhere. Moreover, virtually whole UN membership expects us bite the bullet at San Francisco and there will be grave disappointment if President does not. Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. 2 Reference is to the President's June 25 address in San Francisco commemorating the 20th anniversary of the United Nations. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pp. 703–706. 357. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 357. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 6, 1965. SUBJECT US Position on Article 19 Ambassador Stevenson and I have reviewed the Article 19 issue and recommend to you the course of action described below. If you agree, we would discuss it with key members of Congress and subsequently with our allies over the next few weeks. Our allies can in general be expected to react favorably. Following is the course of action to be discussed with Congressional leaders: 1. Ambassador Stevenson would inform members of the Committee of 33 just before it reconvenes in early August that the US position is as follows: a. If, when the Assembly reconvenes, the UN membership is not prepared at this stage in the UN's development to require the major powers to pay assessments levied for major activities which they do not wish to support, we would note this conclusion and consider it applicable to the US. On this understanding, we would acquiesce in the Assembly resuming its normal business when it reconvenes in September. b. We would oppose proposals to write off the Soviet and French debts, preferring to leave these on the books even though the GA is unlikely to enforce their collection. c. The Assembly will still have the problem of restoring UN solvency, and we believe it should make every effort to raise sufficient funds, especially from those who have not contributed to UN peacekeeping operations. d. We would also state in general terms our willingness to join with the membership in helping to strengthen the UN and to assist in future peacekeeping operations. e. The integrity of the regular budget should be sustained. 2. We will continue to insist that the amortization of bonds is an obligation of the organization properly funded from the regular budget. Most members will agree with us on this point. But the USSR will probably continue to refuse to pay this portion of their regular budget assessment. As a result, repayment of the bonds may have to be made in part from the UN's miscellaneous income. If this succeeds, it would have the effect of making the Soviets indirectly help pay off the bonds. 3. The procedural choices are: (a) a vote deciding not to apply Article 19; or (b) letting the GA simply go ahead with its normal business without a vote on the Article 19 issue. We conclude it would be disadvantageous to seek a vote since the more likely result would be a consensus which favored letting the Soviets and the French off the hook; we do not think the Assembly would be willing to say formally that failure to uphold the “loss of vote” sanction and its mandatory taxing power has weakened its Charter powers in this regard for the future. It is therefore preferable for us to draw and state our own conclusion and act accordingly in the future in light of the dictates of our national interests. The above is recommended in light of some hard, unattractive facts. Both Adlai Stevenson and I are convinced that our position on Articles 17 and 19, which was supported by the World Court and an overwhelming majority, will now not be supported by the Assembly. Lester Pearson recently informed us that Canada can no longer support us on the application of Article 19. The U.K. has urged a course of action which even goes beyond the limited one described above by proposing, in effect, that the GA not apply strictly the past GA resolutions on financing the Congo and UNEF. This could mean Assembly exoneration of the delinquents. The recommended course of action would help break the deadlock while cutting our losses in that the United States would draw the conclusion that the Assembly's unwillingness to apply Article 19 means that we would not feel bound to pay for any future major activities voted by the UN to which we might have objection. This would make the above package palatable on the Hill and offer further protection for us against a possible ganging up by the Afro-Asian majority in the Assembly. It is also designed to shift the burden from ourselves to the Assembly for failing to apply Article 19, by making it clear that the decision is one for the membership at large. It would tend to desensationalize the issue by defusing it in a sub-organ of the UN during the summer doldrums; and would give us a “quid pro quo” by making clear that a double standard cannot be applied for major activities. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. 358. Memorandum of Conversation 358. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 19, 1965. SUBJECT Vietnam PARTICIPANTS Secretary General of the UN—U Thant Under Secretary—Ralph J. Bunche Under Secretary—C. V. Narasimhan Under Secretary—J. Rolz-Bennett Secretary of State—Dean Rusk Acting U.S. Representative to UN 2 —Francis T.P. Plimpton Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs—Harlan Cleveland After a discussion of the Stevenson fellowship proposal (reported in a separate memorandum), 3 the Secretary asked U Thant to suggest the agenda for this conversation. The Secretary General said he wanted first to discuss Vietnam, referring to his talk with the President in San Francisco and to the talks he had with Governor Stevenson in Geneva. 4 The Secretary General said he had been struck by a published comment by Averell Harriman in Moscow, 5 to the effect that in Vietnam, the North and South should settle their own affairs. The Secretary said this was not a deliberate act of policy, but was consistent with our general thinking. Peace could come in one of two fashions. There could be a Conference, called in any of a number of ways; but there seemed little interest in conferring as far as Hanoi is concerned. Or peace could come de facto by parallel decisions to let the fighting “peter out,” as in the Greek guerrilla case in the 1940s. We have had frank talks with Moscow, the Secretary said. But Moscow is unable to take the initiative so is being dragged along. Washington and Moscow are unable to strike a relevant bargain, since Moscow cannot deliver. Nor can we talk bilaterally with Hanoi, without involvement of the Saigon Government. Dr. Bunche asked about dealing with the Viet Cong. The Secretary said we are in South Vietnam because Hanoi is there. We perceive no large-scale political movement associated with the Viet Cong. If there is a pull-back by Hanoi, the National Liberation Front could take its proper place as one of a number of parties in a South Vietnam political framework. The Secretary General said his assessment was this. The Geneva settlement of 1954, 6 he said, was all right. Up until September of last year, there was a realistic possibility of making both South and North Vietnam neutral and independent. That is why he (the Secretary General) asked Ho Chi Minh if he would meet with the United States. Through the Russians, Ho said yes. The best place seemed to be Rangoon and Ne Win agreed. But the United States did not agree on the ground that it might hurt morale in Saigon. For eleven years Hanoi was pro-Peking. Until last year, an Austrian-type solution was possible. But now Hanoi seems to be following Peking's line. (Later in the conversation, the Secretary General contradicted this and said he still feels Hanoi is basically closer to Moscow.) There followed a brief argument about facts in Laos. The Secretary General said that CIA was working against Souvanna Phouma, and for Phoumi Nosavam. The Secretary said this was simply wrong, that indeed, we had restrained Phoumi from conducting a successful coup. As the discussion reverted to Vietnam, the Secretary General conceded that the Communists' basic condition—that the U.S. should be willing to get out—has been met. But he said it is too late because Hanoi is now following the Peking line. The Secretary General said we now need a cease-fire by everybody involved. That was why he had tried out on us his March 31st text. 7 He had held this up on our advice. The Secretary asked whether it would not be better to have a conference at which a cease-fire is the first item on the agenda. The Secretary General held to the view that a “Geneva Conference” with a cease-fire ahead of time “if possible”, would be the best arrangement. The Secretary commented that it was certainly news to him if Hanoi had ever been prepared to be “neutralized”. There followed another discussion on the issue whether Hanoi's infiltration or the Americans presence in South Vietnam had started it all. The Secretary General said the United States had military advisers and were providing military assistance from the outset after the 1954 agreements. The Secretary said the Communists began immediately to provide military assistance. “But it was the military advisers that made all the difference,” the Secretary General said. The Secretary said that at first they were only advisers on logistics and supply matters. Only after President Kennedy came into office were other advisory elements added, to frustrate the growing threat from the North. The Secretary said we must have a further discussion of the facts in the Vietnam case. The Secretary General, returning to the proposed Geneva Conference, raised again the issue of representation. “Is there a government in Saigon?”, he asked rhetorically. He also said there was a clear difference between the NLF and Hanoi; for example, in a letter to U Thant, Prince Sihanouk had said the National Liberation Front was tougher than Hanoi. Perhaps the right answer was the one suggested in London by Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad-Tobago: That three Vietnamese groups (Hanoi, Saigon and the NLF) should be represented at a conference. The Secretary General said that he and many UN members were bothered by analogies: Would the recently expressed American doctrine mean that if there was infiltration anywhere in Asia or even in Europe, that the United States would bomb the country of the infiltrators? He then rehearsed his familiar line that the answer in Southeast Asia was for the United States not to be involved in a military way, and to stick to economic aid. His reference to Burma's success in remaining non-Communist without aid, brought a reminder from the Secretary that Burma had been getting military aid. The Secretary General said the Burmese had assured him last year that there was no U.S. aid, but now told him it was a special arrangement for creating counterpart funds and buying military equipment at a discount. He said he was not sure this should be called military aid, but in any event it was not visible and did not involve a military presence. The Secretary said we would like to make progress toward convening a Geneva conference with a cease-fire first on its agenda. Alternatively, peace could be made by the de facto route. But the difficulties of the de facto route were illustrated by the recent pause in our bombing. On the very first day of the pause, perhaps by coincidence, Peking said that if bombing stopped it would make no difference. On the third day of the pause, the Secretary was in Vienna and saw Gromyko who said that to stop bombing in these circumstances was an insult. In all equity the Secretary said, Hanoi would have to get its 325th Division out of South Vietnam and the contiguous areas of Laos. Maybe the Communists miscalculated, feeling that our election speeches about not wanting to widen the war made it possible for them to widen the war on their side with impunity. But the fact is we mean business. They will not be permitted to take over South Vietnam by force. After another excursion into the history of Vietnam, the Secretary General rather suddenly asked what reaction the Secretary would have to getting both South Vietnam and North Vietnam into the UN. The Secretary said he would ponder it. The Secretary said we do not think the Chinese Communists want to carry things to the point of a general war. But so far they are in the position of being able to “fight to the last Vietnamese”. The Secretary General agreed, commenting “Yes, they are having a heyday”. The Secretary asked whether it would be useful, short of calling for a Security Council meeting, to bring our reporting to the Council on Vietnam up to date—sometime within the next week or ten days. The Secretary General said he thought that it would be useful. In a brief discussion of the Harriman mission to Moscow, the Secretary said the conversations so far showed no serious advance. Indeed, he thought that the Russians were rather embarrassed to be caught talking with us about Vietnam. The Secretary General suggested we might want to talk with Nakrumah before he leaves for Moscow on his announced mission. The Secretary said we had that very much in mind. Drafting Officer's Comment: In his talks with Ambassador Stevenson in Geneva two weeks ago, the Secretary General had taken under advisement the idea of a Security Council meeting in which, by advance agreement, there would be no polemics and simply a consensus that the Vietnamese situation requires the convening of a conference of the Geneva powers. Ambassador Stevenson's understanding was that the next step would be for the Secretary General to take this up with the Soviets, presumably through the acting representative in New York, Platon Morozov. Evidently, the Secretary General has not pursued this with the Soviets, and does not now think a Security Council meeting of any kind would be useful. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol . 2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by S on July 23. In a July 22 memorandum attached to a copy of this memoranda of conversation sent to Arthur Goldberg, Cleveland wrote: “I think you will find it useful as a summary of the kind of dialogue we have been having with the Secretary General right along. But this was the sharpest confrontation yet.” (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject File, Reel 127, Frame 302) 2 Ambassador Stevenson died in London July 14. 3 Not found. 4 No record of the President's talk with U Thant was found. According to President Johnson's Daily Diary, he met with U Thant between 1:10 and 2:15 p.m., June 25, for a private discussion dealing with Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and the UN debt issue. (Johnson Library) A record of the Stevenson-U Thant meeting is in Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, vol. VIII, pp. 813–814. 5 During Harriman's July 15–22 visit to Moscow; the statement was reported in The New York Times , July 19. 6 See footnote 2, Document 350 . 7 Regarding this approach, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. II, Document 228 , section 2. 359. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 359. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, July 23, 1965. SC 00680/65A THE UNITED NATIONS FINANCING AND PEACEKEEPING PROBLEMS The financial and peacekeeping problems which have hamstrung the 19th session of the UN General Assembly are still far from resolution. The resulting paralysis of the assembly in a year of deepening international crises has caused many members to fear for the future of the United Nations as an effective world organization. As the date 1 September for reconvening the assembly approaches, the members are increasingly anxious that its work proceed normally, and there is no longer majority support for any attempt to deprive financially delinquent members of their assembly vote by enforcing Article 19. However, even if the Article 19 issue is papered over and the UN's solvency restored by voluntary contributions, the basic constitutional question of the General Assembly's right to initiate peacekeeping operations will remain to plague the UN long after the 19th General Assembly is ended. Background The drafters of the UN Charter intended that the Security Council should have pre-eminence in peacekeeping matters and that its permanent members should have the special responsibility for maintaining the peace. The falling out of the Allied powers after World War II, the excessive use of the veto by the Soviet Union, and the flood of new members from the Afro-Asian bloc all served to bring the General Assembly to the fore as the only effective alternative when the Council was deadlocked. The Uniting for Peace resolution, voted in 1950 by the General Assembly, authorized it to undertake the peacekeeping role in certain circumstances and provided the sanction for such later assembly-sponsored operations as the UN Emergency Force in Palestine (UNEF) in 1956 and the UN Congo Operation (ONUC) in 1960. France has refused to pay for ONUC and the Soviet Union refuses to pay for both ONUC and UNEF on the ground that they were illegally authorized. They have persisted in this refusal despite the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1962 that the expenses for these operations fell within the regular assessments of UN members, and despite the fact that the UN has been brought close to bankruptcy. Both France and the USSR are now two years in arrears and must, according to the letter of Article 19, either pay or lose their voting rights in the General Assembly. When the 19th assembly met last December, however, it evaded the issue of voting rights by taking no votes on issues of substance. When the assembly finally adjourned in February, a last-minute attempt by Albania to break the no-voting moratorium and provoke a showdown was defeated only by US agreement to consider the vote to adjourn a “procedural” one. Since then, the whole question has rested with the 33 members of a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations established by the assembly. After numerous meetings, however, matters stand about as they did when the committee was set up. The meetings served as another vehicle for Soviet propaganda attacks on US policies in Vietnam. Few if any new ideas emerged from either the open sessions or the informal private consultations. In order to meet its 15 June deadline for a report to the General Assembly, the Committee of 33 merely drew up a report calling for “normalization” of the assembly's work and restoration of the UN's solvency through voluntary contributions. It also asked for more time in which to devise a formula for future peacekeeping. The committee has now adjourned until August, evidently hoping that one of the big powers will come up with something which would break the impasse and create a better atmosphere for tackling the long-range problem. Article 19 In the present situation it is the prevailing view of the UN membership that the most urgent tasks are to pay off past debts and to avoid any new confrontation. The majority of members has not more stomach now than last fall for threats to deprive the USSR and France of their votes if they do not pay up. Many genuinely fear that if the Soviets are in fact so treated they will pull out and perhaps bring about the demise of the UN. The Afro-Asians in particular have diligently sought to avoid a confrontation. Last December they proposed a plan whereby past debts would be settled by voluntary contributions and Article 19 would not be invoked. This plan was approved by the Soviets who have since urged that this is the only possible solution. An Ethiopian resolution presented to the Committee of 33 is in essence the Afro-Asian plan. Although this resolution has not been voted on in the committee, it remains the most popular solution proposed to date. Many members feel that if voluntary contributions are sufficient, the question of the applicability of Article 19 can be bypassed. This view and the US opposition to the Ethiopian plan led the British and the Scandinavians to open their campaign last month for donations by pledging almost $18 million over and above regular annual assessments. They hope that other developed countries will soon follow suit in whittling away at the UN's deficit of over $108 million. This resort to “passing the tincup,” however, may not suffice. The response has come mainly from members of the Atlantic community—excepting, of course, France. Some nations such as Italy are reluctant to make a contribution until confident the Soviet and French contributions will be sizable ones. The Soviets, who are very much interested in the amount of the donation the United States will make, say that they will make a significant contribution only when assured that Article 19 will not be invoked. It is doubtful that the French will contribute at all as long as no formula for the future has been worked out. If the Soviets refuse to make a voluntary contribution until the US gives in on Article 19, then the US is likely to face increasing pressures in September to do just that. Canada, for example, is one of the members that feels Article 19 is “dead,” and President Quaison-Sackey of the 19th General Assembly claims that, if the US would only agree to remove the Article 19 question, the Soviets would contribute a significant amount. Future Peacekeeping Operations Even if the problem of past debts were alleviated by voluntary contributions, there would be still other issues to settle. The constitutional relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council with regard to peacekeeping matters would need to be clearly defined, with agreement reached on the crucial question of ultimate authority for the initiation of peacekeeping operations, and decisions taken on how these operations are to be financed. The Committee of 33 has scarcely dealt with these problems, feeling that they might be left in limbo for a while. The only significant effort toward working out an acceptable formula was a plan offered by Secretary General Thant which in effect only served to point up the wide divergence of views. Thant's proposals, based on ideas of the Norwegian delegate Nielson and of Quaison-Sackey, center on the so-called “shuttle procedure.” If Security Council is unable to act on a matter of international peace and security, the General Assembly could take it up as provided for in the Uniting for Peace resolution. If a two-thirds majority of the assembly favored a peacekeeping operation and the Security Council still failed to act, then the assembly could itself authorize the operation. The proponents of the plan believe that recommendations supported by a large majority of the UN's members would tend to be of sufficient weight to push the Security Council into taking action. It is questionable, however, to say the least, that France and the Soviet Union, for example, would in fact change their votes on questions of vital national interest because of pressure from the General Assembly. On less important questions, however, the plan does have a feature that might incline such countries to less rigid postures. This feature would permit a permanent member of the Security Council to opt out of paying any share of the expense. Members thus assured exemption from financial liability could choose abstention as an attractive alternative to paralysis of the Security Council by outright veto of an important peacekeeping matter. Despite the opting-out privileges of permanent Security Council members, every effort would be made to maintain the principle of collective UN responsibility in future financing. However, a scale of assessments would be worked out with those states which have requested a peacekeeping action or have a special interest in the operation. Reactions and Other Proposals Recriminations over events in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic blocked serious consideration of Thant's plan when it was presented, but support for it in any case was not strong. Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko charged that the proposals represented only the views of the West and reiterated that the Security Council should have sole responsibility in the field of peacekeeping. He did add, however, that if the Security Council failed to act on a peacekeeping issue then “nothing can prevent the General Assembly from considering the whole question anew.” Soviet officials at the UN subsequently made it clear that this represented no change in the standard Soviet position that the power of the General Assembly for peacekeeping is limited to recommendations. Although the Soviets have concentrated their discussions on past debts they have come forth with one proposal for the future-to strengthen Article 43 of the Charter. This article calls on members to make military forces and facilities available to the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining peace and security under the enforcement measures of Chapter 7. By introducing this idea, the Soviets strengthen not only their argument that the Security Council should have exclusive jurisdiction, but also their claim that “socialist” contingents should be included in future peacekeeping forces. The Soviets ruled out participation by permanent members of the Security Council. The French, who have endorsed the Soviet proposal on Article 43, also rigidly maintain that the Security Council should have exclusive power to authorize and finance a peacekeeping operation. They would permit the assembly to make recommendations only before the Security Council had discussed a question or after it had failed to reach a decision. This position seems motivated primarily by fear of the numerical strength of the Afro-Asians in the General Assembly, which the French would restrict to a forum for the expression of international public opinion. Paris concedes, however, that the General Assembly should have a voice in assessing peacekeeping funds and suggests that a special financing committee in that body be set up. The French expect that voluntary and compulsory assessments by a special scale would be used. Many West European countries favor some sort of plan that would allow the General Assembly the right to authorize peacekeeping operations after going through the shuttle procedure. They also favor automatic opting-out for a permanent member, a special scale of assessments, and the earmarking of troops for Security Council use as implied in the Soviet suggestion. The Afro-Asians naturally contend that the General Assembly should retain an important role in peacekeeping operations. These countries are anxious to exert the power and influence their increased membership in the United Nations gives them in the international arena. Even though Charter amendments will soon give the Afro-Asians increased representation in the Security Council itself, they still have reservations about a body which will be dominated by the big five. They accordingly favor some sort of a plan which includes the shuttle procedure, but they oppose any proposals for opting-out by permanent members of the council. Such a privilege for the major powers would mean a larger financial burden for the smaller nations and would be contrary to the principle of collective responsibility, according to the Afro-Asians. Other proposals which have been advanced go so far as to suggest that the Charter be amended and adapted to the “political realities of this age.” The Brazilian delegate, for example, has suggested the need for a clearer distinction between “enforcement measures” which are the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council under Chapter 7 and “peacekeeping operations” of Chapter 6 in which the General Assembly now has the powers of discussion and recommendation. To achieve this, Brazil has suggested in the Committee of 33 that a new chapter entitled “peacekeeping operations” be inserted in the Charter. It would provide for peacekeeping operations by military contingents designated in advance by medium and small powers and undertaken in response to and within the states which request them. In lieu of revising the Charter, Ireland suggested recently that the Uniting for Peace resolution be modified. It proposes that the resolution not be implemented unless supported by two thirds of the members including at least two of the permanent council members. Financing would be by special scale: 5 percent for less developed nations, 25 percent for developed nations other than permanent members, and 70 percent for those permanent members who vote for the operations. Outlook There is widespread apprehension among the membership of the UN that if the upcoming General Assembly session is like the last one, it could be disastrous for the organization. The appeal for voluntary contributions will ease the financial situation, but it is uncertain whether the USSR and France will contribute. If they do, it is doubtful that they will contribute enough so that the applicability of Article 19 would not be raised. Majority sentiment in the General Assembly is for nonenforcement of this article of the Charter for the sake of averting the sort of showdown that could damage the UN beyond durable repair. On the deeper constitutional question of authority over peacekeeping operations, it appears likely that the General Assembly will have to give up some of the muscle it acquired under the Uniting for Peace resolution. Unless the big nations agree to some form of shuttle procedure to pacify the small nations, then exclusive jurisdiction over peacekeeping operations will probably revert to the Security Council. Unless the members can agree on a special scale of assessments, such operations may have to be financed by voluntary contributions. The earmarking of national troops for UN use could offer some possibilities for the longer term future. Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and some of the neutrals have shown increasing interest lately in this approach to the problem of providing the UN with readily available forces, and the recent Soviet references to Article 43 may lend some encouragement to this trend. This trend would not necessarily eventuate in a “permanent peace force” since the obstacles to its creation seem as formidable as ever. The emergence of regional forces—such as that now contemplated in the Organization of American States—is a possibility, but it is a moot point that they can substitute for UN peacekeeping operations without detracting from the effectiveness of the world organization. Should the difficult problems associated with UN peacekeeping prove intractable, there are those authorities who believe that the world organization could still play a useful role in keeping the peace by exploiting more fully the opportunities to conciliate and meditate. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. The charts included in this report are not printed. 360. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 360. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 26, 1965. SUBJECT Article 19 I was talking to Bill Buffum in State who gave me the following scenario for Article 19 activities over the next couple months: 1. Between now and about August 5, State will be consulting with key Congressional leaders about our proposed course of action. 2. Assuming the consultations with Congress turn out positive, State will probably consult with selected UN members and the Secretary-General. Particularly, State will want to touch base with those members who have supported us in the past; we owe them the explanation. These consultations will probably end by about August 12. 3. The Committee of 33 will meet about August 16. At that time, we will make a statement which will indicate our willingness to avoid an Article 19 hassle. 4. As a result of our statement, we can expect a certain amount of pressure to build up on the Soviets to be more forthcoming on the matter of paying up certain of their regular budget assessments and on the matter of making a voluntary contribution over and above the assessments. (a) On the matter of a voluntary contribution, Buffum guesses that the Soviets will kick in about $5 million, which will probably be just enough to make the gesture amenable to the Afro/Asians and not enough to be anywhere near meeting their obligations. (It would take $20 million to save us from a back-down on Article 19.) (b) On the matter of certain regular assessments, which the Russians have not paid, the latest indications are that the Russians will probably balk on some of them—e.g., the bond issue, since some of the proceeds were used to pay for UNEF and the Congo. 5. At the present time, there is no inclination in State to have the U.S. come up with a voluntary contribution. GC 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Confidential. 361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, July 31, 1965, 2:24 p.m. 160. Ref: USUN's 182. 2 Subject: Proposed British Comments on SYG Peacekeeping Guidelines. We find proposed text of UK letter to SYG in response SYG's request for comments on “guidelines” excellent, except in one important respect. Request you indicate to UKUN our strong reservations concerning second sentence in fourth para, which we suggest be deleted in its entirety. We believe it would be most undesirable for UK to suggest that GA's authority cannot embrace operations “of coercion of any state” and is limited to measures “to preserve international peace while settlement of a dispute is being sought,” for three reasons: First, we think it not in predominant interest of West that GA's authority be so limited. E.g., if Indonesia should attack Malaysia, and USSR should veto SC measures, GA should have authority to recommend—not order, but recommend—collective measures to restore international peace and security. Such measures would not be limited to “preserving international peace while settlement of the dispute is being sought.” Rather, they would involve exercise of collective security character, in defense against Indonesian aggression, which clearly would call for use of coercion against aggressor. Dept recognizes that there are risks in this approach, such as misuse by GA of recommendatory authority in, e.g., Rhodesia or South Africa. But we think we should assume this risk, on ground that two-thirds voting requirement in GA, and West's political and financial leverage, should be enough to prevent GA recommending coercive operations which West opposes. If we do not assume risk, it follows that UN's capacity to undertake resistance to aggression is subject to veto in SC. Second, UK line conflicts with plain intent of Uniting for Peace res. Res. 377(V), 3 “Recognizing that discharge by GA of its responsibilities… calls for … the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by GA to Members UN for collective action… ,” provides that GA “Resolves that if SC … fails to exercise its primary responsibility… where there appears to be a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression, GA shall consider matter immediately with view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Res further describes itself as concerned with “collective security arrangements against breaches of international peace and acts of aggression.” It is clear that GA's recommendations for collective measures, including use of armed force to deal with aggression, embrace measures of coercion against aggressor, and are not limited to peacekeeping measures of UNEF-ONUC character. While, as first sentence of fourth para UK draft rightly states, only SC may undertake enforcement measures, this is properly understood to mean measures which are binding on Members, not measures of merely coercive character. As ICJ pointed out in Expenses Case, “… it is SC which is given a power to impose an explicit obligation of compliance if, for example, it issues an order or command to an aggressor under Chapter VII. It is only SC which can require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor.” However, while GA cannot require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor, it certainly can recommend coercive action. (Should be noted that, even if GA measures were limited to “preserving international peace while settlement of dispute is being sought,” they would imply possibility of coercive action against a state to whatever extent its actions might be in breach of peace.) We would suggest UK could meet this point either by deleting fourth para or by deleting second sentence of fourth para and inserting in first sentence after “Council” phrase “and are of a binding character.” Third, we see no point in West bidding against itself in negotiations with delinquents. USSR and even France have shown almost no interest in reasonable, procedural limitations on GA action. Why should West propose to make concessions of GA's authority with no quid pro quo? While, in any event, we would think it undesirable to surrender GA's authority to recommend collective security operations to resist aggression, and believe attempt to surrender such without Charter amendment would be of dubious effect, we see no point in offering such concessions to Soviet view at this juncture. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Stephen Schwebel (L), cleared in L and UNP, and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to London. 2 Dated July 23; it forwarded the text of a British note regarding peacekeeping. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–4 UN) 3 Dated November 3, 1950; for text see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents , 1950–1955, vol. I, pp. 187–192. 362. Memorandum of Conversation 362. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 2, 1965, 5:05 p.m. SUBJECT Article 19 PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Nigel C.C. Trench, Counselor, British Embassy Ambassador Dean inquired as to the current U.S. views on the Article 19 controversy. Secretary Rusk informed him that we were willing to concede that Article 19 cannot be applied at this time. This would apply not only to peacekeeping operations but to all operations of the UN. If, for instance, the UN membership wished to launch a costly UNCTAD program with which we did not agree, we should be in a position where we could refuse to participate. The French and the Soviets should not be the only ones who could decide when they would participate and when they would not. Ambassador Dean asked if the U.S. would make a voluntary contribution. The Secretary replied that we probably would not. It would depend on what the others did. We might be prepared to contribute on the basis of an assessment to refinance the UN. The Secretary went on to say that if the General Assembly wished to give up its prerogatives, that was for the General Assembly to decide. He reiterated the U.S. view that if the USSR and France were to be given the privilege of nonpayment for what they objected to, the U.S. would want the same privilege. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 2. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on August 10. The memorandum is Part 2 of 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 363. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 363. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 1 New York, August 5, 1965. SUBJECT Legislative Reaction to U.S. Position on Article 19 Under date of July 6, 1965 the Secretary of State handed you a Memorandum reviewing the Article 19 issue and recommending the course of action described in detail in the memorandum. 2 The recommended course of action had the concurrence of Governor Stevenson. After review, you approved the recommended course of action and requested the Secretary and me to discuss it with key members of Congress. We have done so and herein report their reactions. 1. The Secretary arranged a breakfast meeting with the Chairman and ranking Democratic and Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a similar special breakfast meeting with the Chairman and the ranking Democratic and Republican members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. I attended both meetings as did Under Secretary Ball and Ambassador MacArthur of the State Department. Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Church and Hickenlooper participated in the breakfast meeting for the leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Chairman Morgan and Congressmen Zablocki, Fascell, Bolton, and Adair attended the breakfast for the leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. At both breakfast meetings the Secretary, the Under Secretary and I reviewed the proposed U.S. position on Article 19 in detail. In general the response of the members of the Senate Committee was favorable. While Senator Hickenlooper was somewhat more reserved than the Democratic members he nevertheless acquiesced in the proposed course of action. At the House breakfast reaction was likewise favorable although Congressmen Adair and Fascell seemed harder to persuade. My conclusion, however, is that they will go along. 2. I personally met with the leaders, both Republican and Democratic, of the Senate and House. On the Senate side I met with Senators Mansfield, Aiken and Dirksen. On the House side I met with the Speaker, Mr. Albert and Mr. Ford. Save for Mr. Ford, who while cordial was noncommittal, the leaders both of the House and Senate will support the U.S. position. Ford said that he would consult with Senator Dirksen and his other leadership colleagues as well as the leading members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee about formulating a joint position on our recommendation. His general personal reaction was not unfriendly and assuming that the reaction of his colleagues will continue to be favorable, as I believe it will be, my conclusion is that he will go along. Our next step is to discuss our position with our allies. This I shall do next week in New York. Our position will be made public when the Committee of 33 reconvenes on August 16. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Goldberg Correspondence. No classification marking. President Johnson appointed Arthur Goldberg as Permanent Representative to the United Nations on July 26 and Goldberg presented his credentials on July 28. Goldberg's nomination took place against the background of a further escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Documentation relating to the escalation and Goldberg's initial efforts to seek a solution through the United Nations is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, Documents 82 , 99 , 106 , 114 , 116 , 119 , and 129 . 2 Document 357 . 364. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 364. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, August 12, 1965, 2350Z. 354. Article 19. Goldberg, Sisco, Plimpton and Yost saw Morosov (USSR) to explore Art 19 situation. 1. Goldberg said US was considering its position as to whole problem, and wld like an idea of Sov frame of mind toward common object of getting the UN back into business. He mentioned we have domestic political problems, and fact that indication of Sov attitude wld be helpful to President in making final decision. 2. Morosov recalled para 11 of the report of the Comite of 33 (A/5915, 15 June 1965) reading as follows: “11. The members of the Special Committee agreed that the UN should be strengthened through a co-operative effort and that the GA when it reconvenes must conduct its work according to the normal procedure established by its rules of procedures.” 3. He said that this agreement was not bad as a starter, and that it was very important that the provision as to the GA's conducting its ordinary business be implemented. US knew Sov position on substantive matters involved, and there was no point in his repeating it. 4. He recalled the Afro-Asian proposal of December 3, 1964 2 and said it was necessary that the Sovs receive a “guarantee” that the illegal attempt to impose Art 19 be eliminated. There wld be no voluntary contributions without a guarantee that Art 19 wld not be raised in future. Sovs had accepted Afro-Asian proposal, and if US had joined, it wld be a basis for settlement. However, that was history and the past, and not the future. 5. Morosov continued that there shld be no variation from Afro-Asian proposal as basis for settlement. The res introduced by Ethiopia in Comite of 33 deviated and therefore had been criticized by Sovs. They wld not accept a substitute or an improper interpretation. 6. Morosov repeated that there had been no change in fundamental Sov position. Any contribution must be voluntary since there is no Sov obligation. They wld not pay for UNEF or UNOC. It is not only a matter of principle but a problem of commercial importance since they prefer to use their money for other purposes. 7. Goldberg said that the important thing was to get the GA in business without prejudice to either viewpoint. However, to get UN back into business, it must have the necessary finances. What was Sov attitude of mind as to this necessity? The organization cld not function unless it cld meet its obligations. No one shld be regarded as having prevailed or retreated. The issue shld be viewed as one facet of over-all US-Sov relations, although an important one. 8. Goldberg continued by asking whether Sovs and US cld unite on (a) putting GA back into business, and (b) making the UN financially able to carry on its business, since UN cannot function unless it meets its obligations. 9. Morosow misunderstood (?) Goldberg's reference to UN obligations and reiterated that Sovs did not admit there were any obligations. They agreed that GA shld resume its normal business. There was a good beginning in para 11 of Comite of 33's report. Afro-Asians and LAs were impatient as to the impotence of the 19th GA, and US shld not destroy para 11. 10. Goldberg said US will do its best to solve whole problem. Comments: 11. Morsov continued to refer to Afro-Asian proposal, which only provided for not raising Art 19 during “present session,” but talked about necessity of “guarantee” that Art 19 not be applied ever. 12. Morosov ducked Goldberg question as to Sov frame of mind or spirit regarding amending UN finances. 13. There was no threat, overt or implied, that Sovs were withdrawing their “acceptance” of the Afro-Asian proposal. During Comite of 33 mtgs and in corridors, Fedorenko had occasionally hinted that it might be withdrawn. 14. There was no mention of regular budget or bond issue. 15. There can be no guarantee that, if US were in effect to agree not to raise Art 19, Sovs wld make really substantial voluntary contribution. However, chances certainly are that they wld make a contribution, and certainly Afro-Asians pressure on them wld be considerable. Opinions vary as to what amount wld be; perhaps $10 million or more, but small likelihood of any amount exceeding Art 19 benchmark. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow. 2 See footnote 3, Document 321 . 365. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 365. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 1 Washington, August 16, 1965, 4:26 p.m. 248. US Position on Article 19. Amb. Goldberg stating US position on Article 19 in Cmte of 33 on afternoon Aug. 16. In addition to speech which will be carried Wireless Bulletin, 2 you should draw upon following for guidance in informing govt to which you accredited of US position. 1. FYI: In light consultations and proceedings Cmte 33 (Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations), we conclude that requisite majority not available support enforcement Article 19 against USSR and France when GA resumes. We believe it not in our interests any longer carry ball on Article 19. Even closest allies are changing course and number have informed us they unwilling support us any further. End FYI. 2. Following are main points in our statement Cmte 33: (a) Principle of collective financial responsibility and right of GA to assess for “expenses of the Organization” under Article 17 is clear. Art 19 clearly applies to Congo and Middle East peacekeeping assessments. (b) We continue adhere to Articles 17 and 19, and believe various GA decisions taken to establish and finance peacekeeping and to protect GA prerogatives were sound and remain valid. (c) However, responsibility for protecting GA assessment power rests on membership at large. Issue of applicability Art 19 in this situation is for GA to decide. From history of 19th GA and membership attitudes we conclude that at this state GA not disposed apply loss-of-vote sanction to present situation. (d) “The United States adheres to the position that Article 19 is applicable in the present circumstances. It is clear, however, that we are faced with a simple and inescapable fact of life which I have cited. Moreover, every parliamentary body must decide, in one way or another, the issues that come before it; otherwise, it will have no useful existence, and soon no life. Therefore, without prejudice to the position that Article 19 is applicable, the United States recognizes, as it must, that the General Assembly is not prepared to apply Article 19 in the present situation and that the consensus of the membership is that the Assembly should proceed normally. We will not seek to frustrate that consensus, since it is not in the world interest to have the work of the General Assembly immobilized in these troubled days. At the same time, we must make clear that if any Member can insist on making an exception to the principle of collective financial responsibility with respect to certain activities of the Organization, the United States reserves the same option to make exceptions if, in our view, strong and compelling reasons exist for doing so. There can be no double standard among the members of the Organization.” 3. Important this not be interpreted as retreat or capitulation by US on principles involved. We adhere to position Art 19 applicable in present circumstances and we disclaim responsibility for GA's attitude which had developed contrary to views we still hold valid. Responsibility for decision not to enforce Art 19 rests on Membership. We prepared see principle collective financial responsibility put into practice to extent requisite majority will support. But if principle not upheld by GA there can be no double standard. 4. We believe UN must not be hamstrung and that its full capacities for peace, including residual GA peacekeeping powers, must be available, particularly at this time of world tensions. 5. No attempt should be made to elaborate or speculate on fuller meaning of our action or reservation we making re future as set forth in Cmte 33 statement, para 2d, above. Wording carefully designed put responsibility for applying Art 19 on shoulders GA, reserve options for future, maintain flexibility re exceptions we might make in future re payment for certain activities “if, in our view, strong and compelling reasons exist for doing so.” 6. On related aspects following is our position: (a) We oppose cancelling or reducing debts of delinquents directly or indirectly even though these debts remain uncollectable. (b) UN still has problem of restoring solvency. Every effort should be made to raise sufficient funds, especially from those who have not contributed to UN peacekeeping operations. (c) We are willing to join in helping strengthen UN and assist in future peacekeeping operations. If raised, you should say that there are no present plans for the US to make a voluntary contribution. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, Administrative Histories, Department of State During the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 2, Part 5. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Pelcovits on August 16; cleared in AF, NEA, EUR, ARA, UNP, and L/UNA; and approved by Sisco. 2 For text, see Department of State Bulletin , September 13, 1965, pp. 454–457. 366. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 366. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, September 10, 1965, 2312Z. 713. Subject: Financing of UN Bonds. 1. At 20th GA session we will face in Fifth Comite 2 question of how to handle financing (i.e., payment of principal and interest) of UN bond issue. While UN bond res [A/RES/1739(XVI)] 3 provides that amount sufficient to pay principal and interest be included annually in regular budget, and this has been done thus far, Sov bloc as well as France have deducted from their annual regular budget assessment payments, amounts equivalent to their share of such principal and interest. They have attempted to justify these withholdings, which now total about $3.3 million for 1964 and prior years, on the ground that bond issue was designed principally to finance expenses of ONUC and UNEF to which they object. As of now we can expect Sov bloc and France to continue in Fifth Comite to insist that provisions for bond interest and principal be removed from regular budget. 2. Many developing countries can be expected support proposal remove bond financing provisions from expenditure sections of budget since they contend bond proceeds were used primarily for financing ONUC and UNEF (and this is true) and that expenses of these operations should not have been included in regular budget and assessed on basis of regular scale of assessments, but should have been financed on same special basis used for financing ONUC and UNEF during other periods—under which LDC's paid far less than regular scale. 3. There is considerable sentiment among developed countries and more responsible developing countries to find new way to handle financing of bond issue which will: (A) Ensure repayment of bonds, (B) Avoid question of applicability of Art 19 arising in future with respect to nonpayment of assessments for bonds, and (C) Be acceptable to Sov bloc and France as well as majority of membership. 4. SYG has been studying this problem and possibility of financing bond issue from misc income of UN. He has run into problem that annual principal and interest payments amount to about $8.6 million, whereas annual misc income amounts to about only $6.5 million, and as result he has indicated belief solution through use of misc income would be feasible only if period of amortization of bond issue extended another five years, i.e., to thirty years. We opposed any such extension. 5. In our view, misc income approach—properly used—has fair chance of resolving problem in manner highly desirable in terms of US interests. Objective should be to find solution which: (A) USSR and France can acquiesce in and agree to, with as little loss of face as possible, as part of overall solution of UN financial problem; (B) Does not require changing UN bond Res 1739, i.e., continues basic responsibility for repayment of bonds as obligation of regular budget; (C) Does not impair provision that US “deduct from annual payment of assessed share of United States of budget of United Nations an amount equal to corresponding” amount due US each year on bonds. (P.L. 87–731, Oct 2, 1962); (D) Does not change term of bonds, e.g., from twenty-five to thirty years maturity; and (E) Gives added security to repayment of bonds and to integrity of regular budget. 6. It should be quite possible to use misc income approach to achieve objective provided there is agreement to use, in addition to misc income, the annual regular budget surpluses, plus whatever small additional amount of staff assessment income might be required. Annual regular budget surpluses have varied in amount from $1.3 to $2.6 million in the 1960–1964 period and have averaged about $2 million. Thus, use of surpluses should substantially fill gap between total of misc income and amount required for annual principal and interest payments. However, should some portion of gap remain, we calculate it should be possible to draw annually on staff assessment income for this purpose to extent of $1.2 million without creating any income tax reimbursement problem for tax equalization fund into which staff assessment income normally channeled. 7. We are aware of history of UN bond legislation in UN [US] Congress and fact that it not desirable change present UN financing procedure for bond issue if this can be avoided. Accordingly, believe our first position should be that, now that Art 19 problem has been removed with respect to ONUC and UNEF special accounts, SYG and Afro-Asians should try induce Sov bloc and France to pay assessments for all items in regular budget including bond financing. However, we have little hope of success on these efforts and believe we must be prepared move rapidly to fol position in order have any control over developments. 8. US should be prepared: (A) Agree to use misc income, regular budget surpluses, and staff assessment income—in that order—to pay interest and amortization on UN bonds, and (B) Directly, if necessary, but preferably through dels such as Canada, Mexico, and Sweden, attempt persuade SYG put forward such proposal. 9. Although there are reasons to support this proposal even if it stands alone, we should also try make it part of package. Other parts of package would be: (A) That Sov bloc agree pay all costs remaining after removal of bond issue, including peacekeeping items they have so far refused to pay, i.e., TSO Palestine (about $1.6 million), UNCURK (about $150,000), Korean Cemetery (about $50,000), and UN field service (about $1.5 million). (B) That Sov bloc agree pay for Part V (technical assistance) of regular budget in dollars or convertible currencies as they are obligated to do by UN financial regs. (Alternative would be to take this item out of regular budget altogether. Since many developing countries would strenuously object to this, we should be careful make clear that responsibility for deletion of item—should Sov bloc and France so elect—rests with Sovs and France.) 10. We should try get as much of (A) and (B) as possible but should not insist on making them conditions to agreement on bond financing per para 8. 11. We recognize it may be argued that suggested new financing approach is not consistent with bond res [A/RES/1739(SVI)] and Dept's commitment to Congress that bonds would be financed from regular budget of UN. However, we believe there are several very satisfactory answers to any such contention: (A) Present proposal would give more security that payments on bond indebtedness would be met; (B) Proposal which designates misc income, surpluses, and staff assessment income as sources of funds for financing bond issue are within intent of A/RES/1739 that an amount sufficient to pay principal and interest on bonds be included annually in regular budget. Misc income, regular budget surpluses, and staff assessment income are all dealt with each year in UN regular budget appropriation res, and they all enter into calculation of regular budget assessment of each govt; thus, use of these sources of funds produces no materially different effect from that resulting from including amounts for bond principal and interest payments in expenditure section of regular budget as is now done; and (C) If for any reason full amount due annually to US for principal and interest installments has not already been paid in cash, US can, and must under its authorizing legislation, deduct amount due from its annual payment of assessed share of UN regular budget. Thus, repayment to US would not be affected by manner in which UN accumulates funds for repayment of principal and interest. (D) This is best way known to date for getting effective, even though camouflaged, Sov bloc and French contributions to paying off bonds. 12. In order eliminate any question about regular budget being ultimately responsible for bond repayments, it would be desirable for GA action to state this specifically. But facts of life are that this compromise too must allow face saving by all parties. Therefore, we would expect somewhat ambiguous statement by SYG to Fifth Comite that, in its report to GA, Comite include recommendation along fol lines: “… funds available from UN income or regular budget surpluses of staff assessment income should first be used to pay interest and principal on UN bonds.” 13. We believe it important that this proposal not be considered as emanating from US. However, as mentioned above, SYG and number of dels, specifically Canada, Mexico, and Sweden, have shown great interest in finding some method of financing bond issue which would avoid further accumulation of arrears and Art 19 problem. We believe it possible, with help these dels, sell proposal outlined above to SYG and have him carry ball with reference to it. If this is be done, it should be done quickly before other and less sound proposals put forward formally. This is almost certainly our best hope for preserving financial soundness of UN. It may not be acceptable to Sov bloc or French, but we believe effort must be made. 14. Request instructions. 4 Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4. Confidential; Limdis. 2 The Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly. 3 Brackets in paragraphs 1 and 11 are in the source text. 4 In telegram 628 to New York, September 24, the Department of State approved the general approach set out and indicated that Sisco would meet with Goldberg to discuss implementation of Mission recommendations “prior to any action.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Article 19, Vol. 4) 367. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 367. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, September 13, 1965. SUBJECT 20th General Assembly—Strategy Session On Saturday, there was rather a large meeting in State to discuss strategy for the 20th General Assembly which is scheduled to start on September 21. Rusk chaired the meeting which included Ball, Goldberg (accompanied by assorted aides), Tommy Thompson, Mann, Butch Fisher, 2 Rostow, a number of regional and functional Assistant Secretaries, and a healthy contingent from IO. Here are the major items of discussion. 1. Major U.S. Themes at the Session and the U.S. Opening Speech —The group discussed the themes we should try to sell at the General Assembly, sporadically linking this subject with the content of the U.S. opening speech—scheduled for delivery on September 23 by Goldberg, Rusk, or conceivably the President. Rostow said that we ought to get off the defensive and be as positive as we can. First, we should stress U.S. faith in self-determination and in government by the consent of the governed; in this context, we can even use the Dominican experience positively. Second, we should be forthcoming on disarmament—e.g., willing to share responsibility and willing to guarantee those who don't have a nuclear capability. Third, we should take the lead in dramatizing the food part of the population explosion equation. Fourth, we should try to use the Great Society approach overseas. In this regard, it is important to note the major impact of the President's August 17 Alliance for Progress speech in which he made a link between the Alliance and the Great Society. Soapy Williams 3 said that the theme of self-determination is an important one for Africa. He added that we may be able to do something dramatic in the area of health as well as in the area of food. Butch Fisher described a number of disarmament proposals that could be made, many of which already had considerable interagency agreement. Goldberg said that he likes all the general themes which have been described but added that what really makes an impact is a specific, hard proposal; it matters little whether it is big or small. One possibility is to offer something specific on food or health in our opening speech. Another possibility is to propose something in the way of linking our whole aid program to the UN—i.e., the UN, acting as a sort of clearing house, would come up with lists of projects from which the U.S. could pick and choose. To a certain extent, we are already doing this sort of thing with the Mekong. Mansfield's proposal on Kashmir is also pertinent. Tommy Thompson said that we can anticipate some strong Soviet attacks on “the U.S., which regards itself as the gendarme of the world.” We should get ready for these attacks. 2. Vietnam —The group discussed the recent article by Lin Piao. Goldberg said that the paper has caused great alarm among small countries and that we should hit it hard. Rostow said that we can focus on two points with respect to the paper. First, we can show how it is an obvious attempt to exploit small nations. Second, we can put a positive tone on our attack by making the pitch that the author is not a real revolutionary, that he is only a tactician and that we are the real revolutionaries. Rusk said that, at the General Assembly, we must do a lot of lobbying with small nations on Vietnam. Moreover, we must give them a position which they can support—e.g., support of negotiations and the 1954 agreements. 3. Presidency of the General Assembly —Goldberg noted the present dilemma—in the wake of Article 19, we are anxious to keep the job away from the Eastern Europeans; our last best hope seems to be the West Europeans, but they are dancing around the issue and have not yet come up clearly with a candidate. Goldberg went on to describe an approach from the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs tell us that they want the job; they argue that they are not members of the Bloc and that they have paid their UN debts. Rusk thought that this might not be as bad as it looks. A Yugoslav might, for a while at least, take care of East European demands for the Presidency; among East Europeans, we can hardly do better than a Yugoslav. Moreover, the rulings of the President of the Assembly are not so important with Article 19 in the ice-box. Sisco agreed, and noted that, in the past, Bloc chairmen of UN bodies have been very “correct.” Tony Solomon added that the Yugoslavs will be dependent on us for assist-ance over the next couple years. The group decided to look more closely into the possibility of a Yugoslav in the Presidency. Among other things, we will have to check with the West Europeans, to whom we are committed if they come up with a candidate. Also, we will want to know whether a Yugoslav will or will not reduce future pressures for a “real” East European in the job. 4. Conference on Outer Space —Goldberg, Sisco, and Meeker felt that we should respond affirmatively to a proposal for a Conference. This proposal has been in the works for a long time and we will be in a bad light if we don't respond affirmatively; moreover, we have plenty to crow about in this field. Rostow and a NASA official pointed out that there are some drawbacks. Inter alia, the Conference will be proposed for 1967 and this year will probably be a good one for the Russians—it marks the 10th anniversary of Sputnik and the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Also, the rhythm of our space program as opposed to the Russian space program is such that we will probably not look our best in 1967. The group agreed to study this one some more, keeping in mind the possibility of shifting the Conference to 1968. Rusk noted that, in this review, we should take a hard look at what such a conference will cost. 5. Kashmir 4 —Goldberg said that U Thant will probably be in Delhi on Sunday, that he will probably report back during the middle of the week and that the Security Council will probably focus on the issue on Friday (September 17), at the earliest. Goldberg went on to describe the New York atmosphere with regard to the Indian position—i.e., a cease-fire and then sweep the issue under the rug with no discussion of the underlying problem. First, Adebo 5 had told the Indians that they will never get away with this position and that, when U Thant returns to New York, the Indians better be ready for some heat. Second, with the exception of the Russians, who are not entirely clear on this matter, everyone on the Security Council will be anxious to get involved in the underlying Kashmir issue. Sisco added that the Pakistanis always have the option of bringing the issue to the General Assembly, where there would be overwhelming support in favor of getting involved in the underlying issue. Rostow (with Mann concurring) made the point that we have to be very careful how this one comes out—in effect, whatever comes out (a) should be politically tolerable for Shastri and (b) should not make it seem as though Ayub's aggression “has worked,” and that he can “have all this and China too.” In this regard, we should work on ways of putting Kashmir in a larger package, which will include a few costs for Pakistan. 6. World Disarmament Conference —Goldberg pointed out that there is strong sentiment for this sort of a Conference in the General Assembly and that we probably can't head it off. We should work hard in channeling this sentiment into the direction we want. 7. Chinese Representation —Goldberg said that USUN is more pessimistic than Washington and thinks that our chances are no better than 50–50 that we will be able to win a simple majority. We may well have to rely on the “important question” route. And, if this happens, we better watch out—the psychological impact of losing a simple majority could change the whole Chirep equation. Goldberg went on to say that we ought to be doing some very hard thinking on this entire question. Some members of the group noted that the present particularly bellicose attitude of the Chinese should help us on this issue. Others disagreed, noting that some General Assembly delegates feel that this is precisely why the Chinese should be in the UN. 8. UN Finances —Goldberg said that there is support in the Secretariat for using the miscellaneous income of the UN to pay off the bonds; assessments could be increased to make up for this transfer. Rusk noted that this is a flim-flam which the Russians will put up with only if they want to. Goldberg thought that the Soviets might be willing—in view of the facts (a) that the Secretariat is pushing the idea and (b) that it is probable that the Secretariat has already sounded out the Russians on the question. With regard to the annual UNEF expenses, Ambassador Yost noted that we would like to cut down the annual cost from $18 million to $10 or $11 million and that we would like to arrange it so that this is an assessment, or at least an apportionment. Rusk said that this is precisely the kind of problem that should be thrown to the Secretary-General. We are not the bill-collector for the UN. 9. South Africa and Apartheid —Goldberg said that we must do something about our posture on this issue and went on to propose that the U.S. Government announce publicly a voluntary program to curb U.S. investment in South Africa. The proposal brought forth a number of reservations. Rusk said that moving into the human rights field with sanctions poses some tough problems and wondered what we are prepared to do about, for instance, Eastern Europe, Liberia, and countries with one-party regimes. Ball said that we could not expect the British to join us in this effort, and that the South Africans would surely retaliate in one way or another; as a matter of fact, there might be actions South Africa could take in the economic field that would really hurt. Ball went on to say that a voluntary program wouldn't work anyway. Others noted the ambiguity of the Africans themselves, some of whom still trade with South Africa. Goldberg rebutted. It is true that we can't solve all the human rights problems of the world, but apartheid is something special; its enormity makes it so. We simply must square our position on this issue with our efforts in this area in our own country. And remember, we are not talking about sanctions but about a voluntary program. Soapy Williams supported Goldberg, noting that such a program would make us a lot more credible with the Africans. He went on to rebut the argument that such a voluntary program wouldn't work. Among other things, he said that banks are frequently asked by potential investors about prospects in South Africa and that the banks, at present, cannot discourage these people because “the Government has not taken a stance.” Williams went on to say that his talks with one big investor—Engelhart (phonetic) 6 —indicate that he probably would not have gone in to South Africa had he clearly known our views. 10. Rusk and the General Assembly —Rusk said that he plans to be in New York for about ten days. GC 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Secret. Copies were sent to Bator, Cooper, Johnson, Keeny, and Komer. 2 Llewellyn Thompson, Thomas Mann, and Adrian Fisher. 3 G. Mennen Williams. 4 The long simmering Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir escalated into armed conflict on September 1 when Pakistani forces attacked Indian positions. For documentation regarding U.S. efforts to achieve a cease-fire, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XXV . After prolonged talks, the two states agreed to and implemented a cease-fire on September 22. 5 Chief S.O. Adebo of the Nigerian delegation to the General Assembly, Chairman of the Fifth Committee's Working Group. 6 Presumably Charles W. Englehard, Jr. 368. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) 368. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) 1 September 18, 1965, 1:27 p.m. [Here follows discussion unrelated to United Nations issues.] LBJ: Now, two or three things on my part. AG: Yeah. LBJ: You got a pencil there— AG: Yes, I do. LBJ: You want to take some notes? I said to the group the other day that we are not pro labor—the steel people or pro business. We are pro— AG: [Inaudible] LBJ: —pro freedom, pro freedom. Now, we're not pro Pakistani, we're not pro India, we're pro freedom in the world. AG: Right. LBJ: We're for any nation—every nation—determining what it wants to do and then being left alone— AG: Right. LBJ: —free from aggression. We're not even going to tell the North Vietnamese what they got to do or the Chinese what they got to do— AG: Right. LBJ: Now, we feel that very, very strongly. My own personal opinion is, that the twenty years that the UN has been in existence, it has not had a fair shake. I don't think that Austin, 2 and I don't think that Lodge 3 and I don't think that Stevenson ever got over the fact that we just couldn't fight any more wars, and we had to settle them some way, and this is the best way to settle them. Now, Morse 4 says we oughtn't to be so strong for UN settling Pakistan and India, and then being gangsters so far as Vietnam is concerned. Well, I don't know whether—I didn't get us into Vietnam and that was behind me before I got into it. AG: Yeah. LBJ: But now, when I asked you to go off the Court— AG: Yes. LBJ: I didn't do it to liquidate the UN. 5 When I backed up and agreed to a new position, 6 which was humiliating for me to do, I didn't do it because I wanted to liquidate it—if I'd wanted to liquidate it, I'd have just let it go on as it was and it would go. Now, my whole purpose and my primary objective is to try to finally do an education job on the world that we can't fight another war, whatever else you say. If we can, we got to resolve it some way and this is the only way I know to resolve it, or at least the best way I know to resolve it. So we've got to give them standing and prestige and so forth— AG: Right. LBJ: So the President of the United States, the most powerful country in the world, and the United States is standing there and getting down on its knees, and not standing ten feet tall, but even standing lower than U Thant of Burma, to support him all the way on this thing. And we are transferring from the White House, up to the United Nations, our positions. So I told Bill Moyers to tell these folks that we can't be dealing under the table and carrying on little private negotiations with Pakistan, a little private one with India and a little private one with somebody else who is dealing between the two of them, while this man, his prestige, and his organization, and all of them are trying to work with the other nations of the world. We are really leaning over to try to go along with DeGaulle, to try to go along with the Russians if there is any way in the world we can. Now, in that process, it's very important that you educate—and I think the basic qualification that you've got that the others have not had is two-fold. One is you don't point up the areas of disagreement, you find the areas that we can agree on and any damn fool can disagree on forty things. AG: Yes. LBJ: But the few things we can agree on, you search them out. Second is, I think that you can get over your viewpoint better to the country and to the public. So, I would like for you to say—Moyers said it this morning—“the position of the United States is as communicated by Goldberg yesterday upon advice and counsel and instructions of the President.” AG: Right. LBJ: That's being done up there. We're not going to do it here. We're not going to do it at the State Department here, not going to do it with Ambassadors here, not going to do it with Pakistan and India here or out there. It's going to be done up there. So you and Rusk get together. Be sure you are in agreement then [break in conversation] even after the Council meeting, and any time you can, I'd give them the damnedest slug of information that they ever got about the United States supporting the United Nations and trying to build up the United Nations every way in the world you can, and then you try to be on that front page every morning right along with the Russians— AG: Right. LBJ: —in language that the cab driver can understand better than he can the Russians about how much you want peace. They say we don't want peace because I don't give out an interview every day. AG: Right. LBJ: Now, I don't give out an interview every day because it makes you look like a midget if I'm handling down here and you're just popping off up there. AG: Right. LBJ: So I'm trying to get it transferred where you speak for us— AG: Right. LBJ: —that we pull all of our folks together. AG: Right. LBJ: But in order to do that, you've got to get out all these columnists—now, you were going to do that for me on the steel thing, you never did get around to doing it because it never did come through and you got busy in India and Pakistan, and I never saw all these liberals— AG: Did you get the letters that— LBJ: I got the letters, but I'm talking about the columns. AG: Yes. LBJ: You remember what I told you. You got involved in Pakistan. We struck out on that. We'll do it again next time. Let's don't strike out on this though. AG: Did Drew come through? LBJ: No, ain't nobody come through. You just get busy on this— AG: Yeah. LBJ: —and be sure that before you go in your Council, after you get out of your Council, wherever you are— AG: Yeah. LBJ: —that you're backgrounding, talking to them and having hopes and strengths— AG: Right. LBJ: —here's the problem and that you are saying every breath “we think the Pakistan people ought to have a cease-fire until we can pull this thing. We think India ought to do it.” What's good for the goose is good for the gander. Hold the two of them, be equal to both. Strictly neutral. Pull them together. No threats. But they've got to—they just can't afford to have this World War III and they just—people are still paying for World War II and World War I, and they can't have that kind of crime around their necks. AG: Right. LBJ: And you give plenty of information. And every day, say “I just talked to the President, I just talked to the Secretary of State,” and you can talk to Bundy and to Bill Moyers, when I'm in other things. And to me. AG: Right. LBJ: But be sure that you are talking to them every day so that we can put everything we've got behind the United Nations in this endeavor. Now Bill wants to say something. [Bill Moyers on the telephone, LBJ reading news article] LBJ: “The arena is at the United Nations—” AG: Right. LBJ: “—Moyers said.” AG: Right. LBJ: This was his—where I asked him to do yesterday and today. “Meanwhile, the official said, Johnson, for the President, was avoiding any specific comment on India, Pakistan, Red China, lest he create an inaccurate impression on U Thant that this country is proceeding on one course while the Secretary General has embarked on another.” AG: Right. LBJ: “Our attitude, Moyers said, is that the entire proposition rests in the UN where it should be. Moyers added that the President continued to hope that the UN could produce a quick and positive result which would lead to restoration.” I want him to quit hoping so much. “Johnson's time was greatly occupied with studying,” and so forth. “Barring a change of heart, he will stay here.” Now, I think you ought to use this with U Thant. I think you ought to just say “this represents a dramatic”— AG: Yes. LBJ: —“constructive move on the part of my government, that the President and the Secretary of State have said that where he leads us, we will follow. We will support this man.” They turn him down and kick him in the ass, but we're going to put our arm around him, and you just tell us which way you'd go, and we'd support you as best we can. AG: Right. Now, Mr. President, have you seen me on television on this subject? LBJ: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. AG: All right. LBJ: I think it's good, too. AG: Bill, have you got a copy of the speech I made last night at the lawyers? 7 LBJ: No. I can tell you. Bill, he's asking you? BM: Yes, sir? LBJ: Bill is busy talking with a more important— BM: I, I saw it Mr. Ambassador— AG: Yeah. BM: —in The Washington Post this morning. There is a fuller account of it in the Star this afternoon. AG: Yeah. Get a hold—I made a complete statement on this Kashmir thing where it's just what the President has been saying— LBJ: Well, you get the Pauline Fredericks in and you get all of them in and you saturate— AG: Right. LBJ: I think the John Birchers are getting more publicity than United Nations. I've been watching it for two days here and I saw you sitting there listening to them and writing some notes and then I saw you read a statement which was very good and positive. But I—Benson drowns you out. 8 He's over at headquarters at the John Birch Society down here. AG: Mr. President, I'll do that. I'm doing it every day. LBJ: Good. AG: Can you do something for me? LBJ: Yes sir. AG: What the hell is Wayne Hays carrying a torch against me? LBJ: No, he can't. Well, because, it's like saying what the hell is Wayne Morse against— AG: Right. LBJ: —steel companies. AG: No, I'll take care of Wayne Morse. LBJ: Yeah. AG: I've taken care of him three or four times. LBJ: Well, there ain't nobody can take care of Wayne Morse or Wayne Hays. AG: Well, I'll take care of him partially. At least he didn't jump on us over the UN business. LBJ: No. AG: And, he was, he threatened to. And I'll get a hold of him. 1 Source:Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg, September 18, 1965, 1:27 p.m., Tape 65.04, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. Goldberg called the President from New York City. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 Warren Austin, Representative to the United Nations, 1947–1953. 3 Henry Cabot Lodge, Representative to the United Nations, 1953–1960. 4 Senator Wayne Morse (D-Oregon). 5 Reference is to the Article 19 dispute. 6 See Document 365 . 7 No transcript of the Goldberg speech was found. President Johnson also addressed the group. For text of his September 16 address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pp. 999–1002. 8 Former Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson. 369. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 369. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 20, 1965, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Meeting at 5:30 PM-Kashmir and 20th UN General Assembly At 5:30 today you will be meeting with Rusk, Goldberg, Sisco, and me to discuss Kashmir and issues that are likely to come up at the 20th UN General Assembly, which opens tomorrow. 2 1. Kashmir —It is likely that Goldberg will want to give you a current report on and talk about Kashmir. In fact, this item may take up a large part of the meeting. 2. Goldberg's Opening Speech on September 23 . 3 Goldberg may want to discuss with you the themes of his opening speech to the General Assembly (e.g. Great Society; peace keeping; disarmament; economic development) and especially the following two proposals. (a) Forthcoming noises on certain disarmament questions—e.g., nuclear safeguards for non-nuclear countries; destruction of nuclear weapons; a World Disarmament Conference which would include the Chinese Communists. In this latter regard, there are those who would argue that soft noises to the Communist Chinese on the heels of a Chinese threat to the Indians would constitute poor timing. (b) Proposals to channel more aid through the UN mechanism—e.g., an expansion of the Mekong idea. Note : In the event Goldberg does raise these specific proposals in the context of his opening speech, you may want to discourage Goldberg from making any bold specific proposals which could be more usefully made by you from either an appropriate Washington or New York forum. On disarmament, I fear there is not much we can wisely add to our present position. On AID we must be careful to protect your right to review next year's programs and reach your own decisions. If you are pressed for time, Goldberg says you can stop with these matters. If you want to hear further discussion, it will probably be on the subjects as follows: 3. Presidency of the General Assembly —State will probably want to report to you on the status of the fight between Fanfani (Italy) and Popovic (Yugoslavia) for the Presidency of the General Assembly. The latest word today is that Popovic has withdrawn and that the way has been cleared for Fanfani. 4. Vietnam —While not inscribed as a General Assembly agenda item, State will probably want to red-flag the Vietnam issue, which will provide an important backdrop to the General Assembly session. In this regard, Chinese threats and/or moves, against India can be expected to mitigate the heat we receive on Vietnam. 5. Chinese Representation —State may want to report to you that we are safe on this issue for another year. Goldberg, while agreeing, may make the point that we have no better than a 50–50 chance to get a simple majority against the entrance of the Communist Chinese and that the psychological impact of losing a simple majority could conceivably make it tough for us to get the necessary votes to uphold the “important question” principle. 6. Apartheid —Goldberg may make a pitch on doing something in the near future to indicate that the U.S. Government is firmly against apartheid— 4 e.g., announce publicly a voluntary program to curb U.S. investment in South Africa. If he does, Rusk will probably point out a number of reservations-that moving into the human rights field with sanctions poses tough problems with regard to such other areas as Eastern Europe; that it probably wouldn't work; and that the South Africans could probably retaliate meaningfully in one way or another. While my own sympathies lie with Goldberg on this issue I do not think we should consider anything drastic until later on when we have had a chance to take the UN temperature and when the International Court of Justice finishes with the related South West Africa issue in the spring of 1966. 7. Miscellaneous Issues—Rusk and Goldberg may want to take the opportunity to brief you on such miscellaneous items as UN financing and UN outer space problems (e.g. World Conference on Outer Space). McG.B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Confidential. 2 According to the President's Daily Diary, he met in the Oval Office from 5:58 to 6:42 p.m. with Rusk, Bundy, Goldberg, McNamara, Ball, and Moyers. (Johnson Library) No record of the conversation was found. 3 For text, see Department of State Bulletin , October 11, 1965, pp. 578–587. 4 The section of Goldberg's speech dealing with this question had been subjected to some editing within the Department of State. Komer supported, and President Johnson approved, the modifications. (Memorandum from Komer to Johnson, September 22; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2) 370. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 370. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, September 29, 1965. SUBJECT U.S. Payments to the UN 1. Because we had a “no vote” 19th General Assembly, the UN has been operating during calendar year 1965 on a regular budget which has not yet been approved by the General Assembly. To get money for this budget, the Assembly, in February, asked members to make advance payments toward the 1965 budget to the tune of 80% of their 1964 assessments. 2. So far, 43 governments have made some sort of advance contribution to the 1965 budget, including the Russians who have so far kicked in an advance of roughly 30% of their assessments in 1964; the Russians are expected to pay the bulk of the balance of their regular budget assessments in 1965 as they have in the past (but not peacekeeping-related expenses). Up to now, we have made no advance contribution. 3. This afternoon Goldberg is going to make an advance payment of $24 million towards our 1965 assessments; this represents 80% of our 1964 assessments, plus $4.5 million for UNEF, less $3.9 million owed to us for bond repayment. We are doing this now because (a) the UN needs the money and (b) we want our name to appear on a financial statement which the Secretary General is putting out in the very near future. State feels that our skirts are relatively clean with regard to Congress. We have notified Congress about what we are doing. Moreover, State points out that when Congress appropriated money for the regular UN budget and UNEF, they knew that the UN budget had not yet been approved and that the General Assembly had asked for advance contributions. Nevertheless, they made no stipulations about advance payments and were aware that they might occur. 4. State wanted us informed on this issue on the very slight chance that Goldberg's delivery of the money (which will be low key) causes any adverse reaction in Congress or in the press. If it does, we will take the line (a) that our payment, in line with a General Assembly resolution, merely represents an advance payment on assessments which we are going to have to pay this year anyway, (b) that the UN needs the advance money, and (c) that 43 other countries, including the Russians, have joined us in this effort. GC 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, IT 47 UN. Confidential. 371. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 371. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, October 22, 1965. SUBJECT UN Financing In the event you are interested, here are some points on the UN's financial problems. Essentially, there are two fairly important issues at the present time—(a) repayment of the bonds and (b) the Secretary General's efforts to get $100 million from the UN membership. 1. The Bonds —Under present procedures, the UN budget assessment for the repayment of the bonds runs at the rate of $8.6 million per year (of which $3.8 million is owed to the U.S.). The UN is now in the fourth year of a 25-year repayment schedule. The crux of the present problem is that the Russians and some others have been refusing to pay their share of assessments for the bonds on the grounds that they are a peacekeeping expense and should be paid for by voluntary contributions. We disagree; among other things, if a system of voluntary contributions is instituted, we conceivably may have trouble getting the $3 million per year which is owed to us and which we get now by simply subtracting this amount from our annual UN budget assessment. Also, a voluntary system might give us trouble with Congress, which approved the original bond purchase on the understanding that repayment would be from the regular UN budget. The bond problem will probably be resolved, one way or another, in Committee 5 within the next couple weeks. Present indications are that there may be an attempt to use the UN budget's “miscellaneous income” to pay off the bonds. This is a flim-flam which would not pain us and which would provide a fig leaf for the Russians if they wanted to be forthcoming on the bonds. We don't know yet, however, whether the Russians in fact want to be forthcoming. If they are not forthcoming, we still think we will be able to avoid the unattractive voluntary contribution system for bond repayment—e.g. at worst, we can probably continue with the present arrangement which means that we get our $3 million per year and that the Russians keep piling up a debt on bond assessments. 2. Secretary General's Efforts —The Secretary General has said that the UN needs roughly $100 million. About $80 million of voluntary contributions are needed to pay old bills ($5.3 million is owed to us) and to restore the UN Working Capital Fund, while $18 million of voluntary contributions and assessments are needed to pay UNEF expenses for 1965. So far, U Thant has collected $28 million, which includes $4.5 from us for assessed UNEF expenses. The Secretary General still feels he needs about $70 million. His chances of getting this amount depend in large part on what the Russians do—i.e. if they come through with a large voluntary contribution, others may follow close behind. The Russian contribution, in turn, probably depends partly on how the bond repayment issue comes out in the GA; if the Russians are fairly satisfied, there are some indications that they are prepared to contribute as much as $15 million. The U.S. position at this time on voluntary contributions is fairly relaxed. While we are not saying it publicly, we think that U Thant's statistics have holes in them. Even if they are correct, the UN financial situation is not very desperate. It has been much worse in the past. At this time, we are not thinking about giving any voluntary contributions to U Thant; we feel that we did our bit when we caved on Article 19 and that others should do their part. Only if voluntary contributions start coming in from everyone else (including the Russians) might we be willing to help. In this regard, one painless way of helping would be to simply waive reimbursement on the $5.3 million which is owed to us. GC 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential. 372. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 372. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 1 New York, October 27, 1965. Dear Mr. President: The Secretary-General has raised with me the matter of the failure of the United States to accede to the United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities approved by the General Assembly in 1946, 2 and he has asked me to bring this matter to your personal attention. He considers it most important for the United States to accede to this Convention in order to fill certain gaps in the protections afforded to the Organization and its members. I am enclosing a copy of the Aide Mémoire prepared by the Secretary-General's Legal Counsel setting forth his views on this matter. 3 This Convention was submitted to the Congress in 1947, and it was deferred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They issued reports recommending approval. However, no final action was taken. The principal effect of accession to the Convention would be to provide full diplomatic privileges and immunities for the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretaries of the United Nations and to provide immunity from arrest for delegates to the General Assembly and other temporary meetings. I am advised that the Justice Department has some reservations about extending immunity from arrest to General Assembly delegates, but I do not share these. I am attaching a memorandum of my views on this matter. The United States has been criticized both privately and publicly at the United Nations for its failure to accede to the Convention, particularly since 92 other Member States have acceded to it. Lists of those acceding and those not yet parties are attached. I share the Secretary-General's strong view that the United States should accede to this Convention and I recommend that it be resubmitted to the Congress for approval. 4 Sincerely, Arthur J. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol 3. Confidential. 2 For text, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949 , pp. 125–129. 3 None of the attachments is printed. 4 In a November 9 letter to Goldberg, Bundy reported on the state of efforts to steer confirmation of this treaty through Congress. He also stated that Goldberg's letter had not been forwarded to the President pending completion of staff work. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3) Goldberg concurred in this decision in a letter of November 12 to Bundy. (Ibid.) The Senate did not take action on the treaty. 373. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 373. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, November 20, 1965. SUBJECT World Disarmament Conference 1. Attached is a cable from Goldberg and Foster 2 which recommends that we support immediately a Preparatory Commission for the WDC, composed of the 5 nuclear states, plus 4 or 5 others. Goldberg and Foster feel that the Chicoms will either refuse to participate in such a Preparatory Commission or will be obdurate. 3 This in turn will bring us beneficial returns on both the WDC and on the Chirep issues. On the other hand, if we continue to give the impression that we are not willing to have the Chicoms participate in disarmament outside the UN, it will only increase the determination of the WDC supporters to bring the Chicoms into the UN. 2. Bill Buffum (Joe Sisco's deputy) on a preliminary basis thinks that the tactic is a sound one and that there is a good chance that Ball and your brother 4 will buy it. Joe Sisco hopes to meet with Ball about the matter on Sunday. 5 GC 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Nations, Vol. 1. Secret. For additional documentation on the U.S. position on a world disarmament conference, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XI . 2 Not found. 3 McGeorge Bundy wrote “OK” in the margin next to this sentence. 4 William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. 5 November 21. 374. Memorandum of Conversation 374. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 7, 1965, noon. SUBJECT Viet-Nam PARTICIPANTS UN—Secretary General U Thant UN—Under Secretary Ralph Bunche State—Under Secretary George Ball USUN—Ambassador Goldberg (in part); Mr. Richard Pedersen State—Assistant Secretary Sisco State—Mr. George Springsteen Mr. Ball opened his courtesy call on the Secretary General by telling him there was a solid group of admirers of the Secretary General in Washington, and that we believe he is doing a difficult job admirably. We want to be helpful to him in achieving his objectives. Mr. Ball explained that his visit was part of a program of more regular visits to the UN by high level officers from the Department, including regional assistant secretaries over the next ten days. The Secretary General thanked Mr. Ball warmly and commented how very helpful Ambassador Goldberg has been and how quickly he has grasped the essentials of the work in New York. He asked Mr. Ball to convey to the President the Secretary General's belief that the President had made an excellent choice in bringing Ambassador Goldberg to the UN. The Secretary General then immediately launched into Viet-Nam at his own initiative, inviting Mr. Ball to make any comments that he wished. Mr. Ball informed the Secretary General that Mr. Rusk was today in Texas to discuss a number of matters with the President, including Viet-Nam. 2 He noted that the Secretary also would be reporting today on the Secretary General's conversation of last week with Ambassador Goldberg. 3 Mr. Ball stressed that we do not want to overlook any possibilities for bringing the Viet-Nam problem to a peaceful resolution, and that a complete canvass of the question would be made in the Texas conversations, including the possibility of further diplomatic initiatives. The Secretary General, almost without interruption, then went into a detailed rundown of the efforts he has made in the interest of a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam problem, since August of a year ago, expressing regret that they did not succeed. He said pointedly one thing continues to trouble him: was the President aware of his suggestions? Mr. Ball responded that the President was aware of the Secretary General's suggestions and that they were considered in the light of diplomatic possibilities then pending—though perhaps these suggestions might not have been as clearly explained to Washington as they should have been. The Secretary General said he didn't know what role he now could play since indications are that Hanoi would not respond to any attempts by him now. He has not made any attempts to contact Peking in the last two years. He had felt that there was some prospect of contact with the Chinese in Algeria this past year since Ben Bella had invited the Secretary General to go there. When Chou En-lai arrived in Algeria, however, he told Ben Bella that he would object to meeting with the Secretary General as Secretary General, though he would not object to seeing him as an individual. This attitude on the part of Peking was confirmed when Chou left Algeria and stopped off in Burma to see Ne Win who advised Chou that he should see the Secretary General. The Secretary General indicated that he knows both Chou and Mao Tse Tung very well. He also knows Ho Chi Minh. He recalled that he spent two days with Ho in 1954 when he accompanied U Nu to Peking, and he had a three-fold impression of him at that time: (a) that Ho Chi Minh was not a communist, (b) that he was not pro-Chinese (this fact was confirmed to the Secretary General by all of the ICC representatives, particularly the Indian), and (c) that he had a strong attachment for everything French. The Secretary General then recalled his conversations with General De Gaulle in the summer of 1964 saying that he had endorsed publicly De Gaulle's proposal for a neutralized Southeast Asia. 4 Mr. Ball recalled that he, too, had talked to De Gaulle a year ago in June 5 and had found himself in agreement on a number of aspects of the Viet-Nam problem with De Gaulle though not on a number of the procedural aspects. Mr. Ball recalled that he had asked De Gaulle what was meant by a neutralized Southeast Asia. If it included withdrawal of forces of both sides, we could contemplate such a thing. If neutralization meant that the neutralized state would abstain from joining any alliances, this also could be contemplated. If it meant that the state might agree not to maintain any foreign bases on its soil, this was also possible. Finally, General De Gaulle had accepted the principle that a sovereign state must have the right to call for outside support if threatened by aggression. But, said Mr. Ball while De Gaulle was prepared to concur with an acceptable definition of neutrality he did not offer any workable means of bringing about a peace based on these principles. The result was a point of divergence between ourselves and France. General De Gaulle's only procedural proposal was the calling of a big conference of 30–35 nations in which the problems of Southeast Asia could be submerged. Mr. Ball said we could contemplate a conference if it would be based on the principles he cited above and if the conference dealt realistically with the cessation of infiltration and aggression in South Viet-Nam. It was on this point that De Gaulle's answers were unsatisfactory. The General's only proposal was that a cease-fire should begin the day the conference convened. De Gaulle was confident that once a cease-fire was called Ho Chi Minh would not fire a shot thereafter. Mr. Ball had replied that this was not in accordance with experience. What we faced in South Viet-Nam was not the classical confrontation of armies in regular formation but a war in which the aggressors and the defenders were all mixed up geographically. Under those circumstances it was very hard to see how a cease-fire could be effectively arranged—and once arranged how it could be policed. Mr. Ball was confident that unless a cease-fire was enforceable Ho Chi Minh would continue his guerrilla warfare and thus make a mockery of the negotiation. The Secretary General said that his July meeting with De Gaulle had not dealt with these difficult modalities, and he had the impression that De Gaulle had in mind an Austrian-type neutrality. Both the Secretary General and Mr. Ball agreed that General De Gaulle in these respective conversations had not given any indication that he had had any kind of positive signal from Hanoi or that the views expressed regarding the neutralization of Southeast Asia were anything other than the views of General De Gaulle. The Secretary General then turned to his meeting with Secretary Rusk in Washington in August of 1964 6 in which he said he sought to emphasize the point that a private dialogue (he says the word negotiation is anathema to the other side) would be necessary between the United States and Hanoi. From this meeting the Secretary General got the impression that Washington was generally receptive to talks with the other side, although he admitted that no definite assurances were given. As soon as he had returned from his Washington talks he arranged to contact Ho Chi Minh through the USSR. He had informed the USSR that he wanted only Hanoi contacted with a view to seeing whether it was possible to get the Americans and North Vietnamese together in exploratory talks. He was confident that Peking did not know of this at that time and that the secret was kept from Peking for many months. He said he had received a reply in three weeks through the USSR (September 1964). The USSR had informed him that Ho Chi Minh would be glad to send a representative anywhere the Americans wanted. The Secretary General also said that the DRV was thinking in terms of Ambassadorial level talks through each country's local representatives. The Secretary General had asked Stevenson to convey this to Washington and both he and Stevenson had agreed that this was an opportunity that should be seized. Thereafter he met Stevenson at least once every week. 7 Stevenson could say nothing, however, except that he had received no reply from Washington. He said Stevenson never mentioned McNamara at any time regarding these suggestions, and Mr. Ball confirmed that Mr. McNamara was not aware of these proposals. On December 2 Thant entered the hospital to have his ulcer treated and he and Stevenson lost contact three weeks. At the end of December he asked Stevenson if he had received a reply and Stevenson said he had no reply as yet. The Secretary General said that after his return from Jamaica he met again with Stevenson on January 11 or 12. Stevenson had then asked the Secretary General at what place and at what level the conversations might take place. The Secretary General said he discussed four possibilities with Stevenson (Cambodia, France, Burma, Pakistan). He and Stevenson agreed that Burma would be best—with the level of representation to be the Ambassador on the spot since this would reduce the visibility. (Moreover, the Secretary General said that he held Ambassador Byroade in highest regard.) The Secretary General said that he directed a query to Rangoon and that Ne Win had replied, within 24 hours, that he would be willing to provide facilities in Rangoon. This was on the 16th of January. During this period the Secretary General said he kept the Soviets regularly informed. The Soviets asked him on occasion for information regarding the United States reaction. The Secretary General said that on the 29th or 30th of January Stevenson gave the reply. Stevenson said that Washington had considered the Secretary General's suggestions fully and that it could not agree. The reason given the Secretary General by Stevenson was that the United States could not engage in discussions without the South Vietnamese since this would demoralize them and might result in another fall of the Government there. The Secretary General said that both he and Stevenson had agreed that, in view of the fact that there had been so many governmental changes in Saigon, the argument regarding the fall of government was not a persuasive one. The Secretary General said that at the end of January he transmitted our reply to Hanoi. He has since found out that Peking did not learn of all this until February of this year at which time Peking then blasted Moscow. Without mentioning the Secretary General specifically, Peking started attacking him in June or July of this year. The Secretary General said that his message must have gotten to Hanoi about February 5 when the bombing started. At his press conference on February 24 he disclosed, in answer to a question, that he had made certain suggestions to the parties and indicated that his efforts were not conclusive. 8 He informed the UK on February 16 generally of his effort and the French on February 21. He then recalled the Frye leak in the Chicago Sun Times and his affirmative response at a press conference to Don Grant's (of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch) 9 question as to whether the United States had been given the Secretary General's suggestions. With some signs of displeasure, the Secretary General then recalled the Reedy statement that the Secretary General had not made any “meaningful” proposals. Later, the Secretary General drafted the text of his cease-fire proposal and gave a copy of this appeal to Stevenson in April. 10 He described his proposal as calling for a two-month moratorium, covering both overt and covert military activities. He said Stevenson agreed this was a good text and sent it on to Washington on April 18. The Secretary General said that he revised his proposal later in May to drop the specific references to Pearson proposals made in the Prime Minister's Philadelphia speech. We had expressed displeasure at that time that these proposals had been made without consultations on the eve of Pearson's trip to Camp David. 11 The Secretary General said he had asked Washington (through Stevenson) for suggestions for any modifications in his cease-fire appeal. He noted that Sevareid was erroneous in saying that he (the Secretary General) had indicated we could write the proposal in any manner in which we wanted. He recalled also that he sent the cease-fire proposal to a number of capitals, including London, Paris, Saigon, the ICC capitals, Hanoi, Peking, Moscow and Washington. Without elaborating, he confirmed that Hanoi and Peking refused even to receive these proposals. He said that when he saw Stevenson in Geneva in July the latter had said he had no reply from Washington on the cease-fire proposal. Finally, the Secretary General said that on August 12 he had advanced a new cease-fire proposal to Peking, Hanoi and Saigon and the Western capitals. The proposal had never leaked out. 12 After having run through the above chronology in very considerable detail, the Secretary General reflected for a moment and said he wanted to go back even farther. He recalled that in November, 1963, after Diem's fall, he had told Stevenson that the US must do something and had told him that every effort should be made to establish a national government in which all sections and all groups of Viet-Nam would be represented. He suggested the US should contact Tran Van Huu in Paris and ask him to return to Saigon to form such a government. He reported that Stevenson was enthusiastic over this proposal and had transmitted it to Washington. Mr. Ball replied that—particularly in view of our experience in Laos—we were persuaded that a coalition government would be only a prelude to the Viet-Cong takeover of the Government in the South. The Viet Cong were disciplined and organized; the free South Vietnamese were not. The Secretary General replied that he believed there were only two alternatives in Viet-Nam: a Communist takeover or the Laos pattern. Mr. Ball repeated that a coalition solution was unacceptable. This was the device contemplated by Point 3 of the Phan Van Dong Four Points. 13 Point 3 would give the dominant role to the Viet Cong in a coalition government. The Secretary General responded that a coalition government might have been possible in 1963, but agreed with Ball that it was now out of the question (presumably because of the American military commitment). Mr. Ball assured the Secretary General that we had looked long and hard at the proposal for a coalition government in 1963, and reiterated that the US could not accept it since it opened the door to a Communist takeover. Several times throughout the conversation Mr. Ball reiterated that on the basis of evidence available to us, there had been no indications from the other side of a willingness to sit down unconditionally. Mr. Ball cited Seaborne's reports to us running from the Fall of 1964 to May of this year. The Secretary General's response was that Hanoi would not be as frank with the Canadians as with him. Mr. Ball turned the conversation to the current situation. He said that, no matter how historians might sort out the past, the present reality was formidable. He stressed we are actively pursuing every possibility for a peaceful solution and reiterated our strong desire for unconditional discussion. While the foregoing follows very much the same lines of what the Secretary General has said to Goldberg in past weeks, the most interesting aspect of this conversation relates to the Secretary General's current views. The Secretary General said the Chinese in the past two months have been giving massive aid, both in small arms and food, to North Viet-Nam. He doubted the reports of direct Chinese Communist involvement with troops. Mr. Ball suggested that perhaps some Chinese Communist personnel were involved in technical and engineering work, bridge building, and repair of the railroad. In view of this massive aid, the Secretary General indicated that he had information that the Soviets were nearing a big decision. They must show solidarity with Peking or go the other way. (He seemed very clear on this point.) The Secretary General felt that this decision would be related to the possibility of the Soviets having to honor their mutual security pact with China. The Secretary General indicated that he was aware of rumors floating around the UN corridors among the Eastern Europeans of such a decision but he doubted that the Eastern Europeans really had any inside information. He also felt that the change in Indonesia would play a big part in present Soviet thinking and would have a key effect on the Soviet decision. He implied, but did not say so directly, that if the Indonesians continued to move away from Peking this might help the Soviets to move away or break with Peking. The conversation concluded with the Secretary General responding to a question regarding his actions at the time of the non-aligned appeal. He reported that while he had been asked by Stevenson to follow-up and that he had done so with the Soviets, he found that the Soviets were unwilling to put any pressure on Hanoi at that time. Mr. Ball thanked the Secretary General for receiving him and reiterated the US Government's regard for the Secretary General. He also noted his intention to report this conversation to the President. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco. 2 See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, Document 223 . 3 In a December 4 letter to the President, Goldberg reported that during recent talks with the Secretary General, U Thant had expressed the conviction that a cease-fire in Vietnam would be seen as proof of U.S. good will. (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 127, Frames 722–724) 4 The French President made this proposal in a number of fora; see De Gaulle, Discours et Messages , vol. 4, pp. 217–219 and 234–237. 5 See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, Documents 196 and 202 . 6 August 6; see ibid., footnote 1, Document 298 . 7 See ibid., Document 427 . 8 Extracts of U Thant's February 24 press conference are in Public Papers of the Secretaries General of the United Nations, vol. VII, U Thant, 1965–1967, pp. 42–50. 9 Apparent reference to a report that U Thant stated that the United States turned down a peace proposal he had forwarded. The reports grew out of oblique comments by the Secretary General during his February 24 press conference that the U.S. Government was holding back the truth about the possibilities of negotiated peace from the American people. See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. II, Documents 161 , 162 , and 164 . 10 See ibid., Document 233 . 11 See ibid., vol. XII, Document 327 . 12 See ibid., vol. III, Document 119 . 13 For text of the Four Points, see ibid., vol. II, Document 245 . 375. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 375. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 1 New York, December 22, 1965. SUBJECT Twentieth General Assembly—An Assessment Summary and Conclusions After two years on the sick list because of the Article 19 crisis, the General Assembly got back on its feet to dispose of some one hundred items of business. 2 The wounds from the financial battle were partly healed although recovery is far from complete. On no single count was a serious United States national interest prejudiced, and on most of the important issues our policy goals were met. In an expanded membership of 117 interested primarily in colonial and economic questions, this was no mean feat. This proved possible, however, in several instances because the United States was prepared to adopt greater flexibility in its voting position. That is, on several issues, we voted for resolutions or abstained on them even when they did not accord with our views, accompanying our vote by an explanation which interpreted the text broadly as falling within the general framework of our policy. The so-called Cold War items met increasing resistance and apathy, Tibet and Korea suffering accordingly. Moreover, there was a significant and dangerous erosion in our position on Chinese Representation. While by very hard lobbying we maintained a thin majority, we must seriously reconsider our policy on this subject if we are to avoid a major defeat in the Assembly next year. This is particularly true because there was a disturbingly dangerous tendency in this session to treat more and more items which clearly involve substantive matters as being purely procedural and, therefore, requiring only a simple majority to decide. Disarmament, which occupied more than one-half of the Political Committee's time, was one area where we can perhaps take the most satisfaction with the outcome. With near unanimity, the General Assembly agreed with our view that disarmament questions should be negotiated in Geneva and that priority attention should be given to efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is particularly reassuring since when the session opened it was unclear—in view of its previous lack of progress—whether the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee would even be continued. We were able to vote with the overwhelming majority in favor of a World Disarmament Conference which was designed to bring the Chinese Communists into the disarmament picture, but we must proceed delicately on the follow-up steps. We are trying to organize preparations so that any such conference would be productive and that, if it should fail, the onus would rest with the Chinese Communists. The Assembly regrettably made little headway in clarifying how future peacekeeping operations can be financed in the aftermath of Article 19. The entire problem was remanded to the Committee of 33 for further study. The one bright note in this regard was the Assembly's willingness to continue the apportionment of UNEF costs for 1965 and 1966 among the entire membership. If this pattern can be maintained in one form or another, United Nations peacekeeping will be more effective and the United States will have less to pay than if the United Nations should have to rely solely on voluntary contributions. We were pleased with a French initiative establishing a study committee to examine how the budgets of United Nations agencies could be brought under tighter control. A related and equally important item, introduced by the United Kingdom, on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, unfortunately suffered a sudden demise when the Africans vented their spleen on the British for Southern Rhodesia by deciding not to consider it further in this session. Viet-Nam was not on the agenda but, together with the Dominican Republic, constituted the basis of the Soviet attack on us under their item on non-intervention. Their effort backfired to a considerable extent with the Latins and Afro-Asians joining forces to condemn all forms of outside interference, including those clearly endorsed by the USSR and Peiping. A Declaration to this effect was adopted almost unanimously. 3 The general debate revealed widespread support for the idea of unconditional negotiations on Viet-Nam, although our bombing of North Viet-Nam is widely criticized. We were able to make common cause with the Africans on Southern Rhodesia in the Assembly, prior to UDI, and in the Security Council afterwards. While our fast reaction in following the United Kingdom lead, including an oil embargo, has left us temporarily in a strong position with the Africans, the proof of the pudding will be whether the sanctions result in Smith's downfall; if not, we will come under heavy pressure for more far-reaching measures including mandatory sanctions (Chapter VII) 4 and use of force. We remain in a very small minority on subjects like apartheid and Portuguese Territories where African demands for sanctions go far beyond our views of what is fitting and proper. Our large investments in South Africa are under particularly heavy attack and, if our opposition to apartheid is to remain credible, we may have to take steps to reduce future investment. Should South Africa and Portugal flout the oil embargo on Rhodesia, pressure for further action against them would be particularly difficult to resist. Over the coming year, we will still be faced with troublesome colonial problems in several General Assembly sub-organs such as the Committee of 24 and the Apartheid Committee. The merger of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund into the United Nations Development Program with a program target of $200 million designed to carry out the United Nations work in the fields of technical assistance and preinvestment had overwhelming support, including that of the United States, as did the decision to establish within the United Nations a United Nations Organization for Industrial Development to assist the developing countries. The fact that the United States and other Western countries were able, after intensive discussion and negotiation, to convince the developing countries to support the latter as a reasonable alternative to their idea of a new Specialized Agency for Industrial Development is encouraging. The Assembly adopted a Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which we supported although we considered it necessary to interpret certain questionable provisions as not imposing restrictions on the right of free speech. The proposal for the establishment of the post of United Nations Human Rights Commissioner, endorsed by the United States, was remanded to the Human Rights Commission for further study. Plans were advanced for celebration of 1968 as Human Rights Year. 5 Many of the new members will from time to time misuse the Assembly and over-ride its rules on matters in which they are emotionally involved. Nevertheless, the Assembly will continue to be useful to us not only as a forum for exchanging views with friends and enemies alike, but also as a fallback for peacekeeping operations blocked by a veto in the Security Council. We should look to the degree feasible to the Security Council as the primary instrument for accomplishing major peace and security business, despite the fact that the veto and the recent expansion of the Council from 11 to 15 members will limit its utility. Already during this session we have seen how the Council can perform important tasks in this area even while the General Assembly is meeting, since it dealt successfully with such critical problems as Kashmir, Cyprus and Southern Rhodesia. Arthur J. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, IT 47 UN. Confidential. 2 During its September 21–December 22 session. 3 G.A. Res. 2103 (XX). 4 On November 5 the General Assembly approved a resolution calling on the United Kingdom to use “all necessary measures,” including military force, to subdue the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. The white colonial administration of Southern Rhodesia declared its independence on November 11. On November 20 the Security Council voted to impose an embargo on Southern Rhodesia. (S.C. Res. 217 (1965)) 5 Documentation on U.S. policies on human rights is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 315 ff. 376. Letter From Secretary-General of the United Nations U Thant to President Johnson 376. Letter From Secretary-General of the United Nations U Thant to President Johnson 1 New York, January 10, 1966. My Dear Mr. President, I am asking Ambassador Goldberg to be so kind as to deliver this message to you personally, since he has told me that he plans to go to Washington tomorrow. It was very good of you to have Ambassador Goldberg come in to see me, 2 immediately after my return from a week's absence, to inform me fully about the various aspects of the initiative you have taken towards bringing to a peaceful end the distressing situation in Vietnam. My position on the various aspects of the Vietnam question has been made known to you and your distinguished predecessor over the past two years through my discussions with your representatives at the United Nations. You will readily appreciate, therefore, that I warmly welcome every effort designed to move the Vietnam conflict from the battleground to the conference table. I most earnestly hope that the efforts which you are now making in this direction will lead to a peaceful settlement of this tragic problem. You are, of course, well aware also of my position with regard to the cessation of bombing and therefore you will know that I look with favour upon the present pause in the bombing; the more particularly so, since no time limit has been indicated for the present pause, which is consistent with my conviction that any such pause, if it is to have the intended effect must be of indefinite duration. I wish to thank you again, Mr. President, for keeping me fully informed of your efforts towards finding a peaceful solution to the war in Vietnam. With all best wishes, Sincerely, Thant 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, U Thant, Vol. 1. Personal. 2 The meeting took place on January 4. (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 127, Frames 832–833) 377. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 377. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, January 12, 1966, 2322Z. 3079. Subject: UN Peacekeeping and Attitude of SYG. Yost expressed to Bunche yesterday our view that it is important that work of Comite of 33 be commenced promptly and be pushed forward vigorously. We expressed hope SYG wld cooperate in this endeavor and mentioned that Fanfani might be most effective chairman of Comite if he is available. Bunche agreed most heartily. He went on to say that he has been attempting for some time to persuade SYG that UN peacekeeping is in state of most acute crisis that he, Bunche, has ever seen during his long tenure and that, unless it can be promptly revived, there is grave risk that it may almost entirely fade away. He added however that he has been unable to convince either SYG or Rolz-Bennett that situation is so serious. Part of Bunche's discouragement arises from fact that, since Fedorenko attacked SYG publicly in SC for his action in India-Pak operation, 2 Thant has been unwilling to take even the most minor sort of action, in supplying either manpower or equipment to UNMOGIP and UNIPOM, without seeking prior clearance from SC and, since to do so wld probably lead to embarrassing debate, it has proved impossible to do practically anything in this respect. Yost pointed out that Sovs had for a period of weeks endeavored to persuade Council to take action which wld bind SYG in this way but that Council had refused to do so and hence had in effect rejected any such modus operandi. Bunche agreed entirely and said that he had made this point repeatedly to SYG but without effect. He added in strictest confidence that Thant is simply too good-natured and too “soft” to deal effectively with peacekeeping crisis which now exists. He, Bunche, has definitely decided to leave UN in Feb 1967 when his commitment to Thant expires. It was clear that his determination to do so arises from his frustration in current situation. Yost asked whether he thought Thant expects to seek another term. Bunche replied that he believes Thant wld much prefer to retire but that, on the other hand, in view of hostile situation in Burma, it wld probably be impossible for him to return there, and he might therefore feel that, having no place to retire to without loss of face, he might end up by staying where he is. Yost 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential; Exdis. 2 Made during the October 25–28, 1965, Security Council debate on the Kashmir issue. The Soviet delegate accused the UN of overstepping its authority. 378. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs (Sisco) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 378. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs (Sisco) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 25, 1966. SUBJECT Ambassador Goldberg's Meeting With the House Democratic Study Group As the President requested, Ambassador Goldberg met with members of the House Democratic Study Group this morning. The turnout swelled to over 100 before the meeting was over, including many of the 77 members of the House who recently wrote to the President to urge that he not give up the current peace offensive. 2 In his introductory remarks, Ambassador Goldberg outlined briefly the principal elements of the peace offensive, 3 including your trip to Canada, Ambassador Harriman's travels and his own to various capitals. The major part of his presentation was to detail the efforts made by the President to involve the United Nations in the Vietnam problem, starting principally with the speech made by President Johnson in San Francisco last summer. 4 The thrust of the questions was directed at why the Administration has not used the UN more on the Vietnam matter. The following questions are illustrative: 1. Why not convene the Security Council and, if there is a veto, call for a special session of the General Assembly and present a resolution recommending that the Geneva Conference be convened and calling for free elections in Vietnam? 2. Why reject Thant's suggestion that the Viet Cong be made a party at interest and be given a role in the Government? 3. Why not find a way to get North and South Vietnam into the UN? There were several questions regarding the resumption of bombing of the North and in particular what our assessment was as to the effect of resumption on future prospects for negotiation with the other side. In general, the questions were balanced and searching. The overall impression was an expression of concern that the Administration's efforts should continue in pursuing its peace initiatives. No member of the group, either directly or indirectly, called for escalation. Joseph J. Sisco 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Confidential. Copies were sent to Rusk, U, G, FE, H, and S. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 2 For text of the January 21 letter signed by 77 House members, see the Congressional Record , vol. 112, pp. 897–898. 3 For documentation regarding the peace offensive of December 1965–January 1966, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volumes III and IV . 4 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pp. 703–706. 379. Intelligence Information Cable 379. Intelligence Information Cable 1 Washington, April 21, 1966. TDCS DB–315/01186–66 COUNTRY United Nations, USSR, France DOI Mid-April 1966 SUBJECT Factors Influencing the Secretary General of the United Nations in Determining Whether He Will Run for Reelection ACQ (15 and 19 April 1966) [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] 1. United Nations Secretary General U Thant will probably reach a decision by the end of June as to whether he will run for reelection. He is confident he has the support of the French and British Governments. He is uncertain of Soviet support and says he has had some “differences” with the Soviets that have not been altogether healed. He is unsure of the attitude of the United States. If the United States is satisfied that he is the best man available, some indication of this to him would influence his decision. 2. U Thant will take soundings during the next two months to determine his support. Among his objectives will be assurance of a free hand in effecting an internal reorganization of the Secretariat to rid it of much “dead wood.” If his soundings indicate a willingness on the part of those queried to give him the requisite prerogatives, this will be another contributing factor in his decision to remain in his position. 3. The Secretary General's wife is violently opposed to this decision by her husband. She dislikes New York and life in the United States and exerts every pressure she can on her husband to return to Burma. [ 1 paragraph (10–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified ] 5. Field Dissem: None. Also sent USUN. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 380. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 380. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 23, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Secretary Rusk informed me as follows on the U Thant matter. 1. He shares your view of U Thant. 2. He has personally boxed the compass in recent weeks looking for an alternative in ways that would avoid a leak. 3. The central problem is the Soviet veto. This eliminates: a Western European; a Latin American; or an Asian ally. 4. An African was conceivable; but the Secretary is convinced a good African would not be acceptable to Moscow; for example, Robert Gardner, able head of the Economic Commission for Africa. 5. The Secretary and Arthur Goldberg reluctantly concluded that U Thant was better than a weak African acceptable to Moscow. 6. As for a Presidential letter, the Secretary was initially skeptical. He felt a verbal message of U.S. support would suffice. Goldberg argued strongly that a letter would: —earn us a little future credit with U Thant; —convince U Thant he was in and would not have to accept any conditions from the British and French on his trip to Europe beginning Monday. 7. Secretary Rusk would be pleased to discuss this further, if you desire. I'm, of course, at your disposal. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential. 381. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 381. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 1 New York, May 4, 1966. Dear Mr. President: I believe the time has arrived when your Administration should move ahead on international human rights conventions, as it has so effectively on human rights in the United States. Accordingly, I urge that you use your leadership, persuasiveness and skills to assure the approval by the Senate of the ratification of certain United Nations human rights treaties. Conventions on slavery, forced labor and political rights of women have languished in the Senate since they were submitted by President Kennedy in July, 1963. 2 I believe that only your leadership can bring about Senate action on these three conventions. You might wish to put the particular imprint of your Administration on our efforts in the international human rights field by adding one or more conventions to the package transmitted to the Senate by President Kennedy. The International Labor Organization convention on discrimination in employment and occupation would be a particularly appropriate addition, since it covers much the same ground as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 Ratification of these treaties would require no changes in domestic law in the United States. But it would be of immense value in helping to set and uphold international standards—a fact that the United States accepted when it ratified the UN Charter. Moreover, ratification of human rights conventions would represent a new, liberal departure in our international relations. It would also enable us to answer Soviet criticism in a psychologically important area of international cooperation. You may recall that the Bricker amendment controversy was a principal factor in our unwillingness to participate in international human rights conventions under the Eisenhower Administration. President Kennedy decided to consider each such convention on its merits and, accordingly, transmitted the three conventions mentioned above to the Senate. Ratification of human rights conventions is the logical complement to the domestic effort in the racial field begun by President Kennedy and brought to fruition under your leadership. In the present circumstances we are losing much of the international advantage that could be gained from a truly exceptional domestic record. A number of non-governmental organizations in the United States have joined together in an Ad Hoc Committee on Human Rights and Genocide Treaties, to urge the ratification of these instruments. Among the members of the Ad Hoc Committee are the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans for Democratic Action, the United Auto Workers, AFL–CIO, and various religious organizations. I am confident that, with your encouragement, these groups could contribute to understanding in the Senate and the American public of the importance of US ratification of human rights conventions. I urge that you meet with representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee. There are two frequently advanced arguments against ratification of human rights conventions; first, it is said that such treaties are an improper use of the treaty power. I cannot imagine the Supreme Court would hold that the protection of the flight of birds is a greater national concern than the protection of human beings. Yet the United States has ratified bilateral treaties on this subject with Mexico and Canada. Second, it is argued that such treaties may require domestic legislation which would distort the normal state-federal relationships. I cannot accept this argument. In any case the human rights conventions currently before the Senate, except for the Genocide Convention, would require no implementing legislation. Finally, a few thoughts about the Genocide Convention, 4 which has been before the Senate since 1949. I firmly believe there are no legal impediments to ratification, and consider that ratification should take place as soon as possible. I recognize, however, that the requirement of implementing legislation, including a federal murder statute, complicates the task of securing the necessary support in the Senate. Thus, even though there is strong support for it among certain groups, especially Jewish organizations, I recommend that you not push for ratification until after the Senate has approved other United Nations human rights conventions. It is my fervent hope that you will take a strong stand in favor of ratification of human rights conventions. I would myself be glad to undertake advance consultations with members of the Senate before any public statement is made and to testify in support of ratification. Respectfully yours, Arthur J. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. No classification marking. 2 For text of President Kennedy's letter to the Senate on these treaties, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , p. 586. 3 For text of P.L. 88–352, July 2, 1964, see 78 Stat. 241. 4 For text, see 78 UNTS 27. 382. Intelligence Information Cable 382. Intelligence Information Cable 1 Washington, May 6, 1966. TDCS DB–315/01304–66 COUNTRY United Nations/USSR DOI Early May 1966 SUBJECT Comment of Soviet Employee of UN Secretariat on Soviet support for U Thant's reelection and on Soviet desires for personnel changes in the Secretariat ACQ [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] (3 May 1966) [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] 1. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] said in early May 1966 that the USSR will support the reelection of U Thant as United Nations Secretary General. The USSR does not regard U Thant highly, he said, but it sees no alternative candidates. The USSR does not wish to cause a fight on this issue. 2. If U Thant stays in office [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] believes he will revamp the personnel in the United Nations Secretariat. The USSR wants the retirement of Ralph J. Bunche as Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs and Paul Hoffman as director of the United Nations Special Fund. The USSR also wishes the removal of some other Americans and Western Europeans from the Secretary. The USSR will urge U Thant to appoint more officials from Socialist countries, but not the USSR, to the Secretariat. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] said, as an example, that not one Cuban was employed in the higher echelons of the United Nations. 3. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] commented that if the United Nations Chef de Cabinet C.V. Narasimhan resigns, present Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs Jose Rolz-Bennett would be a likely candidate to replace him. If Rolz-Bennett is promoted, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] believes the present Mexican permanent representative to the United Nations, Francisco Cuevas Cancino, would be a prospective candidate for the position as Under-Secretary in Charge of the Office of Public Information. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] spoke highly of Cuevas Cancino. [ 1 heading and 1 paragraph (3–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified ] B. USUN 4703 2 dated 2 May 1966 to State reported that Daris Jhabvala, a New York Herald Tribune correspondent, told a mission officer that he has heard that C.V. Narasimhan will leave the UN Secretariat soon and that the Government of India is requesting his services. C. Another source who has reported accurately in the past on contacts with the Soviets, but who also seems to reflect the Soviet “line”, said on 28 April 1966 that, according to a “report” he had heard from unnamed persons (whom he insisted were not Soviets), the Soviets recently discussed a second term with Secretary General U Thant and attached the following conditions for their support: (1) C.V. Narasimhan should no longer retain the dual responsibility of Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs and Chef de Cabinet. The Soviets feel that Narasimhan has too much influence on the Secretary General and they wish his functions split, with Narasimhan retaining the position of Chef de Cabinet and someone else taking the portfolio of Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs. (2) The Secretary General in the future should be counselled by an advisory board that could consist of Ralph Bunche, Jose Rolz-Bennett Narasimhan, and Aleksey Nestorenko. (Headquarters Comment. Bunche and Rolz-Bennett are both Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs and Nestorenko is Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs.) The Soviets claim that Nestorenko is never “brought upstairs” by the Secretary General for major policy discussions. The Soviets, according to this “report,” would seem to prefer cabinet type meetings giving them a chance to know what others are saying. The Soviets do not feel that they have an appropriate voice in the Secretary General's formulation of his policy decisions. According to this same “report,” the Secretary General found the Soviet conditions unacceptable and told the Soviets that if they had a better candidate to offer for his position, they should do so. The source concluded his account of this “report” by saying that the Soviets obviously do not question the Secretary General's sincerity and have no one else to offer as a candidate. 5. Field Dissem: None. Also sent USUN. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad, Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 2 This telegram reported on personnel changes in the UN Secretariat. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UNP-3) 383. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 383. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, June 3, 1966. WWR: The White House has a choice on how we handle the UN account. The key question is: Does the President want a Johnson policy toward the UN or a State Department policy? With sporadic exceptions, we have generally left the job to State . There was a time when Arthur Schlesinger (Sam Belk helping full-time) made it his part-time account. Otherwise the UN account has been “additional duty” for an NSC staffer with other responsibilities. There have been brief spurts of high-level attention like the 20th Anniversary speech last year. But I think it is fair to say on balance that there has been no Presidential policy toward the UN and international organizations , at least since the end of 1963. My earlier memo to you (copy attached) 2 spelled this out in more detail. But let me add that, after five short months in this business, I think the primary gripe of the United World Federalists, UN Association and all the other internationalist groups is not that USG refuses to give up its sovereignty to the UN today, so to speak. Their gripe is that the President is not exerting strong leadership in this field. There are several current opportunities to show this leadership: 1. We can bury or build from the ICY experience . I will lay this choice out for you and the President in more detail shortly. But the question is whether the President wants to capitalize on a great deal of citizen interest in practical international problems and try to direct it into useful channels. 2. In March, the President sent a memo 3 to department and agency heads instructing them to improve the quality of our participation in international organizations. This was a Budget Bureau product, and Budget is prodding through its channels. But Sisco is not oriented this way, and little is happening in State. 3. The President has the usual choice of making a speech to the UNGA in the fall. Now is the time to begin vigorous staffing (see my memo). 4. Ambassador Goldberg has proposed we host a UN seminar on eliminating racial discrimination in connection with the Human Rights year (1968)—a terrific opportunity to marry the President's domestic and foreign programs. In short, there are exciting opportunities . There is probably more day-to-day slogging than dramatic achievement in them, but a good substantive speech to the UN and a decent response on ICY could be a very good six months' work in brightening the President's image. How do we do this? You either have to sell the President right off or gamble on selling him case by case until he excites himself. Either way, if you want to make this presidential, you need a full-time staff man . Here are some of the choices I see (keeping the budget in mind): 1. Budget has a very good man (David Stottlemeyer) working on the international organizations. He has academic study in the field and has seen a lot of the operation on the ground. He wants to make his career in this field. Would it be possible to work out some arrangement with Schultze like you have with Hornig on Keeny— you buy half his time ? The Budget half of his time would give him needed depth on the programs. 2. I could detach myself from NEA and tackle this, though I wonder whether it makes sense to sacrifice over four years of experience in the area and start over again. We are just digging into the new idea business in NEA. 3. A combination of #1 and #2 would be for Stottlemeyer to spend the NSC part of his time working with Howard and me, at least until he learns how to handle the President's business. 4. I don't know enough about the Johnson -Keeny enterprises to know whether there's as much duplication there as appears. Could Chuck tackle this? 5. If you can afford another full-time staff member , the field is wide open. But whatever we do, it will not succeed unless the intent is to build a positive Johnson posture . Sisco resents outsiders fiercely, but Goldberg is eager to involve the President. So the trick will be to convince IO that Presidential involvement can be a useful adjunct to its policy. 4 Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 3. Confidential. 2 Not printed; the April 25 memorandum was entitled “Forward Planning: United Nations.” 3 Dated March 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Unarranged Files, NSC Miscellaneous Memos and Reports, 1965–1968) 4 A handwritten note by Saunders at the end of the memorandum reads: “ Afterthought : A long shot might be to put a good White House Fellow on this next season. But he'd be handicapped with IO.” 384. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 384. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, June 24, 1966. SUBJECT Celestial Bodies Treaty Chuck and I thought that you might like to see the attached draft negotiating instructions for Ambassador Goldberg on the Celestial Bodies Treaty while the document is still in an early stage and can be easily modified. Also attached for your information are the draft U.S. and Soviet texts for the Treaty. 2 Although the substance of this Treaty is somewhat remote to our current problems, it has special significance in that it may well be the only agreement the President can hope to get with the Soviets in the near future. However, we are concerned that, even though the U.S. and Soviet positions do not appear to be very far apart, the question could easily get tied up in the prolonged negotiations over the details of the wording. I found the attached instructions much too concerned with the question of pride of authorship. If the President wants a quick agreement, we cannot insist that every word have a U.S. stamp on it, particularly when there is no substantive objection to some of the Soviet language. In any event, the impact will come from the fact of agreement and very few people will read the text carefully enough to have any idea as to the nationality of the drafters. I have discussed this point with Len Meeker and he has agreed to soften the language in the instructions. I also think we have unnecessarily introduced the inspection issue in a meaningless manner by insisting in Article VI that we have a Treaty right to access to all installations and vehicles on celestial bodies. At the same time, the U.S. delegation is empowered to agree to inclusion in the Treaty of the substance of the “no bombs in orbit” U.N. Resolution without provision for inspection. Since some people consider “bombs in orbit” a real threat, I would not advise opening up this can of worms before the Senate by focusing attention on it through its specific exclusion from the inspection provisions of the Treaty. If we simply ignore the inspection issue in the Treaty, we can easily take the position that we will unilaterally take whatever actions we choose both in space and on celestial bodies to verify the peaceful nature of foreign activities. Len Meeker has agreed to explore this problem further with State and DOD with the thought of dropping the Article entirely. I have also asked him to make sure that the negotiations both here and in Geneva are properly coordinated with ACDA which has not really been involved in the problem to date. The State Department is talking about negotiating all summer on this with the thought that the Soviets want to refer it to the General Assembly this fall. If the President would like to see a quick agreement on this subject, we would recommend that, in addition to the formal instructions to the delegation, the President make this wish clear to Rusk and Goldberg prior to Goldberg's departure for the negotiations so that he will be in a position to move for a quick deal if this is possible. Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty. Confidential. A copy was sent to Charles Johnson. For text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, signed January 27, 1967 and entered into force for the United States on October 10, 1967, see 18 UST 2410. Documentation relating to the negotiation of the treaty is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XI . 2 None of the attachments was found attached. 385. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations European Office to the Department of State 385. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations European Office to the Department of State 1 Geneva, July 6, 1966, 1958Z. 61. For Acting Secretary from Ambassador Goldberg. Subject: RE Viet-Nam. 1. I had hour's private conversation with U Thant on number UN matters, but wish report promptly significant part of this talk as it relates to SYG's primary preoccupation—Viet-Nam. 2. I smoked him out indirectly regarding any possible plans he might have to send Rolz Bennett to Hanoi and Peking in near future and I am satisfied based on what he said that he has no such present plans. It also became obvious during conversation that while there is no formal agenda for his talks in Moscow late this month, Viet-Nam would be one of the subjects discussed. I urged that he confine this discussion to support Prime Minister Wilson's longstanding proposal that the co-chairmen join in reconvening the Geneva Conference rather than exploring SYG's three-point peace proposals, emphasizing that as he knew his proposal for a unilateral suspension of bombing would not be acceptable to the United States. He in turn indicated that he really expected nothing more from the Soviets on this issue than a reiteration of their frequently stated position in support of the total program of Hanoi and the Viet-Cong. 3. I found SYG remains quite concerned as he has been for some time over the course of events in Viet-Nam. He remains convinced the course of the war in Viet-Nam will push the North Vietnamese closer to the Chinese camp which he maintains Hanoi has been resisting. SYG also remains convinced that Ho and Pham Van Dong do not want to be dominated by Chi Coms but that there are elements in the Communist Party, particularly its secretary, who lean in that direction. He said he has unverified reports that they will make a trip to Moscow, presumably before SYG himself goes there. 4. He also informed me that he had recent report from Algerians about which I indicated great skepticism, that during the last bombing pause Ho Chi Minh had advised UAR Ambassador that he had withdrawn some of his regular forces from the South as a concrete manifestation of Ho's desire to move toward a negotiated settlement. I commented we had received no such indication to my knowledge from the UAR, and on the contrary our intelligence reports indicated a build-up by infiltration of regular North Vietnamese forces and supplies to the South. The Secretary General himself seemed to indicate skepticism concerning the Algerian report. Moreover I also pointed out the United States, having established direct contact with the North Vietnamese during that period, received no such indications from them. 5. SYG informed me that on recent visit to Italy Fanfani reported to him that Pol[ish] ICC Ambassador had had conversation with Ho Chi Minh on June 27 in which Ho presumably said that they would be prepared to engage in serious discussions with US, notwithstanding Chinese and Soviet objections, if bombing were suspended and if Viet-Cong participated in talks. According to Thant, this information relayed by Pol ICC Ambassador to Italian Ambassador in Saigon who in turn communicated it to Fanfani. Thant further reported that Fanfani believed message contained two new elements: (a) that Ho was not insisting on unconditional cessation of bombing, merely a suspension; and (b) Ho not insistent that Viet-Cong be sole representatives of South Vietnamese people at such negotiations. Fanfani had also told the Secretary General that he thought this message of such importance that it warranted sending a special Italian emissary to Washington to communicate the substance of it to United States officials. SYG said Fanfani did this and that special emissary was asked in Washington to remain there pending a probe through Fanfani of the word, suspension, and also to inquire what Ho meant by saying Viet-Cong would have to participate in the talks. Fanfani swore U Thant to secrecy and the Secretary General therefore imparted this information to me in the strictest confidence saying he had not communicated to anyone in Secretariat. He asked in particular that I not raise this with Fanfani, but if latter mentioned it to me, I should disclaim knowledge of it from SYG, except as I might receive knowledge of it from Washington. 6. Since I will be meeting with Saragat and Moro on evening of eighth and with Fanfani on ninth would appreciate receiving prompt guidance from the Department. 2 Tubby 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Top Secret; Exdis. A note on the telegram indicates it was forwarded to President Johnson. 2 The instructions were contained in an unnumbered telegram from the Mission to the United Nations in New York to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. (Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject File, Reel 95, Frame 1553) 386. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Consulate in Geneva, Switzerland 386. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Consulate in Geneva, Switzerland 1 New York, July 15, 1966, 1521Z. 122. For Goldberg from Finger. Re Geneva query on Waldheim's qualifications, mission personnel who know him best are probably you and Tacher, who in Geneva. Amb Yost whom we have consulted feels Waldheim, if elected with broad support, would be “safe” SYG in sense that he could be trusted resist direct or indirect pressures on his office or authority or actions contrary to US interests. On other hand, does not believe Waldheim has qualities of strong leadership which would be desirable in getting UN out of doldrums on peacekeeping problems. Waldheim's cautious nature and likely inability mobilize ASAFs effectively even if originally supported by them may, in Yost's view, limit his capacity for leading UN toward more positive development its potential. We share this assessment Waldheim but believe it should be weighed against assessment other candidates which could appear in wake any negative decision by SYG. Waldheim's qualities may be greater or less depending on who he compared with. Baker 2 and I believe he is as capable and as friendly to US as any other name which has cropped up as electable possibility thus far. Waldheim was described by Emb Vienna as “unusually frank and open, thoughtful, dignified, informal and a pleasure to work with.” They also reported he was helpful in promoting US interests. My own dealings with him would support that assessment. Further, he is very knowledgeable about UN, having been an observer at 9th GA session and participated in 10th through 14th GA sessions prior to his coming here as Australian rep in 1964. As for qualities of strong leadership and cautious nature, I believe Waldheim would not compare unfavorably with Thant. Important factor would be possible American successor to Bunche and role he might play vis-à-vis Waldheim. Fully share line taken by you with Waldheim which, while demonstrating appropriate interest and sympathy, keeps our hands free in event SYG decides against continuing and in meantime keeps US in wholly correct position vis-à-vis SYG. Of poss interest is statement to MisOff July 14 by Lessiowski ( UN Sect) who just back from Moscow where he participated for 4 days in June in preparations for SYG visit which then envisaged for early July. He claimed Sov Govt supports continuation of SYG and putting no qualifications or reservations on it. He personally believes SYG will decide continue for three years but does not claim any inside info and admittedly he is influenced by his own hopes of being appointed UN Rep at D–2 level in Moscow in Dec. Anderson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to the Department. 2 John Baker of USUN. 387. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations European Office to the Department of State 387. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations European Office to the Department of State 1 Geneva, July 28, 1966. 493. From Goldberg. Subj: Outer Space Legal-Bilateral Discussion with Morozov. 2 1. I met this morning with Morozov at his suggestion for approximately two and one-half hours. The meeting was essentially negative in result; he remained insistent on essential elements of Soviet positions where we have had differences. Detailed account follows. 2. Morozov opened by stating that the USSR was withdrawing from Article I 3 the sentence on “equal conditions”, but wanted to preserve the idea in a new provision that would appear later in the treaty. New provision would be limited to tracking stations and would require countries permitting tracking station to one power to accord MFN treatment to others. Next, Morozov said the USSR accepted the idea of a provision on reporting information relating to the physical safety of astronauts; however, such information should be furnished directly to governments and not through UNSYG. Then, Morozov said USSR was waiting for US concession on access, reporting, and military equipment. 3. I said we had hoped for a more forthcoming response since the US has been entirely forthcoming on the major issue of scope; Soviet response this morning had simply not met our needs. 4. I said US agreed that question of access on celestial bodies presents safety problems. Would Morozov be prepared to accept Japanese proposal of July 2 concerning “maximum precautions”? In regard to the requirement of reporting, I proposed addition of the following qualifying words: “in the greatest feasible and practicable detail”. I commented that the new Soviet proposal on equal conditions opens a Pandora's box and presents many great problems. It would, for example, have effect of diminishing number of states that would become parties to the treaty. I told Morozov we could accept the Soviet language “without discrimination of any kind” in Article I. As for military equipment, I said the US has no intention of creating a loophole in the obligation to use celestial bodies for peaceful purposes only; we agree on a prohibition of military operations; I asked what kinds of equipment is the USSR worried about. Finally, I pointed out that there are great principles in this treaty—such as incorporation of General Assembly Res. 1884; 4 US has met Soviet key demand on scope; USSR should reciprocate and not interject complicating requirements. 5. Morozov said he was glad US had accepted Soviet proposal on scope, which was not new and was also in interest of US. He said that USSR does not want to see too large a UN umbrella over this treaty which might destroy its universal coverage. He observed we were not too far apart on military equipment, but much has changed since time of Antarctic Treaty 5 and now we must be “more careful”. Rations or medical supplies are not military equipment. Such equipment is what can be used exclusively for military purposes. Morozov went on to say USSR considers equal conditions provision important; ban UN discrimination is something else. 6. I reminded Morozov that non-space powers would ask for reciprocity in regard to launchings if MFN obligations should be laid on non-space powers re furnishing of tracking stations. Morozov simply said that this would be an unreasonable demand: if US and USSR agree, there will be no problems here. He justified the MFN provision as contributing to cosmonaut safety. I observed that his proposal was politically impractical, and that Soviet space program had been highly successful in absence of international MFN commitments on tracking stations. 7. Morozov said USSR insisted on the voluntary character of reports; US formula would lead to mutual accusations. As to Japanese proposal on access, it would let visitor decide on safety precautions; they are not able to do this alone, and there must be joint efforts. I then sounded him out on rewording of Japanese amendment as follows: “Such representatives and those of all other states parties concerned should take maximum precautions to protect the safety and the normal functioning of activities therein.” As for reporting, I said the US takes a position of principle not of self-interest; there would not be great arguments; the world scientific community can judge, and the reports of other countries will be a standard for determining adequacy. I emphasized that we considered reporting on a voluntary basis unsatisfactory. In reply, Morozov said the USSR insisted on voluntary. As for amended Japanese language on access, he could agree to it if this were an addition to the Soviet language on visit by agreement. I said I thought this Soviet proposal was illogical. I went on to say that advance notification is different from agreement, and perhaps we could get together on this. We could also say that visitors and visited should “join in taking maximum precautions.” Morozov then proposed advance notification for the timing of a visit agreeable to both sides. I said this defeated the purpose of our suggestion, and asked whether he would accept “advance notification sufficient to ensure safety.” Morozov rejected this on ground it would permit visitors to determine timing. 8. I asked Morozov whether his understanding of “military equipment” would exclude a launching rocket and a capsule. His reply was “this goes without saying” i.e., it is permissible to use an ICBM rocket for this purpose. I pressed him as to whether he meant a rocket usable also for military purposes and he gave the same reply. 9. At conclusion of meeting I asked for his conception of how we should proceed on bilateral discussion and in the subcommitee. Morozov said he was willing to follow any reasonable procedure. He suggested we present a commonly agreed text where possible, and report the results from the working group to the subcommittee, and later from the subcommittee to the full committee. I said this would not be very constructive; it would mean no agreement but instead a report of failure. I suggested we consider the matter further and also advise the chairman at an appropriate time. Morozov simply said the Soviet delegation was ready to continue the efforts at agreement; there was no need for pessimism; only four items remain: access, reporting, military equipment, and equal conditions. We agreed to be in touch later today. Tubby 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Repeated to NASA, DOD, USUN, and Moscow. 2 Concerning the Celestial Bodies Treaty; see Document 384 and footnote 1 thereto. 3 For text of the treaty signed January 27, 1967, see 18 UST 2410. 4 For text of the resolution adopted October 17, 1963, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963 , pp. 133–134. 5 For text of the treaty, signed at Washington, December 1, 1959, see 12 UST 794. 388. Text of Telegram From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson and Secretary Rusk 388. Text of Telegram From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson and Secretary Rusk 1 Geneva, August 5, 1966. For President Johnson and Secretary Rusk from Goldberg (Geneva, 676). As you know, the Outer Space Committee has recessed Space Treaty negotiations which will be reconvened in New York before or early during the forthcoming General Assembly. In addition to detailed reports which the delegation has made concerning the negotiations, I wish to make the following comments: On the whole, we can regard the negotiations to date as reflecting great credit upon the United States, for the following reasons: 1. Negotiations came about as a result of initiative taken by the President on May 7, in calling for negotiations looking to a treaty. 2 This was initially resisted by Soviets who finally had to go along under the pressure of world opinion. This fact recognized and emphasized during the course of negotiations here in Geneva. 2. The attitude of the U.S. delegation in accordance with Department instructions has been forthcoming and this too has resulted in very favorable claim on world opinion both diplomatically and in the world press. Intelligence reports confirmed that it is the shared opinion among the delegations irrespective of ideology that Soviets have been placed at a disadvantage by reason of forthcoming and conciliatory attitude of the U.S. delegation. 3. In final statements by delegates winding up this phase of deliberations, only Hungary and Bulgaria fully supported Soviet reservations which for time being blocked a treaty. It is interesting that statements by Poland and Romania did not expressly support key Soviet reservation on equal access and reporting. Unless the Soviets remain unwilling because of Vietnam to conclude an agreement in General Assembly, I see no reason why a final treaty text cannot be speedily concluded once the Committee reconvenes in New York. My own analysis of Soviet actions here is that Morozov, the Soviet representative, was acting under instructions not to make a final agreement in Geneva but to reserve a few points as a delaying maneuver. It is my impression that Soviets were unwilling because of concern about Chinese criticism to make it appear that they were agreeing with us too readily on an international treaty of this importance. An alternative explanation is that Soviet delegation at Geneva was concerned about the possibility of a government shake-up and desired to confirm their instructions in Moscow personally before making final agreement. Although present government was confirmed by Supreme Soviet during last stages of our negotiations in Geneva, Morozov in private conversation with me several times referred to the necessity of consulting with “new” government. Whatever the cause, it will be very difficult for the Soviets in the light of the great support the U.S. received in the Committee among other delegations including all non-aligned countries to block an acceptable treaty draft at General Assembly. Finally, I want to convey to the Department the excellent cooperation I received from all members of the U.S. delegation, particularly Meeker, Reis, Helman (State Department); Thacher (USUN); Sohier (NASA); Graybeal (ACTA [ACDA]); Moroncew (ACTA [ACDA]); and Captain Cole (DOD). They were a superb and hardworking team and contributed greatly to the progress we made in Geneva. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty. Confidential. The copy printed here was retyped in the White House for the President. 2 For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 487–488. 389. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 389. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, August 10, 1966. SUBJECT Negotiation of an Outer Space Treaty Background —On May 7, President Johnson asked Ambassador Goldberg to undertake the negotiation of a treaty governing the uses of celestial bodies. After some initial private conversations, and a letter from Gromyko to U Thant which indicated that the USSR was interested in such a treaty, both the U.S. and the USSR tabled drafts. Ambassador Goldberg proposed a meeting on July 12 of the Legal Subcommittee of the UN's Outer Space Committee, and the USSR agreed. The meeting took place in Geneva between July 12 and August 4. Negotiations —We agreed at an early stage to expand the scope of a treaty from celestial bodies to outer space generally. The Soviet draft Treaty had proposed this broader scope with which we were prepared to go along, as the Soviet text was drawn in large part from UN resolutions which we had taken the leadership in obtaining. We held a number of private bilateral discussions with the USSR in which points of agreement and disagreement were defined. The proceedings of the Legal Subcommittee reflected the results of these discussions. Results —Agreement was reached on thirteen substantive points (Tab A). 2 The most significant of these are (a) the translation into a treaty obligation of the UN resolution banning the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, outer space or on celestial bodies; (b) an unconditional commitment to assist and return astronauts who land in another state and to publish discoveries relating to astronaut safety, and (c) the proscription of claims of sovereignty over and national appropriation of celestial bodies. There are two principal issues which divide us at the moment: a. Access—We insist that the principle of free access to all installations and vehicles on celestial bodies be reflected in a treaty, subject only to reasonable safety precautions. The USSR has sought to qualify the right of access with such concepts as “reciprocity” and agreement as to the timing of visits. b. Reporting—Our treaty article as tabled provides for compulsory reporting to the Secretary-General on the nature and location of activities on celestial bodies and publication of information on the results of these activities for the benefit of the public and the international scientific community. The USSR insists that the reporting obligation should be voluntary. There are two other differences which should not prove as difficult. One relates to the types of military structures to be prohibited on celestial bodies and the nature of the equipment to be permitted. We are substantially in agreement with the USSR on permitted and prohibited structures and equipment, but have not been able to reflect this in treaty language. The other difference involves a USSR proposal which would require a state hosting a tracking installation to grant similar facilities to other space powers. We suspect that the USSR tabled such a provocative proposal to serve as a barrier to the conclusion of a treaty until they are ready for one. We received generally strong support from members of the subcommittee for our position on the disagreed provisions. Tab B contains a chart of agreed and disagreed principles. Next Step —The results of the subcommittee's work will be reported to the Outer Space Committee. The subcommittee also decided to hold further negotiations before or during the 21st General Assembly. We will be pressing for early talks but recognize that the USSR has the capacity to delay negotiations and agreement. BHR 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Confidential. 2 Neither tab was attached. 390. Text of Telegram From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 390. Text of Telegram From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 1 New York, August 17, 1966. For the President from Ambassador Goldberg (USUN 383). Secretary General Re-election In a lengthy conversation with the Secretary General on several subjects today, I asked him specifically, pursuant to the Secretary's request, whether he could further enlighten me about his intentions to stand for re-election as Secretary General. The Secretary General stated he was definitely of the mind that he would not stand for re-election for various reasons assigned to me in our previous conversations and reported by me in earlier telegrams. The Secretary General further stated he would make this decision known by letter to members of the Security Council shortly following his return from South America, scheduled for later this month. This would mean probably during the first part of September. I told the Secretary General that undoubtedly there would be a general feeling at the U.N. that he should be drafted, notwithstanding his personal disinclination to run. The Secretary General indicated he would resist a draft and would urge in the strongest possible terms that the Security Council proceed with its search for an acceptable candidate. He again, as he had once before, indicated his belief that no available African or Asian would be found acceptable and that the choice ought to come from a neutral European country, such as Finland, or from Latin America. He spoke in enthusiastic terms about Ambassador Jakobson of Finland, saying he had a high regard for him as a person and as a diplomat. The Secretary General hastened to add this was purely a personal reaction to Jakobson and the Secretary General was not advancing his candidacy. Comment : It is my impression, reinforced by each visit on this subject, that the Secretary General is becoming more firm in his resolve not to stand for re-election. This does not mean, however, he would not submit to a draft for a relatively short term if no other suitable candidate were found. It is still Ralph Bunche's view, repeated to me in a visit I made to Bunche this morning at the hospital where he is convalescing from his recent accident, that the Secretary General would, however reluctantly, agree to a draft for a limited term. Finally, the Secretary General went out of his way to say to me that stories which have appeared in the public press assigning reasons for his reluctance to stand, for example, to our attitude concerning Vietnam, Soviet criticism of his role in peacekeeping, the financial situation of the U.N., Soviet pressure on the Secretariat for additional posts, etc., are stories not based upon any statements authorized by him. Today he emphasized to me personal and family considerations which he said have led him to this conclusion not to run plus his conviction that any Secretary General expends himself physically and by way of influence in a single five-year term. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; Nodis. The copy printed here was retyped in the White House for the President. 391. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 391. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT UN Secretary General My conversation yesterday with U Thant (reported in telegram number 383 from the US Mission in New York—Tab A) 2 leads me to the conclusion that we will probably be unable to persuade him to run for another term. The best we might hope for is that he would agree to stay on for some months while we seek agreement on a successor. A new Secretary-General would have to be chosen “by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council”, which means that the Soviets must agree. If U Thant announced his decision to step down early in September, two months before his term formally expires (November 3), many hats will immediately be thrown into the ring for his job. It is very important to us that any candidate selected be as sympathetic as possible to our views, but we recognize that over the long run an objective and impartial UN Secretary-General is essential for the good of the Organization and its work. It is highly important the new man be a good executive and administrator; the UN Secretariat badly needs administrative pruning and a strong guiding hand. While it is too early to say much about individuals, a good many names have been mentioned as possibilities. Among the stronger prospects are: 1. Robert Gardiner (Ghana)—He is probably the most outstanding African administrator on the international scene. 2. Kurt Waldheim —Austrian UN Representative. (He told me a considerable number of Africans want him to take the job if U Thant will not.) 3. Francisco Cuevas Cancino —Mexican UN Representative. 4. Max Jakobson —Finnish UN Representative. 5. Majid Rahnema —Iranian Ambassador to Switzerland and member of a number of Iranian delegations to the General Assembly. 6. Sadruddin Khan (Iran)— UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Arthur J. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; Nodis. 2 Document 390 . 392. Memorandum of Conversation 392. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 27, 1966. SUBJECT SYG's letter of Resignation PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Pedersen William B. Buffum (1) Bunche is trying to reach the SYG in Panama this afternoon to discuss the latter's letter of resignation. 2 (2) He will continue to try to get U Thant to write a shorter letter citing merely personal reasons for wanting to resign and making it less categorical. (The earlier draft was a six-page affair dictated by the SYG. It was poorly written and could damage the UN because it highlights the UN's current ineffectiveness.) Viet-Nam is mentioned but not in a way to criticize the United States; he speaks, rather, of the inability of the UN to contribute to a solution. (3) To be certain that we are not caught flat-footed on a possible insertion by U Thant of an unhelpful reference on Viet-Nam, USUN will draft two contingency statements next Monday which might be used after the SYG's letter is released. Buffum said we would wish to review these statements carefully in Washington, and Pedersen promised to send them down. (4) Goldberg must still talk to Federenko early next week and see if he would be agreeable to a quadripartite meeting with the SYG August 31 to try to dissuade him from resigning. Goldberg and Caradon already have individual appointments with U Thant on that date. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret. Drafted in IO on August 27. 2 Released September 1; for text, see UN doc. S/7481. 393. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 393. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. TWENTY-FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES I. General The forthcoming General Assembly Session, faced with the Secretary General's intention not to continue in office, will open in an atmosphere of uncertainty and depression. Moreover, the outlook is for a good deal of sharp discussion of the hardy perennials on the General Assembly's agenda, particularly African questions, and for hard slogging on those few items which have moved into a substantially different stage. Controversy over Viet-Nam, which is not now on the Assembly's agenda, will figure heavily in the general debate and will probably preclude substantial Soviet-American cooperation in the Assembly, except possibly on outer space matters. The annual assemblage of prominent figures from all over the globe will afford an excellent opportunity to restate the fundamentals of our policy on Viet-Nam. We shall stress our desire to open channels of negotiation with the other side and remind UN members where responsibility for continuation of the war lies. Nevertheless, we will be subjected to heavy pressure to cease the bombardment of North Viet-Nam. In the absence of such a gesture, there is no indication that the discussion on Viet-Nam would result in anything other than a stand-off. The voting power of the Africans and their Asian friends will again dominate the Assembly's decision-making activities. The Africans enter this Session in a mood of frustration and bitterness. No headway has been made on the hard core problems of Southern Africa—the Portuguese territories, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and apartheid—and the July 18 decision of the International Court of Justice has at least temporarily blocked off one route toward the mandatory sanctions which the Africans seek to apply. We need to consider carefully how we can best channel African thinking in the direction of constructive and effective measures, and how we can counteract the African tendency to vote on non-African issues not on their merits, but in terms of the attitudes of governments towards South African problems. Disarmament will occupy much of the session. As usual, we shall have difficulties in keeping disarmament resolutions within limits acceptable to the United States, especially in the areas of nuclear proliferation and nuclear testing. Chinese representation will remain one of the critical issues, and it will be more difficult to protect the position of the GRC. We will seek to place the onus for the exclusion of Communist China on the Communist Chinese themselves and stress our determined opposition to any move to replace the GRC by the PRC. Beyond these contentious issues, we will continue our support for the important ongoing work of the UN in the peacekeeping field as well as its economic and technical assistance programs. One of the few areas which may offer an opening for a new U.S. initiative is the field of marine resources; appropriate proposals are being developed. II. African Problems (A) Rhodesia —The failure of UN-supported sanctions to bring down the Smith regime, and the interminable and inconclusive British negotiations with Smith, have strengthened the Afro-Asian distrust of British and, to some degree American motives in respect to this problem. It seems unlikely that the British can present the forthcoming Assembly with any solid indications of progress. Our own position is difficult. We must keep the British in front on this question; the resources we can devote to a solution are very strictly limited. Recognizing the British Government's difficulties in dealing with the situation, we must press it not to make concessions which will undercut the six principles on the basis of which they started the negotiations. At the same time, we must help the UK in its efforts to prevent the Assembly from moving on to more extreme anti-Rhodesian measures until the negotiations have reached some conclusion. (B) South West Africa—The failure of the International Court of Justice to grapple with the substance of the South West Africa case in its July 18 decision has at least temporarily blocked a promising road for forward movement on this problem. Resort to South West Africa proceedings under Article 94 of the UN Charter to mobilize the international community against apartheid in South West Africa is now impossible. The possibility of bringing the West and the Africans together in a course of constructive action is perhaps smaller than ever. The Assembly will give priority attention to South West Africa, with discussion of this item running concurrently with the General Debate. The Africans will undoubtedly press for an early decision on revocation of the mandate. While we would not wish to take a stand which appeared merely a spoiling or delaying action, our interests would be best served if the initial phase of debate resulted in another Assembly appeal for South Africa to comply with its reporting requirements, and establishment of a Committee to make recommendations during the final weeks of the session in light of South Africa's response. It would also be in our interest if the Africans would agree to ask for a further opinion from the reconstituted ICJ as to whether the Assembly has authority to revoke the mandate. It is questionable, however, whether the Africans will be patient enough for either of these moves, and we must be prepared to take a stand at the opening of the session on the question of revoking the mandate. While it would be desirable for political reasons to support revocation, we would need to assure that such a stance would not imply a commitment to take the enforcement action which would probably be required to give reality to revocation. (C) Apartheid —The prospects for forward movement in the Assembly with respect to apartheid are equally slim. There is no sign that the Verwoerd Government has any intention of relaxing its apartheid policies in any way. We must continue to register our strong opposition to the policy of apartheid. We will have to decide how to vote on a resolution which, as in 1965, would “take no decision” on South African credentials in the General Assembly. There is a risk that if such action is taken, South Africa will withdraw from the Assembly and perhaps from the UN this year. (D) Portuguese Territories —The African racial problems which center on Rhodesia and South Africa have their colonial complement in Portuguese policy, which remains comparably unyielding. The Africans are expected to press for a total arms embargo and the application of economic sanctions against Portugal itself. We must again oppose such moves while continuing to press Portugal to move toward self-determination for the peoples of her African territories, including an option for independence. (E) A Possible Next Step in Africa —Confronted with these intractable African colonial and racial issues, on which emotions run so high and the scope for future action is so limited, we need to demonstrate our concern over the lack of progress. Otherwise conditions in southern Africa may deteriorate even more rapidly; and the Africans' exasperation over what they regard as our immobility will force them into a position highly unpalatable to us on matters like Chinese Representation, Viet-Nam and disarmament. In the longer range, this situation would weaken our position in Africa, stimulate increasingly radical initiatives by the Africans regarding southern African problems, and further diminish the UN's credit not only in Africa but across the board. In order to help meet this situation, consideration should be given to an announcement in our General Debate speech that in the light of our opposition to minority governments in southern Africa and the unwillingness of these governments to open the way for orderly transition to majority rule, the United States considers further American investment in the area economically risky and politically undesirable; for this reason we will no longer guarantee American investment or credits there, and will warn American business interests not to invest further. We should also consider whether to stop encouraging trade with southern Africa and whether to oppose further investment of funds there via international agencies, including the IBRD. Such a policy would apply immediately to the Portuguese territories, South West Africa and South Africa; but only provisionally to Rhodesia pending the outcome of UK talks with Smith. In addition, we should announce whatever follow-up is possible to the President's proclaimed intention to increase cooperation with African states. The Korry report provides useful proposals in this field, especially with respect to measures for agricultural research and development. III. Disarmament In view of the failure of the ENDC to register progress on any issue since the last General Assembly, we must anticipate increased restiveness about the need for movement. This is particularly true with regard to the dangers involved in the probability of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Failure of the United States to take the initiative and give a new lead in the disarmament area would give us no counter to unpalatable but superficially attractive Bloc or non-aligned proposals. Accordingly, we should advance some new proposals publicly along the lines described below. In addition discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko will afford an opportunity to probe other possibilities (this will be covered in another paper). A. Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Sharing. To help discourage non-nuclear powers such as India from seeking acquisition of nuclear weapons, we could volunteer to join in support of an Assembly resolution which would give assurance to non-nuclear states that others would come to their assistance in the event they are the object of nuclear attack. We would need to hedge this sufficiently so that we are not committed to a particular type or scale of assistance in any given situation. Moreover, we must anticipate a Soviet riposte based on their non-first-use proposal. B. Extension of Test Ban Agreement. Efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty remain deadlocked on the issue of verification. Our past position has required on-site inspections. In the meantime, our seismic detection capabilities have so improved that we can detect and distinguish from earthquakes almost all man-made underground explosions above a seismic magnitude of 4.75. For a new impetus in this area, we could propose extending the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty to prohibit underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75. IV. Outer Space President Johnson's proposal for a treaty to govern the exploration of outer space and celestial bodies was greatly advanced by the work of the Legal Subcommittee of the Outer Space Committee this summer. A few substantial points of difference remain between the USSR and the majority of the Subcommittee, led by the United States. Whether these differences will be ironed out before the Assembly or aired in it remains to be seen; in either event, our posture should be good. We already have agreement within the government on several fall-back positions which can be used to good public relations advantage whenever appropriate in the negotiating situation in New York. For example, these include such points as readiness to delete an explicit provision in the treaty authorizing the use of military equipment and personnel in outer space, as well as more flexible language on access to installations on celestial bodies. V. Peacekeeping We can expect no progress on new arrangements for authorizing or financing peacekeeping operations. Given the stone-wall attitude of the USSR, the report of the Committee of 33 will contain no substantive recommendations for improving peacekeeping preparations or devising reliable and practical measures for financing. In addition, the continued failure of the USSR and France to come through with their long promised voluntary contribution to restore UN solvency casts a shadow over the fiscal integrity of the organization. Our interests lie in preventing a regression from the UN capacity to meet threats to the peace, in improving the psychological climate in support of peacekeeping operations, in keeping open options for peacekeeping even where there is no unanimity, in assuring the widest possible cost sharing in the financing of UN peacekeeping. We should also seek to increase the pressures of the members on the delinquents to persuade them to come through with their contributions. Four possible steps we could take to strengthen peacekeeping possibilities and as an earnest of our continued support of UN peace actions are: 1. Earmarking of Logistical Services In the past our crucial contribution (apart from money) has been airlift and other types of logistical support. We have said we need not earmark particular units since we can call on the vast range of our military capabilities to respond to a UN call on short notice. However, as a concrete and dramatic manifestation of our support, we could announce the earmarking of specific air-transport units to be available on short notice to airlift UN troops. 2. Aid to Earmarkers Last year we proposed a UN program to help countries that are unable to assume the full burdens of training and equipping units for UN service. We could follow this up by proposing a US program to train and equip UN-committed units by earmarking nations. This program might initially be linked to the military assistance program (MAP) which provides a statutory base for such assistance to certain countries. 3. Peacekeeping Fund We could propose that the GA examine the possibilities of establishing a peace fund, available for the initial financing of UN peacekeeping operations and as a supplement to other financing methods. Voluntary contributions and perhaps independent sources of income could feed revenue into such a fund. A US proposal for a peace fund for the UN would imply our readiness to make a contribution. 4. Special Scale of Contributions to Peacekeeping The Irish delegation will probably again propose a special scale of assessments to be applied to major peacekeeping operations. As we said last year we could not agree to a mandatory assessment above one-third to be applied to all operations which we politically support (as the Irish propose). However, we could agree to a fair apportionment above one-third, considered as a non-mandatory contribution on our part. This would follow up our commitment last year to the principle of a special scale. In practice we have paid more than 40%—in some cases close to 50%—of the cost of certain operations through combined assessments and voluntary payments. We could indicate that for major operations we supported we would be prepared to pay our share of a special fair-apportionment scale—up to 40% of the cost. As in the case of UNEF apportionments, we could treat such payments as voluntary contributions so that the question of the legislative limit does not arise. In the meantime, important UN peacekeeping work goes on in the Near East, Cyprus, and Kashmir. While grumbling about their costs will increase, we expect the Assembly will again adopt a budget for UNEF close to its present level; and when the mandate of the Cyprus force requires extension again in December by the Security Council, we assume that the previous contributors or most of them will once more reluctantly find the necessary financial means to keep it going. VI. Chinese Representation According to our present count, there are 35 UN members whose votes are uncertain on Chinese representation. The situation is increasingly volatile, and the uncertain votes will determine the outcome. Our objective will be to prevent the replacement of the GRC by the PRC. VII. Secretary General The Secretary General has announced his intention not to accept another term. Whether he may be responsive to a more limited draft is problematical. If he is not, a major dispute over a successor is possible, and we may face a new crisis in the UN. Our planning must cover this contingency. In such circumstances our strategy would be to press for the maintenance of the office of Secretary General in its full integrity. We would urge U Thant to continue in office on a temporary basis until a successor is found. VIII. Other Political Issues Hardy perennials such as Palestine refugees and Korea will continue to engender much heat but little progress. On UNRWA we will again have to challenge provision of rations by UNRWA to the PLA and take a middle position between the maneuverings of Israel and the Arab states for political advantage over the refugee issue. Having turned down Israel's unrealistic proposal for a solution of the refugee problem based on compensation (paid by the US) without repatriation, we must expect Israel to dig in and say no forward movement is possible. But based on previous history of Assembly action on this subject, it also seems unlikely the Arabs can expect their position to be materially improved by Assembly action. Recent noises from Pyong Yang raise the prospect of a more flexible approach by North Korea to the traditional item on Korea, which is likely to be more difficult to cope with than in recent years. IX. Economic and Social In the economic sphere, the most notable proposal will be that for the adoption of the Charter of the UN's Organization for Industrial Development (UNOID), a proposal which we will support (perhaps with certain amendments if these have general support). We shall continue to oppose establishment of a UN Capital Development Fund or the UNDP's transformation into one. We shall also wish to emphasize the importance of agricultural development and family planning, particularly in the LDCs. In the social sphere, the major challenge will be that of adoption of implementing procedures for the Covenants on Civil and Political, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. While the drafts of the covenants contain implementation procedures which appear to be in advance of what the UN traffic will bear, we will probably wish to press for implementation procedures which, though less far-reaching than the present drafts, will still be substantial. X. Legal In the legal sphere, we shall seek to prevent adulteration of Charter principles in the context of “friendly relations” and, more broadly, will endeavor to hold the Assembly to appropriate standards of constitutionalism and orderly procedure. In view of the practical inability of the Assembly to influence the major political problems of Viet-Nam, colonialism and racism, restricting the consequent frustrations to constitutional channels may prove to be one of the major challenges of the 21st Session. This problem will be magnified as a result of disillusionment with the ICJ ruling on South West Africa. In fact, the election of new judges to the Court will be heavily influenced by the outcome. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Confidential. Drafted in IO on August 31. 394. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 394. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 2, 1966. Just to keep you up to date on the maneuvering in New York over U Thant's resignation , you will note from the attached 2 that support for our idea of a draft is far from unanimous . Goldberg is seeing Fedorenko at 4 p.m. this afternoon, both to sound out Soviet views and to see how far Fedorenko is willing to go as this month's President of the Security Council. Although the Soviets have publicly supported U Thant for a second term, it looks as if they might be just as happy to see the UN in a period of turmoil and, therefore, may not want to push U Thant hard to stay on. The Russians with their constant efforts to hamstring the SYG and their failure to pay their debts have contributed more than their share to U Thant's disillusionment. Their support for him now looks pretty hypocritical. This increases my own fears about our getting too firmly tied to the idea of drafting U Thant for another term . We may have to fall back on this—at least for a partial term—if we can't agree on a successor by November. However, I have the uneasy feeling that State has since April put too many eggs in the U Thant basket. They certainly got the President tied to U Thant in an exercise that didn't pay off. I am wondering now whether we shouldn't, at least for in-house talking purposes, argue with State that we should cut our losses and begin looking early for a successor . Brom promised this morning to ask S/S to send over for the President a memorandum on State's current succession thinking. He was going to say that the President is deeply interested in this problem and hint that the Secretary might want to volunteer something on the subject at next Tuesday's lunch. If that conversation materializes, I tentatively suggest that you might take a pretty hard line against State's current tack of pursuing U Thant to the end . Hal 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret. 2 Reference is to USUN 582, September 1, not attached. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 8–3) 395. Intelligence Information Special Report 395. Intelligence Information Special Report 1 Washington, September 13, 1966. CSDB–312/02578–66 COUNTRY United Nations DATE OF INFO. 12 September 1966 SUBJECT Secretary General U Thant's Willingness to Retain Office; Procedures for Draft and Re-election U Thant Considers Acceptable SOURCE A Source who is intimately familiar with the subject matter, who conveyed this information to a representative of this Agency, whom he knew as such, with the hope and expectation that it would reach the highest United States Government officials and would assist them in their approach to the problem. There is no indication that Secretary General U Thant intended that this information be passed to us. Our experience with the Source, however, leads us to believe that it is essentially accurate. 1. United Nations Secretary General U Thant is prepared to continue in office, but it is vital to him that his expression of willingness to do so come as a result of appropriate representations by the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly. He is neither accepting nor laying down any conditions to his continuing in office. At the same time, it must be perfectly clear that he is reacting to pressure from no nation or group of nations but to the persuasion of the international community as a whole as expressed in the United Nations General Assembly. Further, U Thant is willing to accept the office for the full term, realizing that a shorter term would quickly render him a “lame duck.” However, if such outstanding issues as Vietnam, peace-keeping and finances were to be resolved, and an acceptable successor were at hand, he might leave before the expiration of his term. 2. A suitable timetable and procedure would be: (1) an interim statement by the Security Council reaffirming its faith in the Secretary General but requiring no reply from him; (2) a statement by Amintore Fanfani, President of the 20th United Nations General Assembly, at the opening session of the 21st General Assembly scheduled for 20 September 1966, in which he would emphasize that the Secretary General's continuance in office will not resolve the important issues and that it remains the responsibility of the General Assembly to dedicate itself to their solution. An arrangement along these lines is already being worked out with Fanfani; (3) an exchange of letters between the Security Council and the Secretary General about mid-October, in which the Council's letter would stress the responsibilities of the international community and the Secretary General would announce his availability; (4) disclosure of this exchange to the General Assembly on October 24, United Nations Day; (5) re-election of the Secretary General on November 3. 3. The Secretary General is desperately anxious that his availability be a closely guarded secret since advance knowledge could cause various nations, and specifically the Soviet Union, to pose conditions. Similarly, to safeguard the universality and impartiality of his position, there should be the least possible evident participation of the major powers in the steps leading to his decision. The Afro-Asians should “carry the ball.” The Secretary General wants nothing to happen, or to be said, that could make his decisions and actions seem to be in any way a response to any pressure other than that of the whole international community acting through the General Assembly in the interests of mankind. As far as the major powers are concerned, including the United States, the watchword should be: “Easy does it.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad, Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 396. Notes of Meeting 396. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, undated. NSC MEETING ON 20TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY The President called on Acting Secretary Ball for introductory remarks and Ambassador Goldberg for a fuller presentation. General Assembly. Both Ball and Goldberg noted that the General Assembly is a recommending, not a decision-making body. It is useful as a forum and a safety valve. Seventy foreign ministers will assemble in New York, and this provides an opportunity for the broadest high-level consultations. Security Council. Secretary Ball reported his conversation with Foreign Secretary Brown in which he told the British we would not use the veto on an African race issue. 2 Brown said he would resign before acquiescing in Britain doing so (Ball added that it could even come to that). Goldberg said we have never had to use the veto, but we could do so perfectly legitimately if our vital interests were at stake. Goldberg described his efforts to upgrade the caliber of Latin American UN representatives, particularly those on the Security Council. Secretary General. Ambassador Goldberg explained why we continue to favor U Thant as Secretary General. He noted that the probable alternative would be an Afghan, whose country lies on the Soviet border, or an African, who would be subject to intense pressure from the African Bloc. Vietnam. Ambassador Goldberg outlined probable Soviet plans for Vietnam debate. Africa. Ambassador Goldberg praised sense of responsibility of African and Asian Commonwealth members and Wilson's handling of the issue. Goldberg expressed concern that the Africans might not have the patience to wait out the proposed 90-day cooling-off period, and described the mounting emotional pressures. Outer Space. Ambassador Goldberg referred to the Soviet push to get most-favored-nation rights in tracking stations. He described his consultations with countries which might be involved and asserted that the Soviet demand is totally unacceptable. He described how he had offered the Russians a chance to have joint tracking stations in the Soviet Union and the U.S. The Russians would not agree. He said there were two interpretations of the Russian demand: (1) they have decided they are not prepared to make an outer space agreement at this stage of the Vietnam war; or (2) they want to spring their own initiative at a later time in the General Assembly, claiming credit for the agreement for prestige purposes. Ambassador Goldberg said prestige should not be the overriding consideration, but he was protecting our prestige to the extent of putting proposals on record, and insuring that they would have to be surfaced along with the Soviets'. Other Items. Ambassador Goldberg touched briefly on general disarmament questions, Chinese representation, Korea, peace-keeping, etc. The President asked Secretary McNamara if he had any comments, which he didn't, and the President closed the meeting. ND 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. No classification marking. Drafted by Nathaniel Davis. The President met with the National Security Council on September 15 from 11:19 to 11:55 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) 2 No other record of this conversation was found. 397. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 397. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, September 16, 1966. SC 00787/66B THE UN'S PROBLEMS ON EVE OF 21ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY The 21st session of the UN General Assembly, convening on 20 September, could be the most difficult and rancorous in United Nations history. The foremost of many problems facing the membership is finding a successor to Secretary General Thant. Thant, who says he will not offer himself for another term after his present one expires in November, has become increasingly concerned about the major powers' failure to make greater use of the UN organization and especially of the office of the Secretary General. He has also deplored the atrophy of the UN's peacekeeping function, as evidenced by its inability to bring about a settlement in Vietnam, its minor role in the Dominican crisis last year, and the present ills of its operations on Cyprus and the Middle East. In part because of such operations, the UN is still in the red financially. It will remain so as long as the USSR and France, the principal debtors to the UN, fail to make voluntary contributions to relieve the situation. Serious though these issues may be, they are likely to be overshadowed in the coming session by still others of a substantive nature. The Afro-Asians, who can now dominate the assembly by virtue of their numerical superiority, are expected to tie up most of the coming session with a bitter campaign against what they consider vestiges of colonialism on a variety of African problems. The question of the future of the disarmament negotiations will also need to be faced, however, as will the recurring problem of Chinese representation. An African Assembly Among the African problems, that of South-West Africa will be given priority. African delegates remain determined to loose the Republic of South Africa's hold on the territory, despite their recent failure to accomplish this through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN's principal judicial body. The court refused to rule on the merits of the case, insisting that the plaintiffs—Liberia and Ethiopia—had no legal right to require South Africa to meet its League of Nations mandate obligations in the territory. The UN Secretariat has suggested that the afternoon sessions be devoted to the South-West Africa question, with the rest of the general debate held during the morning meetings. The African group is pleased with this plan since it will dramatize the urgency of the problem and will give the foreign ministers who usually participate at the beginning of the general debate an opportunity to speak out. The discussion will cover the report of the Committee of 24 on the subject of South Africa and the secretary general's report on the educational and training programs for South-West Africa, but it will concentrate on the situation arising from the recent ICJ judgment. The Africans will attempt to pass a resolution stripping South Africa of its League mandate and placing South-West Africa under UN administration. Such action, however, is of questionable legality and might precipitate South Africa's withdrawal from the UN. Another tactic would be a request to the ICJ for an advisory opinion on whether South Africa has breached its mandate. However, at the present time the anti-ICJ sentiment prevailing among the Africans makes it doubtful that they would go to the court again. During the ICJ election the Africans plan to “purge the court” by filling the five vacancies on the bench with judges more sympathetic to their views. In addition, they plan to introduce an amendment to the UN Charter enlarging the court to give Africa and Asia more representation, as was done for the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council last year. Considerable sentiment exists for an attempt by the assembly to revoke South Africa's League mandate, but a strong condemnatory resolution, which would have no juridical consequences, might be enough to satisfy the Africans. Ernest Gross, the legal counsel for Ethiopia and Liberia in the recent ICJ case, proposed that a UN commission for South-West Africa be set up to supervise the administration of the mandate and work toward ultimate independence for the territory. Such a maneuver would be a delaying tactic and would rule out any action by the assembly to end the mandate. Other African issues will involve Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, and South Africa's apartheid (racial segregation) policies. The General Assembly will consider the report of the Special Committee on Colonialism which recommended mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and called on the UK to take all measures including the use of force to abolish Ian Smith's rebel, white-minority regime. The Africans are like to attempt to pass an assembly resolution requesting that the Security Council take stronger mandatory action under Chapter 7 than the voluntary measures under Chapter 6 that the UN took last year. Financing and Peacekeeping The noise and heat generated by the African debates are likely to dissipate what little impulse exists to deal with UN finances and peacekeeping. The members have little stomach for tackling these problems. There are deep divisions among them on political principles as well as interpretation of the UN Charter's articles on peacekeeping functions. The feeble Committee of 33 set up to deal with the question is now on its last legs. After many months of discussion no new suggestions have been presented and the apathy of the Afro-Asians has brought the meetings to a quiet close. The committee's report to the General Assembly will contain little of substantive value. Only the Irish have shown any interest in searching for a solution. Even though their proposals were shelved by the last assembly and hardly considered by the Committee of 33, the Irish intend to present them to this assembly. Their plan for financing future peacekeeping operations allows any of the permanent members (US, USSR, UK, France, and China) to avoid sharing the cost of a peacekeeping operation by simply not voting in favor of it. The Canadians are thinking about presenting their formula on financing which apportions the cost of an operation among the members according to a special scale. Over a year ago an appeal was made for voluntary contributions to relieve the growing UN debt. However, the major debtors—the Soviet Union and France—have as yet given no sign that they will make a contribution. The UN's financial conditions are contributing to the ills of the present peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. The secretary general has had to pass the “begging bowl” to keep the operation alive. Members with forces on the island continue to threaten to pull out unless they are reimbursed for their expenses. This has led some countries to suggest that the forces be reduced or replaced by an observer mission-a change which might endanger the shaky peace now maintained on the island. The UN operation in the Middle East (UNEF) is suffering from the same ills. Here too there is considerable support for a major reduction in troop strength. The majority of members hold that unless there is some demonstrated progress toward easing Arab-Israeli tension they will be unwilling to continue contributions. The general view is that future financial support for UNEF should be through voluntary contributions. Disarmament The numerous disarmament items on the agenda for the 21st General Assembly will be time-consuming and difficult to handle. At last year's assembly these same items—nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear-free zones, and others—were discussed and then handed over to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) for further study. However, the ENDC's failure to make progress on any of these issues has led many Afro-Asian countries to question the value of continuing it. East-West differences over a nonproliferation treaty and the diminishing support from the ENDC's nonaligned members for the Western formula have stalled the negotiations. The deadlock has caused the eight nonaligned members to consider presenting their own version of a treaty at the next ENDC session. Their draft would call for a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons to states not already having them, a cutoff on the production of fissionable material for weapons, a reduction of stockpiles by nuclear states, and the universal application of international safeguards to all nuclear activities. The eight have drafted a memorandum reaffirming their conviction that a nonproliferation treaty should be concluded and should include these restrictions or be accompanied with or followed by other measures which accomplish the same goals. Of even more interest to the nonaligned countries is the proposal to extend the limited test ban treaty of 1963 to cover all testing. The nonaligned group sees this issue as the one on which the ENDC might make progress. The nonaligned will argue that improvements in technological capabilities to monitor underground explosions has reduced the need for on-site inspections, hitherto one of the stumbling blocks to such a treaty. Other possible disarmament topics are a Latin American nuclear-free zone and abolition of foreign military bases, another favorite of the Afro-Asians as well as the Soviet bloc. While there seems to be little progress toward settlement of the various disarmament issues, there is one bright spot in the related subjects of outer space: the treaty draft now approaching completion in the legal subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Soviet Union may, however, seek to extract certain propaganda advantages. Admittance of Peking Another go-around on the question of seating Communist China is expected to occur at about mid-session. The vote was a tie last year and a close vote is expected this year. Secretary General Thant's reasons for not accepting a second term include a reference to the Chinese representation issue. He reiterated his dissatisfaction that the world organization has not yet achieved universality of membership. It is generally known that Thant has supported the admission of China but his listing it as one of the reasons for his resignation will probably cause some members to reconsider their position on the issue. However, the recent developments inside China which have further tarnished its international image, together with its leaders' statements disclaiming any desire to come into the UN, will possibly affect Peking's chances of winning more votes. Last year the ruling that admission of Communist China was an “important question” requiring a two-thirds majority for passage was upheld. This year the importance of this procedural ruling is even greater owing to the likelihood of some changes in the voting pattern. Iran and Senegal intend to vote for admission. Canada is wavering and may abstain. However, Chad and the Maldive Islands, which abstained last year, are expected to support Taiwan. The outcome will depend on the Afro-Asians, who control the most votes in the General Assembly, and their attitudes on the Chinese issue may be affected by the outcome of the debate on South-West Africa and Rhodesia. Other Issues Although Vietnam will not be on the agenda, it is certain the foreign ministers will discuss it in their opening speeches. There is also a rumor that the Afro-Asian nations will introduce a resolution at the end of the general debate either on their own or at the request of the secretary general. This resolution would merely call for the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of negotiations. However, the Soviets have recently been making it clear to their friends at the UN that they want no resolution of any sort on Vietnam. Another kind of admission problem-UN membership for small states (“the bits and pieces problem”)—may receive further airing at the 21st General Assembly. The admission of the Maldive Islands last year caused concern that numerous small entities might aspire to UN membership upon becoming independent. Such territories, too small to carry out charter obligations, could find their way into the assembly to the detriment of states with major responsibilities. It has been suggested that there should either be a minimum standard on the size of the states becoming members, or some form of associate status. It has also been proposed that the Security Council committee on membership be revived in order to prevent acceptance of small states simply because no one wants to oppose them. The Korean question will again be on the agenda but will probably not come up until the end of the session, in which case it would be brushed aside. Saudi Arabia will probably introduce a proposal to invite North Korea to attend the assembly discussions. There is a strong feeling among the nonaligned members that this should be done and that direct talks between the parties should be held. Thant's Departure and Its Effect on the UN Overshadowing all of the numerous problems the UN faces is Secretary General Thant's decision not to offer himself as a candidate for another five-year term. There is a possibility that after a formal appeal by the Security Council, Thant will decide to accept a shortened term for perhaps two or three years. Many of his colleagues feel that Thant genuinely wants to leave his post, but they also hope he will not leave if the leadership crisis has not been resolved by 3 November, the day his term expires. If Thant adheres to his decision to leave, the UN will face the difficult problem of finding a qualified successor acceptable to all major powers. At present there are no strong candidates, and the search is likely to be long and rigorous. Possible candidates that have been mentioned are Prebisch of Argentina, Garcia Robles or Cuevas Cancino of Mexico, Adebo of Nigeria, Slim of Tunisia, D'Arboussier of Senegal, Rolz-Bennett of Guatemala, Enckell of Finland, and Pazhwak of Afghanistan. The Afro-Asians have agreed among themselves that Thant should be pressed to stay on for an extension of his term if no suitable replacement can be found. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 4. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. 398. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 398. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, September 27, 1966, 2242Z. 1058. Secretary General. At private meeting between Fedorenko (USSR), Caradon (UK), Seydoux (France) and myself this afternoon we agreed subject to confirmation by Seydoux and Caradon before 10 a.m. tomorrow morning on following procedure to be followed with respect to status of SYG at private meeting of Security Council which will be called on Thursday, Sep 29 at 3:30 p.m. After SC approves its report to the GA which will be the officially stated subject of meeting, the President will submit for approval of members the following statement: “The Members of SC welcome the statement of the SYG on Sep 19 2 that he is ready to continue in the office of the SYG until the end of the present session of the 21st GA. “Taking into account the great positive role played by the SYG U Thant in the activities of the UN, the members of the SC further express their confidence in him and consider that if U Thant should express willingness to serve another term as SYG it would fully meet the desires of the Members of this Council.” I indicated approval of this statement on behalf of US Government and Fedorenko on behalf of Sov Union. Seydoux approved it personally but stated he desired to consult and would give final word before 10 a.m. tomorrow. Caradon approved statement but following Seydoux' statement indicated he would also give final answer tomorrow morning. Upon receiving agreement of all of four permanent members Fedorenko as Council President will consult with other members to obtain their concurrence so that action can be taken on Thursday 3 unanimously and without debate. I will consult with Chinese Amb and seek concurrence from him. Following action by SC in private session this statement if adopted would then be released publicly by Fedorenko on behalf of Council. Comment : It is to be noted that this statement at this time does not recommend to Assembly extension of present term to the end of the session. It was the view after considerable discussion that this would set off long Assembly discussion on entire problem which would be premature and that if necessary formal recommendation could be made by Council reasonable time before Nov 3 to cover remainder of Assembly session. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol 5. Confidential; Exdis. 2 At a press conference that day. 3 September 29. 399. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 399. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 4, 1966, 6:30 p.m. Mr. President: Arthur Goldberg called and wished you to know the following. This afternoon the Soviet representatives in New York came in with space treaty proposals “which go a long way to meet our requirements.” They will be meeting tomorrow to see if it is the real thing. He regards it as “interesting” that they have moved on the space treaty because he feared after his conversation with Gromyko yesterday they would try to hinge progress on this treaty to other matters. He believes they are trying to create a good atmosphere for Gromyko's meeting with you next Monday. 2 W. W. Rostow 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Bator and Keeny. 2 President Johnson and Gromyko met on October 10; see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Documents 178 and 179 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 400. Memorandum of Conversation 400. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 10, 1966. SUBJECT United Nations Problems PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary William C. Foster—ACDA Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson Governor Harriman John M. Leddy-EUR Malcolm Tonn—SOV U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko Soviet Ambassador Antoliy Dobrynin Alexander I. Zinchunk, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy Counselor of Embassy Vorontosov Ivan I. Ippolitov, Aide to Gromyko The Secretary asked Mr. Gromyko if he had given any thought to the problems we faced in the United Nations in view of the expansion of membership far beyond our original expectations when we worked out the Charter. Clearly, some way has to be found to prevent the small nations, whose financial participation in United Nations operations was minimal, from assuming a dominating role. One possible solution might be a weighted vote scheme. Another which particularly intrigued the Secretary was to make the UN budget subject to Security Council recommendation but without a veto. Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would readily support the Security Council idea but did not comment on the veto point. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, UN 6. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Toon on October 18 and cleared in S and S/S on October 19. 2 In an October 17 memorandum to Goldberg, Sisco reported that Rusk had told him that during a private discussion following this talk Gromyko had indicated “the likelihood of a Soviet voluntary contribution.” (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 76 D 435) 401. Intelligence Information Special Report 401. Intelligence Information Special Report 1 Washington, October 13, 1966. CSDB–312/02855–66 COUNTRY United Nations DATE OF INFO. 10 October 1966 SUBJECT Continued Interest of the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, in a Second Full Term [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] 1. The Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, is still thinking of serving another full term but, for tactical reasons, wants to defer his decision to a time beyond the expiration of his present term on 3 November 1966. For the time being he is interested in an extension until the end of the year. He envisages that the extension would be recommended by the Security Council to the General Assembly and would be granted, without a vote, by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the President of the Assembly, who would announce that the extension would be in accordance with the wishes of the Secretary General. 2. About the end of November the Secretary General would advise the Security Council of his willingness to accept a new full term. His thinking assumes some progress by that time on the question of voluntary contributions and possibly on Vietnam. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. 402. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 402. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 7, 1966. SUBJECT Goldberg Trip to the Ranch I talked to Joe Sisco this morning. He says Goldberg's trip down was the President's idea, and he called Goldberg late yesterday afternoon. Goldberg climbed on the plane at 6:00 am today and is returning tonight. 2 Joe thinks the President's idea is electoral politics 3 —the Jewish community in New York, peace image, constructive initiatives, etc. He also thinks the President is aware of Goldberg's acute sensitivity about his access to the President for consultation. He thinks Goldberg will talk publicly about efforts for a Vietnam peace (nothing very substantial) and other current UN business. Privately, Goldberg will undoubtedly talk about Chirep, the Outer Space Treaty, Southwest Africa and Rhodesia, Vietnam (of course), and non-proliferation. On outer space—unless Goldberg has talked to Morozov on the sly—there has been no change in the situation since my memo of November 2 (attached). 4 Goldberg put off today's meeting with Morozov until tomorrow. I would not be surprised if Goldberg announced Outer Space “agreement” today in Texas, or urged the President to do so. We are so close that this probably could be done. 5 ND 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Bator. 2 According to the President's Daily Diary, Goldberg and Komer arrived at the LBJ Ranch around 9:40 a.m. They apparently spent much of the rest of the day with Johnson and accompanied him during afternoon trips to Cotulla and San Antonio. (Ibid.) 3 November 8 was election day. 4 Not attached. 5 In a November 9 memorandum to Rostow, Davis reported that the President and Goldberg had discussed Vietnam and Goldberg's trip to Asia, the Chinese representation question, and the Outer Space Treaty on which substantive agreement existed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5) 403. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 403. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 10, 1966, 0045Z. 2193. UN Financial Situation. Seydoux (France) told Goldberg today French had been in consultation with Sovs on UN financial situation. Now that decisions had been taken on basis Comite of 14 report 2 they wanted to move ahead. We were first ones being consulted after their consultations with Russians. Seydoux said his instructions were as fols: (a) that solution should cover the full amount of the $31.9 million deficit; (b) that contributions of states involved should be “in harmony” with each other; (c) that announcements of contributions should be made simultaneously. Seydoux said he had been asked to get our reactions. He said words “in harmony” meant that relative payments of those participating should be in general proportion to their respective ratios of contributions in other matters, but that it would not have to be precise. Goldberg said we of course regarded deficit as being in $52 million range and that even with that figure there would still be future problem of additional deficit coming essentially from bonds. We regarded those who were delinquent as the ones who should make contributions; lower figure in itself would be asking US to forego refunds due it and thus increase its share of expenses. Said US could not be expected to do anything simultaneously with those who were delinquent, but as he had already said in past if others were generous in meeting UN financial problems US would not thereafter be found wanting any more than it had in past. Seydoux said he knew from Fedorenko that Sovs had conveyed to US amount of contribution they had in mind. Fedorenko had told him that US had not reacted and Seydoux had impression Sovs thought amount they had suggested was therefore acceptable to US. He went on in course of discussion to add that Sov figure of $7 million was in his view not sufficient as it would not eliminate deficit which he now thought must be met. Goldberg told him we had no knowledge of any Sov notification to US of $7 million or any other figure, and that we would not regard $7 million as an appropriate amount. Seydoux asked that we not reveal that figure came from him in light of his “indiscretion.” Conversation ended with Goldberg statement that we would give French official reply to their approach to US. While request made to US in French instructions was for comments on specific points set forth above it was clear from Seydoux's handling of discussion that they were very much interested as well in questions of how much, when and how US might participate. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Confidential; Exdis. 2 Apparently the second report with recommendations, submitted July 17; for text, see UN doc. A/6343. 404. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 404. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 23, 1966, 0130Z. 2564. For the Secretary and Sisco. I sought a meeting with SYG this afternoon for purpose of specifically ascertaining his intentions about extending his term as SYG. No one except SYG and myself were present at his conversation which was frank and extremely candid. I told SYG that time had come when it was necessary for him to make final decision as to whether he was willing to stay for another term. I said that he knew our govt's position and that of other members of SC, as well as the overwhelming sentiment in the Assembly and that it would be pointless for me to review the many discussions which had taken place on this subject. I also said that while I knew his strongly held views about Vietnam, he could not anticipate that our govt's course would be changed in the interest of inducing him to remain in office. I thought it necessary to be very forthright and candid with him on this point. I did say that he knew we desired a peaceful solution but that it was not our considered view that the course he specifically recommended would bring this about. I reiterated to him what we said publicly, that it would be by mutual reciprocal actions only that a diminution of hostilities could occur. I added, however, that this did not mean that we did not believe that he could play an ultimate role in bringing about an honorable settlement. He is an Asian who by virtue of his office and his own personality enjoys prestige in SEA and it was my personal view that circumstances might be such that his good offices could be helpful to both sides. Despite our differences concerning Vietnam, our govt held him in high regard and believed strongly that the interests of the world organization would be impaired if he did not agree to continue on. I further emphasized that campaigning had already commenced and that names of various candidates were being bandied about. This, in my view, was undesirable and made it even more imperative that a final decision be reached now about his status. SYG said he appreciated the extreme candor of my statement, particularly my frank exposition about his views concerning Vietnam. He said he had never intended his expression on this subject to constitute a condition for reconsideration on his part. He commented that he was too aware of the political realities to believe that his reappointment would affect our deeply held views on this tragic conflict. He said, however, that since he had stated in September that he would not stand, some concrete step would have to be taken other than Vietnam, in order to make it possible for him, with dignity and face, to accept an appointment. I in turn stated that the time had come when subtlety and indirection had no place, and that it would be necessary for him to be specific. He replied that he understood this and that he would talk specifically but only on the level of personal confidence with me and as a friend whose judgment and discretion he valued. On that basis he stated that if the financial problems of the UN were alleviated and if on my initiative as President of the Security Council a private meeting were held where the Council would determine their inability to agree upon another candidate, this would afford him the basis to accept reappointment. I expressed appreciation for his candor and said that I would undertake to see what could be done about the financial matter. I added that I saw no difficulty in getting the SC to agree at a private meeting to the lack of ability to find a suitable successor, and a unanimous desire to extend his term. On the financial matter I indicated disappointment with the Russian proposal to contribute seven million dollars. SYG inquired whether I knew what amount the French had in mind and I said I did not, and he in turn said that the French had never indicated to him what contribution they were willing to make. SYG further emphasized that if action was to be taken by SC, he would hope it could be taken during my Presidency. He said that while the next President, Amb. Berro of Uruguay, is a fine mean, he would not feel comfortable or trusting enough to have him handle this delicate matter, nor would he feel warranted in confiding his innermost thoughts to the Amb of Uruguay. SYG and I noted that this leaves us with only one week to conduct this very delicate operation. Comment : The significance of this conversation is, of course, self-apparent and in my judgment requires a re-evaluation on our part of our willingness to make a financial contribution in concert and in harmony with Soviets, French and British, plus such others as may like to join. I know deeply held views of Dept. We are not defaulters, and the French and Russians are. On other hand it seems clear that unless we act quickly and in concert with them, it is very likely SYG may conclude that there is no dignified basis for him to stay on. If he does leave, the conclusion among a considerable body of responsible American opinion as well as world opinion is that he will be leaving his post because of frustrations over our Vietnam policy. It is in my considered view a cheap price to pay to guard against this type of reaction, for US to come up with a contribution to the UN deficit. I have in mind our attempting to get agreement on matching contributions between the four permanent members based upon what the British have already paid, namely, 10 million dollars. This would mean an additional 30 million from the US, USSR, and France, since the British have already paid their contribution, plus what can be collected from other members. It should be possible if the permanent members each contribute 10 million dollars, to raise better than 5 million dollars from all other members who have not yet contributed to the deficit. While this would not solve the financial problems of the UN, it would contribute considerably towards their solution and would enable the SYG to conclude that a substantial response has been made to his appeal to keep the UN house in order. In making this recommendation I do not mean to say that I would start on this basis with the Russians. I would ask them for the contribution they originally implied—15 million. For this, state our willingness to contribute 10 million. My judgment is, however, that after initiating such negotiations, what I have recommended is the only feasible course for bringing the matter to a speedy conclusion. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; Nodis. 405. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 405. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 30, 1966, 0340Z. 2793. Continuation of U Thant as SYG. Series of three meetings (Nov 28 a.m. with nonperm members SC; Nov 28 p.m. with full SC: Nov 29 at first with full SC and then with USSR, France, UK, Uruguay) culminated in presentation of following statement to SYG 6 p.m. Nov 29: “The members of SC have been meeting informally. They wish you to know that, after taking all considerations into account, they unanimously wish you to continue for another term in office. They believe this would meet the best interests of the organization. “Pending SC action in a formal sense, which it would plan to take on Friday of this week members of Council hope you would postpone any public statement in reference to this matter.” Goldberg read statement orally, and SYG made no substantive reply other than to say he would postpone press statement scheduled for Nov 30. To SYG's question what would be occurring in interim between now and Friday, Goldberg replied that there would be consultations among SC members and with him. After meeting with SYG, UN press officer announced that U Thant would not make statement of future plans until later this week, and specifically, not tomorrow. General summary of meetings as follows: 1. Goldberg several times mentioned his reasons for convocation of Council: In meeting with SYG as US rep and not as Council pres, he had derived impression that U Thant amenable to remaining in job provided matter handled in proper way. Goldberg suggested that SC draft statement noting Council had considered whole situation concerning office of SYG and had arrived at unanimous decision to invite U Thant to remain. Statement would be informally checked with SYG before being formally presented to him in mtg of Council. Since SYG had not mentioned serving for less than full term, and since full term was the norm, Council invitation would be for full term. Statement suggested by Goldberg as follows: “On Oct 28, 1966, Council unanimously adopted a res (Res 227) 2 recommending that appointment of U Thant as SYG of UN be extended until end of 21st session of GA. On Nov 1 GA unanimously so extended his term in Res 2147 (XXI). 3 “Under terms of these two reses extension was to be accompanied by further consideration of the appointment of the SYG. In their consequent considerations, every member of Council has been conscious of SYG's statement of Sept 1, 1966 expressing his decision 'not to offer myself for a second term as SYG and to leave SC unfettered in its recommendation to GA with regard to next SYG'. 4 “Members of Council have accordingly examined situation with this statement especially in mind. They have attached great importance to consideration that organization should continue to be served by a SYG who has capacity to evoke cooperation from all members and confidence of their peoples. They have taken into account need of ensuring that interests and purposes of organization are furthered and strengthened by this recommendation of Council. They have weighed SYG's wish that members examine possibility of reaching agreement on another nominee against advantages to organization of continuity and stability under current conditions. “SC, meeting in private session, and after giving consideration to all these pertinent considerations, has decided to recommend as most conducive to interests and purposes of organization appointment of U Thant for another term in office as SYG of UN”. 2. Goldberg's position met with several lines of objection. French, with Sov support, professed desire keep U Thant in office while arguing vociferously for weakest possible Council statement to SYG. Their initial move was for draft simply noting that SYG scheduled to issue statement Nov 30, asking him to postpone the statement, and informing him that Council would be formally considering SYG's reappointment on Dec 2. (Adebo (Nigeria) read text to this effect in meeting Nov 29, Sovs and French had text before meeting began.) Argument made in favor of such move was that SYG must be headed off before he committed himself in Nov 30 statement, that Council must for the moment concentrate upon agreeing to this, that procedure for choosing SYG fairly complicated, involving not only SC but GA, and that attempt to formulate full position for presentation to SYG would involve waste of valuable time. To Goldberg's statement that Adebo draft too negative, that it regarded U Thant as candidate, Fedorenko said man of SYG's caliber would understand and be cooperative. View that initial Council statement should be warmer than as proposed by Adebo received support from Corner (NZ) and Caradon (UK). Gradually, agreement reached to include language re unanimous support for SYG in statement. 3. Second aim of French and Sovs was to ensure that SYG gave no reply to Council while US was SC pres. Seydoux and Fedorenko fastidious to see that no hint of a question relating to SYG's availability was included in statement made to SYG. Asked specifically for deletion of language suggested by Goldberg noting Council desire to comply with what SYG had outlined in Sept as requirements for his continued service. Adamantly opposed Caradon suggestions of asking for SYG's response as quickly as possible or of asking SYG how Council should proceed. Seydoux even reluctant include in statement language indicating Council intention consult further with SYG. Argument was that, since terms of invitation to SYG not yet agreed upon, it was premature to ask about U Thant availability; moreover, U Thant not in position to alter Council draft and Council should be very careful not to embarrass him. When Goldberg argued strongly that SYG should be told how Council planned to proceed, even if nothing asked of him, it was agreed Goldberg would indicate in general terms Council desire consult with SYG before formal action. Seydoux insisted that formal Council action be set not earlier than Thursday, and preferably Friday. 5 4. Several reps concerned that dignity of Council not being taken sufficiently into account. Kironde (Uganda), El-Farra (Jordan), Tarabanov (Bulgaria) among those initially believing that SYG's availability should be ascertained before any statement drafted. But all agreed time was of the essence, and by time of meeting Nov 29 this line of argument maintained only by El-Farra. Kironde willing accept Goldberg's belief that SYG available. Goldberg said he thought SYG would react negatively to preliminary approach by Council to rely on his impression, but said that presentation to SYG on draft Council invitation, along with request for U Thant's approval, would ensure that no formal move of Council would be rebuffed. Maintained that he too concerned with dignity of Council. 5. Brief argument ensued over whether presentation to SYG should be oral or written. When Berro (Uruguay) claimed written approach would be more dignified, Fedorenko said U Thant would understand in either case, Seydoux worried that draft would be made public (while US still Council pres), Ruda (Argentina) noted that submitting draft for approval very far away from Council's usual duties. Consensus finally obtained for oral presentation of written statement. 6. Discussion of who should represent Council to SYG ended in consensus choice of four major powers plus next Council pres (Uruguay.) These five reps remained Nov 29 after others left and drafted the statement that was used. 7. Same group of five plans convene tomorrow to work on draft invitation to SYG. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; Limdis. 2 For text, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966 , p. 204. 3 For text, see ibid., pp. 204–205. 4 See footnote 2, Document 392 . 5 December 1 and 2. 406. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 406. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, December 1, 1966, 0122Z. 2820. Talk with Kuznetsov (USSR). At suggestion of the Secretary who thought it might be useful, I had a private and rather prolonged discussion of approximately one and one half hours with Deputy FM Kuznetsov at the Soviet mission this morning. 1. After the usual pleasantries and exchange of courtesies, Kuznetsov opened the conversation by making a strong plea that we withdraw our support for the Canadian res on peacekeeping. 2 He said that his govt would regard the adoption of a res of this type as constituting a renewal of the difficulties which arose between our two countries during the Article 19 dispute. He reiterated familiar Soviet arguments that the Charter required agreement between the permanent members at the Security Council level on peacekeeping operations and argued at considerable length that the Canadian proposal was not based upon a sound interpretation of the Charter. 2. I told him in friendly but in categoric terms that our govt completely rejected his arguments. I pointed out that the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion had sustained our interpretation of the Charter in the Article 19 dispute, and that we had gone as far as we were prepared to go in not seeking the applications of the Charter's provisions against the Soviet Union, France and other defaulters. I further said that we still maintained our position in principle concerning the Article 19 matter but that this was not the current issue in the Canadian res. On the contrary, the Canadian res sought merely to repair the damage done by the Soviet and French unwillingness to give genuine support to the necessary peacekeeping activities of the UN. I emphasized that even where our interests are parallel, as in the India-Pakistan dispute of last year, the Soviets had insisted in the Security Council upon a position which would have paralyzed Secretary General's necessary efforts to maintain the fragile peace which the SC by resolution had brought about. I said that we would persist in our support of the Canadian res but that we were perfectly willing, following its adoption, to pursue a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and with France, if the dialogue would lead to a concert of opinion in support of genuine peacekeeping activities by the UN. 3. Kuznetsov, in reply, asked whether this could not be done by sidetracking the res and by referring the matter again to the Committee of 33. I in turn pointed out our experience in last round involving Committee 33 which had led us to conclusion that Soviets were not genuinely interested in viable peacekeeping and were only proposing the reference to Committee of 33 as a burial ground for genuine peacekeeping. Comment : Canadians have told us Kuznetsov made a similar pitch to Paul Martin and Martin replied in terms similar to mine. 4. I then raised question of our problems in completing space treaty due to the French belated proposals. 3 I repeated to Kuznetsov in great detail objections which I had made to these proposals in our meeting between US and Soviet delegations earlier in the day. Since these have been separately and fully reported, I shall not repeat these arguments here. Kuznetsov listened very intently but finally commented that they thought virtue of having French as a signatory to treaty more than compensated for difficulties which I described. I in turn said that I was convinced that French would be a signatory to the treaty without their views being specifically mentioned in the res if both US and Soviets were to indicate undesirability of France pressing its position at this late hour. Comment : It seems perfectly clear that Soviets wish to maintain posture of accepting French proposals to put onus on US of rejecting them. 5. At conclusion of space discussion we then turned to question of non-proliferation negotiations. Kuznetsov said that he thought good progress was being made and that currently they were awaiting a reply from US concerning the most recent discussions. 6. Finally, I asked Kuznetsov how long he intended to stay and he stated that in all probability he would stay throughout the rest of the General Assembly. Comment : As indicated above, the meeting was very cordial in tone and when I was leaving, Kuznetsov in particular asked me to remember him most cordially to the Secretary. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 5. Secret; Limdis. 2 Reference is to a seven-power resolution introduced by Canada and adopted on December 14; for text, see UN doc. A/SPC/L.130. 3 Incorporated during the drafting of UN General Assembly Resolutions 2221 (XXI) and 2222 (XXI), both December 19. 407. Minutes of Meeting 407. Minutes of Meeting 1 Austin, Texas, December 17, 1966. PRESENT Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Katzenbach Ambassador Harriman Ambassador Lodge Ambassador Goldberg W.W. Rostow [Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and NATO matters.] Amb. Goldberg then reported on UN matters. The Space Treaty was completed and would move forward. In general, the UN session was notable for the willingness of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to move forward, despite Viet-Nam, on a practical basis. The Space Treaty was first raised in April; negotiations began on June 12; were completed in mid November; and adoption by the General Assembly will take place before January 1. 2 He anticipated no objections in the Congress. The President recalled Amb. Goldberg's success with Article 19 and was warned that “a stitch in time saves nine” in dealing with Congress. Under Secretary Katzenbach said he hoped Congress would be friendly to the Space Treaty but we must rap on wood because he saw difficulties with this Congress on East-West trade. Amb. Goldberg then said the Soviets evidently want a non-proliferation treaty. Roschin will be going home on Tuesday and we should get a message to him in the wake of Secretary Rusk's consultations in Europe. Amb. Goldberg believes the non-proliferation agreement should be negotiated by the Foreign Ministers, not by the ENDC, which is too slow. On the UN issues of Korea and China, the vote was better than last year, in part because we were more flexible, in part because of the trouble inside Communist China. U Thant's reelection 3 must be counted a plus although he will be difficult for us on Viet Nam. The alternatives would have been far worse. With respect to Rhodesia and Southwest Africa, we cannot wash our hands. The Soviet Union would exploit any opening we gave them by our getting out of Africa. He had talked with Senator Russell who was troubled about our Rhodesian position but when he understood that we under no circumstances planned to use force to make sanctions effective he pronounced himself satisfied. Amb. Goldberg said he told Senator Russell we would use a veto if necessary to prevent the use of military force to enforce sanctions against Rhodesia. W. W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings, Dec. 17, 1966. Top Secret. 2 For text, signed at Washington January 27, 1967, and entered into force October 10, 1967, see 18 UST 2410. 3 December 2. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 408. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 408. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 31, 1967, 10:15 a.m. Mr. President: I had a long talk with Joe Sisco who gave me, I am sure, as honest a picture as he could of Amb. Goldberg's mind and feelings. 1. Amb. Goldberg stepped down from the Supreme Court and remains conscious of the height he had achieved in our society. 2. Like his predecessors, he did not, at the beginning, understand the extent to which the job in New York is and must be limited in its authority and, ultimately, subordinated to the Secretary of State. He has come to understand the inherent limitations of the post. 3. On the other hand, he is intensely loyal to you personally and to the Administration. He does not wish to take any action which would hurt us between now and 1968. Sisco tells me that he put the question directly to Sisco who told him flatly: You cannot leave the Administration before 1968. 4. Goldberg has been searching for a way to leave his post with appropriate dignity: he inquires as to the successor to Mr. Justice Clark. He asks whether Phil Jessup's post on the International Court of Justice at The Hague may soon be vacant. 5. Sisco's view is the key to keeping him at his post for a while is his trip to Saigon. He has been pressing to make a speech to the Constituent Assembly. 2 He does not want a trip in which he “simply reviews the troops.” Bill Bundy and others find some difficulty in having an American Ambassador talk directly to the Constituent Assembly; but they are working on other ways to give him something dramatic to do on the civil side, if he goes to Saigon; for example, speak at the American University with members of the Constituent Assembly present. I suggested some other ways to associate him with constructive civil enterprises in a dramatic way when he is in Viet Nam. The issue will be coming soon to Secretary Rusk. 6. Sisco said that he believes his greatest possible service to you and the Administration will be to give us a warning if Arthur's mood gets desperate and he comes close to a decision. I told him to stay close to Arthur; let us know how it goes; and suggest as many ways as he can of letting him feel he is in on the substance of policy. I will try to have him over for an early lunch here when he is in town. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Rostow Memos. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 For text of the speech, delivered February 10, see Department of State Bulletin , February 27, 1967, pp. 310–316. The Constituent Assembly was elected on September 11, 1966, to draft a new constitution to provide for the re-establishment of an elected government in South Vietnam. The new constitution was promulgated April 1, 1967, and took effect on May 1. 409. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 409. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 8, 1967, 7:15 p.m. SUBJECT Ambassador Goldberg's Speech at Howard University I have 2 read the draft of Ambassador Goldberg's speech. It is a thoughtful and dispassionate analysis of our attitude toward settling the Vietnam war and of Hanoi's publicly stated positions. It is not, as stated on page 3, an assessment of “the present status and prospects of our efforts for peace.” It does not get into any recent diplomatic moves. Nor does it try to measure what the chances of peace are. It deals more gently than I would with Hanoi's equating of our bombing and their willingness, perhaps, to talk (see page 14). I believe the analysis used may leave some of his listeners thinking that Hanoi's position is not so unreasonable. The formulation (on page 15) might be strengthened. He says we would stop bombing if Hanoi assured us a “tangible response toward peace.” Some people might well consider the starting of negotiations as that kind of response. Perhaps it should be something like “a corresponding action to limit the conflict.” On page 16, he mentions our points, Hanoi's points, and the Liberation Front's points. He should note that the Government of South Vietnam will undoubtedly have points it will wish to discuss. The discussion of the Liberation Front is weak. The main argument used to question its role is that it did not exist in 1954 when the Geneva Accords were reached. He really ought to point out with more emphasis that the Front speaks for only a limited number of the people of South Vietnam, as the dismal failures of its efforts to launch general strikes and disrupt elections have demonstrated so clearly. In conclusion, I do not think this address will raise any particular problems as far as present efforts to achieve peace are concerned. I doubt it will raise any trouble in the public affairs area. But it is a lot softer on Hanoi than I would be. P.S. I have made these points available to Sect. Rusk who will review the speech tomorrow A.M. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 6. Confidential. This memorandum was included in the President's night reading. 2 Rostow crossed out “I have” and replaced with the handwritten annotation “Bill Jorden and I have.” 3 Rostow added the P.S. by hand. Goldberg delivered the speech February 10; see footnote 3, Document 410 . 410. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 410. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 17, 1967, 3:55 p.m. Mr. President: You should know that we have a quite serious problem with Goldberg. Nick 2 spoke to him; but he is not appeased—perhaps unappeasable. I was asked by Sisco and Ben Read to talk to Goldberg before he saw the Secretary General at lunch, which I did. His points are these. 1. He took his job on the assumption that in major matters involving his work, he would have a chance to express his views before decisions were made. 2. In this particular case 3 some of the formulations put forward during the week did not fit what he had been empowered to say in the UN on the basis of our policy. He said he understood the situation was quite particular; but he was not consulted as to what language might have been offered which would have reconciled his position and that which we put forward. 3. He does not now believe his Asian trip is worth while. It will be taken as a peace mission no matter what we say. He is inclined to cancel it. I tried to explain to him that we were counter-punching at odd hours of the day and night to issues posed directly to you by the Prime Minister; 4 and that the fact that he was not called in in no way reflected a desire or a decision by you to forego his counsel. He seemed quite dug in, saying several times that Stevenson had the same problem; implying that it was probably inevitable and he thought that the man in New York should be a professional rather than a public figure who would insist on having his views heard before decisions are made. You should know that a part of the problem is that up at Harvard somebody shoved a microphone before him and asked him about the extension of the bombing pause beyond Tet, which he could not answer; and I gather the New York Post has an article or editorial suggesting that he was not consulted. Obviously all this cuts pretty deep. 5 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Arthur Goldberg. Confidential; Eyes Only. 2 Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. 3 Reference is to the “Sunflower” peace initiative of winter 1966–1967. By early February the British Government was actively engaged in the effort to find an agreeable basis for a cease-fire in Vietnam. On February 8, during a bombing pause for the Tet holidays and while Prime Minister Wilson was holding discussions with Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, President Johnson sent a message to North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh offering to make the pause permanent in exchange for a guarantee that North Vietnamese infiltration of men and materials into the South would cease. On February 10 Ambassador Goldberg, in a speech at Howard University, stated that the United States was ready to halt the bombing on a permanent basis as soon as it had assurances from Hanoi that infiltration would cease. Meanwhile the White House communicated its views through Wilson to Kosygin for the North Vietnamese. Kosygin failed to provide the concrete guarantees Washington wanted from Hanoi within the time frame it insisted upon. On February 13, after the Wilson-Kosygin talks finished, the President ordered the bombing resumed. Documentation on the Sunflower initiative is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume V . 4 Harold Wilson of Great Britain. 5 A covering sheet attached to this memorandum reads: “Put on desk for mtg w Goldberg, LBJ/JJ/mf, 3–8–67, 11:05 a.” According to the President's Daily Diary, March 8, Johnson and Goldberg met from 11:41 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. for a discussion that “included the Ambassador's future plans.” Speaking to the press after the meeting, Goldberg stated that he had reported on his Far East trip. (Johnson Library) 411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, February 24, 1967, 7:33 p.m. 143841. Subj: Committee of 24—VM's to US NSGT's. Ref: USUN's 4051. 2 1. Dept has carefully reviewed question of receiving Comite of 24 Visiting Missions to US Non-Self-Governing Territories, and concludes as last year (CA 9790, April 1, 1966) 3 that US should not receive VM's. FYI. Decision based on following considerations: (a) UN Charter does not obligate US to admit VM's to our NSGT's. US regularly submits information to UN on developments in US NSGT's, including information on political developments. US territories part of open society and therefore, there little additional relevant information which Comite might develop which not already available in press and public proceedings of US and territorial legislatures. (b) Past performance of Comite of 24 provides no reason to believe Comite would submit objective report. Rather some members can be expected to use occasion to reiterate dogmatic views already expressed towards traditional colonial situations. (c) Reception of UN VM in US territories would provoke considerable criticism both in the islands and in US. Islands are inhabited by US citizens or nationals, and despite designation as non-self-governing territories, Guam and the Virgin Islands are already largely self-governing. Removal of last major obstacle to internal self-government for Guam and the Virgin Islands, through election of governors, can be expected in near future. In addition, Samoa legislature has just completed review of its governmental machinery. (d) Question of VM's to US territories must be viewed in context their effect on policy of US allies. Forthcoming Quadripartite Talks on Pacific Islands expected discuss, among other topics, question of VM's. (e) Even if US could hope for relatively favorable reports, particularly on American Samoa and the Virgin Islands, acceptance of VM's would probably have unhelpful effect of leading to more detailed Comite of 24 consideration of US territories than we anticipate in case of refusal. End FYI. 2. After discussing US position with UK, Australian and New Zealand missions, believe USDel should inform Comite of 24 Chairman Malecela that US not prepared to receive VM's to US territories. In doing so, the delegation should point out US submits complete information on US NSGT's and that US reports combined with public information freely available to Comite, including free press and proceedings of popularly elected legislatures, provide full picture on developments. 3. USDel may add that while US not prepared to receive VM's as such, USG and Governments of the territories ready to extend official courtesies to individual UN Reps who may wish to visit US territories, subject, of course, to applicable travel regulations. 4. If necessary USDel may reiterate to whole Comite points in paras 2 and 3. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 9 UN. Secret. Drafted by Jones; cleared in EA, H, L, ARA, UNP, EUR, and the Department of the Interior; and approved by Popper. Repeated to London, Wellington, and Canberra. 2 Dated February 18; it provided an analysis of meetings of the Committee of 24. (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 19 UN) 412. Memorandum of Conversation 412. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 1, 1967. SUBJECT Three political-legal items in the U.N. General Assembly (Friendly Relations, Non-Intervention, Use of Force and Self-determination) PARTICIPANTS The Under Secretary Ambassador Patrick Dean Assistant Secretary Sisco L/UNA-Herbert Reis IO/UNP-Gerald Helman L/UNA-Lawrence Hargrove 1. Ambassador Dean stated that he wished to ask the Under Secretary to review the proceedings of last fall's General Assembly on three related items: principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states; non-intervention; and the Czechoslovak item on use of force and self-determination. While the views of the U.K. and the U.S. in this field were identical, we had differed on tactics and our votes had on some occasions diverged. We could expect a steady flow of such items in future Assemblies, with the basic objective of causing embarrassment to the West. The British view was that, where it is arguable that a resolution is a statement of law, we should not accept that it can be adopted in a hurry without due deliberation in subsidiary bodies. This was important because, while both the U.S. and the U.K. reject the view that Assembly resolutions make law, the fact is that they are regarded as sources of law by some Members. In the light of this fact, when resolutions are adopted without significant opposition there is a strong tendency later to claim for them the status of a sacrosanct legal text. The choice facing the U.S. and the U.K. seemed to be either to adhere to the strict view that General Assembly resolutions are political, accepting a resulting deadlock in subsidiary organs, or to take the more flexible view of “opposing the process” in the plenary and dealing with the issues on their merits in the subsidiary organs. The U.S. seems to have favored the former view, the U.K. the latter. Ambassador Dean stated that he wished to leave the Under Secretary an aide-mémoire setting out U.K. views on this matter. 2. The Under Secretary noted that items of this sort were inherently mischievous—they would be mischievous whether designed to be or not. They could create very troublesome problems and warranted close attention and co-ordination by the U.S. and U.K. The Under Secretary raised the question as to whether the International Law Commission might be considered as a forum for further consideration of such topics as Friendly Relations, particularly in view of the length of time which the I.L.C. consumes in completing any item on its agenda. Mr. Sisco stated that we had tried this approach some time earlier but had been unsuccessful. In response to the Under Secretary's inquiry as to the chances of killing the Friendly Relations item out-right, Mr. Sisco estimated the maximum support for such a move as 1/3 of the Assembly membership. Comment : Ambassador Dean left an aide-mémoire and written speaking points (attached). 2 Later, on March 16, Mr. Ian Sinclair, Legal Adviser to the United Kingdom Permanent Mission to the U.N., met at his request with Carl F. Salans, Deputy Legal Adviser, and Messrs. Reis, Helman and Hargrove, for the purpose of following up Ambassador Dean's conversation with particular reference to the Friendly Relations item. The main burden of Mr. Sinclair's remarks, and of an additional aide-mémoire (attached) 3 which he left with Mr. Salans, was that (1) the U.K. wants to present a comprehensive draft declaration on the seven Friendly Relations principles, on its own or with Western co-sponsors, at the next meeting of the Special Committee on Friendly Relations; and (2) the U.K. has decided that it would be tactically wise and substantively tolerable to incorporate into this draft the first four paragraphs of the General Assembly's controversial declaration on non-intervention, notwithstanding prior Western objections to it. Mr. Salans indicated that we were generally quite skeptical of the idea of accepting the declaration as a legal text without modification, but were studying the U.K.'s position very carefully. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 9 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Hargrove on March 23. 2 Neither printed. 3 Not attached. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 21 UN) 413. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 413. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, March 15, 1967, 5:42 p.m. 155593. Subject: UN Peacekeeping—Committee of 33. Following summarizes our objectives and strategy re peacekeeping for Committee of 33 and Special GA as developed in March 13 discussions in Department between IO (Assistant Secretary Sisco and staff) and USUN (Ambassadors Buffum and Finger): 1. We believe it would be useful for special GA to (a) adopt Canadian resolution as way of maintaining prospects for future peacekeeping and of laying groundwork for non-mandatory special scale, and (b) terminate Committee of 33. However, in view continued Soviet and French objections we recognize likelihood that GA majority will back away from showdown on peacekeeping. In any event we do not consider key elements of Canadian res involve US interests so directly as to warrant lobbying efforts on our part. Our primary objective is to maintain practical peacekeeping prospects rather than to reaffirm existing residual GA role. 2. Consequently, US posture in Cmte 33 should be continued support for approach in Canadian res, recognizing however it is Canadian initiative on which they should take lead while we remain in background. Similarly, it is up to non-aligned to come up with proposals they believe could serve as basis for accommodation on peacekeeping. US prominence could have backlash effect by making bridging of differences more difficult. We should indicate our readiness to examine specific proposals by nonaligned but underscore that, as history Cmte 33 indicates, stumbling block has been Soviet-French intransigence and that absent constructive response from them US reserving position. 3. Future of Committee of 33 . We see no advantage in continuation Cmte 33. We will wish to work toward termination of Cmte 33 in special GA, irrespective of whether Canadian resolution or something like it is adopted. 4. Authorization and Constitutional Elements . While we continue to adhere to principles in preambular paras of Canadian res we see no advantage in attempting formulate in more precise terms complementary GA-SC roles. Any attempt at redefinition of competence of GA could curtail peacekeeping possibilities. How far GA can go will be determined case-by-case. Also, since we have misgivings about possibility future undesirable GA action in this area we prefer leave limits ambiguous. 5. Future Financing . This is one area in which Cmte 33, through finance working group, could take constructive step of examining various proposals for non-mandatory special scale, such as UNEF, R–18, 2 Jamaican formula, 3 etc. While we are prepared search for reliable and equitable formula, initiative should remain with others. As in past, a variety of methods will be used, depending on circumstances. We support widest possible sharing, along lines UNEF-type special scale, R–18 formula, etc. It must be clear that such presumptive apportionment is non-obligatory and that any agreement on this does not prejudice Goldberg reservation of August 1965. 6. Indian proposal that Cmte 33 examine financing for SC-authorized operations (USUN 4179) 4 may have possibilities if Soviets could be induced to discuss it seriously which we doubt since it leaves formal apportionment to GA. In first instance non-aligned should direct their attention to Soviets and attempt engage them in discussion of particulars. (At same time we would not want to leave impression that we could consider any scheme that impairs GA prerogative in financing, though SC could have recommendatory role.) 7. We oppose suggestions that Cmte 33 focus on Article 43 talks since this province of SC. As indicated in SPC and in our support of Canadian res, we can acquiesce in proposals for SC to explore prospects for Article 43 agreements. However, Article 43 forces are for use in enforcement action and do not meet problem of manning consent-type peacekeeping. If there is general agreement in Cmte 33 on eliminating para 4 we could acquiesce, provided Article 43 provision also dropped. 8. UN Deficit and Voluntary Financing . We oppose moves by Cuevas and others (a) to focus Cmte 33 on UN deficit by encouraging voluntary contributions or (b) to consider in context Cmte 33 method for servicing bonds or other contentious items in the regular budget. Apart from strong misgivings we have about specific suggestions made by Cuevas (USUN 4313), 5 considered in next para, responsiveness by us or others to such suggestions could turn Cmte 33 into engine of pressure on US to make contribution and to make unacceptable concessions re present arrangements for bond servicing, as well as compromising special missions item in regular budget. It could also lend support to suggestions for breaking down budget into administrative and operational expenses, with special rules and scales to govern operational costs. Consequently, we should discourage Cuevas from making such proposals in Cmte 33. 9. We have following specific objections to Cuevas proposal (USUN 4313): (a) In principle servicing bonds through miscellaneous income is not to our disadvantage if necessary safeguards applied to ensure that bond servicing remains charge on regular budget and at regular scale rates. But it is totally unrealistic to assume that Soviets would agree to consider this proposal except on basis of concessions by us that are out of question. Effect of Cuevas move would be to spur attempt to pull bonds out of the regular budget, apply special scale, and generally compromise integrity of bond repayment. We therefore oppose any Cmte 33 action on bonds. (b) While in principle we see advantages in excluding $6.4 million TA item from regular budget, we doubt this could be done without at the same time excluding contentious peacekeeping items and bond repayments from regular budget. Elimination from regular budget of peacekeeping items would erode principle of collective financing for peacekeeping, might lead to attempts to apply special scale to such small operations, and could stir up sensitivities re sharing of costs between parties concerned (for example UNTSO). (c) We oppose any proposal to meet deficit out of regular budget surpluses, since this is equivalent to US contribution to tune of 31% of entire deficit. Our position on possible US contribution remains that set forth in State 145141. 6 10. In sum we should refrain from taking lead in Cmte 33, while indicating our support for Canadian resolution and readiness to discuss non-aligned proposals. We would hope by remaining in background we might establish cooling off period in differences with Soviets over peacekeeping, perhaps improving possibilities for future dialogue. However, we see no possibilities for useful US-Soviet discussions on peacekeeping at this time. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 37–4 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits; cleared in OIA, USUN, UNP, and EUR; and approved by Sisco. 2 Apparently the 18-power resolution approved by the General Assembly on December 19, 1966; for text, see UN doc. 2220 (XXI). 3 For texts of two proposals made November 30, and adopted by the Special Committee on December 14, 1966, see A/SPC/L 133 and Rev. 1. 4 Dated March 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–4 UN) 5 Dated March 10. (Ibid.) Francesco Cuevos Cancino of the Mexican delegation served as chairman of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. 6 Dated February 23; it evaluated the domestic political impact of a special U.S. contribution to assist the United Nations. (Ibid., UN 10) 414. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 414. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, March 17, 1967. SUBJECT U.S. Delegation to the UN GA Special Session With the exception of Ambassador Rogers, the proposed list of representatives for the UN Special Session is a strictly “in-house” group. For a debate that will be dominated by the racial situation in South West Africa, the delegation is notable for the absence of any Negroes. It also has no Congressional members. Apparently IO originally intended to include Senators Church and Case (who were at the last General Assembly), and perhaps one or two public members. Joe Sisco recommended this to the Secretary. The Secretary then called Goldberg, and the upshot was to cut the delegation back to the regular New York staff plus Rogers, who has been our representative on the Committee on South West Africa. The reasons were: The IO budget is strapped for funds; we have not generally appointed full delegations to special sessions; we are trying to keep the whole session in low key and would be just as pleased, in fact, if the Special Session were called off. Moreover, the extra public members would not be read-in on the complex problems under discussion, and might find themselves fifth wheels. Case and Church might not want to leave Congressional business to go to New York, and Case might not want to be closely involved in defending U.S.-African policy (he begged off a major speech on that subject last fall). I think it's usually not helpful to try to change this sort of recommendation—particularly when the Secretary and Goldberg have been personally involved. However, I'm not particularly impressed by the reasons given. I should think we could at least ask the Congressional leadership if they'd like to have some participation. After all, Congress was in session during part of the last General Assembly; and the Congressional delegates probably would be back and forth any how. The following are several public members it might be worth thinking about: 1. Whitney Young of the Urban League. 2. Marvin Wachman, President of Lincoln University. 3. John Mosler of the Mosler Safe Company (he has substantial African connections). 4. Mercer Cook. 5. Patricia Harris. 6. John Spencer, a young Rockefeller son-in-law who lived in Nairobi for two years—an African specialist for Ford. (Incidentally, I understand Stanley Marcus would be happy to serve on the U.S. Delegation next autumn if he were asked again.) ND 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol 7. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bromley Smith. 415. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 415. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 29, 1967, 7:45 p.m. Mr. President: Secretary Rusk's report of Ambassador Goldberg's conversation with Secretary General U Thant was based on the attached summary of a telephone report from New York. The full memorandum of the conversation is not yet ready but will be available by morning. 2 Bromley Smith Attachment March 29, 1967. Summary of Telephone Conversation 3 SUBJECT Hanoi Reply to U Thant's Latest Viet-Nam Peace Proposal Ambassador Goldberg talked to U Thant today about Hanoi's reply to the Secretary General's latest proposal. 4 The Secretary General said the reply was delivered through Moscow. The first point of the reply indicated that Hanoi had apparently thought that U Thant would not deliver his proposal to any other party until after Hanoi had replied to him. This was a misunderstanding: U Thant believes that he was told in Rangoon not to make the proposal public before Hanoi made a reply. The second point made in the reply was that the first step proposed by U Thant (a stand-still truce) equated the aggressor and the victim of aggression and was advantageous to the United States. Hanoi made no comment on the second and third steps proposed by U Thant. The third point in the reply was an expression of thanks for U Thant's interest in and desire for peace, and an appreciation of his motives. The Secretary General's interpretation of this is that Hanoi does not want him to carry on his efforts. He noted that this is the first written reply Hanoi has ever made to him. The fourth point was the one made publicly that the U.N. has nothing to do with the Viet-Nam problem. Ralph Bunche believes that the tone of the reply is friendly. The U.N. interpretation is that nothing further can be done now, and that things must be allowed to settle down for several months. Ambassador Goldberg agrees. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret. An annotation on the memorandum indicates President Johnson saw it. 2 A copy of the full text is ibid. 3 Secret; Exdis. 4 On March 14 U Thant proposed a three-step process to end the war: “(a) a general stand-still truce, (b) preliminary talks, (c) reconvening of the Geneva Conference.” For text of the proposal, see Department of State Bulletin , April 17, 1967, p. 624. 416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, May 1, 1967, 7:02 p.m. 185661. Subject: Committee of 24 Travel. Ref: USUN's 4983. 2 1. Although we have great difficulty in determining balance of arguments for and against participation in this year's Committee of 24 trip to Africa and Near East, we are particularly interested in the opportunity which non-participation would provide for us to underscore our dissatisfaction with Committee's behavior. 2. We are especially reluctant to pass up this opportunity for a mild remonstrance since we doubt next 6–12 months will prove suitable time for us to register our objection in a more forthright way. As you know we have been reconsidering more fundamental question of our continued membership on Committee of 24 in context our growing doubt that membership is net benefit to our influence in UN. In fact we are by now reasonably certain that any advantage in terms of our status as an anti-colonial power is offset by our evident inability to moderate Committee behavior from within. Nevertheless, possible convergence over the next few months of crises over Rhodesia, South West Africa and various problems of apartheid may make it a particularly difficult time for us to extract ourselves from Committee membership. This probability increases our interest in lesser step which could be taken now. 3. Would appreciate USUN's further comment. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by William Gleysteen (UNP); cleared in AFI, EA, ARA, UNP, and EUR; and approved by Sisco. 2 Dated April 24; it reported the British decision not to participate in the Committee of 24's African trip. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram USUN 5150 from New York, May 4, the Mission to the United Nations expressed doubt that non-participation in travel would produce the effect desired by the Department of State. (Ibid.) In telegram 191658, May 10, the Department of State replied that it accepted the Mission's judgment. (Ibid.) 417. Editorial Note 417. Editorial Note During May 1967 tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors intensified. On June 5 citing Egyptian and Syrian actions that threatened its national security, Israel launched attacks on these states. War also erupted between Israel and Jordan. Israeli troops defeated all three states within a few days and a United Nations brokered cease-fire went into effect on June 10. Documentation relating to the origins and causes of the war, U.S. efforts to achieve a cease-fire through UN mediation, and subsequent discussions regarding the peaceful solution of outstanding Arab-Israeli disputes, including the genesis of UN Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, that set parameters for a peaceful settlement, are in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XIX . 418. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 418. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. MAJOR ISSUES OF THE 22nd UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Four principal issues will tend to dominate the proceedings of the 22nd United Nations General Assembly which convenes on September 19th, whether or not these issues become a formal part of the agenda. 1. Middle East It is still possible, though unlikely, the Security Council will meet before the Assembly opens. If it does and reaches agreement on some forward movement (e.g., the appointment of a mediator), there will be less focus in the Assembly on the Middle East. In all likelihood, however, there seems no way to avoid full dress consideration of the whole range of Middle East questions in the Assembly. The Emergency Special Session is likely to be reconvened before the regular Session and, after a brief discussion of Jerusalem and possibly of the refugee problem, to refer all Middle East items to the regular Session. There, our main problem will be to insure there is no erosion in the position of the majority of the Emergency Session that a Middle East settlement requires at a minimum both the withdrawal of Israeli forces and acceptance by the Arabs of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, free of claims or acts of belligerency. Proposals of the type advanced by Tito will pose serious tactical difficulties. As time goes by, with Israel continuing its occupation of Arab territory and with some conciliatory statements by countries such as Jordan, pressures will mount on Israel to show greater magnanimity than they are now showing. The Israelis' position has hardened and the Arabs show no sign of a willingness to make a concrete act of renouncing belligerency. 2. Vietnam We are exploring the feasibility of the Security Council adopting a resolution calling for a conference to achieve a permanent settlement of the Vietnam problem in accordance with the Geneva agreements. We will know before the opening of the General Assembly whether we are able to mobilize the necessary nine votes to inscribe the matter on the agenda. If the Security Council should decide to consider this matter, which is doubtful, the likelihood of formal substantive results is not great in view of the continuing negative attitude regarding UN involvement held by Hanoi, Peking, Paris and Moscow. In any event, Vietnam will be on the minds of most delegates. Over 100 Foreign Ministers will at one time or another be in attendance, and this will afford Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg the opportunity in private discussions to make our policy clear. Last year the fact that we put forward a new proposal, consistent with our overall basic approach, provided many of our friends with the opportunity to come out publicly in the general debate in support of our position. We will want to make a positive statement of our position on Vietnam in the general debate speech. This statement will be prepared over the next ten days and submitted to the President for review. 3. Non-Proliferation Treaty and Related Issue of Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Powers The best result would be if the ENDC over the next four to six weeks could achieve agreement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Article 3, and therefore be in a position to present it to the General Assembly for its endorsement at a late stage in its proceedings. This has been our prime objective. However, the more likely situation will probably be that the ENDC will suspend its deliberations soon and the discussion of the NPT in the Assembly will be in circumstances in which there is no agreement on Article 3. Some of the non-aligned will seek to mobilize support for inclusion of a security assurances article in the Treaty. Our objective should be, in concert with the USSR, to maintain the present Non-Proliferation Treaty intact, to try to assure certain of the non-aligned of our willingness to consider the assurances problem within the context of a UN resolution. We ought to be able to manage the debate, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, so as to give the non-aligned an opportunity to express their views and make their criticisms without upsetting the agreement thus far achieved between the US and the USSR. Our aim should be to have the matter returned to the ENDC so that further attention can be given to Article 3 and consultations can be undertaken within the ENDC to see whether the assurances problem can be taken care of in the form of a UN resolution. 4. African Problems The pattern of these questions in the UN is relatively unchanging. In their desire to produce movement and to force changes in the status quo, the black African delegations press for measures which go beyond what we can accept despite the fact that we are in general agreement with the goals. Our failure since the 21st GA to meet African expectations that the US would be more forthcoming on southern African issues will make us a target for more widespread attacks than in the past. Nonetheless, we should continue with positions that discourage illusions, among others, that the US might be willing to move further than we know to be the case. A. South West Africa The Special Assembly Session in April–June 1967 established a UN Council for South West Africa to administer the territory which was instructed to report to the 22nd General Assembly. Its activities so far have been confined to preparing a letter to the South African Government requesting its cooperation in implementing UN resolutions on South West Africa. If the Council limits its report in this way, it may be that the Assembly will simply recommend cooperation with the Council and be willing to hold off on other action pending further Council activity. In view of the new proposals for legislation of South West Africa made by Vorster, it can be anticipated the Africans will press for stronger measures this year. Since we have gone as far as we can in meeting African demands on South West Africa and are not in a position to support recommendations for more forceful measures against South Africa, such as sanctions, we plan to try to persuade the Africans that the best interim course is to permit the Council to undertake such activities as it can, to maintain pressure on South Africa and to discourage it from further implementation of the Odendaal plan calling for establishment of “bantustans” in the Territory. B. Rhodesia The Security Council imposed selective mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in December 1966. The Assembly will be convening at a time when the sanctions will have been in effect about nine months without any visible effect. Consequently, we can expect further African demands for broader sanctions, and for the use of force, as well as condemnation of those countries who appear to be violating them. Our efforts in the Assembly will be to cooperate with the British, whatever the state of their own discussions with the Smith regime, in counseling moderation and in seeking to prevent the Assembly from recommending measures that go beyond what we consider reasonable. 5. Other Developments A. General Assembly Presidency For the first time in its history the Assembly will have a Communist President, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Manescu. In the absence of any other candidate, we expect to support him and he is likely to be a competent and objective presiding officer. B. Chinese Representation Developments on the mainland continue to work in our favor on this issue which should be manageable this year. We will seek as pro forma a consideration of this matter as possible. The present vote count indicates sufficient support to defeat the traditional resolution seeking to substitute Red China for the Republic of China and to reaffirm that this issue is an important question requiring a two-thirds vote. However, we will have to watch carefully to see whether there are significant Arab defections as a result of bitterness over the Middle East which, combined with a few changes in the African line-up, could jeopardize our position. In view of the uncertainty of the tactical situation, we have kept open the option of going alone with an Italian Study Committee. This proposal was welcomed last year as some evidence of forward movement and was useful in helping to mobilize a substantial vote in support of our position. C. Peacekeeping We will continue to give strong support to the United Nations peacekeeping role demonstrating this through our financial contributions to pay for the costs of the United Nations force in Cyprus and the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East and Kashmir. Fundamental constitutional differences between the US and the USSR will not be bridged, and we can expect no lightening of the financial burden of the UN from the Soviet Union or France who have been unwilling to make any voluntary contributions to date. We would welcome the demise of the GA committee studying this problem. D. Oceanography We are developing a possible US proposal which would call for: (i) GA establishment of a Committee on the Oceans similar to the Outer Space Committee; (ii) an outline for a Declaration of Legal Principles to Govern the Activities on the Ocean Floor; (iii) a proposal for a marine science reserve in the Pacific; and (iv) a suggestion for a Decade of Exploration and Development of the Resources of the Deep Sea to begin in 1970. This proposal is still being cleared in the interested parts of the Government. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Secret. Forwarded to members of the National Security Council by Bromley Smith under cover of a september 8 memorandum. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File) 419. Notes of a Meeting of the National Security Council 419. Notes of a Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, September 13, 1967, 12:32 p.m. SUBJECT National Security Council Meeting in the Cabinet Room—Wednesday, September 13, 1967 Meeting convened: 12:32 PM President departed meeting 12:58 PM Attending were: The Vice President, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Katzenbach, General J.P. McConnell, Leonard Marks, Ambassador Goldberg, Under Secretary Paul Nitze, CIA Director Dick Helms, Secretary Henry Fowler, Joe Sisco, Bromley Smith, Walt Rostow and George Christian. The President opened the meeting calling on Under Secretary Katzenbach. Katzenbach pointed out that Secretary Rusk will be going to the United Nations for the usual meetings of Foreign Ministers. He said these are very helpful and useful to have these bilateral discussions, although it is very wearing on Mr. Rusk. Katzenbach said that the Africans are better than they used to be. They held together well, and they are more realistic than they used to be. Katzenbach said the President's announcement of the U.N. Delegation with new and different people is very helpful politically both to the United Nations and to this Administration domestically. Katzenbach said that Joe Sisco briefed the NATO people on the Middle East and this was helpful, but he is not sure that they will stay considering the pressure the NATO countries are under. On Vietnam, Katzenbach said Goldberg has been having discussions with the U.N. delegates. The President said he appreciated what Katzenbach said about the United Nations delegation. The President then called on Goldberg for discussion of the major issues facing the United Nations General Assembly. Goldberg said there are about 100 items on the General Assembly agenda, many of these are repetitious. The principal issues listed by Goldberg were Middle East, Vietnam, non-proliferation, Chinese representation, oceanography and African problems. Goldberg began with the Middle East saying that there are some signs of moderation in the Arab camp, and some signs of hardening in the Israeli camp. He said this presents a problem for us. Israel has serious internal problems and it is difficult for any Israeli spokesman to be “sweetly reasonable.” Goldberg pointed out that Israel takes the President's statement of June 19 2 and uses those portions it likes and omits those portions it does not like. On the withdrawal issue, they have referred to the President's statement on June 19. Goldberg said he believes the United States has a sound policy. We don't charge the Israelis with aggression. Goldberg said it will be more difficult in the next session to hold the line against a resolution in line with our desire for peace in the Middle East. He said he believes Israel feels now that they would have been better to support the Latin proposal we supported which also included a withdrawal provision. They were with us tactically in getting the Latin Resolution voted, but they now say that was merely a tactical support, Goldberg said. Goldberg said the minimum conditions for a sensible peace in the Middle East is a commitment by the Arab states that they are not in a state of war with Israel. If the Arab states do this (and Goldberg pointed out that the Khartoum Conference did not say this) we may have to part with the Israelis on formulation… . Goldberg said the Israelis have not faced up to the demographic problem… . Goldberg then turned the discussion to Vietnam. He said he has not discussed this with all members of the Security Council. Our friends are timid and reluctant. They don't want to come along. They don't think the Security Council will reach a settlement. If they are solid in this belief, nothing could come out. He said Canada, Great Britain and the Danes have shown great diffidence. Russia says don't get into this. They said they would veto a straight resolution. The President asked who feels we should go to the Security Council. Goldberg said the general feeling is that we ought not to do it. The President asked how many on the Council. Goldberg replied 15. Goldberg pointed out that Argentina, Brazil and China are with us on going to the Council. Bulgaria is lukewarm, Denmark would rather not be involved, Ethiopia is a question mark, France is no, India is against us, Japan will go along but they are not enthusiastic, Mali is against us. Nigeria wants planes, and if we give them planes they will do whatever we ask. Russia is against us, United Kingdom is against, but will vote with us if pressured. The President then summarized saying that actually there are only three for us. Goldberg said he wanted to take exception to a statement made by Secretary Rusk that there will be a future time to go to the United Nations with this. Goldberg pointed out that this will be the last time we can manage the Security Council. He said that we could probably maneuver the Council if we put the maximum pressure, but that after January, this would not be possible, because we lose Japan for Pakistan, and Pakistan is no friend. We lose Mali. We lose Bulgaria for Hungary; Nigeria for Senegal; Argentina for Paraguay. Goldberg also pointed out that Russia may be playing a waiting game. They may try to go before the new Security Council with a Resolution condemning our bombing. The President asked what was thought of our going to the U.N. and getting defeated. Goldberg said I don't think this would be considered a rebuff, although the press may say it is a rebuff. The President asked can we close off … . Goldberg said no, if they were solid we would have nine votes, but they don't want to be involved. The President asked what Goldberg's recommendation was. Goldberg replied I would go recognizing the great dangers. We could not come out with anything that would hurt us. I don't think anything would come out at all. There would be some who would say this was a rebuff, but this would show to the Mansfields and that group that we at least tried. Secretary McNamara said I'd be for going before the United Nations if there was any possibility that it would pass. But I don't think it will and they will say it was a rebuff because of our unreasonable and inhumane action in the bombing. On balance, that would be a loss in my judgment. Goldberg said I don't agree. Katzenbach said he agrees with McNamara. If we got Ethiopia in and got the nine votes to inscribe it, and the question was on unilateral cessation, I figure there would be five in favor, five against, and five abstaining. Probably Algeria and Ethiopia would abstain. That would put Canada and the United Kingdom really on the spot. I think a 5–5–5 situation would be no gain for us. McNamara said he believes such results would feed the Mansfields et al with new fuel to tell us to stop the bombing. The Vice President said it depends on what the issue is. If we are rebuffed, the reason may be phrased because we held our old position of quid pro quo. While I am anxious to have the United Nations have some involvement in this, I don't think we should do it if we don't have the votes. Goldberg said one thing that has been overlooked is that we may not get to the resolution at all. Russia will not support a move to amend on the bombing. Hanoi has already said this and Russia has picked up this line. In my judgment the resolution would just flounder into a state of disagreement and we would get credit for having tried. The President asked, is that a plus in relation to where we are now? I feel that Mansfield might think that would be a plus, the President said. Katzenbach said Mansfield would regard those evils as we do. The President said you should talk to Mansfield when he gets back from Japan. Goldberg then began discussing the non-proliferation treaty. Saying the likely situation will be that the ENDC will suspend its deliberations soon and the discussion of the non-proliferation treaty in the assembly will be in circumstances which there is no agreement on Article III. Our objective should be in concert with the USSR to maintain the present non-proliferation treaty intact to try to assure certain of the non-aligned of our willingness to consider the assurances problem within the context of the U.N. resolution. Our aim should be to have the matter returned to the ENDC so that further attention can be given to Article III and consultations can be undertaken within the ENDC to see whether the assurances problem can be taken care of in the form of the U.N. resolution. The President departed the meeting at 12:58 PM, and turned the remainder of the meeting over to the Vice President. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Secret. The notes were forwarded to the President in the form of a memorandum from Jim Jones of the White House staff. 2 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book I, pp. 630–635. 420. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 420. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, September 20, 1967, 1404Z. 890. UN/Convention Privileges and Immunities. 2 1. During meetings with members of Congress for Peace Through Law held here last Friday, 3 question of accession to convention on P & I was discussed. Advice from Senator Clark (only attending Senator) and House members was (a) that Executive Branch should submit, (b) that submission “as a treaty” was desirable, and (c) that there was much better chance to get 2/3 vote in Senate than majority in each body. 2. Fact that convention was sent up 20 years ago as companion piece to headquarters agreement in form of joint res was not considered to be persuasive on method to be followed now and House members felt that using different method now would not provoke controversy in House. Rationale is simple, i.e. except that it was part of a package then, it would have been sent up as a treaty and this appears to be proper method now. 3. Sen Clark emphasized that treaties should be ratified by body where they properly belonged. House members appeared to feel this might well relieve House of “hot potatoe” in view of present mood of House outside Foreign Affairs Committee. 4. Strongly recommend Dept review proposed method, conduct additional soundings in Senate immediately, and, unless there persuasive evidence to contrary, that convention be forwarded soonest. 5. As Dept fully aware, I attach great importance to submission and accession to this convention. It appears that we have strong support now in Senate Foreign Relations Committee: during and subsequent to Senate Foreign Relations Committee visit this spring, Fulbright and others indicated support. Passage in Senate—unless soundings surprisingly negative—seems likely if we are united in our support. Subject to result of sounding, I am willing undertake further discussions with President. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 8. Confidential; Exdis. 2 See Document 372 . 3 September 15. 421. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 421. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, October 2, 1967, 2142Z. 1140. US Participation in Comite of 24. I believe present moment appropriate for careful reconsideration of question of continuing US participation in Committee of 24. Much of the argumentation, pro and con, is already available to Dept. In general, remarks contained in USUN's 5472, June 30, 1966 2 remain valid; in fact, situation confronting US in committee has deteriorated somewhat since then. Fol are main points: 1. Arguments for Leaving Committee: A. Committee Violations of UN Procedure: There is an increasing tendency of committee, under its radical Afro-Asian leadership, to disregard not only UN rules of procedure but also basic parliamentary principles of fairness and equal treatment of delegations. This tendency has at times interfered with ability of US delegation to record US positions promptly and effectively. Dept will recall that chairman's anti-Western bias became extreme enough this session to warrant formal objection by US del. Even though we might not wish to press this point in UNGA statement, leaving the committee at this time would be interpreted as impressive indication that the US not prepared condone departures from procedures and principles which we consider essential to the UN's future healthy functioning. B. Negative Role of US on Committee: Observations made last year about committee's role and achievements remain pertinent today. It is difficult to point to one “colonial country” which committee has helped on path to independence. What has happened in recent years is that general tenor of committee's debate and resolutions has become increasingly and aggressively anti-Western. Serious consideration of colonial questions has diminished to point where only pro forma attention is given to problems of the populations and to actual developments in areas concerned. This trend is probably a natural consequence of frustration resulting from discovery that administering authorities will not accept direction from Committee in matters concerning their own colonies. This mounting ASAF condemnation of “imperialists” has made committee ideal vehicle for Soviet bloc propaganda attacks on West. Soviet bloc dels not only help lead chorus but vote resounding “yes” to virtually all of committee's draft resolutions. There is solid evidence that Tanzanians, plus certain other ASAF delegations, conspire frequently with the Soviet del, and it is sometimes difficult to determine which is the leader. By contrast, role of US on committee is essentially defensive and negative. We seek, within limitations mentioned para (1) above, to straighten record insofar as US policies toward colonial areas are concerned. However, given inherent conservatism of these policies as well as radicalism of committee, there is little if any possibility for US initiatives and positive role. We consistently abstain on or vote against Committee's resolutions, since we are unable accept extreme measures proposed. C. Little Prospect for Improvement: There seems to be little grounds for hope that situation in committee will improve substantially. While present chairman, Malecela of Tanzania, will not remain indefinitely, it is generally assumed that chairmanship must go to an Afro-Asian. Moderate Afro-Asians of Committee not only appear have no interest in job but seemingly feel it is inevitable and perhaps appropriate that militant “anti-colonialist” hold down job (Iraq is currently most frequently mentioned as replacing Malecela when he steps down). 2. Arguments Against Leaving Committee: A. Unfavorable ASAF Reaction: Claim is often made that ASAF's would interpret US abandonment of committee as sign lack of interest in solving problems of Southern Africa. Indeed, Soviet bloc would seek to place such interpretation on our action, and to obtain maximum mileage from it. I would expect sharp reaction from certain militant ASAF dels at time announcement made, milder criticism from some others (although some moderate ASAF's would probably rejoice quietly over blow to Committee 24 prestige). I doubt that reaction would be long-lived. Committee by now fairly widely known as outlet for views of Soviet bloc and ASAF radicals rather than as effective instrument for solution African and other colonial problems. Hence I doubt that many ASAF's would seriously consider US move as diminishing what chances there may be for progress in this field. Conversely, under circumstances described para 1–B above, it can hardly be argued that US continuation on committee helps us in our relationship with ASAF's. Instead, contrary is true: membership continually highlights conflict between US positions and those of ASAF's, especially on African issues which are of basic importance to many of them. If we left Committee 24 we would still have occasion express US views on colonial problems in Fourth Committee, but would not be forced argue these questions at UN repetitively throughout the year. B. Loss of Ability To Influence Committee Action: Another argument sometimes raised against leaving is that as member US can hope exert some influence on Committee action on agenda items like Fiji, Gibraltar, and other small territories, i.e. items which are of secondary importance to ASAF's but quite significant to certain Western members. This argument obviously more valid for UK than US. In any event, past experience suggests that while Western dels may secure changes of peripheral importance in these lesser agenda items, even here they cannot deflect main thrust of committee action. It can of course be argued that our ability keep Puerto Rico off committee agenda would be jeopardized if we were not on committee. Obviously we would not be in position exercise rights of reply when Soviet bloc and other dels raise question suddenly, although we could ask to take part if and when debate scheduled. To date our ability resist unfavorable decision has stemmed from fact that slim majority in committee appears sympathize with US. Provided we continue lobbying as necessary here and in capitals, this favorable voting line-up need not change. We could probably count on friendly dels committee working group as well as on Secretariat sources to warn us in advance if chairman proposes new step. C. Possible Opposition From Other Western Dels: Possibly one or two other Western members of committee might not welcome US decision to leave committee. However, most likely any disagreement would focus on timing rather than principle. As Dept aware, UK and Australia already considering same step, and have urged we consult closely. Australia might well decide join us. UK has apparently decided tentatively take no action until after XXII GA, although UKUN says US decision leave during GA might influence UK thinking. In any case, US need not feel honor bound to act in concert with UK, since UK in past two years has avoided debate on major committee problems by boycotting Africa trip despite US urging to contrary. Italy, Finland both known to be “fed up” with committee, although we do not know their current views on resigning. 3. Conclusions: It will be clear to Dept from foregoing that I have been led to conclusion that continuing participation by US not in our net interests. By remaining on the Committee we highlight our differences with the ASAF's, costing us in terms bilateral relations ASAF countries and also in terms ASAF support for UN measures we consider important. Moreover, by participating in committee's work we are contributing our support to a body which no longer merits it. Accordingly, I recommend Dept give me discretion to announce US withdrawal at most propitious time. 3 US could explain withdrawal by stating we have participated fully in repeated and exhaustive consideration of all Committee 24 problems for several years, at headquarters and in Africa, and now believe time has come to let some other country make whatever contributions it can to their solution. We would promise continuing US interest and cooperation when US territories under consideration. Goldberg 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 78188, December 2, the Department of State affirmed its general agreement with Goldberg's recommendations and sketched out a series of approaches to take prior to formally withdrawing from the Committee of 24. (Ibid.) 422. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 422. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 29, 1967, 5 p.m. CAP 67907. Eyes Only for the President from Secretary Rusk. 1. Coming separately, is a draft of a statement 2 which Goldberg might make to the Senate Committee on Wednesday or Thursday 3 of this week. 2. I am sending you my comments as background for a telephone call before you return to Washington. 3. Our judgment is that the Mansfield resolution 4 will pass with a substantial vote in the Senate. Those who will vote for it will have widely divergent reasons for doing so but the votes are there. I believe, and Goldberg strongly concurs, that we ought not to be in the position of opposing a resolution which seems to be consistent with everything which you and I and Ambassador Goldberg have been saying publicly for the last two years. My own judgment is that it is tactically far better for us to take the view that the Senate resolution crawls upon your own coattails rather than that you are being pressed by the Senate to do something which you are reluctant to do. 4. There may be ways in which we can delay action in the Senate, both in the Committee and on the floor, to take account of the private contacts now in process. There will be some advantage in delay but I do not look upon this as an overriding consideration. What is fundamental in my judgment is that we ourselves not appear to be fearful of the UN approach to Viet-Nam. 5. Looking ahead to possible action in the Security Council, Ambassador Goldberg and I see the situation as follows: A) There is almost no chance that there would be nine votes for inscription of the item on the agenda at this time. The present prospect is that negative votes will be expected from: Bulgaria, France, India, Mali, Nigeria and USSR; abstentions probably from Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, and the UK (though Canada, Denmark, and UK might shift to affirmative under pressure); affirmative votes: Argentina, Brazil, Japan, China and the US. In other words, there are just not nine votes today to inscribe the item. This resolves the problem of whether the Security Council would take some hostile action, but, in all honesty, it raises the possibility that the absence of nine votes for inscription would mean a UN repudiation of the US position. Goldberg would develop the point before the Senate Committee that the absence of votes has to do with the forum and the timing and not with the merits of the question. This is, in fact, the true situation. Further, I challenged Mansfield directly on this point and asked him whether the absence of votes in the UN would be then used by Senate doves to claim that we had been repudiated by the UN. Mansfield replied that this would not be the case, but that the burden would be carried by the UN rather than by the US. Frankly, I took his statement on this with a grain of salt because Morse, Young, Hartke and others may well take the other view. B) If by some chance the item is inscribed, the overwhelming prospect is that the Security Council would do what it did in January and February 1966, namely, to recess the debate for consultation among members. Such consultation would produce nothing and we would not hear the matter again for months. C) The remaining issue is whether there is any possibility that there would be a resolution tabled in the Security Council calling upon the US for a unilateral cessation of the bombing without any corresponding action by Hanoi. For such a resolution to have any prospect whatever would require a major change of view by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, France and a number of others about the jurisdiction of the UN to deal with this question. But if, through some wholly surprising development, even this should occur, Goldberg and I agree that such a unilateral resolution could not get the necessary votes. Goldberg and I cannot imagine any resolution which would get nine votes for inscription. 6. On balance, therefore, I believe we should not object to the Mansfield resolution and that we are on safe ground in letting the Security Council demonstrate that it is unwilling to take up the question or to take any action on Viet-Nam. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 8. Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis. An annotation on the telegram indicates President Johnson saw it. 2 Not found. 3 November 1 or 2. Goldberg's November 2 testimony is in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Submission of the Vietnam Conflict to the United Nations: Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1967). 4 Reference is to S. Res. 180, introduced by Mansfield on October 25 with the co-sponsorship of 59 other Senators declaring the “sense of the Senate” that the United States should seek the involvement of the United Nations in the solution of the Vietnam conflict. The Senate adopted the resolution on November 30 by a vote of 82–0. For more information, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 915–922. 423. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 423. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 1 New York, November 7, 1967. Dear Mr. President: Several weeks ago I wrote you about the importance of the early ratification by the United States of the United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities. Earlier this year, when members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee visited New York, 2 the Secretary General spoke to them in some detail about the problems which, in his judgment, result from our failure to ratify. Since then several members of the Committee have sent inquiries to me and to the Department of State regarding our plans for submitting the Convention. As you know, I think our failure to ratify the Convention over these past twenty-one years is damaging to our position here out of all proportion to the relatively minor extension of diplomatic privileges and immunities which would be entailed. Obviously it is now too late to submit the Convention to the Congress during the present session. And I fully appreciate your view that you would not wish to submit it now without some assurance of substantial Congressional support. It would, however, be most helpful to me to have a statement of intent from the Secretary of State indicating that the Convention will be submitted early in the next session. This matter is of particular importance right now in view of the impending debate in the General Assembly on diplomatic privileges and immunities. As originally proposed by the Secretary General this item was confined to specific immunities of representatives to the United Nations; however, we were successful in broadening the focus so that it will now encompass incidents such as attacks on our diplomatic missions abroad—a subject in which the United States has a deep interest. Nonetheless, the United States will be under heavy attack with the usual charges on host country problems. Our failure to ratify the Convention on Privileges and Immunities gives each nation so inclined an irrefutable springboard from which to attack us. As a result of our last discussion on this matter within the State Department, a letter from the Secretary to me was drafted and submitted to the White House for approval. I understand that Joe Califano is taking the view that the letter is too specific a commitment. I enclose the text of the letter as drafted, and a slightly modified version which—in the light of Joe's comments—is less specific in its commitment. 3 While I would, of course, prefer the original and stronger version, I strongly recommend that you approve the Secretary's addressing to me one or the other of these letters. I propose in turn to convey its substance as a reply to the latest inquiry from the Secretary General, and also make use of it, as necessary, to deflect criticism of our position during the forthcoming debate on privileges and immunities. Respectfully, Arthur J. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 9. No classification marking. 2 March 22. For notes of the meeting, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Conversation with U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, 92nd Congress, 2nd session (Washington, 1972). 3 Attached but not printed. 424. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 424. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 27, 1967. SUBJECT Future of the Trusteeship Council In light of your question to Dave Popper, I am submitting a review of where we stand on the future of the UN Trusteeship Council. With the termination of the Australian-New Zealand-UK Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru on January 31, 1968, New Zealand will drop off the Trusteeship Council and it will no longer be possible to maintain parity between administering authorities and non-administering members as stipulated in Article 86 1(c) of the Charter. The composition will then be as follows: Australia and the U.S. as administering powers; the Republic of China, France, USSR, and UK as Permanent Members of the Security Council; and Liberia as the only elected member under Article 86 1(c). Moreover, there will only be two remaining Trusteeship Agreements, i.e. Australia's Agreement for New Guinea and our own strategic trust with the Security Council for the TTPI. We concluded some time ago that the lack of parity should not—at least in a legal sense—disrupt the continued existence of the Trusteeship Council, especially since the imbalance will be in favor of the non-administering members. This opinion has now been strongly endorsed by the SYG's Legal Adviser in a document to the Trusteeship Council (Attached). 2 No objections were raised by any member of the Council, and even the Soviets agreed to this interpretation while reiterating their complaint that the Trusteeship Council is too conservative and that the work of decolonization should be carried on by the Committee of 24 and General Assembly. We are not certain how this problem will evolve. Many of the former colonial states which are so heavily represented in the Committee of 24 and the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly would like these bodies to take over as much as possible of the Trusteeship Council's residual activities. While we are prepared to discuss our dependencies as appropriate in the General Assembly, neither we nor the Australians are willing to have the Committee of 24 become the UN's agent for surveillance in our trust territories. Full controversy may not develop until Liberia's term on the Trusteeship Council expires on December 31, 1968, but we cannot rule out considerable difficulty beginning within the next few weeks when the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly considers the question of Nauru's independence. Hopefully, however, the UN Legal Adviser's opinion and its acceptance by the Soviets will help hold controversy to manageable proportions for the time being. As far as we are concerned, we have an important protection in that our Trusteeship Agreement is with the Security Council. We would prefer to continue reporting to the Trusteeship Council but we could very properly decide to begin reporting to the Security Council if the Trusteeship Council ceases to operate. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Gleysteen. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary. 2 Not attached. 425. Memorandum for the Record 425. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, January 10, 1968. SUBJECT Puerto Rico and the Committee of 24 Acting under Mr. Sayre's long standing instructions and after consultation with Mr. Ward Allen, I telephoned Angel Calderon Cruz, Assistant Secretary of State for External Affairs, Puerto Rico, to pass on the following message: the United States was actively considering withdrawal from the UN Committee of 24 and would shortly commence consultations with the membership of that Committee on this subject. Briefly, the reasons for which the U.S. was considering this action were as follows: 1. The increasing tendency of the Committee to disregard UN rules of procedure and basic parliamentary principles. 2. The Committee's debates and resolutions have become increasingly anti-Western. 3. The Committee has become a vehicle for propaganda attacks on the West. 4. The U.S. role on the Committee is essentially defensive and negative. 5. There is little, if any, possibility for U.S. initiatives and a positive role. 6. There seems to be little grounds to hope for the situation to improve substantially. In view of the above, the U.S. is contemplating withdrawal from the Committee. Because of the Committee's previous desires to place the Puerto Rican problem on its agenda, the U.S. wanted to let Puerto Rico know ahead of time what course of action was being contemplated. Dr. Calderon whistled when he was told about our plan. He took my explanation in good form but said this was a most important action from the Puerto Rican standpoint. He wondered what would happen, assuming U.S. withdrawal, if Puerto Rico were attacked by members of the Committee. I told him I thought the U.S. as a member of the UN would have the right to reply to attacks of this nature if the U.S. desired to do so. He said that from Puerto Rico's viewpoint and speaking off the cuff it would be best if USUN could avoid precipitate leaks concerning this pending action. The “independentists” groups in Puerto Rico would be happy to use this contemplated action to their own benefit. I explained that as soon as consultations started in New York we anticipated that there would be leaks about this possible withdrawal. Dr. Calderon said he would consult urgently with Secretary of State Irizarry and Governor Sanchez Vilella on this issue and that he would in all probability be in touch with me shortly. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Edward T. Long (ARA/CAR). Copies were sent to ARA, IO, UNP, L, USUN, and the White House. 2 In a January 24 memorandum for record, Long reported that Calderon Cruz had replied stating that the Governor's position was that the Committee of 24 issue fell within the purview of U.S. policy regarding the United Nations. “Puerto Rico's only concern was that [its] views be considered and defended if the issue came up in the Committee of 24.” (Ibid.) 426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, January 25, 1968, 1430Z. 104302. Subj: Committee of 24. 1. Dept appreciates careful analysis with respect to closely balanced issue of how we handle continued representation in Committee of 24. 2 We are impressed with fact that all of those we consulted strongly urged US to continue its membership and, to greater or less degree, indicated there was possibility that with change in Chairmanship and understanding of US attitude some improvement might follow, at least in Committee handling of procedural problems. We also note British are unable, just as we are, to gear themselves up to definitive break with Committee now. 2. In circumstances, we think question boils down to how we can best continue to exercise our leverage to produce more satisfactory conduct in Committee. While argument can be made either way, we believe it is better for us to stay with Committee, while making it plain that we reserve right to withdraw if unsatisfactory practices continue, than to absent ourselves from opening meeting. Latter course puts wrong foot forward at outset. It is not clear what Committee could or would do to meet our needs that could not be done by our representations from the floor of the Committee and privately. In short, unless or until we actually decide to withdraw, we think it preferable that we continue to participate. 3. Accordingly we propose that US Del attend opening meeting and at suitable opportunity make statement along following lines: USG welcomes Chairmanship of Makkonen (or Mesteri). As Committee members know, at last session of Committee and more recently in private consultations US expressed serious concern about some aspects of Committee's work. US looks forward to working with new Chairman in the hope that these problems can be worked out in course of current year. 4. Promptly thereafter USUN should privately inform Committee members as well as others previously consulted that consultations had produced expression of understanding and statements that efforts would be made to adopt more satisfactory approach to work of Committee. Members had expressed hope that the United States would remain on Committee. On this basis US will defer its decision as to its future course, reserving the right to review the situation at any time. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Popper and Donald 2 Transmitted in telegram 3450 from New York, January 23. (Ibid.) 427. Editorial Note 427. Editorial Note On February 21, 1968, President Johnson and UN Secretary General U Thant met for a discussion of the Secretary General's most recent effort to find a solution to the Vietnam war. U Thant reported that the North Vietnamese were willing to begin talks “immediately” upon the cessation of U.S. bombing raids on their territory. The Secretary General urged the President to undertake another bombing pause to test the sincerity of the North Vietnamese. The President expressed his doubts about North Vietnam's objectives but encouraged U Thant's efforts. A tape recording of their conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings, Tape C002A–1D. A 3-page summary of the meeting and an unedited transcript are ibid. Johnson discussed the meeting in The Vantage Point, page 395. 428. Notes of President Johnson's Meeting with U Thant 428. Notes of President Johnson's Meeting with U Thant 1 New York, April 4, 1968. U Thant: Thank for your helpfulness. You were very magnanimous in the process for peace. I congratulate you. I regret your decision. Your speech 2 will generate a process for peace in Vietnam. The President: That is encouraging. We tried to convince our people some move had to be made. We felt this was a step. I hope conditions will permit it to be a big step. If there is any recognition of it we will take another one. I will not do anything to endanger my men. We are hopeful it will permit initiation of some exchange. That will be encouraging. I have asked Ambassador Goldberg to brief you on the speech. U Thant: Thank you for that. As I indicated to you it is important that Peking has not broadcast Hanoi's statement up to 1 a.m. today. Hanoi ignored Peking. Peking Radio never broadcast some statements. Hanoi doesn't care about Peking's attitude. These are factors that indicate Hanoi is somewhat independent of Peking. This indicates relative independence of Hanoi from Peking. You should keep this in mind. It is difficult for even doves in Hanoi to come in with a statement like they did yesterday. On Monday I transmitted a message to Hanoi: Not to react negatively immediately to the President's speech. Please consider it carefully and react after very carefully reading it. Also told General DeGaulle not to react negatively. I have nothing to advise on the next step. But this is a very important step. Hanoi really wants to talk to you. There are some procedural questions. I think Geneva would be the best place since Geneva has historically been involved. When I was in New Delhi, if parties agree to talks, she will be privileged to have them in New Delhi as Chairman of the ICC. The French also said, not officially, the French Government would be privileged to host talks in Paris. I am at your disposal. My sole concern is to contribute as best I can to bringing about peace. Coming from the country I do, our experience in Burma in World War II—95% of our people were elated—we worked for them. The more they stayed, the more Japanese stayed on, the more bitter the feelings were. We began to regard the Japanese as foreigners—just as the British. Now our relations with the Japanese are excellent. Now all my people are very anti-Communist. The Communist backbone was broken in Burma with advisers. I think you should test Hanoi. Hanoi is very independent of the Communists. In the final analysis, they will come with non-aligned constitution. It is necessary that U.S. has a long and difficult task. I have a high regard for Thompson and Harriman. I hope Goldberg can be involved. I am at your disposal. I leave this evening for Geneva. If possible, I may talk with Bo. 3 There is no immediate prospect for a resolution. I may talk to Bo. The President: That would be very desirable. Your evaluation and assessment is a reasonable one. You demonstrate a very constructive attitude. I appreciate your statement and your doing what you did Sunday. 4 I do not hold out much hope from this message, but I do have hope. I wanted to appeal to the UN and ICC and others who could be in a position to help. I asked the Soviet Ambassador to come down. I spent some time with him. The Soviets thought we would never get out of Vietnam because of investment and bases there. Rusk and Clifford and I put in a plan—a modification of the Goldberg plan. We would help both of them if we could, if they would let us. From the Kosygin talks in Glassboro, 5 I don't think they understand Americans. We want to communicate the hope of tomorrow. I have tried in this effort to stop the bombing against most of the people, and it continues only where these efforts directly threaten our men. I stretched this as far as I could. Goldberg wanted to stop it all. But I could not endanger our men. If they would not have a crash program, O. K. But now they are desperately rushing in supplies. Ninety percent of the population is above the 20th parallel. Secretary Clifford feels we have 9–10 months to do what we can for this world. We have to take some chances. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting took place at United Nations headquarters. It lasted from 3:47 to 4:30 p.m. Another set of notes of the meeting taken by President's Special Assistant Jim Jones is ibid., Meeting Notes File. 2 Delivered March 31; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–1969 , Book I, pp. 469–476. 3 Mai Van Bo, Paris-based diplomatic representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 4 March 31. 5 For documentation on the June 1967 meeting of President Johnson and Prime Minister Kosygin, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Documents 217 - 238 . 429. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 429. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, June 14, 1968, 2015Z. 5606. Secretary, accompanied by Amb Goldberg and Sisco, called on SYG who was joined by Bunche. Secretary, after thanking SYG for receiving him on short notice, said he would be meeting with Kuznetsov today to discuss two serious matters, Vietnam and Berlin. On Vietnam, Secretary said we deeply concerned over escalation of the war in the South. 78 per cent of the land of North Vietnam and 90 per cent of the population are free from bombing, while not a single square mile of territory in South is free from North Vietnamese rockets and bombing. President took an important step in limiting bombing on March 31, hoping North Vietnam would respond to de-escalate war in some way and begin serious talks. Neither has occurred. In fact, NVN infiltration rate for month of May is highest on record. A new North Vietnamese division has shown up in area of DMZ and VC leaflets have been spread that 100 rocket attacks can be expected on Saigon for the next hundred days. Hanoi is immune, whereas Saigon is under increased attack; this is situation which we cannot tolerate. Nobody has been able to tell us what would happen if we stopped the bombing. We would be talking to Kuznetsov today to see whether the Soviets can make a contribution which would move matters towards serious talks. In Paris, we have been talking past each other. We are there on basis of President's Mar 31 statement, and North Vietnamese are there on basis of their statement of Apr 3. 2 Unfortunately, statements have been public across the conference table and there has been no real private contact. We will continue to explore the possibility of quiet talks. While coffee breaks have become a little longer, we do not know whether these can lead to serious quiet talks. SYG recounted info he had recd. He was informed by Hanoi during first week of May through a third party that while bombing of North Vietnam had been restricted in area, its intensity has been more severe and more numerous than previous. In March bombing over whole of North Vietnam was about 2,000 attacks; in spite of the restricted bombing area, it was up to 3,000; this represented 50 per cent increase in intensity. He further understood that during the first week of May the intensity of bombing was more than the first week in Apr. Point he was making was that although area had been restricted, intensity of bombing was greater. SYG said he was against all escalation. There was difference of view between himself and Washington re the first of his three point proposal 3 (stoppage of all bombing of the North), whereas second point which called for de-escalation was not agreeable to Hanoi. Secretary interjected that US had not rejected first point; rather, we had asked what steps of de-escalation would be taken if US stopped bombing. SYG said that Hanoi felt that it could not be treated on a par with “aggressors.” He admitted he had not been able to convince Hanoi to take steps of de-escalation, and that he did not know whether there would be a “revised” position on de-escalation by Hanoi if all the bombing has stopped. He felt this could be found out only after we had stopped all of bombing. As to third point of his three-point proposal, SYG felt question of participation was in Pres Johnson's words “not an insurmountable problem.” He maintained he had told Hanoi it was unrealistic for only one side to de-escalate. Hanoi's response was that there must be American withdrawal, which SYG said he had never advocated. Secretary said level of bombing is directly related to level of infiltration. Number of sorties are seasonal, and if there is comparison with previous season, there is not an escalation in that sense. On the other hand, escalation on the ground in South is very marked, especially since Mar 31. It is difficult for US and for South Vietnamese to understand why Saigon can be bombed every day whereas Hanoi is immune. SYG opined that Hanoi's objective was probably to get new government in Saigon. Secretary asked what would be situation if we adopted objective of a new govt in North Vietnam. Where is reciprocity in that? Amb Goldberg added we could all agree that escalation is not a proper framework for negotiations. SYG's three-point proposal was directed towards de-escalation. SYG has said it is not realistic for one side to de-escalate while the other side increased its activity. Secretary said 80 percent of casualties are in First Corps near DMZ, and that this means that area north of DMZ is integral part of entire battlefield. We cannot tell our Marines not to shoot until trucks and personnel are within mile of them. There are dozens of ways in which Hanoi can let us know what it is willing to do to de-escalate and what would happen if we stopped all bombing of North. SYG said Chi Comms are 300 per cent against Paris talks. Fact that Hanoi is talking in face of Peking opposition is something. He noted that North Vietnamese del was not received by any officials in Peking on its way to Paris Talks. He noted too that Peking Radio avoided broadcasting about Paris Talks. He underscored it is important that we understand Hanoi's difficulties. He described Tho as a super hawk, and he thought that perhaps he had been sent to Paris to make Peking happier. He has met with French UN rep Berard this a.m. and urged French to help bring about private contacts which he believed important. Secretary concluded this part of conversation by saying we would continue our efforts in this distressing situation. Secretary then filled in SYG on Berlin situation which he said he would also discuss with Kuznetsov. 4 He said Berlin is serious matter arising from unilateral East German action to change existing understandings and procedures. He did not see why East Germans had taken such steps and there had been no prior consultations by Russians with us on matter. He did not feel that East German action could be attributed to so-called emergency legislation in West Germany which has no bearing on Berlin. East German action comes at a very bad time since there are differences in West Germany re NPT. Some in West Germany feel that it represents a unilateral concession to Sovs without West Germany getting anything in return. This action has certainly complicated possible West German ratification on NPT, and this is something which Sovs cannot possibly like. Secretary said that interference with access might result in serious situation like that which arose in 1961 and 1962. We view situation seriously, and we are making clear that viability and freedom of access cannot be tampered with. SYG limited himself to saying he was not familiar with situation and therefore cld not react or assess it. He understood, however, its seriousness. Secretary pointed out that Sovs have supported East Germany publicly, that East Germany had probably discussed this matter with the Sovs when Ulbricht was in Moscow. Secretary said that maybe Ulbricht was afraid of a poss détente and was concerned over developments in Chechoslovakia and Rumania. SYG viewed Czech developments as much more fundamental than those that have occurred in Rumania. Secretary indicated he was calling on Manescu this afternoon, and he felt he had done good job as GA President. In response to Secretary's inquiry as to why Tanzania and Zambia voted against NPT, SYG attributed it generally to Chinese influence. Bunche added he thought it was primarily Chinese Communist influence on Nyerere and in turn Nyerere influence on Kaunda. Suggest Dept decide on distribution. Goldberg 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 10. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 2 For extracts from both statements, see Department of State Bulletin , April 22, 1968, p. 513. 3 Reference is to the three-point proposal U Thant first introduced on June 20, 1966. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 819. 4 A memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Kuznotsov is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XV, Document 270 . 430. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 430. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, June 25, 1968, 1831Z. 190014. Subject: Voluntary Contributions to Overcome UN Financial Deficit. 1. We doubt that Cuevas' initiative on voluntary contributions is likely to be constructive. Indeed, it appears designed primarily to put pressure on US to move first on a contribution and make us share onus for Soviet-French stalling on making substantial voluntary contributions. 2. However, should Cuevas follow through with contemplated approach to Ambassador Ball, 2 we should say first move is up to Sovs and French and we will then see what we can do. 3. Suggest following stance be taken. a. We recognize that UN financial problem is key concern both in terms of overall UN capacity and in its effect on financing future peacekeeping. US prepared to cooperate in restoring UN solvency, and can be counted on to meet our fair share of UN costs. We believe it could be useful for Secretariat to update the current deficit estimate of Committee of 14. More than two years ago Committee 14 established low “current deficit” figure of $31.9 million and high figure of $53.3 million, after deducting voluntary contributions already made or pledged. We continue to accept higher figure which embodies “surplus accounts” since we believe UN has real obligation to refund credits owed countries that paid their peacekeeping assessments in cases where appropriations exceeded actual expenditures. Although SYG in introduction to Annual Report for 1966–67 presented revised estimate for lower deficit figure he failed to update high figure incorporating surplus accounts. b. At very outset of any discussions on deficit it is important to put matter in correct perspective. Entire responsibility for meeting deficit through voluntary contributions rests on Sovs, French and others who refused to pay their peacekeeping expenses and thus brought about the financial crisis. Understanding in 1965 was that USSR and France would make substantial contributions as quid pro quo for not pressing applicability of Article 19 to ONUC and UNEF arrears. Though face-saving language called for substantial contributions from highly developed countries without distinction, clearly our position is very different from Soviets and French. We particularly reject new interpretation of history that Soviet-French contributions should be contingent on ours, or that contributions should be “harmonized,” which Sovs and French have inspired in recent years. c. FYI. Reasons for insisting on setting history straight with Cuevas and others is not only to avoid sharing onus with defaulters for UN financial plight, but also to reject suggestion that any US contribution would be equated or “harmonized” with theirs. As you aware, if contribution ever eventuates it will consist of write-offs on bills due us for Congo support ($4.5 million) and waiving all or part of $9 million due us on ONUC surplus accounts. Soviet-French contributions would necessarily be new money. To put us in same frame of reference would make our contribution look phony or paltry. End FYI. d. Consequently, first move is up to Soviets and French and Cuevas should knock on their door first. As USUN will recall, in exchange with Goldberg in April 1967 (USUN 5094) 3 Kuznetsov laid great stress on finding out what US would do if Soviets made voluntary contribution to overcome deficit. At no time have we had firm and explicit indication from Soviets and French as to size of their “substantial” contributions. (As you will recall, it has been generally accepted that serious offer from Sovs and French must total cash contributions of $25 million, based on previous deficit estimates.) e. In interest of restoring UN solvency and moving on peacekeeping, once Sovs and French make firm commitments we would examine seriously and speedily what US could do. 4. FYI. We would have Congressional problems with any voluntary contribution to UN at this time in view of budgetary situation and continued memories of unfortunate history of GA refusal to force Soviets to pay peacekeeping arrears. A substantial Soviet contribution would take some of the edge off this criticism. Even so, as you aware, rationale and public presentation of our contribution would need to be carefully framed (for example we would maintain that the arrears remain on the books). We recognize that, irrespective of merits, dispute over UN finances and UN peacekeeping has had cold war overtones and impaired UN effectiveness. We are prepared to cooperate in efforts to return the UN to a sound financial basis. However, the responsibility and the first move is up to the other side, and any approach to be practical must take account of above realities. End FYI. 5. Welcome your comments. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–4 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Pelcovits; cleared in OIA, UNP, and L; and approved by Sisco. 2 Ambassador Goldberg left post on June 24; Ambassador George Ball presented his credentials on June 26. 3 Dated April 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–4 UN) 431. Notes on a Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 431. Notes on a Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 September 23, 1968, 9:37 a.m. Secretary Rusk advised President Johnson of four names he was recommending to fill the post of UN Ambassador. The Secretary mentioned Sisco, Cleveland, Bohlen and Magee and said he thought these men all had pluses and minuses but he thought they could actually handle the job for the next three months. Secretary Rusk added his belief that the General Assembly was going to be relatively low-key after the debate on Czechoslovakia and flareup and debate possibly on Viet Nam 2 and he thought it was really the Security Council aspect of it that is most important as opposed to the General Assembly. The President in further discussing the resignation of Amb. Goldberg [Ball] said: “I had this reaction. I told him I appreciated the things that motivated him and I thought it was very unselfish but his willingness to refuse to take any position under the Humphrey administration. I don't know how likely that is … but that that was just going to help Mr. Humphrey and I thought he should think about what the real reaction it is going to have and whether that reaction is going to be a plus for the Democrats or not. My own judgment is that it is going to be a big minus. I imagine the first thing they will say is that the President and Secretary Rusk recommend a man, pick him, call him back to a Cabinet status job, with the most important thing in the world being peace, then he leaves in a few weeks and gets off on a political campaign. That just sounds erratic. “Humphrey has turned his campaign completely over to Larry O'Brien. My judgment is that George Ball would just get himself in a mess because I think he will talk to Humphrey every night, maybe even have some influence although I don't think he can be effective if he does this and he will be explaining every time why he left, what the differences are and what he and the President disagreed on. So first, I do not think he can be effective if he does it, second, it will leave the appearance of being erratic with the Administration, with the President and with the Secretary of State.” President Johnson told Secretary Rusk he had asked Walt Rostow to talk to Secretary Clifford, then discuss the matter further with Secretary Rusk so that the President could have a well-rounded view. 3 The President reported there would be a Security Council meeting next Wednesday 4 and he wanted Secretary Clifford and Secretary Rusk to come in after the meeting to discuss what ought to be done with the Phantoms and Amb. Yarring regarding Israel. 5 [Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and other subjects.] The President advised he would return to Washington tomorrow and instead of having the luncheon tomorrow would give his luncheon group 6 the day to get their houses in order because they had to get the George Ball matter in shape, then if Secretary Rusk and Clifford had no conflict, they could go to Security Council meeting. Secretary Rusk asked: “I think George Ball was planning to see Humphrey tonight. Do you think I should suggest to him that he postpone this for a couple of days?” President Johnson replied: “I would say so. Tell him that we are going to come back to Washington tomorrow 7 and I am returning … that you and Clark Clifford are finalizing this matter … that these questions have been raised … that first, can he be more effective over with Larry O'Brien and these politicians or can he do it talking directly to Humphrey every night … and he is there and is getting all the intelligence and we'd work with him very closely and we would tell Humphrey to work with him closely. I think if he leaves, he will just have to explain that there's a big bust-up and I think it could be used for propaganda purposes. I think The New York Times and the doves will. I think Hanoi will … they are still quoting Goldberg every morning. I think the Congress will. And I think it will hurt Humphrey and will hurt the Democrats because it will show we're not stable. And tell him that we will communicate with him not later than Wednesday at noon and see if he'll see Humphrey Wednesday night instead of Monday night.” Secretary Rusk advised he would do this. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation of September 23, 1968 with Secretary Rusk. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The President called Rusk from the LBJ Ranch. A tape of the conversation is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F MISC. 05. 2 The Security Council debated the Czech situation five times between August 21 and 25. No debate took place in the General Assembly. A complaint of U.S. and South Vietnamese incursions into its territory was brought before the Security Council by Cambodia in June. No General Assembly debate on the Vietnam war took place that year. 3 No record of these discussions was found. 4 September 25. 5 According to the President's Daily Diary, the three men met “Off the Record” at 1:43 p.m., September 25. No other record of the meeting was found. (Johnson Library) 6 See Document 433 . 7 According to the President's Daily Diary, Johnson left the LBJ Ranch at 8:50 a.m. September 24 and arrived at Andrews Air Force Base in Washington at 12:57 p.m. EST. (Johnson Library) 432. Summary Notes of the 591st Meeting of the National Security Council 432. Summary Notes of the 591st Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, September 25, 1968, 12:05–1:40 p.m. The 23rd UN General Assembly The President: The purpose of the meeting of the Council is to review the issues before the current United Nations General Assembly and to discuss our position on these questions. Secretary Rusk will comment in general on the General Assembly meeting and Ambassador Ball will deal with the specific problems. Secretary Rusk: Suggested that Ambassador Ball lead off and he would comment later. Ambassador Ball: The session of the General Assembly meeting in New York will probably be the most routine in UN history, barring some unforeseen event. (See copy of State Summary of UNGA issues attached.) 2 The following major issues will be raised: 1. Czechoslovakian Situation a. A specific General Assembly agenda item on Czechoslovakia is unlikely, especially if the Czech delegation takes the position that it does not want a separate item. b. There is very little support from NATO members for a specific Czech item. c. The Czech situation will be fully debated under other agenda items which will make it easier to avoid Soviet rebuttal by citing Vietnam and other world problems. d. If there is further Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia, the situation in the UN could change drastically. 2. The Middle East a. We have the last clear chance for an Arab-Israeli settlement in the next few months. b. Ambassador Jarring will be in New York and will be meeting with Arab foreign ministers and the Israeli foreign minister. The work on the Middle East will be done in hotel rooms, not in the United Nations Assembly. c. Currently, the Arabs appear to the public to be readier to settle than the Israelis. d. There is very small chance for settlement unless we push on the Israelis and the Russians push on the Arabs. Even if this were done, a settlement is doubtful because the two sides are so far apart. This is a sad prognosis. e. Unless action comes within the next few weeks, Jarring will be ending a year of activity without results. If he cannot advance toward accomplishing the objectives of the November 22 resolution, he may quit. The problem then becomes even more difficult for us because it will be returned to the UN Security Council. The subject is complicated by the U.S. election. 3. Biafra a. The sad situation in Biafra is a result of federal Nigerian leaders who are willing to sacrifice millions of lives to gain a military advantage. Efforts of the Ethopian Emperor to bring the two sides to an agreement have been unsuccessful. The result is a human tragedy in which thousands are starving. b. It is difficult to get the Biafra problem into the United Nations because the African members say the OAU should handle the case. Asian members side with the Africans in opposition to UN intervention. Despite world pressure, the General Assembly cannot act because of this African opposition. c. To handle the humanitarian aspects of this problem, we should name a man to coordinate U.S. Government assistance to the Biafrans. 4. Chinese Representation There is no change in the U.S. position of opposition to the admission of Communist China. The voting pattern of past General Assemblies is likely to be repeated. There is therefore no serious problem this year. Secretary Rusk: The general debate of the Assembly is beginning later this year than usual. The debate will occupy the Assembly during most of October. Consequently, GA votes on major issues are unlikely before our election is over. Ambassador Ball: Secretary General U Thant's press statement 3 on halting the bombing in Vietnam upset many UN delegates. There is no serious effort to introduce a Vietnam resolution as a result of the Secretary General's intervention. U Thant may have learned a lesson from this incident. He was rebuked by us for his action and in a later statement has “walked the cat back” from the position many people thought he was advocating, i.e., a United Nations resolution calling for a bombing halt in North Vietnam. Assistant Secretary Sisco: U Thant's statement on Vietnam will not change the direction of the General Assembly. However, some 80 foreign ministers who will be in New York will all be asking Secretary Rusk whether progress is being made in the Paris talks with the North Vietnamese. The President: The U Thant statement was certainly not helpful. It added further confusion. Even the enemy must be confused by the various statements, including that of Representative Laird (reported plan to reduce by 90,000 the number of U.S troops in Vietnam). [Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam.] The President: Asked whether the appropriate Congressional Committees had been briefed on UN problems. Secretary Rusk said he or Assistant Secretary Sisco would brief the proper Congressmen. Ambassador Ball pointed out that there are two Senators on the U.S. delegation who will be in New York this week and will remain for a few days of the General Assembly. Secretary Rusk: Mentioned to the President that many of the Foreign Ministers coming to New York would want to come down to Washington. He said he would speak to the President later about those Foreign Ministers whom the President should see. Secretary Fowler: Said that he wished to add to the list of those wanting to come to Washington who wanted to see the President, 110 Finance Ministers and over 100 representatives of central banks. [Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam.] Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 6. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Another set of notes for this meeting, prepared by Tom Johnson, is ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 September 23; summarized in Keesing's Contemporary Archives , 1968, pp. 22982–22983. 433. Notes of the President's Weekly Luncheon Meeting 433. Notes of the President's Weekly Luncheon Meeting 1 Washington, September 25, 1968, 2:04–2:45 p.m. ATTENDING WERE The President Secretary Rusk Secretary Clifford Walt Rostow Tom Johnson Clark Clifford: George Ball called me. I saw him this morning. He said he had “reached a decision.” I listed the reasons he should continue in the job. Ball also said: I cannot permit myself to remain quiet any longer about Nixon. He is a liar, dishonest, and a crook. This is my country. We would get poor leadership. He said, he must be free. —Speak out myself —Help Humphrey say what he should —Bring in people to help He said he couldn't live with himself if he didn't work to defeat Nixon. Secretary Rusk: He said the same things to me. He is misestimating the political situation. It would be interpreted as “break” with the Administration. Clark Clifford: He said he does not intend to “break” with Administration. Secretary Rusk: Ball quits 2 months after he takes 2 office. Clark Clifford: He has an excellent statement. The President: The time when he should have decided this was when he agreed to serve. The President: I talked to Dirksen yesterday. Secretary Rusk: Bus 3 might pass the word to Abrams to slip out these facts about —The 3rd offensive being blunted. —SVN strength improved. Clark Clifford: Better press tone because of —General Sidle's approach. —General Abrams' doesn't “sell” it. —Facts are on our side. Secretary Rusk: Bunker would try to go along with anything, but he puts priority on GVN presence at table. Secretary Rusk: To replace Ball, Cy Vance would be ideal. Walt Rostow: I expect within 2 weeks to know what will happen in Paris. They are getting their military dispositions. Detailed messages on exactly what their strength is in the field. The President: Ball's going to Humphrey is part of movement to “dove” side—special sale number one. McCarthy is an admirer of Ball's. Clark Clifford: This may be a desperation move by HHH. They talked on the phone Monday. [Omitted here is discussion of Spanish base negotiations.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. A copy of the statement and transcript of the subsequent press conference in which Ball outlined the reasons for his resignation are in the Princeton University, Ball Papers, Speeches. 2 The word “leaves” was crossed out and replaced with “takes.” 3 General Earle Wheeler. 434. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 434. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 New York, October 1, 1968, 2052Z. 6765/Secto 6. Secretary, accompanied by Buffum and Sisco, had about an hour's discussion with SYG on Sept. 30 (accompanied by Bunche) on a number of matters relating to current GA. Following are principal points which emerged: 1. In response to Secretary's inquiry on how SYG sees upcoming GA, Thant singled out as important Assembly discussion of disarmament, ENDC report, results of non-nuclear conference, seabeds, outer space, and UNCTAD items. 2. On Middle East, Secretary stressed need for Jarring 2 to intensify his efforts and to seize opportunity afforded by presence of Foreign Ministers at GA to see whether progress could be made. Secretary expressed hope, that if parties not making progress, Jarring would put forward proposals of his own. SYG said he expected new proposal from Eban. Bunche said Jarring depressed because Israelis have not given him anything. Suggested Secretary encourage Jarring when he sees him Tuesday 3 am. Thant said Jarring expects to continue his efforts possibly until the end of November and then submit report. If substantial progress has not been made, SC will have to consider matter. Thant and Bunche said Jarring expects put forward “ideas” of his own to the parties probably near end of his tour. Both Thant and Bunche, who described Jarring's ideas as constructive, assumed that if one or the other parties turns down ideas this would end Jarring's utility and will generate series of SC meetings where Thant sees two alternatives: (a) appointment of a new Jarring; or (b) a new substantive resolution different from November SC resolution. Bunche stressed that another factor which will influence whether Jarring decides to continue beyond end of Oct is the amount of support he gets from major powers. Secretary affirmed that US intends to support Jarring's efforts and that he would be seeing Eban, Rifai, and Riad to this end. Also it was pointed out fact that Jarring puts forward “ideas” that are turned down by one or other of parties might not necessarily mean that parties would consider UN representatives' mission at an end. We believed UN rep could submit ideas to parties privately, but whether his utility will have come to an end will depend in part on how much he decides to put out publicly regarding the substance of his ideas. If any SC report were non-substantive, break in Jarring's services might be avoided. 3. Considerable part of conversation centered on Vietnam. Secretary said we had been taken by surprise by Thant's recent statement 4 and that Ambassador Ball had expressed our views to Thant last week. Secretary said he surprised SYG made no reference to what other side would do. SYG said he had long held view that first step to be taken is for US to cease the bombing unilaterally and that “meaningful talks would ensue.” He urged US to take risk. He cited French and Soviet views in support of thesis that meaningful talks would follow cessation of bombing. In response to Thant's statement that Hanoi considers cessation of bombing of North non-negotiable, the Secretary rejoined that stopping bombing without some reciprocation is not negotiable; question was in light these strongly held views how was war to be ended and an honorable solution achieved. Throughout Thant maintained that his objectives were same as US, but that his understanding and his conception of war was different than ours. As Secretary pressed Thant to say what as a matter of conscience Hanoi should do, Thant responded that Hanoi should abide by the Geneva Accords of 1954 and “at some stage” with the general agreements of 1962. 5 Thant refused to respond directly as to whether Communists should stop sending guerrillas to Thailand or restore DMZ. When Secretary expressed view that majority in GA did not favor simple unilateral cessation of bombing resolution, Thant, as he did with Amb. Ball, repeated he was not suggesting that GA consider resolution on matter and that Hanoi, Paris and Moscow all against UN involvement. He said he based his assumption that majority favor simple cessation of bombing on examination of speeches made in general debate last year. 4. In response to further queries of Secretary which focused on Communist action necessary to restore effectiveness of the Geneva Agreements on Laos and to respect territorial integrity of Cambodia, SecGen would not be drawn out. Moreover, he said he could not say for how many days or weeks US should stop the bombing. When Secretary asked whether SYG would support resumption of bombing of North if Communists took advantage of situation, Thant refused commit himself and limited himself to saying this depended on circumstances. Secretary stresssed that US had taken first step pursuant to President's March 31 statement and that North Vietnam had not responded constructively to it. Secretary again returned to query as to what SYG in good conscience thought Hanoi should do to move towards peace and pointedly told SYG this lacking in his statements. Secretary said SYG had not been authorized by an organ of SC nor had there been an expression by majority of UN on basis which SYG expressed his views in favor total cessation of the US bombing of North Vietnam. SYG said he had authority under Article 99 to bring matter to UN, but that he had not done so. He underscored his strong anti-Communist views, while expressing strong disagreement with methods we were using in Vietnam. He said he would be happy to have UN consider Vietnam problem, preferably in SC, but he recognized that both Hanoi, French and Soviets were opposed. He would be happy to have Czechoslovakia matter brought to UN but Czech opposition prevented this. On ME he noted neither Arabs nor Israelis wanted matter of settlement discussed in Assembly at present time. 5. Secretary explained the current state of play on Foreign Aid Bill, pointed out that impression from press might be that US was not doing great deal in this field. He singled out our support for Asian Bank, IDA, PL 480, and our hope there will be a substantial contribution made to UN development program. 6. In response to Secretary's query, Thant had no new ideas to offer regarding possible UN involvement in Nigerian matter. Expressed hope that UN would be able to send anything it wanted by way of help in agreement with govt in Lagos. He is waiting further reports from Gussing who presently in area. 7. Thant raised question of four-power conference and said he sending a letter to ForMins on Tuesday with some modest ideas. Letter Thant apparently had in mind was one in which he would suggest four powers not try to discuss major difficult problems such as ME, Vietnam or Czechoslovakia, but rather would exchange views on how UN could be strengthened. He hoped that such a meeting might help devise ways and means to move UN forward and in particular arrive at some kind of solution of financial difficulties. Such meeting would give lift to UN, he said Secretary reacted strongly to sending formal letter of this kind to ForMins without prior consultations. Secretary said four-power meeting, in which no progress made, would set things back rather than move them forward. He insisted there should be prior consultations with ForMins before any such letter is sent. Secretary pointed out he consulting with other ForMins and Thant should do so before any such letter sent. Secretary stressed we living in highly dangerous world in which USSR nervous and afraid of something. Any move, such as four-power meeting, should be taken only with great care and after full consultations. To hold such a public meeting at which differences would be aired would be unhelpful. Effective diplomacy by SYG required prior consultations. Thant then backed off and said he would consult beforehand with four powers. Bunche later confirmed to US that SYG had definitely decided not send letter for time being pending consultations. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 11. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 2 Between January and May 1968, Gunnar Jarring, the United Nations Special Representative in the Middle East, met with Arab and Israeli officials in Cyprus. After his return to New York Jarring continued secret discussions relating to a Middle East peace settlement at the United Nations. 3 October 1. 4 See footnote 3, Document 432 . 5 For text of the 1954 Geneva Accords, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505 – 1546 . For text of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 , pp. 1075–1083. 435. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 435. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, October 4, 1968, 2343Z. 6862. Subject: SYG's Four-Power Proposal. 1. Bunche gave us informally foll ltr for comment prior to formal transmission from SYG to US, USSR, UK and France. Bunche assured us, SYG would not transmit ltr until he had received our comments. As Dept will note, SYG has in mind a four-power mtg as prelude to possible summit mtg in 1969. He suggests that agenda might deal in first instance with ways to strengthen UN, including finances and peacekeeping, and leaves open the possibility that discussion would include “reaffirmation of charter principles”, advice to Jarring, and certain aspects of disarmament. Dept should note penultimate para in particular where SYG says it may not be necessary “that the four Fon Mins should meet as a group.” 2. We will be studying ltr carefully and make recommendations to Dept on how to handle it. Begin text. My Dear Fon Minister/Secretary, You will perhaps recall that in my introduction to the Annual Report 2 in the work of the organization last year I advanced a suggestion that an attempt might be made to assess the value of holding periodic meetings of the Security Council at which its members might be represented by a member of the government or by some specially designated representative. It was actually my hope that such a meeting would be attended by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States concerned and that this would give an opportunity for a free-ranging discussion of major problems which have a bearing on international peace and security. It may also be recalled that at an informal dinner I gave for the Foreign Ministers of the four major powers last year, I discussed some of the ideas which were at the back of my mind when I made this suggestion. Since I put forth this possibility last year the international situation has further deteriorated and the hopes for an East-West détente have been seriously set back. I feel that some special effort should now be made in spite of the present unfavourable atmosphere—or, indeed, because of it—to identify some important issues where a community of interest may facilitate big power agreement irrespective of the adverse circumstances. It is with this thought in mind that, in my latest introduction to the Annual Report which was issued last month, I proposed that it might be useful to take advantage of the presence of the Foreign Ministers of France, USSR, United Kingdom and United States during the current session of the General Assembly so that they might meet and discuss some common problems. I felt that such a meeting would help to halt the growing feeling of insecurity in the world and provide some antidote to the feeling of pessimism about the future of international peace and security that is now so widespread. Let me state, Mr. Foreign Minister, that I am well aware of some of the risks involved in organizing such a meeting. Amongst these may be mentioned the real risk that hopes may be raised which may not be realized. However, I believe that some concrete results might be achieved if an agenda could be agreed upon which would be realistic and not over-ambitious. If the idea of such a meeting is acceptable, I shall be happy, if so desired, to prepare a draft agenda. I realize that at the present time spectacular results in regard to the serious developments in many parts of the world may not be achieved. However, I believe that a modest start could and should be made in an attempt to deal with the basic problem facing the organization, namely, how can the United Nations be enabled to develop into a really effective instrument for peace and progress as envisaged in the Charter. This, of course, is my main concern; but one cannot ignore the existence of other problems which also have a bearing on the effectiveness of the world organization. I may mention amongst these the financial solvency of the United Nations, and its peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions. These problems can be solved only if, to start with, the big powers could agree amongst themselves either on the general principles of their solution, or on a pragmatic approach which, without prejudice to the respective positions of principle, may allow the organization to function effectively. Another thought I have is the need to reaffirm the Charter principles and the accepted rules of international conduct. One could hope also that such a meeting might give attention to ways of more helpful collective guidance and support for Ambassador Jarring's vital mission. It may also be opportune to discuss certain aspects of disarmament at such a meeting. In the introduction to the Annual Report, I had stated that hopefully a meeting of the Foreign Ministers could lead to a meeting of the heads of state and government of the four major powers. I know it requires most careful preparation to arrange such a meeting. I also recognize that, in view of the current political situation in individual countries, such a summit meeting could hardly be envisaged until some time in 1969. I cannot help feeling very strongly that the mere fact of agreement in principle to hold such a summit meeting would shine as a ray of hope in the presently clouded sky and bring a sense of relief to human beings all over the world who are deeply concerned about the trend of international developments today. Let me add that in my thinking it is not necessary that the four Foreign Ministers should meet as a group. It would be equally effective if they were to meet individually with each other, taking advantage of their presence at the current session of the General Assembly. Preliminary discussions now initiated could be followed up by subsequent meetings at a time and place which would be mutually convenient. In all such efforts I shall of course be happy to be of help, if so desired. I feel that the ideas I had expressed, perhaps too tersely, in my introduction to the Annual Report, needed to be spelt out a little. It is with this thought in mind that I address this letter to you. I have no doubt that you will wish to give this suggestion your most earnest consideration. End text. 3 Buffum 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 11. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 2 Annual Review of United Nations Affairs , 1967–1968 (Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1969), pp. 1–44. The ideas referred to here are in Section X, Other Questions. 3 In an October 5 memorandum to the President transmitting both the text of this telegram and of the proposed State Department reply, Walt Rostow requested and received approval for a response “based on the proposition: We are not prepared at this time to in effect commit a new administration to a summit in 1969.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 11) 436. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 436. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, November 26, 1968, 2318Z. 8082. US Participation in the Comite of 24. USUN 1140 and State 104302. 2 On basis of our experience in Comite of 24 this year, we believe US should now proceed to leave Comite as was contemplated last January. Comite has produced absolutely no positive results, multiplies points of friction between US and Afro-Asian Group, and generally detracts from effectiveness and credibility of UN in whole colonial arena. Our decision should be made known in the final days of this session, either by a letter to the Pres of GA or by a statement in plenary; or, depending on circumstances, shortly after GA adjourns. Considerations are as follows: 1. There has been some improvement in procedures this year, which may be attributed in part to the consultations we held in January when we were considering leaving the Comite and in part to the chairmanship of Mestiri (Tunisia). (A) The Comite's public proceedings have been improved compared with previous years. Mestiri has been a fair and competent Chairman. He has generally agreed to our requests that draft resolutions and other proposals not be put to vote in same meeting at which presented. He has also consistently upheld our right to speak and has been consistently fair when points of order were raised. (B) After we made known to Mestiri our opposition to an African trip this year, he succeeded in delaying the question and finally in avoiding any decision to go on such a trip in 1968. (C) The Comite met less often and displayed less energy during meetings. Since general product of Comite is bad, this diminution in activity may be considered an improvement. 2. Nevertheless the substantive work of the Comite of 24 continues to be very bad. It produces the worst resolutions in the United Nations and thus contributes to depreciation in the currency of resolutions, which would be serious enough even without the Comite of 24. Such resolutions are drafted primarily by radical Africans—e.g., Foum (Tanzania)—aided by the Soviets and radical Arabs such as Syria and Iraq. Moderate members in the Afro-Asian caucus sometimes try to tone them down, but they are almost invariably cowed into submission by the extremists. On certain flagrant miscarriages, such as a paragraph declaring US use of military bases in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands as contrary to the UN Charter, moderates will screw up the courage to abstain; the result is that such outrageous provisions are adopted by a plurality instead of a majority. Paragraphs that are bad but not outrageous will usually carry by an overwhelming majority, due to simple fact that they emerge from Afro-Asian caucus, are supported by Communist members and acquiesced in by LA's. Once AA caucus, which is dominated by extremists, presents a text to Comite, no change of any consequence is possible. As a result the US role is essentially defensive and negative while the Soviets have a propaganda field day. Pet Soviet items, such as foreign military bases and foreign economic interests which allegedly impede attainment of independence, continue to be subject of bad recommendations by Comite. Some moderates hold their [noses] but they do not oppose. Latin Americans in Comite are completely submissive to AA caucus. Such minor improvements as we are able to achieve are not worth the effort and are far overshadowed by generally bad product emerging from Comite on which we are a member. 3. Comite has accomplished nothing of substance during its entire existence. It is difficult to point to one independent territory which Comite helped on path to independence. Serious consideration of colonial question has diminished to point where only pro forma attention has been given to problems of populations and actual developments in area concerned. Comite recommendations are drawn up without consulting administering authorities and rammed through against their objections; consequently they achieve no result. Thus Comite's product consists largely of unrealistic recommendations and anti-Western propaganda. 4. Based on this and previous years' experience, there is little hope that situation in Comite will improve substantially. It is evident to us that Comite itself serves no useful purpose. A fortiori US presence on Comite is of no value, waste of our resources, and to use a cliché, counterproductive. 5. We recognize that there will be some adverse reaction from some of our African and Asian friends when we announce our decision to leave. We believe this could be minimized by discussing with them in advance the reasons for our decision. We can point out to them that our trial extension of our membership during this year produced no evidence that there could be any material improvement in Comite's work. Furthermore, members of Comite are by now fully aware that it produces nothing of consequence and we doubt that their disappointment over our decision will be long lived. As for product of Comite it is not likely to get appreciably worse than it is now, whether we stay on or leave. In any case, we can participate on items involving US interests, as other non-members of Comite do. Moreover, we shall have an opportunity to participate in GA consideration of all these questions, and recent developments in Fourth Comite suggest that our chances for meaningful influence are better there than in Comite of 24—a point we can make in explaining our move to friendly Africans and Asians. 6. There is one point on which our withdrawal might have a disadvantage for US—Puerto Rico. We have until now been able to muster a majority against efforts to have Comite of 24 take up Puerto Rico. If we leave Comite, and—as is probable—our example is followed by Australia, Norway, Italy and perhaps UK, voting picture will change substantially. But the fact remains GA would have to reverse its earlier decision that Puerto Rico is not a dependent territory and we could concentrate our efforts in blocking a change there. 7. It is just possible our decision to leave Comite would bring about its demise or at least discredit it to the point where its activities would have even less influence, as is case with Apartheid Committee. Neither of these developments need cause US any pain. 3 Wiggins 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN. Confidential. 2 Documents 421 and 426 . 3 In telegram 285062, December 10, the Department of State concurred with the Mission recommendation to withdraw from the Committee of 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 UN) 4 President Johnson appointed James R. Wiggins to succeed Ball on October 4; he presented his credentials on October 7. 437. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 437. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 26, 1968, 6:30 p.m. SUBJECT Letter from Tex Goldschmidt Tex has written you directly (attached) 2 of his belief that you should take extraordinary steps to avoid cutting our contributions to the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) this year from $75 million to $70 million. Bill Gaud, with Nick Katzenbach's agreement, made the cut when he apportioned the Congressional cuts. The UNDP took a small cut relative to others, but Tex believes it is important to your record not to go down in history as the President who began a downward trend in our aid through this multilateral channel. Tex suggests that you authorize a transfer of $5 million from other AID accounts. He assumes that there will be leftovers here and there by the end of the year and that Gaud could commit himself now. If that is impossible, his compromise would be to turn $37.5 million over to the UNDP now, as a six-month payment at the past annual rate and say that our pledge for the whole year is $70 million but we'll try to find a little extra money at the end of the year to climb back to $75 million. Charlie Zwick is opposed to any action at this time which would tend to lock in the new Administration or to pass along to it a disproportionate share of the FY '69 cutback problem. On the question of committing the full $75 million now, Charlie believes this would deprive the new Administration of flexibility later in the year. Tying up even $5 million more from this year's reduced AID appropriations now would restrict the new Administration's flexibility in meeting serious unfunded contingencies in Nigeria, the Indus Basin, Dominican Republic, to name a few. On Tex's idea of splitting our pledge, Charlie points out that moreover this unusual approach would produce this effect: —A $75 million rate for January–June 1969 ($37.5 million), and —A $65 million rate for the last six months of 1969 (32.8 million). Zwick believes we should make a straight $70 million pledge with the promise to look into the possibilities of additional funds later on. The important point in this is that the 1969 figure results primarily from Congressional reductions. Your record is in good shape because you requested $80 million for 1969 and your 1970 budget will include $85 million. It will thus be obvious to critics that the cut is Congress', not yours. I would leave this to Charlie's judgment, but I promised Tex I would put his argument up to you. He and Wiggins feel strongly that splitting our pledge would have some value in appearances in New York. I must admit that it looks pretty marginal from here, and Charlie feels strongly that you would be narrowing your successor's flexibility. Walt Go with Charlie 3 Try Tex's tactics (split pledge) 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 2. Confidential; Exdis. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Johnson checked this option. The United Nations and the Cyprus Crisis The United Nations and the Cyprus Crisis 438. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) Washington, January 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. Secret. A copy was sent to Jernegan. 439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 18, 1964, 8:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1161–1162. Confidential. Drafted by Paul Jones and George Moffit (UNP); cleared in NEA, EUR, and UNP; and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to USUN as telegram 1879, which is the source text, and repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for TOPOL. 440. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, January 25, 1964, 2 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara. 441. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 27, 1964. 442. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, January 27, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1188–1189. Confidential. 443. Memorandum by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, January 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret. 444. Memorandum for Record Washington, January 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Confidential. Prepared by Bromley Smith. 445. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 29, 1964, 10:05 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved in U on January 30. 446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, January 29, 1964, 12:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Cleveland and Sisco; cleared in NEA, EUR, and S/S; and approved by Ball. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. 447. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, January 30, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, and Ankara. A note on the telegram indicates it was passed to the White House, DOD, JCS, CIA, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCEUR. 448. Memorandum Prepared by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff Washington, January 31, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. No classification marking. The memorandum was apparently drafted by Komer for the President's use. 449. Intelligence Information Cable Washington, January 31, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret: No Foreign Dissem. 450. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Top Secret. A covering memorandum is dated February 4. 451. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, February 5, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files. Secret. 452. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, February 6, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. 453. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, February 7, 1964, 1 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, RG 59, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Priority. Received in the Department of State at 9:10 p.m. February 6. Repeated to Paris for USRO, Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR also for POLAD, CINCSTRIKE also for POLAD. 454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, February 6, 1964, 10:35 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Cleveland and cleared by Ball. 455. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, February 7, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. 456. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 7, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8, CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Helseth. The Greek Ambassador was called to the Department of State for a similar discussion. A memorandum of that February 7 conversation, which includes a copy of the draft proposal, is ibid. 457. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State Nicosia, February 8, 1964, 4:45 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department at 6:52 p.m. and passed to the White House. 458. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, February 8, 1964, 5:15 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Received in the Department at 6:52 p.m. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE also for POLADs. 459. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State Athens, February 10, 1964, 4 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE also for POLADs. 460. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State Nicosia, February 13, 1964, 10:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1289–1292. Secret; Flash. Also sent to London, Athens, Ankara, and USUN. 461. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 15, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. 462. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, February 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. 463. Memorandum for Record Washington, February 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. Secret. 464. Transcript of a Background Press and Radio News Briefing Washington, February 18, 1964, 11:17 a.m. Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1138–1347. No classification marking. 465. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, February 26, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and New York. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, and CIA and repeated to CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 466. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, February 26, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, London, and CINCSOUTH. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 467. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, February 27, 1964, 2:40 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and USDOCOSOUTH for POLAD. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 468. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, February 27, 1964, 10 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and New York and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and to CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 469. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 27, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Confidential. 470. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, February 28, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, USUN, and Nicosia and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 471. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, February 28, 1964, 8:12 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John Jernegan (NEA) and Moffitt, cleared in IO and UNP, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to New York, Ankara, and Nicosia. 472. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, February 29, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. 473. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, March 1, 1964, 2:56 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Jernegan, Cleveland, and Moose. Repeated to Athens, New York, Nicosia, and London. 474. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, March 2, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 475. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 3, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. 476. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, March 3, 1964, 1:06 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Buffum, cleared in IO and NEA, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Athens, USUN, Nicosia, and London. 477. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, March 4, 1964, 8:14 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Cleveland and Jones; cleared in NE, DOD, and AID; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, London, Ottawa, Stockholm, Dublin, and New Delhi. 478. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, March 4, 1964, 3:36 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Text received from the White House and approved by S/S. 479. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, March 5, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and USDOCOSouth. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 480. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, March 5, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and USDOCOSOUTH for POLAD. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 438. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 438. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) 1 Washington, January 16, 1964. It now seems clear that not only Makarios but the UK want to dump Cyprus in the UN lap if London Conference fails. 2 The British obviously feel that this would take them off the hook. Since the Greek and Turkish Cypriot positions are so far apart that the London talks will probably be abortive, we ought to consider whether the UN route would serve our interests. With the Soviets and non-aligned thus able to play a major role, Greek Cypriots would be the gainers. This would inevitably lead to strong Turk pressure on us to forestall such a step. How do we handle the Turks at a time when the Turk political scene is so unstable? 3 And wouldn't the trend toward a non-aligned Cyprus under UN rather than Greek/Turk/UK auspices be a threat to US/UK base rights? I raise these questions not because I see a good alternative solution, but because I see the Cyprus crisis drifting in a direction which will harm our interests. At the minimum shouldn't we make a greater effort to assure success of the London Conference, perhaps by joining with the UK in warning both Greeks and Turks of the consequences of failure (along lines of my 11 January note to you)? 4 Bob 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. Secret. A copy was sent to Jernegan. 2 Reference is to the January 15–February 5 meeting of representatives of the Guarantor Powers, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey with Greek and Turkish Cypriot spokesman. Documentation on the United States role in the Cyprus crisis is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XVI . 3 Turkey was being governed by a minority government. 4 A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. 439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, January 18, 1964, 8:15 p.m. 4356 Ref: London's 3220 (USUN 9069), USUN's 2726, 2744. 2 Cyprus. Following is Dept's preliminary thinking re UN role in Cyprus: 1. We can understand UK concern re their responsibility for keeping peace in Cyprus. However, we have some misgivings as to UN's undertaking any substantial peacekeeping operation there. We have in mind current UN financial situation; fact UN already stretched thin in such operations as Congo, Yemen, UNEF; and possibility UN might have to assume a peacekeeping role in one or more other trouble spots in world today (e.g. Angola, Malaysia), where alternative peacekeeper such as British might not be available. 2. We note from USUN's 2726 that Cypriot UN del Rossides said Cyprus would pay cost of UN mission even if this required “as many as 100 men.” Given size of UK military force now committed and apparently necessary to maintain peace between Greek and Turk Cypriots, and potentialities for renewed violence by trigger-happy extremists, Dept doubts 100-man UN group or even double that number would be adequate insure peace if situation deteriorates. Moreover it seems doubtful, despite Rossides statement, GOC could undertake finance UN operation of any substantial size. 3. Re possible Sov attitude to UN peacekeeping operation, evidence suggests they taking side of Greek Cypriots in Cyprus dispute and, thus, if Makarios favored UN peacekeeping force, might go along in Security Council. This more likely be true if cost of operation borne by interested parties and not assesed on UN membership. 4. UK, Greece, and Turkey have treaty obligations and direct interests in solution Cyprus problem. UK, in addition, has sovereign bases on island. As Dept has frequently emphasized, three countries have primary responsibility for Cyprus problem, and we feel should make every effort settle it with Cypriots, even if London conference collapses. We can, however, if situation continues to be critical, see usefulness of modest UN presence, primarily to help offer assurances of objective appraisal of situation to world community and thus be of some value in deterring military action by either Greeks or Turks in support contesting Cypriot groups. While such modest presence would not replace military contribution of UK, it might be helpful in moderating attitude all parties concerned by assuring that international spotlight will be shown immediately on any derelictions. Dept notes (USUN's 2744) that, according UK del New York, HMG may shortly propose joint US–UK contingency planning re UN peacekeeping force for Cyprus. We would hope, and you requested so inform UKUN and UK FonOff, that HMG will not consult others before taking matter up with US. In so doing, you may point out that we have reservations re desirability saddling UN at this time with what could become major peacekeeping operation, drawing as appropriate on foregoing. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1161–1162. Confidential. Drafted by Paul Jones and George Moffit (UNP); cleared in NEA, EUR, and UNP; and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to USUN as telegram 1879, which is the source text, and repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris for TOPOL. 2 Telegram 3220 from London, January 14, reported on a meeting of the British and Turkish Foreign Ministers. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) Telegram 2726 from New York, January 15, transmitted Dean's comments on the Secretary General's Cyprus initiatives. (Ibid.) Telegram 2744, January 16, discussed plans to put a UN force into Cyprus. (Ibid.) 440. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 440. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, January 25, 1964, 2 p.m. 2851. Cyprus. 1. When and if London conference breaks down, (which increasingly predicted) or when new communual troubles break out on island, it seems certain Cyprus problem will be brought back to SC by GOC. Each of parties to dispute likely want despatch additional outside forces to help control security situation. UK particularly anxious spread responsibility for law and order, and HMG seems determinined at least share, if not pull back from, responsibility for rapidly deteriorating security situation, lest it be obliged inflict and incur serious casualties in UK pre-electoral period. 2. UN force for Cyprus: Possibility suggested here most frequently has been that SC might send UN “peacekeeping force” to Cyprus. Whatever may be reasons arguing for eventual deployment of substantial UN force to Cyprus, there are serious practical difficulties to getting any UN force to Cyprus in time to prevent widening of communal disorders, which if not promptly controlled would almost certainly lead to early intervention of Turkish forces from mainland. In first place, UN would simply not be in position logistically send major force to Cyprus on short notice. Further, SC authorization would depend on who asks for force, on methods of financing, and on terms of reference. SC (and in first instance Soviets) would probably never authorize UN force unless GOC (with at least Turkish Cypriot acquiescence) asked for its despatch. It is questionable whether member states would provide forces which would clearly be required shoot civilians. Re financing, with fight on Article 19 with Soviet bloc in offing, doubt that financing by all UN members is practicable. Financing from contingency funds would not be appropriate or acceptable for despatch of substantial peacekeeping force. Thus only real possibility re financing we see is for Cyprus, UK, Greece and Turkey agree to share costs. This they would not want to do unless costs were manageable and unless there were acceptable time limit. 3. Allied Force for Cyprus: We have noted UK interest in allied force for Cyprus (including US contingent) as proposed by Greek FonMin (Deptel 4478 to London). 2 Acceptability of allied force made up of units from NATO countries would depend on Cypriot consent as well as that of Greece and Turkey. We wonder whether Makarios, even if he recognized need for outside help in maintaining order, would agree to receive allied force as long as he thought he might get UN or Commonwealth force, latter presumably to have Asian and African participation. Of all alternatives, we agree with Caccia (London's 3461 to Dept) 3 that Makarios would prefer UN involvement so as to preserve expected ASAF backing in UN for control by Greek majority on island in name of self-determination. Makarios could well calculate that willingness receive allied force might prejudice that support. Unless Makarios can be brought to request allied force Soviets and some ASAF's will no doubt scream and endeavor to block. 4. In contrast, primary US and general NATO interest is to avoid war between two NATO allies over Cyprus. We calculate it would be easier restrain Turks and Greeks with force of NATO members than with UN or Commonwealth group. With these factors in mind, we believe Dept should give careful consideration to allied contingent alternative, including US, as long as Greeks willing and able to obtain Cypriot approval. We doubt such force could be put together without US participation. 5. UN Observer Force: It may well develop however that because of difficulties outlined above, it will not be possible to line up support and despatch either UN, allied or Commonwealth force to Cyprus prior to breakdown of London conference and outbreak of new fighting on island, accompanied by new appeal to SC by Makarios. Under circumstances, SC might be called upon to establish some kind of expanded “presence” in Cyprus before irrevocable acts take place. Best course would seem to be immediate expansion of UN “Observer Group” already operating on Cyprus under Gyani, perhaps by immediate and temporary detail of officer observers from UK force on island or from UNEF and UNTSO. We can also imagine (particularly if Secretariat's Military Staff makes appropriate quiet contingency plans) almost immediate despatch of additional military observers who could be stationed at neuralgic points on island and with UK, Cypriot, Greek and Turkish forces. Their responsibility would be to observe and report to SC through SYG and in meantime endeavor work out local ceasefires wherever possible. 6. Despatch of expanded Observer Group or any larger forces to Cyprus should be supplemented by SC request to parties to enter into further negotiations leading towards more firm settlement. Presence at such conference of “special rep” designated by SYG at request of parties, might be helpful in getting over sticky moments. Also such a rep and head of observer force should have enough authority and freedom of communication to blast Makarios and/or Kutchuk when obviously responsible for demagoguery or incendiary action. 7. There is some question whether it would be feasible to retain UN Observer Group if allied force despatched, but we are inclined to believe some token UN presence could be continued if Makarios so requested as he probably would. 8. US appeal to Makarios: I have known Makarios for many years and Sir Hugh Foot, now in New York, confirms view that regardless of above contingencies he is real key to peace in Cyprus. He has repeatedly showed himself prepared to shed blood, Greek or Turkish, in order achieve his political objectives. His tactics worked before and he probably calculates they will in present situation. He is undisputed leader of four-fifths of Cypriot population and, while he cannot prevent minor incidents, he can prevent major hostilities. At present he probably calculates this not to his advantage. 9. In light of very grave consequences to US and Western security which would very probably follow further major hostilities on the island, more positive US action seems called for, though of course not of a sort which would interfere with British efforts now underway. Specifically we recommend prompt high-level démarches to Makarios to effect that (1) we believe further outbreak of violence would be tragedy for Cyprus and for all others involved, (2) we are confident Makarios as chief of state and as leader of four-fifths of population has necessary authority and power prevent such a tragedy, (3) US and whole world cannot but hold him and Greek majority in Cyprus primarily responsible if this tragedy occurs, but (4) if he prevents it we will assist in checking any outside intervention in Cyprus and, as appropriate, in finding an equitable and generally acceptable solution for the problems which have given rise to present unrest. We should at same time inform Greek Govt of this démarche and urge them support it. Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara. 2 Dated January 23, it transmitted the text of a British aide-memoire regarding Greece. (Ibid., NSC Histories, Cyprus) 3 Dated January 23, it reported on British discussions with the Turks and concerns regarding their intentions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 441. Memorandum for the Record 441. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 27, 1964. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, Memoranda Originated by General Carter. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.] 442. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 442. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, January 27, 1964, 8 p.m. 2862. Re: Cyprus. Dept rpt fol as desired: Rolz-Bennett (UN Secretariat) told us today SYG very concerned about deterioration in Cyprus, expects return within matter of hours from African trip if needed in NY. Rolz said Secretariat continuing with its contingency planning for possible expansion observer or peacekeeping force. He remarked, however, that under circumstances it would probably be necessary get SC approval send even expanded observer force to Cyprus. Stated flatly nothing could be done in Cyprus without new SC meeting, adding that GOC has made it very clear it expects call SC if London conference breaks down. Comment: Rolz seemed be hinting that some kind of pledge had been made to Sovs re holding of formal SC meeting before UN takes any further steps in Cyprus. Re possible UN peacekeeping force, Rolz said he had impression Makarios probably no longer inclined request SC establish such a force in first instance, but would confine self to request for UN blessing for abrogation of Zurich agreements. However, what Cypriots really want is UN guarantee for Cyprus' territorial integrity, and once this agreed to GOC likely to acquiesce in dispatch of UN peacekeeping force. Rolz said under circumstances Sovs likely approve if, once GOC's approval and statement on territorial integrity having been secured, acceptable financial arrangements could be made. Rolz asked about reports that UK has requested US make American peacekeeping contingent available. Relying on Deptel 1975 (USUN 9996) 2 we confirmed British had made request and matter under discussion, although US not enthusiastic about participation. Rolz thought it would be hard get SC approval for allied force although if Makarios agreed to our plan this not impossible. Asked if presence of Gyani would be affected by dispatch of allied force, Rolz said he thought “question would become very sticky.” He added, however, he had strong doubts about value of even expanded observer force if communal disorders broke out. While Gyani's presence had had calming effect in first 48 hours latter was in Cyprus, more recently it seemed to have had little impact. Emphasizing again that it would take SC decision send even expanded observer force to island, Rolz repeated he personally doubted presence of additional “25 or so” observers would help keep peace. Plimpton 1 Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1188–1189. Confidential. 2 Dated January 25, it summarized the results of a Rusk-Ormsby-Gore meeting on Cyprus. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 443. Memorandum by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 443. Memorandum by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, January 28, 1964. US ROLE IN CYPRUS I. Whether or not the US joins an allied force, we're almost compelled to take a major role in finding a Cyprus solution. This is because only we have the power (and aid leverage) to influence Athens and Ankara. UK can't force a settlement precisely because it lacks this power. And even if we stood aside and let the issue go to UN we'd be blamed by Greeks and Turks (or both) for whatever we let happen. Moreover, Cyprus is of major strategic interest to us, because of its highly strategic location, US and UK bases, and fact of our closest allies being so emotionally involved. We can only get UK to stay in if we participate in some way. UK is determined either to share this problem with us, or dump it on UN. Dumping Cyprus into UN is worst solution because Communists and Afro-Asians will all buy in and force a settlement to our disadvantage and that of Greeks and Turks too. Only beneficiaries will be Makarios and the Communists. And we'll have to take a stand in UN too. II. For all these reasons the US cannot really avoid being drawn into the Cyprus affair. Indeed I feel we and UK let the problem drift until too late. We had plenty of warning, and if we'd tried preventive diplomacy we might not be in present fix. But this is water over the dam. Now the situation calls for quick US action. But the real issue is “what kind of action?” A. An “allied” peacekeeping force, including US, would tend to forestall more shooting on Cyprus, and block Turk intervention. But it might not help move settlement closer because the very threat of Turk intervention is what is restraining the Greek Cypriots from demanding the whole loaf. So unless we're prepared to apply real muscle (perhaps getting Greeks and/or Turks very unhappy with us), we might be on Cyprus for many moons. B. On other hand, tensions are so high on Cyprus that without a larger UK, UN, or allied peacekeeping force, fighting could break out again. If so, Turks would almost certainly intervene (so their Cypriots wouldn't be massacred). Then Greeks would move, though I personally doubt regular Turk and Greek forces would actually go to war (we could probably stop this by threatening to cut off all aid). III. The best course I see is to prepare for prompt “allied” intervention if necessary, but meanwhile try an all-out diplomatic effort to forestall this need: A. Make all preparations for quickest entry of “allied” peacekeeping force if tragedy looms. Promise UK we'll act in this case (which should calm them). B. Put maximum diplomatic pressure on Turks, Greeks, and Greek Cypriots to accept in principle Sandys' compromise solution, arguing that it really gives both sides what they want. Why shouldn't some higher degree of local Turk Cypriot autonomy be acceptable to Greek Cypriots? I doubt that we could get early agreement, but at least we might be able to get both sides talking again. We could send Ball or Harriman on a quick trip to area for this purpose—authorized to lay it on the line. The very presence of our man in the area would be a factor for restraint, as everyone would be waiting to see how he came out. The above course would both prepare for the worst, and not jump the gun until absolutely essential. The risks are that fighting would break out before we got there, or that Makarios would rush to the UN. But both risks seem acceptable to me on present reading. R.W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 444. Memorandum for Record 444. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, January 28, 1964. Ambassador Bruce telephoned at 5:45 PM to urge that a decision be taken immediately, one way or the other, on U.S. participation in an allied force to reestablish order in Cyprus. He expressed deep concern that the situation in Cyprus would soon be out of control. The Ambassador said he favored U.S. participation. He opposed taking the problem to the UN. The Ambassador said everyone was waiting for a decision from the U.S., the British, the Greeks and the Turks. He feared that the Turkish Foreign Minister would leave London Thursday, thereby breaking up the London conference. The only hope was for the U.S. to take the major role in trying for a solution. B. Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Confidential. Prepared by Bromley Smith. 445. Memorandum of Conversation 445. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 29, 1964, 10:05 a.m. SUBJECT Cyprus PARTICIPANTS U.K. Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador Christopher Everett, Second Secretary, British Embassy U.S. The Acting Secretary John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR The Acting Secretary gave the British Ambassador a copy of our counterproposal for a peace keeping force in Cyprus. He said he had requested David Bruce to make a copy available in London. 2 The Ambassador observed that we were sticking to the mediator. The Acting Secretary replied that we recognized the disability under which the British labored in keeping the peace because of the burden of history. The same disability applied to British ability to make the peace. This was especially true in so far as the Turks were concerned. The Turks were convinced the UK favored Greece. The US did not want to become tied in through a troop commitment when we could not see clearly the path along which progress toward a settlement could be made. The Ambassador acknowledged the point. He had no instructions about the mediator. However, he suggested it might cause difficulty because of the rights conferred on the guarantor powers under the Zurich agreement. The UK would not object to a mediator if the London Conference were clearly stuck. There might be difficulties at home if in the first instance Britain abandoned its responsibilities. He was not sure to what extent Turkey was talking to advance its own position. Anyone trying to compose a settlement would be open to such accusations. The Acting Secretary commented that we felt a new face might help. He emphasized that obviously there was nothing in a mediator concept prejudicial to British rights in the sovereign areas. The Ambassador thought that under our concept the UK would almost certainly lose control of the negotiations at some stage. The British bases were not an issue now. However, their renunciation could become an element in any solution. The Acting Secretary stated we would not support that. It should be made clear in the mediator's terms of reference that the sovereign areas were not affected. From the NATO point of view the sovereign areas were important. We also had our own facilities. The mediator would be from a NATO country. The Acting Secretary noted that Sir Arthur Snelling had mentioned that Spaak once before burnt his fingers on the Cyprus problem. 3 We now recalled that this occurred while Spaak was NATO Secretary General. This probably eliminated Spaak. Van Roijen would make a fine mediator. The Ambassador agreed and added that Lange was also first class. At this point Mr. Everett entered and reported that he had received from the British Embassy a summary of telegrams from Paris and Rome. The British Ambassador had spoken informally to Couve about the peace-keeping force. Couve gave no inkling of what the French response would be if French participation were requested. He said France would wait for a formal request. When approached in Rome Saragat asked how large an Italian contingent was involved. The British Ambassador explained the magnitude of the force envisaged. Saragat mentioned one regiment as the possible Italian contribution but without commitment. He received the approach sympathetically and said he would bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister. Schroeder was at the time in Rome and the Ambassador was trying to see him. The Ambassador inquired whether we had received a report from General Lemnitzer. 4 The Acting Secretary informed him of the report. The Ambassador asked about UN aspects and the Acting Secretary said we had instructed USUN to coordinate with UKUN. The Ambassador questioned whether we could ask the Secretary General to continue keeping an observer in Cyprus. This would be difficult for him. Perhaps we should not be altogether sorry to see the UN disappear from Cyprus. It would be difficult to ride both the NATO and UN horses. The Acting Secretary agreed. There was an inconclusive discussion about informing the Russians. The Acting Secretary expressed doubt over the extent of Athens' control over Makarios. The Ambassador said the British shared this doubt. Makarios was subject to many pressures. The Acting Secretary and the Ambassador agreed that the pressures ran in both directions. The Ambassador observed that the communists would exert every effort to avoid Makarios' acceptance of a peace-keeping force. There was a discussion of what other NATO countries could bring influence to bear on Makarios. The Acting Secretary said we would ask the views of our Ambassador in Nicosia. He also mentioned the possibility of a message from the President to Makarios. The Acting Secretary asked about approaches in other capitals. The Ambassador replied that after London had studied the proposal we would have to see what could be done with respect to Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada. The Ambassador said that Ankara would be the first obstacle. The Acting Secretary thought that the one thing which would bring Turkey around is the mediator concept. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved in U on January 30. 2 A copy of the proposal is contained in telegram 1998 to New York, January 28. (Ibid., NSC Histories, Cyprus) Bruce reported on the British response in telegram 3597 from London, January 29. (Ibid.) 3 Reference is to Spaak's 1958 efforts to mediate a Cyprus settlement; for documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1958–1960, vol. X, pp. 672 – 734 . 4 See footnote 11, Document 448 . 446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, January 29, 1964, 12:15 p.m. 1999. We wish to avoid SC consideration of Cyprus question. Since Allied response would be at the request of Makarios, we believe any UN problems would be manageable. Purpose of Allied force would be to promote pacific settlement of Cyprus issue. Allied force would be in Cyprus to maintain law and order at the request of Cypriot Government and would not constitute action within terms of Article 51 of Charter. 2 Therefore, no obligation exists to make a report to SC. However, our judgment is that it will probably be politically desirable to do so, precisely to make point under UN dateline that this is not NATO action but ad hoc response by group of Atlantic nations at request Government of Cyprus. Request USUN consult with UKUN and report joint judgment as to whether reporting this action to SC would likely stir up USSR or other uninvolved UN members. Our present judgment is that if strong pitch is made by USSR or other UNSC members, we would not fight inscription. In event SC meeting is called, either because unfriendly members wish to complain of Allied action or because Makarios believes he needs UN meeting to keep his Afro-Asian friends from objecting to Allied intervention, our present thinking is along lines following guidance. Request you discuss with UKUN on contingency basis and comment: 1. We would of course oppose any SC action designed to inhibit Allied action. 2. Best outcome would be SC consensus taking note of Makarios' request, Allied response, and mediation effort, and urging all concerned to keep shirts on. USSR would probably not be willing to go this far. 3. In absence of consensus that blesses action being taken, any resolution should be limited to asking all concerned to avoid any action designed to exacerbate the situation. 4. Failing this, we would seek to limit SC consideration to speeches with SC remaining seized of Cyprus question, but without taking any formal action. 5. In course of debate we would urge SYG to keep limited presence in Cyprus for its potential future usefulness. This is not vital. 3 Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Cleveland and Sisco; cleared in NEA, EUR, and S/S; and approved by Ball. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. 2 Article 51 of the UN Charter required members to report exercises in self-defense against armed attack to the Security Council. Text of the Charter is in A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949 (Revised Edition), pp. 95–110. 3 In telegram 2895 from New York, January 29, the Mission to the United Nations reported on its talks with British and UN representatives. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2) 447. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 447. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, January 30, 1964, 7 p.m. 2903. Cyprus. Rossides (Cyprus) called Stevenson by telephone at 1 PM to say he had just received telephone call from London to effect that force in Cyprus must be UN force, and that he wanted our reaction. Stevenson pointed out emphatically that: (1) If UN force included Western powers such as UK and US, it would be difficult if not impossible to exclude USSR; (2) if force comprised, as in previous cases, of units from small countries, there would be no basis for excluding Eastern Europeans; (3) debate over composition of force, terms of reference and financing would take long while; (4) recruitment might present many difficulties if great powers excluded; (5) precipitating debate on article 19 and whole problem of financing at this time would be most unfortunate, with unpredictable consequences; (6) allied force could be organized and landed swiftly to prevent communal fighting; (7) UN could keep observer there and preserve UN involvement. Rossides seemed to retreat rapidly from insistence on UN force, and promised to report Stevenson's preliminary and unofficial reactions to London by telephone. He seemed particularly concerned with Turkish pressure to concentrate Turkish population by force and terror, thus achieving de facto partition. Also seemed concerned about possibility of Communist units in UN force. Obviously implications of an SC debate and a UN force have not been carefully considered in Cyprus, and Stevenson had impression that Makarios sudden announcement re UN force was impetuous response to rumors of allied force plan. Stevenson made clear that these were his personal and immediate reactions and would defer asking Department for instructions pending formal presentation by Cyprus. Stevenson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, and Ankara. A note on the telegram indicates it was passed to the White House, DOD, JCS, CIA, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCEUR. 448. Memorandum Prepared by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 448. Memorandum Prepared by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, January 31, 1964. CYPRUS 1. Aside from being kept informed by my staff on Cyprus developments, I was called immediately Saturday by Acting Secretary Ball of the high level UK appeal for help. 2 I directed him to meet with McNamara and Taylor to examine their proposition urgently. I sent my staff man Komer to attend their meeting. 3 2. Ball reported to me three times Saturday on developments. 4 Komer filled me in too. I told both I wanted to look before we leaped, though fully prepared to do what was necessary. 3. Sunday—Ball and Komer reported to me on exchanges with the British. I sent out messages to our ambassadors in Ankara, Athens, Nicosia to tell all concerned at my request to stay loose and keep London conference going. 4. Sunday evening I met with Ball, McNamara and my staff. I directed that we send Lemnitzer to calm down the Greeks and Turks. I told McNamara to bring over a senior UK general on the AG's plane to explain what they had in mind. 5 5. Monday 6 early I asked State to firm up soonest a report on all alternatives open to us. 6. Monday night Ball filled me in on the UK pleas sent via the AG who just returned from London. I also heard from Komer and McNamara. 7 7. Tuesday morning I asked the AG to give me the gist personally. Ball, McNamara, and Congressional leaders asked in to hear. 8 8. Late Tuesday afternoon after being briefed during the day, I discussed with Ball a proposal by my own staff to and a high level US official to press the parties to see reason. He proposed alternative plan. 9 9. Tuesday evening Ball, after discussing with McNamara, presented me with the final US proposals for tying US agreement to participate in peacekeeping to a third party mediator so as to limit US liability. I reserved judgment till we heard from Lemnitzer. 10 10. At 9:10 Wednesday morning, after sleeping on matter, and seeing morning cables, I called Ball who gave me Lemnitzer's report. I then gave the green light. I stressed that all parts of our package must be inseparable. 11 11. Wednesday 12 afternoon and evening Ball and my staff kept me informed of UK questions. 12. Thursday afternoon I was informed that UK bought our proposals. Thursday night I got a brief note of thanks from Home. 13 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. No classification marking. The memorandum was apparently drafted by Komer for the President's use. 2 For Ball's memorandum of the January 25 conversation, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Document 2 . 3 See ibid., Document 3, footnote 2 . 4 According to the President's Daily Diary, Johnson talked with Ball twice that day, at 2:05 and 6:29 p.m. (Johnson Library) 5 For a memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Document 3 . The “AG” is Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The orginal of the memorandum of conversation at the LBJ Library is dated January 25, but other evidence that has come to light indicates that the meeting took place on Sunday, January 26. 6 January 27. 7 There is no record of an evening discussion between the President and Ball. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the President and Ball met from 11:40 a.m. to 12:09 p.m. The President subsequently met with Secretary of Defense McNamara from 5:25 to 5:40 p.m. No other record of these discussions was found. 8 January 28. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 9:50 a.m. (Johnson Library) No other record of discussion was found. 9 January 28, 6:35 p.m. Recordings of this and subsequent telephone conversations with McNamara and Ball are in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 1,2,3. 10 See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Document 5 . 11 Lemnitzer's report was contained in an unnumbered telegram to Secretary of Defense McNamara. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2) According to the President's Daily Diary the Johnson-Ball conversation of January 29, took place at 9 a.m. No other record of their discussion was found. 12 According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met with Ball and other senior advisers at 5 p.m. Subsequently at 6:12 p.m. he discussed the Cyprus issue again with Ball by telephone. A recording of the conversation is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 64.09, Side A, PNO 2. 13 A copy of the January 30 message is ibid., National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. 449. Intelligence Information Cable 449. Intelligence Information Cable 1 Washington, January 31, 1964. COUNTRY Cyprus DATE OF INFO. 30 January 1964 SUBJECT Views of Patriotic Front Official on Archbishop Makarios' Stand Regarding NATO Involvement [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] DATE ACQ. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] (31 January 1964) REF IN 10061 TDCS–3/571,670 [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] [ 3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 1. Archbishop Makarios will find it very difficult to accept the involvement of NATO in the Cyprus crisis either with troops on the ground or in the search for a political solution. This is because articulate opinion among the Greek Cypriots and among the masses insofar as this can be ascertained has taken a sharp turn towards reliance on the Soviet Union. This is particularly true of right-wing nationalist opinion, formerly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, which has undergone an emotional trauma under the fear of Turkish invasion and the official pronouncements of Soviet support for the Greek Cypriot cause. Many prominent and representative Greek Cypriot nationalists assert that now that the Soviet Union has stepped in, Cyprus has no need for NATO, which has done nothing to restrain the Turks. Calling in NATO will thus be strenuously opposed by Greek Cypriot Communists, nationalists, and even right-wing extremists. 2. Even if Makarios feels that a solution through NATO is called for, his psychological make-up is such that he will not press for it against virtually unanimous opposition. Makarios still smarts under the accusation that he is responsible for the London-Zurich agreements 2 and is thus a traitor to the Greek Cypriot cause. He has often stated he will not bear this taint indefinitely and that he would upset the agreements at the first possible moment. To protect himself from a similar charge in the future, Makarios' current attitude is not to take the initiative for a solution at all but to call meetings of representative people so that they can recommend to him the course the Greek Cypriot side should adopt. He thus intends to follow public opinion rather than try to form it. In the current state of anti-Western feeling in all strata of the Greek Cypriot population no demand whatever will be heard for a solution through NATO or for calling in NATO forces. 3. Some formerly Western-oriented leaders are so virulently opposed to the involvement of NATO that, should he assent to it, they are capable of turning on Makarios and trying to depose him. He is aware that this is a possibility. It is conceivable also that, barring a turn of public opinion, some irreconcilables who are sufficiently well armed will provoke incidents against elements of the NATO forces if they do come to Cyprus. 4. ( Field Comment : The above analysis predates the meeting with Makarios on 31 January of U.S. Ambassador Wilkins and U.K. Acting High Commisioner Cyril Pickard to propose the use on Cyprus of forces from NATO countries.) 3 5. Field Dissem: State, Army, EUCOM, CINCSOUTH (personal) and CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCMEAFSA. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret: No Foreign Dissem. 2 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959 , pp. 765–775. 3 Reported in telegram 579 from Nicosia, January 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 450. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 450. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, undated. JSCM–74–64 SUBJECT Proposed Multinational Force for Cyprus (U) 1. In Appendix A 2 hereto is a summary of the highlights of discussions with Lieutenant General Sir Geoffrey Baker, Vice Chief UK Imperial General Staff, concerning British proposals for a multinational force for Cyprus. 2. The British concept provides for a multinational force from NATO countries to deploy to Cyprus to maintain the peace there. The concept envisions a force of approximately 10,000 personnel with the United States providing one-third of the force, the United Kingdom one-third, and other NATO countries one-third. The force would not, however, be deployed under NATO auspices. 3. SACEUR, in reporting on his talks with Turkish officials in Ankara on 28 January 1964, 3 stated, “NATO appears to be the only source of adequate security forces (to include Greek and Turkish) to restore peace in Cyprus and maintain firm control of the situation until such time as an agreed political solution can be worked out in a conference. Restoration of peace is an absolute requirement before any conference can be successful.” 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a multinational force could maintain order in Cyprus by serving as a peace-keeping force to prevent a renewal of intercommunal strife. However, it is their view that such a force may find itself in Cyprus for an indefinite period with no end in sight because of failure of the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots to reach a political solution to the Cyprus problem. Additionally, there is some doubt that the force proposed by the British will be effective in meeting the objective of fully maintaining the peace in Cyprus. Even if intercommunal fighting is not resumed, the force may still be unable to restore Cypriot morale and mutual confidence between the two communities sufficiently to permit the re-establishment of normal community services and commerce. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is militarily undesirable for the United States to participate in a multinational force for Cyprus, as this could result in maintaining an occupation type force, such as in Korea, for a prolonged period of time. Such action on the part of the United States could set a precedent in that other countries would believe that the United States would participate in future such contingencies throughout the world. 6. Nevertheless, on the assumption that the United States will participate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that US ground force participation be limited to a reinforced battalion of approximately 1,200 troops. They consider that the US forces to be employed should be drawn, in order of priority, from one of the following sources: a. The Long Thrust IX battalion, now in Germany, appropriately reinforced. b. A reinforced infantry battalion from USSTRICOM. c. Appropriate elements of the Marine Corps battalion landing team now in the Mediterranean. 7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the following modifications of the British concept are appropriate: a. Participation by the British up to one-third of the total force does not appear to be adequate participation by that country since they are one of the guarantor powers for keeping the peace in Cyprus. In any event, it is considered that the bulk of overhead and administrative troops for the force should be provided by the British. b. The British propose that the commander of the force report to an Ambassadorial Group in London, this group representing all the contributing nations. This command organization would be extremely unwieldy. A better plan would be to designate the United Kingdom as Executive Agent for the countries involved much like the United States is designated the Executive Agent for the United Nations in Korea. It is assumed that political guidance to the commander in the field will be provided through the Executive Agent. 8. Attached as Appendix B 4 hereto are proposed Terms of Reference for a multinational force which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend be used as the US position in any forthcoming negotiations. Further, USCINCEUR will provide the US representation, augmented as he deems necessary by personnel from other agencies, in any associated military staff discussions to be held in London. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Top Secret. A covering memorandum is dated February 4. 2 Not attached. 3 Lemnitzer reported on his talks with Turkish officials in an unnumbered telegram to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 29. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2) 4 Not attached. 5 The memorandum is unsigned. 451. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 451. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 5, 1964. An Alternative Course of Action on Cyprus What we want to do is steer between the Scylla of uncontrolled UN intervention and the Charybdis of sending US troops unless absolutely necessary. Makarios' reply, which was essentially negative but left door slightly ajar, allows us to take a new tack. 2 But we must do so quickly before Turks move or Makarios goes to UN. I don't think Kyprianou's remarks to Sandys offer much hope. In any case, Kyp doesn't count. He's a 32-year-old messenger boy, whom Mak uses as a front man. The job to be done is still in Nicosia, where we must convince Black Mak to reverse course. The Brits are still determined to pull us in, which makes London a problem too. Here the trick is to keep UK from giving up, while still not letting them commit us to anything Sandys dreams up. Ankara is our problem. The Turks will only listen to us. Moreover, they'll keep their mouths shut, which means we can talk tough privately, if we must. But we must offer the Turks some hope too, because they rightly see themselves the losers if we let Makarios dictate the terms. The following scenario attempts to meet the above criteria. It's admittedly thin, but little more so than State's idea of putting UN shrubbery around US/UK proposal. Scenario 1. Keep the European mediator idea. It helps keep issue out of UN and helps limit our liability (in forcing a solution). 2. Tell all parties that unless and until mediator idea worked out it's essential to keep London Conference going. The more we keep talking, the less likelihood of violence. 3. Mount a major effort with UK to keep it from running to UN. LBJ/Home letter—saying don't act till we can talk here on 12th—might be in order. Tell UK we must act together. 4. Since some kind of stronger peacekeeping force on Cyprus seems essential, largely to forestall bloodshed precipitating Turk move, explore urgently possibility of (a) Commonwealth reinforcement (Canadian, Aussie, plus Pakistani or Sudanese to give Moslem flavor); (b) proportional reinforcement of Greek/Turk/UK forces; or (c) beefing up of UK forces alone. Even if none of these work, talking about them keeps the ball in play. 5. To keep Makarios out of UN, convey to him forcefully but discreetly that Western powers won't play ball, and that in courting Bloc and AsAfs he'll lose his Western friends. We could also raise spectre of Turkish move saying it perfectly legal under Zurich treaty. We should attempt to box in Makarios by (a) getting to his more pro-West colleagues; (b) threatening to reveal their NATO offer; (c) talking up Grivas, etc. Only if we cool Mak and his extremists down can we keep lid on. 6. Use every private argument to keep Turks from acting, saying on plus side that we'll make sure Turk Cypriot position will be protected (vaguely) but on negative side that if Turks move without consultation we'll stop MAP cold to both them and Greeks. 7. In Athens we must convince Greeks they can't let Makarios steal the play. They must talk up NATO solidarity too. As leverage we use above MAP argument, but also say we're ag'in partition (since Turks admit they're ag'in it too). 8. To get above across forcefully we may have to send a senior man out, especially to Nicosia. Wilkins just doesn't carry weight with Makarios, and is temperamentally reluctant to use tough talk. In any case, sending a man from Washington conveys impression we mean business. Above moves should at minimum have calming effect, and buy us some time. If they don't work, we haven't lost much, and can still retreat to modified US/UK proposals or let Mak go to the UN route. It would be very hard to sell this line (especially 4 above) to UK, but we could do the others while negotiating on 4 with Brits. R. W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files. Secret. 2 Dated February 4; for an excerpt, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , p. 557. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 452. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 452. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, February 6, 1964. SUBJECT Points to Make to Denis Greenhill-U.K. Embassy 1. We have sent to London our suggestions on how the U.S.-U.K. plan should be revised. 2 I want to stress the importance of the U.S. and the U.K. speaking with one voice on this matter. 2. In this connection, we are deeply concerned over the conversation which Sandys had with Kyprianou. 3 3. While Sandys admittedly was speaking on a personal basis, he made specific reference to willingness to include territorial integrity in the terms of reference for the Peacekeeping Force which would undoubtedly result in the Turks going up in smoke. Moreover, this is an obligation which the United States itself would not be prepared to undertake if it were committing troops to this exercise. I think many other NATO members would feel the same way. 4. You have made clear to Ormsby-Gore 4 and there was an understanding with him that Sandys would not talk to the Cypriots, at this stage, about a Security Council resolution. Sandys, in fact, not only talked about a Security Council resolution but also talked in terms of “approval” of the Peacekeeping Force. With American inclusion in such a Force, it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets could swallow this by allowing any resolution to go through. For this reason, we have stressed and are stressing the necessity of a pre-arranged deal with Makarios which would be “taken note of” by a “consensus” of the Security Council. 5. We are deeply concerned about the Turkish attitude. Frankly, the Turks have been highly suspicious of the UK in this matter and knowledge of the Sandys conversation with Kyprianou will undoubtedly increase the nervousness in Ankara. The Turks have been very strong against putting the Peacekeeping Force under Security Council control. 6. We agree fully that the U.K. should continue to take the lead in negotiating this delicate matter. However, positions put to Makarios must be fully concerted so that Makarios is not given any opportunity to make a difficult situation even more difficult by exploiting differences among us. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. 2 See footnote 3, Document 453 . 3 According to a February 6 memorandum from Komer to President Johnson: “Sandys suggested we could live with (a) SC resolution 'approving' international force; and (b) due recognition that mission of force would include preserving territorial integrity of Cyprus, i.e. against Turks. We'd specifically warned against both.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus) 4 According to telegram 4904 to London, February 6, Ball told the British Ambassador: “We thought it would be a formidable error to hold meeting scheduled February 7 between Sandys, Bruce and Kyprianou. We urged strongly postponement of meeting until US and UK in position [to] present agreed position.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 453. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 453. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, February 7, 1964, 1 a.m. 3783. Embtel 3780. 2 1. I had lengthy session this evening with Sandys, Caccia and others to go over Sandys redraft (see reftel) of our package proposal on Cyprus. We again agreed on operating arrangements that once US and UK agreement is reached, our respective Embassies in Ankara and Athens should discuss redraft with GOT and GOG. Thereafter, following their acquiescence, it might be presented to Makarios and Kutchuk. 2. Meanwhile, Sandys suggested meeting with Kyprianou be held tomorrow as scheduled, but without attempting to give him any piece of paper at that time. Purpose of meeting would be to elicit Kyprianou's reaction. Sandys thought some slight advance on Kyprianou's previous position might be gotten out of him. At that meeting, however, Kyprianou will be given no indication of what is being considered by US as next step. Once clearance is obtained from US, UK, GOT and GOG, he might be given agreed paper later in day or following day. Time of meeting tentatively set for noon tomorrow. In accordance my telecon with Burdett, I suggest Dept discuss with Gore or Greenhill desirability postponing Sandys meeting with Kyprianou. If he still decides to go through with it, unless Dept objects, I think I should attend. It might be useful hear what Kyprianou has to say, and my presence might serve to restrain Sandys a bit. 3. With respect to Brit redraft, Sandys described his efforts as a “tidying up” operation. Following points deserve specific mention: A. By beginning para 1 of covering document (i.e., “International Force for Cyprus”) with phrase, “It is agreed etc.”, Brits believe need for para 2 of our text sent Depcirtel 1438 3 is obviated. B. Para 2 of covering document lifted, with slight revision, from Annex A (Depcirtel 1416) 4 of our package. C. Brits believe para 6 of covering document will be acceptable to Makarios, though GOG might conceivably be slightly unhappy not to have an absolute assurance from Turks re no intervention. D. Sandys prefers omit bracketed para after para 6, but has no objection if Dept desires include it. E. In Annex A, Sandys would like to omit para 1(C), which he considers restrictive rather than helpful and which he expects will be difficult to negotiate. F. Having in mind our objection to any commitment re protection of external security of Cyprus, Brits have redrafted para 5 of Annex A to limit such obligation to those who already have it, namely signatories of treaty of alliance with Cyprus. By thus citing treaty obligation, Sandys hopes make clear to Makarios that he is not losing anything by accepting proposal. Caccia noted, however, that Brits would not regard Turk intervention under treaty of guarantee of aggression. G. Re para 9, I made very clear to Sandys that we cannot accept anything that smacks of Security Council approval (as opposed to “take note of”) for peace-keeping force. Caccia indicated FonOff shares this view. Present wording also refers to “consensus” rather than “resolution”. H. Annex B is same as earlier Brit draft sent Embtel 3678 5 on which we await Dept's views. On their part, Brits owe us their views re our SOF supplement sent Deptel 4772. 6 Until US–UK agreement reached, this annex should remain in suspense and not be shown to Greeks or Turks. I. Sandys believes Annex C, i.e. mediator's terms of ref, should be as simple as possible. He has attempted meld our earlier draft with FonOff/CRO working level draft. He believes bracketed phrase following para 2 of Annex C might be deleted, but is agreeable to retaining it if Dept so wishes. 4. Sandys is disturbed over possibility of any delay and is as anxious as we are to move forward. I also taxed Sandys on Pickard's giving text of unapproved talking papers to Makarios. Sandys made no comment. Action Requested. 1. I shall appreciate having Dept's urgent comments on Sandys' redraft. If redraft is acceptable or once any minor changes have been worked out, we should inform HMG that US Ambassadors in Athens and Ankara may as next step urgently concert with their Brit colleagues to obtain GOG and GOT concurrence. 2. It will also be helpful to know what Dept has said to Gore or Greenhill about Sandys' scheduled meeting with Kyprianou tomorrow. In event meeting takes place and Dept has no objection to my attending, I shall appreciate having any specific guidance for that meeting. 7 Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, RG 59, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Priority. Received in the Department of State at 9:10 p.m. February 6. Repeated to Paris for USRO, Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR also for POLAD, CINCSTRIKE also for POLAD. 2 Dated February 6; it contained the text of the Sandys' counter proposal. (Ibid.) 3 Dated February 5; it contained the U.S. draft of an adjusted proposal for a peacekeeping force. (Ibid.) 4 Dated February 2; it contained the text of the British proposal for an international force on Cyprus. (Ibid.) 5 Dated February 2. (Ibid.) 6 Not found. 7 In telegram 1459 to London, February 7, the Department of State provided changes in the suggested wording of Sandys' proposal. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, February 6, 1964, 10:35 p.m. 2129. For Stevenson from Cleveland. 1. In present state of Cyprus question, it is especially important that Secretary-General hew to the line that Security Council session should be called only after parties most concerned (including Cypriots) have fully consulted with each other on practical arrangements for mediation and peacekeeping. 2. It would be unhelpful for U Thant to make any public statement commenting on any of the points that are mainly at issue here: degree of Security Council jurisdiction, composition of a peacekeeping force, relation of a mediator to Secretary-General, etc. 3. Hope you can see U Thant earliest to emphasize these points. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Cleveland and cleared by Ball. 455. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 455. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, February 7, 1964, 8 p.m. 2992. Cyprus. Rossides approached Stevenson after SC this afternoon to make following points. It was not entirely clear to what extent they stemmed from his govt and to what extent they were his own personal ideas. He emphasized that in Cypriot view there must be SC res which would reaffirm independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. As to peacekeeping force, this should be comprised of some NATO and some non-NATO states. He mentioned specifically UK, three Scandinavian states, Ireland and Austria. He argued that UN force with above-mentioned mandate would have such prestige that it would not be challenged and hence could be much smaller than we had contemplated, perhaps three or four thousand. Rossides assumed that this “UN force” would have to be paid for from UN funds. He had spoken to Federenko earlier today and inquired whether Sovs would object to expenditure UN funds for this purpose. Federenko had been evasive but had said any expenditure UN funds would of course have to be approved by SC. We asked whether if SC approved Sovs would pay their share. Rossides replied he had not asked this question but he assumed they would. We explained in some detail necessity of assessments being levied by GA and grave complications and delays which would result from application Article 19, 2 discussion special scale, etc. Rossides attempted to argue these problems could be deferred until regular GA session and expenses Cyprus operation covered from SYG's contingency fund until that time. We demonstrated this impracticable and pointed out only feasible means of financing would be by those contributing forces. We are far from sure Rossides was convinced. Comment : We note with considerable apprehension that substantial UN role in Cyprus operation is more and more assumed in NY and speculation and discussion of modalities stimulated by Rossides and Sovs is creating climate which will no doubt encourage Cypriots to emphasize and expand UN role. We fear that cumbersome and time-consuming quadripartite negotiation which we are now conducting between each formal approach to Cypriots may drag out negotiation with latter to our disadvantage in view of climate developing here. We suggest that effort be made very rapidly to drop any points in our current position which are not absolutely essential, to decide just how far we can go in terms of SC res (consensus is almost certainly not sufficient), to decide with Cypriots appropriate composition of force, and to present agreed plan to SC in nearest future. Stevenson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. 2 It reads: “A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of the arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.” 456. Memorandum of Conversation 456. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 7, 1964. SUBJECT Redraft of Proposal on Cyprus PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Turgut Menemencioglu Mr. Ilter Turkmen, Counselor of Turkish Embassy NEA-Phillips Talbot GTI-William A. Helseth Mr. Talbot noted that Mr. Sandys had spoken to Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou on February 5 on a personal and exploratory basis. He had informed us, and we understand also the Governments of Greece and Turkey, subsequently about the conversation and said he had agreed to meet again with Kyprianou on February 7 to learn Makarios' response. We did not think this was a good idea and we understand that the Turkish Government also suggested the meeting on February 7 not take place; consequently, the meeting with Kyprianou has been deferred. Talbot handed Ambassador Menemencioglu a copy of the “redraft of the joint proposal regarding Cyprus”, which did not include annexes B and C. 2 After reading the paper very carefully, the Ambassador remarked that it was “very good”, but that he did not understand a few things. Noting that he was speaking, of course, personally and without instructions, he referred to paragraph 8 which states that the mediator “shall keep the Secretary General of the United Nations advised on his progress”. He thought this was even worse than having the international force under the control of the Security Council and he inquired whether Makarios wanted this. He pointed out that the mediator might wish to make recommendations concerning the Cypriot Constitution and the United Nations could not act upon this because it was strictly an internal document. (In this connection, he cited the case of the Congo.) He then noted that this instruction for the mediator was for information only, but the United Nations practice, he added, was to allow any country to raise objections, to discuss or to comment on any paper that was circulated. In response, Mr. Talbot noted that this language was similar if not identical to the language used for Ambassador Bunker when he undertook the Yemeni mediation. 3 Ambassador Menemencioglu then referred to paragraph 9 4 and its reference to the Government of Cyprus having the initiative. He was afraid this might cause trouble because the Cypriot Government might wish to establish its own terms and otherwise act to dominate the arrangements. He pointed out that other powers were there as a result of a treaty. He also raised the question of Soviet action in the Security Council. Mr. Talbot responded that if we went to the Security Council with an agreed package, the Soviet Union would have a lot of trouble in upsetting it. The Ambassador agreed and stated that the Soviets couldn't do that so long as we have a united front. Mr. Talbot stated that we understood that Khrushchev had sent letters to the Governments of the United States, UK, Turkey and Greece. Ours was reportedly in the form of a letter to President Johnson, 5 but we as yet do not have the text. An early message from our Embassy in Moscow, he continued, stated that the letter to be delivered calls for the exercise of restraint, states that NATO is attempting to impose its will on an independent country, and claims that this problem is an international dispute which must therefore be brought to the Security Council. The Turkish Ambassador said this was only legalistic talk and was nothing like the harsh language the Soviet Union had used several years ago during the crisis over Syria. (Note: While the Ambassador did not elaborate, he probably was referring to the Turkish-Syrian crisis in the fall of 1957 when the Soviet Union used very blunt language toward the Turkish Government.) 6 The Ambassador said that he was “keeping his fingers crossed” about the future of this document and that it might need a little touching up here and there. Mr. Talbot noted that we had flatly rejected some of Makarios' points. In making his farewells, Ambassador Menemencioglu noted how pleased he was that Ambassador Hare was now in Ankara. 7 He stated that the Ambassador has the full confidence of Turkish officials and said that this had been reaffirmed in the messages he has received during the course of these negotiations on Cyprus. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8, CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Helseth. The Greek Ambassador was called to the Department of State for a similar discussion. A memorandum of that February 7 conversation, which includes a copy of the draft proposal, is ibid. 2 Not attached. 3 Documentation relating to the mediation is in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, volume XVIII . 4 It reads: “The Government of Cyprus will ask the Security Council to take note by consensus of the arrangements made for the creation of a peacekeeping force and for the appointment of a mediator. The Government of Cyprus will also request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to arrange for his representatives to remain in Cyprus, so that he may keep in continuous touch with developments and may maintain liaison with the commander of the peacekeeping force. The parties concerned will instruct their representatives at the United Nations to support these arrangements in the Security Council. ” (Attachment to memorandum of conversation with Greek Ambassador Matsas, February 7, 1964; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 5 For text of Khrushchev's February 7 letter and the President's reply, see Department of State Bulletin , March 23, 1964, pp. 446–448. 6 Reference is to the September 10, 1957, letter from Prime Minister Bulganin to Turkish Prime Minister Menderes accusing Turkey of planning an invasion of Syria. (For extracts, see Keesings Contemporary Archives , 1957, p. 15811.) Subsequently Soviet naval forces made a show of force and Syria brought its complaint before the United Nations. Turkey denied the accusations. 7 Apparently after a return to the United States for consultations. Hare presented his credentials on April 5, 1961. 457. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State 457. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State 1 Nicosia, February 8, 1964, 4:45 p.m. 685. Personal for the Secretary from Amb Wilkins. With all due respect our position in Cyprus is too rigid; we have lost flexibility. We are now supporting UK force plan which will be anathema to average Cypriot even if GOC accepts it and which will create situation in which Sovs can maneuver to their advantage. We are commonly believed here, rightly or wrongly, to favor NATO force and imposition of solution favoring Turkey, that is partition, under shield of this force; and to be blocking reference to UN where Greek Cyps believe they could establish their right to unified democratic state with guarantees for individual and with no foreign interference. Greek Cyps ask why we withhold this right from Cyprus. I earnestly recommend statement by President Johnson or you as suggested in Embtel 678 2 to bring US policy toward Cyprus into correct perspective. I also earnestly recommend some new course, either in UN or by Greece and Turkey as suggested in Embtel 680 3 para 7A and para 7C. I have no brief for any particular course but they both seem to meet our two principal objects of peace between Greece and Turkey and freedom of Cyprus from communism. We are moving far too fast. We should, in my opinion, at least delay presentation of new UK-Greek-Turkish proposal supported by US and discuss alternative courses with Greece and Turkey before going ahead. If we force new tripartite proposal on Makarios Greek Cyp Communists and other enemies of WEU will be able to take advantage of situation. Turkey and Greece will be forced to intervene with unforeseen consequences. Pickard clearly believes we should now be thinking about alternatives to tripartite proposal in event it proves unacceptable to GOC. We discussed several on informal basis without commitment (Embtel 680) and agreed to discuss them further later. Wilkins 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department at 6:52 p.m. and passed to the White House. 2 Dated February 8; it reported on the deteriorating Cypriot situation and the need for U.S. action. (Ibid.) 3 Dated February 8. (Ibid.) 458. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 458. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, February 8, 1964, 5:15 p.m. 3004. Cyprus. Yost brought SYG, Bunche and Rolz-Bennett up to date in general terms today on where Cyprus negotiations stand. Since SYG seemed apprehensive discussions with GOC for establishment peacekeeping force might be reaching impasse we reassured him that we remain hopeful of agreement within next few days. SYG was pleased to hear that we wished delay SC meeting until we could come in with fully agreed plan which would be presented by GOC. He said he had given Rossides similar advice yesterday and had suggested he assure himself “four permanent members” are prepared to approve plan before it is submitted to SC. We emphasized our discussions with GOC are being carried out in London and Nicosia and not through Rossides. SYG said points on which Cypriots seem most insistent are: (1) SC reso approving arrangements; (2) Some sort of continuing SC control of force so that it does not infringe Cyprus sovereignty; (3) Mention in reso of independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus; and (4) Mixed force of NATO and non-NATO contingents. SYG seemed sympathetic to all these points. We indicated some accommodation could probably be worked out on points 1, 3 and 4 but that continuing SC control of operation seemed to us wholly impracticable. SC would have to remain in practically continuous session and Soviets, as recent Kruschchev letter reveals, 2 would use every opportunity to sabotage operation since their primary objective is clearly not, as our is, to keep the peace in Eastern Mediterranean and inside Cyprus. Bunche said Cypriots are fearful allied force not under SC control would settle down in Cyprus indefinitely and supersede GOC. We replied no one could or would remain in Cyprus without GOC consent and way would always be open for GOC to return to SC if arrangement did not work out to its satisfaction. SYG suggested force might be controlled in same manner as had UN force in Congo (i.e., by himself), but we discouraged this idea and argued only feasible direction was by force commander acting of course in consultation with GOC and other interested govts. Naturally SYG and SC would be kept currently informed by reports from force commander and UN observer. SYG said he had also emphasized to Rossides that UN financing of force is totally out of question and force will have to be financed by those who participate. Yost 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Received in the Department at 6:52 p.m. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE also for POLADs. 2 In parallel notes to the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and Greece, the Soviet Prime Minister warned against establishment of a NATO force on Cyprus and expressed support for the government of Archbishop Makarios. Regarding the Khrushchev letter, see footnote 5, Document 456 . 459. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 459. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1 Athens, February 10, 1964, 4 a.m. 1184. For President and Secretaries of State and Defense. From Under Secretary. 2 1. After a day of meetings with the British headed by Duncan Sandys and a meeting with Kyprianou, the Cypriot Foreign Minister, I have formed some tentative views of the overall situation. 2. I am meeting today in Athens with our Ambassadors to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The discussions at these meetings may lead me to modify these impressions. Subject to this caveat, however, this is how I see our position emerging at the moment: A. The US should not put troops in Cyprus even as a minority component of an international force. The anti-American feeling in Cyprus stirred up by the Communists—and probably by Makarios himself—would tend to make our troops a special target. This is one situation from which we should seek to stand down. B. But I do not propose to announce this position as settled US policy. We have from the first made clear that we would consider participating in an international force only if all parties wanted it. I am accumulating evidence that Makarios does not want it. Wilkins, our Amb in Cyprus, thinks that an American component would be a bad idea. His views are shared by Pickard, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia. C. If I were to make it clear now that we were not prepared to participate, it would: 1. Give the British a chance to get off the hook; 2. Alienate the Turks and tempt them to move unilaterally against Cyprus—which could start a Greco-Turkish war; 3. Destroy the effectiveness of our influence while strengthening Makarios' efforts in the UN to bring in the neutralists and the bloc. D. I plan, therefore, to let the logic of our situation emerge from the accumulating facts, thus leading naturally to an international force without a US component. At the same time I shall take steps to keep the Turks from exploding. E. I hope to work this out over the next four days. Today I shall finish conversations with our three Ambassadors and with the Greeks. Tuesday 3 I shall try to prepare the Turks for a UN force. Wednesday, I shall give the word to Makarios and vice versa. F. Thursday I plan to consult with the British in London and return to Washington. G. As I see it, this activity should—if successful—pave the way for an international force without US participation. This force would be agreed to before presentation to the Security Council. It should contain units from the UK, the Benelux and Scandinavian countries, and possibly Canada. It would be under British command, would be approved by the Security Council, but would not be under the direction of the UN. Nor would it be financed by the UN, since all participating countries would be required to pay their own way. H. The course of action I have outlined must be measured against the following emerging facts: 1. The British want us in badly, but they are beginning to see the difficulties involved for us in participating in an allied peacekeeping force. My impression is they will have to settle very reluctantly for an international force linked to though not under control of the Security Council. 2. I am beginning to doubt that Cyprus wants any peacekeeping force. Makarios' primary objective is beginning to stand out in sharp relief. He hopes to involve the UN in a political settlement designed eventually to change the present constitutional setup. His representatives are now talking about a two phase operation in the SC. They want the Council to go on record for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. They pretend that they wish to have the Council get into the question of a peacekeeping force at a later stage. But it has become clearer that they do not want US in, and I expect that Makarios will confirm this fact. 3. The Turkish, of course, are a major problem. They have put great store on US participation. We have got to let them down easily in order to keep lid on the situation. I propose to stress with them the Cypriot opposition to our participation—while putting the best possible face on some modest UN force as a supplement to the present UK, Turk and Greek contingents in Cyprus in which our contribution might be limited to an airlift. At the same time, I do not believe we should encourage augmentation of Turkish and Greek forces since this would only exacerbate Makarios' ire and trouble. 4. I shall try to place on Makarios' shoulders the primary onus for our non-participation. 5. Although I share Sandys' views that “Cyprus question is insoluble” at least in foreseeable future, the possibility of a moderate UN peacekeeping force with a close link to UN may buy all of us some highly useful time. This I shall endeavor to achieve. 6. But it will require hazardous operation of walking on eggs with golf shoes. Labouisse 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, USUN, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE also for POLADs. 2 For documentation on Ball's missions, January–June 1964, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Documents 1 ff. 3 February 11. 460. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State 460. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State 1 Nicosia, February 13, 1964, 10:40 p.m. 747. For Secretary from Ball. In further session with Makarios, Kyprianou, Clerides and Papadopoulos at four this afternoon we reached complete deadlock. In essence, issue is between establishment of peace force now under aegis we propose and establishment of force only after passage of Security Council resolution which directed against threat of Turkish aggression. We have another session tomorrow at 10. Makarios handed us paper outlining this position and said he intends go to SC at beginning of next week. He said concept on international force is acceptable, but force should serve “to assist the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in restoring law and order and in bringing about a return to normal conditions.” Paper also provided that UNSYG should be invited to Cyprus to discuss role of UN vis-à-vis the force and establishment of committee of reps of participating countries under chairmanship of UNSYG representative. (Text sent separately.) 2 In response, I reiterated that first task is end of bloodshed. I rang all possible changes on argument that SC res re aggression and territorial integrity is unnecessary if peace force is brought in quickly and GOC cooperates to preserve peace; there would then be no question of foreign intervention. Further, I pointed out that role of peace-maker is to prevent conflict, not to side with one party or another. On SC res, I reiterated points I made yesterday that debate would be long, acrimonious exchange of charges and counter-charges, including that of genocide, and that it would be a spectacle that would bring shame to all parties, inflame passions and make no useful contribution to basic security problem of Cyprus. Pickard pointed out a key stumbling block in kind of res Cypriots want will be insistence of members that res be “subject to existing treaty rights”. Pickard then read Makarios a statement (separate tel) 3 underscoring difficulties under which UK troops are forced to operate. Cited aggressive action of legal GOC police forces, GOC refusal let UK troops occupy key positions needed to control situation in Limassol, and impossibility of UK troops being expected to fire on attacking Greek-Cypriot police, which would call down retaliation throughout the island. Pickard summed up that without GOC assurances that it does not espouse use of force against Turkish Cypriot minority, and without translation of such assurance into effective action, UK is reaching stage where it can no longer contribute to maintenance of peace on Cyprus, and he will recommend London consider whether there is any purpose in maintaining the troops here. We added that under these conditions, illogic of GOC view raises serious question of whether GOC genuinely wants peace force at all. At one point Kyprianou said there was no purpose in further discussion on this basis, and Makarios said he did not think they were prepared go beyond what was suggested in their paper. In view of your instructions, I did not accept this obvious breaking point, urged them to study our new redraft of the force proposals, and arranged to meet Makarios again tomorrow. GOC line as disclosed by paper given us today is same one they have pursued from beginning of our conversations. They are committed to a strategy—which, after our discussion of the last two days, I think they should believe is silly—of trying to neutralize Turkey by a Security Council resolution condemning aggression and guaranteeing territorial integrity. In this manner they hope to eliminate the one defense of the Turkish Cypriot population so that the Government of Cyprus can proceed happily with systematic genocide without outside interference. Makarios today stuck rigidly to the paper that had obviously been drafted by his three young ministers (unhappily all lawyers) of whom he is a prisoner. From time to time he glanced uneasily at them to see if they gave him the nod. It was clear that they are calling tune and that he fears both for his job and his life. I cannot play this drama out beyond tomorrow morning. At same time, we cannot leave any impression that Makarios' proposals are serious basis for further negotiation, and I intend to point out our objection to it, and how unrealistic it is. I shall, however, tell him again that the stakes are too high for my government to give up. I intend to fly to Ankara tomorrow, since Government of Turkey is anxiously awaiting results of these talks. Again I shall do my best to restrain them and shall repeat performance in Athens later. Duncan Sandys has indicated that he wants a full review of situation in London, which probably means that I shall be there most of Saturday. I think that even Turks will agree that we have given this matter as hard a try as was possible. We have certainly earned additional confidence by doing everything we could to work this problem out, but we must face fact that Cyprus is an island infected by a blood lust and that there is no government that seriously wants to maintain order. Its only desire is to liquidate Turkish Cypriots. I can best sum up prevailing attitude by quoting a Greek Cypriot who, when asked this morning about the bloody fighting in Limassol, dismissed it with a wave of hand, saying “when you are already soaked, the rain makes no difference.” If there is not a progressive development of widespread carnage in next fortnight, it is possible that we could push GOC into a more tractable position by making sure that they get a bloody nose in Security Council next week. Following that we might be able to establish an international force and begin to inject an element of sanity into situation. If that is so we might theoretically try to give a slight nod to Makarios' paper with necessary modifications. This might enable us to go forward toward creation of an international peacekeeping force that could move into island as soon as Security Council discussions were concluded. Another possibility we should seriously consider with UK and—at right point—with other guarantor powers is for US to move immediately into Security Council seeking creation of an international force. Such a move would have virtue of taking Makarios off balance and would possibly enable us to present Cyprus problem in an advantageous manner. I leave aside for moment possibility of arranging for a joint intervention of guarantor powers since this seems to me fraught with danger and at best a last ditch expedient. Wilkins 1 Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1289–1292. Secret; Flash. Also sent to London, Athens, Ankara, and USUN. 2 Regarding Makarios' paper, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Document 11, footnote 2 . 3 Telegram 748 from Nicosia, February 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 461. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 461. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 15, 1964. Mac— To get it out of my system, let me say that I'm most uncomfortable that I'm not able to do a better job of keeping you and the President clued on Cyprus mess. I'm well aware that you're not asking more of me, and have naturally not been pressing since you returned, understanding that we'd have to leave this one to State for the nonce. Beyond this, of course, State is deliberately neglecting to keep me at least informed. From the very beginning, almost all contacts have been at my initiative, and subject to repeated delays. It is almost as if Talbot has been told “Let's keep this one to ourselves.” He is obviously embarrassed by this, but it reflects a general tendency, as you know. I hope Rusk is at least keeping you or LBJ broadly aware. In fact the 7th Floor isn't using even its own experts. The Office Director commented to me the other day that in the first week (before Ball left) they weren't even in the act. With due allowance for my own feeling of sour grapes, I still find State's handling of Cyprus a very poor example of crisis diplomacy. First, we let this crisis creep up on us, even though fully warned. Second, from a posture of let the UK do it, State suddenly panicked in response to UK panic and reversed field by urging we send troops. Third, having sold this decision, State flubbed on the essential prerequisite, i.e. scaring the Greek Cypriots enough beforehand so they'd buy. Fourth, even though getting us out of the peacekeeping force (which we haven't yet told the Turks, who bought our original proposal solely on the grounds that we were in it), Ball gave away most of our anti-UN position via a series of concessions. These so eroded our position that only extremists like Clerides could fail to see they'd won the ballgame. But the Brits see it all too well, so they're going to the UN instead of being dragged. Now we'll get the worst of both worlds—UN intervention plus everybody sore at us. True, we've wriggled out of troop offer, but we're still committed now to play a major role—if only to save face with the poor old Turks, who'll rightly argue we hornswoggled them. Meanwhile, of course, Greeks will go on killing Turks on Cyprus. The above is crudely oversimplified, but it's painfully close to what happened. Now we'll be worrying Cyprus in the UN through 1964 at least, and knowing we're likely to end up with something quite unsatisfactory because in passing the baton to the UN we're likely to lose control. RWK 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 462. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 462. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 17, 1964. George Ball returns gravely concerned over the Cyprus crisis; he regards the risks involved as second only to those of the Cuba missile crisis. Ball sees a “50/50 chance” of Greek-Turkish war if we don't forestall it quickly. Only two options open to us now, in Ball's view. First we can involve the UN and seek UNSC sanction for a peacekeeping force. Since we've in effect withdrawn from any force, the UK seems resigned to this route. But, as Ball puts it, the Turks will move if the UN leans toward Makarios (as is likely). Moreover, the Western powers will tend to lose control, and the Soviets have a field day in the UN. So instead Ball urges (see attached) 2 a joint peacekeeping force of the guarantor powers—Greeks and Turks joining the UK. He argues that the one way to keep the Turks from acting unilaterally (and the Greeks reacting) is to have them both act together. While Ball may be a bit alarmist about a Greek/Turk war, he's dead right in saying Turk intervention on Cyprus could be triggered any moment—only one more incident is needed. Moreover, we've little to lose by trying his gambit—it limits our liability, takes the play away from the two irresponsible Cypriot communities and forestalls the UN. As Ball says, the Greek Cypriots might resist even agreed Turk landings—but this should be manageable. Problem is that it may be too late either to turn off the UN or to sign on the UK and then Greece. But the threat of imminent Turk intervention may be enough to bring them around. At any rate, it seems well worth trying. If you accept Ball's plan, it's imperative we move fast to: (1) short-circuit the UNSC by getting it to dump the problem back in the guarantor powers' lap; (2) force the UK's hand by telling them the Turks are ready to move; (3) do the same with Athens. R.W. Komer 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. 2 See footnote 2, Document 463 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 463. Memorandum for Record 463. Memorandum for Record 1 Washington, February 17, 1964. SUBJECT Under Secretary Ball's Report to the President on his Cyprus Peacekeeping Mission PRESENT The President McGeorge Bundy R.W. Komer Under Secretary George Ball Asst. Secretary Phillips Talbot Mr. Ball described the critical nature of the situation as he saw it, underlining his belief that this was the most dangerous confrontation since the Cuba missile crisis of October 1962. We were close to a major disruptive war. Ball was convinced the Turks were not bluffing; Inonu had made clear he'd have to move if there were another incident like Limassol. The Greek PM had said the same; he'd have to move if the Turks did. And the Chief of the Greek General Staff had sent Ball a message (through our Ambassador) that if the government didn't move, the Greek military would get a new government that would. There was a 50/50 chance of a Greek-Turk war, which could easily get out of control. The Cyprus Government was unable to control its own people; its only interest was to get UN protection against Turk intervention so the Greek extremists could go on killing Turks. The UK ministers did not seem to understand the gravity of the situation when Ball saw them in London over the weekend, but he'd just had word that they now had their own reports and fully agreed. Ball outlined his own proposal, 2 commenting that no peacekeeping force we could get through the UN would be sufficiently big. Moreover, a UN peacekeeping force couldn't shoot policemen, which was the heart of the matter. The British were unwilling to take on the Greek Cypriot police (who had led the charge at Limassol). But unless a force could take on all the extremists if necessary, it couldn't calm the situation. What was really needed was an “army of occupation, not a peacekeeping force.” This only the Guarantor Powers could provide. The President told Ball the latter had done all that was humanly possible; the President was only sorry he didn't succeed. The President fully agreed as to the gravity of the situation. He thought a Greek-Turkish war was inevitable unless we sidetracked them in some way. He was prepared to try out the Ball plan if all his advisers agreed it was our best bet. Ball indicated that Rusk was in favor; so was Adlai Stevenson. The President said Stevenson had seemed less alarmed than Ball the previous evening, and instructed Ball to reach a meeting of minds with him. Bundy thought the odds of a Greek/Turk clash a little less than Ball, but agreed that his plan was the best idea available even so. We should act on the worst assumption in any case, and try to get our allies signed on as soon as possible. Ball said we should pressure the UK to call a summit meeting as soon as Papandreou was sworn in. He and Inonu were the people to deal with. We should have an “observer” present to make sure the UK didn't falter. Ball thought it might be best if he went himself. It might also be a good idea to send General Taylor to talk to the Greeks and Turks about the military side, since the chief risks were that the Greek Cypriots would oppose a Turk landing or that Greek and Turk forces might clash. The President agreed Ball should go if necessary. Bundy interjected that Ball's mission had been a success in that if he hadn't gone the Greeks and Turks might have been at war by now. The President reminded Ball he'd been in favor of Ball's going a week earlier. As the President saw it, we might have to tell the Turks “it's goodnight, nurse” if they did move. We were in a position to force them to settle the issue peacefully. If we told Inonu we'd cut off aid, he'd have to back down. Ball pointed out that Inonu, great man though he was, wasn't a free agent; he led a minority government. Also his own military might force his hand. The President directed that we talk in the toughest language if necessary to all parties. Ball assured him that he'd minced no words. Turkish restraint so far had been admirable, but they'd have to move now if there were another incident. Bundy suggested it might be time for a Presidential message to Inonu urging him to keep calm. The President agreed (State will draft). 3 He also agreed to send a message to Home telling him we saw merit in the Ball plan—providing all in the USG were on board. At the end there was a brief discussion of how to deal with the press. The President approved accenting the gravity of the situation but avoiding any comment on possible solutions. 4 R.W. Komer 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Cyprus. Secret. 2 Ball outlined the plan in telegram 3961 from London, February 16. (Ibid.) 3 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Document 16 and footnote 1 thereto. 4 See Document 464 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 464. Transcript of a Background Press and Radio News Briefing 464. Transcript of a Background Press and Radio News Briefing 1 Washington, February 18, 1964, 11:17 a.m. Mr. Greenfield: Good morning. The attribution on this one will be US sources. And I think it might help if the Under Secretary opens with just a short general review of the situation as we saw it and see it now, saw it last week and see it now. Under Secretary Ball: Gentlemen, I might start with the situation on the Island, as I found it. As I am sure you know, the original constitution, which went into effect in 1960, has broken down, largely as a result of the fact that the Archbishop, who is the President, decided in December that it was unworkable and proposed amendments which were not accepted by the Turks, and today the Government of Cyprus really represents only the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot community is not effectively functioning as a part of the government, and the decisions are being made by the Greeks. And even the authority of the government does not extend fully to the Greek Cypriot community, because there are independent bands of Chinese warlords, who have their own private armies that are not taking their direction from the state. As a consequence, while there is authority in the government of Cyprus with respect to the Greek Cypriot community, it certainly is not fully effective authority, and there is a problem as to how well the government can control the Greek elements in incidents such as have recently occurred, the latest of which was at Limassol. On the Turkish side, I think there is also a breaking down of the authority of the Turkish Cypriot leadership over the Turkish community. But the Turkish community, as you know, is only about twenty per cent of the population; the Greek is eighty per cent. The incidents have continued, and while they are not spectacular ones within the last two or three days, there are killings every day, and the bloodshed goes on. This created a situation where it was felt that some kind of a large international force, a larger force, had to be injected between the two communities if there were to be peace. The British were brought in by invitation of the Cypriot Government in December, 2 and they have done their very best, and I think have done extremely well under very trying circumstances. But the forces which they have are only in the neighborhood of perhaps 3,000 men at the moment that are doing this job. They are working under very great handicaps, because they are operating as a peacekeeping force and not as an occupation force—which means that if any of the problems result from the actions of the Greek-Cypriot police, why the force cannot, is powerless to do anything about it. And they have proceeded so far on the basis of not shooting, which makes it very hard indeed to maintain order. A proposal was made, as you know, for an international force. This proposal was accepted in some detail by all of the parties concerned, the three guarantor powers, Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Turkish-Cypriot community in Cyprus, and the only remaining interested party that had not acceded to these plans was the Government of Cyprus itself, under Archbishop Makarios. After we had arranged to have a common agreement of the other parties, I spent three days in Nicosia with Archbishop Makarios, 3 and I got the impression—which I don't want attributed to me, but which you can attribute, if you like, to US sources—that the Government of Cyprus was basically interested in other things than the creation of an international force. It was interested, first of all, in a plan which it had worked out, the effect of which, as it saw it, would be to nullify the rights which the Turkish Government had as a guarantor power to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee. Under the Treaty of Guarantee, which was an integral part of the organic constitutional arrangements that were made in 1960, there was a provision that any one of the three guarantor powers, Greece, the United Kingdom, or Turkey, could intervene to restore conditions under the constitution. And the Turks have been seriously considering the need to intervene in order to provide protection to the Turkish Cypriot population, and the Greeks have been considering intervention, certainly in the event that the Turks intervene. Now, under these circumstances, we have a potentially dangerous situation, which obviously could become very much larger than the problems in Cyprus itself. Because it could involve a conflict between two NATO partners, and indeed those partners which represent the right wing of the NATO defense. So this is a matter which perforce the United States has felt it necessary to interest itself in. The refusal of Archbishop Makarios to go forward at the present moment with an international force meant that the matter had to be transferred to a different arena. The Archbishop's position was that after some debate he accepted the idea of an international force. And this was, I think, progress. And there was even some talk about the composition of the force, and an indication of certain countries, particularly the Commonwealth countries, from which he would be willing to see such a force drawn. But he was determined to try, first of all, to secure the neutralization of the Turkish Cypriot community by some kind of action in the United Nations, which would bring about, as he saw it, an effective nullification of the intervention rights of the Turks, under the Guarantee Treaty. For this reason, he wanted to postpone any serious discussion of the international force until after he had succeeded with this ploy. So that when it became apparent that he was determined to go ahead in the Security Council and try to work out a resolution, to obtain a resolution which he had been advised, I think quite mistakenly, would have the effect of nullifying the unilateral intervention rights, it was necessary for Britain also to make a move to the Security Council, in order to mobilize world opinion in favor of a unilateral force, I mean, an international force, and to try to bring about the restoration of conditions of peace and order. I may say that the American position, which was urged strongly at Nicosia, was that we had to get on with first things first, that the prime cause of all the difficulty was the fact that law and order had broken down, that the government appeared either unwilling or unable to maintain order, that some larger outside force, objective, neutral force—neutral in the sense that it was neither for one unit or another—was necessary if order were to be restored, and that once this were done, and order was restored, then the possibilities of the need for the utilization of the intervention rights would disappear. But that we could not permit this, the world would not permit this killing to go on on an extended basis, and that this was the point at which the problem must be tackled. The Archbishop did not see it this way. He felt that it was much more interesting from their point of view to try to neutralize the Turkish community than it was to create an international force to restore law and order. And to some extent this may reflect the lack of control by the government over the situation, and the interests of some of the armed forces, which are not directly under government control, in trying to work toward a policy of dominating the Turkish community, dominating and perhaps even liquidating it. What we are seeking in the Security Council, and what I think the Security Council will come up with, is in effect a mobilization of world opinion behind a scheme which is essentially the one that was agreed upon by all of the parties except the Archbishop. So that in a very real sense this is simply the transference of the same effort into a somewhat different form. All of the discussions which are going on in New York concern the creation of a force, the composition of which would be agreed to by the interested parties. This is not the pattern of the force that was employed in the Congo, where the Security Council itself created a force and where it was financed through the UN. Let me say that no one who is interested in the creation of such a force is talking about it being financed through the UN, and all of the plans which are floating around in New York at the moment contemplate that the force would be one in which the parties would agree as to its composition. So that I think we may say that the force would clearly exclude any Bloc elements, and would be composed of forces from such areas as the older members of the Commonwealth, and perhaps some of the neutral countries in Western Europe, and perhaps some of the NATO members; and certainly the British would remain in it. Well, this is the situation as of today. The Security Council is going to be meeting this afternoon and I hope the debate will not be protracted, but one cannot be sure. There are some procedural problems which will have to be disposed of, such as the seating of delegates from the Turkish-Cypriot community, or representatives of that community at least, to provide information to the Security Council; the disposition of an effort of the Government of Cyprus to obtain a resolution against aggression, which to its mind, based on the advice it has received, would have the effect of nullifying the intervention rights of the Turkish Government, and so on. But I did want to make the point quite emphatically that this is simply a further phase in the same effort, which is an effort to obtain an effective international force which would be composed of elements provided by the countries prepared to pay for them, would be composed of elements on which the parties agreed, and which could bring about a restoration of law and order in Cyprus, and create the conditions which would make it possible for the parties to get together and try to work out a political solution. So far as the formal shape of the political solution is concerned, from the point of view of the United States Government, this is a matter which the parties themselves will have to agree upon. We haven't attempted to impose a solution or even to suggest one. I think this is something which will have to be left up to the parties, although one of the elements of the scheme calls for the appointment of a mediator, and we are hopeful that there can be a mediator designated who can serve as a kind of catalyst in bringing about a meeting of the minds of the parties concerned. [Here follows a question and answer exchange with the press on the Cyprus situation.] 1 Source: Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 87, Frames 1138–1347. No classification marking. 2 See Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XVI, Documents 306 - 309 . 3 See ibid., 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Documents 11 and 13 . 465. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 465. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, February 26, 1964, 1 p.m. 4127. In talk with Wood of FonOff Central Dept this morning, following emerged: 1. UKUN report of yesterday's SC meeting similar that contained USUN's 3183. 2 Brits clearly deeply disappointed way SC consideration of Cyprus issue has gone and are uncertain what next steps should be. FonOff/CRO working team considering problem this morning. 2. Re Embtel 2115, 3 FonOff understanding is Kyprianou proposed abrogate Treaty of Alliance only. Although HMG not a party to Treaty of Alliance, FonOff notes that treaty is closely related to Treaty of Guarantee and basic nature of both documents enshrined in Article 181 of Cyprus Constitution. Hence, if GOC attempts abrogate Treaty of Alliance, HMG will have to speak against this. FonOff still considering what answer should be given to Kyprianou's query at SC meeting if guarantor powers still regard right of intervention under Treaty of Guarantee as valid in light of UN Charter. FonOff acknowledges question is “tricky” and care will have to be taken in framing answers. 3. FonOff working level thinking is now leaning toward SYG's suggestion that early meeting of Papandreou and Inonu be arranged. Such meeting might later be expanded to include Makarios and Kutchuk and perhaps HMG as well. Problem is how to hold such meeting in constructive atmosphere as long as pertinent SC talks continue. FonOff working level has been thinking along lines that SC might adjourn its consideration of Cyprus issue later this week, following which summit meeting outlined above could be held. Thereafter, depending on outcome such meeting, Ball might be put back into play in SC. When leaving FonOff, EmbOff met Rennie of FonOff UN Dept who confirmed discussions still taking place between FonOff and CRO on next steps. Said FonOff hopes be in touch with US again on question sometime this afternoon. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and New York. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, and CIA and repeated to CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 2 Dated February 25; it reported on Turkey's UN position and speculated on how long the Turks could hold this position in the face of Cypriot maneuvering. (Ibid.) 3 Dated October 29, 1963. (Ibid., POL 15–5 BR–GR) 466. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 466. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, February 26, 1964, 8 p.m. 3201. Re: Cyprus. 1. With fate of Bernardes' initiative 2 likely be decided within next couple days, we submit fol estimate its prospects and possible next steps in case it fails. 2. Prospects in SC at present are still uncertain. Surprising degree of unanimity among five of six non-perm members and their agreement on draft res affords some encouragement they may succeed and certainly warrants their being given sufficient time to complete their effort. UKUN is moderately optimistic and favors accepting Brazilian draft as is. On other hand, debate in Council yesterday 3 and latest developments in Cyprus may have hardened situation, with Cypriots believing they can safely stand more firm and Turks becoming more rigid due to explicit Cypriot challenge of their right of intervention. However, Menemencioglu (Turkey) has so far reflected quite flexible attitude on wording of res. Sovs, of course, have capability of creating difficulties at last minute. 3. During course of last week Cypriot position in UN has progressively improved due to fol factors: (a) belief Cyprus is “small” state under armed threat from large neighbor, (b) automatic predilection for unqualified territorial integrity and sovereignty of members, (c) long-standing opposition to Turkey by Arabs and because of its membership in NATO, (d) SYG's efforts, which included reference to territorial integrity but nothing on treaties, (e) Cypriot challenge that treaty grants no right of military intervention at all, (f) solid support from Greece on same point, thus creating explicit alignment of Greece with Cyprus on key points. However, this does not mean Cypriots have gained or can gain total victory in SC. SC members also generally recognize (i) SC cannot challenge or modify treaties, regardless of what members think of them, (ii) that root causes of present issue lie in communal fighting in Cyprus and (iii) that establishment of UN force is practical way in which issue can be overcome. 4. Left to own devices without US–UK pressure, Council would give Cyprus unqualified statement of territorial integrity (being totally silent about Treaty of Guarantee) in return for peacekeeping force and mediator. Given our pressures members of Council will probably stand about on version “b” of Brazilian preamble (USUN 3179). 4 No res likely go through Council will be stronger than this. We think Turks could live with such language in last analysis. Question is whether Cypriots are willing bend even to that degree. 5. If present effort fails, number of possibilities for next step are then open. 6. These are: (a) effort to bring about “summit” meeting either of Turkey and Greece or of 4 guarantor powers; (b) Cypriot move to convene special GA; (c) further effort by US with Makarios to obtain SC solution; (d) further efforts in SC on new lines, such as Norwegian idea of simply asking SYG to appoint mediator. 7. Re summit conf our assessment is that bilateral Greek-Turkish meeting highly unlikely at this stage in light current efforts Greeks to maintain their influence in Cyprus. Four-power summit conf would without any doubt be useful and we hope soundings in regard thereto are being taken. However, we are now far from certain that Cypriots would again meet with guarantor powers and, even if they did, that Makarios would agree to Kutchuk being represented in any equivalent status with him at such summit conf. In their present mood Greeks would probably support Cypriot position. Summit might therefore not be feasible at all or, if it were, it might turn on how far we (and Turks) would insist on equal participation of Turks. 8. Re GA we believe it is open question whether or not Cypriots could get necessary 57 votes. Much would depend upon case left from SC breakdown. There would be reluctance on part many members, even including many Afro-Asians, to have special or emergency GA in light Article 19. On other hand, if situation in SC and in area veered toward one in which failure to convene GA would appear to be acquiescing in Turkish military action, Cypriots might well get their votes. Even Sov bloc might vote for such session if it felt psychology of session would be anti-Turk and correspondingly anti-US and UK, in hopes our prospects in forcing Article 19 would be at minimum in such circumstances. At very least we should not conclude that Sovs would be working against GA because of Article 19. While situation not therefore certain, and while feeling Cypriots must be quite unsure of their prospects obtaining GA session, we cannot exclude it and must in our tactics acknowledge so as to minimize its prospects. 9. We consequently feel further efforts should be made within SC context to reach agreement on SC action even if initiative non-perm members breaks down and even though Greek-Cypriots are using time to increase their own armed strength. Given UK reluctance to continue job itself and mounting evidence Makarios will increasingly focus pressures against UK direct role, key both to restoring law and order in Cyprus and keeping Turks out still lies in international peace-keeping force. If this can be achieved it should be much more satisfactory to Turks than any direct intervention on their part, which would be bound to result in heavy slaughter of Turkish-Cypriots and virtually untenable long-run job for Turkish army. This would, of course, play into Sov hands. 10. Consequently believe next step if non-perm members break down would be for US make final high-level appeal to Makarios to agree to SC solution which would create UN force, keep Turks in fact out, and appoint mediator. Exact details of approach would have to await result of non-perm members negots. We have in mind tentative idea of asking him accept mention in res both of “territorial integrity” and of treaty or constitution, in exchange for explicit Turkish commitment not to exercise its rights under treaty (whatever they may be) as long as UN force is on island and is effectively protecting Turkish lives and property. 11. If this does not work believe next string on bow might be Nielsen (Norway) approach, preferably on basis direct suggestion from SYG to Makarios. Idea of this would be that other issues in SC be set aside for the moment while SYG sends mediator or good officer to consult with govts concerned in area, on basis SC res to this effect. Implicit would be concept that UK force would continue on island with function maintaining present uneasy peace. Presumably any such action would be accompanied by renewed SC and SYG appeal to all concerned, including communities, to refrain from violence. Plimpton 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, London, and CINCSOUTH. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 2 Reported in telegram 3200 from New York, February 26. (Ibid.) 3 Summarized in Yearbook of the United Nations , 1964, pp. 153–154. 4 Telegram 3179 from USUN, February 25, transmitted the text of the Cypriot Security Council resolution. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 467. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 467. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, February 27, 1964, 2:40 p.m. 3212. Cyprus. Ref: USUN 3179 and USUN 3200. 2 1. Prior Feb 27 SC mtg, Yost checked with Bernardes (Brazil), Bitsios (Greece), Menemencioglu (Turkey) and Dean (UK) on prospects of Bernardes draft res. Bernardes felt discouraged with negative reaction to draft by Cypriots and Turks. Bitsios unwilling to get involved in haggling over draft. Menemencioglu strongly opposed text of res: He willing to drop paras 2 and 3 of preamble or to substitute for them para reaffirming Art 2 para 4 of Charter and para on Treaty of Guarantee. 2. Bitsios told Yost he “not aware of anything which would be considered final draft res.” Bernardes had briefed him on discussions of his draft and of various suggestions on wording. He had told Bernardes his govt considered matter very serious but did not want to get into business of haggling over words. Though discouraging Bernardes in this way from showing him draft res, Bitsios stated he told Bernardes he would consider anything that SC members working on this problem produce as final text. Bitsios stressed that important task is now to establish international force on Cyprus and start negots. Said it impossible to remove ref in res to idea of territorial integrity now that matter raised. Did not think treaty should be mentioned in res, however, in view of differing interpretations of treaty. Bitsios emphasized that Greek Govt does not believe failure SC mention treaties affects their validity and that they remain fully valid. Bitsios had no suggestions to offer on what should be next step if SC failed to agree on res. 3. Menemencioglu told Yost that his reaction to Bernardes draft strongly negative. Hoped it would not be submitted, but seemed unconcerned if SC effort ended with no res. When Yost asked whether he would accept res with no ref either to territorial integrity or treaty, Menemencioglu said he would but added that he now working on two preambular paras one of which would quote from Art 2, para 4 of Charter 3 and other of which would recall Treaty of Guarantee and Cypriot commitment to respect constitution. Menemencioglu said he would “walk out” of SC if hearing of Denktash refused. Asiroglu (Turkey) later told MisOff that UK, US, Norway, Brazil, Morocco, and France ready support Denktash, but seventh vote in doubt. Liu (China) had told Asiroglu he has definite instructions abstain. Ivory Coast had been reluctant and French had not insisted too hard with them, Asiroglu thought, Bolivia was key vote. We told him Stevenson would make renewed effort. 4. Dean worried that Bernardes effort would fail and seeking ways to keep UN efforts going. Suggested possible new try by SYG. Stevenson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files l964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and USDOCOSOUTH for POLAD. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 2 Telegram 3200 from USUN, February 6; see footnote 2, Document 466 . 3 It reads: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or act in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” 468. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 468. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, February 27, 1964, 10 p.m. 4193. From Talbot for Under Secretary. Embtel 4189. 2 Lewis Jones and I met with Sandys, Carrington and Snelling this evening. I said I had spoken with you short time ago, and you had said we morally certain Cypriots plan move on abrogation treaty today. We have strong feeling next 24 hours may be crucial and require immediate action along lines your message. There is likely be impasse in SC with subsequent quick build-up for special UNGA meeting. Hence, rapid movement on some other track necessary to forestall such development. Sandys said HMG understands US anxieties and shares them. There is no difference between us re seriousness situation. HMG does not think that we will advance toward our common objective by calling guarantors meeting now. There are several difficulties. First, Greeks will refuse to attend. They have already taken a decision not to do so and will support Makarios to the hilt. Here Carrington interjected latest Brit info they will support him in going to UNGA. Sandys continued that it looks to Brits as though Greeks will henceforth support Greek Cypriots as much as Turks do Turk Cypriots. Greeks will do nothing that is not acceptable to Makarios. Sandys thought that perhaps U Thant might ultimately still be persuaded convene such a meeting. He thought it was undesirable to allow Cypriot problem be taken off SYG's plate. Additionally, there is problem of agenda for such meeting. He doubted that guarantors meeting would have effect suggested in Under Secretary's letter 3 of making clear to Makarios that Turks mean business. Makarios would not be attending such meeting and Greeks are not likely to make any serious effort influence him. I agreed Greeks might be difficult. However, once Bernardes has thrown in his hand and if abrogation surfaces, this might have moderating effect on their attitude. Sandys continued that only circumstance under which guarantors meeting might be called is if Turkey clearly intends to intervene militarily. Under shadow of such a crisis, it might work. Greeks might in that event get cold feet and cooperate. Carrington then outlined HMG's assessment of likely UN reaction to call for guarantors meeting. He thought this might differ from US assessment. Brits believe such call would be viewed as “ganging up” of guarantors against little GOC. Effect of this on Afro-Asians and others might precipitate precisely what we are seeking to avoid. Snelling added that such call would make situation more difficult for Brits on the ground. Greek Cypriots would see such call as precursor to intervention. They would take out their ire on Brit troops in Cyprus. Snelling also noted that latest Brit info does not suggest any advanced state of Turk readiness. Indeed, he had impression Turks were not as ready as they were two weeks ago. I suggested Turks are certain to react strongly to any abrogation statement. A guarantors meeting might not have those consequences feared by Brits, but would be useful to help hold situation. Sandys replied that he doubted Greeks willing to participate in preparatory planning for such contingency. I said that if abrogation statement is made, Turks may be expected make clear their intentions and Greeks would face need to reconsider. Sandys reiterated HMG does not think guarantors meeting possible with any hope of success except in crisis conditions. Carrington thought not much separates our two positions. It was a question of who calls meeting and when. We are both agreed meeting should not be called until after SC impasse. I noted this cld occur almost immediately. Carrington continued that HMG believes we should suggest to SYG that meeting be called at high level, whereas USG suggests HMG call meeting of guarantors. I said abrogation is key moment. If we allow it to pass without reaction, there is little we can do later to preserve treaty rights. A statement by Kyprianou on abrogation will set off chain reaction. Sandys doubted that Cypriots will announce abrogation. They are more likely to ask SC to declare military intervention rights under treaty as inconsistent with UN Charter. Snelling observed that any such Cypriot action as announcing abrogation would be contrary to what Sandys had gotten Makarios to accept several weeks ago. Sandys also expressed Brit concern at Makarios “respectabilizing” EOKA gangsters by putting them into police force. He expects Makarios make formal request of Brits next day or so to take a more active part in helping Cypriot police to maintain law and order. This would mean asking Brit troops assist Greeks against Turks. Brits cannot accept this. Hence, he thought a crisis might be developing in Brit relations with Makarios. I pointed out that crisis might develop along several fronts. In addition those cited by Brits, danger of situation moving to UNGA equally great and Turk reaction might be extremely serious. All of this could start in next 24 hours or so. I recalled SYG had earlier turned down Brit suggestion call meeting of interested parties, including Makarios and Kutchuk. Carrington thought SYG might reverse his position. SYG is duty-bound to do something. I said none of us wants to see matter referred to UNGA. To do so would raise controversial question of Article 19 and voting rights. Sandys said it hard to see what one might do at such a guarantors meeting. It would not be possible get Greeks go along with intervention. I suggested Turks might arrive with an announcement of intention to intervene. Carrington noted that former UK Amb to Turkey, Sir Bernard Burrows, believes Turks will not move unless there is another Limassol. As long as matter is before UN, Brits doubt there will be any further bloodletting in Cyprus. Once it gets out, it could start again. In response my suggestion that problem would become even more difficult for Brits if Turks move in, Carrington said emphatically it would not. Brits will not fight Turks. I said point was that if Turks moved in, then Greeks would do same which could quickly lead to collapse NATO southeastern front. If in those circumstances, Soviets threaten Turks we would have to warn Soviets and situation could quickly reach Cuba confrontation proportions. Sandys concluded conversation by reiterating Brits fully alive to danger of situation. Unfortunately, they do not see any more clearly than do other parties way out of this “haze.” He thought it might be useful to talk to SYG in advance along lines that if Turks did move, he should call summit meeting of interested parties and also tell him Brit PriMin would attend such meeting. He thought that Turks will not do anything next day or so. Carrington noted that Caccia had called Dean in New York after my talk earlier today with Caccia. Dean had said there is no evidence Greek Cypriots will take action to abrogate treaty today. I said, nevertheless, time to save situation likely be extremely short. Comment : I sense some difference of assessment exists between Brits and ourselves. Brits do not seem to have our concern about Cypriot intentions unilaterally to abrogate Treaty of Alliance. They are also considerably more relaxed about danger of Turk intervention. Their primary concern is increasingly difficult position of Brit troops in Cyprus which leads them to cling to UN involvement as long as possible, however, forlorn this may be. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and New York and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and to CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 2 Dated February 27. (Ibid.) 3 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Document 19 . 469. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 469. Memorandum From Samuel Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 27, 1964. SUBJECT Rundown of how we now stand on the matter of Cyprus in the Security Council At yesterday's meeting, the Ivory Coast Delegate spoke in favor of our position; Czechoslovakia took the Soviet line; Morocco wavered, although took the position that the Security Council was not the proper forum to change a treaty; and the Cyprus Delegate put the question straight to the UK, Turkey and Greece as to their interpretation of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee. With regard to the latter, the Greek Delegate said categorically that his country did not regard this Article as granting the right of military intervention. The UK and Turkish delegates did not respond to the question. (Please see the text of the Treaty of Guarantee attached.) 2 The Department, i.e., Abe Chayes and Co., have come up with nothing to indicate that the US ever has taken a stand in the interpretation of the Treaty. The best that has been offered is the difference between the language of the Treaty in which “each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves [italics mine] 3 the right to “take action”, and the argument that this does not grant the right to take action. Presumably this would depend on the particular interpretation each Power would choose to give it. The Turks have made it clear that their interpretation is that the Treaty grants the right to intervene. The Department is now in the process of drafting an instruction to USUN 4 to urge the Turks to steer as clear of the language of the Treaty as possible in the Council; to insist that it is not the proper forum to discuss the validity of existing treaties; and that the purpose of the Council should be to restore peace and order in Cyprus. As a backdrop of the Security Council's consideration of the problem is the possibility that the matter might get into the General Assembly. This would happen in case there was a veto and as many as seven Council members (permanent or non-permanent) voted to send it to the Assembly or, alternatively, if a simple majority of the Assembly (57) voted to accept the problem in the Assembly. Should this happen, we would be in a most awkward situation, with the whole issue of Article 19, financing and Chirep suddenly placed before us. There is good reason to doubt that this will happen. Although opinion is divided, there is reason to believe that the Russians are not yet ready to face up to these problems in view of their repeated statements that they would like to enter into bilateral negotiations with the US on the matter of financing. Also, if the Russians cast a veto on behalf of Makarios and allowed the matter to get into the GA, they would be acting counter to their often stated position that the right place for peacekeeping operations is in the Security Council, not in the GA. There may be some hope in a draft resolution sponsored by the six non-members of the Council which is now under discussion in New York. However, if Makarios holds to his past position, he will reject it because of references to the Treaty of Guarantee. On the other hand, there is reason to believe, from a statement by the Cypriot Delegate to Stevenson yesterday, that the Cypriots may be concerned lest they move too far in aligning themselves with the Soviet Union and, as a result, might be moving toward some sort of compromise. The next Council meeting is tomorrow, when the UK and Turkey will be hard pressed to answer the Cypriot inquiry as to their interpretation of the Treaty. Samuel E. Belk 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Confidential. 2 Not attached; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959 , pp. 765–775. 3 Brackets in the source text. 4 Telegram 2290 to New York, February 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typewritten signature. 470. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 470. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, February 28, 1964, 8 p.m. 2693. Gromyko on Cyprus. After discussion of disarmament prospects (reported separately), 2 Gromyko asked me how we viewed Cyprus situation. I said, obviously our principal concern, like that of UK, was to insure that situation did not deteriorate to point of internecine warfare and we felt best way to do this was through observance treaty obligations by all parties concerned and not their abrogation as proposed by Soviets. Frankly, I felt Soviet policy would result in fierce fighting between Turkish and Greek elements and ultimately massacre although I was sure this could not be Soviet objective. Gromyko said he was discouraged by my remarks. Obviously, Soviet objective is peace and quiet on island but interference from without cannot achieve this. Soviets attach more credence to assessment of situation by Cyprus Government than by outsiders, and Cyprus Government believes outside interference can only worsen problem. I pointed out that in assessing position of Cyprus Government necessary take into account views of both elements this government—Turkish minority as well as Greek majority. Gromyko remarked that certainly US, like Soviets, have nothing to gain from continued tension in Cyprus area. If regard for treaty obligations and not assurance of Cyprus right to independence and territorial integrity is cornerstone of US policy, then Soviets could not agree with US position. We must be aware that where treaties are in conflict with UN Charter, latter must prevail. Since Cyprus has requested SC to insure independence and integrity, UN responsibility and not treaty obligations must be cornerstone of policy. I again pointed out to Gromyko that Cyprus has two voices and both must be taken into account—and statement by Makarios without concurrence of Kutchuk cannot be regarded as position of Cyprus Government, as Soviets contend. In any case, it is vital that we avoid massacre on island and this is precisely aim of our, as well as UK, policy. Gromyko said outside interference inflames emotions of two communities and this makes situation more precarious. We should not accede to “one-sided” demands of UK and Turkey. I ended conversation by reminding Gromyko that it is only natural that Greece and Turkey should be partisan, but UK is strictly neutral, its aim is to avoid bloodshed and war danger, and it is incumbent upon Soviets to join us in supporting British efforts toward this end. Kohler 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, USUN, and Nicosia and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 2 Telegram 2692 from Moscow, February 28. (Ibid., POL 7 US–USSR) 471. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece 471. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece 1 Washington, February 28, 1964, 8:12 p.m. 979. Ref: Athens' 1311. 2 Greek Ambassador telephoned Dept this morning on instructions to report that GOG much upset by Amb. Stevenson's action yesterday in SC in presenting request that Denktash be heard. This had made painful impression on public opinion in Greece. GOG earnestly requested that US do nothing more to give Denktash status and specifically that we not try to change his position of being invited to speak to Council as an individual under provisions Rule 39. 3 We replied that we did not anticipate taking any action beyond that already taken. Dept officer expressed surprise at GOG surprise, pointing out from beginning we had made plain to all parties, including Cypriots, that any Security Council session on Cyprus problem must hear representatives both communities. Ambassador admitted this but said trouble was we had taken initiative. US position on hearing for Denktash outlined Deptel 2237 to USUN (rptd Athens 925, Ankara 834). 4 USUN authorized support any move to seat Turk Cypriot. Our support for hearing Turk Cypriot in no way implies that USG does not acknowledge existence of GOC or Kyprianou as representative of that state. At opening of meeting February 27, SC President said he had request from Turkish del that Council hear Denktash, “Representative of Turk Cypriot Community.” Kyprianou, Soviet and Czech dels all spoke in opposition. Moroccan del then suggested Denktash be heard under Rule 39 SC Rules Procedure. When SC President appeared not to take this as formal proposal Stevenson said: “I thought the motion had been made by the Representative of Morocco. If it has not, in order to facilitate the question before us I would move that the Council invite Mr. Denktash to present his views before the Council in accordance with Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure.” Moroccan Rep confirmed that his suggestion intended as formal proposal. Soviet del continued try obfuscate issue by arguing that, in light Moroccan proposal that Denktash be seated as an individual, Sovs concluded that request he be heard as “Representative of Turkish community” had been declined. Stevenson then said: “I participate in this procedural debate with reluctance and with the hope that we can proceed rapidly with the business before the Council. I must say, however, that I was surprised by conclusion of Representative of Soviet Union that the Council had declined request of Representative of Turkey. No such decision has been made. There is only one proposal that has been made, and that is proposal of Representative of Morocco to invite Representative of Turkish Community in Cyprus to address Council under Rule 39. A motion has been made to that effect; it takes priority over all other matters, and until disposed of it is not appropriate to discuss any further matter. I would suggest, therefore, that if members of Council share my view that it is important and urgent that we attend to the substantive business before the Council, we can dispose of this procedural point with expedition.” Moroccan proposal later approved without vote when SC Pres said if he heard no further objection he would consider proposal adopted. While Dept recognized that hearing for Turk Cypriot would annoy GOG, and while we did not want take lead on debate in this issue, we did feel would be only fair and appropriate for Denktash to be heard. Under Secretary Ball had made clear to Makarios in Nicosia that in any debate in SC a Turk Cypriot would undoubtedly be heard. Article 39 provides that Council may invite persons it considers competent to supply information in matters which Council has under consideration. As Embassy aware Kyprianou, though participating in debate as GOC representative, is presenting strictly Greek Cypriot case. Since Cyprus dispute is essentially one between two communities, it only reasonable that second community be given opportunity express its views. FYI. Through Turk UN del we have urged that Denktash be calm and dispassionate in his remarks. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John Jernegan (NEA) and Moffitt, cleared in IO and UNP, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to New York, Ankara, and Nicosia. 2 Dated January 28; it reported on Greek unhappiness with U.S. efforts to secure Denktash's right to speak before the Security Council. (Ibid.) 3 A reference to Article 39 of the UN Charter that outlines the role of the Security Council. 4 Dated February 17; it instructed the Mission to the United Nations to vote in favor of seating a Turkish Cypriot delegation for the Security Council debate. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 472. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 472. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 29, 1964. The Cyprus crisis may be reaching a critical stage shortly. If the SC resolution being submitted Monday (by the non-permanent SC members) 2 fails, then the likelihood of a Turkish move becomes high indeed. Ball's plan for getting Inonu and Papandreou together still looks like the best bet to forestall unilateral action, but the Greeks are balking (and UK is lukewarm). 3 If the situation is this menacing, you might want to take 3 minutes at end of NSC meeting to ask Rusk: (1) his prognosis; (2) what our contingency plan is if Turks begin to move. 4 R.W. Komer 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. 2 S/5571, adopted as SC Res. 186 (1964) on March 4; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 566–567. 3 See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Documents 15 - 20 . 4 No discussion of Cyprus took place at the February 29 or the March 5 meetings of the NSC. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 473. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey 473. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey 1 Washington, March 1, 1964, 2:56 p.m. 890. For Ambassador from Under Secretary. Will you please deliver the following message to Foreign Minister Erkin from me soonest: Begin Verbatim Text. I have been following the developments in New York on an hourly basis and I should like to give you my personal assessment of the situation as I see it. I would appreciate it if you would communicate this also to Prime Minister Inonu with my warm regards and admiration: 1. I promised the Prime Minister and you that the USG would use its best efforts in the Security Council to defeat the attempt of the Government of Cyprus to obtain a resolution undermining the Treaty of Guaranty. I promised also that we would agree to nothing that would derogate from the Treaty rights of your Government. 2. I am persuaded that the present draft resolution achieves both of these objectives. The Greek Cypriots have been frustrated in their effort to obtain Security Council action that would change the treaty. Not only does the resolution contain nothing which derogates from either of the treaties, but it provides for a peacekeeping force and mediator which were the essence of the original proposal with which your Government was associated. 3. You will recall that Archbishop Makarios rejected our joint proposals along these lines and refused to admit the possibility of a peacekeeping force until after he had achieved a Security Council repudiation of the rights given your Government under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guaranty. 2 If he now acquiesces in the present draft—which seems likely—he will have given up his basic position. 4. The present draft resolution is, in my view, the best we can obtain from the Security Council. It represents a victory for the principles we set out to establish. 5. We intend to make sure Turkey's concerns are taken care of by making it crystal clear in the Council that the second preambular paragraph of the resolution refers to all relevant provisions of the UN Charter, including the Charter Preamble which speaks of “respect to the obligations arising from treaties,” as well as to the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 relating to human rights. We shall also make clear that the necessary assumption of paragraph 2 is that the Government of Cyprus will act strictly in accordance with constitutional procedures. We shall further interpret the reference in paragraph 7 to “the people of Cyprus as a whole” as meaning “all of the people now living on Cyprus” and as not importing any conclusion as to the form of the ultimate solution. 6. With these considerations in mind, I urge that your Government—if it cannot obtain the acceptance of the amendments you are proposing-should acquiesce in the draft resolution in its present form. We shall do everything possible to persuade our British friends to join with us in reinforcing the proper meaning of this resolution. 7. The effect of prompt acquiescence would be to put a peacekeeping force on the Island as quickly as possible and thus bring a stop to bloodshed, and also to arrange for a mediator whom we shall all support in developing an equitable and hopefully permanent solution to this troublesome and dangerous issue. 8. I recognize the difficulties which this whole situation presents to your Government. We all admire the forbearance and restraint that you have displayed in this matter. We shall continue to work closely with you in order to keep the peace and to find the most equitable and compassionate solution to the problem of Cyprus. End Verbatim Text. Ambassador Hare should also communicate to Erkin points being sent by Amb. Stevenson in separate telegram. (USUN's 148 to Ankara). 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by Jernegan, Cleveland, and Moose. Repeated to Athens, New York, Nicosia, and London. 2 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959 , pp. 765–775. 3 Dated March 1; it reported on Cypriot desires for changes in the draft and commented on their possible impact on Turkey. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP) 474. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 474. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, March 2, 1964, 8 p.m. 3256. Cyprus. International Force and SC Res. Ref: USUN 3246, USUN 3255. 2 1. Bitsios told Yost Mar 2 that it now important peace force be formed quickly and, if necessary, begin to show some clear outlines as to composition in next 24 hours. This important, he said, in making it more difficult for Sovs block res 3 and making it easier for Cypriots “convince” them not veto. (He may also have had in mind thought that peace force should get on island before further sentiment grows in GOC in favor avoiding peace force altogether.) 2. From Cypriot and Sov viewpoint, adjournment SC connected mainly this problem (although Turks also asked Bernardes (Brazil) to request adjournment SC mtg presumably so they could get Ankara reaction to revised preamble of res). Cypriots uncertain if terms of reference for force (op para 5, reftel 3246) acceptable to GOC. Clearly they not pleasing to Sovs. Federenko (USSR) asked Bernardes seek adjournment Mar 2 SC mtg (and when this done, he only one urge mtg be afternoon Mar 3 not morning). According Algard (Norway) Sovs also requested Nielsen and Bernardes permit para by para vote so they could abstain on op paras 4, 5, and 7 and then vote for res. Bernardes and Nielsen have told us they firm on no para by para voting and no amendments. Hajek (Czechs) told newsmen he did not believe amendments would be moved. Riha (Czechs) indicated he expected no negative votes on res which he said had clear majority. Indicated Czechs would abstain with clarifying statement on para 4 being in contravention Charter provisions for SC. 3. SYG, aware of need for shaping up peace force rapidly called in Finnish, Irish, Swedish, and UK reps afternoon Mar 2. Rikhye had staff mtg his Comite. Scandinavian permreps had heads together in lounge after SC mtg., Hedin (Sweden) said his govt reluctant but Astrom planning give it arguments in favor, principal one being that other participation would be importantly influenced by Swedish role. Algard (Norway) said Nielsen gave Astrom “third degree” in favor Swedish participation. Also said now that force in UN, not NATO context, Norwegian contribution, if asked, less likely if Swedes refused. Danish MisOff said same thing although less certain of this since Danish had unit ready go in “ten hours.” All agreed Finns, who Rolz Bennett told Yost had legislative restrictions consider (as well as Sov pressures), would not go if Swedes refused and Algard (Norway) noted Irish and even Canadians would be unlikely contribute if Swedes not in. Bitsios (Greece) told Yost Cypriots no longer pressing for Yugos. Indians still appear to be negative in spite Kyprianou's reported contrary impression. Comment : Clear that rapid composition of Cyprus PKF desirable both for purpose SC res and to avoid obstacles its creation. Swedish contribution appears be key to formulation international force. Recommend Dept instruct Emb Stockholm make this situation clear to Swedish FonMin and that Embs Copenhagen and Oslo do likewise with view of coordinating pressure on Swedish Govt act rapidly and favorably this matter. Stevenson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 2 Telegram 3246 from New York, March 1, transmitted a draft resolution on Cyprus. Telegram 3255 from New York, March 2, contained Stevenson's report on a meeting with Greek Cypriot representatives. (Both ibid.) 3 The Soviets had expressed reservations regarding the text being circulated and subsequently announced that they would not vote for the fourth (operative) paragraph. 475. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 475. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 3, 1964. SUBJECT U.S. Support for UN Cyprus Force Assuming the resolution goes through the Security Council this afternoon, the Secretary General will be trying to organize the UN Cyprus Force. We need to make clear, if possible today, what we are prepared to do in support of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Cyprus. We have the legal authority, in the UN Participation Act, to transfer supplies and services to the UN without reimbursement. The Department of Defense tells us that the troops of other nations can be airlifted, upon request of the Secretary of State, with the cost absorbed by Defense. When it comes to transferring equipment and supplies to other countries or to an international organization, the Defense Department would have to seek reimbursement. This could be done: a. Through the military appropriation process; b. Through a special appropriation requested under the Foreign Assistance Act; or c. Through the use of the FY 1964 AID Contingency Fund. If a U.S. voluntary contribution were required in the form of cash—a distinct possibility if the operation is prolonged—it would have to be funded from this year's AID Contingency Fund or from an item added to Chapter 3 of the Foreign Assistance Act for FY 1965. The relevant language from the UN Participation Act and the Foreign Assistance Act is attached at Tab A. 2 We recommend, therefore, that when it becomes necessary Ambassador Stevenson be authorized to say something like this to the Secretary General—and in his discretion in the Security Council: “We assume that each country participating in the Force will provide its own logistic support. However, in keeping with our tradition of support for United Nations peacekeeping operations, the United States will stand ready to assist, on request of the Secretary General, in airlifting the troops of those participating countries which lack the necessary air transport capability.” 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 For text of the Stevenson statement, see Department of State Bulletin , March 23, 1964, pp. 465–466. 476. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey 476. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey 1 Washington, March 3, 1964, 1:06 p.m. 897. Re urtel 1115. 2 You should make clear to Erkin that US, of course, not responsible for additional changes made in Res during Bernardes' final round of consultations yesterday. Even though we can understand Turkish sensitivity on every revision which they think pleases Greek Cypriots, fact of the matter is that text as finally introduced was not modified in any significant degree beyond that approved by Turks on March 1. Fact that text is in as good shape as it now is, due in large part to fact that in negotiations on Res, Amb. Stevenson consistently advanced points on Turkish behalf as requested by Menemencioglu. We have been selling Turkish apples for them throughout the Council negotiations. GOT must recognize that as result our efforts US became identified in NY, Athens, and Nicosia as pro-Turk. We can not believe that with text now in, Turks will upset apple-cart with all grievous effects that would have. All the arguments contained Deptel 889 3 as to why Turks should acquiesce in this Res remain valid. It would be nothing short of tragic if all effort and good will we and friendly SC members have expended to get PKF established to protect Turkish Cypriots should prove in vain because of Turkish stickiness in last round. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Buffum, cleared in IO and NEA, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Athens, USUN, Nicosia, and London. 2 Dated March 1; it reported on Turkish Security Council maneuvers designed to slow adoption of the draft resolution on Cyprus. (Ibid.) 3 Dated March 3. (Ibid.) 477. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 477. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, March 4, 1964, 8:14 p.m. 2335. Re: UN Cyprus Force. Resolution passed today 2 creates presumption that costs of Cyprus Force will be borne by nations providing contingents, with possible voluntary contributions from others. In confirmation Cleveland-Stevenson telecon, 3 U.S. willing consider contribution on following basis where this necessary to effective operation of force. We see three possible levels on which SYG may ask our assistance: 1. Transport . We see no problem supplying troop airlift free of cost to UN where countries contributing forces unable furnish own transportation. To extent British can handle airlift particularly of non-British forces from Europe, we should of course press for that to be first option. Would hope Canadians would also be in position to transport at least their own contingent. We would therefore want to be reasonably forthcoming on this level and with President's approval, you may at your discretion inform SYG. 2. Supply of equipment and logistic support . Seems likely we be asked by SYG supply such things as helmets, perhaps communication equipment, vehicles, helicopters or other items not quickly obtainable elsewhere. We would be much more reluctant engage in this sort supply where we would be asked bear cost without reimbursement. Furthermore, we do not believe situation justifies argument for uniformity of type of equipment, which almost surely would mean greater requirement placed on us. Request you consult with UK as well as SYG with a view to assuring that UK equipment used to maximum. We would want therefore consider such requests on individual basis and would scrutinize them carefully with view assuring ourselves there no reasonable alternative source of supply for UN. If proposals are made for urgent supply particular items, military staff group attached to USUN (supplemented as necessary by people from DOD) should develop detailed requirement rationally related to total military planning. US decision to participate in furnishing supplies and equipment would be made only on basis of demonstration that reliance on US is really only feasible recourse. FYI: Funding presents most complicated legal and financial problems on any considerable logistic support. Modest voluntary contributions in kind can be made if absolutely necessary. End FYI. 3. Financial contribution . There already indications we might be asked make monetary contribution for payment peacekeeping forces from areas such as Brazil. We would not be agreeable to undertake fulfill such request. Would reopen whole question percentage contribution to peacekeeping forces with attendant difficulties. We would hope therefore no such requests would be made of U.S. In talking with SYG you authorized use above in manner you believe tactically most advantageous. We note SYG thinking in terms of peacekeeping force of about 7000 and that he envisages new UN forces of about 4000 as substituting for equal number British troops. We believe SYG and British should be strongly discouraged from acceptance this principle of substitution, certainly at least for initial stage and until situation on ground with respect restoration of law and order and ability maintain law and order is more apparent. We inclined agree with Gyani estimate that at least 10,000 are needed. Would be unwise in view difficulties UK already experienced with present force level of about 7000 to begin to build UN force by substituting for UK troops. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Cleveland and Jones; cleared in NE, DOD, and AID; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, London, Ottawa, Stockholm, Dublin, and New Delhi. 2 See footnote 2, Document 472 . 3 No record of this conversation was found. 478. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece 478. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece 1 Washington, March 4, 1964, 3:36 p.m. 995. From the President to the Ambassador. Please deliver following private message to Papandreou soonest: “I am very pleased that the Security Council has adopted a resolution on Cyprus providing for a suitable peacekeeping force and for appointment of a mediator. Something like this is in effect what you and we have been seeking from the first, and I am grateful for your important contribution to this result. The important point is that prompt creation of a peacekeeping force should stop the bloodshed, and create an atmosphere in which progress can be made toward a settlement of this agonizing issue. The United States will do all it can to help, but your own efforts in this direction will be of critical importance.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Text received from the White House and approved by S/S. 479. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 479. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, March 5, 1964, 7 p.m. 3292. Cyprus. Bunche called Yost late last evening to say that in course SYG-Menemencioglu mtg yesterday afternoon latter had expressed objection to (1) appointment Gyani as commander UN force, (2) presence Indian contingent in UN force, and (3) proposed appointment Rolz-Bennett as mediator. As to “(1)”, Bunche said SYG takes position approval interested parties to designation UN commander not required by SC res and he was merely informing Turks as courtesy. As to “(2)”, approval of parties is required and, in view Turk attitude, SYG will not seek Indian contingent. As to “(3)”, Bunche said he was not sure, since SYG had been somewhat reticent in his explanation, that Menemencioglu understood SYG intends himself to play major role in mediation and that Rolz-Bennett would be merely his representative. Bunche requested US help in making this point clear to Turks. Yost agreed to pass on this point but made no commitment to support proposed appointment. This morning Yost called Menemencioglu to get his reaction to yesterday's interview. Menemencioglu said he had objected to designation Gyani because he is Indian and because he considered his report on Polis affair to be biased. He recognized, however, that SYG was not formally seeking Turkish agreement to his designation. Menemencioglu was gratified at SYG's decision not to seek Indian contingent. He said that he had been astonished by SYG's proposal to appoint as mediator Rolz-Bennett, who had been working very closely with Cypriots all through recent weeks. He had assumed that figure of world stature who would report only occasionally to SYG would be appointed. Yost informed him of SYG's intention himself to play major role in mediation. Menemencioglu said he thought this unwise in SYG's own interest. He had expressed objection to Rolz-Bennett appointment but is seeking definitive instructions from Ankara on this question. (His objection must have been mild since British tell us SYG remarked to them that Menemencioglu, while raising questions, had not dissented strongly.) Upon checking with UKUN, Jackling informed us that they had been equally surprised by SYG's proposal to appoint Rolz-Bennett and himself to play major role in mediation. They shared our doubts as to wisdom this arrangement from SYG's own viewpoint. However, they had sought instructions from London and London is not disposed, in view of delicacy of matter, to raise any objection. Dean proposed to inform SYG later in morning that HMG has no objection. Pursuant to Yost-Sisco telecon, Yost called Jackling again and urged UKUN not convey HMG approval to SYG until Dept had had opportunity to review question at higher level and until we knew whether GOT reaction would be mild or serious. Jackling said he would check with Dean, who was not immediately available, and, since telegraphic confirmation their oral instruction not yet received, recommend they say at this morning's meeting they are not yet ready to reply on this point. Jackling thought they might at minimum say that, while HMG has no objection to appointment, it would feel that any mediator would have to be fully acceptable to all parties concerned. Subsequently, Dean informed us he had taken this line and had moreover added that UK would not wish to express final opinion on this point until other parties had been heard from. In conversation with Bunche this afternoon Yost stressed our belief that mediator in order to be effective must be fully acceptable to all parties. Bunche concurred entirely and said SYG would not appoint Rolz-Bennett if Turks presented strong objection. On personal basis, Yost raised question whether it was desirable in SYG's own interest for him to be so deeply involved in this highly controversial and time-consuming assignment and whether he would not be better protected by appointing someone like Plimsoll, Schurman or Boland to carry main burden. Bunche replied that, since SC res provides mediator report periodically to SYG, latter would in any case have main responsibility and preferred to have mediator who would keep him closely informed at every step rather than have someone who might turn out to be prima donna and make SYG's role more difficult. As to other individuals suggested, he was sure because of Makarios' attitude toward NATO force that he would object to any mediator from NATO country, Turks would certainly reject Boland, and Plimsoll is no better known outside UN circles than Rolz-Bennett. (Bunche was quite clear that, while Rolz-Bennett would not be appointed if Turks objected strongly, otherwise he would be. It appears SYG wishes keep firm hand on rudder and may have judged from Yemen experience he can not control mediator not directly under his authority.) As to Gyani, we understand that SYG had wished to announce today or tomorrow that he is immediately assuming command of “UN” (i.e., British) forces in Cyprus. HMG is objecting very strongly that this is premature, at least until composition of UN force, including number of British participating, is known. Bunche indicated SYG also wishes give Turks opportunity comment further even though their approval is not required. However, it is hoped to make announcement tomorrow that Gyani is being appointed and will assume command at early date. Appointment UK Gen Carver as Deputy Commander will be announced at same time. Plimpton 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and USDOCOSouth. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 480. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 480. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, March 5, 1964, 7 p.m. 3294. Cyprus. Ref: Deptel 2335. 2 Yost saw Bunche March 5 and conveyed info in reftel to him. Bunche reaction as follows: 1. Transport : Agreed with US approach. Said SYG already recommended Canadians supply own air transport. (Dean (UK) told MisOff UK prepared provide transport and indicated this would be for units from Europe.) 2. Logistics : SYG stated three men UNSEC Recon Group consisting of Feiffer (UN Comp Office), Maj Mariz (SYG Mil Staff) and Lansky (UN Field Serv) plan trip Cyprus determine PKF logistics needs, UK ability provide local support such as vehicles, qtrs, rations, etc and develop feel for situation. (Group will depart New York 6 March PM for 5–7 day visit on island with return via London possibility, according Rikhye staff.) Bunche stressed that to maximum extent possible force would try fill needs from UK equipment on Cyprus. Noted only right-hand drive vehicles allowed on Cyprus and hoped expensive problem bringing vehicles into Cyprus could be minimized. Extent UN needs would not be known until survey mission returned and no requests to US should be expected until then. 3. Finances : Bunche indicated US position on monetary contribution expected. Said SYG decided today send ltr all UN members and all spec UN agencies describing Cyprus operation, giving rough estimate of costs, and requesting contributions. In addition, he said, special approaches would be made to UK, West Germany, Switzerland, and perhaps others. West Germany would be told her readiness contribute unit appreciated but in view circumstances monetary contribution would be most welcome form participation. As for UK, SYG would be “tough” saying UN getting UK “off hook” in Cyprus and expected monetary contribution. (Rikhye told Yost at lunch Greece and Turkey would also be asked specifically for contributions. Acland (UK) told MisOff contribution of troops, air transport and equipment would be all UK can manage and Dean told this to SYG today.) 4. Bunche stated SYG thinking in terms 7,000 man force initially. (According Acland SYG told Dean this is in response to GOC view that 7,000 troops enough now.) Bunche said Cypriots agreed to renew question of size of force if after initial period Gyani (who with Rikhye has favored force of at least 10,000) recommended increase. Bunche stated SYG suggested to Cypriots that Greek and Turk contingents be included in UN force, pointing out this one way get them back to barracks. Although Cypriots oppose this, Clerides immediately saw advantage this plan and said GOC reconsideration this point would be sought. (As for status other elements of force, SYG told Dean (UK), March 4, according Acland, Irish participation doubtful, Finnish and Brazilian forces possible only if financing made available.) Bunche commented Astrom (Sweden) forwarding some rather impractical conditions for Swedish participation, such as SYG obtaining specific approval Cypriot VP Kutchuk. Yost suggests channeling request through Turks. (Canadians, according Acland, pressing for definite directives to UN forces to disarm Greek and Turk Cypriot irregulars. Acland said UK reports from Nicosia indicate Gyani favors this as well as disbanding 5,000 Greek Cypriot special constables.) Bunche remarked problem disarming Cypriots difficult one to which close attention being given. Also said he intrigued by enthusiasm of British, not only FonMin Butler, but also Dean and Harold Wilson who recently saw SYG, over idea UK troops under UN command. This sharp contrast with their reservations over UNOC and its action in Katanga. Bunche observed troops of large power are in this case under UN command solely by virtue fact they already there. Comment : Manner in which UK appears accept GOC and SYG decision start with force of 7,000 suggests once responsibility in UN hands UK not as concerned with need for larger force and are more attracted by chance withdraw, as other contingents arrive, up to 3,000 men. Plimpton 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and USDOCOSOUTH for POLAD. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and CINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE for POLADs. 2 Document 477 . Index Index Abrams, Gen. Creighton, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Acheson, Dean, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] Ackley, Gardner, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Acland, Anthony, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Action for Organization Development (ACORD), 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] Ad Hoc Committee on Human Rights and Genocide Treaties, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Adair, Edwin Ross, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Adams, John J., 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Adebo, Chief S. O., 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] ADELA, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] Aden, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Afghanistan, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] Africa, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Chinese subversion in, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] Collection of intelligence in, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] Communist subversion in, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] Denuclearization of, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Negro officials at posts in, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] UN Secretary-General from, possible, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] African Advisory Council, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] African Policy Committee (AFPC), 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Agency for International Development (AID), 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Counterinsurgency, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] Foreign affairs budgeting, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Foreign affairs programming, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] National Security Council, relations with, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Negro officials at African posts, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS), 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Rural development, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] Secretary of State as coordinator of foreign policy activities of, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] State Department, relations with, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] UN development programs, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] U.S. foreign policy objectives and, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] Agreements, international. See individual agreements . Agriculture, U.S. Department of (USDA), 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Aiken, George D., 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Air Force, U.S.: Corona project, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] Defense Attaché System, 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] National Reconnaissance Program, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] Systems Command-Foreign Technological Division, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] Akalovsky, Alexander, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] Albania, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Albert, Carl, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Algard, Ole, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Algeria, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Allen, Ward, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 191 ] Alliance for Progress, 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO), 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] American Foreign Service Association, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Amory, Robert, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Anderson, Adm. George W., Jr., 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] Anderson, Robert, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] Angola, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Apartheid, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Arab-Israeli conflict, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Jarring mission, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] UNGA consideration of, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] War of June 1967 , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Argentina, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Argyris, Chris, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 50 ] Arms control, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Army, U.S., 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Army War College, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Arthur Vining Davis Foundation, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] Article 19. See Peacekeeping, UN ; under UN Charter. Ash, A. Russell, 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Asian Bank, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Asiroglu, Vahap, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] Astrom, Sverker, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Audio surveillance, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Ausland, John, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] Austin, Warren, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Australia, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Austria, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] Ayub Khan, Muhammad, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Baker, Lt. Gen. Geoffrey, 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] Baker, John, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Baker, William O., 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] Balance of payments, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] Ball, George W., 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 216 ] Appointments, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] Ambassadorial selection, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] Assistant Secretaries, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Under Secretary of State, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] Cyprus, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] Johnson meeting with Assistant Secretaries, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] National Policy Papers, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] National Security Council meetings, 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Negro officials, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] NSAM 341, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] Role in State Department, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 42 ] Rusk resignation, possible, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Soviet peacekeeping arrears, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] State Department, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] NSC, relations with, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] Reorganization of, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] UNCTAD, 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 127 ] UN General Assembly, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] UN Representative post for, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Vietnam war, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] World Disarmament Conference, 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Barr, Joseph W., 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] Barrett, Richard, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 107 ] Barringer, Philip E., 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] Barrington, James, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] Barrow, John, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] Barton, William H., 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] Bassin, Jules, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] Bator, Francis M., 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Appointment as NSC Deputy Special Assistant, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] Duties of, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] Government organization report, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Interdepartmental Planning Group, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] Interdepartmental Regional Groups, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] National Security Council, 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Battle, Lucius D., 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Bavis (CIA), 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] Behrman, Jack, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] Belgium, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] Belk, Samuel E. , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] UN General Assembly, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 137 ] United Nations, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] Bell, David E., 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Bellows, Everett, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] Belton, William, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] Ben Bella, Ahmed, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Bender, Albert, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 144 ] Benelux, 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Benjamin, Robert, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Bennett, Jr., William Tapley, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] Benson, Ezra Taft, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Berard, Armand, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Berger, Samuel D., 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] Berlin, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Bernardes, Carlos Alfredo, 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Berro, Pedro P., 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] Biafra, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Bingham, Jack, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] Bissell, Richard, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] Bitsios, Dimitri, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Black, Eugene, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 14 ] Blair, William, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] Blake, Stewart P., 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Blandford, Russell, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Block, Stephen M., 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Boland, Frederick H., 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Bolivia, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] Bolton, Frances, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Bonham, Robert T., 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Bonin Islands, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Borel, Paul, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Borg, Arthur, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] Boswell, William O., 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] Bouattoura, Tewfik, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Bow, Frank T., 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Bowdler, William, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Bowie, Robert, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] Bowles, Chester, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] Bowman, Col. Richard, 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Bowman, Richard C., 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Brazil, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Brewster, Kingman, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Bricker Amendment, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Broadley, John K. E., 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 135 ] Bross, John, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] Brown, George, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] Brown, Winthrop, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] Brubeck, William H., 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] Bruce, David K. E., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] CIA, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] Covert operations, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 118 ] DOD representation at U.S. embassies, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] Executive Review of Overseas Programs, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] Foreign affairs programming, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] Hitch Committee Report, 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Intelligence community coordination, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] National Reconnaissance Office funds, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS), 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] State Department, relations with, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Buffum, William B., 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 216 ] Bulganin, Nikolai A., 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] Bulgaria, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Bunche, Ralph J., 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Cyprus, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Four-Power Conference proposal, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 197 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] UN General Assembly, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] Vietnam war, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Bundy, Harvey H., 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Appointments, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] Candidate for Under Secretary of State, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] CIA leadership problems, 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Coordination and supervision of U.S. foreign policy, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Cyprus, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] Human rights, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 146 ] Intelligence community coordination, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] Johnson receipt of intelligence, 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] Inter-American Affairs appointment, possible, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] Interdepartmental Review Group role for, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] Johnson meeting with Assistant Secretaries, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] McCone resignation, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] Middle East, 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] National Policy Papers, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] National Security Council, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] Staff officer role, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Peacekeeping, UN: Financing of, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Soviet arrears, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 155 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 108 ] Replacement for, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] Resignation of, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Special Group ( 5412 ) name change, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 22 ] State-White House relations, 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] 303 Committee, 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] UN Charter amendments, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] UN Disarmament Commission, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] UN General Assembly: 19 th session, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 136 ] 20 th session, strategy for, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Paralysis of, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] UNCTAD, 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 127 ] United Nations, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Vietnam war, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] World Disarmament Conference, 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Bundy, William P., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] Bunker, Ellsworth, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] Burdett, William C., 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] Burma, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Burris, Col. Howard, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] Burrows, Bernard, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Busby, Horace, Jr., 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Butler, Richard A., 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Byrd, Harry F., 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] Byroade, Henry A., 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Caccia, Harold A., 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Calderon Cruz, Angel, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 191 ] Califano, Joseph A., Jr., 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Cambodia, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Canada ( see also Canada and Canadian subheadings under other subjects ), 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Capron, William, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Caradon, Lord, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] Carrington, Lord, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Carroll, Lt. Gen. Joseph F., 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Carter, Chester, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] Carter, George, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Carter, Lt. Gen. Marshall S., 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Carver, Gen. (Lord), 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Case, Clifford, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Cater, S. Douglass, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Central African Republic, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ( see also Central Intelligence Agency and CIA subheadings under other subjects ), 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 119 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] Congress, relations with, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Corona project, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] Counterinsurgency, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] Covert Action Staff, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 107 ] DCI, relations with, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Defense, U.S. Department of, relations with, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] DIA, relations with, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] EROP review of, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 105 ] FBI, relations with, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS), 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Intelligence Checklist, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 91 ] Intelligence information-handling problem, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] Interagency role, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] Leadership problems, 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Long Range Plan, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] National Policy Papers, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] NSAM 341 , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] NSC, relations with, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] Peacekeeping, financing of, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, relations with, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS), 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] Professional Manpower Committee Report, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 119 ] Public image of, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 86 ] Recruitment, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 119 ] Reforms in ongoing programs, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] SIG, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Soviet peacekeeping arrears, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Special Report SC No. 00647/64C, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] State Department, relations with, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] 303 Committee, 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 118 ] UN problems, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] UN Secretary-General re-election, 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 179 ] U.S. foreign policy objectives and, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] Vietnam Task Force, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Youth groups funded by, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 118 ] Chad, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Chamber of Commerce, U.S., 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 14 ] Chamberlain, Stephen, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Chase, Gordon, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 159 ] Disarmament, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 155 ] UN General Assembly, 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Chayes, Abram, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] Chemical warfare, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Chiang Kai-shek, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Chile, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] China, People's Republic of ( see also China and Chinese subheadings under other subjects ), 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] Disarmament, 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] French recognition of, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Intelligence gathering in, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] North Vietnam, relations with, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Nuclear weapons development, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Subversion by, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] U.S. policy toward, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] China, Republic of, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] National Policy Paper for, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] UN membership issue, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] U.S. force levels in, 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 61 ] Vietnam war, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Chou En-lai, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Christian, George, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Christopher, Warren, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 46 ] Church, Frank F., 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Churchill, Winston L. S., 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 137 ] Civil Service Commission, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] Clandestine collection, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] Clark, Harlan, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Clark, James W., 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] Clark, Joseph, 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 190 ] Clark, Thomas, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] Clarke, John, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] Clayton, Will, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] Clerides, Glaufkos, 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Cleveland, J. Harlan, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] Cyprus, 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] UN Charter, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] UN General Assembly, 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 133 ] Vietnam war, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Clifford, Clark M., 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Appointments, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] As Bundy replacement, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] Central Intelligence Agency, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Intelligence community coordination, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 119 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 120 ] As Secretary of State candidate, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] As Under Secretary of State candidate, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] Vietnam war, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Clifford Board, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] Clifton, Maj. Gen. Chester V., 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] Cline, Ray, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Clinton, John B., 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] Cole, Capt., 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] Collado, Pete, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] Colombia, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] Colonialism ( see also Committee of 24 under United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ), 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] Commerce, U.S. Department of, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Committee on Documentation and Information, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel (Herter Committee), 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Committee of 24. See under United Nations General Assembly . Committee of 33. See United Nations Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations . Community Advisory Services, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] Comprehensive Country Programming System (CCPS), 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] CIA position, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] Ending of, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Failure of, 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 105 ] Configuration Control Board, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] Congo, Republic of the, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] Soviet arrearage for peacekeeping in, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] Congress, U.S. ( see also House of Representatives, U.S. ; Senate, U.S. ), 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] AID budget request, 1966 , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] Annual and Sick Leave Act, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] Bricker amendment, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] CIA, relations with, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Civil Rights Act of 1964 , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Export Control Act, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] Foreign Assistance Act, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Foreign Service Act of 1946 , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] International Cotton Textile Agreement, 1961 , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] National Security Act of 1947 , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] NSC, relationship with, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Overseas Differentials and Allowance Act, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] Overstaffing of foreign posts, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 16 ] Peacekeeping, UN: Financing of, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 137 ] Soviet arrears, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Voluntary payments, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] P.L. 87–731 , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] P.L. 110 , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] P.L. 480 , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] State Department, relations with, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Trade Expansion Act ( 1961 ), 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] UN Charter amendments, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] UN Development Program cuts, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] UN financial situation, 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 159 ] UN Participation Act, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 191 ] U.S. aircraft sales to Israel, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Congress for Peace Through Law, 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 190 ] Connally, John, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] Connor, John T., 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 120 ] Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP), 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 120 ] Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC), 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] Cook, Mercer, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Cooper, Chester L., 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Cooper, Richard, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Coordination and supervision of U.S. foreign policy ( see also Comprehensive Country Programming System (CCPS) ; Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) ; Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS); Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG); Special Group (Counterinsurgency); State, U.S. Department of ): “A” Area reorganization, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] Ambassadorial selection, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] CIA activities, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] Kennedy letter on, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] Civil Service positions for Foreign Service officers, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] Communications issues, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC), 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] Country teams, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Crisis anticipation procedures, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] Cultural exchange cost-sharing, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] Decentralization, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Delegation of power to ambassadors, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] Deputy Secretary of State's role in, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Direction, Coordination, and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas (NSAM 341): CIA position, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Drafting of, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Foreign affairs programming, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] Hitch Committee, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Implementation of, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Importance of, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Internal defense planning, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] Publicity about, 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] Review of, 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] State Department role in, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Director of Viet-Nam Programs (Vietnam czar), appointment of, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] Evening Reading, items for, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Executive Secretariat, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] Foreign affairs budgeting, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Foreign affairs community organization, 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Foreign policy leadership, improvements in, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Government Organization, President's Task Force on, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Idea development, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] Information management, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] Interagency Politico-military Group, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] Interagency Regional Policy Committees, establishment of, 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Interdepartmental regional policy committees, creation of, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Johnson request for reforms, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] Latin American Affairs Combined Organization review, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] National development, mobilizing forces for, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] National Policy Papers, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] “O” Area reorganization, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] Operation Topsy, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Organization for management and coordination of foreign affairs, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Overstaffing of foreign posts, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 16 ] Planning in anticipation of foreign crises, 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Regional Assistant Secretaries, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] Secretary of State's role in, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] SIG-IRG-Country Director interagency machinery, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] State Department organization, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 13 ] State-AID relations, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] Subversion, U.S. response to, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] Task groups, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Trilateral Task Group, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] U.S. military aid programs, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] White House staff role in, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Women in government, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] Corner, Frank H., 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] Corona project, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] ,217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Costa Rica, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 146 ] Council of Foreign Relations, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] Counterinsurgency. See Special Group (Counterinsurgency); 303 Committee. Counterintelligence, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) program, 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Couve de Murville, Maurice, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Covert actions ( see also 303 Committee), 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] Budget Bureau oversight of, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 118 ] CIA-State Department talks on, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] Coordination and policy approval of, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 118 ] Directives on, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] Draft revision of NSC 5412 guidelines, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] Katzenbach Committee, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 118 ] State Department activities in, 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] Cox, Robert G., 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 107 ] Coyne, J. Patrick, 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 118 ] Crawford, R. S., 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Cremin, Con, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] Crimmins, John Hugh, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] Crisis anticipation procedures, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Critchfield, James H., 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Critical Collection Problems Committee, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Crockett, William J., 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Appointments, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] CIA activities in embassies, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] EROP, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] Foreign affairs programming, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] National Policy Papers, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] Negro officials, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] NSAM 341, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Resignation of, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] State Department organization, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 50 ] Cuba, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] As major U.S. crisis, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] Missile crisis, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 208 ] United States, relations with, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Cuevas Cancino, Francisco, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Cyprus ( see also under United Nations agencies and topics ): Allied force for, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 208 ] Arab-Israeli talks, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Australian role, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Base rights, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 198 ] British draft proposal on, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 206 ] British forces in, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] British role, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 201 ] British-Turkish talks, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] British-U.S. differences over, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] British-U.S. talks, 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] Canadian role in, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Chinese UN membership issue, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Commonwealth force for, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Constitutional amendments, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] Dangers of conflict in, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] Enosis with Greece, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] EOKA members in police force, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Geneva talks on, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] Genocide in, 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Greek-Turkish talks, proposal, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] Guarantor powers force, 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] Independence of, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Indian role, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Irregulars on, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Johnson-U Thant talks on, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] London Conference, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Mediator for, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Pakistani role, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Partition of, 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 201 ] Peacekeeping options, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] Soviet position, 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 212 ] Sudanese role for, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Treaty of Alliance, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Treaty of Guarantee, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Turkish exclusion from government in, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] Turkish invasion of, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] Turkish-U.S. relations over, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] UN role in, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] : UN Security Council actions on, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] UN General Assembly emergency session on, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] UN General Assembly 19th session, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP): Article 19 application to, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] British participation, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Canadian participation, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Communist participation, 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 201 ] Composition of, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Cypriot position, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Extension of mandate of, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Financing of, 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Lack of UN collective responsibility for, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] Soviet position, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] Troop levels, 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Turkish position, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. participation, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S. position, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 216 ] UN Observer Force, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] U.S. policy toward, 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 206 ] Zurich Agreement, 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Czechoslovakia, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] Dahomey, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Dalai Lama, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] D'Arboussier, Gabriel, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Davis, Jeanne, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Davis, John, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Davis, Nathaniel, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Davis, Richard H., 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] Davis, W. True, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] De Beus, J. G., 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] De Gaulle, Charles, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] De Silva, Peer, 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 105 ] Dean, Patrick, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] Cyprus, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 156 ] Decade of Exploration and Development of the Resources of the Deep Sea, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Defense, U.S. Department of ( see also Defense Department and DOD subheadings under other subjects ), 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] Central Intelligence Agency, relations with, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] Clandestine activities review, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] Counterintelligence, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 92 ] Crisis anticipation procedures, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Director of Central Intelligence, relations with, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Defense Attaché System, 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Executive Review of Overseas Programs, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] Foreign affairs programming, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] Interagency Regional Policy Committees, establishment of, 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] National Intelligence Resources Board, relations with, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 120 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Oxcart program, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS), 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Project Tagboard, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Special reports for the President, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] State Department, relations with, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] 303 Committee, 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 118 ] U–2, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] U.S. military aid programs, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] Vietnamese pacification, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Defense Attaché System, 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] Defense Intelligence Summary, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Defense Special Missile and Astronautic Center, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Deming, Frederick L., 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Deming Group, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Denktash, Rauf, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] Denmark, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Denney, George, Jr., 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] Desalting, 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Diebold, John, 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Diggs, Charles C., 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Dillon, C. Douglas, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 41 ] Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] Budget reviews, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] As Chief Intelligence Officer, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] Collection of intelligence abroad, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] Defense Department, relations with, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Intelligence community coordination, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Intelligence information-handling problem, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] McCone replacement as, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] National Reconnaissance Program, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] National Security Agency, relations with, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] NSAM 341 , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board role, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] Presidential adviser, responsibilities as, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] Public image of, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 86 ] Role of, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 119 ] 303 Committee, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] Tuesday foreign policy lunches, 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] USIB, control of, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] Dirksen, Everett McKinley, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Disarmament, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] UN General Assembly: 19 th session actions on, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] 20 th session strategy for, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] 21 st session strategy for, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] World Conference on, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Dobell, Peter, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Dominican Republic, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] Donovan, E.A., 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 19 ] Douglas Aircraft Co., 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] Drell Committee, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Duemling, Robert, 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 61 ] Dulles, Allen, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 105 ] Dulles, John Foster, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] Dungan, Ralph A., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] East-West trade, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] Eastland, James, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] Eaton Study Group, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Eban, Abba, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC), 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Eisenhower, Dwight D., 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Intelligence community coordination, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] NSC organizational changes, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] NSC staff under, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] El Salvador, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] El-Farra, Muhammad, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] Elder, Walt, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Ellington, Buford, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] Enckell, Ralph, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Englehard, Charles W., Jr., 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Enthoven, Alain, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Erhard, Ludwig, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] Erkin, Feridum C., 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 216 ] Ethiopia, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] European Economic Community, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] Evans, Allen, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Evening Reading, items for, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Everett, Christopher, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] Executive Orders: No. 10938 , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 108 ] No. 11219 , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Executive Review of Overseas Programs (EROP), 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] CIA activities, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 105 ] Establishment of, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] Failure of, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Implementation of, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] Export-Import Bank, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Faber, Richard, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Fairbourn, Maj. Gen. W.T., 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] Falcon, James C., 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] Falkland Islands, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Fanfani, Amintore, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] Far East, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Farley, Philip J., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] Farr, Nick, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] Fascell, Dante, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Fedorenko, Nikolai T., 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] Cyprus peacekeeping force, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] Soviet arrears, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 156 ] Voluntary payments, 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] UN Secretary-General re-election, 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] UN General Assembly 19th session, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 136 ] Fedoseev, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] Fiat, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Fiji, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] Finger, Seymour, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] Finland, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Fisher, Adrian, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Fite, Harry, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] FitzGerald, Desmond, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 118 ] Fitzgerald, Comm. J., 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] Fleming, Robert, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Foley, Arthur, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] Foot, Hugh, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] Ford, Gerald, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Ford, John W., 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] Ford Foundation, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Foreign Affairs, U.S. Department of, proposal, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 16 ] Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS), 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Foreign Affairs Scholars Program, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. See President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB ). Foreign Internal Defense Action List, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Foreign Service Institute, 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Formosa. See China, Republic of . Forrestal, Michael V., 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] Foster, Mike, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Foster, William C., 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Foum, Mohammad Ali, 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Four-Power Conference proposal, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 197 ] Fowler, Henry H., 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Fox, Richard, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] France ( see also France and French subheadings under other subjects ), 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Foreign affairs programming, 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Four-Power Conference proposal, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Multilateral Force, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Nuclear capabilities, 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] UN Committee of 33, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] UN Trusteeship Council, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] UNCTAD, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 127 ] Frankel, Charles, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] Franklin, John Hope, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Fredericks, Pauline, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Fredericks, Wayne, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Freeman, Fulton “Tony,” 4, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Freeman, Orville, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Fried, Edward R., 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Fritchey, C., 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 132 ] Frye, William R., 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Fubini, Eugene, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] Fulbright, J. William, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 190 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Garcia Robles, Alfonso, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Gardiner, Robert, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] Gardner, Dick, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 137 ] Gardner, John W., 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] Gaud, William, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, July 1954 , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Geneva Conference on Laos, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] Geneva talks on Cyprus, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] Genocide, 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 212 ] Genocide Convention, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Germany, Democratic Republic of, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Military offset payments, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] Policy Planning Paper on, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] UNFICYP financing, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] U.S.-U.K. talks with, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] Ghana, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] Gibraltar, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] Gilpatric, Roswell, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] Ginsburgh, Col. Robert N., 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Glassboro talks, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Gleysteen, William, 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 187 ] Global Alert List, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Godfrey, E. Drexel, Jr., 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] Goldberg, Arthur J., 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] Appointment as U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Howard University speech, 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Human rights, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Johnson meeting with Assistant Secretaries, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] Kashmir, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Middle East, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Peacekeeping, UN: Soviet arrears, 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 156 ] U.S. course of action in dispute over, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] Voluntary payments, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Resignation of, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] Southern Africa, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] UN General Assembly: 20 th session, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] 21 st session, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] Committee of 24 , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] Special session, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] United Nations: Chinese representation issue, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Financial situation, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Secretary-General re-election, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] U.S. policy, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 191 ] Vietnam war, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Visit to Vietnam, proposed, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Waldheim's qualifications, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] World Disarmament Conference, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Goldschmidt, Arthur “Tex,” 349, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] Goldwater, Barry M., 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] Goodpaster, Lt. Gen. Andrew J., 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] Goodwin, Richard, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Gordon, A. Lincoln, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 50 ] Gordon, Herbert, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Gordon, Kermit, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] Gordon Walker, Patrick C., 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Gore, Albert, Sr., 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Grant, Don, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Gray, Gordon, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] Graybeal, Sidney N., 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] Great Society, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Greece ( see also Cyprus), 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] Green, Marshall, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 143 ] Greenfield, James, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] Greenhill, Denis A., 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] Greer, Gen. Robert E., 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] Grivas, George, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Gromyko, Andrei A.: Celestial Bodies Treaty, 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 177 ] Cyprus, 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 212 ] Disarmament, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] International Cooperation Year, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] Johnson talks with, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Soviet arrears, 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] Voluntary payments, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] UN Charter, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] UN voting systems, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Vietnam war, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Gronouski, John A., 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Gross, Ernest, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Guam, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] Guatemala, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Guevara, Che, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 127 ] Gusing Mission, 1962 , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Guthe, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Gyani, Lt. Gen. Prem Singh, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Hadow, Michael, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Hadow, Reginald M., 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Haile Selassie, Emperor, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Hailey, Clifford, 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Haiti, 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Hajek, Jiri, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Hall, Bill, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Halperin, Morton H., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Hamilton, Edward K., 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Hand, Lloyd, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] Hare, Raymond, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Hargrove, Lawrence, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] Harlech, Lord, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 136 ] Harr, John Ensor, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Cyprus, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 201 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] UN voting systems, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] UN General Assembly presidential election, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 128 ] Vietnam war, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Harris, John, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Harris, Patricia Roberts, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Hartke, Vance, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Hartley, Virginia F., 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 135 ] Hartman, Arthur, 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 61 ] Hassan, King of Morocco, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Hay, D.O., 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] Hayden, Carl, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 105 ] Haynes, Ulric S., 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] Hays, Wayne, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Health, Education, and Welfare, U.S. Department of, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Heath, Edward, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Hedin, Sven Fredrik, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Heineman, Ben W., 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Helgerson, John L., 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] Heller, Walter, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Helman, Gerald B., 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] Helms, Richard M., 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] Appointment as DCI, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 113 ] CIA leadership problems, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Intelligence community coordination, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] National Intelligence Estimates, 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 105 ] National Intelligence Resources Board, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 120 ] National Policy Papers, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] NSC 5412 draft revision, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] Presidential briefing on intelligence, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 120 ] Professional Manpower Committee Report, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 119 ] State Department-CIA relations, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] 303 Committee, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 118 ] Tuesday foreign policy lunches, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 62 ] Vietnam war, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Helseth, William A., 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] Henderson, John N., 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Hennemeyer, Robert, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] Herter, Christian, 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Herter Committee, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Hillenkoetter, Rear Adm. Roscoe H., 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] Hilliker, Grant G., 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 146 ] Hilsman, Roger, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] Hitch, Charles J., 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Hitch Committee, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Ho Chi Minh, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Hodges, Luther H., 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] Hoffman, Paul, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] Home, Lord, 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Hoofnagle, James E., 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] Hoover, Herbert C., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 102 ] Hoover, J. Edgar, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Hoover Commission Task Force on Foreign Affairs, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] Hornig, Donald F., 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] House of Representatives, U.S., 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] Democratic Study Group, 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] Education and Labor Committee, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Foreign Affairs Committee, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 190 ] United Nations, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] Houston, Lawrence R., 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] Howe, Fisher, 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Hubbard, Charlotte, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] Hughes, Thomas L., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] Hulick, Charles E., 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] Hull, Cordell, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] Human rights, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] Humphrey, David C., 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] Humphrey, Hubert H., 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Hungary, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] India, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] China, People's Republic of, relations with, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Cyprus role for, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Disarmament, 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] Nuclear weapons development, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Pakistan, conflict with, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] UNCTAD, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 127 ] U.S. arms supply policy, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] U.S. food aid to, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] Vietnam war, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Indian Ocean, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Indonesia, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] Inonu, Gen. Ismet, 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Intelligence community coordination ( see also Covert action; National Reconnaissance Office; President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB); 303 Committee; United States Intelligence Board (USIB) ; individual agencies ), 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Budgets for intelligence activities, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] In Cambodia, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] China Intelligence Task Group, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] CIA/DCI role in, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 119 ] Cuba overflights, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] Defense Attaché System, 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] FBI position, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Intelligence information-handling problem, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] Missile and Space Analysis, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] President's intelligence briefings, 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] Satellite photography, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Special Group ( 5412 ), 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] State Department role, 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] White House role for DCI, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 86 ] Interagency Regional Policy Committees, 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Interdepartmental Planning Group, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) ( see also IRG subheadings under other subjects ), 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Activities of, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] CIA position, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] CIA procedures relative to, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] Criticisms of, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] Effectiveness of, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Establishment of, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] European and economic issues, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Far Eastern issues, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] Foreign policy idea development, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] Inter-American issues, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Internal defense planning, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] National security policy decision-making, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Near Eastern and South Asian issues, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Reorganization of, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] Reports on organizational and policy initiatives, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] White House representation on, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] Interior, U.S. Department of, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] International Control Commission (ICC), 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] International Cooperation Year (ICY), 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] International Court of Justice (ICJ), 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] International Development Agency (IDA), 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] International Human Rights Year, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] International Labor Organization (ILO), 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] International Law Commission, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] International School, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] Ippolitov, Ivan I., 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Iran, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Iraq, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Ireland, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Israel ( see also Arab-Israeli conflict), 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Italy, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Ivory Coast, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] Jackling, Roger, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Jackson, Elmore, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 133 ] Jackson, Henry, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Jackson, William H., 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] Jakobson, Max, 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] Japan ( see also Japan and Japanese subheadings under other subjects ), 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Jarring, Gunnar, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 197 ] Javits, Jacob, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] Jay, Douglas, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Jenkins, Alfred, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Jenkins, Walter, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] Jernegan, John D., 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Jerusalem, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Jessup, Peter, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 120 ] Jessup, Philip, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] Jhabvala, Daris, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] John Birch Society, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Johnson, Charles E., 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] Johnson, Clarence L., 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] Johnson, Griffith, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] Johnson, Lady Bird, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 137 ] Johnson, Louis, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Johnson, Lyndon B., 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Appointments, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] Ambassadorial selection, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] Assistant Secretaries of State, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 50 ] CIA Director, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 113 ] National Security Council, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 75 ] Of Negroes, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] Schelling as programming consultant, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] Secretary of State, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 40 ] Under Secretaries of State, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 49 ] U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Of women, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] Ball resignation, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] Central Intelligence Agency, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Leadership problems, 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Senate watchdog committee on, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 113 ] Youth groups funded by, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 117 ] Civil Service positions for Foreign Service officers, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] Crisis anticipation procedures, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Cyprus, 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 216 ] DCI role, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 119 ] Decision-making style of, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Deming Group, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Election, 1964 , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] Executive Review of Overseas Programs, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] Foreign affairs budgeting, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Foreign policy ideas development, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] Four-power conference proposal, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 197 ] FSO personnel administration, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 59 ] Goldberg resignation, possible, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Harriman, relationship with, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] Hays Bill (H.R. 6277), 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] On Helms and Raborn, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 105 ] Human rights, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Information flow to: Evening Reading, Items for, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Intelligence, 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] Daily Brief, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Intelligence Checklist, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Intelligence Review, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Morning report, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Problems with, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] United Nations, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] Insurgency task forces, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Intelligence community coordination: DCI role, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] Intelligence information-handling problems, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] Presidential intelligence briefings, 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] Interdepartmental Planning Group, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] International Cooperation Year, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] JCS consultation with, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] Kashmir, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] McCone resignation, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] Meetings, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] With U Thant, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Messages: From/to Harold Wilson, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] From/to Khrushchev, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 206 ] From U Thant, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 163 ] Middle East, 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] National Policy Papers, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 100 ] National Reconnaissance Program, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] National Security Council, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Meetings of, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 80 ] Organizational changes, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] Staff roles and functions, 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Vietnam war discussions, 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] National security policy decision making, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] NSAM 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Organization for management and coordination of foreign affairs, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Peacekeeping, UN: Financing of, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Soviet arrears, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 149 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Public relations, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Reduction in force at U.S. overseas missions, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Rusk and McNamara, relationships with, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] Rusk resignation, possible, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] South African sanctions, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 22 ] State Department, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] Leadership team selection, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 7, 838, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 46 ] Organization of, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 14 ] White House, relations with, 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] 303 Committee, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] UN Charter, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] UNCTAD, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 127 ] UN General Assembly: Emergency session of, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] Paralysis of, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] 20 th session, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] 21 st session, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] 22 nd session, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] United Nations: Chinese representation, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 191 ] Goldberg discussions on, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] Secretary-General re-election, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] U.S. policy toward, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] Visit to, possible, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] Vietnam war, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Paris peace talks, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] UN cease-fire proposals, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 193 ] UN role in, 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] White House organizational chart, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Work habits of, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] Johnson, U. Alexis, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] NSAM 341 , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] Replacement for, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] Special Group ( 5412 ), 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] 303 Committee, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] Johnson, W. Thomas, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] Joint Study Group on the Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government (Kirkpatrick Report), 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] Jones, Jim, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Jones, Lewis, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Jones, Paul, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] Jones, Ralph T., 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] Jorden, William, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Judd, Thomas M., 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 156 ] Justice, U.S. Department of, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Kaplan, Harold, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Karamessines, Thomas H., 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 118 ] Kashmir, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Katanga, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] Appointment as Under Secretary of State, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] Appointments, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Covert action, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] Crockett resignation letter, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] Foreign affairs programming, 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] Foreign Service personnel system, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 59 ] Goldberg resignation, 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Intelligence information-handling problems, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] Interagency Politico-Military Group, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] Middle East, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] SIG, 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Vietnam war, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Katzenbach Committee, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 118 ] Kaunda, Kenneth, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Kaysen, Carl, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] Keeny, Spurgeon, 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] Kelleher, Philip, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Kennedy, John F., 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] Chinese membership in UN, 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] DCI role, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] Intelligence community coordination, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] National Security Council, 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] Organizational weakness in foreign affairs coordination, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] State Department and, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] Vietnam war, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Kennedy, Robert F., 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Kennedy Round, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] Kent, Sherman, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 105 ] Kenya, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Khartoum Conference, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Khrushchev, Nikita S., 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] Cuba, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] Cyprus, 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] Messages from/to Johnson, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 206 ] Removal from power of, 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Soviet peacekeeping arrears, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] Kidder, Randolph A., 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] Kilson, Martin, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] Kintner, Robert, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Kirkpatrick, Lyman, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Kironde, Apollo K., 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] Kissinger, Henry A., 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] Kitchen, Robert W., Jr., 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Klein, David, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] Knoche, Henry, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 104 ] Knox, Clinton E., 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Kohler, Foy D., 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] Appointment as Political Affairs Deputy Under Secretary, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] Cyprus, 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 212 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] State Department innovation, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] Komer, Robert W., 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] Appointments, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Replacement for Bundy, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 75 ] Cyprus, 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] National Policy Papers, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] National Security Council, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] NSAM 341, 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] UN General Assembly, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Korea, Republic of, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Korean war, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] Koren, Henry L.T., 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] Kornienko, Georgi M., 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 128 ] Korry, Edward, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Korth, Fred, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] Kosygin, Alexei N., 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Kraft, Joseph, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] Kutchuk, Fazil, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Kuwait, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Kuznetsov, Vasili V., 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] Kyprianou, Spiros, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] Labor, U.S. Department of, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] Labouisse, Henry R., 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Laird, Melvin, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Laitin, Joe, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] Lake, Anthony, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 54 ] Lambert, Francis, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Land, Edwin H., 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] Langer, William, 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] Laos, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Lasker, Mary, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Latin America, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] Communist subversion in, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] Counterinsurgency in, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Foreign affairs programming, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Negro ambassadors to, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] Women ambassadors to, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Latin America Policy Committee (LAPC), 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] Lay, James S., Jr., 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 93 ] Le Duc Tho, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] League of Nations, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Lebanon, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] Leddy, John M., 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Lehman, Richard, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] LeMay, Gen. Curtis, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] Leonhart, William, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] Lesh, Donald R., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Lessiowski, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Liberia, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] Libya, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] Likert, Rensis, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963 , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Lin Piao, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Lindjord, Col., 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] Lindsay, Franklin, 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Lippmann, Walter S., 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] Lipscomb, Glenard P., 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Liu Chieh, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] Lodge, Henry Cabot, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] London Conference, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 198 ] Long, Edward T., 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 191 ] Long Thrust IX battalion, 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] Loridan, Walter, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] Louchheim, Katie, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Lovett, Robert, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 14 ] Luévano, Daniel M., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] Luns, Joseph, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] Luxembourg, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] MacArthur, Douglas II, 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Macdonald, Donald, 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] Macomber, William, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] Macy, John W., Jr., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] Maechling, Charles, Jr., 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] Maghreb, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Mahon, George H., 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] Mai Van Bo, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Makarios III, Archbishop, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Greek-Turkish meeting, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] International peacekeeping force, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Soviet support for, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 212 ] UN role in Cyprus, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 198 ] UN Security council meeting on Cyprus, 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] Makkonen, Lij E., 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 192 ] Malawi, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] Malaysia, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] Maldive Islands, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Malecela, John S., 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] Mali, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Malta, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] Manatos, Mike, 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] Manescu, Corneliu, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Mann, Thomas C., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Appointments, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] As Economic Affairs Under Secretary, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 42 ] Leaks in the State Department, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] State Department organization, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] Manning, Bayless, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Mansfield, Mike, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Mao Tse-tung, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Marcus, Stanley, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Marine Corp, U.S., 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] Mariz, Maj., 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Marks, Leonard H., 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Marr, Carmen, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] Marsh, James, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 46 ] Marshall, George, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] Marshall, Thurgood, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Martin, Edwin M., 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] Martin, Paul, 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Matsas, 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] Matsui, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] McAfee, Robert, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] McAfee, William, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 118 ] McCafferty, Arthur, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] McCarthy, Eugene, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] McCarthy, Joseph, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] McCloy, John J., 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 71 ] McCone, John A., 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 113 ] Central Intelligence Agency, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Corona project, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Crisis anticipation procedures, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] DCI replacement, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] DCI role, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] Defense Intelligence Agency, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] National Security Council, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] Presidential adviser, role as, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] Resignation of, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] USIB reorganization, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] McConnell, Gen. John P., 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] McCormack, John W., 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 62 ] McGee, Gale W., 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] McGhee, George C., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] McGruder, Gen. John, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] McHenry, Donald, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 192 ] McKesson, John A., 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] McMillan, Brockway, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] McNamara, Robert S., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] Appointments, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Crisis anticipation procedures, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Cyprus, 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 201 ] DCI role, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] DOD programming system, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] Force Structure Program, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Government organization report, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Intelligence, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] Johnson, relationship with, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] National Security Council, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] NSAM 341 , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS), 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] Special Group ( 5412 ) name change, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), Reorganization of, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] 303 Committee, 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] As Under Secretary of State candidate, 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] UN General Assembly, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] USIB reorganization, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] Vietnam war, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] McNaughton, John, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] McNutt, Louise, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 143 ] McPherson, Harry C., Jr., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Meeker, Leonard C., 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] Mekong tributary project, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Menderes, Adnan, 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] Menemencioglu, Turgut, 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Merchant, Livingston, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Mesteri, Mahmoud, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Mexico, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Meyer, Cord, Jr., 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] Michaels, Robert L., 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Middle East ( see also Arab-Israeli conflict), 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Military Assistance Program (MAP), 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Miller, Edward G., Jr., 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] Mills, Wilbur D., 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Moffit, George, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] Montero, Frank, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] Moor, Carol, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] Moose, Richard, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Morgan, Thomas E., 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Morocco, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] Moroncew, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] Morozov, Platon D. , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] Morris, Roger, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Morse, Wayne, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Mosely, Philip E., 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] Mosher, Frederick C., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Mosler, John, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Mountain, Maurice J., 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 49 ] Moyers, Bill D., 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Appointments, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 75 ] National Security Council, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] NSAM 341 , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] United Nations development programs, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] White House organization, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Mozambique, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Multilateral Force (MLF), 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Murphy, Robert D., 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] Murrow, Edward R., 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] Nabrit, James M., Jr., 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Narasimhan, Chakravarthi V., 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 100 ] National Association of Manufacturers, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] National Indications Center, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] National Institutes of Health (NIH), 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 105 ] No. 11–8–64 , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] No. 11–14–62 , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB), 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] National Intelligence Survey (NIS), 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] National Interdepartmental Seminar on Problems of Development and Internal Defense (NIS), 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] National Liberation Front (NLF). See Viet Cong . National Military Command Center, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] National Military Communications Center, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] National Policy Papers, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] CIA position, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Corona project, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Implementation of PFIAB recommendations, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] National Reconnaissance Program, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 120 ] Establishment of, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 95 ] Executive Committee, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] PFAIB study and recommendations for, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] USIB role in, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] National Security Action Memoranda, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] No. 57 , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] No. 119 , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] No. 124 , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] No. 131 , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] No. 162 , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] No. 163 , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] No. 177 , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] No. 182 , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] No. 277 , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] No. 281 , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] n, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] No. 283 , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] No. 303 , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] No. 322 , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] No. 341 , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] No. 343 , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] No. 368 , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] No. 371 , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66 ] National Security Agency (NSA), 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] National Security Council (NSC), 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Balance of payments and, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Bundy resignation, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] CIA, relations with, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] Covert action review, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] Cyprus, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] Documents: NSC 4–A , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] NSC 10/2 , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] NSC 10/5 , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] NSC 5412 , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] NSC 5412/1 , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] NSC 5412/2 , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] Indian nuclear weapons development, 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Intelligence Directive No. 1, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] Internal communication, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] Leadership, candidates for, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 82 ] Meetings, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] 521 st, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] 558 th, 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] 591 st, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] 594 th, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] September 13, 1967 , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Operations during Rostow's absence, 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Organizational changes in, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Planning Board, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board role of, 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] Samos project, 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] SIG role for, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Special Committee, 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Staff, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 80 ] Staff officer role in, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Standing Group, 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 63 ] State Department, relations with, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] Tuesday foreign policy lunches, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] UN General Assembly, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] U.S. Middle East policy, 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Vietnam war, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] National Signals Intelligence Program, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] National Student Association, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] Nauru, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] Navy, U.S., 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Ne Win, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Negroes: In African posts, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Appointment of as ambassadors, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 54 ] FBI recruitment of, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] In the National Security Council, 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] State Department employment of, totals, 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] In USUN, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Nestorenko, Aleksey, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] Netherlands, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] New Guinea, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] New Zealand, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Ngo Dinh Diem, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Nicalo, Ruth, 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Nicaragua, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Nielsen, Sievert A., 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Nigeria, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] Nitze, Paul H., 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Nixon, Richard M., 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Nkrumah, Kwame, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Norodom Sihanouk, Prince, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] North Atlantic Council, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Norway, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] Noyes, Charles P., 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] Nu, U, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Nuclear proliferation, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Nuclear sharing, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Nuclear testing, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Nuclear weapons, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Nyerere, Julius, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] O'Brien, Lawrence, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Ocean Floor declaration, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Office of National Estimates (ONE), 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Oil, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Olin Mathieson Corporation, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] Oliver, Covey, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] Oman, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Operation Topsy, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] Organization of African Unity (OAU), 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Organization of American States (OAS), 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 127 ] Ormsby-Gore, David, 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] Outer Space Conference, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Overseas internal defense policy of the United States, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Overseas Operations Group (OOG), 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] Owen, Henry, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] Oxcart program, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] Pace, Frank, Jr., 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] Pacific Islands, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] Pacific trust territories, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Pacification, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Page, Carolyn, 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] Pakistan, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Palmer, Joseph, II, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Panama, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Papadopolous, Tassos, 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Papandreou, George, 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 216 ] Papich, Sam, 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Paraguay, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Parrott, Thomas, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] Parsons, Gram, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] Pathet Lao, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Pazhwak, Abdur-Rahman, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Peace, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] Peace Corps, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] Foreign affairs budgeting, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Foreign affairs programming, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Negro officials, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] State Department, relations with, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 42 ] Peacekeeping, UN ( see also Cyprus; Article 19 under UN Charter): Authorization of, 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] Canadian UN resolution, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] Dutch position, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] Earmarking of national troops for, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Financing of, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Emergency fund (Pazhwak proposal), 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] Future operations, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] Irish position, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] U.S. position, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] Voluntary payments, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] British position, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] French position, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Matching contributions, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 144 ] Soviet position, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] U.S. position, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] French arrears, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] In the Middle East, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Procedures for approval of, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] Security Council role in, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] Soviet arrears, 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] Afro-Asian proposals, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 137 ] British position, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 136 ] Canadian position, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] CIA position, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] Dutch-U.S. talks on, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] French position, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] Johnson-Thant talks on, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] Latin American position, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] Soviet payment amounts, U.S. position, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] Soviet position, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] Soviet-U.S. talks on, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 156 ] UN General Assembly and, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] U.S. position, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Soviet position, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] U Thant inaction on, 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] UN General Assembly role in, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] U.S. course of action in dispute over, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] U.S. position, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Working Group of 21, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] World Court ruling on Congo operations, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] Pearson, Drew, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Pearson, Lester, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Peck, Robert, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 50 ] Pederson, Richard, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 173 ] Peking Radio, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Pelcovits, Nathan, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] Philippines, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] Phillips, Richard I., 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Photo reconnaissance. See National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) ; Satellites . Phoumi Nosavam, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Pickard, Cyril, 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Pitmann, Bill, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 54 ] Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS), 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] For Defense Department, 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Plaza Lasso, Galo, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Plimpton, Francis T. P., 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Plimsoll, James, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Poland, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] Polansky, Sol, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 131 ] Police programs, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] Policy Planning Council. See under State, U.S. Department of . Popovic, Vlado, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Popper, David H., 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 192 ] Population control, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] Porter, Dwight, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] Portugal, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Portuguese overseas territories, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Posner, Ben, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Potter, Phil, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] Powell, Adam Clayton, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Prebisch, Raul, 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) ( see also PFIAB subheadings under other subjects), 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 92 ] Agenda of, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] CIA, relations with, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] Establishment of, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 86 ] Intelligence community coordination, 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Intelligence information-handling problems, report on, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] Johnson directive for, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 120 ] National Reconnaissance Program, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] Progress report, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 122 ] President's Panel of Consultants on Foreign Affairs, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] President's Task Force on Government Organization, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 82 ] Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIO), 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Professional Manpower Committee Report, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 119 ] Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] Pueblo crisis, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Puerto Rico, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Puhan, Al, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] Punta del Este conference, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] Quaison-Sackey, Alexander, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] Raborn Vice Adm. William F., Jr., 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Central Intelligence Agency, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] DCI role, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] Intelligence community coordination, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] National Reconnaissance Program, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] NSAM 341 , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 108 ] President's intelligence briefings, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] 303 Committee, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] Radio Free Europe, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 118 ] Radio Liberty, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 118 ] Rahnema, Majid, 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] Ramparts , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] Rand Corporation, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 118 ] Read, Benjamin H., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Reedy, George, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Refugees, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Reis, Herbert, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] Reischauer, Edwin O., 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] Rennie, John Ogilvie, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] Reston, James, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] Reynolds, Maj. Gen. John M., 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] Rhodesia, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 187 ] Afro-Asian position, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Economic sanctions, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] UN Security Council actions on, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] U.S. position, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Riad, Mahmoud, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Richardson, John, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 119 ] Ricola, 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Rifai, Abdul Monem, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Riha, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Rikhye, Maj. Gen. I.J., 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Rimestad, Idar, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 59 ] Roberts, Chalmers, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 64 ] Roberts, Juanita, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 64 ] Robinson, James, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Rogers, Gladys, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] Rogers, James Grafton, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] Roll, Eric, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Rolz-Bennett, José, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Romania, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Rooney, John, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 49 ] Roosevelt, Cornelius, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] Ropa, Donald W., 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Roschin, Alexei A., 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Ross, Thomas B., 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] Rossides, Zenon, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 206 ] Rostow, Eugene, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Rostow, Walt W., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 197 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Appointments, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Central Intelligence Agency, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 119 ] Foreign policy ideas development, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] Goldberg resignation, possible, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Interdepartmental Planning Group, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] Leadership team selection, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] National Policy Papers, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] National Security Council, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Meetings of, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] As replacement for Bundy, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 75 ] NSAM 341 , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Outside advisory panels, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 54 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 120 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] 303 Committee, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] Tuesday foreign policy lunches, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] UN General Assembly special session, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] United Nations, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] Vietnam war, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Rowan, Carl L., 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] Rowen, Henry S., 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Ruda, José María, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] Rural development, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] Rusk, Dean, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 151 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] Appointments, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Ambassadors, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] Director of Central Intelligence, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] Under Secretaries of State, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 49 ] U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Berlin, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Cambodia, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] Central Intelligence Agency, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 86 ] Congo, Republic of the, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC), 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] Covert action, 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] Crisis anticipation procedures, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] Cyprus, 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] DCI role, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 105 ] Evening Reading, items for, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Executive Review of Overseas Programs, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] Foreign affairs budgeting, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Foreign policy ideas development, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] Four-Power Conference proposal, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Hitch Committee, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Human rights, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] Indonesia, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] Intelligence Checklist, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Intelligence community coordination, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] Interagency Regional Policy Committees, establishment of, 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Johnson, relationship with, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] Laos, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Latin American Affairs Combined Organization review, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] National Policy Papers, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] National Security Council, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 71 ] Nigeria, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] NSAM 341 , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] NSC 5412 draft revision, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 156 ] Soviet arrears, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 120 ] PPBS and foreign affairs decision making, 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] President's intelligence briefings, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 104 ] Reduction in force at U.S. overseas missions, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Regional Assistant Secretaries, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] Resignation of, possible, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 22 ] State Department, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] 303 Committee, 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] Tuesday foreign policy lunches, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 62 ] UN Charter, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 191 ] UN General Assembly: 19 th Session, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] 20 th Session, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] 22 nd session, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Emergency Session, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] Special Session, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] United Nations, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] Vietnam, Republic of, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] Vietnam war, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Russell, Richard, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Ruth, Henry, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 54 ] Ryukyu Islands, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Saarinen, Aline, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Sabah, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Sadruddin Khan, 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] Salans, Carl F., 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] Saltonstall, Leverett, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 105 ] Samoa, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] Samos project, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Sanchez Vilella, Roberto, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 191 ] Sandlin, Marlin, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] Sandys, Duncan, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Saragat, Giuseppi, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] Sarawak, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Satellites: Photography, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Sputnik I, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Saudi Arabia, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Saunders, Harold H., 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] Saunders, Patricia, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] Sayre, Robert, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 191 ] Scandinavia, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] Scanlon, Terrence, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] Schelling, Thomas C., 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Schlesinger, Arthur, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] Schriever, Gen. Bernard, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Schroeder, Gerhard, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] Schulman, Marshall, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] Schultze, Charles L., 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] Schurmann, Carl W. A., 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] Schwartz, Abba, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Schwartz, Harry H., 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Schwebel, Stephen, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC), 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Scoville, Herbert, Jr., 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] Second Non-aligned Conference, Cairo, Oct., 1964 , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Security Crpytologic Agencies, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 92 ] Selassie, Haile, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Semenov, Vladimir S., 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] Semer, Milt, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Senate, U.S., 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Appropriations Committee, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Armed Services Committee, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Foreign Relations Committee, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] CIA-Congressional relations, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Soviet peacekeeping arrears, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 191 ] Government Operations Committee, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Judiciary Committee, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 92 ] UN Charter, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] Senegal, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) ( see also SIG subheadings under other subjects ), 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] Activities of, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 61 ] Budget Bureau role in, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] CIA position, 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] Committee on Training, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] Establishment of, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] Failure to meet of, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Intelligence Report, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] Interagency Politico-military Group role for, 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] International Organization Affairs Bureau role in, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] Meetings, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] National security policy decision making, 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Restructuring of, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] 303 Committee, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] Transfer of Special Group (CI) responsibilities, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] Vietnam war, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] White House representation on, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 30 ] Sevareid, Eric, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Seydoux, Roger, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Sheldon, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Sherman, Edward L., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] Shriver, Sargent, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] Shullaw, J. Harold, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Sides, Adm., 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] Sierra Leone, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Sieverts, Frank A., 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] Sinclair, Ian, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] Singapore, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] Sino-Soviet dispute, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] Sisco, Joseph J., 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 201 ] Canadian UN resolution, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] Cyprus, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Goldberg resignation, possible, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] International Organization Affairs Bureau, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] Kashmir, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] UN, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 135 ] UN General Assembly, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] UN Secretary-General re-election, 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] U.S. policy toward the UN, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] Vietnam war, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] World Disarmament Conference, 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Slim, Mongi, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Smirnovskiy, M.N., 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] Smith, Abbott, 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 105 ] Smith, Bromley K., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Ball resignation, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Cyprus, 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 201 ] Interdepartmental Regional Group, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] McCone resignation, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] National Security Council, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Outside advisory panels, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 54 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] Presidential briefing on intelligence, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Role in NSC of, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] United Nations, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Vietnam war, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] Smith, Ian, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Smith, R. Jack, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] Smith, Rick, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 64 ] Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] Smith, Maj. William Y., 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 62 ] Snelling, Arthur W., 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Sohier, Walter D., 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] Solomon, Anthony M., 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Sosa Rodriguez, Carlos, UNGA, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] South Africa, Republic of, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Black African position on, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Investment curbs, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] UN force in, possible, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] U.S. posture on, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] South Arabia, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] South Asia, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Southeast Asia, 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] Southern Africa ( see also individual countries ), 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] Southern Rhodesia. See Rhodesia. Southwest Africa: Black African position, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Committee of 24 actions on, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 187 ] ICJ actions on, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Outside advisory panel talks on, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] U.S. position, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Souvanna Phouma, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Soviet Union ( see also Peacekeeping, UN ; Soviet Union and Soviet subheadings under other subjects ): Celestial Bodies Treaty, 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] Colonialism, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] Disarmament, 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] Eastern Europe, relations with, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] Fiat plant construction in, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Four-Power Conference proposal, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 197 ] Intelligence gathering in, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Invasion of Czechoslovakia by, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Jews, treatment of, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 143 ] Multilateral Force, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Non-Proliferation Treaty, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Space program, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Subversion by, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] UN Committee of 33, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] UN financial situation, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 159 ] UN Trusteeship Council, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] UNCTAD, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 127 ] United States, relations with, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] U.S. military spending and, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Spaak, Paul-Henri, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] Spain, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Sparkman, John J., 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] Special Committee on U.S. Trade with East European Countries and the Soviet Union, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Special Fund, 339 , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] Special Group 5412 , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] Special Group ( 303 Committee). See 303 Committee. Special Group (Counterinsurgency) ( see also 303 Committee), 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Abolition of, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Reorganization of, 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 22 ] Review of covert programs by, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 105 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group tasks, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] Status of, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] Strengths and weaknesses of, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 105 ] Spencer, John, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Spiers, Ronald I., 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] Spivy, Gen. Berton E., Jr., 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] Springsteen, George, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Staats, Elmer, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Standard Oil, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] Stanford Research Institute, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] State, U.S. Department of ( see also Coordination and supervision of U.S. foreign policy), 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] African Affairs Bureau, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 54 ] Agriculture Department, relations with, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] CIA activities, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 118 ] Appointments: Ambassadorial selection, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] Assistant Secretaries, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] Deputy Secretary of State, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Of Negroes, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Secretary of State, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 40 ] Under Secretaries, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 49 ] United Nations Representative, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Of women, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] Atlantic Policy Planning Group, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] Budget Bureau, relations with, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Bureau of Economic Affairs (E), 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU), 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] CIA, relations with, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] Commerce Department, relations with, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] Congress, relationship with, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC), 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] Corps of Foreign Service Inspectors, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) program, 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Country Director system, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 55 ] Critical countries list, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] Cyprus issue, handling of, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 208 ] Defense Department, relations with, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 55 ] Diplomatic missions, increase in, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau (EA), 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] Employment Control Committee for Outside Officer Recruitment, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] European Affairs Bureau (EUR), 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] Foreign affairs budgeting, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Foreign affairs programming, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] Hitch Committee, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] For intelligence activities, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] Foreign policy leadership, improvements in, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Foreign Service personnel system, 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 54 ] Improving the effectiveness of, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 59 ] Intelligence information-handling problems, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] Intelligence and Research, Bureau of (INR), 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Inter-American Affairs Bureau, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] International Organization Affairs Bureau (IO), 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 54 ] Johnson meeting with Assistant Secretaries, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] Loyalty of officials of, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Bureau (NEA), 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 54 ] NSC, relations with, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] Office of Employment Practices, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] Office of Management Planning, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] Organizational weaknesses, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS), 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] Policy Planning Council, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Policy and Plans Staff, proposed, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 16 ] Reduction in force at U.S. overseas missions, 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Responsibilities of the Secretary of State, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] Role of, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Special reports for the President, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Staffing, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] Territorial administration, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] Travel Service Program, elimination of, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] 303 Committee, 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 118 ] White House, relations with, 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 62 ] Steeves, John, 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] Stennis, John, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 105 ] Stern, Thomas, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4 ] Stevenson, Adlai E., 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] Cyprus, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 205 ] UN Security Council meeting on, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 216 ] UNFICYP, 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] Peacekeeping, UN: Soviet arrears, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] U.S. course of action in dispute over, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Voluntary payments for financing, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] UN Charter, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] UN Disarmament Commission, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] UN General Assembly: 19 th session, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 136 ] Paralysis of, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] Soviet loss of vote in, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 127 ] United Nations, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Vietnam war, 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Stewart, Michael, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Stewart, Michael N. F., 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Stimson, Henry Lewis, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] Stoertz, Howard, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] Stottlemeyer, David, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] Strategic Air Command (SAC), 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 92 ] Stratton, Jay, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 71 ] Sudan, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Sukarno, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] Sukhodrev, V.M., 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] Sullivan, William C., 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Sullivan, William H., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 55 ] Supreme Court, U.S., 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] Suslov, Vladimir P., 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] Sweden, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Switzerland, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Symington, Stuart, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 99 ] Syria, 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] Tabor, Hans R., 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] Tacher, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Tagboard Project, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] Taiwan Straits, 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 61 ] Talbot, Phillips, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Tanzania, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Tarabanov, Milko, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 124 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Appointment as CIA Director, possible, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Cyprus, 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 201 ] DCI role, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 119 ] Interagency Regional Policy Committees, establishment of, 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] NSAM 341 , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] NSC disorganization, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 120 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), reorganization of, 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] USIB reorganization, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] Vietnam czar, appointment of, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] Taylor, Vice Admiral Rufus, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] Taylor Committee reports, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] Thacher, Peter S., 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] Thailand, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Thant, U: Celestial Bodies Treaty, 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] Cuba, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] Cyprus, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 205 ] Initiatives on, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] Peacekeeping force, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Four-power conference proposal, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 197 ] Goldberg resignation, possible, 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Kashmir, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] Laos, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Meetings: With De Gaulle, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] With Khrushchev, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] With Johnson, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Nigeria, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Nuclear disarmament talks, proposed, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Peacekeeping, UN: Financing of, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] Inaction on, 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] Soviet arrears, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Secretary-General re-election: Alternatives to Thant, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] CIA position, 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 179 ] Drafting of Thant, 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] French position, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] Resignation decision, 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Security Council discussion, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] Soviet position, 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] U.S. position, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Southeast Asia, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] UN bonds, 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 191 ] UN financial situation, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] UN General Assembly: 19 th session, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] 23 rd session, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Paralysis of, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] U.S. support for UN, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Vietnam war, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Cease-fire proposals, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Discussion with U.S. officials, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Paris Peace Talks, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Visits: Moscow, 1964 , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] South America, Aug. 1966 , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 171 ] Thomas, William, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Thompson, Llewellyn, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Thomson, James C., 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] 303 Committee, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 120 ] Ambassadors role in embassies, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 110 ] Chairmanship of, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] CIA relations with, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 118 ] CIA-State Department relations, 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 117 ] Covert programs review by, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 118 ] Photo reconnaissance, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] Reorganization of, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] White House representation on, 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] Tibbetts, Margaret Joy, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Tibet, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Tito, Josip Broz, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Toon, Malcolm, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Torden, Bill, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Tran Van Huu, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Treasury, U.S. Department of, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Trench, Nigel C. C., 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 156 ] Trezise, Philip H., 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] Truehart, William, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 118 ] Truman, Harry S, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] Tshombe, Moise, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Tubby, Roger W., 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] Turkey ( see also Turkey and Turkish subheadings under other subjects ), 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Turkmen, Ilter, 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] Turner, Bruce, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 127 ] Tuthill, John W., 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Tyler, William R., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] Ulbricht, Walter, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Ullman, Richard, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] United Arab Republic (UAR), 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] United Auto Workers (UAW), 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 166 ] United Kingdom (U.K.) ( see also U.K. and British subheadings under other subjects ), 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Executive Review of Overseas Programs in, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Foreign affairs programming, 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] Foreign exchange deficits, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] Four-Power Conference proposal, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Rhodesia, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] United Nations, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] United Nations (UN) ( see also United Nations General Assembly ; United Nations Security Council ), 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] African role in, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Capital Development Fund, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] China, People's Republic of, membership in, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] Albanian position, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] British position, 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Chances of, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] U.S. position, 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Committee of 14 , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] Cubans, employed by, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] Financial situation, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Nuclear weapons development, effect of, 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 131 ] Outer Space Committee, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Rules of procedure, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] Small states membership in, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] South African withdrawal from, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Soviet troika proposal, 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 132 ] Soviet withdrawal from, possible, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] Special Finance Committee, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 133 ] U.S. policy, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] U.S. support for, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 158 ] Vietnam war role for, 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] Voting systems, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] West Irian, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Working Capital Fund, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Working Group of 21, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] United Nations Association, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] United Nations bonds, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] United Nations Charter, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Amendments to, 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Article 17 , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] Article 18(2) , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] Article 19 ( see also Peacekeeping, UN ), 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] British position, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] General Assembly emergency session actions, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] Johnson-U Thant talks on, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] Soviet position, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 156 ] Soviet vote in General Assembly, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 127 ] Soviet-U.S. talks on, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] Thai position, 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 132 ] U.S. position, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] Article 20 , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] Article 39 , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] Article 43 , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] Article 49 , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] Article 50 , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] Article 51 , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 201 ] Article 73 , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] Article 86, 1 (c), 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] Article 94 , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Article 99 , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Canadian position, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] Chapter VI, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Chapter VII, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Non-self-governing territories, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] Renegotiation of, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] United Nations Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations (Committee of 33), 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] United Nations Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 191 ] United Nations Council for Southwest Africa, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] United Nations Day (Oct. 24), 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 146 ] United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Costs of, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Detailing of officers to Cyprus from, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] Soviet arrears, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] Troop reduction, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] U.S. position, 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). See under Cyprus. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA): Afro-Asian bloc influence in, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Arab-Israeli conflict, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Celestial Bodies Treaty, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Chinese membership issue debate, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Colonialism, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] Committee of 24 , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Australian position, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] British position, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Establishment of, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] Finnish position, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] Italian position, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Soviet position, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] U.S. participation in, 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] U.S. position, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Visits to U.S. territories, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] Cuba, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Cyprus, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] Czechoslovakia, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Diplomatic privileges and immunities, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 191 ] Disarmament, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] ECOSOC/Security Council enlargement, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] Election of officers in, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Emergency session of, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary), 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] Fourth Committee, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Human rights, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 146 ] Kashmir, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Korean unification, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Korean war, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] Laos, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Latin America, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Legal issues, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Middle East, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Non-Proliferation Treaty, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] Norwegian position, 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] Oceans Committee, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Paralysis of, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 137 ] Peaceful Settlement of Disputes initiative, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Peacekeeping role, 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] Political Committee, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Refugees, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Resolutions: 377 (V), 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 155 ] 1907 (XVIII), 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] 1970 (XVIII), 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] 1990 (XVIII), 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 128 ] 1994 (XVIII), 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] 1995 (XVIII), 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] 2103 (XX), 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] 2147 (XXI), 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] 2221 (XXI), 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] 2222 (XXI), 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] A/RES/1739(XVI), 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] Status as law of, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] Secretary-General re-election, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 176 ] Sessions: 9th , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] 10th-14th , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] 19th , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] Credentials Committee appointments, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] Election of officers in, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] Pazhwak proposal, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] Postponement of, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 131 ] Recessing of, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] Soviet-U.S. talks in, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] 20 th, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] 21 st, 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 185 ] 22 nd, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 190 ] 23 rd, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Special, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] South African membership in, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Southeast Asia, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Southern Africa, 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Soviet loss of vote in, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] Tibet, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Vietnam war, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] World Disarmament Conference, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] United Nations Human Rights Commission, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] United Nations Institute, 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC): British position, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Cancellation of arrears, 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 153 ] Ending of, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 137 ] French arrears, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] Soviet arrears, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 194 ] U.S. position, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] World Court ruling on, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 130 ] United Nations Organization for Industrial Development (UNOID), 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). See under Cyprus. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] United Nations Secretariat, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 166 ] United Nations Security Council (UNSC): Arab-Israeli conflict, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] Cyprus, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Authorization of peacekeeping force, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Brazilian draft, 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] Meeting on, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 212 ] Negotiations, request for, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] Norwegian proposal for mediator, 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] Resolution on, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 216 ] Czechoslovakia, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Election by acclamation to, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Enlargement of, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Guarantor powers force, 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 208 ] Kashmir, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Korean war, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] Laos, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Member selection, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 136 ] Membership Committee, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] Peacekeeping, UN, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 154 ] Resolutions: 186 (1964), 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] 217 (1965), 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] 227 (1966), 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 180 ] 242 (1967), 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Rhodesia, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Secretary-General re-election, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 176 ] South Africa, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Strengthening of, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 127 ] UN budget vote in, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] U.S. veto in, possible, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] Vietnam war, 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] United Nations Special Fund, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] United Nations Trusteeship Council, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 191 ] United States Information Agency (USIA), 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] Foreign affairs budgeting, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Interdepartmental regional policy committees, creation of, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 91 ] Planning-Program-Budgeting System (PPBS), 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] State Department, relations with, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 42 ] United States Information Service (USIS), 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 50 ] United States Intelligence Board (USIB) ( see also USIB subheadings under other subjects ), 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] CIA view of, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 113 ] Collection of intelligence abroad, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 104 ] Comor Subcommittee, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] Corona project, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 89 ] Correlation and evaluation of intelligence by, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 100 ] Critical Collection Problems Committee, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] DCI control of, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 116 ] Intelligence information-handling problems, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 118 ] National Intelligence Resources Board evaluation of projects of, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 120 ] National Reconnaissance Program role for, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 113 ] National Reconnaissance Office, relations with, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Photo reconnaissance, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] Priority National Intelligence Directives, 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Reorganization of, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 93 ] United World Federalists, 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 143 ] Uruguay, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] U.S. Travel Service, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 28 ] Valenti, Jack, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 102 ] Van Roijen, Jan W., 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] Vance, Cyrus R., 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Appointments, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 104 ] Candidate for Under Secretary of State, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 42 ] Counterintelligence, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 92 ] Defense Department role for, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 86 ] Korea study, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] National Reconnaissance Office, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] National Reconnaissance Program, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] NSC 5412 draft revision, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 118 ] Overseas internal defense policy, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] Special Group ( 5412 ) name change, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] 303 Committee, 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 113 ] Vietnam war, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] Vaughn, Jack, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Vellodi, M., 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] Venezuela, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Vidaurrre, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] Viet Cong, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Vietnam, Democratic Republic of ( see also Vietnam war), 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] Vietnam, Republic of, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Political situation, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 182 ] UN membership for, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 165 ] UN observers on Cambodian border, 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 129 ] U.S. commitment to, 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] U.S. planning for crisis in, 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Vietnam Coordinating Committee, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 29 ] Vietnam war, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Ball-U Thant talks on, 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Bombing of the North, 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 163 ] Bombing pauses, 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Bombing restrictions, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Budgeting for, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Foreign Service recruiting, effect on, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 54 ] French position, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Gas warfare, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Indian role, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] Intelligence needs in, 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] Japanese role, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] Leaks to media, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14 ] Loyalty of State Department officials over, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] Mansfield Resolution, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] National Intelligence Estimates on, 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 105 ] NSAM 341 lack of implementation, 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] NSC staff discussions on, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] Paris peace talks, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Public relations efforts, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Rusk-U Thant talks on, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Senior Interdepartmental Group, involvement with, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Sunflower peace initiative, 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] UN cease-fire proposals, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 186 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 196 ] UN Committee of 33 and, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] UN role in, 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 180 ] UN Security Council meetings on, 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] UN General Assembly actions on, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 158 ] U.S. policy, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 14, 1542, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 194 ] U.S. troop cuts, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 195 ] Vinci, Piero, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] Vinson, Carl, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 102 ] Virgin Islands, U.S., 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 185 ] Vorontosov, Yuly M., 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Vorster, Balthazar J., 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 189 ] Wachman, Marvin, 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Waldheim, Kurt, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 172 ] Walker, Lannon, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 56 ] Walsh, John P., 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 109 ] Warner, John S., 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Warnke, Paul, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] Warsaw Pact, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] Watch Committee, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Watson, Marvin, 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] Weaver, George L. P., 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Weaver, Robert, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Weinberg, Sidney, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 40 ] Weiner, Benjamin, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] Wellborn, Adm. Charles, Jr., 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 103 ] Welles, Sumner, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 11 ] Welzenbach, Donald, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 105 ] West Irian, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] West New Guinea, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 127 ] Westerfield, Samuel, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] Western European Union (WEU), 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 206 ] Westmoreland, Gen. William, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 111 ] Weyl, Fred, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 31 ] Wharton, Clifton, Sr., 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 196 ] Wheelock, Col. John G., III, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] Wheelon, Albert D., 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] White, Katherine Elkus, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] White, Lawrence K., 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 119 ] Whiting, Allen, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 74 ] Wiggins, James R., 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 197 ] Wilkins, Fraser, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 206 ] Wilkins, Roy, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Williams, Eddie N., 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 54 ] Williams, Eric, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Williams, Franklin H., 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] Williams, G. Mennen, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] Williams, Maury, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 82 ] Williams, Murat, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 12 ] Wilson, Charles, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 85 ] Wilson, Harold, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Wirtz, Willard, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Wise, David, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 97 ] Witman, William, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 61 ] Wolf, Joseph J., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 56 ] Women in government, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] Wood, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] Woodruff, William, 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Working Group of 21, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 137 ] World Bank. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development . World Court. See International Court of Justice . Wriggins, Howard, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 167 ] Wright, Marshall, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Yager, Joseph A., 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 7 ] Yarmolinsky, Adam, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 38 ] Yates, Sidney, 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 127 ] Yemen, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] Yost, Charles, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Young, Milton, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 191 ] Young, Whitney, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Yugoslavia, 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Zablocki, Clement, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 156 ] Zambia, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 194 ] Zinchuk, Alexander I., 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Zuckert, Eugene, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 99 ] Zurich Agreement, 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Zwick, Charles, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 19 ]