FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXVIII, LAOS Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XXVIII Laos United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Laos (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations Persons Laos January 1964 to June 1964: U.S. Response to the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Offensives of February and May; U.S. Support for Souvanna Phouma During the April Coup; U.S. Photo Reconnaissance and the Retaliatory Attack of June (Documents 1-100) June 1964 to January 1965: U.S. Support of Operation Triangle; Diplomatic Efforts To Revive the Geneva Settlement; the Beginnings of the Air War Against Infiltration Through the Laos Panhandle (Documents 101-161) January 31, 1965 to December 1967: Demise of the Rightists; Controversy Over Interdiction Strategies; Souvanna’s Visits to the United States (Documents 162-325) January to December 1968: The Fall of Phou Pha Thi; Reassessment of Policy; Laos and the Paris Peace Talks; Increased Bombing in Laos (Documents 326-401) Index Sources Sources The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. When this volume was being compiled, all Department of State records consulted were still under the custody of the Department, and the footnotes citing Department of State files suggest that the Department is the repository. By the time of publication, however, all the Department’s indexed central (or decimal) files for the 1964–1968 period have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period will also be transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II over the next several years. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of Presidents Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of State arranged for access to the many audiotapes of President Johnson’s telephone conversations that are held at the Johnson Library. The first audiotapes became available to the editors in late 1994 (a year after this volume was completed) with most audiotapes following during 1995 and 1996 (after this volume was well into declassification). The editors did not believe that the small portion of taped material relating exclusively to Laos justified any delay in publication of the volume. In 1964, President Johnson discussed Laos on the telephone within the context of Southeast Asia and two of those taped discussions are printed in Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs. The Central Intelligence Agency provides access to Department of State historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that Agency and at the Presidential Libraries. This access is arranged and facilitated by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of identifying the key portions of the intelligence record. In preparing this specific volume, the editor made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House files at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. The second important area of research was the extensive records of the Department of State, both the central files and to a lesser extent the lot files. In Laos the Ambassador had a unique responsibility for coordination of the U.S. and allied military effort against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese in addition to his political and diplomatic responsibilities, thereby allowing him to act as a de facto military commander. This responsibility brought the Ambassador into conflict with the military commanders in Vietnam, General Westmoreland and later General Abrams. The papers of Westmoreland and Abrams were important sources for documenting the military side of this bureaucratic struggle. Averell Harriman was the architect of the Laos agreement of 1962, and although his influence on policy towards Laos under President Johnson was not as great as it had been under Kennedy, his papers at the Library of Congress, especially his telephone conversations, are still an important adjunct depository for information on Laos. Because U.S. policy in Laos had such a strong military component, the editor did extensive research in the records of the Department of Defense (DOD) at the Washington National Records Center at Suitland, Maryland, particularly the records of the Secretary of Defense and his major assistants. The files of the Department of Defense of most value were those of McNamara’s office and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In addition, the official files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense’s cable files at the OSD Historian at the Department of Defense, the McNaughton Files at the Johnson Library, and the papers Maxwell Taylor at the National Defense University provided key supplemental documentation. Laos also had an extremely large intelligence component that included secret air support of the Laos armed forces, covert support of the H’mong and other tribal groups, intelligence gathering and covert sabotage and harassment raids against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and an intelligence assessment controversy about the nature of the North Vietnamese infiltration and U.S. success in preventing it. The files of the Directors of Central Intelligence, most importantly Director John McCone’s, provided invaluable insight into how intelligence and foreign policy interacted in Laos. The files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State provided both finished intelligence and a window into the oversight of covert policy through the records of the 303 Committee. The editor attempted to document the history of the covert paramilitary operations in Laos by providing overview documentation based on files of the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency and other relevant collections. Although two key documents selected for publication on this issue remain classified, the basic outline of the story, if not all the details, is presented here. The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of these records is in process. Many of the records are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12958, under which all records over 25 years old except for any file series exemptions proposed by agencies and approved by the President, should be reviewed for declassification by 2000. Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files . See National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files . These files are either transferred or in the process of being transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park Maryland, Record Group 59. Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240 Files of William P. Bundy as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs after November 1, 1966). EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394 Top secret non-telegraphic files for Laos, 1965–1972. EA/Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 74 D 51 Records of the air war in Southeast Asia, 1963–1970. INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99 National Intelligence Estimates, Special Intelligence Estimates, and related documentation for East Asia and the Pacific, 1953–1969. INR/EAP Files Lot 90 D 165 National Intelligence Estimates, Special Intelligence Estimates, and related documentation for East Asia and the Pacific, 1954–1977. INR/IL (Historical) Files Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460 Files of Ambassador Kohler for 1967–1968 concerning primarily his discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204 Exchanges of correspondence between Heads of Government and the President and the Secretary of State, 1953–1964. Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 355 Memoranda of the Secretary of State’s and Acting Secretary of State’s conversations, 1961–1964. S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139 Files of Walt Rostow and Henry Owen of the Policy Planning Council, 1964–1967. S/S–I Files: Lot 79 D 246 Microfilmed master chronological files of international conferences attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, 1953–1966. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files POL LAOS, general policy and background, Laos POL 1 LAOS, general policy and background, Laos POL 1–1 LAOS, contingency planning and coordination, Laos POL 2 LAOS, general reports, Laos POL 6 LAOS, Lao biographical POL 7 LAOS, visits and meetings of Lao officials POL 8 LAOS, Lao neutralism and non-alignment POL 15–1 LAOS, Lao head of state, executive branch POL 15–4 LAOS, administration of Lao government POL 17 LAOS, diplomatic representation in Laos POL 17–1 LAOS, accreditation of Lao diplomats POL 23–7 LAOS, infiltration and subversion in Laos POL 23–9 LAOS, rebellions and coups in Laos POL 27 LAOS, military operations in Laos POL 27–10 LAOS, chemical warfare (napalm) in Laos POL 27–14 LAOS, truces and cease-fires in Laos POL LAOS–US, general U.S. Laos relations POL 1 LAOS–US, general U.S.-Laos relations POL 15–1 LAOS–US, U.S. and Lao heads of state POL 31–1 LAOS–US, U.S. incursions of Lao boundaries POL 15–1 VIET S, head of state of South Vietnam POL 27 VIET S, military operations in South Vietnam POL 1 ASIA SE–US, U.S. general relations with Southeast Asia POL 27 ASIA SE, military operations in Southeast Asia POL US–USSR, U.S.-U.S.S.R. general relations POL 7 US/HARRIMAN, trips of Averell Harriman POL 7 US/HUMPHREY, trips of Vice President Humphrey DEF 1–1 LAOS, military contingency plans for Laos DEF 6 LAOS, Lao armed forces DEF 6–3 LAOS, Lao air forces DEF 6–6 LAOS, Lao military decorations and awards DEF 1 ASIA SE, general military policy in Southeast Asia DEF 1–1 ASIA SE, military contingency plans in Southeast Asia DEF 7 LAOS–VIET S, military missions and visits between Laos and South Vietnam DEF 6–12 US, U.S.-Lao military maneuvers DEF 19–US, U.S. military assistance DEF 19–2 US–LAOS, reports of U.S. military assistance to Laos DEF 7 LAOS–US, Lao-U.S. military missions DEF 15 LAOS–US, U.S. bases and installations in Laos DEF 17 LAOS–US, U.S. military transportation in Laos FN 1–1 LAOS, financial stabilization of Laos INT 6 PHOTO LAOS, U.S. photographic reconnaissance of Laos INT 2–2, National Intelligence Estimates ORG 7 OSD, visits of the Secretary of Defense Central Intelligence Agency DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–01285A Files of Director of Central Intelligence John A McCone, 1961–1965. DCI (Raborn) Files: Job 80–01285A Files of Director of Central Intelligence William F. Raborn, Jr., 1965–1966. DDO Files: Job 79–207A Files of the Office Directorate of Operations. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. OSD Historian’s Office, Secretary of Defense’s Cable Files Official Records of the Joint Chief of Staff Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson National Security File: Country File, Laos, Vietnam Name File National Security Action Memorandums National Security Council Meetings Memos to the President Files of McGeorge Bundy Files of Walt Rostow Diaries and Appointment Logs President’s Daily Diary White House Central Files Confidential File Subject File George Ball Papers Memoranda of telephone conversations of Under Secretary of State George Ball, December 1963–1969. Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings Notes of meetings prepared by Tom Johnson, 1966–1968. John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President CIA Director McCone’s records of meeting with the President, 1963–1965. Dean Rusk Papers Rusk Appointment Book Paul C. Warnke Papers Papers of Warnke’s predecessor, John McNaughton, 1963–1967 and Warnke’ papers, 1967–1968. William C. Westmoreland Papers Papers of William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306 and FRC 68 A 4023 ISA secret and top secret subject decimal files, 1964. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926 Miscellaneous and sensitive ISA subject decimal files, 1961–1964. OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425 Official secret and top secret subject decimal files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their special assistants, 1964. OSD/Admin Files: FRC 70 A 1265 and FRC 70 A 1266 Official secret and top secret subject decimal files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their special assistants, 1965. OSD/Admin Files: FRC 70 A 4443 Official secret and top secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1966. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648 and FRC 70 A 6649 ISA secret and top secret subject decimal subject files, 1966. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4918 and FRC 71 A 4919 ISA secret and top secret subject decimal files, 1967. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498 and FRC 72 A 1499 ISA secret and top secret subject decimal files, 1968. OSD/Admin Files: FRC 72 A 2467 and FRC 72 A 2468 Official top secret and secret subject decimal files of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, and their special assistants, 1967. OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250 and FRC 73 A 1304 Official secret and top secret subject decimal files of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, and their special assistants, 1968. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. Harriman Papers Special files of W. Averell Harriman for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. National Defense University, Fort NcNair, Washington, D.C. Maxwell Taylor Papers U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. Abrams Papers Back channel messages of General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, 1968–1972. Westmoreland Papers Back channel messages of General William C. Westmoreland, Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1964–1968. Published Sources Documentary Collections U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, respectively. ________Department of State Bulletin , 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968–1969 . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, and 1970, respectively. Memoirs and Official Military Histories The Department of State takes no responsibility for the accuracy of these memoirs nor endorses their interpretation of the events. Anthony, Victor B. and Richard R. Sexton. The Air War in Northern Laos, 1954–1973 (unpublished manuscript). Washington: Center for Air Force History, 1993. Colby, William. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen Year Involvement in Vietnam . Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969 . New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. McNamara, Robert S. (with Brian VanDeMark). In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam . New York: Time Books, Random House, 1995. Rostow, Walt W. The Diffusion of Power, 1957–1972 . New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972. Rusk, Dean (as told to Richard Rusk). As I Saw It . New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990. Stieglitz, Perry L. In a Little Kingdom . M.E. Sharpe, Inc.: Armonk, N.Y. and London, England, 1990. Sullivan, William H. Obbligato: Notes on a Foreign Service Career . New York and London: W.W. Norton &Co., 1984. Van Staaveren, Jacob, Center for Air Force History. Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960–1968 . Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993. Westmoreland, General William C. A Soldier Reports . New York: Doubleday, 1976. Abbreviations Abbreviations A–1 (Skyraider), single engine propeller-driven attack plane with one crew member A–1E, single engine propeller driven attack aircraft with two crew members A–1H, single engine propeller driven attack aircraft A–26, (Invader), twin engine propeller driven, World War II era attack aircraft with three crew members A/A, AA, anti-aircraft; Air America AAA, anti-aircraft artillery AAM, Air America AARMA, assistant army attache ACS, air commando squadron ACW, air commando wing AD, air division AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AID, Agency for International Development AIRA, air attache ALO, air liaison officer AOC, air operations center AP, Associated Press ARMA, Army Attache ARS, air rescue squadron ARVN, Army of the Republic of Vietnam ASOC, Air Support Operations Center B–52 (Statofortress), all weather, intercontinental, strategic heavy bomber with twin turbojet engines and a crew of six B–57 (Canberra), twin engine turbot jet medium bomber with two crew members Bango, codename for U.S, aircraft stationed at Ubon, Thailand, and placed on alert for response to requests from the air attache in Vientiane for interdiction or support of Royal Lao Armed Forces BDA, bomb damage assessment Barrel Roll, codename for interdiction and close air support operations in eastern Laos BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs bns, battalions BOB, Bureau of the Budget BR, Barrel Roll BR/ST, Barrel Roll/Steel Tiger C–7 (Caribou), twin engine, propeller driven, short takeoff and landing aircraft with three crew members C–123, twin engine propeller driven, highwing transport aircraft CAS, controlled American source CBU, cluster bomb unit CC, Communist China CENTO, Central Treaty Organization ChiComs, Chinese Communists CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CIAP, Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress CIDG, Citizens’ Irregular Defense Group CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff CM, chairman’s memorandum COMUSMACV, Commander, U.S, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam CONUS, continental United States CORDS, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support CP, command post CSAF, Chief of Staff, Air Force CS, riot control gas CT, Communist Thai CY, calendar year D/D, destroyed/damaged DEPCHJUSMAG, Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group DEPCMDR, deputy commander Deptel, Department of State telegram DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DJSM, Director of the Joint Staff memorandum DMZ, demilitarized zone DNC, Directorate of National Coordination DOD, Department of Defense DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DDO/EA, Deputy Directorate of Operations, East Asia, Central Intelligence Agency Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DMZ, demilitarized zone DOD, Department of Defense DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam DTG, date/time/group Duck Soup, plan to intercept and destroy aircraft resupplying Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese forces in Laos Dye Marker, anti-vehicular and anti-personnel campaign based primarily on mines and sensors E &E, emergency evacuation EA, East Asia EAP, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State Embtel, Embassy telegram ER, economic research E.S.T., Eastern Standard Time EXCOM, executive committee Exdis, exclusive distribution F–4 (Phantom), twin engine turbojet, all weather, supersonic tactical fighter bomber with two crew F–5 (Freedom Fighter), twin engine, turbot jet, supersonic light tactical fighter aircraft with one or two crew F–100, single engine turbojet, supersonic aircraft FA, Forces Armees (Armed Forces) FAC, Forward Air Controllers FAL, Forces Armees de Laos (Lao Armed Forces) FAR, Forces Armees du Royaume (Royal Armed Forces) Farmgate, codename for 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron based at Ben Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State FEOF, foreign exchange operations fund FW, free world FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information GM, Group Mobile (usually 3 infantry battalions and 1 105 mm howitzer) GNU, Government of National Union GVN, Government of Vietnam H.E., His Excellency H.H., His Highness HQ, headquarters ICC, International Control and Supervision Commission IM, intelligence memorandum INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State INR/RFE, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IO, Bureau of International Organizations Affairs, Department of State IRG, Interdepartmental Review Group ISA, International Security Affairs IVS, International Volunteer Service J–2, MACV, Intelligence, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam JCS, Joint Chief of Staff JGS, Joint General Staff JSCM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum KIA, killed in action KM, kilometer L–19, single engine propeller driven, high wing light observation aircraft with one or two crew (later designated O–1 Bird Dog) Leaping Lena, South Vietnamese Air Force drops of South Vietnamese intelligence gathering teams along the Ho Chi Minh Trail L/FE, Assistant Legal Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Limdis, limited distribution LOC, lines of communication LPLA, Lao People’s Liberation Army Lucky Dragon, U–2 aircraft reconnaissance of the borders of Laos and North and South Vietnam MACSOG, Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observation Group MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam MAP, Military Assistance Program MG, machine gun MIA, missing in action MILAD, military adviser mm, millimeter MOD, Ministry of Defense MR, military region MSQ, a radar navigation device Muscles Shoals, air supported anti-vehicular and anti-personnel system using acoustic and seismic sensors (Igloo White after July 1968) NARC, National Army Revolutionary Committee NCO, non-commissioned officer NE, northeast NKP, Nakhom Phanom NLF, National Liberation Front NLHX, Neo Lao Hat Xat (political arm of the Pathet Lao) nm, nautical mile Nodis, no distribution Noforn, no foreign distribution NSA, National Security Agency NSAM, National Security Action memorandum NSC, National Security Council NVA, NVNA, North Vietnamese Army O–1 (Bird Dog), single engine propeller driven, high wing light observation aircraft with one or two crew OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs OB, order of battle OCI, Office of Current Intelligence OP, OPLAN, operations plan Opord, operations order OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense PACAF, Pacific, Air Force PACOM, Pacific Command PACFLT, Pacific Fleet PARU, Police Aerial Resupply Unit PAVN, People’s Army of Vietnam PCA, positive control area PD, Presidential determination PDJ, Plain of Jars (Plaine des Jarres) PF, Prairie Fire PFAO, Prairie Fire Area of Operations PL, Pathet Lao PL/VM, Pathet Lao/Viet Minh POLAD, political adviser Popeye, plan for weather modification in Southeast Asia POW, prisoner of war Prairie Fire, air supported, U.S.-led South Vietnamese reconnaissance teams sent to seek targets and assess damage to the Ho Chi Minh Trail (formerly Shining Brass) PRC, People’s Republic of China PRU, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit PTT, post, telegraphs, and telephones, QM, quartermaster RB–57, B–57 aircraft modified for reconnaissance RDC, Revolutionary Development Corps recce, reconnaissance RF–8 (Crusader), single engine turbojet supersonic jet fighter modified for reconnaissance RF–101 (Voodoo), reconnaissance version of the F–101 twin engine turbojet aircraft with one crew member RLAF, Royal Lao Air Force RLG, Royal Lao Government RO, Requirements Office RT–28, T–28 aircraft modified for reconnaissance RTA, Royal Thai Army RTAF, Royal Thai Air Force RTG, Royal Thai Government RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Air Force or Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces S, Office of the Secretary of State SA, systems analysis SACSA, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities SAR, search and rescue SAW, special air warfare SEA, Southeast Asia SEACOORD, Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Secto, indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State septel, separate telegram Shinning Brass, air supported, U.S-led South Vietnamese intelligence probes of the Ho Chi Minh Trail (renamed Prairie Fire after March 1, 1967) SIP, selected interdiction point SLAM, seek-locate-annihilate-monitor; concept operation combining strategic air, tactical air, and Prairie Fire operation teams SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate SOG, Studies and Observation Group Southpaw, codename for a plan to conduct U.S. Special Forces-led raids into the Laos Panhandle using ARVN forces of one to three battalion strength SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State S/LD, secret/limit distribution SP, Souvanna Phouma S/P, Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State S/S, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State Steel Tiger, U.S. Air Force and Navy aerial interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail S/VN, Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs SVN, South Vietnam SWS, Seaboard World Services T–28, single engine propeller driven 1950s era trainer, crew of two, modified for counterinsurgency warfare Tally Ho, intensified interdiction campaign against the southern Ho Chi Minh Trail TACAN, tactical air navigation (radio air navigation system) Tiger Hound, codename for a task force, a sub-command of the 2d Air Division, responsible for interdiction in southeastern Laos Tosec, indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State TS, Top Secret TSQ–81, portable version of MSQ–77 (a radar navigation device) U, unclassified U–2, single engine, high altitude turbojet reconnaissance aircraft with one crew member U–10 (Super Courier), single engine propeller driven short takeoff and landing aircraft with two crew and room for two passengers UK, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland UN, United Nations UPI, United Press International USAID, U.S. Agency for International Development USAF, U.S. Air Force USG, United States Government USIB, United States Intelligence Board USSF, United States Special Forces USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations VC, Viet Cong VN, Vietnam VNAF, Vietnamese Air Force VP, vice president Water Pump, codename for Detachment 6, First Commando Wing (USAF) Westpac, Western Pacific Whiplash, codename for U.S. F–105 aircraft at Korat, Thailand, on alert for rapid response to requests from the Air Attache in Vientiane for interdiction and/or support of FAR WIA, wounded in action Yankee Team, U.S. Air Force and Navy air reconnaissance and suppressive fire for northern and southern Laos Persons Persons Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 20, 1966 Barbis, George M., Officer-in-Charge of Lao Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs until July 1966 Bell, David E., Administrator of the Agency for International Development until June 1966 Berger, Samuel D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, July 1965–February 1968 Blouin, Rear Admiral F.J., USN, Director of the Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1965–1966 Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France until February 9, 1968; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs after February 21, 1968 Bounlent Colonel Saycocie, Chief of Logistics, Royal Armed Forces; unsuccessful coup leader, January 1965 and October 1966 Bowman, Richard C., staff member, National Security Council 1964–1966; liaison with Joint Chiefs of Staff Brown, Harold, Secretary of the Air Force after October 1, 1965 Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 28, 1966 Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until March 14, 1964; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern (later East Asian and Pacific) Affairs after March 16, 1964 Bunker, Ellsworth, Ambassador to Vietnam after April 5, 1967 Burchinal, Lieutenant General David A., USAF, Director of the Joint Staff, February 24, 1964–July 31, 1966 Butler, Richard (Rab) A., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until October 1964 Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until September 8, 1965 Clifford, Clark, Secretary of Defense after March 1, 1968 Cline, Ray, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency until January 17, 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the Director Colby, William E., Chief, Far Eastern Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency until 1967 Cooper, Chester L., member of the National Security Council Staff, November 1964–April 1966; Special Assistant to Ambassador at Large Harriman, September 1966–1967 Dawee, Chulasapya, Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of Thailand De Gaulle, Charles, President of France Dexter, John B., Deputy Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, July 1964 to August 1965 Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury until March 1965 Dobrynin, Anatoliy, F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States Ewing, Richard T., member of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State August 1965; Country Director for Burma and Cambodia, July 1966–August 1967 Forrestal, Michael V., member of the National Security Council Staff until April 1964; Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnam July 1964–1965 Gaud, William S., Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development February 1964–August 2, 1966; thereafter Administrator Giap, see Vo Nguyen Giap Ginsburgh, Robert N., member of the National Security Council Staff, 1966–1968 Godley, G. McMurtrie, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs after March 1968 Goodpaster, Lieutenant General Andrew J., USA, Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 1–March 31, 1967 Green, Marshall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until June 4, 1965; thereafter Ambassador to Indonesia Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Habib, Philip C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs after June 1967 Hamilton, William C., Deputy Director, Far East Region, Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, October 1964–July 1966; Laos Country Director, July 1966–September 1967; Supervisory Political Officer at the Embassy in Thailand after September 1967 Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 17, 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director for Plans until April 1965; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, April 28, 1965–June 30, 1966; thereafter Director of Central Intelligence Herz, Martin F., Country Director for Cambodian-Laotian Affairs, Department of State, from January 1968 Hilsman, Roger, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until March 14, 1964 Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Home, Alexander Frederick Douglas, British Prime Minister until October 1964 Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Humphrey, Herbert H., Vice President of the United States Hurwitch, Robert A., Deputy Chief of Mission at Vientiane from January 1967 Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until July 12, 1964; Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, July 1964–September 1965; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1, 1965–October 9, 1965; Ambassador to Japan after November 8, 1966 Kennedy, Robert, F., Attorney General until September 1964 Khamking Souvanlasy, Ambassador to the United States after April 1966 Khampan, Prince Tiao, Lao Ambassador to the United States until February 1966 Khanh, see Nguyen Khanh Kirnassovsky, Boris Y., Soviet Ambassador to Laos October 1964–June 1968 Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until November 1966; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs November 1966–December 1967 Kong Le, General, Royal Armed Forces, Commander of the Lao Neutralist military forces until October 1966 Kouprasith, Abhay, General, Royal Armed Forces, Commander Military Region Five Law, Colonel William, Army Attache in Vientiane Leuam Insisiengmay, Lao Deputy Prime Minister LeMay, General Curtis E., Chief of Staff of the Air Force until January 31, 1965 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Ambassador to Vietnam until June 28, 1964; and from July 31 1965 to April 25, 1967 Ma, Thao, General, Commander of the Royal Lao Air Force until September 1966; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Royal Air Force until October 1966 McCain, Admiral John S., Jr., Commander in Chief Pacific after August 1968 McCone, John A., Director for Central Intelligence until April 28, 1965 McDonald, Admiral David L., Chief of Naval Operations until August 1, 1967 McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense until February 29, 1968 McNaughton, John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 1, 1964–July 19, 1967 Manning, Robert J., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs April 11, 1962–July 31, 1964 Mansfield, Mike, Senator from Montana (D) and Senate Majority Leader Martin, Graham A., Ambassador to Thailand until September 9, 1967 Momyer, General William, Commander, 7th Air Force 1966–1968 Moyers, Bill D., Deputy Director of the Peace Corps; thereafter Special Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff of the White House 1964–January 1967; White House Press Secretary July 1965–January 1967 Nguyen Khanh, Major General, Army of the Republic of Vietnam; Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam, February 4–October 30, 1964; Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam and Chairman of the Armed Forces Council December 18, 1964–February 21, 1965 Nitze, Paul H, Deputy Secretary of Defense after July 1, 1967 Nouphet, Colonel, Lao Royal Armed Forces, Commander of the Group Mobile 18 Ouane Ratrikoun, General, Commander in Chief, Royal Armed Forces of Laos Oudom Souvannavong, President of the Lao National Assembly 1966–1967 Oudone Sananikone, General, Chief of the General Staff, Royal Armed Forces of Laos Oun Sananikone, Deputy in Lao National Assembly Phasouk Somly, General, Lao Royal Armed Forces; Commander of Military Region Four Phoui Sananikone, President of the Lao National Assembly until September 1965 and again in 1968 Phoumi Nosavan, General; Minister of Defense of Laos until May 1964; Deputy Prime Minister until July 1965 Rapacki, Adam, Polish Foreign Minister Rostow, Walt W., Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council until March 31, 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President Rowan, Carl, Director, United States Information Agency, February 28, 1964–July 10, 1965 Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Savang Vatthana, King of Laos Sharp, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant, USN, Commander in Chief Pacific until July 31, 1968 Siho Lamphouthacoul, General, Chief, Lao Directorate of National Coordination/Chief of the Lao National Police until February 1965 Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, Chief of State of Cambodia Sisouk na Champassak, Lao Minister of Finance Slutz, Robert F., member of the Laos country office, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs January 1964–June 1968 Smith, Bromley, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Solbert, Peter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Souphanouvong, Prince, leader of the Pathet Lao and Deputy Prime Minister of Laos Sourith Don Sasorith, General, FAL, Commander, Military Region One until September 1966; thereafter Commander of the Royal Lao Air Force Souvanna Phouma, Prince, Prime Minister of Laos and after May 2, 1964, Minister of Defense Steadman, Richard C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 1967–1968 Stevenson, Adlai E., Representative to the United Nations until July 14, 1965 Sullivan, William H., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 1964; Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to the Secretary of State, March–November 1964; Ambassador to Laos after November 25, 1964 Swank, Emory C., Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Laos July 1964–June 1967 Sylvester, Arthur, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, March 1964 Symington, Stuart, Democratic Senator from Missouri Thanom, Kittikatchorn, Prime Minister of Thailand Taylor, Maxwell D., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until June 30, 1964; Ambassador to Vietnam, July 14, 1964–July 30, 1965; thereafter Special Consultant to the President Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large, until December 26, 1966; thereafter Ambassador to the Soviet Union Thomson, James C., Jr., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until June 1964; member of the National Security Council Staff, July 1964–September 1966 Trueheart, William C., Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, May 1964–August 1966; Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, after June 1967 Unger, Leonard, Ambassador to Laos until December 1, 1964; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs January 1965–August 11, 1967; thereafter Ambassador to Thailand Vang Pao, General, Lao Armed Forces, Commander of Military Region Two and head of the Meo (H’mong) guerrilla forces Valenti, Jack, Special Consultant to the President until May 1966 Vance, Cyrus R., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 28, 1964–June 30, 1967 Vo Nguyen Giap, General, People’s Army of Vietnam; Minister of National Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Warnke, Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs after August 1, 1967 Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, June 20, 1964–July 2, 1968 Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army until July 2, 1964; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after July 3, 1964 Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director, United States Information Agency until August 1, 1965 Wright, Marshall, senior member of the National Security Council Staff 1967–1968 January 1964 to June 1964: U.S. Response to the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Offensives of February and May; U.S. Support for Souvanna Phouma During the April Coup; U.S. Photo Reconnaissance and the Retaliatory Attack of June January 1964 to June 1964: U.S. Response to the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Offensives of February and May; U.S. Support for Souvanna Phouma During the April Coup; U.S. Photo Reconnaissance and the Retaliatory Attack of June 1. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Scott) to the Special Group Washington, January 17, 1964. Source: Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. 2. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Saigon Washington, February 12, 1964, 2:29 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Special Category Messages, Vol. I, 11/63–1/65. Secret; Exclusive; No Night Action. Sent to Saigon exclusive for Lodge, Harkins, and the Station Chief; repeated exclusive to Honolulu for Felt, Department of State for Hilsman, OSD for McNamara, JCS for Taylor and Anthis, and the White House for McGeorge Bundy. 3. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 15, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Neubert and Hilsman on February 15. Copy sent to Harriman. 4. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 24, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, 01 Feb-27 Feb, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby, who apparently also attended the meeting. 5. Memorandum From the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Colby) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, February 25, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, 1 Feb-27 Feb, 1964. Secret. Submitted with Helms’ concurrence. 6. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 25, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. Secret. Drafted by Neubert on February 25 and cleared by Sullivan. A copy was sent to Harriman. 7. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, undated. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, Asia 092, Jan-May 1964. Secret. There was no date on this memorandum but there was an indication that it was received in McNamara’s office at 12:30 p.m., February 26. A note on the source text indicates McNamara saw it on February 26. 8. Editorial Note 9. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 28, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. Secret. Drafted by Green. There is a note on this memorandum indicating that Rusk saw it. 10. Editorial Note 11. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 1, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Phom Penh, and Saigon. 12. Editorial Note 13. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 3, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok also for DEPCHJUSMAG, CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon also for Harkins, and Phnom Penh. 14. Editorial Note 15. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Department of State Washington, March 16, 1964, 12:05 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. This telegram was a relay of CAS Saigon 5161, sent to the Department of State Exclusive for Sullivan and Stoneman, to the White House Exclusive for Forrestal, to OSD Exclusive for McNaughton, to JCS Exclusive for Anthis, and to ISA Exclusive for Blouin. Repeated to Vientiane and Honolulu. 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, March 16, 1964, 9:08 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Harriman, and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Saigon as telegram 1448. 17. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 19, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Saigon. 18. Editorial Note 19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, April 2, 1964, 7:08 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Barbis, cleared by Trueheart and Sullivan, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, London, Paris, and CINCPAC. 20. Telegram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State Hong Kong, April 9, 1964, 5:39 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Confidential, Priority, Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon, Taipei, and Vientiane. 21. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Fitch) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, April 9, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Admin Files: FRC 7425, Laos 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw this memorandum on April 10. 22. Situation Report No. 1 Washington, April 19, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret. No drafter indicated, but it was prepared in the Operations Center of the Department of State. 23. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 19, 1964, 10:10 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, 4/30/64–5/20/64. Secret. Drafted by Colby on April 20, who mistakenly characterized this as an NSC meeting. It was not an official numbered meeting of the National Security Council. 24. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Saigon Washington, April 19, 1964, 1:02 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; No Distribution. Drafted and approved by Ball. 25. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Saigon Washington, April 19, 1964, 1:58 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Green, cleared in substance by McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, cleared in draft by U. Alexis Johnson and Thompson, and approved by Ball. Repeated immediate to Vientiane. 26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, April 19, 1964, 4:34 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Green, cleared in draft by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared in substance by Forrestal, and approved by Harriman. 27. Transcript of a Teletype Conference Between the Ambassador to Laos (Unger) and Secretary of State Rusk April 19, 1964, 7:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Mar/June 1964. Secret; Limited Distribution. Unger was in Vientiane; Rusk was in Saigon. The date of the teletype conference is Saigon time, 13 hours ahead of Washington time. 28. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Saigon, April 20, 1964, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 9:30 p.m. April 19. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and USUN. 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, April 20, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok. Received at the Department at 7:46 a.m., April 20. Passed to the White House, CIA, OSD, and USUN. 30. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, April 21, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. III, 4/1–30/64. No classification marking. A note on the source text indicates that the President read it on April 21. 31. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, April 21, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, Memos, 4/16–4/30/64. Secret. There was no indication that the President saw this memorandum. 32. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff Washington, April 21, 1964, 6:50 p.m. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Chronology of Telephone Conversations, April–May 1964. No classification marking. 33. Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, April 22, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, Memos, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by the Office of Current Intelligence. 34. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 22, 1964, 10:07 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Henry and approved in Rusk’s office on May 2. The time of the meeting was taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The source text indicates it was Part II of III. The meeting was held in Rusk’s office. 35. Summary Record of the 528th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, April 22, 1964, 4:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. I, Tab 9. Top Secret. 36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, April 22, 1964, 7:43 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Trueheart, cleared in draft by McNaughton and Forrestal, cleared in substance by Poats, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok for DEPCHJUSMAG and to CINCPAC for POLAD. 37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, April 25, 1964, 5:51 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, McNaughton, and in substance by Rusk; and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 38. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, April 25, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, Memos, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Top Secret. 39. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, April 26, 1964, 1 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and USUN. Handled as Limdis at the instruction of S/S. 40. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 29, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Memos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Top Secret. 41. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, April 29, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, Memos, 4/16/64–4/30/64. No classification marking. 42. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, April 29, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Memos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret. 43. Memorandum for the Record Washington, April 29, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Apr-31 May, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on April 30. 44. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 29, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret. 45. Summary Record of the 531st National Security Council Meeting Washington, May 5, 1964, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 3. Top Secret. 46. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 5, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Apr-31 May 64. Secret. Drafted by Colby on May 6. 47. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 15, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Saigon. 48. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 17, 1964, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash. Repeated Immediate to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC. Received at the Department of State at 2:34 a.m., May 17. Passed to the White House, OSD, JCS, and CIA at 3:36 a.m. 49. Special Report of the U.S. Intelligence Board’s Watch Committee Washington, May 17, 1964, 4:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/17/64–5/20/64. Secret. This report was a result of a special meeting of the Watch Committee held at 3 p.m. on May 17 and was transmitted to members of the U.S. Intelligence Board under cover of a memorandum from Frank J. Benny, Director of the National Indications Center at the Pentagon, on May 17. 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, May 17, 1964, 6:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by William Bundy; cleared by McNamara, McNaughton, Harriman, Rusk, and the White House per McNamara. Also sent Flash to Bangkok and Immediate to Saigon. Repeated Immediate to Paris, London, Canberra, Wellington, Karachi, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, Warsaw, Moscow, and CINCPAC. 51. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 19, 1964, 9:40 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Vietnam. No classification marking. 52. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 20, 1964, 8:55 a.m. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Chronology, Telephone Conversations, April–May 1964. Transcribed in Harriman’s office. 53. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 20, 1964. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, Box 25. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by W.Y. Smith. 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 20, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash. 55. Memorandum by the Chief, Far Eastern Division, Directorate for Plans (Colby) and the Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support, Directorate for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cooper) Washington, May 21, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, May, 1964. Secret. 56. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 22, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC for POLAD, London, Paris, New Delhi, Canberra, Moscow, and Phnom Penh and pouched to Ottawa. 57. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary (Bundy) Washington, May 23, 1964. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Special Papers, Apr/June 1964. Secret. 58. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. V, Memos, 5/21/64–5/31/64. Secret. Also sent to Taylor, William Bundy, McNaughton, and Clay. 59. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 24, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC, London, and Paris. Received at the Department of State at 8:17 a.m., May 24 and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and USUN at 4:30 p.m. 60. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council Washington, May 24, 1964. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Special Papers, Apr/June 1964. Top Secret. 61. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 24, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, April 64. Secret. Drafted by Colby on May 24. Bromley Smith prepared an account of this meeting, which he noted began at 11 a.m; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 369–374. 62. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 24, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary on May 25. 63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, May 24, 1964, 9:47 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Vientiane. 64. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council Washington, May 26, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. V, Memos, 5/21/64–5/31/64. Secret. Drafted by Bundy on May 26. 65. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, May 28, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret. 66. Telegram From the White House to the Johnson Ranch in Texas Washington, May 29, 1964, 1:12 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. II, 5/64–6/64, Memos (B). Top Secret; Exdis. 67. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Bangkok Washington, May 29, 1964, 8:24 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent also to New Delhi. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by Ball. 68. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Bangkok, May 30, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Rusk was in Thailand for a brief visit after attending Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s funeral in New Delhi, May 28–30. Kosygin also attended the funeral. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) 69. Summary Record of Meeting Honolulu, June 2, 1964, 8:30–11:50 a.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 72 A 3470, Southeast Asian Strategy. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. President Johnson’s major advisers met in Honolulu, June 1–2, primarily to discuss Vietnam. 70. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 3, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos, 6/1/64–6/14/64. Secret. 71. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 4, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memo for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 8. 72. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 5, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, Laos 000.1—Sensitive (381 Laos), 1964. Top Secret; Sensitive. 73. Memorandum for Discussion Washington, June 5, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Special Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I. Top Secret. Prepared for the President for a meeting on June 5 at 6 p.m. A copy of this memorandum was attached to a June 5 memorandum from McNamara to the President, entitled “South Vietnam Action Program”; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 461–464. A title page to that memorandum indicates that the paper and its attachments were prepared in the Department of Defense for the use of the President at a meeting on June 5, at 6 p.m. The President met with Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and McNamara from 6:52 to 7:43 p.m., June 5. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the discussion has been found. 74. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 5, 1964. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Mar/June 1962. Top Secret. 75. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 5, 1964, 5:15 p.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 8. The time of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book; according to the President’s Daily Diary, Rusk met with the President at 6:52 p.m. (Both Johnson Library) 76. Summary Record of the 533d Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, June 6, 1964, 10:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 6, 6/6/64, Laos. Top Secret. Prepared by Forrestal. 77. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 6, 1964, 10:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with President, 1/4/64–4/28/64. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary. Copies were sent to Carter and Helms. McCone mistakenly describes this as an Executive Committee of the NSC meeting. It is a formal numbered NSC meeting. For Forrestal’s account of the meeting, see Document 76. 78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, June 6, 1964, 6:09 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared in substance with McNamara and U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, and Saigon. 79. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, June 7, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. II, Memos (A), 5/64–6/64. No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text that Johnson saw it. 80. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 7, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on SEA, Vol. I. Top Secret. Drafted by Forrestal on June 10. 81. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 7, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 May–31 Oct 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone on June 8 and transcribed by his secretary. For Forrestal’s account of this meeting, see Document 80. 82. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, June 8, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 9:48 a.m., June 8. 83. Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson Washington, June 8, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. Colby and Cooper prepared a separate although substantively similar memorandum for the record of this meeting, June 8. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with President, 1 May–31 Oct, 1964) 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, June 8, 1964, 9:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Rusk and William Bundy; cleared with Manning, Harriman, Sullivan, and U. Alexis Johnson; and approved by Rusk and William Bundy. Repeated to Geneva for Ball. 85. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff Washington, June 9, 1964. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Secret; No Distribution; Personal. 86. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson Washington, June 9, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos 6/1/64–6/14/64. Personal and Confidential. 87. Draft Paper Prepared for a White House Meeting Washington, June 10, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. V. Top Secret. No drafter is indicated on the source text, but at the White House meeting (see Document 88) Forrestal summarized the paper and explained its rationale. 88. Summary Record of Meeting Washington, June 10, 1964, 5:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Apparently drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The President did not attend. Dean Rusk returned to the Department of State from this meeting at 7:25 p.m. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) 89. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 10, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 11. Colby mistakenly describes this as an NSC meeting. For Bromley Smith’s version, see Document 88. 90. Memorandum From the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff (Rostow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 11, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. III, Memos B, 6/64–8/64. Top Secret. 91. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 11, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. III, Memos B, 6/64–8/64. Top Secret. 92. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, June 11, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC for POLAD, London, Paris, Saigon, USUN, the White House, CIA, JCS, and OSD. 93. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, June 12, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. V. Top Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw it. 94. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, June 12, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos, 6/1/64–6/14/64. Top Secret. 95. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 15, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 16. The meeting lasted from 6 to approximately 7:20 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) 96. Memorandum From the Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support, Directorate of Intelligence (Cooper) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, June 15, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, June 1964. Top Secret. 97. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Johnson New York, June 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos, 6/15/64–6/30/64. Top Secret. 98. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 17, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July, 1964. Secret. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary. 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland Washington, June 17, 1964, 8:43 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy and cleared by George W. Jaeger, Staff Assistant, Bureau of European Affairs, and Rusk. Repeated to Vientiane, London, Moscow, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, Saigon, Bangkok, USUN, and CINCPAC. 100. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, June 23, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, New Delhi, Saigon and COMUSMACV, London, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House,JCS, OSD, CIA, and USUN at 7:55 a.m. June 23. 1. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Scott) to the Special Group 1. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Scott) to the Special Group 1 Washington, January 17, 1964. SUBJECT Report of the Subcommittee on United States Support of Foreign Paramilitary Forces At a meeting of the Special Group (5412) on November 14, 1963, 2 General Taylor proposed that an ad hoc subcommittee be formed to review United States programs involving support of foreign paramilitary forces. Fourteen countries were listed as having internal security problems and having received U.S. support for paramilitary organizations. Of these fourteen countries, however, only two (Laos [ less than 1 line of source not declassified ]) are now receiving covert U.S. support for their paramilitary forces. The remaining twelve countries receive overt U.S. support for their paramilitary forces. Accordingly, the ad hoc subcommittee has limited itself to a review of the covert paramilitary support programs in Laos [ less than 1 line of source not declassified ]. Reports on these programs are attached at Tabs I and II, 3 respectively. Conclusions Paramilitary forces being aided by the U.S. covertly in Laos [ less than 1 line of source not declassified ] are remote from the urban centers, diffused throughout rural areas, and small in number in relation to the regular military forces. Consequently, they are unlikely to develop into power centers rivalling the established governments or to be involved directly as a major influence in a struggle for power in the foreseeable future. Aid given to Lao [ less than 1 line of source not declassified ] paramilitary forces has not lessened the confidence of these governments in the United States or been inimical to United States interests. Recommendation The Subcommittee recommends that the Special Group (5412): 1. Accept this report on covert United States aid to paramilitary organizations in Laos [ less than 1 line of source not declassified ]; and 2. Refer overt United States programs of paramilitary assistance supported by DOD and AID in the remaining countries listed in the minutes of the meeting of the Special Group (5412) on November 14, 1963, to the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) with the suggestion that it review these programs in the light of General Taylor’s memorandum on this subject, dated October 15, 1963. 4 Joseph Scott Tab I Laos The U.S. is engaged in overt and covert support to paramilitary forces in Laos but in large part the elements being aided are remote from the centers of power and unlikely to be involved in any future power struggle. Military assistance is being provided overtly to the regular non-communist forces, at the request and with the approval of Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma. These regular forces include the conservative Forces Armees du Royaume (FAR) under General Phoumi and the neutralist forces loyal to Prince Souvanna Phouma under General Kong Le. This overt assistance is in accordance with Article 6 of the Protocol of the Geneva Agreements, although we attempt to avoid publicizing it. Covert support is given to paramilitary guerrilla and intelligence collecting groups which consist primarily of tribal members. General Phoumi is, in general, familiar with our assistance to these groups but not in detail. Although Prince Souvanna is generally aware of our activities in this area, he is less so than Phoumi. Paramilitary Forces The principal paramilitary forces in Laos are those receiving covert U.S. support through CIA. In addition, however, certain organizations of the FAR can be considered to have a paramilitary character. These are the Auto Defense de Choc (ADC) units and the Directorate of National Coordination (DNC). CIA Supported Covert Paramilitary Program The genesis of this program stems from high level U.S. Government approval in late 1960 and early 1961 in response to a recommendation by the U.S. Ambassador in Laos that CIA enlist tribal support to fight communism. The main effort in this program has been development of the Meo, the largest non-Lao ethnic group in Laos, as an effective guerrilla force and the provision of plausibly deniable U.S. air support for the program. Since the program’s inception CIA has worked with the two key Meo leaders, Touby Lyfong and Vang Pao. Vang Pao, the commander of the Meo forces, is a regular FAR officer and the Meo forces are technically considered to be FAR ADC units. As authorized by the Special Group in June 1963, this program has expanded to a present force of approximately 19,000 armed Meo guerrillas (23,000 authorized) engaged in village defense and guerrilla activities against the Pathet Lao. [ 7 lines of source text not declassified ] In addition to the Meos, CIA has developed, with Special Group approval, paramilitary and intelligence assets among the Yaos in northwest Laos (currently 1700; 2500 authorized) and the Khas in south Laos (currently 400; 1,000 authorized) and Lao in central Laos (currently 1,200; 2,000 authorized). The latter assets (Lao in central Laos) operate under FAR cover. In support of the above forces CIA has employed covert air support designed to fulfill resupply requirements, as well as meet FAR and neutralist paramilitary and military requirements. This air support, conducted by an ostensibly private and commercial company, has been able to continue operations in Laos under USAID contractual arrangements and through the flexibility of CIA’s cover and funding mechanisms. During the development, employment and support of the above covert tribal paramilitary program in Laos, CIA has provided World War II weapons and associated ammunition; salary and subsistence and miscellaneous support items. The budget for the Laos tribal program for FY 1963 was $11,625,000 and for FY 1964 $14,008,000. ADC The FAR ADC units, which are not part of the Meo ADC force, have a total strength of about 9,000 and are essentially home guard or militia-type military units concerned with local village or urban defense. On occasion, however, they have been used as regular forces. The ADC’s are considered to be part of the FAR and come under its organizational command. Thus, General Phoumi controls these units, as he does the regular FAR troops. Phoumi provides some support to the ADC’s from US military assistance but the amount is probably minimal. The neutralists have also begun recently to develop some ADC elements which will presumably be controlled and maintained by the regular neutralist forces under Kong Le. DNC The Directorate of National Coordination is an organization of the FAR charged primarily with security and police responsibilities. (A national police force has not been reconstituted as yet.) In addition to acting as the police force in Vientiane and other areas, the DNC is engaged in intelligence, customs and border control activities on behalf of the FAR. DNC units are stationed in the few cities and large towns and penetrate slightly into the country side in scattered gendarmerie posts of four or five men. The DNC numbers some 7,800 men under Col. Siho, of which 3,600 are engaged in police and 4,200 in military-type activities. Three battalions of the latter in the Vientiane area are the most important elements of the DNC in terms of any political involvement. As part of the FAR and because of Siho’s relationship with him, General Phoumi controls the DNC. Power Rivalries The basic power rivalry in Laos is between the pro-Communist Pathet Lao (PL) and the non-Communist Lao. Although rivalries continue to exist between the neutralist and conservative factions, the aggressive PL posture toward the neutralists since a year ago has resulted in a more cooperative neutralist-conservative relationship, especially between Souvanna and Phoumi, and also between the military in the field. Rivalries also exist within each of the two non-Communist factions. Growing restiveness has been reported within conservative ranks. It is generally recognized, however, that any attempt to create a new power alignment among the non-Communist leadership requires U.S. support if it is to succeed. We have made our position clear to all concerned that the U.S. continues to support Prime Minister Souvanna and the Geneva settlement and we consider any changes in the existing setup inimical to U.S. and Lao interests. Nevertheless, the danger always exists that some ambitious or misled group might attempt to upset the present fragile balance. A coup attempt could, for example, come from within the FAR ranks by generals disillusioned with Phoumi’s leadership. It could also result from a power play by Col. Siho and the DNC, although this would probably require support by other FAR elements. General Phoumi claims to have the situation under control. We can expect, however, to continue to hear rumors about such coup plotting. In addition, rivalries between neutralist military leaders will continue to produce rumors about efforts of one neutralist group to gain ascendancy over Kong Le’s position. These moves, however, among conservative or neutralist groups, involve primarily regular military forces. The danger of an attempt to gain power by the principal paramilitary group, the Meo, is more remote. The Meo, as all tribal groups in Laos, are isolated from the country’s political arena and are not integrated into Lao society. They are located away from the main centers of the country, living in scattered villages at the higher elevations (the Yao and Kha tribal groups are even more isolated and too few in number to pose a threat). Moreover, the Meo are subject to U.S. guidance and direction. The development of the Meo as a rival center of armed power with political objectives in a national Lao context does not seem to be a realistic possibility. The main problem posed by the Meo, and all other tribal groups in Laos, is the need for their eventual integration into Lao society and identification with the Lao nation. Phoumi is beginning to recognize this, as is Meo leader Vang Pao who has recently also established a working relationship with Kong Le in the Plaine des Jarres area. Other Lao leaders, however, including Souvanna, continue to view the Meo and other tribal peoples in the traditional Lao manner of the tribal people being separate and apart from the Lao. Souvanna even seems to feel that military support for the Meo could lead to a greater autonomous status for them. He has expressed opposition to the use of Thai in support of the Meo. In terms of U.S. interests, however, the Meo will continue to play an essential and useful military role as an anti-Communist guerrilla force. At the same time it is important to continue efforts to impress on the Meo the need for national identification with Laos and the Lao government. The first steps in this respect give some reason for encouragement, although a better relationship with and acceptance by Souvanna is still essential. 1 Source: Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 A memorandum of that meeting is ibid. 3 Tab II is not printed. 4 Taylor’s memorandum of October 15, 1963, has not been found. The Special Group accepted these recommendations at its meeting of January 23. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Meetings) 2. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Saigon 2. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Saigon 1 Washington, February 12, 1964, 2:29 p.m. 00931. Joint State/DOD/CAS message. Ref: CAS Saigon 4293. 2 National Security Action Memorandum No 273 dated 26 November 63 3 contains a paragraph, no 8, which addresses itself to operations into Laos from South Vietnam. This paragraph makes it clear that operational responsibility for “such undertakings” should pass from CAS to MACV. This was a clear directive concerning the transfer of responsibility for cross border operations. Subsequently, CINCPAC message exclusive for Gen Harkins, DTG 302350Z, containing CINCPAC’s comments on Oplan 34B–64, 4 stated that Oplan 34B–64 had been well received and that there was a need for CAS Vientiane and MACV/CAS Saigon to work together to develop a combined plan for actions in Laos. CINCPAC concluded with the request that MACV initiate discussions of these operations with CAS Saigon and advise results. On 21 December, the decision was made at the Secretary of Defense level that DOD would not recommend operations across the Laos border pursuant to MACV Oplan 34B–64 because the political risks would exceed the probable results. However, the Secretary of Defense noted that highly effective CAS operations from within Laos along the Lao frontier should be expanded and the Kha operation developed, at least to cover this area, for intelligence purposes as the first stage. This decision was transmitted to Vientiane and Saigon by CAS Washington on the same date. This was amplified in a subsequent CAS message from Washington on 17 January to Saigon 5 which made two principal points: (1) that Vientiane had authority to expand its own operations in areas adjacent to South Viet nam, and (2) that CAS Saigon would limit its role in the cross border field to that of advisor to MACV in any future MACV planning for cross border operations into Laos from South Vietnam. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Special Category Messages, Vol. I, 11/63–1/65. Secret; Exclusive; No Night Action. Sent to Saigon exclusive for Lodge, Harkins, and the Station Chief; repeated exclusive to Honolulu for Felt, Department of State for Hilsman, OSD for McNamara, JCS for Taylor and Anthis, and the White House for McGeorge Bundy. 2 In this joint Embassy-MACV-CAS telegram, February 4, the Station in Saigon reported that no paramilitary cross border operations into Laos were being conducted under U.S. auspices, nor were any planned for early implementation. It asked for a review of the status of those operations. (Ibid., Laos, Vol. I, 11/63–4/64) 3 Printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. IV, pp. 637 – 640 . In addition to the transfer from CIA to MACV, paragraph 8 suggested that a plan should be developed and submitted to “Higher Authority” for covert military operations up to a line 50 kilometers inside Laos, along with political plans for minimizing the international hazards of such an undertaking. The plan was to have a “redefined method of political guidance,” since timing and character of these operations could have an “intimate relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos.” 4 This telegram outlining plans for cross border operations has not been found. 5 Not further identified. 3. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk 3. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 15, 1964. SUBJECT Laos The Pathet Lao—unquestionably supported by North Vietnamese forces—have recently made new advances in central Laos. They have forced the neutralist and conservative forces off the strategic Na Kay Plateau, which is an important link in the routes southward towards Viet-Nam, and moved to within 15 miles of the Mekong River port of Thakhek. They can take Thakhek at will. Although the Pathet Lao action began as a response to moves initiated by Phoumi, they have gone well beyond the level of activity that had been tacitly accepted as permissible under the umbrella of the Geneva Accords. At the very least, these actions are a probe designed to see how far the Geneva framework can be warped in favor of further Communist encroachment. They have been accompanied by a substantial increase in Viet Minh presence and Communist capabilities in the Plaine des Jarres area as well. If we fail to react, the Communists are likely to use this improved military capability with increasing aggressiveness in ways which must damage our position not only in Laos but in South Viet-Nam. We should not view an increased level of Communist activity in Laos as an isolated phenomenon. The Communist side almost certainly views the situation in all of Southeast Asia as one of change and opportunity. From the Communist point of view the Free World position is in disarray: Recurring coups in South Viet-Nam and American admissions that the military situation there is not good; continued speculation in the Western press about neutralist solutions for the area, which has received impetus from General De Gaulle’s formulas for ending hostilities in the area; and apparent US indecision on how to respond to Prince Sihanouk’s efforts to obtain guarantees of Cambodian neutrality by threatening to turn to Communist China. All of those who today seek to reduce or eliminate the US position in Southeast Asia—the Communist Chinese, the French, the North Vietnamese, the Cambodians—appear to have one view in common: the United States is either unable or unwilling to exert its vast power effectively to defend its positions in Southeast Asia. And in this, the Communists may see an opportunity for decisive action. For all these reasons, we must, in my judgment, respond promptly and firmly to Communist initiatives in central Laos. We should consider encouraging further Thai reinforcements along the Mekong backed up by visible preparations to introduce US Marine landing battalions and air elements into Thailand. I request that you authorize me to undertake an appropriate interagency discussion for such a course of action on an urgent contingency basis. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Neubert and Hilsman on February 15. Copy sent to Harriman. 2 Rusk initialed his approval. Forrestal provided McGeorge Bundy a copy of this memorandum under cover of a February 16 note in which Forrestal suggested that Bundy “may wish to tell the President. I think he would eventually want a meeting to consider plans which are developed.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. I, Memos, 11/63–4/64) 4. Memorandum for the Record 4. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, February 24, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting on Proposed Action Paper for Laos PARTICIPANTS Assistant Secretary Hilsman, Mr. Green, Mr. Neubert, Mr. Barbis, Mr. Hannah—State Mr. Solbert, Colonel McCrea, Colonel Jackson, General Clay—Defense Mr. Forrestal—White House Mr. Myers—CIA Summary It was agreed to revamp the objectives of the State Department draft 2 on what the movement of U.S. forces to northeast Thailand was expected to accomplish so that the JCS could decide what was required. This new paper, attached also contains recommended action inside Laos for CIA action. 1. Mr. Solbert opened the discussion by saying that he was confused by the State Department paper and wanted to know from Secretary Hilsman what he really wanted to do in Laos. Secretary Hilsman said that there were several objectives: (a) cause the Communists to pause in their aggressive actions; (b) worry them more about North Vietnam. There was no intention of moving U.S. forces into Thailand to actually get them involved in the Mekong valley. The move was a political one for the purposes of being a deterrent and to increase American capability in South- east Asia at a time when the U.S. was thinking about more strenuous action in North Vietnam. 2. This type of response did not satisfy the DOD representatives. General Clay was insistent that these were only words and there was no credibility left in the idea of deploying military forces to Thailand. Further, if such forces were deployed they were of no use in Thakhek. Secretary Hilsman and Marshall Green both tried in vain to explain to General Clay the political advantages of such deployment as a move against the Communists and in favor of the Thais. It was also suggested that U.S. forces in Thailand might have a very positive effect on Sihanouk. General Clay still thought this would accomplish nothing in Laos. Mr. Myers mentioned that the arrival of the U.S. forces in Thailand as a political gesture combined with the actions to be taken inside Laos could have some effect. They would strengthen Laotian forces in being so that the nibbling tactics of the Communists might be stopped and so that a more positive political program might get under way inside Laos to serve as a motivating force for the Lao Army as well as for the population at large. 3. Mr. Forrestal agreed with this point but felt that the military complaint about the actual objective of the U.S. military role had to be clarified so that the JCS could make a determination of what steps could be taken. Secretary Hilsman mumbled something about we would at least buy some time. General Clay accepted this as an improvement in clarifying the objective; that it was only to bide time and not to do anything serious. Hilsman went on to explain that he was concerned about how we did these moves, because they should add to our general capability in Southeast Asia and make it possible to initiate measures in North Vietnam. He feared, however, that if we began to carry out attacks in North Vietnam prior to some victories in the Delta, that the North Vietnam program would come under Congressional attack by Senator Mansfield and others and that there would be an up-surge in Congressional support for the DeGaulle position for Vietnam. Mr. Hilsman explained, apropos of nothing, that he was much more in favor of doing more about North Vietnam, contrary to what some people may think. (He was obviously referring to the Stewart Alsop column in the Saturday Evening Post, which said Hilsman did not favor attacks on North Vietnam, to prove that he was really a red-blooded fellow.) 4. There was some general thrashing around over the business of what guise would be required to withdraw U.S. forces from Thailand once they were there. Nothing of any importance was decided. It was now almost 11:00 a.m. and it was agreed that the next step was to revise the State paper which should be done in the afternoon. The DOD representatives, Mr. Green, Mr. Neubert and Mr. Myers went to Mr. Green’s office for a few minutes to get into some more of the specifics of the changes in the draft. Before anything was said, however, Mr. Hilsman burst in the room, emphasizing again his interest in North Vietnam operations, and said that since the situation was changed, his view had also changed. “If the Communists lunge, we hit them in North Vietnam.” With a cheery goodbye he left the room. 5. The conference in Mr. Green’s office went nowhere as the General and two Colonels made loud noises about the value of the old July 1963 Phase I, II, and III plan for Laos, 3 which they thought was more of the point and which gave the military more room. This discussion was adjourned around 12:15 p.m. and Mr. Neubert and Mr. Myers carried on the conversation for a few more minutes. It was agreed that the part of the paper that had to be approved by JCS should merely outline the military action and that the part inside Laos, which would essentially have to be carried out through CIA operations and defended hamlets, should not get mixed up in what the JCS had to approve. Mr. Neubert was in agreement with this point. It was agreed that others would begin drafting the paper at 1:30 and Mr. Blaufarb arrived to participate in the afternoon drafting session. 6. The new draft, 4 attached, is an improvement, except that it leaves aside the question of Lao village security, which FE will raise at the 24 February meeting. 5 WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, 01 Feb-27 Feb, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby, who apparently also attended the meeting. 2 Reference is to a previous draft of attachment 1 to Document 6 . 3 For the plan as described to the President, July 29, 1963, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 1033 – 1040 . 4 Apparent reference to attachment 1 to Document 6 . 5 Not further identified. 5. Memorandum From the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Colby) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 5. Memorandum From the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Colby) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 1 Washington, February 25, 1964. SUBJECT The Attached Draft Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Stabilizing the Situation in Southeast Asia REFERENCE NSAM 256, 31 July 1963 2 1. This memorandum presents for the DCI’s approval a draft Memorandum for the President 3 proposing a new series of actions intended to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia. It follows up on reference NSAM 256 (attached) which authorized certain actions in Phase II of the Laos Action Program. 2. The memorandum, which we understand is planned to be submitted to the Standing Group or Executive Committee of the National Security Council on 26 February 1964, first points out that recent events in Southeast Asia have given the Communists what may appear to them to be an opportunity for “broad, forward movement.” The paper sets forth a series of actions intended to disabuse the Communists of this impression, discourage them from attempting further advance in Laos, and give them reason to believe the U.S. is prepared to escalate the conflict in order to defend its positions in Southeast Asia and reverse the recent course of developments. 3. The paper essentially recommends that the President authorize the Secretaries of State and Defense to carry out parts of Phase II of the program of graduated actions contained in the reference NSAM 256. It is made clear that a delegation of authority only is requested for implementation when the Secretaries of State and Defense agree such action to be appropriate and that it is not intended to implement the actions at this time. 4. With regard to Laos the proposed actions are largely intensifications of activities currently underway. Three of the proposed actions would be the responsibility of the Agency to implement if requested to do so by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The actions involve considerable expansion of covert operations in Laos and will certainly call for increased expenditure of funds and the assignment of some additional personnel. It is impossible to give a specific estimate of such increases at this time because of the generality of the memorandum. 5. During the drafting of this memorandum, Agency representatives urged upon the drafting group the inclusion of a course of action calling for an expansion of the Defended Village Program in Laos, already undertaken under Phase I. The other members of the drafting group felt that this being merely an expansion of a program currently authorized it need not be mentioned as a specific course of action for which additional Presidential authority was required. We recommend that the DCI call the Standing Group’s attention to this matter when the memorandum is submitted to it, as the earlier approved action has actually not been fully implemented due in part to an emphasis on avoiding violations of the Geneva Agreements. 6. With respect to actions to be undertaken outside of Laos, the most significant are the deployment of additional U.S. combat forces to Thailand and the movement of an aircraft carrier group to the coast of South Vietnam. In addition certain diplomatic actions are proposed which in effect consist of bringing our friends into our confidence and gaining their support for these actions and warning our opponents of the seriousness of our purpose. WE Colby 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, 1 Feb-27 Feb, 1964. Secret. Submitted with Helms’ concurrence. 2 Not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 62 D 317, NSAM 256, Laos Planning) For discussion of this planning document, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 1036 – 1040 . The recommended actions in conjunction with NSAM 256 as it applies to Laos are in Document 6 . 3 See attachment 1 to Document 6 . 6. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk 6. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 25, 1964. SUBJECT Southeast Asia: Your Meeting at 4:00 p.m., February 26 On February 15 you authorized me to undertake inter-agency discussion of the desirability of strengthening the US posture in Southeast Asia, particularly in connection with recent developments in Laos. 2 Attached is a draft Memorandum For The President entitled “Stabilizing the Situation in Southeast Asia” for discussion at your meeting at 4:00 p.m., February 26 with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy. 3 The draft has the informal approval of the agencies concerned; the purpose of your discussion is to obtain final inter-agency approval of the version to be forwarded, at your discretion, to the President. The situation within Laos itself is now somewhat less threatening than it was a week ago, although the Communists continue to occupy the area in central Laos into which they had been moving. Our discussions of the problems confronting us in Southeast Asia have, however, only re-enforced our judgment that we should move promptly to counteract the widespread speculation on neutralist solutions for the area and to reassert US determination to exert its power effectively to frustrate Communist advances there. The continued flagrant Communist violation of the Geneva Accords 4 in Laos provides us with the clearest and most understandable immediate issue on which to base actions to these ends. The draft Memorandum sets forth a broad program of political, military and covert actions designed to have an immediate impact upon the situation in Laos as well as to convey a mounting sense of US determination to do whatever is necessary in Southeast Asia generally to defend Free World interests. This program is not specifically aimed at preparing us for any particular military courses of action with respect to Laos, South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam which may commend themselves to us at some point in the future. Nor is it designed to pre-judge decisions on such military courses of action. If the program is successfully carried out, we would expect the Communist side to be substantially more cautious in taking actions which could force us to make these difficult decisions and we would expect our friends in the area to take new heart. In any case, we will be in no worse a position to face the possible difficult decisions on military courses of action if events eventually require them. We do not feel that it is possible at this point to be too precise on the details of the various actions included in the program. Close and continuing consultations between the agencies concerned will be required as the various steps are taken. At all times we must keep in mind the sensitivities and interests of our friends who are most directly concerned, particularly the Thai and the Lao. Undoubtedly, we shall have to tailor some of our actions to fit their desires. What is important, however, is the general concept of coordinated political, military and covert actions—within the limits set forth in the Memorandum—as a means of achieving a limited and essentially political end. I also attach a paper setting forth—in broad outline—our view of how we might expect the proposed program to be implemented. Attachment 1 5 Draft Memorandum for the President SUBJECT Stabilizing the Situation in Southeast Asia The Communists may well see an opportunity for broad forward movement in the recent course of events in Southeast Asia. The political climate is dominated by widespread speculation on neutralist solutions for the area sparked by France’s recognition of Communist China and DeGaulle’s statements as well as Prince Sihanouk’s efforts to obtain international guarantees of Cambodian neutrality by threatening to turn to Hanoi and Peiping. The Communists may well believe that the United States is unwilling to exert its power effectively to defend its positions in Southeast Asia. They, as well as DeGaulle and Sihanouk, must be disabused to any such ideas; and our friends, especially the Thais and Vietnamese, must be reassured as to our determination and intentions. In our view the recent Communist advances in central Laos highlight the continuing erosion of the situation in Laos. We have a clear and understandable immediate issue—the continued flagrant Communist violation of the Geneva Accords. Objectives With respect to Laos, we must undertake a series of coordinated political and military actions designed (1) to discourage the Communist side from continued advances against the neutralist/conservative forces, (2) to give us additional time to augment the efforts we have been making to strengthen and consolidate areas under the control of neutralist/conservative forces, and (3) to preserve our freedom of action in responding to any further actions undertaken by the Communists. The actions we propose do not involve committing U.S. forces to Laos. In the broader context of Southeast Asia, our actions must be designed to give the Communist side reason to believe that we are prepared to escalate the conflict in the area in order to defend our positions there. Our actions should in no way foreclose options we may later wish to pursue with respect to South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam as well as Laos. Communist concern should be reinforced by gradually accumulating evidence of our willingness to support actions against North Viet-Nam itself under the presently approved plan (OPLAN 34–A–64) 6 or on a more extensive scale. We should make it clear that our actions stem from our concern over the situation in Southeast Asia as a whole, and that our actions with respect to Thailand and Laos are indeed coordinated with our assistance to South Viet-Nam. While none of the actions we propose is decisive in itself, a number of them taken together should represent some actual increase in United States military capability within Southeast Asia and demonstrate our concern over the course of recent events together with our determination to reverse that course. Reconvening of Geneva Conference? We do not propose to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Laos at this time. Nevertheless, the Communist side could do so, and Prince Souvanna might if he became extremely discouraged over the situation in Laos. Moreover, at some future time, it might actually be in our interest that a conference be held. In any event, the measures which we are proposing would tend to put us in a stronger position to participate effectively in such a Conference should one occur. Regional Cooperation In view of Souvanna’s key importance in the Geneva settlement, it is essential to coordinate closely with him, obtaining his support or tacit acquiescence. Because Thailand is an avenue for introducing U.S. power, we must obtain full Thai cooperation and support, consulting in advance and treating the Thai as partners. This coordination is particularly important because both Souvanna and the Thai may have reservations on varying specific actions to be taken. Their reaction will be conditioned by the intensity of Communist pressures and our willingness to meet them squarely. The actions we propose will not in themselves cause Prince Sihanouk to accelerate his timetable to threats unless they are executed in such a manner as to cause suspicion that they are directed against Cambodia. Recommendations: 1. That we resume the US program of graduated actions which were contained in the memorandum for the President attached to NSAM 256 of July 31, 1963. 7 Specifically, it is recommended that the following actions be taken promptly (exact timing to be determined by the Department of State with the concurrence of the Department of Defense): a. With regard to Laos: (1) Encourage selective use of 6 Lao T–28s. 8 (2) Expand use of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] other specialist covert teams. (3) Resume use of South Vietnamese border patrols to conduct guerrilla operations in south Laos against the Viet Minh. (4) Further enlarge guerrilla units in Laos and expand operations in enemy held territory. (5) Expand sabotage operations against the North Vietnamese within Laos and in areas of North Viet-Nam adjacent to Laos by guerrillas launched from Laos. (6) Conduct high level aerial photo reconnaissance of Laos 9 (timing as mutually agreed by Department of State and Department of Defense). b. With regard to the deployment of U.S. forces, deploy promptly to Thailand the remainder of the F–100 squadron, approximately 12, which currently has a detachment of 6 there. A decision as to the deployment of additional forces, with composition to be recommended by DOD, will be deferred until after the forthcoming conference in Viet-Nam. c. It is recommended that the current Joint US/Thai Special Warfare Exercise in Thailand be expanded or extended as feasible. 2. That, together with the foregoing measures, we move in the diplomatic arena (a) to reassure our allies as to our intentions to stand by US commitments in Southeast Asia, (b) to indicate that the US is considering further measures for coping with Communist aggression in the area, (c) to produce evidence of North Vietnamese intervention in Laos and South Viet-Nam. Among the diplomatic measures to be taken, we will: (a) Publicize fully Communist actions in Laos in violation of the Geneva Accords. (b) Consult with Souvanna Phouma in order (1) to convince him of our intention to prevent the Communists from destroying the Geneva settlement and to uphold the position of his government and (2) to obtain his support or tacit acquiescence in our course of action. (c) Consult fully with Thailand keeping in mind Thai sensitivities regarding decisions affecting their interests taken unilaterally by the US. Continue to encourage the Thai to strengthen their military forces in Northeast Thailand. (d) Coordinate with Thailand the extent and character of SEATO approval and involvement. (e) Obtain maximum support and contributions from the UK, Australia and New Zealand. (f) Urge the British to go to the Soviets again urgently and demand Co-Chairmen action in support of Souvanna. If the Soviets continue to stall, the British should issue a unilateral statement in reply to Souvanna’s appeal. (g) Follow up the British approach with a direct approach of our own to the Soviet Co-Chairman. We should also speak to the Poles. (h) Inform the Indian and Canadian governments and their ICC Commissioners of our projected actions, and continue to press them for more forceful action in the ICC. 3. Since the solution to the Laotian problem is intimately linked with the solution to South Viet-Nam and its relationship to North Viet-Nam, it is recommended that the Laotian and South Vietnamese problems be discussed further in conjunction following the return of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor from Saigon. Attachment 2 10 Paper Prepared by the Department of State IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM FOR STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA If the program is approved, we envisage implementing it along the following lines: 1. Begin immediately to publish in increasing detail information about the Communist actions in Laos during the past two years in violation of the Geneva Accords. 2. Initiate prompt discussions with the Thais in order to gain their full understanding of our broad purposes and our intent to use the situation in Laos as the immediate cause for action. Our discussions with the Thais will cover the question of how to manage the extent and character of SEATO acquiescence, approval, or involvement in the actions we will jointly be taking with Thailand. We should be prepared to modify our proposed program in order to obtain maximum Thai collaboration and understanding. Although Ambassador Martin believes that Thai cooperation will depend upon our assurances that we are prepared to enter Laos if necessary, it should be possible to obtain their full cooperation on the general concept we pursue without explicit statement as to what we might do in response to hypothetical Communist advances in Laos. We should, of course, be prepared to indicate that the option of using US forces in Laos remains open. It will be absolutely essential that no leak regarding our proposed program occur before discussions with the Thais have begun. 3. After consulting with the Thais, we should tell Souvanna Phouma of the general nature of our proposed actions with emphasis upon our determination to be ready, under whatever circumstances, to defend the position of his government under the Geneva Accords. Since he will not believe that the situation in Laos itself really demands this kind of action on our part, we should be prepared to philosophize with him about the threat which Communist activities centered in North Viet-Nam offer to Free World positions in Southeast Asia generally. 4. Having talked to the Thais and while we are discussing matters with Souvanna Phouma, we should seek maximum political and military support for our actions from the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. The manner of approaching these governments will depend upon the agreements we have reached with the Thais regarding SEATO involvement. 5. Carefully structuring our actions to the degree of understanding we obtain from Souvanna Phouma, we will begin promptly to implement the Phase II actions with respect to Laos. Those actions which are entirely covert will be pushed vigorously as soon as authorized. Others, such as offensive use of T–28s, will demand careful tailoring to Souvanna’s sensibilities as the situation develops. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] 6. Movement of F–100s into Thailand will take place following full consultations with the Thais. Movement of any other US forces into Thailand will follow decisions reached after the visit of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to the area. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. Secret. Drafted by Neubert on February 25 and cleared by Sullivan. A copy was sent to Harriman. 2 See Document 3 . 3 See Document 8 . 4 For texts of the Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos (the Geneva Accords), July 23, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075–1083. 5 No drafter indicated. On February 26 the draft memorandum was sent to Vientiane as telegram 664, to Bangkok as telegram 1438, and Saigon as telegram 1319 for comment by those embassies. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 6 See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 4 – 5 . 7 See footnote 2, Document 5 . 8 Actions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of Group A of Phase II. [Footnote in the source text. The footnote in the source text appears on paragraphs (1)-(5) below.] 9 Action No. 1 of Group C of Phase II. [Footnote in the source text.] 10 No drafter indicated. 7. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 7. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, undated. I–21710/64 SUBJECT Memorandum for the President Concerning Actions which Can Be Taken with Respect to Laos Toward Stabilization of the Situation in Southeast Asia Subsequent to your discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject, the Department of State revised the Draft Memorandum for the President 2 in preparation for your meeting with the Secretary of State at 1600 hours today. The revised Memorandum (Tab A) forwarded to us by State calls for early implementation of the measures listed in the previous memorandum except that U.S. force deployment at this time is limited to the remainder (12 aircraft) of the F–100 squadron which currently has a 6-aircraft detachment in Thailand. A decision on additional U.S. deployments is to be deferred until your return from Saigon. The new draft is in accord with views of ISA and, with one exception, those of the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs recommend the resumption of low level aerial reconnaissance over Laos. 3 This action, however, would be an overt violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements, 4 and its implementation would require a policy determination to the effect that the U.S. is no longer willing to permit unilateral violation by the Communist side. Arguments for the deployment of the F–100’s at this time are: a. It might have some impact as an indication of our willingness to take action in the area. b. It is keyed specifically to Laos. c. It would probably be more acceptable to the Thais than would U.S. ground force deployments. d. It represents a threat against both PL/VM troop movements and Laotian supply routes from North Vietnam. Arguments against are that by itself the action does not mean very much, it may have lost some credibility because we have done it before without taking further steps, and it is a card we might want to play later. On balance, the argument which seems most persuasive is that deployment of U.S. aircraft would be a positive action which we could take immediately and which might have some deterrent impact on the PL/VM. Peter Solbert 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, Asia 092, Jan-May 1964. Secret. There was no date on this memorandum but there was an indication that it was received in McNamara’s office at 12:30 p.m., February 26. A note on the source text indicates McNamara saw it on February 26. 2 See attachment 1 to Document 6 . 3 In JCSM–159–64, JCS to McNamara, February 26. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, Asia 092, Jan-May 1964) 4 See footnote 4, Document 6 . 8. Editorial Note 8. Editorial Note On February 26, 1964, Johnson administration officials met at the Department of State to discuss Southeast Asia and particularly Laos. Attending for the Department of State were Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, Assistant Secretary Hilsman, Special Assistant Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary Green, and Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research Denney. Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary William Bundy, General Lucius Clay, and General Rollen Anthis attended as representatives of the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Director McCone and Chief of the Far Eastern Division William Colby attended for the Central Intelligence Agency. Director Rowan and Deputy Director Wilson attended for the U.S. Information Agency; and Administrator Bell and Assistant Administrator Poats attended for the Agency for International Development. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) In a February 27 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Hilsman briefly described the meeting: “It is my impression that, at our meeting yesterday, there was general agreement upon the desirability of strengthening the overt US military posture in Thailand in ways designed to counteract the increasing trend towards speculation about US intentions in Southeast Asia and the possibility of neutralist solutions. At the time [the meeting of February 26], we could not and did not feel that the situation in Laos necessarily injected an element of urgency into our considerations.” Hilsman stated in the February 27 memorandum to Rusk that, in light of the fall of the Phou Khe mountain complex commanding the southern approach to the Plain of Jars to Pathet Lao artillery attack on February 26, it was now time to introduce U.S. ground troops into Thailand. Hilsman urged that Rusk discuss the idea with Secretary McNamara. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE) 9. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk 9. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 28, 1964. SUBJECT Southeast Asia: Deterioration in Laos Following your February 26 meeting with Secretary McNamara and Mr. McCone on Laos, we have received reports from Ambassador Unger that the Phou Khe mountain complex commanding the southern approach to the Plaine des Jarres has fallen to Communist artillery assault. This Communist success puts them in a position to move effectively against the Plaine des Jarres and to dominate the routes southward toward Tha Thom. Although Souvanna has already asked the ICC to take appropriate action to restore the situation as soon as possible, we can have no assurance that the Communist side will not continue to advance against neutralist/conservative positions in both northern and central Laos. This is a serious new development. It is typical Pathet Lao/Viet Minh tactics to strike and then wait for our reaction; if we do not react, then they strike again. Conversely, when we have reacted, these Communist salami tactics have been checked. Under the circumstances, I believe that we cannot afford to delay on a decision to introduce additional US forces into Thailand, bearing in mind that the other recommendations in our Laos action plan will not be sufficient to warn and deter the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh. We understand from Bill Bundy this morning that Secretary McNamara shares our concern over this latest Communist advance at Phou Khe and is prepared to move ahead with quietly introducing 12 more F–100’s into Thailand, bringing our squadron there to full strength of 18 aircraft. I agree that we should proceed with the F–100 deployment, although we would first have to notify the Thais in the context of our larger plan for Laos. However, I also believe that we should now make the decision to proceed with some US ground force deployment to Thailand. I do not suggest that it be a full battle group but could, as McGeorge Bundy suggested at our meeting, be half that size. It might also be desirable that the ground forces be introduced shortly after the F–100s. Such phasing would give us more time to discuss and coordinate with the Thais, without holding up on the F–100s. Recommendation: 2 That at lunch with the Secretary of Defense and McGeorge Bundy today you discuss with him the following recommendations: 1. That we now decide to deploy promptly to Thailand 12 more F–100 aircraft to bring the squadron to full strength of 18; 2. That we decide as soon as possible in favor of moving some ground forces to Thailand at an early date following the introduction of the F–100s; 3. That we authorize Ambassador Martin immediately to consult fully with the Thais along the lines indicated in the draft memorandum to the President, including our intentions with regard to the introduction of F–100s and ground forces. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. Secret. Drafted by Green. There is a note on this memorandum indicating that Rusk saw it. 2 In telegram 1461 to Bangkok, February 28, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to inform the Thai Government that it was prepared, if Thailand agreed, to send 12 additional F–100’s to bring up to full strength the U.S. fighter detachment in Thailand. Although not authorized to make further commitments, the Embassy should consult with Thai leaders on the situation in Laos. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 10. Editorial Note 10. Editorial Note At the instruction of the Department of State, Ambassador Foy D. Kohler met in Moscow with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko on February 28, 1964, and informed him that the United State was disappointed with the Soviet Union’s performance as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. Ambassador Kohler stated that the United States was particularly disturbed that the Soviet Union did not support Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s call for International Control Commission action against Pathet Lao attacks at Phou Khe in Xieng Khouang province, a clear violation of the cease-fire. Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union stood by the Geneva Accords; and that current problems in Laos were basically minor internal differences. When Kohler took Gromyko to task for this statement, the Soviet Minister—according to Kohler—stated “somewhat sheepishly” that “it seems we are doing what we can.” The report of the Kohler-Gromyko conversation is in telegram 2690 from Moscow, February 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) On February 27 at 4 p.m. in Washington, Secretary Rusk took advantage of another conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to make a similar protest about lack of Soviet support for Souvanna Phouma and performance of the Commission. Two days later on February 29, Under Secretary Harriman handed Dobrynin a formal note protesting the Pathet Lao attacks and International Control Commission’s failure to act. On March 25 Dobrynin handed Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy (who had replaced Hilsman on March 15) a note rejecting the U.S. note’s interpretation. An account of the Rusk-Dobrynin conversation of February 27 is ibid., POL US–USSR; the text of the U.S. note is in telegram 2590 to Moscow, February 29, ibid., POL 27–14 LAOS; and a paraphrase of the Soviet note of March 25 is in telegram 2823 to Moscow, March 26, ibid., POL 27 LAOS. 11. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 11. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 1, 1964, 7 p.m. 927. Deptel 664. 2 Question raised refDeptel cannot be answered solely in context immediate situation. Required first that we ask ourselves whether we intend continue consider ourselves bound by Geneva Accords, working for realization neutralist solution and basing our policy on preservation at least appearance Government National Unity with our principal support going to neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Following comments based on assumption (which we favor—see Embtel 846) 3 that this continues to be our policy, even though we may be prepared shade it somewhat more than in past; if this not the case, what follows of course does not apply. Numbered para 3 under recommendations refers to “solution” to Laotian problem. Given ground rules under which we have been operating here I have not considered it realistic to expect that we could arrive at any definitive solution in Laos at any early date. Instead we have been working here toward limited objective of: 1) Keeping Geneva structure intact as far as possible against day when some progress could be made toward full pacification and unification of country and acceptance throughout territory of authority Vientiane government; impossible guess how remote this may be but certainly unlikely as long as there is no solution South Viet-Nam; 2) Meanwhile concentrating on friendly (i.e. conservative-neutralist) zone of Laos to preserve its integrity as far as possible and build up its stability and internal security. Thus immediate problem of Laos is one of preserving integrity and stability this zone against limited Communist military and para military actions which have as their present objective not taking over entire friendly zone but rather paring that zone down so that all that remains are points taking of which would in Communist view precipitate unacceptable reaction, particularly by US. Central threat to this zone is Viet Minh support, without which PL containable. If fundamental US objective in Laos is simply to defend Mekong lowland because of importance to security Thailand then our policy should be to keep Communists clearly on notice that encroachments on places like Thakhek will provoke reaction from us which unacceptable to them. Beyond that we would not need to be unduly concerned about loss hinterland territory as long as towns and connecting roads along Mekong, including Ban Houei Sai area, in friendly hands and there remains government in Vientiane which in critical situation could ask for free world help and provide foothold on Laotian side Mekong as base of operations for such help. If fundamental objective goes beyond that outlined in preceding paragraph and envisages preservation of Laos as country in friendly hands (albeit neutral) then we can ill afford to see Communist nibbling proceed much beyond what it has already taken. Otherwise friendly zone will be cut down to point where inadequate provide base for regeneration. Presume this describes what is in fact our present holding policy. If fundamental objective for present period also includes interdiction use Ho Chi Minh Trail by getting it out of Communist and into friendly hands, then present policy entirely inadequate; moreover I am persuaded this cannot be accomplished without commiting substantial US forces to Laos. In contemplating actions to be taken Laos we must focus again on philosophy Prime Minister Souvanna in view his key importance to question. His fundamental objective for Laos has been and remains to remove it from field of East-West conflict. While he does not wish communism for Laos, and presumably also not for other countries Southeast Asia, he has much more confidence in possibility avoid this through neutralization and policies such as those pursued by Sihanouk than we do. While he may share our concern over situation Southeast Asia as a whole he is not sympathetic to having our actions with respect to Laos coordinated with those regarding Thailand and South Viet-Nam and influenced by very different international status and orientation those countries. (See my letter Secretary McNamara dated Dec 26, 1963). 4 Souvanna believes story in Lao proverb that when buffaloes fight it is grass which gets hurt and however much he now understands more clearly nature of Communist threat and tactics, he remains persuaded Laos will only suffer more from being made scene of escalated conflict. I would therefore expect him adamantly opposed recommendation A–5 for launching guerrillas from Laos against North Vietnamese targets in DRV. Whenever we consider adopting stronger military actions in Laos we also come up against inescapable fact that friendly armed forces in Laos are woefully limited in their capabilities, as has recently been amply demonstrated. Believe over time they can be made capable of protecting friendly zone Laos before too much more whittled away, if they have support such as recommended Embtel 846 5 and if PL is not too strongly supported by Viet Minh. Therefore actions are called for which would discourage this support, such as prompt and strong ICC activity and, if possible, application pressure on North Viet-Nam by USSR and military responses to evident Viet Minh involvement, for example by expanded use T–28s. At same time we must recognize that as long as South Vietnamese problem involved, every action taken in Laos which in any sense appears to threaten availability to DRV of Ho Chi Minh Trail can be expected to bring sharp reaction, albeit limited, which will seek to keep clean zone of trail and push friendly forces back toward Mekong. Plaine des Jarres appears to be special case both because important psychologically to PL and as means for Communists keep dagger poised, pointing both toward Vientiane and Luang Prabang. With regard to entire range of actions posed refDeptel and having in mind considerations described above I must express doubt as to whether these will have any decisive effect on course of events Laos, although at same time I find it hard to propose other measures we could undertake which would have beneficial effect which do not at same time go beyond bounds set by terms of neutral solution and risk conflict with attitude of Souvanna Phouma. Military and para military measures (recommendations (A)-1 through 6), to extent they concern internal situation in Laos rather than interdiction Ho Chi Minh Trail, would probably help begin gradual improvement friendly forces mentioned above. Would not, however, under present circumstances rule out further gains by Communist forces nor could I give any assurance they would seriously deter Viet Minh, from their support of PL when they wish apply it, and to extent measures appear threaten use of Ho Chi Minh Trail they will probably provoke stronger Viet Minh action. ( Note : Other factor not mentioned refDeptel which bears strongly on capability local forces is use or non-use of American pilots and aircraft in situation where they would be in violation Geneva Accords; present strict rules this regard not infrequently mean withholding indispensable support in critical military situations. I continue agree Dept’s judgment this must be our policy but do not wish to have overlooked limitations which it imposes.) With specific reservations set forth septel, 6 concur in proposals (A)-1, 2, 4, and 6 but not in 5 to extent it involves incursions into DRV. (A)-3 will be commented on separately. As noted septel recommendations along line of (b) for deployment US forces Thailand appear to us as useful general deterrent actions to put DRV again on warning. Recommendation (c) would presumably have same effect. All of diplomatic measures proposed appear useful although recent Soviet, Polish and Indian actions give us little confidence that we can expect much improvement in those quarters. As regards recommendation 2–B, do not believe we can equate Phoumi with Souvanna Phouma. Phoumi can be expected go along with virtually all proposals leading toward escalation since we believe his fundamental objective is to bring about deeper US involvement, including use of US troops. If we followed his advice but were not ultimately prepared commit US troops, then I believe we would be inviting disaster. I believe it is Phoumi’s honest conviction, as well as a position motivated by personal considerations, that in last analysis only military action with strong free world support can save Laos from communism. I believe we must clear with Souvanna all actions which are likely to come to his attention; otherwise we would quickly shatter considerable confidence he now has in our sincere and unreserved support of neutralist solution for Laos. I believe this includes virtually everything proposed except perhaps some actions in most remote southeastern areas of country within perhaps twenty-five kilometers of South Vietnamese frontier. Most matters need clearance from Phoumi from practical point of view since cooperation FAR and local officials frequently involved; moreover Phoumi understandably resents US acting unilaterally in Laos as of course does Souvanna, if not more so. Low level photo reconnaissance flights seem to me almost sure to become known and I would not consider their initiation without consultation with Souvanna, with risk this entails his refusal. Comments on effective use T–28s will be contained septel. 7 Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Phom Penh, and Saigon. 2 Telegram 664 to Vientiane, February 26 (ibid.), transmitted the text of attachment 1 to Document 6 for comment. The references to paragraphs and subparagraphs are the same in both the attachment and the telegram. 3 In telegram 846 from Vientiane, February 9, Unger suggested that while the “Geneva umbrella” handicapped U.S. actions in coping with Communist efforts to subvert the settlement of 1962, at the same time, it “serves to keep Laos under an international spotlight, to provide some instruments for bringing international pressure to bear, to broaden the support for its economy and its neutrality, and, I believe, to circumscribe to some degree Communist choices for action.” Unger stated that the “balance between handicap and advantage” favored continuation of present U.S. policy. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–1 LAOS) 4 Not found. 5 In telegram 846, Unger recommended re-equipping Kong Le’s forces up to a force level totaling 8,200 men, preparing to increase the military assistance program to Laos if required, making better use of the T–28 fighter aircraft in Laos, and strengthening the economic and political strength of the Souvanna government. 6 Not further identified. 7 See Document 13 . 12. Editorial Note 12. Editorial Note President Johnson met at 1:30 p.m., March 3, 1964, for a luncheon meeting with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy, and Special Assistant and Press Secretary Bill Moyers. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) There was no time indicated in the President’s diary for the end of the meeting, but Rusk’s next appointment at the Department of State was at 2:50 p.m. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) No record of discussion at the meeting has been found, but McGeorge Bundy prepared an annotated agenda for President Johnson on March 3. Item 3 (of 5) of the agenda reads as follows: “3. Laos and Cambodia. Closely related to Vietnam are Laos and Cambodia, and you may want to ask Secretary Rusk to explore just where we stand on both these matters. On Laos, particularly, there is a good deal of urgency at the working levels and you and the two Secretaries do need to decide whether you are ready to take further steps.” (Ibid., Files of McGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with President, Vol. 1 [Part 2]) 13. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 13. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 3, 1964, 7 p.m. 942. Use of T–28’s. Deptel 664; 2 Embtel 927. 3 I. Revision of Policy. Limitations on size of RLAF, deficiencies in individual skills, staff work, and ground/air coordination, and hobbling effects of necessity for detailed consultation with U.S. make marked improvement in RLAF performance unlikely over short run under present ground rules and with present equipment. (A review of T–28 utilization is summarized in A–249, March 4, 1964). 4 ARMA, AIRA and RO reps will continue advisory efforts to improve staff work and instill cooperative spirit between FAR and RLAF; prospective special air warfare detachment in Thailand 5 should improve both aircraft and pilot performance. But these efforts will take time. In addition to factors of Lao performance, effectiveness of T–28’s limited by restrictions on armament and BT factors of timing. The margin of utility of bombs (including 500-pounders) over rockets derives from nature of warfare in Laos—absence of large troop concentrations, particular importance of artillery and armor to outcome of fighting, and exposure of slow aircraft to ground fire during high-angle attack required with rockets or machine guns. Timing presents multiple problems: 1) several days frequently elapse between request for strike and completion necessary military planning and approval; 2) required U.S. consultation (sometimes including referral to Washington) adds delay at minimum and apparently has discouraged FAR/RLAF to point that fuzes are no longer requested, in expectation of refusal; 3) present need to clear individual actions with Souvanna requires additional time. We therefore believe early step-up in deterrent effect or in FAR/neutralist capability to contain Communist attacks by air activity requires relaxation in restraints currently imposed on use of aircraft and bombs and grant of greater discretionary authority to Lao. We specifically recommend: 1) Turning over limited number of bomb fuzes to RLAF on understanding that they are to be used for defensive purposes in consultation with us as to types of targets and that replacement of fuzes obviously conditional on evidence of prudent and effective use; 2) introducing 500-pound bombs to make strikes effective against targets such as those suggested in section II below; 3) broadening approved uses of T–28’s. For present we recommend retaining napalm containers in Thailand; Lao are not trained in sophisticated use of napalm and random use seems politically unacceptable. Under this proposal, I would need to obtain Souvanna’s advance approval for release of fuzes and his understanding of tactical concept (below), but decision to undertake individual missions would become Lao responsibility. (II) Tactical Concept. Our guidance to FAR and neutralists for use of T–28’s, to be discussed and agreed in advance, would continue to emphasize use of aircraft, bombs or not, for defensive purposes only, but defining defense to include both reprisal for aggressive actions and interdiction of build-up for attack. 1. Specific recommendations to RLAF would depend on circumstances following completion of Washington’s review of overall policy. As general proposition, believe we should initially stress step-up of visual and photo reconnaissance and a substantial road-cratering effort on principal lines of supply from North Viet-Nam into Laos. Road-cratering (principally routes 7, 8 and 12) commends itself because A) it is measure which comes as close as any available to isolating Viet Minh support from indigenous Pathet Lao effort, and it is Viet Minh who threaten precarious balance of power in Laos; B) it requires less expertise than finding and hitting moving targets and thus provides reasonable intermediate test of RLAF capabilities; C) chagrin would be principal cost of failure; and D) success would have marked effect in reducing pressure on front-line units. 2. Other targets or operations which are currently appealing include: A) Three known artillery positions used in occasional harassing fire against Kong Le headquarters at Muong Phan; B) Support of guerrilla operations (cover/diversion) principally in Xieng Khouang province and designed, as road-cutting, to reduce front-line pressure; C) In-bound convoys; D) Supply depots in combat areas (one such located east of Khang Khay cannot be touched with rockets due surrounding anti-aircraft but could be taken out by low-level bombing); E) Armor, wherever found; F) Phou Khe and adjacent artillery positions, in connection with possible operations for its recapture. (III) Cautions. Preceding recommendations are advanced, and should only be approved with recognition of accompanying reservations: 1. Use of bombs and less discriminate use of aircraft would represent a degree of escalation. Moreover, escalation danger not manageable in detail since Lao would have control over operations subject only to threat of withholding replacement weapons, and this introduces hazards of some dimensions. We cannot surely predict whether first use of bombs will have deterrent or inflammatory effect, and see no way to a determination short of having a few test cases. 2. Improved armament will not make the RLAF a sophisticated air force. We do not believe that six T–28’s, whatever their equipment, will tip the balance in favor of FAR and neutralists against the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh forces they confront except, possibly, in specific tactical situations. Even this exception assumes relatively skillful use of equipment by virtually untried pilots. 3. Expansion in use of T–28’s will require active role by AIRA and ARMA personnel in advisory capacity with respect to target selection, mission planning, and coordination. It will probably require a kind of on-the-spot surveillance of work of aircraft armorers, by RO personnel, that would be visible to any observers at bases (presumably Vientiane and Savannakhet) from which combat strikes launched. (French are already sensitive to role of U.S. personnel presently at Savannakhet.) Initiation of RLAF bombing program should be preceded or accompanied by effort to arrange with RLAF for use of bombing range in Thailand to permit evaluation of RLAF performance by U.S. observers. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok also for DEPCHJUSMAG, CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon also for Harkins, and Phnom Penh. 2 See footnote 2, Document 11 . 3 Document 11 . 4 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 5 The Special Air Warfare Detachment was a proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy four T–28’s and pilots and 30 to 40 support personnel in Thailand. The detachment could augment the Royal Lao Air Force in the event of a serious offensive by the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese, assist the Lao Air Force’s maintenance training, provide advice for planning and employment of T–28’s in Laos, and give impetus to Thai up-country development programs and counterinsurgency efforts. It would also serve as an adequate cover to justify the presence of U.S. T–28’s in Thailand. (Letter from William Bundy to Hilsman, January 11; ibid., DEF 19 US–LAOS) On March 5 McNamara approved the assignment of a SAW T–28 detachment to Udorn. 14. Editorial Note 14. Editorial Note On March 10, 1964, William P. Bundy was designated Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The Senate confirmed him on March 16. Bundy replaced Roger Hilsman who resigned as of March 15. Hilsman sent Rusk two parting memoranda, both dated March 14, on Vietnam and Southeast Asia. In the latter memorandum he reiterated his proposal to send troops to Thailand to demonstrate U.S. concern over Laos. McGeorge Bundy sent both memoranda to President Johnson under a March 18 memorandum in which Bundy noted that dispatching troops to Thailand was “more attractive to State Department and White House staff than to the Pentagon, because its object is political and not military.” McGeorge Bundy’s and Hilsman’s memoranda are in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume I, pages 175 – 182 . 15. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Department of State 15. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Department of State 1 Washington, March 16, 1964, 12:05 p.m. 1705Z. Following is a report from the CAS Station Chief in Saigon; 1. General Khiem called me late on 16 March, told me he and General Khanh met with Phoumi Nosovan in Dalat on Saturday 14 March and came to agreement in principle on three major matters: A. GVN, using marked or unmarked aircraft, can bomb and strafe VC installations at Tchepone, Muong Nong, Muong Phine, Saravane, and in the Boulovens area generally. Khiem seemed eager to take this on right away because “we can catch the Soviet Chinese aircraft that are now there”. B. In the eastern portions of Laos south of Tchepone to the Cambodian border, ARVN may conduct military operations up to and including regimental size in areas mutually agreed as being principally under VC or Communist control. C. General Vang Pao, now in Xieng Khouang, will provide and safeguard, in the area bordering NVN due east of Xieng Khouang, a base of operations for GVN commando or special forces units to raid across the line into the NVN salient containing Route 7. 2. Khiem also said that Khanh would pick an Ambassador to Vientiane by the end of this week, but that one has not yet been chosen. Would let me know as soon as one picked. He further said that if action described para one C came to pass, would want liaison with US in Vientiane. Also said that at same time as new Ambassador went to Vientiane, GVN would establish five-man military liaison team with Laotian forces at Savannakhet. 3. Related all of above to Amb Lodge who expressed his warm approval of GVN proposals given above. He asked that substance this conversation, plus his agreement, be passed to State Dept. General Khiem emphasized that all agreements were in principle, and that, while some planning was being done, they would not implement any of the agreements described in para one without American agreement and support. This cable therefore becomes their means of seeking official U.S. govt reaction and response. Await your comment. 4. Had suggested to Amb Lodge that substance this conversation be transmitted as regular Embassy telegram, but he prefers that it be reported as it is. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. This telegram was a relay of CAS Saigon 5161, sent to the Department of State Exclusive for Sullivan and Stoneman, to the White House Exclusive for Forrestal, to OSD Exclusive for McNaughton, to JCS Exclusive for Anthis, and to ISA Exclusive for Blouin. Repeated to Vientiane and Honolulu. 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, March 16, 1964, 9:08 p.m. 749. Ref: CAS Saigon 5161 repeated Vientiane. 2 1. As stated by Secretary McNamara to Khanh, 3 our approval any plans along lines described reftel must depend on whether they acceptable to Souvanna Phouma. Saigon should ascertain urgently whether this condition made clear to Phoumi and, if so, what indications Phoumi gave of when he would take them up with Souvanna. 4 Assuming Phoumi has now returned Vientiane, Ambassador should immediately reach him to reiterate condition and find out how he plans to handle. 5 Advise soonest timing. If Phoumi has already seen Souvanna Ambassador should see him also and inform him USG aware of proposals. 2. Our own preliminary views are that several of the points agreed between Khanh and Phoumi could be put into effect at an early stage. We would heartily endorse the assignment of an Ambassador to Vientiane and would agree to the covert establishment of a 5-man military liaison team with Laotian forces at Savannakhet. We would also feel that the establishment of a liaison with the US in Vientiane could be executed even before the commando action east of Xieng Khouang is mounted. 3. Our thoughts on the commando action along route 7 would be not to discourage it but to be certain that the GVN feels confident it could be mounted from a Meo base and could fit into the general pattern of Plan 34 A. 4. On the other hand, we feel that air strikes on the targets named (some of which, such as Saravane, are now in friendly hands) and regimental size military operations in areas under Communist control would involve drastic changes in Laotian situation and specifically would breach underlying understanding that, until Geneva Accords can be fully applied, territorial control of the respective parties should remain as it stood at the time of the Laos Accord in July 1962. Thus, proven Communist (i.e., Pathet Lao) control of territory in the Laos panhandle is not ipso facto cause for retaliatory action out of Viet-Nam. In other words, actions proposed in paras 1 A and 1 B of reference message might will cause Souvanna Phouma to assume that we were no longer supporting the Geneva and related accords on Laos and therefore to abdicate. Moreover, the result could be to invite Communist retaliation in Laos, that would almost certainly take the form of early introduction of North Vietnamese units (as in Na Kay plateau during January) and could readily set in motion a major chain of events. We therefore believe action along these lines should not be undertaken unless and until we were ready to move to considerably more drastic action in the area as a whole and had made specific preparations including such action as the introduction of substantial US ground forces into Thailand. 5. Above preliminary views should be used as background by Ambassador Unger in sounding out Phoumi plans and, if Phoumi has already gone to Souvanna Phouma in discussion with the latter. 6. FYI. While these are our current preliminary views, we recognize possibility that we may obtain hard intelligence of North Vietnamese activity that would present worthwhile targets. In absence such intelligence, operations such as proposed seem to us to offer very limited chance of fruitful results in any case. If and when we get such intelligence, we would be prepared to re-examine question of selective specific operations into Laos, but even these would still have to be weighed for their military advantage as against the possibility that they would disrupt our current posture in Southeast Asia before we have a clear and firm plan for graduated pressures that would take account of possible responses both in Laos and with reference to North Viet-Nam. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Harriman, and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Saigon as telegram 1448. 2 Document 15 . 3 During a meeting among McNamara, Taylor, Lodge, Khanh, and Khiem on March 13, as reported in telegram 1738 from Saigon, March 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) For additional documentation on McNamara’s and Taylor’s visit to Saigon, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 130 – 173 . 4 In telegram 1767 from Saigon, March 17, Lodge reported that Phoumi’s discussion with Khanh was “held with the permission of Souvanna” and that King Savang was informed of it. Lodge also recommended that the United States support South Vietnamese covert operations in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 5 See Document 17 . 17. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 17. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 19, 1964, 8 p.m. 1023. Deptel 749. 2 This morning I congratulated PriMin Souvanna on resumption diplomatic relations with South Viet Nam and then referred to Phoumi’s March 14 Dalat meeting with Gen Khanh, noting that we have also been in touch with GVN on various propositions discussed at that time. I said I presumed Gen Phoumi had reviewed these matters with Souvanna but I wanted also go over them since we wished to have his views. Before I had proceeded very far Souvanna asked me whether there were any secret agreements between Phoumi and GVN. It emerged as we reviewed proposals that Phoumi had touched on discussions with Khanh in briefest and most general terms and Souvanna was almost entirely unaware of specific proposals. He said while it true that area of action under discussion adjoins Phoumi’s zone, Souvanna nevertheless is ultimately responsible for all actions in Laos with international implications. He also referred to his forthcoming trip to Hanoi and Peking, 3 acknowledging that he does not know how much he can accomplish there, but pointing out that aggressive actions involving South Vietnamese, like some of those contemplated, would certainly assure complete failure his mission. He said he could envisage situation in which actions of sort contemplated would have to be taken if it clear all hope of realizing neutral solution of Laos is lost. At this point he would probably invite U.S. to come to his country’s aid to avoid its falling to Communists, at which point he would himself probably withdraw from scene, but this moment has not arrived and he still means continue make maximum efforts achieve peaceful solution and hopes we will continue support him in this. I told Souvanna it was precisely because of our firm intention to continue supporting him that I had opened with him discussion Dalat proposals. Although Gen Phoumi had told me several times he had cleared these matters with Souvanna I desired and my government had specifically instructed me to ascertain PriMin’s attitude on those matters which directly affected Laos before determining our own position. I said I would report his views fully on each of proposals, adding there might be those instances where we felt some action was of overriding importance and not entailing too serious risks, in which case I would raise matter with him again. I emphasized to Souvanna that our concern lay not only with Communist actions against neutralist and conservatives in Laos but also with South Viet Nam’s struggle to preserve its independence, and I hoped that in his Hanoi and Peking visits he could protest not only against the actions taken to undermine RLG but also the violation of Laotian territory committed by North Viet Nam to pursue its subversive war in the south. Souvanna said “we are all fully aware of what is going on” and that this has been subject of his repeated protests to North Vietnamese Amb here and will certainly be pressed in Hanoi and Peking. Souvanna then requested me to ask Washington for its suggestions as to what line he might possibly pursue in Hanoi and Peking in order explore whether there are in fact any grounds for constructive negotiations or compromise to improve situations Laos, Viet Nam and South East Asia in general. 4 He said he would of course put forward any ideas we might offer entirely as his own and make no mention of US, but if he knew what kinds of adjustments might have chance of being acceptable to us then his talks might be more useful than otherwise. With regard to specific actions outlined numbered para I(2) Saigon’s 1767 sent Department, 5 proposals contained CAS Saigon 5161, 6 and refDeptel, Souvanna’s reactions were as follows: (1) He accepted without comment idea of establishing covert five-man GVN military liaison team Savannakhet. (2) With regard to air actions, for example at Tchepone, this brought immediate negative reaction from Souvanna who said this would promptly put Laos question back on war footing and he specifically asked this not be done. As a variant, to be invoked if Communist pressures increase in future, I asked what he would think of augmenting present T–28 fleet with additional planes painted with Lao markings flown by South Vietnamese, perhaps with Lao passports. Souvanna indicated his readiness consider something of this nature if situation should deteriorate badly. (3) He accepts modest (not anything like regimental scale) cross border operations in southeastern part of Laos, particularly if units made up of Montagnard stock common to SVN and Laotian territory and if penetrations not too deep. (See airgram A–263. 7 ) (4) I did not raise question commando action along Route 7 in North Vietnam from Meo base in Laos since plan 34A mentioned ref Deptel not available here. I deferred this point also because of Souvanna’s special sensitivity with regard Meo as well as question my mind what benefit to US objectives North Viet Nam to be gained from action in NVN salient containing Route 7. If objective is to interdict use this route against Laos, believe we can proceed on basis plans which CAS, ARMA, and Embassy develops and periodically reviews. (5) I did not raise question aerial photos, not knowing what relation this proposal bore to already agreed high level US aerial photography and, if not the same, what kinds of planes, pilots and which areas envisaged. At conclusion our conversation it was evident Souvanna pleased we had consulted him and asked me be sure that actions to which he had objected would not be undertaken. He made clear he was particularly concerned nothing be done to render useless in advance his Hanoi and Peking visits, although it also seemed clear regardless their outcome he most unlikely agree to bombing and strafing Tchepone and other points. At same time Souvanna stated he has no intention letting Communists take over Laos and although his objective is be able live in peace side by side with Communist neighbors, if this not possible and Communists attempt takeover, then only answer is war and he would hope US would help. Comment : If Souvanna raises Dalat military proposals with Phoumi I will no doubt get annoyed reaction from latter, to which my reply obvious. If not, I would not propose discuss with Phoumi until we on US side are agreed which actions acceptable, which to be rejected, and which deferred. Needless to say I believe our decision should take full account Souvanna’s views expressed above. I also subscribe fully to analysis paras 4 and 6 ref Deptel. I doubt it would be useful have Souvanna discussing with Hanoi or Peking problems of Viet Nam or South East Asia with view to compromises in which we might also become involved. However, he will obviously be discussing Laos regardless and believe there are some suggestions in that regard which we might make to him; we will have proposals in subsequent message. 8 Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Saigon. 2 Document 16 . 3 Souvanna Phouma’s trip, April 2–8. 4 In telegram 1058 from Vientiane, March 26, Unger proposed to encourage Souvanna to protest to leaders in Hanoi and Peking their governments’ support of the Pathet Lao, the Viet Cong’s use of Laos for attacks on South Vietnam, and to express willingness to accept the return of Neo Lao Hat Xat ministers to his government provided Pathet Lao controlled areas were available for visits by top members of his government and the ICC. In telegram 796 to Vientiane, March 27, the Department approved Unger’s line, but hoped that Souvanna would also stress that the United States had no territorial ambitions or desire for bases in Laos. (Both Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS) 5 Those agreed actions between Phoumi and Khanh as reported in telegram 1767 from Saigon, March 17, were: free ARVN passage into southern Laos, creation of a combined Lao-South Vietnamese Staff, bombardment by unmarked South Vietnamese T–28’s, abrogation of the 10-kilometer limit on hot pursuit, combined South Vietnamese and Lao units, ARVN officers with Lao units, and Meo (Hmong) incursions into North Vietnam. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 6 See Document 15 . 7 Dated March 18. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 LAOS–VIET S) 8 See footnote 4 , above. 18. Editorial Note 18. Editorial Note On April 2, 1964, from 12:35 to 2:54 p.m., President Johnson met with Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found, but Michael Forrestal prepared on April 1 a memorandum for McGeorge Bundy with an annotated agenda for the meeting. Item 5 (of 6) of the Bundy agenda anticipated discussion on Laos and Cambodia as follows: “5. Cross border operations between Laos and Cambodia. Although the JCS raised this question this afternoon, they were surprisingly mild. General Taylor, however, was not present, and he may suggest early action. Sihanouk having just made another turn-about, and Souvanna being in one of his periodical states of jelly—this is not the time to press against either of these countries. This is particularly true if we have any hope of laying a political base for direct pressure against the North. It is going to be difficult enough to lay such a base without also having to face the screams of the rest of the world that we are beating on two small and supposedly neutral countries.” (Ibid., Files of McGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with the President, Vol. 1 [Part 2]) The full text of the memorandum is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume I, pages 213 – 214 . 19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, April 2, 1964, 7:08 p.m. 815. Embtels 1062, 1074 and 1087. 2 Neutralists/Conservatives. We share your great concern over recent serious deterioration in neutralist/conservative relationships in Vientiane and especially Souvanna’s loss of confidence in Phoumi. Obviously withdrawal of neutralists and especially Souvanna from Vientiane would endanger fragile framework we are attempting to preserve. Moreover non-communists likely suffer at tripartite meeting unless present schism healed. As first step we consider it essential that there be improvement in security situation Vientiane, preferably including mixed inquiry for Praseuth assassination, 3 joint patrols and progress toward establishment bipartite police force. In addition we believe it should be made clear to Phoumi and others concerned that we take very dim view of situation that has developed (as evidenced by casinos, pork monopoly and other shady deals) and expect drastic action to remedy situation. Essential that there be some results reflecting improved atmosphere and relations between neutralists/conservatives before Souvanna’s return. We recognize you are doing everything possible and wish to reassure you of our full support. In talking to Phoumi, and others as necessary, we know you will be as blunt as you believe is necessary in making it clear that USG will only support those who are willing to get behind Prince Souvanna Phouma. Souvanna’s remarks to conservatives who accompanied him on Cambodia trip (A–274 4 ) that a more genuine cooperation between Right and Center is necessary to preserve coalition fabric reflect our position also. FYI. Connection query Embtel 1083. 5 We have not yet established guidelines for implementation Recommendation 11 nor have we as yet endorsed understandings on military matters reached by Phoumi and Khanh. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Barbis, cleared by Trueheart and Sullivan, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, London, Paris, and CINCPAC. 2 Telegrams 1062, March 27; 1074, March 31; and 1087, April 2, contain reports on the deterioration of relations between Souvanna’s neutralist government ministers and Phoumi’s conservatives in Vientiane. Relations became so strained that Souvanna ordered neutralist ministers to the Plain of Jars and threatened to move himself after his trip to Hanoi and Peking. (The first two are ibid., POL 15–1 LAOS; the latter, ibid., POL 7 LAOS) 3 On March 17 FAR intelligence officer Praseuth was assassinated. The Phoumi-controlled police arrested neutralist soldiers following the assassination. (Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, April 2; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. I, Memos, 11/63–4/64) 4 Dated March 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS) 5 Dated April 2. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 20. Telegram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State 20. Telegram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State 1 Hong Kong, April 9, 1964, 5:39 p.m. 1771. Ref: Vientiane’s 1109; 2 Dept’s 1085. 3 Souvanna received me this morning and listened with interest to accounts latest developments in talks on Vientiane security situation (Vientiane’s reftel). He said that this was good news because at his departure he had been greatly concerned over this problem and the hostile attitude shown by General Phoumi. He then gave us following comments on his conversations in Hanoi and Peiping: 1. He had received assurances that Peiping would not link the Laotian question with that of Vietnam, and this he hoped had cleared the way for a settlement. The North Vietnamese, for their part, had always sought to link the two questions. When asked whether anything had been said in Hanoi on this topic, he said there had not been, but he expected Peiping to use its influence upon Hanoi. The Viet Minh in Laos had always insisted on keeping the frontier zones under their control. But Peiping’s position that the two questions should be kept separate, assuming it was sincerely held, meant that Peiping recognized that RLG’s authority extended to all Laos. For us this position was excellent, he said; now all depended on the meeting of the three factions scheduled for April 17. 2. A key question now was the position of General Phoumi, and whether he would oppose the application of the Nov. 27, 1962 agreement providing for a unified administration, the formation of a mixed police force assuring security at Vientiane, and the establishment of a 30,000 man national army composed of 10,000 man-contingents from each party. Phoumi would have a problem, he recognized, in demobilizing 50–60,000 men, but he believed a solution could be found. If the agreement could be implemented it would mean, he repeated, that the authority of the RLG would extend to all Laos including the corridor. 3. When I asked him how the PL would be likely to react, he said they would have to agree to free circulation throughout Laos. In Hanoi where he had talked with Pham Van Dong and Gen. Giap for two-half hours and later with Pham alone for four hours, he had made them understand that they should use their influence on the PL to make them accept this. He had told them this effort was his last; if he left, it would mean civil war, and North Vietnam would be affected. They had asked him to remain and had said they would do everything they could to help him resolve the Laotian question. If Hanoi keeps promise, Souvanna said the position of the PL at the April 17 meeting will change and will become less stiff. 4. Turning again to the question of Phoumi, Souvanna said that the USG must press him very strongly not merely to see his own personal interests but those of his country and of peace in SEA. Since Sarit’s death, 4 Phoumi had been seeking as an alternative support from SVN and Taiwan; it was important that neither make him any promises. Phoumi, without his permission, had met twice with General Khanh, and once in Bangkok Mar 17 with ChiNat Chief of Staff Peng Meng-chi. This latter intelligence he had only learned of while in Peiping and from the Chinese Communists. All this was very dangerous. (It occurred to me at this point that Souvanna’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the PL might have been improved by those activities of Phoumi’s, but decided it would be better to leave this point for Amb Unger to make if it has validity and is useful.) 5. When I sought further comment on the chances of the PL accepting this arrangement, Souvanna said he thought that the PL wished to return to the government, but because of the poor security in the city they had been unable to remain. He also had authorized two neutralist ministers to leave, and even his own personal security had been menaced. (He seemed at this point to imply that if the security issue could be settled, PL cooperation could be obtained.) 6. This concluded substantive part of our conversation, Souvanna passed on copy of text of communique with North Vietnam, which we had not seen. He mentioned that he also had given copy to Chinese who had not heretofore seen text (being separately airpouched). In parting I mentioned great esteem in which he was held by my superiors in Washington and high importance they attached to success of his efforts. Rice 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Confidential, Priority, Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon, Taipei, and Vientiane. 2 In telegram 1109, April 8, Unger stated that meetings held between FAR military leaders and the Directorate of National Security to discuss the security of neutralist military personnel in Vientiane had taken place on April 6 and 7. Unger hoped the situation would improve. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 3 In telegram 1085 to Hong Kong, April 8, the Department instructed Rice to obtain from Souvanna an indication of the results of his trip during Rice’s courtesy call. (Ibid., POL 7 LAOS) 4 Sarit Thanarat, former Prime Minister of Thailand, died on December 8, 1963. 21. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Fitch) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 21. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Fitch) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, April 9, 1964. SUBJECT (TS) Cross Border Patrols in Southern Laos Referenced attached Embtel Saigon cable 1913, 6 April 1964, para 10 (TS). 2 1. In view of concern in Saigon that the Communists may be creating in Laos a capability for direct unit support to the Viet Cong (Para 7, Reftel), and fact that this concern can not be definitely dispelled by present all-source intelligence holdings, there is a requirement for cross-border air and ground intelligence collection missions. Laotian right-wing sources have repeatedly reported larger concentrations of troops and heavier supply activity (including air drops) in southeastern Laos than can be confirmed or are accepted. Our discounting of these reports is not based on first hand information, however, and could be dangerous. High-altitude photography has been of some assistance in this problem but because of the heavily-forested terrain their product is not conclusive. The photographs have shown truck activity on Route 12A but give no indication of cargo or destination. 2. A Viet Cong hospital and rehabilitation center has been reported in the Laos-Cambodia border area but never confirmed. It would be helpful to know the exact size, status and location of this facility—particularly whether it is in Cambodia. 3. It may also be that the value of logistic support to the Viet Cong via Laos has been overestimated and that in fact the bulk of this support arrives by sea or via Cambodia. Based on present intelligence holdings we are not able to arrive at a sound judgement on this question. Ground reconnaissance patrols into Laos would appear to be the best way to get detailed information on the extent of Communist activity there. 4. This information has been provided to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and interested elements of the Joint Staff. Alva R. Fitch Lieutenant General, USA 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Admin Files: FRC 7425, Laos 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw this memorandum on April 10. 2 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET) 22. Situation Report No. 1 22. Situation Report No. 1 1 Washington, April 19, 1964. LAOS The Laotian summit meeting on April 18 failed because of a Pathet Lao demand that the conservatives make on the spot decisions regarding the neutralization and demilitarization of Luang Prabang, the royal capital. In wake of this event, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma announced on April 18 that he would submit his resignation to the King. During the early morning hours of April 19, local time, forces of the Laotian National Army under General Kouprasith, Commander of the Fifth Military Region which includes Vientiane, and General Siho, Chief of the conservative security forces in Vientiane (Directorate of National Coordination) arrested the neutralists, including the Prime Minister, and seized power in the name of the National Army Revolutionary Committee (NARC). In a communique issued shortly after the take-over, the NARC announced that it had found it necessary to stage a coup d’etat to bring about national reconciliation. It listed General Kouprasith as chief of the NARC, General Siho as deputy chief and most of the other military leaders as functionaries or members. As of 5 a.m. (EST) April 19, the situation in Laos appears calm. A curfew has been imposed and martial law has been declared. A statement, allegedly by Souvanna Phouma, has been broadcast containing his resignation and relinquishment of power to the NARC. According to a CAS report, General Phoumi was advised early of the coup and telephoned his congratulations to General Siho. There is at this time no firm information on the place where Souvanna Phouma is being held. General Phoumi’s position is unclear and he is not listed as a member of the NARC. We have issued a strong statement reaffirming our support of the Government of National Union and urging the immediate release of all neutralists. 2 Ambassador Unger, who had been in Saigon for consultation with the Secretary, has returned to Vientiane. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret. No drafter indicated, but it was prepared in the Operations Center of the Department of State. 2 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 932. At 6:57 p.m. on April 19, Harriman also sent personal messages to Souvanna Phouma and King Savang deploring the coup and pledging U.S. resolve to restore the situation. (Telegram 879 to Vientiane, April 19; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS) 23. Memorandum for the Record 23. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 19, 1964, 10:10 a.m. SUBJECT National Security Council Meeting—19 April 1964 PARTICIPANTS The President State: Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Messrs. Green and Barbis Defense: Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Mr. McNaughton White House: Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Forrestal, Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador Thompson CIA: Mr. McCone and Mr. Colby 1. Prior to the President’s arrival there was a discussion of the traffic from Laos and Mr. Barbis gave a short review of the 1958–1960 series of Lao coups. Secretary Ball identified the basic question as one of determining a U.S. position which would disassociate ourselves from the coup but at the same time not encourage the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese to move against the Lao Government. Mr. Bundy asked what pressures we have on the Right Wing and it was agreed we had considerable power but that our experience had shown it could not be exercised in the short term. 2. The President then entered. Mr. Ball briefed him on the situation and the basic problem of disassociating ourselves without inviting action by the Communists. He pointed out the State Department release of Saturday night deploring the coup 2 and commented that we were in the process of making approaches to other governments involved in the Geneva Agreements to reiterate our non-involvement. 3. The President suggested that Mr. Bundy who is in Saigon be sent to Vientiane for a first hand look prior to his return to Washington. He commented that he agreed with the U.S. support of the Geneva Agreements but that he would not do much urging of action until we see the situation more clearly than we do now. He returned to this point several times during the meeting, indicating some displeasure with the final sentence of State’s release. 3 He stated he agreed that some word should be gotten to Hanoi to hold them back from any idea of moving in Laos. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility of some involvement of General Khanh in the course of the Khanh-Phoumi discussions about two weeks ago. 4. The President also agreed that we take the position with the other Geneva powers that the cease-fire in Laos must be maintained and he agreed that other governments be approached, especially the GVN, along these lines. He then asked that recommendations for action be prepared by Mr. Bundy in conjunction with Ambassador Unger and that meanwhile no other public statements be made. 5. The President then departed and Mr. McNamara requested that the group remain for a general review of the problem. It was pointed out that the balance of forces in Laos generally favored the Pathet Lao with their Viet Minh cadres but General Taylor stated that he did not expect any immediate full scale move which would involve Viet Minh units. The FAR was believed by General Taylor not to be much better than it ever was, despite some reports of improvement we have heard in the past. Kong Le offers more a political than a military force. The chances of substantial support to the non-communists from Thailand or South Vietnam were not considered great. Among the actions considered were the possibility of reinforcing the Thais with a U.S. unit (which it was agreed was complicated as the Thais would exact some assurances on our policy in Laos), and the movement of U.S. naval units off North Vietnam. Ambassador Thompson suggested that we tie our actions in Laos to the public discussion of possible action against North Vietnam, which he believed has a useful effect on the Communists. 6. There was then some discussion as to whether it would be possible to restore a neutral government in Laos or whether it would develop into a formal partition. It was agreed that the assistance of the King should be sought but that no great hopes could rest upon him, and that one of the critical figures was Kong Le. 7. Mr. Bundy summarized the actions required as determining: a. Whether and how we reestablish the neutral solution (i.e. “put Humpty Dumpty together again”). In this context the position of Kong Le is important. b. The degree of South Vietnamese involvement, encouragement or potential in the Lao situation. c. How to maintain the cease-fire, getting word to the Communist side and especially Hanoi to do so. d. The reactions of our Ambassadors in various countries to the prospect of a new Geneva meeting on Laos and whether this would involve Cambodia, Vietnam, etc. e. The effects of a formal North-South partition on the situation in Vietnam, i.e. whether this would substantially improve the North Vietnamese capabilities of supporting the Viet Cong. f. Alerting various intelligence activities to any indications of early action by the Communist side. In this context the Department of Defense will ensure a full coverage by high level reconnaissance on Southeast Laos and NSA will be altered to follow the traffic analysis in Laos and Vietnam. 8. After the meeting Mr. McCone and Secretary McNamara discussed the problem informally, Mr. McCone indicating it might be necessary soon to move to Geneva from a real position of strength with the U.S. fleet pointing at Hai Phong. Secretary McNamara indicated he agreed with this position. WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, 4/30/64–5/20/64. Secret. Drafted by Colby on April 20, who mistakenly characterized this as an NSC meeting. It was not an official numbered meeting of the National Security Council. 2 See footnote 2, Document 22 . 3 The final sentence of the release reads: “We are therefore categorically opposed to any seizure of power and are urging immediate release of neutralists as a first step to restoring the situation.” 24. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Saigon 24. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Saigon 1 Washington, April 19, 1964, 1:02 p.m. Tosec 69. For Secretary from Ball. Met this morning with President, McNamara, Taylor, McCone and Bundy to report on overnight events and activities. General agreement was in favor of efforts to try to restore tripartite neutral arrangement although President himself felt that we did not know enough to reach definitive conclusions. President in fact was a little unhappy that we had moved so quickly in issuing public statement in the middle of night categorically disavowing coup. 2 My efforts to explain necessity for this were not fully persuasive. As balancing action, we are seeking to get word to Hanoi and Peking through London, Paris and Delhi that our statement should not be interpreted as condoning any effort by Pathet Lao and/or Viet Minh to move against FAR or neutralist positions. Separate instruction on this being repeated to you. 3 President was anxious to get clearest reading possible of situation and was therefore insistent that Bill Bundy should pay brief visit to Vientiane before returning in order to bring home a first-hand report. 4 We will possibly be meeting with President again later this afternoon but only if there is information or developments to justify it. 5 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; No Distribution. Drafted and approved by Ball. 2 See footnote 2, Document 22 . In a memorandum of a telephone call between Ball and McGeorge Bundy, April 19, 12:30 p.m., Bundy told the Acting Secretary that it would have been better if the President had been called and given a chance to offer an instruction on the coup. Ball agreed. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Laos [4/19/64–11/12/65]) 3 Not found. 4 In White House telegram CAP 64118 to Saigon, April 19, 2:03 p.m., McGeorge Bundy informed Rusk and Lodge that President Johnson wanted to detail William Bundy to proceed as soon as possible to Vientiane to consult with Unger and others and then make a report with recommendations. The telegram continued that the “confused situation and multiplicity of varying reports make President eager for first-hand review by senior Washington officer.” McGeorge Bundy concluded in the telegram that “no further public statements” were desired. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5 Printed from an unsigned copy. 25. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Saigon 25. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Saigon 1 Washington, April 19, 1964, 1:58 p.m. Tosec 70. For Secretary from Acting Secretary and Secretary McNamara. We would appreciate your views soonest on desirability unadvertised movement of US forces, such as naval units toward North Viet-Nam, in order to deter and discourage North Viet-Nam or other communist elements from military exploitation of current confused situation in Laos. Such movements would obviously have to be carried out in such manner that coup government in Vientiane does not feel it has blank check from USG and also so that there is a credible innocuous explanation. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Green, cleared in substance by McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, cleared in draft by U. Alexis Johnson and Thompson, and approved by Ball. Repeated immediate to Vientiane. 26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, April 19, 1964, 4:34 p.m. 877. For the Ambassador. We fully support and commend excellent way you and your staff handling this difficult complex situation. Our much preferred course of action is, of course, to put Government of National Union back together again and we look forward to your recommendations on ways and means for achieving this cardinal objective. If, unfortunately, it appears that present political situation is likely to be irreversible, or if other courses seem to be necessary to pursue, we will also need your thoughts on alternatives. In line with your recent think-piece (Embtel 1134) 2 you may perceive ways to utilize ferment of evolving events to move towards a stronger government under Souvanna, notably introducing more integrity and common sense into the right wing and more vigor and leadership into the center. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Green, cleared in draft by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared in substance by Forrestal, and approved by Harriman. 2 In telegram 1134 from Vientiane, April 17, the Embassy proposed charting a revolutionary process of gradual internal regeneration even while the country remained divided. The eventual goal would be a new, more progressive leadership drawn from the younger members of the conservative-neutralist ranks. (Ibid., POL 27–14 LAOS) 27. Transcript of a Teletype Conference Between the Ambassador to Laos (Unger) and Secretary of State Rusk 27. Transcript of a Teletype Conference Between the Ambassador to Laos (Unger) and Secretary of State Rusk 1 April 19, 1964, 7:30 p.m. SUBJECT Coup in Laos PARTICIPANTS IN SAIGON The Secretary Ambassador Lodge Assistant Secretary Bundy Mr. de Silva Secretary: We are ready. Please go ahead with latest situation. Unger: See Saigon 234 2 sent immediate for situation thru 1600. Since then I have seen Gen. Kouprasith and Siho just as they were preparing for scheduled 4:00 P.M. press conference. I told them U.S. could not accept or support action taken this morning, that USG supports Government of National Union under framework of Geneva Accords. I showed them Department press statement (ToSec 66). 3 Generals taken aback, asked in effect what could be done. I pressed for release of detained neutralists. Generals stated Souvanna and Minister PTT Tiao Sisoumang “being released” and Min Interior Pheng Phongsavan missing, did not mention neutralist figures. Secretary: Your 234 not yet received. Would it make sense for us and others to urge the King to gather all the notables and tell them the time has come to put an end to so much nonsense, to send away all foreigners meddling in their affairs and to support a Government of National Union designated by him to run the country. Give priority to transmission your 234. (Vientiane’s 234 repeated Dept. 1146 then transmitted) Unger: I asked whether Revolutionary Committee considered itself a government and they replied in negative. They indicated they did not know what action to take re Government of National Union, which I said is only Government we recognize, since they had already announced it dissolved. They asked for advice and I said they must reinstate Government National Union. I added suggestion on strictly personal basis, they might explain to public they had acted because of concern over security to which Souvanna’s declared intention to resign had given rise. Now security restored, Government National Union reinstated, and question of Souvanna’s resignation will be handled in constitutional manner. Generals took this in, indicated only that they would consider some revision their intended statement and would be in touch with Souvanna. I repeated before leaving that we could not accept or acknowledge group on basis of this morning’s action. If Souvanna resigned and King accepted, we would face new situation in which I did not know U.S. position but as of now we recognize only Souvanna as PriMin of coalition government. Throughout conversation, both Kouprasith and Siho gave impression of being badly frightened little boys who now realize they have climbed too far out on limb and uncertain how to proceed or whether to draw back. After my meeting with them Generals met press and distributed list of executive committee of Revolutionary Committee (by septel). 4 Kouprasith subsequently issued statement that army, which has worked twenty years for independence, could not be instrument of coalition government which by its deficiencies and divisions had come to face stalemate and in this situation has risen to overthrow the (coalition), reestablish peace, improve the economic situation, bring happiness and democracy to the population. We proclaim our fidelity to the King and the population and we hope the population supports us. I have now just come from seeing Phoumi to whom I made familiar arguments. He professed his disgust with infantile action of Siho (whom he primarily blames) and agreed to urge him and Kouprasith to restore situation to status quo ante. When I left him those two were waiting to see Phoumi and I hope he will live up to his promise and with good effect. He also promised try to reach Souvanna and explain his non-involvement in coup. Whatever responsibility Phoumi may bear for coup, he now seems to have decided to disassociate himself from Revolutionary Committee entirely. All further circulation Vientiane now ruled out by curfew. Tomorrow morning I will try see Souvanna and Phoui Sananikone, believing latter bears considerable responsibility for Kouprasith and Siho actions. Will also try see Soviet Ambassador. Unless Revolutionary Committee has reinstated Government of National Union tomorrow morning I am ordering Americans actually working in Lao Govt as advisers, etc. to remain absent from work and will seek avoid any action which appears to recognize or in any sense support Revolutionary Committee. This is in line with course of action agreed among 4 Ambassadors. Secretary: International reaction may become crucial to General’s attitude. Do not hesitate to press United Kingdom, French, Australian Ambassadors to put aside niceties and make their position clear direct to Revolutionary Committee. Such contact cannot possibly confer recognition which is clearly a matter of intention. Unger: Latest radio communique of Revolutionary Committee reports congratulations and sympathy from Kong Le to Kouprasith, stating his troops happy to join in coup. ICC, on other hand, has message via its PDJ team from Kong Le to British and Soviets saying Kong Le remains faithful to policy of neutrality under Souvanna Phouma. AARMA sent to contact Kong Le has not returned at this hour. Secretary: Please reply our items one and two. I plan to leave for Washington tomorrow morning as scheduled unless you have some urgent thought otherwise. In this situation you and your colleagues will richly earn the pay you don’t get and we shall be giving you all possible support. Congratulations on your handling thus far. Anything else? Assume you are reporting fully to Washington. Unger: (Reply to item one). If we can make contact with King, if situation not already rectified by then, and if King willing (which questionable) this could be done. Unclear, however, who are foreigners. Designation of new Government of National Union to replace present one of pre-coup situation would of course raise numerous very tricky questions involving Pathet Lao concept, etc. Revolutionary Committee which currently in charge Vientiane would also have to agree. Secretary: I mean by foreigners the Viet Minh and assume the Government of National Union would start with Souvanna Phouma. Unger: (Reply to item two). I believe it important that GVN be advised against expressing support for action of coup group, particularly in dealing with FAR General Oudone Sananikone and other emissaries of Phoumi presently in Saigon. Similarly believe it important Thai Govt be cautioned against giving evidence of support for action against constituted Govt—action from which some of leaders at least now show some signs of wishing to retreat. Secretary: This has already been done by Ambassador Lodge and General Khanh has shown full understanding and has agreed not to act without full consultation with US. If you have nothing else we are departing this end. Unger: Soviet Ambassador, whom I have not seen but with whom British in continuing contact, shares general unwillingness deal directly with Kouprasith. He makes much of his belief in Thai complicity. Thanks for all support. It has helped having you nearby. We’ll do our damndest to work out problem. Bon Voyage. 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Mar/June 1964. Secret; Limited Distribution. Unger was in Vientiane; Rusk was in Saigon. The date of the teletype conference is Saigon time, 13 hours ahead of Washington time. 2 Telegram 234 to Saigon, sent also to the Department of State as 1146, April 19, 6 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 Dated April 19. (Ibid., POL 23–9 LAOS) See footnote 2, Document 22 . 4 Not found. 28. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 28. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Saigon, April 20, 1964, 10 a.m. Secto 74. For Ball and McNamara from Rusk. Regarding Tosec 70 2 believe it would be well to move naval units into Tourane area approaching from north where their pressure would become known to other side. One of my recommendations upon return will be that we consider very seriously maintenance of a naval presence in either Tourane or Cam Ranh Bay areas until pacification completed. Cover story for present move would be exercise to examine and test ability coastal areas South Viet-nam to receive and accommodate external naval forces. Believe Khanh would be entirely cooperative but story should be checked with him before issuance. Do not believe in view of what Unger has said forcefully in Vientiane that coup leaders will misinterpret. Naval presence might be encouraging to Souvanna Phouma. Would not recommend movement of troops to Thailand for present (though units should be alerted). Part of reason is that it not wholly clear Thai not involved in coup in some way. Bundy has reservations about naval units entering VN harbors or being visible from shore, at least until Laos situation clarifies. Believes presence naval units is minimum show readiness to act, but that actual visibility might produce ambiguous effect in Hanoi that could trigger action. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 9:30 p.m. April 19. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and USUN. 2 Document 25 . 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, April 20, 1964, 6 p.m. 1156. Dept repeat Secretary if feasible. 2 From Bundy. Have talked with Ambassador, met with him and British Charge and French and Australian Ambassadors, and lunched with country team. Find nothing to add to first-rate reporting this outstanding team, but while situation still fluid and awaiting return Souvanna and party from Luang Prabang may be useful outline possibilities and attempt initial analysis their implications. Following appear to be possible outcomes: 1. Souvanna (who contrary to our fears does as of now seem willing to resume responsibility) obtains agreement of King and Phoumi, plus Siho acquiescense, to restoration of tripartite Government of National Union with balanced representation. Might be some changes of portfolio, but essential structure preserved. 2. Souvanna agrees to head neutralist-rightist government, with top portfolios to these two groups and either no PL participation or token offer to PL which in circumstances would almost certainly be refused. 3. Rightist-dominated government (perhaps under DNC veto) but with some neutralist participation altho not Souvanna. For example, Kong Le might support under a deal for his keeping local control. Clear judgment here is that Kong Le will not revert to PL under any foreseeable outcome. 4. Agreement tonight on solution 1, but then this upset by hotheads, Siho and Tong Lit, so that result is clearly rightist government. This much the same as 3, but likely to be more extreme and less legal in appearance. Following is analysis: A. Likelihood. Outcome 1 still seems possible and almost in Lao pattern; Phoumi may well have had plans to move toward outcome, but crudeness this coup and quick US opposition may cauterize present pressures for that and even stay his hand for some time. Outcome 2 contrary to all previous Souvanna statements about staying only so long as he can keep all three factions in harness of sorts; however, Pathet Lao obdurate position at meeting of three (which Denson reports outraged Souvanna, especially when Soviet Amb tried to defend PL Saturday afternoon) might conceivably have persuaded him PL now hopeless. Outcome 3 is what Phoumi wants and Kong Le yesterday ambiguous enough to suggest he might play. Outcome 4 unpredictable, but Siho will have lost a lot of face and his personal forces plus Tong Lit position in Vientiane still major factors. (CAS reports forces surrounding Phoumi house today, and these presumed under Tong Lit.) B. Desirability for US interests. In order of numbers, clearly only outcome 1 keeps Geneva Accords intact and leaves risks PL and DRV action at past levels; as all along, it is only buying time in one sense, but that alone of great value unless and until we have concerted plan for stronger action throughout area. Essentially, both outcomes 2 and 3 confront us with rupture with PL and sharply increased chance they and DRV moving on military front perhaps initially at such places as Saravane and Attopeu, perhaps PDJ, although probably not Thakhek till later. Thai pressure then very strong and our own interests would probably require military counter-action. Difference between 2 and 3 is that presence of Souvanna would give much better appearance and reduce adverse major power reaction especially French. However, Soviets would oppose and I guess withdraw from picture tho probably not helping DRV and CC except by words. Outcome 4 seems absolutely sure to trigger sharpest PL and DRV military action, in worst possible political circumstances for US. Also FAR itself might be split in such case, with Phoumi downgraded in favor of hotheads, who have limited capacity and ability to work together. In sum, although a partition of Laos has never been off the cards and there many advantages in US moving into southern and eventually eastern Laos, alone or with Thai, wider disadvantages of doing so under outcome 2 not minor and under 3 and 4 very great indeed. As in 1961, we just don’t have much to work with, and military action expensive with no clear end; however, advantages for South Vietnam struggle now clearer and perhaps more persuasive to US public. Since even outcome 2 breaches spirit Geneva Accords, we must reckon in all three with inhibiting effect of call for reconvened conference, and bad effect of any “Geneva conference,” even on Laos, on Vietnamese morale. C. US action. As we are now doing, we should bend all our efforts to get outcome 1. Since there is shadow of doubt on Thai role and attitudes (Ambassador here refusing, as Dean of Corps, to lead group in calling on Souvanna), assume Embassy Bangkok is making this position clear there. If useful I could see Thanat tomorrow afternoon before leaving with General Wheeler for home. Assume we also stressing PL responsibility for PDJ summit breakup to Soviets. (Sov Ambassador has just told Unger he recognizes PL were “a bit hard”.) If tonight or later developments make clear outcome 1 out believe we could recognize outcome 2 promptly. If outcome is 3 or 4, believe we should at least withhold recognition for short time but avoid freezing into position of disapproval we might soon have to eat. Try to let PL and DRV make first military moves, but be ready to react very quickly and to decide early just how far we are prepared to go. My own feeling is that we must then act against Laos corridor, justifying on basis PL and DRV have been violating all along. But it is worth some military disadvantage to get political posture in as good shape as possible, stressing that we had no part in events and above all that crisis really brought on by PL not only now but over long period. Suggest a quick white paper on this be drafted in case of need. A more minor point would be to stress that my mission here was to encourage Souvanna to stay on, if persuasion needed, which is explanation Unger and I have already given three Ambassadors. As to military action, believe we should go no further than Seventh Fleet movements for now, but do all possible to improve reaction time for forces into Thailand. In terms of PL and DRV deterrence, this is the big card as it was in 1962. Ambassador has seen and concurs. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok. Received at the Department at 7:46 a.m., April 20. Passed to the White House, CIA, OSD, and USUN. 2 Section one of this cable was sent to Elemendorf Air Force Base and passed to Secretary Rusk who was returning from Vietnam. The second section did not arrive until after Rusk’s plane left. 30. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 30. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 21, 1964. RE Pros and Cons of Keeping Bill Bundy in SE Asia 2 Pro 1. Because of his rank and his Washington standing, he is a symbol of our concern in Laos and provides that much reinforcement to Ambassador Unger. 2. If he comes back promptly and then things come apart, it may look as if he had failed to make an adequate effort. 3. If he should stay two or three days and the coalition is put together again, it would be a real plus for a Presidential emissary, and would give some advantage to us on that score. Con 1. As a practical matter, both Bill Bundy and everyone else agree that Unger is first class and can be counted on to play every card with skill and energy in Vientiane. Indeed the whole Laotian country team has performed outstandingly in this crisis. 2. The high probability is that negotiations for a reconstituted government with or without Souvanna will go on for many days, no matter what pressures we bring. The clocks in Laos run on their own time. 3. There are very important operational responsibilities here which have been waiting Bill’s return, and we lose effectiveness on some issues in Vietnam and elsewhere as long as he is away. 4. If the current negotiations should break down and we should need to move in a new direction in Laos, we could always get Bill Bundy back out there in 24 hours, and if he came fresh from up-to-date deliberations in Washington he would be in a stronger position to act for us in such a crisis. On balance, my own judgment is that we should bring Bill back, and I believe this is also the view of Secretary Rusk. McG. B 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. III, 4/1–30/64. No classification marking. A note on the source text indicates that the President read it on April 21. 2 William Bundy was sent to Vientiane at President Johnson’s instruction; see footnote 4, Document 24 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 31. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 31. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 21, 1964. SUBJECT Laos Until early this morning there had been no messages from Embassy Vientiane for 22 hours. The three cables which came in this morning are attached, but the last of them is still incomplete as of 10:30 a.m. 2 Briefly, the situation seems to be that Generals Phoumi, Siho and Kouprasith have pressed Souvanna Phouma into resigning and forming a new government without the Pathet Lao. Ambassador Unger is trying to persuade the generals that this action will not be accepted by the Pathet Lao and will result in a breakdown of the Geneva Accords. We do not yet know whether he will be successful. Bill Bundy is standing by in Bangkok, but will be taking off within the next three hours unless we tell him to stay. I believe that the consensus in State is that he should return in order to report to you as soon as possible and to assume direction of the operations in Washington. Mike 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, Memos, 4/16–4/30/64. Secret. There was no indication that the President saw this memorandum. 2 There is no indication on Forrestal’s memorandum which cables were attached. 32. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff 32. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, April 21, 1964, 6:50 p.m. H: I find the Secretary [Rusk] is reaching for some easy way out and one of them is to get the Russians to agree to a government of neutralists and the right wingers without Pathet Lao representation. This would be utterly unrealistic. Russians would never agree. He wants Tommy [Thompson] to see Dobrynin. If this comes up, it must be knocked out. Would make Russians think this our put up game. If fixed, could have a meeting about how this can be worked out. We can’t go to the Russians and ask them to accept in advance. Wouldn’t do it and haven’t got assets. You are not going to be at the breakfast; 2 I wish you were. F: I will speak to Mac [Bundy]. H: Three sanctions are proposed and only #2 worth anything. F: Do they intend to bring that up at the breakfast? H: I don’t know. Marshall is preparing a memo for the Secretary. 3 F: I better be in touch with him. H: We have got to be very clear that only one posture we can take and that is strong support for back to the status quo. No other position is tenable. If anything else develops, about all we can do is demand from the world that civil war does not break out, and possibly call a meeting, perhaps not necessarily a Geneva meeting. F: We have to play this line out completely. H: Have to play line out completely without any dirtied hands. Khrushchev is bored with Laos and wouldn’t do it and hasn’t got any assets. F: Agree completely. H: I am on 100 percent wave length with Unger’s actions. F: Same here. H: Everything he is doing, doing with great skill and sense. F: Thanks. I will get right to Mac on this. H: Thanks a lot. 1 Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Chronology of Telephone Conversations, April–May 1964. No classification marking. 2 Reference is to a breakfast meeting attended by President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, and McCone, which began at 8:45 a.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) According to an April 22 agenda prepared by Bundy, Rusk was prepared to comment on the SEATO meeting, his trip to Saigon, and the Laos situation. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. III) 3 Not found. 33. Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency 33. Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, April 22, 1964. OCI No. 1124/64 SUBJECT Background of the 19 April Rightist Coup in Laos 1. The coup mounted by rightist elements in Vientiane on 19 April appears to have been only marginally successful. Denied the support of key rightist elements, weakened internally by the shifting allegiance of General Kouprasith and opposed by the Western powers, the coup group’s authority appears limited to Vientiane and its environs. On one count, however, it must be scored a success: the current coalition seems finished and it is problematical whether it will be possible to preserve the tripartite coalition formula. Conditions Leading to Rightist Opposition to the Coalition 2. The conditions which prompted the coup attempt have been present and festering since the coalition was formed in June 1962. From the outset, leaders of the conservative faction doubted Souvanna’s ability to resist Pathet Lao encroachments. Rightist fears were multiplied when Communist China stepped up its road-building activities in northern Laos in late 1962. About that time, it was also becoming clear that left-wing neutralist Quinim Pholsena was exerting increasing influence over national policies through his position as foreign minister. More recently, Souvanna’s efforts to secure neutralization of Luang Prabang without exacting commensurate concessions from the Pathet Lao sharpened rightist doubts regarding his value as national leader. 3. Other, less obvious, grounds existed for rightist opposition to Souvanna’s coalition experiment. Under Souvanna’s plan for military demobilization rightist forces would be reduced from approximately 60,000 to 10,000 men. Aside from impairing rightist ability to resist Communist subversion and reducing both the numbers and the influence of the military, this reduction would erode individual power positions, such as Boun Oum’s “fief” in south Laos under the command of General Phasouk Somly, and Phoumi’s power base in General Siho’s 6–8,000 man security force. 4. In short, the coalition formula has been viewed by the rightists as opening the way to Communist encroachment within the government and as a vehicle for changes which could adversely affect the interests of a substantial portion of the right-wing elite. Manifestations of Rightist Opposition 5. Rightist opposition to the coalition concept was evident even before the signing of the Geneva accords of July 1962. It took US economic sanctions and the military disaster of Nam Tha in May 1962 to bring around the rightists to support of the tripartite formula. 6. Since the formation of the Souvanna government, rightist opposition has taken the form of resistance to measures designed to implement national reunification. In most cases, rightist opposition has had more than adequate justification in the face of continued Communist military and diplomatic maneuvering. 7. Basic rightist opposition has also been reflected in the coup rumors which have been heard in Vientiane from time to time. Right-wing elements—generally those with power bases in the Vientiane area, i.e., Kouprasith and Siho—repeatedly have been cited as preparing to topple the government. Many of these rumors probably were trial balloons launched almost wistfully to test US reaction. The rightists continued to hope that US policy toward Souvanna would change and that the US—while not explicitly promising support—would not oppose his ouster. 8. Most rightist leaders, subjected to repeated US rebuffs to such probes, generally took the line that they would not act without US acquiescence. 9. More recently, General Phoumi reportedly had been planning to take control of the government upon Souvanna’s expected resignation. However, reporting indicated that he intended to hold off any move until Souvanna had actually submitted his resignation. Souvanna, following the failure of tripartite talks in the Plaine des Jarres on 17–18 April, had come close to the end of his rope. He indicated to Western diplomats and the press his intent to submit his resignation to King Savang on 20 April. Western powers began to mount intensive efforts to dissuade Souvanna or—failing that—to convince the King to decline the resignation. In view of Souvanna’s known proclivity to issue—and then back off from—resignation threats, there appeared to remain a chance that he could be led to reconsider his decision. 10. At this point, General Siho, jumping the gun, mounted his coup early on the morning of 19 April. With the apparently reluctant support of Kouprasith, the roundup of the neutralists was a simple matter and Vientiane quickly was under Siho’s control. Siho’s reasons for such precipitate actions are obscure. He is inordinately ambitious, and he may have thought he saw a way of emerging from Phoumi’s shadow and obtaining recognition in his own right. It is also possible that the politically unsophisticated Siho saw in the recent coups in South Vietnam the key to US recognition and support for a more vigorous opposition to Communism. That something of this was in Siho’s mind is suggested by Siho’s reported view that his coup was “similar” to General Khanh’s in South Vietnam, and had the purpose of stepping up “the war against the Pathet Lao and Communist enemies.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, Memos, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by the Office of Current Intelligence. 34. Memorandum of Conversation 34. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 22, 1964, 10:07 a.m. SUBJECT Laos PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador David Henry, Deputy Director, SOV After brief discussion on another subject the Secretary, who had asked the Ambassador to call, raised the matter of Laos. He said that he had received within the last ten minutes a telegram reporting on current developments in that country and in particular interviews of several chiefs of mission with the King and later Souvanna Phouma (Vientiane’s 1168, April 22). 2 He said that the United States continues to support the Government of National Union and considers it necessary to restore that government to full authority. He added that Souvanna Phouma is ready to stay on as Prime Minister and that General Siho is the primary obstacle to restoration of the previous situation in Vientiane. He added that the Laotian armed forces elsewhere are not participating in the current revolt and that the King has asked General Phoumi to take care of the Siho difficulty. After mentioning that the United States Ambassador to Laos is in close touch with his Soviet counterpart, the Secretary emphasized that the United States had nothing to do with the military coup but that it arose from the recent breakdown of talks between the three factions in Laos, which had been making good progress toward agreement in principle when Phoumi said that he must consult with his supporters and Souphanouvong insisted on immediate agreement and broke up the meeting on this issue. Souvanna Phouma felt that Souphanouvong had been very unreasonable. As a result of the breakdown of the talks Souvanna Phouma became discouraged and wanted to resign as Prime Minister. The United States attempted to discourage him from this course. When Ambassador Unger came to Saigon to discuss the subject with the Secretary, the coup broke out and the Secretary immediately sent Unger back to tell Siho and Kouprasith that the United States supports the Geneva Accords and the tripartite government formed under them. The Secretary continued that he wished to emphasize how important it is that the Pathet Lao should not act now in any way to damage the Geneva Accords. He requested the Ambassador to ask his government to do everything possible to get the Pathet Lao to support the Geneva Accords. He said it is vital to keep the 1962 Geneva Agreements effective. We (the United States) have been discouraged by the Pathet Lao’s actions against the Geneva Accords, in particular their introduction of North Vietnamese forces into Laos and their allowing the North Vietnamese to use Laotian territory as a corridor into South Vietnam. The Secretary emphasized again that both the United States and the USSR should do everything possible to restore the Geneva Agreements of 1962 and said that if all of us worked toward this objective, there seemed a reasonable chance that we could attain it. The Secretary then referred to an Izvestiya commentary (see Moscow telegram 3225 of April 21 3 ) which links the United States to the Vientiane coup. He said that he hoped the Soviet Government would not continue to follow that line, for the United States is sincerely trying to support the Geneva Accords. 4 He added that the recent meeting of the Ambassadors with the King had confirmed that the latter, as well as Souvanna Phouma, is in agreement with this United States position, that there may be a meeting in Luang Prabang with all three factions of the Government of National Union present, and that if Phoumi succeeds in handling Siho, it should be possible to restore the previous situation in Laos. The Secretary then turned to the broader subject of Southeast Asia as a whole, mentioning that he wished to make a comment which he had not had in mind when the Ambassador came in. He said that the United States is not looking for military positions in Southeast Asia. If Hanoi and Peiping would leave this area alone, the United States would not have troops there. The United States is concerned about Hanoi and Peiping’s actions and intentions and wishes to protect the Southeast Asian countries. A very unpleasant situation could develop if Hanoi and Peiping continued to push. The Soviet Government as well as the United States should try to keep the situation under control. 5 After discussion of another subject the conversation turned again to Laos. The Secretary noted that Izvestiya’s commentary had said that “all sources” agree that the tripartite talks broke down over Phoumi’s refusal to agree to neutralize Luang Prabang. This was not the United States Government’s understanding. We understood rather that Souvanna Phouma felt Souphanouvong had been unreasonable. The Secretary also noted with amusement that Izvestiya’s commentary had quoted former Vice President Nixon and pointed out that Nixon is not speaking for the United States Government at the moment. Ambassador Dobrynin said that the USSR considers the situation in Laos a serious one; that it had asked the United Kingdom to make a joint appeal to restore the situation; that the Soviet Government supports the Geneva Accords and therefore Souvanna Phouma; that his only information on current developments in Laos came from the April 21 TASS statement; that he understood Phoumi was responsible for the breakdown of the tripartite talks, noting that Phoumi seemed freer in action since the coup than Souvanna Phouma; that the USSR has been doing its best to support the tripartite coalition government and the Geneva Accords; and that he did not need to repeat but could confirm that the Soviet Government’s view on the Laotian situation as set forth in “our” note of March 31 [sic, but probably the Ambassador’s note of March 25]. 6 With regard to Southeast Asia as a whole, Ambassador Dobrynin said that his government disapproved United States activity in general in this area. The Soviet Government believed it better to let people alone to make their own decisions. The Secretary responded that South Vietnam should be free from the pressure of the North Vietnamese men and weapons. There followed an exchange on the situation in South Vietnam and North Vietnam’s responsibility for it. The Secretary and the Ambassador disagreed on the facts and on their interpretation. The Ambassador emphasized that the Viet Cong, like all guerrillas, could not succeed without popular support, while the Secretary emphasized the North Vietnam role in the fighting. The Ambassador concluded that he was sure both he and the Secretary understood each other’s positions in this matter. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Henry and approved in Rusk’s office on May 2. The time of the meeting was taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The source text indicates it was Part II of III. The meeting was held in Rusk’s office. 2 See footnote 2, Document 36 . 3 The commentary argued that Lao neutrality was dependent on the end of the war in South Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS) 4 See Document 10 . 5 On May 5 Dobrynin, acting under instructions, made an oral statement to Rusk responding to this discussion. Dobrynin noted the presence of U.S. military personnel in Laos and the activities of AID and Air America. He pointed out that the organizers of the coup were those forces in Laos which the United States supported. Notwithstanding U.S. assurances, Vientiane was not safe for Souvanna Phouma and many neutralist ministers, nor was Vientiane in control of the Government of National Union. Should the Neo Lao Hat Xat be forced from the Government and the civil war resumed, Dobrynin stated that “it is difficult to imagine the external forces to remain indifferent to the situation.” (Memorandum of conversation, May 5; Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS) 6 Brackets in the source text. 35. Summary Record of the 528th Meeting of the National Security Council 35. Summary Record of the 528th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, April 22, 1964, 4:45 p.m. SUBJECT Cutback in Nuclear Production; Secretary Rusk’s Report and Vietnam; Asst. Secretary Bundy’s Report on Laos Secretary Rusk chaired the meeting in the absence of the President and reported on his recent trip. 2 [Here follows discussion of the SEATO meeting in Manila, a conversation with Chiang Kai-shek, and South Vietnam; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume I, pages 258 – 262 .] The President joined the meeting. Secretary Rusk suggested that Assistant Secretary Bundy report on his trip to Laos. 3 Mr. Bundy said Ambassador Unger and the country team are doing an excellent job. The Ambassador is cool and has good judgment. As of this morning, the chances looked pretty good that the former coalition will continue in power. The King may be successful in holding together the coalition government within the general Geneva framework. Souvanna Phouma, who last week was very discouraged and prepared to resign, is now ready to continue as Prime Minister. Possibly the effect of his having been under arrest for two days has changed his view about continuing as Prime Minister. The danger in Laos is that right-wing hotheads who promoted the military revolution and who now have military control of Vientiane may refuse to accept the compromise and break out despite the opposition of Phoumi and other senior officers. Siho is a real thug and very bad news. Kouprasith is a reasonably intelligent officer. Phoumi has been reasonable and denies that he took any part in the recent coup. He promised to try to get back to the situation where they were before the right-wing officers overthrew the coalition. A rightist push may, however, come later. Our short-term problem is to keep the hotheads from preventing the restored coalition government regaining power. We are considering a cable to our Ambassador authorizing him to tell the right-wing hotheads that the U.S. will not support their forces and will continue U.S. assistance to the other military forces. We must always remember that it was the Pathet Lao who were responsible for breaking up the conference at the Plaine des Jarres and preventing the coalition from working. The Pathet Lao created the situation which led to the right-wing revolt. Secretary Rusk said he had warned Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin of the importance we place on keeping the Pathet Lao from taking advantage of the current chaotic situation in Laos. 4 He said the Soviets plan to refer publicly to their continuing support of the Geneva Accords. [Here follows discussion of cutbacks in nuclear production.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. I, Tab 9. Top Secret. 2 Rusk and Bundy traveled to Saigon before and after the SEATO Council meeting in Manila, April 13–15. Documentation on that trip is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 234 ff. 3 Regarding Bundy’s trip to Laos, see footnote 4, Document 24 . 4 See Document 34 . 36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, April 22, 1964, 7:43 p.m. 889. Embtels 1163, 1165, 1168, and 1169. 2 We conclude from your 1168 that King may now endorse continuation government of national union, subject possible modifications, and that this may be accepted by Phoumi but subject to grave danger counter action by Revolutionary Committee. Seems preferable obtain restoration status quo without additional measures or sanctions. However, in event Revolutionary Committee continues to put pressure on King and perhaps Phoumi, whether or not King has announced formal action, we authorize you to carry out limited sanctions and measures enumerated your 1163 and 1169 except for public announcement of suspension of military supplies. 3 Instead of public announcement we believe military supply suspension should be handled by your informing key individuals to this effect in your discretion. You might wish to start with Phoumi, making clear that shipments would continue, not through Vientiane, to FAR units remaining loyal to government recognized by King. (This need not mean formal pledge to this effect, but could be left to your judgment of where loyalties lie.) We leave it to you how to play Kouprasith and whether it would be useful to say this to Siho or might drive him to violent reaction. You could also inform UK, French, and Australian reps urging no publicity. We prefer this discriminate approach rather than press announcement although we recognize word may get out. If so, believe you should avoid comment at your end but report to us, and we could arrange low-key confirmation here covering all aspects. In suspending shipments of military supplies to Revolutionary Committee forces, we assume that it is unlikely that the Pathet Lao will take advantage of present confusion to initiate any military action since reconstruction Geneva framework and government of national union presumably in their interest also. If PL do attack, we would, of course, have to reconsider our position. In any event immediate impact of suspension will be primarily psychological and will be slight in terms of military capability of units affected. In order to ensure that PL/NVN will not interpret suspension as invitation to move against non-Communists, suggest Denson, Millet, or one of your other colleagues make it clear to ChiComs and DRV Ambassadors Vientiane that we would not condone any military action by PL/NVN forces in Laos. In connection with third sanction, restricting contacts with Revolutionary Committee, we fully concur in your actions reported 1165. 4 Re withdrawal of Ambassadors, we share your view that it would be unwise to withdraw Ambassadors as Millet has suggested and that best step would be for you to move to Luang Prabang if you feel situation warrants it and Souvanna remains there. As to evacuation, we regard this more as a matter of your discretion for safety US community than a sanction that would have weight with Revolutionary Committee, and you are authorized to do this at any time and in any degree you see fit. Septel gives funding authorizations. 5 You can judge best balance of safety factors as against any possible implications we expecting the worst. We assume of course that you will first discuss these sanctions and other measures with Souvanna and, if possible the King, so that they will understand what we are doing and our rationale for it. It is essential that we first have Souvanna’s full understanding and support. In addition to your proposed measures, we would like your views on continuing suspension of FEOF sales. Appears to us that resumption of sales during crisis period not in our political or economic interest. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Trueheart, cleared in draft by McNaughton and Forrestal, cleared in substance by Poats, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok for DEPCHJUSMAG and to CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 In these telegrams, April 21 and 22, the Embassy reported on efforts to restore legal government in Vientiane and raised the possibility of gradual sanctions against the coup leaders if they refused to agree to a restoration. (All ibid., POL 15–1 LAOS) 3 Those sanctions were: a gradual but visible withdrawal of dependents of Western diplomats from Vientiane; a public announcement of suspension of U.S. military shipments to forces under control of the Revolutionary Committee; elimination of U.S. Mission contact with the Committee except for delivery of messages from the Ambassador; withdrawal of Western Ambassadors from Laos, or at least from Vientiane to Luang Prabang; and withdrawal of American aircraft based in Vientiane. 4 In telegram 1165, April 21, Unger reported that he had declined a request for a member of his requirements staff to meet with the Revolutionary Committee, and he had refused to provide aircraft for members of the Committee to fly from Savannakhet and Pakse to Vientiane for a meeting of the Committee. 5 Not found. 37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, April 25, 1964, 5:51 p.m. 904. Embtel 1198. 2 Our objective remains to restore Geneva Agreements and full authority Government of National Union. 3 We continue to hope these results can be achieved without threat of sanctions. At same time, we cannot allow Revolutionary Group to insist on conditions or changes which would give Pathet Lao legitimate basis for claiming Geneva settlement undermined, and you are authorized to state that our support (military and economic) will not be forthcoming if Group does so insist, and if it does not restore Government of National Union to full authority. This should be made clear to all concerned. You may make clear this does not mean composition of government need be exactly same as prior to coup, or that Pathet Lao protests must necessarily be heeded or improper demands met, but it does mean that any new composition must adhere to principles of June 1962 PDJ agreement. (See Deptel 898 notal, reporting Secretary’s talk with Alphand yesterday.) 4 To achieve your objective you are authorized at your discretion to proceed with implementation measures recommended in Embtels 1163 and 1169 per Deptel 889. 5 With respect cut-off military supplies leave to your discretion whether it would be effective to make distinction between extreme hotheads and forces under control other members of Revolutionary Group whose position less clear. Request you give us your judgment as to when cut-off of military supplies including consumables, likely affect military capability of forces involved. Re evacuation you have authority to proceed when and as you deem necessary. Payment for transportation and per diem is based on authority to evacuate for safety reasons. We feel present circumstances in Laos provide ample justification for invoking this authority although you may do this partly for tactical reasons. We are arranging for Washington statement per your recommendation and will inform you by septel. 6 Instructions re approach to Thai will be sent by septel. 7 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, McNaughton, and in substance by Rusk; and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 In telegram 1198 from Vientiane, April 25, Unger reported that, encouraged by an April 23 public statement by Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman that his government would not act jointly with other powers in imposing sanctions against the Revolutionary Committee, the Committee was demanding concessions from Souvanna for cooperation with a restoration of legal government. If Souvanna made these concessions, Unger suggested that the Pathet Lao would withdraw from the government and could justifiably claim that the Geneva Accords of 1962 had been breached. (Ibid.) The text of Thanat’s April 23 press conference in Bangkok is in telegram 1804 from Bangkok, April 23. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 3 In telegram 892 to Vientiane, April 23, the Department of State reported that President Johnson stated during a press conference that morning that he had received encouraging reports from Unger that the Government of National Union under Souvanna “was continuing and has the support of all, including the Revolutionary Committee.” The President concluded that the important thing was to concentrate on peace and unity in Laos under the principles established by the Geneva Agreements. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS) Johnson’s statement is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, p. 520. 4 During this discussion, as reported in telegram 5424 to Paris, repeated to Vientiane as 898, April 24, Alphand stated that France could only support a Lao Government that represented all three factions, but he agreed that the composition need not be exactly the same as the old Souvanna government. The crucial point, Alphand continued, was that the Pathet Lao agree to the formula for the new government. (Ibid.) 5 See Document 36 and footnote 2 thereto. 6 Not further identified. 7 In telegram 1910 to Bangkok (repeated to Vientiane as 905), April 25, the Department instructed Ambassador Martin to stress to Thanat and Prime Minister Thanom that whatever its weaknesses, the Geneva framework was still the best means of preventing a Communist takeover of Laos. Although desirable in theory, a strong conservative government in Laos was a chimera. It would lead to an attack by the Pathet Lao, conservative defeat, and Thailand and the United States having to decide to accept a Communist Laos or to assume the fighting in Laos. Once Souvanna’s government was reestablished, the United States would continue strongly to support anti-Communist elements in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 38. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 38. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 25, 1964. This afternoon you asked for my advice regarding further action in Laos. I believe we should accept Bill Bundy’s recommendations and continue to endeavor to force the junta leaders into support of a government formed in accordance with the Geneva Accords. To do otherwise would not only be a violation of an agreement to which we are a party, but might very well lead to a situation in which we face the loss of Laos to the Communists, or alternatively the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into that country. It seems quite clear the Pathet Lao will refuse to accept a government which either excludes or substantially reduces the influence of their representatives. If such a government is formed, almost certainly the Pathet Lao would move against it militarily. We know they have the military power to substantially expand the territory under their control. I see only two ways to prevent an expansion of the influence of the Pathet Lao in Laos: either we must support the Geneva Accords or we must be prepared to introduce U.S. forces into that country. Of the two I much prefer the first. This requires that we apply pressure on the junta leaders to support Souvanna Phouma as Premier and to accept the continued presence of the Pathet Lao in the government. Robert S. McNamara 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, Memos, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Top Secret. 39. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 39. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, April 26, 1964, 1 a.m. 1201. Embtel 1156, 1198. 2 This message addresses itself to problem of position US should adopt should revolutionary coup succeed in spite of our efforts block this and should, as a result, Communist military action be launched to take over this zone. Fundamental premises to what follows are 1) we will not permit strategic Mekong Valley to fall into Communist hands; 2) we continue to support Geneva Accords and a coalition Govt of National Union in consonance therewith. In connection with latter, believe achievement US objectives in Laos in past ten years has suffered in important degree from our sharp shifts in policy. This time we should not permit rash actions by irresponsible Lao to dictate a change in basic US policy. Should the revolutionary coup, in open defiance of US opposition, press on even to point of getting King to recognize it the US should not waver from our declared policy of support for the Geneva Accords. It follows therefrom that we cannot recognize a group or even a so called govt which has taken steps which in effect tear up the Geneva Accords. Our effort, should this occur, would have to be directed at bringing the revolutionary group to its knees by massive application of various sanctions open to us. At same time, we should inform Soviets and ChiComs (and maybe even North Vietnamese), also British and/or French of our continued support of Geneva Accords and agreements underlying them, resulting in our opposition to revolutionary coup, accompanied with sober warning that this in no way means US is about to permit all of Laos to fall under Communist domination. If Communists make any moves threatening strategic Mekong Valley US will immediately take counter measures of its own choosing to guarantee security that valley. Assuming that Communists do not make any threatening move, actions which we should take would be following: 1) We continue publicly support Geneva Accords, coalition Govt of National Union and Souvanna as Prime Minister. (It will be important to keep Souvanna from actually submitting resignation whether he actually leaves Laos or not.) 2) We would announce complete suspension of American aid to Laos (USIP,FEOF, project programs, MAP, etc.). 3) We would undertake immediate orderly evacuation all depend-ents (in hope revolutionary group would be quickly brought to its knees and AID program recommenced we would not at first evacuate employees themselves). 4) We would try to continue supply Kong Le forces and Meo and even any other dissident non-Communist military groups with necessary subsistence and military supplies by means of airlift from outside Laos (arrangements for airlift into Laos from Thailand admittedly might be difficult to negotiate with Thais if they determined to support coup group). We believe application these measures would quickly cause economic chaos as well as serious breakdown FAR logistics thus forcing coup group to give up. At this point we would hope coup leaders would be obliged either to flee Laos or acquiesce in reconstitution of a coalition Govt of National Union under Souvanna. Political consequences hard to predict, but this might mean in effect the disappearance of extreme element of right wing and at least partial amalgamation of right wing with neutralist center under Souvanna. While economy and army might have been seriously weakened end result in terms political configuration would be more in line with our ultimate goal i.e. large grouping of all anti-Communist Lao. Since this merger of right and center would be under aegis of Souvanna there would be no valid reason for objection to it from such as Soviets, Poles, Indians, and French, since PL would still be represented in govt. On assumption that Communists do not heed our warning we would have to resort various SEATO measures to introduce US and other troops to hold various key points along the Mekong. Regardless of circumstances FAR cannot be regarded as anything more than trip wire should Communists make determined move with Vietnamese or Chinese troops. Even in these circumstances we should not permit ourselves to become deflected from our stated goal of reinvesting Souvanna and reestablishing entire Geneva framework if only for our public picture. The status of the coup group at this point has little importance. If our intervention eventually led to a military stand off and partition of Laos we would of course have to recognize govt in control this zone in due course, but since we would in effect be in military control we could probably shape things to our wish without much trouble. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and USUN. Handled as Limdis at the instruction of S/S. 2 Document 29 and see footnote 2 , Document 37 . 40. Memorandum for the Record 40. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 29, 1964. SUBJECT Views of Ambassador Unger on Operations in Eastern Laos The following notes are based on my conversation with Ambassador Unger and Mr. Nes of the Saigon Embassy on Sunday morning, April 19, just before we received news of the attempted coup. They thus reflect his judgment of the reaction in Laos to possible scales of operation, as it related to a political situation that assumed Souvanna Phouma back in control. 1. Southern Laos . The Ambassador reported that a substantial expansion of Kha operations would get underway in early May and would build up out of FAR bases, principally in the Saravan area, so that there would be 15–20 teams, each with radio, operating in the area from somewhat north of Saravan all the way down to the Cambodian border. I referred to General Khanh’s conversation with Secretary Rusk in which he had expressed particular concern over the southeast corner of Laos. 2 (This is also the area apparently covered in the conversations between the Vietnamese and Oudone Sananikone over the weekend of the 19th, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]). 3 Mr. Nes noted that General Khanh believes there are two Viet Minh battalions and a hospital installation in the corner area. (Parenthetically, we agreed at this point that there was inadequate coordination between our people in Vientiane and our people in Saigon on intelligence concerning eastern Laos, and that Vientiane should send over a man at least once a month to be sure that Saigon had all the information that Vientiane was getting through our various operations in the area.) 2. General Standards for Operations in Laos . The Ambassador said that we must consider carefully any action that would be detected and cause a reaction on the part of Souvanna, in the first place, and the Communists in the second. As to Souvanna, he said that Souvanna is perfectly well aware that the Communists use eastern Laos but that he thinks (or thought as of April 19) that he got some hopeful indication in Peking that might enable him to work toward free circulation in discussions with the three tendencies, and that he might also now be able to get more help out of the ICC. Souvanna’s basic feeling is that if there is really a resumption of hostilities for any reason, it would be the end of Laos. Therefore, he would be (again, as of April 19) in a very go-slow mood, and in essence would be opposed to any action that might be detected, i.e., in Ambassador Unger’s judgment, any operation that was not: (a) small; (b) under Montagnard or other cover; (c) kept away from population centers. In this connection, Mr. Nes said that it was the current MACV judgment that anything larger than a small patrol would be detected and clobbered in eastern Laos, in view of the substantial number of Viet Minh battalions operating in the area. On the Communist side, Ambassador Unger thought that once the Communists learned of the significant operations beyond the limits stated above, they could and would move readily against Saravan (which was the key base for Kha operations and which could be taken at any time) or Attopeu, which was also important. 3. Phoumi Attitude . Ambassador Unger thought that Phoumi basically would like to get us into a fighting war, and that his contacts with Khanh might be encouraging him to think he could do this. He also noted that Phoumi has continuing GRC contacts via Bangkok. 4. Soviet Leverage . Ambassador Unger said that the Soviets were now reasonable in Vientiane, but that they had only the most marginal leverage and that their action had now became “very threadbare.” They had no real weight any more with the Pathet Lao, and were often reluctant to use what little they had for fear of cutting across the Soviet effort to maintain some entree with Hanoi. The Ambassador recalled that despite Pushkin’s assurances to Governor Harriman two years ago, Khrushchev had twice refused to reaffirm what Pushkin had said. 5. “Hot Pursuit” . Ambassador Unger said that, as it related to Laos, this was really a fiction, since there had been no genuine case that he was aware of. He also thought that Souvanna Phouma, who might once have been agreeable to such operations, was now opposed (as of April 19). Referring to the outgoing State Department cable of April 7 (1630 to Saigon and 836 to Vientiane), 4 Ambassador Unger was opposed to operations as large as those described in paragraph 2c of that message (i.e., up to battalion size), and also leery of the operations described in paragraph 2d and paragraph 2e (operations up to battalion size to relieve friendly Lao forces on the border, and GVN encadrements of FAR units near the border.) He particularly thought that identifiable GVN forces would be disruptive in Laos. 6. Reconnaissance Operations . Ambassador Unger thought that lower level reconnaissance should be conducted in Laos only down to an altitude of 10,000–15,000 feet. He thought these would have serious consequences if an aircraft were lost, but did not think that unmarked aircraft, unless lost, would cause a serious problem at the altitudes stated. William P. Bundy 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Memos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Top Secret. 2 See paragraph 8 of Secto 71 from Saigon, April 19, printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, p. 247 . 3 The CIA telegram number was not indicated and has not been identified. 4 In telegram 1630 to Saigon and also sent to Vientiane as 836, April 7, the Department asked for comments on and sent tentative guidelines for South Vietnamese cross border operations into Laos which it outlined in the telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 41. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 41. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 29, 1964. RE NSC Meeting on April 29 2 The main business of this meeting is to review intelligence information indicating greatly increased use of Laos for infiltration from North to South Vietnam. I think you may want to follow the following order of discussions: 1. Briefing by McCone on this situation. 2. Briefing by State (presumably Bill Bundy) on the political and paramilitary situation in Laos. 3. Consideration of measures to get more hard evidence on North Vietnamese use of the Laos corridor—State and Defense. I doubt if you will wish to authorize specific actions today. It may be better to hear the argument and let the meeting continue without you to prepare a coordinated recommendation. I think such a recommendation can be developed by State, Defense and the White House promptly, but it is not in hand now. 3 McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, Memos, 4/16/64–4/30/64. No classification marking. 2 See Document 43 . 3 In a handwritten note at the bottom of this memorandum Bundy indicated that a summary of the problem for cross border operations prepared by Forrestal on April 29 was attached. For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, p. 275 . 42. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 42. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) 1 Washington, April 29, 1964. SUBJECT NSC Meeting on Laos April 29 2 This meeting is expected to cover two separate developments which have come to light in recent days. Each item will be opened by CIA briefing: 1. Military Action Northeast and Southeast of the PDJ . It is not yet clear whether this is a more or less routine action to clear Meo units from an area where they have been able to harass Route 7 or whether there is also a push to extend PL control westward along Route 7 at the expense of the Kong Le forces. The latter would be a serious development and the NSC should review various US courses of action which might be followed if the situation develops in this way. For example, movements by the 7th Fleet, introduction of ground forces into Thailand, etc. Souvanna has already protested to the Co-Chairmen and the ICC and the Co-Chairmen’s representatives had planned to go to Khang Khay today. Under this item, we should also be prepared to review for the President the current political situation. 2. Evidence of Greatly Increased Use of Route 12-a from Southern NVN to Muong Phine Area near Tchepone. Although it is not yet absolutely clear, there is a very strong suggestion from photographic evidence that there has been a massive increase in the use of this route for infiltration into SVN. It is essential that we obtain further information as promptly as possible, both in order to ascertain how much is going in and out, so as to take counter-measures, and in order to provide additional evidence for a possible further Jorden report in case we decide on stronger measures at some point. The crucial issue is whether the now much clearer need for better intelligence outweighs the possible adverse effects of activity in Laos on a political situation that seems likely to remain precarious at best for a considerable period. On balance, my own conclusion is that the President should be asked to authorize the following this afternoon, subject to more precise refinement by a working group following the meeting: (a) Use of agents in Laos. No political problem but equally not likely to be really effective. (b) Patrols. This is a tough one. Unger, prior to the coup, had expressed grave reservations about units up to battalion size. At that time, Souvanna was even opposed to “hot pursuit” (a fiction in any case), but the odds are that the tough Peking statements of recent days have overcome any illusion Souvanna may have had over having any better deal in Peking or Hanoi. In any case, I believe we should abandon the idea of units as large as a battalion but authorize patrols subject to the following conditions: (1) Units of 50–100 men. (2) Not in GVN or other uniforms, but plausibly deniable Montagnard or local groups. (3) Aimed at intelligence, with any military action confined to self-defense. (4) Patrols to stay out of populated areas and not to proceed far to the west. A flat mileage limit does not appear wise, but supply and timing considerations alone would probably prevent patrols from going further than 30–50 miles. (5) Aerial resupply to be permitted, but by Vietnamese aircraft, unmarked. (6) No US advisers, at least at the outset. (7) Operations to start in the northern area near Route 9, and to be expanded thereafter to the south as results and indications warrant. Except for the size of units, these are approximately the same conditions proposed to Unger on April 7, to which he demurred at that time. 3 (c) Limited low-level reconnaissance to assess results. The photographic people say that this can produce far greater sharpness but only if undertaken at really low levels. It would help us ascertain what the installations are and whether organized units may be starting to come down. The authorization should not be open-ended, but should provide for perhaps two trial missions to be conducted along Route 9 and Route 12-a staying away from Tchepone and installations which have anti-aircraft. For the longer term the NSC may wish to consider various measures which would improve our posture, such as: 1. Expansion of Hardnose. 4 This will require expansion of secret base [ less than 1 line of text not declassified ]where personnel are trained. 2. Encadrement of BV–33 5 at Lao Bao with Vietnamese. An effective BV–33 would be very useful in harassing any VC activity pinpointed by the patrolling referred to above. 3. Positioning of some additional T–28’s in Thailand. These could be useful in the event of further major Communist drives in Laos. 4. Pushing ahead with Mu Ban Samaki (Lao version of the strategic hamlet). 5. Developing independent logistic channel to Kong Le. 6. Investigating possibilities of bringing new blood into Laotian leadership. An INR memorandum analyzing the latest developments is attached. 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Memos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret. 2 See Documents 41 and 43 . 3 See Document 43 and footnote 4 thereto. 4 Operation Hardnose was a program in which the United States organized, trained, equipped, paid, and operated armed intelligence/reconnaissance teams of various sizes behind Pathet Lao lines. In central areas of Laos the teams were largely comprised of Lao, while in southern Laos they were predominately Kha tribal minorities. The teams were ostensibly designated as FAR commando or guerrilla units and were paid through FAR. 5 BV–33 was an elite Volunteer Battalion of the Lao National Army. 6 Apparent reference to an April 29 memorandum from Richard T. Ewing of INR/RFE to Trueheart that concluded that Communist activities in the Plain of Jars and the Tchepone areas were related to two separate objectives: (1) strengthening the Pathet Lao position in the Plain, and (2) North Vietnamese support for Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. INR suggested that the attacks in the Plain were consistent with routine clearing operations and concluded that there was no evidence of serious danger to the non-Communist position there. INR suggested the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese were following a wait and see approach. Because of its control and use for infiltration of the Tchepone-Muong Phine area, North Vietnam was unlikely to under take an offensive there for fear of encouraging FAR attack or South Vietnamese border operations. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–7 LAOS) 43. Memorandum for the Record 43. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, April 29, 1964. SUBJECT National Security Council Meeting—29 April 1964 PARTICIPANTS The President Messrs. McGeorge Bundy, Forrestal, Smith, Valenti, Governor Harriman, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Sullivan, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McNaughton, General Taylor Mr. Rowen, Mr. McCone, Mr. Cline and Mr. Colby 1. The meeting opened with a CIA briefing on the situation in Laos by Mr. Cline. 2 This included the current situation, the 29 April conclusions of the Watch Committee, and a short statement of the results of recent photographic coverage of road communications from North Vietnam into and in Laos. 2. Governor Harriman then commented that we do not have a clear idea of the implications of the Plaines de Jarres action, that we are pressing the Communists to abstain from actions against the neutralists and rightists 3 and are prepared to move to pressure Siho and the rightists to support Souvanna’s neutralist government. With respect to the area around Tchepone he said that we have some indications of a step-up in North Vietnamese logistic capabilities and that patrols will be authorized in the Tchepone area for intelligence purposes under certain policy restrictions. Also a limited number of low level air photographic reconnaissance missions will be run into this area. 3. The President asked what Lodge’s position was on this. Secretary McNamara said that Lodge would generally support such actions, but that some reservations had been expressed by Ambassador Unger. He then said it was believed necessary to take some of these steps in any case. 4 The Director requested at least twenty-four hours delay on the air photo recommendations in order to process these properly through COMOR. Secretary McNamara also requested twenty-four hours to secure JCS comments on the patrol idea. It was thus agreed that these matters would be processed through these channels and taken up at a later meeting. (It was later set for Saturday.) 5 4. Following the President’s departure it was agreed that Ambassador Unger’s comments would be sought on the air photography point and that this matter would be processed through COMOR. With respect to patrols, General Taylor was the center of an animated discussion in which he took the position that only battalion size operations had any change of success. 6 He finally settled on the position of being given the mission of conducting intelligence probes within this area with the limitation that his forces could not exceed 50 to 100 man patrols. A cable so specifying will be prepared by Mr. William Bundy. In the course of this discussion General Taylor commented that CIA’s crossborder operations to his knowledge had never produced any real information and that these must be run on a more substantial military basis. His primary target in this discussion was the State Department as he expressed some impatience over the need for detailed information south of Tchepone beyond what was available unless it was proposed to do something about these areas. 5. The Director and Secretary McNamara discussed some other matters privately. WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Apr-31 May, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on April 30. 2 According to Bromley Smith’s account of this meeting (in which the starting time is given as 5 p.m.), Cline stated that the expanded Pathet Lao forces had a “50–50 chance” of overrunning all other non-Communist forces, but if joined by pro-Communist neutral and North Vietnamese troops, all Laos could fall quickly without warning. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Tab 1) Smith’s summary record of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 267 – 277 . 3 Smith’s account states that Harriman told the President that the Department of State was attempting to convince the ICC to return to the Plain of Jars to help stop the fighting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Tab 1) 4 In Smith’s account of this meeting, the President ordered that proposals for reconnaissance be presented to Unger again in light of new information on infiltration and the military build up so that Unger could give his best estimate of the political effect of the reconnaissance in Laos. (Ibid.) 5 May 1. No record of the meeting has been found. 6 In an unattributed memorandum with an attached summary of CIA directed cross-border operations into Laos from July 15, 1961, to November 2, 1963, given to McCone on April 29, it was concluded that “the results of these efforts, encompassing operations run over the past two years, have not been outstandingly productive and have lead the CIA to the firm conclusion that large team operations offer the only reasonable chance for worthwhile intelligence missions.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Apr-31 May, 1964) 44. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 44. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, April 29, 1964. SUBJECT Laos Cross Border The aftermath of the NSC meeting this afternoon 2 revealed the basic problem here in Washington. I think I am accurate in stating the two positions as follows: When Max Taylor talks, he is representing a composite view of the Chiefs. There is an element in that body (presently Admiral McDonald and General LeMay) who wish to bomb or otherwise interdict the infiltration routes in Laos. This is consistent with their view that the war in Vietnam is essentially a conventional one, which should be fought by the United States with all the conventional resources at our disposal, especially those which involve a minimum loss of American life, i.e. air and sea power. General Taylor and General Wheeler have a more sophisticated view of the military situation in Southeast Asia, but they are naturally unwilling to ask a subordinate command (MACV) to undertake an action which in their view can have no real military effect on the enemy. General Taylor probes deeply into the soft spot of the State position when he suggests that it may not be worth risking the Geneva Accords merely for small probes to gather intelligence of doubtful value. In other words, General Taylor would prefer actually to invest a Viet Minh base in Laos even at the cost of a pitched battle, rather than to send a hundred men on a mission which he does not believe would be successful. The State Department, on the other hand, is fundamentally worried about the precarious situation in Laos. I suspect that the position they took today was an attempt to appease the military and to satisfy their own need for hard information without compromising that fundamental interest. General Taylor, and probably Bob McNamara, saw through this maneuver quickly. In my own opinion, our real problem is that we have given to the military (MACV) missions in South Vietnam which they are unwilling and unable effectively to perform. We do want hard intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, both for military and political reasons; but in the getting of it, we do not want an overt invasion of Laos at this time. Our regular military command structure has neither the desire nor the capability of tackling such a messy problem. Until August of last year the CIA was preparing and beginning to carry out just the kinds of operations we were talking about this afternoon. As I have explained to you in previous memoranda, they were called off this and several other jobs in Vietnam in “Operation Switchback” and transferred virtually all CAS operational assets in Vietnam to MACV. It will be extremely difficult partially to reverse this transfer; but if I were the President, I would tell my people to try to get it done. Mike 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. II, 4/16/64–4/30/64. Secret. 2 See Document 43 . 45. Summary Record of the 531st National Security Council Meeting 45. Summary Record of the 531st National Security Council Meeting 1 Washington, May 5, 1964, noon. SUBJECT Laos and Overflights of Cuba The meeting began without the President. Secretary Rusk asked Secretary McNamara to review the problem of the use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) on U–2s overflying Cuba. [Here follows 6 pages of discussion unrelated to Laos.] Laos In response to the President’s question, Mr. Bundy said the experts on Laos were prepared to give a short briefing if the President so desired. Assistant Secretary Bundy briefed on the operations which were now being carried out. No request for additional authority was made to the President. The cross-border patrols and low-level reconnaissance missions, which the concerned Departments in Washington agree upon, will be undertaken. They fall within the authority given by the President following Secretary McNamara’s last trip to Vietnam. Certain of the operations which were opposed by Ambassador Unger for political reasons will not be undertaken for the time being. Secretary Rusk said he agreed that we should postpone for a week low-level reconnaissance, but he did not wish to delay much longer. The need to know more about what is going on in Laos as regards the infiltration of men and equipment is so great that a decision needs to be taken soon if our information is to be augmented. He suggested that we should persuade Souvanna Phouma to ask the International Control Commission (ICC) to undertake the intelligence missions we would like to see carried out. We could offer to hold up low-level reconnaissance if the ICC would agree to undertake the necessary missions. Secretary McNamara said the Viet Cong is increasing its pressure in the areas north of South Vietnam. He cited a significant communications buildup which might mean that a major effort was being undertaken by the North Vietnamese to increase their military buildup for use either in Laos or in South Vietnam. He agreed we should wait for a week to see what developments take place in Laos. Our capability to undertake low-level reconnaissance will be brought to a 24- to 48-hour readiness status. Bromley Smith 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 3. Top Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 46. Memorandum for the Record 46. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 5, 1964. SUBJECT National Security Council Meeting, 5 May 1964 PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Valenti, Mr. Smith, Mr. Forrestal Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Governor Harriman, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. William Bundy Secretary McNamara, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. McNaughton Secretary Dillon The Attorney General Mr. McDermott Mr. Rowan Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby 1. The first part of the meeting was addressed to Cuba. 2. With respect to Laos, Mr. William Bundy briefed on the plans for increasing intelligence coverage of the routes through Laos to South Vietnam. He stated that Presidential approval had previously been obtained for the actions mentioned. He said that small patrols would be authorized in the areas north and east of Tchepone, with air in-and-ex-filtration, although it will take several weeks to launch the first of these patrols. With respect to air photo reconnaissance, pursuant to Ambassador Unger’s reservations, these will be withheld, but a new look will be taken after a week. Meanwhile specific targets for these will be determined. Secretary Rusk believed that we should not postpone these more than a week or so unless Souvanna clearly moves to take action. He suggested that we urge the ICC to inspect the Tchepone area and begin our overflights and offer to suspend our overflights if the ICC carries out proper inspection. (Action: FE/TBL with OCI and DIA—Please keep in touch with the list of specific targets.) 2. Mr. Bundy also added that an effort will be made to establish a single point at which detailed reports from all sources can be immediately analyzed in Washington, to analyze the traffic running over the routes from North Vietnam into southern Laos, and arrangements made to cross-fertilize the various intelligence operations in the area. (Action: FE [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]arrange for immediate integration of Vientiane reporting and participate with OCI, DIA, etc., in this center). Secretary McNamara emphasized that this information is badly needed as there has been a sharp increase in communications between North Vietnam and Viet Cong stations on the Lao/South Vietnam border, indicating a sharp upsurge in Viet Cong attention to this area. WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Apr-31 May 64. Secret. Drafted by Colby on May 6. 47. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 47. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 15, 1964, 5 p.m. 1314. Bangkok’s 1864 to Dept, 289 to Vientiane; Embtel 1201. 2 PL/VM are currently engaged in their usual efforts before rainy season sets in to improve their military positions and secure lines of supply. Principal effort now appears be aimed at Tha Thom (which reported to have fallen May 14), with some action also threatened northern Plaine des Jarres sector toward Munong Soui. Heart of Plaine des Jarres itself now under PL guns but since taking of Phou San there have been no important indications of further push in that area. First stages these actions already evident before April 19 coup and could represent nothing more than continuation persistent PL effort take over all areas which occupied separately or jointly by them and neutralists as of June 1962. If this continues be Communist policy we can expect PL/VM forces stop short of Mekong itself. In Tha Thom sector this would probably mean advance up to but not including Borikane (UF 6653). While further improvements of PL/VM positions might be made in Plaine des Jarres and effort made cut route between Plaine and Munong Soui, would not anticipate, under this thesis, effort to push neutralists off Plaine. We are however in new situation which may result in change in Communist calculations and therefore possibly intention on their part move farther than in past and even make all-out effort take over all of Laos including Mekong lowland. Thus far we have no indications any such change but believe it wise consider what this would call for on our part in way of contingency plans and decisions, together with possible deterrent measures to be taken now. (1) April 19 coup introduced new element and may have been taken by Communists, who firmly persuaded U.S. and other anti-Communist nations in region supported it, as indication U.S. has backed away from Khrushchev-Kennedy decision of July 1961 and means install regime in Vientiane which will work for military solution. Communists might consider such a U.S. shift as logical accompaniment our firm policy South Viet Nam. This might persuade Communists that with political excuse of coup available to them and while military leadership in Vientiane thoroughly confused, this is moment take advantage their clearly superior position and take over. (2) Souvanna’s recent statements and actions more hostile to Pathet Lao (see A–341) 3 may be persuading Communists that Souvanna has lost last vestige neutrality (as seen through their eyes) and they no longer have any reason restrain themselves because of disappearance all hope of using him to their advantage. (3) Although we have no overt indication of this, also conceivable that Communists have changed their assessment of U.S. position and no longer fear prompt response from us if they should approach Mekong. Factors contributing to such an appreciation by Communists, if this is case, would be our decision not to move against North Viet Nam directly, at least now; reluctance become involved in any more military actions in election year; and absence any sharp U.S. reaction to PL/Viet Minh advance almost to Mekong in Thakhek area last January. Thus first question is whether we should seek some way tell Communists that we continue be prepared resist with force their stepping over invisible line guarding Mekong lowland. We would of course wish do this in such way as to avoid persuading them, in line with point 1 above, that U.S. bent on resumption warfare in Laos. Tend to agree with Amb Martin that deployment U.S. troops does not provide satisfactory answer; on one hand there is Thai reluctance increase their involvement to this degree if they cannot be assured our readiness follow through if challenged and on other hand I am not sure how seriously it would be taken by Communists unless it were considerably larger scale than in 1962. More persuasive, I believe, would be 7th Fleet action off North Vietnamese coast which would not involve Thais but rather be pointed directly at North Vietnamese who pull strings in Laos and would also represent pressure which could be applied selectively. 4 At same time we must of course be ready with our plans for direct military action, including use of U.S. and/or SEATO troops, in case becomes clear Communists intend seize lowland to any significant degree. Under such circumstances believe government would request SEATO and/or U.S. forces sent to support it to cross Mekong and take principal towns along river at least, so that Communist forces could not credibly charge invasion but would be themselves clear aggressors against lowland territory still held by government. I realize this question becomes immediately involved in highly classified U.S. and SEATO planning and I mean only to suggest it be kept under constant review, particularly should there in future be any clear sign that Communists will not this time be inhibited, as in past, from establishing themselves on Mekong. Should this occur we would still have choice available as to whether we wished accompany action from Thailand with use 7th Fleet off North Viet Nam. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Saigon. 2 Telegram 1864 from Bangkok, May 4. (Ibid., DEF 6 US) For telegram 1201 from Vientiane, see Document 39 . 3 On May 2 Souvanna announced that he had merged both neutralist and rightist factions and that he would lead both. On May 13 the Souvanna government announced that it had merged the neutralist forces with FAR. Souphanouvong demanded a return to tripartite government. (Airgram A–341 from Vientiane, May 14; ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 4 In telegram 1006 to Vientiane, May 16, the Department broadly agreed with the assessment of Pathet Lao/Viet Minh intentions, but doubted that “7th Fleet action could convey clear signal to Hanoi, i.e., that it would be taken as warning of resolve to hold Mekong lowlands.” For this reason and because it did not wish to “overwork this gambit,” the Department was not following Unger’s suggestion on moving the fleet to off the North Vietnamese coast. (Ibid., POL 27–14 LAOS) 48. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 48. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 17, 1964, noon. 1329. This morning I raised three questions with Souvanna and got following answers: 1) If appropriate targets presented themselves would Souvanna agree to use of bombs by T–28’s under present circumstances? Souvanna promptly replied that he would, adding only that target selection should be worked out in conjunction with General Amkha. Therefore we are now seeking get Gens Ma and Amkha together to bring T–28’s into action, if they can be useful. I take Souvanna’s okay to cover not only 100 lb but also, if necessary, 500 lb bombs. 2) I referred to US-piloted T–28’s in Udorn which I said could be promptly converted to be indistinguishable from Lao T–28’s and flown with considerable effectiveness in sorties against PL/VM in present situation (JCS 5197; March 052153Z). 2 I said I had been assured this could be done without American involvement becoming known. Souvanna concurred in this action. 3) I exposed to Souvanna idea convening SEATO military advisors in Bangkok (as set forth Deptel 1006, para 4) 3 and Souvanna said he thought this might have useful effect. He went on to speculate that current action here as well as South Viet-Nam probably timed from North Viet-Nam to coincide with McNamara visit Saigon and he volunteered thought that direct action (e.g. 7th Fleet against North Viet-Nam) would also provide effective warning. Souvanna informed me that as of about 1030 am Gen Amkha in touch with Kong Le (not clear whether at Muong Phan or at Ban Khong, TG 9345). At about 1115 Col Law expected land Muong Phan if appears clear from air that situation permits. Thereafter we should have better understanding of Plaine des Jarres situation. Souvanna also told me PL/VM currently only about 30 kms north of Paksane; this word given him by Gen Ouane. At time of writing this message (11 am) co-chairmen reps and ICC calling on Souvanna at his request. Denson and Munro have diplomatic actions well in hand and I am concentrating on material help to defending forces. Do I have authority to: 1) bring 500 lb bombs into Laos and employ them and 2) can US T–28’s from Udorn be employed as discussed above? 4 Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash. Repeated Immediate to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC. Received at the Department of State at 2:34 a.m., May 17. Passed to the White House, OSD, JCS, and CIA at 3:36 a.m. 2 Not found. 3 See footnote 4, Document 47 . 4 In telegram 1007 to Vientiane, May 17, 4:52 p.m., Unger received authority to introduce 500 lbs. bombs and to use them. As for the use of U.S. T–28’s from Udorn, the Department of State informed Unger that the matter was under consideration and he would have a decision as soon as possible. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 49. Special Report of the U.S. Intelligence Board’s Watch Committee 49. Special Report of the U.S. Intelligence Board’s Watch Committee 1 Washington, May 17, 1964, 4:30 p.m. No. 716A We have reviewed all evidence available to date concerning recent Communist military action in Laos and conclude as follows: We believe that the Communists are seeking to regain all of the Plaine des Jarres area and that continuation of their attacks will make the neutralist position there untenable. The Communist capture of the Plaine des Jarres and other positions in southeastern Xieng Khouang Province will place them in control of almost all of Laos except for the Mekong Valley. We believe that current Communist operations will stop short of attacks against major positions in the Mekong Valley. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/17/64–5/20/64. Secret. This report was a result of a special meeting of the Watch Committee held at 3 p.m. on May 17 and was transmitted to members of the U.S. Intelligence Board under cover of a memorandum from Frank J. Benny, Director of the National Indications Center at the Pentagon, on May 17. 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, May 17, 1964, 6:22 p.m. 1011. 1. Following actions should be taken urgently to meet Laos crisis brought on by Communist attacks in Plaine des Jarres and south of Tha Thom: a. We here see great advantage in Souvanna calling for paragraph 4 consultations 2 at once, envisaging that these would take place in or from Vientiane, would cover local reps signatory countries, and might include on-the-spot looks by these reps to supplement ICC. Believe such diplomatic action would be useful prelude any further action we might take and would probably tend to cut down rather than increase any pressures for a Geneva Conference. Therefore, unless Vientiane feels otherwise, believe you should approach Souvanna urgently with this suggestion. b. Vientiane ask Souvanna to issue request for small number of low-level reconnaissance missions by US jet aircraft over Paksane/Tha Thom road and over key areas of PDJ. Objects of this action, in addition obtaining essential target information and other intelligence, would be morale lift Kong Le forces and show of US concern and determination to PL/VM. 3 Alerting messages have been sent by military channels. Bangkok should seek RTG concurrence for overflights and/or staging of jets at Don Muong should this prove necessary. Saigon should seek GVN concurrence for overflights and/or reconnaissance flights from Vietnamese air bases. c. We believe use US pilots in T–28’s represents excessive risk at this time. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ]In view ineffectiveness Lao pilots, believe substantial operational advantages would be realized if Thai prepared to furnish pilots and Bangkok should approach RTG urgently with this suggestion. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] However, pending receipt such permission, Vientiane authorized to turn over aircraft at once to Lao for operations dispatched through Vientiane. USAF unit at Udorn being instructed accordingly. d. Bangkok to seek immediate meeting of SEATO Perm Reps with MILAD Reps in attendance, for discussion of situation and exchange of information and plans, based on threat to area (dodging question whether Laos considered in SEATO area in light 1962 settlement). We do not know yet just how far we are going in such a session but believe it useful initial move in any case. 2. FYI: Following additional actions being taken or contemplated: a. Secretary today calling in SEATO Ambassadors to express concern and need for maximum SEATO collaboration and participation in actions taken. Secretary also talking separately to UK, Soviet, Polish, and Canadian-Indian Ambassadors, or Charges, urging appropriate action in each. b. If Souvanna agrees to approach Co-Chairmen on Para 4 consultations, we planning strong message to Co-Chairmen in support. c. We urgently considering whether to propose to Thai immediate deployment of US forces to Thailand in approximately same strength as in 1962 (5,000–6,000 men including ground and air units). If we do so, we will seek restoration of UK, Australian, and New Zealand units to full 1962 strength plus units from Philippines. We considering whether this can be tied in some way to forces already being deployed for LIGTAS exercise due begin 30 May in Philippines. d. Kitty Hawk task group has been directed take up positions off Vietnam soonest. e. We do not at present plan make press statement but will let press know of our concern and of urgent consultations with interested countries which are going forward. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by William Bundy; cleared by McNamara, McNaughton, Harriman, Rusk, and the White House per McNamara. Also sent Flash to Bangkok and Immediate to Saigon. Repeated Immediate to Paris, London, Canberra, Wellington, Karachi, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, Warsaw, Moscow, and CINCPAC. 2 Paragraph 4 of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962, which declared that in the event of a violation of Laos’ sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, or territorial integrity, the signatories would consult with the Royal Government and among themselves to ensure observance of the principles and provisions of the declaration. The text of Declaration and its accompanying Protocol is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075–1083. 3 In CAS Saigon telegram 6415, May 18, Personal for McGeorge Bundy, Forrestal (who was in Saigon) recommended against “the meaningless gesture of U.S. reconnaissance flights.” He believed that the tactic had been so overused in the past that it gave the wrong signal, that of an ineffectual response. Forrestal suggested moving the Kitty Hawk offshore near Hanoi, use the Canadians’ visit to Hanoi to express U.S. determination in Laos, and/or send U.S. Marines to Thailand. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. IV, Cables, 5/17/64–5/20/64) 51. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 51. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 19, 1964, 9:40 a.m. Ball asked Bundy the general reaction to the idea of Americans in T–28s. Bundy said they just had a telecon with Lynn [Leon Unger] and he does not need them as of now. 2 He says if he is going to maintain the tempo he will need to use the civilians. Bundy said that the use of civilians in Laos is less desirable than in others because of the fact that the civilians have always been under propaganda attack. Bundy said he was going to check with CIA and see if they had some in Thailand who could do it. Ball said that when Bundy had a few minutes during the course of the day he would like to talk to him. Bundy said he had just talked to Rusk and Harriman and they wanted to get out a message to Khrushchev. The other question is troops to Thailand and what we might do there. [Here follows a paragraph unrelated to Laos.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Vietnam. No classification marking. 2 Dated May 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 52. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 52. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 20, 1964, 8:55 a.m. H: In Mike’s [Forrestal] absence may I say to you what I would have been saying to Mike in last couple of days. B: Yes. H: I don’t think we are hitting this thing hard enough. Morale very bad. I have recommended for some time that we put two battalions back in [to Thailand]. We have just got to do something to support morale. B: The only objection I have seen to putting those troops in is the Thais are so strongly against it. H: If they [Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese] move into the Mekong, we have got to do something to stop them. Have you seen the telegram in from Unger saying he has talked to Souvanna saying got to now head north. 2 I tried to get them to agree to put some low-flying reconnaissance in over Laos and supply road in North Vietnam. I thought it was agreed to but it was cut out after I left. We have got to send a message to North Vietnam. I had hoped we could do it from strength. B: What do you mean, Averell? H: If we send the low-flying reconnaissance in, it will be an indication that we have a very serious interest in where they are and what they are doing. B: We have flown some low-flying reconnaissance. H: Only in Laos. Not in North Vietnam. I thought it was agreed we would fly over supply routes in North Vietnam and that was cut out after I left the room. We’ve got to send a message which is thoroughly understandable. I think we should consider flying over Hanoi. It is all very serious; I have been very cautious about all this, as you know, but I think there comes a time when if you are overly cautious it is not good. B: The whole problem about Moscow is they don’t have much to say about it. H: No, they’re not interested. One of the staff of the Embassy keeps in touch with Bill Sullivan, knew him at the Laos Conference. He saw Bill and said that Pushkin had indicated they would agree to talk about it, but that I turned them down. That just isn’t true. I think I have six times taken up with Pushkin about taking up with North Vietnam and getting them to call off the dogs. The major thing Khrushchev has in mind is row with Peking. It is a long shot but I think our being ready to be vigorous will have more influence on them than to sit back and try to get him to pull chestnuts out of the fire. They’re not going to do that. B: I agree with that. H: As of the moment I would take two steps—have low level flights over North Vietnam. There are supply dump, airfield, and roads which we know about from high level reconnaissance. The other thing I would do is ask the Thais whether they can’t agree to put these troops in; that we cannot decide what we do later but we have every intention of taking steps to protect the Mekong and having these troops in will help further steps. They have moved their own troops in, and I think we should have some witness to the world that we are doing something. B: I agree with you Averell. H: This may be a signal to them. Very hard to know what the facts are. Pathet Lao is hot-headed. They are commanded now by two Peking-trained people. North Vietnamese have a certain hot- headedness. I don’t believe at this time that ChiComs want to take on United States. Of course, one can’t do anything without thinking that this may be in their minds. But they are going after a show of peace to the world, sending people to Africa, etc. Trying to compete with Khrushchev in more vigorous way. This would reverse their policy in India. Well, this is what I would be saying to Mike if he were here, and I wanted to tell you what I think. B: Mike came in on the private wire telling me he doesn’t think low level reconnaissance means anything and would prove weakness, not strength. 3 H: You mean in Laos? Not North Vietnam. I am speaking of North Vietnam. B: I know. H: I was against going into Laos unless Souvanna approved. I don’t mind what they did in the Plaines de Jars yesterday. Laos [is] not afraid of outside attack; North Vietnam is. I wish I could be more helpful. B: It is very helpful, Averell. Thanks. 1 Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Chronology, Telephone Conversations, April–May 1964. Transcribed in Harriman’s office. 2 Apparent reference to telegram 1368 from Vientiane, May 20, in which Souvanna expressed the view that the only way Laos could be saved from the Communists was by military intervention by the Western powers. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 See footnote 3, Document 50 . 53. Memorandum for the Record 53. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 20, 1964. SUBJECT Daily White House Staff Meeting, 20 May 1964 1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting. 2. Southeast Asia. Bundy opened the meeting by saying that the next two or three days would be spent on Southeast Asia, and that other members of the staff who could run a continent without coming to him were encouraged to do so. Nothing more was said on Southeast Asia during the meeting, but afterward Bundy asked Clif Alexander (the Southeast Asia expert in Forrestal’s absence) and myself to stop by his office. [Here follows discussion unrelated to Laos.] 4. Discussion in Bundy’s Office. In his office Bundy showed Alexander and myself the latest cables from Laos. Then, by way of direct conversation and through our overhearing his telephone conversations with McNaughton, Sullivan, and his brother, he let it be known that he was about to ask Presidential approval for intensified reconnaissance and for the use of some US civilian pilots in Laos. He also asked State and Defense to look into the matter of sending troops to Thailand. On this last point he asked me what the Chiefs thought of it, and I replied that, although I didn’t know in this particular context, in general they were somewhat reluctant to do this and nothing else. Bundy then commented that it probably was that the Chiefs thought that we had gotten all the mileage out of troop movements that we could. I said I thought it would be something along those lines. The discussion on that point ended there. Bundy asked Alexander to pull together the diplomatic temperature and the reactions to Rusk’s conversations with various people. In particular, Bundy said Rusk may be taking a stronger line diplomatically than the government has yet reached decisions on. Bundy then asked me to help keep him posted on military planning. WYS 1 Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, Box 25. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by W.Y. Smith. 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 54. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 20, 1964, 5 p.m. 1373. Ref: May 19 telecon; Embtel 1362. 2 T–28 pilots. Request Dept authorize US civilian pilots for T–28’s not only for road cutting operation but in broader framework: 1) they are most immediately available; 2) their ability will be higher than [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] other possible alternatives; and 3) they would be most responsive to guidance resulting from aerial recon once undertaken (septel 3 ). We are actively canvassing possibilities for [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] pilots and will continue to do so but requirement is urgent and as indicated Embtel 1369 4 Souvanna now approves use of US civilian pilots. Would plan initially to assign only four or five to planes being transferred by COMUSMACV. 5 We hope RLG will agree to issue papers to these pilots and adjust personnel records to “terminate” employment with Air America or Bird so that pilots would have status of civilian technicians hired individually by RLG. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] Aircraft would, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] operate out of Vientiane during day where combat loading and pilot briefing would take place. [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] 6 Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash. 2 This teleconference among Unger and Embassy officials and officials at the Department of State contained a discussion of possible actions to counter the Pathet Lao offensive in the Plain of Jars. (Ibid.) In telegram 1362, May 19, Unger addressed questions unanswered in the teleconference. He suggested U–2 reconnaissance rather than low-level jet flights. Unger noted that Air America had seven pilots and Bird Company four. Utilization of these civilian pilots would require 10 additional T–28 aircraft. (Ibid.) 3 Not further identified. 4 Dated May 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS) 5 In telegram 1034 to Vientiane, May 20, the Department granted Unger authority to use U.S. civilian pilots for T–28 aircraft in Laos. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 6 In telegram 1951 from Bangkok, May 18, Martin reported a 1–1/2 hour conversation with Thai Defense Minister Dawee and senior members of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the situation in Laos. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 55. Memorandum by the Chief, Far Eastern Division, Directorate for Plans (Colby) and the Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support, Directorate for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cooper) 55. Memorandum by the Chief, Far Eastern Division, Directorate for Plans (Colby) and the Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support, Directorate for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cooper) 1 Washington, May 21, 1964. SUBJECT A Program for Laos and South Vietnam 1. To meet the current Communist threat in Laos and Vietnam essentially two extreme courses of action are now being discussed: a) salvaging what we can by negotiations at Geneva; or b) carrying the war directly to Hanoi. Whatever the advantages of either course (we think they are limited) the risks (political in the case of Geneva and political as well as military in the case of Hanoi) are so high as to warrant a searching examination of yet another alternative. We call this, for want of a better name, “massive counterinsurgency.” We recognize that this may be regarded as “more of the same” rather than as a genuine alternative to either of the two extreme courses. We believe, however, that what follows represents a difference in kind from the present US/GVN effort in implementation as well as conception. 2. The Program In brief, what is proposed is that the defense and stabilization of the situation in South Vietnam (and Laos) be accomplished by a substantial change in the nature of the counterinsurgency program and certain substantial increases in its scale. This to be supplemented by intense psychological warfare pressures and selected military action (including, but not necessarily limited to bombing) against the Communists in South Vietnam and Laos as well as in North Vietnam. Such a program would necessarily require further inputs of personnel by CIA, a reorientation of US military and AID programs, some changes in the US organizational and command structure, and putting the GVN on a “war footing.” These actions would probably involve additional requirements for US personnel directly involved in the counterinsurgency effort of as much as 5,000 men. Perhaps a corresponding economy could be achieved among US military and civilian personnel presently in South Vietnam. 3. The “oil spot” concept is the key to victory in South Vietnam, and its objective is the population, who must be given something to fight for and something to fight with. They must also be supported by the regular forces against the larger VC units now prevalent, and these regular forces must give this supporting, reinforcing, and protective mission priority over attempts to find and kill the VC. 4. In order to insure maximum attention to the development of this counterinsurgency approach CIA should develop such local political and paramilitary forces as feasible, among the Montagnards, the Cao Dai, the Hwa [ Hoa ] Hao, etc.). These would be supplementary to the CIDG, SDC, etc. In order to carry this out, CIA would establish officers in the local areas with direct lines of command to Saigon and direct logistical and financial support. This is not a reversal of Switchback; it is an extension of the CIA capability to conduct political and paramilitary actions in a flexible manner into new fields, leaving to the regular military and aid programs the development of the more organized and orthodox national forces. 5. Essential to the oil spot approach is a program of local self defense, which is where we believe the CIA can make an important contribution and we suggest that the Agency re-enter this field on a large scale. Thus, we propose: a. There should be established in each province of South Vietnam an officer not necessarily CIA, in charge of counterinsurgency. He would have on his staff a USOM man and an officer of the US Special Forces or Marines. The latter, in turn, would have under his command up to 100 specially trained and indoctrinated US troops. b. The Province counterinsurgency group would report, over its own communications, to a counter-insurgency command center in Saigon, [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. This command center would be directly under the Ambassador and would have the same status in Saigon as MACV, USOM, etc. c. Consideration should be given to establishing regional counterinsurgency commands (the Delta, the Montagnard area, etc.). d. US Special Forces Officers would function on a “counterpart” basis at the hamlet level and would be the action element in carrying out the elementary economic and social measures that are needed to provide the positive element to defend as well as to instruct the locals in their own self defense. The CIA, AID, and Special Forces officers would travel constantly through the Provinces to see that the programs are being implemented. 6. These proposals are designed to supplement rather than replace the regular AID and military programs in Vietnam. In essence, the regular, more orthodox programs should be designed to support the local counterinsurgency effort at least until the situation is stabilized. 7. We recognize that the proposals involving increased counterinsurgency activity with CIA participation, entail a number of adjustments in the chain of command structure: the relationship of the military and AID personnel on the counterinsurgency group to MACV and USOM, the relationship of the counterinsurgency command to the Commanding General, Vietnam. We believe, however, that if the concept of massive counterinsurgency is adopted, these command relationships could be easily worked out. 8. To supplement a vastly increased counterinsurgency effort within South Vietnam, the US/GVN should undertake a stepped-up program of psychological warfare against North Vietnam. This would include diplomatic, military, propaganda and economic pressures. This would also involve a program of bombing Communist targets, especially in Laos, but leading close to the North Vietnam frontier and into North Vietnam if necessary. This is relatively low-risk in Laos, and would encourage our friends and perhaps give pause to one enemy. (The pilots should be in the first instance Lao [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], phasing into the use of US pilots.) The initial military target inside Laos would be in the Plaine des Jarres area, along Routes 12A and 12B, Route 9, leading then along Route 7 towards the North Vietnamese frontier. These attacks would be more in the nature of a psychological pressure program than an all out military attack. They would have some slight military value in interfering with Communist supply routes, but their main objective would be to demonstrate an increasing determination on the US side to press the bombing into North Vietnam. 9. In Laos, it is recommended that all of the villages on our side be approached with the same philosophy as in South Vietnam, adapted as necessary to local conditions. Enterprising Lao have demonstrated in several instances that it can be done. In this way the areas on our side of the ill-defined informal partition could be secured by the villagers themselves. The FAR’s mission would become a defensive one in support of calls for help from any village complex that comes under attack. Since the attack on a village if properly defended has to be fairly large scale, the political noise level to the Communists would rise and they would also be vulnerable to aerial attacks. This tactic should remove the scattered Pathet Lao bands on our side of the informal partition and provide the basis for long-term political development in Laos. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] Southeast Asia Counterinsurgency Command 10. We suggest that the idea of a civilian counterinsurgency command for Southeast Asia be explored. Such a command would have general authority over counterinsurgency programs with, of course, major emphasis on South Vietnam and Laos. This command would be directly responsible to Washington and have authority to guide, expedite, and inspect the counterinsurgency programs in various countries under its aegis. Its primary responsibility would be to augment and coordinate current counterinsurgency programs. The command will also have authority to recommend appropriate military and psychological meas- ures against the enemy to affect his will to press the current insurgency effort. 11. The functions of the command would be: a. To guide, expedite, and inspect the work of all agencies and their concentration on the implementation of the approved strategy, i.e., the oil spot. The emphasis should be on the rapid exploitation of any opportunity, however valid, not overall or detailed planning or comprehensive reporting. b. To organize a counterinsurgency center to train and indoctrinate Americans, Lao, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] on an accelerated basis. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] subcenters for extension of the effort might be established in the countries involved. WE Colby Chief, FE/DDP Chester L. Cooper A/DDI/PS 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, May, 1964. Secret. 56. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 56. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 22, 1964, 6 p.m. 1395. We may at this point in Laos be on watershed between (a) continued Communist military attacks driving at or very near to Vientiane and Paksane or (b) at the end of this dry season’s pressure except for few consolidating and mopping-up operations. We are not disposed here to think that Communists this time do intend move to Mekong although their calculations in this regard may have been changed by some new elements in picture. These are (a) Souvanna’s much more outspoken and consistent anti-Communist position which has finished any lingering Communist hope that he can be used to gain their ends and (b) our reconnaissance flights over Ho Chi Minh Trail which Communists may regard as prelude to serious assault on that corridor. Since corridor certainly represents major North Vietnamese interest in Laos, they might be driven to more extreme action if they become persuaded their continued use of it is threatened. More likely hypothesis is that recent rash of fighting just about over, having resulted in body blow to neutralist forces, from which they may or may not recover, and having acquired for PL/VM prize geographical base for future harassment and advances in all directions northern Laos. If this is case, however much right wing and even Souvanna will protest about being devoured by Communists bite by bite, we (i.e. Western Powers) might accept new situation and try live with new state of affairs as we have lived with other unsatisfactory situations in Laos before. It would of course be a good deal harder to get acceptance of this course of action in Vientiane even than in past and would be much harder to live with our friends here in future, unless we considerably increased military help and showed ourselves much less restrained by Geneva Accords. A fuller discussion of implications this course of action contained septel. 2 Under this we would seek to avoid involving ourselves in another conference and another set of accords, which could only be worse than last and where we might put ourselves in position of being obliged to beat an even more recalcitrant right wing (and perhaps Souvanna too) into negotiations and concessions to Pathet Lao which we full well know could only benefit latter. In other words should we not seriously consider drawing the line at this point and living with an even uneasier peace than before and something shakier than our accustomed instability rather than pretending that there is a possibility of peaceful co-existence with Communists in Laos? Of course, if an international conference could buy some worthwhile concessions it might have some value but otherwise I can’t see why we should go into it and I would hope we could persuade enough of our friends of the rightness of this position that we could avoid finding ourselves so uncomfortably isolated as to feel obliged to give in. With the French proposal and their current pressures on Souvanna, coupled with Communist line that is becoming daily clearer, we obviously will very soon have to adopt clear course or find ourselves swept along by force of events. It seems increasingly clear that it is Communist strategy to present Souvanna as prisoner or puppet of right wing and to present government in Vientiane as fictitious. In short order I expect them to say they cannot accept Souvanna Phouma as in position speak for Laos. They may go to point of even withdrawing diplomatic representation and, if there were a call for article 4 consultations from Souvanna, they would most probably not attend or, if they did, would not accept that he represents the Royal Laotian Government. At a Geneva type conference I would expect them to accord Souvanna role merely of representative of one of three tendencies and in no sense able to speak for Laos as a whole. I believe this is line we must do our utmost to combat and frustrate and in conversation with U.K., France and Australian colleagues this morning I emphasized this point. Particularly for benefit of Millet whose government’s officials (Paris to Dept 5565 3 ) talk of Souvanna as “prisoner of right.” Souvanna as we all well know has many times threatened to resign and once carried this threat out some years ago. He is certainly under no physical compulsion today and if he wished would not have slightest difficulty in leaving country. He apparently has been so thoroughly disillusioned and discouraged by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese behaviour that he no longer feels able work on his earlier cherished hopes of bringing about reconciliation. As for Souvanna not being free here, there of course comes immediately to mind contrast with Pathet Lao zone where he may not even enter without express permission. Colleagues here make much of Polish two-day incarceration, current plight of North Vietnamese Embassy, continued though moderated censorship, etc. all of which thoroughly stupid and highly counterproductive actions of extreme right wing; I urged them do as I have done, i.e. try bring about correction of these errors but don’t dwell on them so as to play into Communist hands when grounds for condemnation of Pathet Lao and DRV are so much graver. French are obviously obsessed with idea that tripartite balance must be restored and I am persuaded Millet using all effort with Souvanna to this end. If he manages play role in bringing about cease-fire (Deptel 1043) 4 it will certainly be with intention break up present neutralist right wing cooperation. This would of course also be French objective in any conference. Continuation of uneasy status quo as discussed para 2 above would be entirely unacceptable to French in present frame of mind. In light all this we come to immediate question of international conversations, in whatever form. As for Geneva type conference (either as Communists would have it or in slightly modified form proposed by French) if I understand correctly we have not burned our bridges entirely (for example Secretary’s statement Depcir 2133 5 which appeared leave door slightly open). Nevertheless I gather from Deptel 1039 6 and various public expressions that we are definitely not prepared accept a conference now. It seems to me this is correct position since we know nothing can come out of conference that would in any way improve situation in Laos from our point of view. I believe our answer to pressure for conference should be two-fold: (A) Article 4 consultations requested by PriMin should proceed in first instance to solidify PriMin’s position and define issues and strategy of friends if there is to be a conference and (B) Conference would be accepted only if it brought in advance clear gain, such as cease-fire coupled with withdrawal throughout Laos of PL forces to April or May 1963 positions (i.e. following Neut-PL break). (If, of course, current Pathet Lao/Viet Minh military attacks continue and cannot be contained and we are not willing intervene militarily to block them, we might have to buy cease-fire with conference.) If Pathet Lao-Viet Minh pressure continues strong and we give consideration to military intervention, or if we come to conclusion that even with let up by Pathet Lao today we cannot expect to have viable free Laos with Plaine des Jarres severed from it, then another possible course of action outlined septel may have to be considered. This would entail a sharp and limited employment of U.S. forces to retake Plaine des Jarres. Depcirtel 2169 7 arrived following drafting foregoing. I see no conflict between that message and present tel and will await comments on cirtel, with which I am generally in accord. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC for POLAD, London, Paris, New Delhi, Canberra, Moscow, and Phnom Penh and pouched to Ottawa. 2 Telegram 1398 from Vientiane, May 22. (Ibid.) 3 Dated May 21. (Ibid.) 4 Telegram 1043 to Vientiane was a repeat of telegram 6078 to Paris, May 20, in which the Department reported that Rusk discussed Laos with French Ambassador Alphand who answered Rusk’s question about the French proposal for an international conference on Laos to reestablish tripartite government and implement the 1962 agreements. (Ibid., POL 15–1 LAOS) 5 Dated May 17. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 6 In telegram 1039 to Vientiane, May 20, the Department asked the Embassy to inform Souvanna of U.S. opposition to proposals for reconvening the Geneva Conference. (Ibid.) 7 Circular telegram 2169, May 21, contained the Department of State’s views on Souvanna Phouma’s request for consultations along the lines of Article 4 of the Geneva Declaration and the French call for a Geneva Conference on Laos. The United States wanted to proceed with Article 4 consultations as it doubted that a new Geneva conference on Laos could resolve the problems. The Geneva Agreements of 1962 provided a suitable framework for a settlement provided the Pathet Lao cooperated. (Ibid.) 57. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary (Bundy) 57. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 23, 1964. I. In connection with your Sunday meeting of the Executive Committee on Southeast Asia, 2 you may wish to note the following points relating to item 4 on your agenda 3 entitled “Other immediate actions: State to report on efforts to forestall a Geneva Conference on Laos”. Actions taken in this regard have been: 1. Immediate coordination between Unger and Souvanna to ensure Souvanna’s support for Article 4 consultations in Vientiane, although being prepared to accept a conference on Laos in principle if certain key pre-conditions to be discussed on basis Article 4 are agreed to in advance by all concerned. 2. Coordination talks with the British over the past several days. 3. A circular telegram to all our posts in countries signatories of the Geneva Accords defining our position and asking for any urgent major comments they might have. 4 Discussions with host government not authorized. We have received only one reply—from Lodge—which was completely in accord with our position. 4. We wired Vientiane today (Saturday) 5 instructing Unger to induce Souvanna to make a clarifying statement regarding Vientiane as the locus for Article 4 consultations, since Souvanna’s position has not been entirely clear publicly on that point. 5. Following Souvanna’s clarifying statement, action posts will consult with host governments on the basis of the various telegrams we have sent out reporting our position. Comment: We are not rushing our consultations with other countries since there is advantage in dragging things out, but there is also a need to counteract the French who have been very active on the diplomatic front on this issue. II. I recommend that you flag the problem of possible moves to have the UN concern itself with Laos. L and some people in IO so favor. 6 I am not only opposed because of the “Hairy” Project you have up your sleeve, 7 but also because: 1. A UN presence in Laos right now would help the Pathet Lao to consolidate their most recent gains. 2. The Communists would be far less inhibited and prevented from covert-type actions than we would be, were the UN to get itself in the act. 3. UN involvement has never been successful in this kind of situation, although it is a good way to waive our responsibilities in Laos and get out. 4. Because of the above, a UN involvement might well discourage the anti-Communists in Laos. 5. If the UN gets involved in Laos, the pressure will be on for its involvement in Viet-Nam as well. 6. To discuss Laos in the Security Council would almost inevitably require the presence of North Vietnamese representatives in New York. 7. To recommend UN action in Laos raises the question: why not a Geneva Conference, particularly in view of the fact that Peiping and Hanoi, interested parties, are not members of the UN? 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Special Papers, Apr/June 1964. Secret. 2 See Document 61 . 3 Not found. 4 Circular telegram 2169, May 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 5 Not further identified. 6 The Legal Advisor’s recommendation is in a memorandum from Chayes to William Bundy, May 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 7 The “Hairy” project has not been identified, but it could relate to recommendations proposed by Bundy in Document 60 . 58. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 58. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 23, 1964. SUBJECT CAS Vientiane Assessment of Situation in Plain of Jars and Immediate Requirements to Bolster Friendly Forces in Laos 1. Attached is the gist of a CAS Vientiane report 2 received this morning as an assessment of the situation in the Plain of Jars. This report confirms the disordered and disorganized condition of General Kong Le’s forces, and notes CAS support to the neutralists as well as to the Meo guerrilla forces. It concludes with CAS Vientiane’s belief that it would be a mistake to relax even for a moment in preparations for countering further Communist pushes against friendly forces. Vientiane notes there will be, among other requirements, a need for additional air support. 2. I believe this report is of particular significance as a candid assessment of the confused situation in Laos, with some thoughts as to what we can do about it. There was not sufficient time for CAS to clear with the Ambassador and other members of the Country Team although the report is being passed to them for their information. Richard Helms 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. V, Memos, 5/21/64–5/31/64. Secret. Also sent to Taylor, William Bundy, McNaughton, and Clay. 2 Attached, but not printed. 59. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 59. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 24, 1964, 5 p.m. 1411. Want Dept be fully aware of degree to which we now becoming involved in measures in violation Geneva Accords but which are absolutely necessary if we are to meet urgent requirements in this ugly situation. Souvanna called me on telephone this morning regarding threatening situation around Muong Kheung-Ban An-Muong Soui and asked for T–28 strikes in area. I told him [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] to do anything quickly we would have to turn to U.S. pilots for combat missions. Souvanna hesitated at first but finally gave me green light proceed with U.S. pilots. Accordingly I am authorizing U.S. pilots (Air America civilians) to undertake T–28 flights tomorrow for two purposes: 1) help to hold PL advance on Ban An-Muong Soui area (Muong Kheung has reportedly now been evacuated); 2) cratering Rte 7 east of Ban Ban. Pilots will be briefed very carefully on known enemy dispositions and AA batteries. On a selective basis I am relaxing certain long-standing prohibitions: 1) Air America, particularly choppers, being permitted carry military personnel in hill areas and also war material; 2) Dept already aware presence here U.S. T–28 technicians; 3) closer ARMA and AIRA participation with FAR and RLAF in targeting for T–28 strikes and more direct USAID/RO participation in supply arrangements. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC, London, and Paris. Received at the Department of State at 8:17 a.m., May 24 and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, and USUN at 4:30 p.m. 60. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council 60. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council 1 Washington, May 24, 1964. SUBJECT Laos and the Timing of Possible Actions Against North Viet-Nam 2 Present Situation Souvanna Phouma has stated that he would accept a “Geneva” conference on Laos subject to several preconditions, of which the most notable are withdrawal of Communist forces from areas previously occupied by the neutralists (principally the western part of the Plaine des Jarres) and reaffirmation of his own status and full power as head of the government. We are strongly supporting these preconditions, and are pressing the British and friendly signatories of the 1962 Accords to do likewise. In addition, we propose, if a conference should ever meet, to press for full compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1962 as our objective. This would include total withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and an end to the corridor through Laos from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. Both of these Communist actions have persisted since 1962; we have protested against them frequently, but in practice have taken no stronger action. Probable Communist Reaction to this Position (We assume that the Communists do not enlarge their present military actions to a further offensive. If they did so, we would have immediately to consider drastic action both within Laos and against North Viet-Nam.) Unless further pressure is applied, the Communists are virtually certain not to withdraw their forces from the neutralist areas of the Plaine des Jarres. Moreover, they will undoubtedly fight any clear affirmation of Souvanna’s power and legitimacy, and at least seek to argue at length that they were justified in boycotting the government, that Souvanna is a prisoner of the right-wing generals, etc. Thus, if we, and Souvanna, and the British, adhere to these preconditions—as we must seek to do—we shall be at an impasse with the Communist side. They may well cease any further military action, so that we would have virtually a de facto ceasefire. But they are unlikely to go further. US Options The US could take further military actions within Laos at any time. We have already introduced jet reconnaissance flights and have now authorized US civilians to fly T–28 prop fighter bombers against Communist positions. Our next actions in Laos could include the use of US aircraft in Thailand, South Viet-Nam or from carriers to bomb Communist positions in Laos. This should be done only on the request of Souvanna and a major problem might be that, although he might well request some quantity of such action, he is basically concerned about destructions in Laos and might not wish us to push it far without himself pressing us to go at once against North Viet-Nam. Our action could further include deployment of ground and especially air units to Thailand both to step up such air actions and to convey at least a threat of ground action by US forces within Laos. If we do deploy forces to Thailand, we could probably get the British, Australians, New Zealanders, and possibly the Philippines, to join with us, but it is less clear that any of these nations would join in actual attacks into Laos. Once we started overt US military attacks into Laos, we would be forcing even more of a showdown and making it even more imperative that we not withdraw from our insistence on Communist withdrawal. By such attacks, we could inflict substantial damage on the Pathet Lao and could perhaps try to single out North Vietnamese troops for such attention. However, even in the face of such damage, the chances cannot be considered great that the Communists would withdraw, since to do so would represent the loss of the major morale and material gains they have made by their recent actions. Thus, we could arrive at the point where we would virtually have to consider attacking North Viet-Nam in order to prevail in the contest of wills. Thus, in effect, the “Laos route” could lead us to the point of attacking North Viet-Nam, and could compress any timetable we might have for taking such action based on our wider view that it had become essential to hold South Viet-Nam and the whole area. On the other hand, the timing of such a showdown is to some extent within our control. The various preconditions laid down by Souvanna, particularly in the political sphere, could be negotiated for a significant period of time before the withdrawal issue became the last remaining one. We must not seem to be dodging that issue, but we need not force it at once. For example, we could let the Article 4 consultations in Vientiane spin out a little on the issues of the ICC and Souvanna’s own position, employing direct US military action only if the Communists did continue to move to any degree. We might during this period still move forces to Thailand to steady the situation and put ourselves in a position to move fast and hard once we did decide to act either within Laos or against North Viet-Nam. In sum, the course of events in Laos could burn out the fuse on a decision to hit North Viet-Nam in a matter of 3 to 4 weeks, or it could conceivably be strung out longer. But, now that we are launched on insisting on the preconditions—which we could hardly have avoided—what we must recognize above all is that there is almost bound to be a showdown over these preconditions at some time in the next 1–3 months. If we back down from such a showdown—by abandoning the precondition of withdrawal—we will suffer a serious further loss of confidence among the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia. Laos in Relation to South Viet-Nam as a Peg for Action Against the North Up to a point, the Laos issue can be useful to us in preparing the way for whatever action we want to take against North Viet-Nam. Our legal case in Laos is strong, with widespread recognition that the Communist attacks have been major violations and cannot be justified by the antics of the right wing or by past occasional right-wing violations. This helps us to bring the British and others along and gives a good legal basis for opening moves we might want to make in any case. However, as we approach the point of actually hitting North Viet-Nam, justifying this on the basis of Laos would have little appeal to the American public and probably would not seem appealing even to the British and others. Thus, before we hit North Viet-Nam, we would wish to justify such action not merely on account of Laos but, perhaps far more, on the basis of the continued North Vietnamese aggression against South Viet-Nam. The “Laos route” must merge with the “Souvanna Phouma route” at this point and in fact become the smaller of the two. Course of Events if Communists Do Accept Withdrawal On the lesser chance, that the Communists would accept withdrawal from neutralist positions in the Plaine des Jarres, we would then be virtually compelled to go on to a conference on Laos in Geneva or preferably somewhere else. Such a conference would probably be a prolonged “who struck John” exercise with endless argument about the political problem and with we and perhaps others pressing for total force withdrawal and the end of the corridor. Such a conference, however, need not significantly affect either the timing or the carrying out of actions against North Viet-Nam. The issues are old ones and do not involve the loss of confidence that would be entailed by our backing down on the immediate withdrawal issue. Indeed, since we would have achieved our immediate objective of withdrawal, our psychological position at such a conference would be fairly good. In sum, if this should happen, the Laos problem as such could be put to one side as a factor in our thinking whether to hit North Viet-Nam. 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Special Papers, Apr/June 1964. Top Secret. 2 For the record of meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC, see Document 61 . 61. Memorandum for the Record 61. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 24, 1964. SUBJECT White House Meeting On Southeast Asia—24 May 1964 PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Mr. Sullivan Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster Mr. Bell, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Smith, Mr. Cater Mr. McCone, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Colby 1. Mr. McNamara opened the meeting by securing general approval of photo flights over the Plaine des Jarres on 25 May. He commented that he had been disappointed with the product from the low-level reconnaissance of the Tchepone area to date. 2. Secretary Rusk then opened the discussion of Vietnam. He stated, viewing Southeast Asia as a whole that it is clear that South Vietnam is the lynch-pin, although Laos and Cambodia also bear upon the matter. He emphasized that we have a good political position with respect to Laos in our demand for return to the 1962 Accords and that it is important to exploit this. [Here follows discussion on Vietnam.] 3. The problem of what to do about Laos was discussed in considerable depth, at the end of which Mr. William Bundy was requested to draft a detailed scenario of escalation of military action related to Laos. Mr. Rusk indicated concern that we may have an immediate problem on Laos and suggested that it might offer an alternate route to action against North Vietnam, on which our political base would be better founded. While the U.S. public is not much interested in Laos, Mr. Rusk thought that the Ho Chi Minh trail and the Viet Minh presence in Laos as related to South Vietnam could associate the problems of Laos with the U.S. public’s more positive attitude toward Vietnam. Mr. Rusk thought that it important to maintain pressure on the pre-conditions for a Laos conference, such as restoring Kong Le’s positions on the Plaine des Jarres by a Pathet Lao withdrawal, a cease fire throughout Laos, strengthening of the ICC and reaffirming Souvanna Phouma’s full authority. At the conference itself there would be emphasis upon the Ho Chi Minh trail and the Viet Minh presence, but an effort would be made to restrict the conference to Laos rather than allowing it to spread into Vietnam. Mr. Rusk thought that the way to achieve the pre-conditions is to bring pressure on the Pathet Lao through other governments. Mr. McNamara felt that it would be necessary to use military action to bring about these pre-conditions, e.g. dispatching U.S. Forces to Thailand, bombing the Pathet Lao and possibly going ahead to bombing North Vietnamese routes of access into Laos. Once the failure to obtain the pre-conditions for a Lao conference is evident, particularly if this involved extension of military action into North Vietnam, it would be necessary to approach the Communists on the basis of Vietnam as well as Laos. Mr. McNamara felt that this would depend on the degree to which we force the pace. Mr. Rusk thought that the operation could be divided into two phases, a diplomatic effort to clarify our pre-conditions to a conference followed by the steps we might take if these were not achieved; Mr. McNamara felt that U.S. military action at least to some degree would be necessary in both phases. The DCI urged that we not divert our attention from the main Vietnamese problem just to obtain small diplomatic advantages based on Laos. Mr. Bundy felt that the U.S. position vis-à-vis Laos would have an effect on Vietnamese morale. 4. With respect to Vietnam Secretary Rusk reiterated his concern at adopting a course of action which might collapse because of poor performance or a collapse in South Vietnam. He insisted therefore that firm commitments be obtained from Khanh at an early rather than late stage on these matters. As an aside he said that he was investigating the potential for a UN Security Council sponsorship of a UN Commission to cover the Lao/Cambodia border. [Here follows discussion related exclusively to Vietnam.] 11. [Here follows discussion on Vietnam.] Mr. McNamara reverted to Secretary Rusk’s interest in Laos, commenting that we might be able to move into a North Vietnam program via the Laotian problem or we might even be forced into considering it by the situation in Laos. Mr. Sullivan brought out the point that Souvanna Phouma might cave in under too large a U.S. support of Laos. 12. The following actions were assigned: a. JCS: Scenario of a stepped up covert program against NVN. b. State: Proposals for the use of the United Nations. c. Mr. W. Bundy: Scenario on Laos. d. Mr. McNaughton: Revise the scenario on NVN. e. Mr. Cooper: Review of number of additional personnel who would have to be brought into a formal USIB condition of the draft SNIE. f. All Agencies: List of all personnel who are aware we are considering North Vietnam operations to be provided to Mr. Bromley Smith. 13. Mr. Bundy reiterated the necessity of secrecy in this whole operation. William E. Colby 2 Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, April 64. Secret. Drafted by Colby on May 24. Bromley Smith prepared an account of this meeting, which he noted began at 11 a.m; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 369 – 374 . 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 62. Memorandum for the Record 62. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 24, 1964. SUBJECT Discussion at Dinner at the White House on Sunday night, May 24th IN ATTENDANCE The President, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy, George Mahon (there as a guest of the President) and McCone 1. The purpose of the meeting was to review the situation in Southeast Asia and for the President to receive the views developed at the Sunday morning meeting (memorandum of which is being prepared by Cooper and Colby 2 ), and to decide on actions to be taken. 2. Secretary Rusk pursued his position at this morning’s meeting; namely, that action taken against North Vietnam should be in response to violations of the 1962 Laotian Agreement. McNamara and McCone disagreed, stating that there would be little public support for a reaction because of any issue in Laos, as Laos is not in particular the popular or important issue with the people of the United States. 3. Rusk felt that it would be difficult to justify any actions in North Vietnam on the evidence of violations of the 1954 Agreement of South Vietnam. He was not clear as to why he differentiated between the two. I made the point that the South Vietnamese issue appeared of much greater importance in the minds of the American public and the Congress than the Laotian issue. McNamara seemed to support this position. 4. The President, throughout the evening, expressed impatience that we had not reached a conclusion as to the course of action to be followed. He said that he felt that there was little developed throughout the dinner discussion that had not been evident several days or several weeks earlier. 5. I stated that I felt we must be extremely careful about action in North Vietnam. I observed that the Chiefs (at least General LeMay) advocated a strike deep into North Vietnam. I pointed out that if this were done it might unleash forces which could readily overcome the friendly forces in both Laos and South Vietnam, with the result that we would “lose our base” in Southeast Asia. This view was supported by Bundy and recognized by the President. 6. Bundy pointed out that the most important paper before the President was the estimate prepared by the Board of National Estimates 3 which in effect said a limited strike against North Vietnam might cause a hesitation on the part of the North Vietnamese in their direction to the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong, causing them to stand down their operations temporarily while events developed. On the other hand, the estimate pointed out that a large-scale attack might have just the opposite effect, i.e., intensification of action by the PL and VC and also intervention by the North Vietnamese and very possibly the Chinese Communists. 7. McNamara insisted, throughout the evening, that any action against North Vietnam must anticipate the commitment of at least seven Divisions in Southeast Asia. That while he did not intend to commit them, he felt that they should be pre-positioned and alerted. In fact, he said, they were already alerted. I took issue with this point, stating that in my opinion, (which was strictly non-professional and not supported by any studies) air attacks would be more decisive than this indicated and possibly conclusive. I furthermore said that if any action involved the commitment of troops to combat in South Vietnam, we had better forget it because the American people and the Congress would not support such action under any condition. I said that, in my opinion, the American public are fed up with adventures such as the Korean War and would not stand for another one. 8. Throughout the evening the President inquired as to whether all possible was being done in South Vietnam. The answer was affirmative and I did not take issue with this. There was some question concerning the JCS plan of additional training and also some questions about closer integration of the SVN government and MACV. However, the meeting did not deal with these issues to any particular extent. 9. The President then summarized the course of action he desired to follow about as follows: a. We should do all possible in South Vietnam. We should review all that is being done in South Vietnam and see that any possible action on our part which might improve the situation is undertaken. A conference should be arranged in Honolulu or elsewhere with Lodge to be sure that he is “on board” on everything we wish to do and that no stone is left unturned in supporting Khanh, training men, developing plans, etc., which will assist with the effort in South Vietnam. In this connection we should point out that we are handicapped by a cut in foreign aid and foreign military assistance funds by the Congress. b. We should go to Khrushchev and appeal to him to use his offices to relieve the situation threatening the peace. The United States should be in the position of promoting peace. On the other hand, we would not stand to see a country over-run and imposed upon by its neighbors. c. We should go to the United Nations and make all possible noise advocating peace, telling the world through the United Nations forum of the aggression from North Vietnam. This should be done through the Security Council (not the General Assembly). If a veto is encountered, then we should; d. Go to SEATO, solicit their aid, their assistance and their support. e. If all of the above failed, then we should prepare for action against North Vietnam on carefully selected targets (this term was not defined and the discussion did not turn to exactly what was meant by the term, carefully selected targets). If this involved a positioning of troops and other actions, then we should be prepared to take such actions. 10. These were the guidelines laid down for me for my discussion with Eisenhower, with special emphasis on the cut in foreign aid. 11. It was agreed that low-level flights over Laos would be authorized to the extent required and requested by MACV and to the extent of 9 flights per day with a 36-hour lead time on actual authorization from Washington. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary on May 25. 2 Document 61 . 3 SNIE 50–2–64, May 25, “Probable Consequences of Certain US Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos,” is printed in part in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 378–380. 63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, May 24, 1964, 9:47 p.m. 7706. Following message has been delivered to Prime Minister Home through White House channels: Begin Text Dear Prime Minister: The situation in Laos has reached a critical point. Pathet Lao attacks against forces loyal to the Royal Government continue. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Souvanna, in a statement today, announced publicly he has called for consultations in Vientiane under Article Four of the Geneva Declaration, and I am glad to hear that you are having your Charge take the lead in organizing these promptly. Souvanna also makes it clear that the Royal Government of Laos is prepared to attend a conference on Laos, which some signatories of the Geneva Agreements prefer, on condition that a cease-fire be established immediately throughout the country, that the Pathet Lao forces withdraw to the positions they held before the May 17 attacks, that his own powers be fortified and that the ICC operate effectively. I believe we must give our unreserved support to Souvanna’s position and seek through the Article Four consultations to develop as much further support as possible. Souvanna’s conditions are truly minimal unless we are prepared to hold a conference to ratify another Communist grab. From Mr. Butler’s message to Dean Rusk, 2 I gather that your instructions to Denson call for achieving the objective of (1) an effective cease-fire supervised by the ICC, and (2) some real unity in the Government of Laos, but they apparently do not mention the important matter of Pathet Lao withdrawals. If in fact there is this omission, then I do not believe these instructions go far enough. As Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma himself has put it, we cannot go to a conference faced with a fait accompli to the advantage of the aggressors, and where the latter could use their new territorial gains to argue that they control the whole country. Moreover, seizure of the entire Plain of Jars area by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese has been aimed at demoralizing and indeed eliminating the Neutralist forces in Laos. Unless a Neutralist position can be restored, Souvanna’s right to speak for his country internationally will be put in question and the whole political basis for the Geneva Agreements undermined. In this connection, we are somewhat puzzled by Mr. Butler’s allusion to a Zurich-type meeting. We do not, of course, wish to weaken in any way Souvanna’s position as Prime Minister, any more than we can accept the takeover of the Plain of Jars. Souvanna must sit at the conference table as the representative of Laos just as he did at the concluding session of the 1962 conference. He could bring with him representatives of various factions if he wished. To sum up, and to put the matter in more precise terms, I wish to say to you in all frankness that I do not see how the Government of the United States can consider attending a conference on Laos unless (a) there is an effective cease-fire supervised by the ICC; (b) there is a withdrawal of the Pathet Lao from the positions held by the Neutralists on the Plain of Jars before the recent Pathet Lao attacks; and (c) it is clearly understood that Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister would represent the Government of Laos at the conference. As Dean Rusk has put it in his letter of Friday to Mr. Butler, 3 any other position would simply not be understood in this country and, “might very well be disastrous for our whole position in Southeast Asia, by finally convincing our friends that we really do not have the will and determination to resist a Communist take-over of the peninsula”. I fully realize that firm adherence to this position may result in sharp disagreement on the Communist side, at least initially. We would then have to consider various additional moves of a military nature. We would expect to consult closely with you on these. I greatly value the close consultation our two governments have had and the parallel actions we have been taking. I hope that we can continue to see these matters eye-to-eye in approaching the Article Four consultations in Vientiane. Lyndon B. Johnson. End Text . Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Vientiane. 2 Dated May 23. (Ibid., S/S Presidential/Secretary’s Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials-Sec. Rusk, 1962–1964) 3 Text in telegram 7679 to London, May 22. (Ibid.) 64. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council 64. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council 1 Washington, May 26, 1964. SUBJECT Additional Measures to Stabilize the Situation in Laos Vientiane’s 1419 and 1430 2 contain Unger’s judgment that we could only get the Communist side to withdraw from the Plaine des Jarres by the application of very considerable military force in Laos, and the further fear that, if we and Souvanna should stand firm on the withdrawal conditions, the Communist side may also respond by maintaining attacks and gradually enlarging its area of control. We have all felt that it was unwise or premature, or both, to get into substantial military actions in Laos at this point. Hence, the UN proposal 3 to build up additional diplomatic pressure before we go further, with the “go further” contemplated to include measures against North Vietnam. However, this may leave us a serious problem of deterring the kind of additional Communist attacks Unger fears. I believe that the only measure that would do so would be a prompt deployment of moderate-sized US and other SEATO ground and air forces to Thailand. We would not use these forces in Laos unless the Communists did actually continue to move on a significant scale, but their very presence would indicate that we were considering further measures and could well serve as a warning to the Communists that would hold the situation somewhat in place while we urge Souvanna to take the deadlock on withdrawal to the UN. I therefore recommend that we consult immediately with the Thai in this sense, 4 and concurrently with the British, Australians, New Zealanders, and Filipinos. This would involve our making clear that we were contemplating the UN request in order to build up international support and as a prelude to possible additional actions. I do not think, however, that we would need at this point to go through the whole range of possible actions in order to get the key nations to accept this course of action. It must be recognized that the Thai might so insist, but I think in the existing situation we would probably not have to spell it out. The only other way I see to deter continued Communist action in Laos would be to bring the Lao complaint to the UN at once. However, this would somewhat rush our timing both in the sense of getting our materials together to handle that case effectively, and in the sense that the Lao action is itself part of the broader timetable on which we probably do not wish to act quite as rapidly as this. Therefore, the movement of forces to Thailand becomes a stopping action to enable us to take perhaps ten days or so before we move to the Lao complaint. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. V, Memos, 5/21/64–5/31/64. Secret. Drafted by Bundy on May 26. 2 Dated May 24 and 25. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 This UN “Scenario” was prepared by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, and sent to Stevenson on May 26 under cover of a letter from Cleveland. (Ibid., POL 27 ASIA SE) A copy can also be found in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Special Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I. 4 In telegram 2152 to Bangkok, May 27, the Department asked if the Embassy thought Thai attitudes against introduction of U.S. troops had changed and, if not, what could be done to change them. In telegram 2032 from Bangkok, May 28, the Embassy responded that to obtain Thailand’s concurrence, Thai leaders had “to be cut pretty fully on scenario” and convinced that contemplated U.S. actions represented effective countermeasures. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 65. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 65. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 1 Washington, May 28, 1964. SUBJECT Implications of the Polish Proposal on Laos for US Interests 2 Yesterday, the Polish Government, obviously with Soviet approval if not on Soviet instruction, suggested a meeting at a neutral site between representatives of the Geneva Co-chairmen, the ICC member nations, and the three Lao factions. The following are our initial views on the implications of such a meeting for US interests. For this discussion, we assume US interests to be to retain as nearly as possible the Geneva solution—as opposed to some form of partition—with the minimum use of US military force. Such a meeting, to be sure, could become merely a back door to a full Geneva conference. It could also lead the British and the Canadians, now apparently firmly behind Souvanna, and even Souvanna himself into making concessions to achieve at least the appearance of progress. However, these dangers are probably common to any purely political and diplomatic efforts directed toward resolving the problem of Laos. Although its prospects for achieving a successful settlement would be remote, we believe that such a meeting could have certain tactical advantages. These might make it to the interests of the United States to keep the proposal open, assuming it is acceptable to the Lao factions, as an alternative to Article 4 consultations should the latter break down or prove ineffective. We see the tactical advantages of a meeting such as that proposed by the Poles as follows: 1) It would give the US another forum in which to work out a solution before going either to the UN or another 14 nation conference. The failure of such a meeting to produce agreement could bolster the argument of the futility of proceeding to Geneva. 2) Short of partition or of occupying Lao territory with United States forces, our best hope of keeping a non-communist government in being in Laos remains through some form of agreement, however fragile, among the Lao themselves. It should be remembered that the 1961–62 Geneva Conference could never have reached agreement if the Lao themselves had not agreed at Zurich to form a coalition government under Souvanna and at the Plaine des Jarres on the composition of the cabinet. Therefore, if there is any chance that the Lao might still reach agreement among themselves, we should encourage the chance. If there is no such chance we will at least have established once again that it is the Communist faction alone which refuses to cooperate with the other two, and will be on more solid ground to take further action. 3) The closer the United States comes to direct intervention the more disastrous it would be should Souvanna back down. If there is any chance that he will get off the train at some future stop, it should become apparent at such a meeting. If he should back down on his own conditions for a Geneva Conference it would be preferable for him to do it before we have committed United States troops and prestige to the support of these conditions. Such a meeting would test Souvanna’s determination. 4) Such a meeting would provide a forum for negotiation in the absence of the French, the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese. Souvanna’s conditions and our continued support for them would have a better chance of being justified and maintained at such a forum than at either a Geneva Conference or the UN. 5) Finally, the Polish proposal does not threaten to raise the question of Cambodia or South Vietnam as would a 14 nation conference or a UN debate. In short, such a meeting would provide optimum conditions for Souvanna to establish his position with the very parties he must deal with sooner or later. In the absence of the French and the Asian Communists, Souvanna would be under less pressure to compromise. And no matter what the outcome, the United States need not be committed to anything Souvanna has not agreed to himself. Probable Soviet Tactics The main advantage of any Geneva-type conference, in Moscow’s view, would be to forestall strong US countermeasures against the communists in Laos. The Russians may see the Polish-proposed meeting simply as a means of easing the West into a full-blown Geneva conference. However, they probably prefer the Polish plan which would get negotiations started in a forum excluding the two major Soviet adversaries, the United States and Communist China. It is difficult to predict Soviet tactics with any precision in the absence of reaction from both the Asian communists and from the Lao principals themselves. The Polish proposal suggests that a cease-fire might be an acceptable precondition, but Moscow would probably be unwilling and almost certainly unable to obtain compliance with Souvanna’s demands for a Pathet Lao withdrawal from the Plaine des Jarres advances. The Polish statement also proposes that Laos be represented at the meeting by the three factions and does not refer to the Royal Lao Government or to Premier Souvanna Phouma. However, Moscow probably would try to work out a compromise formula to accommodate both Souvanna and the Pathet Lao. We believe that Moscow will seek to get the coalition government into operation again as a promising alternative to further polarization with the dangers of all-out war and US involvement. Therefore, the Soviets would support Pathet Lao demands that the neutralist-rightist merger be ended. Moscow probably would not agree to more effective ICC functioning; indeed it might seek to insure that no majority activities could be undertaken in the future. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret. 2 The text of this assessment was sent to Rusk at New Delhi in Tosec 26, May 28. (Ibid.) Rusk and William Bundy visited New Delhi May 28–30, Saigon and Bangkok May 31, and Honolulu on June 1 for a conference on Vietnam. For accounts of Rusk’s meetings in Saigon and Honolulu, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 405 – 433 . 66. Telegram From the White House to the Johnson Ranch in Texas 66. Telegram From the White House to the Johnson Ranch in Texas 1 Washington, May 29, 1964, 1:12 p.m. CAP 64145. To Jack Valenti at LBJ Ranch, for the President from Mac Bundy and Forrestal. 1. Next following telegram is going from George Ball to Dean Rusk tonight and gives summary of current thinking on Laos. 2 This part of Southeast Asia crisis which could move quite soon into a new phase on its own steam, and for this reason you should know what is being considered even though no decision is called for today. 2. In essence, telegram to Rusk reports results of two long and comprehensive meetings here today in which Harriman, Stevenson, and Attorney General have been included with constructive results in all three cases. 3. Current proposal is that we should encourage Souvanna to accept a leading role in meeting proposed by Poles of representatives of the International Control Commission, Soviet and British Co-Chairmen, and three Laos factions. Virtue of this forum as against full Geneva conference is omission of French, Chinese Communists, and North Vietnamese. Also some slight tactical advantage to us in our own absence. 4. Key point in Souvanna acceptance would be statement that if no satisfactory restoration of situation in Laos emerges from Polish meeting, he would have to ask active foreign assistance and has assurance that U.S. at least would respond. 5. Form of our response would be international deployment to Thailand with probable company of British, Australians and Philippines, and readiness to execute air strikes, on Souvanna’s request, against Communist supply lines in Laos (moving into North Vietnam only if total SEA picture made it desirable). 6. Thus, basic decision which may come to you is authorization of assurance to Souvanna that U.S. would act on this basis if situation in Laos remains unsatisfactory and Polish meeting should fail. 7. You will see at once that on this plan U.S. readiness to act in support of Souvanna is key element, both internationally and in terms of your own decision. Reason for thinking in terms of this decision now is that any international meeting with no show of U.S. will is bound to have gravely weakening effect not only in Laos but in South Vietnam, and so in other countries as well. This is unanimous judgment of both meetings today, including Stevenson and still more Harriman and the Attorney General. 8. Nevertheless, object of this scenario is to move actual use of force with respect to Laos further down the road and to limit it more tightly than any other alternative now apparent. Moreover, even if Polish meeting should fail, this scenario leaves open further appeal to UN at time of deployment and before any actual strike. 9. We repeat that no decision is required tonight or, in all probability, before your return. But because the problem of Laos has been somewhat in the background in your discussions of recent days, we believe it important for you to have this up-to-date report of current thinking here. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. II, 5/64–6/64, Memos (B). Top Secret; Exdis. 2 This telegram was a White House transmission to the Johnson Ranch of Document 67 . 67. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Bangkok 67. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Bangkok 1 Washington, May 29, 1964, 8:24 p.m. Tosec 36. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. 2 Following represents general consensus of meetings today which included McNamara, Attorney General, Stevenson, General Taylor, General Carter, McGeorge Bundy, and Harriman on line of action re Laos. 3 Prior to formal presentation of recommendations to President, would appreciate your views after such discussion as you may desire to have with Martin and Unger. 4 There was general feeling that our objective should at minimum be seek prevent further deterioration in Laos and take action directed toward restoration status quo ante May 16th. Matter viewed not just from standpoint of Laos but also morale effects in SVN, Thailand and much of underdeveloped world. Also general consensus that no hope of achieving foregoing objectives by negotiation, whatever the forum, without some clear expression of US determination and will that US not willing write off Laos to Communists. While we initially would seek to treat Lao question separate from SVN-NVN problem, if satisfactory Lao solution not achieved basis should have been laid for possible subsequent actions that would permit our dealing more effectively with NVN with respect both SVN and Laos. Against foregoing background, we felt initial step should be acceptance of appropriately modified or interpreted Polish proposal (full text being transmitted by septel) 5 accompanied by firm assurance from us to Souvanna that we would be prepared to give him prompt and direct military support if the Polish conference was not successful. We recognize that, before making such commitment to Souvanna, it would be necessary for us to obtain agreement of Thailand. However, we assume that, under circumstances outlined herein, this could be obtained. Contrary to views set forth Circular 2209, 6 which was not given seventh floor clearance, we now feel that Polish proposal probably offers best initial forum to seek to work out solution. It would: 1. Provide alternative to UN (where, in absence French support, we would probably be unable harness seven votes for useful proposition in Security Council) or another fourteen-nation conference. US support of such a meeting would be additional (and least damaging in terms SVN and Thai interests) demonstration our willingness seek peaceful settlement. 2. Short of partition or US occupation Lao territory, our best hope of keeping some non-Communist Government in being in Laos remains through some form of agreement, however fragile, among the Lao themselves. If Lao not able reach agreement, we will at least have established once again that Communist faction alone refuses to cooperate with other two and we will be on more solid ground take further action. 3. Such a meeting would provide forum for negotiation without French, Chinese Communists, or North Vietnamese. Souvanna’s conditions and our continued support for them would have better chance of being justified and maintained in such a forum than at either the fourteen-nation Geneva conference or the UN. 4. Polish proposal does not threaten to raise question of Cambodia or South Viet-Nam as would fourteen-nation conference or UN debate, and should minimize problems in SVN of any conference on Laos. 5. Souvanna could go to such a conference without abandoning, and in fact he should not abandon, his preconditions for any fourteen-nation conference. Essential to acceptability of Polish proposal is recognition of Souvanna Phouma’s position as Prime Minister of RLG. Polish formula appears leave room for negotiation on this point. 6. By providing a forum which includes Soviets but excludes ChiComs, such a conference keeps Soviets seized of Laos problem in context most useful to our interests. To carry out foregoing, we would envision scenario along following lines: 1. Begin discussions with Souvanna, Thais, French, UK and USSR. 2. Assuming outcome of foregoing discussions favorable, Souvanna would undertake, with our support, discussions with Poles to obtain whatever reformulation or interpretation of their proposal may be required to obtain recognition Souvanna would be attending such a conference as PM of Government of National Union and sole spokesman for that Government. Representatives of other two factions would be attending solely as representatives of those factions. 3. Subject to satisfactory outcome foregoing, Souvanna would accept participation in Polish conference while maintaining his present preconditions for participation in any fourteen-nation conference. 4. In agreeing to attend conference, Souvanna would seek to improve bargaining position by making it clear, publicly or privately, in manner agreed with us and Thai Government, that, in event conference not successful, US would provide prompt and direct military support along lines described para 6 below. (Study being given here to question of Congressional consultation or approval of such future US force commitments, taking account of SEATO obligations.) 5. Souvanna would at same time request assistance of US (and possibly others) in reequipping his forces and we would immediately initiate such resupply through present channels. 6. If Polish conference not successful or in meanwhile Pathet Lao/Viet Minh significantly advance toward Mekong from present positions, we would, in response to Souvanna request, immediately deploy to Thailand an international force and initiate selective air strikes against Pathet Lao/Viet Minh supply lines and installations. (Note: We would not attempt at this time exactly to define what would be an acceptable degree of “success” but at minimum feel it would require reestablishment of some Kong Le presence in Plaine des Jarres. Whether such air strikes would at least initially be confined to Laos or include targets in North Viet-Nam would be determined at the time in the light of developments in the total Southeast Asia scenario.) 7. At the time of deployment to Thailand, accompanying Security Council action would be taken by Souvanna and/or ourselves in which our position would be that we were prepared to yield in favor of the UN if and when the UN reached agreement on appropriate measures to restore the situation. Decision would have to be made at the time with respect to exact time relationship between UN moves (by Souvanna as well as ourselves) and our military moves. 7 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent also to New Delhi. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by Ball. 2 For Rusk’s itinerary, see footnote 2, Document 65 . 3 The meetings took place at 11 a.m. and 4 p.m. A combined summary record of them is in a May 30 memorandum by Read. In addition to the individuals named in the cable, McNaughton, Colby, Cooper, Gaud, and Rowan attended the meetings. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 In Secto 25 from Bangkok, May 30, Rusk stated that he concurred generally with the reasoning and scenario outlined below although he had a number of questions and observations. (Ibid.) 5 Transmitted in Tosec 37 to Bangkok, May 29. (Ibid.) 6 Dated May 27. (Ibid.) 7 Printed from an unsigned copy. 68. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 68. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Bangkok, May 30, 1964, 3 p.m. Secto 23. Had one hour talk with Kosygin at Soviet Embassy accompanied by Bowles. Soviet Ambassador and one Soviet FonOff official also present. [Here follows a brief account of trade discussions.] We then turned to Laos at my request. I went over background of Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement of June 1961 and Geneva Accords of 1962. I described two major Viet Minh violations throughout subsequent period, namely, continued presence Viet Minh military in Laos and use of Laos as corridor to attack South Viet Nam. I told him we and Soviet had agreed that everyone should leave Laos alone and that, if left alone, Laos would cause no problems for its neighbors. Neither side needed Laos as an ally. I said that, on the one side, the United States has no interest in military bases or a military presence in Southeast Asia and that if Hanoi and Peiping would leave their neighbors alone there could be peace in Southeast Asia. On other hand, I said that we could not stand aside and watch Southeast Asia be overrun by Hanoi and Peiping. I concluded by urging importance of close cooperation between Washington and Moscow to support full compliance with Geneva Accords of 1962. Time began to run out because both of us had to attend and speak at Delhi memorial meeting for Nehru. Kosygin, however, said that he would report my observations to Mr. Khrushchev, declared that Soviet Union fully supports Geneva Accords, but stated that US was taking military steps which would provide no answer to situation. I told him that we are not seeking a military solution but that Pathet Lao with help of several Viet Minh battalions were resorting to military action contrary to the Accords. I told him growing danger of situation made it all the more important for our two governments to act together to preserve Geneva Accords. Atmosphere of conversation was relaxed throughout except for two or three sentence exchange over our actions in South Viet Nam. No threats were used by either side. Since time was very short I do not believe this conversation substitutes for more systematic exchange of views with them on Laos at highest level. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Rusk was in Thailand for a brief visit after attending Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s funeral in New Delhi, May 28–30. Kosygin also attended the funeral. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) 69. Summary Record of Meeting 69. Summary Record of Meeting 1 Honolulu, June 2, 1964, 8:30–11:50 a.m. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume I, pages 428 – 433 .] General Milton 2 reported on “Military Action to Strengthen the Situation in Laos. Reequipping of Kong Le’s forces; Farmgate in Laos; US/SEATO forces in Thailand.” Annex H. 3 He said the objectives are (1) Hold the Mekong Valley. (2) Hold Sayorboury province. (3) Keep Souvanna in the saddle. (4) Get control of the external influences on the war in SVN while prosecuting the war in SVN. (5) Hold the confidence and support of Thailand. He recommended (1), that we continue high and low-level recce in Laos, with armed escort with authority to return fire. The purpose is to get a better feel for the situation in Laos. (2) Continue to build up T–28 strike capability and use Lao and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]Thai pilots. (3) Build up Thai “paru” operations in Laos. (4) Build up offensive guerrilla (Hardnose) operations. (5) Priority effort on GVN border patrols. (6) Cross-border operations from GVN into Laos (continued air recce, commence ground recce, raids and offensive guerrilla operations, psyops to get at least passive support of tribal groups and villages). (7) Hot pursuit into Laos. (8) Air lift and air resupply of ground recce. 4 (9) Plan with RVN for retaliatory air strikes on selected targets in NVN. (10) Naval presence off VN. (11) Low-level foto recce over NVN by Farmgate (USAF and USN). (12) Improve air defense of RVN and Thailand. (13) Retaliatory air strikes on selected targets in NVN and aerial mining of NVN ports. (14) Simultaneously, move ground units into Laos to secure (presumably at invitation of Souvanna) Thakhek, Vientiane, Paksane, and Savannakhet/Seno (2–3 brigades or 10,000 troops). Mission to hold those key points as “trip wires”. If attacked, reenforced. (15) Start airborne and amphibious raids on NVN. (16) Start harassment of NVN maritime shipping. (17) Step up air strikes. (18) Selective quarantine of NVN. (19) Be prepared to defend SEA against Chicom/NVN reaction, which might be invasion. 5 [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.] [?] asked if anything into Thailand. (No.) And if any SEATO contribution. Martin said keep them doing what they are: UK building a field near Savannakhet; Australia has aircraft at Ubon. Felt said that troops into Mekong towns will not all be US (but UK and Australia feel that their ground forces are tied up in Borneo; might provide air). Martin said the Australians might provide token forces to help themselves psychologically at home. Taylor said there must be more US forces in Thailand if put US into Lao towns. SecDef said it would require substantial deployments to Thailand. Further, any action against NVN would have to precede by substantial US deployments. Felt said it would be enough to be ready to send such US troops; the communists are “yellow” and will back down if the brigades are deployed to the Mekong towns. Taylor said this gets us to Hanoi by the Laotian route, which is not thought to be desirable. General Clay 6 discussed “Punitive air strikes in support of the Laotian situation.” He said there are four fixed targets in the north, and 3 in the Panhandle (only good ones, Ban Ban and Khang Khay in the PDJ). CIA identified 17 bridges. Also 5 sod-type airfields, as potential targets if air resupply used. So very few attractive fixed targets. Armed reconnaissance, though, might provide something to attack (those who shoot at you). SecDef pointed out that nothing mentioned so far will stop flow into SVN (e.g., 6 people a day, and equipment moving at night). It has psychological effect and is an escalating move but little physical impact. SecState said the same pertained to China targets during Korea, which led to conclusion that Chinese will would be affected only by striking Chinese cities! Felt distinguished the VN case, where no massive invasion. You can throttle down the flow of stuff (not stop it). Lodge said must distinguish supplies to Delta and to High Plateau. Taylor said that it would provide action for us, where we really can’t retake the PDJ. Felt thinks a package of actions might cause Lao to be more active. SecDef asked whether we wouldn’t have to increase US presence in Laos first (White Star teams, MAAG, etc.) to guard against PL moves. Bundy didn’t think anything like that we did would make much difference on short term. Felt said PL are encadred by Viet Minh; we might encadre the FAR. Have done it to some extent with Thai. Lao don’t like it. Chadbourn concurred, but said Lao might accept it. SecDef said he would oppose putting US troops into Mekong without some US military stiffening of Lao (White Star and encadrement) and way of knowing what goes on. Taylor asked about a Laos Farmgate. Milton said they had no enthusiasm for it. Taylor asked re reequipping of Kong Le. Felt said it is being done. He objected, but Unger said it is needed, so did it. Don’t need tanks replaced. Issue was trucks and 105s. They are “on the way”. SecState asked whether Souvanna would go to Paris if shooting began. Chadbourn said probably yes. Taylor asked if Felt is happy with present recce. Felt said (1) want armed recce and (2) want to look at North Laos (near China). SecState doubted value of recce. (They will hide and travel at night). SecDef asked what if Souvanna left. Chadbourn said he might stick around. He has said he would not preside over a war. He has not asked for strikes in Laos, or even for US pilots. He thinks strikes against NVN are right and would put an end to the trouble. Souvanna, if he left, would probably be succeeded by Phoui Souvanikone. SecDef said that if we moved into Mekong towns, Thais would be with us. SecState said that a VC-type operation from Laos into Thailand would be very difficult to handle. Felt said occupation of the towns would go with pressures elsewhere on NVN. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 72 A 3470, Southeast Asian Strategy. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. President Johnson’s major advisers met in Honolulu, June 1–2, primarily to discuss Vietnam. 2 Major General Theodore R. Milton, Commander of the 13th Air Force and then CINCPAC’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. 3 Not found. 4 That above are in ascending order; that air strikes in Laos so far by Laos and Vietnamese; that guerrilla-type operations by tribal groups are probably encadred with US. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 (1) Easy to talk of, hard to effect partition. But can make Red life in Panhandle miserable. (2) Not practical for US to retake PDJ. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 Brigadier General Lucius D. Clay, Jr., Director, J–3, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 70. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 70. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 3, 1964. SUBJECT Intermediate Actions in Laos 2 At the moment Article 4 consultations among five of the fourteen Geneva nations are taking place. These will not amount to a hill of beans. The next probable step will be something like the Polish proposal, modified so that this meeting will take place in Luang Prabang instead of Geneva and will include Souvanna Phouma, as well as representatives of the three factions. There will be two principal issues: restoration of the Government of National Union and PL withdrawal from the Plaine des Jarres. This meeting will fail to produce any agreement; but it will probably produce intense pressure for a fourteen-nation Geneva Conference. We should take an intensely firm decision (probably by the President) not to attend the Geneva Conference. We should repeat this decision incessantly to our friends and enemies. Simultaneously, we should expand our air reconnaissance activities to include all those areas both in Laos and North Vietnam through which Hanoi’s supply lines run into each of those countries. I understand (contrary to my previous expectations) that significant results are already being achieved. The purpose of the reconnaissance is not only to give a signal of our determination, but also to provide evidence for use before Congress and later the world. Some of our planes will get shot at; some may even be lost. Hopefully, this will not start happening for some time, when we may be in a position to take advantage of this to begin moving down a more serious tack. This is very sketchy, but I think we must get a start on a combined military/political tack in Laos. 3 “The political and diplomatic course of action with respect to Laos is probably still the most immediate possible trigger of larger decisions. For the moment, we are doing quite well in our negotiations with and on behalf of Souvanna, and our relatively affirmative position on the Polish proposal has been helpful, but it is agreed that we need to discuss possible further actions with respect to Laos, both among ourselves and with the Thais, the British, and the French.” (Ibid., Memos to the President, Vol. V, 6/1–30/64) The memorandum is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 440 – 441 . Mike 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos, 6/1/64–6/14/64. Secret. 2 According to a June 3 covering memorandum from Forrestal to Bundy, Forrestal suggested that Laos was the place for the United States to take “an action tack in SEA,” but Forrestal feared that the Department of State was not “really getting down to it.” Forrestal stated that “Bill Bundy’s Laos people are weak, and Sullivan is diffident about intruding into this area; nevertheless, the thoughts in the attached memorandum come largely from him.” (Ibid.) 3 In a memorandum to President Johnson, June 3, which dealt mostly with Vietnam, McGeorge Bundy summarized developments in Laos as follows: 71. Memorandum for the Record 71. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 4, 1964. SUBJECT White House Meeting on Southeast Asia, 4 June 1964 PARTICIPANTS Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Forrestal Assistant Secretaries Bundy and Manning, Mr. Green, Mr. Sullivan Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby 1. This meeting was in preparation for a session with the President on 5 June. 2 Assistant Secretary Manning will be developing a comprehensive public information program and Assistant Secretary Bundy took on the job of drafting a Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia. Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the following meeting discuss where we stand, develop the problems of Laos, cover the actions to be taken in Vietnam, mention the fact of the need for a public information program and go over a checklist of the range of military choices. 2. With respect to Laos, it was accepted that the value of the Lao situation is that we have a positive position, although we are not apt to regain any geography. Mr. William Bundy suggested that we stick to Souvanna Phouma’s precondition of Pathet Lao withdrawal, and take certain steps to indicate strength. We should divide our potential actions into pre-impasse and post-impasse actions. Mr. McNamara noted that we do not wish to take military action soon but that we should do more than talk. He suggested that an impasse or a breakdown of the coalition government of Laos might occur any time and would call for stronger effort. Mr. William Bundy also indicated the importance of initiating some planning for actions on the Mekong with the Thai, at least on a hypothetical basis. 3. A discussion then took place of specific actions in the attached list with respect to Laos, with a selection among them as to various things to be done in a pre-impasse period. Few of these were selected as most were postponed for the impasse period. During the conversation the point was made that CIA hoped for somewhat looser restrictions on its covert operations to build strength within Laos; this was generally accepted. The measures to be recommended were to be summarized by Mr. Bundy in a separate paper the next day. 4. A discussion of the steps to be taken after an impasse brought up the problem of how we can keep from going to Geneva. Mr. Bundy opined that this depends largely on Souvanna Phouma, although the Thai and GVN will probably refuse to go. It was noted that the President wants a massive diplomatic effort to settle the problems in Indo China. Mr. Sullivan and others believed that it might be necessary to give some assurances to Souvanna Phouma of military action and to actually take some military steps in addition. The DCI commented on the difficulty of taking U.S. military action, and also whether it would be effective in holding back the Communists or keeping us from Geneva in the light of the pressures upon us to go there. It was also noted that Souvanna might be overthrown by the rightists if he started to go to Geneva. Various actions were then discussed for possible application after an impasse and these will be included in Mr. Bundy’s memorandum above. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.] 6. Arrangements were made for a meeting the following day with the President. WE Colby Chief, Far East Division Attachment 3 ILLUSTRATIVE MILITARY MOVES DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE U.S. INTENTION TO PREVENT FURTHER COMMUNIST ADVANCES IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM 1. Continue high and low-level reconnaissance over Laos. 2. Continue high-level reconnaissance over DRV (20 flights per month). 3. Introduce GVN recon. teams into Laos (with or without U.S. advisors)—4 approx. 6/15; 16 by 8/15. 4. Authorize hot-pursuit into Cambodia. 5. Initiate selective low-level recon. into DRV along supply lines feeding the Laotian corridor. 6. Re-introduce a MAAG into Laos (shift from Thailand). 7. Re-introduce White Star teams into Laos—(15 teams in 20 days). 8. Introduce GVN harassing forces into Laotian corridor (with or without U.S. advisors)—60 days. 9. Send 500 additional military advisors to SVN to expand the counterinsurgency program (announce immediately; complete in 120 days). 10. Expand T–28 operations in Laos, their use of U.S. military pilots. 11. Accompany U.S. recon. flights over Laos with fighter escort. 12. Authorize VNAF air strikes against DRV activities in Laotian corridor. 13. U.S. Force movements: a. 1 or 2 B–57 squadrons into SVN—24 hours. b. 1 interceptor squadron into SVN—24 hours. c. 1 or 2 fighter squadrons into Thailand—24 hours. d. 1 Army Brigade (5150 men) into Thailand (5 to 12 days) e. 1 Marine Brigade and Air Group (5700 men and 40 aircraft) into SVN on exercise or assignment (8 days). f. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days) g. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days). h. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks). i. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days). j. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days). k. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days). 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memo for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 8. 2 See footnote 1, Document 73 . 3 Confidential. 72. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 72. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, June 5, 1964. JCSM–479–64 SUBJECT Use of Thai Special Forces in Laos 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–24061/64, dated 8 May 1964, 2 subject as above, which requested views on the possible use of Thai Special Forces in Laos, with particular attention to whether they could be employed fruitfully and taking into consideration other current operations in Laos. 2. Except for a modest overt military assistance program and the small-scale cross-border operations from South Vietnam into Laos which were recently authorized, the paramilitary operations in Laos are under the operational direction of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These programs are: a. Operation Hardnose, which is a covert program primarily designed to develop intelligence of Viet Cong/Pathet Lao activity in Central and Southern Laos utilizing indigenous Lao and Kha tribesmen. b. A covert program designed to support tribal elements engaged in village defense and guerrilla activities against the Pathet Lao. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] 3. Certain of CINCPAC’s operations plans provide for the utilization of Royal Thai Army (RTA) Special Forces along with other local national and Allied forces. In this event, such forces would be employed as part of a larger Allied military effort. 4. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] the RTA Special Forces could be used as cadre and trainers for FAR and Neutralist regular Lao units. However, such use of Thai Special Forces at this time would probably create major problems in coordination and control. In addition, current training deficiencies of the Thai Special Forces make it unlikely that their use would be effective at this time.CINCPAC has the capability to provide the training necessary to improve their effectiveness for either overt or covert employment. 5. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that RTA Special Forces should not be employed at the present time in Laos. They recommend Foreign Minister Thanat be informed that the United States can provide training for RTA Special Forces. CINCPAC has been instructed to arrange for a mobile training team to conduct such training as soon as he is requested to do so by the Royal Thai Government through the Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Curtis E. LeMay 3 Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, Laos 000.1—Sensitive (381 Laos), 1964. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 Not found. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates LeMay signed the original. 73. Memorandum for Discussion 73. Memorandum for Discussion 1 Washington, June 5, 1964. LAOS The enemy has two choices in Laos, each with a number of shadings. First , he can at any time initiate substantial military action on the ground aiming toward the Mekong Valley. Second , he can try to keep what he has for the present and leave any military initiative to us. This is our major problem. I. Action if the enemy moves strongly toward the Mekong. While we rate its likelihood very low (less than one in ten) we must obviously be prepared for this first case—substantial enemy pressure toward the Mekong. In this case we believe that it would be necessary to be prepared to move U.S. and other forces into Thailand at once and to be prepared, with the Thais, to occupy selected Laotian cities on the left bank of the Mekong. This of course would imply a still sharper de facto partition of Laos, but since it would by definition be a response to clear-cut Communist military aggression, we believe it would be internationally and nationally acceptable—and indeed almost inevitable. Recommendation 1 Our recommendation is that contingency planning against this possibility should be undertaken at once with Thailand, and we believe that military discussions of this contingency will have a useful diplomatic effect in Thailand, Laos and North Vietnam. II. Politico-Military Scenario if there is no further major Communist movement in Laos. The second enemy choice poses us a more complicated problem. In essence our objectives are three: (1) not to let the situation develop so rapidly that we are faced with a choice of humiliation or major military action before we are ready to take decisions in the context of SEA and especially SVN. (2) not to lose whatever prospect there is of maintaining a Souvanna government and at least a nominal maintenance of the political status quo in Laos. (3) not to permit a diplomatic “victory” for neutralism and Communism which would reflect heavily against our position and that of our friends in SVN and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Our belief is that the following politico-military scenario is the best available for these purposes. By a minimum of force, and an absence of direct hostile action unless they shoot first, it aims to show (1) Our determination (2) Our readiness for peace (3) More specifically, our continued dedication to the Geneva Accords and especially to the Souvanna government. 1. The Article IV consultations. These are proceeding in Vientiane now and we should do our best to string them out and to wring out of them a sharp picture of Pathet Lao aggression in the Plain of Jars. The Article IV consultations are limited to our friends and include neither French nor Communist representation. They have their value and it should not be we who bring them to an end. But already pressure is very high for the next step which is likely to be the Polish Proposal. Recommendation 2 We recommend continuation of the consultations in Vientiane, exploitation of the evidence they produce, and readiness to move to the Polish proposals at the latest workable time. At this stage our military pressure consists of fairly regular reconnaissance flights over the Plain of Jars and over Southern Laos, together with high-level U–2 reconnaissance over North Vietnam. Recommendation 3 We recommend that these programs continue. 2. The Polish Meeting. We are in favor of the Polish proposal for discussion among the British and Soviet Co-Chairmen, the ICC Members (Canada, India and Poland), and representatives of the three parties in Laos. It remains our position that the pre-conditions for any Geneva conference are as stated by Souvanna—cease-fire and withdrawal to previous positions, acceptance of Souvanna’s position and powers, re-establishment of the Souvanna government of National Unity, and effective functioning of the International Control Commission. We must hold this stand strongly, less for the sake of our own prestige than for the protection of Souvanna’s position vis-à-vis his Right Wing, and the position of the Khanh government in South Vietnam. We do not suppose that these conditions will be accepted in toto, but we do not at all exclude the possibility of real progress toward them if we follow the program set out below. In one form or another the Polish discussions are likely to occur within the next week or two. Under proper conditions these meetings can be useful in gaining time. Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that these discussions will produce any substantial result, and when they reach an impasse, there will be stronger calls than ever for a new Geneva conference. We therefore believe it important that the Polish meetings be accompanied by additional military signals on our side to underline our determination to insist on a certain degree of Communist pull-back before a Geneva meeting is held. The best available military indicator for this purpose is the extension of present U.S. low-level reconnaissance over Laos into North Vietnam along supply lines feeding the Plain of Jars and the Laotian corridor toward South Vietnam. Recommendation 4 We recommend the initiation of such low-level reconnaissance at about the time of a Polish meeting. Recommendation 5 We recommend further that if such planes are downed either over Laos or North Vietnam, fighter escort should be provided with instructions to return ground fire and attack anti-aircraft installations. 3. Impasse in the Polish meetings . The actions recommended to this point are those which would occur before an impasse in the Polish discussions. When such an impasse has been reached, we expect to recommend selections from the following additional actions to strengthen our general position. No specific decisions are recommended at present, but such actions might include the following: (1) The expansion of T–28 operations in Laos, including the use of third country pilots, but not Americans. (2) The introduction of harassing action by South Vietnamese forces into the Laotian Corridor (with U.S. advisors). (3) The authorization of South Vietnamese air strikes against North Vietnamese activities in the Laotian corridor. (4) A number of movements of U.S. forces from our West Coast toward the West Pacific in ways that will increase our readiness posture and give a general warning signal. These movements might be selected from among the following: a. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days) b. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days) c. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks) d. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days) e. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days) f. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days) 4. Political steps after a Polish impasse. Our present belief is that after an impasse is reached in the Polish discussions, the next step politically should probably be discussion in the UN. Such discussion need not necessarily be limited to Laos, and at this stage we might well wish a general discussion of the threats to peace in Southeast Asia in the UN forum. We believe it important to have in reserve additional military deployments, warning of which might properly be given in the UN debate. It is possible that on further discussion some of the actions listed above might be withheld for this purpose, but our preliminary thinking has been that the most valuable item in this context would be the deployment of U.S. ground forces, of about 5,000 men to Thailand. It is our current belief that this general politico-military scenario could be expected to last about a month to six weeks, and that at the end of that time further action should be closely related to our wider planning for South Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole. III. The Special Problem of the Laotian Right One continuing danger, in all our Laotian efforts, is the Right Wing. Both the relatively skillful Phoumi and the quite unpredictable Siho are capable of acting to overthrow Souvanna and take power at Vientiane at any time. De facto, they have much power there now. Any Right Wing takeover would be most destructive to our whole position. Recommendation 6 We recommend that Ambassador Unger continue to use all appropriate diplomatic pressures to prevent any such takeover, including the specific warning that the U.S. would not support those executing such a coup. At the same time, we must avoid as far as possible action which might trigger such a Right Wing reaction. This is one important reason for keeping the finger of accusation pointed at the Communists and avoiding a Geneva conference which tacitly accepts the status quo in the Plain of Jars. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Special Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I. Top Secret. Prepared for the President for a meeting on June 5 at 6 p.m. A copy of this memorandum was attached to a June 5 memorandum from McNamara to the President, entitled “South Vietnam Action Program”; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 461 – 464 . A title page to that memorandum indicates that the paper and its attachments were prepared in the Department of Defense for the use of the President at a meeting on June 5, at 6 p.m. The President met with Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and McNamara from 6:52 to 7:43 p.m., June 5. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the discussion has been found. 74. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 74. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 5, 1964. For your meeting with Secretary McNamara and McGeorge Bundy at 5:15, 2 to be followed by the meeting with the President, 3 there are two papers. I attach the paper related to Laos, 4 and my comments appear below. Mr. Sullivan will give you the paper on Viet-Nam3 with his comments. The Laos paper accurately describes the discussion in the Executive Committee yesterday. 5 You may wish to make the following additional points: 1. At the bottom of page 2, 6 you might note that the failure of the British to consult Souvanna may give us an immediate problem in Laos with Souvanna and especially the right. (We are drafting a long cable to Unger so that he will do all he can to ease this.) 2. In the middle of page 3, as to military actions in the “pre-impasse” period, no mention is made of continuing and perhaps modestly extending T–28 operations and also reequipping Lao forces. 7 These are modest measures but they might at least be noted. 3. In the discussion of the “impasse” situation no mention is made of the possibility that Souvanna might himself make things extremely difficult for us at this point by yielding on the preconditions and accepting a Geneva conference. We can hope that our firmness and Unger’s persuasiveness would keep him from doing this, but the President should perhaps be aware that the situation could slide off very rapidly at this point. In our Excom discussion, we all recognized this danger and the possibility that it might virtually de-fuse the whole Lao situation as an aspect of any wider action we might decide on over the summer. 4. The impasse situation might also produce a Communist declaration that they were forming their own government in Laos. This would indeed be a de facto partition, and we might then need to consider not only the various military steps discussed under paragraph 3 but also such steps within Laos, if Souvanna requested them, as reinstating the MAAG and putting substantial advisers into Lao units. The military effect of such steps would be modest but they would be a further sign that we were not prepared to stand for any Communist military action. W.P.B. 8 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Mar/June 1962. Top Secret. 2 See Document 75 . 3 See footnote 1, Document 73 . 4 Document 73 . 5 See Document 71 . 6 Reference is to paragraph 2 under Recommendation 3. 7 Apparent reference to the last paragraph in Recommendation 3. 8 Printed from a copy that indicates a member of Bundy’s staff, possibly Bob Barnett, initialed for Bundy. 75. Memorandum for the Record 75. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 5, 1964, 5:15 p.m. SUBJECT White House Meeting on Southeast Asia, 5 June 1964 PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Mr. Sullivan Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster Attorney General Mr. Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Cater Mr. Bell, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Wilson Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby 1. Mr. McNamara suggested that plans be prepared for low level reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam to precede the convening of the Polish sponsored conference now possibly coming up on 23 June. 2. The meeting then discussed the attached agenda 2 and its attached outlines of action. 3 leakage in Vientiane (William Bundy), the fact that the U.S. forces do not seem to be needed in the absence of a further Pathet Lao push (Mr. McGeorge Bundy) and that no Congressional resolution is envisaged which would warrant such an assurance for the time being (Mr. McNamara). Mr. William Bundy pointed out that it might be desirable to send troops into Thailand on an exercise at least or to give such assurances if the pressure on Souvanna Phouma to go to Geneva grows, in which case at least air units might be sent to Thailand. Secretary Rusk indicated interest in how the scenario could be brought around to bring attention to the corridor to South Vietnam. Mr. McGeorge Bundy thought there was time for this as we are not apt to immobilize our efforts in the corridor area in any case by any settlement. The Attorney General commented that there seemed to be very little going on in the early stages of this effort, followed by a large jump as an impasse was reached. He suggested that it might be desirable to do more earlier. Both Mr. William and Mr. McGeorge Bundy replied that we are deliberately moving the whole operation quite slowly. Governor Harriman commented that Siho is a distinct weakness in our armor and would like to know what is being done about eliminating him from the scene. No definite answers were given in view of Siho’s strong position in Vientiane. Governor Harriman also assumed that we would continue with our program of supply of equipment, etc; this was confirmed. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.] 4. Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested particular attention to the Lao recommendations on low level reconnaissance and fighter escort over North Vietnam. There was no dissent from these. With respect to the idea of a Polish conference, Secretary Rusk expressed interest in the prospect that the USSR and Poles might use such a forum to indicate some support of the Geneva Agreements. The Attorney General suggested that a more vigorous U.S. posture might be useful to the USSR and Poles in order to hold back the somewhat more aggressive DRV. 5. The meeting then broke up as the President was understood not to be available. After some intervening discussion, however, he arrived and the Cabinet members remained with him. WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 8. The time of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book; according to the President’s Daily Diary, Rusk met with the President at 6:52 p.m. (Both Johnson Library) 2 Not found attached. 3 Apparent reference to Document 73 . 76. Summary Record of the 533d Meeting of the National Security Council 76. Summary Record of the 533d Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, June 6, 1964, 10:45 a.m. LAOS Secretary McNamara reported that an RF–8 jet reconnaissance plane from the USS Kitty Hawk had been shot down by antiaircraft fire approximately six miles from the town of Ban Ban in the Plaine des Jarres. The pilot was observed to have parachuted to the ground and was surrounded by Pathet Lao troops. Rescue attempts have been made but have not been successful. Secretary McNamara reported his own recommendation and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that aerial reconnaissance be conducted tomorrow. A single flight plan was recommended, to be carried out by two reconnaissance aircraft, escorted by six to eight fighter bombers, with instructions to return any ground fire. General LeMay and General Greene stated that they had personally recommended that the antiaircraft unit which had fired upon the downed aircraft be attacked but both concurred in the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of State [Defense]. Both were certain that future reconnaissance planes would be subject to ground fire. General Wheeler said we should wait for further ground fire before hitting antiaircraft positions. All the military officers, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed that it was important militarily to continue reconnaissance. Secretary Rusk agreed that reconnaissance should be continued with armed escorts who would return ground fire; but that such reconnaissance should be limited strictly to what is militarily required, and should be scheduled in accordance with real needs. The Secretary of State further wanted an opportunity to obtain, during the day, Souvanna Phouma’s concurrence in the recommended action, to which the Secretary of Defense agreed. 2 . The President inquired what had been the results of previous reconnaissance. Secretary McNamara replied that reconnaissance had shown the location of antiaircraft sites, troop dispositions and movements, supply routes and depots, and the movement of numbers of trucks down these routes. Night reconnaissance had also disclosed a significant increase of night movement on the supply routes from North Vietnam into Laos. The Secretary of State agreed with the Secretary of Defense that reconnaissance had also had a political effect and may have prevented the complete breakdown of the Government of National Union. The President specifically asked the Attorney General, Mr. McCone, Speaker McCormack and Mr. McGeorge Bundy whether they agreed with the recommendations of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs. All agreed and no one present made any further observation. Michael Forrestal 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 6, 6/6/64, Laos. Top Secret. Prepared by Forrestal. 2 In telegram 1138 to Vientiane, June 6, the Department informed the Embassy of the decision to conduct a single reconnaissance flight of 2 aircraft on June 7 with 6–8 fighter-bomber escorts able to respond if the reconnaissance planes were fired upon. The Department instructed the Embassy to explain to Souvanna that this action was needed to offset the psychological effect of the shooting down of the U.S. plane and to demonstrate U.S. will, and that Souvanna need not specifically request the armed reconnaissance; he need merely acquiesce. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) In telegram 1537 from Vientiane, June 7, Unger reported that Souvanna raised no objection to the plan, but insisted upon no publicity 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 77. Memorandum for the Record 77. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 6, 1964, 10:45 a.m. SUBJECT Meeting of the Executive Committee With the President, Saturday, 6 June, 10:45 a.m. Note: Detailed memorandum on the conversation which took place being prepared by Mr. Colby. 2 1. Secretary McNamara reported on the shoot-down of a Navy reconnaissance plane, the fact that the pilot was observed parachuting and had sent out radio signals and he had landed in an area infected with Pathet Lao. Efforts to retrieve him had failed and had been ordered stopped because of darkness. McNamara then recommended that a reconnaissance mission of two planes be sent out tomorrow, that it be accompanied by 8 fighter bombers, with orders to return fire if the reconnaissance planes were attacked. 2. The President then asked the opinion of each of the Chiefs. All expressed agreement with LeMay and Greene, favoring fighter-bomber operations prior to the reconnaissance flight. Wheeler and MacDonald were studying the Secretary’s recommendation. The differing views were reconciled along the lines of the McNamara recommendation. 3. Rusk then was asked his views. He said that he felt the reconnaissance flights had been a deterrent to PL operations, that they should be continued to the extent “necessary and essential in developing photographic reconnaissance required by the situation”. He opposed excessive flights and he opposed “loitering” to gain visual observation of villages, encampments, etc. With this restriction, Rusk agreed to the reconnaissance flight tomorrow with fighter-bomber accompaniment and orders to return fire. 4. The President then said that he questioned whether we had thought through where we are going; specifically he said, “and what comes next?” This question—the most important question raised in the meeting—remained unanswered. 5. The President then asked my opinion. I stated that it was probably true that the reconnaissance flights had caused the Pathet Lao North Vietnamese to act with restraint. However I noted their limited time for military actions which involved going forward aggressively for a short period, pausing and then withdrawing was typical of PL operations and probably due more to logistic and support problems, ammunition shortages, etc., than to such considerations as our overflights. With respect to the McNamara recommendations, I supported them without hesitation or reservation. 6. The Attorney General likewise supported the recommendations. 7. The meeting adjourned. I then met briefly with Forrestal and asked if he had researched the SEATO Agreement 3 and the extent to which we could lean on it if we wished it to commit actual war. Forrestal agreed to review the Treaty and the obligations over the weekend. I then met privately with Bundy and posed the same question to him. I said that the problems of securing a Joint Resolution were most serious as it would involve a debate on the Floor of the Senate which would probably be violent and corrosive to U.S. policy position. However in my opinion the commitment of ground troops to Laos would cause consternation throughout the country and the debate on the Hill infinitely more violent than the one that might arise over a Joint Resolution as outlined by the Attorney General. I said it would surprise me if several important Senators such as Russell and Saltonstall would not severely criticize the commitment of troops to Laos and that I felt a sampling of public opinion at this time would indicate that not one person in 50 favored such commitment. I pointed out that all of the “hardboiled spokesmen” such as Goldwater, Nixon, Rockefeller (to a lesser extent), and even Symington had advocated air strikes and envisaged our boys flying back to base in safety after having deposited their bombs on North Vietnam or elsewhere. I therefore viewed with great concern the consequences of the actions which we were “drifting into” and I wished Bundy to express this view to the President. Bundy agreed to give the President a brief memorandum. 4 [Here follows discussion of the DCI’s and CIA’s general responsibilities and the possibility of CIA returning to South Vietnam in an active rather than a support role.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with President, 1/4/64–4/28/64. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary. Copies were sent to Carter and Helms. McCone mistakenly describes this as an Executive Committee of the NSC meeting. It is a formal numbered NSC meeting. For Forrestal’s account of the meeting, see Document 76 . 2 Not found. 3 The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), September 8, 1954. For text and related Protocol, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955, pp. 912–916. 4 Not further identified. 78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, June 6, 1964, 6:09 p.m. 1144. Our exchanges with you today have of course related to PDJ missions. We have held off in authorizing any further Tchepone missions until we have decided on policy about escort. Defense Dept. view is that Tchepone operations should not continue without escort. However, we recognize that such escort would involve possible firing on targets in eastern Laos in areas where Souvanna has never appealed for our reconnaissance and where Hanoi has made no complaint nor have we ourselves acknowledged them. International defense these flights can be made on grounds infiltration violates Geneva Accords, but case clearly more difficult in absence Souvanna request. We can take more time on this decision than over questions of continuing and escorting PDJ flights. However, we need your judgment by Monday whether you believe Souvanna is in fact aware that we are conducting the Tchepone area flights and how he would feel about escort for them. 2 Experience to date is that these flights have encountered very little reaction and that only one out of nearly fifty has in fact been fired upon. We have impression Communists and perhaps Souvanna treating this area as almost a no-man’s land where rules need not be quite so strict as elsewhere. In accordance with your 1537 we have authorized escorted missions in PDJ for June 7. 3 Press release contained septel. 4 As you will see, we simply did not think we could plausibly claim RLAF doing protection. We hope our exact measures will not become known except to Communist side for at least a few days but of course cannot guarantee against leaks here. In any case we will review future frequency PDJ operations tomorrow having in mind all factors including allied reaction. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared in substance with McNamara and U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, and Saigon. 2 In telegram 1548 from Vientiane, June 7, Unger stated that there was no mandate from Souvanna to reconnoiter the Laos corridor. Unger believed that Souvanna would not agree to it, nor to armed escorts. Unger recommended “quietly continuing corridor flights to extent this is considered necessary but not put on escort.” (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 2, Document 76 . 4 Telegram 1148 to Vientiane, June 6. (Department of State, Central Files, INT 6 PHOTO LAOS) The text of the statement indicated that these flights were at the request of the Lao Government of National Union and would continue at its request. The statement concluded with the information that the Royal Lao and U.S. Governments were consulting about measures required for protection of these flights. (Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1964, p. 994) 79. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 79. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 7, 1964. I have spoken with Mac Bundy on the telephone. He has the following thoughts about the Laos problem: 1. He feels we have not been figuring the odds of accidents over the Plain of Jars very carefully. 2. We should not feel rushed into counter-action by the strong desire to hit back. We should instead calculate very carefully and very professionally just when and how to make a strike that will really take out one of the offending anti-aircraft batteries. If that takes a day or two—O.K. We know we have the will to do it, so we don’t have to prove our determination to ourselves. The enemy will be more impressed by an effective strike than by one that is not reasonably sure of success. 3. We ought not to push this into a faster escalation than we have planned at this stage. In other words we ought to confine our actions to the places where the incidents occurred. 4. Mac will be standing by to come down from Boston whenever you feel his presence here would help you. I plan to call him after the meeting this afternoon. 2 5. The name of the first missing pilot is: Lt. C.F. Krusmann of San Diego, California Mike 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. II, Memos (A), 5/64–6/64. No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text that Johnson saw it. 2 See Documents 80 and 81 . 80. Memorandum for the Record 80. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 7, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting with the President, June 7, 1964, Laos Reconnaissance PRESENT AT THE MEETING Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Harriman, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, Director McCone, Deputy Secretary Vance, Mr. Forrestal The Secretary of Defense reviewed the circumstances surrounding the shooting down of an F8 aircraft flying an escort for the reconnaissance over the Plaine des Jarres early this morning. 2 The Secretary of Defense proposed that another flight of two reconnaissance planes, accompanied by between 6 and 8 escorts, follow a maximum safety route to the vicinity of Xieng Khouang Ville. The escort planes would strike a fortification in this area in which aircraft batteries have been identified by photographic reconnaissance. Immediately following the strike, the photo reconnaissance planes would follow, taking additional pictures, and would then exit from Laos by the safest route. The Secretary of Defense said he would prefer that this action take place tomorrow, but understood that the Department of State wished to delay it 24 hours. Under Secretary Harriman and Assistant Secretary Bundy explained that they did not wish to increase the pace of escalation and particularly wanted to avoid interfering with discussions about the Polish proposal which were currently going on in London and Moscow. They asked, therefore, for a 24-hour delay. The Secretary of Defense agreed. A proposed press statement prepared by the Department of Defense was also reviewed at the meeting. The Secretary of Defense proposed that on June 10 a carrier task force from the First Fleet be transferred to the Seventh Fleet and that a public announcement of this fact be made. The President approved the escorted reconnaissance flight described above to take place on June 9, unless cancelled in the meantime. The President also approved the press statement for release between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m. on Sunday, June 7. 3 The President further indicated that he was prepared to approve the proposed announcement of the fleet transfer on June 10. 4 Michael V. Forrestal 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on SEA, Vol. I. Top Secret. Drafted by Forrestal on June 10. 2 June 6. 3 Apparent reference to a statement released by the Department of State, June 7; see footnote 4, Document 78 . 4 Not found. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 81. Memorandum for the Record 81. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 7, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting on Sunday, June 7th, with the President, McNamara, Vance, Forrestal, Harriman, [U. Alexis] Johnson, William Bundy, Manning and McCone After some discussion McNamara recommended: 1. Flying of a mission on June 8th involving 6 or 8 fighter bombers in advance of 2 reconnaissance planes to fly over an installation (Xieng Khouang Ville). Fighter bombers taking out the antiaircraft installation in advance. This would be a retaliatory action and it was agreed upon. 2. Press release concerning the shootdown of the F–8. 2 3. The positioning of a portion of the First Fleet to join the Seventh Fleet in the Far East. Note: This was item 13 on the courses of action. 3 All attending the meeting approved. There was some discussion between State and Defense as to whether the above mission should be run June 8th or 9th. It was agreed to run on June 9th because of a meeting taking place in Vientiane on June 8th. The President continually raised the question of what we see down the road. Harriman said we seek a government of national union and reestablishment of the terms of the 1962 accord. Johnson said our purpose was to demonstrate the U.S. determination to preserve Laos and the actions would assist the Soviets in supporting this position. The President then said what if we do not take out the entire battery. Are we in danger, and secondly, are we violating the sovereignty of Laos. Johnson stated, no we are not violating the sovereignty since Souvanna had requested reconnaissance flights and therefore we were responding to his request. (Johnson did not specifically refer to the fighter bomber action either in return of fire or in advance of fire as anticipated on the June 9th flight.) McNamara and the President then aired exchanges on the chances of the loss of another plane. McNamara stated that the Chiefs thought there was a very small chance and he placed the chance of losses for missions at 5%. We have run 138 missions with only 2 losses and this more or less verified his estimate. With respect to this particular operation, which was planned so the planes would go in on the safest route, take out the target and then exit by the safest possible route, he estimated the chances of a loss to be “only 1 in 500”. The President and Harriman then discussed the 1962 Accord and Harriman stated that we wished to reestablish Kong Le’s position in the PDJ and to have the status quo established as prior to the PL offensive actions. McCone stated we should want more than that. We should want the full terms of the 1962 Accord complied with. He noted that they had not been complied with, that Souvanna originally planned to go to every section of Laos and create political support for his government and the 1962 concept but in reality he had been able to go to Vientiane and Luang Prabang and had only travelled between the two cities by air, that the eastern part of Laos had been controlled by the Pathet Lao, it had been used as access to South Vietnam and if we agreed to merely the reestablishment of conditions prior to the PL advance, we were in effect turning over eastern Laos to the Communists for continued use in their effort against South Vietnam. I therefore strongly urged that we concentrate on the establishment of an adherence to all the conditions of the 1962 Accord. At this point Harriman said this was all very good, but he didn’t think it could be brought about and then he said that neither he nor any one else expected that the terms of the 1962 Accord would be complied with, and when it was signed it was recognized that such things as full access to all of Laos was probably unattainable, even though the agreement provided it. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] The President then asked where we were going, or was this a day-to-day affair. He seemed to be concerned that we were getting in a little deeper all the time and not really answering the problem. Harriman noted that Rusk was concerned over the practicality of our position as anti-aircraft and machine guns were scattered over the entire PDJ. In answer to a question from the President, I stated that I felt there was grave danger of us “sliding down the slippery slope” on day-to-day decisions and that we did not have a full scenario of actions in view of the military effort that was now being made. Both McNamara and William Bundy challenged this, stating there was a scenario carefully worked out and that it was set forth in papers which had been approved and that the courses of action were designed to apply increasing pressure on Laos. Note: I let the discussion drop at this point, but I wish to return to this issue as the papers referred to which were those considered on June 4th, specifically did not anticipate actual combat operations by U.S. air either in support of regular flights or in advance of regular flights. What is happening is that a scenario designed to bring pressure on Laos during the period of negotiations under Article 4, ICC discussion on Polish proposal, are now being considered as adequate under active military operation of a type which has taken place in the last 2 days and is anticipated for June 9th. Check with Cooper and Colby. [Here follows a brief discussion unrelated to Laos.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 May–31 Oct 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone on June 8 and transcribed by his secretary. For Forrestal’s account of this meeting, see Document 80 . 2 See footnote 3, Document 80 . 3 Reference is to paragraph 13, subparagraph h, of the attachment to Document 71 . 82. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 82. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, June 8, 1964, 7 p.m. 1559. For Secretary Rusk and Bundy. I am deeply distressed over events of past several days and am apprehensive that all our careful work of past two years may be largely vitiated. Problem as I see it is that air reconnaissance exercise, initiated (as far as I am concerned at least) primarily as political instrument to provide some encouragement here and serve as warning to Communists, risks becoming military exercise for its own sake, running rapidly out of control, seriously endangering our carefully managed position with regard to Geneva Accords, our good relations with PriMin and constructive relations with British, Canadians and others. I now believe I made serious error in agreeing to approach PriMin Saturday night 2 to seek his concurrence in sending armed escorts with recce planes. I yield to no one in my concern over fate pilot of plane downed June 6 but these are risks everyone must have known we were taking and, given political background of situation, we should have resisted putting on fighter escorts. Escorts were put on but on clear understanding with Souvanna Phouma that this would remain secret. After June 7 shooting down question of press handling arose again and statement contained Deptel 1148 3 went long way to meet requirements here as well as U.S. Government requirement of maintaining its position with regard Geneva Accords. Release did mention “F–8 aircraft from carrier Kitty Hawk” but this we thought we could live with by continuing stick to publicity line already laid down. Now I learn (Deptel 1151) 4 that Department and DOD have authorized background identification of downed aircraft as fighter escort. I am at a loss to understand why this was done. As long as our previous line was maintained we could pass off bombings and strafings in PL area as work of T–28s however much PL presented eye witness accounts of U.S. jet involvement. Now, however, we have virtually acknowledged that U.S. aircraft, not invited by RLG, have been bombing and strafing in Laos in direct violation of Geneva Accords. I have no idea what is likely be PriMin’s reaction when press queries him on these points. Deptel 1151 proposes that I follow “same line” but am afraid I will require considerably more guidance than that both to reply to press, to PriMin’s further questions, to ICC inquiries (and perhaps charges), and to British and Canadian reps who will be visiting Khang Khay Wednesday and will undoubtedly be jumped on this one. I apologize for negative tone taken here and you may of course be assured I will do everything possible at this end to minimize damage to U.S. position. I hope U.S. military can be put under more stringent orders to restrain themselves to actions that fit strictly into our political requirements. I am every bit as frustrated as they but want to be sure that if we move into U.S. military action we have chosen right time and place. In this connection see penultimate para my tel 1551. 5 At this point it seems to me we would be wise to institute at once scaling down of recce flights as already recommended and withdraw fighter escort. I may of course have entirely misinterpreted our actions, which were perhaps taken with full recognition of possible consequences mentioned above. Have we come to decision that after two years of Communist violation of Geneva Accords and aggression in Laos, we are also taking off wraps? Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 9:48 a.m., June 8. 2 June 6. 3 See footnote 3, Document 80 . 4 Dated June 7. (Department of State, Central Files, INT 6 PHOTO LAOS) 5 In this paragraph of telegram 1551 from Vientiane, June 7, Unger agreed that photo reconnaissance over northwest Laos should not be lost track of, but he wondered if the Department had given consideration to whether it wanted to excite the Chinese at this stage. Unger suggested covering this area with reconnaissance flown by T–28’s out of Luang Prabang. Only if the results were unsatisfactory should U.S. jets overfly this politically sensitive area. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 83. Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson 83. Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson 1 Washington, June 8, 1964, 3 p.m. SOUTHEAST ASIA OTHERS PRESENT Acting Secretary Harriman, Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, Special Assistant Sullivan, General Carter, Mr. Chester Cooper, Mr. William Colby, Mr. Michael Forrestal, Mr. Bromley Smith The meeting began by pre-arrangement without the President. Acting Secretary Harriman, Alexis Johnson, and William Bundy arrived a few minutes late. They had been delayed by discussing with Secretary Rusk in Newport, Rhode Island, the recommendation to conduct an air strike with U.S. planes on a specified target in Laos. Mr. Harriman said both Ambassador Unger’s messages 2 had been relayed to Secretary Rusk. After discussing the pros and cons, Secretary Rusk favored going ahead with the strike although he considered the decision to be an extremely close one. Mr. Harriman said that he, Mr. Johnson and Mr. William Bundy believed that the arguments for the strike were stronger than did Secretary Rusk. They were firmer in their belief that the President should authorize the strike today. Mr. Harriman said the purpose of the strike would be to convey a message to Hanoi. Unless we take some action to convince Hanoi that we are serious, negotiations with Ho Chi Minh will not be productive. Secretary McNamara agreed. Mr. Harriman said he did not think the strike would be as harmful to our relations with Souvanna as Ambassador Unger thought. If we attack a specific target we won’t lose Souvanna by his giving up his position. It was clear that Ambassador Unger had written his cable 1559 (copy attached) without knowing specifically what was planned in connection with the escorted aerial reconnaissance and the air attack. Secretary McNamara said he disagreed with Ambassador Unger who had proposed that T–28s be used to take out the antiaircraft battery. He said that T–28s flown by Vietnamese would not be able to destroy the target. In his view, if another U.S. plane were knocked down, we would have to respond by some military action, not necessarily an air strike. Secretary McNamara noted that he was not satisfied with the way the reconnaissance flights had been carried out by the Navy. He had asked the task force, for example, why the U.S. planes had expended only seven rockets. He referred to Ambassador Unger’s comment about the military 3 and asked the State Department to make clear to the Ambassador that the U.S. Government is working together and that Defense is not operating unilaterally. He noted that he had agreed that napalm should not be used because of the excessive political cost involved in its use. In response to a question, Mr. Harriman opposed delaying the strike in order to allow time for Ambassador Unger to talk to Souvanna before the strike. Souvanna has to be against such an attack publicly, and, therefore, it would be better to tell him after it had taken place. Privately, he will not be as strongly opposed as he will have to be in public. Mr. Forrestal asked what would be risked if the strike were delayed for 24 hours, as had been mentioned by Mr. McGeorge Bundy following a telephone conversation during which the current situation was summarized. 4 The general response was that nothing would be gained by delaying the attack because we would learn little during the next 24 hours that we do not already know. Secretary McNamara pointed out that the attack had already been delayed 24 hours. General Carter recommended that the air strike be stood down on the grounds that it is a precipitous action based on the normal desire to retaliate against the shoot-down of two U.S. planes. He did not see it as part of a scenario which was aimed at seeking to improve the situation in Laos and South Vietnam. He stated this was Director McCone’s view. Secretary McNamara disagreed sharply, saying that Director McCone had told him flatly at 1:30 PM on Sunday 5 that he was for an air strike in Laos. General Carter said he was not at the Sunday meeting but that he had been told that the Director disapproved of the attack because it was not part of a longer range plan to deal with the existing situation but rather an action taken out of sequence. Secretary McNamara crossquestioned General Carter as to Mr. McCone’s view, saying that the Director may have changed his view, but as of Sunday, he had joined with all the others in recommending Presidential authorization of the specific air attack in Laos. Secretary McNamara said: “Suppose we decide not to make the strike? What would we do if we cancelled it?” Mr. Sullivan pointed out that Canadian International Control Commission (ICC) representative Seaborn would be in Hanoi on June 15. 6 The message he is to convey would not be appropriate if we had not acted in some way in response to the shootdown of our reconnaissance planes. He, in effect, would be going to Hanoi with a broken stick. There was discussion of low-level reconnaissance of North Vietnam as a possible alternative. The general view was that such reconnaissance would not be safe. General Wheeler recommended strongly that the air attack be authorized. He opposed any delay and said that we had no other plan to respond to the shoot-down. Secretary McNamara said we do not have to recommend the air attack but that no other action we can take to convey a message to Hanoi is comparable to an air attack. The possibility of some of our planes being shot down was a real one but the possibility that there would be a catastrophe was one chance in a million. The risk of not doing anything is greater than doing what is proposed. We must put additional pressure on Hanoi now. In response to a suggestion that Laos and South Vietnam are separate issues, Alexis Johnson said the relationship between the problems in the two countries is exemplified by two chess boards, some plays being made on both boards. Secretary McNamara said he and Deputy Secretary Vance had talked to several Senators during the day, including Senators Saltonstall and Russell. They had encountered less opposition than they had anticipated. Secretary McNamara said a perfect attack would consist of hitting the antiaircraft battery and losing no U.S. planes. If the fighters miss the antiaircraft battery but no planes are lost, we can consider the attack successful. If the antiaircraft battery is hit and a plane is lost, we can consider the attack satisfactory. In the event of any of the above results, no further reconnaissance measures will be flown for the time being and no further retaliation would be undertaken. With respect to public information, we would announce only that a reconnaissance mission had taken place. If the Communists say our planes fired, we would say that the Communists fired on our planes and we merely returned the fire. Following a discussion of whether the air attack fitted into the existing Laos scenario, Mr. William Bundy described the attack as providing only a bump in the upward curve of the military actions proposed in the scenario. Secretary McNamara said we must make a reply to North Vietnamese military pressure by means of an attack or by some other means. With respect to Ambassador Unger’s views, it was pointed out that he was looking at the picture in a Laos framework. The air attack was visualized as a signal to Hanoi covering our total Southeast Asia policy. With respect to whether the reconnaissance pictures we had obtained had been worthwhile, Secretary McNamara said they had been very useful, but that we could do without them, as we had during the past two years. He emphasized again we had one, not separate problems, in Vietnam and in Laos. Aerial photographs of the specific target and the surrounding area were circulated and examined by the group. It was pointed out that the antiaircraft battery to be attacked was 7/10 of a mile from a village. Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Harriman said that we need to reconsider previously discussed courses of action in the light of the current situation. Mr. William Bundy pointed out that the papers in the gray folder had not been discussed with the President. He had prepared a paper listing the diplomatic actions 7 for the immediate future and it was his understanding that our current objective was to string out as long as practicable any diplomatic conference involving Laos. At this point (3:45 PM) the President joined the meeting. Mr. Harriman said the State Department, including Secretary Rusk, agreed that the air attack should be made although the decision was a close one. The risks involved in the attack were offset by the absolute requirement to send a firm signal to Hanoi. The President asked that Ambassador Unger’s cable be read to the group (No. 1559). Secretary McNamara said that before the message was read, he wanted to point out that when Ambassador Unger had sent the telegram he did not know of our plan to launch a single retaliatory attack. The President, referring to a paragraph in Ambassador Unger’s message, asked whether we had agreed to keep secret the fact that we were sending fighter escorts with the reconnaissance planes. The answer was that we had not said we would not send escort fighters, but we had probably not made clear to Souvanna what we would do following a shoot-down of an unarmed reconnaissance plane. Mr. Forrestal then read 1559 and 1562 (copy attached). Secretary McNamara noted that we had already reduced our reconnaissance flights from ten to one. In reference to Ambassador Unger’s opposition to suppressive attacks on antiaircraft batteries, he said that we were not doing this except in the one specific case now being recommended. He repeated his flat statement that the antiaircraft battery could not be destroyed by Vietnamese pilots using T–28 airplanes, as Ambassador Unger believed. The T–28s would be lost to ground fire if they tried to attack an antiaircraft battery and the Vietnamese pilots had insufficient inability to deal with the targets. The President repeated some of Ambassador Unger’s comments to the effect that we were abandoning the Geneva Accords and violating them in a way which we had not done previously, despite Communist violations over the past two years. The President asked how we answered the accusation that an air attack would violate the Geneva Accords. Mr. Harriman said the Communists had broken the Geneva agreements. We had sent in reconnaissance planes to obtain information which the ICC could not get. This information was very important to us because we needed to know how the Communists were violating the Accords and whether they were initiating a buildup with a view to capturing the Mekong River cities. We were invited to carry out reconnaissance missions by Souvanna who was not asked to agree to fighter escorts but did not oppose our sending in fighter escorts when we told him we were. We have to get a message to Hanoi to convince Ho Chi Minh that we are serious, that we haven’t backed down, and that we are not scared off by attacks on our planes. The President asked whether the gains in taking out the antiaircraft battery are sufficient to offset world criticism that we are violating the Geneva Accords. Secretary McNamara replied that he did not think the air attack violated the Accords. Others present agreed that Communist violations of the Accord had altered the situation. In addition, we had sent in reconnaissance planes on a peaceful mission. These planes had been shot at. Therefore, we were entitled to reply to the hostile action taken against our peaceful planes. The President said Ambassador Unger felt that if we launched such an attack the Souvanna Government would fall. Others disagreed that Ambassador Unger had made this point. The telegram was re-read in an effort to clarify exactly what Ambassador Unger had said. Secretary McNamara said the ICC had failed to carry out its duty of maintaining peace in the area. The Pathet Lao forces had advanced. Souvanna had agreed to aerial reconnaissance by U.S. planes and did not object when we told him that we were going to send in fighter escorts with our reconnaissance planes. He repeated his view that the legal situation consisted merely of the Communists firing on escort planes and our returning the fire. The President asked whether anyone present was bothered by the charge that if we took out an antiaircraft battery we would be violating the Geneva Accords. He was bothered. Everyone acknowledged that the Communists had violated the Accords. If we go on further we will be throwing to the winds the Geneva Accords. In addition, we may lose Souvanna. The Communists are not expected to be responsible, but we are responsible people. Mr. Harriman pointed out that if we decide not to make the air attack proposed, we would be criticized because we didn’t respond to the hostile actions of the Communists. The President asked: “What happens after the antiaircraft battery is attacked?” Mr. Harriman referred to a list of nineteen military actions from which we could choose. 8 One such action was the movement of an additional carrier to the seas off South Vietnam. The President asked whether the air attack might not “blow” the meeting proposed by the Poles. Mr. Harriman responded that it might, but if we took no military action now, we would obtain no concession from the Communists at the Poles’ meeting. Secretary McNamara said he saw no possibility of obtaining any concessions from the Communists during the Poles’ meeting. The question is how to prevent further deterioration of the situation in Laos but one thing he was sure we must not do is to show any weakness in the face of hostile Communist actions. The President asked what we do if they knock down a bunch of planes. Secretary McNamara said we have to take some military action. He doubted that we could push the Pathet Lao back to where they were before their recent attack, but we must take some military action, such as the air strike, if we are to prevent further deterioration in our position in the area. Mr. Harriman said he did not write off completely the Polish talks which might help halt Communist aggression. He acknowledged that this was not very likely. Secretary McNamara, noting that it was 4:30 PM, said that if the decision was to halt the mission, he must send a cable immediately because the planes were authorized to take off at dawn unless otherwise notified. The President asked Mr. Harriman if he would recommend the air strike if it meant losing Souvanna. Mr. Harriman and the other State officers replied “no,” they did not recommend the strike if it meant losing Souvanna, but they did not think we would lose Souvanna if the attack took place. They added that Ambassador Unger did not know our full plan when he talked to Souvanna, and, therefore, some arguments he could have used he did not use. A cable giving him the full picture would be sent immediately. 9 The President said that even if Ambassador Unger knows all about the plan, he very much doubts that the Ambassador would agree that it was a good thing to do. The President asked what would happen if the strike were delayed for 24 hours. Mr. Harriman replied that damage would not be great but it would reveal a certain amount of indecision on our part. Secretary McNamara said the decision was a political one and not a military one. The air attack was one way of affecting any negotiations with Hanoi. The President was brought a note and he left the room. In his absence, Secretary McNamara said we cannot go on as we now are. We can take an entirely different course but we cannot continue talking tough and acting weak as we are now doing. He said he was even ready to give up Southeast Asia but now we must back up the words we have already spoken about our firmness of purpose. He had been concerned ever since the President’s Los Angeles speech 10 which conveyed the thought that we were going to act firmly in Southeast Asia. We must be careful not to convey an impression of strong action when, in effect, we are not so acting. If we do not make the proposed air attack, we should change the very strong message which we have asked Seaborn to convey to Hanoi. Mr. Harriman asked Secretary McNamara to repeat his statements to the President upon his return. The President returned and Secretary McNamara re-stated his view. He was deeply concerned about the inconsistency between our words and our action. Ever since the Los Angeles speech, he has been concerned that we had no plan to back up the words contained in that speech. He said there has been much tough talk by Secretary Rusk and by himself. He referred to the Rusk interviews in New Delhi 11 in which the Japanese were told of our firm intention to prevent the Southeast Asia situation from deteriorating further. It is most dangerous, especially with the Chinese, to have our adversaries conclude that we talk tough but act weakly. He does not oppose cancelling the air strike, but if we do, we must change our talk immediately. The President is not responsible for creating an impression of tough talk but his advisers are. We must change our talk and our present inconsistency. Mr. Harriman said the air attack was the only way that we could signal Hanoi. If we don’t send this signal, the situation will deteriorate in Southeast Asia. Souvanna may object publicly to our action but he will not be too unhappy in private. One day later we will know little more than we know now. There are fewer risks in going forward than in not acting. The President said Secretary McNamara may have made a point in his remarks about what we have been saying in speeches. However, we are not now deciding what to put in a speech, but we are talking about something much more important, namely, an action involving an attack on an antiaircraft battery in Laos. We are here considering whether this action should be taken. Ambassador Unger’s cable distressed him because he thought what we had been doing and were planning to do was done with the consent and knowledge of the Laos Government. He asked why the air attack was to be launched from Saigon rather than from an antiaircraft carrier. He wanted to know why an attack from Saigon would not be justification for the Communists to attack South Vietnam. What we do on the high seas is our business, but to attack in Laos would give the Communists a basis for launching an attack in South Vietnam. General Wheeler said the North Vietnamese had no air force, and, therefore, whether we attack from the sea or from Saigon made no difference insofar as retaliation by the North Vietnamese was concerned. Any Communist aircraft which could attack South Vietnam would have to come from Communist China. Communist retaliation is very unlikely. Secretary McNamara responded by saying that we were planning to attack from South Vietnam before we could use U.S. Air Force pilots who, in his opinion, are better prepared for the kind of attack proposed. He criticized the June 7 Navy operation from the aircraft carrier, saying that the reconnaissance planes were split into two groups, they came in over their target too high, and they apparently used Sidewinder air-to- air rockets when they should have used only air-to-ground missiles. General LeMay had said that he felt the Navy task force missions had not been as efficiently planned as the Air Force would have planned them. In response to the President’s question, General Carter said he had earlier recommended strongly against the air attack. He added, however, that this was his judgment and CIA did not have an agency view on the policy decision. He recommended that the air strike be delayed for 24–48 hours if for no other reason than to acquaint Ambassador Unger with the reasons why the attack was being launched. He said his personal view was that the air strike was motivated by a desire to retaliate against the loss of our planes and did not fit into a plan aimed at improving our situation in Southeast Asia. He repeated, however, that this was a question of judgment and acknowledged that he had no alternative proposal to suggest which would have the effect of letting Hanoi know that we were serious about our position in Southeast Asia. The President said that we should go ahead with the mission but that he had doubts about the action. Bromley Smith 12 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. Colby and Cooper prepared a separate although substantively similar memorandum for the record of this meeting, June 8. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with President, 1 May–31 Oct, 1964) 2 Reference is to telegram 1559 ( Document 82 ) and telegram 1562 from Vientiane, June 8, in which Unger reiterated his opposition to armed reconnaissance and a retaliatory strike against a Xieng Khouang anti-aircraft site. Unger suggested that attacks by Lao Air Force T–28’s would be “infinitely preferable” to deployment of U.S. jets. Unger was also concerned about international reaction to plans to employ napalm in the attack, since it had not been used before in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 Apparent reference in telegram 1559 ( Document 82 ) to Unger’s statements that the operation “risks becoming a military exercise for its own sake, running rapidly out of control.” 4 No further record found. 5 June 7. For a record of the meeting, see Documents 80 and 81 . 6 A brief report of Seaborn’s meeting with Pham Van Dong on June 15 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 525 – 526 . 7 Dated June 8 and entitled “Diplomatic Action Concerning Southeast Asia.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. II, Memos (A), 5/64–6/64) 8 Harriman is apparently referring to a paper entitled “Illustrative Military Moves designed to Demonstrate U.S. Intention to Prevent Further Communist Advances in Laos and South Vietnam”; see the Attachment to Document 71 . 9 Document 84 . 10 Reference is to the President’s remarks at the University of California at Los Angeles, February 21; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, pp. 303–305. An extract is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 959–960. 11 Rusk was in New Delhi for Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s funeral, May 28–30. Rusk’s interviews have not been further identified. 12 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, June 8, 1964, 9:40 p.m. 1158. Highest levels concluded mission June 9 should go forward. In view time factor we did not await your reply Deptel 1155 2 but assumed it would generally follow lines your 1559 and 1562 3 which as we saw it indicated Souvanna would certainly not publicly approve and might even disavow but that even another incident and loss plus firing would not be likely drive him seriously other actions. Incidentally, you may rest assured all decisions this subject being reached closest consultation Department and Defense with higher approval as necessary and in light most careful weighing we can make of political factors. We all feel badly we did not cut you in full sequence events and particularly regret operations message did not reach you. 4 We are now clear that we will in any event take a few days after June 9 mission to assess next step and will hold off on further recce operations on any basis during this period. Hopefully you can catch up a little on sleep. We also regret that in sending you text our statement on June 7 shootdown 5 we did not make clear that we felt we would have to admit on background aircraft was escort although we did not admit and have not yet admitted that we have actually fired. Our basic problem here is to maintain credibility and we assumed, as it turned out rightly, that Communist radio would immediately charge us with firing and that we would be in impossible position unless we admitted that aircraft were being escorted. If as we expect Communists again respond by propaganda attack to firing by June 9 mission we will do maximum hold this line and to avoid conceding that ground positions were actually taken under fire. For your further information we had informed British and Canadians our probable intention institute escort missions and they and others must now know that they took place and infer that we did actually fire. So far no reaction reported. We are perhaps more concerned about Indian reaction than any other and you should perhaps seek hold Indian Ambassador and ICC hand to maximum. Naturally, Souvanna himself remains critical. You can best judge whether it useful discuss problem with him during day June 9 or whether it best you await results and act accordingly. Obviously you should not indicate in any way prior knowledge extent June 9 mission, but you might tell him you believe this escorted mission planned but to be followed by recess. You should certainly make clear to him and to all others our actions concerning recon mission do not indicate in any way we throwing away Geneva Accords but rather that we taking necessary action to carry on recon operations which fully justified within spirit Geneva Accords and in light RLG request and ICC inability to act to get facts about Communist military violations. Above drafted before receiving your 1563. 6 We weighed alternative possibilities continuing recce missions without escort and attacking anti-aircraft sites with T–28’s. We rejected former on grounds no safe flight path could be guaranteed and another shootdown without active US measures would above all give Hanoi and Peking another lift and would almost certainly be heavily criticized in US and possibly lose us crucial support for whole course of action we pursuing in Southeast Asia. We rejected latter on grounds military judgment here that it would be ineffective and almost certainly produce serious loss unless napalm used which we thought had other serious disadvantages particularly in international sphere. We also rejected alternative another generalized escorted mission on grounds this might produce another loss with no offsetting advantage damage to other side and thus really force our hand for next move. We understand fully your point about risks being daily incurred by your aircraft and those from Udorn and our hats are off to all concerned. Fact is that damage to our overt reconnaissance creates different pressures both in relation to Hanoi and Peking and in relation to US public. Your 1564 now received. 7 You should certainly follow line with Souvanna that attacks in June 9 mission were in response hostile fire (which indeed probable once aircraft in area). Secretary wants you to know that he feels our principal chance of turning the Southeast Asian situation around without large scale military action of one sort or another lies in our getting effective signals to Hanoi and Peiping that they must leave their neighbors alone before events go too far. In your discussion with Souvanna, if the strike of June 9th comes up in a different form, you are authorized to tell him that certain steps are underway, which you are not at liberty to disclose, to make very clear to Hanoi that they are embarked upon an exceedingly dangerous course of action in their gross and persistent violations of the Geneva Accords. The timing of our reaction as of June 9 is related to that signal to Hanoi. Secretary also believes that you should not, even within your own staff, take the view that such actions on our part are themselves violations of the Geneva Accords. It is a well established principle of international law that where one side grossly violates particular provisions of an agreement such as those forbidding Viet Minh personnel in Laos or the use of Laos as a corridor to South Viet-Nam that those unilateral violations relieve other parties of relevant restrictions upon themselves. Our objective remains the fullest execution of and meticulous compliance with the Geneva Accords. We are ready to work with everyone and anyone to obtain full compliance on all sides. Central to our policy is full support for Souvanna Phouma despite repeated and contemptuous rejection of his role and authority by the Pathet Lao. Deeply appreciate your thoughtful series this subject. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Rusk and William Bundy; cleared with Manning, Harriman, Sullivan, and U. Alexis Johnson; and approved by Rusk and William Bundy. Repeated to Geneva for Ball. 2 Telegram 1155 to Vientiane, June 8, 4:33 p.m., in which the Department asked Unger if he was still opposed to a strike mission on June 9 even if it was a sharp single retaliation against a worthwhile target followed by a reduction in reconnaissance operations. The message also asked Unger to gauge Souvanna’s reaction to the operation. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 2, Document 83 . 4 The operations message has not been found. 5 See footnote 4, Document 78 . 6 In telegram 1563 from Vientiane, June 8, Unger stated that since the strike against Xieng Khouang was designed to demonstrate that the Pathet Lao could not shoot down reconnaissance planes without punishment and to offset the international psychological lift of their having done so, attacks by T–28’s armed with napalm and continued reconnaissance flights would have the same effect. Unger stated that acknowledgment of U.S. armed attack in Laos put the United States in severe risk of going “over the dam” of the Geneva settlement. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 7 In telegram 1564, June 8, Unger stated that it would be impossible to ascertain Souvanna’s reaction, but given that he agreed to armed reconnaissance only with the promise of no publicity, Souvanna would hardly approve of an acknowledged air strike. (Ibid.) 85. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff 85. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff 1 Washington, June 9, 1964. (Conv at time of bombing of Khang Khay, after bombing & reaction from Unger) H—What’s your reaction to this morning’s take? The Secy made a good addition (tel to Unger). 2 Bill (Bundy) is off the track. He is quite for going on with this thing (further bombing) regardless. F—No one is in favor except him. McNamara is not in favor. H—It is interesting, his thought that we should put some attack planes in if there is an attack. That is an entirely different proposition. They are worried about something coming from overhead. Then they have the sublime (faith) in the T–28’s. I have never imagined they would do much damage. F—Unger asked for a high-level letter (to SP) from LBJ. We are against it. Do you feel you could do a comforting letter? H—I think it’s the wrong thing to do, but I am perfectly willing to do it if it is the net balance. Seems to me this is a job Unger ought to do. It’s certainly not a good thing for the President to do. If anybody should send it, I should. The idea of his thinking we could keep things quiet like the Soviet press, is fantastic. I have never seen anything which made me believe that we had taken a commitment not to say anything (to the press re fighter escort plane). F—Prior to shooting down one of these planes it never occurred to Unger what we do if we get hit. They failed to think it thru. H—I took up cutting out those two letters (on the plane). Bob McNamara said I can’t handle it on the Hill. The announcement we would have made would have been exactly as Unger suggested if we took out those numbers. So I raised it. Bob said, “I can’t live with it.” You will get found out sooner or later so we accepted that. Unger has to understand. Trueheart has been getting something to the Secy to take to the President. It is interesting that SP suggested a certain operation if the other people did something. I think that would be a very, very dangerous thing to do. F—That is way down the road. F—The next step if we do anything at all is to change the fleet movement. H—Bob thought that was probably the best. Do you think we are on the wrong track—that Unger is right about this? I don’t see it myself. F—No. H—The trouble is that Bill (Bundy) didn’t send enough background stuff. I just can’t understand why they didn’t do it. It’s a one-man show, instead of getting a team play. When you’re active yourself you feel as if you are achieving something, but it isn’t done. I still believe it was a wise thing to do. I hope that the President thinks so. Incidentally to take the conceit out of some people who will be nameless. It is really preposterous. Not the ones we talk to. The ones in the background. This is two flops—yet they come forward next time with just as much assurance. It is a damn good thing because otherwise you couldn’t win wars. But they shouldn’t be allowed to sit in on policy discussions. F—I tried to persuade Mac (Bundy) to let me and him pull over here to the White House some of the working people to try to begin to blow a new course. He says no. He wants to leave it to Bill to try.—To push State to taking the lead. I said if it will work. H: The trouble is Bill is so (involved) in operational details. F: I hope for a meeting tomorrow and then with the President the next day. H—I think it is too early. I think if you try you are apt to rush decisions. This is what President Kennedy wanted, but not President Johnson who wants things thought through. I don’t think we’ll have things digested enough. F—I don’t have the feeling that everybody is thinking very much. 1 Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Secret; No Distribution; Personal. 2 Reference is to a revision in Document 84 made by Rusk. In the last sentence of the third paragraph, Rusk revised the following sentence, which originally read: “If as we expect Communists again respond by propaganda attack to firing by June 9 mission we shall certainly have to concede such firing did take place arguing that it was in response to hostile fire.” 86. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson 86. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 9, 1964. What follows is in the context of my full support for whatever decisions you may have to take under the awesome responsibilities of your office. You alone have all the available facts and considerations. You alone can make the decisions. From the Senate, we can only give you, in the last analysis, our trust, our support and such independent thoughts as may occur to us from time to time in the hope that they may be constructive. You know far better than I how delicate a manoeuvre was, first, the reconnaissance flights and, second, the bombing of the anti-aircraft sites in Laos. These two steps have opened up the immediate possibility of a far more direct U.S. military involvement in Laos than we now have in Viet Nam. I presume that the reconnaissance flights were designed primarily as a show of U.S. determination and as an aid of some sort for the government of Laos. Nevertheless, they did lead to the shooting down of the U.S. planes and then to the U.S. bombing of anti-aircraft sites. Clearly, this process of action and reaction can continue and grow deeper. It may be that circumstances require that the process continue and deepen. Only you are in a position to make that determination in the light of the whole of the interests of the nation. But I gather from our telephone conversation 2 that a deepening of the involvement is not what you believe desirable or necessary in terms of the nation’s interest. You indicated to me that the bombing of the sites was not to be repeated. But you cannot count on the absence of the need for repetitions of the bombings so long as the reconnaissance flights continue over Laos. What happens if other U.S. reconnaissance planes are shot down? Having once taken out anti-aircraft sites by bombing are we not to repeat the operation? And if we cannot stop the attrition by air must we not do it by land force or suffer the ignominious consequences? I think it is most dangerous to assume that if the reconnaissance flights continue, additional U.S. planes will not be shot at and, if they fly low enough, that some will not be brought down. The basic reality remains: if it is not in the national interest to become deeply involved in a military sense on the Laotian front, we will avoid those actions which can impel us, even against our inclination or expectation, to become more deeply involved. We will avoid further unilateral commitments and actions and take every possible initiative to bring about a peaceful settlement. But if our interests justify, in the last analysis, becoming fully involved on the Southeast Asian mainland then there is no issue. What must be done will be done. My own views are well-known. On the basis of my limited knowledge I do not conclude that our national interests are served by a deep military involvement in Southeast Asia. But in this situation, what I or any other Senator may conclude is secondary. The responsibility rests with you and we can only give you our support in whatever decisions you may make. If the decisions must be for a continuance of the course which is leading to deeper involvement, however, I would most respectfully suggest that the basis for these decisions must be made much clearer and more persuasive to the people of the nation than has heretofore been the case. In my judgment, public attitudes are far from understanding, much less accepting, even the limited degree of our present involvement in Southeast Asia. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos 6/1/64–6/14/64. Personal and Confidential. 2 Not further identified. 87. Draft Paper Prepared for a White House Meeting 87. Draft Paper Prepared for a White House Meeting 1 Washington, June 10, 1964. DE-FUZING LAOS The following are our objectives in Laos: 1. Preserve Souvanna Phouma as the Head of a Government of National Union, or at least as the Head of a government composed of the Neutralists and the Right Wing, leaving a door open to Communist participation. 2. Discourage further Pathet Lao grabs of territory. 3. Accomplish the above two objectives in such a way as to avoid dangerously demoralizing the South Vietnamese and the Thai. Period of the Polish Conference Our most immediate problem is probably not further Pathet Lao military grabs, but rather the preservation of Souvanna Phouma. Today he announced that he had asked the U.S. to cease reconnaissance activities over the Plain of Jars. This will probably further expose him to the risk of an overthrow by the Right Wing forces of Siho and Kouprasith. Recommendation: Unger should seek out Phoumi, Siho and Kouprasith immediately and leave them in no doubt that we still support Souvanna and would take the most drastic measures against the Right Wing in the event they attempted to overthrow him. Souvanna’s military and political position is probably now very weak and we therefore need to do what can be done, independently of any international negotiations, to shore it up. Recommendation: We try to re-establish Kong Le in some other territorial base, perhaps Luang Prabang, using air if necessary as part of a refugee operation. We increase our economic, as well as military, aid to him and his supporters and encourage as intense cooperation as possible between Kong Le and the Meo under the leadership of Vang Pao. Before the beginning of the Polish conference, either we bring the Canadians and the British here, or we send briefing teams to London and Ottawa in order to explain to them and persuade them that our primary objective is to reduce tension in Laos. To do this we need to have the Polish discussions go on as long as possible. During these discussions we would not expect to secure a withdrawal of the PL from the Plain of Jars, although this would be an initial demand. We should concentrate on using the Polish forum as a way of pressuring the PL and the Right Wing into an agreement to preserve the Government of National Union. During this period Souvanna will become even more vulnerable to Right Wing attack; so we must devise every means of neutralizing Siho and Kouprasith, while at the same time bolstering Souvanna. Recommendation: Explore the possibility of providing funds and goods directly to Souvanna and his allies in substantial quantities. Reduce, if necessary, our support of the Right Wing in Vientiane, taking into account the risk of a violent reaction by Siho. [ 1 paragraph (1–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified ] It must be expected that the Polish discussions will fail to achieve any of these objectives and will result only in a call for a 14-nation Geneva conference. Souvanna might well be persuaded to attend, if the Right Wing did not assassinate him beforehand. We would then have two choices: we might tell the Right Wing that unless they cooperated with us, we would be forced ourselves to attend the Geneva conference; but that if they did cooperate, we would refuse to attend and continue our support to them. We might also agree with the Thais and the South Vietnamese that we would not attend a Geneva conference. If the conference should then take place, without our participation, our objective would be, with the help of our British and Canadian friends and of Souvanna, to drag it on as long as possible. At the same time, or perhaps prior to this, we would take (or would have taken) certain actions designed to discourage the Pathet Lao, at least temporarily, from further territorial encroachment. We should also consider high-level reconnaissance of the trail networks in Laos, both to keep track of PL-VM deployments and also for use by the British and Canadians at Geneva. If the Geneva conference should fail to assemble because of our refusal to attend, we should consider resorting to some of the pre-Geneva 1962 measures, which we abandoned then. Among these would be heavily increased supply of money, weapons and goods to Souvanna and Kong Le; maintenance of our level of supplies to Phoumi’s forces; possible re-introduction of some American advisory presence in the form of a small MAAG and/or White Star teams; U.S.-led GVN combat intelligence operations in the panhandle; and a beefing up of American operated air transport facilities within Laos. The objective of the above would be to improve the bargaining position of Souvanna Phouma when and if the Geneva conference might occur. Ideally, we would at least go back to another Geneva conference in about the same position we were in May 1962. A second objective of these actions would be to reassure the Vietnamese and the Thai that we would not negotiate in Geneva from a position of complete impotence. Another alternative would be to agree to attend a Geneva conference, but only after we made it clear that we intended to return to the status quo ante-May 1962 in Laos. The only difference between this alternative and the previous one is that we would go to a Geneva conference before we had completed the actions described above. If we took this route, it would probably be essential to take somewhat stronger action in the form of military deployments and cross border activities in order to convince the South Vietnamese and the Thai that we were not throwing in the towel. If it is possible to keep the South Vietnamese, the Thai, and the Right Wing in Vientiane in hand, the actions described above might carry us through the early part of 1965, i.e. until the normal time for the Pathet Lao to attempt another bite. If Souvanna Phouma gives up or is liquidated during the course of the above scenario, we should consider the formal partition of Laos. In any such partition all international restraints on our efforts to support the Right Wing would have to be eliminated. If Souvanna were lost during an international conference, we would press for formal recognition of a divided Laos, insisting, of course, on Right Wing control of the panhandle at least from Paksane south. The negotiation of any such solution would obviously be very long drawn out and involve many such thorny questions such as what to do about the Meo and the demarcation of the partition lines in the North. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. V. Top Secret. No drafter is indicated on the source text, but at the White House meeting (see Document 88 ) Forrestal summarized the paper and explained its rationale. 88. Summary Record of Meeting 88. Summary Record of Meeting 1 Washington, June 10, 1964, 5:30 p.m. SUBJECT Southeast Asia PRESENT Secretary Rusk (later), Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, Under Secretary Harriman, Director McCone, Director Bell, Director Rowan, Mr. Rostow, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Special Assistant Sullivan, Mr. Chester Cooper, Mr. William Colby, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Douglass Cater, Mr. Bromley Smith Three papers were considered. Copies of each are attached. 2 The attached agenda was followed. 3 The first question which arose was what statement should be made to the press about the reconnaissance missions over Laos. Secretary McNamara said we should say that a U.S. reconnaissance mission was flown in Laos, that it was fired upon, and that the U.S. planes fired back. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said this statement was not true and strongly cautioned that nothing be said now which later could be used to prove that the U.S. Government had told a lie. He said the U.S. must not risk being exposed as making false statements. Mr. William Bundy referred to Ambassador Unger’s plea contained in his telegram 1586 (copy attached) that the U.S. not admit that the planes escorting the reconnaissance planes had used suppressive fire. 4 The Ambassador’s cable was in response to a request for his views when it appeared here that it would almost be impossible to maintain our position of “no comment” in reply to questions concerning the firing of U.S. planes in Laos. Mr. William Bundy said that at an earlier meeting this morning 5 all present had agreed with Ambassador Unger’s reasoning and he asked that the present group agree to stand on “no comment.” Mr. McGeorge Bundy agreed that refusing to comment on operations was a much better position than one which, in effect, was not true. Secretary Rusk asked whether the press furor over the “no comment” position would blow over in a few days. Mr. McCone replied that he thought that press interest in the Laos operation would be very short-lived. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that Senator Morse would undoubtedly yell but we could live with his criticism. Secretary Rusk, who had just returned from the Hill, said that he felt that there was little Congressional interest in the Laos situation. He noted that several Congressmen had reacted almost with boredom to a discussion of the reconnaissance flights in Laos. He wondered whether we and Ambassador Unger had built up the air strike out of all proportion. In response to Secretary Rusk’s question, Mr. Rowan said there had been some international interest in our air activity in Laos, but there had been no huge international outcry over press reports to date. Secretary Rusk said our long-range stake in keeping Souvanna in power in Laos was great. He thought that we should back our Ambassador in the field. Secretary McNamara agreed as to what we would say to the press. However, he thought that to Members of Congress and friendly governments we should say that U.S. reconnaissance missions over Laos had been fired on and we fired back. Mr. McGeorge Bundy repeated his statement that this would not be the truth. He strongly disagreed that we should make such a statement because he believed that it would not stick and the true facts would become public. Mr. William Bundy said we would be making a general statement without reference to a specific mission. 6 We would simply say that reconnaissance missions were being flown in Laos and our planes were authorized to fire back when they were fired upon. We would not admit that we had carried out a suppressive mission. The British do not know that we carried out a specific air strike. The only explanation we would make to foreigners would be that there has been firing in Laos by U.S. planes because they had been fired upon. Secretary McNamara urged that everyone in the room agree on one position to be taken by all so that all discussions of this subject would be identical. Assistant Secretary Manning was asked to draft guidance for the use of everyone to include statements to the press, statements to Congressmen, and statements to foreign nations. It was agreed that we would continue to stand on “no comment” to the press but that Congressmen and foreign government officials would be told that our planes had been fired on and that they had fired back. Mr. William Bundy said that the International Control Commission (ICC) inspectors were on the ground in the general area where firing had taken place. It is possible that they may see bomb craters caused by U.S. planes. There is doubt that Ho Chi Minh would allow the ICC to inspect Khang Khay because he would thereby reveal to outsiders the existence of antiaircraft batteries manned by Viet Minh crews. In addition, he would be creating a precedent of allowing the ICC inspectors to enter Communist-held territory. The group then considered the paper entitled “Defuzing Laos.” 7 Mr. Forrestal summarized its content and said that its purpose was to reduce pressures in Laos. Secretary Rusk said that if we accomplished the first objective stated in the paper, we would be in a hell of a shape. Our real objective in Laos is to get strict compliance with the 1962 Geneva Accords, which means getting the Pathet Lao out of Laos. We have taken this position recently with important foreign nations including the Soviet Union. We should push hard in any conference, such as that proposed by the Poles, for our prerequisites for a Geneva-type conference. It is in our interest to keep the Russians and the Poles in opposition to the Chinese Communists and Ho Chi Minh. We should not give up the effort to get the Pathet Lao out of the Plaine des Jarres by diplomatic means. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said he thought our objective was to keep Souvanna in power so that we could go ahead with our major objective which is to improve the situation in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said we must not keep on restating unrealizeable objectives. He said we have no program which, in his view, will result in forcing the Pathet Lao out of the Plaine des Jarres. Secretary Rusk suggested that a paper should be prepared which spells out the position which we have just taken with Khrushchev. 8 Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that nothing now planned will get the Pathet Lao out of the Plaine des Jarres. Only General Taylor could do this by using U.S. military force and he would resign before agreeing to put U.S. troops into the Plaine des Jarres. The important problem is South Vietnam, not the presence of the Pathet Lao in the Plaine des Jarres. Secretary Rusk said the defuzing paper surrenders our objective of seeking a pressure point against Hanoi and would result in giving Souvanna and the Thais a very leaden feeling. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said if it were true that the proposed policy would give Souvanna and the Thais a leaden feeling, this would be a valid reason to oppose it, but he did not think that its lack of effect on the Pathet Lao problem in the Plaine des Jarres was a valid objection. Secretary McNamara said the President had been confused because there has always been a difference between our stated objectives and our courses of action. He expressed in several ways his view that the actions we have proposed to the President will not achieve our stated objectives. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said we have never told the President that the Communists had now gone too far and that we propose to throw them out. Secretary Rusk replied that our objective is certainly not to support Souvanna solely for the purpose of halting further Pathet Lao advances. Our objective is to force the Pathet Lao to retreat. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said he thought that our policy was aimed at trying to avoid bringing things to a military head over Laos. Secretary Rusk said he visualized our Laos policy in three stages. The first preventive stage was to take those actions necessary to be ready militarily to do more than we are now doing if it appeared that the Pathet Lao was undertaking a campaign to seize the Mekong River towns. The second stage was to do all we could during the Polish-proposed conference to achieve our preconditions for a Geneva conference. We may not achieve this objective but we might. We simply don’t know. The third stage would be a Geneva conference at which we would seek to obtain the removal of the Viet Minh from Laos and South Vietnam and close the North Vietnam corridor to the South Vietnamese. Secretary McNamara asked whether we would go to a Geneva conference if we did not obtain the preconditions. Secretary Rusk replied that we would not. Secretary McNamara said that, therefore, there would be no conference. The defuzing paper is to look at the situation we would be in without a Geneva-type conference. The plan is based on not taking U.S. military action until we had obtained a Congressional resolution, which it did not appear would be obtainable very soon. Secretary Rusk asked why we should not take as our objective the most probable contingency facing us. Secretary McNamara suggested that, for the President, we prepare a paper which gave our stated objective being sought on the diplomatic track. The paper would acknowledge that we were unlikely to achieve our stated objective by diplomatic means and that, therefore, we propose to deviate from the diplomatic track and then state what we would do. He felt that we were leading the President down a track which would oblige him to resort to the use of military force in the next three months if the situation were to be saved. He expressed his fear that the conference route will run out in a few weeks and then there will be nothing left for us to do but use U.S. military force. Director McCone expressed his concern that we would not be able to resist world public pressure for a conference by saying merely that we won’t go to a conference unless the Pathet Lao holds back a few miles in the Plaine des Jarres. Secretary Rusk replied that the Pathet Lao pullback, which is a prerequisite for the conference, would not be difficult for the Communists to agree to do. Mr. Rowan said he wanted to make certain that all were aware of the danger of having public objectives which differed from objectives known only to government officials. Mr. Forrestal said the objectives listed in his paper should accurately be described as interim objectives. Mr. McCone wanted to know how we proposed to discourage further Pathet Lao territorial grabs as stated in objective number two. Mr. Forrestal said the actions he had in mind involved those listed under point thirteen of the McNamara report, including the movement to the area of U.S. forces. Secretary Rusk asked that he be permitted to study the paper for another day or so. He was concerned that if we gave up the objective of moving the Pathet Lao back, we might forfeit the effort which we have been making in Moscow and indirectly in Peking. Secretary McNamara said we do have military actions which could be used to prevent the Pathet Lao from grabbing further territory in Laos, but we do not have actions which he felt were adequate to force the Pathet Lao to get out of the Plaine des Jarres. Secretary Rusk said he did not feel that a mountainous diplomatic effort would be necessary to get the Pathet Lao back to their previous lines. The Soviets have a stake in not ratting out on the agreement they have with us on Laos. Mr. McGeorge Bundy, who had been out of the meeting for a few minutes, returned to say that he had told the President it would not be necessary for him to join the group today because another working session would be required before the group was ready to discuss recommendations with him. [Here follows a record of the remainder of the meeting, which dealt mostly with Vietnam; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume I, pages 487 – 492 .] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Apparently drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The President did not attend. Dean Rusk returned to the Department of State from this meeting at 7:25 p.m. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) 2 See Document 87, footnote 7 to Document 83 , and draft paper entitled “Alternative public positions for U.S. on Southeast Asia for the period July 1–November 15,” printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 493 – 496 . 3 The agenda items relating to Laos were “Press Handling of Laos Flights,” and “Stringing Out Laos Negotiations.” (Memorandum from William Bundy to Rusk, June 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos 6/1/64–6/14/64) 4 Dated June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, INT 6 PHOTO LAOS) 5 No record of this meeting has been found. 6 Dated June 11; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 932–933. 7 Document 87 . 8 Not further identified. 89. Memorandum for the Record 89. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 10, 1964. SUBJECT National Security Council Meeting on Southeast Asia—10 June PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Sullivan, Secretary Manning Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster The Attorney General Secretary Dillon Mr. Bell, Mr. Rowen Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Smith, Mr. Cater Mr. McCone, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Colby Summary The U.S. position with respect to reconnaissance and escorts over Laos will be “no comment with respect to operations”. Mr. Rusk will review a paper on our objectives in Laos and efforts to “defuze” the situation there, 2 he believing that we must maintain our objectives as the withdrawal of the Viet Minh and returning to the 1962 Accords, Mr. McNamara and Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggesting that a more realistic approach is to consider our interim objective as merely to repel further Pathet Lao advances. With respect to South Vietnam it was agreed that the morale of the South Vietnamese must be actively considered in any step taken with regard to Laos or Southeast Asia as a whole. With respect to GVN ability to improve its counterinsurgency it was agreed that we should go ahead with a trial infusion of U.S. personnel. An operational checklist will be prepared for the senior officials to review the progress of South Vietnam. The DCI pointed out that the Watch Committee has been assigned the task of close attention to the possibility of a sudden VC thrust. It was indicated that a Congressional Resolution on Southeast Asia would probably not be desirable as the ground work could not be laid prior to July and the debate might raise more trouble than it would solve. If matters should indicate the real necessity for a resolution, Congress could be called into Special Session. 1. The meeting opened with a discussion of the position the U.S. will take with regard to overflights and escorts in Laos. After some discussion, between Secretary McNamara’s position that we should say that our missions were essentially reconnaissance but authorized to return fire (with no specific reference to the June 9th mission) and Mr. McGeorge Bundy’s concern that we be caught saying something that is not so, it was agreed that the line to the press internationally will be “no comment with respect to operations”, in support of Ambassador Unger’s strong plea. Mr. Manning was directed to present an agreed script to which all parties were instructed to adhere (attached). 3 2. The attached paper by Mr. Forrestal on “DeFuzing Laos” 4 was then reviewed. Mr. Rusk had trouble with this paper’s expression of our “objectives” in Laos, believing that our real objectives are the complete withdrawal of the Viet Minh and that they not use the corridor to South Vietnam, i.e. adherence to the 1962 Accords. He feared that if our “objectives” were only the discouragement of the further Pathet Lao advances, there would be a bad feeling in the pit of the stomach of the people we expect to withstand Communist pressure in Southeast Asia, as this would be an abandonment of our previous objectives. Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. McNamara argued that the discouragement of further Pathet Lao grabs and the preservation of Souvanna Phouma were all we could practically hope for at this time and that our program of action certainly does not contain any steps to push the Pathet Lao back. Secretary McNamara thus made the point that our stated objectives and our courses of action would be inconsistent, if the former were the precondition of Pathet Lao withdrawal. Mr. Rusk emphasized that our real objectives must be to continue to press for the 1962 Accords and that our courses of action must envisage the necessity to act militarily if the Pathet Lao move to the Mekong, make a diplomatic effort to obtain the pre-conditions of Pathet Lao withdrawal prior to any Geneva meeting and endeavor at a conference to remove the Viet Minh from both Laos and the corridor. Mr. McNamara brought out that this rapidly brings up the problem of how much military pressure we are prepared to use to obtain these. Mr. McCone pointed out that there are extensive international pressures pushing us towards Geneva even though the pre-conditions may not be met. Secretary Dillon suggested that there might be two stages, interim objectives and ultimate objectives. Mr. Rusk then asked that he have an opportunity to revise the paper and resubmit it. 3. In the course of this discussion it was agreed that there is little evidence that the 9 June action had any impact on the Pathet Lao assessment of what it is faced with. Mr. William Bundy felt it would have little effect. Mr. McNamara questioned whether the Pathet Lao could be brought to move back from the Plaine des Jarres. Mr. Rusk believed that it might be possible to obtain movement of this nature, in part by pressure on and by the Soviet Union, which has an interest in defuzing the situation in Laos also. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.] WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 11. Colby mistakenly describes this as an NSC meeting. For Bromley Smith’s version, see Document 88 . 2 See Document 87 . 3 Attached, but not printed. 4 See footnote 2 above. 90. Memorandum From the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff (Rostow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 90. Memorandum From the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff (Rostow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 11, 1964. SUBJECT Reflections on Yesterday 2 1. The question, from one end of the world to the other, is quite clear: Is the United States prepared to apply force to bring about Hanoi’s compliance with the Accords of 1954 3 and 1962 in both Laos and Viet Nam? Behind this is the related question: Are we prepared to face any level of escalation Hanoi and Peiping might mount in response to our actions? Virtually no one doubts that we would react with force if there was an attack on the Mekong Valley or across the seventeenth parallel, initiated by the Communists. Virtually no one doubts that we are prepared to stick it out in Viet Nam and Laos along present lines. What is seen clearly, from Paris through Moscow east to Peiping, Hanoi, Bangkok, etc. is: a. Communist techniques of erosion in Southeast Asia, based on violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords, are working well and rendering progressively less viable our present policy; and b. We have evidently not made up our minds to apply force to bring about Hanoi’s compliance with the Accords of 1954 and 1962. 2. I can understand, of course, that a policy might be built around avoiding or postponing that decision; but if the object of the exercise is to maintain until November such confused anxiety in the Communist camp as to keep Hanoi from launching a big offensive and sufficient hope in Vientiane and Saigon as to avoid a total political collapse then: (a) we should assess and the President should understand fully the risks involved; (b) everyone around the table should be working consciously to the same time-buying conception of the task; and (c) we should be straining within the limits of that conception to do what we can within our operational limitations, and without surrendering our ultimate objectives. 3. What struck me hard yesterday was that there was no common assessment of either our ultimate or our operational objectives. The Forrestal approach 4 assumed that we were unprepared to apply virtually any force in Southeast Asia; and, in the end, it confronted us with a formal split of Laos, involving an explicit extension of Communist power and implicitly a legalization of the Viet Minh presence in Laos which, given the character of any Lao border in a split, I would regard as a disaster. Secretary Rusk, on the other hand, evidently felt (and I would agree) that the U.S. does have certain diplomatic leverage and, if this is progressively backed at critical stages by a demonstration of our willingness to use force, it might yield some forward movement, while maintaining our ultimate objectives. Secretary McNamara, on the other hand, was asking for greater clarification about how much force we were prepared to use before we started and committed ourselves to our objectives; but he saw little hope that much force would be applied in the coming months. With commendable candor, he insisted that our statement of objectives be geared to our modest prospects, under the circumstances he assumed as realistic. 4. The critical need, as I see it, is to assure ourselves that we are working within a framework which is actually the one which the President desires. This means that he must understand from us: (a) what the risks are of political collapse in Vientiane and/or Saigon; (b) what the consequences are of maintaining a declaratory policy in support of the 1954 and 1962 Accords, without in fact answering the central question. This ambiguity has already cost us a good deal. It will certainly cost us more; but under certain circumstances that cost might be more acceptable to the President at the present time than the risks of a confrontation with Hanoi. 5. The President should also be confronted not merely with our assessment of the possible costs of a time-buying policy but also with a scenario as fully worked out as we can of the type which Secretary Rusk apparently has in mind; that is, one of holding firmly in diplomacy to the 1954 and 1962 Accords while using all the elements of power we have available short of a direct confrontation. I sensed yesterday some tendency to take the view that unless we were prepared to go for a McNamara Option Three (or Rostow) policy, that we should operate pretty passively with minimal defensive objectives with respect to both Vientiane and Saigon. If we strain imaginatively along the lines, say, of Bill Sullivan’s memorandum of yesterday, there may emerge uses of force as a counterpoint to diplomacy which would improve our position somewhat without committing the President to a final confrontation. It is in this area that I think we have to get consensus, assuming that the President is not now ready for the direct confrontation. 6. I say all this while still believing that, as nearly as I can perceive the situation, we are in fact taking risks in not having the confrontation now, which outweigh the risks of the confrontation itself. Moreover, I disagree with the view that a Congressional resolution would be difficult to get if the President made up his mind that he needed it. The Democrats would certainly back him, except for a few mavericks; the Republicans would not oppose him, although they would be prepared to exploit the consequences of failure as in any case they will exploit the Southeast Asian situation during the campaign; and, until we publish the Jorden Report, 5 we will be conducting diplomacy with at least one hand tied behind our backs. But only the President can make that judgment. 7. In short, I believe we are caught in a vicious circle. Diplomacy can only be truly effective once the President is committed to a confrontation. What I fear now is that the ambiguity of our signals will lead to a situation of desperation—based on the assessment that we are not prepared for a confrontation—and that then (with Goldwater on our flank) we shall be forced to act convulsively and with vastly more bloodshed than if we had acted sooner. 8. As one who has been merely reading newspapers and cables on Southeast Asia in recent weeks, I can only say that we have been conducting propaganda as defined by F.M. Cornford: “that branch of the art of lying which consists in very nearly deceiving your friends without quite deceiving your enemies.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. III, Memos B, 6/64–8/64. Top Secret. 2 See Document 88 . 3 The Geneva Agreements of July 20 and 21, 1954, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505 – 1546 . 4 Apparent reference to Document 87 . 5 The Jorden Report, formally known as “Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam’s Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam,” was released in February 1965 as Department of State publication 7839. 91. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 91. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 11, 1964. SUBJECT Laos and Southeast Asia I think there has developed over the last few days some clearer thinking on what might be done during the next few months to stiffen our friends in Southeast Asia and give appropriate signals to Hanoi and Peking, without getting stuck on an escalator. As a result of Monday’s action, 2 we have come upon a device which may be just what we need during the negotiations developing over Laos to show our determination. We have almost established our intention to continue reconnaissance flights over Laos on an as-needed basis with Souvanna’s approval; and we have a good public rationale for these flights, i.e. support of the ICC and the Geneva Accords. This public rationale would permit us to conduct reconnaissance not only over the Plain of Jars, but also over the panhandle where evidence is accumulating of significant Viet Cong buildups directed at Vietnam. We should now develop in advance a number of specific targets both in the panhandle and in the area east of the Plain of Jars, Ban Ban, and Nong Het. We should pre-plan with the military as carefully as possible the most precise kind of strike directed only at clearly military targets. We should put these plans on the shelf while we continue limited reconnaissance (high-level in the dangerous areas) in order to maintain the presence of aerial inspection. Then at appropriate times during the course of the negotiations over the next few months, we should be ready to pick one of our strike plans quickly off the shelf and put it into rapid and effective execution in support of a diplomatic objective. I believe and hope that the aftermath of Monday’s action would show that the Communists will have great difficulty mounting a public reaction to a specific strike, if the target is entirely military and preferably Viet Cong, since they cannot allow an international inspection without admitting the presence of North Vietnamese military installations in Laos. The essence of this scheme is that we can control the timing and the place of strike. This will require the greatest self-discipline and coolness on the part of all agencies of the Government; but I think it would permit us to maintain some pressure during the period of the next several months. MF 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. III, Memos B, 6/64–8/64. Top Secret. 2 June 8. Forrestal is apparently referring to the decision on that day to go ahead with the strike on the Xieng Khoung anti-aircraft artillery site on June 9. 92. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 92. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, June 11, 1964, 3 p.m. 1587. When I called on PriMin Souvanna this morning he told me he would like reconnaissance flights begin again starting any time after tomorrow morning. He asked me to say nothing to press about this today. I indicated my satisfaction at his decision but noted that press were expecting something today for sure, knowing that he and I were discussing the matter; I also said I thought it would be more appropriate if word came from him. After some discussion Souvanna agreed and he will receive press late this afternoon. I then raised with him question of escorts and he said, while raising no objection to employment of escorts, he wished nothing to be said about this and to continue reply to question of protection by referring to use T–28s. Souvanna repeated his arguments about necessity our playing this game in same way as Communists to avoid giving them propaganda fuel, etc. I accepted his points in principle but then reviewed two compelling reasons why we had to continue to acknowledge use of escorts, namely (1) to assure Congressional and public opinion that recon planes being adequately protected and (2) by public mention of escorts to reinforce signal to Hanoi and Peking which would not be as strong if we appeared be trying to suppress this information. After much discussion in which I drew liberally on helpful information contained Deptels 1158 2 and 1176, 3 Souvanna accepted my point. Souvanna therefore said he will speak to press this afternoon along following lines: He will say he has received new information on Vietnamese infiltrations as result of which he has asked me to resume reconnaissance flights. If he is queried about use of armed escorts he will reply that he does not object to their use if the U.S. judges this necessary for protection of recon planes. I used this opportunity to mention that reports frequently received about Pathet Lao/Viet Minh troop movements in South (citing what he had earlier told me about possibility impending attack on Saravane) and reports of supply convoys from North Viet-Nam. Could recon planes be used also in that region if reports required verification? Souvanna agreed. Souvanna then volunteered that he wished make maximum use T–28s to support RLG forces, to interdict supplies arriving over routes to Xieng Khouang (No. 7) to Thakhek and Savannakhet (Nos. 8 and 12) and to destroy on the ground what supplies Pathet Lao/Viet Minh have in place. They must be so crippled that they will be able mount no further attacks on RLG forces and so that possibly in due course RLG may be able retake Plaine des Jarres. He asked that my attaches be in touch with appropriate RLG officers to work out plans for T–28 program which will really punish PL/Viet Minh. I told Souvanna of Lao-American targeting group already in operation and other forms of cooperation which I said we would be happy to augment. Throughout our conversation Souvanna kept returning to theme “act but don’t talk about it”. He is very conscious of necessity maintain internationally his neutral position and to maintain Geneva Accords. There is no question in PriMin’s mind that violations by Pathet Lao/Viet Minh justify actions already underway and perhaps more but he insists for political reasons that we must avoid going on record acknowledging actions and thus giving Communists both propaganda fuel and pretexts. Was able put over point that we could not deny use of escort planes but he is quite opposed to our acknowledging that escorts firing or attacking on Lao territory, even though he accepts that some of this may be necessary. Comment : I believe it was combination of having some time for reflection, influence of King in Luang Prabang and messages I was able convey to Souvanna yesterday by letter (Embtel 1582) 4 which showed we were avoiding further revelations that avoided his going off deep end. If we continue respect his wishes, particularly with regard publicity I think we can do what is necessary and keep Souvanna with us. I was vastly relieved to read first sentence Deptel 1176 and I believe our discipline in this helped very much to save the day; Phillips has my fullest sympathy and from reading Deptel 1178, 5 I feel for his predicament. Souvanna’s statement to press this afternoon should take off good deal of heat on that score. I must absolutely insist, however, that we stick to our line with regard to questions about operations. If we are in real difficulties again from press, let me try bring Souvanna around but let us avoid going contrary his desires which, in many cases at least, can I believe be in due course modified. I will get to work at once with ARMA,AIRA, CAS and others to map out program to get maximum benefit from T–28 program, perhaps expanded beyond present level. We have had to assume always that RLG forces incapable standing up to PL/Viet Minh if latter really meant to push through, conceivably air support can redress balance and permit at least reestablishment equilibrium. (There is of course always risk that Communists will also introduce aircraft.) As soon as possible we will be submitting our thoughts on what would be most effective type T–28 program. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC for POLAD, London, Paris, Saigon, USUN, the White House, CIA, JCS, and OSD. 2 Document 84 . 3 In telegram 1176 to Vientiane, June 10, the Department suggested telling Souvanna that it was not a question of pressure from the press that compelled the United States to publicize escort operations, but “the necessity of maintaining basic credibility vis-à-vis American public.” This had become a problem in South Vietnam, and the Department wanted to avoid the problem in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 In telegram 1582 from Vientiane, June 10, Unger reported that he had delivered messages to Souvanna in Luang Prabang from Harriman and from him deploring the misunderstanding over the armed escorts. (Ibid., INT 6 PHOTO LAOS) 5 Telegram 1178 to Vientiane, June 10, contained the text of Department Spokesman Phillips’ press briefing on Laos reconnaissance, June 10. (Ibid.) 93. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 93. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 12, 1964. Detailed analysis of the June ninth air strike in Laos 2 reveals that half of our planes found and attacked the assigned target, which was a fort near Xieng Khouang, but other half dropped their bombs on a different fort about ten miles away near the town of Phong Savan, as ChiComs have charged. 3 The planes flew together in two flights of four to the target area. The first four planes found and attacked Xieng Khouang. The second four planes lost sight of the first four, orbited twice, found what they thought was the target, and dropped their bombs. It is now clear that the second flight attacked a fortified area but not the assigned target. A special U–2 flight will photograph the entire area today if weather permits. Results will be available in Washington over the week end. The discovery that the second four planes had attacked a target different than the assigned target was made when the air photographs taken of Xieng Khouang after the strike failed to reveal where fourteen of the twenty-five 750-pound bombs had fallen. Confirmation was obtained by questioning the pilots. MG.B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. V. Top Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw it. 2 A memorandum from Carroll to McGeorge Bundy, June 12, provided a re-evaluation of the June 9 F–100 strike against the fortified anti-aircraft artillery position at Xieng Khouang. (Ibid., Country File, Laos, Reconnaissance Flights, Vol. I, 6/6/64–6/16/64) 3 China accused the United States of “wanton bombing and strafing” of Khang Khay and of wounding five and killing one member of the Chinese economic and cultural mission there, as well as destroying the mission’s quarters. The text of the Chinese complaint to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Laos, June 13, is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 933–934. 94. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 94. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, June 12, 1964. SUBJECT Laos I attach a scenario prepared by Chet Cooper at John McCone’s suggestion, on a diplomatic track for Laos. 2 Briefly, it proposes that we call an urgent Geneva Conference, confined to Laos, and insist that it last only two weeks. Its purpose would be to restore Geneva Accords. If the Conference failed, we should “take over physical control of that part of Laos most important to us.” This suggestion has two major flaws, in my opinion. We could never convince our Asian allies that we could confine such a conference to a two-week discussion on Laos, and I think they would be right. Our purpose heretofore has been to drag things out. I don’t think that bringing the situation to a military head in two or three weeks is what we want in this situation. Lastly, how do we “take over” the Mekong Valley? Mike 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos, 6/1/64–6/14/64. Top Secret. 2 Attached, but not printed. 95. Memorandum for the Record 95. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 15, 1964. SUBJECT Executive Committee Meeting on Southeast Asia, 15 June 1964 PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary William Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary Cleveland, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Sullivan Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Vance, General Taylor, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Cater Mr. Bell, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Stoneman, Mr. Don Wilson Mr. McCone, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Colby Summary Concern was expressed about South Vietnamese morale and the need for assurances of U.S. determination. There was some obscurity as to the Country Team position on the eight province program which will be clarified by further cables. It was concluded that a Congressional Resolution is not now feasible but that an effort is needed to develop a better base of understanding in the Congress, and support of the Administration’s policy, through speeches. Part of this must come from an increase of third country participation in the struggle in South Vietnam. It was agreed that a contingency plan is needed for specific military reactions to possible Pathet Lao or Viet Minh advances in Laos. Additional escorted U.S. photo missions over Laos will be authorized but will be run in a safer manner. 1. The meeting opened with a discussion of Mr. Sullivan’s 15 June paper on Vietnam. 2 This led to a rather inconclusive discussion of South Vietnamese morale and the degree to which it was dependent upon a conviction of U.S. determination to support Vietnam. [Here follow continued discussion of Vietnam, a possible Congressional resolution, and Rusk’s discussions with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam.] 4. The meeting reviewed Mr. McGeorge Bundy’s attached paper on a policy without a Congressional Resolution. 3 Mr. William Bundy expressed the need for a scenario for appropriate reactions to small scale Pathet Lao or Viet Minh advances, such as additional T–28s at Udorn but with non-U.S. military pilots. It was agreed that planners should meet for this purpose [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Mr. Bundy also felt that a contingency plan should be drawn up for the possible loss of Saravane or Attopeu, which he thought should be replied to by Vietnamese Air Force strikes in the corridor. Secretary McNamara recommended that a specific plan be drawn up along this line and that at least initial conversation on it be held with Souvanna Phouma. Mr. McGeorge Bundy asked what the objective of such action would be, whether to punish the Pathet Lao or to roll them back. Mr. McNamara replied that the purpose would be to slow the Pathet Lao advance and to assist South Vietnamese morale. Mr. McNamara emphasized his concern over the absence of a contingency plan for our reactions and that he felt the President should have a much better view of what we are thinking of over the next two weeks. General Taylor suggested that we try to define what is meant by a “push to the Mekong”. With respect to the Polish Conference Mr. McNamara commented that we will try to drag it out, Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the present indication is that one will not take place and Mr. William Bundy expounded on the effort he is making to bring it about. Secretary Rusk terminated this discussion by requesting that a plan for reaction to specific military contingencies be staffed out. 5. Mr. McNamara then raised the desirability of an additional photo mission over the Plaine des Jarres. General Taylor said that JCS recommended a medium level (10,000 feet above terrain) flight wherever weather permitted, for greater safety against anti-aircraft. In the Plaine des Jarres and in other difficult areas he recommended that there be no low level operations unless there is a strong military or political reason. Mr. McNamara stated there is a political motivation for a mission during this week but that this need not be in a hot area; therefore he recommended a mission over Nape, escorted [sic]. Secretary Rusk believed that U.S. jets over Laos provide a good political signal and he approved the Nape idea. Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that we will at sometime have to return to the Plaine des Jarres or we will not show the proper signal of strength but that is not an immediate necessity. 4 WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 16. The meeting lasted from 6 to approximately 7:20 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) 2 According to a June 15 memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to McNamara, the purpose of this meeting was to consider five papers. The principal question for discussion was whether the group should recommend to the President that he seek a Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia. A second question, according to Bundy, was what action should be suggested if a resolution was not recommended. Bundy’s memorandum to McNamara, its four papers, and one supplemental paper, are in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 500 – 518 . 3 Dated June 15, the paper was one of the five prepared for this meeting. ( Ibid., pp. 516 – 518 ) It examined potential policy decisions if the United States did not decide upon a Congressional resolution and major military action against North Vietnam. Included as possible military actions in Laos were reconnaissance, reconnaissance-strikes, T–28 operations, and South Vietnamese Air Force strikes in the Laos corridor. Political actions relating to Laos included support for a diplomatic track, an effort to sustain the Souvanna government by restraining the right-wing Lao forces, and support for Kong Le. 4 William Bundy also prepared a paper dated June 12—the second of the five papers—on the case for the Congressional resolution entitled “Memorandum on Southeast Asia,” which dealt primarily with Laos. Bundy noted that “now that we have worked through the immediate problem of shooting down of our aircraft over Laos and have Souvanna Phouma’s clear understanding that reconnaissance flights may continue over the Plaine des Jarres and ‘South Laos’ and with escort as necessary, we should now draw back and examine the total picture as it may develop in the next three to four months and what our plan should be.” For text, see ibid., pp. 507 – 512 . 96. Memorandum From the Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support, Directorate of Intelligence (Cooper) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 96. Memorandum From the Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support, Directorate of Intelligence (Cooper) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone 1 Washington, June 15, 1964. SUBJECT A Course of Action for Laos US Objectives in Laos 1. Recent events in Southeast Asia and current discussions in Washington warrant a restatement of our objectives in Laos. Unless we have consciously or sub-consciously modified our objectives, it is my understanding that we continue to want: a Laos in which a genuinely neutral and viable government effectively rules the country; a situation in which neither the government nor the territory of Laos is used to threaten the integrity or the internal stability of our two allies, Thailand and South Vietnam. (It may be, of course, that the objective circumstances in Southeast Asia, generally, and Laos, particularly, may make these ambitious objectives impossible of achievement.) 2. Having stated our objectives, we should distinguish between them and the means by which we choose to achieve them. We signed the Geneva Accords in 1962 because we believed they provided a means, admittedly imperfect, for the achievement of our objectives. They were not an end in themselves. If the Geneva Accords are grossly and constantly violated by the Communists, presumably we have to achieve our ends through other means. The following scenario has been developed with this in mind. Whether this scenario “fuses” or “de-fuses” the situation in Laos depends as much on the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh as it does on us. (But this is true for almost anything we do short of large scale US military attacks on North Vietnam on the one hand, or abandoning Laos on the other.) The Scenario 3. Whether it is explicitly stated or not, most, if not all of the courses of action recently developed with respect to Laos wind up in Geneva by one route or another. Since our own case with respect to observing the Geneva Accords is better now than it is likely to be as time goes on, our position might be best served by taking strong, even self-righteous, initiatives for an early Geneva conference. Rather than being dragged to one kicking and screaming as if we were the defendant, we should notify the two co-chairmen that we insist that a conference be held as soon as possible. 4. Our preconditions should not be a pull-back of the Pathet Lao from the Plaine des Jarres (we won’t get it anyway), but rather: that the conference be confined to Laos; that it be directed exclusively to a restoration of the Geneva Accords; and that it last only two to three weeks. We should further insist, not only that the forms of the Geneva agreement be restored, but that they be adequately and effectively policed by a reconstituted ICC. 5. As implied above, our posture at such a conference should be tough and aggressive, taking advantage of our good case and of the split in the ranks of the Communist Bloc. 6. Unless our terms were met in the time period prescribed, we should indicate that we plan to achieve the objectives sought in the Geneva Accords by unilateral moves. While we need not be specific as to what we mean by this, we should provide ample evidence of our intent to move militarily. 7. If in fact the Geneva Accords are not reconstituted at this conference, we should move into that part of Laos most important to us (along the South Vietnamese and Thai borders and into the key Mekong River towns). We should then emphasize our readiness to reconvene at Geneva and, upon a satisfactory agreement there, our willingness to remove our forces. We should point to Lebanon as an example of our sincerity. Accompanying Moves 8. Obviously, we should undertake, on a crash basis, the necessary arrangements for moving into Laos, hopefully within hours after the breakup of a Geneva Conference. 9. We should also make sure that necessary steps are taken to prevent the rightists from taking over the government in Vientiane, during Souvanna’s absence. Alternatively, we should work out with Souvanna some way for him to be represented at Geneva without his having to leave Vientiane. 10. While all of these moves are taking place, we should proceed with despatch to strengthen the position of the South Vietnamese government along the lines we have already worked out. We should also endeavor to avoid discussing the Vietnamese problem in any international forum until the Laos situation is resolved—by which time substantial results should have been achieved from our efforts in South Vietnam. 11. Finally, we should proceed with our program of explaining to the American people what we seek in Laos and South Vietnam and the importance of maintaining a non-Communist position there. Some Caveats and Some Cautions 12. In the last analysis, US objectives in Laos (and in South Vietnam) can be achieved only if the DRV is somehow induced to stand down its assistance to and direction of the anti-government forces. There are three main, conceivably inter-related, approaches toward accomplishing this: Hanoi might be persuaded in multilateral negotiations or by some direct deal; or Hanoi might be forced to yield by military means. 13. The scenario above proceeds basically down the negotiating track. It has many advantages (taking the negotiating initiative, meeting the desires of certain western allies and neutrals, seizing control of the time-table for Laos and Vietnam, exploiting present Sino-Soviet difficulties, demonstrating US strength of purpose). But it also presents many problems (the Thai and South Vietnamese concern about any Geneva Conference, the danger of a Rightist coup in Laos, the risk of the Communists fuzzing and indefinitely extending the Conference, the problems in moving US military units into Laos). Whether this course is one that should be pursued depends on the netting out of the advantages and the disadvantages and also on the promise that other courses hold. 14. A scenario for a direct deal with Hanoi has yet to be developed and will not be further discussed here. Although large scale military action against the DRV has been discarded, at least temporarily, there are many lesser military actions now under consideration. In considering the effectiveness of contemplated US measures to force the DRV into compliance, the French experience in the early 1950’s provides some perspective. By 1954 the French Expeditionary Force in Vietnam consisted of about 135,000 French and Foreign Legion forces. In addition, the French High Command had under its control 221,000 organized Vietnamese troops (about 160 battalions), 120,000 auxiliaries and many thousand of “suppletifs” roughly equivalent to the present SDC). By the end of the war, French air strength included 150 combat aircraft (plus another 50 from the aircraft carrier Arromanches) and about 80 transport planes. 15. This is not meant to imply that we couldn’t defeat the DRV with the same or even smaller forces. But it does indicate that reconnaissance flights (escorted or not), small teams of infiltrators, small-scale bombing (VNAF or USAF) of targets in Laos and even in North Vietnam are not likely to frighten Hanoi into complying with US demands. US Force movements will cause some breast-beating and shrill propaganda reactions, but even these are not likely to have much deterrent effect until they are actually used. US Objectives—Another Look 16. The courses of action discussed above and many others, as well, relate to the US objectives spelled out in Paragraph 1. But, are we deluding ourselves? Should we lower our sights to a more realistic set of goals—more realistic in terms of our ability to achieve them with courses of action carrying less risk and smaller commitments? The fact is that some courses of action currently under consideration subsume objectives substantially more modest than those we thought we would attain through the Geneva Accords. For example, the idea of letting the situation in Laos stew along until and unless the Pathet Lao pushed down the Mekong has its attractions, but we should not pursue this course unless we are ready to adjust our objectives. In short, we must put the cart and horse in their proper places: Let us decide, first, what our current objectives are and then work out the scenarios for achieving them. Not vice-versa. C.L. Cooper 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Vietnam, June 1964. Top Secret. 97. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Johnson 97. Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Johnson 1 New York, June 16, 1964. REF Some Unsolicited Comments on Situation in Laos and Vietnam 1. We should continue to support Polish proposal but not be too sanguine that such meeting will ever come about or, if it does, will last long. If PL refuses to attend, several other prospective participants may well fall away. There seems to be more disadvantages than advantages to agreeing to a 14-nation conference at this time. 2. We should not be too certain that our various “signals”, political and military, to the Communists will really deter them. If they believe their vital interests (which in their view might include (a) control of substantial parts of Laos and/or (b) demonstration of success for revolutionary insurgent movements), are threatened, they will react on the ground despite our “signals”. Page 31 of Questionnaire 2 seems to be unduly optimistic about the prospective passivity of ChiComs. Both North Vietnam and Communist China of course have the capability of substantially increased ground commitment in northern and eastern Laos. We should watch closely for their “signals”. Remember Korean precedent. 3. We should, if and when necessary, be prepared to occupy and hold the Laotian river towns, at least from Vientiane south. Any attempt to occupy and hold with American troops the Plaine des Jarres and Luang Prabang would be extremely hazardous and seriously risk involving ourselves in Dien Bien Phus. We should be under no illusion that we can drive the Communists out of Laos by military action, but we can hold them approximately where they are and make their presence increasingly costly to them. 4. The best means of combatting Communist military action in Laos is certainly by air strikes. Strikes by T–28’s seem much more effective and useful than aerial reconnaissance with armed escorts. Except to the degree really necessary for intelligence purposes, the latter involves US prestige openly without adequate benefit and obliges us to react to losses by action we might prefer not to take. Air strikes by “Laotian” planes really do a job and serve just as well to get a “signal” across. 5. Even “Laotian” air strikes and useful air reconnaissance may bring about (a) increased Viet Minh and perhaps ChiCom intervention on the ground and (b) heavier pressure from friends and neutrals for a Geneva Conference. These possibilities must be kept in mind but should not deter us from air action as long as Communist pressure on the ground continues. 6. As to Vietnam, it is assumed attack by ground forces north of the 17th parallel would be counterproductive. If the time comes for overt military action in North Vietnam, would it not be feasible for air strikes to be carried out by “South Vietnamese” planes? Direct avowed US participation would almost oblige the ChiComs to respond in some very substantial way. As to targets, new factories, on which the DRV’s hopes for industrial development rest, would be the most impressive loss they could suffer, but these are presumably close to centers of population and should be targets for sabotage rather than air attack. Ports would pre- sumably involve ships of other nations. Lines of communication, though somewhat insubstantial in Southeast Asia, would probably be as productive as any feasible target. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VI, Memos, 6/15/64–6/30/64. Top Secret. 2 Not further identified. 98. Memorandum for the Record 98. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 17, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting with Secretary McNamara in his office on 17 June, 4:00 to 5:15 1. We exchanged views on Southeast Asia and both were in agreement on the following scenario in which political and military actions would parallel one another: With respect to political action, we agreed: a. Polish proposal seemed dim in view of the attitude of Peiping, Hanoi, Souvannavong and now Moscow. Furthermore, State believes that the advantage of the Polish proposal as a means of separating Moscow from Peiping seemed questionable. b. We probably had to go through the United Nations but it would not be productive. c. We would end up in Geneva and it was probably better for us to move progressively towards Geneva charging the Communists with violations of the ‘54 and ‘62 Agreement instead of being hauled in and put in the defender’s box As these diplomatic efforts proceeded, we should continue to make preparations for extended military operations along the following lines: a. Do all possible to reinforce Khanh’s base. b. Intensify the Vietnam information service. c. Face up to the probability of the early replacement of Lodge and select a proper Ambassador. In this regard, many names were mentioned but none agreed to. d. Continue occasional reconnaissance flights and continue the T–28 bombing missions out of Vientiane. It was recognized the latter will become increasingly vulnerable as anti-aircraft guns are installed in PL territory. e. Release ARVN to bomb Laotian corridor. f. Deploy ground, air and military units so that they can be placed in appropriate places in Laos and elsewhere in minimum time if decision is reached to extend north. Concurrently we should probe every way of obtaining a Congressional Resolution. We recognized a Resolution was necessary. The difficulties of getting it were also recognized, however the prospect of committing U.S. forces to action in Southeast Asia made a Congressional Resolution almost mandatory. McNamara expressed himself as feeling that as a result of the Honolulu meeting and other information, he did not feel the immediate dangers were as serious as he had thought. He did not agree with Lodge or Gen. Westmoreland that things would “jog along and get better.” He thought they would get worse, but not collapse. I said I was not quite that sanguine, that I felt some unexpected situation might occur which would confront us with a severe crisis unexpectedly. [Here follows discussion of items unrelated to Laos.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July, 1964. Secret. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary. 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 1 Washington, June 17, 1964, 8:43 p.m. 2041. We naturally concerned indications declining Soviet interest in Polish proposal and have received somewhat conflicting reports Polish position. To take advantage favorable elements Polish position as reported from Ottawa and to follow up previous representations to Poles, Warsaw should deliver following personal oral message from Secretary to Rapacki. Text of oral message: You are already aware from my talks here with Ambassador Drozniak 2 before his departure of my deep concern over the situation in Laos and my hope that the constructive Polish proposal for six-nation consultations could lead to improvement. As you know, the US subscribed to the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos, and we have no other object in Laos than to see them observed. We want no bases, no military presence nor any other special position in that country. It seems to me self-evident that, if all foreigners would simply leave Laos and let the Lao run their own affairs, Laos could be at peace and would create no problem for any of its neighbors. The Accords of 1962 in fact reflected this view. In a broader sense, I think Your Excellency will agree that the 1962 Accords also held out hope that agreement on difficult political questions could be reached between Communists and non-Communists and faithfully carried out despite ideological differences. The violations of the Accords by the Hanoi regime thus call into question whether two different political systems can find ways to live in peace with each other and devote themselves to the betterment of their own peoples. For I must say to Your Excellency most solemnly that unless Hanoi and Peking leave their neighbors alone, the prospects for peace in SEA are dim. Because the developing situation seemed to me so ominous, I was especially glad to see the Polish initiative calling for six-power consultations. It is our hope that these consultations can be held. The grouping your Government had suggested seemed to us particularly appropriate for the discussion of necessary measures to improve the military and political situation, without which it remains our strong feeling that no purpose could be served by a wider 14-nation conference. We have of course noted the adverse comments on your proposal by the regime in Peking, and also by the Pathet Lao faction within Laos. We believe that the comments of Peking simply underscore the desirability of a smaller grouping that would be in a better position to ascertain the facts in a clear and objective manner and to take measures to restore the situation. As to the Pathet Lao position, we do not interpret anything they have said as a firm rejection of your proposal, and we believe that if an invitation could be promptly issued they would in fact be under great pressure to attend. I recognize, of course, that there are various questions of fact concerning what has taken place in Laos not merely in the last month but over a period of nearly two years. There has not always been acknowledgment of what we have regarded as clear Pathet Lao and Viet Minh violations on the part of the non-Communist factions. Yet there should be no difference between us about the facts, and the Co-Chairmen and members of the International Control Commission are in a peculiarly strong position to establish exactly what has taken place. In conclusion I should like to stress again my Government’s desire for a peaceful solution of the problem. As you know, we have recently supplied additional military aircraft to the Government of National Union in Laos at its express request, and have similarly engaged in reconnaissance operations, which we believe to be entirely justified in view of the military activity taking place and the inability of the International Control Commission to discharge its functions in areas under Pathet Lao control. In short, the limited measures we have taken have been made necessary by the persistent violations of the Geneva Accords of 1962 by the Pathet Lao and by Hanoi. So long as these gross violations continue, it has seemed necessary for us to let Hanoi know that the engulfment of Laos will not be accepted. Our purpose remains the fulfillment of the Accords of 1962, and the withdrawal of all foreign influence from Laos as those Accords intended. End text of oral message . You should accompany this by amplification along lines previous telegrams and report status Polish thinking urgently. Above drafted with knowledge Poles might be on point of revising their proposal, but prior receipt of London’s 6286. 3 If by time your meeting with Rapacki you have received official word from Poles that they are modifying their proposal, you should make following changes in above message: a) Change second sentence, fourth paragraph to read: “It was our hope that these consultations could be held.” b) Change last sentence fifth paragraph to read: “As to the Pathet Lao position, we had not interpreted their statements as clearly rejecting your proposal, and we had thought that if an intervention were promptly issued, they would quite possibly accept. I very much hope, therefore, that the changes you are considering will not affect the essentials of your proposal.” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy and cleared by George W. Jaeger, Staff Assistant, Bureau of European Affairs, and Rusk. Repeated to Vientiane, London, Moscow, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, Saigon, Bangkok, USUN, and CINCPAC. 2 An account of one of these talks on June 9 is in a memorandum of conversation, June 9. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 6286 from London, June 17, the Embassy reported that the Soviets stated there was no point discussing the original Polish proposal as the Poles had modified it. (Ibid.) 100. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 100. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, June 23, 1964, 5 p.m. 1683. For Bundy. Appears essential and urgent that we seek to clarify what we aim to accomplish by military action in Laos in succeeding weeks and months. Essential also, at least for us here, that we have better understanding concerning our relations with the press on these matters as well as positions we should take when military actions raise questions concerning interpretation Geneva Accords. I continue operate on assumption we desire keep Souvanna in office as PriMin; this may become increasingly difficult in any case if and as military action begins to escalate toward full scale fighting but sure to be markedly aggravated if we continue have misunderstandings over public positions taken by RLG and U.S. Government (Deptel 1220 notal). 2 As for military situation itself I feel there is still a dichotomy between on one hand U.S. action such as escorted recce flights taken on U.S. initiative to encourage friends and give clear sign our determination to Communists, and on other hand U.S. military help directly related to immediate threat which RLG armed forces currently face. Military action latter category would include range of actions from use Air America pilots in T–28’s, through employing SAW detachment, through use U.S. jet fighter bombers in support RLG forces, through actual deployment U.S. ground forces across Mekong (Embtel 1613). 3 Another element to be introduced [garble]could be use Thai ground forces (Deptel 2319 to Bangkok) 4 on this side Mekong. I realize that over past several weeks U.S. action dictated more by need demonstrate clearly to Commies our posture, through such actions as June 9 bombing, thus supporting over-all Lao position, and less by consideration of direct assistance to RLG forces. Whether this phase is past no doubt depends on our assessment of effect these actions have had on Communists. I recommend in any case that in future we seek to relate our military action more directly to military efforts RLG. This could include not only graduated actions noted above which would be undertaken in response to Communist initiatives, but might also include “suppressive action” to cut Route 7 at favorable locations east of Khang Khay, to prevent PL/VM build-up for attack on Muong Soui now reportedly underway and to support neutralist push north from Vang Vieng to take Sala Phou Khoun (Embtel 1673). 5 The more our military action directly supports FAR and neutralist forces, the better performance those forces likely to turn in and the greater morale boost to free Laos. Seems to me also our actions along these lines will demonstrate our intentions to Communists every bit as clearly as proposed “suppressive action” on Khang Khay (Embtel 1146 to CINCPAC, 1675 to Dept). 6 How long such initiatives would go on would depend on whether we seeking stabilize status quo or roll Communists back. If U.S. military actions are to serve our political as well as military objectives, then I must be able work out each new step with Souvanna Phouma so that we can count on his support of, or better his request for, each action undertaken in cases where such action publicly acknowledged. He and I must be able count on Washington silence in those cases, should they arise in future, where he insists on maintaining secrecy about U.S. involvement (and I am unable dissuade him from this) and we decide nevertheless to go ahead with action under his conditions. We must avoid instances in future where Souvanna has agreed to our action in Laos on condition it not be publicly acknowledged, and we nevertheless proceed to acknowledge it; in such cases we must not proceed with action if public acknowledgement deemed inevitable. Septel will provide some further observations on Deptel 1220 (notal). 7 While recce flights in my mind need not involve us in questions of Geneva Accords, escort by fighters certainly begins to and employment those fighters in response to ground fire, to say nothing of “suppressive avion”, raises question in most active form. This also true, of course, of use Air America or Thai pilots, SAW detachment, to say nothing of U.S. fighter bombers supporting ground operations. In U.S. public statements we have by now pretty well acknowledged some of these actions which are clearly in violation of Accords and justified them on grounds clear and continuous violation by Communists of Accords releases us from our obligations. At same time Department appears nervous about any acknowledgment that Air America involved in maintenance T–28’s in Udorn even though we have had to use Air America planes liberally in moving troops and munitions to and from areas such as Ban Na and Muong Soui where there are no aircraft which Lao can fly which can do the job. I understand of course we should avoid our involvement unnecessarily in actions which could be interpreted as violations but I am unclear as to our position on prohibited actions which are indispensable or at least very difficult to avoid in supporting RLG military effort. Initially I had also assumed that publicity about our actions would take this question into account, and we would seek avoid public acknowledgment of actions violating Geneva Accords, such as escort fighters responding to ground fire; however this evidently not Department’s position and therefore I would appreciate guidance as to position we should take with regard to Geneva Accords and our continuing to be bound by their provisions. With respect to possible use of Thai ground forces which briefly discussed Udorn June 19 with Amb Martin and Generals Milton and Moore and Admiral Miller, I strongly recommend that planning on this point be closely correlated with planning for graduated responses and use of recce flights, etc. discussed above. Answers to questions posed above also essential if I am to be able effectively respond to RLG questions or stimulate RLG action concerning employment FAR and neutralist forces. Reply to Kong Le about offensive northward on Route 13 relatively clear-cut but we may one day be faced with proposal, for example, for counteroffensive to retake Plaine des Jarres with American air support, an action which would certainly convey to Communists clear picture of our involvement but which might also invite much heavier response from Communist side than we are now anxious to have stimulated. I need to know whether to discourage, acquiesce in, or seek to stimulate such a move. In light questions raised above would appreciate guidance soonest concerning (1) what we aim to accomplish in Laos by military action in immediate period ahead, (2) how we expect handle publicity concerning such actions and (3) what position we will take when such actions raise questions concerning Geneva Accords? Would be helpful if closely related questions raised Embtel 1613 could be answered. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, New Delhi, Saigon and COMUSMACV, London, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House,JCS, OSD, CIA, and USUN at 7:55 a.m. June 23. 2 In telegram 1220 to Vientiane, June 17, the Department informed Unger that it would “not employ or endorse fabrications or false denials. Whenever possible we will hold with no comment or silence.” The Department urged the Embassy to do the same when asked about U.S. participation in military operations over Laos. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 1613 from Vientiane, June 13, the Embassy suggested that lines should be drawn beyond which Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese forces could not pass without triggering a U.S. reaction ranging from air operations to the introduction of U.S. troops. (Ibid.) 4 In telegram 2319 to Bangkok, June 19, the Department reported that a Thai official had suggested the use of Thai volunteers in Laos much as the North Vietnamese used their troops to bolster the Pathet Lao. (Ibid.) 5 Dated June 22. (Ibid.) 6 Dated June 22. (Ibid.) 7 Not further identified. June 1964 to January 1965: U.S. Support of Operation Triangle; Diplomatic Efforts To Revive the Geneva Settlement; the Beginnings of the Air War Against Infiltration Through the Laos Panhandle June 1964 to January 1965: U.S. Support of Operation Triangle; Diplomatic Efforts To Revive the Geneva Settlement; the Beginnings of the Air War Against Infiltration Through the Laos Panhandle 101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, June 24, 1964, 10:54 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy, cleared in substance with McGeorge Bundy and McNaughton, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Bangkok and repeated to Saigon, London, Paris, New Delhi, and CINCPAC. 102. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 27, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381, Jan-June 1964. Secret. A note on the source text indicates McNamara saw it. 103. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 27, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, Laos 000.1—Sensitive, (092 Laos), 1964. Top Secret; Sensitive. 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, June 27, 1964, 7:01 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared with McNamara and in substance with Rusk, and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Thailand and repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, and CINCPAC. 105. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, June 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Muong Soui, Operational Triangle, Vol. I, 6/64–7/64. Secret. 106. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 29, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B 1285A, Meetings with the Pres, 1 May–31 Oct, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary. The meeting lasted from 5:38 to approximately 6 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, June 29, 1964, 7:52 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy; cleared in draft with Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by William Bundy. 108. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VII, Memos, 7/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 109. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 11, 1964. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Laos 2. Secret; Personal. 110. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 14, 1964. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, July/Dec 1964. Secret. 111. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 15, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381 (9 Apr 64), Laos Operations. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw it. 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, July 16, 1964, 8:57 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy; cleared with McGeorge Bundy, Trueheart, and McNaughton; cleared in substance with Rusk and Forrestal; and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Bangkok and repeated to Saigon, MACV, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 113. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XII, Memos, 7/64. Top Secret. 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, July 26, 1964, 3:17 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis, Drafted by William Bundy; cleared in draft with Green, Trueheart, Barbis, and Sol Polansky of EUR/SOV; and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Moscow and Vientiane, and repeated to Paris, Ottawa, New Delhi, Warsaw, Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 115. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (Sullivan) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 27, 1964. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jul/Dec 1964. Top Secret. Sent through William Bundy. 116. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jul/Dec 1964. Secret. Bundy’s handwritten note on the source text indicates it was probably dated July 28. 117. Memorandum for the Record Washington, July 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, 1/4/64–4/28/65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary on July 29. Bromley Smith also prepared an account of this meeting. (Ibid., National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 9, 7/28/65) 118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, August 1, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential; Priority; Exdis; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Trueheart, the White House, and Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; and approved by Rusk. 119. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, August 3, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Moscow, Warsaw, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, Bangkok, Saigon,CINCPAC, and USUN, and passed to the White House,DOD, and CIA. 120. Editorial Note 121. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Other Posts Washington, August 13, 1964, 4:23 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Barbis; cleared by Trueheart, Klein at the White House, and by Vladimir Toumanoff of EUR/SOV; and approved by Green. Sent to Moscow, London, Paris, Vientiane, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, New Delhi, Ottawa, Warsaw, Hong Kong, USUN, and CINCPAC. 122. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, August 18, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VI. Top Secret. The source text indicates that the President saw it. 123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, August 20, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent priority to the White House, DOD, and CIA, and repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 124. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 20, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. IX, Memos, 8/64. Secret. 125. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, August 20, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC to pass to Defense. 126. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 26, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. IX, Memos, 8/64. Secret. 127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, August 26, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Green and Trueheart, cleared by McNaughton in draft and with McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC. 128. Memorandum From the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) Saigon, August 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup, 27 July–31 August, 1963. Top Secret. 129. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, September 5, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381. Top Secret. 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, September 9, 1964, 8:17 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McNaughton, and approved by William Bundy. 131. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, September 13, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, Saigon,DOD, and MACV, and passed to the White House and CIA. 132. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, September 16, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 D 7425, Laos 381 (9 Apr 64) Laos Operations. Secret. 133. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State Washington, September 18, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Slutz and cleared by Trueheart and Green. Sent to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, which indicated it had been prepared at Bundy’s request. 134. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 28, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Barbis. A note on this memorandum indicates that Rusk requested it and that he saw it. 135. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 1, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–2 US–LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Barbis and cleared by Trueheart. A note on the memorandum indicates that Rusk saw it. 136. Editorial Note 137. Telegram From the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Washington, October 7, 1964, 10:49 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XI, Cables, 10/64. Secret. Drafted by Colonel F.E. Kramer, Assistant for Laos, Far Eastern Region, ISA, and approved by Blouin. 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, October 7, 1964, 7:24 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal; cleared in substance with Rusk, William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, and in draft with McNaughton; and approved by Forrestal and Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC, Saigon for COMUSMACV, and Bangkok. 139. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Other Posts Washington, October 8, 1964, 11:18 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Barbis; cleared by Trueheart, Clunan, and in substance with James Ozzello of EUR; and cleared by Green. Sent to Vientiane, Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Tokyo, Taipei, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC. 140. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, October 13, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, Laos 000.1–370.64 (092 Laos). Top Secret. 141. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, October 19, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381 (9 Apr 64) Laos Operations. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A copy was sent to Wheeler. A note on the source text indicates that Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance saw it. 142. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, October 22, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw it on November 11. 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, November 5, 1964, 8:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Vladimir I. Toumanoff of SOV; cleared by David H. Henry, Director of SOV, Dexter, J. Harold Shullaw, Director of BNA, Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Thompson; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Moscow, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, London, Paris, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Ottawa, and CINCPAC. 144. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 12, 1964. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Working Papers, November 54, vol. III, Misc. Back Up. Top Secret. 145. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 30, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Dexter and cleared in draft by Corcoran and Robert Johnson. 146. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 3, 1964, 11 a.m. 147. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 5, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and cleared in S on December 9. The memorandum is part II of III. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. 148. Editorial Note 149. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 9, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 30. The memorandum indicates it was Part V of VII. This was a luncheon meeting at the Soviet Embassy. 150. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, December 10, 1964, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. William H. Sullivan was appointed Ambassador to Laos on November 25, 1964. 151. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, December 17, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381. Top Secret. Attached but not printed was a map. 152. Memorandum for the Record Washington, December 19, 1964. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 1 Nov-31 Dec, 1964. Secret. 153. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 19, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 12/64–1/65. Secret. 154. Editorial Note 155. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, January 7, 1965, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 ASIA SE. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to the Department of Defense and White House; repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC; and passed to CIA. The source text is incorrectly dated January 7, 1964. 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, January 14, 1965, 7 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate; Ivory; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. 157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, January 19, 1965, 7:08 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Barrel Roll. Drafted by Cleland and Barbis; cleared by Trueheart, McGeorge Bundy, in draft with McNaughton, and in substance with Admiral Mustin of J–3 of the JCS; and approved by Unger. Also sent to Saigon, and repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC, the White House, DOD for JCS, and CIA. 158. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, January 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 12/64–1/65. Top Secret. 159. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts Washington, January 23, 1965, 2:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart; cleared by Unger, William Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Robert C. Creel, Director of Soviet Affairs David H. Henry, Salans, Thompson, and Director of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs J. Harold Shullaw; and approved by Rusk. Sent to Vientiane, Moscow, Paris, London, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, New Delhi, Saigon, Warsaw, and Hong Kong. 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State Bangkok, January 26, 1965, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–3 US LAOS. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Vientiane and CINCPAC. 161. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 27, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 12/64–1/65. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limit Distribution. 101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, June 24, 1964, 10:54 p.m. 1250. Embtel 1683 and ARMA CX–291. 2 Without attempting to answer all points reference message, following are main lines of our present thinking: 1. In absence major communist military moves in Laos or developments with respect SVN compelling major policy change, our military actions in immediate period ahead, insofar as they concern Laos, should be selected with a view to (a) deterring further PL/VM moves; (b) bolstering morale and capacity non-communist forces; (c) keeping Souvanna in office and bolstering his position; and (d) maintaining US freedom of action. We do not envisage supporting efforts to drive communists back in PDJ or elsewhere if this would require major action. 2. It is in line with this general approach that we have been more forthcoming in publicity about recce flights while reluctant to admit involvement in T–28 operations. Fact is that former are necessarily more visible here and elsewhere and that we have been taking firm and consistent line both in public and with important third countries that we are not directly involved in T–28 operations. On this basis, believe we can make out sound case that we are not violating Geneva Accords for reasons set out Deptel 1174. 3 On other hand use of US pilots in T–28’s or employment of SAW detachment, for example, could not be so defended and would be unwise unless need was truly critical. 3. We recognize importance of remaining in step with Prime Minister in terms both explaining actions we take and protecting and strengthening his position vis-à-vis conservative generals. At moment it seems there may be more danger Souvanna getting out in front of us than vice versa. Particularly relevant is his presentation proposed three-pronged attack on PL in area junction routes 7 and 13 (ARMA CX–291) “with maximum US support to include use American pilots with T–28’s and armed US recce.” Along lines our present thinking we are not prepared use US pilots in T–28’s although air lift activities and reconnaissance support within existing guidelines quite acceptable. 4. More basically, our first reaction is that operation on scale outlined ARMA CX–291, involving as it does movement of forces from already threatened Attopeu area and complex maneuvers with air support, runs extremely serious risk outright defeat in view past experience FAR. Even if operation were relatively sure of success it would be out of line with basic stance we wish maintain at this time (see para 1 above). As we see it, proposed operation would not really contribute to relieve Muong Soui situation but apparently aimed to achieve psychological lift of victory. We also not clear just how this planning has been arrived at or whether Kong Le and Amkha are really in accord on this concept. 5. We not clear just how serious threat to Muong Soui is but are planning medium-level recce operation there for 26th or 27th and preparing plans for further low-level operations if required. From here it looks as though assets now proposed to be devoted to CX–291 operation could be much better employed strengthening defenses of Muong Soui. Alternatively, we would think preservation neutralist forces in secure position more important than retaining foothold in PDJ. There may well be merit in evacuation neutralist forces to Vang Vieng area as Amkha originally urged. 6. In any event, it would certainly help if Souvanna could publicize threat to Muong Soui and provide additional basis justifying possible extensive low-level recce operations if required. If Muong Soui actually attacked, we probably prepared, along lines Embtel 1613, 4 to authorize US civilian pilots fly T–28’s, but had not thought we could go further than this in response this particular action. 7. Realize above if communicated to Souvanna might sharply deflate his present rather ebullient mood and perhaps endanger his position with conservative military leaders. If we conclude we should discourage CX–291 operation, line we would propose would be to say that RLG forces not yet ready for such ambitious undertaking but that we prepared to take substantial measures to beef them up further. Among these could be: a. Furnishing additional T–28’s. We exploring this urgently. b. Additional Thai pilots and perhaps other forms of Thai volunteers greatly expanding present limited Thai elements with RLG forces. In this connection, Bangkok should explore in wake of Milton talks just where Thai do stand with respect such additional efforts. c. Whatever else you recommend except that for present we would not consider introducing US military personnel in any capacity for reasons stated para 2 above. 8. Above reasoning also means we should certainly not encourage any military move to recapture PDJ areas themselves. Obviously, what we have is serious problem of maintaining Souvanna and RLG morale while restraining them from unwise military action and while we pursue negotiating track. Believe we can do a lot within present guidelines but we are most reluctant to go further in the direction of US involvement at this time. Our essential effort is to use negotiating track to build up Souvanna position and ICC role and to frame and isolate withdrawal issue while putting this off for significant period to avoid premature crisis. For Bangkok: Re Para 7 b above, request you explore immediately Thai willingness supply additional pilots for T–28’s on same basis pilots already with RLAF. For longer term, we wish explore possibility large-scale Thai encadrement (Deptel 2319). 5 Thai Minister has suggested best way of proceeding on this would be for Ambassador to approach Thanat for general discussion Thai views as to what needs to be done in Laos. Minister implied Thanat would himself probably raise possibility of volunteers. You are best able judge whether this is good way of proceeding but unless you perceive strong objection, request you explore matter in some way without compromising Thai Minister. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy, cleared in substance with McGeorge Bundy and McNaughton, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Bangkok and repeated to Saigon, London, Paris, New Delhi, and CINCPAC. 2 Document 100 . In telegram CX–291, the U.S. Army Attaché in Vientiane reported on a June 23 meeting with the Lao General Staff and Souvanna to discuss a FAR offensive against Pathet Lao strongholds at the junction of Routes 7 and 13 north of Vientiane and west of the Plain of Jars. The ultimate objective of this extensive three-pronged offensive would be to relieve pressure on Muong Soui. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 In telegram 1174 to Vientiane, June 16, the Department suggested that U.S. armed reconnaissance over Laos was designed to provide the ICC and the Royal Lao Government with information on North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao military dispositions on the Plain of Jars: a task the ICC was no longer able to perform. (Ibid., INT 6 PHOTO LAOS) 4 See footnote 3, Document 100 . 5 See footnote 4, Document 100 . 102. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 102. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, June 27, 1964. JCSM–561–64 SUBJECT Additional T–28s in Laos (S) 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–25638/64, dated 25 June 1964, subject as above. 2 2. In response to the reference, an estimate of the quick augmentation capability (e.g., within three to seven days) to expand the Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR) T–28 force as a possible response to an early Pathet Lao (PL) move against Muong Soui is outlined as follows: a. Aircraft . The Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) has 20 T–28s available in Laos or at Udorn. It is estimated that 15 T–28s can be made available from RVN resources as a result of the conversion from T–28s to A–1H aircraft without detriment to the RVN war effort. The USAF Special Air Warfare (SAW) Detachment at Udorn could turn over an additional four aircraft. Thus, the total available aircraft is 39. Assuming a 75 per cent in commission rate, 29 aircraft should be operational. b. Pilots . The RLAF has 13 qualified T–28 pilots augmented by ten Thais. Six Air America pilots have also been checked out and are available. Thus, 29 RLAF/Thai/US civilian pilots could be available, matching the 29 operational aircraft. c. Additional Augmentation . The augmentation of the RLAF, outlined in subparagraph 2a above, would bring a halt to the present SAW training program of ten RLAF pilots scheduled to graduate on 9 August 1964. This training program is the only feasible short term source of RLAF T–28 pilots. Thailand has 61 T–28 pilots and 27 T–28 aircraft; however, their future contribution should not be taken for granted. The US Ambassador to Thailand has been requested (State to Vientiane, 1250, dated 24 June 1964) 3 to ascertain the Thai responsiveness to additional contributions. d. Maintenance Capacity . The present maintenance capability in Laos, backed by various maintenance assets at Udorn, could support the RLAF for a short period. A sustained effort would require augmentation of the Udorn assets. e. Base Capacity . In view of the present inability to fly operational missions from Thailand, base loading in Laos would be a critical limitation. Careful planning between operational missions, maintenance flow back to Udorn and minimum ground time at Vientiane would be an absolute necessity. f. Implications of Using Non-Lao Pilots . The use of non-Lao pilots presents the risk of disclosure of intervention. There are problems now in preserving the cover of Thais participating in T–28 operations. g. A–1H Aircraft . The use of A–1H aircraft by either VNAF or US pilots would raise the problem of detracting from the war effort in the RVN. CINCPAC reports he doubts that the present basic qualifications of the RLAF pilots permits them to become combat pilots in the A–1H aircraft. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that in any augmentation plan the four T–28 aircraft of the USAF SAW Detachment, Udorn, remain in place to continue to provide the only source of trained RLAF T–28 pilots, and that efforts be made to encourage the Thais to provide the required additional assets. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: JW Davis Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381, Jan-June 1964. Secret. A note on the source text indicates McNamara saw it. 2 Not found. 3 Document 101 . 103. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 103. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, June 27, 1964. JCSM–565–64 SUBJECT Operations in Laos (U) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposed Laos offensive as reported by the Army Attaché, Vientiane (ARMA Vientiane CX 291, DTG 231350Z), 2 to clear out the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh (PL/VM) along Route 13 from Vang Vieng to Sala Phou Khoun and to relieve the pressure on Muong Soui. Recognizing that there are certain risks involved when operations in Laos are concerned, they consider the operation desirable in the circumstances. 2. Insofar as support operations are concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined: a. The additional airlift aircraft (three C–123 and three Caribou), estimated by the Ambassador to be required (Vientiane to State 1694, 25 June 1964), 3 can be made available from PACOM resources with no appreciable effect on the air effort in South Vietnam. When the requirement has been firmly established, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct CINCPAC to lend these aircraft to Air America at Udorn and to support them as required. b. Necessary logistic support for ground and air operations is available in the WESTPAC area. c. Fifteen T–28s have been made available from resources in the Republic of Vietnam. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Should the operation be approved, Air America pilots should be authorized to fly T–28 aircraft as necessary to exploit available aircraft and assist in maximizing the effectiveness of the air effort. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that Ambassador Unger has been given authority to use napalm in the defense of Muong Soui. They further recommend that Lao pilots be authorized to employ this munition when it is considered optimum for the attack of military targets. 4. One of the most important measures to strengthen coordinated air-ground operations and increase the effectiveness of the air effort in Laos would be establishment of an effective air control system. The Air Attaché has reported (AIRA Laos CX–300, DTG 242001Z) 4 that due to factional difficulties there are major problems in establishing such a system using either FAR or Neutralist ground force components. CINCPAC’s views have been requested; subsequent to their receipt, the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be submitted to you. 5. Associated with both the defense of Muong Soui and the proposed Laos offensive are requirements for reconnaissance flights over Routes 7 and 13. These are being handled separately and should be supported on a timely basis. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the possibility that the attack envisaged by the plan could result in (1) a complete failure caused by the collapse of the FAR/Neutralist forces with subsequent PL/VM attacks toward the Mekong, or (2) an increase in the support of the PL/VM forces in Laos to include possible active intervention by regular North Vietnamese forces. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the PL/VM forces in Laos could attack toward the Mekong in any event. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, as concomitant actions to the Laos offensive, preparations be made for actions in the priority listed below: a. US air strikes against appropriate PL/VM targets in Laos. b. Defense of the key cities along the Mekong utilizing Thai forces and such US forces as may be necessary in accordance with CINCPAC OPLAN 32–64, Phase II—Laos. 5 c. Air attacks against targets in North Vietnam to destroy the DRV will and capabilities as necessary to compel the DRV to cease support of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos (Appendix). 6 7. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The United States support the plan for relieving pressure on and providing for the defense of Muong Soui, by (1) Providing three additional C–123 and three additional Caribou aircraft, subsequent to further validation of the requirement for such aircraft; (2) Providing necessary logistic support for the planned air and ground operations; (3) Authorizing Air America pilots to fly T–28 aircraft in support of the operation as required; (4) Authorizing the use of napalm against appropriate military targets; and (5) Providing reconnaissance support, as requested by Vientiane, on a timely basis. b. The United States prepare the necessary forces for contingency operations in Southeast Asia in the following priority: (1) Air strikes by US aircraft against appropriate PL/VM targets in Laos. (2) Defense of the Mekong cities, using appropriate US forces in conjunction with Thai forces. (3) Low-level reconnaissance and air strikes by US aircraft against appropriate targets in North Vietnam. 8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the above views, and those expressed in the Appendix hereto be given due consideration in the current State-Defense discussions. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J.W. Davis 7 Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, Laos 000.1—Sensitive, (092 Laos), 1964. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 See footnote 2, Document 101 . 3 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 Not found. 5 Not found. 6 Attached, but not printed. 7 Printed from a copy that indicates Admiral Davis signed the original. 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, June 27, 1964, 7:01 p.m. 1267. Joint State Defense message. In preparation decision highest levels 2 request addressee comments following tentative position with respect RLG plan for operation against Routes 13 and 7, and possible contingencies arising therefrom. 3 Do not consult RLG or RTG except as specifically noted. A. With respect to operation itself. 1. We would tell Souvanna we believe objective of cleaning out PL forces in this area and lifting morale RLG forces by demonstrated success is sound and that operation has reasonable chance of success. At same time we would stress that operation must be undertaken by RLG on own responsibility and with clear recognition possible risks and limits additional US action in event adverse developments as stated below. Also, per your 1707, 4 we must be satisfied problems coordination and logistics worked out satisfactorily. 2. Souvanna must recognize that initiation of operation in itself probably increases possibility major Communist attack against Neutralist forces in Muong Soui. If such attack takes place, he must recognize that Muong Soui itself cannot be held even with extensive US air operations (problems of which set forth below) and that in this event we would strongly urge that Neutralist forces be in position to move west from Muong Soui seeking to link up with forces from Vang Vieng and Luang Prabang to establish firm and consolidated RLG-controlled area. We believe sacrifice Muong Soui area geographically would be good exchange for such consolidated position, and that preservation Neutralist forces crucial. 3. Vital that operation be represented to maximum as designed to assist threatened Neutralist forces in Muong Soui and thus defensive in character. We would take this line ourselves and assume that Souvanna would do likewise. Both of us should constantly reiterate our objective is preservation Geneva Accords. As your 1716 5 notes, fact that opening move in operation is airlift GM-16 to Muong Soui is helpful factor in support this rationale, and if this operation becomes known we and Souvanna should certainly publicize on basis assisting in defense Muong Soui and forces there. 4. We are prepared to furnish additional T–28’s promptly [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] we do not believe US civilian pilots required for T–28’s in support of operation. However, US is prepared to use existing Air America aircraft, provide additional three C–123’s and three Caribou, and permit use of US civilian pilots to bring GM–16 up to Muong Soui and to provide continuing resupply of operation as required. (Our public and third-country position would be that the operation is mercenary Air America and not US Government and that, in any event, the operation relates directly to defense of Neutralist forces along lines para 3 above.) FYI: We also considering authorizing use of napalm if Souvanna requests and you approve, in support of this or any other operation and not merely in case major Communist attack as you have previously requested and we have authorized. End FYI. 5. Since stiffening of Muong Soui defenses crucial in any event, we working urgently with Thai to obtain additional gun crews and also engineers and supplies to conduct land-mining operations and also Thai air-ground controllers. 6. We prepared also to conduct added reconnaissance in operational area as necessary prior its initiation. (Operations of 27 June produced only 10 percent results as you know.) FYI: We have considered possible deterrent effect reconnaissance operations east of Muong Soui but are uncertain whether this effect great enough to warrant risk of loss in area obviously well defended. JCS believe any such low-level reconnaissance should be preceded by suppression strikes. Request your comment. End FYI. 7. FYI: Control and supervision of operation appear vital, and we would be prepared if you think necessary to augment your attaché personnel for this purpose. End FYI. B. If Muong Soui subjected to major attack. We have noted your telecon request that in this event we authorize US civilian pilots in T–28’s and also direct US Navy and USAF strikes against forces attacking Muong Soui. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] As to US air strikes (with or without “reconnaissance” cover) our view is that such action would not enable Muong Soui position to be held and would also be very difficult to conduct unless we had effective airground control in being. Basically, we are concerned that Souvanna may have excessive view of what air can accomplish in this situation, and we reluctant get into large-scale US air strike operation that would in fact be militarily ineffective in countering the attack itself. At best we see any additional action at this point as being effort permit Neutralist forces withdraw and re-group in orderly fashion in accordance with para A(2) above. However, we would consider what would in effect be series of punitive air attacks against PL military targets in PDJ and Route 7 areas. This would be designed punish other side and show our continued determination but avoid committing our air to vain attempt hold Muong Soui. We need to know how extensive punitive strikes you recommend. On diplomatic front we would in any event continue to urge Polish proposals and to oppose Geneva conference both if operation takes place and if Muong Soui attacked. In latter event, we would contemplate urging Souvanna take his case to UN although we do not have any hope Security Council would vote for withdrawal or anything more than ceasefire. If outcome appeared likely be indecisive, we might, with him, avoid any formal appeal for action but at least use Security Council as platform dramatize continued Communist offensives and stress our adherence Geneva Accords and justification actions we would have taken and continuation such actions in response Communist action. C. If Neutralist and RLG forces gravely threatened and disorganized. Possibility must be faced that operation goes badly and/or Communist attack Muong Soui so effective as to disorganize Neutralist forces and prevent their effectively linking up with Bang Vieng and Luang Prabang forces to make a new government-held area along Route 13 and a small part of Route 7. In this event we would again consider penalty bombings possibly more sustained and extensive than covered under B above. D. If Communists attack elsewhere in Laos. Our current estimate here tends to support your judgment that this not likely in view Communist view other points along dividing line critical and might bring about drastic US intervention. However, we are particularly concerned that GM–16 withdrawal may invite action against Attopeu. If this occurred we would expect to authorize GVN air action in area but would also have to consider movement US air and ground forces to Thailand and possibly across Mekong if attack went further than Attopeu. Same possibility exists if Communists should attack at some other point threatening Mekong. We have considered whether a US air and/or ground deployment to Thailand might be helpful in event of contingency C above and request Bangkok comments whether Thai might agree and approve and Vientiane comments whether such action would bolster Souvanna in this case. In Rusk-Thanom May 30 talks, 6 attack on Muong Soui had not been included as part of what Thai viewed as major Communist push. However, current Vientiane estimate of seriousness fall of Muong Soui (Vientiane’s 1707) may mean that we should revise our calculations and that Thai would see matter in different light than at that time. We have noted Bangkok’s comment that Thai interested more in ground than air deployments, but likelihood would be that air forces would be employed before ground forces as indicated above. For Bangkok : You should consult RTG immediately on pilots and on contingency basis on gun crews and also on air controllers and engineers for land-mining operations. Need your report on land mine availability and possible arrangements for shipment to Muong Soui. Since in these approaches you will be asking Thai for fairly substantial commitment, you may reveal Lao have requested our airlift support for GM–16 move to Muong Soui and that we are considering this and also further commitment to continuing airlift support for whole operation. You should seek get Thai reaction to chances of success for operation and generally consult as fully as you feel necessary while avoiding full commitment US support to operation at this time. For CINCPAC: We note your 260707Z 7 which underscores air control problem any US air operations in direct support Muong Soui. Request your comment whether Thai air controllers could help on this. You will note that this message modifies viewpoint stated Deptel 1250 to Vientiane in light subsequent exchanges indicating serious internal reactions if we do not support operation. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared with McNamara and in substance with Rusk, and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Thailand and repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, and CINCPAC. 2 On Saturday, June 27, Rusk met at the Department of State with McNamara, McNaughton, Meyers of CIA, McGeorge and William Bundy, and Trueheart to discuss Laos. At 12:40 p.m. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy returned to Rusk’s office. Rusk met with Ball at 1:47 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) The drafting of this cable was no doubt discussed; for a brief account of the meeting, see Document 105 . 3 In telegram 1251 to Vientiane, June 26, the Department suggested that as it and the Embassy were “out of step on the proposed operation,” they should discuss support for the offensive in a telephone conference at 1 p.m. Greenwich time on June 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 In telegram 1707 from Vientiane, June 26, the Embassy in Laos renewed its recommendation that the United States consider supporting the proposed FAR operation and gave reasons for doing so. It also answered specific questions raised in telegram 1251 to Vientiane in anticipation of the teleconference. (Ibid.) The text of the teleconference is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Muong Soui, Operation Triangle, Vol. I, 6/64–7/64. 5 Dated June 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 6 Documentation on these talks is scheduled for publication in the compilation on Thailand in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXVII. 7 Dated June 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 105. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 105. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 28, 1964. The attached papers give the background of the decision we face tomorrow on support for a battle Souvanna Phouma is planning. They are worth reading through this evening, I believe. The basic briefing memo is my brother’s; the supporting analyses, at Tabs A 2 & B 3 and the cables at Tab C, 4 are also important. Souvanna’s initial proposal was for quite extensive U.S. involvement in his attempt to beat the Pathet Lao now holding two roads west of the Plain of Jars, between the two capitals of Vientiane and Luang Prabang. As we have examined it, we think we can in fact meet his needs by a relatively modest increase of U.S. transport support (6 planes and civilian pilots), essentially to move and supply an 1800-man force from Southern Laos to the Muong Soui area. As of yesterday Rusk, McNamara, the JCS, and Unger were in favor of this operation. My brother, for good diplomatic reasons, is wary. The reasons for approval are many: (1) Souvanna will be deeply disillusioned if we do not support him in a course that has unanimous backing of non-Communist Lao military, and his own strong personal leadership. (2) The level of new U.S. military commitment is modest (there is no thought of U.S. combat support). (3) Support of the operation should allow us both to strengthen the neutralists near Muong Soui, and to mitigate the bad effects of a possible defeat there. (4) As Laotian battle plans go, this one is unusually promising. The big reasons for wariness are two: (1) Souvanna’s attack is very likely to provide the excuse for a successful Pathet Lao attack on Muong Soui. (2) Our diplomatic track will be weakened, as Indians and Russians may abandon Polish proposals and begin to press hard for a Geneva meeting. My own conclusion is that while this is a chancy enterprise, our best course today, as for two years past, is prudent support of Prince Souvanna. I would follow the policy outlined in outgoing cable No. 1267 5 (Tab C). McG. B. Attachment Briefing Memorandum Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) SUBJECT Support for Possible Military Operations Within Laos On June 23 the Government of Laos asked for extensive US support for a military operation in the area north of Vientiane and west of the Plain of Jars. In subsequent exchanges with Ambassador Unger, it is clear that our response to this request involves serious issues affecting our relationship to Souvanna Phouma, possible Communist reactions to the proposed operation, and indeed the whole trend of our military actions in Laos. I. Situation and Nature of Proposed Operation A. Proposed Operation . The operation would be a three-pronged attack designed to secure control of Route 13, which runs between Vientiane and Luang Prabang, and of that part of Route 7 which runs from Route 13 east to the present position of the Neutralist forces at Muong Soui. The initial troop movement would be made about July 1 with the operation itself to commence about July 7–8. Ten government battalions would be involved, including one substantial force to be airlifted from its present position in southern Laos. The opposition in the area is currently estimated at three Pathet Lao battalions. The operation as proposed by the Lao called for US participation in the following respects: a. Some prior US reconnaissance activity in the area. b. Extensive Air America airlift support using US civilian pilots and aircraft currently within Laos, supplemented by three additional C–123’s and three Caribou which could be supplied with Air America markings. c. US civilian pilots in Lao T–28’s in combat operations. In examining the proposal, we have already concluded that the use of US civilian pilots in T–28’s (c. above) is not necessary provided that—[ 1 line of source text not declassified ]. However, we must recognize that use of US pilots in airlift support of combat operations (b. above), even though they would be civilians flying unarmed aircraft, represents a degree of open US involvement going beyond anything we have hitherto done and laying the US open to charges of direct violation of Article 4 of the Geneva Accords 6 in the sense that the pilots would in effect be performing military operations. This new US involvement differs only in degree from what we have done to date but does have this additional element. The Lao would of course also use their own fairly extensive airlift capability. A military analysis of the operation has been prepared by the DOD and is separately submitted at Tab A. The JCS favor the operation. Ambassador Unger, with the advice of his highly competent attaché staff, believes that the operation has a reasonable chance to succeed. B. Threat to Neutralist Forces in Muong Soui. This is the major element in the current military situation, and the operation is designed to relieve pressure on Muong Soui and to provide a consolidated government-held area into which the forces in Muong Soui could retreat if defeated. The current judgment in Vientiane is that the Communist forces are massing for a possible early attack on Muong Soui, and the RLG has been dramatizing the threat. A Washington intelligence judgment by CIA is at Tab B; it concludes that an attack on Muong Soui is a little better than 50/50 today, and will become probable, as a normal response, if Souvanna’s operation is carried out. The Neutralist forces in Muong Soui number approximately 3300 and, although apparently in a reasonably good state of organization and morale, have several deficiencies, notably in respect to artillery crews. The current judgment is that, if the Communists attack in full force using tanks and artillery, Muong Soui could not be held for more than 3–4 days, even if the present Lao T–28’s were augmented by additional American-piloted T–28’s as well as extensive US reconnaissance/strike operations. Defeat of the Neutralist forces at Muong Soui could have extremely serious consequences in military and above all in political terms. The Neutralist forces would probably be dispersed, though a great many would find their way down toward Vientiane and link up with other government forces. The Meo would also be exposed. Above all, the cumulative effect of this defeat, coming on top of the May defeats, could well discourage Souvanna completely and possibly result in drastic and unwise action by Neutralist and Rightist generals either in the form of military action for its own sake or in the form of some political upheaval in Vientiane that could damage or even destroy Souvanna’s position. Although we have not hitherto regarded a Communist attack on Muong Soui as in the same category as Communist offensives against the Mekong areas or Luang Prabang, Ambassador Unger has now stressed that it has assumed a much greater psychological importance than we had hitherto realized. In relation to the threat to Muong Soui, the proposed operation can be argued both ways. On the one hand, it might trigger a Communist attack that would not otherwise have taken place. On the other hand, particularly if there were some identifiable Communist action against Muong Soui, the US would be in a very serious position if it had refused to support an operation designed to relieve Muong Soui. Even if the operation did not achieve its objectives and if Muong Soui fell, it would be far better for the US-Lao relationship to have made the effort and to have failed than to have held the Lao back from what they regarded as a promising attempt to help. C. Domestic Political Factors in Laos . Souvanna Phouma has joined with both Neutralist and FAR generals in planning the proposed operation and has indeed prodded them into the present plan. Both he and they believe that the May defeats were about all they could take and must be countered by some offensive action on the Government’s side. In addition, Souvanna and his generals, Ambassador Unger reports, have noted the various statements and evidences of our own determinations to hold in Southeast Asia (attaching special weight to the Taylor appointment 7 as an indicator of possible stronger action) and have come to believe that the US is prepared to go far in breaching the Geneva Accords in support of government military operations. It is Unger’s judgment that failure on our part to support the proposed operation would make it very difficult to maintain the confidence of Souvanna and the generals in our ultimate willingness to take strong action to defend Laos and with it Southeast Asia. (Souvanna is also urging maintenance of a major reconnaissance program within Laos and the use of reconnaissance flights for strike operations to cut Route 7 east of the Plain of Jars.) D. International Factors The future diplomatic track concerning Laos is still uncertain. The Poles have discussed a modified proposal with the British, involving initial meetings of the three Lao factions, with the participation (apparently on something of a sideline basis) of the co-chairmen (the British and the Soviets) and the ICC members (Canada, India, Poland), with the co-chairmen then to determine whether conditions warrant a full-scale Geneva Conference. This is an entirely acceptable variant from the original Polish proposal, and we have told the British we would endorse their accepting it. However, they and the Poles have not yet agreed on a form of invitation, and it is possible that the Poles and the Soviets are weighing their actions very carefully. There is also a serious question whether the Pathet Lao would accept even this modification, and the Poles are apparently dealing directly with them to work this out. In sum, there is a good chance that the proposal will surface in the next few days, and it remains by far the best bet we have to keep negotiations on Laos moving without weakening on our insistence on withdrawal. (During the week we have examined alternatives if the Polish proposal does not get off the ground, and none of these alternatives, including resort to the UN, seems to have real promise of buying time and making some progress on issues other than withdrawal.) If renewed hostilities in Laos appeared to be initiated by the Government, with US support, and not in response to Communist action, this could have a serious disruptive effect on our negotiating track. Even though we might reduce direct US involvement, almost all the countries concerned with the diplomatic negotiations would probably assume that the operation had US blessing and was part of a broad US plan to maintain and increase pressure in Laos. The French would naturally resume their pressure for an immediate Geneva Conference, but, most important, the Indians and Soviets might well believe that the US was moving drastically further and that the only way out was to get an immediate Geneva Conference. Even the British and Canadians might well weaken under these circumstances, and the total result would be serious danger to the possibility of the Polish proposals doing what we hope they can do. Our second international problem would be the reaction of the ICC. Unless the Communists had started to move against Muong Soui, the Indians and Poles would probably regard the operation as a breach of the cease-fire and would be particularly sensitive to the degree of direct US involvement in violation of the Geneva Accords. Although Souvanna and we could argue that the action was entirely justified in response to far more serious Communist aggressions of May—which it certainly is— it would be difficult to head off ICC investigation, and the Indians in particular might be very difficult indeed. In relation to the negotiating track, offensive action by the government would tend to obscure the blame that now rests on the Communists for their May actions and would tend to support a “plague on both your houses” position by key nations that would greatly weaken our pressure to bring about Communist withdrawal. Obviously, these adverse international reactions would be sharply changed to the degree that the operation could be represented as being a relief of Muong Soui. Vientiane’s present estimate that attack on Muong Soui may be imminent, coupled with the timetable proposed for the operation, may make it possible to justify the operation completely on this basis. But we cannot now be sure of this. Similarly, adverse international reaction would be reduced to the extent the US was not directly involved. In a broad sense, the operation does not represent a major change from what we have been doing in our reconnaissance operations. However, we have had a strong justification for the latter, and have hitherto refrained from direct military involvement in combat operations within Laos. E. Possible Communist Reactions The Communists almost certainly already know of the proposed operation, since it has been prepared by a wide circle of military planners in Vientiane. They thus have ample time both to prepare their defenses and to consider action in other parts of Laos in response. Within the area actually affected by the operations, the Communists would have difficulty in any major reinforcement. The nearest Viet Minh units are believed to be several days’ march away, on the eastern edge of the Plain of Jars, and would have to come through rough country to reach the area. We would probably get some information on any such movement. On the other hand, the Communists could easily react by an extensive attack on Muong Soui. 8 Moreover, the Communists have the option of attacking in other parts of Laos. Unger thinks this is unlikely, on the ground that they already have this option and have not exercised it, and that they must know that action in other areas would be in effect a move toward the Mekong. Washington intelligence judgment shares this view, although there is some concern that the Communists might move in the Attopeu area of southern Laos, from which the additional forces required for the operation would be drawn. Even though some compensating reinforcement of Attopeu is planned, the town is now dangerously encircled by Pathet Lao forces. The same is true of many other points along the boundary between the government forces and the Pathet Lao, and it remains true (and Unger agrees) that the Communists have the capability of taking government positions just about any place they choose. In terms of its signal effect on Hanoi and Peking, US involvement in the operation would have some initial value, but the real impact would probably depend on what we did if the Communists reacted by attacking Muong Soui or elsewhere. If we failed to react very strongly to such action, the Communists might well conclude that we were trying to do things in Laos on the cheap. II. Possible Courses of Action In the light of all these factors, the Secretaries of State and Defense yesterday agreed to a tentative position set forth in the outgoing State/Defense message, 1267 to Vientiane, attached hereto. The reply from Vientiane (Vientiane 1726) 9 concurs generally in the proposed position and is also attached. No reply has been received from Bangkok, but Ambassador Martin had previously urged that we approve and support the operation. With respect to the diplomatic repercussions, we queried London, Paris, Moscow, New Delhi, and Ottawa last night (State 8632 to London attached). 10 The replies received to date are as follows: a. Moscow 3934, 11 attached, feels that the Soviets would react very adversely, back off the Polish proposal, and shift to all-out support for an immediate Geneva Conference. b. London 6481,11 attached, indicates that the British would be troubled but would try to support us. It urges that the British be fully cut in, and mentions that they would expect our support if they had to take a somewhat parallel action in the Indonesian situation in the near future. c. Ottawa 1748,11 attached, indicates the Canadians would be lukewarm unless the operation clearly appeared a response to direct and imminent threat against Muong Soui. It stresses that the Canadians should be fully consulted in any event before we take action. The Soviet reaction may be a serious factor requiring further consideration. The British and Canadian reactions make it clear that we should consult with them and this we should certainly plan to do if we adhere to the tentative position stated in last night’s outgoing message. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Muong Soui, Operational Triangle, Vol. I, 6/64–7/64. Secret. 2 Tab A is an analysis of the attack prepared by ISA on June 26, which is summarized in William Bundy’s attached briefing memorandum. 3 Tab B is a June 27 memorandum from Kent to McCone, answering three questions put to the Office of National Estimates by the Department of State: would the Pathet Lao attack Muong Soui; would they attack if the RLG operation was undertaken; and would the Pathet Lao attack on Muong Soui succeed if the RLG undertook the offensive? Kent answered that there was a slightly better than even chance that the Pathet Lao would attack; they would certainly attack if there was an RLG offensive; and there was about an even chance that the garrison at Muong Soui could hold out if attacked as a result of the proposed operation. If there was no RLG operation, Muong Soui would fall within days if attacked. 4 At Tab C is a series of cables that are footnoted as they are mentioned in the attached briefing memorandum. 5 Document 104 . 6 Article 4 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962, prohibited the introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military troops, and foreign military personnel into Laos. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1078–1083. 7 As Ambassador to Vietnam as of July 1, 1964. 8 The following phrase and sentence were crossed out at this point: “and it is far from clear that the proposed operation would put the government forces in a stronger position to resist such an attack in the short term. On the contrary, the extensive effort involved would probably weaken the government’s capacity to help the forces at Muong Soui.” 9 Dated June 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 10 Sent also to Paris, Ottawa, Moscow, New Delhi, and Ottawa, June 27. (Ibid.) 11 Dated June 28. (Ibid.) 106. Memorandum for the Record 106. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 29, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting of the National Security Council—June 29, 1964 to Discuss the Souvanna Phouma Plan for Action in Laos IN ATTENDANCE The President, McNamara, Vance, McNaughton, Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, Dillon, Rusk, Ball, Harriman, McCone, William Bundy, Forrestal 1. Rusk discussed the Muong Soui disclosure; stated that the odds were better than even that the PL would attack Muong Soui therefore the FAR operations proposed by Souvanna Phouma had been under serious consideration; however in evaluating the operation we must recognize they would undoubtedly bring on an attack on Muong Soui. 2. William Bundy then reviewed in considerable detail the Souvanna Phouma FAR plan of attack on Routes 13 and 7. After some questioning, McNamara stated that he, Vance and the JCS supported the plan. 3. General Wheeler stated that the Joint Chiefs feel the plan had reasonable chances of success, mentioning that they are better than 50–50 and that the Joint Chiefs should unanimously support the plan. 4. The President turned to me and asked my opinion. I said that I personally supported the actions but noted that the movement of 1800 troops from Attapu and weakening Attapu defenses would very possibly cause Attapu to fall to the Pathet Lao. McGeorge Bundy said that an attack on Attapu would open up an entirely new set of problems as Attapu was considered one of the Mekong towns. 5. McNamara said that a more serious problem would be the chances of success or failure of the effort. If the effort failed, then we would have a more serious problem on our hands in Laos; however he felt there was a good chance of success. All agreed that it was extremely difficult to forecast success of the FAR/Lao operation. 6. After some discussion the President approved the attached cable subject to drafting modifications. 2 [Here follows a brief discussion of improved morale in South Vietnam and the success of 34–A operations against North Vietnam.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B 1285A, Meetings with the Pres, 1 May–31 Oct, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary. The meeting lasted from 5:38 to approximately 6 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) 2 Document 107 . 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, June 29, 1964, 7:52 p.m. 1270. Joint State/Defense message. Deptel 1267 to Vientiane (NOTAL), 2 Deptel 8632 to London. 3 1. After careful consideration field comments, decision has been taken 4 to provide added US military assistance in support RLG operation in accordance with concept outlined Deptel 1267. Vientiane should so inform Souvanna. 2. Additional US support requested by Vientiane has been authorized and implementing action is being taken by DOD. Specifically: a) 3 C–123’s and 3 Caribous being turned over to Air America. b) 15 additional T–28’s are being moved to Udorn. c) Medium-level recce in operation area and night reconnaissance east of Muong Soui will be provided urgently. d) Actions are in progress to provide additional Attaché personnel per para A(7) Vientiane’s 1726. 5 Separate DOD message will give details. 6 3. Bangkok’s 2244 7 appears to cover all requirements for Thai personnel and Bangkok should proceed urgently to arrange for their movement to Laos in close coordination with Embassy Vientiane. RTG should be informed USG deeply grateful for prompt and forthcoming response. Authorizations re 105’s [howitzers] and L–19’s [light observation aircraft] requested para 3 Bangkok’s 2244 being transmitted by DOD. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 4. Clearly one weakness proposed operation is inability move artillery forward after opening phases. Are there measures we could take to help on this, such as additional jeeps to carry ammunition? 5. We continue to attach great importance to linking this operation to defense of Neutralist forces now at Muong Soui. Souvanna’s statements helpful in this regard and we here stressing to press that threat serious and imminent. Importance this rationale should be stressed to Souvanna, and we believe he should follow up by immediate call for PL to pull back and—unless you feel this would uncover Thai activity—for ICC mobile teams to go to Muong Soui area (Deptel 1265). 8 6. In light Moscow’s 3934, 9 appears particularly vital get across defensive rationale to Soviets. Believe this can best be done by Vientiane stressing to Soviet Charge reality of threat to Muong Soui and, at appropriate time, adding that movement GM-16 directly related defense Muong Soui. Although we assume Soviets in Vientiane aware of operation, Moscow reaction may be somewhat tempered by such explanation and by continued effort, both in Vientiane and Moscow, stress defensive nature and also limited scale of operation if and when it starts. 7. As suggested Delhi’s 3921, 10 Vientiane should also fill-in Indian Ambassador on operation, stressing its relation to defense Muong Soui. Delhi may in its discretion brief Desai. 8. We also concerned statements by generals or others may play up offensive aspect and hurt basic defensive rationale. We must also get them to downplay US role and preferably not discuss at all. (Phoumi particularly has given Time 11 long expose of US role generally.) Recognize morale factors tending offensive direction, but Vientiane should do all possible to play down. 9. We shall be briefing British and Canadians here fully on operation on above lines and plan also to give somewhat less complete fill-in to French. In no case will role of Thais be disclosed. 10. Assume you will advise final timetable including timing GM–16 airlift and coordinated attack. 11. For Bangkok. You should draw fully on Deptel 1267 to Vientiane in explaining our position to Thai. We particularly concerned they not misjudge feasibility holding Muong Soui if PL make determined attack, or limits our counteraction both in this case and if RLG forces actually disorganized and dispersed by such attack. Hope Thai have no illusions we now ready move across Mekong except in response major Communist push toward Mekong. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy; cleared in draft with Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by William Bundy. 2 Document 104 . 3 See footnote 10, Document 105 . 4 See Document 106 . 5 In paragraph A (7) of telegram 1726 from Vientiane, the Embassy suggested that three teams of Thai liaison personnel and five artillery company grade officers should be available. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 6 Not further identified. 7 Dated June 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 8 Dated June 26. (Ibid.) 9 See footnote 11, Document 105 . 10 Dated June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 11 Apparently reflected in articles in Time, June 19 and June 26, pp. 22–23 and 24–28 respectively. 108. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 108. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 1, 1964. RFE–47 SUBJECT Laos: The Situation and our Options We have attempted to weigh US options in Laos against the background of the changes that have occurred there over the past year. The courses of action open to us fall into four general categories: 1) continuing in our present stance; 2) attempting to reconstitute the neutral solution; 3) opting for formal or “hard” partition essentially along present lines of control; and 4) seeking this partition with expanded non-Communist territorial holdings. The Situation Although, in many respects, the situation we now face in Laos is similar to that of twelve months ago, certain differences alter our position and outlook: 1) The neutralists’ status has changed markedly. The April coup has undermined Souvanna’s position as a neutral, although the unravelling of the coup under international pressure may have strengthened him somewhat in his role as leader of all non-Communist forces. Militarily, the territorial base of Kong Le’s neutralist forces is all but lost. 2) The image of the Vientiane government as a three forces coalition has eroded further. The Pathet Lao, continuing to reject Souvanna’s right to take action as head of the national government in the absence of unanimous agreement by all three parties, has charged that Souvanna is a captive of the right and the United States. It has declared that it cannot regard him as premier as long as he continues on his present course, and has announced that it will withdraw its entire representation from Vientiane. Souvanna has designated non-Communists to act for the long-absent Pathet Lao cabinet members without formally replacing them. The possibility that the Communists are prepared at a time of their own choosing to establish a rival government is suggested by reports that they have organized a “true” neutralist-Pathet Lao shadow government. 3) The right wing has become both more militant and more fractured. Differences between Phoumi and the Sannanikones have come closer to the surface and Phoumi’s power position is something of an enigma. 4) There have been further defections from Kong Le’s forces to the “true” neutralists. Khamouane Boupha also appears to have allied himself with the “true” neutralists. Should the Pathet Lao attempt to portray their neutralists as the sole remaining neutralist faction, the adherence of Khamouane Boupha with his territorial base in Phong Saly and his control of 1500 troops could lend greater credibility to their claims. 5) The Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese support, have extended their control over almost all of the territory they occupied jointly with the neutralists before 1962. They have also done considerable damage to the Meo. We continue to believe, however, that they do not propose to move to the Mekong at this juncture. 6) The United States, to the limited degree implied by our air activities, has become an open military participant in the hostilities. 7) North Vietnam has responded to American escalation signals by expressing its determination to defend itself and by practical defensive measures. However, even if Asian Communist demands for reconvening the Geneva Conference primarily reflect fear of escalation, this fear has not yet caused them to modify their negotiating terms nor is it yet clear that they have abandoned their military advance in Laos. The Prospects Together these developments certainly make it even more difficult to sustain the argument that Laos can be effectively neutralized by international action. To some degree also, the real world of Laos has been altered in that the de facto partition has been geographically sharpened by the Communist advance in the Plaine des Jarres and the consequent removal from most of that area of neutralist forces formerly intermingled with the Pathet Lao. Whether the closer relationship that has developed between the right and the neutralists constitutes a corresponding advantage for us is open to some question; the relationship is a tenuous one at best. These alterations, however, do not eliminate the prospect, which is indeed fortified by the advent of the rainy season, that we are in for another period of stalemated negotiations and relative military quiet. Our Options—The Present Course Under these circumstances, we have the option of accepting Laotian marching and countermarching as tolerable since our vital interests lie in Vietnam and friendly forces hold the Mekong. This stance, in essence a continuation of the posture we have adopted to date, permits us to claim the support of the Geneva Accords for Souvanna as Prime Minister and thereby justify our assistance to him. Our continued diplomatic activity and limited retaliatory measures will probably keep credible our Mekong deterrent. This will spur Moscow to use what little leverage it has to keep Laos below the boiling point. Meanwhile, we can continue to press for effective utilization of the Geneva machinery and support Souvanna’s efforts to secure acceptable terms from the Pathet Lao through our diplomatic and military moves. By pushing for full implementation of the Geneva Accords, we will maintain credit with those neutrals and allies who are anxious to avoid a further spread of hostilities. Our own military involvement and commitment would thus remain at a low level. As time goes on, however, particularly if Pathet Lao territorial nibblings are not met with at least some successful FAR/neutralist counter nibbles, morale in Vientiane may reach a critical point. Souvanna’s position at this stage may present us with one of two problems. If he continues his present militancy, he may demand US moves that will destroy the uneasy status quo or destroy it himself by leaving the scene. If, on the other hand, he tolerates continuing the status quo with only limited retaliatory measures against the Communists, he will face moves from the right to overthrow him which, if successful, would intensify the pressures on the United States to alter its stance. We will face also the problem of adjusting our interventions on behalf of friendly forces to meet two somewhat conflicting objectives: maintaining the plausibility of our ultimate deterrent and avoiding premature escalation. This problem is likely to grow progressively more difficult and acute. On the one hand, restraint may make our actions ineffectual, with all the obvious impact on Lao morale and on domestic and international opinion. On the other hand, we will be uncertain whether moves of greater force will induce Communist restraint or a sharply-increased response. In any case we will remain under continuing pressures to accept a new Geneva Conference. Moreover, these pressures will increase in direct ratio to the threat of escalation of US and Chinese Communist involvement. The difficulties and frustrations of this stance have been amply demonstrated over the past two years. It remains an open question, however, whether other courses would be both feasible and more profitable. Omitting measures focused essentially outside Laos, which in any case would have to be directly related to measures within Laos itself, alternative policies fall into two general categories: a concerted effort to reconstitute the neutral solution; or a more open acceptance and exploitation of the partition. A Reconstituted Neutral Solution In our present stance, reconstitution of the neutral solution remains our ostensible objective. However, existing circumstances make achievement of this objective highly unlikely. As the contenders are now disposed, restoration of the tripartite government in any real sense would require concessions unacceptable to one side or the other. For Souvanna at this juncture to disassociate himself from the right in terms acceptable to the Pathet Lao would require him in effect to surrender a position that he has reached with our encouragement over a considerable period of time. Any alternative leader prepared to abandon this position would be difficult to find outside the ranks of pro-Pathet Lao neutralists who would be unacceptable to the right. Even if Souvanna were prepared to abandon his position, moreover, it is difficult to see how he could secure right-wing acquiescence; another coup in Vientiane would thus become highly likely. If we acceded to Souvanna’s abandonment of his terms and increased the pressures on the right to acquiesce, this reversal of our public position would call into question our basic resolve, particularly in the minds of the Thai and South Vietnamese. For the Pathet Lao and their Chinese and Vietnamese supporters, on the other hand, Souvanna’s present terms can hold no interest unless rejecting them presents unacceptable dangers. It is possible, although unlikely, that the cumulative effects of our present air activities could induce the Communists to modify their current stance in order to secure a recess that would leave open the possibility of forward movement at a later date. Souphanouvong’s apparent acceptance of the Polish proposal for tripartite negotiations may be a move in this direction. It is more likely, however, that to raise the level of threat and to bring about effective Soviet leverage would require US military intervention on a considerably more substantial scale. At best, this intervention on behalf of the neutral solution could lend credence to the viability and defensibility of that solution, restore the territorial balance (perhaps more fully observed and effectively policed) and restore the tripartite stalemate in Vientiane. At worst, it could lead to prolonged hostilities and higher levels of outside Communist support for the Pathet Lao, with the USSR constrained to provide at least diplomatic and propaganda backing for the Communist side. Between these extremes, and perhaps most likely, we could anticipate intensified pressures for an immediate, unconditional reconvocation of the Geneva signatories. Weighing the risks of this course against the very limited likely advantages suggests that if American military power is to be applied on any significant scale in Laos it should be in pursuit of broader objectives than those attainable through an effort to reconstitute a neutral solution, which has not proved successful in the past and which holds little prospect for greater success in the future. Exploitation of Partition—Present Territorial Arrangements As a result of military action over the past year there is now less intermingling of friendly and hostile forces and, therefore, a somewhat more coherent territorial base for the transformation of the “soft” partition that has existed in Laos since the signing of the Geneva Accords into a more formal division under rival regimes. There is also some possibility that both Souvanna, now completely disenchanted with the Communists, and the Pathet Lao, close to a break with Souvanna and in a stronger territorial position, might find such a division more attractive than would have been the case a year ago. However, a “hard” partition on the basis of present territorial holdings would be of questionable advantage to the United States. The principal area in which friendly and Communist forces were intermingled—the Plaine des Jarres—has now come largely under Communist control and is unlikely to be negotiable. Intermingling remains a problem south of Luang Prabang and south and west of the Mekong between Ban Houei Sai and Luang Prabang. Territorial adjustments in this area have been largely in favor of friendly forces and, under a partition proposal, shifts might be negotiable. Khammouane Boupha’s sector of Phong Saly, however, would probably move from its present still somewhat anomalous status to complete identification with the Pathet Lao side. Meo positions are almost entirely within Pathet Lao territory, and the Meo would be difficult if not impossible to move to another area as a fighting force. Without the Plaine des Jarres, RLG territorial holdings would be more compactly disposed, more defensible by Lao forces, and more effectively fortified by conventional means against further nibbling. Were we, however, to initiate or accept a firm partition after having lost the Plaine, we would be seen as moving or reacting from weakness and the plausibility of our Mekong deterrent, although not necessarily weakened, would certainly not be enhanced. Under such partition, we might wish to continue to uphold the concept of international neutrality for our zone in Laos, without, however, compromising its right to request and receive defensive support from friendly powers. This stance would offer the prospect of maximizing international acceptability and support of a reconstituted Royal Lao Government and might even provide some basis for the continued use of the ICC, at least as a device to keep its members involved in the Laos problem and to publicize Communist violations. In a partitioned Laos, however, efforts by us to maintain Souvanna’s position against erosion from the right could no longer rely so completely upon the importance of his international acceptability, with the danger that our role in Lao internal arrangements would be more vulnerable to charges of external dictation. At the same time, the retention of Souvanna himself in this situation would be less vital to our interests, particularly after a successful transition had been made to the new arrangements, although the problem of coming forward with a competent successor able to unify the various factions will remain. In any event our involvement with the Lao government would be likely to increase, with past performance holding little promise that even the complete elimination of the Pathet Lao factor in the non-Communist zone would result in a government notably more united, dedicated, or capable. Although the complete collapse of the Geneva arrangements might remove formal restraints on our assistance to the Vientiane government, the practical effects of this removal could be rather limited except insofar as we wished to inject our own or Thai and perhaps other ground forces. Already Souvanna has been willing to legitimize a fairly wide range of overt military assistance. Such Meo and similar activities as we wished to continue in the Pathet Lao zone would require covert support in any case, and there are distinct limitations on the amount of assistance that FAR and neutralist forces themselves can absorb. Partition of Laos on this basis would provide no more real protection against subversion than did the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the question here being whether the Pathet Lao supported by the North Vietnamese would be as effective in this role as the Viet Cong. Certainly the long border, approximately 1,000 miles, could not be closed effectively against infiltration from the Communist side. Finally, partition of Laos along existing territorial lines would leave the Communists in control of the corridor into South Vietnam. As the same time, in considering operations to restrict Communist use of the corridor based in South Vietnam or elsewhere, we would no longer need to be restrained by the effects of such operations upon tripartite arrangements in Laos. Exploitation of Partition—New Territorial Arrangements To establish a partition based on territorial arrangements other than those that now exist would almost certainly require the intervention of United States forces on some significant scale, especially if the territorial arrangement were to be genuinely advantageous. To be advantageous in a partition, such an arrangement should be the Mekong Valley plus the panhandle rather than the Mekong Valley plus the Plaine des Jarres. In our contingency planning of the past, a move into the panhandle has usually been envisaged as a response to a clear Communist military threat to the Mekong. If, however, the panhandle is seen as seizable and worth seizing in the interests of our position in Vietnam, it is questionable whether we benefit by waiting for the Communists to provide us with a trigger only to maximize the international legitimacy of our position. Our posture, for some time, has communicated our determination to move more decisively if necessary to protect the Royal Lao Government and South Vietnam. We have the evidence on which to present a strong case against Communist violations of the Geneva Accords. Moreover, for many of the countries making up the numerical majority in the world community, the question is not so much who is right in Indochina as who is likely to win. For our allies, as well as for friendly neutrals, the question is not so much whether the United States should apply its power more forcefully as it is whether there are means of applying this power that we are prepared to employ and that can be effective in stemming the Communist advance without precipitating major hostilities. Especially, for those countries that might be expected to participate usefully in our action to greater or less degree—Thailand, the GVN, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and Australia—the most significant issues are thus those of scope and effectiveness. We could certainly expect a vigorous Communist response to an effort to seize the panhandle, including: a significantly greater use of North Vietnamese forces, an enhanced supply effort, and, simultaneously, redoubled appeals for an immediate Geneva Conference backed with threats of further escalation. If, however, our advance were to go no further north than would be required to secure the Pathet Lao road net fanning out of the Mu Ghia Pass, we would not be posing a direct threat to vital North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist territory and would thereby minimize the prospect of a genuinely escalatory military reaction. If we were to embark upon such an action we would of course have to accept the indefinite commitment of United States ground forces, in an area that lends itself by terrain and forest cover to prolonged and effective guerrilla resistance. By the same token, although reducing infiltration into South Vietnam, we probably would be unable to seal it off completely and infiltration efforts through other routes (e.g., the DMZ, the sea, and Cambodia) would continue. Finally, the effect of interdiction of infiltration routes on the Viet Cong effort would be primarily psychological and, in terms of military capabilities, long-run rather than immediate, and would not provide a substitute for more vigorous and successful politico-military action in South Vietnam itself. Our ability to seize, hold, and at least partially seal the panhandle, even though not significantly reducing Viet Cong capability in the short-run, could bolster morale in South Vietnam as evidence of effective action against the enemy in what has become his territory. Similarly Thai confidence in our intentions and capabilities would be reinforced and there might be some positive impact also on defeatist “wave of the future” attitudes elsewhere in Asia. At the same time, there would exist the danger of becoming involved in a prolonged and inconclusive campaign—not to speak of a failure—which would tend to reinforce the belief that a Western power, if it denies itself its ultimate weapons, is ineffective against a determined military/subversive campaign in areas bordering on Communist Asia. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VII, Memos, 7/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 109. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 109. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 11, 1964. SUBJECT Circular Telegram on Laos I see no useful purpose to be served in the attached proposed circular telegram on Laos. 2 All it will do is confuse some recipients and discourage others. The telegram is negative, and shows little understanding of what we have been fighting for in the last several years. Our position is substantially better than it was two years ago: We have lost practically no territory, in spite of the May 16 advance, from what the RLG controlled in 1962. We are not supporting the neutralists and the conservatives, whereas before we were in the intolerable position of supporting only an unpopular right wing. Our objective must not only be to support Souvanna, 3 but to try to strengthen the neutralist position in Laos, including Kong Le. We should make more effective the activity in the villages and elsewhere to popularize this government and to discredit the communists. Furthermore, we have so far held the Mekong Valley from Viet-Cong control, and to a considerable extent protected Thailand from the subversive incursions that we were gravely concerned would make Thailand another guerrilla battlefield. Our stimulation of activities in Thailand has improved the situation. I agree that Souvanna must be induced to remain at all costs, but some action must be taken to develop a neutralist political force within the country as a matter of basic policy. I have consistently believed that the corridor should be closed from SVN rather than from Laos, and believe that Saigon should be encouraged to increase this activity. 4 I think it is an idle thought that the Pathet Lao will conform to a neutralist solution under its present leadership. 5 Souphanouvong might have been willing to do so some years ago, if we had had sense enough to pursue neutralist policies at that time. Today, however, he has been pushed aside by several Hanoi-dominated aggressive personalities. I am glad I have read this telegram because it brought to the surface so many points that ought to be given deeper consideration. I suggest that we have a good tough review of where we are and where we are going, to which we should bring in as well as your people, Mike Forrestal, Jorden, Chet Cooper, INR and CIA. W. Averell Harriman 6 1 Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Laos 2. Secret; Personal. 2 The attached circular telegram, drafted by Neubert on July 10, has a note in Harriman’s hand indicating it was not sent. The telegram’s main theme was that South Vietnam, not Laos, was the key to preventing “further communist encroachment in SEA,” and that a neutral and independent Laos could only be achieved after the defeat of the insurgency in South Vietnam. 3 The draft telegram stated, “Our ability to keep our options open in Laos is going to depend first of all upon political situation among non-communists in Vientiane. Critical factor here is Souvanna himself.” 4 The draft telegram stated that, with Souvanna’s recent collaboration, the United States was in a position in Laos “to place additional military pressure on North Vietnamese use of southern Laos corridor.” 5 The draft telegram stated that while avoiding a “Geneva-type Conference,” the United States “must exploit all available opportunities (tripartite discussions, variations on Polish proposal, UN discussion, diplomatic contacts, public statements) to make clear our continued support of 1962 Geneva settlement, to emphasize communist intransigence, and to strengthen Souvanna’s position.” 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 110. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 110. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 14, 1964. SUBJECT Operation “Triangle” in Laos This is the code name for the operation against Routes 13 and 7 that we have undertaken to support with airlift. The present status is that the Group Mobile from the south has finally been put down in Muong Soui and it is now estimated that the operation may get underway on the 19th or 20th. This is a delay of about 12 days from the original schedule, and is due principally to rain making the Muong Soui airstrip unuseable, for considerable periods. Mac [Bundy] called me today to say that he had accumulated a number of worries about the operation, and thought it might be a useful subject for discussion at your lunch today. 2 I had had the same feeling for several days and last night sent the attached 3 to Len [Unger] highlighting two points of worry: 1. A story out of Vientiane that virtually described the operation in full and above all did not relate it at all to the defense of Muong Soui—which we had all agreed was an important element. The article doubtless told the Communists nothing they did not already know, but it also underscored the difficulty of maintaining the “defensive” rationale in face of the fact that the Communists have been conspicuously lying low at Muong Soui and it has not been possible to point to any specific action there, although they are certainly grouped and perhaps even massed in position to attack. 2. The King told Len he estimated PL/VM strength in the area of the operation considerably higher than the 3 PL battalions we had estimated. Based on these two points, we flagged to Len the possible necessity for caution in carrying out the operation. We have not had their reply to the second point. In addition, to these two points, there are the following: 3. As a result of the delay, the Communists have had even more time to figure out their next move and deploy for it. In a sense, this does not change our assumptions at the time we approved the operation, but it does underscore this concern. Our best guess is that they would respond by attacking Muong Soui and, although the Thai have moved significant artillery and 200 men to assist there, I would suppose that it remained true that Muong Soui could not be held against a determined attack. We also remain concerned about a possible threat to Attopeu in view of the withdrawal of the Group Mobile, even though it has been replaced by other units that are less good. 4. We have informed the Canadians and British quite fully about the operation, and the French have picked it up in Vientiane from the Lao. The Indians also apparently know about it, and their Ambassador is sympathetic. Thus we have done some insulating against diplomatic reactions, but the French we have regarded as not open to much persuasion. In these exchanges, the only demurring voice has been that of the Canadians, who expressed the fear that the operation would hit the Communists on a particularly sensitive nerve because of the association of the Route 13/7 road junction with their 1961 success, and that the Communists would immediately attack Muong Soui with plausible justification. Despite this worry—which we do not share on the first point—[ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. The French, however, will certainly blame it at once on Souvanna and on us and re-double all their pressures. 5. There have been recurring reports of personal differences among the various Lao generals. We did not assume that there would be perfect coordination, but the picture between the lines sounds rather worse than our expectations. The net of all this does not point, in my judgment, to any change in our basic decision to support the operation. 4 Even a limited success would lift morale and could create much better and more defensible government-held areas. On the other hand, what we may well want to consider is whether we should move fairly strongly to urge caution on Souvanna and perhaps on the individual key military leaders. If they restrict our attempted advances, which would be the likely result from a military standpoint in any event, they will not weaken the defense of Muong Soui significantly. If, however, they get possessed with a “gung-ho” spirit, the forces could end up all over the place to very little purpose and leave Muong Soui more weakly defended. Until we have Unger’s judgment, I would not urge a decision on this, but I do think that you could join in what Mac may suggest, i.e., a medium-level hard look at the whole thing tomorrow morning. 5 William P. Bundy 6 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, July/Dec 1964. Secret. 2 Lunch with President Johnson, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, 2 to 4:20 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found. 3 Telegram 40 to Vientiane, July 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 In a July 14 memorandum to Bundy Green agreed with the views expressed by Bundy, but thought that the Pathet Lao were unlikely to attack Muong Soui because their traditional pattern of aggression was to bite and digest. The recent mammoth bite of the Plain of Jars required considerable digestion. Furthermore bad weather and T–28 attacks had “fouled up” Pathet Lao offensive capacity. Green feared that the Pathet Lao would not attack, but rather use the FAR operation to charge that the United States and Thailand were breaking the Geneva Accords by supporting Operation Triangle. (Ibid., POL 31–1 LAOS–US) 5 The meeting apparently took place at 3:30 p.m., July 15, see Document 111 . 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 111. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 111. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, July 15, 1964. I–26277/64 SUBJECT Operation Triangle—“Second Thoughts” I met with Mac and Bill Bundy this afternoon 2 to discuss their “second thoughts” about Operation Triangle. Our thoughts ran along the following lines: 1. “Triangle” is going probably July 19 or 20 or soon thereafter. 2. [ 2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 3. The Bundys are worried about Operation Triangle because (a) delay allowed improved PL preparations, (b) unconfirmed reports of VM battalions in Rts 13/7 area are frightening, (c) leaks of plans “to the barrooms of Vientiane,” (d) loss of “cover” since the PL do not appear to be attacking Muong Soui, (e) excessive bickering among the Lao generals, (f) larger-than-expected US-attache participation (11 Americans) in [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] artillery and Lao ground operations, 3 and (g) the wet weather, which will hamper artillery movements and T–28 operations in support of offensive actions. 4. Bill Bundy will draft a cable to ask Unger—after assuring him that we will still support Triangle—whether, in view of the “new facts” (especially the “offensive” appearance of Triangle) the Operation couldn’t be (a) tempered or (b) cancelled. 4 His pitch to Souvanna might be that the plan (and its leak) has already served its purpose—viz., defending Muong Soui. (It must be borne in mind, of course, that the Thai may be harder than the Lao to “turn off.”) It would be made clear that, in any event, we should see that the Operation is touted as defensive. 5. My judgment is that we are too far from the facts and the scene to tamper with this fragile little operation. However, I see no objection to asking Unger his opinion. John T. McNaughton 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381 (9 Apr 64), Laos Operations. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw it. 2 The proposed agenda of the July 15 meeting is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 7/64. 3 CIA is undertaking to see that US personnel are briefed on how to extricate themselves and that the possibility helo evacuation is examined. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 Document 112 . 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, July 16, 1964, 8:57 p.m. 55. Joint State/Defense message. Ref: Vientiane 101 and 102. 2 1. Vientiane’s 102 delayed in transmission. In meantime we had reviewed whole status Operation Triangle with eye to elements changed since we decided to support operation (Deptels 1267 and 1270). 3 We fully agree operation well past point of no return and no thought here of changing our decision. 2. Nonetheless, believe it would be helpful for you to have points that emerged here: a. Military situation in operational area itself appears slightly less favorable to anything like full success. Delay has advanced us further into rainy season than Kouprasith and Kong Le originally thought desirable (our June 26 telecon) 4 and our analysis photography Route 13 and Route 7 indicates PL have number fairly tough defensive positions and may well have had time to add considerable mining and road block obstacles. We had always realized condition of roads would probably prevent forward movement of artillery after opening phase and that T–28’s would be relied upon, and July experience would suggest that T–28’s would generally be able to operate successfully but may have periods where weather prevents. Our information does not support King’s concern of significantly larger number of PL/VM battalions, but as suggested Embtel 101 there does seem to be possibility some reinforcement through countryside from Sam Neua area or possibly by limited airlift observing radio silence. b. On other hand, defense of Muong Soui has clearly been strengthened and we here would suppose it could now be held unless PL/VM bring to bear considerably larger forces than now appear to be deployed directly east of Muong Soui. Artillery balance now appears favorable with Thai in place, and our estimate is that T–28 attacks have had major effect on friendly morale and have also impaired PL supply operations. Also advance of rainy season impairs additional buildup and tends to limit scale of attack. c. Although we of course fully anticipated your need for increased attache personnel, number now assigned to Muong Soui plus plan to have both one AARMA and one AIRLO with each advancing column does add up to somewhat greater US exposure than we had fully taken in at time operation approved. d. Fact that PL/VM have been lying low opposite Muong Soui, plus Reuters and NCNA stories, have made it far more difficult maintain rationale operation is really defensive in support of Muong Soui. We note line proposed your second para. Embtel 102 5 and agree and will fully support here by taking position that operation is defensive even if Muong Soui is not attacked. We of course hope further disclosures plus Lao tendency play operation up can be kept to minimum. However, at best international appearances now likely be somewhat worse than we had hoped when operation approved. e. It follows from point (d) above that PL/VM might consider they would be in pretty defensible international position if they retaliated sharply either at Muong Soui or perhaps against Attopeu or elsewhere, thus raising chances of such action in areas where we would have great difficulty countering it without major moves. As you know, we have been reluctant to be drawn into major escalation of Lao fighting at this point and have also been concerned that major operations would throw off any possibility of Polish-type negotiating track and perhaps sharply increase pressures for an immediate Geneva conference. British have been fully briefed and have not expressed concern, but we cannot be sure how they would react if ante raised, and Indian and Soviet positions would certainly be doubtful. We take French sabotage for granted. f. Fact that RLG has managed to carry out operation to this point and particularly to strengthen Muong Soui defenses while carrying out continuing effective T–28 attacks may have somewhat diminished need for clear-cut prestige victory to maintain neutralist and rightist morale and avoid excessive rightist pressures on Souvanna. 3. We repeat above factors do not in our judgment indicate that operation should not proceed or that we should consider changing our decision to support it. At the same time, however, we believe that increase in international risks and difficulties does warrant consideration our making effort to impress on Lao, and say also to Thai, that we believe operation should be carried out in a controlled manner. 6 As we see it from analysis your reports, even limited success would do a great deal to assure maintenance of Lao morale and support for Souvanna’s position, while an effort that does not take into account need to maintain adequate defensive posture might weaken the now relatively secure defenses of Muong Soui and lead to a military reverse which the PL/VM may be in a pretty strong position to argue was simply in retaliation for an unprovoked government offensive. 4. If Vientiane generally concurs in above analysis you are authorized draw on points under paras. 2 and 3 above and with Souvanna and appropriate Lao generals, while of course continuing to assure our support on agreed lines. Bangkok should await Vientiane reaction and report whether approach made and if so review status with appropriate RTG officials in same manner. We understand both Vientiane and Bangkok have already made clear limits our contingency actions as defined Deptel 1267. 5. As to last para. Embtel 102, 7 possible differences in approach based on high visibility Operation Triangle as compared to tendency both by third countries and Communist side regard Corridor as separate problem as to which long-standing violations of Accords pretty well accepted on all sides. Recent increased VC activity in northern areas SVN may also make action Corridor areas both more urgent and more defensible. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy; cleared with McGeorge Bundy, Trueheart, and McNaughton; cleared in substance with Rusk and Forrestal; and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Bangkok and repeated to Saigon, MACV, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 In telegrams 101 and 102 from Vientiane, July 15 and 16, the Embassy estimated that enemy strength inside the Operation Triangle area was three Pathet Lao battalions with North Vietnamese cadres. The Embassy was guardedly optimistic about the operation and urged that the Department put aside its concerns and support it. (Both ibid.) 3 Documents 104 and 107 . 4 See footnote 3, Document 104 . 5 In this paragraph, the Embassy suggested that neutralist pockets around Muong Kassy and Sala Phou Kou could be induced to ask for relief from Pathet Lao pressures, reminding international public opinion of the defensive nature of the operation and the fact that the neutralists had just as much right to be there as the Pathet Lao. 6 In telegram 126 from Vientiane, July 20, the Embassy stated it was “on the same wave length” as the Department on Operation Triangle except for the idea that it should be carried out in “controlled manner.” Lao lethargy, lack of organization and follow-through might well make the operation too “controlled,” that is piecemeal and only a minimal success. In telegram 64 to Vientiane, July 20, the Department responded that what it meant by “controlled manner” was that the operation should not expose the RLG/neutralist troops to destructive counterattack by the PL/NVN forces. (Both Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 7 In this paragraph the Embassy asked why the Department of State was not as concerned about South Vietnamese cross border operations in the Laos corridor as it was about aiding the Lao in defense of their own soil. 113. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 113. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 23, 1964. SUBJECT Situation in Laos In response to your request for a summary of the general problem treated in Vientiane’s 138 (attached): 2 1. Unger’s cable is a comment on CINCPAC’s recommendations 3 to the JCS for stepped-up U.S. actions in conjunction with Operation Triangle. 2. These recommendations largely parallel a package sent to Secretary McNamara by the JCS on June 27 and July 9. 4 McNamara has taken no action as yet on the JCS recommendations, pending the slow and unsteady unfolding of Operation Triangle. 3. In addition to measures urged for the defense of Muong Soui (provision of additional C–123’s and Caribou, logistic support, Air America pilots for T–28s, napalm, and reconnaissance support), the JCS recommendations included preparations for the following “contingency operations in Southeast Asia”: (a) Air strikes by U.S. aircraft against appropriate PL/VM targets in Laos. (b) Defense of the Mekong cities, using appropriate U.S. forces in conjunction with Thai forces. (c) Low-level reconnaissance and air strikes by U.S. aircraft against appropriate private targets in North Vietnam. 4. Both State and DOD are informally agreed that insofar as these recommendations look to increased U.S. involvement, they should be deferred for the present. Given the relative speed with which we can deploy our forces if necessary, we have decided on no advance deployment. We are opposed to the use of U.S. pilots. 5. As you know, the chief question of the day has concerned the use of napalm against enemy positions on Phou Kout hill near Muong Soui. 5 In order not to jeopardize British efforts to keep the Polish proposal alive, we have “suspended consideration” of the use of napalm at Phou Kout. 6. We are attempting to meet Unger’s needs without resorting to American pilots by arranging for additional Thai pilots; and we are locating and earmarking additional transport aircraft. 7. Meanwhile, Operation Triangle may possibly move into high gear tomorrow or Saturday when our boys encounter their first enemy road blocks. JCT 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XII, Memos, 7/64. Top Secret. 2 Dated July 22, not attached. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 Transmitted in CINCPAC telegram 180313Z, July 17. (Department of Defense, OSD Historian’s Files, Secretary of Defense’s Cable File, Tiger, Oplan 34 A, etc., July 1964) 4 For the June 27 package, see Document 103 . The plan is also outlined in JCS telegram 7146 to CINCPAC, July 29. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. I, Muong Soui—Operation Triangle, 6/64–7/64) 5 In a memorandum to William Bundy, July 23, Assistant Legal Adviser for the Far East Carl F. Salans suggested it would be a mistake to use napalm in Laos. It was an escalatory step out of proportion to the conventional measures employed by the PL/NVN forces and would weaken the case that the operation was defensive. Salans also worried over bombing errors resulting in attacks on nearby small villages. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–10 LAOS) 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, July 26, 1964, 3:17 p.m. 627. London should deliver following letter earliest Monday morning. “Dear Rab: I am writing to give you our reactions to the Soviet note on Laos 2 before you sit down with your staff prior to your departure Monday evening. 3 We are not wholly surprised at the Soviet move. They have for some time shown themselves sensitive to the ChiCom and/PL objections to the various Polish proposals, and I am sure are strongly inclined to try to find an excuse to wash their hands of Laos. We would assume the Soviets are far less concerned about actually having a conference than they are with finding some means to withdraw from a difficult and deteriorating situation, and the timing of their move just before their talks with you seems to support this view. Although we have continually impressed on them the importance on US-Soviet relations of their following through on the Kennedy-Khrushchev undertakings going back to June of 1961, this has probably been a weakening factor in their thinking. However, I am sure you would agree, that it is vital not to let them get away either with a call for a 14-nation conference without preconditions or with giving up their role as co-chairman. The unhelpful noises from Paris during the week simply underscore the latter point, and I am sure that you would agree that a Soviet withdrawal at this point would leave us with no negotiating track except for the increasingly mischievous initiatives of DeGaulle. The obvious answer still seems to us to be to get some acceptable variant of the Polish proposals off the ground. On this the Soviet note is clearly weak and indeed contrary to the facts, as you are in a particularly strong position to bring home to them. Far from there being any objection by the Western powers to the Polish proposals (not stated in the note to us but clearly implied, and actually stated orally by the Soviet Charge in handing over the note), the objections have come wholly from the PL, with the ChiComs and Hanoi behind them, and you well recall that Trevelyan was prepared with our consent to be highly forthcoming on the wording of invitations under the original Polish proposal. The only possible Western action to which the Soviets could point would be our delay of a very few days in this late May period, and this was surely entirely reasonable in view of the novelty and implications of the proposals. I would suggest that this be your main line with the Soviets, coupled with the strongest possible stress that for them to abandon their Co-Chairman role would be not only a drastic and unwarranted rejection of an obligation freely assumed but could very seriously increase the chances of the situation getting out of hand. I am sure you can ring the changes on this theme forcefully, and I would like your judgment on whether and when it would be useful for us to chime in with a forceful reply along the same lines. Our instinct would be to do so while you are still in Moscow, but to leave the opening guns to you. I know that in any case you will leave the Soviets in no doubt whatever that we would not accept any 14-nation conference without the satisfaction of Souvanna Phouma’s preconditions, and I am sure you would be taking the position that you would not join as co-chairman in the issuing of any such invitations. The Soviets may, however, seek to assert that such preconditions are invalid either because of the April events or because of the military operations of Souvanna Phouma, including his imminent offensive against the area of routes 13 and 7. You can of course refute any arguments based on the April events, and the Soviets know well what we did at that time, and indeed how closely we worked with them as well as with you. Ambassador Hopson’s report on the Soviet Charge’s recent remarks at a dinner in support of Souvanna and his neutralist position, which did not include any reference to a conference, 4 might also be referred to. You might well add that the Soviet refusal to participate in the Article 4 consultations makes their reference to the April events particularly specious. On the military operation, you will have noted Souphanouvong’s protest of July 23 5 and the Soviets might well latch onto this. I think Ambassador Hopson has been kept fully posted on all aspects of this action, and we have filled you in here on the degree of support we are giving and why we felt impelled to support the operation. For purposes of discussion with the Soviets, I should think the line to take would be that any operation now pending is a fully justified defensive measure to relieve the continuing PL pressure on Muong Soui, and that in any case the area involved—as Souphanouvong himself has stated—was jointly held in 1962 by the neutralists and NLHX, with the neutralists later driven out by the NLHX. We would hope you would stress above all that in any case the first blow was clearly struck by the PL May offensive in the Plaine des Jarres, and that PL withdrawal there would resolve the problem on the ground and prepare the way immediately, at least in this respect, for a wider conference. I might add, but not for discussion with the Soviets, that if the present offensive should succeed, the way might be open for a territorial trade of mutual withdrawals or of both sides holding to what they then had. But it is surely premature to get into such possibilities. They might well arise during the course of any Polish-type discussions as part of some arrangement that would seek to restore the military and political situations, while of course also providing for fully effective ICC operations. I realize that it will be an extremely difficult task for you to get the Soviets turned around during your stay in Moscow. They may come up with difficult counter-proposals, and it will certainly be necessary for us to keep in the closest possible touch with you. I am of course copying this message to Moscow so that Ambassador Kohler will be available to you at all times. It may also be useful for us to talk further prior to your departure for Moscow tomorrow and I shall be available if you wish to telephone me. I am also repeating this message to Vientiane and instructing our Ambassador to urge Souvanna to adhere to his position and to make a strong reply to Souphanouvong’s protest. With warm regards. Sincerely, Dean Rusk” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis, Drafted by William Bundy; cleared in draft with Green, Trueheart, Barbis, and Sol Polansky of EUR/SOV; and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Moscow and Vientiane, and repeated to Paris, Ottawa, New Delhi, Warsaw, Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 The Soviet note, July 26, stated that in the face of flagrant violations of the 1962 Geneva Accords, there must be a 14-nation conference on Laos or the Soviet Union would have to reconsider its role as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. The translation of the note is in circular telegram 160, July 26. (Ibid.) The memorandum of a July 26 conversation between Soviet Charge Georgi M. Kornienko and Ball, during which the note was delivered, is ibid. 3 July 27. 4 Not further identified. 5 To the Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, protesting against Operation Triangle. (Telegram 161 from Vientiane, July 23; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 115. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (Sullivan) to Secretary of State Rusk 115. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (Sullivan) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 27, 1964. SUBJECT Week-end Developments in Vietnam and Laos Proposal for Air Operations in the Laos Panhandle We cabled Ambassador Unger yesterday a description of possible air strikes against Ho Chi Minh Trail targets in the Laos Panhandle area and asked him whether he thought he could sell this idea to Souvanna Phouma. 2 Unger replied this morning that either GVN or joint GVN-U.S. air attacks on the Laos Panhandle would probably be unacceptable to Souvanna Phouma, who regards the Ho Chi Minh Trail as Vietnam’s problem and not his. Souvanna Phouma would argue that we should do more in the Plaine des Jarres and even attack North Vietnam rather than put him in the position of having to accept air attacks by South Vietnam on the southern part of Laos. Unger also believes that such air attacks would trigger further escalation and upset the Geneva Accords. (Vientiane’s 170, attached) 3 We repeated the proposal for air attacks on the Panhandle to Ambassador Taylor for his personal information. We have not yet had his reaction to the proposal as such, 4 although he did apparently refer to the idea in the most general terms while he was talking to Khanh in Dalat yesterday. Operation Triangle—Laos Today’s reports indicate that the joint FAR/Neutralist three-pronged movement of troops to secure the area at the junction of Routes 7 and 13 (the east-west road across the Plaine des Jarres from North Vietnam and the north-south road linking Vientiane with Luang Prabang) has started. The forces coming up from Vang Vieng in the south have attacked two Pathet Lao villages and appear to have taken them. The forces from the north and east are moving, but have as yet met no opposition. It is too early to say whether Operation Triangle will be in any sense successful, but it seems to have produced a strong political reaction from Souphanouvong, who has complained about it to the co-chairmen. In the meantime, the Soviets have told us that they are going to insist on a 14-nation Geneva Conference on Laos and have threatened to quit as co-chairmen unless we accept. The British Foreign Secretary is on his way to Moscow, where he will discuss Southeast Asia with Gromyko and possibly Khrushchev. Our position at this point is that we will not go to a conference unless the Pathet Lao withdraw to their positions in the Plaine des Jarres as of May 16. If Operation Triangle is successful, however, there might be the makings of a compromise in the event we wanted to find one. [Here follows information on internal developments in South Vietnam, with the exception of the fact that Taylor raised the issue of joint studies of initiatives against North Vietnam and the Laos panhandle, which took Khanh by surprise. Khanh was reportedly keen on the idea and agreed to think it over.] 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jul/Dec 1964. Top Secret. Sent through William Bundy. 2 Transmitted in telegram 89 to Vientiane, July 26. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3 Not attached, but printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 579 – 582 . 4 Taylor’s response was in telegram 236 from Saigon, July 27, ibid., pp. 582 – 583 . He did not feel any great urgency and recommended that action be delayed until he could produce a joint plan for the attacks with Khanh. 116. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 116. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Laos Contingency Actions: For Your Luncheon Meeting with the President With Operation Triangle now underway (in its own fashion), we have three outstanding proposals for action. We have discussed these with Defense, and believe they should not be undertaken or authorized at this moment. However, the situation could develop fast, and I should think it might be wise for us to discuss them with the President at the luncheon. With respect to Vietnam, Ambassador Taylor seems to have got Khanh cooled off for the moment, and the latest reading on military morale (Saigon 235) 2 is somewhat reassuring—at least if one assumes that we can ever read the Vietnamese mind clearly. Thus, we are in a “wait-and-see” period on Vietnam, although I think we must recognize that the nerves of Khanh and others have frayed to a greater extent than ever before and are likely to do so again over the next 2–3 months. Lao Contingency Actions The status of these is: a. Unger has asked for standing authority to use the Air America pilots in T–28’s at any time. He argues that an emergency may arise very rapidly and not permit him to appeal to Washington. His arguments (Vientiane 165) 3 are based on annoying but possibly inescapable facts about the use of Lao [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] pilots. Possibly we could place greater pressure on the Lao to use their transport pilots in T–28’s, and we should try this out on Unger. Assuming it does not work, I would agree with Defense that we should be negative on any standing authority—but at the same time the situation may compel us to give this authority rapidly if the situation becomes serious. b. Operation Against Route 7. Unger has been urging this for some time, with a proposal for Air America pilots using the A1H’s out of Vietnam. Although the JCS came out for this (in what was reported to be a lukewarm fashion), we have all felt that the better way to do this would be through the Air America pilots in T–28’s. Latest photography shows substantial anti-aircraft along Route 7, so the operation is a risky one at any time. I have agreed with Defense that we should continue to be negative for the time being. But again should have this one as a possible response if the situation becomes serious. A further alternative way to carry this out would be through a “suppressive” recon strike with our own aircraft: again there would be risks. c. Advance guard elements into Thailand. JCS and CINCPAC have urged that this be done at the time Operation Triangle kicks off. Secretary McNamara has gone into it in detail and concluded that any added air deployments are not needed and that greater deployments would convey a stronger signal than is warranted by the saving of 6–24 hours in reaction time if it should become necessary to introduce forces into Thailand. I agree with this judgment—but again I think the President should be aware that a deployment to Thailand may become an urgent issue if the military situation becomes serious. I would myself bet a fairly substantial sum that we will be carrying out a deployment to Thailand before the fall, either to stabilize the Lao situation or because of developments in Vietnam—and John McNaughton tends to agree. I suspect strongly the Thai would go along under present circumstances, and might indeed welcome it at the appropriate time. Laos Negotiations Butler has indicated (London 440) 4 that the British are going to play their hand in Moscow by proposing invitations to a 14-nation conference with the preconditions written in. I am a little startled at this, as we had urged that a variant of the Polish proposals be the opening gambit. I cannot but suspect Butler is working to weaken the preconditions to meet Soviet objections, and we may have to work fast on this depending on the reports we get of Butler’s first conversations. In the last analysis, we can always block a 14-nation conference by refusing to attend, assuming we can hold Souvanna to this position, but I think we are in for a worrisome period. The Polish proposals are still by far the best bet, but I am not sanguine that Butler and the Soviets will get together on them. This uncertainty about the existence of an acceptable negotiating track underscores the importance of possible measures to stabilize the military situation on the basis of whatever Operation Triangle is able to achieve. Underlyingly, we may be moving willy-nilly toward a partition in Laos, which has advantages and disadvantages. William P. Bundy 5 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jul/Dec 1964. Secret. Bundy’s handwritten note on the source text indicates it was probably dated July 28. 2 Dated July 28. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S) 3 Dated July 26. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 4 Dated July 27. (Ibid.) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 117. Memorandum for the Record 117. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, July 28, 1964. [Here follows discussion unrelated to Laos.] 3. Ball then reported on Laos and South Vietnam. He indicated there was little action in Laos. The neutralist/rightist drive had begun. It was too early to detect results. The men were moving on foot through difficult terrain, but he intimated that we could expect a favorable result. He had no particular view on the political situation within Laos, indicating a wait-and-see attitude. He commented on Butler’s trip to Moscow, 2 stating that the British and the United States were in agreement concerning the terms of a summit conference. He indicated no change in U.S. attitudes or the “pre-conditions” for a 14-nation Geneva Conference. He stated that Khrushchev obviously was tired of the whole affair and wanted to extricate himself from any responsibility in fear that Laos might and Southeast Asia might break out into a more serious situation. With respect to South Vietnam Ball added very little to what is known. He commented on the “go north” attitude of Khanh but felt that General Taylor’s plan for some “joint planning” would calm things down for the time being. 4. Rusk stated that any change in attitude with respect to U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, including expanding the war in a manner suggested by the JCS, or any other “new look” in Southeast Asia must await the outcome of the Butler talks. He therefore dismissed any consideration of JCS plans. 5. McNamara reviewed the losses in South Vietnam, briefly reciting figures of the rising casualties, the increased rate of incidents and other difficulties. He made no statement concerning the “trend of the war.” He agreed with Rusk that no action should be taken at the present time. 6. General Wheeler then said that JCS had considered three courses of action. He precisely stated the actions. He paralleled those contained in the Board of National Estimates memorandum. 3 They involved air strikes in the Laos corridor, which he stated would “hamper but not stop” the infiltration. Secondly the intrusion into the corridor by SVN ground units and he made the same estimate concerning the effect of this. Third, the extension of the war to modest bombing of North Vietnam by unidentified and unmarked South Vietnam planes with SVN pilots. He presented this as an extension of 34–A. He estimated that this would involve no particular escalation of the war and no rise in threat from NVN. He therefore did not advocate a deployment of U.S. units, either ground units, air units or the fleet to strategic locations in Southeast Asia; namely, Clark Field, Thailand, etc. He stated that the Chiefs did not want to take such a move which would have the effect of tying up these units on a stand-by basis with no active mission and hence there would be a rapid deterioration of morale and great criticism at home. Throughout the discussion by Rusk, McNamara and Wheeler the plan to send additional advisors to South Vietnam was mentioned without comment or explanation. It was accepted that since General Taylor wanted these additional men they should be furnished to him. Wheeler reviewed the triangle operation in Laos, explained why it was going very slow, but did not seem concerned because of the difficulties and the terrain. Harriman spoke of the use of the napalm explaining why we felt it should not be used in the PDJ and why the request of Souvanna was denied. Harriman thought napalm was a “sensitive” weapon and that its use would bring violent reaction from the Soviets and the Chinese Communists and would probably add to the pressure for a Geneva Conference on terms not desired by the United States. The President then asked my views and those of CIA. I stated that we had no disagreement with the reports on the situation in South Vietnam and Laos. The situation in SVN was fragile but we could not detect a coalescence of the dissident forces opposed to Khanh and while Khanh was discouraged, we felt there was a better than even chance that he would survive for the next several months. (Note: This point was mentioned briefly in the meeting, elaborated on at the luncheon meeting. 4 ) I then said that we had reviewed the three courses of action proposed by the Joint Chiefs. 5 Obviously courses one and two against Laos could not be considered in view of Unger’s understandable opposition, which I understood had been accepted by State and JCS. (Note: JCS specifically referred to this in their written report.) There seemed to be no disagreement that Unger’s position was valid. I then said with respect to the third course of action, the North Vietnamese response would be totally dependent upon the level of activity. An occasional bombing would probably be met in response by increased activity of one sort or another in South Vietnam, such as VC moves, acts of terrorism, etc. If the bombing increased in level of activity and the NVN felt a vital interest were threatened, we might see a deployment of air defense units, such as MIG–17’s and 19’s from Communist China. These indeed might be flown by ChiComs. We saw no reason to deploy military units to strategic locations, such as the Philippines or Thailand, unless and until a relatively substantial effort was programmed against NVN, which would lead the NVN and the ChiComs to feel that they were being really threatened. The meeting adjourned after about 45 minutes. There were no policy matters to discuss. The purpose of the meeting was merely to report to the NSC. 1 Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, 1/4/64–4/28/65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary on July 29. Bromley Smith also prepared an account of this meeting. (Ibid., National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 9, 7/28/65) 2 See Document 116 and footnote 4 thereto. 3 See the July 28 memorandum from McCone to the President in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 585 – 587 . These three actions as described by McCone were: category 1: air raids on the panhandle by the VNAF, possibly using napalm, and possibly augmented by Farmgate; category 2: ground force cross-border operations by GVN units up to a battalion and perhaps accompanied by U.S. advisers; and category 3: limited airstrikes against military and transportation targets in North Vietnam by unmarked planes flown by non-U.S. air crews. 4 Reference is to a luncheon meeting with the President at the White House at 1 p.m. after the NSC meeting which Rusk, McCone, and McNamara attended. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of this meeting has been found. 5 The JCS courses of action are in JCSM–639–64 to NcNamara, July 27, in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 583 – 585 . The JCS courses of action were described in abbreviated form by McCone in his memorandum to the President, see footnote 3 above. 118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, August 1, 1964. 316. Please deliver to Gromyko following message from President to Khrushchev: Begin Verbatim Text: Dear Mr. Chairman: I write with regard to the Soviet statement on the deteriorating situation in Laos which was handed to the Under Secretary of State on July 26. 2 You will have seen the United States response given to your Charge d’Affaires on July 30. 3 While I believe that latter adequately covers the points of substance involved, I should like personally to express my concern over the suggestion in the Soviet statement that the USSR would be compelled to examine its role as Co-Chairman under the Geneva Agreements if its proposal for a conference is not accepted. I realize that the task of the Co-Chairmen has been an onerous and largely thankless one. The same may be said of most activities which we carry out to keep the peace. I know the importance which you, Mr. Chairman, attach to this responsibility, and I recall your statement of July 8: “To insure stable peace, to rid mankind of the menace of thermonuclear war, peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems—these are the noble goals for which the Soviet Government is fighting resolutely in the international arena.” 4 With regard to Laos, the Soviet Union together with the UK, has accepted, through the Geneva Agreements of 1962, a special responsibility with respect to those Agreements. It is a responsibility which I believe the whole world expects the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to discharge, even though there may be frustrations at times. As President Kennedy’s successor, I have a special duty to urge that the Soviet Union persevere in this task which is so important to the possibility of a peaceful solution of the problem. The understanding which you and President Kennedy reached at Vienna in June 1961 laid the basis for the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos. As you know, we have regarded this understanding as a demonstration that it is possible for the two of us, despite disagreements on some important questions, to cooperate to keep the peace in the mutual interest of both sides. We have not been opposed in principle to a new conference on Laos. But I would remind you that there has not been the slightest hint or indication that Hanoi and Peiping would come to such a conference with the idea of giving full effect to the Agreements reached in 1962. This is why we have supported Prince Souvanna Phouma’s so-called “preconditions;” surely they constitute the most minimum indication that such a conference could meet with any prospect of success. Finally, it seems to me that we should not reach a point where diplomacy admits there is nothing else to do. Discussions continue about the possibility of a meeting of Laotian leaders. We do not believe, further, that the Polish proposals should be abandoned. In other words, it is my view that we should make further attempts to bring about full compliance with the Geneva Agreements. If our joint efforts are to have any chance of success, it seems to me necessary that the Soviet Union continue to accept its responsibility as Co-Chairman. In this most recent period, our two governments can derive encouragement from the fact that we have achieved two important agreements, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Geneva Agreements on Laos. 5 Looking toward the future, it seems to me that it is of great importance that we demonstrate that such agreements can be effective and fully sustained. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson End of Verbatim Text . Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential; Priority; Exdis; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Trueheart, the White House, and Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; and approved by Rusk. 2 See footnote 2, Document 114 . 3 The text of the response is in circular telegram 186, June 30. The conversation between Rusk and Kornienko on July 30, when the Secretary handed the Soviet Charge the note, is in a memorandum of conversation, July 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS and POL 27–14 LAOS, respectively) 4 The source for this quote has not been identified. 5 For texts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1032–1037 and ibid., 1962, pp. 1075–1083, respectively. 119. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 119. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, August 3, 1964. 219. Deptel 110. 2 In trying to look ahead and chart course for next several months we have military and political programs to follow which inevitably inter-relate and interact on each other in obvious ways, nevertheless I will discuss them separately. Common background for both is assumption that if possible we would still prefer to realize something along lines Geneva solution mapped out 1962 and that our current firmer words and actions are undertaken in hope they may bring PL, North Vietnamese, and Chinese into line. If this fails then we will still be seeking equilibrium in which Souvanna and his government could continue survive and hopefully improve situation until opportunity (such as might come with Vietnamese settlement) opened up for working toward lasting solution, although stronger application force may be required to assure such equilibrium maintained. Is possibility our actions here may meanwhile be deeply affected by requirements of Vietnam situation. Military Immediate tasks in this field are to consolidate gains Operation Triangle and to firm up defenses of Muong Soui by taking Phou Kout, perhaps Phou Keng and other similar defensive moves. Generally concur in analysis of current situation set forth refDeptel. We must surely also reach understanding with Souvanna Phouma and military here as to what are their goals in foreseeable future. Optimism and overconfidence engendered by recent success has stimulated loose talk of retaking PDJ, cleaning out northwest (see A–45), 3 combined ground-air operation on Tchepone, etc. US statements about support and our readiness let down some of past barriers and even engage US personnel in limited fashion have revived hopes of ever present “AAR party” in Laos, who would like to resume anti-Communist crusade of early 1960’s, casting aside Geneva Accords and counting on considerable US military and financial support. Therefore, we must now make abundantly clear we do not support goal retaking all Laos by force of arms or even quite justifiable objective of cleaning Viet Minh out of country. They should understand what we do support is steady strengthening of positions through political, social, economic as well as military programs, to be sure in first place this zone can be held securely. Meanwhile current efforts toward negotiated solution should be given full chance to work out equilibrium, conceivably with strengthened ICC or UN support. Once we and Lao understand each other on limits of our current military goals then we should study carefully what areas beyond those immediate tasks already mentioned deserve first priority treatment to assure solid defense of free Laos. Where else should there be carried through carefully prepared and well supported action such as Operation Triangle which would consolidate territory free Laos and make it easier defend without predictably provoking enemy reaction beyond power of national forces to contain? Given our special interests in corridor question this study should also consider what actions can be taken there. Without pretending to give any final or all-inclusive answers, following kinds of operations illustrate point: retake Tha Thom, retake Nhommarath and Mahaxay, secure triangle Pakse-Attopeu-Saravane, secure Mekong for traffic Ban Houei Sai-Luang Prabang-Vientiane, reestablish Meo in at least some of areas east of Xieng Khouang ville, etc. At same time also map out with Lao long range improvement plan for armed forces which could assure maintenance of order in country if there is no significant outside interference. This should envisage forces adapted to country’s terrain and lack of infra-structure and geared as far as possible to its financial possibilities over long run. Once plans for this long range improvement well underway (perhaps 9 months or a year hence) and assuming no successful negotiated settlement reached interim, then serious consideration can begin to be given to gradual reestablishment RLG authority throughout country. Realistically, however, not much can be accomplished in this direction until there is a settlement in Vietnam and North Vietnamese are ready to leave Laos. Political Immediate political goal is holding of tripartite meeting; preferably Switzerland. Admittedly we do not expect such meeting to achieve anything and we recognize in atmosphere of such a meeting there may be difficulties keeping Souvanna from making risky concession on his preconditions. Nevertheless, meeting offers only means of containing pressures for 14-nation conference, and at same time opportunity for establishing defensible basis for rejecting 14-nation conference when it clear PL will not meet Souvanna’s preconditions and, perhaps, will insist on entirely unacceptable status for him at conference. Tripartite meeting also gets Souvanna to Europe, after which refreshment he can probably be coaxed on to continue here for further indefinite period. If unexpectedly tripartite meeting “successful” in that PL meet preconditions then we will presumably be ready see 14-nation conference proceed. If not “successful” (or if it proves impossible convene tripartite meeting), as noted we have good case for rejecting that conference and perhaps no further action in international field need be contemplated for time being unless something can be devised which, unlike 14-nation conference, promises some improvement for us. If military situation still dangerous, this might be moment to turn to UN Security Council to put Lao problem and Communist violations Geneva Accords before world forum. Depending particularly on Soviet position at that time, this might be done in expectation some effective Security Council action or, more likely, for purpose of showing impossibility controlling situation through UN and thereby providing justification for intervention by SEATO powers or the like. Meanwhile in Vientiane there is ever present risk of Government being upset by one or other irresponsible group and of single voice commanding international respect which Souvanna now represents being dissipated into a confusion of extreme groups calling for massive military solution along lines of anti-Communist crusade with strong support from US, including ground forces as in past. It will be essential for us here to make clear that US support will not be forthcoming for such irresponsible groups. Foregoing military and political program rests on continuance what has been our settled line on Laos at least since 1961. Needless to say if because of Vietnam situation or other larger policy considerations basic lines of our thinking have been changed, then what is outlined above also would require modification. Plan is admittedly for immediate future, a limited policy which promises no full solution but which seeks to avoid either loss of free Laos (within about present limits) to Communists or substantial involvement of US forces in fighting in Laos. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Moscow, Warsaw, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, Bangkok, Saigon,CINCPAC, and USUN, and passed to the White House,DOD, and CIA. 2 In telegram 110 to Vientiane, July 31, the Department suggested that there was for the moment “a certain balance of force” in the critical north-central part of Laos. The PL/NVN forces would probably absorb the shock of Operation Triangle and wait to apply military counterpressure, especially in the face of enhanced T–28 capability and Thai support of the Royal Lao Government. If this analysis was correct, the Department thought it likely the PL would negotiate with Souvanna in a tripartite context looking toward a 14-nation conference. (Ibid.) 3 Dated July 28. (Ibid.) 120. Editorial Note 120. Editorial Note On August 10, 1964, Chester L. Cooper, who was detailed to the National Security Council Staff, sent a memorandum to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, outlining the results of the analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency of certain contingencies and the implications for U.S. foreign policy and national security. Cooper stated that he had asked the Agency to examine certain contingencies likely to occur in the near future. Included in the list of developments having “at least an even chance of occurring in the next few months” was the following: “b. Sharp Deterioration in Laos. The situation is so fragile that it could crumble in any of many ways. Two good possibilities are a strong PL/VM counteroffensive in response to Operation Triangle and/or a Rightist coup. However, a general Communist offensive in Laos (such as a sweep to the Mekong) is deemed unlikely in this period. (A Communist counteroffensive in the Muong Sui area would face the US with an immediate demand for greater US military involvement in Laos. A Rightist coup would send present US policy back to Square One.)” Bundy wrote “needs strong attention” next to this paragraph. At the end of the memorandum, he noted that Cooper’s memorandum “might be sent around, to a limited circle.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Cooper Memos) 121. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Other Posts 121. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Other Posts 1 Washington, August 13, 1964, 4:23 p.m. 281. Following is summary (based on Soviet Embassy translation) of Khrushchev’s August 7 reply to President’s August 1 letter transmitted Deptel 316 to Moscow (also rptd other addressees): 2 Khrushchev expresses appreciation for frankness President’s views and says he would also be frank. Situation in Laos cause for concern and for this reason Soviets proposed conference be held August. Khrushchev reaffirms Soviet support and observance agreement reached with President Kennedy at Vienna and Geneva Agreements which based on it. In reply to idea Soviet Union should bear special responsibility Laos and to call not to withdraw from Co-Chairmanship, what more can be added to Soviet statement July 26? Efforts as Co-Chairman constantly blocked by actions of others in violation Agreements. Must admit efforts Co-Chairmen remain fruitless. Recall that following Vientiane coup in April situation deteriorated further. Co-Chairmen made recommendations to restore situation, to renew cooperation three political forces. Nothing done to change situation. Hard to believe USG could not have exerted influence on Souvanna and Nosavan in order restore situation accordance Geneva Agreements. Increasingly obvious two not three political forces acting in Laos. “Souvanna Phouma has lost his identity, he has in fact ceased to be the representative of the neutralist forces.” Although you wrote in principle you do not object to new Geneva Conference US puts forth preconditions for such a conference and UK and others follow suit. This approach unrealistic. If one side insists on preconditions other can do same. For example one might demand Nosavan pull back his troops to previous positions. Or that situation be restored to that existing before coup. Such a view not unfounded. Such approach would clearly make impossible convening conference. Who is to say whose troops occupied what and when? Impracticable to advance preconditions you recommend. You write this is what Souvanna demands. Do not dispute but would say “from our standpoint such a demand merely confirms that Souvanna Phouma has recently drifted further away from the position of cooperation of the three political forces and has already ceased to express interests of the neutralist group which he represented earlier.” You also express doubt Hanoi and Peking will agree participate in 14-nation conference. They have said ready attend and even insist conference be convened urgently. Hope US will drop any preconditions and remove obstacles to convening conference on Laos. Otherwise Soviet Union will have to consider question relinquishing Co-Chairman’s functions since they have become anachronism, turned into fiction. Difficult view Lao question isolated from other regions of Southeast Asia. US measures escalating military operations in SVN as well as dangerous naval and air operations Gulf of Tonkin do not facilitate peaceful settlement Laos. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Barbis; cleared by Trueheart, Klein at the White House, and by Vladimir Toumanoff of EUR/SOV; and approved by Green. Sent to Moscow, London, Paris, Vientiane, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, New Delhi, Ottawa, Warsaw, Hong Kong, USUN, and CINCPAC. 2 Document 118 . 122. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 122. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 18, 1964. SUBJECT T–28/Helicopter incident in Laos At 3 AM today Cy Vance informed me that a T–28 with a Thai pilot was down in eastern Laos. The pilot had been seen to parachute, and air cover for a rescue operation was requested. Vance and I agreed that in the light of your judgment last week, this should be authorized, and a limited four-plane cover was approved for the remaining daylight hours (up to about 7 or 8 this morning, our time.) Meanwhile, Ambassador Unger, on his own initiative, authorized a T–28 napalm strike in support of the rescue, with civilian American pilots aboard for control and management. 2 In executing the attempted rescue, a U.S. helicopter with an American pilot was shot down. Fortunately the pilot and crew of this helicopter were rescued by another helicopter. One of the fighter pilots covering the operation flamed out over Thailand, but the pilot ejected and has been rescued in good condition. Finally, one of the T–28s covering the attempted rescue appears to have hit heavy weather in quite another sector of Laos. The plane is down but the pilot is believed to have parachuted safely. (The nationality of this pilot is Thai.) Meanwhile, it is believed that the two Thais in the original T–28 have escaped into the brush and may be in the hands of friendly Mao [Meo]tribesmen. The net of this somewhat messy operation is that no Americans are lost, as far as we know, although the one helicopter pilot has been severely wounded. Vance and I agree that T–28 operations and attendant contingency rescue planning need intense and immediate review, and that review is beginning. A particular problem is that Ambassador Unger authorized American civilian pilots in the T–28s against explicit Washington orders to the contrary. He was acting in an emergency situation, and it may well be that we have held him on too tight a guideline here, but a direct issue of action without authority does exist. Dean Rusk and I will try to bring you a more complete report on this aspect at lunch Wednesday. 3 McG. B. (1) There is now some doubt whether napalm was in fact used. (2) Both Unger and Washington will try to keep this whole episode under maximum security, because of the unusually high degree of U.S. involvement. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VI. Top Secret. The source text indicates that the President saw it. 2 As reported in telegram 314 from Vientiane, August 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) In telegram 171 to Vientiane, August 18, Rusk informed Unger that use of American pilots in T–28’s or other combat roles had to be authorized by Washington. Turn-around time of Flash messages could accomplish the process quickly. (Ibid.) 3 August 19. President Johnson met with Rusk, Ball, Vance, and McGeorge Bundy at 1:33 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found. 123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, August 20, 1964, 3 p.m. 485. Udorn August 18 meeting made considerable progress in sorting out various possibilities and problems associated with action in Laos panhandle. Bangkok represented by Ambassador Martin, Gen. Easterbrook, air attaché and CAS rep, Vientiane represented by Ambassador Unger, Col. Law, CAS representative, Col. Tyrell and political counselor. Alexis Johnson, general Deputy Sullivan and Jorgensen attended from Saigon. This cable summarizes conclusions and recommendations arrived at, indicating responsibilities agreed upon for follow-up actions. (1) [ 10 lines of source text not declassified ] (2) It was considered that intelligence emanating from Kha operations in southern panhandle, particularly on movements of VC personnel, units and material would be useful asset to feed directly into Vietnamese operational units along Lao-Vietnam frontier. When such intelligence adequately developed, CAS Vientiane will notify CAS Saigon, which will arrange with MACV to have direct communications linkage established from Kha teams to proper ARVN units. (3) Ambassador Unger agreed that shallow ground penetration by ARVN units would be acceptable into sparsely populated areas of Laos contemplated by ARVN JGS “bridgehead” east of Chavane and west of Dak Prou (this is I Corps area and middle bridgehead of three which ARVN has proposed). Penetrations would have to be limited to about twenty kilometers and should involve absolute minimum of air support or resupply. MACV will crank this acceptability factor into its plans on assumption operation could be conducted without active concurrence of RLG. (4) There was considerable discussion re feasibility larger scale operations on Route 9 into which “bridgehead” concept being discussed between MACV and JGS could be fitted. Concept discussed would contemplate Lao units, heavily assisted by Thai, moving eastward from Eno through Phalane, while another Lao unit (replacement for current Lao Bao volunteer battalion 33) heavily assisted by ARVN, moved west from Lao Bao putting squeeze on Muong Phine-Tchepone segment of Route 9. It was considered that such an exercise would hit Viet Minh/Pathet Lao in their most sensitive spot, and therefore large and instantaneous Viet Minh reaction would have to be anticipated. Such an operation would require the use of substantial forces up to two or three battalions and would also require close air support. Ambassador Unger stated that operations of this magnitude could not be hidden; that the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh would put heavy pressure on Souvanna and that unless US gave Souvanna a guarantee of support by US air and possibly ground forces, such an operation would be unacceptable in terms our relations with RLG. Ambassador Martin made same point with respect Thai participation. Consequently, we could not initiate such an action on a significant scale unless we were willing to give the Thai, the RLG and the GVN assurances that we would move in rapidly with US military support, either air or ground, or both, to extricate them from anything bigger than they could handle with their own resources. It was considered, how that the fact of planning by itself for such an operation, mutually conducted through US intermediation, but involving Thai, Vietnamese and some Lao participation, could have healthy repercussions, both on the present situation and for the longer future, and should therefore not be rejected. Moreover, some more limited actions in this region, involving Thai and Vietnamese encadrement, but not to exceed hit and run type operations, might prove feasible. MACV will examine this further with view making recommendations. (5) More limited ARVN ground operations near Route 9, of company size, probably airborne, and probably building on the Leaping Lena 2 experience, were also discussed. Ambassador Unger expressed considerable reservation about such plans as well as re larger GVN “bridgehead” plans in this area and doubted Souvanna would accept them under any foreseeable circumstances. He would, however, reserve definitive comment until he could examine specific proposals, such as those which might be mounted along the route from Route 9 to Muong Nong.MACV will prepare specific proposals which will be submitted for examination, including Embassy Vientiane. (6) In discussion possible air action in the panhandle, Embassy Vientiane reps reported that General Ma, Chief of Lao Air Force, has examined twenty military targets suggested by MACV, GVN, and CAS, in corridor area south Mugia Pass and expressed willingness attack them with Lao T–28 force. Was willing assign ten planes to this action, and felt that, with good weather, could accomplish task in ten days of operations. Because it is believed some of these targets are protected beyond capability of Lao pilots to penetrate, it was agreed that Embassy Vientiane would examine target list, designate those targets which it felt RLG capable of handling, and reserve remainder for Yankee Team to eliminate during armed “reconnaissance” missions. When such division of targeting completed, MACV, through second advon, will seek authorization for Yankee team strikes and will coordinate YT–RLG actions. MACV will also examine to see if there exists residual target requiring use VNAF and/or Farmgate. (9) In discussion RLG air capabilities, question arose re possible augmentation its current strength. Two methods were proposed (a) augmentation T–28 force by assignment remaining T–28’s now in Vietnam as soon as A–1–E’s arrive in country, (B) assignment VNAF aircraft (A–1–H) and pilots to Laos, [ 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Embassy Vientiane will study and make appropriate recommendations. In considering all the foregoing conclusions and recommendations, an effort was made to strike a balance between military desirability and political acceptability. Conferees were keenly aware of need to avoid precipitation of a major political debacle (such as resignation of Souvanna) by overzealous pursuit of conspicuous military actions which might, in practice, have only marginal benefits to situation in Vietnam. Therefore the scope of agreed operations (both ground and air) which was considered feasible fell short of this which would represent the most effective military action within the capability of friendly forces. Finally, however, it was recognized that even the maximum action of which currently available friendly forces would be capable probably falls considerably short of being truly effective as a military solution to the panhandle problem. Bangkok and Vientiane invited comment or correct foregoing summary. Taylor 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent priority to the White House, DOD, and CIA, and repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 Leaping Lena, code name for South Vietnamese Air Force air drops of South Vietnamese intelligence gathering teams along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 124. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 124. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, August 20, 1964. As I reported to Alice 2 by telephone, Marshall Green and John McNaughton are ready for an inter-departmental meeting on the Laos T–28 problem any time in the next day or so. Marshall suggests, however, that the two problems—general T–28 operations and SAR operations—might properly be separated in terms of (1) Unger’s incoming cable (Vientiane 337 attached) 3 requesting advance authorization for use of Air America pilots in T–28 SAR operations; and (2) the Department’s query to Vientiane (Deptel 174 attached) 4 asking for Unger’s comments on the more general problem of T–28 operations during the weeks ahead. Although State and DOD are perfectly willing to discuss both questions in the same meeting, Marshall’s inclination is to send out at once a favorable reply to Unger’s SAR request and to delay discussion of the general T–28 strike question until we have had Unger’s response 5 to our query. That response would provide a more solid basis for your proposed meeting. 6 Jim 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. IX, Memos, 8/64. Secret. 2 Alice Boyce, McGeorge Bundy’s secretary. 3 Dated August 20; not attached. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 Dated August 19; not attached. (Ibid.) 5 See Document 125 . 6 In an August 21 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy Thomson stated that Green felt that “we have accumulated a series of inter-related T–28 and SAR problems that should be examined together.” Green recommended an inter-departmental meeting on August 24 or 25. Bundy wrote a note on the memorandum agreeing to the meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. IX, Memos, 8/64) 125. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 125. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, August 20, 1964, 7 p.m. 338. Joint Embassy/AIRA/ARMA message. Deptel 174. 2 I do not see much prospect of reducing calls on US planes and personnel for SAR operations if we hope to exploit the advantages of our T–28 strike force in present military situation. SAR is a crucial factor in maintaining morale of pilots and there is no prospect at this juncture of establishing effective SAR procedures without use of both civilian (Air America) and US military personnel. See Embtel 337. 3 But we might be able to justify before US and international public use of military aircraft in attempt rescue downed American military fliers (e.g. Yankee team) while withholding use jet fliers for rescue RLAF or Thai pilots. I am convinced, however, that such distinction would seriously cripple morale of Thais, who have borne far greatest brunt of air operations in PDJ area, and of AA pilots, who regularly expose themselves to great risks. Even if Muong Soui area is stabilized and no counter-attacks in PL occur there, or elsewhere, we still foresee need maintain military pressure against PL, e.g., Route 7, Thatom and panhandle, in which T–28s must play important role. Moreover we must maintain strength which continued T–28 operations provide for Souvanna Phouma in current negotiations. Risks involved in all air operations over Laos are considerable, including little publicized regular civilian and military supply operations. Since Jan 1 there have been more than 40 ground fire attacks (much small calibre) against transport, passenger and helicopter aircraft. Many operations such as straight-line dive at targets using the [?] make T–28 aircraft particularly vulnerable. With its many limitations, T–28 cannot employ less hazardous attack patterns of more modern aircraft. Recent losses of T–28s—three in past few days—as well as helicopter and US jet point up enemy capabilities. Nevertheless, recent losses might be regarded as law of averages catching up after extended period of low loss rate. Since May 17, when T–28 activities expanded, RLAF had flown 1543 combat sorties, many against heavily-defended targets, e.g. Ban Khan bridge, Phou Kout area, PDJ. Yet during this period only four T–28s lost to enemy ground fire and one lost to weather. Lost rate .0032 percent very low. As reftel points out T–28s have proved be decisive factor in recent military operations. They have carried out air operations to destroy PL bases, interdict supply lines, provide close support for ground operations and provide visual and photo recce. They have also played important role SAR operations. In many respects amount and effectiveness hostile fire here is much greater than in South Viet-Nam. Present enemy antiaircraft capabilities include 37mm towed; twin-mount 14.5mm mg’s in open-topped armored cars; vehicle- and tripod-mounted 12.7 machine guns; and 7.62mm machine guns at all echelons. All these weapons are mobile and are present in areas of key importance such as eastern area adjacent Phou Kout, Xieng Khouang ville, Muong Panh. We believe on basis attack patterns that 57mm may also be present in some areas. We are deeply preoccupied with problem of control of military operations in this very difficult political and military situation and constantly attempt keep risks at minimum consistent with objectives which we have set for ourselves in Laos. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC to pass to Defense. 2 See footnote 4, Document 124 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 124 . 126. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 126. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, August 26, 1964. SUBJECT SAR Operations in Laos REF CINCPAC 190252Z August 1964 2 In the referenced message, CINCPAC addresses the problem of timely execution of search and rescue missions in Laos which are required when pilots are forced down in Communist-held territory. On two recent occasions, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos has requested and received U.S. jet fighter “cap” for these missions because his own in-country resources were inadequate to cope with the expected Pathet Lao/Viet Minh opposition. Current procedures for handling such requests call for processing them through a number of command echelons with a consequent delay in obtaining the necessary action. CINCPAC therefore recommends that the tactical commander on the scene be given the authority to respond to requests for SAR support by the U.S. Ambassador without having to obtain authority from Washington. The chances for successful rescue are best if the SAR attempt is made before the enemy has time to react effectively, and the downed pilot is still in good physical condition. When jet aircraft support is needed, the sooner it can be provided the more certain it is that the actual helicopter rescue can be made with minimum risk to all involved, as the surprise, speed, and force of the attack will have greater effect against unorganized opposition. Also, it is generally believed that failure to provide the U.S. jet fighter “cap” when a Lao or Thai pilot is lost—when it is clear that we would use such a cap if the pilot were American—would give a very bad impression to our allies. State and Defense (including the JCS) agree that CINCPAC’s recommendation is sound and appropriate. The attached draft message 3 will accomplish the objective. It has some safeguards built in. I recommend Presidential approval. 4 John T. McNaughton 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. IX, Memos, 8/64. Secret. 2 Dated August 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 Not further identified. 4 A note in McGeorge Bundy’s hand indicates that this recommendation was approved by phone on August 27. 127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, August 26, 1964, 5 p.m. 193. Vientiane’s 337 and 338. 2 We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations, that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and that SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans, Thais and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T–28’s for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits. At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and control arrangements for T–28 operations extending into future. Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations more or less automatically impose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increase AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T–28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna’s position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of operations and/or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T–28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel. 3 ) On control problem, our understanding is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with AIRA in effective control, but that this not true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm control. Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future scope T–28 operations and your comments as to whether our impressions present control structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Green and Trueheart, cleared by McNaughton in draft and with McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC. 2 See footnote 3, Document 124 and Document 125 , respectively. 3 Telegram 197 to Vientiane, August 28, in which the Department requested the Embassy’s appraisal of Royal Lao Government reaction to the use of RLAF T–28’s in the Laos panhandle and for a detailed targeting plan for both the RLAF and Yankee Teams. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 128. Memorandum From the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) 128. Memorandum From the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) 1 Saigon, August 28, 1964. SUBJECT Concept for Attack of Panhandle Targets 1. Pursuant to your direction my staff has been engaged with Mr. Sullivan in efforts to arrive at an agreed Embassy-MACV “Concept for Attack on Panhandle Targets”. After several exchanges of memorandums and some conversation, I cannot agree to the concept expressed by Mr. Sullivan as set forth in his memorandum of 25 Aug (Att 1). 2 Militarily, the situation in the RVN no longer permits us to allow the VC to benefit from unrestricted use of infiltration routes and centers in the Laos Panhandle. 2. I consider the capability of the Laotian Air Force to neutralize or seriously damage the 22 infiltration associated targets identified in Laos to be negligible. I further believe that political consideration in Laos will not permit the R.L.G. to acquiesce in or direct a meaningful attack within a time-span appropriate to the military situation in the Republic of Vietnam. I also do not believe credible and militarily effective attacks against these targets can be launched by recce escort aircraft in the role of flak suppression. One target, Tchepone Army Barracks, requires 68 sorties for an acceptable degree of destruction. 3. I therefore urgently advocate the only feasible course of action available to us with forces available for attacks on Laos Panhandle infiltration targets. This is air attack by VNAF/Farmgate forces. We have developed complete attack plans for the six principal targets which call for 154 sorties of A–1E/H aircraft. These targets have been approved by CINCPAC for combined planning with the RVNAF (VNAF). Specific authorization from you to conduct such planning has not been granted. 4. I believe that the basis for an excellent moral and political justification for the concept which I advocate rests in the following considerations: a. The right of self defense in the face of a desperate threat. b. The targets are illegal DRV enclaves in Laos and constitute an invasion by the DRV of the Sovereign territory of Laos for purposes of supporting efforts to overthrow by force the Government of Vietnam with which the R.L.G. is at peace. 5. With respect to paragraph 3 of the attached memorandum 3 this is a mode of attack that may provide the pretext for the results we seek. However, it would not be timely and the weight and location of attacks would be out of the context of credible requirements of the military situations likely to develop. 6. Reference paragraph 4 of Mr. Sullivan’s memorandum, 4 I do not concur that VNAF/Farmgate actions against targets in Laos should be tied to a decision to attack the DRV if there is likely to be any delay in such a decision. Every day, to the best of our knowledge, the illegal entry of the enemy into the RVN continues through the Laotian targets. This in turn makes the pacification task in the RVN that much more difficult, costly and time-consuming. 7. I request that you grant approval for US/GVN combined planning for air attack on the following targets, initially: a. Muong Phine Army Barracks (12 Sorties) b. Ben Thay Military Camp and 4 AAA Batteries (18 Sorties) c. Ban Na Nhom Military Camp (12 Sorties) d. Tchepone Army Barracks (68 Sorties) e. Huong Nong Military Area (10 Sorties) f. Ban Trim Barracks and Supply Area (34 Sorties) These targets are clearly identifiable, separated from civilian communities and definitely in support of DRV infiltration into the RVN. Subject to appropriate review of plans, I urge you seek authority to launch these attacks. W.C. Westmoreland 5 General, United States Army 1 Source: Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup, 27 July–31 August, 1963. Top Secret. 2 In this memorandum, Sullivan suggested a three-pronged strategy for air attacks on the Laos panhandle. First, air attacks by RLAF T–28’s supplemented by U.S. armed reconnaissance aircraft. Second, air support of ground operations by Vietnamese and Farmgate aircraft depending on the nature of the ground operations. Third, VNAF and RLAF attacks on targets of opportunity in the panhandle, such as convoys, in conjunction with attacks on North Vietnam so long as there was “convincing evidence” that these were North Vietnamese and not Lao targets. (Ibid.) 3 Paragraph 3 of Sullivan’s memorandum of August 25 discussed air support for ground operations. 4 Paragraph 4 discussed the attacks on targets of opportunity in Laos. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 129. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 129. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, September 5, 1964. JCSM–777–64 SUBJECT Rules of Engagement (U) 1. The US Ambassador to Laos has requested that a revision be made in the Rules of Engagement to permit US aircraft to engage hostile aircraft over Laos without prior reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. Recently the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized certain changes in the Rules of Engagement for Southeast Asian countries and, inter alia, specifically authorized the protection of US forces operating in Laos but excluded friendly Lao forces. 3. The reason for this exclusion of coverage was that in discussions with the Department of State they felt it was premature to request permission of the Lao Prime Minister to furnish protection to the friendly Lao forces. During inter-agency discussions on the above mentioned Rules of Engagement, it was concluded that consultation with the Lao Prime Minister concerning protection of friendly Lao forces by US forces would be deferred. 4. The United States has expended considerable effort, time, and funds in support of the friendly Lao forces. The introduction of the additional T–28s and support that have been provided to the FAR enabled them to undertake offensive actions for the first time in a number of years. The introduction of tactical air in support of the Pathet Lao might degrade a favorable situation that now exists. Consequently, the air superiority in support of the FAR should be maintained. 5. To intercept hostile aircraft effectively over Lao territory and protect this investment, it is necessary for the US forces in Thailand to react immediately upon receipt of a hostile aircraft warning. To request authority from the Joint Chiefs to Staff to engage hostile aircraft and await a reply after receiving a hostile aircraft warning nullifies effective air defense. 6. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, concurred in the need for air defense and recommended definitive rules of engagement be established for Laos. 7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that: a. Authority should be granted US forces to engage hostile aircraft over Laos without prior reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. b. Definitive rules of engagement be established for Laos. 8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the attached message 2 which reflects the evaluation made above. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381. Top Secret. 2 Attached, but not printed. In a September 25 memorandum to the JCS McNamara informed them that their recommendations in paragraphs 7a and 7b had been discussed with the Department of State which concurred in McNamara’s decision to approve them. The JCS were directed to promulgate the revised Rules of Engagement for Laos. (Ibid.) 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, September 9, 1964, 8:17 p.m. 229. Joint State/Defense message. Refs: Vientiane 296 and 305 to Bangkok. 2 Saigon 67 to Vientiane, repeated Dept 778. 3 Meeting today 4 approved in principle early initiation air and limited ground operations in Laos corridor as soon as politically and militarily feasible. Therefore believe meeting this week as proposed by Saigon would be useful way to clarify scope and timing possible operations. 5 Following questions appear crucial: 1. Air operations a. Best targeting division as between GVN and RLAF, and what targets would be recommended for US suppressive strikes. b. Latest reading political acceptability GVN strikes and US suppressive strikes and whether we should inform Souvanna before undertaking, or go ahead without informing him. Related question is whether to publicize. 2. Ground operations a. Review of latest plans and possible timing of action especially for limited bridgehead along lines indicated Saigon 485. 6 b. Requirement for US advisors and support. These not covered by today’s decisions and might require another review when plans developed. c. Same political questions as to Souvanna and publicity. 3. In light of answers to above what should be GVN, RLG, and US public stance re operations? Believe it would be desirable for Bangkok be represented at meeting, in view possible Thai involvement in some operations. Ambassador Taylor concurs. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McNaughton, and approved by William Bundy. 2 Vientiane telegram repeated to Bangkok as 296, was sent to Saigon as telegram 220 and repeated to State as 424, September 7. Vientiane telegram repeated to Bangkok as 305, was sent to State as telegram 432, September 9. Both dealt with the preliminary details for the meeting among MACV and representatives of the U.S. Embassies in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam on September 11. (Both ibid.) 3 In telegram 67 from Saigon to Vientiane, September 8, the Embassy in Vietnam suggested that there was a consensus on corridor operations: shallow 20 kilometer GVN ground operations with minimal air support, and RLAF T–28 attacks against infiltration targets. It also believed the September 11 meeting in Saigon should proceed. (Ibid.) 4 The meeting in Washington was called primarily to discuss Vietnam; an account is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 749 – 755 . One of the recommendations for approval at the meeting was: “Limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor areas of Laos should be undertaken in the near future, together with Lao air strikes as soon as we can get Souvanna’s permission. These operations will have limited effect, however.” ( Ibid., p. 748 ) This recommendation to the President was approved at the meeting. 5 The Laos Embassy’s account and comments on the September 11 meeting are in Document 131 . The Vietnam Embassy’s summary of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 761 – 763 . 6 Document 123 . 131. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 131. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, September 13, 1964, 4 p.m. 448. After hearing report from Embassy Vientiane representatives at meeting COMUSMACV September 11, 2 I am persuaded, despite certain unresolved questions, it should be possible to move ahead quickly with limited but probably useful land and air operations in corridor. 1) Land operations. Shallow penetration raids (20 kms) in central area (toward Chavane), Rte 9 area (as well as Leaping Lena Teams in Rte 9 area) and probing operation in the southern area near Cambodian frontier by company-sized units do not in my mind require any clearance by the RLG. We would assume they could be carried out as soon as the VN ground and support units are in state of readiness. Here we are thinking of minimum indispensable air support which would be based on RVNAF for all supply, evacuation and emergency operations over Laos, as was agreed on at Saigon. This would envisage US advisor role limited to accompanying Leaping Lena Teams in airplanes (jump masters), but not on ground. 2) Air operations. Thus far lack of specific instructions has inhibited us from pressing RLG on initiation T–28 strikes in corridor, but if Washington desires, believe we can persuade RLG military to agree that individual strikes can be started on this quite soon, although large scale concentrated program will probably have to await Souvanna’s return from Paris. His reaction would probably depend on degree of agreement there among Lao factions. We would probably have to give RLG assurances of adequate support if such actions brought about sharp enemy response that appeared beyond capability Lao armed forces to withstand. We might also be asked give RLG further support in northern and PDJ operations. Souvanna would probably prefer see air attacks against corridor targets extended over period of time, perhaps three to four weeks, rather than massive attack designed to eliminate all targets within three or four day period. As for difficult targets, particularly several bridges in the corridor area, these might be left to Yankee Team “suppressive missions” which could be got underway shortly. I do not think it would be necessary for me to tell Souvanna Phouma that such Yankee Team strikes were being undertaken if number of aircraft engaged in any such operation were kept within pattern present Yankee Team flights. For example, flights of perhaps four “escort” fighters could be readily passed off as suppressive strike. 3) [ 7 lines of source text not declassified ] Suggestions outlined above for corridor operations clearly do not meet all military desiderata, but have advantage that they could be undertaken almost immediately. More effective military program could run into significant political difficulties (reviewed in previous messages) and delays. In undertaking this program we should recognize that operations outlined above are designed to provide shot in arm to VN armed forces as well as further signal to enemy of seriousness our intentions. On other hand, cutting off corridor so that passage of personnel and materiel from north to south would be substantially reduced or eliminated is generally accepted, I believe, as being beyond capabilities GVN, to say nothing of RLG military, even with any US support at level we understand currently envisaged. Please instruct. Unger 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, Saigon,DOD, and MACV, and passed to the White House and CIA. 2 See footnote 5, Document 130 . 132. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 132. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, September 16, 1964. JCSM–799–64 SUBJECT Future Military Operations in Laos (U) 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–27, 643/64, dated 3 September 1964, 2 subject as above, which requested comments and recommendations on Ambassador Unger’s proposals for the employment of Lao ground forces (FAR and Neutralist) during the next six months in operations designed generally to consolidate control over the Royal Lao Government’s zone of influence. 3 2. It is noted that Ambassador Unger predicates his proposals on two assumptions: (1) no ceasefire, and (2) no major enemy offensive. The concept of employment of the Lao forces as proposed by Ambassador Unger is as follows: a. First phase (September–November)—consolidate the gains of Operation Triangle; clear out Pathet Lao (PL) pockets (1) south and west of Luang Prabang, (2) north and northeast of Vientiane, and (3) in the western portion of south Laos from Savannakhet to the Cambodian border; and conduct operations to place pressure on the PL in the vicinity of Tha Thom and improve defenses against an enemy advance south towards Paksane. b. Second phase (November–February)—following the cleanup of the first phase, troops in south Laos move to a line east of Phalane, Nong Bua Lao (but west of the PL base at Muong Phine), 15 kilometers east of Saravane and Attopeu, and south to approximately 20 kilometers of the Cambodian border. 3. The above concept closely parallels the actions approved by the President for implementation and the concepts for selected offensive actions provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 4. Analysis of the proposed actions indicates that they are within the capabilities of the Lao forces. The opposing orders of battle in south Laos are: FAR—30 battalions with artillery and air support and Pathet Lao/Viet Minh (PL/VM)—14 battalions (10 PL and 4 VM). Since the concepts of July 1963 were prepared, Lao forces have achieved a somewhat improved posture, particularly as a result of the augmented and battle tested Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), but also as a result of enhanced esprit, increased training, and US assistance. This improved posture does not, however, extend to the point that the FAR or Neutralist forces can be relied upon when confronted by North Vietnamese. 5. The operations envisaged would serve to keep pressure on the enemy, would tend to inhibit the Lao from initiating actions in the north beyond their capability to handle, and could well have a diversionary effect in support of South Vietnamese cross-border operations into Laos. 6. Operations of the RLAF, which are essential to success, should not involve such a commitment that they cannot respond to a PL/VM attack elsewhere, such as toward Thakhek. It is noted that Ambassador Unger mentions the establishment of a special Air Operations Center (AOC) at Savannakhet. It is considered that the proper air control agency in south Laos should be an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) at Savannakhet, subordinate to the AOC at Vientiane, the latter allocating aircraft consistent with the over-all priorities for the air effort in Laos. 7. Operations in southern Laos will require coordination with COMUSMACV and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), and with CAS operations. It is noted that RVN liaison in Laos has been established and that the Army Attaché has recognized the need for liaison with COMUSMACV. The ASOC at Savannakhet should be the air control agency in Laos with which the AOC at Tan Son Nhut could coordinate to achieve integration of air actions in the Laos corridor in the event VNAF/Farmgate/US air strikes therein are mounted from South Vietnam. 8. The degree of US participation and assistance is not clear. The US Army Attaché’s message CX–450, DTG 010250Z September 1964, 4 which amplifies the Ambassador’s message, indicates that US advisors will be required at three command posts and also in a logistical and artillery advisory capacity. 9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the concept outlined herein and recommend that: a. The United States support these modest operations in view of the gains to be expected. b. Ambassador Unger be queried on the anticipated military personnel and equipment requirements discussed in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, above, and the degree of US participation and assistance required, in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can address these requirements. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 D 7425, Laos 381 (9 Apr 64) Laos Operations. Secret. 2 Not found. 3 In telegram 387 from Vientiane, August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 Dated September 1. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 D 7425, Laos 381 (9 Apr 64) Laos Operations) 133. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 133. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, September 18, 1964. LAOS SITUATION The month-long Laotian Princes’ meeting in Paris has become an intermittent but unproductive dialogue between Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao leader, Souphanouvong. Souphanouvong has been pressing for a 14-nation conference on Lao affairs. Souvanna may well wish to go to a conference but has firmly insisted on two preconditions: (1) effective cease-fire throughout Laos and (2) withdrawal of Pathet Lao troops to positions held on May 16, before their attack against the Neutralist army on the Plain of Jars—and a basic assumption that he head the Lao delegation to such a conference in his capacity as Prime Minister. PL Scheme On September 15, the Pathet Lao in an effort to appear conciliatory proposed that about 1000 deserters from Kong Le’s Neutralist army, led by a Colonel Deuane, be reabsorbed by Kong Le. The Pathet Lao intended that occupation of the Plain of Jars by Deuane’s men under the label of Neutralists would be sufficient window-dressing to meet Souvanna’s most embarrassing (to them) precondition. The Pathet Lao’s adamant refusal to (1) permit ICC inspection of the area and (2) allow Kong Le’s own troops to reoccupy their former positions on the Plain clearly exposed their continued intransigence, and Souvanna rejected the proposal. In addition, the PL will only accept Souvanna as titular leader of a non-governmental delegation to a conference, not in his capacity as Prime Minister. French Pressure There are indications the French devised this scheme for the Pathet Lao. In any case, French officials have employed massive pressure tactics to force Souvanna to accept the PL proposal and agree to a 14-nation conference without preconditions. Initially, the French disclaimed any intent to interfere, but as no progress developed toward the 14-nation conference which General De Gaulle desires, high-level French officials have become deeply involved. They have openly supported the PL position and have been disingenuous in their dealings with us. Ambassador Alphand called on the Secretary September 16, requesting that the US help pressure Souvanna to agree. 2 The Secretary rejoined that acceptance of the Pathet Lao proposal would amount to capitulation to the Communists. Souvanna has so far stood firm and Ambassador Bohlen and his staff in Paris are maintaining close contact with Souvanna and company to bolster their resistance as necessary. The French are reportedly furious over the failure of the PL proposal and blame us for Souvanna’s opposition to it. De Gaulle’s Policy Ambassador Bohlen understands that General De Gaulle’s policy and prestige are heavily engaged in the success of the Lao talks in leading to an international conference—a forum at which Vietnamese and Cambodian affairs would be discussed, as well as Lao. In this respect, Hanoi’s and Peiping’s policies coincide with the French. Break-up of Talks In view of the deadlock, Souvanna has planned to break-off and return to Vientiane September 21, but he has postponed his departure from Paris because a formal meeting is now scheduled between the Lao leaders on that date. After Souvanna’s departure September 22, the talks would apparently continue among the deputies of the leaders. Military Situation Monsoon weather continues to restrict military operations in Laos to desultory mopping-up by government troops in areas north of Vientiane. Near Tha Thom, southeast of the Plain of Jars, government troops recently captured two North Vietnamese soldiers. Both have been displayed by the Lao Government at press conferences. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Slutz and cleared by Trueheart and Green. Sent to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, which indicated it had been prepared at Bundy’s request. 2 Recorded in a September 16 memorandum of conversation. (Ibid.) 134. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk 134. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 28, 1964. SUBJECT The Problem of Renewal of Special Powers to Souvanna’s Government Summary On October 7, 1964, the special powers granted the Government of National Union of Laos by the National Assembly expire. Failure of the Assembly to renew these powers could lead to a governmental crisis. In such an event the Souvanna government might be forced to resign followed by strong pressures for a new government excluding the PL. Our latest information indicates, however, that General Phoumi and the Sananikones, whose rivalry for power figures intimately in the special powers issue, are prepared to go along with a request from Souvanna for renewal, thus avoiding a governmental crisis. However, the renewal can only extend until next spring when the Assembly’s term expires. The constitutional requirement for national elections will then become a crucial issue. Here again, however, it is likely that a compromise can be worked out postponing elections. Background In October 1962, the Lao National Assembly granted Souvanna’s Government of National Union special powers for one year to govern without reference to the National Assembly. These powers were renewed for another year in October 1963. They expire on October 7, 1964. There was not much difficulty in 1962 in obtaining Assembly agreement to grant the special powers and thus give the coalition government the opportunity to carry out its mission. At that time the possibility existed that the objectives of the Lao tripartite agreements for national reconciliation and unification could be achieved under the Geneva settlement. Moreover, the 1961 Zurich communiqué between the three princes, the basic agreement underlying the coalition government, had provided that the provisional Government of National Union would be formed without reference to the National Assembly. (This was necessary because neither the Pathet Lao nor, at that time, the neutralists recognized the Assembly, claiming it was created by “rigged” elections in 1960.) Before renewing the special powers in October 1963, questions were raised in the National Assembly as to whether this should be done since the coalition government had made no progress toward achieving its objectives. Nevertheless, as a sign of support for Souvanna, the special powers were renewed on the condition that Souvanna report to the Assembly on the results of the trip he had just made to France, the United States, the United Nations, England and the U.S.S.R. Last May a dispute arose over the interpretation of the period for which special powers had been granted in October 1963. Some argued that the period extended only from the time the Assembly recessed, after granting special powers, to its reconvening in May. Others argued the powers has been granted until October 1964. The latter view finally prevailed but the dispute foreshadowed the likelihood of a battle in the Assembly over renewal in October. Rivalry Among Conservatives The Assembly is dominated by the conservatives, although there are some neutralist (but no PL) Deputies. Its President is Phoui Sananikone who controls a large bloc of Deputies. Another large bloc is subject to General Phoumi’s control. The rivalry between the Sananikones and Phoumi for general control of the conservative faction has been increasingly intense, especially since April 19, 1964. Before the attempted coup Phoumi was pretty much in the saddle, despite latent divisions and rivalries among the conservatives. The Sananikones up to that point were fairly inactive politically. Phoui, leader of the clan, emerged from semi-retirement in May 1963, when he was elected President of the Assembly, and began to take a more active interest in affairs of state. At first these activities appeared to be constructive and in support of Souvanna and his policies. For example, Phoui supported the formation of a parliamentary group which made trips around the country to areas accessible to the government, in support of Souvanna and the policy of neutrality. It thus appeared that at last all important non-communist elements in Laos were uniting behind and in support of Souvanna—the hope we had when we signed the Geneva Agreements. It was not long, however, before rumors began to circulate in Vientiane that the Sananikones again had ambitions of their own for political leadership. On several occasions Ambassador Unger had talks with Phoui to ensure he understood that the United States supported Souvanna and the Geneva settlement and that we would not view with approval any attempt to upset existing arrangements. Phoui always agreed and affirmed his support for this policy. Earlier this year, however, it began to become clear that the Sananikones were no longer satisfied to take a back seat. There is no question that they took advantage of the growing discontent and frustrations of the conservatives not only with the Government of National Union but also with Phoumi’s monopoly of conservative leadership. Although Phoui remained behind the scenes and tried to appear non-involved, his brother Oun (also a Deputy) was very much involved in the attempted coup last April. While the coup failed to achieve its purpose of upsetting the Government of National Union, it did succeed in diminishing the power and influence of General Phoumi and reasserting an influential role for the Sananikones. However, it still did not put the Sananikones in a position of unchallenged leadership of the conservative faction. This has been particularly disappointing to Oun Sananikone, the real troublemaker in the clan. Special Powers and Government of National Union The question of Assembly renewal of the special powers gives the Sananikones another opportunity to strengthen their political position. If the Assembly fails to renew the special powers, Souvanna’s government will be vulnerable to a no-confidence vote forcing its resignation. Various conservatives, including the Sananikones, and even some neutralists, have made it clear they see no purpose in continuing with the Government of National Union. They favor reorganization of the government to exclude the Pathet Lao completely. This the attempted coup had hoped to achieve but only succeeded instead, because of United States and other international opposition, in obtaining replacement of dissident neutralist cabinet members and, subsequently, of certain conservative members. Various proposals have been put forth concerning reorganization of the government. One would have the King or Crown Prince assume the powers of the premiership but it is unlikely the King would agree to this. Another would have the King reappoint Souvanna to form a government excluding the PL. Still another would have the King appoint an unnamed Prime Minister. Present Status of Special Powers Issue At first Phoumi indicated he saw no problem with the Assembly’s renewing the special powers. Later, however, as his duel with the Sananikones intensified, Phoumi claimed the mood of the Assembly was such that renewal would not be feasible. Phoumi blamed the Sananikones for this situation and the Sananikones blamed Phoumi. Nevertheless, largely no doubt as a result of our making it clear we did not favor any attempt to upset the applecart, both Phoumi and Phoui are now saying that if Souvanna requests it the Assembly will renew the special powers. We have instructed Ambassador Unger to use his influence as appropriate to ensure that this is done. The King apparently also shares our view there should be no change in the situation. We should know during the course of the week whether there will be difficulties. Election Issue The Assembly’s term expires in April 1965 when, according to the Constitution, new elections must be held. The renewal of special powers would thus be only for the balance of the Assembly’s term. The question of the elections also poses a problem since it seems unlikely they can be held under present conditions in Laos. The Lao have been considering this problem and seem to feel the matter can be resolved under a constitutional provision permitting the Assembly, meeting jointly with the King’s Council, to suspend, in effect, the constitutional requirement that elections be held every five years. Ambassador Unger is sending us his views on this issue. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Barbis. A note on this memorandum indicates that Rusk requested it and that he saw it. 135. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk 135. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 1, 1964. SUBJECT United States Military Personnel in Laos and their activities Since the Pathet Lao attacks against the Neutralists in April 1963, our service Attaches in Laos have been authorized to become increasingly involved in activities which go beyond those normally carried out by Attaches, approaching a military advisory role. In the summer of 1963 we increased the size of our Attaché staffs (this applies to the Army and Air Force, since the Naval Attaches are resident in Bangkok). Again this past summer, because of Pathet Lao attacks on the PDJ in May, we increased the number of United States military personnel in Laos in connection with the defense of Muong Soui and to support Operation Triangle. Most of these temporary personnel have since been withdrawn. However, USAF personnel engaged in support of T–28 activities still operate in Laos. Most of the army and air personnel mentioned above carry the title of Assistant Army or Assistant Air Attaché. They are so notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when they enter Laos, although not all of their names appear on the diplomatic list. We understand that although there is a general awareness in the Vientiane community, including the diplomatic and foreign press corps, that there is a larger number of United States military Attaches in Laos at present than before May 1964, the exact number is not known to them. It is quite possible that, in the event of any ICC investigation of Communist charges alleging a United States military presence in Laos in violation of the Geneva Agreements, there might be witnesses who could testify about the participation of United States personnel in military operations, particularly around Muong Soui. You have recently signed a telegram to Embassy Vientiane stating our basic position in such a contingency. A summary of the numbers and status of United States military personnel now in Laos follows: Army Attaché Office Authorized complement—nine officers, one warrant officer and approximately 28 enlisted men. In addition to normal attaché duties, these personnel travel throughout RLG-held areas consulting with, advising and, to some extent, training Lao military forces. One officer is stationed at Muong Soui. Eight additional officers were introduced on a temporary duty basis in connection with the defense of Muong Soui and Operation Triangle. All but one of these have departed Laos. A further temporary augmentation was authorized recently but has not yet taken place. This provides for a team of six officers to form a mobile training team for a period of twelve weeks. One of the main purposes of this program is to build up a corps of United States officers with Lao experience who would be available in the event of another emergency requiring direct United States involvement. Air Attaché Office Authorized complement—three officers, one of which is stationed at Savannakhet with the RLAF. In addition, there are five (previously nine) officers on temporary duty as Assistant Air Attaches assisting in T–28 activities. Some 25 USAF ground personnel in civilian clothes arm and service the T–28’s at Vientiane airfield but return to Udorn, Thailand, every night. Naval Attaché Office Although resident in Bangkok, these three officers make periodic visits to Laos. One of them (Marine) assisted in artillery training during one of his visits to Muong Soui last summer. Others A JUSMAG advisor accompanied the Thai group to Muong Soui but it is not clear whether he is still there. Other military personnel have been permitted to enter Laos on a selective and controlled basis during recent months, with Ambassador Unger’s approval, but great care is taken to keep these visits as inconspicuous as possible. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–2 US–LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Barbis and cleared by Trueheart. A note on the memorandum indicates that Rusk saw it. 136. Editorial Note 136. Editorial Note On October 5, 1964, President Johnson met with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy, and Director of Central Intelligence McCone in the Cabinet Room of the White House at 4:15 p.m. Two of the five items discussed related to Laos. According to McGeorge Bundy’s minutes of the meeting: “It was agreed that we would not at present respond affirmatively to Souvanna Phouma’s request for interdiction operations along route 7. We should point out to him that such an operation now would put the onus of escalation upon us. We should not, however, foreclose the possibility of a different decision in the event of renewed hostile activity by the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh.” In the 4th item, according to McGeorge Bundy’s minutes: “The President agreed to a program of Laotian bombing in the communications corridors of Southern Laos, using the T–28 force now available. The Secretary of Defense pointed out that there was implied in this program a limited use of U.S. fighters, at some stage, for suppressive strikes, but Presidential approval for this part of the program was neither asked nor given.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VII) The other topics discussed were a possible Rusk visit to South Vietnam, 34–A operations against North Vietnam, and the Alliance for Progress. The full text of McGeorge Bundy’s minutes, October 5, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume I, pages 811 – 812 . McCone also prepared a brief summary of this meeting. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with President, 1 May–31 Oct, 1964) 137. Telegram From the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 137. Telegram From the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Washington, October 7, 1964, 10:49 a.m. DEF 9535. For your information General Phoumi’s discussions with Secretary McNamara and Asst Secretary McNaughton developed following proposal. 2 Phoumi reiterated his well-known feeling that (using his own word) present “supple” policy—i.e., one that requires continued political accommodation with Pathet Lao in Government of National Union (1962 Geneva Agreements environment)—and recent pressure for military operations in Panhandle is not fully satisfactory. He clearly believes that stronger policy of military operations in northern Laos, stressing interdiction of Route 7, is called for. This stronger policy could involve not only “occupation” by Lao forces of Nhommarath-Mahaxay area east of Thakhek if necessary, but, more importantly, he said, should require establishment of a “barrier” in the area east of Ban Ban across Route 7 in northern Laos. With this “barrier,” to be accomplished apparently by special forces type units, primarily the Meos and other tribes, using clandestine and subversive guerrilla style tactics presumably, Phoumi hopes to isolate the PL from NVN support via Route 7 and thus enable the Royal Lao Armed Forces to recover the Plaine des Jarres from the Pathet Lao. He felt the present military realities—e.g., weakened, demoralized state of the PL, the Lao T–28 air strike effectiveness, and growing combat capabilities of Lao special forces made this stronger policy feasible. He indicated Lao could reduce its regular armed forces in order to build up special forces. According to Phoumi, under this stronger policy the RLG would continue to adhere openly to the provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1962, but in practice would extend its control by this clandestine “occupation” over all Laos. Phoumi was informed that the U.S. seeks to establish stability in Laos and to gain adherence to the 1962 Geneva Agreements. However, we would, of course, consider his proposals. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XI, Cables, 10/64. Secret. Drafted by Colonel F.E. Kramer, Assistant for Laos, Far Eastern Region, ISA, and approved by Blouin. 2 Phoumi arrived in Washington the afternoon of October 3 and left the afternoon of October 5. Phoumi’s discussions with McNamara and McNaughton, October 5, are recorded in two memoranda of conversation, I–28447/64 and I–28448/64 respectively. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 091.118, 1964) 3 In telegram ARMA CX–567, October 24th, the Army Attache, Colonel William Law, recommended that no action be taken on Phoumi’s plan of operations outlined above. Law noted that this was a “classic proposal” submitted by Phoumi several times in the past. It was “totally beyond the capability of FAR (or Neutralists) forces.” Rather, Phoumi sought to create a crisis to force SEATO and the United States to send military forces to his rescue. (Ibid.) 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, October 7, 1964, 7:24 p.m. 313. Ref: Deptel 275 2 to Vientiane and Vientiane’s 545, 550, 568 and 581. 3 Joint State-Defense message. You are authorized to urge the RLG to begin air attacks against Viet Cong infiltration routes and facilities in the Laos Panhandle by RLAF T–28 aircraft as soon as possible. Such strikes should be spread out over a period of several weeks, and targets should be limited to those deemed suitable for attack by T–28s and listed Para. 8 Vientiane’s 581, excluding Mu Gia pass 4 and any target which Lao will not hit without U.S. air cover or fire support since decision this matter not yet made. You are further authorized to inform Lao that Yankee Team suppressive fire strikes against certain difficult targets in Panhandle, interspersing with further T–28 strikes, are part of the over-all concept and are to be anticipated later but that such US strikes are not authorized at this time. Report soonest proposed schedule of strikes and, upon implementation, all actual commitments of RLG T–28s, including targets attacked, results achieved, and enemy opposition. Also give us any views in addition to those in Vientiane’s 581 as to any targets which are deemed too difficult for RLG air strikes and on which US suppressive strikes desired. FYI: Highest levels have not authorized Yankee Team strikes at this time against Route 7 targets. Since we wish to avoid the impression that we are taking first step in escalation, we inclined defer decision on Route 7 strikes until we have strong evidence Hanoi’s preparation for new attack in PDJ, some of which might come from RLAF operations over the Route. End FYI. You may inform RLG, however, that US will fly additional recce over Route 7 to keep current on use being made of the Route by the PL and to identify Route 7 targets and air defenses. The subject of possible decision to conduct strikes on Route 7 being given study in Washington. FYI: Cross border ground operations not authorized at this time. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal; cleared in substance with Rusk, William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, and in draft with McNaughton; and approved by Forrestal and Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC, Saigon for COMUSMACV, and Bangkok. 2 In telegram 275 to Vientiane, September 25, the Department of State asked the Embassy to explore with the RLG its willingness to conduct T–28 strikes in the Laos corridor as soon as possible. The objective of the operation was primarily psychological: putting increased pressure on North Vietnam and indicating U.S. seriousness. (Ibid.) 3 In these telegrams, September 30, October 1, 3, 6, the Embassy reported on its consultations with the RLG on air strikes in the corridor, suggested consideration in Washington of air strikes to interdict Route 7, the principal PL/NVN supply route to the Plain of Jars, and provided a target list for the strikes in the corridor. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS, and ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 4 In telegram 330 to Vientiane, October 13, the Department explained that the two Mu Gia Pass targets were “too close to North Vietnam for this stage of the scenario.” (Ibid.) 139. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Other Posts 139. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Other Posts 1 Washington, October 8, 1964, 11:18 a.m. 613. Phoumi Visit. Following are highlights based on uncleared memcons, of Phoumi’s discussions with Department officers which included call on Secretary. 2 More detailed accounts by MemCon: 3 1. Connection Moscow visit Phoumi repeated similar information Paris 1910 and 1914 to Dept (notal). 4 Concluded Soviets disinterested Laos and have little influence over PL. Apparently he did not obtain clarification Soviet attitude Co-Chairman role. 2. In Paris he said French urged reconvening Geneva conference without preconditions. Phoumi told Joxe this unacceptable. Conference can be held only if preconditions met and agreement reached on agenda designed to obtain implementation 1962 Geneva Agreements. Also told Joxe not possible to cancel recent government changes. 3. Phoumi agreed RLG must continue operate within framework Geneva settlement despite lack good faith on part PL, Hanoi and Peiping. However more effective military action needed to persuade Hanoi and Peiping to stop aggression. Phoumi referred approvingly to Gulf Tonkin incident in this connection. 4. In line with present policy to seek peaceful solution, talks with PL continuing in Paris but RLG would try to shift them back to Laos. Problem is that PL dominated by Communists and there little hope for agreement. 5. Phoumi sees no problem with expiration special powers. Question of elections must be resolved however either through suspension constitution and appointment Constituent Assembly or amendment of constitution by National Congress postponing elections and empowering King appoint provisional Assembly. Second alternative seemed to have most support. Considering composition of provisional Assembly in same proportion as Government National Union, i.e., one-fourth Conservative, one-fourth PL and half Neutralist. For our part, we made clear there no change in US policy of support for Geneva Agreements and RLG under Prime Minister Souvanna. Pointed out we do not see what could be gained by attempt to find military solution Lao problem. RLG in strong international position in view PL intransigence and Communist violations Geneva Agreements. Must keep trying find peaceful settlement through political discussions. At same time, of course, RLG should improve its military forces and consolidate control over territory held by RLG. Also emphasized it important that efforts continue to strengthen government administration and improve economic conditions. Latter connection essential that fiscal stability be maintained. On question elections, we did not offer advice other than that we would hope matter be resolved within framework constitution. In referring to recent recall Lao ambassador Hanoi, we stressed importance that relations not be broken and that contact be maintained with DRV despite NVN bad faith. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Barbis; cleared by Trueheart, Clunan, and in substance with James Ozzello of EUR; and cleared by Green. Sent to Vientiane, Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Tokyo, Taipei, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC. 2 Phoumi had a working lunch with Harriman on October 3, met with Rusk on October 4, and then met with Harriman and other Department of State officials later that day. On October 5 Phoumi met with officials at the Department of Defense, see Document 137 . 3 Dated October 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 In telegrams 1910 and 1914, October 2 and 3, the Embassy transmitted reports of Phoumi’s discussions in Moscow with the Deputy Foreign Minister and the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Both ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 140. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 140. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, October 13, 1964. JCSM–870–64 SUBJECT Operations in Laos (U) 1. On 30 September 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided you with their views for implementation of air and ground cross-border operations in the Laos corridor. With regard to the air operations phase, they forwarded an air strike plan for attacks on Viet Cong (VC) infiltration routes and facilities in the Laos Panhandle. They recommended that the targets associated therewith be struck by a mix of Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) T–28s and US aircraft under a Yankee Team cover. US participation was recommended as follows: a. US air strike hard targets—bridges—and such additional hard targets not suitable for the RLAF as may be developed. b. US air fly flak-suppression missions for the RLAF and high cover in the event that Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) aircraft attempt to interfere. 2. From a review of Ambassador Unger’s message of 6 October 1964 (Vientiane to State No. 581) as amplified by the Air Attaché, Vientiane’s message of 12 October 1964 (AIRA Vientiane CX–822), 2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted that the RLAF has: a. Proposed certain modifications to the target list. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the modifications, including the striking of two targets in Laos west of Mu Gia Pass which the Lao have developed from RLAF intelligence sources. b. Requested US air cover for strikes against four of the targets, those close to the North Vietnam/Lao border. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this a proper extension of their recommendation for high cover in the event of interference by DRV aircraft. c. Proposed that Yankee Team jets strike four heavily-defended, high-risk targets. One of these four (Nape bridge) was originally scheduled for a US strike; the other three are among the more important targets. It is noted that Ambassador Unger suggests that US air suppress the AAA defenses at these targets for T–28 strikes, a proposal in line with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. d. Indicated that they will commence striking 13 targets in Laos on 14 October 1964 during an eight-day period, weather permitting. The targets, as indicated in subparagraph 2 a, above, include two that are close to Mu Gia Pass in Laos; the remainder do not include the hard targets for which US strike assistance has been requested (Nape bridge, Tchepone, and Ban Thay). They do include those for which air cover has been requested. 3. Only a small portion of the air strike program has to date been approved; namely, strikes by the RLAF on those targets, excluding Mu Gia Pass, which they are willing to hit without US air cover or fire support. With regard to Mu Gia, Ambassador Unger has indicated that the Lao give Mu Gia Station in Laos a top priority as a critical supply point; he recommends that the RLAF strike it with US jet cover operating well within Lao territory. The Defense Intelligence Agency considers that the militarily significant target at Mu Gia Pass is in North Vietnam and has detected no military activity at Mu Gia Station. As noted in paragraph 2, above, the RLAF has developed two targets in this area in Laos. 4. In connection with these operations in Laos, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently noted the report of the initial discussions in Saigon of the newly formed SEASIA coordinating group, which expressed unanimous agreement that US participation in the air operations in the corridor is essential if such operations are to have the desired military and psychological impact, particularly since the initiative for the operations came from the United States. Specifically, the group has proposed that the United States reconsider: a. Removing the ban on RLAF strikes on Mu Gia, b. Authorizing participation by US air in strikes against the hard targets (which together with Mu Gia are among the most important), and c. Permitting the United States to fly air cover for RLAF strikes, as requested by the RLAF. 5. Failure to provide US assistance as requested could result in losses to the RLAF, both in manpower and aircraft, that would be unacceptable to the Royal Laotian Government (RLG). Without assistance in a time of need, the RLG could conceivably question US resolve in Laos as well as in Southeast Asia. Similarly, the Government of Thailand could view US reluctance to support Laos as a demonstration of US weakness. US participation in the air operations in Laos is essential to the success of the operation, politically and militarily. Recognition must be given to the fact that the PL and the DRV will be sensitive to attacks in the Panhandle and to US participation. Our participation will represent a penetration into a PL area which has been undisputed PL territory for the last few years. In addition, air operations in the Laos corridor should be undertaken because of their importance to the over-all effort in South Vietnam. The situation there, as indicated in SNIE 53–2–64, 3 has continued to deteriorate. Stronger, more dynamic, and successful actions by the United States outside of the Republic of Vietnam, which clearly demonstrate our resolve and commitment to support military operations against the common enemy, could well serve as a principal means of arresting this trend. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, accordingly, again recommend US participation in the air strike program in the corridor to include: a. High cover for RLAF strikes as requested by the RLAF. (Initially four targets.) b. US air strikes on targets beyond the RLAF capability to handle. (Initially Nape bridge.) c. US flak suppression for RLAF strikes as required. (Initially Tchepone barracks, Tchepone military area, Ban Thay military area.) d. SAR and air defense operations as may be required. 7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that no attempt be made to persuade the Lao not to strike PL/VM targets in Laos even though close to the North Vietnam border. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 4 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, Laos 000.1–370.64 (092 Laos). Top Secret. 2 Telegram 581 from Vientiane, October 6, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.AIRA Vientiane CX–822 has not been found. 3 SNIE 53–2–64, “The Situation in South Vietnam,” October 1, 1964, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 806 – 811 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 141. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 141. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, October 19, 1964. S–3549/AP2F1 SUBJECT (S/LD) Corridor Interdiction in the Laos Panhandle 1. The corridor interdiction program of airstrikes by the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) began on 14 October 1964. From a list of 22 targets recommended by US Air Attaché (AIRA) the RLAF chose 13 that were believed to be best suited to airstrikes by T–28s. Of these targets, 12 were scheduled for strikes the first 8 days. The RLAF requested that US jet cover be provided for four targets on the list of thirteen. Authority was granted for use of US air cover “as necessary” but there has been no indication of its use to date. AIRA estimates that the initial strikes will end on the 23rd and harassment raids may continue for 30 days. Regarding the rest of the 22 targets, RLAF requested US Air hit 4 “high risk” targets, 3 bridges were placed in an “on call” status, and 2 targets were dropped. 2. Original planning by RLAF called for an average of 18 sorties against up to two targets per day. As many as 19 sorties have been flown against a single target as was the case with the strike of the military strong-point near Lak Sao on 15 October. 3. The missions have so far been conducted out of Savannakhet using 13 aircraft (T–28). To date strikes are known to have been conducted against 5 of the 12 scheduled targets. Yesterday, Gen Ma, Air Force Chief, moved six T–28s to Pakse to strike the two southernmost targets today. 4. Lao pilot reports of strike results are sketchy and somewhat overly optimistic. Although no bomb damage assessments have been completed, they are programmed. An initial photo interpretation report of one of the targets hit on the 14th indicated bomb craters 150–200 feet from the main installation but no significant damage. Reconnaissance flights are being hampered in some cases by weather. No photography of these strikes is yet available in Washington. 5. Results: See Attached Enclosure 1. 2 Joseph F. Carroll 3 Lieutenant General, USAF 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381 (9 Apr 64) Laos Operations. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A copy was sent to Wheeler. A note on the source text indicates that Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance saw it. 2 Attached, but not printed, were a list of the sorties and results and a map of the targets. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Carroll signed the original. 142. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 142. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, October 22, 1964. JCSM–897–64 SUBJECT Possible Pathet Lao/Viet Minh Moves in Laos (U) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the apprehensions and convictions of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos concerning a major Pathet Lao/Viet Minh (PL/VM) military offensive in Laos, possibly as early as October, as reported by Ambassador Unger. They have also noted the belief of the US Intelligence Board that the communists will react to recent Government successes and to the failure of Souphanouvong to gain concessions from Souvanna in the recent Paris talks. 2. Historically, the communists have made their moves during the dry season, which commences mid to late October. Also, in the past, the communists have responded to Forces Armees du Royaume (FAR) gains by strong military actions. In this connection, the PL, with VM military assistance, are still given the capability of overrunning Laos almost at will. 3. Germane to this matter are the frequent expressions of US support for Souvanna; it was at our urging that he stood firmly during the Paris talks and made no concessions to Souphanouvong. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Souvanna should be assured of US military support, should the PL/VM launch a new offensive as he fears. This support should be at the request of Souvanna and in the form of: a. Interdicting the supply routes from North Vietnam into Laos, primarily Routes 6, 7, 8, and 12. b. Prompt US air strikes against PL/VM forces, utilizing optimum conventional ordnance, to the extent that, in conjunction with the Royal Lao Air Force, the Laotian ground forces can withstand successfully the PL/VM attack. Aircraft used should be those US aircraft based in Thailand, RVN, and at sea on the CVA(s) in the South China Sea. 4. Prompt US air strikes in response to communist aggression would not only significantly assist the Lao in resisting such actions, but also would convey to others, friend and enemy alike, that the United States is ready and willing to assist those who are on the front line of the fight against communist aggression. 5. In the event the PL/VM persist in their aggression in Laos, additional measures should be taken as required and as recommended to you in paragraphs 6 and 7b of JCSM–565–64 (extracted in the Appendix hereto). 2 6. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that governmental approval in principle be sought for prompt US air strikes against communist LOCs in Laos and against attacking PL/VM forces in Laos, should a major PL/VM offensive be initiated and should Laotian forces be unable to withstand the attack. Such approval should include authority to use Thai-based US aircraft. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Curtis E. LeMay Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw it on November 11. 2 Document 103 . The appendix is attached, but not printed. 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, November 5, 1964, 8:37 p.m. 412. Secretary called in USSR Ambassador Dobrynin this morning for half hour talk on Laos. Secretary said he felt it timely in view Chou En- Lai’s presence Moscow, to discuss Laos with Ambassador as US wishes see this problem solved and removed from agenda. Sole basis for solution is complete and meticulous observation 1962 accords with all foreign interference removed as originally agreed. Question of conference, however, has been complicated by Hanoi and Peiping retreat from 1962 agreement. Two points of Souvanna Phouma’s conditions for conference are especially important. Re Souvanna Phouma’s position at conference, he was USSR’s candidate whom US had accepted, who wanted genuinely neutral and independent Laos, and it not possible for him to go to new conference as less than Prime Minister. If Souvanna could speak only when three factions agree then Laos would have no voice at conference. Re ICC, denial of access to PL territory is problem of fundamental importance, simple to eliminate. If these two obstacles not overcome, conference could not be successful and US sees no way of entering upon it. US has no interest in Laos other than full compliance with 1962 accords, this our sole purpose which US ready support completely. Observance these accords in both US and USSR interests, Laos should be no cause for differences between us, and solution of problem calls for urgent attention as future not bright if compliance with 1962 accords is not achieved. Dobrynin asked if US agrees to conference. Secretary said US never rejected conference in principle, has not consulted with other governments and wished to start with USSR by stressing importance of two points (1) Souvanna Phouma’s position and (2) ICC access. Re (1) Dobrynin said basic principle underlying 1962 accords was unanimity of three Laos factions.USSR has presumed from beginning this principle accepted, otherwise no united Laos could exist. This basic presumption might be said to apply both de jure and de facto, and is subject for conference discussion and resolution. Same applies ICC access—that is what conference is for. Secretary said if unanimity principle denies ICC access and destroys ICC then 1962 accords are violated. US would understand occasional “not this time” denial but “not any time” refusal as at present would mean entering upon conference as though 1962 accords nonexistent. Starting point of any new conference on Laos should be the agreements achieved at the 1962 conference, particularly on such matters as Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of a neutral, independent nation and ICC as effective observer of compliance. Conference could not succeed if it started as though 1962 agreement had never occurred. Dobrynin stated USSR has no bases, technicians, officers or soldiers (except Embassy staff) in Laos, but information re US presence well known. Secretary explained US would have no objection to this as subject for conference, US had withdrawn 600 men from Laos in 1962 but NVN force in Laos has never fallen below 6,000 despite ICC observation some token border crossing, which maybe reversed next day. Question of US, UK, French, or Thai, activity Laos might be considered for conference topic. US sees no profit however in conference at which Peiping or Hanoi could seek concessions in exchange for acceptance of Souvanna as Prime Minister. One does not buy same horse twice. In response Dobrynin query what US proposes as further steps, Secretary stated if two problem points worked out, US would be in position approach other governments about conference. Dobrynin said he would report to his government but personally concerned as Secretary’s presentation sounded somewhat like preconditions. Secretary responded that it is Hanoi and Pathet Lao which have initiated challenge of Souvanna as Prime Minister and that problem with unanimity principle is that PL unlikely at conference to take line divergent from Hanoi and Peiping. In answer Dobrynin query, Secretary said US has not raised these particular points with CPR in Warsaw talks, although SEA generally discussed. Dobrynin asked if Secretary could give him any views on question of conference on Cambodia, which might provide great power guarantees of security and independence, solve Cambodian border issues, resolve difficult relations with SVN, and render Sihanouk less turbulent. Secretary said US not yet prepared give views, will continue study idea of conference. Cambodian border disputes, however, more easily solved bilaterally than in conference, and Sihanouk might better start by settling his problems with Thais and SVN. It was agreed that Dobrynin would tell press, if asked, that Secretary had raised question of Laos. No press was present at arrival or departure. No separate memcon will be prepared. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Vladimir I. Toumanoff of SOV; cleared by David H. Henry, Director of SOV, Dexter, J. Harold Shullaw, Director of BNA, Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Thompson; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Moscow, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, London, Paris, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Ottawa, and CINCPAC. 144. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 144. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, November 12, 1964. SUBJECT Relationship of Laos Situation to Next Moves on Viet-Nam The following is in response to your request for an analysis of the relationship of the Laos situation to next moves on Viet-Nam, with particular reference to a possible further Geneva conference on Laos. Present Situation On May 24, reacting to various demands for a new Geneva conference on Laos, Souvanna Phouma spelled out the conditions under which he could accept a new conference. These were (1) a cease-fire “throughout the Laotian territory” and (2) withdrawal of the Pathet Lao forces from positions which they had taken in the Plaine des Jarres. The second of these conditions was subsequently modified to call for a tripartite administration of the PDJ under ICC supervision. Souvanna from the first also laid great stress on strengthening the position of the GNU and especially that of the Prime Minister. One of the main ways in which Souvanna wanted the Prime Minister’s position strengthened was to give him clear authority to call on the ICC “for the control and the correct and sincere execution of the Accords.” Souvanna has held to these preconditions ever since May, including during talks in Paris with Souphanouvong in the course of which he was subjected to extreme French pressure. Throughout this period the US has consistently urged Souvanna to maintain his preconditions and, more important, the preconditions have come to be regarded in Laos as symbols of Souvanna’s firmness in resisting Communist and French pressure. Looked at without regard for neighboring countries, political and military conditions in Laos today are more favorable from our standpoint than they have been for many months. In my recent visit to Laos I was struck by the air of well-being and relative optimism which seemed to pervade the place—an attitude quite in keeping with the Lao Ambassador’s remark to Kohler in Moscow the other day (Moscow’s 1444). 2 This derives from the undoubted improvement in the military situation following the success of Operation Triangle and the proof-testing of the RLAF. This situation could be reversed by a renewed PL offensive, but I think it would be wrong to assume that such an offensive will necessarily materialize in the next few months, or succeed if it does. On the political side, the situation is also manifestly improved, with Souvanna and the neutralists on our side and collaborating with the conservatives. There are, of course, many things still wrong in Laos, including Communist control of large areas of the country, but I think it is fair to say that our side is “one up” for the first time in a long while and that, so far as Laos alone is concerned, the pressure for a new move is not on us but on the Communists. There is no showing that the Communists are prepared to make any concessions in terms of territory or in terms of strengthening the position of the GNU or the ICC, or otherwise cooperating with the non-Communists. Until there is some sign of movement on the Communist side, there is no particular incentive for the non-Communists to go to a conference. Contact between the factions continues in Paris so that a conference is not required for this purpose. It might, of course, be considered that a Geneva conference on Laos would provide a convenient device for sounding out Communist (Peking and Hanoi) views on a Vietnamese settlement. A new conference could indeed do this. However, in almost every other way, it would appear to conflict with our likely courses of action over the next few months. In the first place, as matters stand a conference could only be brought about by Souvanna’s abandoning one or more of his preconditions—very probably the vital ones relating to his own position and the operation of the ICC. Given the way these conditions were developed and the significance, real and symbolic, which they have taken on, this would run the gravest risk of Souvanna’s overthrow by rightist elements in Vientiane. Even if a conference could be convened without losing Souvanna in the process, it would still almost inevitably involve a cease-fire. This would greatly inhibit or prevent the kind of operations in the Laos corridor that are envisaged for the next few months, while in no way putting similar brakes on Viet Cong use of the corridor. Finally, indicating US willingness to attend a conference on Laos under foreseeable conditions would certainly detract greatly from the ominous image which we wish to present during this period. In sum, setting up a new Laos conference as a way of establishing a channel of communications with Hanoi and Peking seems to me a long run for a short slide. If a conference is the desired vehicle, I believe one on Cambodia is a better bet, although it, too, presents grave difficulties notably in terms of Thai and Vietnamese attitudes. 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Working Papers, November 54, vol. III, Misc. Back Up. Top Secret. 2 Dated November 9. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 145. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 145. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 30, 1964. SUBJECT Proposed Route 9 Project On October 15 you asked me to look into the possibility of a highway project being undertaken on Route 9 in Laos as a basis for an operation to seal the Lao corridor against infiltration into South Vietnam. 2 This suggestion has been reviewed thoroughly in FE, S/VN and S/P 3 and has also been the subject of discussion among representatives of Embassies Bangkok, Saigon and Vientiane. The latter two have submitted preliminary comments. Our general conclusions at this stage are as follows: 1. Because of its location, Route 9 should be considered as a possible element in any measures to block, limit or detect infiltration into South Vietnam. 2. This route should logically be improved eventually in the course of the long range peace-time development of the region as a component of a regional highway system, as an adjunct to a Mekong Valley development program and as an access to land-locked Laos. 3. Route 9 runs through territory held by the Pathet Lao and used by North Vietnam in support of its campaign in the south. These facts make it difficult to conceive of circumstances in which control or access to critical portions would be yielded to any non-communist authorities for any purpose without a struggle which would require introduction of foreign troops. 4. Introduction of foreign military forces is prohibited by the 1962 Geneva Agreement without exception. Therefore, any operations in the PL-held portion of the road would entail either a basic United States policy change to permit open violation of the Agreement, or elaborate diplomatic preparation to reconcile the action with the Agreement and establish an acceptable non-military rationale. 5. The problems involved in any Route 9 activity are such that further consideration should be related to and subordinated to decisions on basic courses of action in South Vietnam and Laos. We can bring our present thinking on this concept into better focus if we organize it around various alternative assumptions as to possible future policy, of which there are three which seem most relevant to any actions we might decide to undertake in the corridor. First, we may determine that, in connection with continuing the pacification struggle in South Vietnam, it is essential that infiltration through Laos be checked at once. Second, we may decide that immediate action against the infiltration routes is unnecessary, or that the costs (including effects on our Lao policy) are too high, but that achievement of our Vietnam objectives requires eventual curtailment of corridor infiltration. Finally, we may wish at some time to seek a political settlement in South Vietnam involving controls to assure against renewal of North Vietnam aggression through Laos. Under the first assumption we would probably have to think exclusively in terms of military actions justified on the actual grounds of military necessity and DRV violations of the 1962 Geneva Accords. This course would require deliberate abandonment of our present policy of supporting the Geneva Accords. Time would probably not permit development of a plausible economic development rationale or other arrangements to gain international acceptance. Furthermore, the scale of military force required to meet predictably heavy PL and North Vietnam resistance would quickly break down any non-military cover. It would then be a purely military decision as to whether Route 9 offered the most effective basis for our action in the corridor. Under the second assumption, a longer range action program could be considered. We might think in terms of a phased operation beginning with efforts to create an appropriate international political atmosphere, probably using various economic development arguments. The initial phase might also include improving portions of the road in Vietnam and Laos which are now in non-communist hands (i.e., in Laos between Savannakhet and Muong Phalane). The second phase could include clearing and improving the PL-held portion of the road using limited force, initially Lao only, for protection of construction workers. After completion of the road, which might take two years of actual construction at a cost in the neighborhood of $275 million (Embassy Saigon estimate), a permanent guard force might be established. This could be either a force strong enough to completely block north/south movement, or a light, mobile police-type force having the limited objective of acting as a “burglar alarm” against DRV aggression. Under the latter approach, the ultimate sanction in defense against such aggression would have to be directed against the DRV itself. The difficulties to be encountered in planning such a long-range course of action would be enormous, possibly insurmountable. The basic obstacle would be the unwillingness of the PL and North Vietnamese under any pretext to surrender, without massive resistance, control of this important strategic area that they now hold and use. Therefore, whatever advance preparations we might make to create international acceptance of the highway project as a pretext, we would probably still have to face ultimately the necessity of introducing foreign military forces in defiance of the Geneva Agreements and in contravention of our own present policy in Laos. It would be folly to commence any long-term program relating to Route 9 without appreciation of this fact. Further, a logical objection may be raised to a long-term approach such as that outlined above on the ground that, if corridor infiltration is of sufficient importance to justify elaborate international arrangements and heavy financial commitments, both for the road and for the related economic development projects, then it must be important enough to justify a course of action with more immediate effect on infiltration. This point would be particularly telling if, as we believe, we would be likely even at the end of our long term program to have to introduce substantial military force. Although consideration of Route 9 has up to now been related only to the pacification struggle in South Vietnam, we should not exclude the possibility that the general concept might be applied under the third of our suggested policy assumptions (i.e., a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam). In such a settlement, we might seek some kind of internationally guaranteed status for South Vietnam with arrangements for preventing and detecting subsequent DRV infiltration. In the enforcement arrangements, a place might well be found for Route 9. As an established “beat” for patrolling by the supervisory agency, it could greatly facilitate detection of infiltration on both sides of the border in the critical region of the demarcation line. Improvements in the road necessary for peace-keeping purposes could, of course, be related also to other considerations such as Mekong development, regional highway planning, etc. Recommendation: In light of the above it does not seem to us that we can fruitfully proceed further in studying the Route 9 concept until basic decisions have been made on our Viet-Nam policy and until we can see more clearly the nature of our requirements in the Laos corridor. However, the various possible formulations of the concept should be kept in mind as alternatives to be explored in detail after such decisions have been made. We will in the meanwhile forward the views expressed in this memorandum to Embassies Saigon, Vientiane and Bangkok for their comments. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Dexter and cleared in draft by Corcoran and Robert Johnson. 2 As described in an October 15 memorandum from William Bundy to Green, Forrestal, and Dexter. (Ibid.) 3 In memoranda from Dexter to William Bundy, October 15; Forrestal to William Bundy, Green, and Dexter, October 15; and Robert Johnson to Forrestal, October 26. (All ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 146. Memorandum of Conversation 146. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 3, 1964, 11 a.m. SecDel/MC/35 SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, December 1964 SUBJECT 1962 Geneva Accords—Southeast Asia PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary William J. Cunningham, FE Mr. Edmund Glenn, Interpreter Foreign Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi Nosavan (Laos) H.E. Nou-Ing Ratanavong, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Laos Mr. Khamchan Pradith, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Laos to the UN Mr. Samlith Ratsaphong, Delegation of Laos to the 19th UNGA Turning to the question of Geneva accords, General Phoumi said that it is now evident that the Pathet Lao has no intention of living up to them. He said that Laotian public opinion would not long tolerate a passive attitude by the government. If these violations continue, the government would be in a most difficult situation, one which would not fit into a framework of friendship with Peiping. General Phoumi said he would like to examine the matter with Secretary Rusk and other “high personalities” of the U.S. Government because so much depends upon the attitude of the United States toward this matter. He said “we see quite clearly that in seeking peace in Laos we can no longer count upon the good will of Peiping, the Pathet Lao and Hanoi.” General Phoumi said that a change would show Laos was “entering a new framework”, and he said he wanted to ask quite candidly whether “we should continue to follow the present line toward Peiping and Hanoi.” The Secretary replied that it was important to insist upon complete and meticulous compliance with the 1962 Geneva accords. He noted that the North Vietnamese have violated these accords in a number of ways; he had in mind the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and the use of Laotian territory for purposes of infiltration to South Viet-Nam. He said he was convinced that if Peiping and Hanoi would leave Laos alone, the Laotians would be able to decide their own future, for themselves and to their satisfaction. The Secretary said that he had recently sent a message to Souvanna Phouma concerning Soviet intentions in Laos. 2 He said that in conversations with Foreign Secretary Gromyko here in New York he had pressed for full Soviet support of the 1962 accords. The Secretary noted that the attitude of the Soviets toward the Geneva accords is a matter of considerable importance to us since we would regard their performance on them as an indication of the attitude Moscow would take toward a series of other accords it is interested in concluding with the United States. The Secretary said that Gromyko had suggested that the outcome of new talks among the three Laotian factions be awaited. The Secretary felt that Gromyko wanted to leave the impression that the Pathet Lao might take a different tack in these talks; we should try to find out if the Pathet Lao are prepared to move seriously toward implementation of the accords. If this does not occur, he said, we face a serious situation in Southeast Asia—one requiring grave decisions. The Secretary said he was deeply concerned about the unity of countries under pressure from their northern neighbors. He hoped that the Laotians would use what influence they had among the Vietnamese to urge them to achieve internal political unity. He described the importance of such unity in the terms of rallying popular American support for the effort we are making in South Vietnam. He said that if the disunity now found in South Viet-Nam should occur in Laos, this would have a very bad effect. If, however, there were political solidarity in South Viet-Nam and in Laos, an American commitment might be called very necessary and successful. The Secretary mentioned that we have been “sending additional signals to Hanoi” in an effort to deter the North Vietnamese from some of their present activities in Laos. He said that some of the accusations made by North Vietnamese are false, but not all are false. Returning to the problem of domestic political unity in South Viet-Nam, he again stressed that the international impression of unity as well as the fact of unity is important. In response General Phoumi said that he would like to begin with the last part of the Secretary’s statement. He said that unity in Vientiane is increasing. Of course, he said, it must be understood that there is no hope of unity with the Pathet Lao, despite any assurance that Gromyko may give Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma, however, [they] have drawn much closer together and Souvanna Phouma now sees through the Communists’ schemes. He said that it was quite clear that Peiping and Hanoi wish to destroy the 1962 Geneva accords. Souvanna Phouma also feels this way, and it is for this reason that he has thought of presenting the question to the United Nations. This also explained his desire to request additional American measures in Laos. The Secretary said that we would be in touch with the Laotians in another ten or fifteen days after talks in Saigon have been completed. Hanoi and Peiping look upon South Viet-Nam as the main theater of action. If they should succeed there, Laos would be at their mercy. We must insist that Hanoi and Peiping change their attitude toward their neighbors and in this respect Laos is a thermometer of their intentions. Peiping could change its policies in Laos with a minimum loss of face since it could fall back on the 1962 Geneva accords. It is, therefore, important that we continue to insist upon the full compliance of Peiping with those accords. From a military point of view, Viet-Nam is the major problem, but from a political point of view Laos is very sensitive. General Phoumi said that he appreciated these considerations, but he said that Laos could carry on as it now is indefinitely; to do so might bring on serious changes. He said that it is clear that Hanoi and Peiping have a very negative attitude. The Secretary said that this is also our present estimate, stressing the word “present.” General Phoumi said that the present military situation in Laos is indicative of a desire on the part of the Pathet Lao and South Viet-Nam to advance rather than to retreat. He said that he hoped we were prepared to cope with the situation should eventual developments confirm these indications. The Secretary assured him that we would be watching the situation very closely. General Phoumi said that there were a couple of other matters he wanted to discuss. Since the Government of National Union had been established, there had a break in liaison between the Laotian and the U.S. military at both the national level and at lower command levels. The Secretary said that he believed contact was now being maintained through the Embassy at Vientiane, and he said that he believed this was an adequate channel. In this connection the Secretary said he wanted to mention that our new Ambassador to Laos, Mr. Sullivan, was the personal choice of the Secretary and of President Johnson. 3 He said that Ambassador Sullivan has a very deep commitment to Southeast Asia and he was sure that General Phoumi and the Laotian government would find him a very strong and able envoy. General Phoumi said that he knew Mr. Sullivan personally and had a very high opinion of him as well as of the retiring ambassador, Leonard A.E. Unger. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cunningham and approved in S on December 17. This conversation took place at the Beverly Hotel in New York City. Rusk was the head of the U.S. Delegation to the 19th session of the UN General Assembly. The conversation was recorded in four parts, and this was part III. Part I dealt with the military situation in Laos. In response to a question about recent Pathet Lao advances from Rusk, Phoumi answered that they could prove critical. Phoumi also praised the use of T–28 support and thought that it had proved the difference in the recent fighting. (Memorandum of conversation, December 3; ibid., POL LAOS) Part II was a discussion of Chinese representation in the United Nations. Part IV was a request for Phoumi to met with President Johnson. Rusk promised to see if it was possible, but it was not. (Both ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, Dec. 1964) 2 Text transmitted in telegram 489 to Vientiane, December 1. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 In an October 19 memorandum to President Johnson, Dungan stated that Rusk, William Bundy, and Taylor recommended the early appointment of Sullivan as Ambassador to Laos. Sullivan was then a Special Assistant to Taylor in Saigon and had been involved in Southeast Asian issues for 2 years. The memorandum reported that Unger was an “excellent man, but has been on the firing line in Vientiane for several years.” Johnson approved the recommendation to appoint Sullivan. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XI, Memos, 10/64) 147. Memorandum of Conversation 147. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 5, 1964, 4 p.m. SecDel/MC/8 SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, December 1964 SUBJECT Laos PARTICIPATION U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Stevenson Ambassador Kohler Mr. Tyler Mr. Taylor—BTF Mr. McIntyre—BTF Mr. Akalovsky U.S.S.R Mr. Gromyko Ambassador Dobrynin Ambassador Fedorenko Mr. Smirnovskiy Mr. Falin Mr. Sukhodrev The Secretary recalled his brief private conversation with Mr. Gromyko the other day 2 on the subject of Laos and said he wanted to make a few further comments. In the course of that conversation, Mr. Gromyko had indicated that we should await the discussions among the three Laotian factions and see how they proceeded. We now gathered that Souvanna Phouma had sent a message to Souvannavong suggesting discussions, but we had no information as to the latter’s reaction. The Secretary wondered whether Mr. Gromyko knew anything about Souvannavong’s reaction and also what his own estimate was of the prospects for such discussions. Mr. Gromyko replied he had no information. The Secretary expressed the hope that the three factions would be able to establish effective contact and that progress towards the full implementation of the 1962 Geneva accords would be made. Our position, which we had repeated on numerous occasions, was that all those involved in Laos, and particularly the signatories of the Geneva accords, should strictly comply with those accords. Perhaps the first move in that direction could be discussion among the three factions, which we hoped would bring concrete results. Mr. Gromyko said that Soviet Union had always welcomed discussion of internal questions between the three Laotian parties. Unfortunately, the other side, i.e., the rightists led by Phoumi Nosavan, and in part also Souvanna, did not want to cooperate with the third party. One recent example of this was the designation of the Laotian delegation to the UN, which had been made without agreement among the three, who had different positions on this matter. The Soviet Union believed that the rightists were to blame for the situation in Laos. This was the Soviet appraisal of the situation, an appraisal which the Soviet Union had always regarded to be correct and which it continued to maintain. As far as the U.S. was concerned, the Soviet Government had believed and continued to believe that it would be best if the U.S. withdrew from Laos all of its forces, both military and para-military, and particularly the air force now stationed in that country. Such an action would be in the interests of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko continued that there was no need for convincing the Soviet Union of the necessity of implementing the 1962 accords. As he had told the Secretary both in Geneva and in New York, the Soviet Union considered that the accords should be fully implemented, and this remained Soviet policy. He said he was glad to hear from the Secretary that he was of the same opinion, but wished to point out that there should be no discrepancy between U.S. words and deeds. The Secretary said he wished to state very clearly, without any possibility of misunderstanding, that there was no problem regarding the so-called U.S. military personnel in Laos; if many thousands of North Vietnamese military personnel left Laos and went home, there would be no U.S. personnel in Laos. We had withdrawn our personnel in 1962, but Hanoi had not; indeed, it had introduced many thousands of additional personnel in the last few months. The roads from Hanoi into eastern Laos were jammed with trucks carrying arms, personnel, and possibly some peaceful goods as well. The Secretary said he wished to stress that the following three factors were the chief obstacle to the implementation of the 1962 accords: First, there was continued presence, and in increasing numbers, of North Vietnamese personnel in Laos, something which was contrary to the agreement. Second, in contravention of the agreement, there was continued and increasing use of Laotian territory for infiltrating into Laos and South Vietnam. Finally, the ICC was not allowed to carry out its activities in the territory controlled by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese elements. All these were flagrant violations of the Geneva accords. Our policy continued to be one of seeking full implementation of the 1962 accords, and if Pathet Lao and North Vietnam were to accept such implementation, there would be no difficulty on the part of the U.S. or of the elements with which we have influence. Mr. Gromyko said that regarding North Vietnamese military personnel, he could only repeat what he had told the Secretary a few days ago, but he did not see any point in doing so. The only observation he could add was that if the Secretary’s information were correct, all of Laos would have been overrun by now. Yet this was not the case and no one had been able to produce any concrete evidence of North Vietnamese presence in Laos. He suggested that we await the forthcoming discussions among the three factions in Paris and expressed the hope that they would be successful. He said the Soviet Union was not happy with the situation in Laos since it was not as it should be under the terms of the Geneva accords. The U.S. was informed of the Soviet views regarding the reasons for that situation. Mr. Gromyko then said that he had exhausted the comments he could make on this subject. Noting that there had been no prearranged agenda for this meeting, he said there were other topics he would like to raise. The Secretary had no objection to moving to other subjects. He agreed that we should sound out the situation from the forthcoming talks among the three factions. He thought there was broad agreement between the two sides on basic policy. However, he also believed that it would also be useful if from time to time the two sides were to exchange information regarding the factual situation in Laos, inasmuch as sometimes small noises in Laos made big headlines in the papers, creating the impression of a big war going on there. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and cleared in S on December 9. The memorandum is part II of III. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. 2 Rusk recounted this December 1 discussion in Document 146 . 148. Editorial Note 148. Editorial Note In a December 7, 1965, memorandum to Secretaries of State Rusk and Defense McNamara and Director of Central Intelligence McCone, President Johnson informed them that he had approved “a paper on policy toward Southeast Asia as guidance for the work in this field for the coming months.” The paper, prepared by the Executive Committee of the National Security Council on December 2, considered Southeast Asia with special reference to South Vietnam, but it also contained specific references to Laos. In the initial “Concept” section of the paper, the third objective was to “maintain the security of other [than South Vietnam] non-Communist nations in Southeast Asia including specifically the maintenance and observance of the Geneva Accords of 1962 in Laos.” In that same section, the paper stated that the action program against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would include as its first phase over the next 30 days: “intensified forms of action already under way, plus possibly US air protection of Lao aircraft making strikes in the Corridor, US armed reconnaissance and air strikes against infiltration routes in Laos.” In describing the Thirty Day Action Program as it affected Laos and Thailand, the paper stated that, “in the case of Laos, we will obtain RLG approval of an intensified program of US armed reconnaissance and air strikes both in the Panhandle area and along key infiltration routes in central Laos. These actions will not be publicized except to the degree approved by the RLG.” The paper added that Thailand “will be asked to support our program fully, to intensify its own efforts in the north and northeast, and to give further support to operations in Laos, such as additional pilots and possibly artillery teams.” In describing “Intensified Military Actions,” the paper noted that “Lao military operations will be intensified, especially in the corridor areas and close to the DRV border. US air cover and flak suppression may be supplied where needed.” Also included under this heading was the statement that “US armed reconnaissance and airstrikes will be carried out in Laos, first against the corridor area and within a short time against Route 7 and other infiltration routes. (These actions will be subject to RLG concurrence and publicized only to the degree agreed with Souvanna.)” Finally the paper listed deferred actions not to be taken within the 30-day period, but to be considered for adoption in the transitional phase of the program. One of these actions was “GVN/Lao air strikes across the border [of the DRV], initially against infiltration routes and installations and then against targets south of the 19th parallel.” (Both Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VII) The full texts of the December 2 paper and Johnson’s December 7 memorandum are in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume I, pages 969 – 974 , and 984 , respectively. 149. Memorandum of Conversation 149. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 9, 1964, 1 p.m. SUBJECT South East Asia PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Thompson Ambassador Kohler Mr. Tyler Mr. Akalovsky U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov Ambassador Dobrynin Mr. Smirnovsky, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry Mr. Sukhodrev [Here follows discussion about Vietnam, which is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume I, pages 990 – 992 .] The Secretary said that on this point it was best to start with Laos, since there was a recent accord in existence with respect to that country. If a Fourteen-Nation meeting were convened which was doomed to failure, that would worsen the situation, just as a deteriorating situation in the country lessened the prospects for success of the meeting. Our view was that if Souvanna Phoumi had left the 1962 conference as Prime Minister, he should not be asked to come to the conference now as something else, e.g., as Chairman of three factions unable to speak without agreement among the three. It was the Soviet Union who had supported Souvanna in 1962. We had accepted him and we believed he should return to the conference as Prime Minister. The Secretary continued that another problem was that for two years the ICC had not been permitted to carry out its activities on the part of Laos under Pathet Lao’s control, except to go to Kang Khai and ask Souvannavong what his wishes were. That was a flagrant violation of the 1962 accords. We would be willing to go to the conference if those who came there felt bound by the 1962 accords and did not start all over again, as if no agreement had ever been reached. In other words, the question was the attitude of Hanoi. Were they going to leave their neighbors alone? If not, we had a serious problem. Mr. Gromyko said he didn’t like the Secretary’s remarks. The Secretary appeared to be against holding a conference on Vietnam or Laos; at least he was advancing preliminary conditions for such conferences. Mr. Gromyko said he did not believe that this was in the interest of the U.S. The U.S. seemed to want to expand the war. Of course, he recognized that the Secretary had his own views, but if the U.S. wanted to improve the situation, he did not see how it could object to holding conferences on Vietnam and Laos. He did not think the Secretary’s negative position was justified. In any event, the U.S. could state to the conference the views the Secretary had just set forth to him. The Secretary asked whether Mr. Gromyko, as Co-Chairman, would make it clear in inviting Laos that he was inviting Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister. Mr. Gromyko replied that the question of form was of secondary importance and that it could be resolved once there was agreement to hold a meeting. The Secretary should reply whether the U.S. was willing to have a conference. The Secretary said we wanted to know what we were attending. We wanted to know who would represent Laos. Mr. Gromyko said this was not a serious problem, and perhaps the three factions would reach agreement on this point. In any event, those who objected to conferences did not look very good. The Secretary observed that we had thought this problem could be gotten around through the Polish proposal. However, Hanoi and Peiping had said no and that was the end of it. Mr. Gromyko said that in any event the meeting as proposed by Poland would have been only preparatory. The Secretary noted that he was rather sensitive as to who represented Laos, because when he had arrived at the last conference, there had been an understanding between the two Co-Chairmen which had not been communicated to him. He then asked whether Mr. Gromyko had heard anything about Souvannavong’s reply to Souvanna. Mr. Gromyko had no information on this point. He said he wished to note that now the U.S. had two princes under its influence. Indeed the Laotian capital was surrounded by Phoumi’s troops and even neutral troops were absent from Vientiane. Moreover, after Pholsena’s assassination, neutrals were afraid to come to Vientiane and were concerned about their safety. The Secretary observed there had been rumors that Pholsena had been involved in the assassinations of some neutral leaders. [Here follows discussion about Vietnam; see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume I, pages 992 – 993 .] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 30. The memorandum indicates it was Part V of VII. This was a luncheon meeting at the Soviet Embassy. 150. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 150. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, December 10, 1964, 7 p.m. 868. I met alone with Souvanna this afternoon and carried out full sense of my instructions. 2 Souvanna’s reaction was excellent and he is prepared cooperate in full measure with our proposals. As anticipated the only complication arose in my request for his concurrence in the introduction of more candor into our public statements concerning air operations in Laos. He fully supports the US program of pressures against North Vietnam and believes they should be carried out with deliberate “sang-froid”. He reviewed his familiar contention that actions speak louder than words and believes we should in this instance let the actions speak for themselves. In discussing proposed armed reconnaissance against infiltration routes he specifically requested that we employ US aircraft over Routes 7, 8 and 12. He demonstrated full comprehension of meaning of “armed reconnaissance” by stipulating that if we “see anything moving on the road, either day or night, attack it.” He asked that our air attaché coordinate the proposed US actions with General Ma and assured me full cooperation of RLAF. With respect contemplated air strike against Ban Ken Bridge, he recognized significance this action and did not blanch when I told him it might involve a considerable number of aircraft. He himself expressed hope we would eliminate anti-aircraft batteries before attacking bridge structure. It was in discussion of this particular action and the real possibility that we might lose some aircraft in the process that I stressed need for more frank admission by US authorities concerning nature of actions in which our aircraft would be engaged. On this point Souvanna became quite adamant. He cited North Vietnamese attitude of bland, unembarrassed denial of military presence in Laos even when four of their soldiers have been captured and presented to the public. He said that open admission by the US of military action on Laotian soil in direct violation of 1962 agreements would not only open us to extensive Communist propaganda attack but would face him with intolerable international and domestic pressures. He proposed that we stick to line that US aircraft conducting photographic reconnaissance at RLG request and that, if unhappily one should be shot down, we leave the impression it was consequence of reconnaissance mission. He even recommended we refuse to acknowledge that aircraft were armed. I explained to him necessity for candor in maintaining US public support for Southeast Asian policy and desire US officials maintain public confidence by avoiding misleading statements. I said I was not sure his response would constitute satisfactory formula for Washington but would report his views faithfully. He said he was leaving tomorrow for visit with King and subsequent travels Sayaboury Province. Returning Vientiane December 15. I told him we might wish begin some operations prior to that date. He took that fully in stride, saying “we are ready today” and only asked that I let him know the results of our operations. In making my presentation I stressed need for maximum discretion, advising him that only limited number US officials and senior representatives specified allies were being informed of our intentions. He indicated complete understanding need for maximum security. 3 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. William H. Sullivan was appointed Ambassador to Laos on November 25, 1964. 2 Not further identified. 3 Also during this meeting, Sullivan gave Souvanna an oral message from President Johnson stating appreciation for his “patience, courage and perseverance” and expressing confidence that Souvanna would continue with the same “tenacity.” (Telegram 510 to Vientiane, December 9; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS) During their discussion Sullivan noted that Souvanna gave “no inkling” that he was thinking of retiring, as had been feared. (Telegram 872 from Vientiane, December 10; ibid.) 151. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 151. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, December 17, 1964. JCSM–1050–64 SUBJECT Operations in Laos (U) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that on Saturday, 19 December 1964, there will be an interdepartmental meeting to discuss further the controlled program of graduated pressures on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) including a second week’s plan of US armed reconnaissance/prebriefed air strikes against infiltration routes and facilities in Laos. This second week’s plan will be a follow-on to the first week’s program of two missions, which was presented in JCSM–1041–64, dated 11 December 1964, 2 and approved at the meeting on 12 December 1964. 3 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that a gradual increase in intensity of operations is intended for the second week. They consider that some relaxation in the existing guidance will be required in order that more frequent route coverage may be obtained and a greater number of aircraft may be assigned certain missions. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that towards the end of the second week operations should be extended from those against corridor infiltration targets to armed reconnaissance of Route 7, the main route from the DRV leading into the Plaine des Jarres. Prime Minister Souvanna has frequently asked that the United States interdict this route. 3. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following missions be approved for the second week’s plan of US armed reconnaissance/prebriefed air strikes (Annex) in Laos: a. Primary Mission (1) Armed route reconnaissance by six-eight aircraft sorties of Route 23 between its junction with Route 12 and the southern limit of Pathet Lao (PL) controlled area (Savannakhet/Saravane Province boundary); secondary target if ordnance not expended during route reconnaissance: Tchepone barracks (RLAF Target No. 3). (2) Armed route reconnaissance by six-eight aircraft sorties of Route 9 between the Republic of Vietnam border and the junction with Route 23 at Ban Yang; secondary target if ordnance not expended during route reconnaissance: Tchepone military area (RLAF Target No. 4). (3) Armed route reconnaissance by 12 aircraft sorties of Route 7 between the DRV border and Nong Pet (19–33N/103–26E); secondary target if ordnance not expended during route reconnaissance: Nong Het supply area (19–29N/103–59E). b. Repeat Missions. Repeat first week’s armed route reconnaissance of Routes 8, 121, and 12; secondary targets if ordnance not expended during route reconnaissance: Ban Thay military area (RLAF Target No. 19) and Ban Kha Dap military camp (16–37–20N/106–31–00E). 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will alert the Commander in Chief, Pacific, that these missions are under consideration and that he should be prepared to conduct them. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Curtis E. LeMay Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381. Top Secret. Attached but not printed was a map. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, Laos 000.1–370.64 (092 Laos), 1964) 3 The meeting was held at the Department of State at 10 a.m. and was attended by William Bundy (chairman), McGeorge Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Cooper, McCone, Vance, McNaughton, Mustin, and MacDonald. Vietnam comprised the bulk of the discussion. (Telegram 1265 to Saigon, December 12; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 152. Memorandum for the Record 152. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, December 19, 1964. SUBJECT Meeting of Principals on Vietnam—19 December PARTICIPANTS Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Mr. Greenfield, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Trueheart Deputy Secretary Vance, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Johnson, Admiral Mustin Mr. Rowen Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Cooper Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby 1. The meeting opened with the approval of the attached telegram 2 approving four air strike missions in Laos according to the missions stated on the attached map. There was some discussion of the fact that these actions do not constitute an escalation of the situation in Laos, although the Route 7 mission might cause some reaction. It was noted that Ambassador Sullivan’s problems with respect to the previous missions have been taken care of. 2. It was agreed that the USG would continue a stonewall “no comment” response to any Hanoi propaganda blast as a result of the above missions. If a plane were lost, however, the principals would assemble for consideration of the appropriate line. Mr. Greenfield pointed out that the press currently assumes that we are over Laos on a daily basis and he believed that there would be little reaction even if we were to announce the loss of a plane. Mr. Greenfield suggested that our major problem would come from leakage of our planning and program. 3. With respect to the Cooper report on infiltration, 3 Mr. William Bundy pointed out that the field is being pressed on this subject. He stated that Mr. Greenfield and others estimated that there would be little splash caused by its release. Mr. Vance stated that Secretary McNamara still prefers that it not be released. Mr. Greenfield also pointed out that it might be worth stalling as its release would give Alsop and other journalists a handle for pressure. It was agreed that the matter would be covered by gradual reference to “increased infiltration” in backgrounders and that Saigon would be authorized, if pressed by the press, to give a backgrounder giving the general figures involved. [Here follow paragraphs 4–7 related exclusively to Vietnam.] WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 1 Nov-31 Dec, 1964. Secret. 2 A note on the source text indicates that all the attachments were destroyed on January 26, 1972. 3 Attached to a memorandum from Cooper to William Bundy, December 4; see footnote 4, Document 153 . (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 153. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 153. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 19, 1964. SUBJECT Recapitulation of Meeting on Laos and South Vietnam on December 19 2 A two-week program of Barrel Roll activities was submitted. The program continues in fairly low key and signals (“by design”) no intensification of U.S. actions in Laos. 3 It was agreed to continue our stone-walling tactics with respect to information on these flights. We will deal with shoot-downs on a case-by-case basis. (Greenfield noted that there is a great lack of interest, both in this country and abroad, on U.S. planes over Laos). However, we should prepare for leaks to the likes of Alsop or Baldwin. The infiltration report was shelved indefinitely, 4 but the information concerning increased infiltration should seep out gradually. If Embassy spokesmen were put under considerable pressure they could give a background briefing on the subject. Vance gave a rapid run-down on scheduled plans for 34–A operations. 5 Particular emphasis was put on the difficulties for Maritime Ops experienced at this time of year. Despite a request from Saigon, it was decided that this program had a large enough bank of targets to give it the flexibility necessary. Forrestal gave a run-down on progress in connection with Third Country aid. 6 Except for a reference to the Australian response (not too discouraging) to the President’s letter, he added little to what you already knew about progress on this program. Bill Bundy raised the question of contingency planning for the use of ground forces in Vietnam. The key point here is to get the Australians committed to participation, if necessary. Bundy’s probing of the Australian Ambassador brought a surprisingly favorable response. On the other hand, his talk with the New Zealand Ambassador was somewhat discouraging. General Johnson, who had just returned from Vietnam, mentioned the concern that some of the younger military officers have about the lack of understanding in the U.S. concerning Vietnam. The following actions are to be taken: 1. You are to get final approval on the two-week program for Barrel Roll and OP Plan 34–A. 2. I am to work up a draft Christmas message from the President to Americans in Vietnam (I am in contact with Rowan on this). There will be no meeting next Saturday. 7 Chester L. Cooper 8 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 12/64–1/65. Secret. 2 The meeting was held at the Department of State at 10 a.m. and was attended by William and McGeorge Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Vance, McNaughton, Cooper, Rowan, McCone, and others. See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, p. 1012, footnote 2 . 3 See Document 151 . 4 Regarding this report, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, p. 1013, footnote 4 . 5 Against North Vietnam. 6 To South Vietnam. 7 December 26. 8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 154. Editorial Note 154. Editorial Note On January 6, 1965, Assistant Secretary William Bundy sent Secretary Rusk a memorandum entitled “Notes on the South Vietnamese Situation and Alternatives.” The memorandum was in anticipation of a meeting with President Johnson that afternoon at the White House. Most of Bundy’s memorandum concerned Vietnam, but he did discuss Laos, noting that North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union “have called for a Laos Conference without preconditions but have refrained from mentioning a conference on Vietnam.” Bundy suggested that the explanation was simple: the three were “not too happy with the way things have gone in Laos, but that they see Vietnam falling into their laps in the fairly near future.” Bundy added than no one at the Department of State believed that the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese would concede in any meaningful way on the preconditions demanded by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Bundy suggested that the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese hoped that Souvanna and the United States would abandon these preconditions, thus drastically weakening, if not destroying, Souvanna’s position in Vientiane. With the exception of the situation in Laos, Bundy stated that in the rest of Southeast Asia, U.S. posture was weak, especially in South Vietnam and Thailand. He suggested consideration of specific actions to remedy this problem. One of these actions was intensified air operations in Laos. Bundy noted “they may have some use, but they will not meet the problem of Saigon morale and, if they continue at a high level, may raise significant possibilities of Communist intervention in Laos with some plausible justification.” Bundy stated that the United States had “gone about as far as we can go in Laos by the existing limited actions,” apart from cutting Route 7, intensified military actions would not accomplish much. He concluded that “this form of action thus has little further to gain in the Laos context, and has no real bearing at this point on the South Vietnamese context.” Bundy’s memorandum is in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume II, pages 30 – 33 . The meeting with the President was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 5:03 to 6:44 p.m. In addition to President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy attended. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) Bundy’s personal notes of this meeting, the only record found, are printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume II, pages 37 – 38 . As a result of the meeting a cable was sent from the President to Taylor concerning policy toward Vietnam. (Telegram 1419 to Saigon, January 7; ibid., pages 40–41) 155. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 155. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, January 7, 1965, 1 p.m. 2073. During course SEACOORD meeting 2 participants considered means improve effectiveness US air operations in Laos. General assessment was that operations to date had achieved measured success, especially with respect to Laos-Thai morale, enhancement US pilot proficiency in area, and deterrence to vehicular borne infiltration over main routes into Laos. Moreover, these flights, combined with Lao T–28 operations, have caused Viet Minh-Pathet Lao to dismantle and disperse installations in many target areas. Presumably these installations have been re-established under jungle cover. Presumably also, due to random interdiction of roads, Viet Minh have moved into more expensive and less satisfactory methods of human portage, utilizing conscripted coolie labor which in itself is becoming scarce item due to peasant fear of air attack. However, we concur Deptel 1397 3 that these operations have been run in such a manner that Hanoi and Peiping are probably not able identify them as increments of pressure which are designed to have an influence upon North Vietnamese will to continue aggressive actions. Group developed several recommendations designed improve efficiency of US air operations within parameters of authority already accorded from Washington to Embassies and Commands represented at SEACOORD. A summary of these measures plus a general assessment of effectiveness US air operations Laos will be included in general reporting message from SEACOORD meeting. 4 Message will also provide group’s [garble—view?] re Pathet Lao, Hanoi and Peiping reactions to US air operations. Beyond these recommendations, however, group strongly believes that certain additional Washington authority is required to obtain maximum efficiency US assets committed to this program without markedly increasing visibility these air actions. Essentially, authorization consists of following: A. Single pre-planned air strike against bridge at Ban Ken (UG 6066). Success of this action would relieve to some degree potential pressures against ground forces in northern sector of Laos, provide choke point with additional targets, and create additional obstacles to rapid support or reinforcement of enemy forces west of the bridge. It would probably also reduce requirements for some of risky armed and photo reconnaissance missions of type now flown by US aircraft along Route 7. B. Because of dispersal concentrations in panhandle area and camouflage targets as noted above, there is need for intensive new low level Yankee Team oblique photography along Routes 12, 8, 23 and 9 in Laos corridor. Airmen present at meeting were unanimous in view that such flights, if flown on random schedule and with appropriate armed escort, would not involve significant risk of pilot and plane loss. They were equally unanimous in view that current pattern of flights which places Yankee Team planes above anti-aircraft range is of limited value from tactical and intelligence viewpoint. C. In contemplating future pattern “Barrel Roll” operations, group recommends that configuration of missions be concentrated on two types of operations: (1) night armed reconnaissance missions flown along Laotian corridor routes and Route 7; (2) daytime operations with priority given to “secondary targets” and armed reconnaissance feature becoming subsidiary. In instance no. 1 above, ordnance load, if not expended on target of opportunity, would be returned to base or jettisoned into the sea. In instance no. 2 above, targets designated would be those (i.e. bridges and A.A. installations, etc.) mutually agreed between RLAF and AIRA Vientiane as more satisfactory for US than RLAF operations. Ambassadors Taylor, Martin and Sullivan concur in foregoing. If Washington also concurs, CINCPAC is prepared to submit operational plans for all three general categories outlined above, drawing upon MACV and Embassy Vientiane resources and recommendations. Taylor 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 ASIA SE. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to the Department of Defense and White House; repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC; and passed to CIA. The source text is incorrectly dated January 7, 1964. 2 The meeting of the SEA Coordinating Committee (representatives from the Country Teams in Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos and MACV) took place on January 7 in Saigon. 3 Dated January 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 A general review of the meeting is in telegram 2086 from Saigon, January 8. In this telegram the Embassy stated that the conferees felt it was doubtful “whether Hanoi had identified Barrel Roll operations as a separate and distinct U.S. act of minor escalation,” the reason being that it had been so overshadowed by the far more numerous Lao Air Force T–28 and U.S. Yankee Team sorties. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, January 14, 1965, 7 p.m. 1056. Souvanna returned from Luang Prabang this afternoon and I filled him in on strike against Ban Ken bridge. 2 He was delighted to receive news that strike had been a success and even more pleased to know that we had recovered both pilots safely. I showed him copy of statement which Arthur Sylvester had issued Washington 3 and told him we would maintain “no comment” line in response to press inquiries here. He expressed satisfaction with Sylvester’s statement and reiterated his traditional position that we must not permit ourselves to be drawn out in any further discussion this subject. I told Souvanna that only other Lao fully briefed on this operation was General Ma, who was of course being kept informed for operational reasons. Souvanna said he preferred to leave it at that and generally felt the less said the better. 4 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Immediate; Ivory; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. 2 Two USAF jet aircraft (an F–100 and F–105) taking part in Barrel Roll Nine were lost to heavy anti-aircraft protecting the bridge. 3 The statement made at the noon press briefing at the Department of Defense by Spokesman Sylvester stated only that the planes were shot down by ground fire in central Laos. When asked during the briefing if the planes were shot down over the Plain of Jars, Sylvester replied that they were not. (Telegram 592 to Vientiane, January 13; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 In telegram 600 to Vientiane, January 14, the Department informed Sullivan that in view of intense press and Congressional interest in the loss of the two planes and under what authority the United States acted, Souvanna should be prepared to field questions as to whether or not he gave permission for Barrel Roll Nine. The Department suggested Souvanna should be headed off from a direct denial. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, January 19, 1965, 7:08 p.m. 616. Barrel Roll. Joint State-Defense message. Ref Vientiane AIRA CX–01070, Bangkok’s 921, Vientiane’s 1081, 2 CINCPAC 182111Z and Vientiane’s 868 to CINCPAC. 3 In view recent developments connection Barrel Roll Ten and conversations with General Ma on this subject, following are current guidelines for future Barrel Roll missions: 1. In order continue signal given by Barrel Roll, program will continue with both daylight and night missions. 2. In addition informing PriMin Souvanna in general terms on character of continuing program, future actions will be closely coordinated with General Ma. 3. On an urgent basis Vientiane should prepare an updated current list of secondary targets for both daylight and night missions, 4 obtain General Ma’s approval, and provide to all concerned. 4. As indicated in CINCPAC 182111Z and agreed to by Vientiane’s 868 to CINCPAC: (A) US day and night Barrel Roll missions in Laos south of Route 9 confined to area east of Muong Phine and east of Route 23; (B) Route 23 south of Route 9 and all area to west of Route 23 south of Route 9 reserved for RLAF air operations; (C) No restrictions to north of Route 9 except as prescribed for each mission; (D) COMUSMACV will continue to act as coordinating authority for Barrel Roll and Yankee Team missions to ensure routes and targets of all operations in Laos have concurrence AmAmb Vientiane. 5. Targets of opportunity are defined as military vehicular and troop movements and active AA spotted on or near roads designated for recce in Barrel Roll mission being flown. 6. Until further notice, campfires, if spotted, should not be attacked. 7. For immediate future avoid areas of heavy AA concentration in order to minimize risk of loss of aircraft. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Barrel Roll. Drafted by Cleland and Barbis; cleared by Trueheart, McGeorge Bundy, in draft with McNaughton, and in substance with Admiral Mustin of J–3 of the JCS; and approved by Unger. Also sent to Saigon, and repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC, the White House, DOD for JCS, and CIA. 2 These telegrams, January 15, 17, and 18 respectively, concerned the accidental bombing on January 15 of the friendly Kha village of Bang Tang Vai in Savannakhet province by aircraft engaged in Barrel Roll Ten. Five villagers and five soldiers suffered minor shrapnel wounds; five houses and seven graineries were destroyed. General Ma, the head of the Royal Lao Air Force, was extremely upset about the attack. Sullivan met with him to assure him that it was an accident and to issue an apology. Sullivan also ordered AID representatives to the village to make fast and generous restitution for damages. Ma insisted, as reported in telegram 1081 from Vientiane, that future Barrel Roll operations be limited by the restrictions outlined in subparagraphs 4(A), 4(B), 4(C) and paragraph 5 below. (All ibid.) 3 These telegrams, both January 18, proposed new procedures and guidelines for Barrel Roll operations and indicated the Embassy in Vientiane’s approval of the guidelines. (Ibid.) 4 In telegram 619 to Vientiane, January 20, the Department of State emphasized that telegram 616 presented general policy guidelines. Night Barrel Roll operations were still under review in Washington and no night operations with secondary targets would be authorized without further consultation with the Embassy in Vientiane and without Souvanna’s and Ma’s general approval. (Ibid.) 158. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 158. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 22, 1965. SUBJECT Developments With Respect to Laos I. The Communist Buildup in Laos A review of all available intelligence leads to the conclusion there has been a significant reinforcement of the North Vietnamese forces in the Plaine des Jarres and the Panhandle (see map). 2 Although a reinforcement of this type tends to occur each year at the end of the rainy season, it has extended farther to the south than heretofore and probably exceeds the totals observed in previous years. Prior to the end of the rainy season, there were an estimated 7–8 North Vietnamese battalions, and a total of 5–6,000 North Vietnamese troops present in Laos. Although precise information is still lacking, it is believed that the recently introduced elements may have increased the number of North Vietnamese units to 14–16 battalions and overall personnel strength to 9–11, 000. Pathet Lao strength has remained relatively constant at some 20,000 men. This recent reinforcement, although it provides improved defenses for key installations and infiltration routes, also gives the Communists a capability to move sharply, and with little or no warning, against targets in Laos and South Vietnam should they decide on retaliation for increased pressures brought to bear on them by the U.S. II. Soviet Draft Message on Laos The 19 January Soviet note was sent to the British in the form of a draft message from the Geneva cochairman to the U.S. and the three Laotian factions. 3 It provides further evidence of Moscow’s concern that U.S. air strikes in Laos may call forth Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese counteractions leading, in turn, to a dangerous military escalation. Following previous practice, the Soviets published their draft without waiting for a British response. In addition to expressing support for the Pathet Lao’s routine call on 17 December for a new Geneva conference, the Soviet draft urges the leaders of all three Laotian “political forces” to refrain from actions which would aggravate the situation. This might be an oblique warning to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese to avoid moves which might provoke greater U.S. intervention. Moscow’s attempts to inhibit the actions of both sides in the Laos conflict may have been prompted by a belief that the North Vietnamese and Chinese are developing a public justification for renewed offensive action in Laos. Propaganda and official statements over the past month have at least implied that Hanoi and Peiping would regard U.S. air strikes against “liberated areas” in Laos as a move to “extend the war to all of Indochina”. On the other hand, Moscow has written to the North Vietnamese and Chinese Foreign Ministers supporting their recent protests against U.S. actions in “involving troops of its South Korean puppets in the aggressive war against the South Vietnamese people.” Gromyko stated that the USSR, “will render every support and assistance” to the people of Vietnam. III. Free World Press Reaction to Recent Events The shooting down of two American jets in Laos on January 13 was given moderate press coverage in most areas of the non-Communist world, accompanied by very light, scattered comments in a few countries. A definite change in U.S. military and political policy was seen by the London Times and Rome’s Messaggero. The Times said this was “the first official indication that the bombing of Viet Cong supply lines had begun.” The Times headline over the story said “First Evidence of New Policy.” Messaggero said the action “suggests a radical change in the political and military course followed until now by the Johnson administration.” This course, the paper says, “is a serious warning to North Vietnam about U.S. determination to react strongly to a move or less direct intervention of North Vietnam in the war in South Vietnam.” A sharp change in tactics was also seen by the West German press. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung viewed the American air attacks as a development of new tactics in an effort to stop Communist reinforcements and supplies. Le Monde , Paris, reviewed developments and added, “even though the State Department neither confirms nor clearly denies that the air force has been making photographs or conducting air attacks, it has admitted implicitly that a new phase of intervention has been underway for some time.” In the Far East, reports are available only from Thai newspapers which have carried official comment and editorials. Prime Minister Thanom approved the U.S. air action and said “if supplies and reinforcements can be prevented from reaching the Viet Cong, it might greatly facilitate the suppression of the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam.” No comment has yet been received from other countries in the Far East or from Africa and Latin America. CLC McGeorge Bundy 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 12/64–1/65. Top Secret. 2 Attached, but not printed. 3 As reported in telegram 2084 from Moscow, January 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 159. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts 159. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts 1 Washington, January 23, 1965, 2:30 p.m. 1331. Moscow’s 2084 to Department. 2 British Embassy here has informed us of January 19 conversation between British Ambassador Trevelyan and Soviet Deputy FonMin Lapin reported reftel. Embassy has also told us, on instructions, that FonOff considers that Soviet initiative in proposing action by Co-Chairmen on Laos represents important shift in Russian policy since summer of 1964 when Khrushchev indicated that USSR was abandoning Co-Chairman role. British went on to inquire whether we would agree with their taking advantage of Soviet initiative to probe Soviet intentions somewhat further. If idea is acceptable to US, Trevelyan would be instructed—while refusing to join in transmission of proposed message on grounds outlined reftel—to welcome renewal of Soviet interest in Laos Co- Chairmanship and suggest initiation of informal Anglo-Russian conversations. Latter in British view would have dual purpose of (1) preparing report on future of ICC pursuant to Article 19 of 1962 Protocol, 3 and (2) ascertaining whether or not any generally acceptable basis could be found for reconvening international conference on settlement of Laotian question. British would be agreeable have conversations take place between ambassadors in Vientiane, or in London or Moscow. Unless Russian response is wholly negative, matter could then be pursued during Gromyko visit to London in mid-March. Finally, British point out that approach along above lines need not commit UK or other Western powers to any particular course of action. If Russian attitude either before or during conversations seemed unpromising, it would be possible to concentrate talks on future of ICC or let them lapse altogether. We are informing British Embassy that we agree on desirability of probing Soviet intentions further. We suggest, however, that principal thrust of approach should be on question of preparing report on future of ICC, rather than on reconvening international conference, although we recognize that it may be necessary to hold out possibility of latter to interest Russians in further discussions. Possibility of conference is implicit in Article 19 of Geneva Protocol and we will urge British, if they feel it necessary to advert to conference, to relate it to requirement under Article 19 to consult with members of conference re ICC not later than July 1965. We have of course stressed that in going along with proposed approach to Soviets, we are in no way committed on question of US participation in new conference on Laos. Decision on this would depend not only on outcome of Anglo-Russian conversations but also on situation in SEA and on attitudes of RLG (and RTG and GVN). Except for London, above should not be discussed with host governments. Approach should in general be treated with greatest discretion, as any indication of UK-USSR discussions on subject 14-nation conference could have adverse effects particularly in Vientiane. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart; cleared by Unger, William Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Robert C. Creel, Director of Soviet Affairs David H. Henry, Salans, Thompson, and Director of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs J. Harold Shullaw; and approved by Rusk. Sent to Vientiane, Moscow, Paris, London, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, New Delhi, Saigon, Warsaw, and Hong Kong. 2 See footnote 3, Document 158 . 3 Article 19 of the 1962 Protocol on the neutrality of Laos stated that the Co-Chairmen could, if the Royal Lao Government requested it, present a report with appropriate recommendations for the termination of the ICC for the consideration of members of the Conference. This must be done after consultation with the Royal Lao Government and the Commission. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1083. 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State 1 Bangkok, January 26, 1965, noon. 974. Department for Ambassador Martin. Ref: Deptel 1076. 2 I saw Marshal Dawee this morning on T–28’s as instructed reftel. He has consulted with Prime Minister Thanom and CINC RTAF and has agreed turn over to us ten RTAF T–28’s immediately for operations in Laos. Anything beyond that number, according to Dawee, would create extreme difficulties for RTAF on basis emasculation their operations and ongoing training programs. (RTAF now down to 31 T–28’s. Loan of ten for Laos would leave only 21 for three composite squadrons and training program.) I outlined to Marshal Dawee seriousness of situation and fact that nine T–28’s lost on January 24 were in addition to other losses over period of past six weeks, which had brought number of aircraft available for vital operations in Laos to dangerously low ebb. Dawee intimated he would give matter further consideration, but I suspect he is having real difficulties with Air Chief Marshal Boon Choo. I told him we in turn would also consider the matter further and would be in touch again at a later date. JUSMAG getting in contact with RTAF immediately to effect necessary transfer of ten aircraft. Wilson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–3 US LAOS. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Vientiane and CINCPAC. 2 In telegram 1076, January 26, the Department instructed the Charge in Thailand to approach the Thai Government about the loan of 14 T–28 aircraft of which 9 should be ready for immediate delivery. These aircraft would eventually be replaced from the Laos military assistance program. (Ibid.) 161. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk 161. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 27, 1965. SUBJECT Communist Buildup in Southern Laos May Be Precautionary The Communist troop and supply buildup in the Laotian corridor since December has raised the possibility that Hanoi intends to initiate a major new offensive in Laos or to introduce regular North Vietnamese army units into South Vietnam. However, the relatively cautious Communist propaganda approach to Laos and the absence (despite Binh Gia) 2 of any firm indication of a shift from guerrilla to conventional warfare in South Vietnam argue against the conclusion that these are now Communist intentions. The events preceding the buildup and the evidence we have of its nature point more convincingly to the conclusion that the buildup represents a determined effort to shore up and maintain the security of the infiltration routes to South Vietnam. Communist Setbacks in the Corridor. Since October, RLAF T–28’s and Yankee Team aircraft have conducted an intensive air reconnaissance and interdiction program against known and suspected infiltration-related targets. The extent of damage inflicted by air operations is unknown. However, photography confirms that many former military areas are now deserted and nearly all road movements take place at night. Since November, FAR units—largely through superior artillery and close air support—have completed Phase II of Operation Victorious Arrow, 3 advancing some 10 miles on a 15 mile front along Route 9 and capturing several former Pathet Lao strong points. In addition, four to five Meo intelligence/harassment teams have infiltrated deep into Communist-held territory and at least one has clashed with Communist forces. Compared with the degree of control previously exercised by the Communists over this area, therefore, developments since the end of the rainy season have represented a serious deterioration. The Communists undoubtedly know that Phase III of Victorious Arrow envisages an attempt to capture Muong Phine; they may also interpret the press speculation following Ambassador Taylor’s December visit to Washington and the subsequent US jet strikes as a prelude to a ground movement against access routes to South Vietnam. In any event, there is ample cause for Communist concern over existing and possible future deterioration of their security in the corridor. The Communist Response . Since December, road watch teams have reported artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, heavy convoys and a possible total of 2,000 North Vietnamese troops, moving west and south in the Panhandle. Aerial photography has confirmed the arrival of possibly two new anti-aircraft battalions in the same area during the same period. These battalions alone, accompanied by security forces, support elements, and ammunition, could account for a major portion of the reported troop and supply movements. The remainder may have been introduced to cope with FAR/Meo ground action and to provide the manpower for a sharp counter-attack against operation Victorious Arrow. In December 1963, for example, the FAR advance on Kham Keut and Lak Sao was reversed only after an estimated 2–3,000 Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops had been brought into the area. We conclude that although recent movements make intensified anti-aircraft and ground action highly likely, they do not indicate any basic change in Communist tactics in Laos or in South Vietnam. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 12/64–1/65. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limit Distribution. 2 The battle for Binh Gia, 40 miles southeast of Saigon, took place from December 28, 1964, to January 4, 1965, the longest battle of the war in South Vietnam to that point. 3 Operation Victorious Arrow was a FAR operation to retake Route 9 and Muong Phine in southern Laos. Unlike Operation Triangle in the north the previous year, U.S. aircraft did not play a major support role. January 31, 1965 to December 1967: Demise of the Rightists; Controversy Over Interdiction Strategies; Souvanna’s Visits to the United States January 31, 1965 to December 1967: Demise of the Rightists; Controversy Over Interdiction Strategies; Souvanna’s Visits to the United States 162. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 31, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII, 1/1/65–2/19/65. Secret. An initial on the source text indicates that Johnson saw this memorandum. All four attached telegrams are Secret, Flash and were repeated Priority to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. For Sullivan’s account of this episode, see his Obbligato: Notes on a Foreign Service Career, pp. 221–227. 163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, February 1, 1965, 5:46 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 6 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Barbis, cleared by Trueheart and Green, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 164. Memorandum From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, February 3, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIV, Memos, 2/65–3/65. Secret. 165. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, February 4, 1965. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, SNIE 10–65. Top Secret. Prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the USIB concurred with it on February 4 except the representative of the FBI who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction. 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, February 5, 1965, 8:05 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared by Barbis, and approved by Green. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, London, Paris, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, February 6, 1965, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, February 26, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, sent with instructions that the Department pass a copy to the JCS and Saigon a copy to MACV. 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, March 1, 1965, 8:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Barbis; cleared by Trueheart, Unger, and William Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, and CINCPAC. 170. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 2, 1965, 3:10 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Robert Owen of SOV and approved in S on March 9. The meeting was held in Rusk’s office. 171. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 3, 1965, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. Passed to the White House and Department of Defense. 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State Bangkok, March 6, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, March 14, 1965, 3:17 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Barbis and approved by Unger. 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, March 20, 1965, 5:04 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared in substance with Hamilton of OSD/ISA, and approved by Unger. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 175. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 22, 1965, 0546Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. Beginning in spring 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, March 25, 1965, 8:06 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Barbis; cleared by Miller, Dexter, Blouin, and Mustin; and approved by Unger. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, April 8, 1965, 11:49 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart and Barbis and approved by Green and Ball. Repeated to Tehran for Rusk (who was attending the CENTO meeting), Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and Moscow. 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, April 21, 1965, 0912Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 ASIA SE. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. The substantive portion of this telegram was retyped in the White House, but there was no indication on the retyped copy whether or not it was submitted to the President. 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, April 23, 1965, 1000Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC, Saigon, and USUN. 180. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, April 26, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, FO. Secret. The first page of this memorandum is on White House stationery and the type font is different from the following pages; apparently it was retyped at the White House. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, May 10, 1965, 9:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 ASIA SE. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared in draft by William Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, Hong Kong, and Moscow. 182. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 13, 1965, 0210Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. 183. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State London, May 14, 1965, 1125Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, and Bangkok. Rusk was in London to attend the NAC Ministerial meeting May 11–12. 184. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 14, 1965. 185. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) Washington, May 14, 1965. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Chronology, Telephone Conversations, Nov. 1964–1965. No classification marking. Transcribed in Harriman’s office. “PM” appears on the dateline on the source text. 186. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 20, 1965, 0920Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, and JCS. 187. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, June 21, 1965, 0445Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC. Passed to DOD and CIA. The substance of this telegram was retyped in the White House and a note on it reads: “send to Pres.” 188. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Dexter) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) Washington, June 26, 1965. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret; Limdis. 189. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, July 8, 1965, 1940Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Vientiane, London, Moscow, and New Delhi. 190. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 9, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. Secret. 191. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 23, 1965. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Raborn) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 22 July–3 Nov 1965. Secret. Drafted by Colby on July 27. 192. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, August 5, 1965. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 58–65. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the National Security Agency. The Directors of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency concurred with its release by the Director of Central Intelligence. The AEC and FBI representatives on the USIB abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 193. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, August 7, 1965. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, DOD/OSD Admin Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Viet 381. Top Secret. 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, August 9, 1965, 1124Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 195. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, August 13, 1965, 1040Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 196. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, September 10, 1965. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, Top Secret Material. Top Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the USIB concurred with its release on September 10 except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 197. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) Washington, September 17, 1965. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and cleared by Barbis. A copy was sent to Unger. 198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, September 28, 1965, 10:29 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Trueheart; cleared by Unger, George H. Aldrich of L/FE, and McNamara; and approved by Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and DEPCHIEFJUSMAG. 199. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, September 28, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. No classification marking. This memorandum was also from Chester Cooper and was sent through Valenti, who wrote on the memorandum that he agreed that the President should see Souvanna. 200. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 18, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by George Carroll. 201. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 18, 1965, 3:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS-US. Secret. Drafted by Jose DeSeabra of Language Services and Barbis and cleared in Rusk’s office on October 26.The time of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book. Rusk’s next appointment was at 4:56 p.m. (Johnson Library) 202. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 3, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. Confidential. 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) Vientiane, November 8, 1965, 0600Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 466, which is the source text, and to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, DOD, and JCS. 204. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, November 18, 1965. Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret. Drafted by Barbis and cleared by Unger. 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, November 23, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Nodis; No Distribution Outside Department. There was no time of dispatch on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 4:42 a.m. 206. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs (Barbis) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) Washington, November 23, 1965. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret. 207. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, November 29, 1965, 1112Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon, London, Moscow, and CINCPAC. 208. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, December 3, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Top Secret, Drafted by Unger. Rusk’s initials appear on the source text. Copies were sent to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Ewing and Barbis of SEA, Miller of FE/VN, and Sullivan in Vientiane. 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, December 4, 1965, 0417Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC,COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG, DOD, and JCS. 210. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 10, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 211. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, December 15, 1965, 1100Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 212. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Ewing) to the Director (Trueheart) Washington, December 16, 1965. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Barbis. 213. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to Vice President Humphrey Washington, December 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. Confidential. 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to Secretary of Defense McNamara Vientiane, December 23, 1965, 0525Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash; handled by S/S-O as Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State as 678, which is the source text, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and JCS. 215. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Johnson Washington, December 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos. 4/65–1/66. No classification marking. A note on the source text indicates it was sent to Johnson at his ranch in Texas on December 31. 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, January 3, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis; Privacy Channel. No time of transmittal appears on the source text, but it was received at the Department of State at 1:29 a.m., January 3. 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, January 5, 1966, 1019Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson, under a covering memorandum, January 5, 5:30 p.m., in which Bundy suggested that the President might be interested in Symington’s views as expressed to Sullivan. McGeorge Bundy wrote: “It may be that we ought to talk to him [Symington] before he starts to say this sort of thing in public. He doesn’t much like being muzzled by the White House, but he has played ball with us before.” An initial on the memorandum indicates that Johnson saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVIII) 218. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, January 6, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. No transmittal time appears on the source text, which was received at the Department of State at 6:37 a.m., January 6. 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, January 13, 1966, 1225Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis/Pinta. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Moscow, and Warsaw. Passed to the White House. 220. Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson Washington, February 16, 1966, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Secret. An initial on the source text indicates that Johnson saw it. 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Embassy in the Philippines Vientiane, February 20, 1966, 0610Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 905, which is the source text, and to CINCPAC and Seoul. 222. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) Washington, March 8, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. 223. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 11, 1966, 0245Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Limdis; Priority. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 2d Air Division, and Bangkok. 224. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 21, 1966, 1000Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 2d Air Division, and Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Udorn. 225. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff (Burchinal) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) Washington, March 21, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Laos 000.1 (373.5 Laos), 1966. Top Secret. 226. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane March 23, 1966, 09095Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ASIA SE. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Moscow, London, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC. The time of dispatch on this telegram is an error; it was received at the Department of State at 5:17 a.m., March 23. 227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, March 23, 1966, 7:23 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Slutz; cleared with Blouin, Mustin, Jorden, in substance with Trueheart, and paragraph 5 with Richard L. Sneider, the Public Affairs Officer, and FE; and approved by Unger. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and 2d Air Division. 228. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, April 4, 1966, 1131Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 LAOS. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Tokyo, London, Moscow, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC. 229. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 5, 1966, 11–11:15 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17–1 LAOS–US. Confidential. Drafted by DeSebera of Language Services and James P. Murphy of SEA, neither of whom are cited as participants. Approved in the White House on April 16. 230. Memorandum From R.C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 9, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Top Secret. 231. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, April 11, 1966, 0515Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. 232. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hamilton) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) Washington, May 4, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648. Laos 000.1 (200.2 Laos). Secret. Sent through Admiral Blouin. Copies were sent to Truehart, Barbis, Colonel Mobley, and the Air Force Foreign Liaison Branch. 233. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 15, 1966, 0935Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–3 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC, JCS, and Saigon. Passed to the White House upon receipt at the Department of State. 234. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, May 31, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cowherd of FE and cleared by Trueheart, Assistant Legal Adviser George H. Aldrich, Seymour Weiss of G/PM, and Unger. 235. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Saigon, June 4, 1966, 0900Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 April–30 June 1966. Secret; Eyes Only. 236. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, June 9, 1966, 1130Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Moscow, Saigon, and CINCPAC. The substance of this telegram was retyped in the White House and sent on June 10 to the President by Rostow who suggested, “This account of Souvanna and the King of Laos in Moscow will interest you—notably paras 6 and 7, which have the ring of credibility.” His initial on the source text indicates the President read the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67) 237. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, June 10, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–12 US. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Cowherd and cleared by Trueheart, Weiss, and James F. Leonard of INR/RES. This memorandum was originally directed to Rusk through Johnson, but Johnson approved it for the Secretary on June 11. 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, June 27, 1966, 0610Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, Hong Kong, and Moscow. This telegram was retyped in the White House, but there is no indication whether or not it was sent to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67) 239. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 28, 1966, 4–4:25 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Laos 000.1 (333 Laos), 1966. Top Secret. Drafted by Mobley on July 5 and cleared by Blouin. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. 240. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, July 11, 1966, 0930Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House upon receipt at the Department of State. 241. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Saigon, July 13, 1966, 0725Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Repeated to the Department of State for Unger, which is the source text,OSD, and JCS. Handled as Exdis upon receipt at the Department of State. 242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, July 16, 1966, 2:27 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Slutz, cleared by Hamilton of DOD/ISA, and Ewing, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG/THAI. As of July 1, 1966, Department of State telegrams to all posts were numbered consecutively according to the time they were sent. Telegrams repeated to posts for information used the same number. 243. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Sylvester) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 19, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Laos 1966 (Laos 704). Secret. 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, August 3, 1966, 0521Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, Saigon, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG, and OSD. The substance of this telegram was retyped in the White House and sent to the President under cover of a note from Rostow, August 3, 3 p.m., which reads: “We often forget there is a significant—secondary—war going on in Laos. Here is an interesting account of recent operations.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67) 245. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 8, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Confidential. 246. Report by the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, August 16, 1966. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Far East General. Secret. 247. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report September 6, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National, Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 248. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to the 303 Committee Washington, September 8, 1966. Source: Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, 9/15/66. Secret; Eyes Alone. No drafting information or attribution appears on the source text. A September 13 memorandum from William Bundy to Alexis Johnson commenting on this report indicates that it was prepared by CIA. Bundy supported the recommendations that the operations be continued and expanded by 3,000 persons in FY 1967, but he believed that the justification for these operations were not tied exclusively to Vietnam. Bundy believed that they were important for the security of Laos and the Mekong Valley. (Ibid.) 249. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, September 11, 1966, 0715Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. 250. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, September 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VII, 5/66–6/67. Top Secret. 251. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Saigon, September 16, 1966, 0518Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 58, Cables, 9/1–18/66. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to JCS for Wheeler. 252. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Saigon, September 16, 1966, 0519Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 58, Cables, 9/1–18/66. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Exclusive. Repeated to the JCS for Wheeler. 253. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report September 27, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 254. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Donnelly) Washington, October 3, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–12 US. Top Secret. 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, October 8, 1966, 1103Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Moscow, and USUN. 256. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 11, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt. W. Rostow, Vol. XIV, October 1–31, 1966. Secret. 257. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 12, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Slutz and Sophia K. Porson of Language Services and approved in Harriman’s office on October 28. 258. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 12, 1966, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Hamilton and Alex Toumayan of Language Services and approved in S on October 25. According to Rusk’s Appointment Book the meeting began at 3:05 p.m. (Johnson Library) A typed note on the source text reads “Part I of VI.” 259. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Secret. Drafted by Slutz and Alex Toumayan of Language Services on October 13. 260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, October 15, 1965, 4:54 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Hamilton and cleared with Unger and in substance with Holland of OSD/ISA. 261. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) Vientiane, October 17, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. 262. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, October 20, 1966, 0200Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential; Flash. Repeated flash to Bangkok, and to Saigon, COMUSMACV, and DEPCHJUSMAG THAI. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and NSA. 263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, October 21, 1966, 12:39 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by Hamilton and approved by Berger. Repeated flash to Saigon and Manila for William Bundy, who was attending the Manila Conference with South Vietnamese leaders. 264. Paper Prepared for President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. It was sent to Rostow for the President and sent for information to Jorden. Apparently this was the text of a cable sent to Manila for the President. 265. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) Washington, October 21, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Top Secret. Drafted and released by Richard C. Steadman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). Bromley Smith wrote a note on the White House copy of this telegram making certain that Rostow should see it. 266. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, October 22, 1966, 5:55 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, repeated to Manila, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG THAI, DIA, and DEPCMDR 7/13th AF Udorn. Passed to the White House,CIA, USIA, and NSA. 267. Memorandum From D.W. Ropa of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 3, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Ropa Memos. Secret. 268. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, November 9, 1966, 0852Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Also sent to DOD and repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, 7th Air Force T SN, DEPCHJUSMAG THAI, 7th/23d Air Force Udorn, 606 ACS Udorn, and COMUSMACTHAI. 269. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, November 18, 1966, 1135Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, and DEPCHJUSMAG THAI. 270. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, December 2, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz, Hamilton, and Unger; cleared by Hamilton, Oscar V. Armstrong, Public Affairs Officer in EAP, and Harold Kaplan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. As of November 1 the names of the Assistant Secretary and the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs was changed to East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 271. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 27, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Confidential. The source text indicates that the President saw this memorandum. 272. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report December 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Confidential. 273. Note From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 7, 1967, 9:05 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Confidential. The source text indicates that Johnson saw it. 274. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 13, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by Hamilton. 275. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, January 21, 1967, 0507Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 LAOS–VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. 276. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Honolulu, February 16, 1967, 1906Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Jan-31 Mar 1967. Top Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland. 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, February 24, 1967, 9:50 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Hamilton and cleared by Steadman, Unger, and Daniel Arzac of the Bureau of Public Affairs. 278. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Honolulu, February 25, 1967, 0152Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Jan-31 Mar 1967. Top Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland and General John D. Ryan, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force. 279. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, February 25, 1967, 0850Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 4:40 p.m., February 25, Washington time. 280. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at the American Chiefs of State Conference, Punta del Este, Uruguay Washington, April 13, 1967, 2:51 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. Repeated to Moscow, London, Vientiane, Ottawa, New Delhi, Warsaw, and Saigon. 281. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 17, 1967. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, McNamara, Robert. Top Secret; Nodis. 282. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, April 20, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(Laos 381), 1967. Top Secret; Sensitive. 283. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 1, 1967. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Far East, General. Top Secret. 284. Editorial Note 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, May 10, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Eugene Rostow, Unger, William Bundy, and Walt Rostow. 286. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) Honolulu, May 13, 1967, 0319Z. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OSD/Admin Files: FRC 72 A 2467, Laos (Laos 385) 1967. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to JCS, CINCUSARPAC, and Vientiane. 287. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 18, 1967. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 18. All members of the Board concurred except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 288. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Saigon, May 24, 1967, 0350Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Apr-30 June 1967. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Wheeler. 289. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 29, 1967, 1000Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and JCS. 290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, June 3, 1967, 12:15 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LAOS–US. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Hamilton; cleared by Aldrich, Habib, and Steadman; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 291. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, June 9, 1967, 0929Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Hong Kong, Moscow, Saigon,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and 7th AF. 292. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 17, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(Laos 381), 1967. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance saw it. 293. Memorandum of Conversation New York, June 21, 1967, 8:15–11 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel and approved in Rusk’s office on June 27. The dinner meeting was held at the Secretary’s apartment in the Waldorf Towers. The conversation on Laos is one part of seven memoranda of conversation. All are ibid., Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Rusk-Gromyko. 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, June 29, 1967, 4:43 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 17 LAOS–US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Hamilton; cleared with Habib, Rear Admiral Lemos of DOD/ISA, Arzac, Salans, and Brigadier General Dobson of the Joint Staff, J–3; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 295. Information Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, July 5, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Hamilton. 296. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, July 6, 1967, 0830Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 LAOS–US. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and JCS. 297. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Saigon, July 10, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, McNaughton Files, MCNTN XIV, Misc. 1967 (3). Top Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Copies were sent to CJCS and CINCPAC. 298. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Saigon, July 11, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, Paul C. Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, MCNTN XIV, Misc. (3). Top Secret. Copies were sent to JCS and CINCPAC. 299. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, July 18, 1967, 0330Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Rangoon, Saigon, Warsaw, Hong Kong, CINCPAC, and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI. 300. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Steadman) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) Washington, July 21, 1967. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. 301. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, July 24, 1967, 0550Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, Saigon, COMUSMACV, JCS, and SecDef. 302. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, July 29, 1967, 0930Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE–US. Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. 303. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report July 29, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVII, Cables, 2/67–12/67. Confidential. 304. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to President Johnson Washington, July 31, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVII, Memos, 2/67–12/67. Secret. An attached covering note from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, August 1, reads: “Herewith Dick Helms’ man, Bill Colby, reports quiet but substantial progress in Laos. The pressure of the road-watch teams, married to jet aircraft, is one reason infiltration has shifted to the DMZ.” There is an indication on the note that the President saw the memorandum. 305. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, August 9, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ASIA SE. Top Secret. Copies were sent to William Bundy, Kohler, and John C. Ausland of G/PM. 306. Telegram From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) Vientiane, August 10, 1967, 1210Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 July–30 Sept. 1967. Top Secret. This message had no number and was not sent via Department of State communications channels. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. 307. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Saigon, August 13, 1967, 1310Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 July–30 Sept. 1967. Top Secret. Repeated to Wheeler. 308. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, August 26, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1967. Top Secret. Drafted by Mobley and Lemos. 309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand Washington, September 1, 1967, 2338Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis; Priority. Drafted by Steadman, cleared by Warnke and Habib, cleared in substance by Katzenbach, and approved by Bundy. Also sent to Vientiane and repeated to Saigon, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 310. Memorandum of Meeting With President Johnson Washington, September 12, 1967, 1:25–3:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. Drafted by Jim Jones, who sent it to the President. 311. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 19, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Visit of Souvanna Phouma, 1/20–21/67. Top Secret; Exdis. The source text indicates that the President saw it. 312. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 20, 1967, 12.30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Visit of Souvanna Phouma, 10/20–21/67. Secret. Drafted by Toumayan and Slutz. A note on a copy of this memorandum in the Department of State indicates that it was approved by Walt Rostow on October 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 313. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 20, 1967, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Visit of Souvanna Phouma, 10/20–21/67. Top Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted by Toumayan and Slutz. 314. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 21, 1967, 11:30 a.m.–12:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Toumayan and Slutz and approved in S on November 5. The meeting was held at Blair House. The time of the end of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) Prior to this meeting Vice President Humphrey met Souvanna at 11 a.m. at Blair House. Souvanna and Humphrey discussed bombing policy against North Vietnam and rice production in Laos. (Memorandum of conversation, October 21; Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS–US) 315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos Washington, October 20, 1967, 2331Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Richard C. Holbrooke (U), cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Katzenbach. 316. Editorial Note 317. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 28, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5 EE (1) Laos, 10/67–12/68. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was for use at a luncheon meeting on November 28. The President met with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and Christian for lunch at 1 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of this meeting has been found. 318. Memorandum of Meeting With President Johnson Washington, November 29, 1967, 1:40–2:37 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, 11/29/67. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the White House. 319. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) Washington, November 29, 1967, 2337Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Nov-30 Nov 1967. Top Secret. Also sent to Sharp and repeated to Sullivan. 320. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, November 30, 1967, 1325Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, and COMUSMACV. 321. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, December 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Laos (Laos 385.1), 1967. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw it on December 4. 322. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, December 16, 1967, 0340Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Moscow, Saigon, COMUSMACV, and CINCPAC. 323. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Washington, December 18, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Laos (Laos 385.1), 1967. Secret. 324. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, December 20, 1967, 0603Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC,CINCSAC, and COMUSMACV. 325. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, December 26, 1967, 6:02 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVII, 2/67–12/67. Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was received at the LBJ Ranch at 6:35 p.m. This report was drafted by the Central Intelligence Agency and sent to the White House as report No. 1688. (Ibid., Vietnam, 5 EE (1) Laos 10/67–12/68) 162. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 162. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 31, 1965. SUBJECT News of the day [Here follows material unrelated to Laos.] 2. At Tab A is a splendid set of cables from Bill Sullivan in Vientiane showing the rise and probable fall of an unusually foolish coup earlier today. It is worth your reading because of the flavor it gives of life in Laos, and still more because it shows what a resourceful man Sullivan is—in essence he blocked this coup by getting a tipsy Australian technician to cut some wires. [Here follows material unrelated to Laos.] McG. B. Attachment A Vientiane, January 31, 1965, 11 p.m. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1164. Considerable activity of confused origin shaking city tonight. Several roadblocks have mushroomed around city and troop movements are reported. One short burst of automatic weapons fire about 2015 hours. Most rumors suggest that young colonels may be taking action that they have long discussed. If so, action likely be diffused and directed primarily against grievances which are more personal than institutional. We have officers with General Kouprasith and Col. Ttoglith [Tong Lit?] at Chinamao. We are sending others to be with General Siho at his headquarters. Our purpose is to neutralize main sources of local power in order avoid escalation. British Ambassador, who has called Souvanna, has been assured by latter that situation being brought under his control but we, at current moment, have no assurance that he knows any more than we do just what is afoot. Sullivan Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, February 1, 1965, 12:30 a.m. 1165. As far as we can determine, difficulty in Vientiane seems to be initiated by Col Bounleut Saycocie, malcontent chief of logistics and activist among Young Turks of military establishment. Our best estimate is that he has only one company of troops. However, this is difficult to judge with confidence since everybody with a weapon seems to be milling round in town or on the outskirts. Bounleut’s principal accomplishment so far has been seizure of radio station. He has broadcast five communiques announcing coup d’etat in name of several officers who, to best of our knowledge, are not engaged in activities. Radio station seems to have been left in hands of few soldiers who control entrance while main force of Bounleut’s company have moved south of city in direction of Chinaimo camp. I have rounded up Australian technician who runs radio station (he unfortunately is half-stoned) and also Australian DCM. With concurrence Australian Ambassador, I am sending a joint US-Australian Task Force of about 6 men to cut a wire leading from radio station studios to transmitters, thus putting radio off the air. They have instructions to do this only if they can avoid confrontation with military. Once we have silenced radio station, I hope we can send Bounleut and his boy scouts back to their marshmallows. I have talked with Phoumi by telephone and am reasonably confident he is not personally directing this operation. However, he is fairly lathering to take advantage of anything that develops. Both Souvanna and General Ouane are in King’s palace compound where I have not been able to reach them by telephone. Three members of Cabinet are holed up in [garble—hospital?] (where we were having dinner and where my wife is now plying them with cognac to quell their trepidations). In general, it seems to be a normal Sunday evening in Vientiane. Sullivan Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, February 1, 1965, 12:30 a.m. 1166. ANZUS Task Force has cut wires, putting radio off air. I have sent two officers from Military Attache’s office to roadblock controlled by Bounleut’s troops to tell them coup has failed and to advise them head for the hills. To best our knowledge, only casualties are two soldiers from Chinaimo who were killed while attempting run Bounleut roadblock. I am off to see Souvanna at palace if I can get through. Sullivan Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, February 1, 1965, 2 a.m. 1167. I have just come from seeing Souvanna, who is holed up in King’s compound with most of General Staff and with those Cabinet officers who not at my house. He was delighted know we had cut radio and seems to feel that effort will fizzle. According his information there are two colonels involved: Bounleut Saycocie and Khamchan Souvouovong. They dispose at most of two companies of men. Their chances for success seem nil. He asked if we could assist in disposing their men. We sent Assistant Military Attaché to camp which Bounleut allegedly was using as command post but have not been able find him. We are now sending same officer to seek him out at roadblock en route Camp Chinaimo. In meantime, I am sending General Sang (PsyWar Chief) who still drinking my brandy at my residence, in company with EmbOff to get message from Souvanna to broadcast on his Armed Forces Radio Station. Sang seems somewhat reluctant, but he is being transported bodily to palace at this moment. Assuming broadcast calms population and troops disperse, I think we may be out of woods by morning. 2 Sullivan 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII, 1/1/65–2/19/65. Secret. An initial on the source text indicates that Johnson saw this memorandum. All four attached telegrams are Secret, Flash and were repeated Priority to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. For Sullivan’s account of this episode, see his Obbligato: Notes on a Foreign Service Career, pp. 221–227. 2 On February 1 McGeorge Bundy sent the President an additional memorandum on the coup in Laos as follows: “Since you enjoyed the first of Sullivan’s reports on the non-coup in Vientiane yesterday, you may want to have the whole series as we have it. It comes out as he predicted it would, but there are some amusing ups and downs and some good touches at the end, including resumption of the tennis tournament, a Canadian black tie dinner for Souvanna, and a swim (after victory) for Sullivan.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to President, Vol. VIII, 1/1/65–2/19/65) The additional attached cables are not printed. 163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, February 1, 1965, 5:46 p.m. 652. Embtel 1182. 2 In view reftel and FOV 8212 and especially increasing indications that Phoumi probably involved in keeping pot boiling (e.g. FOVs 8213 and 8215), 3 you are authorized to warn Phoumi if you believe it necessary or desirable, that USG takes very dim view of recent developments and moves Vientiane. Remind him that unity and cooperation among all non-communist Lao elements in support PriMin Souvanna has always been vital to Lao national interests and in particular at this time when serious threat may be developing in southern Laos (Embtel 1181). 4 Leave to your discretion how to handle matter with Phoumi and whether you should also make same points to Siho. Hope however you can make it unmistakably clear that we continue to be unalterably opposed to any attempt, such as Bounleut’s last night or by others that may be planned, which threatens stability of RLG or its armed forces. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 6 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Barbis, cleared by Trueheart and Green, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 In telegram 1182 from Vientiane, February 1, the Embassy reported on the beginning moves in a coup against the Souvanna government. (Ibid., POL 23–9 LAOS) 3 The CIA telegrams have not been further indentified, but in a telephone conversation on February 1 at 11:20 a.m., William Bundy told Ball that he had a telephone call from CIA “saying there was a coup in Vientiane.” In a telephone call to Rusk on February 1 at 4 p.m., Ball stated: “the Laotian business was a one day wonder; it was a young staff Colonel [Bouleut Saycocie] who did not get much farther than occupying the radio station.” (Both in Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Laos, 4/19/64–11/12/65) 4 In telegram 1181 from Vientiane, February 1, the Embassy described ground action that began on January 31 near an area east of Thakek as potential Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese “Sunday Punch,” the beginning of a counter offensive in southern Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 164. Memorandum From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 164. Memorandum From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 3, 1965. SUBJECT Situation in Laos Ambassador Sullivan has reported there are no U.S. casualties as a result of the outbreak of fighting today between rival rightist factions in Vientiane, 2 although some of their houses have been hit. U.S. personnel assigned to the airport and to the opposing factions have been withdrawn and U.S. aircraft have been dispersed. The Embassy reports that troops loyal to the Souvanna Government have directed an intensive artillery barrage on the headquarters camp of rebel troops loyal to General Phoumi. No official estimates of Laotian casualties have been received; however, the press is reporting at least 30 killed and wounded. Sullivan states the intensity of the bombardment would indicate a considerable medical problem. At last report, a cessation of artillery had been ordered. The headquarters camp has been reduced to flaming ruins. General Phoumi’s whereabouts are unknown, and he is believed to have fled the city. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIV, Memos, 2/65–3/65. Secret. 2 Forces loyal to Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi and the Chief of the Directorate of National Coordination, Siho Lamphouthakoul, against forces under the command of General Kouprasith Abhay, loyal to the Souvanna Government. In telegram 1199 from Vientiane, February 3, Sullivan reported that all Americans were safe. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS) 165. Special National Intelligence Estimate 165. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, February 4, 1965. SNIE 10–65 COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND NEAR-TERM INTENTIONS IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM The Problem To assess the significance of recent Communist military force deployments in Laos, North Vietnam, and South China, and to estimate the scope and timing of Communist military operations in Laos and South Vietnam over the next four or five months. The Estimate 1. The Present Situation. A gradual buildup over several years has given the forces of Communist China, North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, and the Viet Cong potent military capabilities in and near Laos and South Vietnam, including offensive capabilities as yet unused and defensive capabilities as yet untested. Since the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 1964, various Communist moves and force deployments have noticeably improved some of these capabilities, particularly the air defense of South China and North Vietnam. During the same period, deployments of Communist forces in some parts of Laos have augmented capabilities already in being. There has also been a steady improvement in the capabilities of Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. Some of this improvement results from stepped up North Vietnamese support, though detailed judgments are complicated by the spotty and frequently ambiguous nature of the evidence available. 2 2. We believe that these new deployments have the immediate purpose of improving the military capabilities of Communist forces in those areas where US and US-supported pressure against them has been increased, e.g., in the Laos panhandle, where T–28 and FAR ground operations are taking place, and in the air over North Vietnam, where reconnaissance is flown and where further air strikes are feared. The Communists probably also hope that these deployments will help deter the US from expanding the war to North Vietnam. The addition of air strength to the already formidable ground strength in the China/Indochina border area is also intended to strengthen Chinese/DRV defenses against the contingency that the US might ignore Communist warnings and take the war to North Vietnam and even to China. 3. The deployments we have observed do not now appear to be of the nature or scope that we would expect to precede a major change in the nature of Communist military activity in Laos or Vietnam such as an overt offensive. We have seen no significant increases of ground force strength in South China or the DRV; the net increase in Communist ground strength in Laos is estimated to be no more than a few thousand at the most; and no large organized military units are known to have moved into South Vietnam. 4. Peiping has recently extended by one year the terms of service for all its armed forces. This is probably designed to improve capabilities by retaining trained personnel, and it may result in a very substantial increase in the size of the armed forces. We believe that this, along with the program for development and production of more modern weapons systems, is part of Peiping’s longstanding effort to strengthen its military establishment rather than an indication of an immediate Chinese intention to mount offensive activity in Indochina. 5. Increased Air Defense Capabilities . The introduction of 50-odd jet fighters into North Vietnam and the increase of Chinese air strength in the border area from 150 jet fighters to about 350 appears to be responsive to a similar buildup of US air strength in the area. This move gives the Communists a limited capability to conduct surprise raids against Laos or the northern parts of South Vietnam, especially for psychological effect. We do not believe they will do so, however, because of the high risk of major US retaliation and the consequent danger of air conflict with the US, a form of hostilities most disadvantageous to the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. Thus far, the Communists have not used aircraft to defend forces in Laos against damaging T–28 attacks. We believe they will rely on anti-aircraft artillery, ground fire, and passive defense in Laos. However, they would certainly attempt to use fighters against air strikes on North Vietnam, and would certainly do so in the case of an attack on China. 6. Offensive Potential in Laos . The recent troop reinforcements from North Vietnam have also somewhat increased Communist offensive capabilities in Laos. In each spring since 1962, the Communists have launched some ground activity designed to improve their position during the dry season. We consider this sort of action likely again this year. 7. A likely Communist move would be an attempt to recapture the junction of Routes 7 and 13, lost to rightist forces last summer. The Communists might estimate that they could attempt this without risking serious escalation of the war. The Communists might also move against Kong Le’s position near Muong Soui. In the panhandle, the Communists are likely to try to push the FAR out of positions it has recently taken along Route 9 in Operation “Victorious Arrow.” Though they are capable of seizing any of the Mekong towns (e.g., Thakhek or Savannakhet) or Seno, we do not believe they will attempt to do so, since they would consider it involved undue risk of enlarged US counteraction. 8. Military Portents in South Vietnam . In the past year, the Communists have appreciably augmented the size, armament, and general capabilities of Viet Cong (VC) forces with particular emphasis on their regular (“Main Force”) units. Recent battles (e.g., Binh Gia) indicate that when the VC consider the circumstances favorable they are willing to initiate battles with sizable GVN regular units. They have not yet willingly engaged GVN regular units except when they outnumbered them at the point of attack. More probes and actions on the order of Binh Gia are probable. We consider, however, that unless GVN military capabilities deteriorate sharply, the chances are less than even that the next four or five months will see prolonged offensives employing larger units. 9. The VC military campaign will certainly be carefully tailored to exploit and increase South Vietnam’s political and morale problems. For reasons of psychological warfare, the Communists—unless and until convinced that such actions carry unacceptable risks—will probably essay further attacks against US facilities and personnel. The Communists will also continue to improve their conventional capabilities so that, if discord should split the GVN’s military establishment, they could, if they chose, take full military advantage of the situation. 10. Although Hanoi and Peiping are still apprehensive about the possibility of US attacks on North Vietnam they are probably less so than they were in the late autumn of 1964. For example, while the attack in August on a De Soto patrol met with instant retaliation, US warships later suspended these patrols. Communist action against Bien Hoa in November and the bombing of the Brink BOQ in December did not produce any military rejoinder. The Communists appear prepared to accept present levels of US and US-sponsored activity and even to run the risk of some escalation. Influential voices in the US opposing extension of the war may have persuaded the Communists that the US is not disposed to undertake major escalation. 11. In these circumstances, we believe that Hanoi and Peiping are determined to continue their present policies in Laos and South Vietnam. While the Communists are probably not yet ready to embark on a general military offensive, it is almost certain that they will continue their support of insurrectionary forces and will prepare to exploit any new opportunities which arise in either Laos or South Vietnam. 12. Role of the USSR. Kosygin’s projected visit to North Vietnam carries forward the trend of increasing Soviet involvement in this area which began directly after the fall of Khrushchev. The new leaders apparently believe that Khrushchev erred in leaving a dangerous situation largely in the hands of Peiping and that his limited responses in past incidents may have encouraged the US to be more aggressive. We believe that the USSR now hopes to rebuild influence in Hanoi and to deter the US from expanding the scope of hostilities. To this end, the Soviets will probably increase their military and economic assistance to North Vietnam to include additional air defense equipment and perhaps jet fighters and surface-to-air missiles. They will probably also offer a full line of equipment for use in insurgency and subversion. But we doubt that the Soviets will undertake the military defense of the DRV or run very high risks to protect it. 13. The Soviets almost certainly hope that North Vietnam will avoid actions which might provoke US reprisals and produce further escalation. Kosygin will probably urge this point of view in Hanoi, but the intricacy of Sino-Soviet-North Vietnamese relations will require him to maneuver carefully lest the USSR seem to be lacking enthusiasm for the DRV cause. 14. Less Likely Contingencies. Our estimate of what the Communists probably will do militarily in the near-term future falls far short of our appreciation of what they could do against indigenous forces if the latter were not reinforced from the outside. Using only forces already in Laos, the Communists almost certainly have the capability to carry out actions such as the following: to recapture the junction of Routes 7 and 13 in Laos and to launch a subsequent drive on both Vientiane and Luang Prabang; to capture Thakhek and Attopeu and to harass both Seno and Savanna-khet. At the same time, the VC could be augmented by some of the PAVN forces now in the panhandle of Laos for a drive against the northern provinces of South Vietnam. However, such moves are not likely unless Hanoi and Peiping are willing to take the risk of direct and punishing attacks on at least DRV territory—or unless Hanoi and Peiping should come to believe that Free World persuasion coupled with internal US pressures would be strong enough to prevent such retaliation and force the US to a negotiated settlement. 1 Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, SNIE 10–65. Top Secret. Prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the USIB concurred with it on February 4 except the representative of the FBI who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction. 2 The details of Communist deployments are given in the USIB Memorandum D -24. 7/1 of 26 January, (distributed through special channels). [Footnote in the source text. The memorandum was not found.] 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, February 5, 1965, 8:05 p.m. 665. Although events have certainly not run their course, we are assuming at this juncture that Phoumi and Siho have been eliminated for foreseeable future from any effective role in Laos. Their departure from the scene plainly changes situation drastically and we await with interest your analysis of implications for US policy. We here are very much in doubt as to the effects. We would of course agree with Australian Ambassador’s view (Embtel 1219) 2 that departure of Phoumi and Siho removes disruptive elements but we wonder whether he has given adequate weight to dangers which have simultaneously been enhanced. While we are far from concluding that it is inevitable, it is certainly possible that the Sananikones and Kouprasith, seeing their opposition evaporate, may move swiftly to undermine Souvanna, the GNU and the Geneva settlement and to establish undivided control of legitimate and illegitimate business in Vientiane. A second danger, related to the first, is that the leaders in southern Laos may refuse to cooperate with Vientiane and/or fragment after failing to find a rallying point to replace Phoumi, with all that this would mean in terms of resist-ance to PL and our support for it. A third element in the equation is the reaction of Vang Pao to what has transpired. While we shall no doubt have to leave the working out of these affairs to the Lao and especially to Souvanna, US influence on developments will be substantial. It is therefore important that we come to a common assessment of the situation and agreed broad lines of action as soon as possible. For Bangkok: Would welcome any comments you may have on Thai reaction. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared by Barbis, and approved by Green. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, London, Paris, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 Dated February 4. (Ibid.) 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, February 6, 1965, 5 p.m. 1237. Since occidental mind persists in illusion that we can explain things that happen in Laos, I will attempt in this message to reconstruct some sort of explanation for events of past week. I will also speculate somewhat on probable events for next week. However, in general, I feel it unproductive to consider things Laotian in time span much longer than from Sunday to Sunday. It now seems clear in retrospect that Bounleut action which began January 31 was protest action mounted quite independently of Phoumi-Siho coup effort. Bounleut, who is fairly decent type, but not too bright, had for some time past indicated his desire to break out of vicious circle of power politics and corruption afflicting army-police relationships in Vientiane (ARMA CX–13). 2 Bounleut, having received much sympathetic attention to his complaints, apparently assumed he had widespread support, and therefore appeared genuinely confused when his effort fizzled. Phoumi, who had been secretly nurturing his plans for a comeback coup during the past several weeks, saw in Bounleut’s action an opportunity to precipitate his plans. His basic miscalculations were twofold: (1) he did not have adequate forces loyal to him and (2) he underestimated willingness of ability of Ouane-Kouprasith forces to fight when challenged. Siho, whom Phoumi had been attempting to tease into collaboration over several months, sought continually to maintain an independent position, hoping to move in after Phoumi and Kouprasith forces had exhausted each other or stalemated. He was, however, frustrated in this purpose by fact that Kouprasith, who has long borne unyielding enmity towards Siho, chose to shove Siho’s forces into Phoumi’s arms and take care of both of them simultaneously. Despite callous unconcern for civilian population in which Ouane-Kouprasith forces carried this out, one has to admit that their tactics were sound and their forces surprisingly effective. Souvanna, ever since April 19, has had to balance himself between Kouprasith’s forces representing the Sananikones and Siho’s forces, representing an unknown and volatile quantity, constantly susceptible to Phoumi’s intrigue. In his actions during late December and January, culminating in military conference at Luang Prabang January 13–14, Souvanna clearly chose to throw in his lot with Ouane and Kouprasith, obviously choosing the devil he knew rather than chance his future in collaboration with Siho. The firmness of the resolve is indicated by the grim tenacity with which Souvanna pursued and directed the annihilation of Phoumi-Siho forces during the fighting February 3. Immediate military problem now is to assure that organization which Souvanna endorses under leadership Ouane and Kouprasith can indeed assert its authority over FAR officers, most of whom derived their original strength from Phoumi. Even such patriotic professionals as Phasouk and Vang Pao retain sentimental attachment to Phoumi and have expressed reluctance submit themselves “to Kouprasith.” Unless Souvanna can completely isolate Phoumi from contact with these men he will continue to have trouble within his military structure. Most serious kernel of trouble still unresolved on military side is problem of Kham-khong, who with his region II forces in immediate vicinity Vientiane, remains a critical threat to this capital. Souvanna has asked our assist-ance in treating with this problem and we are providing it in low key. A long trip abroad for Khamkhong is one solution under consideration. Immediate political problem for Souvanna consists of need for reconstituting conservative political wing. This has always been a coalition of families, regions and military forces. Its strength in the south can still be centered on Prince Boun Oum. Its strength in the center is now very largely in the hands of the Sananikones. Souvanna says he will attempt to bring Boun Oum into government. I thoroughly doubt Boun Oum will accept any such subordinate position. However he may designate some representative such as Leuam Insisiengmay to handle his interests and be his spokesman in coalition with the Sananikones. It will be recalled (Embtel 965) 3 that Phoui Sananikone gave me his solemn assurance that the Sananikone family would not seek to upset Souvanna Phouma. I therefore believe we can count upon loyal acceptance of ostensibly subordinate role by Sananikones within framework of Souvanna government. However, early next week I intend call on Phoui Sananikone, remind him of his previous statements and ask that he use his influence with Kouprasith to establish similar moderation in Sananikone dominance of armed forces. Kouprasith is already showing signs that he recognizes need for this moderation, at least tactically and for the time being. Nevertheless, he is an ambitious young man and we will have a constant problem reining in his future ambitions. As I said at the outset of this message, I do not intend look beyond next Sunday in prognosis for things to come. However, I would venture the estimate that this coming week will be somewhat calmer than the week just past. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 Dated January 8. (Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense’s Cable Files, Laos, Jan-Mar 1965) 3 Dated December 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS) 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, February 26, 1965, 4 p.m. 1365. During recent SEACOORD meeting, 2 General Westmoreland showed me copy of message he had sent JCS February 13 3 recommending coordinated package of operations against DRV. In this message, he suggested that Rolling Thunder, 34–A, Barrel Roll and Yankee Team operations be consolidated into single program. While I fully sympathize with General Westmoreland’s desire have orchestrated operations in DRV to include armed route reconnaissance and low/medium level photography, I wish enter note of caution insofar as his proposal may be interpreted as desire extend current Barrel Roll and Yankee Team operations from Laos into DRV. I have discussed this matter with General Westmoreland and have advised him of my intention write this message. I think he and I are in agreement on this subject but do not presume speak for him in this message. He will doubtless wish comment separately. Problem in brief is as follows: Laos, unlike South Vietnam, is incapable protecting itself against ground action by DRV and does not have US commitment assure such protection. It therefore becomes highly important to Souvanna to be able to state that his territory and air space are not being used for actions against DRV. If he can maintain this posture, he believes he will have continuing general support from Soviet Union and its support will provide check against overt DRV incursions into Laos. Fragile as this belief may be, we must accept it as basic element Souvanna’s outlook and respect it if we are to expect his continued cooperation in other enterprises this area. He has no objection to massive US punishment of DRV within DRV itself. He has no objection to clandestine US punishment of DRV and Pathet Lao within Laos. However, he strictly insists two must be kept separate so that he can maintain aforementioned sophistry of innocence in his international dealings, particularly with Soviets. This is a very tricky balance, but one which I think we can respect with a little extra effort on our part. To maintain this respect, I would therefore take exception to concept of extending Barrel Roll and Yankee Team into DRV. These two programs were developed for operations exclusively in Laos, and I believe tricky nature our operations require them to stay (however artificially) in that same compartment. If armed recce and low/medium level photography programs established for DRV, I believe they should be separate from Lao programs and not ignore international boundary between Laos and DRV. Partly because of need preserve this artificial distinction as well as because of material advantages to be gained, I have welcomed PACAF proposals establish Yankee Team out of Udorn. It seems to me that this small group of aircraft and pilots, operating exclusively over Laos, will develop special skills which will materially improve the quality of intelligence we accumulate here. The thought arises, although I will not advance it here, that there might be some prospect for compartmentalizing and specializing Barrel Roll in this same manner. Especially as Rolling Thunder program gains momentum and occupies both Second Air Divison and Fleet air assets, it may be of some value to designate some separate unit, to be based in Thailand, for specific purpose conducting our relatively modest Barrel Roll program. As layman, I have been impressed with capabilities of A–1–H aircraft in Barrel Roll operations, and particularly with their ability (relative to jets) to absorb anti-aircraft damage. This factor is of significant concern to us in connection with our SAR responsibilities, which we take very seriously. I won’t ask in this message whether there would be an A–1–H equipped marine air unit available for such duty, since I feel this would be unwarranted intrusion into the very complex problem of US air dispositions in this overall theater, something well beyond our perspective as we peer out from the jungle canopy of Laos. However, from our very limited perspective, such a disposition would have its attractions. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, sent with instructions that the Department pass a copy to the JCS and Saigon a copy to MACV. 2 Reference is to the SEACOORD meeting of February 22–23, reports of which are in telegram 2771 from Saigon, February 23, and telegram 1347 from Vientiane, February 23. (Both ibid.) 3 Not found. 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, March 1, 1965, 8:37 p.m. 738. As you know, our objective in Laos remains to seek full implementation 1962 Geneva Agreements. This connection we saw advantage in British approach to Soviets on Article 19 Protocol as means of exploring Soviet intentions and whether prospects existed for constructive discussions on Laos. 2 Depending on results these bilateral talks, we prepared see Co-Chairmen dialogue expanded to include consultations with ICC governments and RLG, as provided by Article 19, and conceivably to eventuate in conference. Since Soviets have not yet responded to approach re Article 19 we will be discussing with British what we might do to push ahead on this. Souvanna’s February 26 message to Souphanouvong (Embtel 1379) 3 appears to be useful move in this connection, in addition to recapturing initiative and putting Souvanna in good public posture, since possibility of resumption tripartite talks may have constructive influence on Soviets. We recognize of course that it unlikely Souphanouvong will agree come to Vientiane for talks but see merit in Souvanna’s continuing to press for their resumption, perhaps falling back on Kouvao proposal if necessary. We would hope that Souvanna can be encouraged to discuss his plans this respect with cabinet members and others to ensure full understanding and support political and military leadership. Given above framework our thinking here would appreciate your comments. 4 You are aware that in recent months during discussions on Laos we have been urging Soviets (Gromyko) and French (Couve) to use their influence on PL to adopt more conciliatory attitude re tripartite talks. Despite changed situation since February 3, we presume Souvanna still likely to encounter domestic opposition to resumption tripartite talks. Is his position sufficiently strengthened that he can bring Sananikones and military leaders along? 5 Is there serious risk that Phoumi could exploit such a development and mobilize sufficient support to attempt comeback? 6 Assuming tripartite talks are resumed, is Souvanna likely to insist on conditions for effective cease-fire in return for which it would be worth relaxing present RLG/US military pressures if accepted by PL? 7 (To be effective, cease-fire arrangements would have to include and be contingent upon active ICC supervisory and control role with complete freedom movement into PL areas, without possibility PL veto.) On more speculative plane, how does Souvanna relate tripartite talks, and specifically question of effective cease-fire, to possible 14-nation conference? 8 There would obviously be connection between any discussion Article 19 by Co-Chairmen and consideration in tripartite talks of ICC role in enforcing cease-fire.) Where does Souvanna now stand on his May 24 preconditions for 14-nation conference? 9 For example, we know he feels that Operation Triangle gains have offset necessity of insisting on PL withdrawal from PDJ. Do Kong Le and others share this view? 10 Would Souvanna be able to develop sufficient support for agreeing to reconvening 14-nation conference as outgrowth Article 19 procedure? 11 Key question with respect Co-Chairmen consultations with RLG re Article 19 and in any conference situation will be Souvanna’s status. We have always insisted that his authority as Prime Minister must be recognized. On other hand Communists will insist on right of PL to speak independently and will support PL position that Souvanna can speak for RLG only if he has tripartite agreement, based on PDJ agreement, etc. This not acceptable to us nor would we presume to Souvanna either. How would he plan to handle this problem which would inevitably arise in any case connection Article 19? 12 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Barbis; cleared by Trueheart, Unger, and William Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, and CINCPAC. 2 See Document 158 . 3 As reported in telegram 1379, February 28, the message contained a proposal for renewed tripartite talks, but the Embassy noted that Souvanna made it as partly a “psychological warfare” move and partly an attempt to probe Pathet Lao intentions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 In telegram 1408 from Vientiane, March 5, Sullivan reported “every scrap of intelligence” the Embassy had pointed to the “truculent and unyielding nature of the Pathet Lao positions.” As Sullivan and the Embassy saw it, the Pathet Lao were a “pale image of the Lao Dong,” the Communist Party of the DRV. The Pathet Lao would only enter negotiations when the Lao Dong Party reached the conclusion that U.S. pressure required negotiations over South Vietnam. (Ibid.) 5 This and subsequent questions were answered in telegram 1408. Sullivan replied that Souvanna’s position was strong enough unless he failed to consult his Cabinet colleagues and made unilateral concessions to the Pathet Lao. (Ibid.) 6 Sullivan considered this possibility unlikely. (Ibid.) 7 Sullivan responded that Souvanna might be tempted to accept a Pathet Lao proposal for unpoliced cease-fire, but certainly not indefinitely. (Ibid.) 8 Sullivan replied that, should Article 19 consultations hold out the prospect that agreement might be reached on strengthening the ICC, Souvanna would not “haggle” over his preconditions. (Ibid.) 9 Sullivan agreed that the success of Operation Triangle made the first condition of withdrawal from the Plain of Jars less important. As for the second precondition of a cease-fire, Sullivan assumed some progress would have been achieved during the tripartite talks. As for the third precondition, Souvanna would still insist that it be acknowledged that he alone spoke for the Royal Government of Laos. (Ibid.) 10 Sullivan answered that Kong Le “would not make trouble” over Pathet Lao withdrawal from the Plain of Jars. (Ibid.) 11 If the Pathet Lao showed readiness to negotiate seriously such issues as a cease-fire and the ICC, Sullivan believed Souvanna could develop sufficient public acquiescence, including that of King Savang, to bring the Royal Lao Government to the conference table provided the United States gave him unstinting support. (Ibid.) 12 Sullivan stated (see footnote 9 above) that Souvanna would insist that he alone spoke for the Royal Lao Government. (Ibid.) 170. Memorandum of Conversation 170. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 2, 1965, 3:10 p.m. SUBJECT Discussion on Southeast Asia and Other Matters PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Thompson Robert I. Owen, SOV U.S.S.R. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador Alexander I. Zinchuk, Counselor, Soviet Embassy The Secretary said he would like to make some comment today as part of a review of questions of mutual interest, perhaps the first of a series of sessions. He recalled that he and Foreign Minister Gromyko had discussed a number of matters in their five meetings last fall. 2 We continue to be interested in possibilities for the improvement of relations between our two countries. We do believe that we two have heavy responsibilities in world affairs and that we must be very attentive to how we exercise these responsibilities. The Secretary said he wished to turn to the situation in Southeast Asia and to comment in part on the history of the past four years. When President Kennedy became President (and, he noted, Mr. Johnson became Vice President) he looked at the situation in Southeast Asia and felt that here the largest interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. need not be in conflict, and that both therefore should try to find ways to help bring peace and security to the area. When this was discussed with Mr. Khrushchev at Vienna, it seemed to us that there was mutual agreement that Laos should not be a bone of contention. This agreement opened the way for negotiations on Laos, and the Geneva Accords of 1962 underlined the concept that if everyone left Laos alone Laos could develop peaceably and independently. This was an understanding of major significance. The Secretary said that in reaching that agreement (1962 Geneva Accords) the United States had made some important concessions to views not held previously, namely we (1) accepted Souvanna as Prime Minister and (2) accepted the idea of a government of national union. Subsequently we took various steps to reinforce the agreements. Last year we supported Prime Minister Souvanna fully when he was opposed by rightist groups and helped him restore stability. We supported Souvanna again when he encountered difficulties with Generals Phoumi and Siho and the police forces. The Secretary said that as we understand the significance of our information: (1) North Vietnamese military personnel in Laos never dropped below six thousand; (2) continuously since 1962 Laos has been used by North Vietnam for infiltration into South Vietnam—this directly contrary to the agreement; (3) the Pathet Lao last year moved against the neutralist elements on the Plaine des Jarres forcing us to take action. “Let’s find a common basis of facts.” We believed in 1962 that we had an agreement. This was a very important development, a way by which we could find a basis of mutual interest. The actions of Hanoi and the Pathet Lao have prevented this. The Secretary said that he had talked with Gromyko in December 3 concerning some way to return to the agreement. One question was that of further talks between the three Laotian factions—with the obstacle that the Pathet Lao suggested Souvanna not go (to talks) as Prime Minister but rather as chairman of the three factions. Souvanna has tried to have contact for talks with Prince Souphanouvong but without success. The Secretary wondered what the Soviets might think about the prospect for talks between Souvanna and Souphanouvong. The Secretary noted that under the 1962 Accords (Article 19 to be specific) the co-chairmen have the responsibility for reporting by July 1 of this year with regard to the effectiveness of the ICC. The British Government is aware of this. Perhaps the two co-chairmen may wish to consult with each other, with members of the ICC and, possibly, with some of the other signatories. This might open the way for a constructive process leading to a return to the ‘62 Accords. The Secretary stressed that our sole logic is capital and meticulous compliance with the ‘62 Accords and, as far as we are concerned, we will do everything to bring this about. The Secretary said that a big problem with regard to a conference is whether it would begin where the last one ended or where the last one began. There would be no prospects for success if we had to start all over again from the beginning. On the other hand, we’ve never seen any evidence that the Pathet Lao (or Hanoi) ever really adhered to the agreements. The Secretary hoped that our two governments can find ways to limit the causes of tension. Noting that during the Kennedy-Johnson period the 1962 Accords and the Test Ban Treaty were seen as two important ways to reach accord and reduce tensions, the Secretary said it is important for us to find ways these two agreements can be made effective and carried out. With regard to the situation in South Vietnam where there has been no bilateral agreement comparable to the one achieved on Laos in Vienna in 1961, we have no doubts whatsoever concerning the facts of North Vietnamese infiltration, the introduction of arms, personnel and units into South Vietnam. The Secretary stressed that we have made it clear many times that if South Vietnam were left free of efforts to bring it down from the outside we would be perfectly willing to pull out and go home. However, we have very serious commitments there to the South Vietnamese government and people, commitments which we intend to honor. We do not accept the view that what is happening in Vietnam is indigenous. It is no more indigenous than the conflict in Korea was indigenous. (At Ambassador Dobrynin’s request the Secretary explained the meaning of the word indigenous.) Neither we nor the South Vietnamese can accept that the supplying of arms and intrusion from the North is merely part of a “civil struggle”. The Secretary said that more talks are needed to clarify the issues and to improve our understanding of one another in the interest of peace in Southeast Asia. The United States does not want any larger or expanded conflict in the area but we do consider the safety and the security of the people of South Vietnam to be most important. We cannot sit by and allow them to become innocent victims. The Secretary said that for Ambassador Dobrynin’s private information we have had a number of contacts with Peiping along the way and, indirectly, also with Hanoi. Despite these and other channels of communication we have not seen any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop what it is doing in South Vietnam. This is a key point, a central point. (Asked if the Soviets had received any such indication from Hanoi, Ambassador Dobrynin was evasive.) Our going home is an idea which we might entertain if Hanoi would actually stop doing what it is doing in South Vietnam. We are not going to pull out and leave South Vietnam to be overrun by North Vietnam. The Secretary asked that Ambassador Dobrynin inform Mr. Gromyko of this firm U.S. position. The Secretary said that if there continued to be disagreement as to the facts of the situation in Vietnam it is important that the matter be discussed further at the Ambassador’s earliest convenience in an effort to make progress toward mutual understanding. [Here follows discussion on the Geneva Disarmament Conference, East-West trade, and the German question.] Presented the opportunity to address himself to the Secretary’s remarks, Ambassador Dobrynin said that the Soviet positions on developments in Southeast Asia are very well known and that consequently he would not review them in detail. As for speaking about the improvement in our bilateral relations, these depend very much on the previously mentioned developments in Southeast Asia. In other words, when you Americans bomb North Vietnam we are very concerned that if you continue the bombing and military intervention in North Vietnam this can cause a spreading of the conflict into one of a larger scale. This creates an immediate and important danger. (The Ambassador avoided answering a question by the Secretary as to the Soviet attitude with regard to stopping what is going on in South Vietnam.) Ambassador Dobrynin then compared the scope of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam to the assistance granted the Viet Cong by the North Vietnamese. Who can believe that in addition to 300,000 South Vietnamese troops, the mighty U.S. with many aircraft, 25,000 troops, missiles and so forth is not capable of crushing the few men with limited equipment who come in from North Vietnam? In other words, even if one accepted the figures of the State Department’s White Paper with regard to the scale of North Vietnamese assistance this assistance is very small compared to the scale of opposing U.S. assistance. The only answer is that the peoples of South Vietnam do not support the U.S. effort. The Soviet Union cannot accept the logic that military failures in South Vietnam justify U.S. attacks on North Vietnam. Just as in the fighting against the French, the majority of the Vietnamese are now fighting the U.S. There was a discussion of guerrilla warfare techniques and whether or not they can be effective without truly popular support. Ambassador Dobrynin continued that the U.S. has started a new policy. At first it ostensibly was a policy of reprisal, bombing North Vietnam because of actions against Americans in South Vietnam. He asked what the policy was today? Things have been quiet in Vietnam and now the Americans bomb the North without any claims that this is reprisal action. Ambassador Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union wants better relations, but that they are convinced that what the U.S. is now doing cannot lead to any peaceful solution in the area. He ignored a question from the Secretary as to what his people think about Hanoi’s activity and whether that activity can lead to a peaceful solution. Ambassador Dobrynin stressed the importance of stopping the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam as the first imperative if there is going to be any search for peaceful solutions. He asked where does one go from there if the bombing is not stopped. The Secretary said that one place to start would be a return to the 1962 agreements on Laos. Ambassador Dobrynin repeated that bombardment does not lead to peaceful solutions. The Secretary responded with a reference to the apparent Soviet desire that we desert the South Vietnamese, leaving them in the position of a petrified rabbit waiting for a snake. In another vein, Ambassador Dobrynin deplored some talk that he has heard around Washington which supports strong U.S. measures as necessary to prove that the U.S. is not frightened. He said that this is ridiculous, that the U.S. is mighty and powerful and “nobody thinks you are scared”. The Secretary said we weren’t. As to a resumption of the Geneva disarmament talks Ambassador Dobrynin, speaking personally, asked what kind of an atmosphere would it be to sit down and talk in Geneva at the very same time as the U.S. is bombing North Vietnam. He said that the suggestion seem inconsistent or at least unrealistic to completely divorce the actions in Vietnam from other questions. The Secretary commented that disarmament is a long-term problem and one we should continue to work despite disagreements elsewhere. He asked if the matter of the arms race in the Near East might not also be a problem which could be usefully considered in the Geneva context. Ambassador Dobrynin reaffirmed his personal feeling that U.S. actions in North Vietnam created an atmosphere which is not conducive to talks on disarmament and related matters. As the conversation concluded, Ambassador Dobrynin said that he would report everything that the Secretary had said to his government and again stated that the Soviet Union was greatly concerned over the dangerous situation in Vietnam. The Secretary responded that the situation would be much less dangerous if everyone stayed behind his own frontiers. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Robert Owen of SOV and approved in S on March 9. The meeting was held in Rusk’s office. 2 Apparent reference to meetings between Rusk and Gromyko at the United Nations during the UN General Assembly session, November–December 1964. 3 See Document 149 . 171. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 171. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 3, 1965, 1 p.m. 1393. Deptel 742. 2 It is difficult assess from here exactly what signal Hanoi has received from Barrel Roll operations in Laos. My personal judgment would be that it has probably to date been somewhat scattered, largely because program itself has been scattered. Our primary concern at current moment is to reshape this program into more systematic operation, which will then perhaps produce better defined and more clearly understood signal to Hanoi. In my view, this reshaping does not involve increase in scale and only partly involves increase in frequency. Structure of program we seek will be built around two general features: (a) establishment and re-seeding of choke points which will enhance interdiction of routes primarily used for DRV infiltration and supplies, and (b) constant, random armed reconnaissance of those routes, especially at night, by a group of pilots who have learned the terrain and can fly these programs with assurance. If we have four choke points established, and re-seed these every week, we will, of course, have four operations per week pre-empted for these purposes. If we wish keep saturation armed recce on four principal routes, we will also have three or four operations per week on that account. In general, therefore, there would seem some value in considering the prospect of a systematic (but not spectacular) program on a seven day per week basis. Perhaps the most important recommendation I could make is to have this program run by one special contingent of planes and pilots who become experts in the field. I feel this is most critical if we are to avoid the political hoorah which eventuates when a mission somehow goes astray (e.g. Barrel Roll 39). I also feel it important in terms of safety for the pilots themselves who are required to fly with minimum navigation over some pretty horrendous terrain. It is for this reason that I recently floated idea (Embtel 1365) 3 of a Thai-based unit to carry out strike, seeding and recce missions involved in Barrel Roll. I discussed these thoughts with General Hunter Harris at Udorn Monday 4 and found him very much in agreement. Only exception he took to my views was his prejudice in favor of jet aircraft to do the strike and rescap [?] jobs. (I don’t want to get involved in middle of service and equipment scrap on which I have no qualifications whatsoever, but I feel I should report that junior operational air officers involved in these programs show a distinct preference for the A–1–H, which has longer time on target, more capability to absorb flak, less likelihood of smacking into a mountain at high speed, and more ability to stay with and protect choppers on SAR missions.) In sum, I believe a program systematically geared to interdiction of DRV routes into Laos, flown with limited number specialized planes and pilots based in Thailand, and continuously applied over a considerable stretch of time will get a clearly audible signal to Hanoi. I do not rule out occasional spectacular strikes, but, except for Ban Ken Bridge, believe they have to date created more diversion than destruction. As far as Souvanna is concerned, I believe program laid out above fits precisely with his line of thinking and, indeed, needs no further discussion with him. The only thing that gives him trouble is the occasional big show in which we lose aircraft and provoke loud Communist propaganda reaction. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. Passed to the White House and Department of Defense. 2 In telegram 742 to Vientiane, March 2, William Bundy asked for Sullivan’s “personal judgement” as to Souvanna’s reaction to an increased Barrel Roll program as a “useful added signal to DRV.” If Sullivan thought additional operations desirable, he should specify the types and objectives. (Ibid.) 3 Document 168 . 4 March 2. 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State 1 Bangkok, March 6, 1965, 6 p.m. 1278. Deptel 738 to Vientiane; 2 Vientiane’s 1408 to Dept. 3 Probably greatest difficulty seen from here in courses of action suggested reftels is that they would appear from standpoint Thai reactions to treat Laos in isolation and fail adequately to take into account fact that this is only one element of larger Communist campaign in Indochinese peninsula of which Communist pressures on Laos, SVN and Thailand are inseparable parts. Thai accordingly would not be able to see how new initiatives now for multi-nation conference on Laos could avoid encouraging demand for similar conferences on VN with all its disadvantages or, even more importantly, how talk of conference could avoid undermining position of strength we are now painstakingly building up step by step in SVN and Laos. We recognize risks French and Communists will attempt to shake faith in US on part of Souvanna and other RLG leaders by suggesting US interested in Laos only in relation to VN. We are not persuaded, however, that only way to convince Souvanna otherwise is to arrange separate negotiations on Laos. Without publicly subscribing to French view, we find considerable validity in Millet’s statement to Sullivan (Vientiane’s 1397 to Dept) 4 that Laos could be discussed only as aspect of global conference on Indo-China focusing primary attention on fighting in VN. Thai position has been made known to us whenever question of conference has come up in connection with Laos, Vietnam or Cambodia and was recently made explicit in authoritative article by diplomatic correspondent close to FonMin (Emb A–668). 5 In discussing US SEA policy this juncture and possibility negotiations, article declared that Communists only go to conferences to consolidate gains already made or to obtain from free nations greater concessions. Although Thanat and other RTG leaders have frequently indicated their receptivity to conference at proper time, they have also indicated that they do not believe that this time is at hand. They have made abundantly clear in relation to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam that premature conference or talk of conference on any one of these countries will have adverse repercussions on our position in others. News article did not even recognize any possibility of negotiation at present. Although we believe we are today completely on same wave length with Thai, should we encourage Souvanna to press for resumption of talks or associate ourselves with co-chairmen dialogue, we are likely once again to undermine Thai confidence. Top Thai officials have regretted damage in this regard caused by columnists and others critical of our present policy. Thanat has also expressed concern about ability of Souvanna to continue to maintain his position in much narrowed political framework of Vientiane; but we defer to Amb Sullivan’s judgment (Vientiane’s 1408) as to possibility of greater internal pressures on Souvanna should he now attempt to promote further negotiations. Re last para ref Deptel, we are frankly puzzled. We have worked hard here to get Thai to support Souvanna’s authority as PriMin and as head of coalition government. We had thought Souvanna also saw importance of consistency in maintenance this position. If this is so, do not understand what more we expect Souvanna to do in handling this problem should Communists insist on right of PL to speak independently or should they challenge Souvanna’s right to speak for RLG without tripartite agreement. We had thought from our reading on traffic re UK approach on Article 19, that we were disinclined to see British press ahead in absence indication something substantial would be achieved vis-à-vis Soviets and that we would take position ICC remains operative with or without consultation. Unless there is more to it than meets the eye, strongly urge we do not sacrifice vital store of confidence in us built up at considerable cost in VN and Thailand for what appear here to be only dubious tactical gains in Laos. Amb Sullivan has indicated PL likely to take lead from DRV and Lao Dong. It would seem to us that when time is ripe for negotiations on Vietnam, serious talks on Laos will fall into place. Martin 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 Document 169 . 3 See footnotes 4–12 to Document 169 . 4 Dated March 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS) 5 Dated March 5. (Ibid., POL 1 ASIA SE–US) 173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, March 14, 1965, 3:17 p.m. 780. Believe we have reached stage in development Barrel Roll program where it would be useful review situation and obtain your assessment impact BR has had and likely have on Lao political and military scene and clarification your views on program itself. We in general agreement with basic position outlined in Embtels 1393 2 and 1416 3 that program requires reshaping into more systematic operation built around two general features of (1) chokepoints and (2) armed reconnaissance of key routes with latter including secondary targets of fixed installations, having in mind difficulties involved in shifting targets without adequate preparation. We also share your view that this reshaping should not involve increase in scale and only partly increase in frequency. These considerations important of course, as pointed out Embtel 1416, connection continued acceptability of entire program to RLG and specifically Souvanna. From Embtel 1393 we gather that you consider schedule of four chokepoint-reseeding operations per week plus three (to four) armed reconnaissance operations per week or a total of seven operations per week as about right for systematic non-spectacular program. However pressures are developing to shape program into more than this by increasing not only frequency of operations significantly but their scale as well. Up until now we have been holding firm on four strike aircraft for day armed reconnaissance missions and two to four strike aircraft for night missions. In case of chokepoint or other special missions strike aircraft have been kept to maximum of sixteen and flak suppression aircraft to maximum of twelve (with exception reseeding missions which are no more than twelve and twelve). Moreover there has been 48-hour sterile period between day missions and 36 hours between day and night missions, with special exception made in case of chokepoint missions which exempt from sterile period injunction. In recent JCS message (JCS 6570 DTG 061703Z), 4 which requested program for BR 42–55 and which was not cleared with us since it declared “planning” message, seven day and seven night missions were proposed for two-week period with no limitation placed on maximum number of strike aircraft per mission and with 48-hour sterile period between standard armed recce missions reduced to 24 hours. If these new terms of reference are accepted it seems to us that scale and frequency of Barrel Roll operations will be in excess of non-spectacular program envisaged Embtel 1393. Proposed chokepoint operations in Sam Neua (approved by Vientiane) calling for four BR operations on consecutive days (one of which will have target 3 nm from Sam Neua town) is another example of trend toward increase in scale and frequency of BR operations. These proposed chokepoint operations, whether conducted on same day as CINCPAC recommends or on consecutive days as you prefer, would be significant departure from pattern and scale of BR program to date. With one armed recce BR per day and one chokepoint reseeding BR mission per day (given total eight chokepoints) likely we could have two Barrel Roll missions any given day. Would appreciate your comments. In general you should also keep in mind that our ability hold the line here depends to considerable extent on our being able cite your arguments and recommendations in support position for non-spectacular, carefully controlled program. For example, we are being pressed on BR 29 5 and 31 by JCS but have held line based on your reasoned nonconcurrence. In this regard we will be sending you septel by regular channels requesting your views on BR 29 and 31 and to which request you reply by regular channels. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Barbis and approved by Unger. 2 Document 171 . 3 Dated March 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 Dated March 6. (Ibid.) 5 In telegram 1394 from Vientiane, March 3, Sullivan did not concur in Barrel Roll 29 because he believed that there was no compelling reason to execute a strike against Ban Keng Khan Kao military area. Sullivan was opposed to new special Barrel Roll missions in addition to those special and routine missions already programmed. (Ibid.) 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, March 20, 1965, 5:04 p.m. 809. Ref: JCS 7484. 2 In connection with intensification of air operations pursuant to para 9 of ref, separate program of US air operations in Panhandle against routes and targets associated with infiltration through Laos into SVN under active consideration here. 3 Nickname for new program would be Steel Tiger. Other US air operation in northern Laos, except for Trojan Horse and Yankee Team, will continue to be conducted under Barrel Roll program. It is envisaged that Steel Tiger operations (which would begin April 3) would be carried on at considerably greater intensity than present operations in Panhandle. Separate JCS message will define program more precisely, 4 but broadly speaking it would be theoretically possible to have in any 24-hour period a re-seeding mission, one or more route recce missions, plus a special strike mission. Procedure for coordinating these missions with you would remain as at present. Present boundary between US and RLAF operations in Panhandle would not be affected. New Barrel Roll program (also to commence April 3) would be solely responsive to RLG requirements as defined by you. Thus, for example, choke point/re-seeding program in Sam Neua province and on Route 7 could be stepped up or slowed down as you and RLG consider desirable. Although Steel Tiger will have first call on US assets, Department understands latter not expected to be limiting factor on any foreseeable Barrel Roll program. This new arrangement is designed primarily to meet requirements laid down by high authority here to make maximum effort shut off infiltration into SVN through Laos. At same time it gives due recognition to fact that RLG has primary interest in other Barrel Roll missions. Request your views soonest, after such consultation as you consider necessary with Souvanna. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared in substance with Hamilton of OSD/ISA, and approved by Unger. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 Not found. 3 In a March 16 briefing memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, for a luncheon meeting later that day, Bundy informed Johnson that “State and DOD are coordinating closely on a program which is intended to be more effective and more visible (at least to Hanoi). This program will imply daily route reconnaissance and 3 or 4 operations for attacking or reseeding choke points each week.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXI, Memos) This extension of Barrel Roll operations was just one of four military actions (the other three related solely to South Vietnam) under consideration. For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. II, pp. 446 – 449 . The President met with McNamara, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy from 1:34 to 3 p.m. on March 16. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found. 4 Apparent reference to JCS 9314, April 17, guidance for planning for Barrel Roll/Steel Tiger. (Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense’s Cable File, Laos, Apr-Dec, 1965) 175. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 175. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 22, 1965, 0546Z. 1511. ReDeptel 809. 2 (A) Before I consult with Souvanna and prior receipt anticipated JCS message re Steel Tiger, 3 I should like to make a few observations and pose one or two questions on this program. (1) It should be recognized that our air operations in Laos are entirely dependent upon the political authority granted us by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The fact that this card carrying neutralist permits US aircraft to conduct combat missions against enemy targets on Laotian soil is the result of very carefully nourished relations which my predecessor skillfully began and which I have attempted perpetuate. It bespeaks not only Souvanna’s total disgust with North Vietnamese but also his remarkable confidence in United States. (2) This confidence in US was not always present in Souvanna’s calculations. Our policy in 1960–61 evaporated it in his mind almost to vanishing point. Even today, it is constantly under attack especially by such “friendly” elements as the French. (3) To my mind, the continued nourishment of Souvanna’s confidence in US requires several things: (a) Absolute frankness with him; (b) Correlation US operations with Laotian national interests; (c) Assurance that US air operations will be conducted in meticulously careful manner, aborting missions when there exists any question of damage to friendly villagers; (d) Close and careful coordination with Royal Lao forces; (e) Careful observance of conditions stipulated by Souvanna (e.g. publicity). (4) While, in this catalogue all elements are important, 3 (c) is perhaps the single point on which I would bear down most heavily. Laos is not North Vietnam. It is not even Viet Cong held territory in South Vietnam. Laos is a friendly country and the villagers are a considerable asset to us. The Viet Minh (even to a large extent the Pathet Lao) are an enemy expeditionary force operating in territory which is hostile to them. The guerrillas in this country are not only friendly to us, they are our guerrillas. This mission is not only their paymaster and their quartermaster; we give them their orders and direct their operations; it is therefore highly important that any air operations conducted in Laos be carefully mindful of our valuable assets here. This means, in my opinion, that we must bend over backwards in executing our military missions so that we maintain this unique and essential political foundation for our operations. It means that we must sometimes sacrifice maximum military opportunities, in order to temper them to the political climate. For example, we have, since beginning of this program, denied ourselves use of napalm “until it is absolutely required for significant military reasons in highly critical situation.” This sort of situation is unlikely arise in purely interdictory-type missions and we must therefore maintain this self-abnegation until it does. (5) In elaborating on point 3 (d) I would like to correct the apparently erroneous assumption in reftel that there is “boundary” between US and RLAF operations in Panhandle. This is not so. RLAF is free to operate anywhere in Panhandle. There is, however, unilateral restriction against US operations along and west of Route 23, south of Route 9. But it must be borne in mind that RLAF, which takes highly deserved pride in its own operations, reserves its priority to strike targets anywhere in Laos. In principle, our operations have to be fitted around theirs. In practice, careful handling of General Ma reduces this problem to manageable proportions. (B) Having recited this preamble, I wish to say that I welcome concept of dividing our air missions into “Barrel Roll” and “Steel Tiger” categories. I think operations can be managed somewhat more effectively if they are so configured. I would warn, however, against any indications to Lao, or others, that we are making this distinction. In order have full support and coordination, we need preserve identity Lao national interests with all we do. There follow certain questions and suggestions which flow from proposed program: (1) How would geographic boundary between Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger be defined? I would suggest Routes 6, 7 and 8 fall within Barrel Roll; Routes 12, 9, 23 and trail complex south of Route 9 within Steel Tiger. (2) How would SAR for Steel Tiger be managed? I would suggest USAF assume primary operational responsibility from Nakorn Phanom, supplemented by Air America, RLAF and other in-country assets as necessary. (3) How would Barrel Roll be managed to be “solely responsive to RLG requirements” as defined by this Embassy? I would renew my suggestion that special unit of aircraft and pilots be stationed Thailand (preferable Udorn) to carry out bread-and-butter portion Barrel Roll, supplemented as needed from time to time by PACFLT and Second Air Division assets for bigger operations. (C) Foregoing questions, plus several other features Steel Tiger program, would seem to require conference among principal responsible elements to achieve closer understandings than we can accomplish by exchange cables. I would therefore propose meeting appropriate author-ities at Udorn sometime later this week (perhaps Saturday, March 27). Believe this should involve senior reps from Embassies Bangkok and Vientiane, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV and such subordinate commands as CINCPAC may designate. 4 If State/Defense concur, please advise soonest, with appropriate guidance. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. Beginning in spring 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 2 Document 174 . 3 See footnote 4, Document 174 . 4 A March 27 report of that meeting is in telegram 1554 from Vientiane, March 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, March 25, 1965, 8:06 p.m. 837. Joint State/Defense message. A. Embtel 1511; 2 B. Embtel 1534. 3 As indicated Deptel 809, 4 high authority has directed that air operations to interdict infiltration routes through Laos to South Vietnam will be made as militarily effective as feasible. 5 The purpose of JCS messages 7651 and 7653 6 is to establish planning guidance to best carry out this new directive while still providing appropriate combat air support to the forces of the RLG. Agree that meeting of appropriate authorities at Udorn should be useful and recommend that addressees work out arrangements for such meeting directly in order to best implement the planning guidance. Fully agree with reftel A that in proceeding with our air activities in Laos we must always bear in mind that our authority to carry out these operations depends on political agreement of PriMin Souvanna. Important therefore that we continue to take necessary steps to ensure retention Souvanna’s confidence. This requires, as you state, absolute frankness with him and for this reason we indicated in Deptel 809 that you should consult with Souvanna, as you considered necessary, re decision to intensify certain air operations in Laos. We also agree with other considerations (B–E of subparagraph A, 3) which you consider important for this purpose and especially 3 (C). There no misunderstanding over restriction on US operations in area reserved for RLAF west of Route 23 south of Route 9 and freedom of RLAF to operate anywhere in Panhandle. Count on your continued effective handling of General Ma to ensure coordination our respective operations. Agree that division we have made into Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger categories need not be revealed to Lao although Souvanna will be consulted on intensification of air operations in Panhandle. Following are our comments on questions and points made under B reftel: 1. Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger have been separated in order to increase operational effectiveness of interdiction of infiltration routes into South Vietnam. Thus decision to place Route 8 (JCS 7624, DTG 231953Z) 7 under Steel Tiger has been made on functional basis. 2. It envisaged that SAR operations would continue as at present. However you may wish to discuss this subject at proposed meeting and submit any comments or recommendations which may develop. 3. Assumption with respect to new Barrel Roll is that, by being exclusively based on your requests, these missions will be more responsive to RLG requirements. Concerning your suggestion on special unit based in Thailand, suggest this be discussed with military representatives at conference as to feasibility and desirability. Assume that in recommending Udorn you have considered likelihood that publicity problem would be much more difficult to handle there than at other base in Thailand such as Takhli. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Barbis; cleared by Miller, Dexter, Blouin, and Mustin; and approved by Unger. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 2 Document 175 . 3 In telegram 1534, March 25, the Embassy requested guidance for a meeting to be held at Udorn on March 27 among U.S. officials to discuss “modalities for execution of Steel Tiger/Barrel Roll missions Laos.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 Document 174 . 5 The decision was officially acknowledged in NSAM 328, April 6, explaining decisions made by the President on April 1. In decision 9, the President approved a general framework of continuing actions against North Vietnam and Laos. The fifth action of paragraph 9 of NSAM 328 reads: “Air Operations in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.” NSAM 328 is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. II, pp. 537 – 539 . 6 Both dated March 23. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIV, Cables, 2/65–3/65) 7 Dated March 23. (Ibid.) 177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, April 8, 1965, 11:49 a.m. 885. Embtel 1612. 2 We welcome Souvanna’s prompt action to name representatives for low-level tripartite talks, which we hope will lead to renewed top-level talks in Laos. If such talks eventuate, they would provide the neutralist and rightist elements a new opportunity to press for full implementation of the 1962 Accords. 3 Whether or not the Pathet Lao proved less intransigent than in the past, we would have a further opportunity to build a record on our side that all we want is assured compliance with solemn agreements already reached. This record could be important for the communists and for those non-communist countries which are confused about the real issues. In speaking to Souvanna along these lines, you may wish to recall for him the Secretary’s letter of November 30 (Deptel 489). 4 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart and Barbis and approved by Green and Ball. Repeated to Tehran for Rusk (who was attending the CENTO meeting), Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and Moscow. 2 In telegram 1612 from Vientiane, April 6, the Embassy reported that on April 3 the Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane transmitted a March 25 letter from Souphanouvong to Souvanna proposing a meeting of representatives of the three factions to discuss a site for the next tripartite meeting. (Ibid.) 3 In Secto 8 from Tehran, April 6, Rusk told Ball that he thought the Department of State should urge Souvanna to be constructive in these preliminary talks. Rusk thought the meeting would provide an opportunity for building a record of insistence on compliance with already signed agreements of 1962. Rusk thought such an approach would dispell international confusion on U.S. policy toward Laos. (Ibid.) 4 See footnote 2, Document 146 . 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, April 21, 1965, 0912Z. 1712. For Bundy. During SEACOORD meeting participants were briefed by MACV on JCS proposals for extensive new U.S. troop deployments Southeast Asia. Since I believe execution of these proposals would have widespread reactions in all countries this region, you may find it of some use to have my judgment re probable Lao reactions to these deployments. First, as I have reported, Lao believe our methodical bombardment of North Vietnam is correct and will produce results. They are perhaps more optimistic than we that in reasonable period of time DRV and Viet Cong morale will collapse and they will sue for peace on terms acceptable to us. They have taken great heart from our actions and have gained a new confidence in their own future. If we, by proposed deployments, indicate we, on other hand, have lost confidence in prospect that bombardment will produce results, Lao will rethink their own estimates. They will probably interpret our deployments as evidence of panic and this atmosphere can be very infectious. Second, despite many earlier misgivings and in the face of Communist and French propaganda to contrary, Lao accept idea that we have no colonial or neo-colonial ambitions here. A massive occupation of South Vietnam by U.S. forces except in extremis would also cause this assumption to be re-examined. Net result of these two factors would, in my judgment, be considerable diminution in Lao confidence re U.S. objectives and capabilities. Practical consequences would probably include much less active cooperation with us in our current military operations and a rather headlong rush to embrace French policy of “negotiated neutrality” for Southeast Asia. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 ASIA SE. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. The substantive portion of this telegram was retyped in the White House, but there was no indication on the retyped copy whether or not it was submitted to the President. 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, April 23, 1965, 1000Z. 1726. Subject: Laos cross border operations. Ref: (A) Saigon 78 sent Dept 913. 2 (B) COMUSMACV 270428Z. 3 (C)CINCPAC 302249Z.2 (D) Saigon 553. 4 During recent SEACOORD meeting Saigon, participants discussed proposed cross border operations into Laos. Focus of discussion was Ref B, in which MACV laid out three phase concept of operations. It was noted that Ref B was based on, but departed from, initial operating concepts laid out in Ref A, which had been approved by earlier SEACOORD meeting last September. It was further noted that none of cross border operations authorized in that earlier message had been executed as yet. After considerable discussion, we reached a meeting of minds on steps to be taken and I agreed reduce this to writing in form of comment on Ref B. This message represents that comment and indicates action in which I would be prepared concur. (A) I would agree that all actions contemplated paras 2 A through 2 D of Ref A could be carried out as previously programmed. That is to say that ARVN assets could operate in all three zones in accordance with their capabilities and characteristics. (B) I would be prepared modify Vientiane position reflected para 2 E Ref A to the extent that I would agree to presence U.S. advisors accompanying ground units infiltrated overland in two southern zones of operation, provided it is clear that they will penetrate only up to an eventual depth of 20 kms and provided they will remain in penetration areas no longer than ten days. I do not concur in presence U.S. advisors introduced by paradrop or by helicopter, or by light aircraft. I further do not concur in presence U.S. advisors with any ARVN teams which may be introduced (a la Leaping Lena) in northern region around Route 9. After some experience with overland operations in two southern areas, I would be prepared consider possibility linking up these two zones or otherwise expanding operations with U.S. advisors in shallow penetration overland operations in this sparsely occupied area of Panhandle. I would wish to consider this request, however, in the light of some established operational experience. All other provisions Ref A would continue apply. (C) As for region in vicinity Route 9, I am convinced it is so sensitive and so well guarded that introduction any assets there runs high risk capture. However, if SOG wishes introduce AVRN agents in same manner and under same ground rules as 34 A assets in DRV, I would not object. To send Americans would, in my view, be suicide and would also be politically counterproductive. (D) As for follow-on phases in proposed concept, I wish to reserve all judgment pending some operational experience in Phase I. I see no need make commitments to entire three phase concept at this time. (E) The rather wistful expansion of MACV’s concept proposed in CINCPAC’s message (Ref C) strikes me as an old White Star ghost pulling my leg. It is, in my view, totally unrealistic to think in these terms under today’s circumstances. In fact, I have some doubts it has ever been or would ever be realistic. The hill areas of the Panhandle accessible from the Bolovens are very sparsely populated (perhaps 15,000 people at most). These are the most primitive tribes, civilizations removed from the Meo or the Rhade, or the Jurai. They do not ordinarily hunt with firearms but with crossbows, etc. The firearms which an earlier White Star generation gave them were turned in (and collected by) the FAR because the Lao did not consider it safe to have them loose in the hills. It is, in my view, far-fetched to think of storming the Ho Chi Minh Trail with a bare bottomed bunch of these boys. (F) In the final analysis, my feeling is that in the Laos Panhandle a little intelligence scouting, with luck a little sabotage, and maybe even a little interception can be done by assets foreseeable available to be spared from the counterinsurgency effort in SVN. This could be all accomplished in southern reaches of Panhandle. But if there is any serious intent to break up the real marrow of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the area where the Viets truly protect it by organic battalions, we had better start thinking in terms of regiments and divisions, and not tribal assets. (G) Finally, I hope SOG will be fully briefed on CAS operations which we are already running and expanding in the Panhandle. These, it seems to me, have the best chance of being profitable. An SOG visit to 333 Headquarters in Udorn might be useful. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok,CINCPAC, Saigon, and USUN. 2 Not found. 3 Not found, but summarized in the text. 4 Telegram 553 from Saigon to Vientaine, was sent to the Department as telegram 3464, April 21. It contained an account of the SEACOORD meetings of April 20–21. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 ASIA SE) 180. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 180. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 26, 1965. SUBJECT Additional Diplomatic Moves 2 Mr. Moyers has conveyed to me your request for suggestions as to what we might do in regard to future diplomatic invitations. Most of what I would suggest could be used whether or not the Cambodian conference fails. 3 Some of it should be given a harder push if we don’t get the Cambodian conference. 1. Actual negotiations on any subject . I do not believe we should specifically call for a conference on Viet-Nam itself unless and until we have some real sign of “give” from Hanoi. My best guess is that we will not get such a sign in the near future, and to propose a conference in the absence of it would have demoralizing effects in Saigon and might build up tremendous pressures for us to stop bombing. This leaves the possibility of negotiation on Laos. Both the Soviets and Hanoi called for a Laos conference in their recent communiqué. 4 We have never been against such a conference in principle, but have fully supported Souvanna Phouma in insisting that the Communist side must first recognize Souvanna’s own position and be prepared to permit the ICC to operate in the Communist areas (including the infiltration routes). Last spring, Souvanna, with our support, also insisted that the Communist side withdraw from the territory it had taken over in its military offensive last May; however, the subsequent Government gains north of Vientiane pretty well canceled this out and we would not need to insist on this precondition now. However, the other two conditions do remain important, the Communist side has shown no signs of yielding on them, and to go ahead on a conference without satisfying them would run serious risks of undermining Souvanna’s internal political position with his generals and others potentially opposed to him. The present state of the bidding is that preliminary talks are under way in Laos simply to fix on an agreed site, also in Laos, for further talks. Although the Communists are hurting in Laos, there is as yet no clear sign that they really want to accept even the political and ICC provisions of the 1962 Accord, much less permit the ICC to do a job in the infiltration areas. Nonetheless, if the Cambodian conference fell through, we have one avenue for discussion on Laos that avoids the tricky problem of Souvanna’s conditions. The British, on February 2, proposed to the Soviets that the two co-chairmen get together to discuss the continuation and functions of the ICC. This approach was in accordance with Article 19 of the 1962 agreements, which provides specifically for such co-chairman action prior to July 1965, when the ICC technically expires. The Soviets have not replied to the British initiative. Since we believe they really meant it about the Cambodian conference, they might be prepared to pick up the Laos gambit if the Cambodian conference falls through. (I doubt it otherwise.) This would mean, not an immediate conference, but a meeting of the co-chairmen in the first place, possibly with invitations to the members of the 1962 conference to come and express their views. We could get some sort of informal gathering, at first, which might develop into a full-scale conference or not, but which would at least show that we were still working for discussions. The gathering would also provide opportunity for the same sort of corridor contacts we have envisaged as possible in the Cambodian conference—even though we do not now think the Communist side would be taking advantage of them. [Here follows a section entitled “Clarification of US and Vietnamese negotiation positions,” relating to definition of terms of settlement in Vietnam.] William P. Bundy 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, FO. Secret. The first page of this memorandum is on White House stationery and the type font is different from the following pages; apparently it was retyped at the White House. 2 The following note appears at the top of the memorandum in the President’s hand: “Bill, Follow thru & you & Goodwin get another Baltimore speech ready.” The President was alluding to his April 7 speech at John Hopkins University in which he declared U.S. readiness for unconditional discussions on finding a negotiated settlement for Vietnam. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 394–399. 3 On March 15 the Cambodian Government requested that the Geneva Co-Chairmen convoke a meeting of the participants of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina to consider the question of the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. The text of the message is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 715–716. 4 Reference is to the joint USSR-DRV communiqué of April 17, issued at the end of a week-long visit by DRV Workers Party First Secretary Le Duan to the Soviet Union. For text, see ibid., pp. 855–856. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, May 10, 1965, 9:13 p.m. 982. With prospective Cambodia conference pretty well out of the window, we are giving thought once again to possibility of Laos conference. Although British have not yet mentioned this to us, we suspect they will soon be reviving idea. We recognize of course that ChiComs, and perhaps DRV, may be as interested in sabotaging a conference on Laos as one on Cambodia. (Of course DRV did favor Laos conference in communiqué with Soviets, but even adverse attitudes would not be completely negative factor.) There is still a need from our point of view to keep some sort of diplomatic track open in Southeast Asia. Laos conference would be an attractive vehicle in some ways for doing this. We would be on a much better wicket substantively than in the Cambodian conference and should be able to press effectively for full implementation of the 1962 Accords by the Communists. A second advantage would be that Souvanna Phouma’s expected firmness regarding the composition of the RLG delegation at such a conference might make it more difficult for Commies to press for representation of NFLSVN. In any case RLG as principal interested party would certainly itself oppose Front representation. At same time we sense from Souvanna’s ready agreement to Cambodian conference and from Laotian situation and his attitude generally that Laotian conference would be manageable for him domestically. Specific condition of neutralizing PDJ might well not be necessary now in view consolidated RLG hold on compensating areas—though of course RLG and we could point to Communist aggression in PDJ as one matter requiring redress. Similarly for GVN and RTG, it would appear from reactions to Cambodian conference that US interest in Laos conference would not in present circumstances be taken as sign of weakness. In short it would appear that we have good deal to gain and little or nothing to lose by encouraging conference on Laos at this time, either through Article 19 route or otherwise. If Communists block meeting, we have scored significant propaganda point. If meeting takes place, we are in sound position to push for implementation of 1962 Accords and to profit by any Communist interest in corridor talks on Vietnam which might develop. Would appreciate thoughts of addressees on the above. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 ASIA SE. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared in draft by William Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, Hong Kong, and Moscow. 2 The Embassy in Bangkok vigorously opposed a Laos conference. The Embassy in Vientiane and the Consulate in Hong Kong were not enthusiastic about the idea, suggesting that the Cambodian conference was not yet dead. (Telegram 1773 from Bangkok, May 12; telegram 1845 from Vientiane, May 12; and telegram 1732 from Hong Kong, May 13; ibid., POL 8 LAOS and POL 27 ASIA SE) The Embassy in Vietnam favored the idea, see footnote 3, Document 182 . 182. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 182. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 13, 1965, 0210Z. 1861. Re Saigon’s 623, sent Dept 3747. 2 I emphatically disagree with Saigon’s blithe assumption (reftel) that “Laos conference would, in many ways, be more attractive forum than Cambodian conference.” On the contrary, our position with respect to neutrality, integrity and sovereignty of Cambodia is impeccable by comparison with our situation in Laos. 3 We have come a long way from the day when our only transgression of the 1962 Geneva Accords was the covert direction of Air America operations. We now conduct an average of fifty combat air sorties daily by U.S. aircraft against targets on Laos territory; we maintain, encadre, and direct a clandestine guerrilla force of 20,000 men which inflicts daily casualties on the enemy; we have installed, we supply, and we advise a Thai artillery battalion at a critical point on Laos soil; we operate a fleet of about fifty aircraft primarily engaged in paramilitary activity; and we conduct a clandestine military aid program here on a fifty million dollar a year scale. We get away with all this by elaborate precautions of dissimulation, tight discipline over loose talk, and a sprightly collusion with our Lao hosts. However, the enemy is fully aware of what we are doing and would lose no opportunity in a conference to expose us. Once we became exposed, it would be inevitable that many of our activities would have to be suspended. Those of us who conduct these operations harbor the illusion that they are of some value to the United States and cause some annoyance to our enemies. On the basis of this assumption, we require scores of Americans to risk their lives every day and a few every month to give their lives in an effort to carry out this program. If we are willing to jeopardize and probably dismantle all the operations listed above because of a desire to experiment with a new “diplomatic track”, that is a decision which can only be made in Washington and will, of course, be accepted here. However, let us not make the decision on the illusory grounds that we would be more comfortable sitting in a Laos conference than we would in a Cambodian conference. The oratory from Cambodia might be more painful than from Laos, but the practical damage to our own interests would be nil. I know from personal experience in Geneva that one can get surprisingly immune to oratory, particularly of the Communist variety. And I’m sure Averell Harriman has been insulted by better men than Sihanouk. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. 2 Dated May 12. (Ibid.) 3 McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson with the following observations in a covering note dated May 14, 12:50 p.m.: “Very few people in the Foreign Service write as well as the average journalist. Bill Sullivan in Laos is an exception. Quite aside from the merits of his argument, I think you will be interested in his reply to an effort by my brother Bill to open another diplomatic track toward Vietnam negotiations by way of a conference on Laos.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. X, 4/15–5/31/65) 183. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 183. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 London, May 14, 1965, 1125Z. Secto 22. From the Secretary. Reference Vientiane’s 1861. 2 I am not particularly concerned about the effect which our present activities in Laos would have on a Laotian conference. 3 The elementary fact is that we were in near complete and meticulous compliance with the 1962 Accord whereas the other side always had several thousand North Vietnamese in Laos contrary to the agreements and never seriously interrupted the use of Laotian corridors to South Viet-Nam contrary to the agreement. At a Laotian conference what we are doing would constitute a major card to play in obtaining serious compliance by the other side. Surely our posture would simply be “we support the 1962 Accords, and are in favor of complete supervised compliance with those accords by all parties.” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, and Bangkok. Rusk was in London to attend the NAC Ministerial meeting May 11–12. 2 Document 182 . 3 In telegram 1868 from Vientiane, May 15, Sullivan stated that the concern he expressed was not about the “effect our activities in Laos would have on a Laotian conference but rather the effect a conference would have on our activities.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 184. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 184. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 14, 1965. SUBJECT Laos Conference You asked about the genesis of State’s new interest in a Laos conference. The initiative came from Mr. Rusk, who signed off on a circular on May 10th (attached) 2 in which he concluded that since a Cambodia conference was “pretty well out the window”, we might turn our attention to a Laos conference in order to maintain some sort of diplomatic track in Southeast Asia. The responses to this cable have been fairly negative for differing reasons—most cogently, because certain addressee posts disagreed that a Cambodia conference was dead. Since then, as you know, the Cambodia business has shown new signs of life. State is sending out a new circular today which moves the Laos problem to the back burner and brings the Cambodia one up forward once again. 3 Jim 1 Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, 4/65–1/66. Confidential. 2 It was not a circular, but a multiple addressees telegram, see Document 181 . 3 Circular telegram 2236, May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 185. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 185. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 1 Washington, May 14, 1965. Governor talked to Unger re Sullivan’s telegram 2 re a Laos telegram [conference?] and Governor’s memo to Secretary 3 that he fully agreed with Sullivan. H: Politically it would unstick the situation. I urged the whole thing be dropped and concentrate on the other country or some other way of getting it started. It was amazing to see the Secretary’s message. 4 Amb. Unger said something about entering the picture through Article 19. It would not have anything to do with the conference. He said absolutely essential there be such talks. Something on a six-nation basis that gives some entrance wedge. H: I think Bill is right. We are going to get into terrible trouble. Even a six-nation [conference] … the whole thing is fraught with danger. The whole point is to have private conversations. This is a silly performance. It would just open the door. All these facts come out; just couldn’t help it. What is our answer? U: Just haven’t got answer for some of the points Bill raising. H: Cambodia thing quite different. In other [Laos conference] these facts would unquestionably come out in the talks. How could you prevent it? I think the whole thing is absolutely unthinkable. I have been against it. Souvanna doesn’t want it. It would unstick the rather tenuous situation that exists. Article 19 relates to co-chairmen talk, consulting with the whole range of conferees, particularly with the ICC countries and the Lao themselves. We are out of that. Article 19 doesn’t do us any good because we want to be in place where we can have corridor talks, they call them after session talks. Here there would be the most violent attacks against us which we couldn’t answer. It’s just a pipe dream. Everything they could get hold of they would throw at us. I think it is just borrowing trouble. 1 Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Chronology, Telephone Conversations, Nov. 1964–1965. No classification marking. Transcribed in Harriman’s office. “PM” appears on the dateline on the source text. 2 See Document 182 . 3 Dated May 14, in which Harriman “completely endorsed” Sullivan’s view of the damage that would be caused by a conference on Laos. In addition Harriman suggested that a potential conference on Laos “would cause perhaps irreparable damage to the tenuos political situation that now exists.” Harriman strongly urged concentration on a Cambodian conference and finding other ways to start negotiations on Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 Document 183 . 186. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 186. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 20, 1965, 0920Z. 1899. On eve Souvanna’s departure for brief vacation in Thailand, I had fairly detailed discussion with him re future of our bombing program in Laos. I told him that our military men felt that great deal of dam age could be done to PL/VC if we could make systematic attacks against their depots and storage areas. I then gave him a map which we have worked up locally showing our estimate of depot locations throughout PL/VC territory. Souvanna, said that, in principle, he was agreed to program of destroying logistics depots and wished to push ahead with planning for such action. Problem, as he saw it, was fact that PL/VC very often used civilian population centers as their principal warehouse areas, deliberately seeking the protection of innocent villagers as a deterrent against air raids. He said that he and members of General Staff had discussed this specific problem in meeting they held day before yesterday with RLAF General Ma at Savannakhet. They were examining ways of flushing out civilians before action began. However, if we could (by infra-red or other means) spot areas which were clearly military concentration points away from civilian population centers, he would be willing see them subjected to systematic strikes. He asked that I have my people discuss these matters in detail with General Ma and General Staff. He would instruct his people accordingly. I then turned to our evaluation of probable heavy use of river transportation by enemy on Nam Hou and Se Kong Rivers, and asked his views re strikes against waterborne traffic. He said it was impossible from the air to distinguish between a native boat and a PL/VC boat. In fact, most boats used by PL/VC were merely local native boats dragooned into service. He therefore could not authorize strikes against river craft. He asked that we stick to land traffic portaging goods up to river embarkation points. We will follow up on this conversation in military channels locally. Would welcome comments or suggestions from addressees. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, and JCS. 187. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 187. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, June 21, 1965, 0445Z. 2054. In company with Air Attaché, I spent all day Sunday with RLAF Commander General Ma. He first viewed with us (at his Savannakhet Headquarters) action which he has undertaken in course past month meticulously tracing out routes which he believes DRV is using to support 325th Division now located south of 17th parallel. This has involved literally hundreds of sorties, flown mostly at tree-top level, to determine roads, waystations and truck parks. He now believes he has a fairly good fix on two principal routes, generally moving eastward from Muong Nong (XD 6110) to the GVN frontier. He has occasionally flushed out convoys on these routes and has succeeded in destroying several trucks. Nevertheless, all our Yankee Team photo recce missions over this area have failed to turn up a decent trace of a recognizable route. Moreover, there have been two occasions during past week when General Ma has called for U.S. jet strikes (Bango mission) on these routes and jets, upon arrival at scene, have not been able to find the road, or their target. In part, this has been due to dicey weather, but in even greater measure, it has, I am sure, been due to impenetrable tree canopy which high speed, high flying jets literally can not see through. In order to demonstrate significance this latter point General Ma and Colonel Nouphet, commanding GM 18, took us by helicopter to some forward territory recently captured from Pathet Lao, which straddles a section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Both Air Attaché and I, despite our several years experience in this part of the world, were astounded by what we found. The “trail,” even in this rainy season, was a thoroughly passable road. We drove two jeeps over it for more than a mile. It would have easily accommodated 4x4 trucks. Yet nowhere on this road, except for two very limited areas, was it open to the sky. Even flying over it slowly with a helicopter, road was not discernible from above. Air Attaché took several photographs demonstrating canopy which he will submit through his channels. It seems clear to me, from this experience, that significant quantities of logistics can still be moving over routes which General Ma and his men have so meticulously plotted out for us but which our strike aircraft are unable to discern. This obviously poses a number of military problems, but it also involves some fairly basic political decisions. Among them are questions of massive employment of defoliants, bombing on infra-red rather than visual controls, using saturation bombing tactics to create major choke points, etc. Any decisions on these matters, I realize, will require Washington discussion at high levels, and will doubtless demand more detailed information than I have provided in this message. By same token, if Souvanna sticks to original Algiers schedule, he will be leaving here tomorrow morning and will, in any event, be leaving in near future. I have undertaken no significant military departures since I have been here without full and frank discussion with Souvanna. This is, in my opinion, sound practice both with respect U.S. and RLG interests. Therefore, if there is to be any Washington inclination to move toward tactics suggested in preceding paragraph, I believe I should have some guidelines soonest, so that I can at least be prepared to discuss this matter in principle with Prime Minister before his imminent departure. 2 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC. Passed to DOD and CIA. The substance of this telegram was retyped in the White House and a note on it reads: “send to Pres.” 2 The Departments of State and Defense responded that time did not allow consideration in Washington of the issues raised by Sullivan before Souvanna’s departure. The Departments suggested that Sullivan brief Souvanna in general on the problem. Sullivan should ask for Souvanna’s reaction and suggestions, but should not raise the use of defoliant or saturation bombing. (Joint State/Defense telegram 1100 to Vientiane, June 21; ibid.) In telegram 2060 from Vientiane, June 22, Sullivan reported that he had talked to Souvanna along the lines suggested by the Departments of State and Defense. (Ibid.) 188. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Dexter) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 188. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Dexter) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 1 Washington, June 26, 1965. SUBJECT Interception of Hostile Resupply Aircraft in Laos You will recall that the Soviet airlift, begun in December 1960 to neutralist/PL forces, was terminated in October–November 1962. The Soviets withdrew from the scene, transferring most of their transport aircraft involved in the airlift to the DRV. We have had no reports of any covert Soviet air activity over Laos since that time. From time to time since the fall of 1962, we have received low-level reports regarding isolated unidentified transport-type aircraft overflying Laos. However, there had been no reliable intelligence that the enemy was conducting air resupply of PL/NVN forces on any kind of regular basis until early April 1965. Starting in early April, we have been receiving an increasing number of CAS reports strongly suggesting that PL/NVN forces in the Xieng Khouang/Sam Neua area are receiving supplies by air drop. (On one occasion two transport-type aircraft were observed on Sam Neua airfield.) Embassy Vientiane has reported that on the basis of reports from ground observers (the above CAS reports) and other intelligence (presumably including radar trackings by Udorn) there now appears to be a more or less regular pattern of air resupply activity taking place during twilight hours in the Xieng Khouang/Sam Neua area and involving at least 1–2 unidentified transport aircraft on most occasions. As a result of the first reports in early April, we informed Vientiane that higher authority had directed that US forces intercept and destroy hostile aircraft engaged in the air resupply of PL/NVN forces in northern Laos. In view of the obvious political and other risks involved, the instructions cautioned that any intercept effort should be based on reliable intelligence that the aircraft was or were in fact hostile and engaged in air resupply. Hot pursuit into NVN was also authorized, as necessary. The Ambassador was also instructed to consult Prince Souvanna. Souvanna, after considerable deliberation, agreed in principle that we should attempt to intercept and destroy any hostile aircraft engaged in air resupply but indicated this should be done only in flagrante with full assurance that the aircraft was parachuting or dropping supplies to the enemy. Souvanna and Sullivan acknowledged that this operation would be tricky. To date there has been no intercept attempt. Second Air Division has now concluded, and Sullivan concurs, that intercept operations are not justified since the probability of success is reduced as a result of the need to limit the hours during which an intercept attempt can be made. This is in order to permit normal Air America and other resupply activities in the area to take place without interruption. Ambassador Sullivan now proposes that two RLAF T–28’s with AA pilots, and three USAF ground support personnel, be repositioned on alert at Site 98 2 to accomplish the intercept mission (Embtel 2079). 3 He has requested our approval. We recommend that this proposal be disapproved. We are already stretching our luck, it seems to us, in using AA pilots on T–28’s on SAR missions. So far our luck has held out but we question the desirability of running the added risks involved in intercept missions. We assume Ambassador Sullivan did not suggest the use of Lao or Thai pilots because of the problems of positive identification that the aircraft is hostile and engaged in flagrante in air resupply (and not one of ours), and the language barrier (the AOC Vientiane would make the final identification decision). In view of the earlier personal involvement of the President in directing that these hostile aircraft be intercepted and destroyed, perhaps we should explore the possibility of using Lao or Thai pilots on T–28’s for this mission before deciding to cancel this project. There should be at least two pilots whom our people know well enough to have confidence in their pilot proficiency, judgment and reliability. They could be given intensive aircraft identification indoctrination. The language problem could be overcome by having an interpreter at the AOC to pass the final authorization, etc. It is possible that the need to use Site 98 may make this suggestion impractical. However, we think it is worth putting to Vientiane. Otherwise we recommend that Project “Duck Soup” be dropped. 4 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret; Limdis. 2 Site 98 was Long Thienh (Chien), Meo (Hmong) leader Vang Pao’s headquarters. 3 Dated June 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 4 Dexter wrote the following note at the end of the memorandum: “Bill Hamilton told me it has been suggested at DOD that USAF SAW pilots be used instead of AA. I disagree.” In telegram 1121 to Vientiane, June 30, the Department stated it was not prepared to run the risk of having Air America or U.S. Air Force Special Warfare Detachment pilots fly T–28’s in Laos except for search and rescue operations. The Department suggested that the Embassy explore the possibility of using specially trained Lao or Thai pilots for Operation Duck Soup. (Ibid.) 189. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 189. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 8, 1965, 1940Z. 171. From Governor Harriman. At noon July 8, I had one-hour conversation with Souvanna followed by luncheon with Prince and Princess, Lao Ambassador and wife, Mrs. Harriman and members Embassy staff. 2 Prince said his present plans called for meeting with De Gaulle and lunch with Couve de Murville on July 12, London visit July 20–21, Moscow July 24, New Delhi July 28 and return to Vientiane prior August 2 to attend marriage of King’s son in Luang Prabang; indicated Princess and youngest son intended join him in New Delhi to proceed Vientiane. Main points of conversation: 1. I expressed our admiration for leadership and courage shown by Prince in dealing with difficult problems faced by his country and assured him continued support and cooperation of U.S. in difficult task preserving Laos independence. Added that we respected RLG military effort and particularly performance of officer cadets in defeating PL/DRVN attacks. Prince expressed appreciation for U.S. support and indicated his determination to continue on same course. 2. I stressed our continued support for 1962 Geneva Agreements and noted importance RLG maintaining strong position by making clear responsibility for any breach lay with PL and Communist side. Prince fully agreed noting that after coming elections he intended reappoint PL ministers to their present posts, knowing of course they would not occupy them. In this connection, Prince said that every effort must be made not to embarrass Soviets and to make it easier for them to support RLG, with which I expressed full agreement. 3. Prince said he attached great importance to persuading USSR and UK, as co-chairmen 1962 agreements, to reconvene the conference of 1954. He noted that this much more satisfactory to him than reconvening conference on 1962 agreements since he had laid down a prior condition to latter, namely, that all PL troops be withdrawn from the Plaine des Jarres; reconvening 1954 conference would permit participation Laos without fulfillment such precondition and would permit discussion of any aspect problems of three countries former Indochina. He said he had expressed his desire that 1954 conference be reconvened to Soviet and UK Ambassadors prior his departure to Vientiane and they had referred to govts. He intended press matter both in London and Moscow during upcoming visits. I assured him such proposal had our full support but stressed importance his presenting idea purely as his own. Prince indicated full agreement and understanding. 4. On Viet Nam, I pointed out President had made clear willingness have discussions without preconditions but in light Communist rejection all proposals for talks, determination to continue defend South Viet Nam including bombing. Prince replied he happy our policy in SVN so firm and agreed bombing should continue, noting that bombing of routes from North Viet Nam into Laos had already made it impossible for Communists to launch planned spring offensive and permitted RLG establish control in large areas. 5. Indicating I assumed Prince would continue head government for some time even beyond the five years he had undertaken, I asked if younger men were being developed and showing promise. In reply he stated only that he thought Sisouk showed greatest promise among younger men. In this connection, it was noted that all RLG ministers would be back in Vientiane for elections. 6. Referring to President’s SEA development proposal, 3 I said we hoped Prince would show active interest in such program as it must have broad Asian sponsorship. Prince replied he thought establishment of Asian Bank highly important and that he would of course support all development efforts in area. He indicated particular interest in Nam Ngum Dam project, noting with appreciation that he understood U.S. expert had just recommended planning capacity should be increased to 80,000 kw and that U.S. support be augmented; added he thought we wise to try to obtain participation as many other countries as possible in development Laos and SEA. In this connection, he said he intended ask Soviets in Moscow to contribute to program, pointing out that RLG supported Soviets claim to be Asian power and that Soviets should prove they truly Asian by supporting SEA development. I assured him we would welcome Soviet participation in this effort. 7. With particular reference India, Prince said he disappointed in their performance as far back as first Bandung conference when Nehru showed he dominated by Chou En-lai; he still disappointed but considered it essential India remain as Chairman ICC and that it adopt more realistic attitude toward Asian problems. I commented that we were helping Indian military build-up against possible future ChiCom ag gression but we concerned that Shastri, while agreeing our position in SVN privately, publicly called for cessation our bombardments; said I thought Indians might be better advised to call for cessation of hostilities by both sides. Prince said disappointment with India had led him make strong effort increase roles both Soviets and Japan in this area. 8. Other subjects touched on included: Souvanna’s request to move Phoumi to south Thailand; irresponsible activities of Sukarno and Sihanouk; strengthening moderates at Algiers Conference; Souvanna’s opinion of relationship between Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and character NLF (details in airgram). 4 Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Vientiane, London, Moscow, and New Delhi. 2 In telegram 17 from Vientiane to Paris, July 7, Sullivan suggested that Harriman, who agreed to meet with Souvanna Phouma, make three essential points: U.S. willingness to “see it through in Vietnam”; U.S. continued adherence to the 1962 Geneva Agreements and the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding on Laos at Vienna in June 1961; and the need for reform and new blood in the Lao Government. (Ibid.) 3 Reference is to President Johnson’s request for an additional $89 million for a Southeast Asia Aid program, the text of which is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 696–698. 4 Not further identified. 190. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 190. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 9, 1965. SUBJECT A Possible Coup in Laos Strong coup rumors with more than the usual substance are again circulating in Laos; a move is reportedly planned prior to the National Assembly election on July 18. Several key military and civilian figures are said to be involved, including Air Force Chief General Ma, second military region commander General Vang Pao (the Meo leader), and possibly neutralist leader Kong Le. The reason for their unrest is the increasing military and political dominance of the Sananikone-Kouprasith faction in Vientiane. They charge this faction with neglecting the legitimate needs of military commands outside the capital, flagrant misappropriation of U.S. aid, and a failure to prosecute a vigorous campaign against the Pathet Lao. They also decry Souvanna’s lack of energetic leadership. The coup group reportedly plans to depose Souvanna while he is in Europe, relieve key Vientiane-based generals from their General Staff positions, initially establish military committee rule, and invite a representative of the Royal Family to lead the government. The coup rumors reflect the continuing family and factional rivalries which have long plagued Laotian politics. The chances for a successful coup depend upon a number of variables, the cohesiveness of the plotters and the loyalties of commanders and units. Of critical importance, as it has been in the past, will be the degree and timeliness of U.S. pressure upon the disaffected leaders, as well as simultaneous efforts to persuade the Vientiane group to open up the supply channels to the provinces and to permit non-Vientiane elements (notably General Ma) a greater role in the military establishment. Some of these pressures, specifically reaffirmation of full U.S. support for Souvanna, are being brought to bear. Should these pressures fail the combined forces of the dissidents, backed by General Ma’s T–28’s, could pose a formidable threat to the Vientiane forces. C 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. Secret. 191. Memorandum of Conversation 191. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 23, 1965. SUBJECT Meeting with Ambassador William Sullivan, 23 July 1965 PARTICIPANTS Ambassador William Sullivan, Mr. George Barbis, The Director, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. DeSilva, Mr. Colby 1. After a preliminary discussion, the Director outlined his plans to augment CIA’s effort in Southeast Asia as a whole and his assignment of Mr. DeSilva as a Special Assistant for Vietnam. 2. Ambassador Sullivan stated that Laos is handled as a part of the Southeast Asia total problem through the SEACOORD meetings and through exchanging intel. He then outlined his own thinking that Laos is a holding operation whose future depends upon South Vietnam. However, he pointed out that the two areas must be treated differently, both publicly and in the style of operations. He pointed out that most American operations in Laos are clandestine in nature and that no admission is made of American participation. Mr. FitzGerald mentioned the possibilities of more formal and overt U.S. military activity as a result of alleged “intelligence gaps” appearing in South Laos. Ambassador Sullivan said he was aware of this but that it is his intention to carry on along his basic line. He particularly pointed out the problem of defining what is meant by “interdiction”, which would call for large numbers of troops, and “harassment” which would probably end our intelligence coverage. He indicated that the same problem arises over the military’s ideas as to operations into the DRV. His line there was that it would be immoral to encourage “resistance” of any size in the DRV if we were not willing to follow it up and support it. Mr. Colby indicated that we had some problems in carrying out the intelligence operations authorized by Ambassador Sullivan if we were not able to develop at least a popular base of opinion and some armament to protect the teams. Ambassador Sullivan was not convinced of this and maintained his position that the intelligence effort should be handled as a small team effort only. Ambassador Sullivan indicated that he was prepared to encourage the use of overt U.S. or Vietnamese force Westwards along Route 9, gradually extending the SVN border, while publicly denying that the troops were in Laos, all the way to Tchepone if necessary. On the other hand, he said that the use of Thai rangers in this area as suggested by Ambassador Martin seemed to him impractical as they would inevitably be too overt and too well known. 3. On the political side Ambassador Sullivan indicated some satisfaction with the situation in that the “corrupt gang” around Phoumi is out and Souvanna had developed an heir apparent, Sisouk, with some younger and better quality leadership on the way up. 4. The Director indicated that CIA is intending to increase its effort in the Southeast Asian area but that he was convinced that the problem there must be approached from a total point of view rather than as specific and limited items. He told Ambassador Sullivan that he was recommending establishment of a national planning task group to carry out such an integrated planning effort. 5. The meeting closed on Ambassador Sullivan’s expression of his satisfaction with the excellent work of the Vientiane Station and CIA personnel and programs there. WE Colby Chief, Far East Division 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Raborn) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 22 July–3 Nov 1965. Secret. Drafted by Colby on July 27. 192. Special National Intelligence Estimate 192. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, August 5, 1965. SNIE 58–65 SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR LAOS Scope Note Laos continues to lie as a secondary theater in the shadow of Vietnam. This estimate surveys the local Lao scene and evaluates the prospects for serious trouble arising from local political or military developments during the next few months. Extension of major ground operations of the Vietnam conflict into Lao territory would, of course, create a fundamentally new situation. Summary A. During the next month or so, the formation of a new government will create a period of some tension in Vientiane and will present problems in relations with the Pathet Lao (PL). Although the PL will launch propaganda attacks on any new arrangements made as a result of the recent elections, we believe the chances are better than even that they will not set up a rival government. Considering the characteristic volatility of Lao politics, a coup is an ever-present possibility, but we see no major threat at this time to Souvanna’s continuance in office. B. Whereas we are fairly confident in our judgment that the Communists probably do not intend to initiate any major military action in Laos in the next few months, we are certain that they would react vigorously to any offensive in Laos which they felt seriously threatened the infiltration route to the Viet Cong or moved into the territories bordering on the DRV and Communist China. Despite some improvement in the Lao army in the past year or so, we believe that any major Lao offensive into these sensitive areas would be repulsed with great damage and a severe setback to general military morale. I. Political Situation and Prospects 1. In 1962, the neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma was made premier of the tripartite regime established as a result of the 14-nation conference at Geneva. Two deputy premiers, Prince Souphanouvong and Phoumi Nosavan, represented the pro-Communist and rightist factions respectively. Pro-Communist participation in the government practically ended in the spring of 1963 when Prince Souphanouvong and one of the PL ministers left Vientiane for Communist territory. Although some cabinet posts are still held open for the pro-Communists, the government has since been in effect a neutralist-rightist coalition, with rightist influence growing. Souvanna himself has become increasingly anti-Communist. 2. The flight of Phoumi Nosavan from Laos after his attempted coup last February eliminated one important source of political instability and strengthened Souvanna Phouma’s position. Souvanna has some degree of backing from most of the non-Communist political factions in Laos. The King has supported him increasingly, and even such powerful conservatives as the Sananikone family, whose position was also strengthened by Phoumi’s departure, have been generally content to work with him as premier. Most Lao politicians consider it useful to continue him in office because he symbolizes the Geneva legitimacy of the Lao Government (RLG). Nevertheless, dissensions among military leaders, although more related to rivalries between the general staff and the field officers than to Souvanna’s role, could erupt in a manner that would threaten or destroy stability. 3. Although Souvanna keeps tight control of foreign affairs and has increased his command of the sources of power in the government (patronage and money), he has tended to leave a large part of the everyday management of government affairs to others. A number of relatively young civil servants and junior cabinet officers have recently come into prominence, of whom the most important is Sisouk na Champassak. By Lao standards they are a hard-working and generally honest group. A few have already been accused of lining their pockets, however, and we cannot be confident that increased authority or frustration will not incline them toward the corrupt ways of their elders. Souvanna has been promoting the cause of Sisouk in a way that indicates he sees him as a possible successor to the premiership, but, as Sisouk himself recognizes, he has not yet acquired the necessary maturity and prestige for that difficult job. 4. The approach of the National Assembly elections of 18 July stimulated some uncertainty and considerable activity, including threats and bribery, among the various factions, for whom seats in this largely rubber-stamp body represent at least accretions of prestige and political influence. The electorate, restricted to about 20,000 military officers, government functionaries, and teachers returned an Assembly generally younger and more energetic and capable than its predecessor and one accordingly that is likely to seek a more active role in the government. 5. The outcome of the election was favorable for the preservation of stability. No group won such complete dominance that others would feel driven to overthrow it, and no group was so badly defeated that it would feel a coup was required for self-preservation. On the whole, the chief gainers were the “Young Nationalists,” who line up with Sisouk na Champassak. Since the election enough of the successful candidates have gravitated to Sisouk to give him a majority, which he can be expected to use in support of Souvanna. The chief losers were the Sananikone family, but even they won about 10 of the 50 seats. The leading Sananikones, former Premier Phoui, and his nephew, General Kouprasith, commander of the military region which includes Vientiane, have both expressed satisfaction with the outcome. 6. During the election campaign, rumors of coups were rife in Vientiane. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ]There will always be a threat to stability, however, as long as command relationships remain in contention and distrust persists among the military leaders, particularly between Vientiane and the field commanders. However, we believe the chances are better than even that the legal government will survive these dangers and that Souvanna will continue as premier. 7. The ambitious General Phoumi, now in exile in Thailand, poses little present threat. Although he still retains some following, particularly among middle ranks in the military, he has little chance of recouping his position as long as the present balance prevails in Laos. His diminished standing with the Thai was further lowered by his ill advised play for power early this year; the Thai leaders are willing to let him remain in Thailand as a refugee, but they almost certainly have no intention of backing Phoumi in an attempt to return to power. Although the Thai leaders do not much care for some of the present Lao leaders, they are willing to accept them or any other non-leftist group that appears able to provide a modicum of stability in a non-Communist Laos. Phoumi would remain available for the Thai to back should the situation in Vientiane collapse into chaos. II. Military Situation and Prospects 8. At present the Lao Government forces (FAR) have about 54,000 men (including about 1,000 in the Air Force and 450 in the River Flotilla). The Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), under the leadership of General Ma, has available about 45 propeller-driven fighter-bombers (T–28s), and its pilots have shown commendable courage and skill in close air support action and in harassing enemy movements and supply. Last summer’s successful clearing operation around the junction of routes 7 and 13, this spring’s successful defense of Dong Hene against an attack by North Vietnamese troops, the absence of a Communist offensive before this year’s monsoon, and, perhaps most important, the increased ground attack capability of the RLAF (plus US air action in Laos) have combined to give the FAR improved morale and confidence.FAR capabilities are probably the best they have been, but this still leaves it as a third-rate fighting force with little capability against determined opposition. 9. A significant element on the anti-Communist side is the large number of tribal irregulars who continue to put up vigorous defense of their mountain-top home areas and have provided some effective harassment of enemy supply lines. The neutralist forces commanded by General Kong Le should also be counted on the anti-Communist side, but these largely demoralized 8,000 or so men have a very limited military capability. 10. The Communist forces in Laos are estimated to include about 22,000–25,000 Pathet Lao (PL) and about 9,000 North Vietnamese troops (PAVN), of which about 2,000 are encadred in PL forces. 2 There are also about 2,600 rather ineffectual dissident neutralists under the commands of Colonel Deuane and General Khamouane Boupha. The Deuanists, like their counterparts under Kong Le, are of wavering loyalty, even though encadred with PL. It is unlikely that there are any organized Chinese military units in Laos, although detachments of armed guards have probably at times accompanied Chinese road-building crews and supply convoys in Phong Saly and Nam Tha provinces. 11. The Communist forces—particularly the PAVN—are generally more effective than the non-Communist Lao forces and retain the capability of rapidly seizing such exposed places as Thakhek or Luang Prabang. The interior southern towns of Saravane and Attopeu are especially vulnerable to Communist attack and could be seized by small forces. They could not overrun FAR-held territory quite so swiftly and easily as they might have in the past, however, because of the improvement of the FAR and especially because of the effect of air attack on their forces and supply lines. Seizure of Vientiane, Pakse, or Savannakhet would almost certainly require the introduction of substantial additional PAVN forces. 12. The Communists give no sign of wanting to stir up the military situation in Laos. They already control those parts of Laos which are most important to them: the areas adjacent to China and North Vietnam and the part of the panhandle used as a supply and infiltration route into South Vietnam. Not since 1962 have they moved to take an important town from the FAR, and this year they have even passed up the usual pre-monsoon offensive against the neutralists. They have conducted some fairly vigorous clearing actions against the anti-Communist irregulars along their supply lines in Sam Neua province, and they are currently increasing pressure on the anti-Communist irregulars in the region where Luang Prabang, Phong Saly, and Nam Tha provinces come together. These efforts have resulted in some improvement of the security of their supply lines, but much of the rugged country outside the roads and strong points remains in the hands of the tribal irregulars. The results have shown that Communists also find it difficult and costly to suppress guerrillas. In addition, air action has complicated their supply problem and lowered morale. 13. Whereas we are fairly confident in our judgment that the Communists probably do not intend to initiate any major military action in Laos in the next few months, we are certain that they would react vigorously to any offensive in Laos which they felt seriously threatened the infiltration route to the Viet Cong or moved into the territories bordering on the DRV and Communist China. Any FAR offensive into these sensitive areas would be repulsed with great damage to the FAR forces involved and a severe setback to general FAR morale. [Here follows a map of Laos.] 1 Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 58–65. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the National Security Agency. The Directors of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency concurred with its release by the Director of Central Intelligence. The AEC and FBI representatives on the USIB abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 2 In past summers, Hanoi has substantially reduced PAVN forces in Laos to lessen the monsoon supply problem, and it may have done so this year. The 9,000 figure does not take into account this possible reduction; neither does it take into account PAVN troops in transit through Laos into Vietnam. [Footnote in the source text.] 193. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 193. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, August 7, 1965. SUBJECT Cross-border Operations (U) 1. (TS) JCSM–475–65, dated 18 June 1965, subject as above, submitted recommendations pertaining to cross-border operations into the Laos Panhandle. 2 2. (TS) Subsequent to submission of JCSM–475–65, the US Ambassador to Laos, on 23 July 1965, 3 in conference with representatives of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and the Joint Staff, indicated concurrence with the concept for cross-border operations and initiation of Phase I, subject to the following modifications: a. Initial introduction of teams accompanied by US advisors into Laos to be by ground infiltration. b. Subsequent resupply, reinforcement, or evacuation by air from South Vietnam to be permitted. c. Air strikes on possible targets developed to be flown as approved and conducted through the Bango system only, not to include strike aircraft from South Vietnam. d. Elimination of the ten-day restriction on the length of stay. 3. (TS) With regard to subparagraph 2 c, above, air strikes on targets developed by cross-border teams would be conducted through the Bango alert system, which employs strip alert US aircraft based in Thailand. This system requires that air strike requests be passed to the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), Udorn, and thence to the Air Attache (AIRA), Vientiane, for approval. Upon approval, attack aircraft are scrambled from Ubon and a T–28 air coordinator from Udorn. If the aircraft in Ubon are unavailable, the Bango system draws on Whiplash aircraft at Korat and Takli, which are up to 380 nautical miles from the target area. The original concept envisioned that all strike requests would be passed immediately to an ASOC in the RVN. The ASOC would launch A–1 aircraft on ground alert at RVN bases less than 90 miles from the target area. An air coordinator would not be required and US team members trained as Forward Air Controllers would control air strikes. COMUSMACV has pointed out problem areas involved in using the Bango system for this particular operation. However, in the interest of obtaining early approval to initiate operations, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC recommend acceptance of the Bango system with necessary adjustments to be made if the responsiveness of the system is not satisfactory. 4. (TS) CINCPAC, on 27 July 1965, recommended acceptance of the other modifications listed in paragraph 2, above, for initiation of Phase I operations. 5. (TS) Costs incident to FY 1966 cross-border funding requirements have been refined by COMUSMACV as follows: a. Dollar funding requirement—$191,000. (1) Individual equipment for approximately 80 personnel— $20,000. (2) Organizational equipment including communications— $100,000. (3) Personnel and organizational equipment replacement and additional communication requirements—$25,000. (4) TDY funds to support US augmentation personnel—$46,000. b. Piastre funding requirements totaling $125,000 will be made available through GVN approved budget. c. If special paramilitary forces are required for subsequent operations visualized for Phases II and III, additional funds will be required. 6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the view that FY 1966 costs for specialized equipments and support of indigenous personnel which cannot be allocated through normal timely mechanisms be provided from DOD contingency funds. In this connection, responsibility for planning and conducting cross-border operations has been assigned by COMUSMACV to the Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group which currently is responsible for OPLAN 34A operations against the NVN. Therefore, the funding mechanism developed for cross-border forces should be additive or compatible to that utilized for OPLAN 34A, in order to avoid layering two methods of accountability on the field agency responsible for operations. Further, with regard to the COMUSMACV estimate for TDY funds to support US augmentation personnel ($46,000—item 5a(4), above), it is considered that such costs should be borne by the Services involved as a normal obligation as in the case of other TDY personnel ordered to forward stations. Therefore, the dollar funding requirement summarized in paragraph 5, above, for FY 1966 DOD contingency funds should be $145,000. 7. (TS) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend, in lieu of paragraph 8 of JCSM–475–65, that: a. The cross-border concept contained in JCSM–475–65, as modified by paragraph 2, above, be approved. b. Phase I, as modified by paragraph 2, above, be approved for execution. c. FY 1966 costs incident to cross-border operations in the amount of $145,000 be funded from DOD contingency funds in a manner similar to that employed for OPLAN 34A funding. 8. (U) Upon receipt of your approval, the draft message in the Appendix 4 will be dispatched. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, DOD/OSD Admin Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Viet 381. Top Secret. 2 The recommendations were that cross-border concept be approved, in principal, for further planning, training, and discussion with the RVNAF; that approval be given to the first phase, operating in only the two southernmost areas of Laos (Dak Prou and Dak Tou), operate up to a limit of 20 kilometers from the border and for no longer than 10 days; that the costs be paid from Defense contingency funds; and that air infiltration, exfiltration, and supply be allowed and that uniformed U.S. advisers participate in the operations. (Ibid.) 3 Sullivan summarized his discussion on this issue in general in Document 194 . 4 Not found. 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, August 9, 1965, 1124Z. 142. 1. During my recent peregrinations in Saigon, Washington, Honolulu and Bangkok, I had numerous discussions with interested officials concerning Lao corridor. Because these talks covered various aspects of the problem at various stops, I consider it might be useful to record in one message the view which I have expressed orally. 2. First of apb, [all?] I have indicated some concern that we define our objectives as best we can in the various categories of interdiction, harassment and intelligence. Any actions we would intend to take towards any one of these ultimate objectives will have its effect on each of the other two. 3. Starting with interdiction, which would be the ideal end result, I think it has to be conceded from the start that we do not have adequate resources in Laos to accomplish true interdiction against a determined Viet Minh effort to keep the corridor open. Similarly, it is most improbable that we could interdict by air action alone. Therefore, if we really intend to interdict, we have to think in terms of large numbers of ground forces moving into Lao territory from Vietnam in order to occupy the terrain. CINCPAC estimated these numbers at approximately two U.S. divisions. 4. In considering such an enterprise, the probable military results have to be measured against the predictable political costs. These costs, which would involve the overt violation of the 1962 agreements on Laos, would involve far more than just a question of principle. There would be very real practical consequences as well. These could develop in either of two directions: A. Our invasion would have to be done contrary to Souvanna’s wishes. (This would be most likely circumstance.) In this case, we would have to decide to defy him, to establish a puppet government with military backing, and take the consequences. In effect, we would have to repeat the 1961 scenario. It is doubtful that the outcome would be any more satisfactory this time around. B. Our action could be undertaken with Souvanna’s blessing but at the price of assuring him protection by U.S. resources against the consequent Viet Minh reaction. This would engage considerable numbers of U.S. and probably Thai forces to protect the Mekong River Valley and associated areas of Laos. In short, we could not confine our Laotian military undertaking to the corridor alone. 5. I encountered no strong disposition, at any of my stops, to propose interdictory action at the political and military costs outlined above. I also found a general understanding that, in greater or less degree, these same considerations applied to all measures proposed against the corridor which entailed overt, conspicuous violation of Lao territory and the 1962 agreements. Thus, certain of the contingency plans discussed under agenda item 1 (c) of the most recent SEACOORD meeting, 2 which would involve forces that could not, because of their nature and numbers, remain clandestine, have to be measured in this same general scale of military results versus political costs. 6. This brings us to harassment. It will be recognized that we already engage in some harassment against the corridor. This is in the form of RLAF air action, Steel Tiger, Bango/Whiplash, and finally the clandestine SGU operations on the ground. We are attempting to enhance all of these, and, given certain technical breakthroughs, ought to be able to be more effective, particularly with our air actions. We should not overlook the possibility of more effective exploitation of FAR’s potential in the southern corridor area, the provinces of Attopeu and Saravane. We have certain advantages here, including a competent commander, which should permit some modest advances along the fringes of the corridor, giving us better jumping-off bases for intelligence and harassment. 7. A special case in point is Shining Brass. I had useful talks both in Saigon and Honolulu on this subject. Colonel Blackburn, the new SOG Chief, has a very realistic approach to this enterprise and is quite willing to try a start under the ground rules now in effect. In comment on these ground rules, I should like to stress that these are intended to fix practical operating conditions which minimize the risk of a large political ruckus, but which will provide an experience factor against which we can explore modifications as time goes on. Therefore, in Saigon, we agreed that SOG would begin its operations by overland penetration in the two authorized areas, using small teams accompanied by U.S. personnel. Although I have no reason, from Vientiane perspective, to insist on ten day limit for operations, Colonel Blackburn seemed to feel that was reasonable from viewpoint human endurance in this terrain. If he wishes extend that period, I would not object. As for air support, I would naturally concur in emergency extraction by air if the team were in trouble. It seems to me that this would fall into category of SAR effort. On aerial resupply, this would seem to be one of the matters where experience factor should be examined, especially in determining whether teams wish to jeopardize the secrecy of their locations by conspicuous airlifts. With respect air strikes, these can be accomplished with Bango/Whiplash framework if strikes are really desired. It is important that we use this procedure in order to have effective double check against possibility striking other friendly clandestine units operating in corridor under Vientiane control. Finally, on question aerial introduction of teams, I continue negative insofar as it concerns initial penetration. Nothing could be more reckless than to drop some boys (a la Leaping Lena) into an unknown area where they are almost certain to be caught. Whether we would ultimately wish rotate personnel by air is question on which I feel we should again reserve judgment, as in case aerial resupply, until experience factors can be measured. In short, I feel the most fruitful course of action on Shining Brass is to begin modestly under rules currently approved and then examine the operations as they proceed to determine where and how they can be successfully improved. 8. This brings us to intelligence, and especially to the inherent conflict between harassment actions and intelligence efforts. It has been our experience that, whenever we convert some of our passive intelligence assets into positive harassment teams, we produce a reaction which eventually degrades our intelligence capabilities. For example, when a guerilla team, based on intelligence supplied by one of our road watch teams, conducts a harassment, the Viets invariably react by launching a sweep which clears all of our road watch teams off that section of the road. This relationship is one which will have to be examined in the conduct of all our operations in the corridor. I discussed it with General Carroll, during his recent visit, and with Admiral Sharp at Honolulu. It will have particular pertinence to Shining Brass and will, in large measure, determine operational features of that program. Similarly, with our SGU teams, our Kha assets, and other in-country efforts, objectives have to be fixed in the light of this equation. 9. Finally, there is the question of the degree to which the RLG should be or would wish to be privy to all our activity. Much of what we are now doing in the corridor is known only in vague outline to Souvanna and I’m sure he prefers it that way. Some of our future operations may involve such political risk that it would be prudent to have fairly clear understandings with Souvanna. This is something else we’ll have to keep under constant examination. 10. In summary, there are vomiting considerations to all the actions which may be proposed in the corridor. We will have to weigh these in the balance each time. The essential consideration is that we must be sure, in each instance, that the objective we seek is worth the price we will have to pay. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 Apparent reference to the SEACOORD meeting of July 23–24 held at Bangkok. Item C discussed at this meeting was plans presented by COMUSMACTHAI for Thai/U.S. Special Forces operations in the Laos corridor. At the meeting it was agreed that the planning should go forward on a stand-by basis even if it proved unnecessary to use the forces. (Telegram 149 from Bangkok, July 24; ibid., DEF 1 ASIA SE) 195. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 195. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, August 13, 1965, 1040Z. 161. Shining Brass. Refs A. Deptel [106]. 2 B. Vientiane’s 142. 3 C. MACV MACSOG 9621. 4 1. My political reservations about certain features of Shining Brass have always been associated with prospect that U.S. military personnel would be captured during these operations and would be paraded as flagrant violators of 1962 Geneva Accords. Our experience with GVN personnel captured during Leaping Lena indicates that Vietnamese elements of these teams will readily reveal all features of operations during interrogation. We could therefore expect details of these operations to be thoroughly exposed. 2. An exposure in this form would not only prove highly embarrassing to U.S., but also to Lao Government. Since it is currently contemplated that Shining Brass should proceed without knowledge of RLG, this embarrassment might produce strong reaction from Souvanna, and jeopardize most of our other operations in this country. 3. It has always seemed to me that U.S. and GVN personnel who are introduced into Laos by ground infiltration can claim either that (A) they were captured on Vietnam side of border, or (B) they did not know where border was. Hence, any chances of violating Laos territory could be anticipated and neutralized by a claim that U.S. personnel had been captured by Viet units in Vietnam and dragged across border into Laos. 4. On other hand, units introduced by air, with virtual certainty that operational details would be disclosed to enemy (para 1) if captured, would leave us with much egg on face. Therefore, I decidedly feel that we should reserve any authorization for use of air reinforcement or resupply until experience factor in Shining Brass gives us grounds on which to make a political judgment. It may be that Shining Brass operators themselves will decide, for military reasons, that they do not wish aerial resupply and reinforcement because such conspicuous activity would compromise their locations. However, if, for military reasons, they wish (after gaining experience factor) to recommend aerial resupply or reinforcement, then, at that stage, we will have to get a political judgment at fairly high levels. One element in that judgment will be decision whether we will wish to clear entire operation with Souvanna. 5. As previously stated (Ref B) I would have no objection to emergency aerial extraction, since I would regard this as an SAR action, similar to those we conduct regularly for downed airmen. Aerial extraction as a routine operation measure would, however, fall into same general caveats stipulated in para 4 above. 6. I note that no mention is made in Ref A concerning proposal in Ref C that certain selected teams be launched into corridor from Laos. I assume therefore, that this feature is not authorized. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 Reference A was not completed, but it is to telegram 106 to Vientiane, August 12, in which the Department of State informed the Embassy that the Department of Defense contemplated approving in principle cross-border operations into Laos. South Vietnamese teams accompanied by U.S. advisers would be infiltrated by ground, resupplied, reinforced, and evacuated by air. They could receive air support while in Laos and their stay would no longer be limited to 10 days. The Department asked if the Embassy had any objection to air resupply, reinforcement, or evacuation by air from South Vietnam. (Ibid.) 3 Document 194 . 4 Not found. 196. Special National Intelligence Estimate 196. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, September 10, 1965. SNIE 10–10–65 REACTIONS TO A CERTAIN US COURSE OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The Problem To estimate Communist and other international reaction to US moves to establish a barrier across Communist supply lines in the Lao panhandle. Assumption A US force of three divisions moves into Laos along Route 9 from Thailand and South Vietnam to seize and hold terrain along the route with the purpose of blocking Communist troop and supply movements. Discussion 1. The international reaction to the US action would be generally unfavorable particularly if the action were not undertaken with the approval of Premier Souvanna Phouma. We believe, however, that the chances are less than even that Souvanna could be persuaded to make such a request. He would recognize that the US action would be a clear and conspicuous violation of the 1962 Geneva accords upon which the legitimacy of his government rests. He would see few advantages to Laos and many dangers in such a deployment. He would fear that Laos would become a major battleground for the powers involved in Vietnam, that the Communists would retaliate against his forces in other parts of Laos, and that the Chinese Communists might occupy the northern provinces. Souvanna has approved of US escalation of air activity and he would probably prefer to see this course fully exploited, including the destruction of Hanoi before considering involvement of Laos in a US-Communist ground war. 2. If the US pressed for a Lao Government request in the face of Souvanna’s opposition, he might be led to resign and return to France as he has so often threatened to do. While most other Lao leaders including the King would be likely to share Souvanna’s misgivings, Souvanna could probably be removed by a coalition of conservative forces. Under such circumstances, however, any successor government would be seen by most of the world as a US puppet. 3. If Souvanna could be persuaded to call for the US divisions, his assent would almost certainly be conditioned on explicit US guarantees of protection against DRV and Chinese counteraction in northern and central Laos. He might not request immediate deployment of US forces into these areas, lest this precipitate the very attacks he wished to prevent, but he would almost certainly demand some tangible evidence that substantial US forces would indeed be available quickly if needed. This would be equally true of any successor government. 4. The Thai would be concerned about having such a larger foreign presence in their country as the assumed action implies, but their major concern would be that the action might bring Communist, particularly Chinese, attacks against Thailand. We believe that the Thai would cooperate with the US plan if given specific commitments on defense measures to protect Thailand in such a contingency. The Thai leaders would also almost certainly seek a substantial increase in US aid. At least sporadic sabotage efforts against the lines of communication across Thailand to the Route 9 region of Laos would be likely, and their protection would require a fairly large-scale Thai or US effort. In short, the US would almost certainly be called on to provide substantial forces, in Thailand as in Laos, over and above those which would be required to seal off the Communist supply route through Laos. 5. In Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk’s fear of US-supported attacks from South Vietnam or Laos would probably be increased. He would vociferously condemn the US action and would probably reiterate in some form his demands for international guarantees of his borders. At the same time, however, he would probably be impressed with this new evidence of US determination not to be driven out of Southeast Asia. Until he had some clearer view of the outcome of the US effort, he would probably be reluctant to see any expansion in the use of Cambodia as a supply route and safe-haven for Communist forces in Vietnam. 6. The North Vietnamese would almost certainly learn that a major US operation was being planned; they already seem to suspect that something of the sort may be under consideration. As US intentions became clearer, Hanoi and the Pathet Lao would seek to discourage Souvanna’s concurrence and to deter the US action by propaganda and by actions designed to demonstrate their ability to threaten areas about which the Lao and Thai governments are sensitive, e.g., by troop movements in the north and central areas. At the same time they would send some reinforcements into southern Laos and attempt to stockpile supplies. As the dimensions of the US build-up in northeast Thailand became more apparent, Hanoi might undertake limited offensives to bring PL/PAVN forces close to the Mekong along the Thai frontier. All this would be accompanied by a vigorous propaganda campaign designed to heighten fears in Laos and abroad of an ever-expanding conflict. 7. Once the US operation was under way, the North Vietnamese might choose to engage US forces at specific points where the PL/PAVN units would have local advantage, but the normal pattern probably would be vigorous harassment and ambush. Though the PL/PAVN would probably exert strong pressures in north and central Laos, we believe the chances are less than even that they would launch a major counter-offensive against the US forces in the south. For at least some time, the Communists would be likely to feel that they could maintain the insurrection in South Vietnam, even if the US interdiction reduced the levels of activity. Hanoi and the Pathet Lao would call for condemnation of the US action under the Geneva agreement. The North Vietnamese might set up a rival Lao “government of National Union,” particularly if Souvanna were no longer in power. They would at least withdraw their diplomatic representation from Vientiane, have the Pathet Lao sever all contacts with the Lao government, and threaten to renounce the Geneva agreements. 8. Even after the US forces had occupied the length of Route 9, we believe that the North Vietnamese would continue efforts to infiltrate some cadres through Laos. At the same time, Hanoi would increase its reliance on sea routes directly to South Vietnam or via Cambodia, at least for arms, equipment, and supplies. If the US effort, including not only the action assumed here but other actions against Communist lines of communications, succeeded in seriously restricting the supply of men and materiel to the insurrection in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese would have to decide whether to reduce sharply the level of that insurrection, to seek a respite through political means, or to attempt to break the blockade through military action against the US forces in Laos or elsewhere. Which course they would choose would depend on a number of circumstances of the moment, such as conditions in North Vietnam, Chinese pressures, Hanoi’s reading of the US domestic situation, and, probably most important, the strength of the VC and the state of its morale. 9. The Chinese Communists, as well as the DRV, have been anticipating US intervention in the corridor and have already made propaganda attacks and threats aimed at blocking such action, including private warnings that they might have to send troops into Laos if the US commitment in Vietnam were greatly increased. We believe, however, that so long as the US forces had not crossed the Laotian frontier in strength, Peking probably would not for its part send Chinese combat forces in any strength into Laos, although it might order threatening troop movements along the border. It might also increase its assistance to the Pathet Lao in northern Laos by introducing some specialized personnel to support the PL/PAVN. At a minimum, Peking would increase its propaganda attacks and threats of intervention, and step up aid and commitments of support to the DRV. 10. However, once the US had crossed into southern Laos in force, the Chinese Communists almost certainly would counter in the northwest by supplying personnel and equipment to augment Communist capabilities there and expand Communist control into areas close to the Thai border. 2 This would be designed to facilitate infiltration of Thailand, to intimidate Lao and Thai leaders, and to raise international and domestic pressures on the US Government to avoid expanding the war. 11. As long as the Chinese Communist leaders estimated that the US forces would remain in the Route 9 area of south Laos, large-scale intervention by Chinese forces would be unlikely. However, an imminent Communist move against north Laos would lead the Lao government to demand US forces for protection of this area. If the US responded by introducing US ground forces into northern Laos—e.g., the royal capital at Luang Prabang—this would in itself sharply increase the risk of Chinese entry. 12. The principal Soviet reactions would be political. In the initial stages of the US deployment, Moscow would probably use its position as Geneva co-chairman to reinforce other diplomatic and propaganda efforts to block the US action or cause abandonment of the project. Moscow almost certainly would like to see another international conference on Laos. However, its actions would be strongly influenced by the course of events and by the positions of Hanoi and Peking. For example, if Hanoi and Peking recognized a Communist-dominated government in Laos, Moscow would probably do so as well. At some stage, the USSR might renounce its role as co-chairman, on the grounds that the US had destroyed the 1962 Geneva agreements. 13. On the military plane, the Soviets would avoid a direct commitment of forces, but they might provide logistical and material support to Communist operations in Laos as they did in 1961. This would require Peking’s cooperation, however, and the US action in Laos would probably not cause the Chinese to drop their opposition to any significant Soviet role in Indochina. 14. US-Soviet tensions would sharpen, both because the Soviets would be under heavy pressure from the Asian Communists, and because the Soviets would regard the US action as a repudiation of agreements worked out with the USSR in 1961 and 1962. The Soviets might increase their own defense spending and even abrogate some US-Soviet agreements or understandings. We doubt that the USSR would retaliate against the US in Berlin simply as a response to the US action in Laos. Some carefully controlled harassments in Berlin are, of course, possible in any case. 15. The British, too, would be faced with difficult problems. As one of the two co-chairmen of the Geneva conference on Laos, the UK would find it somewhat awkward, though of course not impossible, to support US violation of the accords. Furthermore, US policy in Vietnam is not popular with the British public, and a major extension of the Vietnam conflict into Laos would excite considerable opposition. Prime Minister Wilson would be under severe attack from his own left wing and from much of the public and press. Nevertheless, he would not want openly to oppose the US on this issue. Although he might be restrained from strong public support, he would probably give private assurances and try to avoid public criticism of the US action. 16. France would see the US action as a major extension of erroneous US policy in Vietnam, and would strongly condemn it. Even if the action had the blessing of Souvanna’s government, the French reactions would be severely negative; in this case, Paris might cut off its remaining economic aid and political support for Souvanna’s regime. If another regime had replaced Souvanna’s, it would be condemned by France, almost as strongly as by the Communist powers, as a US puppet. We do not believe, however, that France would initiate action against the US in the UN, and we cannot see much that France could do to make its opposition felt practically. 17. The reaction of other members of the world community would generally follow predictable lines (e.g., approval from Taipei and condemnation from Djakarta), with an increased amount of unfavorable reaction. If the action had Souvanna’s support, reactions would be somewhat less unfavorable than otherwise. The success of the US action would also have an important effect on world reactions; if the three divisions did not result in speedy and pronounced lessening of hostilities in South Vietnam, criticisms would be harsher and endorsements less enthusiastic. Even though Hanoi and Peking have categorically denied that the UN has any jurisdiction in the Vietnam conflict, sympathizers might move for a UN condemnation of the US action. The likelihood of such an effort would be greater, of course, if the US action were taken over Souvanna’s opposition. 1 Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, Top Secret Material. Top Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the USIB concurred with its release on September 10 except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 2 The Director of Intelligence and Research believes that the estimate should state specifically that “personnel” probably would include some regular Chinese Communist combat units, since “personnel” can be interpreted as meaning only limited numbers of specialized cadre. [Footnote in the source text.] 197. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 197. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, September 17, 1965. SUBJECT Duck Soup 1. I understand that Al Friedman will be calling you again on this subject. 2 We have been informed that the JCS and ISA are taking the matter up with Mr. McNamara. Al’s call may be a final attempt to reverse our position before approaching the Secretary of Defense. The paragraphs which follow explain the position we have taken on this matter and the rationale. 2. Souvanna’s Position. When Ambassador Sullivan sought Prince Souvanna Phouma’s views regarding this US-proposed operation, Souvanna replied “with considerable deliberation” that in principle he wished such enemy aircraft destroyed, but also in principle he would prefer that it be done by RLAF T–28’s (Vientiane’s 1802 of May 4). 3 a. Caveats. Souvanna recognized, however, that in practice it seemed doubtful that his T–28’s could do the job. Since the alternative was US aircraft, he carefully spelled out the terms of reference which would have to be followed: (1) Extreme care must be taken to avoid giving the Communists a big propaganda play; (2) Aircraft must not be struck on the ground; (3) Aircraft must not be hit during casual flight; in other words, (4) The enemy aircraft must be intercepted in the air while it is engaged in the act of parachuting or dropping supplies to enemy ground forces. (5) Souvanna’s approval of an intercept with these caveats pertains only to operations in Sam Neua Province. 3. Department caveat. In addition to Souvanna’s caveats, the Department in Deptel 1121 4 said that only North Vietnamese aircraft could be intercepted in this fashion. If there is uncertainty about the identity of the aircraft, it should not be attacked. This point was made because of Ambassador Thompson’s great concern that we not shoot down a Soviet plane. 4. Evidence. The evidence of continuing enemy air drops is quite intermittent and seldom confirmed. Reports during the past five months concerning unidentified aircraft in Laos refer to sightings in other provinces as well as Sam Neua. Few actual sightings of drops have been reported and the reports are mostly by small friendly units. All recent reports indicate enemy aircraft activities have been at night—therefore not subject to attack under the restrictions outlined above. 5. Absence of Lao Request. During this entire 5-month period, neither the Lao armed forces nor Souvanna Phouma has raised this subject with U.S. officials. Presumably, if the volume of air drops to enemy troops in Sam Neua was sufficiently great to affect the struggle there, the Lao themselves would have attempted an intercept or request the U.S. to intervene. 6. T–28 Pilots. Ambassador Sullivan suggested making the intercept with T–28’s flown by Air America pilots. The Department so far has refused to give this authorization and suggested, instead, that Lao [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] pilots be selected and perhaps trained in T–28’s for this operation (Deptel 1121). Ambassador Sullivan replied that no such Lao [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]pilots are proficient enough to perform the task. a. L/FE has reminded us that civilians who engage in hostilities are usually treated as “unprivileged belligerents” or possibly even as spies. Thus, if Air America pilots flying T–28’s on combat missions were shot down or otherwise fell into enemy hands, we might have no legal basis for claiming for them treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with POW conventions or accepted international law practice. Moreover, in such an event, this evidence would give confirmation to Communist charges regarding the para-military character of Air America and undermine our position with respect to Air America, RLAF T–28’s and support for the Geneva Agreements. 7. As matters stand, there have been no recent reports of daylight air drops in the Sam Neua area and Bill Sullivan agrees that we would not be warranted in keeping planes on alert to intercept. He has requested instead authority to institute such an alert with Air America manned T–28’s and to carry out interception when and if daylight air drops are resumed. 8. Our position is that the political risks are sufficiently great and involve factors (e.g. US-Soviet relations) beyond the purview of Vientiane, that the decision to intercept made last April should be reviewed in the light of circumstances prevailing when flights are next reported. This position is reflected in the attached draft telegram which Defense has thus far refused to clear. 5 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and cleared by Barbis. A copy was sent to Unger. 2 On September 10 Friedman sent Bundy a copy of a September 7 memorandum from Blouin to him, recommending that a JCS proposal to give Sullivan authority to execute Duck Soup without recourse to Washington be approved by the Department of State. Also attached to this memorandum was an undated note from Bundy to Trueheart, stating that Bundy told Friedman that the Department of State “must stick to our guns.” (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 Dated June 20. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 5 Attached was a draft telegram deferring a final decision on Duck Soup until more reliable evidence on the air drops was available. For the cable as sent, see Document 198 . 198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, September 28, 1965, 10:29 a.m. 192. Joint State/Defense Message. Ref: (A) Embtel 220. 2 (B) Deptel 1121. 3 (C)Embtel 1950. 4 (D) Embtel 1802. 5 (E) Embtel 3. 6 (F) CINCPAC 180035Z July. 7 Duck Soup 1. Ref F proposed solutions for conduct of Duck Soup operations which is concurred in by Amembassy Vientiane (Ref A). It is agreed that this solution would constitute an acceptable basis for conducting such operations at an appropriate time. However, in absence recent reports of daylight air drops in Sam Neua area, we agree that you would not be warranted in keeping planes on alert to intercept. 2. We have carefully considered your request for discretionary authority to mount intercept operation when and as sightings and other conditions so warrant. Conclusion is that political risks are sufficiently great and involve factors (e.g., US/Soviet relations) beyond purview of Vientiane, that decision to intercept made last April should be reviewed in Washington in light of circumstances prevailing when flights are next reported. Considerations underlying this decision are outlined in paragraphs which follow. 3. When consulted regarding proposed operation in May, Souvanna concurred but only subject to restrictions which would require that enemy aircraft be attacked in flight and while actually engaged in dropping supplies to enemy forces. Even under these conditions, Souvanna’s concurrence pertained only to operations in Sam Neua province (Ref D). 4. In Ref B Department laid down additional condition that only North Vietnamese aircraft could be intercepted. 5. Operationally, above factors require that intercept be carried out in daylight and by American pilots. 6. Reports of enemy air drops in Laos are quite intermittent and seldom confirmed. Few actual sightings of drops have in fact been reported and all recent reports of enemy aircraft activity have been at night. 7. During the last five months neither the Lao Armed Forces nor Souvanna Phouma has raised this subject with U.S. officials, as they might have been expected to do if air drops were materially affecting operations in the Sam Neua area. 8. Use of Air America pilots in armed T–28s poses problem of permitting U.S. civilians to engage in hostilities under conditions in which they might be treated legally as “unprivileged belligerents” if they fell into enemy hands. Not only would it be difficult to claim rights POW treatment for them in accordance with international law and practice, but communists would be given confirmation of their charges of paramilitary character of Air America. We have accepted these risks in connection with SAR operations but are more reluctant to do so in this case in absence stronger showing military advantages. Emphasize that we are not ruling out use of Air America pilots; we simply wish to review question of their use in total context prevailing at time air drops are next reported. 9. Any recommendation to mount Duck Soup operation will be acted on promptly. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Trueheart; cleared by Unger, George H. Aldrich of L/FE, and McNamara; and approved by Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and DEPCHIEFJUSMAG. 2 In telegram 220 from Vientiane, August 28, the Embassy concurred in the plan suggested in CINCPAC telegram 180035Z, but the plan would be implemented at the discretion of the Ambassador in Laos. Telegram 220 is ibid. Regarding telegram 180035Z, see footnote 7 below, 3 See footnote 4, Document 197 . 4 Telegram 1950 from Vientiane was a repeat to the Department of State of telegram 1508 from Vientiane to CINCPAC, June 2, in which the Embassy reported that Souvanna had authorized attacking a DRV transport plane when it was involved in a supply mission. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5 See footnote 3, Document 197 . 6 In telegram 3 from Vientiane, July 1, the Embassy stated that the use of Thai or Lao pilots was not feasible because of technical difficulties in landing and taking off from the launch sites and communications/language problems. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 7 CINCPAC telegram 180035Z, July 18, proposed a solution whereby Air America pilots would fly T–28’s based in northern Laos. They would remain on ground alert until 5 p.m. and then would go on airborne alert. (Ibid.) 199. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 199. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 28, 1965. SUBJECT Visit with Prime Minister Souvanna of Laos Secretary Rusk recommends that you see Souvanna when he is here during the week of October 18. 2 So do we. Souvanna has behaved admirably since he assumed office following the Geneva Conference in Laos in 1962, in the face of difficult internal and foreign problems. He has often expressed a desire to retire from office—a development which would compound our problems in Laos and Indochina generally. He would be encouraged and stiffened by a session with you. 3 Secretary Rusk’s memorandum is attached. >McG. B.C 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. No classification marking. This memorandum was also from Chester Cooper and was sent through Valenti, who wrote on the memorandum that he agreed that the President should see Souvanna. 2 Recommended in a September 23 memorandum, not attached. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 LAOS) 3 The President declined to see Souvanna. McGeorge Bundy wrote the following note at the end of the memorandum: “CLC [Chester L. Cooper]: this might be revised next week. McGB.” Because of his hernia operation, President Johnson did not see Souvanna, but Vice President Humphrey did; see Document 200 . 200. Memorandum of Conversation 200. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 18, 1965. PARTICIPANTS The Vice President; His Highness Souvanna Phouma; His Royal Highness, Prince Khampan, Lao Ambassador to the United States; His Excellency, Sisouk na Champassak, Lao Minister of Finance; Mr. Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Far East; Mr. George Carroll, Assistant to the Vice President; and Mr. John Rielly, Assistant to the Vice President. An interpreter was present. The Vice President welcomed His Highness, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and gave him the personal greetings of President Johnson, who regretted that illness prevented him from enjoying the privilege of seeing the Prime Minister. 2 Souvanna Phouma thanked the Vice President and expressed regret that the President was ill. Souvanna Phouma had enjoyed meeting President Johnson when he was Vice President. The Vice President had watched with increasing admiration the achievements of Souvanna Phouma and his government. Souvanna Phouma was a courageous man. His visit gave us happiness. The economic and political progress in Laos was impressive. Souvanna Phouma thanked the United States for assistance. During the last ten months the military and political situation had ameliorated. Military officers had a greater appreciation of their roles. Political leaders understood the situation, as well as each other, better. Leadership was more cohesive; they now cooperated. They understood the need for solidarity. During the last six months the military situation had improved. Officers had a good hold on the Army: discipline had improved. Armed Forces had been reorganized. Officers had a full understanding of their roles. Many areas had been seized from the Pathet Lao. Resupply from North Vietnam of the Pathet Lao was more difficult to accomplish. As a matter of fact, the Pathet Lao had not been able to mount their usual monsoon offensive. Souvanna Phouma pointed to defections from the Pathet Lao. After three to six months of training and indoctrination a full infantry company of former Pathet Lao had been sent into combat against the enemy. In addition, approximately three to four companies of former Pathet Lao are now in training. The Vice President expressed appreciation for those improvements in the situation. They had been well reported by Ambassador Sullivan. Souvanna Phouma complimented Ambassador Sullivan. He said it would take several more months to consolidate several recaptured areas. Toward the effort the highway between Luang Prabang and Vientiane would be repaired. Work would commence early in November. Road building equipment was being placed halfway between the two cities and work would then progress at the same time in both directions. The Vice President wanted to assure the Prime Minister of two things. First, U.S. economic, technical and military assistance will continue as long as it was effective and so long as the Prime Minister’s policies continued. The President had been encouraged by the cooperation that existed in the field of foreign assistance between of Governments of Laos and the United States. The Congress supported the program. Secondly, the U.S. Government was determined to resist aggression in Southeast Asia. We wanted stability and peace in the area. President Johnson saw Southeast Asia as an entire region. Our assistance to Laos was related to all other U.S. assistance in Southeast Asia. We intended to establish peace in the area until a Regional Development Authority could do its work. President Johnson had outlined his plans for assistance in the economic development of the area in his address at Johns Hopkins. 3 That speech attempted to sketch the beginning of his hopes for Southeast Asia. Laos was an important part of that development. The Nam Ngum Dam Project in Laos, it was hoped, would be the first, or one of the first development projects. The United States did not want war in the area. It sought peace. It would remove its military as soon as conditions permitted. The United States wanted each state to be free to work out its own destiny, to develop its resources and people in its own way. Close to President Johnson’s heart was assistance in the field of education. He had spoken his feelings in his recent address upon the centennial of the Smithsonian Institution. To succeed in the peaceful development of the region, all nations needed the kind of courageous leadership the Prime Minister was giving Laos. Observing the effectiveness and spirit of that leadership made us in America want to do a better job. President Johnson wanted the Prime Minister to know of his deep intent to assist in the building of a prosperous region. For South Vietnam we were recruiting doctors, nurses and technicians to go to South Vietnam and to build hospitals and dispensaries. This was the kind of peaceful project that the President wanted for peaceful nations. He wanted peace, not war. At the same time, the United States intended to do whatever might be required to defend South Vietnam. The Prime Minister was happy to receive assurances of the intention of the U.S. to continue assisting Laos. His country needed economic assistance to develop its resources. Laos had been at war for more than twenty years, actually since 1939 and the Japanese invasion. Laos had borne a heavy burden. It was difficult to improve life while surviving the attacks of the Vietnamese and Chinese. If Laos were to survive, it would need help. The Prime Minister appreciated the adherence of the United States to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, but Laos needed weapons and firepower at least equal to that of the enemy. Now, Laos suffered a disadvantage. The Pathet Lao and Vietnamese had Russian and Chinese automatic weapons, while Laos had single-shot carbines. His army knew the terrain better. That was why several spectacular victories had been won. There had been the victory by the Cadet School over the Pathet Lao and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN)—where Vietnamese soldiers were captured. There was also the victory at the village of Hua Muong, twenty-five miles north of Luang Prabang which had been recaptured. These engagements demonstrated, as he had told Ambassador Sullivan, the need for helicopters. The height of the mountains and the distance between objectives required that air transport was necessary if soldiers were to move more than a few miles on foot each day. The Vice President presumed that the Departments of State and Defense were looking into the problem. Ambassador Unger stated that they were. The Prime Minister said his National Armed Forces had only one helicopter for the North and one for the South. When Hua Muong was retaken only one helicopter transported one infantry company and cannons. The Vice President said we would be glad to look into it. The Prime Minister repeated that the Force Armee Royale (FAR) had only two helicopters. The Vice President laughed, indicating he had well understood the Prime Minister’s point. Souvanna Phouma smiled and said Laos needed ten helicopters. The Vice President said that resistance to Communist aggression was a basic part of our response in Southeast Asia. While mindful of each other’s needs, we must be sufficiently ingenious so that we all could work as a team. Laos was independent. Thailand was independent. Each needed the cooperation of the other. The U.S. wanted to help each state to cooperate with the other. In any case, we would look into the Prime Minister’s suggestion. Souvanna Phouma said that he explained to Bangkok officials his understanding that Laos needed a free Thailand. Internal trouble in Thailand acted against the interests of both countries. Laos was the first line of defense for Thailand. We should do all we can to prevent the spread of difficulty. He had explained this to Ambassador Sullivan and asked him to explain all this clearly to Thailand. Many lower level officials in Thailand still sympathize with General Phoumi and act against the interests of the two countries. The Vice President said his Government was aware of the problem and understood the Prime Minister’s concern. Souvanna Phouma said he would stop in Bangkok to achieve greater cooperation between the two countries. The Vice President said it would also help for Southeast Asian responsible leaders to state publicly upon occasion that they knew the U.S. desired peace. Our country was subjected to propaganda to undermine the confidence others had in our peaceful intentions. The Prime Minister had witnessed demonstrations here against our policy in South Vietnam. These demonstrations were meaningless as far as changing our policy was concerned. They were well organized by forces that attempt to subvert Laos and elsewhere. He had no doubt the organizing capacities of Communist Parties around the world were at work in New York and Saigon. The people know President Johnson understands strategic warfare; the President wants to keep conflict limited. Only one-tenth of our demonstrators knew what they were doing. The rest just were demonstrating because they are young. We believe in free speech and assembly. The U.S. was in South Vietnam to stay. The Vice President and the U.S. would be honored if the Prime Minister were to act as our spokesman of our peaceful intentions. The Prime Minister knew the position of the United States. He appreciated its intentions. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by George Carroll. 2 On October 14 Read sent Humphrey a memorandum recommending that he see Souvanna during his visit to Washington, October 18–22. In an October 15 memorandum to John Rielly, Assistant to Humphrey, Read provided a briefing memorandum, a biographic sketch of Souvanna, and suggested talking points. (Both ibid., POL 7 LAOS) 3 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 696–698. 201. Memorandum of Conversation 201. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 18, 1965, 3:40 p.m. SUBJECT The Secretary’s Meeting With the Prime Minister of Laos PARTICIPANTS The Secretary H.H. Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos H.E. Sisouk na Champassak,RLG Minister of Finance H.R.H. Prince Khampan, Lao Ambassador Mr. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, Far East Affairs Mr. Jose DeSeabra, Language Services, Interpreter 1. After greeting the Prime Minister and his party, the Secretary said that he would be interested in hearing the Prime Minister’s views on the situation in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister said that he had relatively little information regarding the situation in North Viet-Nam, but it is generally believed in Laos that there are serious difficulties in North Viet-Nam which have been increased as a result of US air activities. These bombings, he said, are having an effect in Laos, since it is quite clear that very small amounts of supplies are now coming into Laos for the Pathet Lao from North Viet-Nam. In particular, the bombing of roads leading into Laos made it extremely difficult, in the Prime Minister’s opinion, for the North Vietnamese to send men and supplies into Laos. He admitted, of course, that it is impossible to say what might happen when one was dealing with the North Vietnamese. 2. The Secretary asked what Pathet Lao intentions might be for the future. He believed that the Pathet Lao could not fail to see that, with the US commitment in Southeast Asia and the deployment of US forces there, a dark road was ahead for them if they were to try to achieve their objectives. The Secretary wondered whether the Pathet Lao leaders might not come around to the realization that the time had come to stop their aggressive activities. The Prime Minister replied that the Pathet Lao were the prisoners of Hanoi in the same manner that North Viet-Nam was a prisoner of Peiping. Hanoi could do nothing against Peiping’s will, although it might realize that as a result increased suffering was being inflicted on the population. He commented that Peiping would fight to the last North Vietnamese just as North Viet-Nam would fight to the last Pathet Lao. Until a solution was found to the Viet-Nam problem, Hanoi would not allow the Pathet Lao to return to the national community, since such a return would mean government control of Pathet Lao-held areas, thus preventing infiltration through Laos from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. 3. In response to the Secretary’s question, the Prime Minister said that there had never been good faith on the part of Hanoi or Peiping during the Geneva conference or subsequently. Only a few technicians were withdrawn from Laos following the conclusion of the 1962 Agreements, and North Vietnamese troops have remained in force in Laos since that time. As proof of this, the Prime Minister showed interrogation reports of North Vietnamese prisoners who have been captured in Laos during the past year. Although the Communist ICC members (i.e. the Poles) were fully aware of the illegal presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos, they would not admit it officially. 4. The Secretary then asked the Prime Minister whether he anticipated any changes in Laos in the next several months and whether developments in Laos depended solely on the situation in Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister replied that, although the situation in Laos was largely affected by developments in Viet-Nam, at the same time there had been improvement in the military situation over the past ten months. 5. The Prime Minister said that for the past four months, the Lao Government was making efforts to move the population out of the areas in south Laos where the Lao Air Force was bombing North Vietnamese infiltration activities and facilities. Aside from humanitarian considerations, this program was part of the government’s strategy to turn the area in which the North Vietnamese were moving into a desert so that they could not rely on the local population for food and transportation. He also mentioned that Lao guerrilla groups were operating behind enemy lines to interdict Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese movements. 6. The Secretary pointed out that an important aspect of US foreign policy that was not always understood abroad was that the United States had no ambition to impose its presence or seek advantages in other countries. On the other hand, people should know that Peiping wants to dominate their countries and advocates a doctrine of world revolution. The Prime Minister responded that he fully realized the danger which Pei-ping constituted for Laos. At the same time, however, Laos was fated, because of its geographic proximity, to have to live with the Chinese. 7. The Secretary expressed the bitter disappointment of the United States that the 1962 Agreements had not succeeded. At the time, President Kennedy had hoped that all countries would get out and leave Laos alone. This was to be a very important first step towards peace in Southeast Asia. However, Hanoi had not lived up to its commitment and continued to interfere in Laos, including its infiltration into South Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister said that the failure of the Agreements had also been a source of disappointment for Laos. He had gone to Hanoi and Peiping in early 1964 in an effort to find a solution. Peiping told him to talk to the leaders in Hanoi. In his talks with Tran Van Do, Ho Chi Minh and Giap, he was told that North Viet-Nam would not leave Laos as long as the South Vietnamese problem was not settled. Following this trip and the events of the April 19 coup, the Pathet Lao Ministers, claiming that their safety was in danger, left for the Plain of Jars. 8. In response to the Secretary’s query about General Phoumi, the Prime Minister mentioned recent talks with Thai Government officials in Bangkok in which he had underscored the importance of political tranquility in Laos so that necessary efforts could be concentrated on facing the enemies from the east. He said that Phoumi continued to be active against the interests of both Thailand and Laos and he had told Marshal Thanom that since Laos was the first line of Thailand’s defense, the Thai Government should do everything in its power to curb the activities of those elements in Thailand which sympathized with Phoumi. He planned to discuss this matter with the Thai again on his return and said that he had mentioned this matter to the Vice President during their meeting. The Secretary commented that we had had a good response from the Thai officials on the question of General Phoumi from which we were encouraged. 9. Turning to the subject of US aid to Laos, the Prime Minister said there was a urgent need for increased US economic and military aid and he had discussed this with Ambassador Sullivan and, earlier in the day, with the Vice President. He pointed out that Laos was experiencing some difficulties as a result of recent changes in the United States import program (USIP). He said it was vital that at least certain items relating to construction projects be reinstated in the program, particularly since construction activities were underway. He stated that it was important that US economic aid be maintained at the same level as last year and that support for the armed forces be increased. He specifically mentioned the fact that, although our military assistance was based on a Lao force level of 50,000 men, the Lao budget was supporting a force level of about 75,000 and that the US should, therefore, raise its support to the level of the actual strength of the Lao armed forces. The Prime Minister also referred, as he had to the Vice President, to the pressing need for more automatic weapons and ten helicopters. (On October 19, during the military briefing which was given to the Vice President by the Department of Defense, the Prime Minister referred to a need for ten to fifteen helicopters in talking with Mr. McNaughton.) Helicopters, he said, were badly needed for the movement of troops and equipment in areas where there were no roads and the Lao at present only had two helicopters. 10. The Secretary commented on the situation in Indonesia and said he felt that Prince Sihanouk could not fail to realize that Peiping had received a serious setback there with a resulting reduction of its influence in Southeast Asia. Prince Sihanouk also knew, as a result of US efforts in Viet-Nam, that Peiping would not be permitted to overrun Southeast Asia. Since Prince Sihanouk might not want to be on the wrong side in Southeast Asia, the Secretary wondered why he did not become a genuine neutralist. The Prince Minister agreed that it was extremely difficult to try to analyze Prince Sihanouk’s motives. He said that Lao relations with Cambodia were rather bad. The Prime Minister then went over some of the developments in this respect. He said Prince Sihanouk had thrown himself into the arms of Peiping in order to maintain the integrity of his country. However, in the face of the demonstration of US determination to resist Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia, Prince Sihanouk might realize that he had been wrong in betting on Chinese victory and non-intervention by the United States. The Prime Minister said he felt that any change of mind on the part of Prince Sihanouk would bring about a loss of prestige for him and that this prestige had already been badly shaken by the recent Soviet refusal to receive him. Another factor, however, which might make him change his mind would be the development of internal pressures, should they occur, as a result of a deterioration in the economic situation in Cambodia. 11. Commenting briefly on Indonesia, which he had visited last Spring, the Prime Minister said that, in his view, the Indonesian army disliked the Communists and was rather western-oriented, mainly because of the large number of officers who had been trained in the United States. 12. The Secretary expressed the appreciation of the United States for Laotian support to the total effort in Southeast Asia. He said that the voice of the Prime Minister was helpful in the present situation, even though our two countries could not consider ourselves as allies, since Laos was neutral. Nevertheless, under the present difficult circumstances, our two countries could have a common attitude with regard to Hanoi. The Prime Minister commented that in the light of information he had, North Viet-Nam could not hold out much longer. He said that unless there was increased pressure on the US by Moscow, Hanoi might be willing to accept proposals for negotiations in about four to five months. The Secretary replied that the US was under no pressure from Moscow, although he felt the Soviets were interested in a conference on Viet-Nam. With respect to Laos, the Prime Minister said that the Soviet Foreign Minister had told him that there was no change in Moscow’s position with regard to Laos, its neutrality or its Prime Minister. Mr. Gromyko had also said he continued to believe in the need for strict compliance with the Geneva Agreements. The Secretary commented that in our discussions with the Soviets, we always made it clear that an agreement existed between Washington and Moscow, at the highest level, guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos. The Secretary added that the Soviet attitude toward Laos was a factor of paramount importance in relations with the United States. At the meeting in Vienna between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, Khrushchev said “we agree on Laos” and this was something that the United States would not let the Soviets forget. 13. In conclusion, the Secretary commented that the United States had accepted Moscow’s candidate for the post of Lao Prime Minister and we had never regretted doing so. The Prime Minister stated that Moscow had no influence on Hanoi which was under Peiping domination. However, continued military action by the US might pull Hanoi away from Peiping. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS-US. Secret. Drafted by Jose DeSeabra of Language Services and Barbis and cleared in Rusk’s office on October 26.The time of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book. Rusk’s next appointment was at 4:56 p.m. (Johnson Library) 2 In a supplementary memorandum of conversation, October 18, drafted separately because it was classified Secret-Limdis, Souvanna stated that he was pleased that all U.S. aid to the Meo (Hmong) was now going through his government. He requested that U.S. assistance to other tribal groups in Laos also go through the Royal Lao Government. Souvanna remarked that relations with Vang Pao were excellent. As for his request for additional helicopters, Souvanna stated that, if necessary, Thai crews could operate them. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS) 202. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 202. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, November 3, 1965. SUBJECT Statement on Increased Aid to Laos During the absence of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Finance Minister Sisouk from Laos, the Souvanna Government and Sisouk personally have been damaged by political attacks based on a recent change in the pattern in U.S. non-project support which opponents have charged represents a reduction in total U.S. economic aid. The Finance Minister is our principal contact on foreign aid matters, upon whose collaboration we are heavily dependent. He is one of the most important political leaders in Laos today and Souvanna’s main lieutenant. Ambassador Sullivan considers it important that when Sisouk returns to Laos in the next day or so, he should be authorized to make the following public statement: 1. The USG had advised him that the total of U.S. aid to the economy of Laos will not be cut as has been charged, but will be increased in FY 1966. 2. Even in the non-project area, which is the area of attack, aid to the Lao economy will be larger than in FY 1965. 3. Furthermore, U.S. developmental aid to speed Lao progress and raise living standards is being substantially increased, with major expansions being planned in education, agriculture and rural development. Such a statement, which would not contain specific amounts, would only confirm publicly what we have for some time planned to do and what we have privately indicated to the Lao Government. The non-project increase results from the acceptance by all aid donors of major military and civil service wage increases and our advocacy of expanded military and civil operations by the Lao Government. The project aid increases were implicitly promised by President Johnson in his April 7 and subsequent speeches on Southeast Asia development and in our testimony in support of the $89 million supplemental request to Congress for Southeast Asia. The three fields specified are those in which the President has expressed strong interest and in which concrete plans for expansions are well advanced but not yet announced. In order to maintain direct security operations, contribute to economic stabilization and provide for a major developmental effort, the AID program in Laos will be $7–$10 million larger than originally planned in FY 1966. These additional funds will not be available until AID appropriations are replenished for this and other reasons in January. I believe the statement we propose to authorize the Finance Minister to make is not a new commitment in the narrow sense but rather the confirmation of previously implied U.S. decisions in an ongoing operation. However, I would appreciate your confirmation so that we may proceed with giving Ambassador Sullivan the authorization he urgently requests. David E. Bell 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. Confidential. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 1 Vientiane, November 8, 1965, 0600Z. 080600Z. Ref Embtel 051045Z. 2 1. RLAF General Ma came to Vientiane Sunday afternoon to meet with Air Attaché and me concerning operations in Panhandle. As result of meeting, I believe we have basis for satisfactory cooperative U.S.-RLG air effort against infiltration routes. However, in order implement fully, we will need hold trilateral Vientiane-RLG-Saigon reps meeting which I have proposed in other messages. 2. Substance of our preliminary understandings is that U.S. aircraft will be able, subject to detailed arrangements to be worked out in aforesaid trilateral meetings: A. Fly night armed recce over currently restricted Steel Tiger routes south of Route 9; B. Share daytime recce over same route structure with RLAF on basis system to be worked out at meeting; C. Share low-level, eyeball recce and FAC functions with RLAF in 0–1 type aircraft. For this purpose General Ma would like to accept MACV’s previous offer of ten 0–1 type aircraft; D. Use Bango missions against any targets developed by actions cited above. 3. We also skirted into question of operations in Shining Brass area, but in absence MACV concurrence, I was unable reveal to him fact that we were currently penetrating Lao territory in this area. General Ma was somewhat cautious in reacting to this (perhaps because he knew I wasn’t leveling with him). He indicated his intention fly certain missions in that general area himself. Therefore, unless we get this straightened out soon, run risk of having some entanglement there. This needs personal attention of Generals Westmoreland and Dupuy. 4. General Ma also said he wished move his T–28 operational and staging base closer to trail complex. For this purpose he needed some improvements to Saravane Airfield over and above that work which we currently have in progress there. This would not be costly, but might involve a bureaucratic funding problem. I will look into it, but may end up asking PACAF to divert certain service funds for this worthy cause. I suspect it will be less than $100,000. You will note that he ran 45 T–28 sorties November 6 on Route 92 and estimates 200, mostly road workers, KIA as result his strikes. These were staged from Pakse. He says he could double sorties if he staged from Saravane. 5. Finally, he offered help with some air infiltration of native agents whom he had recruited into territory along Route 92. He required supplies and communications support for this effort. I will work out something on this with CAS. 6. In general, I think we have progress here and will need your closest cooperation bring this into being. Please remember that the secret word is “collaboration”. If Ma thinks we’re trying to take over his territory, he freezes. If he’s permitted to play first string on the first team, he’s all American. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 466, which is the source text, and to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, DOD, and JCS. 2 In telegram 051045Z to COMUSMACV, November 5, repeated to the Department of State as telegram 462, Sullivan reported that he shared Westmoreland’s view that the North Vietnamese were increasing their infiltration in South Vietnam through the Laos Panhandle. Sullivan agreed that, after proper liaison, there should be a stepped up program of attacks on the infiltration routes. (Ibid.) 204. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 204. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 1 Washington, November 18, 1965. SUBJECT U.S. Air Operations in Laos 1. Recent U.S. aerial photography has revealed Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese road construction and improvement activities along the eastern part of southern Laos where infiltration routes into South Viet Nam are located. Photography has specifically detected the construction of an alternate route—Route 911—east of Route 23, south of Route 12 and north of Tchepone. In addition, photography has revealed the use of trellises to camouflage portions of this road, which is also covered by heavy foliage. (Map attached.) 2 2. When Ambassador Sullivan briefed Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on the above on November 14, 3 he also showed the Prime Minister photographs of the trellissed road. Upon seeing these photographs the Prime Minister recommended that defoliants be used to open it to air observations and attack. 3. In view of the Prime Minister’s recommendation, the Department of Defense has proposed a joint State/Defense message to CINCPAC noting the Prime Minister’s interest in intensified air operations against the infiltration routes in southern Laos and specifically concurring in the Prime Minister’s recommendation regarding the use of defoliants. 4. We recommend that the Department concur in this proposed message. 4 Before doing so, however, I wish to bring the matter to your attention since this would be the first use in our air operations in Laos of defoliants. Pathet Lao propaganda has in the past accused the United States of using defoliants, toxic chemicals and napalm in its air operations in Laos. We can expect that the actual use of defoliants will lead to a concerted Pathet Lao propaganda campaign to highlight this development, which will be supported by Hanoi and Peiping, as evidence of increased active US intervention and escalation in Laos. 5. As you know, because of Lao sensitivities and our own considerations with respect to the 1962 Geneva Agreements, we do not acknowledge or otherwise comment on our air activities in Laos beyond acknowledging that at the request of the RLG we have been conducting air reconnaissance in Laos since May 1964, in the face of continued Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attacks against the Lao government and in view of the inability of the International Control Commission to carry out its responsibilities because of Pathet Lao refusal to permit the Commission to do so. In the event of future questions or charges regarding the use of defoliants, we would plan to take the same line (i.e. not to acknowledge or otherwise comment on the matter). Recommendation: 5 That, unless you perceive objection, the Department concur in the proposed Department of Defense message authorizing the use of defoliants. 1 Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret. Drafted by Barbis and cleared by Unger. 2 Not found. 3 As reported in telegram 487 from Vientiane, November 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 532 from Vientiane, November 22, Sullivan requested authorization for COMUSMACV to use defoliants. (Ibid., POL 27–10 LAOS) 4 Sent as telegram 330 to Vientiane, November 24. (Ibid.) 5 Ball approved this recommendation on November 22. 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, November 23, 1965. 535. 1. You should be aware that I am under considerable pressure from Souvanna to concur in actions which it seems to me will escalate U.S. operations on Laos to a point where we risk exposure to international political criticism. So far, we have been able to avoid excessive publicity and a major hassle, especially with Soviets, by judiciously selecting our operations and handling them with maximum discretion. 2. The recent trend of events, including large-scale U.S. commitments to Vietnam and Viet Minh attacks on Thakhet area, has apparently moved our usually phlegmatic Prime Minister into a state of somewhat more reckless endeavor. The joker in his attitude, however, is that no matter how far we expose ourselves, he insists that we still maintain our position of flatly denying that anything is happening. In short, he has asked me to behave just like the DRV Ambassador and deny it all. In the course of service to my country, I have become a fairly practiced dissimulator, but I am not sure my talents in this direction extend quite so far as Souvanna’s desires. 3. The latest, most insistent plea, is for use of napalm by both U.S. and Lao forces in country. I have stalled him regularly on this, and in latest Thakhet operations have provided white phosphorus, which, in my own layman’s opinion, is better for flushing out caves anyway. However, my own military, and particularly the Air Force pilots who have to risk their necks daily over Laos, fervently endorse Souvanna’s pleas. Souvanna has yesterday specifically asked me to get a ruling from Washington on this subject. I don’t now whether this reflects the possibility that someone in Washington encouraged him on this score, or whether he is merely hoping for a better ruling there. 4. I can continue to take the heat in the local kitchen if that is the preferred course. However, if Washington wishes to accede to Souvanna, please let me know urgently. In any event, I would feel more content if I could have a fairly detailed indication of your current thinking on ground rules for napalm here. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Nodis; No Distribution Outside Department. There was no time of dispatch on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 4:42 a.m. 206. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs (Barbis) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 206. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs (Barbis) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 1 Washington, November 23, 1965. SUBJECT Laos—Use of Napalm The following is submitted in response to your request: 1. Present Guidance —You will recall that the question of possible use of napalm first came up in June 1964 in connection with Phou Kout. The basic decision on the use of napalm in Laos, which is still in effect, is contained in Deptel 1269 of June 29, 1964, Exdis. 2 This joint State/Defense message granted authority for the use of napalm in Laos by T–28’s whenever Prime Minister Souvanna, with the Ambassador’s consent, desired its use on military targets. You were cautioned in this message to stress to Souvanna the necessity of avoiding attacks with napalm even on military targets which are in close proximity to areas inhabited by civilians. 2. You may also recall that this authority was never implemented because of British concern over this proposed use of napalm in support of the operations against Phou Kout. The British concern was based at the time on the possible effect this action would have on the Polish proposal for limited discussions on Laos. In informing Vientiane of these British views and our decision not to use napalm at that time at Phou Kout, we qualified the basic authority given in Deptel 1269 to prohibit the use of napalm without the prior authority of Washington, except in a situation which the Ambassador considered to be an emergency or a situation in which particular offensive or defensive military action already undertaken would otherwise fail. Souvanna’s concurrence, of course, continued to be required. 3. Comments —Ambassador Sullivan in his telegram 3 has put his finger on the main arguments for continuing our policy not to use napalm in Laos, except what the RLAF can do under specific conditions described under 2 above. These arguments are, of course, first, the question of escalation and international reaction to it and, second, whether it would be possible to hold the line publicly, as Souvanna insists, on any comment as a result of pressures for information on the subject. It seems to me that Ambassador Sullivan should be able to take the heat in the local kitchen much more easily than he or we would be in a position to take the heat from press queries and pressures, not to speak of our allies and the Soviets. Despite all that we have done or are doing in Laos, because of our restraint and the judicious application of necessary actions to preserve the independence of Laos and hurt North Vietnamese infiltration through Laos as much as we can, we are nevertheless still in fairly strong international position. I have the fear that with the intensification of our air operations and with the authorization to use defoliants as two examples, to go this one step further and to authorize the use of napalm by both US and RLAF aircraft will very soon put us on the road to destroying the good position we and the RLG are in. Moreover, it does not seem to me that the level of PL activity is such that the use of napalm is critical (e.g., white phosphorus seems to be meeting immediate tactical requirements adequately). The use of napalm in US air operations against infiltration also seems to me to be unnecessary at this stage and would bring with it, should it be authorized, a whole series of problems resulting from possible mistakes in hitting the right target and the like (e.g., can you imagine what the reaction would have been had napalm been used against the FAR trucks west of Muong Phalane, or in the mistake made in hitting BV–33?). 4. I hope we can continue to exercise the restraint which has really been our strength in Laos in dealing with Souvanna’s pressures for the use of napalm. 4 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27–10 LAOS) 3 Document 205 . 4 In telegram 329 to Vientiane, November 24, the Department of State informed Sullivan that it would continue to adhere to the present guidance on the use of napalm in Laos: napalm should be used by RLAF against military targets only with expressed authority from Washington, except in a situation Sullivan considered an emergency or a situation in which a particular military offensive or defensive action already undertaken would fail without the use of it. In all such cases, Souvanna would have to concur. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 207. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 207. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, November 29, 1965, 1112Z. 580. 1. I detect a recent tendency on part of press to zero in more closely than usual upon possibility of U.S. air and ground operations in Laos. This is a natural consequence of reports which indicate increased DRV infiltration through Laos. 2. It is disturbing, however, to note that responses to press inquiries by senior officials are beginning to skirt away from our policy of persistent prevarication and are running ever closer to the awful truth. I recognize that, to the cognoscenti, such carefully worded statements as those of Alex Johnson and Secretary McNamara are cleverly constructed to avoid outright lies but also to avoid open admission of our operations. Unfortunately most readers miss the nuances and there is a natural tendency to conclude that we are admitting U.S. operations in Laos. 3. British Ambassador, in capacity as co-chairman’s representative, is becoming most sensitive to recent press stories, especially because Soviets are trying to get British to subscribe to condemnation of U.S. actions. Brits will stoutly deny they are taking place; but will be hard put to it if some official U.S. spokesman slips over the line and admits what we are doing here. 4. Therefore, I would urge once again that all responsible officials be cautioned to be wary of press probing on U.S. operations in Laos and that all consciences be collectively steeled against the continuing need to dissemble. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon, London, Moscow, and CINCPAC. 208. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 208. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, December 3, 1965. SUBJECT Escalation of US Activities in Laos—Some Observations on a Developing Situation 1. The intensification of military activity in South Viet-Nam and the evidence of the presence there of up to seven regiments of PAVN forces has sharply heightened interest in the passage of North Vietnamese men and supplies through Laos. Although it still remains fundamentally true that the fight has to be won in South Viet-Nam, there is a growing feeling that the support which arrives via Laos can no longer be tolerated to the extent that it was in a period when our involvement in South Viet-Nam was not so deep. 2. Over recent months our efforts to interdict this traffic, both with the Lao and with the South Vietnamese, have considerably expanded. We are now carrying out the reconnaissance, intelligence and interdiction programs like Yankee Team, Steel Tiger, Shining Brass and the Hard Nose and Kha intelligence operations in the panhandle at an increasing tempo. There is in prospect further expansion of these activities, for example, an increase in Steel Tiger sorties from 3000 to 4500 per month. It is hoped also that Hard Nose and Kha operations may move into harassment. These activities, except for Yankee Team, remain covert and unacknowledged. Although the air activity is rather widely known to be taking place, we have abided by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s stricture to refrain from any public acknowledgment of these activities. 3. Quite recently there has been a tendency to speak more openly about the problem of the corridor and, because of our deepening Viet-Nam involvement, speakers have been impelled to approach closely to a revelation of what we are doing. It may be that Souvanna Phouma, who appears to be increasingly ready to charge the North Vietnamese publicly with what they are doing in the Lao panhandle, may in due course be persuaded by us to let the world know the actions we and the Lao are taking. If so, this can be justified both as collective self-defense and as a response to long-standing and repeated violations of the Geneva Accords by North Viet-Nam. Unless Souvanna modifies his position, however, it is essential that we honor our commitment to him, lest we suffer a set-back in an ever-broadening cooperation which it is very much in our interest to nurture. Ambassador Sullivan’s most recent conversation with Souvanna 2 would appear to bear out Souvanna’s increasing readiness to face the facts squarely and it suggests that we may be able to move more rapidly along the lines of para 2 above than we had anticipated. 4. The infiltration problem has also occasioned a restudy of the various proposals to draw a cordon sanitaire across the middle of Laos, roughly along Route 9, as a means of sealing off the panhandle route. (This is of course different from the spoiling thrust westward by GVN forces mentioned to Sullivan by Souvanna.) This sealing-off project, which would require the overt introduction of foreign forces in violation of the Geneva Accords, might serve to seal off the Ho Chi Minh Trail, although this remains a moot question from a military point of view. Nevertheless it might relieve some of the heavy military pressure in South Viet-Nam, even though leaving a substantial guerrilla and insurgency problem still to be solved. However, we would inevitably be trading that gain for the outbreak of a new war in Laos of a type at least as intense as the war we were unwilling to fight in 1961. Can we not assume that North Viet-Nam would throw itself into that fight at least as hard as the one in the south, considering its long frontier with Laos and commitment to the Pathet Lao as well as its apparent determination to keep open an avenue to the south? It seems likely also that Communist China would feel more threatened than at present and might feel the scales tipped in favor of intervention, and there is no doubt that many nations, notably the USSR, and including some of our friends as well, would feel obliged to reach most adversely to our open violation of an instrument they are party to. 5. If we reach a decision that the support from North Viet-Nam to the south must at any cost be cut off, I suggest that we give consideration also to the alternative of moving into the southern area of North Viet-Nam up to approximately the 20th parallel (or if necessary up to the Nape Pass as well) to cut off infiltration at the source. Such a move obviously has the gravest implications such as the likelihood of Chinese direct intervention, but I believe we should not minimize the possibility of an equally strong Chinese reaction to our taking overt, large-scale action in Laos to seal off the panhandle. 6. May I note in passing that current attention being given to the panhandle problem threatens to revive some loose thinking and talk which, if reported publicly, could do us incalculable damage. I have in mind references to the possibility of our supporting Thailand in an absorption of Laos or partition of the country between Thailand and South Viet-Nam. Leaving aside the likelihood that an annexation by Thailand in the context of the situation today would, in my opinion, cure none of the military problems which Laos presents, we could also count on a violent reaction by Communist China to any such move. We would also see the disaffection of nine-tenths of those friends of ours in Laos who have over recent years been prepared to cooperate with us quite extensively on matters of common interest. 7. Our tentative view is that our military and intelligence programs in Laos should be expanded as far as necessary and feasible to meet the infiltration problem, remaining covert, however, except where Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma agrees to public acknowledgment; and that a massive, overt military intervention with the goal of sealing off the panhandle should not be undertaken. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Top Secret, Drafted by Unger. Rusk’s initials appear on the source text. Copies were sent to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Ewing and Barbis of SEA, Miller of FE/VN, and Sullivan in Vientiane. 2 Not further identified. 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, December 4, 1965, 0417Z. 610. Embtel 605. 2 1. This morning before his departure Ambassador Sullivan told me he had had opportunity inform Souvanna yesterday evening of his meeting December 3 with Generals Westmoreland and Moore (see reftel) and of increasing US concern over infiltration men and supplies through Panhandle. 2. Souvanna told Ambassador US should employ whatever resources necessary to counter infiltration but should in no event publicly admit conduct of operations in Laos. We regard this as further striking confirmation of PriMin’s willingness play ball with us provided we can continue to avoid publicity concerning operations in Laos. Latter is indeed crucial aspect of our relations with PriMin on military questions, and we regard it as of utmost importance that we continue maintain absolute silence about what we are doing or plan to do. 3. Souvanna has approved installation of TACANs in northern and southern Laos as navigational aids to civil and military air operations those areas. Once problem of manning these has been resolved (see paras 5, 6, and 7 of reftel) we should be able to move ahead quickly with COMUSMACV and 2nd Air Div to arrange for TACAN installation. Recent serious navigational errors in Panhandle make installation of TACANs in our view both imperative and urgent, and assurances to PriMin that we shall seek avoid further strikes on friendly positions are not very meaningful unless we can foll through with concrete actions. Team from mission will proceed Saravane early next week to examine possible secure sites for TACAN in that area and also to appraise what improvements and facilities are needed to permit General Ma to operate T–28’s out of Saravane Airport. Will therefore appreciate earliest reply of manning problem. Swank 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC,COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG, DOD, and JCS. 2 In telegram 605, December 3, Sullivan reported on his meeting with Westmoreland and Moore at Udorn to discuss plans for more intensive air operations in the panhandle, including the desirability of adding additional navigational aids (TACANs) and ways to avoid mistaken air strikes against friendly positions. (Ibid.) 210. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 210. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 10, 1965. SUBJECT Communist Road Development in Laos The substantial Communist effort over the past year to expand and improve supply routes in the Laotian panhandle is now ready to show results. As the attached memorandum notes, this effort has increased the Communist capability to support an even greater level of fighting in South Vietnam, and also raises the prospect of stepped-up military activity inside Laos. Ray S. Cline Attachment Washington, December 9, 1965. Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 3097/65 SUMMARY The Communists have made a substantial effort over the past year to expand and improve their supply routes in the Laotian panhandle. This effort is clear evidence of Hanoi’s determination to backstop the Communist military campaign in South Vietnam. It increases the Communist capability to support an even greater level of fighting there. It also raises the prospect of stepped-up military activity inside Laos, which might look attractive to Hanoi as a means of distracting our attention from South Vietnam. The program, which has involved upgrading existing roads and trails and building new ones, is now ready to show results. With the re cent advent of the dry season, a road watch team positioned on Route 23, a key section of the supply network, is already reporting trucks moving south in numbers comparable to last season. The Communists should be able to do better this season. By building a number of alternates and bypasses they have also reduced the vulnerability of the supply system to interdiction by air action. COMMUNIST ROAD DEVELOPMENT IN LAOS 1. The Laotian panhandle for several years has provided Hanoi with a primary avenue for supporting the war effort in South Vietnam. The sequence of roads, rivers, trails, supply dumps, and base areas runs through parts of Laos which have been in Communist hands for some four years or even longer. 2. Over the last year, and especially in the past several months, the Communists have been hard at work building additional truckable roads which lead ultimately to the South Vietnamese border. The effort quite obviously carries a high priority tag. One measure of this is that Hanoi, despite a crying need at home, has sent mechanical earth-moving equipment to the panhandle road program—a first in this remote part of Laos. 3. The program, pushed intensively right through the summer monsoon, is now ready to show results. The North Vietnamese can now send trucks 100 miles farther south than they could before, all the way to the South Vietnam border southeast of Da Nang. They have also made the system less susceptible to outages in wet weather. 4. Moreover, by building a number of alternates and bypasses, the Communists have reduced the vulnerability of their supply system to air action. Aerial photography shows they have built an elaborate vine-covered trellis over exposed parts of at least one section of new road. Also, convoys now move almost exclusively at night. 5. A road watch team positioned on a key section of the supply network reports that southbound truck convoys began moving about a month ago, a month earlier than last year. In the past ten days an average of some 17 trucks per day have moved past this single observation point. Last year the Communists averaged the same figure over the six-month dry season. Recent evidence that the Communists are using fuel tanker trucks for the first time indicates that they intend to do better this dry season. 6. We estimate that the Communists could theoretically deliver some 300 tons per day to South Vietnam during the six-month dry season, if they used the road network to its maximum. To do so, however, the Communists will have to move seven times as many trucks on the roads as they did during the last season, a development which would in- crease their exposure to air interdiction. 7. A force of at least 8,000 Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese is ranged along the road net. Additional troops may have been transferred into this area recently. These forces, like Communist forces elsewhere in Laos, are in position to launch attacks on government positions at any time with little advance warning. At present, the prime task of these forces is to prevent Souvanna’s troops from moving eastward and interfering with the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies over the road and trail network to South Vietnam, where they are pressing the guerrilla campaign against American and South Vietnamese forces. [Here follow a map, and four photographs of bamboo trellises under construction and completed on Route 911, porters on Route 92, a river ford on Route 92, trails, motorable trails, barracks and fox holes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 211. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 211. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, December 15, 1965, 1100Z. 651. 1. I have spent most of my recent vacation worrying about the Ho Chi Minh Trail. What concerns me is the prospect that any kind of direct attack we may be able to mount against this skein of roads, paths, rivers, streams and tunnels will fail in the ultimate necessity of interdiction. Our air action currently harasses the routes and, as we perfect our techniques, will make that harassment more severe. However, we all conceded it cannot interdict. Shining Brass, even if stepped up to air borne command proportions, could at best spasmodically harass. Even the much discussed Route 9 invasion, either from Thailand or from Vietnam, or both, would do nothing more than spread a thin picket of men along horrendous terrain, and expose them in any one location to the bloodletting of concentrated enemy attacks at places and times of the enemy’s choosing. None will assure interdiction. 2. As all our intelligence indicators suggest, we must, in the near future, expect the movement of DRV regular forces, perhaps in divisional strength, down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We must also expect the current rather limited logistics operation to expand to proportions more nearly comparable with the trail’s capabilities. We should therefore be searching to achieve maximum interdiction if we are to have any hope of approaching isolation of the highlands battlefield in South Vietnam. 3. General Westmoreland has told me of his proposals re increased US forces for Vietnam. I assume these are favorably under consideration in Washington now. We must assume, as stated above, that their development will attract more DRV regulars and that the fighting will assume ever greater conventional characteristics. So long as we are unable to stem the flow through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, I wonder where we believe this constant reciprocal escalation of manpower will lead US. 4. My assumption is that Peking hopes it would lead us into two actions which would have significantly deleterious political consequences for the US. The first of these would be the bombing of population centers in North Vietnam, which would achieve very little militarily, but which would earn us all sorts of opprobrium in the Afro-Asian world and would play clearly into Peking’s racist propaganda, thus enabling them to pursue their efforts to isolate US diplomatically among non-white nations. It would also, of course, cause all sorts of trouble domestically for the administration. The second action would be the aforementioned Route 9 operation, which would also achieve much less than is desirable militarily, but which would constitute a direct provocation to the Soviets in Laos, bring Thailand irretrievably into the war and generally follow the ChiCom desire to spread the conflict geographically away from its concentration on North Vietnam, thus diffusing the issues, increasing the opportunities for confusion, and complicating our problems, both militarily and politically. 5. Before we start down these rocky roads, and while Washington is presumably considering the deployment and commitment of considerable number of troops, I would like to suggest an alternative mission for these troops. At first blush, this proposal may appear radical or even rash; but, balanced against the considerations adduced above, I am convinced it would not only be more effective but actually more conservative. My proposal is that we mount an amphibious invasion of North Vietnam in the region of Vinh and that we cut the country in two at the narrow waist which is not only the most defensible point, but where interdiction of infiltration could genuinely be achieved. 6. This is not a new or an original suggestion. I recall first being briefed on the Vinh concept by General Lemnitzer in Secretary McNamara’s office in 1962. At that time, the number of troops involved seemed all out of proportion to the problem we faced in Vietnam. Moreover, the political consequences appeared to be so formidable that no one chose even to examine the obvious military advantages seriously. Now, of course, the troop numbers are very much within the framework of our current consideration. Moreover (and this is what I believe is new) I would further submit that the political consequences of this proposal would be less drastic than that which would eventually flow from apparently less radical measures. 7. The major question, of course and as always, would be the ChiCom reaction. When I was in Hong Kong earlier this week. I threw the question hypothetically to our senior China experts at the Consulate General and got a curiously mixed measure of replies. Although more thought this would trigger ChiCom military intervention than thought otherwise, there were those who argued with much cogency that ChiCom policy would still be to fight only to the last North Vietnamese. 2 Needless to say, they will continue to study and discuss the issue. 8. To my mind, the ChiCom risk is more or less a constant, which we are obviously, no matter what our course, going to have to approach more closely in any event before we finish this business. The variables have more to do and the choices more clearly lie (it seems to me) in the realm of effectiveness of alternatives open to us and the constant efforts to pinpoint, isolate, and concentrate on the immediate source of decision in Hanoi. 9. One further element that appeals to me about the Vinh proposal is the asset we would gain for bargaining in any political settlement. We have earlier expected that, at any conference table, our bombing raids would be the political equivalent of VC terror in the South. They may yet be, but we now (for “conference” proposes) need a political equivalent of infiltration. By seizing and holding a piece of DRV territory, by emphasizing that we are doing it in order to throttle infiltration, and by making clear that we are willing to give it back when the eventual guaranteed political settlement is reached, we would have our equivalent—in spades. 10. I could go on and argue this case for several more paragraphs but feel I must have essentially made my point clear by now. Hence, I will stop here. However, I am stopping only to elicit a response. If, as I hope, others in Washington have already laid this issue out [for?]discussion, I shall rest easy. If no such discussion is underway, I would like to open it by a further, more detailed brief. Please let me have reaction soonest. 3 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 In telegram 1179 from Hong Kong, May 21, Rice reported that although his staff had mixed opinions as to the Chinese reaction to U.S. ground operations against North Vietnam or Laos to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the officers working most closely on mainland China were of the opinion that the Chinese would react militarily. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 686 from Vientiane, December 27, Sullivan complained that he had no reaction to his proposal as outlined above. Sullivan added that he believed he was not “in the picture as far as current military planning is concerned.” (Ibid.) 212. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Ewing) to the Director (Trueheart) 212. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Ewing) to the Director (Trueheart) 1 Washington, December 16, 1965. SUBJECT Checklist of Developments During Your Absence: Laos 1. U.S. Operations There has been an intensification of Steel Tiger activities. Defoliants authorized along a narrow strip of the SVN border. One B–52 strike (Duck Flight) close to the SVN border has taken place on a target developed by Shining Brass. There have been two more Shining Brass reconnaissance team penetrations (for total of 4). (I believe you have seen all the important messages on the above.) 2. Souvanna Souvanna is in more of a fighting mood than ever and has reacted strongly to the NVN involvement in the Thakhek fighting of November. He warned the DRV Charge, for example, that unless NVN troops are withdrawn others (i.e. US) may feel they can bring in troops. We had a Nodis exchange with Sullivan on the use of napalm for which Souvanna was pressing. 2 Souvanna has also talked to the SVN Ambassador (Nodis) re possible GVN military action from the east in the event the PL/NVN move against Mekong river towns. 3 3. Publicity The problem keeps getting worse and holding the “no comment” line more difficult in view of continual leaks by US and Lao sources. P is quite concerned. 4. Lao Military Operations Having blunted PL/NVN advances in the Thakhek area in November, largely as a result of T–28 close air support, the FAR is slowly re-establishing its defensive lines in the area. However, PL groups are still moving about freely south of Thakhek and there has been some activity in the Savannakhet-Seno area. The FAR General Staff is apparently pushing Souvanna for more aggressive RLG action in southern Laos where they fear a PL/NVN attempt to take Seno. Operations are also underway to improve defenses around Tha Thom. Comment: As usual some of the generals want to bite off more than they can chew. They should concentrate on clearing up PL pockets in Mekong area and improving their defenses (as they plan in the Tha Thom area) rather than moves towards Muong Phine-Tchepone, etc. 5. US Presence [ 1 paragraph (5–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified ] 6. Political Souvanna and Sisouk have had to do some work in countering criticisms and mild opposition that developed and resulted from their absences from Laos. A special Assembly session will take place in January. Originally it was intended to deal with economic problems (i.e. criticism of the RLG and US aid) but Souvanna and Sisouk have apparently succeeded in deflecting this and the special session will be concerned officially with the Phoumi case, with economic problems to be discussed quietly. 7. Economic It looks like we will have trouble raising $16 million for FEOF. We have made our demarches here to all present donors and are now working on prospective ones (NZ today, Canada and Germany next week). A wrinkle has developed over implementation of the Nam Ngum project—the Lao want to manage the project, with the IBRD only managing the funds. This, of course, is unacceptable to us and the Bank. A donors meeting is scheduled in Washington December 22. We are still short of the $26 million requirement. On the domestic economic side we are still faced with the problem of local currency requirements for our aid program, including Wapi expansion. (We have sufficient counterpart to carry us through the fiscal year but will have a problem in early FY 67.) Vientiane is still calling for approval of the Hawaii survey team-recommended model secondary school in Vientiane as a new project to announce to the Lao. We have reservations about this project here and cannot give quick approval. There is also the problem of new commitments. 8. Co-Chairmen/ICC The Co-Chairmen circulated their report to the signatories, pursuant to Article 19 of the Protocol, on November 25. If there are no replies within two months, the Co-Chairmen stated they would take this to mean the signatories agreed with the Co-Chairmen position not to recommend termination of the ICC at this stage. The PL, Hanoi, Peking and Moscow have attacked the ICC Report on the three NVN prisoners captured in 1964 (No. 35), which the British released unilaterally on December 6, as illegal, null and void. As yet, the PL, Hanoi and Peking have not addressed themselves specifically to the Co-Chairmen report although they continue to attack the Indians and Canadians who they say are playing the US imperialists’ game, etc., and do not investigate US violations (air activities) of the 1962 Agreements. 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Barbis. 2 Document 205 and footnote 4, Document 206 . 3 As reported in telegram 601 from Vientiane, December 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 213. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to Vice President Humphrey 213. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to Vice President Humphrey 1 Washington, December 21, 1965. SUBJECT Helicopters for Laos In response to your query of December 9th to Mac Bundy 2 regarding Bill Sullivan’s interest in meeting Souvanna’s request for more helicopters, here is a brief status report: During his recent Saigon trip, Secretary McNamara decided to authorize delivery to the Laos Government of a total of 10 helicopters (in addition to the 2 they already have) as rapidly as the necessary ground and air crews can be found or trained. In fact, this will mean delivery of two additional helicopters in January, with the remaining 8 to be phased over an 18-month period. CINCPAC has now proposed a specific timetable to implement McNamara’s decision. In short, Souvanna will be getting what he wants as rapidly as the Lao can operate the helicopters—which is probably somewhat less rapidly than Souvanna hopes. James C. Thomson , Jr. 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos, 4/65–1/66. Confidential. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to Secretary of Defense McNamara 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Vientiane, December 23, 1965, 0525Z. 230525Z. Reur 9191. 2 1. I wish appeal at highest levels against decision cited reftel re suspension U.S. air operations Laos. 2. Second military region, which is heart of Meo country, is experiencing heavy DRV attacks which obviously timed coincide with Meo New Year (Dec 22–25). Souvanna called me in yesterday and asked that we respond to these attacks by maximum air strikes. 3. I have undertaken obtain these strikes and have received allocation 36 sorties from Second Air Division for today’s operations in this area. Several forward positions (notably Site 58) have already fallen and we anticipate heavy enemy pressure extending over several days which could menace Nakhang (Site 36) and Tha Thom (Site 11) unless these attacks are thwarted. 4. Realize that Vietnam stand down requires appearance of no hostile activity originating from bases in Vietnam itself. However, with suspension Rolling Thunder, there ought to be assets available from Thailand and Seventh Fleet which could operate in Laos without press detection. 5. Although I don’t really see how Laos fits into VC Christmas truce package, I would be willing concur in suspension Barrel Roll-Steel Tiger normal operations. However, I can see no way in which we can justify a suspension of Bango support for RLG units which, I am sure, will continue to be under heavy DRV attack all during Christmas period. VC offer of truce obviously does not apply to Laos, where Hanoi never admits they are fighting in any event. 6. Please revise instructions soonest so that we can continue program operations as needed. 3 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Flash; handled by S/S-O as Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State as 678, which is the source text, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and JCS. 2 McNamara’s 9191 to Vientiane has not been found. The pause in bombing over Laos was in conjunction with the bombing pause over North Vietnam, to begin on December 24. See the editorial note in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 691 – 692 . 3 In telegram 415 to Vientiane, December 23, the Department of State stated that it understood the continuing need for air support for RLG units and authorized a continuation by Thai based and aircraft carrier planes. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 215. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Johnson 215. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 29, 1965. SUBJECT Village Health Program—Laos As one example of an activity that has been remarkably effective in reaching the rural population of Southeast Asia, you might be interested in some details of our Village Health Program in Laos. Through a chain of AID supported dispensaries in the rural areas, medical assistance to refugees in northern Laos, and operation of emergency facilities in newly liberated areas, we provide badly needed medical care and instruction in hygiene to a broad cross section of the Laos population. We have found that members of a family will travel more than 30 miles for medicines for a sick person; thus our help and influence reaches far out into the countryside, well beyond the areas considered secure for USAID or for the Lao Government. Some statistics may serve to define the scale of this program: —Support is given to 140 hospitals and dispensaries. —150,000 patients are served each month. —In the last fiscal year, 268 medics were trained. This is accomplished by an American staff of only 5 doctors and technicians. The facilities of Operation Brotherhood, a Philippine organization supported in Laos by AID, are used for training. The most expensive part of the project is the medicines and other commodity support, which costs $1.2 million out of the current fiscal year total of $1.6 million. The most interesting and unusual part of the project is in the hill tribe areas of Laos. Most of the medical facilities throughout the refugee areas are of primitive construction and are built of such local materials as bamboo and thatch by the local people at little cost to the U.S. and Lao Governments. Paramedical personnel to staff these facilities have been obtained by training local villagers who, in many instances, are totally illiterate. Yet medical care is given to over 250,000 refugees, and approximately 80 percent of the total war casualties in Laos are given either complete or preliminary treatment through this program. A few photos are attached. 2 David E. Bell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XV, Memos. 4/65–1/66. No classification marking. A note on the source text indicates it was sent to Johnson at his ranch in Texas on December 31. 2 Not reproduced. 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 216. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, January 3, 1966. 703. For Bundy. 1. Since I seem to sense increasing pressures on you from various quarters to do something dramatic against Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos, I think it may be useful to provide you with more detailed information concerning action already in progress so that you can help whip some of these pressures into perspective. 2. As far as aerial operations are concerned, you should know that MACV has set up a special sub/command of Second Air Division, called Tiger Hound, which specifically concerns itself with infiltration route. (I would add parenthetically that this organ was established at my suggestion.) 3. Tiger Hound has a mission and an authority which essentially permits it to devastate all eastern reaches of Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, and to intercept all traffic before it gets to south Viet Nam. This is accomplished as follows: A. We have drawn a line from Laos, Cambodian, SVN tri-border point at YB 7535 to point on Lao-SVN border approximately XD 9020. In the area east of this line, Tiger Hound operates O–1 observer and spotter aircraft with U.S. airborne FAC’s, just as they do in-country. Additionally, there is an Airborne Command Post C–130, with two RLAF officers aboard, and instantaneous communications with Savannakhet and Vientiane. B. Tiger Hound has been running from 100–200 sorties daily in this area since early December. My impression is that this is a far more intense sortie rate than any similar area in SVN or than any comparable area in DRV. There is, in short, no limitation upon ability our air power strike this region except limitations they impose upon sortie rate. C. I might add that it had been my intention augment this ability by recommending gradual extension B–52 raids to same area, but believe Air Force may have jeopardized their own future here by inability keep their prowess from the press. D. Although it will be noted that the area given to our military to strike covers the essential zone contiguous to SVN, I have not precluded possibility that zone may be somewhat further extended once operations in current area are perfected. In my judgment, they are far from perfected as yet and could stand a great deal of internal improvement on the U.S. side. Therefore, until there is evidence that our people are really doing their job well in this given area, I see no benefit to the home team in giving them more to try to digest than they already have on their plate. 4. One other problem which probably is regularly dished up to you is Shining Brass. I find the role I have to play in this exercise particularly galling. This is essentially an Eagle Scout program devised by some extremely well motivated and brave young men. However, except for Max Taylor, nobody in the U.S. military establishment has ever seemed willing to tell them that the program is not militarily worth the price. The net result is that all our military hierarchy stands aside and lets me shoot down these schemes which responsible senior military men should never permit to come to my attention. 5. This matter reached the height of absurdity last week when I was sent photos of an area which Shining Brass wished to reconnoiter in order to establish its military nature. It was clear to me from the photos that the area was military and so I validated it forthwith as an air strike target. The air strikes were carried out and secondary explosions resulted. The target will be recycled as required. 6. Imagine my surprise when I got a complaint from the Shining Brass people that I had given their target to the Air Force. This supposedly would have been their objective in any event, so I can only assume I deprived them of brownie points. 7. You will see from foregoing that, if our air program develops properly, there should also develop an incompatibility between Tiger Hound and Shining Brass. We cannot saturate an area with air attacks and still open it up for foot soldiers to patrol through. I trust, therefore, you will be able hold this one also in perspective. 8. I am meeting again with Westy January 5 on all these matters. 2 Any thoughts you may have for that meeting should reach me prior close of business January 4 Vientiane time. Don’t give up the ship. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis; Privacy Channel. No time of transmittal appears on the source text, but it was received at the Department of State at 1:29 a.m., January 3. 2 Telegram 715 from Vientiane, January 5, contains a brief summary of the meeting among Sullivan, Martin, Westmoreland, and Moore at Udorn on January 5. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) Westmoreland provides a more detailed account, noting that he “finally accused him [Sullivan] of ‘fiddling while Rome burned,’” when Sullivan refused to remove the restraining line for Tiger Hound. In addition, Sullivan insisted that expansion of the Shining Brass program required authorization from Washington. (Memorandum for the record by Westmoreland, January 11; Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History File, #3 20 Dec 65–29 Jan 66) 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 217. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, January 5, 1966, 1019Z. 713. 1. At Senator Symington’s request, I met with him privately at Udorn January 4. In order preclude possibility some aspects this conversation may be reported out of context, I feel it prudent submit this summary record of our meeting. 2. Meeting opened with Senator asking for review recent U.S. air action against infiltration routes in Laos. I showed him operational reports on last three days’ action and list of sorties scheduled for January 4. There were 274 sorties for Steel Tiger areas fragged for that day alone. 3. Senator pronounced this shocking waste of air power and said it was crime to use high-priced, high-powered jets to “beat the bushes” in southern Laos. He asked if I felt we were accomplishing interdiction by these air strikes. I said that I did not and felt that at best we were causing enemy some harassment. I pointed out that depots had been broken up into 5–10 ton storages. Troop concentrations were limited to few hundred men each and all were dispersed under the trees. There was very little that we saw moving on the roads themselves. 4. Senator then said he understood it would take three divisions of U.S. troops to try to interdict Ho Chi Minh Trail by land. He felt such troops were not available, but wondered whether I thought they should be asked for. I said I thought three division estimate was probably conservative and doubted they could develop air tight plug anyway. I went over with him nature of terrain, methods of infiltration, etc. I doubted that ground troops constituted the answer. 5. Senator then asked whether I didn’t feel air power, instead of “beating bushes”, should be used to “knock out fuel storage areas, power plants, port of Haiphong, and hit dams and levels which would flood countryside in DRV.” I suggested Senator had better examine just how many such installations existed in North Vietnam before he reached a judgment on that proposal. I recalled a prime target list we worked up for DRV in late 1963 which had less than 100 targets altogether. It was my impression greater part of these had already been hit and, although certain significant areas remained unscathed, I wondered what practical effect their destruction would have on continuing DRV ability infiltrate troops into South and maintain them in combat against U.S. forces there. 6. Our experience in Laos suggested that a fuel storage area, once destroyed, would reappear in the form of 50-gallon drums scattered under trees and in caves. It would cause DRV much more work, but would not seriously degrade their ability to get fuel. Power plants would be either replaced by small generators or else products they nourished would be provided by China and Russia. As for dams, I doubted there were many available and busting levees on the Red River would make sense only in July and August, when the river was in flood. Breaking up Port of Haiphong would be a serious blow, but it would just mean that cargo would come in by small coastal vessels transshipping out of Port Wallut and elsewhere in south China. It would, furthermore, place DRV completely in ChiCom hands by excluding Soviet shipping. I felt that aspect had to be considered. 7. In short, I doubted efficacy of “strategic bombing campaign” in DRV, and especially doubted that it would have any significant effect upon DRV infiltration into SVN. My comments obviously pained the Senator, who said that “everybody else” he had talked to on this trip agreed with him that air strikes such as he proposed would “take DRV out of the war.” I said I regretted being in such isolated minority but thought I felt more comfortable in that position than I would be joining those who stood elsewhere. 8. Senator then shifted discussion and said he understood I favored amphibious operations at Vinh. I confirmed that I had submitted recommendation for such operation and explained my reasoning for recommendation. He then asked whether I felt such an operation should be undertaken without air strikes against strategic targets he had previously described. I said that I frankly did not know; that this seemed to me a matter which military planners needed to study; and that they should recommend what preparatory or supplementary air action was required to make the invasion a success. The Senator asked whether he could then say that I did favor bombing his strategic target list in order to support “my invasion.” I reiterated my previous position about military planners, etc., and we finished our meeting on this note. 9. Comment : It might be helpful to give Senator Symington, on his return to Washington, some idea of the specific targets available for type of campaign he envisages. Since he categorically says that he does not favor “bombing DRV back to the stone age”, he presumably proposes a fairly limited campaign, with, I fear, limited results. I have the impression he intends propose this course of action in public statements and in Armed Services Committee. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson, under a covering memorandum, January 5, 5:30 p.m., in which Bundy suggested that the President might be interested in Symington’s views as expressed to Sullivan. McGeorge Bundy wrote: “It may be that we ought to talk to him [Symington] before he starts to say this sort of thing in public. He doesn’t much like being muzzled by the White House, but he has played ball with us before.” An initial on the memorandum indicates that Johnson saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVIII) 218. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 218. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, January 6, 1966. 721. 1. Shining Brass operations in authorized areas of Laos Panhandle along SVN border have been targeted against “hard” objectives, which consist largely of DRV storage depots, logistics points, and troop concentration areas. With development of Tiger Hound, these objectives are coming more and more under U.S. air attacks. MACV has therefore considered that Shining Brass ought to be withdrawn from operations against these objectives, and moved instead against relatively “soft” targets. 2. These “soft” targets have been defined to me as way stations; porterage areas, etc., which are less likely to be heavily defended strong points. Rather than having Shining Brass ferret these out for air strikes, MACV would propose that these be made subject of harassment attacks by “exploitation forces”, which would be larger in size and more extensive in operations than current 9 to 18 man intelligence probes. 3. Moreover, teams would be given task of operating in far more extensive area than currently permitted. This area would, in MACV’s proposal, coincide with controlled strike zone now utilized for Tiger Hound air strikes. They would be introduced and extricated by helicopter. They would be made up largely of Nung tribesmen encadred by U.S. special forces. 4. In short, MACV suggestion would shift Shining Brass from its original scouting and intelligence mission against targets susceptible to air strike and would fashion it into harassment mission against more fleeting or less tangible objectives. This proposal has been put forward by MACV through military channels for planning purposes and has been put to me informally to obtain political judgment. 2 5. Department will appreciate, as consequence Souvanna’s recent statements to me that he could not take the international heat which would accompany entry U.S. ground forces into Laos, that I could not raise this proposition with him. He has, in effect, told me in advance that the answer would be no. Therefore, chances of getting this approved by him are in my opinion absolutely zero. 6. If need for operation is felt so compelling that it should be undertaken without Souvanna’s consent (and in the light of his known objections) it would have to be done without consultation and we would have to take the risks of those consequences which would flow from possibilities of it becoming public knowledge either through enemy capturing some of our American forces (there would be probably 30 or 40 Americans with each 540 man exploitation force) or through indiscretions by friendly elements. 7. Viewed purely from subjective perspective, one immediate consequence would be loss of my own credibility vis-à-vis Souvanna. I have taken great care since I have been here to check out all our actions with him and have never authorized anything which he has specifically disapproved. I don’t know what the consequences would entail if we ignored him in this matter but would predict that it would make it more difficult for me to obtain his concurrence in other programs of perhaps greater significance than this one. 8. Ultimate judgment on these matters had perhaps better be made by persons who will be more objective than those of us either in Vientiane or Saigon. Balance of advantages and disadvantages can probably best be seen from Washington. Would therefore appreciate Washington guidance. 3 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. No transmittal time appears on the source text, which was received at the Department of State at 6:37 a.m., January 6. 2 The proposal was formally submitted by Westmoreland in telegram COMUSMACV, 707 DTG 080105Z, January 8. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 465 to Vientiane, January 13, the Department agreed with Sullivan’s analysis and did not believe he had overstated the negative factors. The Department noted that MACV proposed a gradual expansion of Shining Brass teams and stated that it preferred to take a position on the matter after hearing the views of JCS and DOD. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, January 13, 1966, 1225Z. 752. 1. Harriman spent one hour and quarter in restricted conversation with Souvanna this morning and two and one half hours of more casual luncheon talk. Present at first meeting were Secretary General Lao FonOff, Cabinet Secretary, Fred Flott (from Saigon) as interpreter, and myself. Present at lunch were Minister Finance, three top generals of armed forces and members of U.S. mission. Lao luncheon guests were obviously chosen to demonstrate unity of armed forces with Souvanna-led government. 2. In restricted session, Harriman gave Souvanna general summary of visits which he and other Presidential emmissaries have made during current “peace offensive” 2 and provided him with an indication of reactions which visits had elicited from various governments and personalities. He emphasized fact that, while President was sincere in his quest for peace, this was not an effort to “save face” or abandon our commitments to Vietnam. To underline these facts, he cited President’s remarks on Vietnam in today’s State of Union address. 3 3. Souvanna thanked Harriman for his exposition. He agreed with need for continuing pressure on Hanoi for negotiations. He expressed view, however, that Chinese influence was still very strong in Hanoi and that Chinese would do all in their power to frustrate political settlement. He felt ChiComs must be faced squarely at this time and be stopped before they develop an effective nuclear force. He discussed subversive ChiCom activity in Thailand, Burma and Cambodia, as well as Laos. 4. Souvanna then went on to say that he had just had a surprise visit from Jerzy Michalowski, Secretary General of the Polish FonOff. Latter was in transit through Laos on his way to Hanoi (our subsequent checks with ICC manifests show that Michalowski had just come from Hanoi and was en route to Bangkok). He had made courtesy call and had discussed Vietnam and Laos. 5. Michalowski made two major points: (1) North Vietnamese considered U.S. “peace offensive” was really an ultimatum. U.S. was, in effect, saying that DRV must accept U.S. position or be subject to new and more severe punishment; (2) it would be “useful” for the United States to “accept the principle of DRV four points”, 4 as a means of opening discussions. Their substance could be thrashed out later. (Although we attempted clarification of this rather vague formulation, Souvanna was unable provide any further precision.) 6. Souvanna said he told Michalowski that Poles had placed things backwards. If DRV wanted a détente, they should show their intentions by action now. They must withdraw their forces from Laos and they must cease violating Laotian territory by sending forces down Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam. 7. Michalowski had replied that Warsaw and Moscow both believed U.S. was preparing to launch an offensive against DRV by sending troops from Thailand across Laos. Souvanna had replied that, if DRV continued give U.S. pretext by maintaining forces in Laos, there was grave danger this would happen. He therefore considered it all the more reason DRV should withdraw its troops, in order eliminate this pretext. 8. Harriman expressed interest in Michalowski visit and in his conversation with Souvanna. He recalled that Rapacki had agreed make contact with Hanoi and had said that it might require “unusual means to reach them.” Perhaps Michalowski was the messenger. Harriman then discussed at some length U.S. position re “four points” and our willingness talk about them with DRV; but said we could not accept “the principle” of the four points if that meant, for example, agreeing to the idea that the Liberation Front was the dominant authority in South Vietnam. He asked Souvanna if latter thought Liberation Front had any popular base. 9. Souvanna said that Liberation Front held its grip on people by “authority of fear”. He said they had demonstrated they were not afraid of killing people to enforce their control. The same occurs in Laos, but the falsity of Communist claims is demonstrated by steady flow of refugees out of Pathet Lao-held territory. 10. Harriman asked whether Souvanna had any points he would like former carry back to Washington. Souvanna said there was one matter he had raised with me which was continuing to give him great trouble. This was crescendo of newspaper speculation about U.S. intentions send troops into Laos. Although he personally had accepted my interpretation and explanation Secretary McNamara’s remarks in Saigon (when Secretary spoke of action against infiltration), there was great deal of public speculation that we were preparing invade Laos. He pointed to Michalowski’s statement to indicate type of trouble this caused. Many people even assumed that presence U.S. troops in Laos was a given fact. 11. Souvanna then cited recent newspaper story (St. Louis Post-Dispatch) that there were Thai forces marching into Laos. He complained that U.S. Spokesman (Department of State), instead of issuing vigorous denial, had made “very weak” reply. This only augmented the speculation. 12. Souvanna asked whether Washington could make a flat and unequivocal statement which would scotch all these rumors. He also asked if he could quote Harriman as denying the story about Laos troops and the Polish allegation about sending U.S. troops across Laos to attack DRV. Harriman pointed out problems inherent in our undertaking speak for Thai but agreed we could work out something about denying plan to attack DRV across Laos. (We subsequently worked out some phraseology which supports independence and neutrality of Laos and denies intent send U.S. troops across Laos to attack North Vietnam. It will be issued on sole responsibility of RLG stating that these assurances emerged from conversation. We will send exact text when issued—pre-sumably tomorrow.) 13. Conversation then turned to other matters, of which more important will be reported septels outside Pinta series. 14. Harriman returned Bangkok 1615 local. Memcon follows by pouch. 5 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis/Pinta. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Moscow, and Warsaw. Passed to the White House. 2 Harriman was in Vientiane on January 12 for talks with Souvanna on ending the Vietnam war. He was one of the U.S. envoys in the “Peace Offensive” initiated by President Johnson in conjunction with the suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam. Harriman visited Warsaw on December 29, 1965, for discussions with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki; Yugoslavia on January 1, 1966, for discussions with President Tito; New Delhi on January 2 for a meeting with Prime Minister Shastri; Iran and Pakistan on January 3 for meetings with President Ayub Khan and the Shah; Egypt on January 4 for a discussion with President Nasser; Tokyo from January 6–9 for talks with Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina; and Canberra January 9–12 for discussions with Australian officials. 3 For text of the speech, January 12, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 3–12. 4 On April 8, 1965, DRV Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong told the National Assembly that it was the policy of the DRV to respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam based on four points: (1) recognition of the rights of the people of Vietnam and the withdrawal of the U.S. military from South Vietnam; (2) no military alliance, bases, troops, or personnel in North and South Vietnam; (3) settlement of the internal affairs of South Vietnam without foreign interference and in accordance with the program of the NFLSV; and (4) peaceful reunification of Vietnam without foreign interference. 5 Airgram A–198 from Vientiane, January 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) In telegram 1382 from Bangkok, January 14, Harriman commented on Sullivan’s report of his talk with Souvanna. Harriman reported that Souvanna made it clear to him that his policy was to maintain the support of the Soviets and that he feared China and North Vietnam. Harriman also reported that Souvanna “doesn’t mind our bombing of panhandle where there is no Lao population as long as the we don’t admit it.” Souvanna did not approve of large detachments of troops entering Laos. (Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Souvanna Phouma) 220. Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson 220. Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 16, 1966, 5 p.m. I would like to add my comments to Ambassador Sullivan’s cable summary (attached) 2 of my conversations with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane, Laos. 3 I found Prime Minister deeply concerned about increased Communist infiltration into Laos. He was also gravely concerned about the developments in Thailand. The primary problems there derives from the influence of the Chinese and North Vietnamese. The head of Communist Party in Thailand has large numbers of well trained and well organized cadres, most of whom are Chinese in origin although having Thai nationality. Thailand is further weakened by a second “Fifth Column,” in the presence of the North Vietnamese refugees. These are well organized, have regular contacts with North Vietnam and are in touch with the Pathet Lao in Laos, to whom they supply money and arms. To counteract this increased Communist pressure, Prime Minister desired to increase Laos fire power and hopes for early delivery of United States commitment of M1 and M2 weapons. The Prime Minister also indicated his desire for further assistance from the United States in the field of secondary education and agriculture. The Prime Minister is eager to increase agricultural development, specifically the production of rice. Past year six million hard currency spent for rice alone. Drain for young manpower for military needs has slowed rice production. Hence greater need for tractors. The Prime Minister indicated that he was not surprised that the bombing pause produced no results because China is interested in war, not peace. He laid great emphasis on the expansionist aims of China because of population pressure more than ideology. He stated bluntly, “you should take advantage of this period when China does not have the bomb.” And finally, he stated that the U.S. bombing raids in North Vietnam are helpful to Laos because they immobilize the North Vietnamese troops and make access to Laos more difficult. Once again, I am impressed by the realism of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and his determination to defend his country. Although appreciating the limitations placed on his Government by the Geneva Accords and the necessity to preserve a facade of neutrality, he is not only willing but eager to develop closer cooperation with the United States, including in the field of internal security. Therefore, his urgent request for military assistance indicates an appreciation that Laos future even though a neutral country, is linked to that of other countries in Southeast Asia. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Secret. An initial on the source text indicates that Johnson saw it. 2 Telegram 887 from Vientiane, February 14, in which the Embassy transmitted a draft composite report of Humphrey’s conversations with Souvanna and other Lao officials during the Vice President’s 4-hour stay in Vientiane. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Humphrey) Humphrey’s report to the President summarizes telegram 887. 3 Humphrey was on a tour of Asia, February 9–23, at President Johnson’s request. In addition to Laos, he visited South Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea. The Vice President was accompanied by Harriman, Presidential Special Assistant Jack Valenti, Ambassador Lloyd Hand, and members of the NSC staff and Humphrey’s own staff. Humphrey’s public report to Johnson on his trip, March 3, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, pp. 489–491. 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Embassy in the Philippines 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Embassy in the Philippines 1 Vientiane, February 20, 1966, 0610Z. 58. For Harriman from Sullivan. Reurtel 18 from Canberra. 2 1. In general, enemy military activity throughout Laos continues about normal for this time of year. As you know, period February through April has traditionally been their season of major offensives, which then terminate just before rainy season sets in. There have been the usual spate of rumors (assiduously cultivated by the French) that this year they will open a major drive into the Mekong Valley and, of course, they theoretically maintain capability to do this if they choose. But we see no extraordinary evidence to suggest that they so intend, nor would we see any particular logic in their making such an effort this year. Having said this, I would point out that the lines of communication with North Vietnam are short and Hanoi’s logic is not always susceptible to rational determination. 2. The major military event which has occurred since departure VP party has been a two (or perhaps three) battalion attack by North Vietnamese units against Nakhang (Site 36) in Sam Neua Province. These troops came up by forced march from Ban Ban on Route Seven for this deliberate purpose. Although the objective (Nakhang) is worthwhile in itself, the force deployed seems probably inadequate to capture and hold the site against counterattack by RLG forces. Therefore, this action has the earmarks of a politically inspired operation. They have chosen an area of significance to RLG and ourselves (which we use as forward base for air rescue helicopter units) and have attacked units which have a special status for us because they are under command of Vang Pao. By good luck, they even managed to wound Vang Pao slightly in the action, causing his medical evacuation. 3. I do not interpret this attack as a reaction to VP visit, but rather as a direct reaction to Kong Le’s loudly heralded but rather feebly executed attack on Phou Kout. As you know, the Neutralists have been attempting to take Phou Kout on and off for two years and Souvanna personally encourages them in this effort. On this occasion, the Neutralists’ effort was widely publicized (again with French connivance) and has provoked PL promises of retaliation. I presume Nakhang action falls in that category. 4. However, unless North Vietnamese are prepared pump a few more battalions into this sector, I would expect attacking force would gradually retire under pressure RLG reinforcements now being brought to the scene. 5. As far as action in other sectors concerned, there is not much new. Rumors persist of large enemy units moving towards Bolovens Plateau in south, but none have yet been located. General Phasouk is conducting search operations in area and one clear and hold operation without encountering major resistance. However, I do not discount something happening here because I think Communists actually believe US intends occupy the area and they may wish activate some spoiling operations. 6. In far north, there is pressure on the Nam Ou Valley. North Vietnamese used bombing pause to build up supplies at Dien Bien Phu, which lies at head of Nam Ou Valley. A serious thrust down this valley could endanger Luang Prabang, but it seems doubtful either Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese forces in area are adequate for this purpose. 7. Finally, at Thathom in central Laos, there is an opportunity for enemy exploitation because of weakness and demoralization of defending forces. These are remnants of old Phoumi units and have no desire to fight under current leadership. They are being rotated out and should be replaced in time to plug current weaknesses there. 8. In general, I feel that any major enemy drives would have to involve concentration of forces, which would then become vulnerable to air attack. I believe our air resources are good enough to handle pretty much of what we can foresee. Therefore, since the enemy is aware of this, I would expect them to use their next two months for their annual nibbling operation, during the course of which we will lose some terrain. 9. During the monsoon season, we would expect to get back what we lose in these two months and therefore, on balance, would expect the ground situation in Laos to stay just about the way it has been over the last couple of years. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 905, which is the source text, and to CINCPAC and Seoul. 2 Not found. 222. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) 222. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) 1 Washington, March 8, 1966. Dear Cy: Despite strict rules of engagement and improvement in navigational aids (I understand that TACAN has now been installed in both northern and southern Laos and, in any case, no towns, villages or inhabited areas should be attacked), the number of serious incidents of our air strikes on friendly and unauthorized targets in Laos seems to be continuing to rise. There were two incidents this last month, both involving attacks of friendly military positions, killing and wounding Lao troops and damaging ground installations. I am enclosing a partial listing of such incidents known to us that have occurred during the past year. 2 These incidents are continuing to take place in spite of increasingly stringent rules of engagement and I am sure that you share my concern for the effect that this can have on our continued ability to operate in Laos. After each incident Bill Sullivan must attempt to explain to the Prime Minister what has happened and, in addition to the loss of life and property damage to innocent persons, we have to consider the problem of the loyalty of Lao military units and the continuation of the loyalty of villagers to Souvanna Phouma. While appreciating the problems of the pilots engaged in these operations and the risks to which they are subjected, I deeply feel that we should most urgently search for some way of at least sharply reducing these unfortunate and costly mistakes so that their continuation does not jeopardize our larger interests. I would appreciate any action that can be taken to this end or suggestions that you may have on how we can be of help. Sincerely, U. Alexis Johnson 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. 2 The attached list covered the period January 15, 1965 to February 24, 1966. It contained 13 incidents of U.S. air strikes against friendly targets and 3 incidents of unauthorized attacks on enemy targets. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original. 223. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 223. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 11, 1966, 0245Z. 978. 1. Because of increased enemy pressure against Neutralist positions near Phou Kout, there is an immediate threat to the vital installation at Muong Soui. A loss of Muong Soui would be disastrous because of its key position leading into the approaches to Route 13. It would also cause considerable complications because of the Thai artillery unit stationed there. 2. Souvanna has reviewed this situation with his military commanders and has concluded (as we have known all along) that the safety of Muoung Soui requires the capture of Phou Kout. He therefore asked me to use napalm to clean out enemy positions which are deeply entrenched on Phou Kout so that Neutralist troops can capture it. 3. My Attaches have reviewed assault plans with the Neutralist commander, Colonel Sing, and have concluded that he has a feasible proposal for the operation. It is scheduled to kick off at 1000 hours Monday March 14. 4. We have made arrangements with 2AD to provide adequate USAF strike planes, with napalm, to accomplish the objective. There is to be no publicity. 2 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Limdis; Priority. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 2d Air Division, and Bangkok. 2 In telegram 586 to Vientiane, March 11, the Department of State agreed to the use of napalm provided the plans for the assault offered good prospects for success, napalm was essential to the operations, and it could not be delivered by the RLAF. (Ibid., POL 17 LAOS) 224. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 224. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 21, 1966, 1000Z. 1008. Ref Embtel 1006. 2 1. In course of day, we have taken several actions in effort restore morale and effectiveness of units defending Muong Soui. Current situation at Muong Soui itself is calm and our people on spot report that troops are somewhat less nervous today. 2. Most important contribution today has been effective series of sorties by USAF, both in immediate vicinity Muong Soui front lines at Phou Kout and also among supply depots further east in PDJ. 3. Additionally, we have finally gotten General Staff to focus seriously on problem and to begin deployment of additional FAR forces to the area for a coordinated FAR-Neutralist defense plan. ARMA will report further on this. 4. Finally, I saw Souvanna this afternoon, got his approval on an overall air operations plan for the PDJ and encouraged him to stimulate more action by his forces. He had already called in Kong Le and sent him to Muong Soui (for whatever good that will do) and has given orders for extensive patrolling north and south of defensive positions. 5. He asked me for additional reconnaissance by O–1 type aircraft north of Muong Soui to track down reports that enemy units are approaching down Nam Khan Valley. We are in touch with Dep Com 2AD to fulfill this request. 6. Comment : Souvanna was considerably depressed and obviously not very confident about abilities of his Neutralist unity. Perhaps a few days of successful air operations will help restore his bounce. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, 2d Air Division, and Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Udorn. 2 In telegram 1006, March 21, the Embassy reported that “we are facing a severe case of galloping blue funk among the Neutralists” which could endanger the Muong Soui region. According to the Embassy, the problem was the chaotic situation among the Neutralists and the virtual abdication of authority by Kong Le. It was compounded by minor but sharp military reserves suffered by the Neutralists, notwithstanding the fact that they had the enemy outnumbered, outgunned, and they held the better ground. (Ibid.) 225. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff (Burchinal) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) 225. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff (Burchinal) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) 1 Washington, March 21, 1966. DJSM-360–66 SUBJECT Mishaps in Laos Resulting from US Air Operations (TS) 1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum I–35338/66, dated 10 March 1966, 2 subject as above, and to its referenced letter of 8 March 1966 from the Deputy Under Secretary of State. 3 2. (U) In the sense that the incidents noted in the letter of the Deputy Under Secretary of State do occur from time to time, it is agreed that the cumulative total has continued to grow. 3. (TS) All military echelons are concerned over incidents involving inadvertent delivery of ordnance on friendly forces or noncombatants, in Laos or elsewhere. They are also concerned over casualties being inflicted by the communists on both military and civilians in the war in South Vietnam, which must now be recognized as amongst the more intensive armed conflicts in which this country has engaged. Our air strike operations in Laos are a necessary and integral part of that war. Despite precautions taken by responsible military at all levels, often at the cost of added risk to their own lives, it is a lesson of history that there will be some casualties amongst noncombatants in a war zone; no feasible restrictions or rules of procedure can guarantee against this. A deeply regrettable fact of the war must therefore be acknowledged, that the cumulative total of the incidents noted will probably continue to grow. 4. (TS) It should be noted, however, that although the cumulative number of mishaps has grown somewhat during the past six months, there has been a substantial downward trend in the incident rate. This rate is considered to afford the most meaningful indication of the degree of effectiveness of the intensive countermeasures taken. As illustrated in the enclosure, Joint Staff records indicate the incident rate per thousand combat sorties in Laos has been reduced from about 5.0 during the first quarter calendar year 1965 to approximately 0.14 at present, a thirty-five-fold improvement. David A. Burchinal Lt General, USAF 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Laos 000.1 (373.5 Laos), 1966. Top Secret. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 Document 222 . In a subsequent letter to Vance, March 18, U. Alexis Johnson suggested that DOD funds rather than RLG kip counterpart funds should be used to compensate friendly civilians and military personnel attacked by mistake. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Laos 000.1 (373.5 Laos)) 226. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 226. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane March 23, 1966, 09095Z. 1015. Ref: Embtel 1010. 2 1. There seems to be little evidence to support Souvanna’s view, as expressed reftel, that Hanoi’s primary objective in its current aggressive military action in northern Laos is to threaten Laos so severely that it will “draw in” American ground forces. If their aim were provocation, there would seem to be more direct actions they could take. For example, NVA troops would have no real difficulty in destroying Thakhek or another town on the Mekong, an action Hanoi must assume would bring about some kind of American response. We assume on the contrary that Hanoi wants to avoid actions that might bring about the deployment of American ground forces, that it will probably restrict its actions to what is considered acceptable under current ground rules and that its present objectives in the north are motivated at least as much by political as military considerations. 2. Hanoi’s current offensive in the north has been made possible only as a result of key decisions and actions made months ago, including a decision to expand its logistic operations. It has long diverted far more supplies and trucking, if not troops, for military operations in northern Laos than are required merely to hold its own and PL positions. The decisions that lay behind this considerable effort were probably based on a variety of considerations, some of which might be the following: A. Hanoi wants to show that it can still call the shots in northern Laos. As a result of both Lao and American air action in 1964 and 1965, limited as it was, NVA and PL forces were at first unable to take effective action against friendly positions in the north. Meo and FAR troops in fact were able to make modest advances and strengthened their enclaves in enemy territory. Hanoi may have concluded that the increased relative strength of FAR and Meo forces, the determined Meo attack against Hua Muong, stepped up air action and some boastful Lao talk presaged a serious effort to dislodge VNA and PL forces from key positions in the north. It was time to give the FAR and Souvanna a hard lesson. Hanoi then took steps to counteract the effects of air harassment through an improved road network and increased trucking of supplies and resumed its former practice of taking the offensive against friendly positions during the dry season. They have by now dislodged friendly forces from most of the positions north of the PDJ which were taken since the summer of 1964. B. As a corollary to A above, Hanoi probably wishes to demonstrate forcibly to Souvanna that no amount of American intervention short of deployment of US troops, if even that, can prevent NVA military successes whenever Hanoi chooses to take the offensive. Hanoi may regard an impressive series of victories in northern Laos, even though limited in scope, as a means of raising doubt in Souvanna’s mind about the utility of his American support. Souvanna’s proposed trip to Moscow will doubtless give Hanoi further incentive to keep up the pressure. C. The PL, which is discredited as a political movement, probably put heavy pressure on Hanoi to sustain its military and political position. The PL needed several strong shots in the arm, and Hanoi could not afford to allow further weakening of a movement that has been so useful to its expansionist objectives. D. Continued NVA military successes can badly demoralize the FAR and Neutralists armies. Hanoi would probably hope exploit such demoralization through political offensives. 3. We ourselves would not expect Hanoi this year at least to press its military advances much beyond the Plain of Jars area and into key valleys and routes that lead into it from the north, east and south. At this point operations carried FAR to the west to their main bases might impose serious logistics problem for NVA troops. Nevertheless we believe they could attempt push to this junction of Routes 13 and 7 if they are prepared to pay a heavy price, and NVA forces might be able carry out operations which could become a threat to Luang Prabang, e.g., a push down the Nam Hou from Dien Bien Phu. 4. At any rate, one lesson from NVA actions in northern Laos is by now clear. Whether or not the North Vietnamese choose to move further in northern Laos they have already demonstrated they are willing and able to mount an impressive logistics and offensive operation in the face of air and guerrilla harassment in a theater that has no direct connection with their main military efforts in South Vietnam. Thus far, of course, our air attacks in the north have largely been only harassment. We have until this week avoided out of political consideration such key supply areas as Ban Liang (because of its proximity to Khang Khay). But heavy and frequent attacks against such targets and stepped up armed recce and inter- diction in the BR area should make it much more costly and difficult for Hanoi to maintain an offensive, which, limited as it might be, poses a serious threat to the political and military stability of Laos. 5. Finally, if friendly forces and positions survive dry season relatively intact, we still hope they will be able recover some recently lost terrain during the monsoon. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ASIA SE. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Moscow, London, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC. The time of dispatch on this telegram is an error; it was received at the Department of State at 5:17 a.m., March 23. 2 Dated March 22. (Ibid., POL LAOS–USSR) 227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, March 23, 1966, 7:23 p.m. 602. Ref: A. Deptel 82 to Vientiane July 24, 1964. 2 B. Embtel 984. 3 Joint State/Defense message. Use of Napalm in Laos 1. Believe use of Napalm will enhance effectiveness of strikes against targets in Lao Panhandle and provide increased flexibility for US tactical air operations in Laos. We also believe that Napalm should be provided RLAF for use at General Ma’s discretion as you suggested. 2. To maximize effectiveness against infiltration-related targets and simultaneously to ensure maximum safeguards against inadvertent strikes on Laos civilians (i.e., prevent use against villages and huts, inhabited areas or civilians) and friendly troops, use of Napalm should be integrated into well-established procedures for FAC operations currently in effect in Steel Tiger area. While it is appreciated that initially limiting the use of Napalm to newly proposed Shinning Brass area might have some advantage, this limitation could cause operational difficulty by establishment of still another boundary, within relatively small operating area, involving another set of operating rules. 3. Accordingly, if Souvanna concurs, 4 you may authorize (a) selected use of Napalm on FAC-directed missions (i.e., with Lao participation in accordance with para. 3 of Annex B of BR/SL operating rules, 2nd Air Div OPORD 433–66 5 only against validated RLAF targets within Steel Tiger Recce areas, D, E, F, and G, and (b) release Napalm for use by RLAF. In seeking Souvanna’s concurrence you should reaffirm to him that every possible precaution is being taken to ensure use only against authorized targets. 4. You are still authorized, with Souvanna’s concurrence, use of Napalm elsewhere in Laos in a situation which you consider to be an emergency or a situation in which particular offensive or defensive military action already undertaken would otherwise fail. 5. Use of Napalm like other U.S. combat air operations in Laos will not be publicly confirmed, although we must anticipate possibility that it may become matter of public knowledge. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Slutz; cleared with Blouin, Mustin, Jorden, in substance with Trueheart, and paragraph 5 with Richard L. Sneider, the Public Affairs Officer, and FE; and approved by Unger. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and 2d Air Division. 2 This telegram contained the basic guidance on use of napalm in Laos: “to prohibit use of napalm without prior authority from us except in a situation which you consider to be an emergency or a situation in which particular offensive or defensive military action already undertaken might fail. Souvanna’s concurrence of course continues to be required.” (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 984 from Vientiane, March 14, Sullivan reported that he had only authorized the use of napalm by U.S. aircraft twice, both times at Lao request. MACV and the 2d Air Division wanted to employ napalm in Tiger Hound/Steel Tiger Missions. General Ma of the RLAF also wanted to use napalm in some of his operations. Sullivan did not see a problem with Communist propaganda charges since the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese had already charged the United States with the use of napalm in Laos. What worried Sullivan was a mistaken napalm attack on a friendly village. He suggested that the Department review the matter with other agencies in Washington. (Ibid.) 4 In telegram 1024 from Vientiane, March 25, Sullivan reported that he had obtained Souvanna’s concurrence in the use of napalm by U.S. aircraft in the Steel Tiger area and his agreement in principle to its use by the RLAF. Souvanna wished to delay the actual delivery of napalm to the RLAF until he had personally discussed with General Ma the limitations for its use. (Ibid.) 5 Not further identified. 228. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 228. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, April 4, 1966, 1131Z. 1054. 1. If I were to choose any one word to characterize the situation in this country on the eve of Lao new year, I would suggest the word “fatigue.” 2. The Prime Minister is tired, the members of his government are tired, the Royal Army is tired, the Neutralists are tired, 2 and (according to our information) the Pathet Lao are tired. This condition is partly the result of the current enervating and oppressive heat which precedes the rains and partly because we had no winter to speak of this year. But, primarily, it is because of the long, exhausting conflict which has been the fate of Laos for the past ten years. 3. The Prime Minister took off for Tokyo this morning to attend the conference on Southeast Asian development. Before his departure, I had our Embassy doctor give him a couple of vitamin injections to perk him up a bit. However, he won’t gain much zest unless he can get a little relaxation on his visit to Japan. He has agreed to take a few days’ rest, and I have attempted to persuade Japanese Ambassador (who will be accompanying him) to be sure he is not overwhelmed with hospitality. 4. The Royal Army is going to have to hang on in its current dispositions until the rains come. Then, there are plans to rotate units out of the front lines, give them some R and R, and to re-form and re-equip them, before sending them back into action. 5. As for the Neutralists, this is a sticky question. They see no future for themselves, yet they do not wish to merge their identity with the FAR and certainly have no intention to defect to the Communists. The enemy is quite aware of the demoralization among the Neutralists and Radio Peking is already crowing about it. The Neutralists are currently (and for this reason) the prime focus of Viet attacks in Laos. Their fate is quite definitely in the balance. 6. The Pathet Lao, as a fighting force, were just about washed up a few months ago. They have been revived by the introduction of additional new Vietnamese cadre and fighting units. How long this new injection of energy will last is anyone’s guess, but it is doubtful that it will really survive the rainy season. 7. The sixty-four dollar question, in all this evaluation, is the state of affairs among the North Vietnamese. Starting from the assumption that they are human, we can only suspect that they, too, are feeling the strain. Captured prisoners, recovered diaries, and other evidence bear out this supposition. But the nature of their continued thrust, the vigor of their new invasion give us small comfort that we are anywhere near in sight of a collapse. 8. We must, however, take some notice of the fact that, as a whole, the human fabric of this constant conflict is beginning to fray. Nothing is immediately critical. But it is all beginning to wear just a bit thin. 9. Given these circumstances, it is difficult to predict reactions to any particular situation. The best we can do is to lay in more vitamins, look lively and pray for rain. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 LAOS. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Tokyo, London, Moscow, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC. 2 In telegram 1039 from Vientiane, March 31, the Embassy reported that Neutralist morale was continuing “to plummet.” Infantry Battalion Eight near Phou Kout abandoned its positions and asked to be airlifted to its headquarters. Kong Le refused to intervene in the affair. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 229. Memorandum of Conversation 229. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 5, 1966, 11–11:15 a.m. SUBJECT Presentation of Credentials by Lao Ambassador PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Samuel D. Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs Mr. James W. Symington, Chief of Protocol Mr. Chester C. Carter, Deputy Chief of Protocol Mr. Norman Armour, Jr., Assistant Chief of Protocol Ambassador Khamking Souvanlasy After the formal presentation of credentials the group moved to the Treaty Room where the President and the Ambassador had a brief talk. In reply to the President’s query concerning the current situation in Laos, the Ambassador said that when he left there were no political problems and there had been practically none over the past year. However, the recent attacks by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces in the Attopeu area had worsened the military situation. The President asked how Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma felt about the situation and the Ambassador replied that the Prime Minister was very much encouraged by the improvement in the political situation over the past two years, to the extent of feeling optimistic about the future. Because the military situation remained difficult he continued to rely on assistance from friendly nations, and particularly from the U.S. in containing invasion and aggression. The Ambassador added that both Souvanna Phouma and the King were following with apprehension the developments in Vietnam, as they were fully aware of the repercussions on Laos of the unfortunate turn of events in Vietnam. The President commented that we were deeply distressed over the present state of the Government of Vietnam, and that we hoped some measure of stability might be attained. From a military standpoint, we were daily increasing an already substantial commitment. There was no doubt that the attitude of the Government of Vietnam regarding its political stability would affect what we might do. The Ambassador said that Laos had been encouraged by the visits of the Vice President and of Ambassador Harriman. He noted that both had given Laos assurances of U.S. support and friendship. As a consequence Laos felt more capable of defending and safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and neutrality. The President remarked that he had received very good reports from both the Vice President and Mr. Harriman. The Vice President had been anxious to include Laos on his itinerary, to follow up on the contacts he had previously made with Lao leaders. The Vice President was encouraged by the progress he had noted. The very cordial meeting ended with a friendly exchange of amenities. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17–1 LAOS–US. Confidential. Drafted by DeSebera of Language Services and James P. Murphy of SEA, neither of whom are cited as participants. Approved in the White House on April 16. 230. Memorandum From R.C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 230. Memorandum From R.C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 9, 1966. SUBJECT Ground Operations in Laos Attached is a JCS paper 2 which is now under consideration in State and could come to your attention at any time. It does the following: (1) Reaffirmed the 7 January request that US ground forces be authorized immediate pursuit into Laos and Cambodia (same paper asked authorization for immediate pursuit into Chinese airspace). (2) Pending approval of the above, requested authority to authorize actions in self-defense against enemy attacks coming from Laos. Immediate pursuit is already authorized for air action over Laos and North Vietnam, and over Cambodia when actually engaged in combat. But ground action is not authorized in any of these countries. Immediate pursuit would permit US forces to move into neighboring countries as far as necessary to oppose an enemy force that had attacked them, as long as combat were continuous. The lesser request for actions in self-defense against attacks from Laos would permit movement only as long as US forces were in jeopardy. Since the Laotian Government has previously authorized the bombing of enemy controlled sections of Laos, the new factor here is the proposal to let US troops fire into and maneuver within Laos. The Laotians probably would want us to keep such troop movements secret, as in the case of air actions. Since ground action is more likely to be directly observed and reported by the press, the Laotian political reaction might be more serious. From past indications I would doubt that Souvanna Phouma would be very disturbed about the surfacing of an occasional ground action taken in self-defense. However, paragraph 4 of the draft message would authorize attacks against Laotian villages when the US commander felt they were necessary for the preservation of his own forces, and Souvanna has been more sensitive when it comes to attacks on villages. 3 Actually, there are very few villages along the border, but it might be desirable to sound out the Laotians before authorizing any such attacks. Weighing the political consequences against the military gain it could prove better to rule out all attacks on Laotian villages RCB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Top Secret. 2 JCSM–216–66, JCS memorandum to McNamara, April 6, entitled “Combat Operations Involving Laos.” (Ibid.) 3 In an April 11 memorandum to Captain John M. Miller, Political-Military Affairs Adviser, Office of Regional Affairs, FE, Assistant Legal Adviser George Aldrich suggested that the draft JCS message should contain a flat prohibition against attacks on Lao villages or occupied areas. He also noted that such operations should require JCS approval in advance except in emergencies and should be solely exercises in self-defense. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 231. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 231. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, April 11, 1966, 0515Z. 1076. Reur 638. 2 1. As seems to be always the case with matters affecting Laos, the problem re rules of engagement on the SVN border is not with the substance but with the shadow.RLG officials, in contrast to Cambodians, would have no objection to hot pursuit across ill-defined border by U.S. and friendly forces engaged with Viet Cong. However, they would have great difficulty with a public assertion of our right or intention to exercise such hot pursuit. 2. What bothers me therefore is precisely prospect raised in para 2 reftel that U.S. authority to undertake this pursuit would become public knowledge, despite high security classification. Experience has unhappily shown this to be true, no matter how much we may lament it. 3. Therefore, since neither I nor RLG would in any way wish inhibit friendly forces from defending themselves against attack from Lao territory, issue we must tackle is manner in which public repercussions can be eliminated. I would submit that this is not impossible, and that it can be handled in one of three different ways. 4. First way would be to change rules of engagement and publish them widely, albeit with high security classification. When inevitable leak occurs, Spokesman should merely deny it flatly. I put up this suggestion knowing full well it will not be accepted in Washington. However, it is obviously the best and most logical choice. Yet I realize it remains an unacceptable option. 5. Second way would be to change rules of engagement but not publish them widely. In this context, I would suggest they be held at the COMUSMACV level, on an eyes-only basis for a limited and specifically designated number of responsible officers. These officers could then respond, in the event, to an emergency by a field commander, giving him the authorization if and when a situation like a [garble] develops into a cross-border fight. In this option, I would prefer that the public line to be taken should differ from Thai proposed reftel. If there is a leakage, the answer to queries should be: “You are posing a question on a hypothetical issue which has not arisen. We do not answer hypothetical questions.” 6. The third way to handle the problem would be to take the decision at the national level but refrain from publishing it in the field. In this way, the actual change in rules of engagement would take place only when and if a cross-border situation arose. Since, contrary to the Cambodian situation, we are not faced with an immediate prospect of this type attack, there would be no actual handicap to the troops. There would, of course, be much continuing anguish among staff officers. 7. On balance, I suppose the second choice is the most practical. If and when an actual situation occurs and cross-border hot pursuit becomes necessary, then, at the point (but only then) would Spokesman fall back on our standard line for operational matter, affecting Laos, which is “no comment.” At no time would I foresee the necessity to go as far as to assert “authority” publicly, as proposed reftel. We could, however, if necessary, reaffirm our policy as outlined last sentence reftel. 3 8. In general, I would feel it improvement to discuss this matter with RLG. However, just in the event that Washington should decide on some course of action from my current expectations, I wish opportunity to comment again on this aspect when you come to a consensus on the substance of your intentions. 4 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. 2 In telegram 638 to Vientiane, April 9, the Department of State asked for the Embassy’s comments on the proposed changes in rules of engagement for U.S. troops in Laos. The Department suggested that should any operation become public knowledge despite its tightly held security classification, U.S. spokesmen would reply that American military commanders have authority to take actions inherent in the right of self-defense to protect their forces. (Ibid.) 3 The last sentence of telegram 638 reads: “In addition spokesmen would reaffirm USG policy to respect sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territory of Laos and not to widen war in Southeast Asia.” (Ibid.) 4 In telegram 659 to Vientiane, April 23, the Department informed the Embassy that MACV would hold on an eyes only basis authorization to operate in the Laos border area until needed. Should the Department receive press inquiries, the response would be that the question was hypothetical or “no comment,” as appropriate. If pressed, the spokesman could say that Laos is an area in which American commanders have self-defense authority. (Ibid.) In telegram 1116 from Vientiane, April 25, Sullivan suggested that U.S. spokesmen be instructed not to feel “pressed” beyond the “no comment” stage. (Ibid.) 232. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hamilton) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 232. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hamilton) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 1 Washington, May 4, 1966. I–22975 SUBJECT Prospective Command Change in the RLAF As I mentioned in a recent conversation, I have been disturbed by the conjunction of (1) renewed requests for hospitalization (for hernia) and an invitational tour in the US for RLAF BGen. Thao Ma with (2) renewed efforts on the part of Gen. Ouan Rathikoun to have Gen. Ma removed from his command and replaced, apparently, by BGen. Sourith Don Sasorith. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is reportedly sympathetic to this plan. (Key references are EmbTel 1110, TDCS–314/05276–66 and AIRA 00726 Apr 66.) 2 We of course support provision of hospital care for Gen. Ma when required. USAF has confirmed that he can be accommodated at Tripler or Clark upon his request as well as that the invitation to visit the US is open-ended and that arrangements can be made on 60–90 days notice (CSAF AFNICB 86238 Apr 66). 3 Ambassador Sullivan has reported his opposition to having the US “used” (by the offer of trips) to cover Gen. Ma’s removal from RLAF command, and Souvanna has agreed that Gen. Ma would “still be in charge” of the RLAF “when he returned”. This may not go far enough. Based on present knowledge, it seems to me that we should urge Ambassador Sullivan to seek to persuade Souvanna and Ouan not to relieve Gen. Ma, before or after his return from travel to the US. My own judgment is that this is a matter of considerable importance to US and even to RLG military and political interests, but this memorandum is intended only to supplement our brief conversation as you suggested and does not advance a DOD position. On the military side, I do not believe that a ground force commander should assume command of the RLAF or that Gen. Sourith is the one to try it if it were a good idea. Some notes on the personalities involved are attached. Whatever misgivings some RLAF officers have at present about Gen. Ma’s leadership, the imposition of a traditional Lao ground commander on the spirited T–28 jockeys of the RLAF would be a sure step toward diminished morale and military effectiveness. Numerous activities of the US seem to depend on the RLAF remaining sufficiently operational to justify MAP support and the other assistance we have provided to it. We should not run the risk of upsetting a working arrangement, if we can help Souvanna avoid it, unless there are compelling collateral advantages. I do not see any, except that the change would help Gen. Ouan and the Sananikones to consolidate their control of the FAR. Whether this is desirable is more a political than a military judgment. Because the desire to remove Ma is of long standing, I find it hard not to believe that it fits into a pattern of Sananikone actions against Phoumi and Khamkhong and of inaction vis-à-vis Vang Pao and Kong Le that seem to me to account in part for recent and cumulative severe reverses in the northeast. If Ma goes, Gen. Phasouk Somly may well be next on the list. The Sananikones will then be able to concentrate single-mindedly on management of the central Mekong valley area that appears to be about as far as their strategic vision extends. I doubt that their interest in effective control would long be limited to the military sphere without taking on a political character, raising questions about the stability of the RLG. There is no assurance that a restatement of our confidence in Ma will save him from the rockpile. And the best course of action in Laos usually seems to be to let the Lao go their own way, at least after obligating them to consider all aspects of a contemplated decision. This does seem one instance, however, when in the US interest some representations should be made William C. Hamilton 4 Attachment GEN. THAO MA AND GEN. SOURITH DON SASORITH It has been consistently reported by all appropriate American observers since mid-1963 (when the RLAF went “operational”) that among the Lao it is Gen. Ma and he alone who makes the RLAF go. He has significant known weaknesses (fits of temper, inability to organize a staff or delegate work or authority, excessive concentration on one idea at a time, etc), and it is not to his credit that there is no RLAF officer in sight to take his place in the event of either a combat or a political accident: Nevertheless, we must deal with the situation as it is, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that Ma remains of central importance to the RLAF and to the US. A desire to unseat Gen. Ma, because he is too “independent” of Vientiane, has been expressed by Gen. Kouprasith and other General Staff sources off and on for some time. The revival of the idea appears to have followed a recent visit to Gen. Ouan by the RLAF Chief of Staff, Col. Ou Neua. Although there is unquestionably some basis for various charges leveled by him against Ma, I am sure you will recall Ou Neua as one of the least reliable, most fractious officers we had to deal with (notably as Wattay airport commandant in 1962–3). He has been in and out of the neutralist forces and various right-wing alignments and is known to be jealous of Ma’s commanding stature as RLAF chief. It is unfortunate that his testimony (alone, as far as we are informed) enabled Ouan to persuade Souvanna that perhaps it is time to move Ma up and out of the way. One of the charges brought by Ou Neua, for example, is that Ma is “fixed “ on T–28 operations and neglects the transport squadron. Probably there is some truth in this, but part of the translation may be that Ma has cracked down on the use of RLAF C–47s for the transportation of relatives, cattle, and opium. As to Gen. Sourith, I have tapped the recollections of Col. William Law and Lt. Col. Gibert Grout to fill out my own limited knowledge. (Col. Grout has known him since 1958 and was the principal point of contact with him during our period in Laos.) Sourith has certain technical qualifications: a. is a French-trained pilot (but is not known to have qualified except in liaison aircraft); b. about 1958, he served as FAR Chief of Army Aviation (but at that time it was a ground-oriented command consisting of the paratroops and enough aircraft to move them, occasionally); c. he is presently attending the C&GSC at Fort Leavenworth, and is reported to be cooperative, popular with fellow students, and a “fair student” with some language problem. This appears to be about the extent of his military qualifications for the RLAF command. Sourith began his service in the French Army, where at one time he was sergeant-aide to a recent French Assistant Military Attaché (well known to you) who described his talents as having been fully exploited in the aide capacity. He was directly involved in the 1962 Nam Tha episode, making a record no better—though no worse—than the other commanders concerned. After 1962, he remained as CG, MR I, keeping himself aloof from Vientiane and the General Staff. He was regarded by Gen. Phoumi as a “cipher,” though undoubtedly in part because he was not responsive to Phoumi’s interests. Col. Grout believes that he was sincerely devoted to helping build the reputations of the King and Crown Prince out in the villages, distinguishing himself more for a willingness to bat around in the countryside than for the military activities that accompanied this commendable stress on “nation-building”. He was dragged reluctantly into Operation Triangle but, according to Col. Law, did well once he got his battalions under way. He has long seemed content to hold onto his fief in MR I in collaboration with Gen. Norasing in MR VI. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648. Laos 000.1 (200.2 Laos). Secret. Sent through Admiral Blouin. Copies were sent to Truehart, Barbis, Colonel Mobley, and the Air Force Foreign Liaison Branch. 2 None of the references has been found. 3 Not found. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Hamilton signed the original. 233. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 233. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 15, 1966, 0935Z. 1197. 1. Situation with respect General Ma has come unstuck once again. 2 Despite fact he assured Sisouk, General Ouan and me that he was satisfied with arrangements made, he took off yesterday afternoon and returned Savannakhet. There he found his air force colleagues apparently set against him. 2. Consequently, he joined up with his buddy Colonel Nouphet, Commander of GM 18 and went to latter’s headquarters east of Savannakhet, reportedly accompanied by eternal troublemaker Bounleut Saycocie. Wild talk is now emanating from this headquarters that Ma and Nouphet intend to march on Savannakhet and capture it tonight. 3. Except for our communications team at Savannakhet Airfield, I have withdrawn all our personnel from base and instructed them remain in quarters. AID personnel in town have similarly been instructed to stay at home and activate E&E alert. 4. There are eighteen T–28 and about a dozen C–47 aircraft on the field at Savannakhet. If this becomes a battleground, it could produce costly loss of hardware. 3 5. Acting Prime Minister Leuam Insisigmay has flown to Savannakhet in effort head off confrontation. He is about the only person available (except Prince Noun Oum) who could control enough respect to prevent a clash. I have offered him any assistance he may need from our assets for transportation, etc. 4 6. No matter how this turns out, I hardly see that we can salvage any of General Ma’s position. At this stage, he looks like a dead loss. 5 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–3 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC, JCS, and Saigon. Passed to the White House upon receipt at the Department of State. 2 In telegram 1173 from Vientiane, May 11, Sullivan reported that Souvanna had told him that he planned to replace General THAO MA as Commander RLAF and assign him to the General Staff of FAR as Deputy Chief of Operations. Sullivan reported this reassignment was to make way for General Sourith to become Commander of the RLAF. Sullivan reported that Ma had not decided to accept his reassignment. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 2104 to Vientiane, May 15, the Department suggested that, if the RLAF was united in opposition to Ma and the “possibility of fireworks exists,” aircraft at Savannakhet should be moved to Vientiane. (Ibid.) 4 Ma returned to Vientiane on June 4 to meet with Acting Prime Minister Leuam Insisiengmay who, at Sullivan’s urging, ordered Ma to take up his new position. Sullivan asked if the United States was prepared to work out a program of extending training and study for Ma in the United States. (Telegram 1284 from Vientiane, June 4; ibid.) The Department of State responded that it was possible, but it feared that an extended absence from Laos would mean the end of Ma’s career. (Telegram 786 to Vientiane, June 8; ibid.) 5 Ma has subsequently claimed the reason he was relieved as Commander of the RLAF and forced to take a desk job in Vientiane was his willingness to accept bribes or allow his pilots to accept bribes to transport opium. (Alfred W. McCloy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 293–294 and Charles A. Stevenson, The End of Nowhere: American Policy Towards Laos Since 1954 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972) p. 219) 234. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 234. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 1 Washington, May 31, 1966. SUBJECT Rules of Engagement for Combat Operations Involving Laos 1. Defense has asked our concurrence in the attached draft message 2 which would establish rules of engagement for US forces operating in South Viet-Nam near the Laos border, and authorize them to fire and maneuver into Laos under circumstances of defense and preservation of forces, similar to the rules in force for Cambodia. Discussion 2. We believe that para 3 of the proposed new rules should be amended to include a provision for requesting JCS approval in advance when planning operations near the SVN-Laos border. This procedure is prescribed for operations involving Cambodia. 3. That section of the proposed new rules dealing with an emergency situation (para 5) is in harmony with the authority presently in force with respect to Cambodia except that in the case of Cambodia, US forces are specifically prohibited from attacking Cambodian villages or populated areas by air, by artillery fire or by ground forces. We believe that the authority with respect to Laos should have the same limitations. 4. Ambassador Sullivan concurs in principle with the proposed new rules. However, he is concerned with the possibility of premature press leaks of this information and has agreed to knowledge of this authority being held by General Westmoreland at MACV headquarters level only, pending a possible requirement for its wider use. COMUSMACV (and CINCPAC) stated the operational necessity of providing this information in advance to at least the subordinate major field force commanders. We are inclined to agree with COMUSMACV and the handling of this point as outlined in para 2 of the attached revised rules and we do not consider it necessary to return to Ambassador Sullivan on this point, since he is already aware of COMUSMACV views and has not dissented. 5. Pending the development of an actual requirement for use of this new authority in Laos, we would respond to press inquiries that the question is hypothetical or “no comment”, as appropriate. If the authority is used and press queries are made we would answer (as in the Cambodian case) by citing the inherent right of self-defense. Recommendation 3 6. That you approve the attached proposed new rules of engagement involving Laos, subject to the changes outlined in paras 2 and 3 above, and with press handling as outlined in para 5 above. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cowherd of FE and cleared by Trueheart, Assistant Legal Adviser George H. Aldrich, Seymour Weiss of G/PM, and Unger. 2 Attached, but not printed. 3 Approved by U. Alexis Johnson. A June 2 note to S/S on the source text indicates that Johnson acted on this with Ball’s knowledge. The new rules of engagement were promulgated in JCS telegram 4007 to CINCPAC, June 9. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 55, Cables, 6/66) 235. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 235. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Saigon, June 4, 1966, 0900Z. MAC 4572. Ref: CINCPAC 030345Z Jun 66. 2 Subj: Arc Light. 1. In response to reference, let me stress at the outset that I support fully and enthusiastically the objective of obtaining optimum returns per Arc Light sortie. Attainment of this objective entails detailed consideration of two factors: the operational purpose to be served by a given strike or a series of strikes, and the availability of timely, reliable intelligence as the basis for target selection. 2. With regard to the operational purpose served by B–52 strikes in Laos, we see the effort as one designed to assist in destroying an integrated enemy logistic system associated with well-defined ground LOCs. In a very real sense our tactical and strategic air programs in the Laos Panhandle are directed against a vital portion of the enemy’s communication zone. Far more than harassment of infiltration activity is involved. Rather, we seek to identify and destroy storage depots, staging areas, maintenance facilities, [illegible] points, truck parks, bridge and ferry sites, control installations and road repair capabilities. 3. As regards availability of timely, reliable intelligence as a basis for targeting in Laos, we enjoy the benefit of a high order of FAC saturation of the area in question. Rich dividends have been produced as a result of increasing FAC familiarity with the enemy’s logistic system and his pattern of activity associated with operation of the system. The impressive Tiger Hound record in terms of trucks destroyed, secondary explosions and structures destroyed is illustrative of effective intelligence based largely on visual observation. Moreover, the fact that the enemy has been operating overtly throughout his LOC network in southern Laos has afforded us an intelligence advantage generally unknown in SVN. It is my considered judgment, in this regard, that our targeting in Laos has been supported more generously by effective intelligence than has the bulk of our targeting for SVN. 4. You have raised the question of how we might obtain more significant targets for Arc Light strikes and more judicious expenditure of ordnance. I know of but one solution to this problem; namely, periodic review in depth of targeting status and procedures. This is an undertaking in which I participate personally, the most recent instance having occurred within the past several weeks. Coupled with the review process must be command approval of each strike based on detailed assessment of all factors, including intelligence. As you know, I personally approve each Arc Light target as an outgrowth of this system. It is for this reason that I am in a position to assure you that our selection of these targets not only reflects maximum refinement of available information, but takes full advantage of all assessment techniques and targeting expertise available. Targets are competing for selection based on the merits and supportability of the target and not upon any preference for geographical division of effort. 5. Since 11 December last year, 240 B–52 strikes have been carried out under approved programs as follows: Date Laos NVN SVN Dec 11–31 1 25 Jan 1–31 0 26 Feb 1–28 4 33 Mar 1–31 5 33 Apr 1–30 22 2 38 May 1–31 10 35 Jun 1–4 3 3 45 2 193 It will be noted of the total strikes, only about 20 percent have been directed against targets in Laos. Commitment of resources against these targets has on no occasion been at the expense of more lucrative targets in SVN. 6. Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that our present approach to Arc Light targeting be continued. In light of experience gained to date, I am satisfied that it best supports the objective of obtaining optimum returns per sortie. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 April–30 June 1966. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 In CINCPAC telegram 030345Z, June 3, Sharp asked Westmoreland if some of the targets in the Laos Panhandle, such as truck parks or storage facilities, were appropriate targets for tactical aircraft rather than Arc Light bombing by B–52’s. Sharp was concerned about “obtaining more significant targets” and “a more judicious expenditure of ordnance.” (Ibid.) 236. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 236. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, June 9, 1966, 1130Z. 1306. 1. I called on Souvanna and King separately this morning to obtain their impressions of recent Royal visit to Soviet Union. 2 Their impressions differ slightly and are reported below in general outline. 2. Souvanna said that, although there had been more sightseeing than serious exchanges of view, they nevertheless had been able to get some points across. He said that they were accompanied on entire trip by Zhukov, Secretary General of Foreign Office, and former Ambassador to China. He described him as well-informed and obviously sent along to talk substance. 3. He said their conversations had been quite specific, concerning detailed accusations by the Pathet Lao, etc., and they in turn had been specific with respect to North Vietnamese actions, etc. He said King had been quite forceful in presenting Laotian viewpoint. 4. However, despite these details, Souvanna had no impression of Soviet policy precision. He said he felt Soviets were engaged in study of their policy towards Lao and it was probably being reviewed with Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky, who remaining in Moscow until end of the month. He expected that when Kirnassovsky returned he would bring more precision with him. 5. King, on other hand, told me he considered Soviet policy was already quite precise. He said he had held long private talk with Podgorny without presence of Souvanna. He pointed out delicately that, since this was conversation between two chiefs of state, it was “privileged” and he could not give me details. However, he would like to make one observation. 6. He said he had read President Johnson’s Memorial Day speech and was struck by the fact that what President said coincided with what Podgorny said in two important particulars: (a) desire not to enlarge the war, and (b) desire to avoid damage to other U.S./USSR relations. He considered these perhaps the two most important points. 7. He then said that, if he were to draw the balance of his impressions of Soviet policy with respect to United States policy in Southeast Asia, he would advise the President to “just keep doing exactly what you are doing now,” and U.S. will obtain its objectives. He felt that Hanoi was becoming disillusioned with Peking and that the two major points of coincidence of U.S. and Soviet policy would fix the pattern of a settlement in Southeast Asia. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Moscow, Saigon, and CINCPAC. The substance of this telegram was retyped in the White House and sent on June 10 to the President by Rostow who suggested, “This account of Souvanna and the King of Laos in Moscow will interest you—notably paras 6 and 7, which have the ring of credibility.” His initial on the source text indicates the President read the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67) 2 May 16–17. 237. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 237. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, June 10, 1966. SUBJECT Shinning Brass 1. Defense has requested Department approval of the expansion into Phase II Cross Border Operations in Laos (Shinning Brass) as detailed in JCSM–378–66 at Tab A. 2 Discussion 2. Present Phase I Shinning Brass Operations are limited to reconnaissance missions by 11 man teams (3 US personnel in each team) in the area of Laos east of the blue line on the map at Tab B. 3 3. The proposed expansion into Phase II would authorize exploitation operations by specially trained platoon size Nung units accompanied by not over 3 US advisors in each instance. Each operation would be limited to approximately 5 days and the penetration into Laos limited to 10 kilometers (east of the red line on the map at Tab B). The normal ground rules for these type operations with respect to deniability would be observed, i.e. altered maps would be used and the teams briefed that the operations are conducted only in RVN. Phase I operations would continue with their present limitations. 4. Ambassador Sullivan concurs in the operations as proposed to include a 48-hour advance notice of intent to launch an operation. This would amount to a confirmation of an operation shown in the monthly schedule published by MACV (the first exploitation operation, scheduled for June 10, is in abeyance pending Washington approval of the concept). 5. We believe the proposal to be reasonable in view of the restrictions of time and distance, size of forces, and deniability precautions. However, so that we may monitor the program (and veto if necessary), the Department should also be an addressee of the 48-hour advance notification of intent to launch an operation. Recommendation 6. That you approve the proposed Shinning Brass exploitation operations with the understanding that the Department would receive the 48-hour advance notification of intent to launch all future operations. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–12 US. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Cowherd and cleared by Trueheart, Weiss, and James F. Leonard of INR/RES. This memorandum was originally directed to Rusk through Johnson, but Johnson approved it for the Secretary on June 11. 2 Dated June 11; attached but not printed. 3 Attached, but not printed. 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 238. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, June 27, 1966, 0610Z. 1371. 1. Visit by Deputy Assistant Secretary Unger June 24–26 provided excellent opportunity take pulse of Lao body politic in perspective of nineteen-month interval since he left Vientiane. During visit he held discussions with broadly representative cross-section of power elite, highlights of which follow. Big disappointment was weather, which closed in over Luang Prabang for three successive days and forced cancelation of audience with King Savang and luncheon with Crown Prince. Hastily substituted visit to USAID-assisted cluster villages at Banyeun in northern Vientiane plain was also almost washed out by untimely rains. 2. All Lao whom he consulted were unanimous in over-all assessment that there has been steady improvement on political, economic, and military fronts in past year and half. Principal factors cited were (A) ouster of Phoumi and Siho and of disruptive and corrupt influence in government which they represented; (B) return to constitutional forms with election of new National Assembly; (C) steady economic gains, highlighted by continuing success of stabilization program, multilateral undertaking to finance Nam Ngum hydro-electric project, and visible spread of government services (USAID-sponsored) to countryside; (D) growing effectiveness of air strikes and other military and psychological pressures against enemy forces; and (E) increasing Pathet Lao and dissident neutralist defections to friendly forces (from 140 in February to 400 in May). He found, in sum, atmosphere of restrained optimism about internal affairs and also about external situation with Allied military successes in South Vietnam sustaining conviction that North Vietnamese will eventually be brought to bay and RLG achieve some semblance of peace and prosperity. 3. Against this background of relative contentment and moderate progress, Lao nevertheless showed themselves preoccupied with usual set of internal problems. A. There is strengthening conviction that present government, although composed of able men, is spread too thin, and there is general expectation that Souvanna on his return in late July from France will face concerted pressures to enlarge his cabinet, perhaps himself relinquishing one or more portfolios. Unresolved question is whether he can find truly qualified candidates outside of ranks of portfolio-hungry but not very able deputies such as Assembly President Oudom Souvannavong, said to relish portfolio of Minister of Health or of Foreign Affairs; Serc Volavongsa, who seeks Ministry of Public Works; and Khampha Sackda, candidate for now vacant position of Secretary of State for Finance. Souvanna is undoubtedly wise to keep this Pandora’s box closed for as long as he can. B. Assembly deputies are already exercised that their two-year term expires next year. Min Justice Inpeng Suryadhay (himself a deputy) is at work on proposal that King extend term of present deputies from two to five years, which is normal span of service specific in constitution. Few give this proposal much chance of success against expected opposition of King Savang, who personally endorsed two-year term. Another proposal, advanced by Phoui Sananikone, is that King let this Assembly pass into oblivion and exercise his constitutional power to appoint entirely new Assembly. Phoui would vastly prefer this appointive process to either restricted or general elections in context of a divided Laos. Since Souvanna is apparently only mildly concerned at anxieties of deputies over their future, this problem is likely to lie fallow at least until late fall as far as he is concerned. C. Souvanna is increasingly preoccupied, however, with problem of national unity against Neo Lao Hak Xat. He suggested to Phoui June 26 that Phoui accept mandate to establish “union of parties” in National Assembly, which we take to mean a national front incorporating all conservative factions and Neutralists. Union of this sort, while eminently desirable, would have to be based on a meeting of minds between Souvanna and Prince Boun Oum, and until that occurs, Phoui sees no useful role for himself in project. Mere fact, however, that Souvanna sees diminishing value in maintenance of separate Neutralist Party underlines evolution of his thought over past several years. If he could achieve political merger of Neutralists with conservatives into national front (while preserving status of neutrality for Laos), way would be eased to unification of Neutralist armed forces with FAR and to greater military as well as political efficiency. Unification of armed forces is also objective which General Kouprasith Abhay has very much in mind. D. Perhaps because of generally favorable security situation and low level of enemy activity, military concerns did not loom large during talks. Kouprasith said that Lao/Viet may well seek establish fortress base on Bolivens Plateau if pressures continue to mount on their positions in corridor and in South Vietnam. He also anticipates increased enemy rice foraging activity in Panhandle during next dry season. On other hand, he believes friendly guerrilla, conventional, and air operations against enemy in northern Laos are likely to keep him off balance, and a relatively minor threat there, for some time. 4. Visit reaffirmed that Souvanna continues to be central authority on whom all important decisions devolve. He is being roundly criticized by many of his ministers, in particular Vice Premier Leuam Insisienmay, for his failure to consult them on major decisions such as fate of RLAF General Ma. Yet despite his short-comings he remains firmly entrenched in premiership and showed no signs of wanting out. Visits of several foreign personalities to Laos during past week (Unger, Lord Walston, Australian Minister Fraser, British Conservative MP Royle) as well as expected visit of Sainteny 2 have probably buoyed his spirits. Also, he can look forward to being in France from July 7 to 24 and subsequently to attending UN General Assembly in autumn. His visit to USSR has in no way altered his belief that maximum military pressures must be exerted against Hanoi, and while he would strongly resist entry of foreign friendly forces into Laos, he is equally strong advocate of intensified air strikes against NVN. 5. Unger will undoubtedly have much to add to this from his personal impressions. Our own conclusion is that visit was highly successful, providing occasion for Lao themselves to reflect on strides they have made since February 1965 rebellion and to look ahead to future with some confidence. Swank 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, Hong Kong, and Moscow. This telegram was retyped in the White House, but there is no indication whether or not it was sent to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67) 2 Jean Sainteny, former Delegate General of France to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 239. Memorandum of Conversation 239. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 28, 1966, 4–4:25 p.m. I–35641/66 SUBJECT Meeting with Ambassador Sullivan Background: Ambassador William H. Sullivan who was in Washington on home leave and consultations, made a call on the Honorable John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), at 1600 hours, 28 June 1966. In attendance were Rear Admiral F.J. Blouin, Director, Far East Region, OASD(ISA), Colonel J.H. Mobley, Staff Assistant for Laos, OASD(ISA), and Mr. Robert F. Slutz, Department of State Desk Officer for Laos. Ambassador Sullivan reviewed the situation in Laos saying that improvements in the situation in Vietnam are assisting in keeping Laos quiet. He stated that the economic trend in Laos is favorable. Ambassador Sullivan believed that there were hopeful signs that with continued US economic aid, in accordance with the prescription in the President’s Johns Hopkins speech, 2 Laos can eventually become economically independent and viable. To Ambassador Sullivan, this represented a changed attitude from that of a year ago when he was far less optimistic about the economic future of Laos. The Ambassador informed Mr. McNaughton that he understood from previous discussions that a proposal had been made to transfer Laos military assistance from MAP to the Services. He said that he favored this proposal on condition that the sensitivity and classification of the Laos program be maintained in the presentation of Service budgets and in the implementation of the program by the Services. Mr. McNaughton and the Ambassador opined that there will be some opposition in the Congress to the proposed transfer of Laos/Thailand programs from MAP, particularly Thailand. Senator Fulbright was mentioned as being potentially the chief opponent. Ambassador Sullivan discussed the present organizational structure for military assistance in Laos whereby US military assistance in Laos is accomplished by the Requirements Office of USAID. He desired to preserve this organization, since it is considered necessary to abide by the Geneva Accords. A type organization in Thailand (currently DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand) was also believed by the Ambassador to be important to the continued support of the Laos program. Mr. NcNaughton asked what the Lao attitude would be on a “barrier” across Laos to stop the infiltration into SVN. The Ambassador responded by saying that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma would not condone presence of US or other foreign troops and would quit thereby destroying the neutral posture of tri-partite structure of the Lao Government which has existed since the Geneva Accords of 1962. He thought that turmoil would ensue and the war in Laos would be intensified. He believed that the Soviets would withdraw their current support and tacit approval for the Royal Lao Government and would probably resume support and military assistance for Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao leader. The Ambassador pointed out that no materiel assistance from the Soviets is now being given to the Pathet Lao. This would, in his opinion, encourage increased support of the Pathet Lao from North Vietnam and eventually result in a full-scale invasion and over-running of all of Laos by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces, perhaps with the support of Communist China. In any event, a “barrier” would result in giving all Lao territory north of it to the PL which would arouse violent objection from the RLG. 3 The Ambassador stated that he understood six divisions would be required to establish a “barrier.” While Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has said that he would not approve of the presence of US forces in Laos, he has concurred in US activities and operations in Laos. These are the type which are deniable and which do not arouse strenuous opposition from the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. The Ambassador feels that we are now walking a thin wire of tolerance of these activities and operations by the Soviets and Chinese Communists, Ambassador Sullivan remarked that he exercised close control over US personnel in Laos and could, if necessary, cause their removal in a very short period of time. Rather than employ forces in Laos to form a “barrier,” the Ambassador reaffirmed his previously stated proposal for launching an operation against NVN from the sea in the vicinity of Vinh. Ambassador Sullivan revealed his dissatisfaction of US tactical bombing in Laos which concentrates in the lower Panhandle rather than in the area of Laos near the Mu Gia Pass. He believed that an intensification of bombing in this area will be effective in destroying North Vietnamese personnel and materiel at their most vulnerable point, i.e., immediately after crossing the Mu Gia Pass into Laos. The Ambassador said he intended to make this point with the Secretary of Defense, as well as with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he meets with them on Friday, 1 July. 4 The meeting concluded at 1625 at which time Ambassador Sullivan departed accompanied by Mr. McNaughton for an appointment with the Secretary of Defense. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Laos 000.1 (333 Laos), 1966. Top Secret. Drafted by Mobley on July 5 and cleared by Blouin. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. 2 For text of the speech, April 7, 1965, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 848–852. 3 McNaughton sent McNamara a June 30 memorandum describing this “chat” and noting that Sullivan “was very negative about a barrier across Laos.” McNaughton stated that Sullivan “said (1) that ‘Souvanna would quit the next day’ (presumably because a barrier implies the overt presence of US soldiers or their ‘lackeys’ in Laos) and (2) that the Russians would figure the wraps were off and we could expect vigorous Pathet Lao activity in Northern Laos supported by the Russians and perhaps even the Chinese.” Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Laos (Laos 385), 1966. 4 No record of Sullivan’s discussion with McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been found. 240. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 240. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, July 11, 1966, 0930Z. 161. Ref: State circular 4713. 2 1. Believe that two of our recent messages (see Embtel 1371 June 27 3 and Toaid 2798 June 29 4 ) provide background for general conclusion that Laos has made steady improvement on political, economic, and military fronts in past year and half. A. Although country remains divided and at war, it has enjoyed relative political stability under leadership of neutralist PriMin Souvanna Phouma. B. His armed forces have extended security deep into countryside, permitting programs of rural development to make surprising strides in bringing roads, schools, dispensaries, and agricultural services to Lao villagers. C. Under a multilaterally financed program of currency stabilization, value of money has remained relatively stable, allowing urban construction and development to proceed in an atmosphere of increasing confidence. D. Despite strains imposed by defense of its territory against North Vietnamese supported subversion and aggression, RLG has been able to focus increasing efforts on problems of long range economic development. It is taking measures to enhance rice production. It is member of Asian Development Bank. It has concluded agreement with IBRD looking toward construction, under international financing, of the Nam Ngum hydro-electric project in period 1967–1971. This project, part of over-all multilateral development plans for lower Mekong Basin, will irrigate significant area of Vientiane Plain and will provide needed electric power to Laos and neighboring Thailand. It is outstanding example of international support for regional development in SE Asia and of international confidence in RLG and its future. 2. Although end of fighting is not in sight, RLG takes increasing pride in its capacity to contain and to thwart Pathet Lao/NVN aggression and subversion. Armed forces, greatly abetted by a small but efficient tactical air force, have generally good morale and are being by and large efficiently deployed. Defections from enemy ranks have steadily increased during past six months. Refugees continue to flee from enemy held territory strategically situated Meo and other minority peoples increasingly identify their future with that of RLG. 3. Begin FYI. RLG leaders remain publicly neutral in accordance with their 1962 statement BF neutrality. They have openly condemned, however, NVN violation of that neutrality and privately regard NVN as principal source their troubles. They are therefore profoundly aware that their future is intimately linked with course of war in RVN and have gone so far as privately to authorize unpublicized actions by allied forces against enemy forces in Lao territory. They have taken particular encouragement from evident determination of US and its allies to remain in SVN, and that firmness of purpose, although never publicly acknowledged by RLG spokesman, has more than any other single factor persuaded them that their future is not unreliably bleak. End FYI. 4. In sum, over past eighteen months there has been moderate progress in Laos which is all the more encouraging since it has been achieved against great odds. Swank 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House upon receipt at the Department of State. 2 In circular telegram 4713, July 10, the Department of State asked for an assessment of economic, military, and political developments in Asia. (Ibid., POL 2–3 Asia) 3 Document 238 . 4 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 ASIA SE) 241. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 241. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Saigon, July 13, 1966, 0725Z. 24021. Subj: Laotian air operations. 1. From an informal letter addressed to me from Ambassador Unger, 2 Deputy Assistant Secretary Far Eastern Affairs State, I conclude that possibly the Cricket Operation 3 is being touted at Department level as the cure-all for our interdiction efforts in the Laotian Panhandle. 2. This operation has been most effective and shows a sound potential for achieving even more success in the future. However, the tasks facing us in interdicting the principal lines of communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail challenge us to combine and apply all our assets to that end. There is no question of competition between the use of strategic bombing forces and tactical air but only their appropriate application. The devastation and psychological effect achieved by B–52 bombing makes it the most effective and efficient weapons system available for striking area targets. Further, it frees tactical air for use in Cricket and Tiger Hound as well as for explanation of Arc Light results. 3. Our nominations of Arc Light targets in Laos have been for the purpose of attacking a complete LOC system—ration and ammunition dumps, way stations, maintenance areas, warehouses and open storage—as well as the forces involved in support of these resources. It is considered essential, therefore, that the B–52 weapon system be employed in our endeavors in Laos. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Repeated to the Department of State for Unger, which is the source text,OSD, and JCS. Handled as Exdis upon receipt at the Department of State. 2 Not found. 3 Operation Cricket used airborne Forward Air Controllers (FACs) to direct strikes by attack aircraft against promising targets. Rapid assaults on targets was possible because of instantaneous communication between airborne FACs and RLAF headquarters. 242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, July 16, 1966, 2:27 p.m. 9249. Ref: A. Vientiane’s 249. B. ARMA 0471, DTG 140545Z July. 2 Operation Prasane 1. Based on your estimate of prospects for success of Operation Prasane, we inclined go along with your recommendation that we assist FAR in planned assault on Nam Bac. 2. We somewhat disturbed at magnitude of planned operation in area only 60 miles from Dien Bien Phu at time when both King and PriMin out of country and FinMin Sisouk urgently seeking more foreign economic assistance. Not sure how these plans square with implications Souvanna’s recent admonition to General Staff not to provoke sharp enemy reactions (JANAF 0454). 3 3. Nevertheless, we prepared at this time to approve use of your in-country assets, e.g., Air America H–34 helicopters, to provide needed airlift assistance to FAR for this operation. 4. We have serious reservations, however, over introduction of USAF aircraft and pilots into Laos for airlift operations. 4 We would consider this step as major departure from present policy of tactical air support to but not participation in Lao ground operations. 5. Believe political implications this proposal such as to require, as minimum, request from Souvanna for US intervention in this form. 5 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Slutz, cleared by Hamilton of DOD/ISA, and Ewing, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG/THAI. As of July 1, 1966, Department of State telegrams to all posts were numbered consecutively according to the time they were sent. Telegrams repeated to posts for information used the same number. 2 In these telegrams, both July 14, the Embassy and the ARMA set forth the concept of Operation Prasane, a plan to take the strategic town of Nam Bac in Luang Prabang province and thus improve security of the royal capital and lessen pressure on RLG positions in Nam Bac in Phong Saly province. (Both ibid.) 3 Not further identified. 4 The Embassy estimated that to airlift 1,400 FAR troops by helicopter to positions north of Nam Bac would require 10 helicopters with Air America pilots. The Embassy suggested that, instead of tying up so many helicopters, 4 USAF 3–C aircraft with USAF crews should be employed. The risks were considered minimal for the 2-day operation. (Telegram 249 from Vientiane, July 16; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 5 In telegram 335 from Vientiane, July 19, the Embassy reported that as the operation was already underway and delay would adversely affect morale, it was prepared to use in-country assets, Air America helicopters and pilots. (Ibid.) Printed from an unsigned copy. 243. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Sylvester) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 243. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Sylvester) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, July 19, 1966. SUBJECT Credibility and the Release of Casualty Statistics from Laos We are faced with a serious problem in connection with reporting U.S. casualties suffered in operations in and over Laos. Although we have claimed total accuracy in the reporting of our casualties from Southeast Asia, which is true for next of kin, actually we have not told the general public of all of our casualties incurred in Laos. In the case of deaths, MIA, and detained personnel, next of kin are notified of the casualty, where the casualty occurred, and the known circumstances. We reply accurately to specific press queries as to whether a specific individual was killed or lost in Laos, but we do not issue full statistics or lists of names of casualties. This question was raised in a background session of Thursday, May 5, on an off-the-record basis (transcript at Tab A). 2 We stated or at least inferred at that time that Laotian casualties would be folded in to our casualties report from Vietnam. We were, in fact, only talking about combat deaths and at that time, in response to persistent inquiries, had made a special release of the total number of such deaths incurred since the beginning of our Laotian requested reconnaissance sorties in Laos—11. Based on conversations with the Deputy Secretary, I assumed that I had authority to fold such deaths in to our weekly statistical casualty reports to the press. However, the Directorate for Statistical Services, OASD (Comptroller) did not agree, and the deaths have not been included. I should add that until now this has not caused difficulty, since the “Pentagon Regulars” understand our problem and have pushed us only mildly on the matter. It is possibly just as well that the action was deferred since the problem is more difficult than appeared at that time. For example, we have neither announced nor confirmed the 11 servicemen killed in Laos prior to the initiation of our reconnaissance flights, nor have we said anything specific concerning wounded, missing, or captured personnel. The entire problem should be addressed, not just the KIA portion. What is at stake now is the credibility of the Department of Defense and of the Administration as a whole. We have been accused recently of not telling the whole story with respect to all our Southeast Asia combat casualties, and we cannot truthfully deny such accusations. To date, no one of note has questioned this matter but we cannot hope to stay clear of the problem indefinitely. I have discussed this matter at length with the key members of my office and we are all agreed that we must face up to it now or be subjected to great censure if some enterprising journalist or politician digs into it. There are several alternatives available: 1. Continue as we are at present, not announcing Laotian casualties as they occur but making future periodic announcements of the total killed in Laos since the initiation of reconnaissance flights. This course would not take care of the 11 KIA’s which occurred prior to the beginning of those flights nor would it accommodate other types of casualties, such as missing in action. Consequently, our credibility would still be suspect and understandably so. Further, we would be subject to being caught at any time because of unclassified Defense Department reports of Laotian casualties, which receive wide circulation. I refer particularly to the report issued weekly by the Directorate for Statistical Services (sample at Tab B). 3 This course probably would be acceptable to Ambassador Sullivan and the Laotian Government but does not solve the credibility problem. 2. Fold in all casualties (not just deaths) on a predetermined date with our Vietnam casualty reports and then keep up to date as casualties occur. This would have to include our daily release of the names of casualties (which do not include mention of the country concerned), since both AP and UPI keep book on us and make sure that the total number of names released equals the total numbers announced. This latter requirement provides the basic weakness of this alternative since the wire services, by specifically requesting where each individual listed was killed or was located when reported MIA or wounded, could extract the total casualties incurred in Laos—even though this information was not available from the published totals. Such action would permit them to publish separately and regularly a Laotian casualty list. This would be obviously contrary to our national policy. We could possibly decline to answer such specific requests on the basis of national security but the information could be obtained from the next of kin if the wire services or some other media or political group wished to take the trouble to check. Needless to say, Ambassador Sullivan might complain. Should we adopt this alternative today, we would have to include 28 KIA (including the 11 killed prior to the beginning of the requested reconnaissance flights, the names of the 11 disclosed in May and six new dead since then), 26 WIA, 34 MIA, and two captured. This influx of names almost certainly would cause a short press flap. However, we could live with this except for the potential problem already mentioned of weekly, press generated Laotian casualty reports. 4 3. Begin issuing regular Laotian casualty reports. This has the major disadvantage of being completely contrary to current national policy, distasteful to the Laotians and Ambassador Sullivan, and might give an indication of the level of our effort in Laos. On the plus side, however, it is the best solution from the standpoint of credibility. We could truthfully rebut any accusation of hiding our casualties in connection with the war in Vietnam. 4. Do nothing. This alternative would be most acceptable to Ambassador Sullivan and Souvanna Phouma, but put us in a hopeless situation should the matter of the credibility of our casualty statistics ever be seriously pushed. We would also be on the spot should we ever begin to use B–52’s regularly in Laos or mount clandestine ground operations in that country which result in casualties. Basically, the problem revolves around two points: (1) Is it more important to the Administration to cater to Souvanna Phouma and continue to try to hide our Laotian casualties, or (2) is it more important to strike a blow to close the alleged “credibility gap” and assure the American public that we are telling the truth about all our combat casualties in Southeast Asia. I believe that the latter point is overriding. Our credibility is under attack and the severe blow which could be inflicted by the revelation that we are hiding casualties could be a telling one in the November elections. I recommend therefore that we adopt alternative 2, concurrently explaining the national security ramifications involved to the responsible newsmen concerned in the hope that they do not push on the matter of trying to issue regular Laotian casualty reports. Arthur Sylvester 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Laos 1966 (Laos 704). Secret. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Attached but not printed. 4 McNamara approved Alternative 2 on July 20. 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, August 3, 1966, 0521Z. 641. Subj: Effectiveness of USAF operations in northern Laos. 1. Believe action and information addressees will find of more than routine interest following recapitulation of contribution of USAF air operations to ground actions in northern Laos from April 1966 to present. 2. Enemy strength in northern Laos (Provinces of Houa Khong, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Houa Phan, and Phong Saly) has increased spectacularly over past year from total of 39 battalions as of 1 July 1965 to 63 battalions as of 1 July 1966. A. On 1 July 1965 we estimate there were (1) one bn NVN; (2) 15 bns PL with NVN advisers; and (3) 23 bns PL/NVN (bns with attached NVN units of company size). B. On 1 July 1966 we estimate there were (1) 13 bns NVN infantry; (2) 10 bns NVN engineer troops; (3) 15 bns PL with NVN advisers; and (4) 25 bns PL/NVN. 3. This large build-up of NVN troops began last fall and culminated in largest DRV offensive yet seen in northern Laos. Offensive began in November 1965 and succeeded in taking number of long existing sites from friendly forces in Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Province as well as sites recently regained by Vang Pao. Friendly forces did not panic, fought series of bitter actions against NVN units, and moved to new bases north and west of enemy forces in order to be so placed as to put continuing pressure on enemy flanks. Enemy intention was apparently to establish a secure LOC along Route 6 to Plain of Jars with ultimate objective of being in position to resume offensive at start of next dry season (October 1966). 4. In April 1966 an integrated close air support system was introduced. Additional forward air controllers were stationed in area; A 1–E’s were used as airborne forward control; approximately 32 jet sorties were scheduled daily; and close collaboration was established [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] to provide detailed and timely intelligence on enemy movements and on enemy logistics on Routes 6 and 7. 5. Marriage of excellent intelligence furnished by CAS and superb performance by 7th AE units enabled outnumbered friendly units not only to contain enemy offensive but to mount a counter offensive which has now regained 90 per cent of area lost from November 1965 to April 1966. RLAF T–28’s also made considerable contribution to this effort. Enemy troop strength is still greater than friendly troop strength but high casualties inflicted on enemy units plus severe shortage of supplies brought about by airstrikes on enemy logistical system lowered morale of both NVN and PL units. Loss of morale and lack of supplies have enabled friendly elements to gain and hold the initiative. 6. Enemy casualties in northern Laos from November 1965 until June 1966 in total of 952 ground clashes have been 1,359 KIA and 783 WIA; friendly losses this period have been 517 KIA and 678 WIA. During May/June alone, in 348 clashes enemy lost 556 KIA and 134 WIA. Although these figures reflect combined NVN/PL casualties, they were predominantly North Vietnamese regular troops and were result of a grinding guerrilla campaign of ambushes, small unit actions, etc. In addition, from November 1965 until June 1966 enemy lost by conservative estimate (predominantly from ground observers) some 4,300 KIA and 700 WIA from USAF and RLAF air strikes. 7. Apart from their in-country significance, operations in northern Laos have thus made an important contribution to Allied military effort in Vietnam by engaging a substantial portion of DRV forces cited in paragraph 2B above in costly operations outside main theater of operation in SVN. Single most important factor rendering these operations costly to enemy has been USAF tactical support. Recommend CINCPAC extend our appreciation and congratulations to commands concerned through appropriately classified channels. Swank 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, Saigon, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG, and OSD. The substance of this telegram was retyped in the White House and sent to the President under cover of a note from Rostow, August 3, 3 p.m., which reads: “We often forget there is a significant—secondary—war going on in Laos. Here is an interesting account of recent operations.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67) 245. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 245. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 8, 1966. You will be meeting with Ambassador William H. Sullivan, our Ambassador to Laos, at noon today. 2 The meeting was proposed by Secretary Rusk who thought you would be interested in getting Sullivan’s report on current political and military developments in Laos and his views on our future course there, particularly as they relate to Viet-Nam. Sullivan is one of the brighter young (43) foreign service officers. He has been in Laos since December 1964. You may want to ask him: (1) How things are going in Laos; (2) How is Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma holding up; is the internal political situation relatively stable; (3) How does he read the significant North Vietnamese military buildup in Laos over the last year (one NVN Battalion believed in Laos on July 1965, 13 NVN Battalions in Laos on July 1, 1966); (4) How much pressure is Souvanna under from the Soviets as a result of our involvement in Laos; (5) His estimate of the effectiveness of our aerial support in Laos; (6) Are there things we should be doing that we are not doing in Laos? A biographic note is attached. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Confidential. 2 No substantive record of the Sullivan-Johnson conversation has been found. Sullivan mentioned that during his consultations in Washington he discussed interdicting infiltration by bombing the southern portion of North Vietnam. (Telegram 1299 from Vientiane, September 2; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 Attached, but not printed. 246. Report by the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 246. Report by the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, August 16, 1966. [Here follows a report of Colby’s trip to South Vietnam.] Laos 8. As noted in the cable sent to you (copy attached), 2 I found the situation in Laos exhilarating. This is not only true of Northern Laos, which my cable discussed, but also of the situation in the South. The bases at Pakse and Savannakhet are vigorously targeted at the principal objective in the area, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and are pressing operations there with courage, energy and a high degree of professionalism. Most heartening was the contrast between this visit in July and my visit to Laos in October 1965. At that time, Pathet Lao guerrillas were at large in the neighborhood of the city and indeed in January 1966 attacked a radio relay post on the hill overlooking the city, the key Plateau of Bolovens was an inviting and vulnerable target for Pathet Lao seizure and the FAR was torn between trying to defend against at least three PL/VC threats near Saravane, Attopeu and Pak Song. In July 1966, an extensive net of local security forces exists on the Plateau except for a small area of residual Pathet Lao presence being encircled and gradually eliminated. The area near Saravane has been subjected to a most impressive exercise in “oil spotting” so that the road is now open between there and Pakse, protected by village security forces and Special Guerrilla Units. Both Lao and USAF aircraft are finding remunerative targets. In contrast to the situation in Laos in October of 1965, these areas are being used as jump off points for road watch and harassment teams moving east of the Sekong River into the Ho Chi Minh Trail area. One limitation on these operations is the availability of adequate armored helicopter support, which we will be trying to increase. Our side in Laos has the initiative and is looking around for additional work to do. 9. The most important point of a review of the Lao situation is the clear effect of a smoothly working country team under a forceful Ambassador and the strength that results from patient adherence to a balanced program of building popular participation in local security forces, guerrilla units for reinforcement and regular forces for contesting the main forces of the enemy, with full use of closely coordinated air support. Since this is a direct development of the President’s action plan for Laos initiated in July 1963, 3 it is reasonable to expect that a balanced program such as this, prosecuted consistently over a several year period, can be relied upon elsewhere not only to hold off Communist encroachment, but to press it backwards. 10. This Station will probably need small additions to its strength levels to enable it to carry on these programs, plus a variety of opportunities which present themselves in Vientiane for coverage of North Vietnam [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. The basic approach, however, of small scale U.S. and unobtrusive (except to the enemy) efforts will be maintained and will be afforded henceforth the same priority for calls on Headquarters support as that accorded the Vietnam operation directly. We shall also begin the process of developing the cloak, and later the reality, of legality of the paramilitary forces supported in Laos, so that this support may with all deliberate speed be shifted to more regular channels and the programs not be jeopardized by political difficulties in quieter times. [Here follow a report of Colby’s trip to Thailand, Indonesia, and a very brief general assessment.] 1 Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Far East General. Secret. 2 The attached telegram from Colby at Udorn, July 28, described the North Vietnamese buildup and offensive in north Laos against Meo (Hmong) units that began in November 1965. Meo units fought a series of bitter actions as they retreated. In April 1966 the USAF began jet sorties against the North Vietnamese in close collaboration with Vang Pao and the Meo. Colby noted that “the marriage of excellent intelligence furnished by CAS and the superb performance by the 7th AF has enabled outnumbered friendly units to not only contain the enemy offensive, but to mount a counteroffensive which has regained 90% of the area lost.” 3 For documentation on the plan, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 1019 – 1043 . 247. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report 247. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report 1 September 6, 1966. [ document number not declassified ] SUBJECT An appraisal of the political situation in Laos as of 4 September 1966 ACQ [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] SOURCE Staff officer of this organization. This [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] appraisal of the current situation. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation. 1. Summary . Although there is a temporary lull in the political confrontation between Souvanna Phouma and the National Assembly, the factors that caused the crisis still exist. Souvanna’s political demands were emotionally inspired and were not to achieve specific political objectives. During the crisis, anti-Souvanna sentiment and the concept of an inevitable change of government increased in scope; however, Assembly leadership failed to provide a formula of alternate leadership and failed to develop a widespread desire to bring down Souvanna’s government. The King’s view that it was essential to retain Souvanna government was presented to the Assembly by Dr. Oudom Souvannavong; however Oudom was not in Vientiane when it came to a showdown. The army played a major role in preserving Souvanna as Prime Minister and dispatched officers to persuade deputies to tone down their attacks. Senior generals were prepared to support Souvanna temporarily; but said that time is coming for a change. Lao Armed Forces’ schedule calls for a gradual assumption of power through political means. Souvanna’s government could fail as a result of: ill conceived vote of censure or no confidence by Assembly; or as a result of an over-reaction by the young-power seeking colonels to a crisis in Vientiane. However, Souvanna will probably not lose his mandate before the Assembly closes in October. The real-power seekers are trying to wear Souvanna down, and, at the same time, are building up their own political machine which will arrange an orderly transition of power. [Here follows a 10-page report.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National, Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 248. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to the 303 Committee 248. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to the 303 Committee 1 Washington, September 8, 1966. SUBJECT Status Report on CIA Counterinsurgency Operations in Laos 1. Summary From the Fall of 1965 to date an estimated 70,000 North Vietnamese personnel have been committed to a priority campaign in cooperation with the puppet Pathet Lao forces in Laos to: A. Occupy and control the strategically important North and Northeast area of Laos. B. To develop and maintain a complex road network through the Panhandle of Laos (the “Ho Chi Minh Trail”) in order to funnel personnel and supplies to the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. Because of the magnitude and severity of this predominantly North Vietnamese drive, coupled with the war in Vietnam, it has been of priority importance to use CIA-trained and -armed tribal assets as elements of a coordinated Country Team program against these two major North Vietnamese efforts. During late-1965 and early-1966 there was a major enemy buildup in all three Northern project areas (see Tab A). 2 Twelve battalions of North Vietnamese infantry, ten battalions of North Vietnamese engineer troops, fifteen battalions of Pathet Lao with North Vietnamese advisors, and twenty-five battalions of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese entered in Northern Laos. In the Sam Neua compartment the enemy took a number of long-held friendly positions in a series of bitterly contested engagements. Meo units under General Vang Pao moved to positions north and west of the line of advance, remaining in position to put constant pressure on the enemy’s flanks during his drive south. In the Nam Ou corridor, south of Phong Saly in North Laos, the enemy succeeded in clearing the significant Nam Ou River Valley of friendly opposition and then proceeded to buildup his logistical channels from Dien Bien Phu down the Nam Ou to the north of Luang Prabang both east and west of the river. Along the Nam Tha corridor enemy action reflected a trend similar to that of the Nam Ou area in efforts to expand south attempting to clear the river valley of friendly influences, secure the rice-producing area, and consolidate gains. In April 1966 the United States Air Force with Forward Air Controllers joined the action. A close collaboration was established between the Headquarters of General Vang Pao (Leader of the Meo Paramilitary force), the 7th Air Force, and CIA/Vientiane [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to provide detailed and timely intelligence to the strike aircraft operating in direct support of ground action. Concurrently a series of guerrilla actions were initiated by friendly forces. The merger of these two actions enabled friendly units not only to contain the enemy offensive but to mount a counteroffensive which regained 90 per cent of the area lost during the previous enemy offensive. Although out- numbered, our paramilitary forces now have the initiative and are engaging the enemy on an almost daily basis. With direct air support provided by 7th Air Force planes who receive target briefs from the target analysis and control base at Udorn, they are tying down a large DRV force, inflicting significant troop casualties, destroying supplies and effectively interrupting logistical lines. During this same period, we have trained and deployed 29 roadwatch teams along the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” in Southeast Laos to provide tactical information on the movement of men and materiel into South Vietnam. This information is transmitted by radio to the Central Control Base in Udorn, Thailand, and to FAC aircraft to facilitate Air Force interdiction attacks against the Trail. Techniques to facilitate this Country Team interdiction campaign are being improved constantly. Tribal assets are employed to provide security for forward team launch bases. Additionally, a Country Team area security program called the Sedone Valley Project is proving successful in consolidating the western-half of the lower Lao panhandle and providing a secure base for operations into the “Ho Chi Minh Trail”. CIA directs the security aspects of this program. In the conduct of this counterinsurgency program, CIA provides logistics, salaries, and subsistence to the tribal forces and provides support base and training facilities. One of the largest cost items is the provision of air support for forward supply of field forces and infiltration/exfiltration of teams. 2. Problem CIA programs in Laos should be continued and in some cases expanded to deal with NVN/PL incursion, as an integral part of the war in Vietnam. [Here follow sections 3, “Factors Bearing on the Problem” and 4, “Coordination,” totaling 14 pages.] 5. Recommendation Because of the importance of the counterinsurgency program in Laos to the overall United States effort in Vietnam it is requested that the Committee endorse the continuation and expansion of the program as outlined above and summarized in the attached chart (Tab B). 3 It should be understood that continuation and expansion of this program as recommended will necessitate raising the funding level in FY 1967 [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. It will therefore be necessary for CAS to request supplemental appropriations for this purpose in the amount of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]in FY 1967. 4 1 Source: Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, 9/15/66. Secret; Eyes Alone. No drafting information or attribution appears on the source text. A September 13 memorandum from William Bundy to Alexis Johnson commenting on this report indicates that it was prepared by CIA. Bundy supported the recommendations that the operations be continued and expanded by 3,000 persons in FY 1967, but he believed that the justification for these operations were not tied exclusively to Vietnam. Bundy believed that they were important for the security of Laos and the Mekong Valley. (Ibid.) 2 Attached, but not printed. 3 Attached, but not printed. 4 This recommendation was approved at the 303 Committee meeting of September 15 as an “exemplary success story.” U. Alexis Johnson reiterated Bundy’s belief that the operations aided the U.S. position in Thailand. (Minutes of the 303 Committee, September 15; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, 9/15/66) 249. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 249. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, September 11, 1966, 0715Z. 1447. Joint Embassy/ARMA/CAS message. Subject: North Vietnamese order of battle in Laos. Ref: A. CINCPAC 180030Z Aug (notal). 2 B. FOV 9190. 3 C. AmEmb Vtn 641/030521Z Aug. 4 1. This is a preliminary response to Ref A based on information provided by CAS Vientiane. Mission plans conduct in very near future review of enemy OB in Laos and will furnish addressees with results of this review. We believe that this review will be facilitated as result increased emphasis on south Laos [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Intelligence produced by this effort should enable us to make hard estimate through collection all source data whereas previous estimates for south Laos had minimal input from controlled assets. 2. CAS OB estimate for 1 July 1965 reflected two possible NVNA infantry bns with Lao troops, 4,525 NVNA troops attached to PL battalions in platoon to company strength (PL/NVNA), and 700 NVNA troops attached to PL battalions as advisors (PL/NVNA), giving total 5,825 probable troops in Laos. In addition CAS estimates that there were about 10,000 engineers (including coolie labor) and about 3,000 NVNA personnel in support activities such as medical, supply, transportation, signal, command, etc., which gave total 18,325 NVNA personnel in Laos as of 1 July 1965. 3. OB estimates for 1 July 1966 reflected 19 probably NVNA infantry bns with strength of 7,435 troops, 4,525 NVNA troops attached to PL battalions from platoon to company strength and 680 NVNA troops attached to PL battalions as advisors. Same estimate reflected 21,000 engineers (including coolies) and about 7,000 in support activities which gave total of 42,265 NVNA personnel in Laos as of 1 July 1966. 4. Comparison of 1 July 1965 and 1 July 1966 figures indicate increase of 23,430 NVNA personnel in Laos during that one year period. 5. Eighty percent of the infantry (NVNA) (PL/NVNA) and (PL/NVN) increase attributable to influx of new personnel into Laos from North Vietnam. A 100 percent increase in engineer personnel (including coolies) reflected movement new personnel into Laos in conjunction with 50 percent increase engineer effort at road building maintenance during the past nine months. 6. Support personnel in Laos increased over 100 percent in connection with increased activity in infantry and engineer fields. 7. Above figures considered as confirmed within CAS’s OB accept-ance criteria (para 8) and as such reflect reporting from human sources in areas where there is continuing coverage in depth. As indicated paras 5 and 6, therefore, major portion above increase reflects actual movement new NVNA personnel and units into Laos including normal replacement filler troops for KIA/WIA. 8. Determination if new enemy troops are replacements for losses, normal rotation or new units made only after lengthy analysis of several months traffic. On occasion, however, such as NVN prisoner taken Na Khang Battle past February, reported in FOV 8942, 5 CAS obtained firsthand information on movement new NVN units into Laos. Otherwise professional analysis of reports using well established OB techniques; experience of OB analyst and common sense are blended in making judgements on which troops reflect casualty rotation replacements vis-à-vis troops belonging to new unit. For example, four thousand troops reported Ref B not killed in one fell swoop but over period Nov 65–Jun 66, prior to, throughout and after which period CAS continues receive reports of manpower conscription throughout Laos and of troops arriving in Laos from NVN. 9. Ref A, however, also considered areas not covered in depth by CAS human sources and reflected use of sources such as aerial photography, special intelligence and refugee interrogations to make estimate of enemy strength in those areas. This estimate primarily an extension of enemy strength identified in well covered areas of Laos and as such CAS considers majority enemy personnel in areas where estimates were made to also reflect new bodies from NVN. 10. CAS conclusion: at least two-thirds of NVN increase mentioned Ref B attributable actual movement new personnel into Laos. Increase in PL strength (Ref B) on other hand reflects almost exclusively bookkeeping changes based on refinement of estimates made possible by receipt additional and more detailed information. 11. ARMA believes that there is conclusive evidence of a substantial NVA buildup during period Jul 65–66. ARMA also believes that there is evidence of a diminution in PL combat and combat support activity which may to some extent offset the NVA increase as well as reduce CAS’s estimate of PL strength. ARMA not convinced (A) that enemy losses (KIA, WIA, and rallies) are adequately reflected, (B) that enemy effective unit strengths are as high as CAS estimates, nor (C) that enemy unit designations are not inflated by deception tactics as practiced in RVN. These reservations concerning accuracy of existing estimates are being fully examined in ARMA study now under way to which CAS is contributing. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. 2 Dated August 18. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 3 Not further identified. 4 Document 244 . 5 Not further identified. 250. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 250. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 15, 1966. SUBJECT Project Pop Eye As you know, we are vitally interested in reducing infiltration into South Vietnam through the Laotian panhandle. Vehicular travel in this area is virtually halted by softening of the road surfaces during the monsoon season. Project Pop Eye is a covert and highly classified operational experiment which we plan to run within the next few weeks in the Laotian panhandle. It will determine the feasibility of increasing the rainfall during the current monsoon season and possibly extending its duration. The objective would be to damage the trail structure by heavy rain. The materials involved are non-toxic and will not harm vegetation. The increased rainfall will be limited to a small controlled area, approximately 200 square miles. Plans have been made and will be put into operation within approximately 20 days—just prior to the end of the normal monsoon season. Concurrence in the merits of the experiment has been received from both the JCS and the theater commanders. Technical adequacy of the experiment has been verified by Dr. Hornig who concurs that we should proceed. Approval for the conduct of the test has been received from Ambassador Sullivan under the condition that it be run covertly, and the State Department has also concurred. I have authorized the program to proceed even though there may be some objections raised by the international scientific community—if there is a breach in security. Such possible objections have not, in the past, prevented the carrying out of military operations considered to be in the interests of our national security. The task of inhibiting infiltration into South Vietnam is one of our most serious unsolved problems—this project might offer a partial solution, if the experiment is successful. Robert S. McNamara 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VII, 5/66–6/67. Top Secret. 251. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 251. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Saigon, September 16, 1966, 0518Z. 160518Z. For Admiral Sharp, info General Wheeler, from General Westmoreland. Subject: Tiger Hound. 1. As result my increasing concern with the enemy’s capability to build-up in Laotian Panhandle again this dry season as he did during last northeast monsoon period, I directed my staff to develop a plan to block, deny, spoil, and disrupt the infiltration of enemy personnel and supplies through this area into SVN. I will send you by separate message an outline of my general concept to be known as “SLAM”—(seek-locate-annihilate-monitor). 2. A major goal of our plan will be to achieve better integration and more concerted use of resources available to the several agencies operating in subject area. For example, we sometimes find that an air operation must be restricted because road watchers have been established (without prior coordination) in proximity of a priority interdiction point selected by Tiger Hound task force. There is real need for close advance coordination of Cricket expansion with Tiger Hound. To be effective, Tiger Hound needs more free strike zones rather than more restricted areas. 3. At my request, Ambassador Sullivan, Ambassador Martin and I met in Udorn on 14 Sep to start the ball rolling. Gen Momyer accompanied me; Ambassador Sullivan brought his Army and Air Attaches and a representative of CAS/Vientiane. We started with background briefings on intelligence situation (J2/MACV) and on Tally Ho/route package one (Gen Momyer), emphasizing interrelation these two areas with Tiger Hound and Steel Tiger north. A briefing on the MACV SLAM concept and an update on CAS/Vientiane operations followed. 4. CAS/V outlined current Cricket assets including present and projected locations. Program underway to expand assets in southern portion of Panhandle. Coordination is working well in Barrell Roll area; major goal is to get similar combined efforts underway in Tiger Hound. A major problem has been getting compatible communications. It is anticipated that ground teams will be equipped with HT–2 radios by end of month for communication with FACs. CAS/V is working up an overall package to develop a multi-sensor intelligence collection capability, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. 5. Substance of major items discussed: A. MACV Concept. There was general agreement with the concept. Amb Sullivan emphasized his endorsement of necessity to assume that enemy will meet or exceed his efforts during last dry season. Amb Martin emphasized his endorsement of basic premise that we should start now to intensify operations in Laos to spoil the enemy build-up. In this connection, Amb Sullivan stressed the importance of striking hard between now and mid-November in route package one. If enemy is to build-up in Laos, he will have to assemble construction personnel and equipment in this area during that period; the enemy should present a more lucrative target there than after entering Laos and dispersing. This is part of the MACV concept outlined to them. We currently are giving priority to Tally Ho and route package one with emphasis on flexibility to shift weight of effort whenever necessary among Tiger Hound, Steel Tiger North, Tally Ho, and route package one. B. Arc Light. I outlined the importance of Arc Light to the SLAM concept and discussed desirability of expeditious concurrence and support for Arc Light strikes from AmEmb Vientiane. Ambassador Sullivan indicated general agreement with strikes in the border areas between Laos and SVN and between Laos and NVN. He stated he was willing to request Souvanna Phouma’s concurrence regarding specific areas about which there is hard intelligence; however, State in Washington must approve this and, so far, had opposed his doing so. Considerable discussion developed concerning Arc Light strikes in DMZ and NVN; the thrust of the comments from Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin was that, while they recognized the sensitiveness of this issue, they considered it less sensitive than what we are doing in Laos. I informed them of my position in favor of Arc Light strikes in the DMZ and suggested the Ambassadors get their points across to Washington. The question of B42 bases closer to target areas to improve reaction time also was raised. I pointed out the advantages of bases in the Philippines and Thailand in terms of improved reaction time; Ambassador Martin made a rather strong favorable pitch for Sittahip, Thailand, as a B52 base. C. Coordination of Operations. I stressed the seriousness of the threat which an enemy build-up in Tiger Hound area poses to my west flank and the importance of having maximum practicable freedom to conduct effective military operations. A particular issue emerging from ensuing discussion was the positioning of ground elements by CAS without prior coordination with MACV, thereby imposing restrictions on US air operations, e.g., road-watch positions located at selected interdiction points (SIPs). Amb Sullivan agreed that mutual coordination was necessary. It was decided to hold a staff-level conference in Saigon during the week of 19 Sep to work out this and similar problems (Amb Sullivan will initiate a cable to recommend specific dates). D. Exchange of Intelligence. We raised problems of getting information obtained by road watchers into MACV intelligence system quickly and completely. It was recognized that CAS/Vientiane passes intelligence to MACV through CAS/Saigon in accordance with basic CAS policies, but this is a slow procedure. We proposed a full-time liaison officer from J2/MACV be accepted under such cover as Amb Sullivan desires in order to expedite the direct exchange of intelligence between AmEmb Vientiane and J2/MACV. There was some discussion of an alternate plan to station a J2/MACV liaison officer at Udorn; nothing specific was decided. This matter will be discussed further at Saigon coordination conference. E. Shining Brass. Chief SOG/MACV briefly discussed plans for increasing size and capabilities of Shining Brass assets. Amb Sullivan again raised the comparative sensitiveness of Laos and the DMZ; he seemed to favor putting Shining Brass assets in the DMZ. I pointed out the importance of getting prompt concurrence from AmEmb Vientiane on Shining Brass missions and discussed extension of the Shining Brass special operating area opposite Quang Tri Province from 5 KM to 20 KM. This is required on an urgent basis because of the current threat to Quang Tri Province and the enemy capability to slip around the DMZ and strike into the province from the west. I consider it enemy attempt to mount a “Dien Bien Phu” type operation against, for example, Khe Sanh. Province is part of my overall plan aggressively to seek information and to nip in the bud any enemy attempts to strike from that area into Quang Tri Province. Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin both expressed similar concern and supported my analysis, particularly in view of the enemy’s need to achieve some dramatic success in period just before US elections. Nevertheless, Ambassador Sullivan stated that, because of his earlier approval of Shining Brass mission with which Washington did not agree, he now had to forward all Shining Brass requests to State Department for their consideration. F. Free Strike Zones. There was general discussion on reducing restrictions on air operations in Tiger Hound. No decisions were reached. This matter will be reopened at proposed Saigon conference during week of 19 Sep. 6. It is imperative that we take action now to reduced further enemy build-up in the Panhandle rather than wait until build-up has occurred. 7. I consider this Udorn meeting to be a good start on better integration of operations in the Laotian Panhandle. Anticipate more concrete progress at Saigon conference week of 19 Sep. Will keep you informed. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 58, Cables, 9/1–18/66. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to JCS for Wheeler. 252. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 252. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Saigon, September 16, 1966, 0519Z. 160519Z. Personal for Adm Sharp, info Gen Wheeler, from Gen Westmoreland. Subj: COMUSMACV SLAM concept (U). Ref: COMUSMACV 160518 Z Sep. 2 1. Reference reported on conference between Amb Sullivan, Amb Martin and myself. This message outlines MACV “SLAM” concept referred to in reference. 2. With arrival of northeast monsoon season, weather in Laotian Panhandle will be clearing and enemy is expected to infiltrate personnel and supporting material in quantity through that area. The requirement to counter this threat is evident. If allowed to go unchecked, it will permit enemy to engage our flank in Quang Tri Province from the west and will permit large scale diversionary attacks further south. 3. The seriousness of this thrust led us to development of a new concept to block, deny, spoil, and disrupt the infiltration of enemy personnel and supplies through Laos during the forthcoming dry season. During the previous dry season we were experimenting, developing tactics and techniques, and building up our assets. Capitalizing on our experience and improvement of resources, we now have developed a concept of operations for the forthcoming period of good weather which I believe will improve significantly our ability to counter the infiltration threat through the Laotian Panhandle. The concept hinges on two basic principles: A. First, we will intensify around-the-clock surveillance and interdiction of known infiltration routes. This process will stress attack of selected interdiction points (SIPs) as well as strikes against targets of opportunity. B. Second, we will concentrate our resources on successive key target areas to be known as “SLAMs.” 4. Highlights of our concept, which consists in turn of a series of overlapping phases, are as follows: A. Phase One. All intelligence collection agencies (all-sensor air reconnaissance, road watcher, FAC’s, Shining Brass, etc.) will intensify their efforts. Our goal in this phase is to refine our knowledge of enemy capabilities to infiltrate through Laos and to obtain indications as to what and where he will put his major efforts. During this collection phase, we will continue normal Tiger Hound strikes and other actions at approximately current rates. In essence, during the pre-northeast monsoon season, we will continue pressure with Tally Ho interdiction in route package one, keeping a sharp eye on Steel Tiger. B. Phase Two. As our intelligence base expands, we will effect transition from phase one into phase two. Current reconnaissance and offensive operations throughout the Panhandle will be continued, with priority to enemy buildup capabilities, i.e., engineer and other construction efforts, way stations, supply points, and staging areas. Concentrated intelligence on these potential target areas will provide required data for selection of key target areas. C. Phase Three. Once an area is designated as a “SLAM,” we will hit the target with sufficient B–52 and tactical airstrikes to neutralize it. This action will be followed by visual and photo air reconnaissance and/or ground reconnaissance patrols and, if appropriate, exploitation forces. During the stage involving ground forces, the only application of air power will be in direct support of Shining Brass. Latter elements, on withdrawal, will leave mines and booby traps; Air Force will follow with air-delivered land mines. In special instances, we plan to leave “stay behind” reconnaissance parties. Dependent upon the area and intelligence, the sequence of applying these resources will be altered. This process will be repeated against each developed target. It is essential in this regard, to understand that massing our efforts on a specific “SLAM” area does not mean ignoring other targets. FAC’s and armed reconnaissance aircraft will be scouring the roads; road watchers and Shining Brass will operate in their territories; and our other intelligence operations will continue. D. During all phases, there will be an intensification of psychological warfare and herbicide operations. 5. In summary, the enemy capability to infiltrate personnel and supporting material through the Laotian Panhandle is a definite threat to our efforts in SVN. We must use all assets at our disposal to block, deny, spoil and disrupt this infiltration. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 58, Cables, 9/1–18/66. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Exclusive. Repeated to the JCS for Wheeler. 2 Document 251 . 253. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report 253. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report 1 September 27, 1966. [ document number not declassified ] SUBJECT An appraisal of the political situation in Laos as of 27 September 1966 ACQ [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] SOURCE Staff officer of this organization. This [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] appraisal of the current situation. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation. 1. Summary. Since the defeat of the budget on 16 September 1966 and the subsiding of the flood waters in the city without serious epidemic or starvation, there has been the most intensive period of political maneuvering in Vientiane since the July 1965 elections. The main contestants, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and a majority grouping of the Assembly, have competed to influence the King, the King’s Council and the army without, however, resorting to violence or even a serious threat of violence. The extremity of the positions initially adopted by each contestant eased somewhat and a compromise solution which would preserve elements of the positions of both sides can yet emerge from the continuing discussions. The intense political activity that took place in the period from 16 to 26 September was characterized by the following main thrusts: A. The Assembly acted with a greater degree of cohesion than heretofore, first in its disparate elements combining to vote against the budget and later when the repercussions of this action and Souvanna’s counteraction became apparent, to work under some degree of leadership for its survival. B. Souvanna plunged into the political fight using his influence with the King, with the King’s Council and to a lesser extent with the army to bring pressure on the Assembly to back down. C. The King has not shunned his constitutional responsibility for playing a decisive role in resolving controversies of this sort, but he has thus far sought to let the parties play their game out with a minimum of interference. D. Lastly, the army as an organizational entity did not intervene to influence the Assembly directly in favor of the government and Souvanna did not seek this. Its overall political role was more passive than in previous crises and it worked to control its own rebellious elements, the perennial angry colonels of the Fifth Military Zone. [Here follows a 5-page report.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 254. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Donnelly) 254. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Donnelly) 1 Washington, October 3, 1966. SUBJECT Shining Brass I have your memorandum of September 30 to Mr. Bundy 2 and, by means of a review of how Shining Brass has come to be what and where it is, would like to explain our reasons for asking that you seek to clear the proposed Public Affairs Guidance with Mr. Moyers. Shining Brass operations involving small reconnaissance teams were first authorized in September 1965. They began in October 1965 on an infrequent, experimental basis, with shallow penetrations along the border in the southern portion of the panhandle. The mission was detection, not harassment, of the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam via Laos. Although the pattern of individual missions has varied, the military authorities judge the over-all operation an unqualified success and an essential adjunct to effective pursuit of our military objectives in Vietnam. The most dramatic result has been an ability to pinpoint targets for tactical air strikes, and in many instances the ground teams have verified good results. Less spectacular but of importance to MACV have been the myriad of particular intelligence items that, in combination with information from other sources, have helped build a picture of the infiltration process. From the beginning the Department’s approval of Shining Brass operations has been predicted on their being conducted in a deniable fashion. This was done initially by severely limiting the depth and method of penetration and by briefings of the teams and other devices to make credible the story that such operations were taking place within Vietnam. This posture has been necessary because Shining Brass has never been discussed with Souvanna Phouma (though some of his military staff officers are aware of it) and because of his flat opposition to U.S. military ground action in Laos. In one statement of his position, on October 24, 1965, he said publicly that he opposes entry of U.S. ground troops into Laos: “So long as I am Chief of Government I will not involve my country in this adventure.” Over the intervening months, at the urgent request of General Westmoreland fully supported by the JCS, the nature of Shining Brass operations has gradually altered. The authorized depth of penetration has been increased and the use of helicopters for infiltration purposes has been extended from a depth of 5 to 12 kms. The approved operating area has been temporarily extended northward to the area in Laos adjoining the DMZ. Further temporary extensions have been granted because of military requirements for flank protection (strategic warning of enemy movements derived from the Recce Team reports) for major U.S. military operations in Quang Tri and adjacent areas in Vietnam. We have authorized limited use of platoon-size “exploitation forces” against targets which the Recce Teams have found attractive for destruction of cached supplies and similar harassment. Ambassador Sullivan reviews all proposed missions in advance and we retain a “veto” power in the Department. The message 3 which occasioned your memorandum was prepared concurrently with our approval of another temporary extension in the authorized Shining Brass operating area—into a heavily infested area north of Route 9 and to a depth approaching 20 kilometers from the Vietnam border. This, again, is directly connected with a major current operation in Vietnam and is designed to ensure timely intelligence of any enemy movement aimed toward entrapment of U.S. units along the western Laotian border in South Vietnam. In this new area, the ever present risk of contacts and disclosure will increase. Furthermore, we anticipate military requests for further expansion of operations during the coming dry season. Hence the need for explicit public affairs guidance; earlier the guidance was most general and rested on the relatively easy deniability of the operations because of their proximity to the frontier. In the light of Souvanna’s position and our relationship with him we simply have not been able to devise an alternative to denial. I realize, of course, the possibility of evidence being adduced that would require comment beyond the initial denial. What our proposal means, therefore, is that any disclosure following a denial would have to be dealt with by devising an explanation of a mistake. We would hold firmly to the proposition that the U.S. “is not conducting such operations” (i.e., deliberately, as a matter of policy) and if under pressure from Communist charges explain any transgression as inadvertent (e.g. bad weather, bad maps, retreat in wrong direction). Paragraph 2 of the proposed message is designed to elicit promptly enough information for us to prepare an explanation tailored to the specific circumstances. We are sympathetic to and respectful of the credibility problem we may face. There are the major domestic factors of the Manila Meeting and the elections. We are also concerned about the possibility that the Communists might spring some specific story connected with these operations timed to undercut Souvanna’s expected denunciation of North Vietnamese aggression against Laos before the UN General Assembly in mid-October. I am satisfied that the military requirements of the situation in northern South Vietnam are such that we cannot withdraw operating authority that has been given only after searching inter-departmental examination. I therefore recommend that, as I understand is your intention, you discuss the problem with Mr. Moyers, for he should be thoroughly aware of this issue, and seek his approval of the proposed guidance. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–12 US. Top Secret. 2 Not found. 3 Not found. 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 255. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, October 8, 1966, 1103Z. 2104. Subj: Souvanna visit Washington and New York. 2 1. This is first of two rather presumptuous messages suggesting the sort of scenario which I believe will make Souvanna’s conversations in New York and Washington most profitable to all concerned. This telegram will concern the meeting with the President. The second will cover conversations with other U.S. officials. 3 2. Meeting with President. Souvanna clearly regards this meeting as the prime objective of his visit. Therefore, he will doubtless have a carefully prepared presentation in mind. I would consequently suggest that the best way to start off this meeting would be for the President to ask Souvanna’s general views on Southeast Asia, how to achieve peace in Vietnam, or some equally broad subject. 3. This discussion will doubtless lead into the meat of Souvanna’s concerns. There are basically three matters on which he would welcome reassurance from the President personally: A) That we continue to hope to work positively with the Soviet Union towards the ultimate development of stability in Southeast Asia (Souvanna has long seen the only hope for Southeast Asia as a tacit entente between U.S. and USSR to bulwark against ChiCom ambitions—at least until such time as ChiComs tame down at home and Southeast Asian infrastructure is in better shape). B) That we have no intention mount invasion of Laos or across Laos from U.S. military positions in Thailand or Vietnam. Communist propaganda (especially Soviet) constantly accuses us of having this intention as sole means effectively cutting Ho Chi Minh Trail. I don’t know how explicit President might wish to be on this point. It could conceivably be covered by a more generalized statement about “no desire to expand war beyond its current boundaries, etc.” C) That we will do our best to persuade other nations, such as Japan, Germany, UK and Australia, to continue and to augment their economic and technical aid to Laos. Souvanna is extremely grateful for U.S. aid, but his status as a “neutral” and his ability to hold his tenuous balance with the Soviets will depend upon avoiding the appearance of being a total dependent of the U.S. 4. Aside from these points and whatever Souvanna may wish raise in his presentation, President may also wish: A) Express our admiration for political risks Souvanna has been willing take in collaborating with our military efforts; B) Express sympathy for suffering and damage caused to Laos by recent Mekong floods; C) Give Souvanna brief summary of U.S. expectations in seven-nation Manila conference. 5. There is always possibility Souvanna may unpredictably raise some particular request for aid—as he did with helicopters when he saw Vice President last year. These requests are usually result of promises he had made to general staff or some minister here in Vientiane. I fear I cannot forecast what form this sort of thing might take. 6. President should be aware that Souvanna is not an expert in fiscal affairs, economic development or regional planning. He has good individual ideas and his enthusiasm can be aroused for specific projects. However, he has no coordinated plan and is not much of a genius in this field. 7. I don’t know whether Souvanna will specifically raise with President the Soviet proposal to overfly Laos in order avoid China. 4 I think this may depend on how far advanced the Soviet-Chinese rupture is at the time, and whether proposal has been formally made. Since Souvanna will probably not have seen Gromyko before he sees President, I would rather expect him to defer this point until his talks with Secretary Rusk and State Department officials. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Moscow, and USUN. 2 Souvanna attended the 21st UN General Assembly session in New York as the head of the Lao Delegation. William Bundy recommended that Souvanna be invited to Washington October 10–14, and Rusk approved. (Memorandum Bundy to Rusk, September 28; ibid., POL 15–1 LAOS) 3 Telegram 2105 from Vientiane, October 8, in which the Embassy suggested that U.S. officials commend Souvanna for the Lao Armed Forces accomplishments against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese; remark on his Finance Minister’s efficient direction of the Ministry; and listen carefully for signs of Souvanna’s increasing disenchantment with tripartitism. (Ibid.) 4 In telegram 1854 from Vientiane, September 28, Sullivan reported that Souvanna had received a request from the Soviet Union to reroute its “airline” to Hanoi over Laos to avoid overflying China. Souvanna told Sullivan that he assumed the Soviet Charge was talking about Aeroflot, and not a military airlift. (Ibid., POL LAOS–USSR) 256. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 256. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 11, 1966. SUBJECT Meeting with Prince Souvanna Phouma You have agreed to see Laos Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday in New York. He comes at a time of political conflict and uncertainty in Laos. The National Assembly has been dissolved after rejecting his government’s new budget, tantamount to a vote of “no confidence.” New elections probably will be held early next year, but the viability of the tripartite coalition government established by the 1962 Geneva Agreements has been shaken. Souvanna, nevertheless, continues to personify “tripartitism,” and your meeting with him will serve to buttress his leadership. Souvanna is openly dedicated to Lao neutrality but in private strongly supports our actions to end North Vietnamese aggression. King Savang Vatthana has told Ambassador Sullivan that our policy in Laos is “exactly right” in all respects and hoped we found Laotian policy “useful” to our larger purposes in Asia. At the outset you may want to: (1) Regret that your illness a year ago prevented your seeing Souvanna then. A meeting had been tentatively arranged. (2) Note the unfortunate loss of life and crop damage from the recent flooding of the Mekong—the worst in 40 years—and promise our continuing assistance to help the Lao recover. I recommended that you then give Souvanna an opportunity to present his general views on how to achieve peace in Vietnam and prospects in Southeast Asia. Specifically, he will want reassurance from you personally that —We still hope to work positively with the Soviets toward stability in Southeast Asia. He has long viewed a tacit U.S.-Soviet détente as the best bulwark against Chinese ambitions. —We have no desire to expand the Vietnam conflict beyond present boundaries. He is highly sensitive to Communist propaganda on this point as it affects Laos. —We will continue to encourage other nations to augment their technical and economic aid to Laos. He is grateful for our aid but sees his country’s neutral status and tenuous balance with the Soviets endangered by any appearance of being dependent on the U.S. Aside from reassuring him on these matters you might also: (1) Reaffirm our desire for Laos to live in peace and tranquility with its neighbors, our continuing economic and military assistance to build the economy and enable Laos to resist Communist pressures, and our commitment to the 1962 Geneva Agreements. (2) Express understanding of Souvanna’s difficulties in implementing those Agreements and our support for his continuing efforts as Prime Minister. (3) Let him know how much we appreciate the political risks he takes in collaborating with our operations against infiltration routes into South Vietnam. (As cooperative as he has been, it should be noted that he has no official knowledge of Shining Brass operations and only limited knowledge of the Arc Light program.) (4) Summarize briefly your expectations from the seven-nation conference in Manila and your Asian trip. There are three specific matters that Souvanna may introduce: Soviet overflight request. The Soviets have requested permission to make Soviet “air line” overflights of Laos en route to Hanoi. Souvanna has deferred a response pending discussion with us. You might note the complexity of this and steer him to Secretary Rusk. Foreign exchange stabilization. We support a Foreign Exchange Operations Fund along with the UK, France, Australia and Japan. There is a shortfall in CY 1966 funds available. If Souvanna expresses concern he might be reassured of our efforts with the other donors and again be referred to State. Future of “tripartitism.” Souvanna and other Lao leaders are increasingly doubtful of the further utility of the coalition governmental arrangements specified in the 1962 Geneva Agreements. They tend to believe that an avowed neutralist prime minister, replacing the tripartite facade, would still satisfy the Soviets. This is a tricky area, and it might be advisable to hear Souvanna out without substantive comment. Souvanna has keen insight and knowledge about most Southeast Asian leaders and their policies, including the North Vietnamese. He is particularly interested in the shifting relationships among Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. As committed as he is to maintaining the neutral image of Laos he recognizes that aggression from Hanoi is the source of troubles in Indochina. Advance information is that he will identify Hanoi as the aggressor in his UN address on October 18, and by implication condemn “wars of liberation” as well. Laos had an observer at the ASPAC meeting in Seoul, has joined the Asian Development Bank and is cooperating in regional programs as politically feasible. Secretary Rusk elaborates on these matters in the attached memorandum, which includes a biographic statement. 2 W.W. Rostow 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt. W. Rostow, Vol. XIV, October 1–31, 1966. Secret. 2 An October 11 memorandum from Rusk to Johnson with attachments was attached but not printed. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 257. Memorandum of Conversation 257. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 12, 1966. SUBJECT Geneva Agreements and Lao Elections PARTICIPANTS Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos Khamking Souvanlasy, Lao Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large Mr. Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far East The Governor said that since Hanoi had not respected the 1962 Geneva Agreements for even one day, how could we be sure that the North Vietnamese would respect them in the future. The Prime Minister believed that it was necessary to work on the Soviets, to get them to help bring peace to Laos. If peace could be achieved there, it would open the way to a general détente in Indochina. The Governor commented that the tragedy was that the reconciliation we had worked for in Laos had not come about. Moreover, it looked as though the Pathet Lao was moving closer and closer to the Chinese and farther away from the Soviets. The Prime Minister agreed, adding that Chinese influence over the Pathet Lao had grown considerably in recent months. The North Vietnamese, owing to the difficulties they were now experiencing, could not help the Pathet Lao as they had in the past. The Governor asked what Hanoi’s current attitude was toward Moscow and Peking. The Prime Minister said that Hanoi is still very close to Moscow. The Governor commented that Moscow seemed to want an end to the struggle but not only did not have enough influence to bring it about but also feared that Peking would accuse the Soviets of being agents of U.S. imperialism. The Prime Minister said he had been in Moscow in April and had talked with Mazuov. He learned that nothing could be done about Laos. The Soviets recognized the existence of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, ergo the presence of North Vietnamese in Laos, but would not act to settle the problem. The Governor said he hoped that the Prime Minister would do everything possible to maintain good relations with the USSR, because if the Soviets considered Laos to be friendly, they would be more comfortable in any steps they took vis-à-vis Hanoi. The Prime Minister said he did not think the Soviets had changed their attitude toward Laos; they continued to trust Laos. Lao Elections Mr. Unger asked the Lao Ambassador whether any decisions had been made concerning the forthcoming elections for the new Assembly. The Ambassador replied in a tone reflecting some surprise since the Prime Minister had informed Finance Minister Sisouk and him only that morning that the elections would be held on January 1. He said the elections would be regular, as distinct from the special elections held in 1965; they would accord strictly with the Constitution, a condition by which the Prime Minister set great store; and they would be on the basis of universal suffrage without discrimination of any kind. In response to Mr. Unger’s inquiry, Ambassador Khamking replied that they would be under the electoral law of 1957, as amended in 1959 or thereabouts. Mr. Unger asked the Prime Minister what he expected the election outcome to be. Souvanna replied with unwonted heat, “the non-election of the members of the present Assembly!” (“He is a hard man at times,” the Lao Ambassador commented in an aside.) Mr. Unger asked whether the elections would bring young, new men to office—men young in thought and spirit, concerned for their country’s welfare and not their own pockets. The Prime Minister said he did not foresee much of a change since the Lao people were tradition-minded and clung to old, well-known figures. The younger men were “illustres inconnus” to the general populace and did not stand much chance at the polls. The Prime Minister went on to say that he did not plan to resign as Prime Minister after the elections, because that would mean the end of the Government established at the time of the 1962 Geneva Agreements, a development which would have an unfavorable effect internationally. Mr. Unger stressed the importance from the international standpoint of maintaining the form of the Geneva settlement of 1962. Souvanna agreed vigorously, in a manner implying there was no need to convert the converted. It was precisely because of this consideration that, while he would probably put two or three new people in the Cabinet, he would keep open the Pathet Lao portfolios. “We do not care,” he said with unusual force, “whether the Pathet Lao participates or not. Others could be named acting to do the work, but the Pathet Lao places would be there.” The main thing was that the form would be preserved. Governor Harriman expressed the hope that those who were creating political troubles would come to realize the importance of Laos’ role in Southeast Asia and in the world at large. The Prime Minister thought that they were becoming more and more aware of that. He said he often stated that if Laos had not achieved its neutrality and if it had not adhered to the 1962 Agreements, it would be a much greater battlefield than it is now. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Slutz and Sophia K. Porson of Language Services and approved in Harriman’s office on October 28. 2 Harriman and Souvanna also discussed the situation in Southeast Asia beyond Laos and made a formal exchange of toasts during a luncheon. Accounts of these conversations are in memoranda of conversation, October 12; ibid. and ibid., POL ASIA SE. 258. Memorandum of Conversation 258. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 12, 1966, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Hanoi-Peking-Moscow Impact on Laos; Tripartitism PARTICIPANTS H.H. Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos H.E. Sisouk na Champassak, Minister of Finance of Laos H.E. Khamking Souvanlasy, Ambassador of Laos The Secretary Mr. Norman Armour, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Ceremonial Affairs Mr. William C. Hamilton, Country Director Lao Affairs The Secretary greeted Souvanna and, noting that Southeast Asia is an area of great preoccupation for us, said he would be interested in what Souvanna could tell us about what is going on in Hanoi. 2 After expressing his regret that he would be unable to lunch with the Secretary on October 13, because of his appointment with the President in New York, 3 the Prime Minister stated that the Lao knew very little about what was going on at Hanoi. There had been no sign that North Vietnam wanted to initiate talks to end the war, in spite of great difficulties because of US bombing of means of communications and vital centers of North Vietnam. Evidence of the difficulty shows in a decline in North Vietnamese aid to the Pathet Lao. Unfortunately Communist China’s influence is increasing, replacing NVN’s influence on the Pathet Lao. Souvanna thought the Secretary would know of statements by Pathet Lao leaders (Souphanouvong, Singkapo, Sot) to the effect that Mao’s thought must be the guide of revolutionary people. This is surprising and worrisome for no such statements have come from North Vietnamese themselves. The Prime Minister declared that direct Chinese Communist aid was coming to the Pathet Lao. North Vietnam is not in a position to supply the Pathet Lao with items they need because of their own internal troubles. All aid comes from China. The Lao have spotted a number of aircraft over the Plaine des Jarres, continued the Prime Minister. Since North Vietnam would use trucks and since they have no planes, these planes must be Chinese. Furthermore, recent intelligence shows that North Vietnamese troops in Northern Laos (Muong Sing-Nam Tha) have been relieved by Chinese Communist (Lu) troops. Souvanna said the RLG concern at the moment is to extend its zone of operations north of Luang Prabang. At a later point in the conversation, the Secretary observed that perhaps the most important development in the area today is what is going on inside China. Did the Prime Minister feel that a more moderate leadership would emerge? Souvanna commented that only good can come out of the situation as far as the free world is concerned. There is strong opposition to the Red Guard among the people and the military. Even today, most Chinese people have lived under the former regime. They are traditionalists; we might almost say conservatives. The Red Guard had gone so far as to accuse the widow of Sun Yat Sen, which was a major blunder because she is greatly respected even within China. Today Mao alone dominates the scene, Souvanna continued. He’s sick, however, and the Prime Minister wondered how long he will last. In 1961, he had needed to sit in an arm chair to ride in the elevator from the 1st to the 2nd floor. If Mao goes, the regime cannot hold. Lin Piao is sick also. Souvanna thought we must do something to help topple the regime, which he did not think would be too hard. “Should we use a stick or a carrot?” asked the Secretary. “Both,” replied the Prince. Souvanna said he had information that many Chinese were trying to leave China. There were perhaps two or three million Red Guard with a hard core of four to five hundred thousand. The rest followed from fear. The Secretary asked Souvanna to do all he could to enlist the Soviets in support of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. He said it was his impression that the Soviet Union did not want a major conflagration in SEA. It was important to hold the Soviets to the 1954 and 1962 agreements. The Prime Minister responded that this is what the Lao are trying to do. This is why they strive to maintain the tripartite government. It does not disturb them to keep open the seats of the absent Pathet Lao. Souvanna thought that in the near future, if a complete diplomatic break took place between Moscow and Peking, the Soviet Union could then assume a more constructive, more positive role with respect to the 1954 and 1962 agreements. Until there is such a break, Moscow hesitates. Moscow is still trying to bring China back into the Communist world. After a final break, he concluded, Moscow will have a different attitude. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Hamilton and Alex Toumayan of Language Services and approved in S on October 25. According to Rusk’s Appointment Book the meeting began at 3:05 p.m. (Johnson Library) A typed note on the source text reads “Part I of VI.” 2 On October 11 William Bundy sent Rusk talking points and biographic sketches for this meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS) 3 See Document 259 . 4 Rusk and Souvanna also discussed U.S.-Laos relations as recounted in a separate memorandum. During this brief and general discussion, Souvanna reiterated his concern that the United States should bomb North Vietnamese troops in Laos, but should not talk about it. (Memorandum of conversation, October 12; Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS–US) Rusk and Souvanna also discussed North Vietnam’s reaction to a possible halt in U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. (Telegram 66984 to Vientiane, October 16; ibid., POL 7 LAOS) 259. Memorandum of Conversation 259. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 13, 1966. SUBJECT Situation in Southeast Asia PARTICIPANTS The President Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos Sisouk na Champassak, Minister of Finance Khamking Souvanlasy, Lao Ambassador Leonard Unger, Deputy Asst. Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Norman Armour, Assistant Chief of Protocol The President expressed his regret at having been unable, because of his illness, to meet with the Prime Minister last year. He was following with much interest the efforts of the Prime Minister. 2 He was aware of the Prime Minister’s responsibilities and that many problems came with them. He had been looking forward to this meeting very much and hoped that the Prime Minister would give him a good fill-in on the situation in Laos and Southeast Asia. He would greatly value hearing the Prime Minister’s views and opinions on any subjects he cared to discuss. The Prime Minister responded that the situation in Southeast Asia was very complex, made even more so by the show of bad will on the part of the Chinese and the North Vietnamese. It had been apparent for some time that the Chinese influence was now the dominant factor. The North Vietnamese tended to draw closer to the Soviet Union and their attitude was more reasonable than the Chinese. Asked by the President if this was a good development, the Prime Minister said that it was indeed encouraging. North Vietnam had much to fear from a neighbor such as China which had dominated Vietnam for centuries. (Later the Prime Minister elaborated on Soviet influence in North Vietnam stating that the Soviets were attempting to gain more influence in that country, but do not have much at the moment.) With the Soviet Union there was at least a possibility of reaching an understanding. The Soviet Union was closer to the countries of the West than China which was completely isolated. Asked by the President to place himself in the President’s role for a moment and say what he would do differently, what he would do that the President was not doing at this time, the Prime Minister emphasized that there was no other solution outside of what the President was now doing. “Would you stop the bombings?” asked the President. “No,” replied the Prime Minister, “because the time is not propitious. North Vietnam has been living a fiction based upon their victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu.” The Prime Minister said he had talked many times with General Giap; Giap feels very strong, he feels that when it comes to infantry the North Vietnamese troops are the best in the world. “What do you think?” asked the President. The Prime Minister asserted that as fighting men they did have great valor. “Why aren’t they fighting then; they have 4 to 5 divisions there?” continued the President. The Prime Minister stressed that they were waiting for the right moment. He said that the North Vietnamese have two aims, one is the socialist conquest of the other countries of Indochina: South Vietnam, Central Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The North Vietnamese flag shows a star with five points denoting the five countries of Indochina. The Prime Minister explained that with their dense and increasing population the North Vietnamese needed more land. As the President knew, under the French South Vietnam fed the North. With more population the North needed to extend itself toward the delta. The North Vietnamese had also taken over a concept which was developed by the French Government in colonial days: Laos, with its still abundant resources, colonized by Vietnam and controlled from Hanoi. This then was the dual thrust of the North Vietnamese: the socialist conquest and the need for more living space. The President reiterated his question to the Prime Minister: What would he do that the President was not doing? The Prime Minister replied that the North Vietnamese needed to be shown how much stronger the United States was than they, then they would come to the conference table. They counted on a victory by force of arms as they did over the French. The second point was to give South Vietnam a democratic and stable regime. It was also necessary to give that government the means to increase its economic level to a point where it would be higher than that of the North. The last elections in South Vietnam, continued the Prime Minister, had shown that the people were against a communist regime. He added that even in North Vietnam, where the regime dominated by force and terror, it would be an error to believe that all North Vietnamese were communists. So if for some time the United States continued to bomb North Vietnam, destroying its economic potential and its military installations, and at the same time continued to conduct military strikes against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in the South, this would help bring them to the conference table. The Prime Minister said that the President had been absolutely right to assert that his country was not attempting to destroy the regime of the North; this point was very important for their leaders. Asked what kind of installations he would bomb, such as steel mills, cement plants, dikes, etc., the Prime Minister answered that these were the type of targets he had in mind and he commented further, after being asked by the President if this would not entail many civilian losses, that such plants were usually on the periphery of the towns and that in any case the towns had been evacuated and there would not be many victims. He felt that while in April 1964, at the time of his last visit to Hanoi, the North Vietnamese were very confident of military success, this could no longer be the case because of the strength deployed by the U.S. The President asked if the Prime Minister would be agreeable to saying a few words to the press and together they outlined what the Prime Minister might say. The Prime Minister listed the following points: This was his first call on the President. He had availed himself of this opportunity to inform the President of the situation in Southeast Asia. Together they have reviewed the situation there trying to find the solution to the present problems. The Prime Minister saw the convening of a conference with a membership similar to, or broader than, the Geneva conference of 1954 as the way to a solution. While waiting for the press to appear, the President asked the Prime Minister for information about the recent floods. The Prime Minister emphasized what a great disappointment this tragedy had been for his country. They had lost a bumper crop of rice. Thanks to the aid of friendly countries and in particular of USAID they had overcome the difficulties and forestalled epidemics. Damage was valued at approximately $5 million mostly in crops and buildings destroyed and livestock killed. The President asked if there had been many losses in human lives and the Prime Minister said there had been about one hundred victims. It was the worst disaster in 40 years. The President assured the Prime Minister that we wanted to work very closely with his government to meet the problems caused by the flood and that we wanted to do all we could to help. The President assured the Prime Minister of our desire to play a positive, constructive role for stability in Southeast Asia. We did not want to keep troops there, or bases, or dictate the political affairs of any of these countries. We wanted to be a helpful friend, not a dominating presence. At the same time we believed that freedom and self-determination were very important for the people of Southeast Asia just as they were for any American family. We did not want to widen the conflict, stated the President. The President urged the Prime Minister to stimulate as many countries as possible to take an active interest in helping foster the economic development of Laos. We were very much aware of our commitment under the 1962 Agreement and we wanted Laos to live in peace and tranquility and we would continue to help in the economic development of Laos. The President pledged his personal support to the Prime Minister and his difficult task. The President emphasized the importance of a meeting such as the forthcoming Manila conference. He said also that the Asian Development Bank and our concern with regional development in Asia must surely help convince the people of that region that we were not interested in Europe alone. At Manila we shall meet with the chiefs of state of all countries having troops in Vietnam. We were ready to go immediately from the battlefield to the conference table. It should be clear to all by now that it was Ho Chi Minh who refused to do the talking. The Koreans had about 50 thousand troops in South Vietnam now, the Philippines were sending a contingent, Australia/New Zealand had sizeable contingents and we were increasing our own forces. Hanoi must certainly understand that it could not win. Asked about his own plans and projects for the development of Laos, the Prime Minister mentioned the trips he had made to get help from other friendly countries. Then he cited a project involving a bridge over the Mekong. It was hoped that Japan would participate in that venture, and he would be happy if USG would take the initiative with regard to the project. The President said he would explore this. The President also assured the Prime Minister of our continued participation in FEOF. [The press then came in and the Prime Minister and the President each made statements.] 3 Following the statements to the press, the President told the Prime Minister that, although he had only a few moments left, he wanted to hear the Prime Minister’s views on what was happening in South China today, what were the real conditions in North Vietnam, how much longer could they hold, and who was the real key in bringing them to the conference table. On China, the Prime Minister thought that the activities of the Red Guards were indeed a very serious development. He thought the situation could not remain as it was in North Vietnam very long. Their difficulties were very serious. They had very little food; they had to work at night. They could not sustain this very long. Asked who was boss in Hanoi, the Prime Minister pointed out that Ho Chi Minh was largely a figure-head whose name and reputation were used. The most influential members of the collective leadership were, in his opinion, Pham Van Dong and Giap. The former, an intellectual, was more reasonable than Giap who was very militant and impressed with the past victories. As an indication of the difficulties in North Vietnam, the Prime Minister cited the fact that the North Vietnamese no longer aided the Pathet Lao; this aid was now given solely by the Chinese. In conclusion, the Prime Minister reiterated what he had said publicly on other occasions that if South Vietnam became communist tomorrow, Laos would be lost. Laos stood as a buffer in front of Thailand, Laos was actually the front line for Thailand. The Prime Minister fully agreed with the President that if the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam, it would not take the Chinese too long to be in Honolulu. The President again assured the Prime Minister that he was giving him his full personal support in the efforts he was making. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Secret. Drafted by Slutz and Alex Toumayan of Language Services on October 13. 2 The Department of State prepared a briefing memorandum for President Johnson’s meeting with Souvanna. (Memorandum from Rusk to Johnson, October 11; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 Laos) A copy was attached to Document 256 . 3 Brackets in the source text. Johnson’s and Souvanna’s statements made at a news conference in New York on October 13 are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 718–720. 260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, October 15, 1965, 4:54 p.m. 66917. Ref: Vientiane 2276. 2 1. Share your dismay over possible new disturbance within neutralist ranks and agree direct action to unseat Kong Le would be unfortunate, particularly while Souvanna in U.S. 2. We are arranging to contact Souvanna in New York and inform him along lines of your para 6, 3 including offer of communications assistance should he desire. You should also contact Sisoumang in similar vein, since it would be impossible to explain to Souvanna why we credited report sufficiently to alert him without informing designated acting MinDef. 3. Also believe it would be useful to spread knowledge of rumored “coup” somewhat more widely if you can arrange to do so without attribution. 4. If your late reading of situation warrants, including Sisoumang’s reaction, recommend you consider feasibility of delaying Kong Le’s return to Vang Vieng by aircraft “mechanical difficulty” or other means. An alternative would be for ARMA rep to accompany him back to Vang Vieng which should disrupt plan at least to some degree, unless you feel this would betray knowledge of plot. 5. Source of FOV 9469 4 is such that we are concerned report may have been launched to test U.S. reaction, and caution obviously called for. Agree it is important to avoid appearance of taking sides (though it is somewhat difficult to see clearly who is on whose side). Though fully cognizant of Neutralist commanders’ grievances toward Kong Le over money, faltering leadership, etc. and of their desire to improve future career prospects, we have not been aware of breach in close personal tie between Col. Sing and Kong Le that would permit former to consider participation in plot that might involve his leader’s death. 6. We continue to believe a reasonable long-range goal is to work for orderly reincorporation of Neutralist forces into National forces, at pace and in ways that will remove rivalry and mutual suspicions, offer security for future of able officers and troops, and preserve Neutralist label at least for time being. Disappearance of distinctive Neutralist units, however reorganized and subordinated to National command, would, we think have general political disadvantage and might lead to further defections toward Deuane or PL from among those who have followed Kong Le so long in pursuit of principle of neutrality. 7. Recognize that if Kong Le has come to be serious and unmanageable impediment to progress in this direction, we cannot indefinitely prop him up in place despite his apparently constructive interest in socio-economic development of Vang Vieng area. Unable judge from here to what extent his retention as Commander is still of symbolic importance to civilians in Neutralist areas and to line troops, as distinct from disillusioned staff and selfseeking unit commanders. But forcible removal of once popular if now tarnished leader (especially by violence and with FAR connivance), under circumstances reminiscent of departure of Siho and other such incidents, would clearly be disruptive and increase sense of personal insecurity among Lao to which you have recently referred. Without implying we would step in to stop contemplated action, your conversations dealing with reported move against Kong Le should make clear we not endorsing any such attempt to solve a basic political problem by force. 5 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Hamilton and cleared with Unger and in substance with Holland of OSD/ISA. 2 In telegram 2276 from Vientiane, October 15, the Embassy reported that officers commanding the majority of the neutralist forces had connived with rightist FAR military officers to arrest Kong Le and integrate neutralist forces into FAR. The conspiring officers would receive command of mobile groups and all cooperating neutralist forces would retain their present ranks. (Ibid.) 3 The Embassy suggested in paragraph 6 that Souvanna be apprised of the threat in general terms without the specifics of the conspiracy. (Ibid.) 4 Not further identified. 5 On October 17 Kong Le left Vang Vieng for Thailand believing that he was on an official mission. When he arrived in Bangkok he discovered that he had been deceived by his subordinates into exile. (Airgram A–108 from Vientiane, November 18; Department of State, Central Files, POL 6 LAOS) 261. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 261. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 1 Vientiane, October 17, 1966. Dear Bill: Shortly after I received your message about General Starbird’s Task Force 728, I received a message from John McNaughton asking me to send my comments on the Task Force proposal to Secretary McNamara in Saigon. 2 I have not yet received the Task Force papers, 3 but John gave me a synopsis of the Project as it has emerged; and, of course, I had an original acquaintance with it during the meetings which Max Taylor and I had with the JASON Group 4 last summer in Santa Barbara. Unfortunately, I was extremely pressed at the time John’s message arrived and had only a couple of hours to consider and compose a reply which would get to Saigon in time for the McNamara review with Westmoreland. Consequently, my cable 5 was rather abrupt and lacking in nuances. However, I enclose a copy to give you the general thrust of my reaction. Since this message was sent, I had the pleasure of about two hours of discussion with John McNaughton here in Vientiane. During that talk, I was able to flesh out my thoughts in greater detail and give him a better appreciation of my views. He was not unreceptive to my perspective and promised to relay my thoughts faithfully to Secretary McNamara. He suggested that I write them out in a long letter to you so that you could then discuss them with him in Washington. Hence, this epistle. First, I start from my impression of the group who developed these proposals. They are, as you know, physicists, mathematicians, and a few engineers. They are relatively unsophisticated in politics and quite innocent of knowledge affecting Southeast Asia. The views of most of them are underlain with a considerable emotion about war—and especially about war “between white men and yellow men.” The thrust of their effort was to create a proposal which would provide the United States with a plausible excuse to terminate the war and evacuate Vietnam. Some members of the group (one father and son combination in particular) were quite intellectually dishonest in the presentation of “facts” and “cost estimates” tailored to their emotions. Others were clearly disinterested. In the Santa Barbara session, neither Jerry Weisner nor George Kistiakowsky was present, so I don’t know their views. However, Murray Gell-Mann, who was clearly the most intelligent among those present, took me aside and described the proposal as totally impractical. He said, however, that he would not resist it because he could think of nothing better to suggest. Starting from this inauspicious beginning, I move into some of the considerations I mentioned in my cable, and some others which I omitted because I was not sure of the political context in which the proposal was being considered. After my talk with John McNaughton, I feel I can comment more directly on these aspects. I shall therefore repeat here what I told him in Vientiane. It is my feeling that barriers ought to be considered in two con- texts—either as tactical measures to be used during the current fighting phase, or as enforcement measures to define a territory which is politically as well as militarily defensible when the war ceases. It might be possible for one barrier to serve both purposes, but I frankly can’t see it in this case. There is nevertheless no reason why planning and even execution could not go forward simultaneously on both types of barriers. Let us take the tactical barrier first. John tells me some consideration is being given to establishing this, and then suspending the bombing of North Vietnam. He seemed surprised to learn that I felt, under such circumstances, that we would soon also have to suspend bombing in Laos. It is not only a question of “uncovering” us by the absence of North Vietnam raids. It is also a question of exposing Souvanna to increasing pressure from Soviet and other sources to force a suspension in Laos. There is moreover the factor of predictable public opinion pressure in the U.S. Therefore, the sorts of barriers Jason proposes, south of the Seventeenth Parallel, and in Laos, accompanied by a bombing pause, would cause all sorts of problems here. It would first lead, in my judgment, to suspension of bombing in Laos. This, of course, would destroy the concept of the vehicle barrier as proposed. It would also make it very difficult, but perhaps not impossible to maintain the personnel barrier. However, it would generate pressures to disclose that a personnel barrier exists in Laos so that you could sustain the logic of your bombing pause. This in turn would raise pressures for the elimination of that portion of the personnel barrier in Laos. In short, I think the Jason barrier plus the bombing suspension is a non-starter for Laos. If the barrier is mounted in the place Jason suggests, but bombing continues, the political problem would be less. However, we would then encounter some practical military considerations. Our Tiger Hound, Cricket, SLAM and Road Watch operations are a barrier in being. They are naturally not 100% effective, but they did cost the opposition about 1000 trucks destroyed last year and may have been a large measure in his decision to go straight across the DMZ. It is too early in the season to predict, but we currently see very little moving down the Ho Chi Minh trail. This may mean, that from a cost effectiveness viewpoint, our “barrier” has already had a considerable measure of success. Consequently, we would be loathe to drop it in favor of a new and untested type of barrier which is highly dependent on gadgetry. There may be some resentment from the Stateside “experts” that my “experts” are willing to second guess them on subjects in which the former hold doctorates. But, I submit that my team knows more than anyone else outside Hanoi about the Ho Chi Minh trail. I am therefore most reluctant to consider trading a road watch team for a sono-buoy sensor, or an FAC strike controller for a sack of “gravel.” In short, we have and will continue to have grave doubts about the technical feasibility of this scheme. There is also one consideration here. If we assume that our current “barrier” operations in Laos have directed the enemy into the DMZ, then we can assume that a new barrier along the DMZ will cause him to consider going back into Laos again. Naturally, from our parochial viewpoint, this hardly represents progress. Moreover, from an international political view, it is a better wicket to have North Vietnamese aggression directly across the DMZ than it is to have it routed through Laos. This shade of difference has significance, especially in our relations with the Soviets. Now, if we still wish to talk about barriers in the “tactical” sense, for use at the current stage of the war, I have a counterproposal. This proposal would have both a military and diplomatic dimension. I have discussed it in some detail with John McNaughton and he may already have relayed it to you. It envisages the erection of barriers, both personnel and vehicle, in North Vietnam. The principal line of blockage would be across the narrow neck of North Vietnam, south of Vinh, from the coastal region up into the badlands. This would be a broad strip, sown with “gravel”, mines, or any other beastly devices Jason can devise. It would be laid either by air or by large naval vessels lying off shore, which could deliver their charges by naval gun-fire or by rockets. Everything south of this region (that is to say, Route Package One) would be subjected to the sort of anti-vehicle barrier treatment proposed by Jason for Laos. And all this deviltry would be coupled with a suspension of bombing in North Vietnam north of these barriers. Now, the virtues of these proposals are (1) that they appear to be a step in de-escalation (2) they address themselves to infiltration heading both into Laos and into South Vietnam (3) they permit our current operations to continue both in Route Package One and in Laos. The drawbacks are the same as those associated with any bombing pause: they permit the enemy to relax a bit and they ease the pressures on the rail link with China. However, they are a better combination by far then current Jason proposals, if those are to be associated with a bombing pause. If, on the other hand, the Jason proposals are not to be associated with a bombing pause, then they are still a better proposition because they add a new dimension of deterrent in an area which does not degrade anything we are currently doing. Therefore, if we are hell-bent to do the Jason business in any event, this is the way I would like to see it configured. Finally, I would direct a few words to the other type of barrier—the one we might consider to define, demarcate, and “hermetically seal” the territory of South Vietnam after a settlement has been reached. This, too, was discussed at Santa Barbara and is perhaps not as far-fetched as it may sound. I think it is clear that, at the current juncture of events, it would be extremely costly, both in terms of men and money, to erect a physical barrier along the borders of South Vietnam, to include the DMZ, plus the Lao and Cambodian frontiers. However, this might not be total folly if and when the fighting reaches some level that would free our forces for such an exercise. If we are to begin such barrier, I would suggest that the mountainous regions along the Cambodian border would be the best place to start. It would be internationally defensible and perhaps even of some interest to Sihanouk. In fact, it might be a better occupation for all General Larsen’s troops than their current game of watchful waiting. Having put all these thoughts on record, I would like to repeat what I said in my cable to you on this subject. I would like a full hearing on any final decisions with respect to this matter and would probably want to participate in the decision. It seems to me to be a matter which could so thoroughly affect our whole posture and all our operations in Laos that it would need the most careful consideration by all concerned with this country. Please keep me posted, and don’t sell the Crown Jewels. All the best, Bill 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. 2 Neither found. 3 For a summary, see Document 265 . 4 A group of scientists working at Department of Defense’s Institute for Defense Analysis to study bombing and a barrier as a means of checking infiltration. See McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 246. 5 Telegram 2256 from Vientiane, October 14. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 OSD) 262. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 262. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, October 20, 1966, 0200Z. 2420. 1. At 0830 hours this morning General Ma’s 5–28 pilots from Savannakhet launched bombing and staffing attacks against Phone Keng and Chinaimo in what appears to be last ditch effort by Ma to salvage his own position and force change in General Staff. 2. We received word an hour ago that Ma, assisted by Nouphet, had placed General Ouane (traveling in south) and General Bounphone under arrest in Savanakhet. Elements of FM’s [GMs ?] 18, 15, and 21 are said to be supporting Ma and Nouphet. 3. I have seen Leuam, who entirely ignorant of developments, and have asked him to contact Boun Oum, who is apparently in town. 4. T–28’s continue to fly over city as we draft this and machine-gun fire heard near Embassy. Bombs have hit barracks near AOC at Wattay as well as Chinaimo and Phone Kheng. 5. AIRA and ARMA have seen Kouprasith who totally surprised by developments. 6. Ma has sent me emotional message asking for support in overthrow of General Staff. 7. We are in for a busy morning. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential; Flash. Repeated flash to Bangkok, and to Saigon, COMUSMACV, and DEPCHJUSMAG THAI. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and NSA. 263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, October 21, 1966, 12:39 a.m. 70350. Ref Vientiane 2420. 2 1. Assuming that Acting MinDef Sisoumang as well as Leuam may lack prestige to issue effective orders, recommend you seek inform King of situation and suggest that in Souvanna’s absence he issue cease fire order to General Ma and any other commanders identified as involved in action. First objective should be total stand down. 2. Assume you have directed US personnel to take all possible steps to withhold ammunition and disassociate US personnel from RLAF Tactical Air except for personnel left for contact purposes at your discretion. 3. Leave entirely to your discretion whether any answer to Ma’s appeal likely be effective without being misunderstood by General Staff and Cabinet. Suggest you consider message to effect that after you have valid evidence all hostile acts have been halted you prepared meet (or have representative meet) with Ma at some agreed neutral point, perhaps Udorn, to hear his problem. Any such response should of course make clear this does not constitute “support” and should probably be made only with agreement of Kouprasith or whoever is acting for Ouan. 4. Unless you have objection (by flash message) we intend pass summary of all info on Ma’s attack to Souvanna in Paris. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by Hamilton and approved by Berger. Repeated flash to Saigon and Manila for William Bundy, who was attending the Manila Conference with South Vietnamese leaders. 2 Document 262 . 264. Paper Prepared for President Johnson 264. Paper Prepared for President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. The potentially explosive Laos situation now appears to be de-fused. General Ma was unable to rally other military units in his personal quarrel with the Lao military leadership. 2 Sullivan, the British Ambassador and Boun Oum flew to Savanna-khet to persuade Ma to go into voluntary exile. They failed at the time but apparently succeeded in convincing Ma that his military situation was hopeless. Lao army Generals Kouprasith, Ouane and Bounpone (the latter two erroneously reported in Ma’s hands) directed General La, third military district commander, to move against Ma and capture Savannakhet airfield. In the face of this Ma has flown out 10 T–28s to Udorn and one to Ubol in Thailand. Ma is now with the Thai base commander at Udorn. Seven T–28s remain at Savannakhet. General La is now moving to reassert the government’s control over Savannakhet and anticipates no opposition. Souvanna departs Paris on October 22, reaching Bangkok and Vientiane on October 23. While Ma’s abortive action posed no immediate threat to the continuity of Souvanna’s government or to the fundamental loyalty of the Lao armed forces, it has increased the political and military tension that has been building. Souvanna will face a dicey situation on his return, with the fate of Ma and Kong Le who are both in Thai hands, first order of business. 3 “Ma is not likely to be forgiven for the deaths his air strikes caused. This was an irrational act by a highly capable tactical air commander who built the Laos air force from scratch. To some extent he is the victim of Lao military politics and his own prolonged brooding over losing out in command reshuffles.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. It was sent to Rostow for the President and sent for information to Jorden. Apparently this was the text of a cable sent to Manila for the President. 2 The phrase, “mustering only two companies in Savannakhet and his T–28s,” was crossed out at this point. 3 The following final paragraph was crossed out: 265. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) 265. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) 1 Washington, October 21, 1966. 6070. Joint Defense-State message. DOD Special Task Force now approaching point of determining and making commitments for assets needed to lay barrier in South Vietnam and Laos. Current planning is to have this barrier installed and in operation by September 15, 1967. Present concept is to deny vehicle traffic no motorable roads in Laos in what is generally the “Cricket Area.” This zone is to extend from just south of the 17th Parallel (in vicinity of Route 9) north to just beyond Mu Gia Pass. To be effective the several alternative routes must be covered. The area is expected to extend westward into Laos as far as Mahaxey at the northwest limit and as far as Moung Sen at the southwest extreme. There can of course either be “sanitary” areas for known friendly populations or resettlement of friendlies outside the denial area. The concept, to be effective, will involve (1) daily seeding of short-lived self-sterilizing mines on and adjacent to selected vehicle routes which are capable of blowing a truck tire or causing loss of a foot, (2) biweekly laying of sensors along the same routes, (3) continuous visual and sensor surveillance aircraft over the area in question, and (4) very quick reaction air strikes where traffic is detected (probably barring case-by-case approvals from Washington, Saigon or Vientiane—implying that advance approval of a broad class of cases will have to be given). Each of these—especially the first and fourth—involve large investment of resources and obvious political implications. The concept, as it applies to Laos, also includes the denial to enemy foot infiltration traffic of the network of trails skirting the western edge of the DMZ. This area is a strip 20 km deep running west from the DMZ to Route 90 northwest of Tchepone. Denial techniques will include mining of traversable terrain, positioning of air surveilled sensors in the more likely avenues of infiltration, e.g. Se Bang Hieng river valley east of Tchepone, and fast reaction air strikes on detected intruders. ASD/ISA understood you to say that—if we kept publicity down, if we continued bombing North Vietnam, and if we avoided friendly populations—you thought the probability was better than 70% that Souvanna would go along with a program of this kind. We would appreciate your assessment of the political factors which will affect the allocation of resources that is now being made. Please make response personal for Bundy and McNaughton. You should know that the Task Force is now pursuing tests along the lines of your suggestions. With respect to other points you raised with ASD/ISA, thinking here is that barrier will not be inside North Vietnam. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Top Secret. Drafted and released by Richard C. Steadman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). Bromley Smith wrote a note on the White House copy of this telegram making certain that Rostow should see it. 266. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 266. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, October 22, 1966, 5:55 a.m. 2457. 1. RLG has had a little difficulty pulling itself together this morning after disruptive events of yesterday and last night. We kept them fully posted during the night as our T–28 chickens were being coaxed to roost in Thailand, but they blacked out the city and otherwise lost sleep over the events. 2. Cabinet and military officers met this morning at 10 am. Meeting heard formal report from General Bounphone concerning events in south and sent messages to King and Souvanna reporting that all has been resolved. Lao Ministry of Information, which has functioned surprisingly well throughout, put out radio broadcast reassuring public and restoring calm. City is now fully returned to normal. 3. During this morning’s meetings, Kouprasith made vigorous plea to demand extradition of Ma and Bounleut from Thai authorities. Due to Ambassador Martin’s expeditious handling of matters with Thai Government and as result triangular telephone conversations he and I had last night through General Bond in Udorn, we were able get word to Leuam in advance that Thai would preserve their time-honored tradition of refuge for these latest Lao immigrants. 4. Nevertheless, there occurred the usual Vientiane contretemps when Boun Oum was erroneously informed that I had arranged with the Thai to extradite Ma and Bounleut. Boun Oum had impression he was double-crossed and was even most unhappy with congratulatory message he received from the King. I think I have straightened him out, although I haven’t been able to see him yet because I have been intermittently busy giving away bride at a wedding this morning. 5. I have, however, talked at length with Leuam and have discussed how best to proceed from here. He agrees that we must make best effort brush all this rapidly under carpet, avoid recriminations, and reconstitute the air force. He, naturally, wishes to defer decisions until Souvanna returns tomorrow, but he and I have agreed on common line to present to Prime Minister. 6. Above and beyond this, I have some views about Ma. As I have reported earlier, he is a very sick man. At the same time he has done as much in the past for the US as any individual in Laos. Therefore, I have no desire to toss him out like a twisted lemon. He is a far different case from Phoumi and merits some proper consideration from us. 7. Therefore, I intend to propose to Souvanna that we go ahead with our commitment to give him hospital treatment, quietly in a US facility. (Among other things, this will remove him from possible contamination by Phoumi.) After that, I would like to see if we can arrange a job for him with Air America, or other friendly organization, as a civilian pilot in Vietnam or Taiwan. He has no personal means and has a family to support. 8. As for Bounleut, I have no plans and feel he is basically the provocateur who led Ma astray. He will doubtless drift into the Phoumi retinue and that ought to serve him right. I only feel sorry to wish him on the Thai. 9. Our next immediate task here is to reconstitute the air force. Happily, our strategy succeeded in preserving all our T–28’s from damage and safely in either US, Thai, or Lao hands. We will have no problem reassembling them into a strike force. We have at least 28 and perhaps more than 30 qualified T–28 pilots. We have no basic differences with General Staff about organization plans (we constantly did with Ma). The only thing we will lack will be the fighting spirit that Ma certainly had. Sourith is no tiger and showed definite traces of a yellow streak in yesterday’s events. But, since he’s the best we have to work with, we’ll start over again with him first thing Monday morning. 10. On balance, this was a big week for Kouprasith. Not only did Ma hang himself by yesterday’s actions, but Kong Le, by his obvious involvement in this affair, finished himself off as well. All military regions, plus the Neutralists, check in on side of General Staff. There is practically no dissident left, unless one counts Phasouk and Vang Pao. However, both of them have played their hands fairly smoothly and we will continue to urge Vang Pao towards reconstruction. 11. The repercussions of all this turmoil on the political scene are a little difficult to gauge until all the smoke clears. However, Leuam has clearly lost prestige and Kouprasith has gained. Whether Kouprasith will add his new gains to Souvanna’s political fortunes or preserve them for some game of his own may turn out to be the most interesting question in town over the next few weeks. 12. All these fascinating digressions should add special embellishment to the annual North Vietnamese dry season offensive, which our intelligence reports indicate we can expect to begin within the next few days. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, repeated to Manila, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, DEPCHJUSMAG THAI, DIA, and DEPCMDR 7/13th AF Udorn. Passed to the White House,CIA, USIA, and NSA. 267. Memorandum From D.W. Ropa of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 267. Memorandum From D.W. Ropa of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 3, 1966. SUBJECT Southeast Asia Developments These are the more important developments during your absence in those parts of Southeast Asia you did not visit. Laos Air Force Commander General Ma, leader of the abortive mutiny on October 21, fled to Thailand and now awaits Thai government decision whether to extradite him or grant asylum. The Thais probably will let him go into court as a delaying tactic to permit Lao tempers to ease and the ultimate resolution of Mao’s status without harming Thai-Lao relations. Souvanna has persuaded Kong Le to remain in Bangkok under the fiction of still being the Neutralist commander in need of medical treatment. Friction among Neutralists, some of whom are unhappy over Kong Le’s unceremonious departure, has triggered unconfirmed reports of a possible Neutralist move on November 5. Sullivan suspects the French are fanning the discontent and seeking a way to bring Kong Le back. Deputy armed forces commander General Kouprasith is continuing his efforts to integrate Neutralist forces into the army under his direct control as prelude to seeking dominant right-wing control in the January Assembly elections. Together with last month’s Assembly dissolution, these events have eroded the facade to tripartitism. Bill Bundy is concerned and was charged a Laos working group to appraise the future of tripartitism and report to FE/IRG by November 30. I am participating. [Here follow reports on developments in Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the aftermath of the Manila Conference.] D.W. Ropa 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Ropa Memos. Secret. 268. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 268. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, November 9, 1966, 0852Z. 2894. Ref: State 77785 Nov 3 (joint State/Defense message—notal). 2 1. On basis enumeration just completed of Lao T–28 pilots now and to become available, Country Team concludes that Thai piloted T–28 support for air operations in Laos will be required until about July 1968. In making this estimate we have assumed that war in Laos will continue at present level of intensity in intervening period and that requirements for T–28 operations will remain unchanged. 2. Fundamental factor in any phase out of Thai support is availability qualified Lao T–28 pilots. Although some 42 have been trained since 1964, pool is presently reduced to 24 as result of combat and training losses and flight of ten pilots to Thailand with General Ma. 3. Accretions to this pool of 24 are estimated as follows: A. General Sourith believes that at most seven (7) of ten pilots who left with Ma might be rehabilitated. He very likely is optimistic and timing their return also undetermined (negotiations have not yet begun). B. Of the seven pilots now in training at Udorn (not including one who died in training crash Nov 7) six seem likely to graduate at end of December. C. A new group of ten Lao are projected to begin training at Udorn in early January. If past averages hold, about seven will graduate in July 1967. 4. If 3 (a), (b) and (c) are all realized and if there is no further attrition in present group of 24, pool will thus stand at 44 pilots in July 1967. Using AIRA suggested ratio of 1.5 pilots per T–28, pool of 44 pilots could efficiently man about 30 T–28’s. We would expect, however, to have fleet of between 44 and 48 T–28’s at that time, about 36 to 38 to which would normally be available for operation (others in maintenance). Thus six to eight aircraft in fleet would be idled for lack of pilots if Thai were not employed beyond next July. 5. We are therefore led to conclude that Thai should not be phased out until pool of Lao pilots numbers at least 55 to 60. Allowing for attrition, this number will not be reached until about July 1963, or after graduation of two further trainee groups beginning training in July 1967 and January 1968 respectively. 6. There are of course imponderables in this calculation. If Water Pump (Det 606 ACS) had additional aircraft and staff and if Lao recruitment of likely trainees could be accelerated, training classes could be enlarged above current optimum number of ten per class. Resources to accomplish this enlargement are not, however, presently at hand. 7. Re para 2C reftel. USAF aircraft are already performing well in interdiction role and in more heavily defended areas of northern Laos. They have not ordinarily been used in close support role, where T–28’s piloted by Lao or Thai function to especially good effect because of ability to communicate in same language with ground forces. USAF assets are therefore best viewed as supplementary to rather than as any fully satisfactory substitute for T–28 operations. 8. Re para 2D reftel, we assume use of Thai pilots is stimulus for Lao to make maximum effort to take over all T–28 operations in Laos. Fundamental reason we continue to need Thai, however, is inadequacy of pool of Lao pilots as indicated above. 9. As for resumption of Thai T–28 operations from Vientiane base (State 77053—notal), 3 we are still not clear after week-long inquiries precisely where obstacles to resumption lies. Both Lao and Thai insist they are prepared to have operations resume, and we hope to sort this one out shortly. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Also sent to DOD and repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, 7th Air Force T SN, DEPCHJUSMAG THAI, 7th/23d Air Force Udorn, 606 ACS Udorn, and COMUSMACTHAI. 2 In telegram 77785, November 3, the Departments of State and Defense asked the Embassy to re-examine the need for Thai-piloted T–28 support in Laos, and queried if that activity could be eliminated or reduced without loss of combat effectiveness. The Departments also wanted to know the date when there would be enough trained Lao pilots to meet the requirements of T–28 operations. (Ibid.) 3 Dated November 1. (Ibid.) 269. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 269. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, November 18, 1966, 1135Z. 3116. For Country Director Laos. Dept also pass USAID, USIA, DOD, CIA. 1. In anticipation your interdepartmental review of situation in Laos and of our policies toward this troubled, strategically placed Kingdom, we must admit that even from our vantage point we view future as most unpredictable. This sense of caution has been installed in us by very recent experiences. Last June (Embtel 1371) 2 during visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary Unger it was consensus of Lao, and of foreign observers as well, that there had been marked progress on military and rural development fronts coupled with attainment of relative political and economic stability. All this seemed to augur well for continued progress, however slow, toward objectives we share with Lao that they achieve true independence and prosperity despite their precarious geographic position and their continuing confrontation with North Vietnamese aggression. 2. Since June we have witnessed a succession of events, some unheralded, some inherent in earlier developments, which have dealt damaging blows to these expectations. Statisticians will dispute placing any monetary value on effects of Mekong flood in September, but by conservative estimates damage to rice and other crops, to roads, and to buildings, plus loss of labor and resources which otherwise could have been applied to constructive enterprises, must reach in neighborhood 20 to 25 million dollars. In economy so relatively unproductive and marginal as that of Laos, this is loss which will be felt for at least two years. 3. Political currents since June have been as unpredictable as those of the Mekong. A National Assembly was dissolved because neither Souvanna Phouma, nor his young and old opponents in Assembly, sought the compromise of their differences which was always within reach. As a result, elections are again in offing with uncertain outcome and with widespread doubt that they should even be held. Predictions of any sort as to their results are hazardous. There followed ouster by Neutralist Colonels of General Kong Le, whose effectiveness as a leader had steadily deteriorated during past several years as result of a failure to command, a loss of self-confidence, and personal excesses. No sooner had he taken refuge in Thailand than General Ma bombed several military sites in Vientiane in a futile, senseless, and self-destructive attempt to settle what he regarded as crucial odds with Generals Kouprasith, Oudone, et al. 4. Reason applied to these developments can only retire in confusion, but the tolerant Buddhist view of life and destiny which most Lao share probably permits them to accept these events as beyond any power to alter or control. They thus probably look to the future undismayed by the past. 5. We have little alternative but to do likewise, setting our course as best we can in an uncharted future. But there are certain stars to steer by. (A) First is premise that it is essential that Mekong Valley, together with most other territories now under RLG control in Laos, be retained in friendly hands. This implies continued military and paramilitary assistance to Laos as long as enemy actions make them necessary. At current levels these commitments reach some 140 million dollars per year but involve only a handful of US military personnel and a minimum of US prestige. Since any substantial escalation of the war in Laos would have serious political (and possibly military) drawbacks, we think our military involvement is at about its most practical level in relation to present enemy threat and our political objectives. This level of assistance is in our judgement indispensable and irreducible. (B) Second is our conviction that as a small, landlocked, undeveloped country with powerful neighbors Laos is most likely to enjoy prosperity in a status of neutrality guaranteed if possible by outside powers. This concept underlay Geneva Agreements of 1962 and despite NVN and other violations it remains in our judgement a valid prescription for Laos. Present de facto division of country could end in formalization of two Lao states, one under Communist control, but friendly Lao still nourish hope that reconciliation with NLHS will be possible if North Vietnamese aggression ceases. Front lines, in north especially but also in south, are still fluid, with significant friendly pockets in enemy held territory and increasing defections from enemy military and civilian population. Formal division of country, under these circumstances, would therefore work principally to enemy advantage. Preservation of Laos as an integral state appears still to be in our interest. (C) Third star to steer by, given (A) and (B), is Souvanna Phouma. He is Lao who most personifies 1962 Agreements, and with all his failings he is a true Centrist -Neutralist, patriotically motivated, internationally recognized. But at same time has condemned NVN aggression and has authorized unpublicized US military actions which have made war more costly to enemy in Vietnam and Laos. As long as Souvanna is at hold, we can also anticipate he will preserve trappings of tripartite government which visibly symbolize RLG fidelity to agreements of 1962. These trappings are essentially (1) retention of provisional government of National Union, symbolized especially by safeguarding of four NLHS portfolios, including that of Prince Souphanouvong as Deputy Prime Minister; and (2) maintenance of some identifiable Neutralist or Centrist presence in armed forces and political structure. 6. As long as Souvanna is in power he will probably be able to command external respect as a spokesman for a neutral Laos. Soviet attitudes are especially vital to his position, and he has taken renewed courage from hospitable attitude displayed by Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky since latter’s return in early November. Following conversation reported Vientiane 2971 (notal),UK Ambassador Warner had further long session with Kirnassovsky November 14. Latter fully accepted Warner’s statements concerning incidents affecting Generals Ma and Kong Le and seemed prepared to ride out new elections in expectation Souvanna is still fundamentally non-aligned and anxious retain Soviet support, however tacit. At large Lao reception November 15, Souvanna took Kirnassovsky aside for lengthy private but conspicuous conversation, following which Souvanna told Ambassador Warner with some elation that Kirnassovsky had given him same impression of Soviet flexibility. This Soviet attitude assumes some significance against background of Kong Le’s current problems. 7. There are new indications of restlessness on part of Peking most recently expressed in hard-hitting and authoritative mid-November articles and broadcasts condemning Laos for espousing a two-China policy, being too friendly to Taiwan, and supporting alleged US aggression. But we doubt that these noises will result, as Bangkok press has intimated, in withdrawal of recognition of RLG. ChiCom Ambassador locally has had number of diplomatic illnesses in recent weeks (Soviet November 7 celebration was one of them) but his counselor has attended receptions in normal manner. ChiCom stands at the Luang Fair Grounds, scheduled to open November 24, are still being erected. There are thus no local signs that ChiComs (or for that matter North Vietnamese or NLHS) contemplate a policy shift. 8. There remains, however, considerable dissatisfaction among Laos elite, particularly younger men, that they are still “saddled” both with Souvanna, whom they respect but for whom they feel no warmth, and with vestiges of “tripartitism” which to them symbolizes foreign intervention in Lao internal affairs and continuing restraint on their freedom of political action. Fortunately the wiser among the Lao elite accept this situation philosophically (Phoui and Ngon Sananikone, Tay Keolunagkhot, Sisouk na Champassak, Inpeng Suryadhay, Outhong Souvannavone, Sisounang Sisaleumsak, among others); and Souvanna continues to be supported and “tripartitism” tolerated by key military leaders, including Generals Ouan, Kouprasith, and Phasouk. King Sa-vang, despite his cultivated remoteness, is also exercising an increasingly constructive influence over government affairs, and in a crisis, such as finding a successor to Souvanna with none in sight, he would play a truly critical role. But forces working for change, especially discontent of young Lao with status quo grow increasingly strong and as last few months have proven can follow unpredictable courses. 9. In an international context, Vietnam is the key, and success or failure of our policies there will influence in large measure what happens in Laos. The other key element is Thailand. One can scarcely envision a happy or productive future for Laos without Thailand, and it should be our objective to cultivate and facilitate a further improvement in relations between them, particularly on such practical questions as transit of cargo. 10. In sum, it does not seem to us that our policies toward Laos need to take new directions, or bilateral programs now in being should be continued, especially our critical important USAID effort (now of a magnitude of $55 million) and we must seek to accelerate economic programs (UN, FEOF, NAM NGUM, etc.) should also be preserved and encouraged. Flexibility in our analysis and selection of political options is also essential, for Laos is, after all, an evolving society, and our own policies must be responsive to these changes. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, and DEPCHJUSMAG THAI. 2 Document 238 . 270. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 270. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, December 2, 1966. SUBJECT Expansion of Shining Brass Operations in Laos Proposal 1. The Department of Defense is seeking our approval of an expansion of the Shining Brass Operations which COMUSMACV has proposed and CINCPAC and the JCS have supported. This calls for a permanent enlargement of the zone of operations in Laos, consisting of a 20-kilometer wide strip on the Lao side of the Laos/Vietnam border from approximately the seventeenth parallel on the north to 165 15’N on the south. (See attached maps, Tab A.) 2 Background 2. Shining Brass operations on the Lao side of the Laos/South Vietnam border were approved on September 20, 1965 and inaugurated on October 17. These limited, covert operations were confined initially to penetrations by small, 10-man (later 11-man) teams including not more than 3 US personnel to a maximum depth of 20 kilometers west of the border for intelligence/reconnaissance patrols in the southern Laos panhandle, a rugged, sparsely settled area. (This is the “Permanent Zone”—see Tab A.) The teams were to conduct their operations so that they would be undetectable, i.e., avoid contact with the enemy and/or villagers and not engage in sabotage or harassment. Their roles were to collect intelligence on enemy locations and to call in air strikes at likely targets. a. No Consultation with RLG—The Prime Minister of Laos has on various occasions specifically told senior US officials, including Ambassador Sullivan, that he could not and would not approve of U.S. ground operations in Laos. In view of this stance, no attempt has been made to inform him of Shining Brass and to obtain his concurrence. These armed incursions, unauthorized by the Lao Government, are thus territorial violations of the sovereignty of Laos, and, of course, violations of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. The involvement of U.S. personnel is the element in this program which creates greatest difficulty for us. Shining Brass operations, therefore, from the beginning were to be conducted in such a fashion that the possibility of exposure, both to the Lao Government and/or to public attention, was minimized, that is: (1) penetration limited to a maximum of 20 kilometers from the border in the southern sparsely-settled panhandle. (2) 11-man teams, including not more than 2, later 3, Americans. (3) no sabotage or harassment. (4) avoidance of contact with enemy and/or civilians in Laos. (5) infiltration by foot. These operations were considered to be fairly safe from detection. Given their limited character and the remoteness of the area it was also thought that even if detected they would not have to be acknowledged. b. Expansion—During the past year, the essential cover from detection and public identification has suffered steady erosion because of expansions which we have accepted on the basis of strong pleas of military necessity. Infiltration by foot was modified to permit infiltration by helicopter up to a depth of 5 kilometers and, in September 1966, up to 12 kilometers. Although introduced as an option, when operationally necessary, helicopter infiltration has been employed systematically. Although the original ground rules prescribed avoidance of contact with the enemy, as well as sabotage and harassment tactics, the reconnaissance teams by June 1966 were burning isolated huts and small villages and destroying livestock and food caches. They had by that time captured five prisoners and killed 11 enemy. There have been an increasing number of instances in which the reconnaissance teams have revealed their presence and position by initiating fire against suspected enemy personnel, presumably in exercise of team leaders’ responsibility to defend their units. On June 20, 1966, the possibility of exposure was further increased by approval for the inauguration of follow-up exploitation forces to strike at enemy targets in Laos discovered by the reconnaissance teams. Ground exploitation, however, was restricted to platoon-size (40-man) strike forces with no more than 3 US advisors and limited to a penetration depth of 10 kilometers and a duration of approximately five days. On July 21, the area of operations for Shining Brass teams was temporarily extended northward from the northern limits of the permanent zone to the southern edge of the DMZ to a depth of 5 kilometers west of the border (see Tab A), exclusive of the enclave at Route 9 where a friendly Lao battalion (BV–33) is located. The area, although rugged, is much more accessible, more heavily populated and militarily most active. On September 24, 1966, a further temporary extension north of Route 9 and west from the border was approved in order to permit reconnaissance in support of III MAF operations just south of the DMZ in South Vietnam, scheduled from September 17 to October 15. Of the seven targets proposed for this extended area, two were disapproved by us because they were located too far from the border and exposure of these missions would have made it virtually impossible to avoid acknowledgment. 3. While the present memo is addressed to the proposal mentioned in para 1 above, you should be aware that the Joint Staff (SACSA) has also informally submitted to us a proposed Memorandum of Agreement for Shining Brass. In addition to advocating a greater delegation of control to CINCPAC and Ambassador Sullivan than I believe we can accept, the Draft would further extend the scope of operations by increasing the size of forces, the US involvement, and the use of helicopters and aircraft. These are matters we have not yet discussed with DOD and for which we lack supporting justification. (The Draft further relates to the proposed extension of Shining Brass-type operations to the DMZ and North Vietnam, a proposal on which a separate memorandum is being prepared.) Therefore, I recommend that you consider the Draft Memorandum of Agreement to be for information only—it indicates clearly the direction in which the military planners desire to move. I will plan to consider it further with DOD in the light of the decision on the question posed in paragraph 1 above. Discussion 4. The present DOD proposal would make permanent the temporary (northern) extensions mentioned above and would go further to the north and west. Such a substantial expansion of the Shining Brass operational zone would bring into sharp relief the fundamental problem of exposure. Significantly deeper penetrations into this populated and militarily active area cannot remain concealed. Already, in the permanent zone and in the temporary area, the frequency of enemy contact and the rate of casualties are increasing. There is possibility that four US casualties, lost in the northern area, may have survived as captives. The enemy appears to be aware of most penetrations within a relatively short time of the actual infiltration and has been taking increasingly sophisticated countermeasures. During the month of October, eight of the nine Shining Brass reconnaissance teams required emergency exfiltration because of enemy attacks. The helicopters used for both infiltration and exfiltration often encounter enemy ground-fire. In at least one case, the enemy apparently spotted the choppers during infiltration and laid an ambush at the Landing Zone for the exfiltration run, including spiked stakes in the Zone itself. The team suffered casualties and the helicopters were damaged during the emergency exfiltration. In addition to the mounting casualties and risk of additional losses of US personnel, it would appear, at this tempo of operations, to be only a matter of time before a helicopter is downed by enemy action inside Laos. While this may be explainable at 4 kilometers from the frontier, it is probably not so at 18, or adjacent to North Vietnam. 5. We have agreed to these operations in an effort to meet DOD requests based on statements of military need, believing that only on the basis of experience could the degree of risk be determined. The experience has been that even in the permanent zone the risk is greater than we anticipated and that with each expansion of the area or in the scope and pace of operations the risk intensifies. Because the area for which approval is now requested is known to be heavily infested and of major importance to the enemy, we believe the risk of exposure too high to be acceptable. 6. With the operations as they are presently conducted, i.e., even without the expansion proposed by DOD, P is deeply concerned about how to avoid acknowledging them should they come to public attention. Under present circumstances it would plan to use the guidance at Tab B. However, this line might not be usable in all circumstances and would rapidly lose credibility for operations under the proposed expansion. 7. US military authorities are, of course, deeply concerned over infiltration through Laos. They consider the Shining Brass program successful and its continuation, including the proposed extension, essential for both intelligence collection and harassment purposes. Their concern has been deepened whenever it appeared that enemy forces might in fact be deploying on Lao territory for an attack against US–GVN positions in northern South Vietnam. The arguments bearing on these points are attached at Tab C. In support of the extension to a 20-kilometer depth in the northern sector, Joint Staff representatives have referred to evidence that a PAVN division-level structure may be located in the area and that it cannot be expected to be within the narrow 5-kilometer belt. Commenting on the military argument, Ambassador Sullivan in September 1966 believed that “the record of Shining Brass to date has not given much substance to the military justification.” The Ambassador has repeatedly recommended that Shining Brass-type operations would be more useful if they were conducted near or in the DMZ, or even in North Vietnam, rather than in Laos. We have reviewed in detail the reports of Shining Brass operations in Laos from inception to the present and believe that the Ambassador’s assessment of achievements there is generally accurate even though we fully appreciate the basis for the concern of the US military. It appears clear, for example, that these operations have not led to any significant interruption of the infiltration efforts, although they have confirmed the presence of enemy troops in this area, and may have given warning about movements into Vietnam. Thus we accept the judgment that Shining Brass operations have been militarily useful. Intelligence developed by the teams unquestionably adds to MACV’s total picture of the infiltration pattern, and air strikes associated with their missions have undoubtedly added some harassment. The question is, does the value to the military justify the high risk of serious damage to US credibility and to our objectives in Laos? Unless such an extension of Shining Brass is essential to the safety of US forces in Vietnam or to their conduct of the conflict there, which we doubt, we believe the answer must be negative. 8. One way to resolve the present difficulty might be to obtain Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s agreement to public acknowledgment. However, he has told Ambassador Sullivan that he could not take the international pressure that would accompany the entry of US ground forces into Laos. As a consequence, the Ambassador has determined that he could not raise the proposition with Souvanna, who has, in effect, told him in advance that the answer would be no. The Ambassador believes that the chances of getting Souvanna’s approval are “absolutely zero.” 9. A second possible course might be to extend these operations without Souvanna’s knowledge and approval. However, as noted above, exposure is already a great risk and would, we believe, become a virtual certainty if this proposal is approved. The discredit and embarrassment to the US Government stemming from public knowledge of these unauthorized operations, in violation of Lao sovereignty and the Geneva Agreements, would be intense. An immediate consequence of exposure would be the loss of Ambassador Sullivan’s credibility with Souvanna. Moreover, exposure would contrast sharply with recent assurance given Souvanna by both the President and the Secretary personally that the US Government firmly supports him and his policies. The Prime Minister’s position, in fact, might become untenable. He would certainly be criticized by the Soviets (whose continued support of the 1962 settlement he and we consider essential) and by non-communist friends of Laos. He is already under pressure (for other reasons) from Lao conservatives, and in the face of such a compromise of his neutralist commitments and convictions might resign. 10. There are alternatives to the proposed expansion of the operating areas under present arrangements which we would be willing to support but in which the Joint Staff (SACSA) has not expressed interest thus far: a. Further extension of the growing CAS program of roadwatch and guerrilla teams (Hardnose and Kha) already operating within Laos. By the end of 1966, CAS expects to have 40 such teams operating in the eastern panhandle area along the infiltration routes. Use of CAS teams is politically attractive because 1) there are no U.S. advisors with the teams on their missions; and 2) the teams are based in Laos, not South Vietnam, and are made up of personnel whose presence raises no political questions. Since 1963, when I first approved the CAS operation, we have viewed it as an attractive alternative (even though less satisfactory from a military point of view) to U.S. military involvement on the ground in Laos, and subsequent expansion of the CAS operation has been endorsed by Ambassador Sullivan. b. The organization of Shining Brass-type teams composed, however, entirely of personnel of the Indo-Chinese area. Provided the depth of US-piloted helicopter penetration were not extended beyond the present 5-kilometer limit, the operation of such teams would not involve substantial risk of exposing US activities, which is the root of our concern. There is a third alternative, in which the Department of Defense has expressed some interest: c. Use of Shining Brass reconnaissance teams only (i.e. no follow-up) within the proposed extended area provided 1) we return to the original Shining Brass operating rules, with no sabotage or harassment and with strict avoidance of contact with enemy and/or civilians in Laos; 2) use of helicopters confined to the present 5-kilometer depth; and 3) air strikes are authorized only after exfiltration of teams. This would give us great difficulty and would continuously present us with a high risk of exposure. Therefore we do not recommend it, although individual cases might be considered if the military situation demands. Recommendations: 3 11. I recommend that: a. State not concur in the proposal to expand the permanent zone of operations for Shining Brass. b. The 5-kilometer strip from the northern edge of the present permanent zone to the southern edge of the DMZ (exclusive of the BV–33 enclave at Route 9) continue to be considered a temporarily approved zone within which Shining Brass reconnaissance team operations only may continue, provided proposed missions (new or repeated) are reported to State in advance in periodic schedules or by individual message. c. We indicate to Defense our desire to accord MACV the greatest flexibility consistent with Souvanna’s position and our posture in Laos, saying that State would be prepared to support alternatives (a) and (b) in paragraph 10 if Defense desires. d. Finally we should state that the arrangements outlined in paragraph 10 (c) could be carried out in case of grave need, on a case-by-case basis with prior Defense and State approval. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz, Hamilton, and Unger; cleared by Hamilton, Oscar V. Armstrong, Public Affairs Officer in EAP, and Harold Kaplan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. As of November 1 the names of the Assistant Secretary and the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs was changed to East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 2 None of the Tabs was attached. 3 For the decision to extend the scope of Shining Brass as reported to the Embassy, see Document 277 . 271. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 271. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 27, 1966. SUBJECT U. S. Contribution to the Laos Inflation Stabilization Fund For the past three years we have contributed to the Laos Foreign Exchange Operations Fund (FEOF) to help control inflation. FEOF contributors are now renewing pledges for CY 1967 based on an IMF review which has ascertained that approximately $20 million is needed. Our share would be $13.8 million, roughly $100,000 more than our commitment for CY 1966. The balance would come from Japan, the UK, Australia, France and possibly West Germany. FEOF was initiated in 1964 by the IMF with our cooperation. Lao government military operations against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese caused expenditures far greater than the government could collect in revenue. The annual budget deficit threatened serious inflation and the country’s political and economic stability. Lao military operations directly support our security objectives in Southeast Asia. We agreed that FEOF was the best available means to check runaway inflation. Bill Gaud notes in his memorandum that the IMF believes the CY 1967 commitment represents the peak in FEOF demands. 2 IMF is confident Laos will be able to cut its budget deficit after 1967, thereby reducing the FEOF requirement. During fiscal year 1965/66 Lao revenues covered 97 percent of civilian expenditures (excluding military and police). The IMF gives them high marks for commendable budget performance these past two years. Of our proposed $13.8 million commitment, $8.9 million can be provided out of FY 1967 funds. The remaining $4.9 million is included in the FY 1968 budget and is not due for payment until the second half of CY 1967. State, AID and BOB approve the proposed commitment. 3 Secretary Fowler is concerned about the balance of payments effect. However, he sees no satisfactory alternative immediately available to us. Secretary Fowler recommends that the $4.9 million installment of the commitment which would come from FY 1968 funds be offered Laos on a conditional basis to permit an overall review of alternative options. This is agreeable to State, AID and BOB. I recommend your approval of the CY 1967 commitment of $13.8 million to FEOF on this basis. 4 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Confidential. The source text indicates that the President saw this memorandum. 2 Dated December 14. (Ibid.) 3 The Department of State’s concurrence was in the form of Slutz’s clearance of Gaud’s memorandum of December 14. The Bureau of the Budget concurred in a December 17 memorandum from Director Charles B. Schultz to Johnson. (Ibid.) Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler’s concern was expressed in a memorandum to Johnson, December 23. (Ibid.) 4 The source text indicates that the President approved the commitment and the Bureau of the Budget was notified on January 5, 1967. 272. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report 272. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report 1 December 30, 1966. [ document number not declassified ] COUNTRY Laos SUBJECT A Situation Appraisal of the National Assembly Election Campaign as of 30 December 1966 ACQ [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] SOURCE A staff officer of this organization. This [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] appraisal of the current situation [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation. 1. Summary: In the few days before the election campaign closed on 31 December 1966, the role of the military is still dominant although military leaders have never coalesced. Military commanders and their candidates are strongest in military regions one, two and four. In the third and fifth military regions, the election fight is more wide open. This is particularly true in the third military region where Deputy Prime Minister Leuam Insisiengmay is attempting to lead a bloc in open opposition to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Souvanna has patched together various arrangements with regional leaders and has used General Ouan Rathikoun to influence Military Region One and as his liaison to Military Region Two. Souvanna has worked with Sisouk na Champassak to reach an accommodation with General Phasouk Somly in Region Four and then has attempted to split the political right by making a deal with Phoui and Ngon Sananikone in Vientiane, Borikhane and Khammouane Provinces. His compromises with FAR and the Sananikones have for the time being checked General Kouprasith Abhay and may cut into Leuam’s power. With these shaky agreements and understandings to provide the props, Souvanna’s compromise list of candidates, largely the selections of regional commanders, will probably prevail and a substantial majority in the Assembly will consist of those who have made some sort of a deal with Souvanna; but the new Assembly and elected candidates will have merely formed the framework in which the political struggle in government-controlled Laos will be slugged out. The regional leaders have compromised with local interests and have in several key cases wittingly incorporated anti-Souvanna deputies with leadership potential into their lists, even over Souvanna’s protests. Souvanna has, however, succeeded in eliminating several offensive deputies and the French-backed Neutralist faction in Luang Prabang has largely evaporated. Although the military leaders will probably serve as a braking force on irrational acts of the Assembly, there remains the raw material and sentiment in the Assembly to develop a bloc of political opposition to Souvanna. This will be a rightist movement; and, if it were well led, it could develop into a political organization which eventually could prove a challenge to Souvanna’s leadership. [Here follows a 13-page report.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Confidential. 273. Note From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 273. Note From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 7, 1967, 9:05 a.m. Mr. President: Here is a lively cable from Bill Sullivan describing the political situation in Laos after the recent elections. I though it might provide a sense of the situation on our Viet Nam flank, which may become important in the year ahead whether Viet Nam moves towards negotiations or towards more intense conflict. On the whole, the situation is much better than anyone might have guessed a few years ago. Walt Attachment 2 TEXT OF CABLE 3977 FROM VIENTIANE When the National Assembly was dissolved early last fall and elections for the new Assembly were scheduled for January 1, the Department expressed concern over developments and asked my views on probable consequences. At that time, I speculated that Souvanna would survive, although his neutralists would suffer; and that the Lao army would emerge as the most powerful and successful sponsor of the new Assembly members. I assumed that the army would be acting very largely under General Kouprasith’s inspiration. Most aspects of this reckless prophecy have indeed come to pass as the result of last Sunday’s election. Souvanna seems intact and at least for the time being in better political shape than ever; his neutralists are a shadow of their former selves; and the army has emerged as the most important force behind the scenes. However, in one significant respect, my prophecy was well wide the mark. Kouprasith has not functioned as the primary inspiration of military politics. If anything, he has been very largely isolated and his influence restricted to the Fifth Military Region. It is, I believe, instructive to examine why Kouprasith slipped. If I were to fix any one causative event, I would suggest the October 21 abortive coup of General Ma. This coup was, of course, aimed primarily at Kouprasith, who had harassed General Ma into extremis. And although Ma failed in his immediate quixotic goal of killing Kouprasith, he nevertheless can take some satisfaction that his rash attack eventually resulted in cutting Kouprasith down to size. This consequence came about partly because other generals in the army were shocked by the disruption which Kouprasith’s harassing tactics had produced, and partly because, in the aftermath of Ma’s affair, Kouprasith very decidedly “blew his cool”. He lashed about so extravagantly that he produced reactions. My own rather conspicuous rebuff to him on that occasion made it plain to the other generals that Kouprasith was not our “chosen instrument,” as some rumors had pretended. All these factors therefore stirred the other generals to more foresighted and more deliberate action in the political field to forestall Kouprasith’s expected initiatives. They also caused the Sananikone family, which has always had a healthy respect for American power, to decide that Kouprasith was not necessarily the best standard bearer for the family’s fortunes. The final result has been that General Ouane Rathikoun, General Van Pao and General Phasouk Somly (especially General Phasouk) with their broad-based regional influences, have developed a political presence that overshadows Kouprasith and leaves him very decidedly just one among the group. The case of General Phasouk is particularly interesting, since he has always been (with good cause) the most respected officer in the army. The fact that he has now also emerged as a political figure in his own right (largely assuming the neglected mantle of Prince Boun Oum) provides a new dimension which we will wish to study and upon which we will wish to comment with some deliberation. Before closing this retrospection, I feel I should emphasize two caveats. A) Kouprasith may be currently somewhat down, but his ambitions are by no means out, and he can still be expected to press for greater leverage. B) The new Assembly, girded as it is by the army and rather loosely pledged to support Souvanna, is a totally untried animal. We don’t know how seriously its members will take their pledges to Souvanna, how united the United Front will be, or how the army will exercise its newly acquired political influence. These several unknowns should assure us that political life in Laos will remain interesting. 3 Sullivan 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos, 2/66–1/67. Confidential. The source text indicates that Johnson saw it. 2 The substance of the attached cable was retyped in the White House. The original, January 5, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 LAOS. 3 In telegram 4177 from Vientiane, January 12, also seen by the President, Sullivan reported that Souvanna asked that Sullivan express to Washington the hope that the Johnson administration continue the bombing of North Vietnam. Souvanna believed that the North Vietnamese were hurting and wanted a pause. Souvanna wanted Washington to know that Laos “profits enormously” from U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. (Ibid., POL 15–1 LAOS) A retyped copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Memos 2/66–1/67) 274. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk 274. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 13, 1967. SUBJECT Weather Modification in North Vietnam and Laos (Project Popeye) Proposal 1. The Department of Defense has requested our approval to initiate the operational phase of Project Popeye in selected areas (map at clip) 2 along the infiltration routes in North Vietnam and southern Laos. The objective of the program is to produce sufficient rainfall along these lines of communication to interdict or at least interfere with truck traffic between North and South Vietnam. Recently improved cloud seeding techniques would be applied on a sustained basis, in a non-publicized effort to induce continued rainfall through the months of the normal dry season. Background 2. A test phase of Project Popeye was approved by State and Defense and conducted during October 1966 in a strip of the Lao Panhandle generally east of the Bolovens Plateau in the valley of the Se Kong River. The test was conducted without consultation with Lao authorities (but with Ambassador Sullivan’s knowledge and concurrence) and, to the best of our knowledge, remains unknown to other than a severely limited number of U.S. officials. 3. During the test phase, more than 50 cloud seeding experiments were conducted. The results are viewed by DOD as outstandingly successful. (a) 82% of the clouds seeded produced rain within a brief period after seeding—a percentage appreciably higher than normal expectation in the absence of seeding. (b) The amount of rainfall induced by seeding is believed to have been sufficient to have contributed substantially to rendering vehicular routes in this area inoperable. Since the end of the rainy season, the communists have failed to undertake route repairs and there has been no vehicular traffic. (c) In one instance, the rainfall continued as the cloud moved eastward across the Vietnam border and inundated a U.S. Special Forces camp with nine inches of rain in four hours. (d) DOD scientists consider that the experiment demonstrated a capacity to raise and maintain rainfall under controlled conditions to the level at which the land is saturated over a sustained period, slowing movement on foot and rendering the operation of vehicles impracticable. 4. In our view, the experiments were undeniably successful, indicating that, at least under weather and terrain conditions such as those involved, the U.S. Government has realized a capability of significant weather modification. If anything, the tests were “too successful”—neither the volume of induced rainfall nor the extent of area affected can be precisely predicted. The only absolute control, therefore, is after the fact, i.e., to halt cloud-seeding missions. Discussion 5. The present DOD proposal would grant authority for the conduct of cloud seeding activities on a sustained basis. For designated areas in North Vietnam, it would mean taking advantage of the present northeast monsoon (the “Crachin”) to increase normal rainfall. The objective is to inhibit overland vehicular movement and to reinforce the bottlenecks already created at stream crossings by the bombing of bridges and ferry installations. With respect to Laos, the objective is to extend rainfall through the dry season (which began in November and continues through April or May), keeping the ground as near the saturation point as possible and obstructing traffic that normally fords streams during the low water period. 6. The assets required for this program are estimated to be very small: extra personnel for existing weather reconnaissance aircraft based in Thailand plus two C–130 aircraft modified for cloud seeding operations with crews, plus supporting personnel. The initial request totals only 33 additional personnel for assignment to bases in northeast Thailand. The cost of the equipment and seeding materials is so low as to be insignificant. 7. A corollary phase of the operation would be to conduct intensified weather reconnaissance and additional experiments in weather modification over international waters in the South China Sea, from Philippine bases—one principal objective being the development of techniques to dissipate cloud cover as well as to induce abnormal rainfall. 8. The proposal differs, in our judgment, from previous weather modification efforts by: (a) being operational rather than experimental (b) having military rather than economic or welfare purposes. Approval could thus be considered to constitute a precedent-making decision with major implications for the future. It raises questions in the political, legal, economic, biological, and psychological spheres, many of which cannot be answered adequately in advance of conducting the operation but which are discussed in the following paragraphs. 9. Urgency. DOD wishes to inaugurate operations at once. A prompt decision would (1) enable 7AF to take maximum advantage of present rainy season conditions along coastal areas of North Vietnam, and (2) permit operations in Laos with minimum loss of time between the end of the rainy season and efforts to recreate rainy season conditions along the infiltration routes. With respect to Laos, the period of heaviest anticipated infiltration activity is at hand. 10. Impact in Target Areas. The target areas within North Vietnam are areas of relatively high population density including the town of Dong Hoi, but at least for the first part of the operational period the areas would be undergoing rainy season conditions even in the absence of the proposed operations. It seems reasonable to conclude that the effect of the operation, at least during the normal time span of the wet monsoon, will fall within the range of weather and terrain conditions already experienced at least from time to time. If the operation continued into rice harvest periods, crop damage could result unless seeding was temporarily suspended. The target areas in Laos, by contrast, are characterized by relatively low population density, but the proposed program would drastically change the weather patterns over the next few months—creating to some extent rainy season conditions during normal dry weather periods. The increased rainfall will inhibit military movement more than civilian movement (to the extent the former is more dependent on motor transport). The effect on military traffic will be to exacerbate difficulties already experienced, to a degree dependent on the extent to which rainfall can in fact be increased on a sustained basis. The experimental phase of Popeye, conducted during the rainy season, does not provide sure indicators of the extent to which wet weather conditions can be re-created during normally dry periods. But DOD believes the induction of rainfall to be feasible, and to the extent its predictions are realized there would be an undoubted favorable military effect. The road network over which vehicular movement takes place in Laos, despite improvement as well as extension over the past two years, passes through many low-lying areas and is vulnerable to interruption in bad weather, in narrow defiles, along hillsides, and at innumerable stream crossings where bridges do not exist or have been destroyed and where fording is normal practice. Interruption of road traffic would not only retard the normal rate of movement but would also force concentration of trucks that would be more vulnerable to aerial attacks at points known to us because we created the bottlenecks. Infiltration of troops, on foot, cannot be halted by creation of wet monsoon conditions, although there would be some retardant effect. The same effect would, of course, apply to the freedom of movement and morale of friendly roadwatch and guerrilla teams operating in the same area. The impact on civilian population will be much the same, in kind, and greater in degree, than that discussed below with respect to areas outside the target zones. The psychological impact will be perhaps greater than any other effect, particularly when conditions characteristic of the rainy season are unexpected. 11. Impact Outside Target Areas. In North Vietnam the impact of successful Popeye operations outside the designated area should be slight. The added rainfall would reach the sea over short distances in the coastal areas where operations would take place or would occur in the mountainous border area that is sparsely populated by tribal peoples. There would likely be some spill over in the form of increased rainfall west of the target areas. There would be some hypothetical effect of an adverse nature in Thailand where, during the northeast monsoon, normal rainfall might be somewhat diminished as the distance west of the mountains along the Vietnam-Laos border increases. However, as a practical matter, rainfall in the dry areas of northeast Thailand is so slight in this season that any difference resulting from the proposed operation is not likely to be either discernible or meaningful in terms of the water table. In Laos, there will likely be discernible effects to the west of the proposed areas of operation, toward the Mekong River. These effects cannot be quantified but give us some concern. If the operations approached the goal of keeping the infiltration routes impassable, they might be substantial. Project scientists estimate that it might be necessary to induce rainfall of up to six inches per month, once the ground was saturated, to keep it in that condition. The following are the types of effect foreseen: (a) In areas where rain falls out of season, the life cycle of plants and animals may be affected. Villagers may unwisely seek to alter planting seasons in the face of uncertainty as to the future implications of the weather changes they experience. If there is heavy and persistent rain, it is possible that more fundamental ecological change may occur, e.g., in the formation of fungi and growth of bacteria which are ordinarily subject to control by the alternation of wet and dry seasons. Although rice production would not be affected by operations during the next few months, cultivation of secondary crops could well be adversely affected in limited areas. (b) Downstream from the areas of rainfall, there will be effects on the water level, diminishing as tributaries broaden toward the Mekong. Unless monitored to limit induced rainfall to the amounts needed to attain project objectives, intensive sustained operations could produce serious localized flooding. Even at the required tempo of operations, it seems probable that there will be changes in normal water flow. Farmers, for example, who normally move during the dry season across country, through dry stream beds or through shallow fords, may be inconvenienced if not endangered by the unexpected rise of water. In view of the uncertainty as to the extent to which wet-season conditions are likely to be created, we should assume in acting on the DOD proposal that there will be appreciable consequences outside the target areas. Project scientists are satisfied that the proposed operations would not induce disasters in the form of large and uncontrolled storms. But with respect to Laos, at least, the more successful the operation proved to be with respect to its military objectives, the greater would be our uneasiness with respect to the likelihood of unwanted side effects. The outside estimates of the range of effect of the seeding of a single cloud is an area 50 by 100 miles. If not large meteorologically speaking, any such range would be sufficient to carry the impact into heavily populated friendly areas. 12. Consultation. There are thus legal, and perhaps moral or philosophical, aspects to the question whether the US should utilize the capability we seem to have developed to alter weather conditions significantly. We cannot lightly assume responsibility for unilaterally altering climate, and possibly landforms, in other sovereignties, and particularly for initiating weather warfare with an uncertain extent of injury to civilian populations. The Legal Adviser, I understand, has undertaken a comprehensive study of the legal implications of weather modification—a project that cannot be completed in time to affect the decision on the pending proposal. Your decision should, however, be made in the light of these uncertainties. With respect to North Vietnam, we believe that as an interdiction measure Popeye operations would be less harmful to the population and area affected than bombing. With respect to Laos, Ambassador Sullivan has approved the project and indicated he would not plan to consult Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. His concurrence, however, was based on an assumption that the proposed operations would be conducted under conditions comparable to those of the experimental phase. We believe conditions would be different, notably in that ground saturation might occur during normally dry weather periods and, if successful, be sustained indefinitely. We do not believe a program of this import should be launched in a friendly country without the knowledge of responsible authority, in this case the Prime Minister. 13. Possible Publicity. The DOD proposes to conduct the project under conditions of strictest secrecy, noting that publicity would create vulnerability to communist charges of US manipulation of weather, in the affected areas or elsewhere. We believe the consequences of exposure would be more profound and widespread than this statement suggests. One probable consequence is that many Lao and Thai might immediately attribute to US experimentation the disastrous Mekong flood of September 1966. More irrationally and perhaps with less certainty, there might be many occasions in which uninformed groups in non-communist as well as communist nations would blame the US for climatic abnormalities with which we had no connection. There are apparently still enough people who blame nuclear experimentation for freakish weather phenomena to justify great caution in this regard. We see no way to quantify the political/psychological burden the US might be required to bear in the future but it must be considered a factor relevant to your decision. At the same time, it seems highly unlikely that such operations could remain secret indefinitely, and our assumption should be that they will become known. In the first place, the altered weather will be observable, in contrast to the experimental phase conducted during normally rainy periods. Disclosure of planned weather experiments in India would make it likely that the connection would become apparent. Secondly, the possibility of a US seeding aircraft being downed cannot be discounted. Thirdly, there is virtually no aspect of military operations in Southeast Asia which has not over time become the subject of leaks or at least of speculation in the press. The possibility of incurring a severe psychological handicap is therefore one of the problems we foresee in connection with the operation. Even though the adverse impact might be less if the operations were to be announced than as if they simply became known, we believe it is preferable that security controls be maintained as long as possible. The principal advantage of this operation, from the security standpoint, is the relatively small number of individuals involved. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to respond to disclosure by acknowledgment and to anticipated charges by arguing that the action was a more humanitarian attempt to reduce aggression against South Vietnam than undertaking bombing, or firing rockets and guns. But we should anticipate that this line would not satisfy critics both national and international, and it is possible that the issue could be brought before the UN. If the reaction were bad, we could anticipate being blamed for atypical weather phenomena in other areas, whether we were responsible or not, and being accused of using the Vietnam conflict for another type of experimentation with unorthodox and “illegal” methods. The history of communist campaigns against “germ warfare” and chemical warfare might be repeated. 14. Military Effect and Counter-Effect. As previously stated, the results of Operation Popeye should be to add a further impediment to the infiltration and support effort moving from North Vietnam through Laos and into South Vietnam. It is not possible to predict to what degree this infiltration will be impeded by Popeye; however, as a minimum, even if the flow of men and materials is not reduced, Operation Popeye should force the North Vietnamese to pay a heavier price for what they are able to move. The question naturally arises as to the extent to which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong might be able to turn this relatively simple technique against us in the current conflict. The present conflict appears to offer a unique opportunity to employ cloud seeding techniques without serious possibility of retaliation in kind. This is based on the fact that successful use of the technique on a scale that could be militarily significant requires almost unrestricted use of the air over the target area. In addition, we are not as dependent on moving large numbers of people and tonnages over long, restrictive and fairly rudimentary roadnets which would be vulnerable to this technique. While the possibility of effective counter-action in the present conflict may be small, the initiation of cloud seeding as a military measure may well have serious long-range military implications. In essence, it would establish the precedent for altering weather and even climate for military purposes. At some future time, in some as yet unforeseen way, this could prove to be militarily disadvantageous to the US. It is difficult to accept the premise that lack of precedent alone would stop some future use of measures for altering weather or climate should they give promise of providing a militarily significant advantage. But the political consequences of “first use” could prove, as in the case of nuclear weapons, highly relevant to any subsequent efforts to control application of the technique by agreement. Recommendations 3 1. That you approve initiation of Phase II of Project Popeye, with the proviso that use of weather-modification techniques be considered still in the experimental phase until additional data are available on the effects. We propose to select among the areas proposed by Defense those which are of highest military priority but to exclude areas of relatively heavy population. We would thus concur on the assumption that Defense experts believe there will be a substantial military benefit from seeding operations limited to the areas authorized. To that end I will, if you agree: (a) Limit authorization at present to those operational areas marked in red on the map attached (one in North Vietnam and four in Laos), with the understanding that additional areas among those proposed can be considered on the basis of experience or that operations can be immediately interrupted if the side effects become unexpectedly adverse or criticism too heavy to bear; (b) Obtain DOD understanding that weekly operational summaries and special incident reports will be made available to State, in order that monitoring of the operation can be carried out on a current basis and side effects in and outside the target areas can be evaluated; (c) Ask Ambassador Martin to obtain concurrence for positioning in Thailand of the limited assets required, and obtain his views whether this operation could be mounted from Thai bases [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]; (d) Instruct Ambassador Sullivan to consult and obtain concurrence of Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma before operations are commenced; (e) Ensure that Ambassador Blair is briefed on experimental activities that would be conducted over the South China Sea from Philippine bases before such activities are launched, and determine with the advice of Ambassador Lodge whether consultation with the GVN is desirable before operations are launched against North Vietnam. (f) Consider ways to supplement aerial observation in order to ascertain the nature and extent of effects outside target areas, without breach of security; (g) Obtain DOD understanding that, because the operation could not be denied if exposed, any compromise of the security cover would require acknowledgement, and develop public affairs materials against that contingency. (h) Undertake a review of the results and implications of Popeye in the light of the legal study of weather modification as soon as it is available and, with DOD, explore the longer-range strategic implications for the US of the use of weather warfare; seek, with ACDA, a general policy on meteorological warfare. 2. That State’s approval of the DOD proposal in this modified form be made conditional on the President’s being advised, and that you consider a joint presentation to the President with Secretary McNamara, in order that he be made aware not only of the significant military advantages anticipated but also of the uncertain but ultimately far-ranging implications of weather warfare in the political, legal, economic and psychological spheres. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by Hamilton. 2 Not printed. 3 Kohler wrote the following note on the first page of the memorandum: “I have serious doubts—may I discuss this with you.” According to a February 7 memorandum from Kohler to Unger, Rusk also had reservations and, after consultations with Kohler, agreed to approve the operation “on a strictly experimental basis” in the five limited areas. Rusk wished to be kept informed of the progress of the project and wanted it to be understood that his approval was not a commitment to approve further steps in the project or broader application of it. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 In a March 18 memorandum to Secretary of the Navy Ignatius, McNamara stated that, contrary to JCS recommendation, he had disapproved the operational use of the 7th Air Force’s OPLAN Popeye. McNamara noted that the testing of Popeye at the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake demonstrated that it was “a potentially powerful weapon against lines of communication in Southeast Asia.” McNamara suggested the establishment of an environmental research unit to develop and test the feasibility of weather modification in Southeast Asia. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1 (000.93 Laos), 1966) 275. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 275. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, January 21, 1967, 0507Z. 4405. Subject: Laotian General Oudone’s conversations in Vietnam. Ref: Saigon 15996 Jan 19 (not sent Bangkok). 2 1. As Department aware, Chief of FAR General Staff General Oudone Sananikone has nourished for some years idea of obtaining from US, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] or South Vietnamese sources funds, equipment, and training for Lao commando operations against enemy positions and infiltration routes in Laos Panhandle. 2. Conversations he held Jan 15 in Saigon (see reftel) are a further development of this idea. Two days later, on January 17, Oudone held another meeting, this time in Vientiane, with Deputy FAR Commander General Kouprasith Abhay, [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] and an SVN military intelligence officer to discuss expanded Lao operations against corridor area (FOV 10,025 Jan 19). 3 3. Reftel asks us to comment specifically on proposal advanced by Oudone in Saigon that he be provided external assistance to recruit, train, equip, and deploy some 1800 Lao commandos (three battalions) in operations against corridor. 4. We of course already have under way in Panhandle under CAS sponsorship, commando and roadwatch operations, which employ Lao, Kha, and other local inhabitants in clandestine operations designed to harass enemy along infiltration routes and to facilitate air interdiction. These operations have grown steadily over past year and now encompass some 3500 effectives with steps underway to recruit and train an additional 500 men. Directed by US paramilitary experts, these operations are highly sophisticated, employing helicopters and other airlift and communications equipment and operational techniques of most advanced sort. They have enjoyed success thus far precisely because they have emphasized highly centralized control of operations, rigorous recruitment and training, and sophisticated techniques. 5. US resources are in our judgment being very effectively employed in this program which is itself still in a stage of expansion. To create a parallel commando structure of sort apparently envisaged by General Oudone would therefore be a redundant, competitive, and less efficient use of scarce resources. Lao manpower of potential commando quality is in especially short supply, as problems General Phasouk is currently experiencing in effort attract Lao into GM-21 fully indicate. CAS has also experienced problems in obtaining and motivating suitable Lao recruits. 6. These practical considerations in our judgment effectively rule out extension at this time of any US military support to program being advocated by General Oudone. Without our support, we seriously doubt that Lao, even with Thai and SVN assistance, can mount efficient program of this sort. 7. We therefore believe Oudone should not be encouraged in this project 4 and that at appropriate time our position should be made known to him, to Thai, and to South Vietnamese. Timing, level, and precise manner in which we would register our disapproval would of course have to be carefully considered; and it could well be we should make no move until our support is formally requested by Lao, Ambassador Sullivan may wish to comment further during his present consultations in Washington. 5 Swank 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 LAOS–VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. 2 Telegram 15996 from Saigon, January 19, contains an account of General Oudone’s conversations with South Vietnamese Chief of the Joint General Staff, General Cao Van Vien, and with Chief of State Thieu, both on January 15. (Ibid.) 3 Not further identified. 4 In telegram 9309 from Bangkok, January 23, the Embassy in Thailand agreed that the United States should not support Oudone’s program for a commando force for the time being, but it suggested that Oudone not be discouraged from discussing the idea further with the Thais and South Vietnamese. At some point, the Embassy suggested, ground forces might be required to fight North Vietnamese regulars in Laos. At that time Asian forces including those suggested by Oudone might prove useful. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 LAOS–VIET S) 5 In telegram 124769 to Bangkok, Saigon, and Vientiane, January 24, the Department agreed that it was important not to discourage Thai-South Vietnamese-Lao consultations, but at the same time it was important not to encourage the idea that the United States was prepared to support Oudone. After discussion with Sullivan the Department suggested that Oudone’s request might be a result of Finance Minister Sisouk’s campaign to reform the Lao military budget, which was characterized by a wide disparity between payroll strength and actual strength. (Ibid.) 276. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 276. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Honolulu, February 16, 1967, 1906Z. 161906Z. Restrictions on operations in southern Laos (C). A. COMUSMACV MACJO1567 Eyes Only 141325Z Feb 67. 2 1. Ref A stresses importance the NVN have placed on the infiltration routes in the Loatian Panhandle and concludes that the enemy is making his main infiltration effort through that area. Specific restrictions hindering effective military operations to counter this enemy effort are enumerated and the recommendation made that political and diplomatic sectors seek accommodations which will eliminate or temper these restrictions. 2. It is recognized that during the past two years there has been a gradual removal of restrictions and increased authorization for military operations in the Laos Panhandle. During the same period the enemy use of this area as the route of infiltration and support for his aggression in SVN has increased rapidly. New roads and trails have been completed, concealment and camouflage improved and work crews enlarged and increased. The influx of men and materials has increased despite considerable air effort expended to hinder infiltration. The gradual removal of restrictions has not kept pace with the rapid build up and use of the infiltration routes by the enemy. 3. It is evident that the reluctance to remove certain restrictions and to authorize increased freedom of action in military operations is based primarily on political considerations. The importance of these considerations is recognized, but difficult to accept unless the military threat is kept in proper perspective. I concur with Westy that we have reached a point where more effective use of our military assets is required not to reduce infiltration. We are using these assets to their maximum under the guidelines authorized. What is required is a lifting of certain restrictions now. The restrictions on ground operations are the most severe at present. The limitations on the size of Shining Brass, reduced area of operation and mode of ingress severely restricts a capability that has proven to be most effective. 4. From background message traffic it is apparent that the restrictions are not all AmEmb Vientiane originated. It is imperative, however, to convince Bill Sullivan that we need his support in convincing Washington. By separate message 3 I am asking Westy to document 4 in considerable detail the contents of para 1, Ref A. There is the possibility that the complete picture is not available to Sullivan. It is possible that our requirements for additional freedom of action have been too fragmented. With the exception of the Shining Brass restrictions, the other restrictions on an individual basis could be lived with. It is the compounding effect of one on top of the other that seriously hurts. 5. It is suggested you delay action in Washington until Westy and I have the chance to present our case to Bill Sullivan. The coming Baguio Conference in early March will provide the opportunity. In the interim, a convincing analysis can be developed on the extent operations are hindered by these restrictions. Hopefully, this analysis will lead to Bill Sullivan’s support in improving the situation. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Jan-31 Mar 1967. Top Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland. 2 Dated February 14. (Ibid.) 3 Sharp’s telegram 170148Z to Westmoreland, February 17. (Ibid.) 4 Westmoreland’s telegram MAC 2015 to Sullivan, March 1. (Ibid.) 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, February 24, 1967, 9:50 p.m. 144166. For Ambassador from Bundy. Extension of Shining Brass. 1. It has been decided at highest levels that we should extend scope of Shining Brass activity as one of series of additional steps to improve anti-infiltration efforts. 2. Decision is to change Shining Brass rules to permit: a. Operations east of line bounded by coordinates XD430980 at Lao/NVN border to XD430400 to XD700000 to YC010980; southern sector unchanged; b. Use of helicopters to full depth of above zone; c. Use of exploitation forces to full depth of zone. d. Multi-platoon operations up to three platoons in any single operation. e. Delegation of authority to approve operations to CINCPAC, who will insure coordination with Vientiane. (We will interpret this to mean that CINCPAC will “obtain concurrence of” Vientiane.) 3. Without consulting Souvanna at this stage, desire your considered views on effect such an extension of Shining Brass operations will have on your essential relationships with Souvanna, and specifically request your judgment on how problem can best be handled in terms of consultation and public affairs aspects. 4. Our reading of situation is that up to now Souvanna is quite firm that he would not consent to US ground operations in Laos. Having in mind his apparent recognition that activities in eastern portion of panhandle are beyond RLG capacity to control, with most of friendly population removed, and on basis of clear evidence of recent upsurge of infiltration at least in terms of truck traffic, do you foresee possibility of his moderating his position? If not, what outcome would you estimate if we were to decide simply to inform him that we have now determined such steps to be necessary and beseech his understanding? Would such a proceeding leave us in better or worse shape than inadvertent exposure of operations without his having been consulted or informed. 5. Your judgment on foregoing questions should be made in light of following preliminary thinking on problem of press handling, together with any further suggestions you may wish to advance: a. There would, of course, be no announcement and standing instructions to guard against disclosures would be reinforced. b. If casualties, helicopter losses or other incidents lead to publicity, we would make maximum effort to avoid acknowledgment by: 1) Declining comment on communist propaganda charges, if such were original source. 2) Citing apparent navigational error if in proximity to SVN border. 3) Using SAR activity as cover if feasible. c. If size of forces involved or location made such explanation impossible, we should seek when possible to fall back on proposition that border crossing occurred while forces in contact with NVN forces and acting in self-defense. d. In event of some hard to explain incident, we would decline comment but talk to responsible press reps on deep background basis, acknowledging that cross border reconnaissance being conducted, explaining it essential we know enemy strenghts and movements in critical area. For reasons analogous to our answering queries on air operations by reference to “aerial reconnaissance,” we would say we simply cannot confront Souvanna with pressures that would result from official acknowledgment. We would thus propose to stop short of any direct admission of violation. Recognize, however, that we would henceforth be dealing with press on a somewhat different footing, by tending to treat all activity in Laos in fashion in which questions on air activities have been handled up to now. 5. Public affairs guidance will be developed for issuance at time operational orders are released, in coordination with DOD and in light of your comments and recommendations, which required by Saturday Feb. 25 Wash. time. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Hamilton and cleared by Steadman, Unger, and Daniel Arzac of the Bureau of Public Affairs. 278. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 278. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Honolulu, February 25, 1967, 0152Z. 250152Z. Installation of MSQ 77 in northern Laos (S). A. CINCPAC 282347Z Nov 66 (Genser). B. OUSAIRA Vientiane AIRA/EMB 01834/291055Z Nov 66 (Genser). 2 1. A front channel message which I have just released provides the military rationale and the necessity of installing an MSQ-77 at Site 85 in Laos. 2. In November CINCPACAF requested authorization to develop a concept and plan for installation of an MSQ-77 in northern Laos and authorization to discuss this matter with Ambassador Sullivan. Ref A authorized CINCPACAF to proceed with plans as requested and directed that AmEmb Vientiane be provided with detailed requirements. Ref A further urged the Ambassador’s concurrence in this proposal and assistance in selection of a suitable site. Ref B stated that Ambassador Sullivan’s view of installation of MSQ on Lao territory was decidedly negative, but would authorize his representatives to discuss proposal with PACAF representatives. He further doubted that RLG would be willing to accept such a major installation for which they would consequently feel security obligations beyond their means. 3. In early December Gen Harris 3 sent a message to Ambassador Sullivan stating that due to the urgency of this proposal and potential impact on the success of our air operations in RT and BR he welcomed the opportunity to provide a briefing to him at Udorn on 10 December 1966. His response again restated his grave doubts that RLG would be willing to permit installation of MSQ-77 in Lao territory and that he had even graver doubts that Washington would even authorize him to propose such an installation to the RLG. Nevertheless, the Ambassador agreed to meet PACAF representatives at Udorn and attend briefing. 4. At the briefing Ambassador expressed keen interest in the tactical merits of an MSQ in northern Laos but again stated that he had misgivings about its political acceptability. He expressed concern that the RLG would most likely term such an installation as an indication that they would in fact be proving direct support to offensive operations against NVN rather than maintaining a neutral position and taking defensive action only. No commitment was made by Ambassador that he would provide further support to this proposal. 5. I discussed the subject with him during his visit en route to Washington. He again emphasized his previous views. It appears that he did not intend to give his full support to this proposal at State level. Due to the significant increase in air operations capability which this MSQ will provide, I believe we must attempt to obtain approval. 6. The information contained in my Genser message is a condensed version of PACAF briefing and plan for implementation. It has been concluded that we can support this plan. I understand that HG USAF has already taken action to repackage MSQ-77 equipment for this type development and if not used as proposed, it will still be valuable for contingency purposes. If go ahead is received, we can have this MSQ in operation in 30–45 days. 7. In summary, from a military viewpoint an MSQ located in northern Laos would greatly enhance our air campaign against the enemy. This is no cure-all by any means, but we must do more now to increase the effectiveness of our air operations in the northern area. The Ambassador’s original objection was based on doubts about the security of site which we have overcome to some degree as expressed in other message. However, his later objections, which shifted to the political angle, may or may not be completely valid. This is something that will have to be flushed out at other levels. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Jan-31 Mar 1967. Top Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland and General John D. Ryan, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force. 2 Neither reference has been found, but they are summarized in the text below. 3 General Hunter Harris, then the Commander of the Pacific Air Force. 279. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 279. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, February 25, 1967, 0850Z. 5248. Ref: State 144166. 2 For Bundy from Sullivan. 1. I take note of highest level decision that we should extend scope of Shining Brass rules to: A) Add new northern zone of approximately 20 kms depth B) Permit helicopter penetration to full depth C) Allow exploitation forces and multi-platoon operations to three platoons in any single operation to full depth. 2. First, let me say that, subject to my comments below, I think we can live with this decision. At the same time, let me add that I believe this is just about all the traffic will bear and that the line has to be held at this point. I think it is important that this be clearly stated at the outset because this new zone embraces some very hot territory where three platoons could be lost in a 30-minute fire fight some fine morning. At that stage, there will be a panicky demand for a battalion to “rescue them.” This will have to be resisted and the risks and losses will have to be borne as part of the original contractual understanding. 3. Next, I would like certain clarifications: A) This zone covers the FAR position at Ban Houei Sane occupied by Lao Bao Batallion BV–33. We will want to work out some operating rules to guide any activities contemplated near this area. B) It is not clear whether use of helicopters and exploitation forces involves “full depth” of new zone or of entire Shining Brass zone. Please stipulate. C) Are three platoons to be committed simultaneously or consecutively? In other words, is there a limit on total consecutive commitment to an operation? 4. Re point 2e reftel. I wish to have “coordination” spelled out to mean continuation of our current system. We have periodic meetings with MACV which work out their programs, we have “intent to launch” rules, etc. We want these preserved and not changed. This includes possibility I may veto some operations for political reasons as I have in the past. I intend continue exercise that right as senior U.S. representative in Laos. I believe Admiral Sharp would prefer it that way so that his field forces are not operative without some exercise of political judgment. 5. Your understanding of Souvanna’s attitude outlined first sentence para 4 reftel is correct. There is, in my judgment, absolutely no chance that he will change this position. This is a matter of major political posture, in his view, and not affected by tactical circumstances. 6. Therefore, it would not be possible for me even to consider approaching him either to “beseech his understanding” or to tell him coldly that we have decided to go ahead in any event. His answer could only be negative in any instance. He has let me know obliquely that if thing ever came to this sort of point he would not wish to be informed in any way. 7. Consequently, my judgment is quite clear that I will have to bear the full responsibility for this sort of operation without sharing it with Souvanna. This I am prepared to do. 8. However, in so doing, I feel I am entitled to complete cover from Washington and other assorted spokesmen in public relations field. I recognize and accept that Washington cannot buy the line of flat denial, which is what Souvanna would want. At the same time, I see absolutely no reason to go beyond the “no comment” stage. 9. Consequently, in rather elaborate discussion of press handling in para 5 reftel, I take inalterable exception to idea of “deep backgrounding responsible press reps”. I would like assurance that this will not be given further consideration and that no official will, in any circumstance, acknowledge these operations even if “incidents lead to publicity.” It is good for a spokesman’s moral fibre to learn to stand on “no comment”. 10. Finally, I wish to stress continuing need for rigid precautions against “inadvertent” disclosure by casual talk, by letters which are sent to next of kin after fatalities, etc. The men who run and operate this program are an elite group of volunteers with an excellent record of discipline and absence of self-seeking publicity. It would be a total disservice to them and their mission if their operations were slipped out because some public information official or staff section can not maintain the same discipline in its far less demanding function. 3 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 4:40 p.m., February 25, Washington time. 2 Document 277 . 3 In joint State-Defense telegram 147744 to JCS, Saigon, and Vientiane, March 2, the Departments of Defense and State outlined press guidance for questions about Shining Brass. The guidance stated that if the inquiry arose from a Communist accusation, the spokesperson should decline comment. If the incident occurred close to the SVN border (about 5 kilometers) and became public, the spokesperson could suggest that it was an inadvertent border crossing or pursuit of NVN/VC. Search and rescue activities could also be used as a explanation when appropriate, but otherwise the response must be “no comment.” There would be no “background” or “off the record” briefings on Shining Brass, nor would operations be disclosed to official personnel except on a “need to know basis.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 280. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at the American Chiefs of State Conference, Punta del Este, Uruguay 280. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at the American Chiefs of State Conference, Punta del Este, Uruguay 1 Washington, April 13, 1967, 2:51 p.m. Tosec 124. In course conversation yesterday, Dobrynin made official demarche to Kohler about Laos. 2 Talking points paper given Kohler contained following points: (1) present developments in Laos causing alarm in Moscow; (2) fundamental reason for acuteness internal Lao situation is increased US interference in internal affairs that country; (3) US actions contradict obligations under Geneva Agreements; (4) US trying convert Laos into new theater military operations; (5) US participating in effort liquidate tripartite system internal organization; (6) all US and right-wing actions aimed at creation single military and political front against Pathet Lao; (7) US conducting heavy air raids on Lao territory; (8) US violating Lao air space to raid DRV; (9) as Co-Chairman Geneva Conference, Sov Govt directs USG attention to fact present political course with respect to Laos may have serious consequences not only for peace and unity in Laos, but also for security all SEA; and (10) Sov Union insists US immediately cease violating neutrality Laos, discontinue intervention including air activities and strictly observe Geneva Agreements; otherwise it will not be possible create conditions necessary reestablish peace and quiet in Laos. Kohler told him he would pass statement along for study and would reserve formal comment until later. 3 As preliminary comment, however, Kohler said it was useful subject should come up. USG considered Soviets had not fulfilled their responsibilities under 1962 Laos agreements and related understandings between Pushkin and Harriman and that their failure to do so was one of main reasons which had led to escalation of hostilities in SVN. If all Laos had been effectively brought under control Central Government with aid and support of Co-Chairmen and ICC, main invasion route into SVN from NVN would not have remained open. Kohler concluded with statement that Soviet Govt should understand we consider they have continuing responsibility this connection. Dobrynin noted preliminary remarks and said he would expect fuller and more considered reply after his return from Moscow. He departs today. British received Soviet proposal yesterday in Moscow that Co-Chairman send message to Geneva signatories apparently long line above demarche. Will send text when available. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. Repeated to Moscow, London, Vientiane, Ottawa, New Delhi, Warsaw, and Saigon. 2 The memorandum of the conversation between Dobrynin and Kohler, April 12, at the Soviet Embassy, is ibid., POL US–USSR. 3 In Secto 55 from Punta del Este, April 14, Rusk responded that since Dobrynin brought up Laos, “we should jump into this for all it is worth.” Rusk asked that upon his return to Washington William Bundy, Harriman, and others prepare a “major presentation to the Soviets about Laos, pressing for 1000 percent compliance by all parties with the Geneva Accords of 1962.” Rusk noted that if Dobrynin’s demarche meant “more trouble ahead, let’s have a good record.” If there was any possibility of getting effective application of the 1962 Accord, Rusk believed it would be a “major step.” (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 281. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 281. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 17, 1967. SUBJECT Soviet Demarche on Laos The Soviet memorandum handed Foy [Kohler] by Dobrynin on Laos 2 is the first real sign of life the Soviets have shown in their responsibilities as Co-Chairman for the implementation of the 1962 Agreement. We believe the demarche should be treated in the larger context of another signal from Moscow that they cannot let further intensification or escalation of our bombing of North Vietnam go without reaction on their part. This opinion is confirmed in a more casual discussion which Zbigniew Brzezinski had with Yuri Zhukov of Pravda. This underlines our view that we should undertake as a matter of urgency a new line of discussion with the Soviet leaders, particularly before they get further involved in Vietnam. The closer they come to confrontation with us, the more difficult it will be for them to retreat, and the harder it will be to achieve a settlement. We believe our response to the Soviets should be in the form of a follow-up to the long and useful conversation you had with Dobrynin in January. 3 We think that the demarche should be answered head-on, but that the opportunity should also be taken of pressing the Soviets to agree to serious and early discussions to achieve a settlement of Vietnam of which the situation in Laos is only a part. With respect to the demarche itself, we suggest a reply along the following lines: We call Soviet attention to the fact that the North Vietnamese, by refusing to withdraw their forces from Laos upon signing of the Agreements in 1962 had, in fact, violated the Agreement from the very moment it was to come into effect. In fact, the continuing presence of the North Vietnam troops in Laos and Hanoi’s continuing use of Laotian territory for the dispatch of personnel and supplies to South Vietnam not only created the present difficulties in Laos, but has largely been responsible for the situation in South Vietnam as well. We wish to submit a list of Hanoi’s violations of the Laos Agreements (attached). 4 We would remind the Soviet Government that, in addition to these substantial violations, the spirit of the Harriman-Pushkin agreement has been broken. (The essence of this agreement is attached.) But no useful purpose can be served by an exchange of charges. The United States has always supported and continues to support the carrying out of the 1962 Agreements. We believe that it is important to take whatever steps are necessary to restore and reaffirm them. Various attempts have been made since 1964 to reconvene the Laos Conference of 1962. The U.S. position remains that we welcome any opportunity in any forum which could restore peace and stability to Laos. In particular, we support the reconvening of the Laos Conference of 1962 and believe that this could help make the Laos Agreements more effective. The USSR, the DRV, and most especially Communist China, would probably refuse to agree to reconvening the Conference at this time. We believe that our stated readiness to attend such a conference would have substantial advantages and few, if any, discernible disadvantages. If a conference were held, the possibility of working out (coincidentally, albeit outside the plenary sessions) a Vietnam settlement might be enhanced. If a conference could not be held because of the refusal of Moscow, Hanoi and/or Peking, our record would be good. It is suggested that you ask the British Co-Chairman to include in his response to the Soviet demarche a strong pitch for reconvening the Laos Conference. In sum, we believe that our response to the Soviet demarche could be the wedge to open up wider and more useful discussions with respect to Vietnam. If you agree, we will prepare some further thoughts on this. Mr. Bundy concurs with this memorandum. Attachment 5 PUSHKIN-HARRIMAN UNDERSTANDING RE LAOS On September 12, 1961, Pushkin told Harriman that the Soviets truly desired a neutral independent Laos on the model of Finland, and he specifically suggested that the “Soviets could and would control North Viet Nam and continue support Souvanna against possible Pathet Lao political or military aggression.” His idea was that “Soviets to police Communist bloc to assure adherence agreement, whereas British should police non-Communists. He was particularly suspicious of Thailand and South Viet Nam.” (Rome’s 882, September 13, 1961) 6 On October 9 Harriman reminded Pushkin of this statement and asked how he intended to formalize the understanding. Pushkin objected to a bilateral written agreement between the Co-Chairmen, but expressed readiness to add a sentence to the article on Co-Chairmen “which would give them responsibility for seeing to observation of obligations by thirteen signatory states.” 7 On October 13 Pushkin handed MacDonald a redraft of the Co-Chairmen article which contained new language reading, “The Co-Chairmen will exercise continuous supervision over the fulfillment of this Agreement and will when appropriate consult with the members of the conference.” 8 The Western Powers ultimately accepted this proposal with a slight revision in text. Thus, the Harriman-Pushkin agreement is reflected in the third paragraph of Article 8 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos which reads as follows: “The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervision over the observance of this Protocol and the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.” 1 Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, McNamara, Robert. Top Secret; Nodis. 2 For a summary, see Document 280 . 3 Rusk and Dobyrnin talked on January 18. They discussed non-proliferation, nuclear explosions, strategic nuclear weapons, the Middle East, Soviet nuclear tests, Soviet-American relations, Germany, Vietnam, and Chinese nuclear non-proliferation. (Memoranda of conversation, January 18; Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US–USSR Officials Memoranda of Conversation) 4 Not found. 5 Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Mark B. Feldman of L/EA on April 14. 6 Printed in Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 411 – 412 . 7 See ibid., pp. 459 – 462 . 8 See ibid., p. 472 . 282. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 282. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, April 20, 1967. JCSM–215–67 SUBJECT Prairie Fire—Phase III 1. Reference is made to: a. COMUSMACV message to CINCPAC, 250820Z March 1967, JCS IN 89390. b. CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 010011Z April 1967, JCS IN 13559. 2 2. (TS) The area of Laos between the Tchepone-Se Kong River line and the Lao/Vietnam border continues to be dominated by North Vietnamese forces and to serve as the principal infiltration route and support area for enemy operations in South Vietnam. The avowed neutrality of Laos and the US desire to conform as closely as possibility to the provisions of the Geneva Accords have limited friendly activity in the area to Prairie Fire reconnaissance and exploitation missions, air operations, and some CAS road watch teams. Although all of these efforts have gradually increased in scope and effectiveness, they are by no means capable of stemming the infiltration or denying the use of the area. Therefore, the search has continued for new or improved concepts to deal with the problem without a drastic shift in policy toward Laos and without upsetting that country’s political and military balance. 3. (TS) During the conduct of Prairie Fire operations over the past few months, COMUSMACV’s Studies and Observations Group (SOG) has identified and assessed a potential for the establishment of a friendly guerrilla force in the Annamite Mountain Region of southern Laos. This potential is the Kha tribal group which inhabits the area and is being exploited by the enemy. Past experience with Montagnard groups in Southeast Asia has shown that these people will respond to Caucasian influence and can be developed into guerrilla forces. Such a program could provide an important supplement to the existing counter-infiltration effort at a low cost in men and materiel and with a low risk of embarrassing the neutralist Government of Laos. 4. (TS) CINCPAC has endorsed (reference 1b) a COMUSMACV proposal (reference 1a) that SOG develop and direct a guerrilla program in southeastern Laos. The proposed concept of operations is outlined in Appendix A hereto. Estimates at this time indicate a potential force of some 3,000 men and a requirement for 135 US Army personnel. 5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the proposed concept and consider that this course of action should be pursued. Time consuming and carefully executed preliminary activities such as contact, exfiltration, training, indoctrination, reinfiltration, and recruiting must be undertaken before it will be possible to determine the exact scope and area of the program. These initial steps can be taken without an expansion of the Prairie Fire zone or the commitment of additional US Army Special Forces into Laos. However, this initial activity should not be undertaken without conceptual approval of the over-all program. 6. (TS) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The guerrilla warfare concept contained in Appendix A 3 be approved in principle for further planning, training, and discussion with RVNAF. b. Execution of the preparatory phase (Appendix A, subparagraph 1b (1)) be approved. c. Execution of the exploitation phase (Appendix A, subparagraph 1b (2)) be approved, subject to the successful accomplishment of the preparatory phase and further assessment. d. The phased PCS deployment to RVN of 135 additional US Army personnel be approved. e. Additional funds in the estimated amount of $2,000,000 be provided to the Department of the Navy for the support of this program through the fourth quarter FY 1968. f. A memorandum substantially as contained in Appendix B hereto, together with Appendix A, be forwarded to the Secretary of State. 7. (U) Upon receipt of your approval, the implementing message in Appendix C hereto will be dispatched. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 4 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(Laos 381), 1967. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 Neither reference has been found, however both are described in the text. 3 Appendices A–C are attached but not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 283. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 283. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 1, 1967. SUBJECT Limitations on Military Actions in Laos 1. You asked me to set out in a paper my estimate of the limitations which face us with respect to extending military actions, both ground and air, in Laos. I will list by subheading those various items which have been proposed or contemplated, and give you my current best judgment with respect to each. 2. Ground Action A. Prairie Fire. As you are aware, the Prairie Fire zone has been extended to accommodate a strip 20 kilometers deep from the DMZ down to the old Shining Brass area. It then runs south to the Cambodian border in a zone which varies between 20 and 35 kilometers deep. The ground rules for operations in this zone have been progressively extended until they now permit harassment actions by forces which can number up to three “platoons”. These platoons are a little larger then normal infantry platoons and have three US advisers per unit. Helicopter infiltration and exfiltration are also authorized; ambush and harassment are undertaken. A variation on these operations is called the “SLAM” concept which combines strategic air, tactical air, and Prairie Fire operations teams. Currently, the opportunities afforded to MACSOG by the Prairie Fire rules considerably exceed their abilities. There are far more targets and far more objectives in the current Prairie Fire zone than there are Prairie Fire teams which could operate against them. The SLAM concept, which concentrates teams on so called base areas, usually employs everything that is available to MACSOG at any one time, leaving nothing left over for other operations. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no reason even to contemplate extensions in the Prairie Fire business unless and until MACSOG is able to handle everything it already has on its platter. This is particularly true with the SLAM areas, which are only being nibbled so far. B. Airborne Battalions. It is partly because of this over-extension of MACSOG resources that Westmoreland has proposed the possibility of introducing an airborne battalion to undertake the operations originally planned for Prairie Fire teams, especially in the base areas. There are two great problems with this proposal. The first is that it would probably destroy completely the element of clandestinity which is an essential factor of Prairie Fire. The second is that the airborne battalion would by definition not be trained in those special skills which make the Prairie Fire teams capable of operating in hostile territory. In other words, the airborne battalion would very likely be decimated on its first operation. Quite aside from the military factors it seems to me that jumping from clandestine teams to conspicuous airborne operations would cross the threshold of Souvanna’s tolerance. He has made it clear that he cannot provide positive acceptance to an overt ground force operating in Laos. He would, therefore, have to make official and public protests against this sort of operation with the consequence which I shall describe in another part of this paper. C. The ARVN Division. As an extension on the airborne battalion concept, Westmoreland has proposed the idea of an ARVN ground division to be introduced into Laos from the A Shau Valley. This division would invest and hold the terrain which embraces the juncture of several supply routes and complexes. It would be Vietnamese led, and Vietnamese operated with American air and logistic support. Obviously the objections which pertain to the airborne battalion would be present in spades for the ARVN division. Moreover, given the consequences of taking and holding territory, rather than just raiding into it, I feel that this one goes well beyond the limitation of anything which really requires serious consideration. D. The Barrier. There are several facets to the barrier which would concern Laos. Many of them have to do with terminology and public relations. That is, if we announce that we are creating a barrier across South Vietnamese territory from the sea to the Lao border and that we intend by this barrier to seal the DMZ hermetically, we introduce one set of problems. This set of problems has to do with forcing the North Vietnamese to make an end run into Lao territory. Souvanna has carefully refrained from saying exactly how he would react to this, but he has indicated that it would cause concern to him. If we create a barrier from the sea to the foothills and then introduce obstacles and electronic devices in the hills, we clearly cannot say that the barrier hermetically seals South Vietnam at the DMZ. This introduces a new set of problems, but a set which is more tractable. If we talk in terms of introducing a barrier from the sea all the way across Laos to the Mekong River, we once again cross the threshold and get beyond the range of anything which Souvanna could tolerate. If I were to describe the sort of thing which I think Souvanna would agree to, I would shape it something like this. The portion of our obstacle course which extends from the sea to the foothills could honestly be called a barrier. Everything westward of that cannot honestly be so called and we should deliberately refrain from applying that label to it. Instead, we should describe what we were doing west of the foothills as an enhanced program of aerial interdiction against infiltration. In other words, we should merely say that we are expanding and concentrating on exactly the same sort of program in which we are currently engaged. In such a concept, I believe we could seed a portion of Laos extending westward from the end of the DMZ at least to the limit of the Prairie Fire zone. We could then turn northward along the North Vietnamese border with a similar pattern of devilish devices sown from the air. However, for political as well as military reasons we should cover the entire strip from the foothills to the Lao border in South Vietnam and we should also run this zone into North Vietnam along the North Vietnamese/Lao border. At the very least it should cover hill 1001 and the staging area at Vi Thu Lu. Such an area could be sown with button bomblets, gravel mines, sensor devises, and any other instruments developed for this purpose. Immediately to the south of the border in South Vietnam and extending into Laos to the depth of the Prairie Fire zone, MACSOG teams could be intermittently deployed for monitoring purposes. This is the sort of arrangement which I believe I could sell to Souvanna. Anything beyond this would be highly questionable. As a matter of fact, Admiral Mustin said the other day this sort of arrangement makes better sense than all the other options which the Practice Nine group would like to preserve for themselves. It seems to me, therefore, that you should push to saw off the concept at this stage and not permit a myriad of options which take no account of political considerations. One final point on this arrangement. The MACSOG teams should be Vietnamese teams recruited and controlled as they now are. If there is any reason for them to have to stage through Thailand because of weather that could be arranged. However, the introduction of Thai recruited teams run from Thailand would be more than the traffic could bear. There are two reasons for this. The first would be the fact that this sort of team would extend the knowledge of Prairie Fire to still a fourth country and could result in a consequence which is further than Souvanna can tolerate. The second reason would be Souvanna’s suspicion (and my own) that the use of Thai teams is purely a device to attempt a later expansion into some sort of Golden Eagle operation. This sort of thing would predictably bring the Soviets and several more friendly countries down on our heads for a margin of our satisfaction which is certainly infinitesimal. 3. Air Action A. Overflights. Despite the Soviet protest and the probable ICC action on US overflights of Laos, I think Souvanna will hold the line and permit these to continue. The one exception to this would be B–52 overflights. For some reason which is hard to define (perhaps the nuclear capability) overflights by B–52’s carry much more propaganda wallop than overflights by fighter bombers. The political and propaganda repercussions of such overflights are in my judgment far greater than the limited marginal operational gain. In short, the 20 minutes to an hour which we would save by overflying Laos rather than going south of Cambodia are just not worth the consequences. Therefore, I believe we should hold the line in running our B–52’s from Utapao south of Cambodia. The B–52’s which come from Guam will continue to execute the bulk of the raids in Laos in any event. I am not convinced that there is such a crying need for flexibility that we must change this pattern. Consequently, we must avoid public acknowledgment of B–52 activity in Laos and we must guarantee no slippage by preventing B–52 overflights from Utapao. B. Air Seeding. As I indicated above, air seeding can be done provided we characterize it as a continuing part of our interdiction campaign and don’t label it a barrier. As a matter of fact we have already done some air seeding in Laos and I have Souvanna’s concurrence in it. Therefore, if we handle this one correctly it presents no problems. If we get the issues all tangled up with barriers it could cause many great difficulties in attempting to obtain Souvanna’s concurrence. C. MSQ-77. Air Forces wishes to install MSQ-77 at site 85. I am having further discussions with Air Force Secretary Brown and Chief of Staff McConnell today. In general, I think Souvanna would reject this if it were put to him honestly. He has agreed to the installation of the navigational devices in Laos and we have installed TACANs on Lao soil. However, the TACAN is a passive device. The MSQ-77 is a command radar which takes positive control of air strikes in North Vietnamese territory. Moreover, it involves several buildings and about 40 men. It would be very conspicuous. I wonder if it is worth it. 4. Political Consequences If we decide to ignore Souvanna’s objections and go ahead with some of these proposals despite him, we would have serious consequences. At the very least, these consequences would involve the withdrawal of Souvanna’s collaboration on many other matters of importance to us, including ground actions within Laos which are designed to protect the Mekong Valley area. At the very worst, he could chuck in his job, retire to France and let the country degenerate into a Pathet Lao occupied, Communist controlled fief. If he retired, the Soviets would predictably support the Pathet Lao. The North Vietnamese would directly attack toward the Mekong and we would lose all the territorial gains we have made in the past three years. Therefore, for limited operational advantages on the Ho Chi Minh Trail (none of which I am convinced would succeed) we would probably lose the entire Mekong Valley. To quote President Kennedy, this would be really trading an apple for an orchard. 1 Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Far East, General. Top Secret. 284. Editorial Note 284. Editorial Note In a May 1, 1967, memorandum to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy set down the “line of thought” that he expressed to Secretary of Defense McNamara on April 29 concerning strategy in Vietnam. Included in that memorandum as a “Factor Affecting Possible Changes in Our Military Action” was the following information on Laos: “Last Friday [April 28] we went through General Starbird’s plans for more effective action against the Corridor in Laos. I think these make sense, although they cannot be expected to do more than make use of the Corridor somewhat more difficult. (We should at once get away from linking these with the true ‘Obstacle’ planned in the eastern area of SVN next to the DMZ. The two are entirely different, and the words ‘obstacle’ or ‘barrier’ as related to Laos have very unfortunate political implications in both Laos and Thailand.) The small ground force team Starbird needs in Laos can be handled, in Sullivan’s judgment. “Beyond this point, Sullivan and I would both be strongly opposed to any such idea as sending a GVN division into Laos. It would almost certainly be ineffective, and the cry would at once go up to send more. Sullivan believes, and I agree, that Souvanna would object violently and feel that his whole position had been seriously compromised.” (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, May 67) The Department of Defense was working on the concept of a barrier, and anti-infiltration system involving strong points and obstacles on the ground immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam in the northeastern part of Quang Tri Province. Air interdiction would form part of the barrier. According to Department of Defense planning, such interdiction would extend into eastern Laos across the panhandle. In addition, the Department of Defense raised again the idea of construction of an international highway, Route 9, across Laos into Thailand as part the anti-infiltration system. (Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Steadman to Unger, I–35288/67, March 23; ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In an April 21 letter to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Steadman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Unger stated that reconstruction of Route 9 across the Lao Panhandle, as an adjunct to the Strong Point-Obstacle System, was impractical and not desirable. Construction workers would have to be preceded by substantial military forces to retake territory held by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops. Forces would have to remain to provide security. The introduction of U.S. military personnel into Laos would not be politically acceptable, nor would the Souvanna government agree to such a proposal because of its often expressed opposition to steps that would widen the war in Laos and lead to direct military confrontation on Lao soil. (Ibid.) 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, May 10, 1967. 191165. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. Please pass the following message to the Foreign Minister: “Dear Mr. Gromyko: I have given considerable thought to the oral demarche on Laos which Ambassador Dobrynin made to Ambassador Kohler on April 12. 2 We do not, of course, accept the charges outlined in that demarche. To the extent that the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Laos have been impaired since the Geneva Agreements of 1962, these unfortunate and dangerous developments are a direct result of North Vietnamese refusal to accept the essential provisions of those Agreements. On more than one occasion we have called to the attention of representatives of the Soviet Union the refusal of North Viet-Nam to withdraw its military forces from Laos, to cease the intimidation of Laos and infiltration of men and arms into South Viet-Nam, the obstruction of the proper functioning of the coalition government of Laos in Pathet Lao held areas and the refusal of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese elements to permit the ICC to function freely throughout the country. However, we do not believe that it serves a useful purpose merely to exchange charges about what has happened in the past. We believe that the Soviet Union and the United States have special responsibilities to Laos because of the circumstances in which the Geneva Accords of 1962 came into being. We believe, therefore, it would be more useful, in the light of our grave joint responsibilities for peace, to turn our common attention to the question of vindicating and enforcing those important agreements, and to do so as quickly as possible. My government has always supported and continues to support what the Bucharest statement of July 7, 1966, calls ‘the strict observance’ of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. 3 We believe that it is a matter of urgency to take whatever steps are necessary to restore and reaffirm them. Various suggestions have been made since 1964 about how to set such a process in motion. Action to this end might be initiated by the Co-Chairmen. The Laos Conference could be reconvened. The ICC could be strengthened and asked to take more active responsibilities. Or we could undertake other steps in the spirit of the Harriman-Pushkin agreement. My government would welcome any opportunity, in any forum, to restore peace and stability to Laos. In particular, we would support the reconvening of the Laos Conference of 1962 in order to make the Laos Agreements an effective instrument of peace. If other ways seem more promising to you, my government will give them serious consideration. I will be pleased to discuss the question of Laos and related matters with Ambassador Dobrynin when he returns to Washington. Alternatively, if you prefer that these matters be discussed with Ambassador Thompson, we would be entirely agreeable. If you prefer some other procedure we will be glad to give any suggestion which you might have to make the most prompt and sympathetic attention. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk”. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Eugene Rostow, Unger, William Bundy, and Walt Rostow. 2 See Document 280 . 3 For text of the statement issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, July 6, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 832–834. 286. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 286. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 1 Honolulu, May 13, 1967, 0319Z. 130319Z. SLAM expansion. A. COMUSMACV MACCOC2 12796/180059Z Apr 67. 2 1. Ref message proposed a two-phase extension of the SLAM concept. Phase I involves the employment of a reinforced ARVN battalion, Airborne or Ranger, to exploit intelligence gained by Prairie Fire assets. Phase II visualizes employment of an ARVN division-size task force in sustained operations against enemy bases in Laos. 2. As ref message points out, Prairie Fire forces are now encountering well-armed and well-trained company or larger sized NVA troops who are willing to fight to protect their supply bases and keep their LOCs open. This is to be expected when considering that Prairie Fire forces of up to three platoons conducted continuous operations in the SLAM III area for almost six weeks. The results of Prairie Fire operations in SLAM III are impressive. 3. You propose the use of regular ARVN forces up to division size. A commitment of large RVNAF ground forces into Laos will almost certainly be opposed by a large commitment of North Vietnamese ground forces to protect their valuable base areas. Thus, a chain of requirements could be initiated of almost open-ended proportions, including the commitment of sizeable US ground forces to assist the beleaguered ARVN. 4. The commitment of regular GVN troops into Laos could not be done covertly. Indeed, it is improbable that the plan could be kept secret once GVN is consulted. Thus, there would be an overt violation of the Geneva Accords which would put Souvanna Phouma and his government in jeopardy. Consider it far preferable to maintain our ground posture in Laos by the use of non-regular, deniable ground forces. Serious consideration of the political complications is required before initiating overt operations which would move the battleground into Laos. 5. Our operations in Laos should be oriented primarily toward maximizing destruction of enemy facilities, base areas, LOCs, and, where feasible, his forces at minimum cost to US. Air power, both tactical and Arc Light, can do this for us when the necessary pin-point intelligence can be made available. Prairie Fire operations do this effectively and at low risk and cost. While in full agreement with the need for increased pressure against the enemy in Laos, it would appear more logical to substantially increase the numbers of Spike Teams and Hornet Force operations, thereby acquiring the necessary intelligence for bringing air power more fully to bear. Use of recon/intelligence Spike Teams is limited only by numbers of teams available and helicopter support. It is now permissible to use up to three Hornet Force platoons in one operation at any given time. There is no restriction on numbers of operations. Efforts to bring the three Prairie Fire battalions, now authorized, to full strength should be accelerated to the extent practicable. 6. Increasing Prairie Fire operations to pin-point enemy targets and then destroying such targets by the use of air power, appears to provide the most practical, as well as the most politically acceptable, means to increase pressures on the enemy at least cost and risk to our primary objectives in Laos and SVN. Action to gain JCS approval for use of ARVN regular forces in Laos is not planned at this time. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OSD/Admin Files: FRC 72 A 2467, Laos (Laos 385) 1967. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to JCS, CINCUSARPAC, and Vientiane. 2 Not found, but the substance is described in the text. 287. National Intelligence Estimate 287. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, May 18, 1967. NIE 58–67 SHORT-TERM POLITICAL PROSPECTS FOR LAOS The Problem To estimate the prospects for political stability in Laos over the next year or so. In addition, to estimate the reactions of Souvanna Phouma and the effect on his government of expanded Allied ground action in the Laos Panhandle. The reactions of other foreign governments to these courses of action are not considered. Conclusions A. During the past several years, the Kingdom of Laos has achieved a substantial degree of political stability. This rests, in part, on the international support which the Royal Lao Government has enjoyed since the 1962 Geneva settlement, support which Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma earnestly seeks to retain. More important, it rests on an understanding among Souvanna, the military, and—to a lesser degree—the conservatives and neutralists, which aims at preserving Lao independence and the attributes of neutrality and tripartitism. In the short term, at least, we see no serious diminution of military support for the regime, nor does a military-inspired coup attempt seem likely. B. We believe that Souvanna, if approached officially, would disapprove any proposal put to him involving Allied ground action in the Laos Panhandle. 2 [ 11 lines of source text not declassified ] [Here follows the “Discussion” section of this estimate, comprising 6 pages.] 1 Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 18. All members of the Board concurred except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 2 Mr. George C. Denney, for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that Souvanna almost certainly would resign. Souvanna regards the preservation of the Geneva settlement as indispensable to the survival of Laos and would see the visible introduction of allied ground forces as signaling the abandonment of that settlement. He has made these points many times. If, despite his opposition, the actions contemplated in this sentence were undertaken, he would assume, against the background of previous US assurances to him, that the US had broken the relationship of confidence built up since 1962 and had lost interest in preserving the Geneva settlement and in his remaining in office. He would have no hope, therefore, that by remaining in office he could exercise any further influence on our courses of action. [Footnote in the source text.] 288. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 288. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Saigon, May 24, 1967, 0350Z. MAC 4866. Ref: AmEmb Vientiane msg to SecState, DTG 151245Z May 67. 2 1. The reference was read with mixed emotions. The fact that Souvanna Phouma has accepted readily the idea of an anti-infiltration system in Laos is extremely gratifying. Moreover, the manner in which his approval was given, as described in the reference, leads me to believe that Souvanna would be amenable to further excursions on the part of the U.S. to operate in Laos against the NVA. 2. Ambassador Sullivan’s statement that he does not intend to approach Souvanna on the subject of Prairie Fire operating in connection with the air supported anti-infiltration system is disappointing to me. I have always considered Prairie Fire support of Practice Nine absolutely necessary if the program is to succeed, and recommend that Souvanna be informed of the use of ground teams in the area as soon as possible. Additionally, I believe that Phase III of Prairie Fire should be surfaced with Souvanna at this time and presented as a necessary adjunct to the anti-infiltration system, and as a logical extension of present Prairie Fire operations. 3. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] He refers to this as a “contingency plan” whereas it is an elemental facet of Practice Nine. During a period of five months of the year, November thru March, the launching of Prairie Fire teams into the Practice Nine area from RVN will be severely limited due to the influence of the northeast monsoons. The use of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] during that period is essential if the anti-infiltration system is to be supported adequately by Prairie Fire operations. 4. Even though no single program is the panacea to the NVA infiltration problem, the combination of the Practice Nine program in Laos, Phase III Prairie Fire, and programmed increases in current Prairie Fire operations would seriously degrade the NVA capability to move troops and supplies through Laos. 5. I believe that an excellent opportunity still exists to present the entire program to Souvanna if it is tied properly to his current interest. I strongly recommend that actions be taken by SecState to implement this approach as soon as possible. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Apr-30 June 1967. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Wheeler. 2 In telegram 7071 from Vientiane, May 15, Sullivan reported that he briefed Souvanna on Practice Nine, an air delivered anti-vehicle and anti-personnel system (later known as Illinois City and then Dye Marker). Souvanna knew about and was receptive to the idea. Sullivan also reported that he did not discuss, nor did he intend to raise, the issue of Prairie Fire forces’ role in Practice Nine. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Cables, Vol. XVII, 2/67–12/67) 289. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 289. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 29, 1967, 1000Z. 7403. Subject: Operation Commando Lava. 1. During Udorn meeting last Saturday, 2 I had my staff give Generals Westmoreland and Momyer a briefing on operation Commando Lava, which we have been conducting in Laos. This operation is an experiment in soil destabilization, for the purpose of producing impassable mud on enemy lines of communication. In our view, experiment has proved successful and we believe it should be given expanded military application. 3 2. Essentially, operation involved air-dropping common chemicals on two interdiction points along Route 96 and Route 110. Rain falling on these chemicals results in chelation and dispersion of soil, in such measure that mud loses all consistency and becomes incapable of supporting vehicles or any other substantial weight. This not only vastly enhances nature’s own mud making in quality, but also extends the effect of the rainy season because of the chemicals’ persistency. 3. We believe this could prove a far more effective road interdiction device (at least in rainy season) than iron bombs and infinitely less costly. Chemicals are commercially available, paper sacked, and air dropped from cargo type aircraft. We would hope that, in proper application, we could close all the main routes into Laos for vehicle traffic during the rainy season, and, perhaps extend that effect for a month or so beyond the normal scope of that season. We also believe program has considerable application in Vietnam. 4. Moreover, I have asked that another experiment be carried out concerning hand application of these chemicals to defense perimeters where soil is also protected by vegetable roots and matting. If this is successful, we may be able to develop some use for this technique in an anti-personnel sense as well. 5. General Westmoreland has expressed considerable interest in following up this program. Therefore, our control team, which consists of three representatives from CAS Headquarters, will visit Saigon later this week, then CINCPAC and then back to the putty-knife factory at Langley. 6. I believe this program demands immediate, high level attention in Washington. I would hope that both Secretary McNamara and Joint Chiefs will have opportunity to be briefed. I would like to make mud on several routes in Laos, starting from 19 in north, through 6, 7, and 4, plus the entire Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trail structures. If the drop aircraft are available and if the chemicals can be shipped, I feel that we can close more routes more effectively, and at a minute fraction of the current cost, than we can with our bombing efforts. 7. I also feel that, if we could combine these techniques with techniques of Operation Popeye, perhaps within concept of Practice Nine, we might be able to make enemy movement among the cordillera of the Annamite chain almost prohibitive. In short, chelation may prove better than escalation. Make mud, not war! Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and JCS. 2 Westmoreland describes the full range of discussion on common operational matters among Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin, Lieutenant General Momyer, Counselor Calhoun of the Embassy in Saigon, and General Westmoreland. (Telegram MAC 5039, Westmoreland to Sharp; Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files,COMUSMACV, 1 Apr-30 June 1967) 3 In telegram 206487 to Vientiane, June 1, the Department of State expressed interest in reviewing operational proposals for Commando Lava. The Department asked if this was a project for which Souvanna should be consulted, suggesting that from a political and psychological point of view consultation would seem important. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) The Embassy responded in telegram 7481, June 2, that as the operation was purely experimental, Souvanna had not been consulted, but if it was executed in military application, Sullivan would consult with the Lao Prime Minister. (Ibid.) 290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, June 3, 1967, 12:15 a.m. 207815. Subject: MSQ-77. For Ambassador from Kohler. 1. We have carefully reviewed JCS request for MSQ-77 installation at Phu Thi (Site 85), 2 in light your judgment of political risks and liabilities for us and Souvanna, expressed in previous correspondence and during your consultations, and of renewed DOD affirmation of need and urgency to achieve maximum effectiveness in air operations over North Vietnam. 2. Unless you perceive new factors not previously taken into account, I would like you to discuss this matter with Souvanna at earliest time you judge opportune. To minimize possibility of damage to our essential relationship with him, you should present proposal as an idea we are considering—with view to obtaining his acquiescence but short of making direct request for authority. You should note that basic function of this installation—like others on SEA mainland—would be precise navigational control of aircraft; that MSQ-77 is a quantum jump beyond TACAN facilities already emplaced within Laos; and that USAF has necessary equipment and personnel for immediate installation. Such a facility may have appeal to Souvanna with respect to US operations in Laos (though we are aware that you believe tactical changes would in fact be minimal at least initially). You will, of course, have to acknowledge capability of system to direct air strikes against North Vietnam. In other words, you should avoid both exclusive concentration on offensive use against North Vietnam of ground installation in Laos and dissimulation that would jeopardize our relationship of candor and trust in event we decide to approve emplacement and installation should ultimately be exposed. 3 3. If Souvanna does not object and you can now agree to positioning of MSQ-77 at Site 85, you may wish to provide your judgment as to whether USAF personnel need be under shallow cover and on any necessary restriction on pattern of crew rotation by helo. 4. I plan to review this proposal with the Secretary on basis of your report. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LAOS–US. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Hamilton; cleared by Aldrich, Habib, and Steadman; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 2 As reported in telegram 194052 to Vientiane, May 13. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) 3 In telegram 7712 from Vientiane, June 14, Sullivan reported he had discussed hypothetically the question of MSQ-77 with Souvanna the morning of June 14. Souvanna’s reaction was “cautious, but generally positive.” If the unit were to be installed, Souvanna suggested that it must be done without his knowledge. Technicians servicing the site would have to be civilians or military personnel with civilian documentation. The site would need to be camouflaged both physically and electronically, and would need demolition units attached for emergency use. (Ibid., DEF 15 LAOS–US) 291. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 291. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, June 9, 1967, 0929Z. 7638. 1. After some delay, the rainy season has begun in earnest throughout Laos. Heavy rain has been falling for the past two weeks in the Panhandle. During last several days, downpour so heavy in northern Laos as to make flying almost impossible. Mekong River Valley, which had already received nearly two feet of rainfall by this time last year, has received several inches in past few days and rice cultivation cycle has begun. 2. Result of this seasonal change, as in the past, has been dramatic reduction in level military activity throughout country. Major difference between this year and previous years is that Lao Government and friendly guerrillas hold considerable territorial advantage, which they feel fully confident to preserve. In fact, they have previously used rainy season to regain dry season losses. This rainy season they may be able convert that sort of forward activity into positive territorial gains. 3. On Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trails, vehicle traffic has ground virtually to a halt. There continues to be some shuttle movement on firm, high stretches of road structure, but lowland reaches have become impassable. Our road watch teams report that in many stretches of both structures, ground has already reached saturation point and standing water has covered roads. With good luck, this condition will prevail from now until late October. It will mean that truck traffic on full length of trails will be impossible during these several months and that major use of these logistics arteries will be ruled out. 4. This does not mean that enemy use of Lao territory for logistics purpose will cease altogether during the rains. Waterways, bicycle trails, and human porters will still be used. We will shift our road watch teams and our tactics to take this into account. However, it does mean that, by and large, those enemy units in South Vietnam which depend on these two logistics routes must live on supplies already in place or in cache for the months ahead. It certainly means that they could not call up major emergency logistics over these two structures during the period ahead. 5. We do not intend to relax our road watch and other vigilance in the Panhandle, or elsewhere in Laos, during the rains. Instead, we intend to use this time to extend and improve communications, to work out better liaison and response arrangements with 7th AF, etc. but we will be surprised if we encounter much enemy activity in most regions and will report and evaluate what we see. 6. We will, of course, be acutely interested in any reflections, either political or military, which addresses may detect to bear out inevitable enemy acceptance of the fact that the monsoon has made its annual mark. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Hong Kong, Moscow, Saigon,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and 7th AF. 292. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 292. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, June 17, 1967. CM-2453–67 SUBJECT Prairie Fire—Phase III 1. Reference is made to: a. JCSM–215–67, 20 April 1967. 2 b. Letter from the Director, CIA, to Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 19 May 1967. 3 2. Reference a recommended approval of a COMUSMACV concept to initiate a guerrilla warfare program in southeastern Laos. This program would exploit certain highland tribal groups who inhabit the area and are currently being exploited by the enemy to support infiltration activities. The concept is visualized as a supplement to ongoing Prairie Fire reconnaissance and interdiction operations and would be stated within the existing Prairie Fire zone with tribes who live astride the RVN/RLG border. If and when successful development of the guerrillas indicated, expansion beyond the existing Prairie Fire zone would be desirable in specific areas. Such expansion would, of course, be coordinated with any ongoing CAS operations. 3. Reference b raised certain objections of the Central Intelligence Agency to the concept. First, the capability to develop an effective guerrilla force is questioned; and second, a conflict between Prairie Fire and CAS operations is feared should the program expand. 4. The southeastern Panhandle of Laos is an immense, heavily jungled area, where the enemy has shown great skill and ingenuity in keeping his routes open and his bases secure. Although air operations, CAS, and Prairie Fire have all increased in capability and enjoyed increasing success, they have only reduced slightly the flow of enemy troops and material. Proportionate to the area and the size of the enemy forces deployed therein even the expanded CAS and Prairie Fire programs would be very modest in scope. The guerrilla concept is simply one more way to reduce the enemy’s security in the Panhandle and to force him to divert more effort to protect his supply lines and base areas. MACSOG has already made sufficient contacts with tribal groups living astride the RVN/RLG border to be confident that a real potential does exist, particularly with the Bru and Sedang tribes. 5. There is no intent on the part of CINCPAC or COMUSMACV to enter into conflict or competition with any CAS program. On the contrary, these programs are seen as being complementary. Initially, recruiting and development activity would be restricted to the Prairie Fire area. Only when and if the potential developed and the situation indicated, would a guerrilla warfare area be designated beyond that limit; and then such an area would be coordinated with CAS to ensure the most effective use of assets and over-all program. There is no intention to simply move the Prairie Fire line west to the Se Kong-Tchepone line. 6. Discussions between SACSA and CIA representatives indicate that the reservations expressed in Mr. Helm’s letter may have stemmed from a misunderstanding of the proposal, and that the CIA would not, in fact, object to the program within the present Prairie Fire area. 4 However, they would rather defer any discussion of expansion beyond those limits until such a time as a guerrilla potential has actually been developed and a specific proposal can be made. This position is not incompatible with the JCS proposal, which recommends initial efforts limited to the present Prairie Fire area with later expansion as indicated by the situation that develops. 7. Accordingly, it is recommended that approval be granted to initiate the guerrilla warfare program within the present Prairie Fire zone. The problem of coordinating an expanded area will be reopened if and when it arises. Earle G. Wheeler 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(Laos 381), 1967. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance saw it. 2 Document 282 . 3 Not found. 4 In a June 28 memorandum to Vance, Helms indicated that after reading this memorandum the Agency view of the Joint Chief’s proposal “remains essentially as outlined to you in my letter of May 19. We do not see significant difficulties for existing Agency operational programs in the Laos Panhandle so long as the guerrilla force is deployed within the current Prairie Fire area.” Helms did suggest that the proposal raised “several political questions,” but noted that these were matters for the Department of State. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1967) 293. Memorandum of Conversation 293. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, June 21, 1967, 8:15–11 p.m. SUBJECT Secretary’s Dinner for Foreign Minister Gromyko: Laos PARTICIPANTS U.S. Side: The Secretary Ambassador Goldberg Ambassador Thompson Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., EUR Soviet Side: Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko Mr. Aleksandr Soldatov, Dep. Minister of Fon. Aff. Mr. Viktor Sukhodrev, interpreter The Secretary wondered if there were any possibility of solving the situation in Laos. We thought it could be solved in 8 hours. Did Mr. Gromyko see any way to proceed? Mr. Gromyko said that the broadening of U.S. interference in Laos is the problem. U.S. aviation and U.S. military activities had increased. He was sorry about the U.S. behavior in Laos, which weakened Soviet arguments for maintaining the Laos agreements. The U.S. knows that the Soviet Union is not in Laos and is not active there. The Secretary asked if the Soviet Union was prepared to go to 1000% agreement of all parties in Laos. Mr. Gromyko asked if the U.S. was ready to do so tonight, to which the Secretary replied affirmatively. But, Mr. Gromyko said, the U.S. is in Laos tonight. The Secretary said that 6,000 North Vietnamese troops had been left behind in Northern Laos after the agreement had been signed. Mr. Gromyko said this was one-sided information which he could not accept as factual. However, it was a fact that the U.S. was in Laos. How could the U.S. say it was not interfering? The Secretary said it should be understood that if a North Vietnamese division moves into Laos, we will bomb it. We don’t want to do so, but this is what will happen. Mr. Gromyko said that if the U.S. was not in Laos it could talk of no interference with the observance of the agreement. But the U.S. is in Laos. There is not one Soviet soldier there. The Secretary said that North Vietnamese troops are there. If we got out, would they get out? He suggested that the USSR should use its influence, as co-Chairman, to bring about the departure of the North Vietnamese troops. Mr. Gromyko said that the U.S. was not a good example for others. At one time, the U.S. was not in Laos openly. We had military personnel there but they were in civilian clothes. Now the U.S. military operates openly. The U.S. is present, and this weakens the Soviet position as co-Chairman, and makes it difficult to use its influence positively. The Secretary asked if the USSR would join with the other co-Chairman to get all of the parties out of Laos. Mr. Gromyko thought it would be better for the Control Commission to take such responsibility. There are three groups in Laos. They should coordinate their actions better than they do. This difficulty is probably a result of U.S. influence on certain factions. If the U.S. used its influence correctly, there could be better cooperation among the 3. The Secretary said it was our understanding of the English text of the Harriman-Pushkin agreement 2 that none of the three powers of the ICC could use the veto to restrict ICC activities. Mr. Gromyko said they had a different interpretation. He continued that the U.S. position on Laos is weak—weaker than before. The U.S. is not only present, but it is present in a new way. The Secretary asked what Mr. Gromyko thought about the North Vietnamese presence, but Mr. Gromyko said the problem was the United States presence. The Secretary said that we had an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1962, but the North Vietnamese didn’t recognize it for a moment. Mr. Gromyko thought there should be a discussion between the three groups in Laos. He thought the U.S. had more influence with Souvanna Phouma than the Soviets. It probably was the U.S. which complicated efforts at coordination among the three groups. If one compared the U.S. position in Laos with that of the Soviets, the U.S. position was worse. The Secretary said this was not the point. The North Vietnamese are there and that is against the agreement. Mr. Gromyko, in something of a non sequitur, said that the killing of a well-known leader of one of the political factions—Foreign Minister Pholsena 3 —had complicated the situation. The Secretary said the circumstances of this were unclear. Some said Pholsena had been involved in the assassination of other figures. Mr. Gromyko reacted strongly, saying there was not a grain of truth in this story. Had there been an investigation? Pholsena had been a neutralist, a Souvanna Phouma man. In any event, the Soviets were sorry that the situation in Laos had become worse. They had wanted agreement. He did not exclude that the Soviets would revert to the Laos problem again. The Secretary asked why we could not all act to support the original agreement in Laos. Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviets would be prepared to consider realistic problems without prejudice, but that we should not complicate the situation with false stories. (The latter was apparently in reference to the discussion about Pholsena.) 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel and approved in Rusk’s office on June 27. The dinner meeting was held at the Secretary’s apartment in the Waldorf Towers. The conversation on Laos is one part of seven memoranda of conversation. All are ibid., Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Rusk-Gromyko. 2 Rusk is apparently referring to the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1078–1083. 3 Minister Quinim Pholsena was assassinated on April 1, 1963. 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, June 29, 1967, 4:43 p.m. 218801. MSQ-77. Refs: A. State 207815. 2 B. Vientiane 7712. 3 Joint State/Defense message. Part One: For Vientiane 1. We are pleased that Souvanna reflects a generally positive attitude about MSQ-77 installation in Laos. His concerns are fully understood and, except with respect to location, those mentioned in Ref. B can be allayed: a. Souvanna’s position that he would wish to be able to deny knowledge of installation is understandable. If facility were to be exposed, we would propose to acknowledge presence of navigational aid in area where such facility woefully deficient. In such circumstance, is it likely that Souvanna would be willing to acknowledge in general that US has provided navigational aids to RLG, so that question in fact directed toward MSQ-77 might be dealt with by allusion to TACANS which we understand Souvanna has approved for use in Laos? We hope in any event that Souvanna would hold in abeyance any comment on “violation” until nature of disclosure precisely known and could be discussed. b. USAF personnel will operate facility, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. c. Equipment would be prepared for emergency destruction at time of installation. In event of communist attack, we will wish to count on Vang Pao for vigorous defense long enough to evacuate personnel but not, if pressure heavy, for defense of equipment. d. Previous communications should provide basis for assurances that every feasible measure will be taken for physical and electronic camouflage. 2. Taking into account technical requirements (primarily line-of- sight feature and range of system) and security and low visibility requirements, it remains Washington judgment that Site 85 is not only best but only feasible location. We have understood your analysis supported this judgment. Unless you have alternate proposal we could quickly review, believe justification for this selection must stand. 3. Secretary Rusk has determined that military requirement justifies accepting potential political liabilities and we are hopeful Souvanna will understand basis on which this difficult decision made. In light contradiction (Ref B) between Souvanna’s desire for reassurances on specific points and his wish not to know what we are doing, will have to leave to your judgment how best to bring him to awareness that we have taken his concerns (which we share) fully into account in reaching decision to proceed. Advise action taken to square your account with him. Part Two: For JCS 4. Unless report requested from Vientiane in para 3 above indicates new objection, you may proceed installation of MSQ-77 at Site 85, subject to coordination of arrangements for installation and continuing support with US Ambassador Vientiane by appropriate USAF authority. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 17 LAOS–US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Hamilton; cleared with Habib, Rear Admiral Lemos of DOD/ISA, Arzac, Salans, and Brigadier General Dobson of the Joint Staff, J–3; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 2 Document 290 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 290 . 295. Information Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 295. Information Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, July 5, 1967. SUBJECT Prairie Fire—Phase III REF CM 2453–67, dated 17 June 1967 2 Problem: 1. In the memorandum to Secretary Vance at reference, Gen. Wheeler requests approval to prepare for and initiate a guerrilla warfare program in the Prairie Fire zone of Laos, using tribesmen indigenous to the Laos-Vietnam border area under command and with participation of US Special Forces personnel. In a reply dated 30 June, Secretary Vance asks Gen. Wheeler to handle the matter with you. 3 (Memos attached). Recommendation : 2. If Gen. Wheeler raises the subject with you before or during the forthcoming trip, we recommend that authorization be withheld pending thorough study of the problems and uncertainties identified below. Alternatively, if you determine that some action is required at this time, I recommend that approval be limited to that aspect of the proposal discussed in paragraph 4d. Summary of proposal : 3. The concept underlying Gen. Wheeler’s current request is outlined in JCS Memorandum 215–67 (also attached). 4 The military authorities propose to supplement present anti-infiltration efforts in the area of Laos south and east of Tchepone and running along the Se Kong River line by seeking to identify, exfiltrate, train, and re-insert indigenous guerrilla forces. The target is a force of 3000 Kha or similar tribal people of the hills, operating in 100-man units under control of US Special Forces A Detachments (total US personnel 135). Initially, Lao approval would be sought through RVNAF/FA liaison, and both recruiting activities and operations would be confined to the presently approved Prairie Fire area. Discussion and Conclusions : 4. Our initial reaction 5 is that the proposal is not susceptible of early realization, that attempting it would divert personnel from other positive programs underway or approved, and that if it were fully implemented it would come into conflict with other projects in Laos and raise to an unacceptable level the risk of exposing US ground operations there. a. Manpower : We understand that US Special Forces personnel available for the Pacific Theater remain in seriously short supply. We do not understand, particularly in the light of other drawbacks, a recommendation to allocate up to a total of 10 USSF A Detachments and support personnel to this program when authorized Prairie Fire operations are already inhibited by shortage of personnel and when prospective requirements in connection with Illinois City remain unfilled. Similarly, indigenous personnel are lacking to meet approved Prairie Fire quotas and operational needs. The shortage looms so acutely, as planning for Illinois City progresses, that COMUSMACV is still pressing for use of Thai units, despite the judgment of both Ambassador Martin and Ambassador Sullivan, which we share, that use of US-Thai teams will not be acceptable under the conditions contemplated. It would not seem prudent to dilute programs already approved for the sake of a new variation unless there were exciting prospects of success. We do not believe this is the case. CIA has had several years experience with Kha tribal groups analogous to those envisaged for the guerrilla force. Prolonged and careful training has resulted in creation of the passive road-watch teams which are increasingly effective in monitoring the flow of supplies through the Laos Panhandle. [ 6 lines of source text not declassified ] b. Anti-Infiltration Tactics : The plan to raise guerrilla forces is in harmony with past military proposals for Prairie Fire—that is, of seeking approval for progressively larger units as well as more numerous operations to greater depths. It is one step further in the direction of commitment of both US and Vietnamese combat ground forces, which we know informally Gen. Westmoreland has at least been contemplating. Given the extent and difficulty of terrain and the political problems of Laos, we cling to the belief that the optimal way to cope with infiltration through the Panhandle is to detect and monitor movement of men and supplies by quiet surveillance and to seek to deter it through controlled use of air power rather than with battalions. We recently suggested that Defense consider breaking up the already constituted larger Prairie Fire units to form more of the small reconnaissance teams, thus far without receiving comment. This is an alternative we consider worth pursuing. c. Extent of Operations : Gen. Wheeler’s memorandum of 17 June says that operations can be initiated within the presently authorized Prairie Fire area and that “the problem of coordinating an expanded area will be reopened if and when it arises”. We believe this issue should be faced now. The approved JCS study (JCSM–215–67) says that although initial steps (recruitment, training, etc.) can be undertaken within the Prairie Fire area and without additional US commitment inside Laos, “this initial activity should not be undertaken without conceptual approval of the over-all program”. The over-all program envisages more than doubling the present depth of the Prairie Fire zone. The greater the depth, the greater the dependence on vulnerable (US) helicopter lift and escort and, in general, the greater the risk of exposure of operations which Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has not approved and has declared in advance he could not approve. Such an extension would also create difficult problems of coordination with the successful CAS road-watch operation and would probably revive earlier CIA objections to the proposal (which Mr. Helms has withdrawn “so long as the guerrilla force is deployed within the current Prairie Fire area”). Ambassador Sullivan has recorded the judgment that the Prairie Fire area cannot be further extended nor larger units introduced without crossing the threshold from covert to overt operations to which Souvanna would be obliged to react. He has recently reaffirmed these views and the belief that it is unrealistic even to consider extension of the zone—with attendant risks—when our resources do not permit more than nibbling at opportunities for application of the SLAM concept of concentrated ground-air interdiction within the established Prairie Fire zone. He would specifically oppose use of Special Forces A Detachments—without which the Kha guerrilla units would be unlikely to function effectively—in Laos. d. Lao Involvement : The concept envisages preliminary discussions between South Vietnamese and Lao military authorities (RVNAF and FA) to obtain Lao agreement to the program and the services of selected Lao personnel to make initial contacts, with US involvement and control kept in the background at this stage. An apparently similar proposal has in fact already been discussed during the recent visit of Lao General Kouprasith and others to Saigon, on which we unfortunately lack detailed reporting. The Lao interest, however, is known to be limited to obtaining Vietnamese logistic, training and probably financial support for the development of guerrilla units that would operate under Lao, not Vietnamese or US, control. To the extent this can be done without direct US financing or other involvement, we would have no objection. We may, in fact, derive from Lao and Vietnamese pursuit of the idea some further insights into the possibilities of developing guerrilla formations in this remote area. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Hamilton. 2 Document 292 . 3 Not found. 4 Document 282 . 5 There has not been time for proper staff review of the military proposal since receiving it on July 3. [Footnote in the source text.] 296. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 296. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, July 6, 1967, 0830Z. 108. Ref: State 909. 2 1. Souvanna agreed this morning to installation of MSQ-77 at Site 85. I assured him that: a) All USAF markings would be removed from equipment, b) Detonators would be affixed to permit immediate destruction in case of imminent danger, c) Personnel would be under civilian cover, d) Maximum measures would be taken to camouflage against detection from the air, and e) Electronic camouflage would be undertaken by scrambled transmission to relay aircraft over Gulf of Tonkin. 2. In turn, Souvanna accepted agreed formulation on public relations posture. If there are deniable allegations concerning presence of this installation, he will say “I have no knowledge of such facility in Laos”. If it is blown in undeniable fashion, he will say “I did not know it was there”. In both instances, U.S. can either remain silent or say “no comment.” This should bring all of us angels together on the head of the same pin. 3. Souvanna also asked whether this radar could function to detect violations of Lao air space. There have been contributing reports of unidentified aircraft in vicinity Plain des Jarres. (Just last evening, we made an abortive effort to intercept a reported Ilyushin 18 near Moung Kheung.) He says he fears these are ChiCom planes used to provide liaison with ChiCom Mission at Kheng Khay. I told him I thought this could probably be worked into installation, but it might degrade our communications security. 4. Please provide technically sound reply whether MSQ-77 could serve as early warning radar, or, in a pinch, as intercept control. 3 If so, would this cause shift from agreed line of sight, scrambled, and relayed emanation pattern. 5. Assume JCS will now direct 7th AF to make contact with my Air Attaché to get this project moving. Timing and other factors involving sensitivity will be coordinated by this Embassy. 6. I would like assurances that info on this installation will be held on the closest need-to-know basis, that all personnel who do know will be briefed on need for maximum security and that all efforts will be made to avoid indications of its location on maps, charts, or instructions. If operational strike units can function without actually knowing exact location of MSQ-77, this would clearly obviate possibility that captured air crews could become source of compromising information. 7. Please advise steps being taken to accomplish objectives of para 6 above. It should be made clear that a compromise might result in a requirement to remove the installation if it, and the RLG, are sufficiently embarrassed. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 LAOS–US. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and JCS. 2 In telegram 909 to Vientiane, July 4, the Department of State agreed that in the “worst” case of full-blown disclosure of the installation at Site 85, the United States would accept Souvanna’s denial of prior knowledge and in turn remain silent or say “no comment.” (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 3371 to Vientiane, July 8, the Department of State informed Sullivan that the early warning and intercept control capacity of the equipment of MSQ 77 “is so limited as to be of little or no use in detecting violations of Lao airspace.” (Ibid.) 297. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 297. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Saigon, July 10, 1967. SUBJECT Laos 1. During the briefing on Laos and Cambodia, 8 July 1967, 2 you asked for my specific recommendations on expanded operations to locate and destroy enemy personnel, supplies and equipment in the Laotian Panhandle. In conjunction with Illinois City, I recommend immediate approval of two additional programs described here: a. Phase III, Prairie Fire: An expansion of our existing covert operations to provide for organizing a 3,000 man indigenous guerrilla force to operate under US leadership against the enemy LOC in the Southeastern part of the Laos Panhandle. b. Southpaw. Airmobile raids of 3–7 days duration employing South Vietnamese regular forces up to brigade size against known enemy base areas contiguous to the RVN border. 2. Phase III, Prairie Fire: The plan is to recruit, train, and control indigenous Lao tribesmen within the present Prairie Fire Operational Area, initially. Development of a friendly guerrilla force in the mountains of the Eastern Laotian Panhandle is of critical importance to the ultimate objective of Prairie Fire Operations, i.e., destruction of the NVA/VC infiltration system and denial of the area to the enemy. The area in question is completely under NVA/Pathet Lao/VC control. The Royal Laotian Government exercises no administrative control nor does it maintain a presence in the area. The region is populated by tribal groups collectively called Kha on the Laotian side of the boundary, and Montagnards in South Vietnam. In the Prairie Fire area, it is estimated the indigenous population could support a friendly force of 3,000 organized guerrillas. Such a force, coordinated with other Prairie Fire operations and provided tactical air support already available, could effectively reduce enemy control of the area. Following approval, the guerrilla force will be developed nominally under the flag of the Royal Laotian Government, thus contributing to the extension of Royal Laotian control areas where it never existed before. Although the estimated goal of 3,000 guerrillas will take over a year to develop, it is envisioned that a 1,200 man force would be ready to carry out operational missions in nine months. Specifically, authorization is required to recruit, support and control Lao citizens now residing in the proposed operating area. Authorization is also required to permit employment of US leadership in Laos on a sustained basis with the proposed guerrilla force. Approximately 120 US Special Forces personnel will ultimately be required in Laos for proper control and development of the guerrilla force. 3. Southpaw: a. This plan provides for conducting ground or airmobile operations across the Laos border by regular South Vietnamese units of battalion or brigade strength against close in known enemy base areas. The operations would pit Vietnamese against Vietnamese in areas controlled by Communists for short duration missions of 3 to 7 days. No publicity would be given the operation and appropriate precautions would be based on current intelligence verified by Prairie Fire forces. Targets will be in unpopulated areas not under Royal Lao control. Prairie Fire forces will precede task force operations for validation of targets and landing zones. Prairie Fire forces will operate in conjunction with the ARVN units as reconnaissance and/or maneuver elements. Preparatory air strikes by tactical aircraft and/or B–52s will be employed as required. The task force will execute blocking, search and destroy, or raid operations against selected targets in the Prairie Fire operational area. Blocking actions will entail occupation of defensible terrain astride known major infiltration roads and trails in order to disrupt force reaction by NVN forces. Search and destroy and raid operations will follow established procedures. Command and control of ground operations will be exercised from a provisional CP established at a Forward Operating Base. The task force commander, intelligence and operations staffs will consist of Vietnamese with US Army advisors experienced in cross border operations. It is visualized that approximately 25 US advisors would be required with a three battalion-brigade force in addition to US personnel that normally accompany the Prairie Fire elements which might be committed. b. Preparatory to the raid operation and as a portion of the cover and deception plan, a CIDG camp with a C 130 capable airfield will be established close to the border of SVN and as close as possible to the planned area of operations in Laos. Materiel necessary for support of the operation will be stockpiled covertly at this camp. Once established, this camp will serve as the launch base for the raid. Close support by US or ARVN artillery units and logistical support for the task force will be provided from this base. The raid task force will depend in the main on tactical air for support and protection. 4. It should be pointed out that while Southpaw and Prairie Fire III are not mutually dependent, they are nevertheless mutually supporting. Taken individually or together, they will enhance the effectiveness of the Illinois City operations. W. C. Westmoreland 3 General, United States Army 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, McNaughton Files, MCNTN XIV, Misc. 1967 (3). Top Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Copies were sent to CJCS and CINCPAC. 2 No other record of the briefing has been found. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Westmoreland signed the original. 298. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 298. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Saigon, July 11, 1967. SUBJECT Arc Light Restrictions and Thai Based Fighter Aircraft In accordance with your instructions, the two proposed papers are attached which would lift restrictions on B–52’s and Thai based fighter aircraft. 2 For the Commander: Walter T. Kerwin, Jr. 3 Major General, USA Chief of Staff Attachment B–52 ARC LIGHT RESTRICTIONS Restrictions (1) B–52 strikes in Laos by Thailand based B–52’s are prohibited. (2) B–52 strikes in Laos from Guam based aircraft must be made during the hours of darkness. (3) Over-flights of Laos by B–52’s en route to targets in North or South Vietnam are prohibited. Discussion (1) B–52’s based at U–TAPAO could strike any target in South Vietnam or Laos and return in four hours or less. U–TAPAO based B–52’s could strike targets in DMZ or Mu Gia Pass area and return in less than three hours. Present route south of Cambodia requires up to six hours. (2) Requiring B–52 strikes in Laos from Guam based aircraft only during the hours of darkness, places an undue restriction on the employment of the force. We should have maximum freedom to schedule the strikes so that we can take advantage of a divert situation for a target of opportunity in South Vietnam. Thus, the scheduling of strikes should be related to ground action in South Vietnam whenever possible. To limit such flights to the hours of darkness is tactically unsound. (3) For an 800 sortie per month rate, the desired basing is 30 aircraft at U–TAPAO. To realize the best effectiveness from such basing, the three to four hour flight time is crucial in order to get strikes into the ground battle area when the ground commander wants them. Overflight of Laos is essential for exploitation of U–TAPAO basing. No tankers are required with this basing, thereby saving some 350 air refueling sorties per month. Action Required (1) Agreement between State and Defense to lift current restraints. (2) Instructions from State to Ambassador Thailand and Vientiane to work out local arrangements in accordance with State/Defense agreement. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Paul C. Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, MCNTN XIV, Misc. (3). Top Secret. Copies were sent to JCS and CINCPAC. 2 The paper on the use of Thai-based fighter aircraft in South Vietnam is attached, but not printed. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Kerwin signed the original. 299. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 299. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, July 18, 1967, 0330Z. 326. Joint Embassy, ARMA, AIRA, USAID, CAS message. Subject: Dry season wrap-up. 1. After a false start in early June, the rainy season made a tardy beginning in July. Lao “patriotic” forces preferred to call an earlier and more traditional halt to the dry season at a May 18 celebration in Sam Neua. Despite their grossly exaggerated claim of having killed over 3500 “reactionary” troops, shot down or damaged 183 planes, and liberated over 40,000 people, they were probably much more anxious to see the end of this than previous dry seasons. 2. Unlike prior years when they made significant dry season gains, North Vietnamese troops, abetted by the Lao People’s “Liberation” Army, were unable to seize and hold any major objective except Nong Khang in northern Houa Phan Province. They additionally lost control over a substantial area in the Sedone Valley that had been under Communist jurisdiction for approximately a decade. Despite repeated attacks, government troops were able to retain exposed sites like Nakhang in Xieng Khouang and Nam Bac in Luang Prabang. A steady flow of refugees from Communist zones testified to the difficulty of life in enemy areas. 3. The government military stance was stronger because of increased devastation from air strikes due to (a) improved intelligence from road watch and reconnaissance teams; (b) better exploitation of; prisoners, particularly North Vietnamese and LPLA defectors of stature; (c) improved communications between ground observers and strike aircraft that have shortened the time gap between reporting and attacks on targets; and (d) night flying aircraft that made their debut November 2 and have been hampering enemy truck movements during darkness. Other factors include increasing North Vietnamese involvement in South Vietnam which has brought no fewer but much greener North Vietnamese troops to Laos; a lowering of enemy morale because of food shortages, labor levies, and fear of air strikes; increased cooperation, since Kong Ke’s ouster on October 17, between FAR and Neutralist troops, even to the extent of conducting the joint operation around Lao Ngam in April and May; and slightly improved morale of government troops due to successful retention of the Nam Bac Valley and the military achievements of the Lao Ngam operation. 4. Better government posture did not always match military success. However, the army still largely thinks in terms of occupying territory rather than winning people. While civil-military relations were good in Vang Vieng, Nam Bac, and Lao Ngam, they were poor in other areas like Kassy, southeastern Wapikhamthong Province, Pakkhanya, and Muong Soui. Some of these unfavorable examples permitted enemy exploitation of the civil populace in attacks against both Lao and Americans. 5. The most significant new enemy activity during the recent dry season was increased terrorism against Americans. An IVS worker was assassinated in Pakkhanya March 25. The USAID house was attacked and looted at Houei Mun in southern Savannakhet March 30, but Americans had already been withdrawn.LPLA troops have been firing on and stopping USAID vehicles at several locations in south Laos during the last few months. The LPLA blew a hole with a bazooka round through the USAID house in Kassy June 8. No one was killed but some non-Americans were wounded. LPLA soldiers have warned villagers near Nong Bok not to ride in American vehicles lest they also become targets. 6. This shift to enemy concentration on Americans is in part testimony to the impact USAID efforts are making in rural Laos. Failure to establish full security in cluster and forward area operations has halted or hampered USAID development efforts in Kassy, Nong Bok, Nam Bac, Houei Mun, and Pakkhanya, however. 7. Although Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky attributed the absence of significant Communist military action during the dry season to a Communist desire to freeze the military position along its present lines (State 208755), 2 the North Vietnamese actually tried hard to make advances but were less successful this time. They may well look to a freeze, based on incapacity rather than willingness, as the only means of maintaining the status quo. 8. Thus although the recently ended dry season marked modest gains in the government position, the costly war of attrition in Laos is far from over. The North Vietnamese retain their dual objective of keeping the corridor open to South Vietnam, and occupying much of North Laos under the facade of the Lao “Patriotic” Front. They may favor a freeze tactically, judging that for the time being their resources would be better used elsewhere. Strategically, there is no indication of North Vietnam’s willingness to abandon its ultimate goals in Laos. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Rangoon, Saigon, Warsaw, Hong Kong, CINCPAC, and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI. 2 Not found. 300. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Steadman) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) 300. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Steadman) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) 1 Washington, July 21, 1967. Dear Phil: As you are well aware, we have been trying for over two months to resolve the problems posed by the proposed ground surveillance activity in support of Illinois City and the political objections thereto. The areas of controversy are three: first, the expansion of the Prairie Fire operational area; second, the launching of operations [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]; and third, the employment of US/Thai teams in Laos. Since the desired operational date of 1 November is fast approaching, and since the Illinois City capability will be a limited one at that time, we need to reach an agreement promptly on at least a limited, initial program. As time goes on, as the Illinois City program expands, and as our operational experience dictates, we can address the appropriate modifications. The essentials of this limited program are outlined below. It should be realized that this is far less than an optimum solution from a military standpoint and may not prove satisfactory. This would only be an initial effort sufficient to provide limited ground support to the early Illinois City system and to develop operational experience. a. Operations limited geographically to the existing Prairie Fire area. b. Team composition to be US/Vietnamese. c. Operations to be conducted from RVN to the maximum extent possible. d. Operations to be conducted from [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] when weather precludes operations from RVN. e. Teams to be staged through [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] remaining in isolation on the base for minimum periods (probably no more than three nights). f. Use of Muong Phalane in Laos as a site to refuel and replenish ammunition for helicopters when operations are launched [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. As the additional munitions and aircraft become available, the Illinois City system will unquestionably expand its coverage in Laos. Whether the expansion will swing north, south or west (see map attached) 2 is still uncertain and will depend a great deal on what the VC/NVA reaction will be to the initial efforts. When this expansion takes place a comparable extension of Prairie Fire limits will be required; however, this extension can be deferred and addressed specifically at the appropriate time. The concept of shuttling teams from RVN [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] is unwieldy and unresponsive and one which COMUSMACV has indicated as the least desirable solution. Operational experience with this concept may well dictate that this restriction be modified to permit a longer stay for teams at [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], or perhaps at some other isolated location [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Again, however, we are prepared to make the initial effort using [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] for minimum staging and control only. We still consider that the use of US/Thai teams for this operation is a worthwhile concept, which should not be finally dismissed. Not only would these teams provide a higher quality source of manpower, but their use would eliminate any political problem which might stem from introduction of Vietnamese into Thailand. The objections to this concept in Embassy Vientiane are still somewhat obscure; and we feel that this idea merits further consideration. In summary we seek your concurrence in the limited program outlined in paragraph 3 above, with the understanding that this should not be considered as a final resolution of those aspects of the plan which we now agree to defer. Sincerely, Richard C. Steadman 3 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. 2 Not found 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Steadman signed the original. 301. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 301. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, July 24, 1967, 0550Z. 433. Ref: CINCPAC 200137Z Jul 67. 2 1. If the CINCPAC staff officer who wrote reftel will kindly raise his right hand, he can have my job tomorrow. However, when he comes (and if he persuades higher authority to accept his plans) he had better bring another 200,000 U.S. troops with him to “pacify” the area he wants to occupy in Laos and to defend it against North Vietnamese forces operating against it on short DMZ-type logistics lines. 2. I am disappointed that messages of this type are permitted to move in official channels and receive wide dissemination. It is the sort of thing which is giving marijuana a good name. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, Saigon, COMUSMACV, JCS, and SecDef. 2 In this telegram, July 20, CINCPAC recommended the expanded use of U.S./Thai and U.S./South Vietnamese teams in Laos under COMUSMACV control. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVII, Cables, 2/67–12/67) 302. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 302. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, July 29, 1967, 0930Z. 543. Eyes only Bundy from Sullivan. Ref: State 13477. 2 1. Thanks for the red flag in reftel. I realize tone of three messages 3 you cite was harsh and assure you that they were deliberately so phrased after rather lengthy consideration. There are two reasons for this. 2. First reason is that military commands as matter deliberate practice seek expand upon and nibble away at restrictions imposed upon them by policy decision. This is a game at the colonel level and continues unabated if met only with gentle demurrers. Unfortunately, these colonels serve only one year duty tours, have no background of history and no future of responsibility. An occasional nasty-gram raised the matter in an attention-arresting way to command levels in an effort to remind commanders that they have policy responsibility even if subordinates ignore it. I realize this skims off some of my popularity rating, but it does usually result in corrective action. 3. The second, and perhaps more compelling, reason is a tactical one which has developed around the Department’s suggestion for a SEACOORD meeting. Since the subject of the meeting is a rehash of old proposals which were rightfully turned down in Washington last May, Department’s failure to turn them down this time is being interpreted by the military as indication that you have weakened on these points and have passed the buck out here to me. Since I have the ill-deserved reputation of being more “realistic” than you fuzzy fellows in Foggy Bottom, they have assumed I would be a patsy for their proposals. I happen to think their proposals are very poorly conceived and have served notice by my three messages that I am going to be most negative in this regard. 4. While it may be that, for tactical reasons, it was prudent for you to delay your decisions on this matter until after a SEACOORD meeting, you and Nick must realize that it has made you look soft on these matters and is going to require me to look hard. If, as I trust, you are still with me in principle, you are going to have to begin looking tough also. I realize it doesn’t suit the dignity of State to use quite such tactless language as I have resorted to, but a good firm tone on occasion will close the apparent chinks and crannies. 5. As you will realize, I feel very strongly about this because I believe we are once again facing a crucial decision in principle which it might be tempting to sweep under the carpet by what appears to be a minor concession in practice. To my mind the point at issue is not whether Westy or I will control and direct the irregular troops we use in the corridor. (I happen to have more and better ones than he can muster, but that is irrelevant.) It is not even a question whether Souvanna would quit if we abandon clandestine levels and move overly into Laos. (I really believe he will, and for tactical reasons, his quitting could make good sense to him.) 6. His quitting would not only face us with the whole dreary cycle we went through once before with General Phoumi (this time it would probably be Kouprasith) but, more importantly, it would change the whole name of the game. We would have to accept overt responsibility for the defense of Laos. I am not exaggerating when I say this would require 200,000 U.S. troops. Worse still, it would be at no net advantage to our position in South Vietnam. 7. But, beyond this, we would throw the Soviets right out of the ball game. I may be wrong, but (as you know) I have always maintained that the only way we will get out of this Southeast Asian engagement is by the Soviets moving to persuade North Vietnam to negotiate, after having accepted the responsibility towards Hanoi and the price towards China which this would entail. The U.S.-Soviet agreement on Laos is the stepping stone towards Soviet action on this front. So long as we keep our fighting in Laos clandestine and covert, the Soviets tolerate it. If it becomes overt, they quit and withdraw their stepping stone. 8. Now, of all times, is not the time to do this. Civil war seems about to start in China. Sihanouk may be in the process of a change. Hanoi may be having its second thoughts. The Soviets themselves may be shaping up to a move. To kick all this away in favor of a military move which has questionable value (and which in my judgement would boomerang militarily) seems less than statesmanlike. 9. Moreover, in purely military terms, Westy’s move would accomplish very little at best. The Viets have already set up a new logistics system in Cambodia which would absorb the loss of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The overwhelming proportion of infiltrated personnel are now moving straight across the DMZ rather than through Laos. Our CAS controlled forces in the Panhandle are on the point of a major take-off in the very territory MACV would like to take over. If they would assign 50 propeller-driven aircraft to work regularly with our assets in the Panhandle, we could clean up those routes and dry up those base areas twelve months of the year. 10. Our military friends are getting a juggernaut complex. With John McNaughton and Des FitzGerald gone, we have to count on a few like you and Nick to keep an eye on the political objective and not let it become lost in the flailings of military expedience. It would be very reassuring if you can reassert your touch with the holy grail. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE–US. Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. 2 In telegram 13477 to Vientiane, July 27, William Bundy informed Sullivan that the tone of telegram 433 ( Document 301 ) as well as two other cables, had caused offense in the Department of State and might also have caused offense with the other addressees as well. Bundy reported that “we value your judgment too much to see its effectiveness impaired by its manner of expression.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE–US) 3 One of the other messages was telegram 484 from Vientiane to CINCPAC, July 26, in which Sullivan complained that a Prairie Fire Spike Team had captured two Lao civilian fishermen and removed them to South Vietnam where they were interrogated and detained because they had seen a member of the Spike Team. Sullivan pointedly asked how CINCPAC planned to return the civilians to Laos “without running even a greater risk of compromising the program than had you permitted them to continue fishing.” (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) The other message, related to Document 301 , has not been further identified. 303. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report 303. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report 1 July 29, 1967. [ document number not declassified ] SUBJECT The improved position of General Vang Pao’s forces operating in the second military region between the latter part of the dry season and the first part of the rainy season; situation appraisal as of 26 July 1967 ACQ [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] SOURCE A staff officer of this organization. This [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] appraisal of the current situation [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] is not an official judgment by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation. 1. Summary: An analysis of the enemy’s tactical posture in the Lao Armed Forces second military region of northern Laos as of 26 July 1967 reveals that the enemy was only able to take one significant piece of terrain from the regular and irregular forces of the Royal Lao Government during the dry season of October 1966 to July 1967. This limited success put the enemy in control of the Nong Khang (VH–0581) area but this gain was far short of the objectives which the enemy had reportedly set for himself in his 1966/1967 dry season offensive. This lack of enemy success has resulted in a tactical shift in the balance of power in the second military region in favor of the regular and irregular forces of the Royal Lao Government under General Vang Pao. As a result of this shift the Royal Lao Government has the opportunity to exercise several offensive options in the second military region during the 1967 rainy season. The successful implementation of these options could contribute to permanently changing the tactical balance of power in northern Laos in favor of the Royal Lao Government. This success by the Royal Lao Government is attributed to General Vang Pao’s improved intelligence apparatus and the fact that it has furnished him with information he could use to hit the enemy with spoiling attacks in staging areas. Individual members of Vang Pao’s regular and guerrilla forces have come to realize they have developed a tactical superiority over the enemy during the past dry season and their morale has improved accordingly. They know from experience that they can successfully defend their position against North Vietnamese Army regulars and that air support and other assistance is close by when they need it. As Vang Pao’s units take the offensive during this current rainy season, they can be expected to expand outward from existing positions in Houa Phan Province. This will include attacks designed to retake Nong Khang. This appraisal updates the previous appraisal [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] on the lack of enemy military successes in Hou Phan and Xieng Khouang Provinces during the 1966–1967 dry season. 2 [Here follows the 9-page report.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVII, Cables, 2/67–12/67. Confidential. 2 Dated April 22. (Ibid.) 304. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to President Johnson 304. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 31, 1967. SUBJECT [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] 1. Once again a visit to Laos impresses me with the substantial gains being made toward [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] overall U.S. objectives. 2. South Laos is a particularly striking example of forward motion on these objectives. During the past year roadwatch team effort [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]has been expanded from an intermittent coverage of a few spots to an almost continuous coverage of all major trafficable routes running from North Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam. A trained and experienced pool of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] teams now rotates so that there are at almost all times [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] teams on the roads. Aside from information provided, this program is causing very substantial damage to the North Vietnamese as they transit Laos. As an example, on the night of 7 July when a roadwatch team reported the passage of 37 trucks, the information was flashed within two minutes through our communications channels to an Air Force command plane in the area, which diverted jets to arrive at the target seven minutes after original sighting to produce a total of 50-odd secondary explosions. On the ground, a force of action teams has been developed to produce minings, ambushes, and other attrition against enemy traffic in the panhandle. This marriage of the guerrilla with jet aircraft has caused the enemy in the corridor to suffer the loss of some 40 trucks to ground action, and 1,565 to air action, during the period November 1966 to June 1967. To these truck losses can be added the early trickle of what should increase to a steady flow of defectors from the transitting enemy. 3. In 1963–64, the Pathet Lao were probing into the Sedone Valley near Pakse and were establishing a foothold on the strategic Bolovens Plateau. The pacification program for this area was conceived by our station and implemented with Country Team help. It was a microcosm of technique now being wrestled with by the CORDS structure in Vietnam. Regular screening forces were organized, self-defense units were trained and armed, economic and social programs were implemented, and a political program of improving local leadership and popular commitment was carried out. The effort followed a careful plan of oilspot expansion. The result this year is that the enemy’s threat has been purged from an area up to 90 kilometers east of the Mekong, self-defense forces are now being demobilized, their arms recovered and screening forces are being made available for employment further east against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. There are small “islands” in Vietnam proving the feasibility of this technique of pacification, but in Laos the program indicates how much more can be done if the process is started before the enemy grows to be a major military threat. The example is compelling for application in Thailand and other areas where our enemies might seek to emulate the Viet Cong experience. 4. The North Laos “quiet war” goes remarkably well. Some idea of our contribution can be gained by such facts as: A. We completely fund, support, and direct a force of local defense units, area security units and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] special guerrilla battalions, plus heavy weapons units, intelligence teams and a spider-web of communications [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ]. B. CIA-supported forces in North Laos directly cause the enemy average monthly casualties of 300 KIA, 115 WIA and an average of 40 defectors and captives processed monthly; they also contribute enormously to casualties from air strikes of some 800 KIA per month. In contrast, the Royal Lao Army has caused an average of 70 enemy KIA monthly. C. From its positions dominating all of North Laos some years ago, the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao enemy has been pushed back to holding a thin edge of North Laos, with a single substantial salient into the Plaine des Jarres, and there is even debate among knowledgeable observers whether this should be taken; there is reason to believe that it could be if it were deemed politically and militarily desirable. D. Behind these military successes, the process of consolidating political cohesion and strength of North Laos continues apace. The most successful action has been the integration of the Meo tribe into the Lao Kingdom, instead of allowing our support to become a centrifugal force to fragment rather than coalesce the variety of peoples called Laos. This has involved the development of the Union of Lao Races Radio Station, an enterprise to handle through commercial channels the supplies formerly dropped from the sky (and incidentally, help develop a Meo managerial middle class), and police administrative services [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ]. In the process, Meo school registration has risen from 3,000 in 1962 to 12,000 in 1967, settled agriculture is replacing mountain village slash and burn farming, an elected Meo sits in the National Assembly and there is a Meo among the generals of the Army. Seventy Meo attend the top lycee of Laos where only 10 were present in 1962. Of course, where CIA conceived plans are non-covert, they are supported for the most part by other agencies. 5. There are a number of substantial policy problems which will have to be faced relating to the corridor. MACV has made a series of recommendations for vigorous prosecution of cross border operations into Laos from South Vietnam. What began as activities by irregular Vietnamese forces (which the U.S. Special Force believes they must accompany) would be increased in terms of regular Vietnamese battalions with U.S. advisory teams and accompanying air and helicopter support. There is always the danger that we may be faced with a general extension of a Vietnam-style war into the corridor. Policy makers will have to consider whether this kind of effort will actually have more real effect than our current ones, as certainly the enemy has shown the capability of utilizing the DMZ itself, maritime infiltration and Cambodian channels. A more serious effect could well be the upsetting of the Souvanna Phouma Government of Laos, which has provided for collaboration of right and neutral wings of Laotian politics with the result that Laos is left as a clearly secondary theater. Polarization of Laotian situation could provoke more forceful probes by the North Vietnamese toward the Mekong with substantial increase in requirements for U.S. defensive support of Thailand and Laos. The most serious policy question, however, would seem to be the degree to which the U.S. wishes to contemplate increased commitment of U.S. forces in active operations in Southeast Asia. The contest in Laos has been by proxy, engaging minimal U.S. prestige, tying down no U.S. forces and involving few casualties. 6. There is still much unfinished business for CIA in Laos. We must have better penetrations of the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh enemy so we know his activities, capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions in advance, not just by observing him as he passes or as we exchange shots. We must increase our toll on his use of the Lao corridor to Vietnam, by placing more action teams and special guerrilla battalions on the job. We must further exploit the several opportunities Laos offers for intelligence operations into North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China. We must also assess and assist the process of succession when 67-year old Souvanna Phouma steps down. Our station is fully aware of these areas of challenge and is already attacking them. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVII, Memos, 2/67–12/67. Secret. An attached covering note from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, August 1, reads: “Herewith Dick Helms’ man, Bill Colby, reports quiet but substantial progress in Laos. The pressure of the road-watch teams, married to jet aircraft, is one reason infiltration has shifted to the DMZ.” There is an indication on the note that the President saw the memorandum. 305. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 305. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, August 9, 1967. SUBJECT Military Projects in Southeast Asia on which Action is Pending In accordance with your request, we have prepared a summary of military projects relating to operations in Laos and Cambodia on which some sort of action is still pending. We have sought to highlight problems and areas of disagreement in each case but have not attempted to set forth here the details of the various positions. We would, of course, be glad to provide you with more detailed information should you require it. Actions Against VC/NVA Forces in Cambodia At the moment we have not been officially seized with any requests for military actions against VC/NVA forces in Cambodia. However, we anticipate renewed pressure from Defense for more forceful actions to limit the advantage the enemy derives from use of Cambodian territory. Defense has made it known to us that they have had under consideration a wide variety of actions which would begin with expanded cross-border intelligence operations and aerial reconnaissance and might eventually work up to such actions as establishment of guerrilla warfare operations in northeast Cambodia, blockade of the Mekong, the immediate pursuit of the enemy across the border, and air strikes against known enemy installations inside Cambodia. Any proposals which may emanate from Defense will, however, be carefully considered by the inter-agency committee on Cambodia before they reach you for a decision as will any recommendations of the Cambodia working group established by SEACOORD. We expect to have the next meeting of the committee on August 15. I will keep you informed of any significant developments. Southpaw COMUSMACV has been pressing for authority to conduct raids into Laos using regular ARVN forces of one- to three-battalion strength. Ambassador Bunker apparently endorses this proposal. However, at the SEACOORD meeting Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin allied themselves with CINCPAC, who has firmly opposed the concept in view of the political and military complications it raises. Although the Department has never been asked for an official view, it is EA’s opinion that the Southpaw concept should be opposed for several reasons, primarily because it would violate the principle of keeping allied operations in Laos at a deniable level. We do not know to what extent the JCS may press for execution of the Southpaw concept, but we doubt that it will get much of a hearing in the Pentagon in the face of the opposition of CINCPAC and Ambassador Sullivan. Prairie Fire III Phase III of the Prairie Fire operation includes the use of indigenous tribal personnel (Kha) to conduct guerrilla type operations in the Laos Panhandle. The Joint Staff supports the concept but believes that unless the area of operation can be extended beyond the present Prairie Fire zone, there is little merit in proceeding with it. You will recall, however, that General Wheeler submitted a proposal to you on July 5 2 requesting approval of the recruitment and training of Kha and other local tribes in Laos, while deferring the question of extending the Prairie Fire operating zone. The views of the SEACOORD participants are as follows: —Both General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker, to the best of our knowledge support the proposal, either in its limited form or expanded beyond the Prairie Fire area, if possible. —CINCPAC apparently endorses the proposal to recruit guerrilla personnel in Laos, but we deduce from his general position on cross-border operations that he desires to limit the area of ground conflict as close to Viet-Nam as possible, i.e. within the current Prairie Fire area. —Ambassador Sullivan believes that it is unrealistic to initiate Phase III of Prairie Fire on the grounds that there are insufficient personnel to exploit existing opportunities and that it will prove impossible to find 3000 Kha suitable for such operations. He continues to oppose any significant extension of the Prairie Fire zone because of the exposure problem. —Ambassador Martin also opposed the Phase III plan. EA’s view was set forth in a memorandum submitted to you on July 5. 3 In brief, we are not persuaded that the added military benefit from moving into a phase of guerrilla combat inside Laos would match the added political costs. Moreover, as noted by Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan in expressing some of their objections to Dye Marker (see following), there is more we can do in this area along current lines of action. Dye Marker (Formerly Illinois City and Practice Nine) The SEACOORD meeting brought out clearly the uneasiness of officials in the field regarding the Dye Marker concept and the way the project has proceeded. We have learned from cables amplifying the SEACOORD summary cable that Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan now have strong reservations about Dye Marker, particularly the anti-vehicular phase which involves operations west of the Prairie Fire area. They argue that by doing more and better what we are doing now, particularly with propeller planes and current and planned Lao indigenous forces under CAS control, we can critically reduce infiltration except via Cambodia. They believe Dye Marker will not work and will cut across efforts now in train which will work. We are not certain how strongly Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland support the project although the plan bears Westmoreland’s signature. We know that the JCS were not originally keen on it but that there was strong pressure in DOD to get it moving. We have had our own doubts about the efficacy of the program but were willing to let DOD give it a limited trial and, indeed, Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan seemed to share this view as of last spring, when only the anti-infiltration measures close to the Viet-Nam border were being considered in detail. In the light of the concerns about this project both here and in the field, we are planning to have a thorough-going review of the entire project when we have received the report of the Dye Marker working group set up by SEACOORD. We will keep you informed as it progresses. Commando Lava The code name identifies a soil destabilization project on which successful experiments have recently been conducted in southern Laos. The process involves application to the soil in target areas of a harmless dry powder which breaks down soil stability. Both MACV and Ambassador Sullivan have expressed interest in operational use of this technique to create untrafficable mud fields along road and infiltration trail routes and, possibly, to supplement mine fields in strengthening defensive perimeters in hostile areas. Ambassador Sullivan is most anxious that the technique be applied in northern Laos as well as in the Panhandle and anticipates no difficulty in obtaining Souvanna Phouma’s concurrence in the program. Mr. Kohler, Mr. Bundy and other Department officials have been briefed by the technical experts on the first experimental effort. We believe that the political problems which might result from the Commando Lava project would be manageable and we expect to forward a favorable recommendation to you when DOD is ready to recommend a specific operational plan. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ASIA SE. Top Secret. Copies were sent to William Bundy, Kohler, and John C. Ausland of G/PM. 2 Not found. 3 For Kohler’s view, see Document 295 . 306. Telegram From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 306. Telegram From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 1 Vientiane, August 10, 1967, 1210Z. 101210Z. Ref: MAC 7473. 2 1. Your message on Prairie Fire touches on the question of the collaborative effort required to deal with the problem of enemy operations on Lao territory. I fully endorse this principle of collaboration and assure you that I also subscribe to the principle of flexibility, within the limits fixed by the imperatives of our larger national objectives here in Southeast Asia. 2. However I would like to stress three points which I will wish to discuss with you in further detail tomorrow at Udorn. A. The Prairie Fire zone is not a piece of territory which has been detached from my responsibilities in Laos and given over to your command. It is instead an area in Laos where MACSOG is permitted to conduct certain types of operations which have been agreed to by higher authority in Washington, subject to my concurrence. Therefore, question does not arise of you “allowing” CAS Road Watch teams to land in Prairie Fire zone. I will send Road Watch teams anywhere in Laos I feel they are needed, including Prairie Fire zone, if that seems the best method of handling the problem. Naturally, if I undertake any operations in the Prairie Fire zone, I will effect the closest coordination with MACSOG to avoid conflict. In practice, I feel it is best to avoid CAS operations in the Prairie Fire zone because of possible conflicts and confusions. However, the principle exists and is valid. B. On the other hand, there is not a reciprocation in principle for Prairie Fire operations in Laos elsewhere than the Prairie Fire zone. In practice, there has been one instance of Prairie Fire authorization west of the zone, although this has required clearance with Washington. C. The case at issue is not quite so black and white as you have described it. It was not a question of employing Prairie Fire forces against a known enemy force astride the boundary of the Prairie Fire zone. The circumstances are as follows: A CAS special guerrilla unit is in the area of an enemy force which is well west of the Prairie Fire zone. For Prairie Fire teams to attack in this area would have required their introduction into the vicinity of our CAS unit, from which they would then have mounted their action. This would have brought the Prairie Fire team into potential conflict with the CAS unit. For this reason it was decided that the CAS unit would undertake the mission and it is currently moving to engage the enemy. While it is true that there are other elements of the enemy (probably associated with the same organization), which are located east of the Prairie Fire zone, the circumstances of their total disposition are such that it does not seem to me to give rise to the considerations reflected in last sentence para 2 reftel. 3. This business of coordination requires the closest and most trusting mutual efforts. It will not be otherwise unless the JCS turns Singlaub and his MACSOG unit over to me or else the President names you Ambassador to Laos. The larger national interests would suggest that we avoid both these extremes. Warm regards. 3 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 July–30 Sept. 1967. Top Secret. This message had no number and was not sent via Department of State communications channels. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. 2 In telegram MAC 7473, August 9, Westmoreland informed Sullivan that “the Prairie Fire boundary should not be considered a limitation on the conduct of military operations against the enemy.” Westmoreland suggested that it should be a “line of coordination” rather than an “iron curtain” to allow tactical flexibility and to deny the enemy “safe havens.” He asked Sullivan to accept this concept. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from an unsigned copy. 307. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 307. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Saigon, August 13, 1967, 1310Z. MAC 7617. Subject: Conference with Ambassador Sullivan with respect to Prairie Fire coordination line. 1. Following the Dye Maker discussion, 2 Sullivan and I met privately to discuss matters of coordination between us. Specifically, I expressed my concern that his staff, based on his guidance, had interpreted the coordination line for Prairie Fire operations to be a barrier that could not be crossed regardless of contingencies. I objected to this interpretation as contrary to sound military practice. Sullivan suggested, and I agreed, that our representatives sit down and trace a new Prairie Fire line to include certain terrain features and roads that naturally fall in the Prairie Fire area. Following this, Sullivan will ask Washington to approve the adjusted line. I put forth the proposition that we should go through our respective channels and urge that the new line be accepted by State and Defense as a coordination line, not a barrier, and we should be delegated authority to coordinate operations across the line on a contingency basis. Sullivan would not agree with this and implied that MACV would take advantage of the situation if such authority were delegated. When I pointed out that he would retain a veto in any given situation, he made the point that he might be succeeded by a weaker individual who might be overwhelmed by the military. 2. It is incomprehensible to me that coordination of operations across a line on a map cannot be delegated to senior officials in the field. Despite Sullivan’s attitude, I recommend that when the new Prairie Fire lines come to State and Defense for approval that Defense urge State to agree to authorize MACV and Embassy Vientiane to coordinate operations on a contingency basis across the line without reference to Washington. Failure to permit this creates delays in reacting to intelligence and, in my view, makes no sense whatsoever. Needless to say, most requests to operate across the coordination line will be from this flank. At the same time, Embassy Vientiane will have veto authority which hopefully would be exercised, not arbitrarily, but in accordance with the best interest of our war efforts. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 July–30 Sept. 1967. Top Secret. Repeated to Wheeler. 2 Sullivan’s account of his and Ambassador Martin’s meeting of August 11 with Generals Westmoreland and Momyer to discuss Dye Marker planning is in telegram 791 from Vientiane, August 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 308. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 308. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, August 26, 1967. I–35851/67 SUBJECT Operations-Laos (C) COMUSMACV has recommended expanded operations in Laos in two proposed programs: Prairie Fire Phase III (organizing an indigenous guerrilla force in the eastern Panhandle) and Southpaw (airmobile operations into Laos by regular GVN units). You had briefings on these programs during your last visit to Saigon. The Prairie Fire Phase III concept, previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of staff, was considered at the 1 August SEACOORD meeting in Saigon where it was agreed in principle there were no objections provided operations are restricted to the existing Prairie Fire area in Laos. Agreement was reached that representatives of MACV and American Embassy, Vientiane would review the specific details in order that Ambassador Sullivan might assess the political implication of these operations in terms of their impact on the Royal Lao Government. Results of this review and assessment by Ambassador Sullivan have not reported but are expected soon. Department of State concurrence in Phase III of Prairie Fire is anticipated. In the attached JCSM–461–67 (Tab A), 2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Southpaw not be implemented at this time since they consider that the political and military risks outweigh the merits of the proposed concept. They leave open the possibility that future conditions may warrant a re-evaluation. I concur in this position and therefore recommend that you sign the attached proposed memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3 Paul C. Warnke 4 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1967. Top Secret. Drafted by Mobley and Lemos. 2 Attached, but not printed. 3 McNamara signed the memorandum stating that he concurred in the JCS recommendation. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Warnke signed the original. 309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand 309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand 1 Washington, September 1, 1967, 2338Z. 31287. Joint State/Defense message. Subj: Dye Marker. 1. Decision here is that there must be U.S. leadership and technical skill in ground teams for support of Dye Marker anti-personnel system. 2 Accordingly either US/Vietnamese or US/Thai teams will be used to provide this support. 2. Because bad weather precludes launching of teams from SVN during most of December–March, facilities and authority must exist for such launching [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. 3. Judgment here is that overcoming Thai reluctance to permit [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]teams to stage through Nakhon Phanom, utilizing isolated, fenced facilities, is less formidable obstacle than political risk to Souvanna of use of US/Thai teams. 4. Accordingly, Ambassador Martin should again seek Thai concurrence for staging [ less than 1 line of source that not declassified ] teams through [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. 3 We are sure that [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] would be prepared to go to Bangkok give Dye Marker briefing to Dawee and others as appropriate. This would emphasize the importance we place upon this project and upon the absolute requirement for use of Nakhon Phanom as a staging base. Amb. Martin should not hesitate to ask for this assistance if he believes it would be helpful in securing Thai concurrence. 5. Requirement to launch from Nakhon Phanom means that a refueling area in Laos must be utilized. Request Amb. Sullivan’s recommendation where this could be placed. We assume Amb. Sullivan will not wish to secure Souvanna’s permission to conduct such refueling. 6. The anti-personnel system will initially be located substantially within the existing Prairie Fire area. 7. With reference to anti-vehicular system, assume any problems will be overcome by work of coordinating group now meeting in Saigon. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis; Priority. Drafted by Steadman, cleared by Warnke and Habib, cleared in substance by Katzenbach, and approved by Bundy. Also sent to Vientiane and repeated to Saigon, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. 2 In telegram 2671 from Bangkok, September 2, Ambassador Martin complained that this decision was not borne out by the facts being examined by the Dye Marker Subcommittee of SEACOORD. Martin suggested that it looked as if “subordinate staff personnel” had “jammed through decision before facts were presented.” (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 3371 from Bangkok, September 8, Martin reported he had received agreement from the Thai Government, which insisted that [ text not declassified ] team’s stays in Thailand be very limited. (Ibid.) 310. Memorandum of Meeting With President Johnson 310. Memorandum of Meeting With President Johnson 1 Washington, September 12, 1967, 1:25–3:10 p.m. SUBJECT Weekly luncheon with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow and George Christian (General Harold Johnson also was present) [Here follows extensive discussion on Vietnam scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume V .] The President then asked General Johnson to have the Joint Chiefs “search for imaginative ideas to put pressure to bring this war to a conclusion.” He said he did not want them to just recommend more men or that we drop the Atom bomb. The President said he could think of those ideas. The President asked Johnson to have the Joint Chiefs come up with some new programs. He pointed out that when this Congress comes back in January they will try to bring the war to a close either by getting out or by escalating significantly. The President asked Walt Rostow to put on a chart the good items represented in the “Blueprint.” 2 The President then read excerpts from the “Blueprint.” (Copy of this is attached.) After reading paragraph B from the “Blueprint” memorandum concerning approval of an elite battalion-size South Vietnamese force with U.S. advisors to raid enemy supply bases in Laos—Secretary Rusk replied that we can do a good many things with Souvanna Phouma if the President will spend an hour with him when he is here this fall. The President said yes, I have already agreed to that. In response to Paragraph A concerning approval and expedition of “Dye Marker” program for electronic devices in Laos to be used in connection with the air program—McNamara said that “Dye Marker” is a barrier and he does not expect any trouble in Laos. Again referring to Paragraph B (the South Vietnamese and U.S. troops raiding the enemy supply bases in Laos)—Johnson said it will become known in Laos because of the way the correspondents travel out there. General Johnson pointed out that this meant violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962. He also said that this action would create no military problem. Rusk pointed out that the key problem is getting Souvanna Phouma aboard. The President said if we get Souvanna aboard, then should we go ahead and do it? Rusk replied, yes. The President asked that we give some thought on how we can do this. Rusk said maybe we can get some Laotian troops in on this. McNamara says this is worth doing if we can do it, and if we can keep from destroying Souvanna. The President then read from Paragraph D concerning “obtaining for Laos corridor work additional propeller type aircraft by the beginning of the next dry season.” McNamara replied that there are “lots of aircraft there now.” He pointed out that the weather has been bad and also that not many trucks have been moving down the corridor. McNamara said that Westmoreland has not asked for any propeller aircraft that has not been approved. General Johnson agreed with McNamara. Rusk asked “if we couldn’t fly a good many planes out of Laos as Laotian planes, even with our pilots.” McNamara said “we don’t have to Dean, because we have time …” [Here follows additional extended discussion on Vietnam scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume V .] Attachment September 12, 1967. Memorandum by the Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Locke) 3 Things I recommend we do in connection with the Vietnam war are: 1. Improve our interdiction efforts in Laos by: a. Approval and expedition of “Dye Marker” program for electronic devices in Laos to be used in connection with air program. (This now I believe approved by our Ambassador to Laos, subject to working out details to blend with his guerrilla program there.) b. Approval of use of elite battalion-size South Vietnamese forces (with U.S. advisors) to raid enemy supply bases in Laos. (We now have 12-man teams operating there, and this would merely enlarge the size of the team. They would not stay in Laos permanently, but would hit and run. Our Ambassador to Laos is opposed to this because he believes it would become known, and Souvanna might resign. We believe if North Vietnamese troops violate Geneva Convention by being in Laos, South Vietnamese troops have a right to oppose them, and solving infiltration problem central to winning war, and risk of Souvanna reaction must be taken. We see little additional risk beyond what we are now doing, and believe U.S. Ambassador to Laos principally afraid of future use of U.S. troops in Laos on massive scale. We can cross this bridge when we come to it. c. Other measures suggested by General Westmoreland in briefing of Secretary McNamara, which I believe have now been approved by everyone. d. Obtaining for Laos corridor work additional propeller-type aircraft by beginning next dry season (December). Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin have impressive statistics that propeller craft hit over twice as many trucks as jets per given number of sorties. Air Force prefers jets, if they have to choose, because they can be used in North Vietnam during Laos monsoon season, whereas propeller planes cannot be used there because of excessive antiaircraft fire. I believe that if more propeller planes would improve interdiction, they should be used there even if they are laid up six months out of the year, and they should be additional to, not in lieu of, other planes needed by Air Force. Air Force does not accept Sullivan figures. [Here follow items 2, Improvement of security efforts in the South Vietnamese countryside; 3, Intensification of operations against North Vietnam; 4, Pacification efforts; and 5, Political front efforts. The remainder of this memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume V .] Eugene M. Locke 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. Drafted by Jim Jones, who sent it to the President. 2 The “Blueprint for Vietnam,” August 26, is scheduled for publication in part in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume V . 3 Secret. A note on the memorandum indicated that a copy of this memorandum was sent to Jones on September 12. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 311. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 311. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 19, 1967. SUBJECT Your meeting with the Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, October 20, 1967 Souvanna arrives tomorrow (from New York where he has attended the UN General Assembly)—and comes directly to your office for a meeting, following which you are hosting a working stag luncheon for 3 people. Later, Souvanna will see the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, and Averell Harriman. He leaves the country Saturday evening on his way to visit Australia. He is anxious to have a thorough discussion with you on the current situation in Southeast Asia and the chances for peace. He has been shaken by the accounts he has read of domestic opposition and needs reassurance that our commitment in Southeast Asia is firm. You might also wish to: —Assure him we seek no wider war and intend to try to try to keep the Viet Nam war within its current boundaries. —Express appreciation for his speech at the UN (October 13), in which he emphasized the UN’s responsibility for peacekeeping. —Express concern about the rice crop (which was hurt by floods last year and droughts this year). Souvanna will probably raise the following matters: —His concern at the effects on Laos of the continuing war (each year 1500–2000 Lao are killed in combat—the per capita equivalent of 100,000 American combat deaths a year). —He may plead for decisive action to bring the war to an end. In the past, he has privately argued that we should increase the pressure on North Viet Nam by bombing the dikes and other civilian targets. In New York he spoke at length with Ambassador Goldberg, urging a 15 day bombing pause on the basis that there was an obligation to try anything that might bring a settlement. —The Laotian need for additional military assistance because, in his view, Laos can no longer support the financial burden of both national defense and economic development. If he raises this point, I suggest that you reply that we are aware of his needs and are undertaking to provide for them. A particular problem which Souvanna will probably raise with you is “the barrier”. He is very fearful that “the barrier” will cause the North Vietnamese to be more aggressive in Laos, that it may lead us to commit U.S. forces overtly into Laos, and that we may use the barrier as an excuse to stop bombing North Viet Nam. Any of these actions, he thinks, would lengthen rather than shorten the war. He is absolutely opposed to any overt U.S. troop presence in Laos and has made it plain that he will have no choice but to publicly denounce any overt military presence as a violation of Laotian neutrality. Ambassador Sullivan has discussed “the barrier” plan with Souvanna, obtained his agreement to the introduction into Laos of an Air-Delivered Detection System, and assured Souvanna that we have no intention of introducing “any manner of ground system into Laos.” Souvanna has reserved the right to approve the precise location of the detection system before it is installed. If he raises this matter, I think you will want to reaffirm Ambassador Sullivan’s reassurances. A special caution . Our sensitive operations in Laos are something which Souvanna seldom discusses, even with his closest colleagues. Except when you are talking with him privately you should avoid mention of any operations in Laos unless Souvanna specifically raises them. Also, Souvanna does not expect, and would not be pleased by an expression of “gratitude” for his cooperation. In every instance, his cooperation has been obtained on the basis of Lao national interests. Souvanna does not consider that we are allies, but rather that harsh conditions force us to work together on some matters because “we are in the same boat.” Another caution concerns the Prairie Fire program in which we operate intelligence patrols in the Laotian Panhandle. Souvanna has made it very clear that he could never officially agree to these operations. So far as we are concerned in discussions with him, he wishes to pretend that this program does not exist. Souvanna will be accompanied by his daughter, Princess Moune (pronounced Moon)—a tough-minded woman and a principal figure in the Lao Foreign Ministry. At Souvanna’s request, she will be present at your “stag” luncheon. Souvanna is also accompanied by his Minister of Finance, Sisouk (See sook), the second most powerful man in the government and Souvanna’s heir-apparent. The briefing book prepared by State is attached. 2 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Visit of Souvanna Phouma, 1/20–21/67. Top Secret; Exdis. The source text indicates that the President saw it. 2 The briefing book, under cover of an October 13 memorandum from Read to Rostow, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Under Secretary Katzenbach sent Johnson an October 19 memorandum suggesting additional talking points for the President’s meeting with Souvanna. (Ibid., POL 15–1 LAOS) Rostow’s memorandum summarizes the key points of the briefing book and Katzenbach’s additional talking points. Ambassador Sullivan suggested topics and provided observations for the Souvanna visit in telegrams 1667 and 1898, September 25 and October 4. (Ibid., POL 7 LAOS) The recommendations in those cables were also included in Rostow’s memorandum. 312. Memorandum of Conversation 312. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 20, 1967, 12.30 p.m. SUBJECT War in Southeast Asia and Prospects for Peace PARTICIPANTS The President Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos A. Toumayan, Interpreter After greeting his visitor and commenting on their previous meeting a year ago, 2 the President told the Prime Minister that he looked forward very much to conversation and luncheon with him at the White House. The President asked the Prime Minister for his views on the situation in his country and remarked how much confidence he had in Ambassador Sullivan and the reports he receives from him. Economic Situation The Prime Minister emphasized that the difficult situation of his country was caused more by the war than by political and economic causes. His government had made progress in reducing corruption and in stabilizing the currency thanks to the friendly countries which contributed to the stabilization fund. This year, thanks to USAID, $6 million had been programmed for the building of small dams and irrigation projects and the purchase of seeds, insecticides, and fertilizers. The Prime Minister felt that his country should once again become an exporter of rice. Today, with 100 thousand young men under arms there was a shortage of labor and therefore production of rice was inadequate. He intended to supplement labor with mechanized tools. The Prime Minister recalled his conversation on the subject of agriculture development with the Vice President when he visited Vientiane last year. 3 The President remarked that the Vice President very much wanted to meet with the Prime Minister again. The President also invited the Prime Minister and the other members of his party to return for an informal luncheon at the White House on Saturday 4 with the Secretary of State, Secretary McNamara, and the Vice President. The Prime Minister said he welcomed such an opportunity because he had many different matters to discuss with the President. War Cost The Prime Minister resumed his presentation, pointing out that he has to wage two wars. He said he would only outline broadly his problems at this time and would go into more details in subsequent conversations. The first was the military one but the second war, the economic war, had to be waged in parallel. The Prime Minister emphasized that winning the military war while neglecting the economic one would only expose his country to the risk of Pathet Lao, Communist subversion. He wanted the US Government to be clearly aware of the fact that Laos is in a state of war where it loses 10 to 20 men every day. The President commented that we were keenly aware of the heavy burden this represents for Laos. US Assistance The Prime Minister stressed that in addition to the high cost in human lives, half the Lao budget goes into defense (he cited $50 million as his annual budget). Thus, he would be very happy if the US Government would help in some circuitous way, because the neutrality of Laos had to be maintained, to relieve these financial pressures. The President remarked that we also have great budgetary problems and that we spend $75 billion on defense out of a $130 billion budget. The President said he was trying to get additional taxes passed and his foreign aid program had just been cut by one-third. The Prime Minister asked if some way could be found to place under Defense assistance some of the items which at the moment were funded by AID. He cited such items as refugee care, consumables for the armed forces, etc. The President advised him to discuss this with Secretary McNamara. War in Vietnam The Prime Minister told the President he had read his San Antonio speech with great attention and also the Secretary of State’s press conference with much interest. 5 Unfortunately, there was no improvement in the North Vietnamese attitude on the war. The President noted that in recent days North Vietnam’s position was even harsher. The Prime Minister asked what would the US Government do, would it also harden its own stand? The President replied that we would continue with what we have been doing, we would continue to apply the pressure we had been applying. The Prime Minister stressed the vital interest of his country in this subject because the majority of the North Vietnamese equipment that infiltrated to the south went through Laos. If the US Government hardened its stand, the Lao would be happy, the Prime Minister continued, if all passes from North Vietnam into Laos are very heavily bombed. The Lao fear that during the next dry season North Vietnam may launch an offensive against Laos. Since North Vietnam has failed to achieve victory in the South, or at the 17th parallel south of the DMZ, during the next dry season it might very well turn against Laos. The President assured the Prime Minister that we would do all we could to prevent such an event. The Prime Minister stressed that the North Vietnamese could draw upon reserves that his own country did not have. Prospects for Peace The President asked him what he thought about Hanoi’s present intentions as opposed to a year ago when he and the Prime Minister last met. The Prime Minister replied that last year upon his return to Vientiane he had asked the NVN Charge what Hanoi would do if the US ceased bombing. The Charge had replied that Hanoi would not accept anything short of a final and unconditional cessation of bombing. Both the Prime Minister and the President agreed that this was the standard answer that had been heard for several years. The President asked him how he thought that the war could be brought to an end. The Prime Minister replied that he thought pressure could be brought upon the Soviet Union to exert its influence on Hanoi toward that end. The President pointed out that the Soviet Union had already tried this but the Chinese Communists were opposed. The President then asked the Prime Minister if he felt we were nearer peace today than a year ago. The Prime Minister replied that perhaps this might be the case although it was a very difficult question to answer and one which he had discussed many times. His own feeling was that during November and December we should try to subject North Vietnam to extremely heavy bombings including all the access roads into Laos. Then there would remain no strategic targets in the north. The President took the Prime Minister and other invited guests to the luncheon. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Visit of Souvanna Phouma, 10/20–21/67. Secret. Drafted by Toumayan and Slutz. A note on a copy of this memorandum in the Department of State indicates that it was approved by Walt Rostow on October 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 2 See Document 259 . 3 See Document 220 . 4 President Johnson met with Souvanna for an informal lunch at 12:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 21. Additional talking points were prepared for this meeting at the request of the White House. (Memorandum from Read to Rostow, October 21, with attached talking points; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS) No record of the discussion at this informal luncheon has been found. 5 For text of the speech, September 29, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 995–999. For the press conference, September 30, at the LBJ Ranch, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, pp. 882–886. 313. Memorandum of Conversation 313. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 20, 1967, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Suggestion for a Bombing Pause in North Vietnam PARTICIPANTS The President Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos A. Toumayan, Interpreter During his luncheon with the President, the Prime Minister formulated in greater detail his proposal regarding a pause in the bombing: the United States should bomb very intensively during the months of November and December, destroying practically every strategic objective still left in North Vietnam. It should then proclaim a halt to the bombing around Christmas or New Year without in any way indicating for how long it intended to stop the bombing. This pause would be in response to demands of public opinion both here and abroad and to the statements made by a number of governments (Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, etc.) that by stopping the bombings the United States would create a climate favorable to the initiation of negotiations. Although the bombing would be halted over North Vietnam, the United States should continue to bomb very intensively all access roads leading from North Vietnam into Laos to preclude the infiltration of men and supplies through Laos. This could easily be achieved by blocking a limited number of mountain passes which were the only accesses into Laos; these were mountainous terrains with no population and no Lao citizen would suffer from these bombings. After about a week of the bombing pause the United States should begin to pressure the governments mentioned above to help bring about negotiations. After another eight days or so, if there still had been no opening of talks, the United States should redouble its pressure on these countries, pointing out that the United States had brought the bombing to a halt and that there were still no talks with Hanoi. The Prime Minister felt that if after two to three weeks there had been no indication that Hanoi was going to open talks, the United States, having demonstrated its good-will to the world, could resume its freedom of action without further delay. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Visit of Souvanna Phouma, 10/20–21/67. Top Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted by Toumayan and Slutz. 2 At 3:30 p.m. on October 20, Souvanna met with Harriman. They discussed Pathet Lao defections, the whereabouts of Souphanouvong, the RLG offensive against the Pathet Lao begun in 1965, use of the Laos corridor, the NLF, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and the role of the Soviet Union in Laos. Souvanna noted that whenever he asked the Soviets about Laos, they replied: “Be patient, your problems will be solved as soon as the problem of Vietnam is solved.” (Memoranda of conversation, both October 20; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS) Harriman and Souvanna also discussed a bombing pause against North Vietnam. (Memorandum of conversation, October 20; Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Souvanna Phouma) 314. Memorandum of Conversation 314. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 21, 1967, 11:30 a.m.–12:15 p.m. SUBJECT Laos and Vietnam PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos Ambassador Khamking Souvanlasy The Secretary said he felt he had to ask the Prime Minister one question even though he knew the answer the Prime Minister would give him. We believe that we have a direct, clear, and simple commitment from the Soviets with respect to Laos. This is the result of the meeting between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. It is an understanding that affects the totality of our relations with the Soviet Union. Did the Prime Minister believe that there was one chance in a thousand that the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos would be respected by North Vietnam before a settlement took place in Vietnam? 2 The Prime Minister replied that he did not think there was such a chance; in his many conversations with the Soviets on Laos he had always stressed that the question of Laos was settled in Geneva in 1962, that Laos has nothing to do with the Vietnam question. He said the Soviets never answered directly, but always advised him to be patient, his problem would be settled as soon as the problem of Vietnam was settled. The Secretary pointed out that Vietnam had not been considered at all in the 1962 Agreement. The Prime Minister concurred and added that the North Vietnamese had violated the agreement immediately after it was signed and had, in fact, never pulled back their troops. The Prime Minister said Moscow was well aware of the fact that North Vietnam had an absolute need to use Lao territory for infiltrating into South Vietnam. He said he had pointed out to Moscow that he had requested the United States to intervene in Laos because of this violation of the 1962 Agreement by North Vietnam; if North Vietnam had not violated the agreements there would have been no need for US assistance. He had repeatedly stressed to the Soviets, he said, that US aid was requested after large-scale fighting broke out in North Laos. As far back as the middle of 1963, he added, North Vietnam had ordered the Pathet Lao ministers to leave Vientiane on the grounds that it was not safe there; this was a lie—at the time all was calm in Vientiane. The real reason for the order was that North Vietnam felt the Lao factions were getting close to an agreement among themselves and if such an agreement were reached the Royal Lao Government would control all the territory then occupied by the Pathet Lao, thereby hampering North Vietnamese passage through Laos. (The Prime Minister seems to have forgotten that the assassination of the Foreign Minister in April 1963 triggered the abrupt departure of the two Pathet Lao ministers.) The Secretary said that he felt the fact that Russia has never denied the existence of a specific agreement on Laos could be useful one day. The Prime Minister said if we could get the Soviet Union to tell Hanoi to leave Laos alone just as Hanoi wanted the United States to leave Vietnam alone, then there might be some hope for Laos. The Secretary asked the Prime Minister if North Vietnamese helicopters were ever observed over Laos. The Prime Minister said the North Vietnamese have only Soviet helicopters and they do not have sufficient range to fly over Laos. The Prime Minister said that in 1964 he had asked Peking and Hanoi for a declaration of their respective policies toward Laos but had been unsuccessful in obtaining one. He had no difficulty, however, in obtaining a statement about US policy from Ambassador Unger. The Prime Minister said the only way for Laos to have peace is for the North Vietnamese to go home. He added that their presence in Laos was simply a matter of socialist expansion, when he tells the Soviets and other socialist countries that they are interfering in Laos, they tell him that the United States is interfering in Vietnam. The Prime Minister said he must constantly repeat that Vietnam had nothing to do with Laos. The Secretary wondered if it would be advantageous to obtain from a number of Asian governments a declaration of policy regarding Laos similar to the declaration of 1962; he had in mind countries such as India, Indonesia, Japan, and Pakistan. He said that although some countries were reluctant to take a stand on Vietnam, they might not hesitate to take a stand on Laos. He added that we did not conceive of peace in South Vietnam as opening the way for further North Vietnamese aggression into Laos. The Prime Minister said he did not believe the North Vietnamese would dare attack Laos after peace had been restored in Vietnam. Laos is attacked now, he said, because North Vietnam needed to use Lao territory in infiltrating South Vietnam. The Prime Minister said that North Vietnam was to a very large extent still glorying in its victory at Dien Bien Phu, still considering itself invincible. The Secretary said that for the past week or ten days Hanoi has been increasingly negative and harsh and expressed the hope that he and the Prime Minister would maintain close contact in order to ascertain North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese intentions. The Prime Minister said he would do all he could to develop more specific information, but said that the North Vietnamese Charge d’Affaires in Vientiane was very quiet. He added that Hanoi’s recent harshness might conceal an intention to accept some form of arrangement. The Secretary asked if the Prime Minister felt that Hanoi’s decisions were being affected by internal strife among North Vietnamese leaders. The Prime Minister said he did not think such internal factors were at work in Hanoi, that under their socialist regime decisions were made collectively. The Secretary asked if under such a system six or eight leaders sat around a table and one of them dissented, did that not make him a traitor in the eyes of the others and render his expression of opinion much more difficult? The Prime Minister recalled that when he was at Khang Khay, discussions would go on for a very long time and if, at the end of a meeting, the Pathet Lao leaders had not reached an agreement, they would simply close the meeting and resume it the next day. Sometimes discussions would go on for two weeks or a month until a consensus had been obtained. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Toumayan and Slutz and approved in S on November 5. The meeting was held at Blair House. The time of the end of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) Prior to this meeting Vice President Humphrey met Souvanna at 11 a.m. at Blair House. Souvanna and Humphrey discussed bombing policy against North Vietnam and rice production in Laos. (Memorandum of conversation, October 21; Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS–US) 2 Rusk and Souvanna also talked during the dinner on the evening of October 20. Rusk asked Souvanna if he had any contact with Souphanouvong, and Souvanna replied only a long letter several months ago rehashing standard Pathet Lao positions. When asked by the Deputy Administrator, Rutherford Poat, who was also at the dinner, if Laos would return to a tripartite government if the civil war ended, Souvanna answered heatedly that it would not be the case. (Memorandum of conversation, October 20, 8 p.m.; ibid., POL 7 LAOS) 3 At 12:15 p.m., October 21, during a conversation before lunch, Rostow asked Souvanna for his impressions of the United Nations. Souvanna answered that he feared it would go the way of the League of Nations. As for Vietnam, the United Nations could not be much help as North and South Vietnam and the PRC were not members. Souvanna recommended a coalition government with the NLF for South Vietnam. (Memorandum of conversation, October 21; ibid.) 315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1 Washington, October 20, 1967, 2331Z. 59769. For Sullivan from Katzenbach. In recent list of possible actions to accelerate war effort, 2 JCS proposed several which involve Laos. We are obviously going to look hard and long at each one before moving. The actions suggested included: 1. Increase air interdiction in Laos and along NVN borders—selective bombing of Lao waterways traffic, special saturation bombing interdiction airstrike zones in Laos; e.g., NW of DMZ, Nape and Mu Gia passes. 2. Eliminate operational restrictions on B–52s with regard to Laos —allow overflights of Laos by day or night, by B–52s to or from targets in Laos and Viet-Nam; allow daylight bombing in Laos; eliminate requirement for cover strikes in SVN when bombing targets in Laos; allow limited penetration Lao airspace during approach to and withdrawal from targets outside Laos. 3. Expand Prairie Fire operations in Laos —consider limited increase in size of teams, but not approve MACV request for battalion sized units; authorize Westmoreland and Sullivan to work out specific case-by-case extension of Prairie Fire area. I know you have heard these ideas before. But since they are likely to come up again in near future, would appreciate your private thoughts through this channel on above moves soon as possible. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Richard C. Holbrooke (U), cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Katzenbach. 2 As suggested in the appendix to JCSM–55–67, October 17, 1967, “Increased Pressure on North Vietnam,” which McNamara sent to President Johnson on October 18. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 316. Editorial Note 316. Editorial Note At a breakfast meeting at the White House on November 21, 1967, President Johnson met with his Saigon and Washington advisers. The discussion dealt mostly with Vietnam, but the President raised the issue of operations in Laos: “The President asked about recommendations for operations inside Laos. “General Westmoreland said he was anxious to initiate action in base area 607. He pointed out that the missiles that hit Da Nang came through this base area. He said this action would require two Vietnamese battalions and a raid of three to four days. “Ambassador Bunker said he was anxious to see this act taken. 80% of their supplies come through Laos. ‘To give them a free hand is suicidal.’ “General Wheeler said over the past 12–18 months the enemy has built a truck road through this area. He said the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that within the next 60 to 90 days General Westmoreland should be authorized to initiate action in this area.” (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, 11/27/67) The full memorandum of this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume V . 317. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 317. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 28, 1967. Mr. President: Herewith a message from Bill Sullivan, 2 which states: —trucks damaged and destroyed in Laos during November are already over 600; —practically none of the dry-season cargo is getting as far south as Route 9; and —if the rate continues, North Vietnam’s truck inventory could be wiped out by the end of the year—which would constitute a major but unpublicizable victory. General Wheeler has asked DIA to evaluate the situation. In the meantime, some preliminary observations. —There has been a manyfold increase in trucks sighted, damaged, and destroyed compared with any previous period (Tab B). 3 —Most of the traffic has been in the upper panhandle. —Truckable mileage is 600 compared to 300 last November and 400 in September 1967, although only relatively short segments are in use. —Surveillance has been more extensive this year. —Weather has permitted large-scale trucking beginning the last week of October, whereas last year traffic flow was restricted until late November and December. Increased truck activity could result from a combination of the following: —enemy intent to accelerate military activity during the current dry season (Loch Ninh and Dak To); —resupply effort to replace supplies expended during heavy enemy activity in I Corps this year; —resupply to replace large amount of supplies destroyed in Laos (secondary explosions: 3,929 from Nov 1966–Sep 1967 versus 1,224 from Nov 1965–Sep 1966); and —enemy effort to preposition supplies farther south in anticipation of the barrier. W.W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5 EE (1) Laos, 10/67–12/68. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was for use at a luncheon meeting on November 28. The President met with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and Christian for lunch at 1 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of this meeting has been found. 2 Attached but not printed. It is a retyped copy of telegram 2912 from Vientiane, November 27. The Department of State copy is in Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. 3 Tab B, attached but not printed, is a table depicting the number of vehicles sighted, destroyed, and damaged by air strikes from September 1966 to November 17, 1967, in the Laos Panhandle. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 318. Memorandum of Meeting With President Johnson 318. Memorandum of Meeting With President Johnson 1 Washington, November 29, 1967, 1:40–2:37 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara General Wheeler CIA Director Helms Mr. Walt Rostow Mr. George Christian Mr. Tom Johnson [Here follows discussion of Cyprus and Thailand.] The President asked about the over-flight of B–52s over Laos. Secretary Rusk said Souvanna Phouma had some problems with this. Secretary Rusk recommended night-time flying if this is possible. General Wheeler said there are three aspects involved: (1) Recommends doing away with restriction against flying over Laos during the day and night. This will shorten the turn-around time, will permit the B–52s to get up to their twelve hundred sorties per month, and will cut down on operational cost. (2) Even trained eyes cannot identify B–52s flying at 20,000 to 30,000 feet, and tell them apart from KC–135s which are permitted to fly over Laos now. (3) It is no longer necessary to couple strikes in South Vietnam with the flights out of Thailand since B–52s stationed on Guam are hitting areas in South Vietnam already. The President approved the over-flights. 2 [Here follows discussion on Vietnam scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume V .] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, 11/29/67. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the White House. 2 This approval was transmitted to Vientiane in telegram 76627, November 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 319. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 319. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 1 Washington, November 29, 1967, 2337Z. JCS 10250. Ref: Vientiane 2919, DTG 271051Z Nov 67. 2 1. I have just been informed that the President is very much interested in the recent success of the air strikes against trucks in Laos as reported in reference. He desires that you be informed of his interest and further, that you assure that all possible usable resources are being applied in order to get maximum effectiveness in this area. I might add that I too am impressed with these successes, particularly since as I understand it, approximately 95 percent of these results have been obtained at night. This I regard as phenomenal. 2. In this regard, DIA has validated the figures contained in the reference and confirms that the total number of trucks destroyed in the Panhandle during the month of November will be approximately 600. On the other hand, DIA believes that the conclusion contained in the reference, that practically no cargoes are reaching the Route 9 area is optimistic since truck sighting figures exceeded damaged and destroyed vehicles during the period 1–25 November by approximately five to one. In addition, about 200 of the trucks reported destroyed or damaged were northbound and probably were not loaded with cargoes destined for areas of Route 9. DIA estimates that more than 300 trucks are currently operated by North Vietnam in this sector of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and are backed up by approximately 2,000 more. Nevertheless, there is no doubt but that we are reducing enemy logistic capabilities in the major combat area, and we are hurting him (I believe more than we realize). Therefore, we should keep up the good work. 3. I would imagine that the implementation of the Mud River project 3 on 1 December will contribute significantly towards your continuing successes in this area. In this regard, DIA has briefed me on the data base which they intend to maintain here in Washington in connection with this project and it looks good. Warm regards. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Nov-30 Nov 1967. Top Secret. Also sent to Sharp and repeated to Sullivan. 2 In telegram 2919 from Vientiane, November 27, Sullivan reported that he had reviewed with Chief of Staff of the Air Force General McConnell the success of the 7th Air Force against truck traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Sullivan stated that this success meant that practically none of the dry season cargo was reaching as far south as Route 9 and that he anticipated that the North Vietnamese would soon run out of trucks for the trail. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 3 Not further identified. 320. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 320. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, November 30, 1967, 1325Z. 2998. Ref: State 76627. 2 1. Although [garble—instructions?] contained reftel may be subject to different interpretations, I suppose it would be appropriate for me to assume that “authorizations” and “decisions” described therein are still subject to rudimentary reconciliation with the vestigial shreds of Lao sovereignty. Therefore, I will discuss the matter with Souvanna and feel confident I can obtain most of what is desired. 2. Before doing so, however, I feel it pertinent to refresh Washington memories on certain aspects of this matter. In particular, I wish to recall that my “suggestion” about the period of “diplomatic curiosity” arose from the fact that the Soviets had protested to Souvanna about U.S. intentions to overfly Laos with B–52s. Our pattern at that time was intended to permit him with honesty to tell the Soviets that B–52s were not overflying Laos, but at the same time, preserve the option of that eventuality when heat was off him. 3. I also wish to point out that requirement for [garble—cover?] strikes in Vietnam arose entirely because public relations offices of Strategic Air Command felt it necessary to announce each Arc Light mission executed by their resources. If cover strikes are to be discontinued, I assume I am correct in understanding last sentence of para 5 3 to mean that this public relations policy will also be discontinued and that no announcements will be made concerning Arc Light missions in Laos. Please confirm. 4. Paragraph 4 states that “optimum force utilization in SEA may require daylight strikes.” As Washington aware, daylight strikes into easternmost areas of Laos have been authorized for some time for those missions entering Lao airspace from the east. The most sensitive feature of this proposed package will be this question of daylight strikes. It therefore may (and probably will) mean that Souvanna’s acceptance of daylight strikes in Laos will be predicated on condition that these missions enter and withdraw from Lao airspace across the eastern frontiers of Laos. 5. I will seek appointment with Souvanna soonest and report results. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, and COMUSMACV. 2 See footnote 2, Document 318 . 3 The last sentence of paragraph 5 of telegram 76627 reads: “You should inform Souvanna that we continue to refuse to discuss details of operations publicly.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In joint State-Defense telegram 78120 to Vientiane, December 1, Sullivan was informed that he could tell Souvanna that there will be no public announcements of Arc Light missions in Laos.” (Ibid.) 321. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency 321. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, December 1967. S–2543 Comments on Ambassador Sullivan’s Cable on Air Operation in Laos, November 1967 Summary 1. In a cable of 27 November 1967 commenting on the air war in Laos, Ambassador Sullivan stated that 1) the total of trucks destroyed in Laos in November would in all probability exceed 600, 2) an overwhelming proportion of the truck “kills” had been on Routes 911 and 912 and as a result practically none of the North Vietnamese dry season cargo is reaching as far south as Route 9, and 3) “if this rate of success continues, the entire inventory of trucks which the North Vietnamese hold for the Ho Chi Minh Trail activity will be wiped out before the end of this calendar year.” 2 2. During November, Seventh Air Force pilots reported 531 trucks destroyed and 198 damaged, the highest monthly rate of destruction reported in Laos during the past two years (see Table 1). Ninety-eight percent of the trucks reported destroyed in Laos during November and 95 percent of those reported damaged were found in the Panhandle (Steel Tiger) Area of Laos. The number of trucks reported destroyed in Laos in November has been exceeded in North Vietnam only during the months of July and August 1967 when 603 and 743 respectively were reported destroyed (see Table 2). 3. The record level of reported destruction of trucks in November results from a combination of factors; (1) exceedingly good weather in Laos and the highest number of sorties over Laos since April, (2) the first full month of the dry season and an increase in traffic densities, and (3) possibly poor convoy discipline resulting from the use of inexperienced truck drivers. We know of no change in US tactics or weapons systems that would account for the increased effectiveness of US air attacks. 4. We agree with Ambassador Sullivan that air operations in Laos were especially effective in November. Even allowing for the inflation known to exist in pilot reporting, a continuation of such heavy losses would seriously erode the North Vietnamese truck inventory in Laos and North Vietnam unless imports from the Communist countries increased substantially. It is to be noted, however, that reported truck losses in North Vietnam in November were light, only 50 destroyed and 66 damaged. 5. We disagree with Ambassador Sullivan’s claim that practically no traffic is reaching as far south as Route 9. While road watch teams report little traffic south of Route 9, recent aerial reconnaissance covering the period 4–17 November shows that at least 15 percent of the trucks sighted in the Panhandle were operating on Route 9 or south of Route 9. Finally, there are anomalies in the data for November which cannot yet be explained. In November relatively more trucks were destroyed than damaged than in any previous period. In addition, only 6 sorties were required per truck destroyed or damaged compared to 35 sorties per truck destroyed and damaged in November 1966, when about the same number of sorties were flown but only 115 trucks were destroyed. 6. We believe that the November experience is heartening but it is still too early to conclude that a major turning point has been reached in the US air interdiction campaign in Southeast Asia. Based on past experience there is considerable doubt that the November performance in Laos can be sustained. [Here follow 3–1/3 pages of “comments,” two tables, and a map of Laos.] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Laos (Laos 385.1), 1967. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw it on December 4. 2 See footnote 2, Document 319 . 322. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 322. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, December 16, 1967, 0340Z. 3326. 1. Although it is too early and difficult to predict the degree of aggressiveness the NVN/PL enemy will manifest this dry season, indications so far are that we shall probably be in for a rather lively time. 2. To the north, immediate pressure on Nam Bac has been relieved but the enemy remain in the area in force and the situation continues to be precarious. There is also a NVN/PL build-up in the vicinity of Site 85. In the south the enemy has made a harassing attack in strength on Lao Ngam during the past two days, withdrawing after inflicting heavy casualties on the friendlies (estimated 42 KIA and 33 WIA) as well as destroying supplies, etc. No US personnel were in Lao Ngam at the time. Also in the south, the enemy continues to build up around Saravane and the Bolovens Plateau. We can probably expect more aggressive enemy activity here and there along the perimeter of friendly held territory in Laos. 3. Our policy and advice to the RLG and FAR has been that the loss of such places as Nam Bac and Lao Ngam would be regrettable but these places should not be defended at all costs. Orderly withdrawal is far preferable to a possible significant military defeat. We believe we can effect our policy through our control of military supplies and our general influence on military matters. 4. Although the FAR has given a fairly good account of itself in the face of enemy pressure at Nam Bac and the FAN similarly at Lao Ngam, experience has shown that when faced with heavy pressure, FAR troops are also capable of panicking. On one such occasion in 1962 (Nam Tha), FAR troops did not stop retreating from the north until they had reached the safety of Thailand across the Mekong. Should FAR troops crack again under pressure, in Nam Bac area or elsewhere, the enemy may well be tempted to press on to more vital objectives. Our estimate is that, with current enemy strength, there is no major threat to vital positions, although the enemy retains the capability of launching attacks to seize temporarily and hold certain positions. We have recently detected, however, through road watch teams in NVN, signs of NVN reinforcements heading towards Laos along Routes 6 and 6 A. The numbers involved are about 3000. For those who are focusing on the war next door this magnitude may seem small; for our little war where friend and foe are evenly matched, the influx of 3000 troops is significant. 5. As the Dept will recall, during November 1965 the NVN/PL came close to taking Thakhek on the Mekong. At that time Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky became quite uneasy that capture of Thakhek would bring US and Thai retaliation. Soviet pressure may have been instrumental in dissuading the DRV from pressing their attack on Thakhek in particular, and the Soviets may also have subsequently discouraged the DRV from launching similar provocative military initiatives in general. 6. I am dining with Kirnassovsky next week, in an effort to forestall NVN attacks, I intend to use that occasion, provided the Dept perceives no objection, to let him know that we know that the NVN are building up, that this build-up continues to violate the Geneva Accords, and that should this build-up threaten the stability of the current political/military situation in Laos, such action would be the cause of grave concern. I would not intend to be drawn out further and would just let him mull it over. Please advise. 2 Hurwitch 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Moscow, Saigon, COMUSMACV, and CINCPAC. 2 In telegram 86442 to Vientiane, December 19, the Department authorized Hurwitch to make the statement to Kirnassovsky. (Ibid.) In telegram 3385 from Vientiane, December 20, Hurwitch reported that he had done so at an official dinner. Kirnassovsky did not make the usual disclaimers about North Vietnamese troops in Laos, but agreed to look into the matter and give it “serious consideration.” (Ibid.) 323. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 323. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Washington, December 18, 1967. SUBJECT The Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos The enclosed study indicates that propeller aircraft are approximately 9 times as effective as jet aircraft per sortie in destroying trucks and water craft in Laos. It appears possible to substitute two A–1 squadrons for two F–4 squadrons in Thailand and significantly increase the effectiveness of our air interdiction campaign in the Laotian Panhandle without reducing the number of jet sorties in North Vietnam. Would you please review the enclosed study and give me your recommendations by December 29, 1967. 2 Robert S. McNamara Enclosure ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF PROPELLER VS JET AIRCRAFT IN LAOS Summary and Conclusions 1. Jet aircraft are relatively ineffective against moving targets in Laos. During the first nine months of 1967 jets destroyed or damaged (D/D) only 366 moving vehicles, 1.5 per 100 attack sorties, at a cost of $700,000 for each truck or water vessel destroyed or damaged. 2. Propeller aircraft are approximately 9 times as effective as jet aircraft per sortie in destroying trucks and water craft in Laos. The prop aircraft destroyed/damaged 996 vehicles, or 12.8 per 100 attack sorties. The cost per vehicle D/D was only $55,000, even though loss rates for propeller aircraft operating in Laos are approximately 4 times greater than the comparable loss rates for jet aircraft. 3. Two additional A–1 squadrons could be deployed to Thailand in 1968 and two F4 squadrons returned to the U.S. without reducing the jet sorties available for use in North Vietnam. The A–1 aircraft are expected to destroy or damage an additional 1200 moving vehicles in Laos over a 12 month period. This proposal would save about $28 million per year over the current plan for the next 2 years. However, an additional 18 aircraft and 8 pilots would be lost under the proposed plan. [Here follow an analysis of “Aircraft Effectiveness,” a table on “Attack Sorties, Losses, and Results in Laos,” a “Discussion of Relative Mission/Effectiveness,” a table of “Propeller Aircraft Deployments,” a discussion and tables of “Alternative Deployments,” a discussion and table of the “Cost of Additional Deployments,” a discussion and table of the “Cost of Proposed Plan,” two enclosures on the USAF A–1 Program, and a table on planned sorties in NVN by Thai-based F–4’s.] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Laos (Laos 385.1), 1967. Secret. 2 See Document 326 . 324. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 324. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, December 20, 1967, 0603Z. 3052. Ref: A) State 76627. 2 B) Vientiane 2998. 3 C) State 78120.2 1. I saw Souvanna this morning and obtained his concurrence in Arc Light overflights of Laos. He stipulated certain conditions and limitations which will be spelled out in following paragraphs. 2. On night-time overflights for strikes in Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, he asked that planes be instructed to fly at high altitudes, that they enter Laos on a corridor north of Pakse but south of Savanna-khet and that they avoid overflight of population centers such as Saravane. This would seem to pose no serious problems and my air attaché will be in touch with MACV to work out details. 3. On day-time overflights for strikes in NVN and SVN he was a little more skittish and asked whether we could avoid mass formation overflights with ostentatious contrails. I said I would look into this, but undertook no commitments. He did not press it further, so I consider his statement stands in the form of a desideratum rather than a condition. It seems to me that his desideratum would be met if strike missions are flown in cells of three, which I gather is normal practice. 4. On daylight strikes in Laos itself, he had problems. He felt that strikes and flights could be easily correlated and he would have hard time justifying Arc Light missions as “reconnaissance activity.” He therefore asked that daylight strikes [on?] Lao soil, when needed, enter and withdraw over eastern frontiers. 5. Comment : I feel this package fulfills essential requirements ref A. As for execution time, he said we could begin tonight if we want. The limitation on routes will add nothing more than a few minutes to any conceivable operation. The limitation on those rare daylight strikes in Laos will add a maximum of about one hour to best conceivable response time and perhaps two hours to entire mission. However, fleeting target situations on Lao soil have been so seldom that this should pose no real burden on our forces. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC,CINCSAC, and COMUSMACV. 2 See footnote 3, Document 320 . 3 Document 320 . 325. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 325. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, December 26, 1967, 6:02 p.m. CAP 671165. Laotian Situation Report (as of 6 p.m. EST, 26 December 1967). 1. Communist forces are keeping up their pressure against government positions in Laos. 2. An enemy unit, estimated at about battalion strength, raided the government base and airstrip at Muong Phalane on 25 December, and destroyed most of the camp’s facilities, including the USAID and Air America buildings. Although government reinforcements apparently have moved into the area, they have not yet reoccupied Muong Phalane. 3. Preliminary reports suggest that the attack was specifically aimed against the U.S. presence at Muong Phalane. Two American technicians who manned a navigational station which assists U.S. air operations in southern Laos are missing. The station itself apparently was not damaged. 4. The attack on Muong Phalane is the first significant enemy action in this part of the Panhandle in over a year. It may be related to recent attacks farther south in the Bolovens Plateau area. These operations appear to be part of a new Communist campaign to forestall stepped-up allied efforts to interdict the infiltration corridor. 5. In northern Laos, the Communists launched a mortar attack on the government airstrip at Nam Bac on 24 December. Continuing reports of a Communist build-up in the vicinity suggest that more ground assaults against Nam Bac’s outlying defenses may be in the offing. Government troops are being repositioned in an effort to reduce their vulnerability. 6. Although the Communists appear to be putting a little more bite into their dry season offensive this year, there is no evidence that they intend to mount a concerted drive into government-held territory. We agree with the U.S. Embassy’s appreciation that the Lao reports out of Vietnam on the status of the North Vietnamese threat are highly exaggerated. In fact, the recent Communist effort against Nam Bac in the north and the Bolovens positions in the south, appears designed to restore the status quo. Until last year, both areas long had been under Pathet Lao control. 7. Nevertheless, we believe that the Communists will make things even hotter in the coming months as they attempt to regain some of the military initiative in Laos. This probably will be particularly true in the Panhandle, where stepped-up allied operations into the infiltration corridor will hit a highly sensitive nerve. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVII, 2/67–12/67. Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was received at the LBJ Ranch at 6:35 p.m. This report was drafted by the Central Intelligence Agency and sent to the White House as report No. 1688. (Ibid., Vietnam, 5 EE (1) Laos 10/67–12/68) January to December 1968: The Fall of Phou Pha Thi; Reassessment of Policy; Laos and the Paris Peace Talks; Increased Bombing in Laos January to December 1968: The Fall of Phou Pha Thi; Reassessment of Policy; Laos and the Paris Peace Talks; Increased Bombing in Laos 326. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 2, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 385.1, 1968. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw the “brief.” 327. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Honolulu, January 21, 1968, 1948Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Jan-31 Jan 1968. Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland. 328. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 22, 1968. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Sullivan, William H. Secret; Personal Files Only. 329. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable January 30, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Cables, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Routine. 330. Memorandum From the County Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 1, 1968. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz. Copy sent to Habib. 331. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 15, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S on February 19. The source text is Part II of VI. 332. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) Washington, February 23, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and cleared by Herz. 333. Editorial Note 334. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Laos and Cambodia Affairs (Herz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 27, 1968. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and Herz. 335. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McConnell) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, February 27, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 385.1, 1968. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the Deputy Secretary of Defense saw this memorandum. 336. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 28, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5 EE (1) Laos, 10/67–12/68. Top Secret; Exdis. 337. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, February 29, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1304, Laos 385.1, 1968. Top Secret. 338. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Saigon, March 3, 1968, 0323Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Mar-31 Mar 1968. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Wheeler. 339. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 9, 1968, 0730Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Moscow, and CINCPAC. 340. Central Intelligence Information Cable March 9, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. According to a note on the source text, advance copies were transmitted to the White House, State, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS, NIC, NSA, and OCI. 341. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 11, 1968, 0532Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, 7th AF, and 7/13 AF. 342. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 13, 1968, 0558Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 7AF, and 7/13 AF. 343. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 14, 1968, 0841Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, JCS, 7th AF, and JCS. 344. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 16, 1968, 1100Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, JCS, COMUSMACV, 7 AF, and 7/13 AF. 345. Note From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 19, 1968, 12:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia 5 E (2)a, 1/68–10/68. Top Secret. 346. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, March 21, 1968. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 58–68. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this volume. All members of the USIB concurred with its release except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained because the topic was outside their jurisdiction. 347. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 23, 1968, 0620Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Dept. 348. Letter From the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) to the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) Washington, March 23, 1968. Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret; Official-Informal. 349. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, March 25, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5EE (1) Laos, 10/67–12/68. Top Secret; Exdis. 350. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, March 26, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. For the additional drafting information on this study, see Document 348. Sent also to Steadman, Special Assistant to Clifford, and on April 2 to Taylor at the White House. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LAOS) 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, March 27, 1968, 0610Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Exdis. 352. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) Washington, March 28, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(Laos 381), 1968. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Mobley. 353. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Steadman) Washington, March 30, 1968. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz. 354. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, March 30, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(092 Laos), 1968. Top Secret; Sensitive. 355. Memorandum From Robert N. Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 22, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia 5 E (2)b, 1/68–10/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. 356. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 23, 1968. Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Herz. 357. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 23, 1968. Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Herz. 358. Editorial Note 359. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, April 24, 1968, 0346Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 360. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, April 24, 1968, 0942Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. 361. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 29, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and cleared in draft by Herz and Habib. An April 29 covering note from Bundy to Rusk informed the Secretary that Bundy told the JCS and DOD (at staff levels) of this proposal and they were sympathetic. Wheeler insisted that the President must make the decision and that the initiative must come from Rusk. A note on the covering note indicated that Rusk agreed to include it on the April 30 luncheon agenda. 362. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) Vientiane, April 29, 1968. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. 363. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, May 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note at the bottom of page 1 reads:” This memorandum was prepared solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Director’s Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs and the Office of Current Intelligence.” 364. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) Vientiane, May 6, 1968. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret; Official-Informal. 365. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 7, 1968, 0435Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 LAOS. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 366. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) Washington, May 8, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Bundy sent a draft of this letter to Katzenbach under cover of a memorandum of May 3, drafted by Herz on April 23, recommending that Katzenbach sign the letter and give it to Nitze on the evening of May 8. A note on another copy indicates that Nitze saw it. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73A 1304, Laos 381, 1968) 367. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, May 16, 1968, 0430Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Nodis; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok. 368. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Director of the Joint Staff (Spivy) Honolulu, May 24, 1968, 0229Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 May–31 May 1968. Top Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland, General Beach (CINC–USARPAC), General Ryan (CINPACAF), and Admiral Hyland (CINCPACFLT). Lieutenant General Berton E. Spivy, Jr., was Director of the Joint Staff April 1, 1967–July 31, 1968. 369. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Vientiane, May 30, 1968, 0847Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text. 370. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, June 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the source text indicates that this memorandum was produced solely by the CIA’s Office of Economic Research in coordination with the Director’s Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs. 371. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 17, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1968. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Warnke saw this memorandum. 372. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Embassy in France Vientiane, June 20, 1968, 1106Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text, Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, June 21, 1968, 0541Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris for Ambassador Sullivan, Saigon, JCS,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, Seventh AF, and DIA. 374. Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Nelson) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, July 12, 1968. 375. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, July 18, 1968, 0602Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–4 LAOS. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 376. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, August 9, 1968, 0601Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–6 Laos. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 377. Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Laos Paramilitary Program Prepared by the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Nelson) Washington, August 15, 1968. 378. Paper Prepared by the East Asian and Pacific Interdepart- mental Regional Group Washington, September 10, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam 5 EE 910 Laos, 10/67–12/68. Secret. According to a covering memorandum from the Staff Director of the Group to its members, including William Bundy who was its chairman, the EA/IRG (formerly FE/IRG) was asked on May 29, 1968, to prepare a paper on the repercussions in Laos of de-escalation in Vietnam. This paper, coordinated with the relevant agencies and with the Embassy in Laos, was the result. The staff director asked for any final comments or changes before it was discussed by the EA/IRG. 379. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, September 25, 1968, 1044Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 LAOS–US. Secret. 380. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, September 25, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the source text indicates that this memorandum was produced by the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services. 381. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, September 26, 1968, 0451Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Nodis. 382. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 26, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos 1/68–1/69. No classification marking. 383. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, October 8, 1968, 0440Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Moscow, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 384. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach Washington, October 9, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 385. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Washington, October 17, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499. LAOS 000.1—(381 Laos), 1968. Top Secret. Drafted by Steadman. Also sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. 386. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Brown) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) Washington, October 21, 1968. 387. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, October 23, 1968, 1141Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INT 2–2. Top Secret. 388. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador in Laos (Sullivan) Washington, October 24, 1968. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Ambassador’s Private Correspondence, 1967–68. Secret; Personal—Eyes Only. 389. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, October 31, 1968. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 58–1–68. Secret; Sensitive; Limit Distribution; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the USIB concurred with its release except the representatives of the FBI and AEC who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 390. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, November 4, 1968, 0950Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 391. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, November 11, 1968, 1045Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris for HARVAN (Harriman and Vance, the U.S. negotiators in Paris), Saigon, and CINCPAC. 392. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) Washington, November 11, 1968. Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. 393. Airgram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Washington, November 18, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 LAOS–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, DIA, London, Moscow, and Tokyo. 394. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McConnell) to Secretary of Defense Clifford Washington, November 20, 1968. Source: Washington National Record Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 0385.1, 1968. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Clifford saw it. 395. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, November 26, 1968, 1220Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos 1/68–1/69. Secret; Limdis. Marshall Wright sent this telegram to Rostow under cover of a memorandum of November 27. Responding to an earlier question to him and Robert Ginsburgh, Wright wrote Rostow, “it is not what we should do but what we can do. The answer, in Ginsburgh’s judgement is ‘nothing’.” In a postscript, Wright noted that Ginsburgh asked that he amend his view to read, “Nothing, unless we want to go to war with China.” (Ibid.) 396. Paper Prepared by the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Laos EE (1), 10/67–12/68. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was apparently prepared by EAP as a part of the interagency reassessment of policy toward Laos described in Documents 392 and 389. 397. Telegram From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) Vientiane, December 3, 1968, 0553Z. Source: Center of Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, No. 1944. Top Secret. Repeated to [less than 1 line of text not declassified], JCS, COMUSMACV, and CIA. This telegram was not sent over Department of State communications channels. 398. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Honolulu, December 11, 1968, 0320Z. Source: Center of Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, No. 1984. Top Secret; Limdis; Eyes Only. Repeated to Abrams and Sullivan. 399. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Air Force (Brown) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) Washington, December 11, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 385.1, 1968. Secret. A note on the source text indicates Nitze saw it. 400. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Honolulu, December 21, 1968, 0403Z. Source: Center of Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, No. 2058. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Abrams and Sullivan. 401. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State Vientiane, December 31, 1968, 0545Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Dept. “Nodis” was handwritten on the source text. 326. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 326. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 2, 1968. CM-2876–68 SUBJECT Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos 1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 18 December 1967, subject as above. 2 2. Findings of the study forwarded by the reference state that the effectiveness of the propeller aircraft in Laos over that of the jet is significant; and, based thereon, it appears possible to substitute two A–1 squadrons for two F–4 squadrons in Thailand. 3. On the basis of a review of the study, it appears that use of propeller aircraft against a specific target—trucks—is more effective than the jet type aircraft in the relatively permissive air defense environment of Laos. However, our present force posture in Thailand was based on the fact that these forces would be primarily assigned to targets in North Vietnam (NVN), with Laotian targets as their secondary mission. During good weather periods in NVN the maximum number of Thailand based aircraft is required for strikes in NVN. As a bonus effect, this capability is used to provide a maximum number of sorties in Laos during bad weather periods in NVN. Accordingly, the replacement of two F–4 squadrons by two A–1 squadrons would seriously limit the tactical air capability to prosecute the air campaign against NVN. Specifically, the loss of two F–4 squadrons would result in an approximate 16 percent loss to the current CINCPAC Combat Sortie Program for Thailand based aircraft. 4. A preliminary review by the Joint Staff indicates that a number of factors, essential to a thorough and objective analysis of the effectiveness of propeller versus jet aircraft in Laos, may not have been fully considered in the study. Some of there essential factors are listed below and discussed in the appendices. a. Type mission scheduled (Appendix A). 3 b. Bomb damage assessment (Appendix B). 4 c. Day versus night sortie effectiveness in Laos (Appendix C). 5 d. Muscle Shoals considerations (Appendix D). 6 e. Enemy air defenses (Appendix E). 7 5. The conclusions drawn in the referenced study are, in some cases, based on highly questionable assumptions. Two examples are cited: a. since there was no bomb damage assessment made on the majority of over 2,400 night/weather radar controlled level bombing sorties conducted by jet aircraft during the period of the study, the study assumes that there was no destruction of the targets attacked; and, b. the study assumes loss ratios will remain the same in the face of increased enemy defenses and the recent rising trend of propeller aircraft losses in Laos. 6. In summary, the study is too narrow in scope to form the firm basis for a decision to exchange two A–1 squadrons for two F–4 squadrons in Thailand. A more comprehensive study of propeller versus jet aircraft in the overall context of Southeast Asia operations is underway. It is therefore requested that the suspense date for the submission of recommendations on this matter be extended to 1 March 1968 in order to include the results of this analysis. 8 However, if a decision is required earlier than 1 March 1968, my recommendation, based upon the evidence at hand, would be against the proposed exchange of A–1s for F–4s. Earle G. Wheeler 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 385.1, 1968. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw the “brief.” 2 Document 323 . 3 In Appendix A, the Joint Staff stated that one of the “key factors” was consideration of primary mission for which the study gave no consideration. Over 75 percent of the sorties of propeller driven aircraft were armed reconnaissance, while only 33 percent of the jet sorties comprised that type of mission. Armed reconnaissance presented the best opportunities for truck destruction. The jet sorties were targeted 67 percent of the time against interdiction points, structures, truck parts, assembly centers, and other targets that rarely produced confirmed truck kills. The Joint Staff argued that the figure of 9 times more effective was wrong and should be 3.5 times if only armed reconnaissance missions were compared. In a period of good weather, the figure dropped to less than 2 times as effective. 4 In Appendix B, the Joint Staff stated that 93 percent of weather/night level radar controlled bombing was performed by jets. Bomb damage assessment (BDA) was seldom accomplished on these missions. In was erroneous to assume that lack of BDA equated to no results. 5 In Appendix C, the Joint Staff stated that jet armed reconnaissance at day forced truck activity to take place at night. Over twice as many propeller sorties were flown at night as jet sorties. 6 In Appendix D, the Joint Staff stated that Muscle Shoals, an infiltration interdiction system to impede enemy personnel and vehicular traffic, would be operational in early 1968 and would improve effectiveness of both jet and propeller aircraft. The North Vietnamese would therefore improve their air defenses and the slower moving propeller aircraft would become more vulnerable. 7 In Appendix E, the Joint Staff stated that as air defenses improved in Laos (2000 percent since 1965), losses of propeller aircraft doubled while those of jets decreased. 8 In a January 25 memorandum to the Joint Chiefs McNamara approved further study to be completed by March 1. McNamara instructed that the object of the analysis should be to “improve the effectiveness of our interdiction campaign in the Laotian Panhandle.” McNamara specifically asked for information on effectiveness of day versus night sorties; the reasons for high jet sorties during the day in view of the high efficiency of night time prop sorties; the differences in jet and prop efficiency based on mission versus characteristics inherent in aircraft design; the impact of enemy air defenses. McNamara also asked for recommendations on increased use of propeller aircraft in Laos. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 385.1, 1968) 327. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 327. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Honolulu, January 21, 1968, 1948Z. 211948Z. The situation in Laos. In view of the recent developments in the Ban Nam Bac area of Laos 2 and current considerations concerning the Laos Panhandle, I am forwarding our assessment of the situation in both of these areas. We view the increase in tempo and intensity of enemy activity in northern Laos as a kick-off of the dry season activities in that area. While serious, and a situation that may develop further, at this point it is not believed to be a general offensive any more than in past dry seasons. The results of the enemy attack on Ban Nam Bac will probably encourage further attempts at offensives in the area. The current emphasis on enemy offensives in SVN may explain some of the increase in activity in northern Laos. Guidance and direction for such offensives undoubtedly originate in Hanoi and are intended for areas of active conflict. Considering the Communist forces presently available in northern Laos, and the currently reflected performance of the FAR forces in this area, NVN has the capability of reinforcing with one division, moving into the Luang Prabang area and sufficiently controlling the situation to permit a Communist take over of most of northern Laos. This probably is not their intention but the capability is there and the situation appears to present few obstacles should the NVN decide to move in force. Turning to the Laos Panhandle area, US/ARVN ground operations in this area, over an extended period, could restrict enemy resupply activities and movement of replacement personnel, destroy his supply caches, and deny him the base areas/sanctuaries he needs. In such a circumstance, the enemy would be expected initially to divert infiltration activities further to the west, and attempt to increase his use of sea infiltration to include use of Cambodian ports and overland route. He could consider our blocking of his infiltration/logistical effort of sufficient import to divert forces from other operational areas and, if necessary, provide additional forces from NVN. He may act to intensify the threat in northern Laos thereby causing FAR and other friendly Lao forces currently in the Panhandle to be diverted to assist in the north and thus further expand the war in the north. It is improbable that the enemy would attempt a complete take over of northern Laos as a reaction to US/ARVN ground operations in the Laos Panhandle area, but, with encouragement and material support from China, he might attempt to extend presently held territory in northern Laos to a much greater degree. In summary, we see the current northern Laos picture as a successful enemy launching of his dry season offensive with limited objectives around the Nam Bac area. The situation is serious but it is not believed that the enemy intends to attempt a complete take over of this entire area. US/ARVN operations in the Laos Panhandle area could create a serious resupply and personnel replacement problem for the enemy. The enemy would be expected to divert to the west and increase his other available means of infiltration. Should our operation be of a magnitude which would result in an unacceptable curtailment of the enemy infiltration effort, he probably would, in an attempt to regain full control of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, reinforce with troops from the north, and may intensify his threat to the northern Laos area. Warm regards. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Jan-31 Jan 1968. Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland. 2 In telegram 3907 from Vientiane, January 18, the Embassy reported that “the Lao seem to be keeping their ‘sang froid’” over the fall of Nam Bac, a major military defeat by the North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 328. Memorandum of Conversation 328. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 22, 1968. I talked with Bill Sullivan on Saturday, January 20. He explained he thought we would be better off if the bombing [of North Vietnam] were stopped in May, rather than now, since in Laos that was the beginning of the rainy season which lasts until the autumn. The North Vietnamese trucks get bogged down in Laos during this period and the roads are unusable. From Bill Sullivan’s standpoint, this idea has two values: (1) It automatically contributes to taking “no advantage” in Laos. (2) He is afraid if the bombing is stopped in the North during the dry season, there will be a marked increase in bombing in Laos. This might have adverse repercussions in our relations with Souvanna Phouma as well as make Souvanna’s position of “neutrality” more difficult with Soviets and others. W. Averell Harriman 2 1 Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Sullivan, William H. Secret; Personal Files Only. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 329. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable 329. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable 1 January 30, 1968. [ document number not declassified ] SUBJECT Appraisal of the Lao armed forces defeat at Nam Bac and repercussions from this defeat as of 30 January 1968 ACQ [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] SOURCE A staff officer of this organization. This [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] appraisal of the current situation [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation. Summary: The defeat of the Lao Armed Forces (FAR) at Nam Bac has wiped out the government’s effort over a two-year period to link up its first and second military regions in a meaningful manner at the Nam (River) Hou and to expand its influence westward in the direction of Muong Sai and to the northwest to Nam Tha. By eliminating the FAR salient at Nam Bac the enemy has put himself in a better position to harass Luang Prabang and its environs and to disrupt pro-government guerrilla operations into north central Laos. FAR’s defeat at Nam Bac and its subsequent inability to regroup approximately 2,000 men from the Nam Bac salient has robbed FAR of all its reserve force. In addition FAR lost over one million and a quarter American dollars’ worth of equipment. 2 Although the military repercussions appear to be more serious than do the political ones there is a movement within the FAR seeking the ouster of Colonel Bounchan, who commanded the ground forces at Nam Bac, and of General Ouane, the commander in chief of the FAR. The defeat at Nam Bac could have been prevented had FAR taken a more aggressive stand against the enemy initially and supplied its men with stronger leadership. End of summary. [Here follows the body of the cable.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Cables, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Routine. 2 In telegram 109097 to Vientiane, February 2, the Department of State informed the Embassy that “we are distressed at the estimated magnitude of US supplied materiel lost and leave entirely to your judgement how best to convey to appropriate Lao officials our concern over results of this defeat as well as its causes particularly since sizeable portion of lost materiel may have been captured intact and now being used against Lao forces.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 330. Memorandum From the County Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 330. Memorandum From the County Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 1, 1968. SUBJECT Enemy Pressure on Site 85 1. The most recent reports of enemy action around Site-85 (Phou Pha Thi) indicate that an attempt to seize the site is imminent. Two key outposts defending the approaches to Site-85 have already been taken by the North Vietnamese and pressure is continuing to close in around the site. 2. Over a year ago when Vang Pao attempted to defend Site-36 (Na Khang), his troops suffered a great number of casualties. At that point he decided never again to commit his units to the all-out defense of a position. That tactic is still being followed and, while his units will continue to defend Site-85 as long as possible, he does not intend to accept heavy casualties in exchange for real estate. 3. As you know, the TSQ 81, 2 as well as a TACAN facility, is located at Site-85. When the decision was made to install these facilities it was understood that no last ditch stand would be made to defend them. Although this equipment is costly, it is expendable—the men who service it are not and they will be removed prior to the fall of the site, if the situation becomes hopeless. 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz. Copy sent to Habib. 2 TSQ 81 was the mobile version of MSQ 77. 331. Memorandum of Conversation 331. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 15, 1968. SUBJECT Laos PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin During an hour and a half’s luncheon conversation the following point was touched on: The Secretary said that our recent information showed that there were North Vietnamese battalions around the town of Saravane in southern Laos and that if, as was possible, the North Vietnamese launched an attack on the city, the U.S. would become militarily involved. Dobrynin made a note of the name Saravane, obviously for the purpose of informing Moscow. The Secretary said that he thought the U.K. and the Soviet Union as co-chairmen of the 1962 Laos arrangement had certain duties, pointing out to Dobrynin that this agreement had been made quite independently of events in Viet-Nam. Dobrynin agreed. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S on February 19. The source text is Part II of VI. 332. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) 332. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) 1 Washington, February 23, 1968. SUBJECT Air Support for Counter-insurgency Mission in Laos Ambassador Sullivan has requested our assistance in obtaining a re-ordering of air support priorities in order to give him sufficient tactical air strike support for key targets in Laos at the time he needs it. 2 He has specifically asked that the 56th Air Commando Wing (ACW) at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, be “dedicated” to Laos. In view of the increasing enemy pressure in Laos, and the important but fleeting opportunities there to inflict damage on the enemy, we think Sullivan’s request should be strongly supported. The over-all counter-insurgency mission in Laos is to harness in an efficient manner three elements—Lao irregulars; perishable, all-source intelligence; and air power—in order to inflict the greatest damage possible on enemy personnel and logistical facilities. Operations have been highly successful when all these elements are present. With the priority attention of the 56th ACW, Ambassador Sullivan believes he would get the number of daily sorties he needs: (a) nine A–26 sorties, (b) eight T–28 sorties, (c) eighteen A–1 sorties. In addition, U–10s and C–123s would be regularly available for Forward Air Control (FAC) and flare ship roles. Sullivan would use this air support in the following order of priority: a. hitting fleeting targets identified on motorable roads which the enemy uses in Laos; b. striking enemy logistical facilities and troop concentrations throughout Laos; and c. providing close air support to irregulars who are being infiltrated into hostile areas, attacking enemy positions, or defending base areas. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] A specific and immediate area of high concern is Site 85, a guerrilla base and command post in northern Sam Neua province, which has been the target of concentrated enemy pressure for several months. The USAF installed its TSQ–81 navigational device there last fall. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] Recommendation That you discuss Ambassador Sullivan’s request urgently with the Joint Chiefs with a view to getting a sufficiently high priority for air support operations in Laos to meet his requirements. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and cleared by Herz. 2 In telegram 4585 from Vientiane, February 20. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 120863 to Vientiane, February 27, the Department informed Sullivan that in light of a CIA presentation to the JCS about an imminent attack on Site 85 and the urgent requirement for increased air support for the defenders, the JCS contacted CINCPAC about Sullivan’s request and the Department “weighed in” with the Department of Defense. The question of “dedicating” air support for Laos was more fundamental and required resolution at a high level. The issue was being considered by McNamara. (Ibid.) 333. Editorial Note 333. Editorial Note On February 24, 1968, General Maxwell Taylor reported to President Johnson that he had spent 3 hours at the Central Intelligence Agency going over order of battle information on Vietnam and discussing possible “surprises” which the future might hold. Taylor summed up his impressions in a February 24 memorandum to the President. Part of the memorandum concerned Laos and reads as follows: “Enemy Activity in Laos “Recent enemy activity in Laos can hardly be termed an offensive since all movements have been to regain terrain which the communists have claimed since 1962. The areas attacked had been taken over by Laotian government forces in 1966 or 1967 so that the Pathet Lao probably feel that they are merely reclaiming lost property. However, the Pathet Lao supported by North Vietnamese troops are capable of moving almost anywhere in Laos and could use this superiority at any time to score a victory in concert with successes, real or claimed, in South Vietnam.” Included in Taylor’s concluding list of “Possible ‘Surprises’ for which we should be prepared,” was “An offensive in Laos to accompany one in South Vietnam.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8 I, 1/67–12/68, Taylor Memos) 334. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Laos and Cambodia Affairs (Herz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 334. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Laos and Cambodia Affairs (Herz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 27, 1968. SUBJECT Air Support for Counter-insurgency Mission in Laos 1. The Issue. Ambassador Sullivan is not asking that any air resources be assigned for use in Laos. He is asking for much less. Although he has excellent working relations with Seventh Air Force, he believes they generally give him tactical air strike support for targets in Laos only after requirements in Vietnam are satisfied. In asking that the 56th Air Commando Wing (ACW) at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, be “dedicated” to Laos, he is not trying to break the general rule that the Air Force needs flexibility in assigning its aircraft. All he wants is a “first call” on some planes. In view of the increasing enemy pressure in Laos, and the important but fleeting opportunities there to inflict damage on the enemy, we think Sullivan’s request should be strongly supported. 2. U.S. Interest. Although the US has no formal commitment to defend Laos, we have a keen political-military interest in preserving its independence as a buffer to protect the Mekong lowlands bordering Thailand. The current enemy dry-season offensive, hitting from north to south, is beginning to crumble the RLG’s ability to defend itself, and North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao troops are pressing ever nearer the heavily populated areas along the river. However, Sullivan’s request is not keyed to any emergency. He is bringing up a long-standing problem because it is more acute now; but the problem has existed for some time. 3. A rule of thumb used to be that we were supporting RLG operations in the North in order to have a fairly free hand in the Panhandle, where our air operations were largely related to the war in Vietnam. This is less true today. The RLG urgently needs our support also in the South. The Lao have not so far expressed any dissatisfaction with US air support, but this is due to the fact that they do not know everything we are doing, or could do, in the Panhandle. The fact is that effective operations in the Panhandle serve also the security of the neighboring countries. Besides, those operations are very productive in terms of trucks destroyed and North Vietnamese killed (some 7,500 to 8,000 NVN/PL killed annually in all of Laos, the majority through air power). 4. Needs: With the priority attention of the 56th ACW, Ambassador Sullivan believes he would get the number of daily sorties he needs: (a) nine A–26 sorties, (b) eight T–28 sorties, (c) eighteen A–1 sorties. In addition, U–10s and C–123s would be regularly available for Forward Air Control (FAC) and flare ship roles. He is asking for prop planes, not jets. We do not know exactly how much he is getting now, but he is getting substantially less than the sorties he says he needs. “Dedication” of a specific 7th AF unit seems to be less important than getting some kind of assurance that Sullivan will get the number of missions specified above. 5. Mission. Sullivan has stated the priorities for which tactical air is needed: (a) hitting fleeting targets identified on motorable roads; (b) enemy logistical facilities and troop concentrations; (c) support for irregulars who are being infiltrated into hostile areas, attacking enemy positions, or defending base areas. The last-mentioned point is the most politically important one in Laos, and perhaps the least appreciated by the military: The counter-insurgency mission in Laos may be small potatoes to 7th AF, but upon it depends the morale of tribal elements (half the total population) and also, in the last analysis, of the entire FAR. Counter-insurgency missions have been highly successful when all three key elements (Lao irregulars, perishable all-source intelligence, and air power) have been present. Without one of these elements, they fail. 6. The Larger Context. Although Sullivan is immediately concerned about protecting Site 85, where we have the TSQ–81 and a TACAN, the lack of sufficient air strike assets for Laos has been flagged by him repeatedly, including in his periodic discussions with the Joint Chiefs, since 1965. He has been proven right in his “Sopwith Camel” approach—that propeller-driven craft are superior to jets in the Laos situation. He has also stressed the importance of hitting NVN traffic as far north in the trail structure as possible (i.e., in the vicinity of Mu Gia) before it disperses under jungle canopy further south. We are, and he is, not taking a parochial Laos point of view: “Dedicating” air assets to Laos will improve also our posture in South Vietnam as well as Thailand. Also, we are not adjudicating a dispute. It is merely a question of upping the priority slightly in one country, in the interests of our position on that country and in the interests of the overall war effort. 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and Herz. 335. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McConnell) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 335. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McConnell) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, February 27, 1968. CM-3060–68 SUBJECT Tactical Air Support in Laos 1. (U) Reference is made to: a. Vientiane 4585/200755Z February 1968 to the Secretary of State. 2 b. Vientiane 4584/200754Z February 1968 to 7th Air Force. c. 7th Air Force 201300Z February 1968 to Vientiane (JCS IN 25321). d. 7th Air Force 232129Z February 1968 to Vientiane (JCS IN 31031). e. Vientiane 221051Z February 1968 to 7th Air Force (JCS IN 28998). 3 2. (TS) The American Ambassador has reported to the Secretary of State that he was receiving insufficient air support to attack key targets in Laos (reference 1a). 3. (TS) Concurrently, the Ambassador voiced his reservations to the Commander, 7th Air Force and recommended that the 56th Air Commando Wing (Nakhon Phanom) be “dedicated” to the air support of targets in Laos (reference 1b). 4. (TS) The Commander, 7th Air Force responded and stated his acknowledgment of the requirement for air support as indicated by the Ambassador. He cited some of the current requirements on his resources and indicated that some of the current problems may soon be alleviated by the arrival of additional A–1s (reference 1c). 5. (TS) After additional review, Commander, 7th Air Force further responded to the reiterated request for assignment of a specific unit to Laos air support, with a firm judgment that he could not reduce the flexibility of his force by dedicating a portion to a specific area/mission. The Commander, 7th Air Force stated his goal of meeting all requirements contingent on priorities and force availability. He assured Ambassador, Vientiane that the necessary sorties would be flown in Laos to meet critical situations (reference 1e). 6. (TS) The American Ambassador, Vientiane responded by restating his request for “dedication” of the 56th Air Commando Wing and acknowledgment of the obligation of 7th Air Force to place first priority on strikes in SVN. Additionally the Ambassador indicated that he was repeating his “dedication” proposal to Washington (Secretary of State) in hopes that authorities there would relieve 7th Air Force of some of its priority obligation in other areas (reference 1d). 7. (TS) The proposal of Commander, 7th Air Force to satisfy requirements is valid and retains flexibility in the assignment of his tactical resources to areas and on missions for which he is responsible. 8. (U) The attached memorandum 4 supports the position of the Commander, 7th Air Force, CINCPAC, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Recommend approval and forwarding to the Secretary of State. 5 J.P. McConnell 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 385.1, 1968. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the Deputy Secretary of Defense saw this memorandum. 2 See footnote 2, Document 332 . 3 Reference telegrams b-e, February 20, 20, 23, and 22, are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. 4 Not printed. 5 Nitze met with Warnke and Bundy on February 27 and discussed the problem of providing tactical air support in Laos. Nitze advised Bundy of the JCS position and therefore the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State was not sent. (Memorandum from Colonel Abbott C. Greenleaf, Military Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS to the Acting Chairman, February 28; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1304, Laos 385.1, 1968. 336. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 336. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 28, 1968. SUBJECT Significance of Phou Pha Thi (Site 85) in Northeastern Laos This is in response to your request for information on the significance of Phou Pha Thi. Equipment . Phou Pha Thi is the site of a very important US radar-navigational station for supporting US air operations in North Vietnam and northern Laos. Equipment installed at the site are: TSQ–81—a portable version of the MSQ-77—an extremely sophisticated radar-navigational device used by US bombers for precision-bombing of targets in North Vietnam north of Vinh at night and in inclement weather. It has an effective range of about 200 miles (see map for area covered in North Vietnam). 2 Installed on November 1, 1967, it is the only device of its kind in Laos. Two MSQ-77’s are installed in Thailand, and two in South Vietnam. TACAN—a navigational aid which emits beams to help orient US aircraft operating primarily in northern Laos. It was installed about a year ago. There are three other TACAN sites in Laos, the nearest one to Phou Pha Thi being at Long Tien, south of the Plain of Jars (see map). US Personnel . At any one time, there are 15 Americans stationed at the site: 12 to service the TSQ–81, two to service the TACAN, and one presumably to oversee the operation. As at the other TACAN sites in Laos, these individuals are USAF personnel, formally converted to civilian status as Lockheed employees for the duration of their tour of duty in Laos. There are three teams based on Udorn, each serving a five-day shift. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has authorized the stationing of US personnel at the TACAN sites, but he has not been told about the TSQ–81 at Phou Pha Thi. Guerrilla Base . Pho Pha Thi, which is situated only 25 miles from Sam Neua town, has also served for some time as a major base for guerrilla operations. At present, about 700 Meo irregulars are based there to carry out forays into enemy territory as well as to man a defensive perimeter with a radius of about 12 miles. This perimeter has been breached during the past week. Enemy Threat . The enemy is undoubtedly aware of the importance of the site as a radar-navigational installation and of the US presence there. The site was bombed unsuccessfully by North Vietnamese aircraft on January 12. 3 Since then, the enemy has been completing elaborate preparations, including the building of roads, to make a ground assault upon the site. Ambassador Sullivan believes that this will take place within two weeks. We believe that should enemy artillery come within range of the 600-foot airstrip, it would become extremely difficult to extricate the small US unit as well as the 700-man Laotian force. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5 EE (1) Laos, 10/67–12/68. Top Secret; Exdis. 2 Not printed. 3 The attack was by two Soviet-manufactured Colt (AN–2) single engine biplanes, which bombed the site at 1:20 in the afternoon. The aircraft dropped 15 bombs of 250 lbs. wounding three Lao soldiers and one U.S. technician. The bombing resulted in slight damage to the TACAN antenna and temporarily closed it down. The TSQ–81 continued to operate. Both planes were lost after the raid. One crashed into a ridge after being hit by small arms fire from the ground, and the other was shot down by a sharpshooter with a rifle from an airborne Air America helicopter. (Telegram 3779 from Vientiane, January 12; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 337. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 337. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, February 29, 1968. JCSM–129–68 SUBJECT The Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 25 January 1968, subject as above. 2 2. (TS) Air strike forces in Southeast Asia require a mix of types of aircraft to perform with optimum effectiveness in both the unsophisticated air defense environment found in Laos and South Vietnam and the heavily defended area of North Vietnam. Reduction of the flow of materials to South Vietnam is more effectively achieved by striking as close to the source as possible. It is, of course, essential to keep these materials under attack throughout the infiltration system. Whenever the choice exists, however, the primary emphasis must be to stop or destroy this equipment before it is dispersed throughout the maze of highways, roads, and trails in North Vietnam and Laos. To attack at the source requires a force that can operate in the highly defended areas of Hanoi and Haiphong at maximum strength. Specialized forces, which can survive only in relatively undefended areas, should be in addition to, not as a substitute for, the force capable of striking the source. Any reduction of the existing F–4 force in Southeast Asia would materially limit the ability to strike the supply source. Therefore, the total mission objective in Southeast Asia should be considered when structuring the force mix to optimize capabilities in the different defense environments. 3. (TS) Both the OSD study and the 18 December 1967 7th Air Force “Comparative Analysis of Propeller vs Jet Aircraft” 3 are addressed to a comparison of propeller aircraft and jet aircraft. However, a more proper comparison is between low and high wing-loaded aircraft. Low wing-loaded jet aircraft such as the B–57 and A–37 have performance characteristics more closely aligned with the low-level/permissive environment capabilities of the A–1, A–26, and T–28 than with the characteristics of the F–4 and F–105. In further discussion in this paper, this comparison is made instead of the more simple but less correct comparison between propeller and jet aircraft. An analysis of the relative effectiveness of low wing-loaded versus high wing-loaded aircraft operations against trucks in Laos should consider: (a) general aircraft capabilities (Appendix A); (b) type mission executed (Appendix B); (c) amount of effort which is applied against trucks (Appendix A); and (d) a comparison of aircraft vulnerability within its area of operations (Appendix C). Comments on these factors are included in the Appendices hereto. 4 4. (TS) With respect to improvements, maximum use is being made of road watch teams, electronic sensors, and night observation devices, i.e., Starlight Scope, side-looking infrared radar, and low light-level television, to improve the probability of detecting vehicles, waterborne craft, and personnel. The development of a suitable anti-vehicle mine and improved area ordnance for high-performance jet aircraft is receiving priority attention. Gunship II should further contribute to this program. 5. (TS) The requirement for a balanced force mix in Southeast Asia and additional considerations contained in the Appendices support the following conclusions: a. Low wing-loaded aircraft also have demonstrated high effectiveness in the night route interdiction mission in a relatively permissive defense environment. However, employment in highly defended areas is precluded because of vulnerability. b. High wing-loaded aircraft provide an excellent capability against the total Southeast Asia environment. If these aircraft were assigned the primary task of truck interdiction, their relative effectiveness against this target element would improve. However, the existing F–4 force is the minimum required to accomplish effectively the overall mission. Any reduction or diversion of this force would proportionately reduce the capability that can be applied against the most critical points of the enemy’s supply distribution system: Hanoi and Haiphong. c. The interdiction effort in Laos is a team effort. The extensive daylight jet strikes against truck parks, transfer points, roads, and supply depots force enemy trucks to travel almost exclusively at night. This has improved the target opportunity and, consequently, the effectiveness of night operations of low wing-loaded aircraft. This balanced approach to interdiction would be adversely affected by substitution of A–1 for F–4 squadrons. Therefore, the aircraft approved for deployment in Program 5 should be additive to, not a substitution for, F–4 assets in Southeast Asia. 6. (TS) Based on these conclusions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed substitution of A–1 for F–4 squadrons suggested in the OSD study be removed from further consideration. 5 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J.O. Cobb Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1304, Laos 385.1, 1968. Top Secret. 2 See footnote 8, Document 326 . 3 See the enclosure to Document 323 . 4 The appendices are attached, but not printed. 5 In a March 8 memorandum to McNamara, Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven disagreed with “both the logic and recommendations” of this JCS paper, but since the Air Force was including an increase from 61 to 97 A–1 aircraft in its proposal to deploy 270 additional fighter/attack aircraft, the issue was overtaken by events. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1304, Laos 385.1, 1968) 338. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 338. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Saigon, March 3, 1968, 0323Z. MAC 02985. 1. (TS) The situation in Laos is rapidly becoming critical. Attopeu and Saravane may fall as well as the Bolovens Plateau. Pakse is threatened which would allow the enemy egress to the Mekong. Ho Chi Minh is taking steps that bear out his design on all SEA. 2. (TS) It is time to consider a strategy that is broad enough to counter the total threat of NVN to SEA. SEATO Plan 6 2 provides a concept of operations that can be refined to meet the current exigencies. 3. (TS) Some of the advantages of this approach are: A. NVN would be countered under international aegis. This could have a broad psychological impact. B. Greater options would be available in the battle for SEA. C. The SEATO powers would be involved. D. The President would have a broader basis for his policies. E. It would permit US forces to enter Laos under international colors by request of Laotian Govt. F. Cambodia would be isolated and Sihanouk may give support to SEATO. 4. (TS) Disadvantages are: A. Broadens war and US commitment to SEA. B. Partial mobilization of both personnel and industry would probably be required. C. Possibility of strong public reaction in the US. D. Possibility ChiCom intervention. E. Time involved. F. Combined staff will compound command and control problems. 5. (TS) Specifically, US/SEATO field forces at the request of the RLG could go through Thailand to seize key areas in Laos such as the Bolovens Plateau. Aggressive action could be taken along the road and trail complex to disrupt the flow of NVA troops and supplies. I feel that Souvanna Phouma would be amenable to the implementation of a SEATO Plan or a similar plan sponsored by another international group. 6. (TS) Although there are practical problems and foreseeable difficulties in an attempt to use the SEATO organization, I feel the situation is such that this course of action should be seriously considered. Our approach should be to back an international group with the purpose of saving SEA as opposed to unilateral action to save a weak SVN Government. SEATO was originated for this purpose. 7. This concept was discussed by me with Amb. Bunker on 2 March. His political staff has it under study. It will be debated at the SEACOORD meeting on 7 March. 3 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Mar-31 Mar 1968. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Wheeler. 2 SEATO Plan 6 envisioned a SEATO military force defending Laos by seizure of strategic areas. 3 See the attachment to Document 345 . 339. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 339. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 9, 1968, 0730Z. 5021. 1. I discovered, in recent SEACOORD meeting, 2 that there is not a clear understanding in all quarters of relationship which Souvanna sees between recent enemy military activity in south Laos and potential introduction of U.S. forces into Lao Panhandle. There was some disposition to assume that, because North Vietnamese not only clearly violating Lao territory, but also threatening population centers, Souvanna would have less objection to U.S. forces coming into Panhandle at this time. 2. This assessment overlooks the shrewd and ruthless blackmail factor which has been a deliberate element of recent enemy activity in South Laos. This element has manifested itself by the enemy tactic of surrounding such significant population centers as Saravane and Attopeu, making obvious their clear capacity to take and destroy these exposed salients of governmental control. At the same time, their allies, such as Soviets and Poles, busily pass word that these centers will not be taken because they were not in Pathet Lao hands in 1962. 3. Patent implication of these statements is that enemy will respect government control over these cities provided no intrusion made into areas of their control. In shorthand, introduction of U.S. troops across SVN-Laos border would mean RLG loss of Saravane and Attopeu. 4. Therefore, from Souvanna’s viewpoint, a putative U.S. request to introduce ground forces into territory which he does not control to fight enemy which he doubts U.S. can fix and destroy would have to be balanced against permanent loss and probable destruction of two cities currently under his control which he has no doubt enemy could take at will. 5. Ergo, current enemy pressures in South Laos have not weakened Souvanna’s resolve to resist introduction of U.S. forces into Panhandle, but rather have been deliberately and rather cleverly designed to enhance that resolve. 6. I do not wish suggest from foregoing that blackmail against these two cities is only issue which keeps Souvanna from welcoming U.S. ground force intervention in Laos. As Dept is aware, his objections to such intervention are based upon many considerations of long standing and reasoned convictions. However, I believe it is important to place a proper perspective on the relationship between current crises and prevailing convictions. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Moscow, and CINCPAC. 2 March 7; see attachment to Document 345 . 340. Central Intelligence Information Cable 340. Central Intelligence Information Cable 1 March 9, 1968. TDCS DB–315/00869–68 SUBJECT Appraisal of the security of the guerrilla base at Phou Pha Thi, Site 85, as of 9 March 1968 ACQ Laos, Vientiane SOURCE [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]This is a field appraisal of the current situation. It is not an official judgment by this Agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretation of [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] at the time of its preparation. 1. Since 25 February 1968, when FOV 13,429 (TDCSDB– 315/00669–68) 2 was prepared to appraise the security of the guerrilla base at Phou Pha Thi (UH 6663–6860), the enemy has methodically continued to prepare the battlefield for his attack on the summit of Phou Pha Thi. In a series of penetrations of the 12-kilometer defensive perimeter around Phou Pha Thi the enemy has focused primarily on bringing more troops into the area and in so doing to consolidate his breach of the perimeter. As of 9 March the enemy has a total estimated force equivalent to seven battalions that could be brought to bear in a ground attack on site 85. In effect, in the period 25 February to 9 March the enemy has expanded his hold on Phou Den Din (UH 790595), has consolidated his position on the ridge line running west from Phou Houei Hao (UH 735583), and has extended the depth of his probes up toward the base of Phou Pha Thi and has thus penetrated deeper into the 12-kilometer defensive perimeter so that by 7 March 150 enemy troops had clashed with a guerrilla patrol in the vicinity of UH 725581, only about five kilometers from the base of the mountain. [Here follows details of the NVN buildup of an attack on site 85 over the last 15 days.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. According to a note on the source text, advance copies were transmitted to the White House, State, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS, NIC, NSA, and OCI. 2 Not further identified. 341. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 341. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 11, 1968, 0532Z. 5038. 1. As Dept has probably learned from military sources, enemy has effectively eliminated air navigation facilities at Site 85. Action began yesterday evening with artillery and mortar shelling. Decision to destroy facilities by self-destruction was taken in small hours of morning. Helicopter evacuation was arranged for first light this morning. 2. Evacuation plans have been seriously disrupted by enemy activity and several [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] personnel have apparently been dispersed from pre-planned evacuation sites. Although seven of them have been accounted for as of this time, eleven are yet to be located. Of those seven accounted for, three are dead on the site, one died in the helicopter en route and three are at Udorn. 3. In addition to these personnel, two CAS and one AIRA forward air controller have been withdrawn from their evacuation sites. Other local personnel (wounded, etc.) have also been extracted. 4. Fighting and shelling continues, as well as helicopter and ground evacuation efforts. Because of confused situation at site and withdrawal our CAS personnel (one of whom was wounded) it will doubtless be some time before we have clear picture or further significant reports. 5. We will, of course, continue reports as information comes in. At first glance, however, it appears we may have pushed our luck one day too long in attempting to keep this facility in operation. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, 7th AF, and 7/13 AF. 342. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 342. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 13, 1968, 0558Z. 5073. Ref: Vientiane 5038. 2 1. Evacuation operations at Site 85 have been completed and site is currently in enemy hands. Personnel from mountain-top positions have been extracted by helicopter with exception relatively small group SGU local troops who have descended to base camp positions, joined other units there, and are withdrawing overland to previously agreed safe havens. Since we may assume that these safe havens will also come under enemy pressure soon, there may be required a second phase of withdrawals for these latter personnel. 2. Final count on [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] personnel accounts for all but three. One of these may subsequently be listed as dead if and when we can get more coherent information from survivors, some of whom in state of considerable shock. 3 3. Contrary to figures cited reftel, there was total of 16 of these personnel at communications site, rather than 18 as we had earlier understood. Of these 16, five were extracted alive but one was killed in helicopter when he was hit by ground fire. Eight others are known dead. Three are unaccounted for, although one of these, as stated above, may be presumed dead. 4. Confusion surrounding extraction these personnel stems from two factors not yet fully explained. First was fact that these personnel, instead of assembling at pre-arranged evacuation site, decide to climb down over face of sheer cliffs to a narrow ledge, using some sort of cargo harness system which they devised for this purpose. It is not known why or when they decided to take this action. But it is presumed that they must have thought, contrary to fact, that trail to evacuation site was blocked. 5. Second was fact that small enemy “suicide squad”, which seems to have made improbable ascent up these same cliffs, surprised and caught these [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] personnel on their narrow ledge, gunning and grenading them while they were trapped in this inescapable position. It was here that these men suffered such heavy casualties and where most of them are reported to have died. Three bodies were subsequently seen on this ledge, but remainder are assumed to have fallen off sheer 2000 foot drop. 6. We and Air Force personnel at Udorn will attempt reconstruct story further from survivors when latter have recovered from sedation and shock. Conclusion, however, seems quite definitive that none of missing personnel are likely to be alive. 7. For this reason, USAF late yesterday afternoon flew several missions against remains of navigation and communications equipment on mountain top, as well as abandoned artillery position, in order destroy materiel left behind. Photo missions are being run today to determine whether further strikes are necessary. 8. Several follow-up actions remain to be accomplished, and will be subject of meeting this afternoon between Ambassador and DEPCOM 7/13 AF. A. We must discuss with RLG and determine what, if anything, needs to be said about this action. It remains to be seen whether Hanoi or Pathet Lao radios will announce their victory. B. We must decide how to handle next of kin notification, casualty announcements, etc. C. We must expedite action for replacement site, at least for TACAN. D. We should discuss possibility that Site 36 will be next on enemy list and what contingencies we should consider there. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 7AF, and 7/13 AF. 2 Document 341 . 3 In telegram 5103 from Vientiane, March 12, Sullivan reported that there would be a search and rescue operation for personnel still unaccounted for, the remaining structures at Site 85 would be destroyed by napalm bombs dropped from U.S. aircraft, no publicity would be given to the battle, Souvanna would be informed, and the next of kin would be notified in the United States. (Ibid.) In telegrams 5119 from Vientiane, March 13, Sullivan reported that he informed Souvanna of the capture of Site 85. Sullivan also reported that 11 U.S. personnel were killed; the 3 previously unaccounted for were killed according to the survivors. (Ibid.) 343. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 343. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 14, 1968, 0841Z. 5136. Ref: A. Vientiane 5123. B. AIRA Vientiane 00341 (notal). 2 1. Fall of Pha Thi (Site 85) in Sam Neua Province opens a new time of troubles for Vang Pao and the Meos of Military Region II. The size of the attacking forces and their heavy supporting weapons are greater than anything friendly troops can muster in the immediate vicinity. Therefore, there is no alternative but to evacuate friendly troop units and their dependents in order maintain them intact for counterattack activity in rainy season. Ref A indicates dimension of refugee problem with which we are attempting to cope. A fleet of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft is engaged in this effort today. 2. It should be borne in mind that North Vietnam mounted attack of this size and intensity because it wished eliminate U.S. installation, which had become “attractive nuisance” for them. Consequently, this vast uprooting of human resources and abandonment of useful territory is direct result U.S., rather than RLG, operational interests. 3. Site 36, which is used as forward launch base for ARS helicopters, is another U.S.-dedicated activity which will doubtless also attract enemy attention. Although it is more heavily defended than Site 85, it is questionable whether it can withstand a determined assault by seven NVN battalions, the strength we feel enemy is probably able to deploy against it. 4. Faced with these prospects, Vang Pao has sent message to Prime Minister Souvanna and to me asking for maximum air strikes against a series of targets in Military Region II. Most of the targets are in or lie close to towns and other centers of civilian population which Prime Minister has previously asked us to avoid. I went over list with Souvanna yesterday and we agreed to have U.S. photo-interpreters examine prospects for carefully controlled strikes against a number of Vang Pao’s targets. We agreed to take joint look at photography as soon as my people can get target folders assembled. 5. Last evening subsequent to discussions reported para 4, Souvanna told me he had received disturbing message from Vang Pao which he interpreted as preparation for withdrawal from additional forward territory in Region II, raising prospect that north and east defenses of Vientiane plains would be significantly reduced in depth. Souvanna felt this was imprudent and hoped to dissuade Vang Pao from any such steps. He felt he needed assurances of air strikes as persuader for Vang Pao and again urged early meeting on subject. 6. Comment : Subsequent Embassy discussion with Vang Pao, who came to Vientiane for military meeting this morning, indicates Souvanna may have misunderstood his message. He reportedly was referring merely to location of new refugee centers rather than relocation of old. Of some possible interest to Embassy Bangkok was his thought of placing some of his Meo refugees in hills of Sayaboury, along Lao border with Nan province in Thailand. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, JCS, 7th AF, and JCS. 2 Neither found. 344. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 344. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 16, 1968, 1100Z. 5187. 1. As we enter last few weeks of dry season without visible reduction North Vietnamese presence or activities, Lao are bracing themselves for another series of enemy attacks. This time there is somewhat less sense of panic than in February and a more careful measuring of circumstances. However, there is also an underlying worry and fatalism, which reflects a broad scale of uncertainties. Chief among these are apparent inability of friendly forces in South Vietnam to reassert initiative, especially in countryside and marks of diminishing support for war in United States. 2. All senior Lao military were gathered in conferences with Souvanna here in Vientiane for nearly three days of discussion this week. Basic thrust of their discussions concerned reorganization of staff and field commands, but sessions provided best opportunity in my experience here for political and military views to be brought into common focus. General Vang Pao, who attended all sessions, told Emboff he considered them most professional he has known. Fact that he and Phasouk (who spent only two days here) were present and active contributors to discussions probably had a lot to do with their realism. 3. Interspersed with his meetings with the generals, Souvanna had me in for a half dozen sessions, culminating in a seance yesterday afternoon which brought me, my AIRA, CAS Station Chief and photo-interpreter into conclave with Souvanna and his ten generals. Purpose of this session was to plan expanded bombing campaign against targets in Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua provinces, including several which have been off limits until now. These strikes have been requested by Vang Pao, but I insisted on having Souvanna personally accept responsibility for targeting, so that he and Vang Pao and general staff could draw lines distinguishing between legitimate military objectives and civilian population centers. 4. As consequence this session, we came up with significant spread of targets which have been passed on to 7th AF. Latter has already advised us of their readiness to react to this request and we assume that air campaign will begin next week, weather permitting. 5. In addition requests for air strikes, Souvanna and his generals asked for expedited delivery of certain types equipment, particularly artillery and crew served weapons. Most of these are already en route, but we have submitted additional requisitions through appropriate channels. Only two items on which I boggled were 106mm. recoilless rifles and tank. Requests for both these items are obviously engendered by reports of enemy tanks and armored vehicles in Lao Ngam area and recent experience with same at Ban Houie Sane. Moreover, Vang Pao feels he would like to use 106’s against enemy artillery, if he can move guerrilla teams close to their batteries. 6. Since I have made negative noises about these two items and since they are not in our MAP program, we could probably finesse this request if we have to. However, if more PR76 or other tanks show up again in Laos, issue is sure to rise once more. Therefore, suggest Dept. take counsel with Defense and advise contingency views for our possible use. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, JCS, COMUSMACV, 7 AF, and 7/13 AF. 345. Note From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 345. Note From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 19, 1968, 12:20 p.m. Mr. President: You may wish to take into account at lunch 2 these thoughts of the meeting of the Southeast Asian Ambassadors and Gen. Westmoreland at Cam Ranh Bay. They raise, among other matters, the possibility of: —a feint against North Vietnam; —limited operations in Laos. W.W. Rostow 3 Attachment 4 Saigon, March 19, 1968. Telegram 22495 From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State SUBJECT Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee Recommendations 1. The Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee (SEACOORD) convened at Cam Ranh Bay on March 7. Present were Ambassadors Bunker, Sullivan and Unger, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, together with their principal advisors. Following represents agreed summary of recommendations: A. Vietnam—1. In light of enemy divisions in DMZ-Khe Sanh area, the U.S. Government should study possibility of conducting amphibious feint north of the DMZ to relieve pressure on I Corps recommended by CINCPAC. Study should include careful re-examination of earlier expressed fear that failure to follow though on such a feint might be termed a propaganda victory for North Vietnam. B. Laos—The extensive use of Laos by North Vietnamese military forces has greatly increased the problem of combating the enemy throughout South Vietnam. The use of Laotian territory by the enemy has reached a degree of seriousness where, despite the political problems involved, we should consider permitting limited military operations in Laos. Current military situation in Laos is moreover marked by aggressive enemy action which bears direct relation to increased North Vietnamese presence in Northern provinces of South Vietnam. Specially planned operations by US forces on Khe Sanh plateau may encounter harassment and fire from enemy forces across the border in enemy base areas of Laos. SEACOORD recommends following actions relating to foregoing evaluation: 1. Contingency planning for possible limited ground operations by US and/or ARVN forces in Laos should proceed. The point may be reached when it will become necessary on a case by case basis to put limited ground forces into Laos. In that event, these forces should be employed close to the border and the operations should be conducted in such a way as to have no press exposure. It is important that the targets selected be worthy of the political risks involved. The Commander, US MACV will prepare contingency plans for consideration by Embassy Vientiane and will forward them to CINCPAC and the JCS for approval. The problems of deniability and/or press disclosure of such operations are recognized, and they will be covered in an appropriate annex. 2. Make immediate efforts to locate an alternate position for Site 85, primarily for aircraft guidance purposes. One such site, Phou Bia, would be valuable but requires specialized helicopter support because of altitude. The 7th Air Force will examine possibilities of obtaining such helicopters. 3. Authorize launching of Prairie Fire missions through Nakhon Phanom, recovering at forward refueling sites in Laos after team insertion when poor weather prevents operations from South Vietnam. These launches from Nakhon Phanom will be subject to existing restrictions on Vietnamese presence in Thailand and Laos. The Commander of Special Operations Groups (MACSOG) will coordinate with Embassy Vientiane re operating arc of current helicopters from Nakhon Phanom in order to determine feasible forward refueling sites in Laos.MACSOG will also propose for consideration by Bangkok alternate launching sites other than Nakhom Phanom. The possible use of other sites in Thailand will be studied by Embassy Bangkok and Commander, U.S. MACV, having in mind military factors as well as the likelihood of approval by the Thai Government which must be sought before any extension in operations beyond the present authorization. 4. Commander, U.S. MACV proposed that Washington accept the principle that the current Prairie Fire boundary is a coordination line and authorize Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and Embassy Vientiane to coordinate locally for exploitation of targets west of Prairie Fire boundary. Vientiane felt case by case coordination locally submitted through Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) for approval by Washington was adequate, but agreed to leave decision on this subject up to Washington. 5. Initiate a Prairie Fire intelligence collection operation, exploiting the potential of Kha tribesmen indigenous to the Prairie Fire area as elements of a low-level MACV-directed intelligence net. 6. Since enemy operations in Laos threatening Khe Sanh area appeared to require extension of dump truck area southward in Laos, it was agreed that Embassy Vientiane would submit a proposal through channels for such extension. 7. Embassy Vientiane proposed an increase in A–1 and A–26 aircraft positioned in Thailand and available for operations in Laos. It was agreed that the weekly planning meetings at Udorn between the 7th Air Force and Embassy Vientiane would include planning air support for ground force operations in counter-insurgency context. 8. Seek immediate augmentation of helicopters for entire SEACOORD area and employ a portion of this augmentation to provide better support for CIA guerrilla activity in Laos panhandle. [Here follows recommendations on Cambodia printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XXVII, Document 232 .] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia 5 E (2)a, 1/68–10/68. Top Secret. 2 According to the notes of the March 19 Tuesday luncheon meeting, neither this cable nor the issues that it raised were discussed. (Ibid., Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, 3/19/68) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 4 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 ASIA SE. Top Secret; Exdis. A note on the source text indicates it was retyped at the White House. 346. Special National Intelligence Estimate 346. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, March 21, 1968. SNIE 58–68 COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN LAOS The Problem To estimate likely Communist intentions in Laos over the next 2–3 months. Conclusions A. We believe that Communist intentions in Laos are highly contingent on developments in South Vietnam. The Communists have the capability to reduce the area controlled by the Laotian Government to a few enclaves in fairly short order. For the present, however, Hanoi’s primary concern in Laos is with the security of the vital panhandle infiltration routes; in these circumstances it is unlikely that the Communists would wish to over-extend their forces in Laos or run grave risks of destroying the general framework of the 1962 settlement. Thus, we believe on balance, that they will probably take a few more positions and then reduce their military pressures during the rainy season. B. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that the Communists might press their advantage. The chances of Hanoi adopting this course would increase in the months ahead if the war in South Vietnam reached a critical juncture and Hanoi saw advantage in deliberately opening a “second front” in Laos in order to place further strain on US resources. Or, if Hanoi were confident at some point that negotiations on South Vietnam were at hand, it might think it useful to take as much territory in Laos as possible to strengthen the Communist bargaining position. 2 Discussion I. The Present Situation 1. Since the 1962 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized by Communist advances in the dry season (November to April in Laos) and counteroffensives by the Royal Lao Government (RLG) forces during the rainy season (May to October). These annual military operations, however, have been limited, and at least until this year neither side has appeared anxious to take action in areas that might provoke a strong reaction by the other. 2. Although generally the fortunes of war had seesawed back and forth, by the fall of 1967 RLG forces had penetrated well into some areas usually dominated by the Communists. This process was highlighted by the RLG capture in August 1966 of the Nam Bac Valley 3 —60 miles north of the royal capital of Luang Prabang—which the Communists had controlled for nearly 10 years. These successes had by the summer of 1967 given the RLG new confidence, and in September 1967 RLG forces planned a further offensive in the Nam Bac area. 3. In mid-January 1968 the Communist forces turned the RLG offensive at Nam Bac into a debacle for the government. Meanwhile, the Communists had begun to launch offensives elsewhere in Laos. In support of these operations, the Communists have introduced new forces from North Vietnam and redeployed other units, possibly including several battalions normally assigned to duty along the infiltration routes to South Vietnam. In general, the present Communist offensive has been directed so far at targets which were either held by them in 1962 or attacked by them in their campaigns since then. 4. In north Laos, in addition to Nam Bac, Communist forces concentrated on Phou Pha Thi, and on 11 March they destroyed the US navigational site located there. They have also attacked other guerrilla positions and have taken the villages of Tha Thom and Sala Den Dine, about 30–35 miles north of Paksane. 5. In central-south Laos, Communist forces have harassed Route 13, the main road artery connecting northern and southern Laos, and on 6 February they blew up the bridge on this route across the Se Bang Fai River between Thakhek and Savannakhet. They also took Muong Phalane against minimal RLG resistance and forced the removal of the US Tacan navigational site in that area. 6. Further south, the Communists have sharply increased their activities in the Bolovens plateau area, reducing RLG positions around Saravane and taking a number of villages along Route 16 in the rice-rich Se Done Valley. In late February they attacked the town of Lao Ngam 4 (the center of the Se Done Valley pacification program) and the outskirts of the district capital of Attopeu. 7. The Communists, with their ability to reinforce rapidly from North Vietnam, have long had the capability to defeat the qualitatively inferior RLG forces and to seize control of most of Laos. Every year Hanoi has strengthened its forces in Laos for the dry season operations. What is noteworthy this year, however, is the extent of the reinforcement and the intensity of operations. Information on reinforcement in recent months is not firm, but it may total 10–14 battalion-size North Vietnamese Army combat units over the past year, concentrated primarily in the Bolovens plateau area in the south and around Phou Pha Thi in the north. This would place total North Vietnamese combat and support personnel in Laos at about 35,000. 5 The Communist position has also been strengthened by their recent advances westward, and by the losses in manpower, material, and morale that they have been able to inflict on the RLG. Accordingly, we estimate that the Communists could, in fairly short order, reduce the RLG area of control to a few enclaves. II. The Outlook A. Factors Influencing Further Communist Actions 8. There are, however, other factors more important than raw capabilities which bear on the future scope of Communist actions in Laos. North Vietnam, of course, desires to preserve Communist control over border areas. Hanoi also has a continuing concern to protect and strengthen the Pathet Lao territorial base while retaining the option to return the Pathet Lao to active participation in the tripartite government. In part, recent military moves have been a reaction to the RLG’s “nibbling” tactics and to the raids of guerrilla forces deep within territory nominally under Communist control. 9. For the present, however, Hanoi’s overriding concern in Laos is with the infiltration system in the Lao corridor. The security of the supply and infiltration routes developed there since the early 1960’s has become even more critical to the Communist effort in South Vietnam in recent months. The Communist “winter-spring” offensive in South Vietnam has clearly required not only additional men and material in preparation for major and widespread military action, but also increased use of the corridor. 10. Hanoi’s normal concern with the panhandle has thus been intensified, while at the same time US bombing and other expanded allied activities have been imposing greater strains on the Communist logistic system in Laos. Hanoi almost certainly desires to improve the routes in the panhandle of Laos, expand the area of control there, and possibly develop alternative routes further west. Although the present Communist logistical system is adequate for the delivery of needed supplies, additional routes would provide the Communists with greater flexibility and force the US to spread its interdiction efforts over a wider area. 11. In protecting the corridor and in advancing other local objectives in Laos, Hanoi would not wish at this time to take actions which unnecessarily complicated or hindered support of the war in South Vietnam. If, for example, it employed its capability to seize and hold most of Laos, the task of supporting and defending these extended lines of communication could detract from the main effort in South Vietnam. Such a military campaign would completely upset the Geneva arrangements which still have some advantages for North Vietnam, and more important, might precipitate larger scale US operations against Hanoi’s supply lines in the panhandle. 12. Hanoi probably believes that its present limited offensive in Laos will not by itself provoke large-scale US intervention in Laos. Instead, it may believe that these operations tend to deter such action by showing the US and Souvanna that the Communists have the capability to make such intervention extremely costly. Finally, Hanoi may believe that even the present level of its military activities in Laos will cause such concern in Thailand as to affect the Thai commitment in South Vietnam. B. Likely Communist Actions 13. On balance, we believe the Communists do not wish to destroy the general framework of the 1962 settlement, and, therefore, are not likely to push their military offensive so far as to run grave risks of this result. Thus, they will probably take a few more positions and then reduce their military pressures during the rainy season. They will, of course, defend the infiltration corridor as necessary, but Hanoi probably still prefers its present use of these routes to the situation that might arise if Hanoi expanded the conflict to the point of precipitating large-scale US intervention in Laos. 14. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that the Communists might press their advantage. The chances of Hanoi adopting this course would increase in the months ahead if the war in South Vietnam reached a critical juncture and Hanoi saw advantage in deliberately opening a “second front” in Laos in order to place further strain on US resources. Or, if Hanoi were confident at some point that negotiations on South Vietnam were at hand, it might think it useful to take as much territory in Laos as possible to strengthen the Communist bargaining position. 6 1 Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 58–68. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this volume. All members of the USIB concurred with its release except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained because the topic was outside their jurisdiction. 2 Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, The Director, National Security Agency, believes the estimate is overly influenced by the contingent relationship between developments in the war in South Vietnam and North Vietnamese activities in Laos. Communist military capability now present in northern Laos is greater than at any time since 1962. While the Communists may be content to take and hold only those areas previously under Pathet Lao control, they nonetheless, have the capability to extend their control over additional areas of northern as well as southern Laos. In their view they could take this action virtually without regard to or risk of any meaningful US counteraction. Gen. Carter, therefore, believes that a greater emphasis should be given to this possibility. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 The town colloquially referred to as Nam Bac is shown on the maps as Ban Nam Bac. [Footnote in the source text. The maps, showing Communist-controlled areas in June 1962 and March 1968 and comprising pages 4 and 5 of the SNIE, are not printed.] 4 Lao Ngam is shown as Ban Lao Ngam on the maps. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 This includes North Vietnamese Army elements in the corridor concerned primarily with support of supply routes to South Vietnam. Some of the estimated reinforcement in the Bolovens plateau area may actually reflect a westward deployment of units already in the corridor. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 See NSA footnote to Conclusion B. [Footnote in the source text.] 347. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 347. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 23, 1968, 0620Z. 5333. Ref: State 135397. 2 1. I regard MACV proposal as part of its continuing two pronged campaign (a) to extrude itself from CINCPAC line of command, and (b) to encroach further with its high risk Prairie Fire operations which in practice have proved to have infinitesimal military value relative to political considerations. 2. Since Admiral Sharp and I see eye to eye on these matters, I find it useful to keep him in the picture, not only with respect to this particular set of operations, but in the overall introduction of value judgements to increasingly myopic proposals. 3. Secondly, if we permitted direct Saigon-Vientiane resolution of these matters, we would be deluged by a flood of proposals from MACSOG (which has nothing else to do) and which would require a lot of our valuable time batting down. 4. In practice, we have been able to work the current system quite satisfactorily. The last proposal cleared Vientiane, Honolulu and Washington in less than 24 hours. However, 36 hours later the “urgent” operation has not taken place because MACV has not accorded MACSOG high enough priority to merit an allocation of helicopters for this particular stunt. 5. You are doubtless aware that I regard MACSOG as a dubious organization of marginal value and that my views are shared by many senior military officers in Saigon, Honolulu and Washington. Perhaps under the new management in Saigon they will quietly disappear. At any rate, we hope Dept will do all possible to keep them off our backs, because they distract time and energy to no particular avail. 6. Therefore, I would recommend Dept continue to hold off JCS on this and other related questions at least until views of new COMUSMACV 3 are better known on whole range of cross border adventures and the relation such measures have to more mundane tasks within Viet Nam itself. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Dept. 2 In telegram 135397 to Vientiane, March 23, the Department of State agreed with Sullivan that coordination for Prairie Fire operations should not be limited to U.S. officials in Saigon and Vientiane. The Department agreed that Washington officials should have a role and was prepared to support Sullivan on that point. (Ibid.) 3 On July 2 General Creighton W. Abrams became COMUSMACV. 348. Letter From the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) to the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) 348. Letter From the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) to the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) 1 Washington, March 23, 1968. Dear Mr. Ambassador: At Bill Bundy’s request, the enclosed study 2 was prepared during the last week and approved by him March 23. Copies have been sent to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Secretary of Defense, and Walt Rostow, among others. The drafting was done by this office, the Thai Desk, our lawyers (for Part III and the legal annex) and DOD/ISA (for the military sections). The Joint Staff was represented by General Andrews (J–5) and CIA [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Our basic mandate was to consider the most dire outcome of current DRV military activities and decide what we should or could do to counter it. The paper was prepared at the time that a SNIE was concluding that the DRV did not intend to push in force to the Mekong, a conclusion shared by all agencies and the participants in our exercise. The urgent need to produce the study precluded consultation with either you or Len Unger. I would, however, welcome your comments and assessment because there is no doubt in my mind that we shall be addressing these or related problems repeatedly in the foreseeable future. As you know, such studies are usually prepared as the result of much pressure from high places and it is difficult to question the premises without seeming to fight the problem. At one meeting, DOD/ISA (Dick Steadman) propounded the view that the enemy had the capability of effectively taking the Panhandle in a matter of days. The ensuing discussion was most educational. Despite the haste in producing this paper, I am satisfied that it is a fairly reasonable assessment; and it was certainly an eye-opener in regard to our military capability to react. Sincerely yours, Martin F. Herz 3 1 Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret; Official-Informal. 2 See the attachment to Document 350 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 349. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 349. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, March 25, 1968. SUBJECT SEACOORD Recommendations 2 The SEACOORD recommendations seem to me to be based on the assumption that we can take additional military actions in Laos, and that otherwise the situation stays the same. That assumption is almost certainly incorrect. The enemy will certainly take steps to counter our ploy. They will attempt to destroy our forces introduced on to their supply line. And they may very possibly use our action as a pretext for an assault upon major Laotian cities. In short, if we “hot up” the war in Laos we can expect with confidence that the enemy will do the same for he has consistently shown fewer inhibitions in Laos than we have shown. And he has the resources on the spot. Unless we are prepared to contemplate a major war in Laos with the overt commitment of American resources we had better be very careful, indeed, in deciding on the SEACOORD recommendations. Marshall Wright 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5EE (1) Laos, 10/67–12/68. Top Secret; Exdis. 2 See the attachment to Document 345 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 350. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 350. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, March 26, 1968. SUBJECT Contingency Study Laos/Thailand At Mr. William Bundy’s request I am forwarding for your information a copy of the Contingency Study Laos/Thailand. Although the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate 2 will conclude that a rapid extension of Communist forces in Laos in a westward direction (to the Mekong) is on balance unlikely, the enclosed Contingency Study has been prepared on the assumption that the present clear enemy capabilities may result in just such an action. The study, which also indicates a number of actions that could be taken now in an attempt to deter the North Vietnamese from such a westward move, has been prepared in close cooperation with Defense and CIA. Benjamin H. Read 3 Attachment Washington, undated. CONTINGENCY STUDY LAOS/THAILAND I. Purpose of Study In view of the current intensification of the war in Laos and the capabilities of the NVA/PL forces in Laos to take over the entire country, to examine the actions available to the RLG, RTG and USG under the assumptions described below. II. Assumptions 1. If the enemy wished to take the lowlands of the Laos Panhandle, he could make quick thrusts to key points on the Mekong with little advance notice. This would involve small forces maneuvering in open country which would make them highly vulnerable to air power. However, such operations could succeed within days in the face of crumbling Lao resistance. 2. While the enemy would require a substantial buildup over a period of weeks or even months to mount a coordinated drive to occupy all the lowlands in the Panhandle, he could achieve the same objective by following up his initial thrusts with a gradual buildup to extend his hold on the lowlands. Such a strategy would be feasible, but would probably require substantial diversion of forces and resources from other operations. 3. If the enemy wished to take over all of Laos, including the mountainous areas of the North, he would require a substantial buildup over a period of months. However, a successful campaign in the Panhandle could result in a crumbling of resistance also in the North; and it is therefore possible that Laos might be reduced to an enclave around Vientiane in a matter of weeks after the launch of a determined enemy campaign. III. U.S. Commitments & Assurances (See Tab A) A. Thailand . We are committed by Article IV of the SEATO Treaty 4 to consult with the other parties if Thailand decides that Communist actions in Laos threaten it or endanger the peace of the area. Such consultations would be held “in order to agree on the measures which shall be taken for the common defense.” By the same article we are committed to “act to meet the common danger” if a Communist attack in Laos were not simply a threat but were part of an armed attack against Thailand. In July 1963, we privately assured Thailand that the U.S. “will not sit idly by and allow the Communists to become entrenched on the borders of Thailand.” President Johnson authorized consultations in 1964 “looking toward joint Thai-U.S. military planning of measures to be taken in the event of a Communist drive toward the borders of Thailand.” The President stated “we must be prepared to act promptly and effectively to check such a drive if necessary.” The resulting plan (Project 22 5 ) calling for substantial U.S. and Thai actions in Laos as well as Thailand was approved by the Joint Chiefs in May 1965. Project 22 is a plan, not a commitment. It provides for implementation “only upon mutual agreement and consent of both the United States and Royal Thai Governments.” However, the Thais will justifiably expect the U.S. to take meaningful action to meet a threat to the Thai border. U.S. or Thai operations in Laos to protect Thailand in the contingency stated require the consent of the RLG. Failure to obtain that consent would raise serious legal problems under the 1962 Geneva Agreement and SEATO, and would preclude reliance on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as Congressional authorization of such action. B. Laos . The United States has no defense commitments to Laos, but the obligations of Article IV of the SEATO Treaty extend to the territory of Laos. However, the 1962 Geneva Agreement committed the RLG not to recognize the protection of SEATO and not to allow the introduction of foreign troops into Laos. The Geneva Agreement was not intended to deprive Laos of its inherent right of self-defense against armed attack, but the present Lao Government, which owes its existence to the Geneva Accords, is not likely to request foreign troops even in circumstances in which such action could be justifiable. It would almost certainly not repudiate the 1962 Agreement by involving SEATO, despite the Western view that the SEATO Treaty could be applicable should the RLG justifiably invoke it. IV. Thai and Lao Political Attitudes in the Contingency A. Thailand . Although deeply concerned by the recent Tet offensive, increased insurgency in North Thailand, and Communist advances in Laos, the Thai Government has kept its nerve and reacted calmly. This has been based on confidence that these setbacks are temporary and the U.S. has the strength and will to defend Thailand effectively. Any indication that the U.S. was unwilling to carry out what the Thai regard as our commitments, particularly under present circumstances, would result in a very serious and adverse Thai reaction. This could include loss of cooperation and operational flexibility in use of Thai air bases, delay or refusal to deploy the forces currently training for Vietnam, etc.—in short an “agonizing reappraisal” of the whole basis of Thai support for the United States in Southeast Asia today. The Thai have made it clear in the past that if we are considering the deployment of U.S. ground forces to Thailand as a deterrent to Communist actions in Laos, we must be prepared to use these forces outside of Thailand. They are not interested in another deployment a la 1962 when U.S. forces came simply to stay in Thailand. Additionally, the Thai have made it clear that if we are prepared to bring in troops for use outside Thailand, they are prepared to join forces with us in these operations. B. Laos. A concerted enemy move to the Mekong would be a heavy blow to the position of Souvanna, but he might be persuaded to remain as Prime Minister on the grounds that he is best able to obtain foreign support and to function as national rallying point. Any other Prime Minister would be confronted with even greater internal dissension unless the King, with U.S. support, were to intervene with unaccustomed vigor. National divisions would be especially along North-South lines, with the southerners tending to seek foreign support without reference to Vientiane. In the southern cities there would be panic, and the mass exodus across the Mekong would not be confined to civilians. Southern leaders might, however, think in terms of holding beachheads around such cities as Thakhek, Savannakhet and Pakse. If the Communists move militarily to take over all of Laos, we must assume that they would take parallel political steps such as the presentation of a “true” Government of National Union. It is hard to see how the Soviet Union could avoid transferring its recognition to such a government. Even if this were not to occur, but especially if it does, Souvanna would consider his position untenable and his neutralist government would come to an end. Under the contingency of an all-out Communist effort, the crumbling of the political structure would be of major proportions. There would be defections of important political leaders to the Communists, particularly from among Souvanna’s Neutralists. Even if the Government remained in a Vientiane enclave, many other political (and military) leaders would cross into Thailand. Although Souvanna Phouma has consistently said that he would not ask for foreign military intervention because he did not wish to turn neutral Laos into a major battleground, it is conceivable that in a calamitous military situation he might ask for foreign intervention to avoid the extinction of his country. More likely, however, he would resign and let another leader issue such a call. Intervention would presumably be asked on the grounds of collective self-defense rather than the SEATO protocol. V. Possible Deterrent Actions A. Diplomatic 1. Lao Actions: Call for Geneva Conference. We believe Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma would be prepared to issue such a call (presumably addressed to the Co-Chairmen of the 1962 Conference) since it fits in with his carefully phased sequence of approaches which has now reached stage 3 of the following series: (1) calls for action by the ICC; (2) appeals to the Co-Chairmen; (3) asking the Co-Chairmen to call for “consultations” among the Geneva signatories as called for by Article 4 of the 1962 Declaration, which Souvanna did February 29, without success to date. The logical next step (4) is to call for reconvening the Geneva Conference, a call which the Communists would resist unless they are ready to agree to such a meeting for discussions of a wider Indochina settlement. The Lao Prime Minister would probably prefer to take step 4 in an emergency, rather as a deterrent to head off the contingency. A call for a new Geneva Conference would have some limited value by helping to dramatize the situation and by showing that Laos was exhausting all means available to it under the Geneva Accords. Although the 1962 Declaration does not specifically envisage a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, Article 4 obligates the signatories “in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present Declaration.” 2. Thai Actions (SEATO). Thailand could also call for consultations under Article IV(2) of the Manila Pact. These consultations could be used to publicize the Communist threat in Laos. This could be a prelude to a SEATO Council meeting on this matter—either a special meeting or the upcoming annual Council meeting of April 2–5. 3. Other U.S. Measures. U.S. note to the Geneva Co-Chairmen, in support of initiatives of Souvanna under 1 above, with appropriate publicity, and with lateral circulation to other signatories of the 1962 Accords. Bilateral U.S. discussion with the Soviets, in an attempt to convince them that we would have to react militarily if the military equilibrium in Laos were destroyed. (Warnings of this kind have been given, more or less explicitly, on several occasions. Our Embassy in Vientiane issued one to the Soviet Embassy there in January; the Soviets seemed to understand the message, but there was no visible result. On the other hand, the Secretary’s remark to Ambassador Dobrynin in February, 6 which was specifically keyed to the situation at Saravane, may have resulted in the NVA/PL exercising some restraint there—although the Communists may not have intended to take Saravane.) Suggesting to the British, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen, that they make parallel demarches to the Soviet Union. U.S., British, and other friendly demarches to the Indian Government in an effort to prod the ICC into activity. All the foregoing steps could be taken or repeated now, but they would have greater credibility, in terms of the stated or implied threat of U.S. forceful counter-action, if they coincided with an obviously critical military situation. B. Military 1. Air a. Thai Air Actions. 1) Use Thai T–28’s for Strikes in Laos. With US/RLG/RTG agreement, additional T–28’s in the RTAF inventory (total now is 46) could be drawn against to augment the present RLAF capability. Additional Thai pilots could be provided to man these. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 2) Overt Use of Other Thai Air Assets. To impress the enemy with the credibility of Thai intentions, the RTG, with agreement of the RLG, might employ the tactical air assets of the RTAF overtly in combat operations in Laos. Air strikes could be accomplished by the T–28’s, F–86F’s, and F–5’s in the RTAF’s inventory. However, of the 27 F–86’s in the inventory, only 15 are currently operationally ready. Also, the limited number of F–5’s (6) diminishes their potential military contribution. Their principal contribution would be psychological, i.e., a forceful demonstration of Thai willingness to act to meet the threat. b. U.S. Air Actions 1) U.S. Tactical Air Operations in Laos. Areas of U.S. “armed reconnaissance,” called Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll, are presently confined to the eastern Panhandle and northeastern Laos (Maps at Tab B). Strikes by U.S. tactical aircraft outside these areas may now be conducted in response to RLG requests concurred in by Embassy Vientiane. In order to cope with situations envisaged under this contingency in a systematic manner and to enable full employment of U.S. tactical air power against the enemy, the RLG would probably request necessary enlargement of presently established “armed reconnaissance” areas of Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll to coincide with significant areas of Communist penetrations. Target selection would have to be controlled to avoid unnecessary danger to the Lao civilian populations. 2) Arc Light Operations in Laos. B–52 strikes on Communist forces advancing on or in the Mekong lowlands could be conducted to supplement Arc Light operations presently being conducted in the eastern Panhandle, generally opposite the DMZ, and add to the interdiction efforts of U.S. tactical air. Arc Light targets in new areas would be coordinated with Souvanna by the Embassy. 3) U.S. Air Units to Thailand. The crowded air base situation in Thailand and the possible deployment to Vietnam of available air units would limit our flexibility in this regard. Additional construction and the attendant delay would be necessary to increase B–52 basing in Thailand. However, an increase in tactical air assets could, with RTG concurrence, be accommodated at existing bases. These would add sortie assets for use in Laos. However, a decision to deploy additional tactical air assets without utilizing Nam Phong would saturate existing facilities and decrease the effectiveness of base operations. Given the situation of a major Communist drive toward the Mekong and the attendant requirements for increased U.S. air efforts in Laos, very high priority would be given to the allocation of appropriate U.S. air resources, propeller aircraft as well as jets. If the decision were made to deploy additional U.S. tactical air assets, the move should be coupled with appropriate publicity linking this action with our concern about the situation in Laos, to achieve maximum deterrent effect. 2. Ground a. Thai Ground Actions 1) Deployment Of Additional Thai Ground Units To Northeast . Only about 21 infantry maneuver battalions (18 Army and 3 Marines) and perhaps as many as six battalions of artillery, tank and/or engineers, could be deployed to the Northeast relatively quickly, and these only as a show of force. Their operational readiness is severely hampered by logistics deficiencies, especially in the area of tactical mobility, training, and low manning. Before they could begin to participate in combat operations, the U.S. would have to take extraordinary logistics actions to include airlifting equipment from CONUS stocks since in-country U.S. depot stocks have been drastically depleted. Depending on when executed, stocks may not be readily available in the U.S. Even then, Thai capability to sustain effective combat operations would be minimal. The current status of the Royal Thai Army may be summarized as follows: The on-board strength of the Thai Army is approximately 100,000 (72% of its authorized level of 139,000). MAP-supported strength totals 89,000. The remaining 11,000 are such non MAP-supported units as General and Special staffs, Military Circle Headquarters, and the King’s Guard. The MAP-supported units include 3 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, a separate regimental combat team, and miscellaneous airborne, special forces, engineer, artillery and signal units. Collectively, on paper, the RTA has about 30 infantry maneuver battalion equivalents, 10 artillery battalions, 3 tank battalions, 4 engineer battalions, 1 airborne battalion, and a special forces battalion. In terms of actual on-board strength, these units total approximately 40,000 men, well below their authorized level, of which about 11,000 are infantry personnel (the equivalent of 18 maneuver battalions, if some patching together were done). The remaining 39,000 MAP-supported personnel comprise non-combat signal, transportation, ordnance, QM, medical and headquarters elements. Some five infantry maneuver and three artillery battalion equivalents are currently deployed on counter-insurgency missions. Additionally, there are three maneuver battalion equivalents of Thai Marines garrisoned in the Sattahip area. 2) Divert Thai Force Now in Training for SVN to Northeast. A Thai brigade of some 5,500 personnel is now in training for deployment to SVN in July. The force could be deployed to the Northeast in lieu of Vietnam, if the final phases of training were completed after deployment. This assumes the force would not engage immediately in combat operations. However, this step should not be taken lightly. Once deployed to the Northeast, it is highly questionable that it would redeploy to Vietnam as long as a threat from Laos existed. In this event, the Communist threat, even though perhaps not implemented, would succeed in tying down this operationally ready and well-equipped force when its services would be better utilized in SVN. One additional factor is that this force consists of 50% volunteers whose notivations are, at least in part, based on the financial remuneration of Vietnam service. This would be denied if the force deployed to the Northeast. The morale implications are obvious. In summary, the diversion of this unit from its SVN mission should be considered only as a last resort. 3) Call-Up Thai Reserves. The RTG has a mobilization system and plans which provide for a call-up of approximately 200,000 personnel. Except for the possible favorable domestic impact this would have in the U.S. (should U.S. Reserves be called, we could at least point out that the Thai have done the same), this action should not be seriously considered. These reservists have had no active-duty training since their discharge from the Army; qualified officers and NCO’s are not available for assignment to the units called; and the problem of equipping the personnel called up appears virtually insurmountable. b. U.S. Ground Actions 1) Deployment of U.S. Ground Forces to Thailand. The deployment of perhaps a brigade or two of the U.S. Army would probably have a significant deterrent effect on an enemy decision on whether to proceed to the Mekong. Thai misgivings regarding U.S. deployments to be used in a defensive posture would first have to be overcome. A deployment of this magnitude, however, would require a call-up of U.S. reservists or a drawdown of Army units from elsewhere. With Reserve callup, two brigades could be made available by the end of July, 7 but would preclude any further deployments to South Vietnam, if required. An additional division could be made available through Reserve callup by the end of September, but major problems with equipment procurement and additional funds make even this capability doubtful. An argument against providing forces to Thailand is the commitment implication attendant to such an action. Should the deterrent effect not be accomplished, the RTG will undoubtedly expect that this force will be committed to operations, as the first increment of additional U.S. forces they would expect under Project 22. Another possibility, perhaps more remote, is that if Communist activity in Laos were coupled with significantly increased insurgent activity in Thailand, to include attacks against air bases, the RTG might ask that U.S. forces be committed to CI operations in Thailand. In either event, it might be politically difficult to get U.S. forces out should we decide not to implement Project 22. 2) Measures Related to Possible Reconstitution of U.S. Stocks in Thailand. A possible deterrent measure would be an effort by us to give the impression that we are rebuilding U.S. project stocks in Thailand to the point where they were in 1964. This would entail certain overt gestures, in the form of providing readily available material to the stocks, with appropriate unofficial “leaking” to insure the other side got the word. Some actual rebuilding of the stocks, albeit necessarily minimal, would have to be accomplished to maintain a degree of credibility vis-à-vis the other side, but no special emphasis should be placed on the action in any discussions we may have with the RTG. 3. Unconventional a. Prairie Fire (US/GVN Special Forces into Laos). This program employs about 2,000 Special Forces personnel (including 300 U.S.) organized into reconnaissance and exploitation teams which presently operate from SVN bases against enemy lines of communications in Laos within an area of operations as shown on the attached map (Tab C). Exploitation of targets west of this area could be accomplished on a case-by-case basis through coordination between CINCPAC and Embassy Vientiane, and if considered necessary, with Washington approval. Operations will be significantly more effective by using Thai staging bases when weather prevents the use of SVN bases. b. CAS Operations. A significant increase in CAS operations is extremely difficult before the end of the present dry season. Depending on time available and the location of the threat, intensification is possible which would result in increased intelligence on advancing NVN/PL forces and intensified harassment of these troops placing an additional burden on the attackers. Intensification of guerrilla operations would be greatly enhanced if additional tactical air and helicopter support were made available. VI. Possible Actions if Deterrent Fails A. Diplomatic I. Laos a. Geneva Machinery. An enemy drive to the Mekong would lend urgency (as well as greater plausibility) to Souvanna’s appeal for reconvening of the 1962 Geneva Conference. The considerations under section V would apply, except that such a conference would be pointless if convened only after the enemy had achieved all his objectives. There is no reason to believe that the Communist countries would heed a call to such a conference unless they were prepared, on terms acceptable to them, to deal with the entire Indochina problem. In view of the need for speed, Souvanna might try to settle for a “little” Geneva Conference without the Communists. Even non-Communist signatories of the 1962 agreement (France, India, Burma, Cambodia) would probably refuse to attend such a meeting, which would be only a minor propaganda operation. b. Appeal to the UN Security Council. In addition to his appeal for a Geneva Conference, which would take some time to bear fruit even under favorable circumstances, Souvanna should be encouraged to take his case directly to the UN Security Council. He is judged to be reluctant to take his case to the UN, largely because of his past experiences with an ineffectual UN mission to Laos, and also because he regards the Geneva framework as overriding, but he could probably be persuaded to appeal to the UNSC in a desperate situation, as means to arouse world public opinion. There would be difficulty in obtaining inscription, but a majority would probably be found in favor. While a Soviet veto would presumably preclude any helpful resolution, resort to the SC would have two beneficial aspects: (1) Souvanna’s credentials as a neutralist and the record of his appeals to the Geneva machinery would make his denunciations of Communist aggression fairly effective; and (2) he would imply, or perhaps state, that he was exhausting the last peaceful means available to him before calling for direct foreign assistance. This could be an important signal to the enemy. On the negative side, we must expect any SC discussion to degenerate quickly into a sterile rehearsal of old charges about Vietnam. Should Souvanna go to the Security Council before he had exhausted the scenario envisaged under V.A above, it is possible that the Soviets would claim that the matter should properly be discussed by a reconvened 1962 Geneva Conference rather than by the UN. This would be a plus if it were to mean that the Soviets would support the convening of a Geneva Conference. In effect, there would be an aspect of ju-jitsu: utilizing the momentum of Soviet opposition to SC consideration to impel them to a Geneva Conference. More likely, however, the Soviets would oppose inscription and try to confuse the debate without actually commiting themselves to a Geneva Conference. 2. Thailand . SEATO. Following consultations (see V.A.2 above) the SEATO Council could meet in special (or the regular) session as a means of further dramatizing the seriousness of the situation. The U.S. should be prepared to take the lead but would seek support from other Asian member nations as well. 3. U.S. Intensified actions pursuing the initiatives taken under V.A.3 and supporting those under VI.A.1&2. B. Military 1. Partial or Full Implementation of Project 22 . A full scale Communist thrust toward the Mekong lowlands could well trigger a Thai request for implementation of Project 22 (CINCUSTAFF Plan 1/65) or similar SEATO contingency plans. At Tab D is a listing of U.S. and Thai force commitments under Project 22. U.S. forces committed total 138,440 (of which 134,040 are Army) and Thai forces, 62,800. Of the approximately 63,000 Thai forces committed, some 10,000 are relatively operationally ready but, even with these, certain equipment deficiencies would have to be remedied by the U.S. particularly in the area of mobility. Furthermore, many of these personnel are presently committed to CI operations in Thailand. The remainder of the Thai units committed to the plan have serious manning and logistical shortfalls, especially the combat support units. Indeed, many of the units do not even exist. Even with a concerted effort by the U.S., utilizing existing equipment in theater, these problems are not susceptible of rapid solution. In short, we should not encourage the Thai to believe we are prepared to move into the Mekong lowlands. 2. Expand Prairie Fire Program in Panhandle . Prairie Fire (US/GVN Special Forces into Laos) operations could be expanded and improved by removing the existing western limitation to Prairie Fire operations; by permitting employment of teams throughout the Panhandle; by author-izing operations into Laos from Thailand bases and from forward operating sites in Laos, if available; and by authorizing Prairie Fire to supplement its operations by developing the tribal guerrilla warfare potential. VII. Conclusions A. If the enemy moves to take over the Panhandle lowlands, it is unlikely that we will be able to determine his ultimate intentions quickly. His initial moves might be probes (as in the past), or diversions, or the beginning of a much more ambitious undertaking. B. Even though an enemy operation to take over all of Laos in unlikely and also apt to be preceded by a considerable buildup, the possibility of a crumbling of almost all Lao resistance exists if the enemy makes some determined thrusts in the South and follows them up with occupation of the populous Southern lowlands. C. The following factors will make it difficult to reach a firm U.S./Thai decision on major military countermeasures such as the implementation of Project 22: 1. Shortage of readily available Thai and U.S. personnel, compounded by serious logistic problems; 2. The uncertain legal basis for action on Lao territory without the consent of the RLG, and predictable differences between the U.S. view of its commitments to Thailand and Thai expectations; 3. The difficulty of evaluating enemy intentions as evidenced by experience in November 1965 when Communist forces pushed to Thakhek on the Mekong (and were repulsed by the FAR) without triggering contingency plans. D. The factors cited above point in favor of undertaking promptly measures short of Project 22 for their deterrent effect. E. If these measures should not prevent the Communists from establishing themselves in force on the Mekong, a wholly new strategic situation would result which would raise serious questions about whether the U.S. should deploy major forces into Thailand, enter Laos in force from the East, etc. This contingency lies outside the scope of this paper and would have to be examined separately. [Here follow Tab A, “Legal Basis for U.S. Military Assistance in Defense of Laos”; Tabs B and C, maps of Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll areas of operation; Tab D, a map of the Prairie Fire area of operations; and Tab E, “U.S./Thai Force Commitments Contained in CINCUSTAFF 1/65.”] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. For the additional drafting information on this study, see Document 348 . Sent also to Steadman, Special Assistant to Clifford, and on April 2 to Taylor at the White House. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 LAOS) 2 Document 346 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature as well as an illegible handwritten signature of the officer who signed for Read. 4 For text of the SEATO (Manila Pact) Treaty and Protocol of September 8, 1954, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955, vol. II, pp. 912–916. 5 Code name of a U.S.-Thai military plan for the contingency of a Communist drive toward the Mekong lowlands, which the Thai regard as vital to their security. It was authorized by the President on June 22, 1964 (from which its name—Project 22. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 See Document 331 . 7 The contingency of a rapid enemy thrust to the Mekong applies only to the dry season, which lasts from October to May. [Footnote in the source text.] 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, March 27, 1968, 0610Z. 5412. Following sent action immediate Seventh AF; info COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, CINCPAC, CSAF, 16 Mar; sent to you for info. Request this be given absolute minimum distribution to be determined by Mr. Read, S/S, only. “Personal for Gen. Momyer from Amb. Sullivan. Reur 141246Z Mar 68. 2 1. I thoroughly concur that post mortem of loss Site 85 is in order. Suggest your people and mine work out procedures for such analysis at next weekly Udorn meeting. 2. Believe you should understand, however, that enemy force was not “relatively small.” Our intelligence indicates their numbers between five and seven battalions, with artillery and rocket support, considerably outnumbering local defense forces, which never numbered more than 1,000 men in 12 kilometer defensive perimeter which drawn around Site 85. 3. We made clear from the very beginning that this site could not be defended against a determined and superior enemy force. We gave regular and accurate estimates of its progressive deterioration, and as early as Feb. 26, advised you that it could probably not be held beyond March 10. Therefore, its fall should have come as no surprise to anyone. 4. The manner in which enemy accomplished its fall is, however, instructive, and should, I think, be carefully studied with view to future operations. Artillery fire, at relatively long range, was surprisingly accurate. According fragmentary reports of survivors, direct hits were scored, very early in the barrage, upon personnel quarters, operations structure, and bunkers. It seems possible that installations were rendered effectively inoperable even before destruction order was given. There may be some lessons in this which should be studied with respect to length of time technical personnel should be required stay at their posts after installation falls within artillery range. In hindsight, it seems to me we should have pulled all technicians out morning March 10 even if this meant losing the last several hours of the installation’s capabilities. 5. What concerns me most is not the defense action, but the disruption of pre-planned evacuation procedure. It is still not clear why technical personnel went over cliff to a narrow ledge rather than down trail to chopper pad. CAS and local personnel subsequently went up same trail to installation searching for technicians, so we know trail was traversable, even if under artillery fire. It is also not clear to me how small Vietnamese suicide squad got to installation site, although it seems they must have scaled the cliff which all of us considered impassable. 6. We can give you details of action taken by 224-man local defense forces at the site and casualties which they suffered in fighting. In their defense effort, these amounted to 8 killed, 18 missing, and 33 wounded. Their defensive tactics, of course, are based on guerrilla doctrines, and we will be pleased review with your people how we think these should be handled in future instances, and especially the role which air power can play in these tactics.” Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Exdis. 2 Not found. 352. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 352. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 1 Washington, March 28, 1968. I–35319/68 SUBJECT Prairie Fire—Phase III The Joint Chiefs of Staff have withdrawn their April 1967 proposal for recruiting, training and employing up to 3,000 Kha tribal personnel in the Prairie Fire area of Laos (Tab A). 2 The Joint Staff (SACSA) determined in December 1967 to abandon this program after it became clear through our diplomatic channels that the Royal Lao Government was insistent upon the proposed program being under the command and direction of the Lao Armed Forces, instead of being under MACV. The current JCS paper 3 is designed to apprise OSD and the Department of State officially of the close-out of the Prairie Fire Phase III proposal and to indicate that some intelligence collection features of the Phase III proposal are included in a separate JCS recommendation (JCSM–171–68). 4 The latter is now being coordinated with the Department of State. Recommend you sign the attached draft memorandum 5 to the Under Secretary of State. Paul C. Warnke 6 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(Laos 381), 1968. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Mobley. 2 See Document 282 . 3 JCSM–170–68, March 21, attached, but not printed. 4 Dated March 21. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos) For the substance of the proposal, see footnote 2, Document 353 . 5 Attached, but not printed. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Warnke signed the original. 353. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Steadman) 353. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Steadman) 1 Washington, March 30, 1968. Dear Dick: The Department of State concurs in the JCS proposal to authorize CINCPAC to establish intelligence nets in the authorized Prairie Fire area. 2 We understand that in accordance with the established Prairie Fire coordination procedures, all such recruitment missions pursuant to this authorization will as usual be cleared with Embassy Vientiane prior to launch, and we have amended the authorizing message accordingly. Ambassador Sullivan and MACSOG have agreed that this program is to be implemented as follows: a. All recruiting will be conducted by indigenous Prairie Fire personnel; recruits (later agents) will have no contact with U.S. Prairie Fire personnel. b. Training in RVN will take place in sanitized setting with minimum contact with U.S. personnel. Airlift of recruits and agents to and from RVN will be by VNAF copters. c. Intelligence net, when fully operational, will not exceed a total of sixty agent personnel. Ten principal agents are to be recruited and trained during six-month period. After training, each principal agent will in turn attempt to recruit five sub-agents or informers. State’s concurrence in the program is based on this agreement. I am returning the copy of JCSM–171–68, dated March 21, 1968 and the two appendices enclosed with your letter of March 26. 3 State concurs in the JCS message, as amended at Appendix B. 4 Sincerely yours, Philip C. Habib 5 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz. 2 In JCSM–171–68, March 21, in which the JCS stated that intelligence operations in the Prairie Fire area of the Laos Panhandle had been hampered by a lack of intelligence gathering capacity. The U.S. decision to conform as closely as possible to the Geneva Accords limited operations to reconnaissance, exploitative missions, and CIA road watch teams. The JCS proposed using the tribal groups which inhabit the area as an intelligence net. Past experience with Montagnards in South Vietnam demonstrated that these groups would respond to U.S. influence and could be developed into intelligence assets. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1968) 3 Not printed. (Ibid.) 4 The draft JCS message as approved with revisions is ibid. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 354. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 354. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, March 30, 1968. JCSM–195–68 SUBJECT US Policy for Laos (U) 1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the situation in Laos on a continuing basis. Since 1962, the US Government has based its policy for Laos upon observance of the Geneva Agreements Respecting Laos (1962) which were signed by 14 nations, including the United States and North Vietnam. The Agreements were designed to guarantee the neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity of Laos and the sovereignty of the Royal Laotian Government. 2. (TS) The Government of North Vietnam has manipulated the Agreements to suit its own interests. The North Vietnamese use the eastern Panhandle as a sanctuary and have developed a logistic and troop movement system from North to South Vietnam through that area. In addition, regular North Vietnamese Army units are being employed in offensive operations against the forces of the Royal Laotian Government. 3. (TS) Generally, the US Government has adhered to a policy of respect for the Geneva Agreements and has undertaken military actions in Laos only in response to mounting North Vietnamese violations. These military actions have been generally of low intensity and have been conducted largely with the knowledge and consent of the Royal Laotian Government. Further, these military actions have been planned and executed carefully in order to preserve the fragile political balance of power in Laos, to avoid public exposure, and to minimize the likelihood of communist takeover of the entire country. The North Vietnam/Laos Panhandle logistic and troop movement structure has been expanded to the point where major North Vietnamese Army forces threaten operations in I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones in South Vietnam. Due to the enemy Tet offensive, supported in large measure through the Panhandle, pacification in South Vietnam suffered a serious reverse. So long as North Vietnam controls eastern Laos, attainment of US objectives in Southeast Asia will be most difficult. 4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose that you take action to initiate formal interdepartmental reassessment of US policy for Laos. There is a need to identify methods whereby efforts to obtain international support to eliminate North Vietnamese exploitation of the Geneva Agreements can be broadened and intensified. Measures to be considered could include reconvening of the Geneva Signatories, direct action to strengthen or replace the International Control Commission, injection of a UN peacekeeping force, or other actions worthy of investigation. 5. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum, substantially as contained in the Appendix hereto, 2 be forwarded to the Secretary of State expressing concern over the gravity of the situation in Laos and proposing formal consideration of the problem by the Interdepartmental Regional Group/East Asia or other appropriate interdepartmental group. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(092 Laos), 1968. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 Attached, but not printed. 355. Memorandum From Robert N. Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 355. Memorandum From Robert N. Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 22, 1968. SUBJECT Sullivan, the Dove General Westmoreland, supported by Admiral Sharp, has requested authority to use Prairie Fire forces of up to battalion size if necessary into Base Area 607 in Laos 2 in conjunction with operations in the Ashau Valley. Ambassador Sullivan states that he has no authority to concur in this concept and has referred the matter to Washington for decision. The current operation (Delaware/Lamson 216) does not involve employment of U.S. or ARVN units in Laos. In emergency situations, however, U.S. forces are authorized to act in self-defense against attacks from locations in Laos. Furthermore, Prairie Fire forces of up to three platoons may be used in Laos under current authorities. Past Prairie Fire operations of up to three platoons have been satisfactorily protected from publicity and have not resulted in any major outcry. Present authorities may be adequate. However, the size and dispersion of enemy units and supplies in this area may require the commitment of Prairie Fire forces larger than three platoons, especially in view of pressures being exerted by U.S. and Vietnamese forces operating in the Ashau Valley. General Wheeler’s tentative view is that the additional authority does not entail a significant additional risk. 3 He should have available by tomorrow a JCS recommendation. 4 Decision of this issue involves a balancing of the following: —military importance of the additional authority; —risk of disclosure; and —political repercussions if the authority were used and if the operation became public knowledge. G 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia 5 E (2)b, 1/68–10/68. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 An attached map, not printed, indicates that Base Area 607 was inside the Laos border mid-way between the boundaries of Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces of South Vietnam. 3 Wheeler made this tentative judgment in an April 22 memorandum to Nitze, the text of which he sent to Westmoreland for comment. (Wheeler to Westmoreland, JCS telegram 04332, April 22; Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Apr-30 Apr, 1968) Westmoreland commented that in view of increased North Vietnamese infiltration, “the use of battalion-size Prairie Fire forces against the enemy’s base areas across the border is another means of applying pressure on the enemy.” (Westmoreland to Wheeler, telegram MAC 05389, April 23; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1968) 4 In JCSM–258–68, April 22, the Joint Chiefs recommended committing Prairie Fire units of up to a battalion size for operations in Base Area 607 in Laos in conjunction with proposed Operation Delaware. (Ibid.) 356. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 356. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 23, 1968. SUBJECT Expansion of “Prairie Fire” Operations in Connection with Operation Delaware 1. General Westmoreland is proposing, and DOD will be raising at the luncheon today, 2 an operation into Base Area 607 which is in Laos just across the border from the Ashau Valley. Although this is presented in terms of an “expansion” of Prairie Fire operations, it is really a conventional battalion-sized operation although limited in time. It is supposed to last four to six days. 2. A battalion-sized operation across an international border cannot be kept secret, even if it is Top Secret. The record is replete with cases where Top Secret operations in Laos of less intrinsic newsworthiness have been compromised within a short period of time. The press is more likely to exaggerate than to underplay the scope of the operation. 3. Ambassador Sullivan has not commented on this proposed operation because he considers that it involves a major political decision which can only be made in Washington. In the past, he has consistently expressed strong doubts that any such operation could be realistically limited in duration, extent of U.S. troop involvement, or publicity. 4. Souvanna Phouma has repeatedly made clear that he would oppose any intervention of U.S. ground forces in the war in his country. In undertaking an operation which could not (as in the case of Prairie Fire operations) be concealed from him and from the world, we would risk a strong public reaction from him. 5. The proposed operation into Laos would be widely judged to constitute escalation of the war in Vietnam. We would be accused of bad faith at a time when we are seeking to get negotiations going. We would also be accused of violating the neutrality of Laos. In the U.S., the UN and in world capitals, there would be questions and accusations for which we would lack plausible answers. Recommended Action: That you withhold concurrence in the proposed “expansion” of Prairie Fire operations in the Ashau Valley. 1 Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Herz. 2 See Document 358 . 357. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 357. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 23, 1968. SUBJECT Restrictions on Barrel Roll Operations—for Tuesday Luncheon When the President gave orders to suspend air strikes north of the 20th parallel in North Vietnam, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos was told that this limitation would not have a serious effect on the military situation in his country because additional air power, used until then in the North, would probably be used in Laos—and that, in any case, no policy change was contemplated as regards air operations in Laos. Then came Hanoi’s allegation of an attack on Lai Chau, in North Vietnam. Since it was possible that that attack might have been related to U.S. air operations in Laos, the President issued an order that operations in Northern Laos along the North Vietnamese border be more effectively controlled. As a result, operations in the entire Barrel Roll area have been temporarily suspended. Subsequently, it turned out that Lai Chau could not have been attacked by U.S. planes. Improved controls were promptly worked out to make any strikes across the Lao border even less possible. Our Embassy in Vientiane worked out such measures with Seventh Air Force and recommended on April 13 that strikes in the Barrel Roll area be authorized again. Our good faith vis-à-vis the Lao Government is involved. Strikes in the Barrel Roll area are very important to the Lao Armed Forces in view of friendly guerrilla assets there and North Vietnamese road traffic feeding into other areas. State, Defense and CIA are agreed to reinstitute strikes (carefully controlled) in the two southern segments (Bravo and Coco) of the Barrel Roll area, but to retain temporarily the suspension for the Alpha zone which is strategically less important and closer to Communist China. General Wheeler had intended to discuss this matter with the President in Honolulu, but had been unable to do so. An early decision is very desirable. Action Requested: At the luncheon today, 2 support JCS and CIA in urging the lifting of current restrictions on air strikes in the Bravo and Coco zones of the Barrel Roll area in Northern Laos. 1 Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. Drafted by Herz. 2 The issue was apparently not discussed at the April 23 luncheon meeting, see Document 358 ; but it was discussed at the April 30 meeting, see footnote 3, Document 361 . 358. Editorial Note 358. Editorial Note A luncheon meeting held at the White House on April 23, 1968, from 2:15 to 3 p.m. with President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, General Wheeler, Director Helms, George Christian, and notetaker Tom Johnson attending, discussed Vietnam. As part of these deliberations, the question of operations in base 607 in Laos was discussed. According to Tom Johnson’s notes, the discussion on the proposed operation into Laos went as follows: “The problem of entering base area 607 in Laos was discussed. “Secretary Rusk: I would send indigenous forces in with U.S. advisers. Our Ambassador (Sullivan) has great problems with this. We should limit this to ‘Ashau Valley fighting.’ “General Wheeler: Westy wants to put one battalion in for 3–5 days. We will call it the Ashau Valley operation. “Director Helms: All you have are primitive tribesmen in the area. “General Wheeler: Ambassador Sullivan is worried about three sites for Air America flights being knocked out. We have a plan to hit Route 7 up to the 20th parallel. “The President: Let’s get the Defense supplemental up, together with other items.” (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes, 4/23/68) 359. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 359. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, April 24, 1968, 0346Z. 6011. Ref: A. State 150585; B. State 150873. 2 1. Any assessment of U.S. policy with respect to Laos must start from an assessment of the commitments and obligations which the U.S. is willing to undertake towards Laos. If the U.S. were willing to underwrite the political and territorial integrity of Laos as we have done for Thailand and the Philippines, we would be faced in Laos with an overt challenge to our self-declared national interests and would presumably be required to react by overt deployment of U.S. forces. If, on the other hand, our commitment is decidedly hedged and deliberately obscure, then our reaction to events in Laos has to be less precise, less overt, and less conventional. 2. A second consideration with respect to Laos must be our understanding about the source of the trouble in Laos. It should be clear to all that the troubles are not indigenous, but stem from North Vietnam. The most direct, effective, and decisive attack on the problems of Laos should in practice be an attack against North Vietnam. If a decision were made that we should resolve our difficulties in Laos by purely military means without regard to the political consequences, then I would unreservedly recommend that we invade North Vietnam, invest its terrain, and strangle its military potential to operate in and against Laos. 3. A third basic consideration should embrace an understanding of the strategic significance of Lao territory to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. This significance is partly in relationship to Lao territory as a buffer in protection of Thailand, and partly in relationship to Lao territory as a buffer (or conversely a threat) to South Vietnam. It is hard to assess which of these relationships is the more significant to U.S. long term interests, as distinct from immediate interests of a tactical nature. However, if I were required to make a choice, I would opt for the protection of Thailand as being the more important. This is not to say that I believe we have to consider these matters as alternatives, since our policy should be directed towards preserving both elements of our interest. However, it is a way of saying that we should not sacrifice a long term strategic interest for a short term tactical objective. 4. Having stated these premises, it then becomes important to know something about the nature of the Lao state. Laos is an agglomeration of territories, families, interests, and personalities which, taken together, fulfill the geographical expression of statehood. However, the state does not articulate through a central, linear system of controls but rather through the inspiration of a series of ganglia-like control centers which have to be stimulated simultaneously and in the same direction. If the sequence of stimulation is not simultaneous, or if the directions do not coincide, the agglomeration could disintegrate into separate geographic, political and ideological entities. These would become subject to external manipulation and each would contain, in multiplicity, the same problems and divisions which currently beset the state as a whole. This would mean three, or possibly four, political creatures, each requiring a different and competitive degree of commitment and none of them providing the strategic buffer protection for neighboring territories. We went this route once before in 1959–61 with disastrous consequences. 5. By application of these several considerations and experiences, we have come to the conclusion that the form and framework which is most feasible for us to obtain (given the limitations on the commitments we are willing to make) is the sort of Lao state envisaged by the Geneva Agreements of 1962. In a larger geopolitical sense, those agreements are important because they incorporate a tacit U.S.-Soviet agreement to collaborate in the support of independent, non-Communist states on the southern flank of China as a means to contain the southward thrust of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. This same tacit collaboration exists in such forms as the Dept schedules for Indonesia, the mutual provision of arms to India, the Tashkent agreements on the sub-continent, etc. But, nowhere else is it incorporated in a formal document except in the case of Laos. 6. Therefore, the first conclusion which I would like to see established in your assessment is the fact that the 1962 Geneva Agreements, as written and signed, constitute the basic desideratum of our policy with respect to Laos and that it is [not?] in our national interests to see these agreements being “exploited” by anyone. (If any nation has been able to “exploit” them successfully, it is the United States.) It is, however, a very clear and precise question of the agreements being violated by North Vietnam. If you can agree on this fundamental, then you can go on to a successful assessment of U.S. policy re Laos. If you can not agree on this point, then I would suggest you scrap the whole project right there and kick it upstairs, because anything other than this is moonbeams. 7. The central problem facing you, therefore, should be the question of how to obtain enforcement of the 1962 agreements. It should be agreed that the primary violator of the agreements is North Vietnam, egged on by the ChiComs. It should then be understood, however, that the Poles, supported by the Russians, are also violators, because of their default in observance of the protocol governing ICC matters. It should then, finally, be understood that the Geneva Agreements do not govern the internal structure of the Lao Government, do not underwrite the status of the Pathet Lao, and do not sanctify a tripartite coalition government. Those actions were all Lao national actions as distinct from international actions. Our attention therefore should be focused on the problem of requiring (a) the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos, and (b) the active participation of the Poles in the functioning of the ICC. 8. At this stage, it should be realistically understood that it is nonsense to consider Laos in a vacuum, and that it can really be discussed only in relation to Vietnam. (At this stage, some of the more astute participants in the IRG exercise may become aware that this whole IRG “reassessment” is consequently nonsense.) Therefore, in determining what we can do to achieve 7 (a) above, we have to relate our abilities and our will to that which we are prepared to do in order to achieve success in Vietnam. If we are prepared to use that military force necessary to invade, invest, and defeat North Vietnam on its home territory, then, presto, we will have solved the problem of North Vietnamese troops in Laos. If we are not prepared to use that degree of force, then we have to consider other methods. 9. One such method often proposed is the introduction of U.S. and/or GVN ground forces into the area of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to invest that terrain and therefore drive the North Vietnamese out of Laos. This is the hard way. In fact, it is about the hardest way that could be devised. Le Duan, Secy Gen of the Lao Dong Party, has examined this prospect and written about it. He has concluded that even Americans wouldn’t be so obtuse as to try this system. It would require, he points out, that the U.S. first seize control of the Do Xa and the western highlands of South Vietnam. (We have never yet had adequate troops to do this.) It would next require a major logistics effort into the trail area. Then it would require a few divisions of troops to be sustained in that area against the threat of massive, concentrated attacks by regular North Vietnamese forces who will be able to attack from short lines of communications in terrain which they know and which favors them. The military picture Le Duan paints is that of a series of Con Thiens and Khe Sanhs along the southwest border of North Vietnam. 10. While I don’t wish to hold up Le Duan or Giap as military experts superior to some of our own deep thinkers on these matters, I would submit that their experience is enough to credit them with the description of a military threat which would require at least 206,000 additional U.S. troops to encounter. I would also note that Le Duan goes on to comment on possibility that the U.S. might eschew a major action like this and choose to attack with lesser units. He says “If a small force is used the problem remains insoluble.” He goes on to add that “The U.S. will be severely condemned by people all over the world and the anti-U.S. movement will turn out to be stronger.” If he knew the U.S. Senate better, he might have added a few gems about its reaction as well. 11. In short, we do not have the will to make the only military move which would be effective (invasion of North Vietnam). We do not have the means to make a military move which, at great cost, might prove significant. The only military means we have could achieve very little of lasting effectiveness, and would predictably do that at a political cost which would further erode the will and the support which remains for other military operations elsewhere in Vietnam. 12. These considerations really address only the immediate local military problem. As such, they are serious enough. However, they pale beside the indirect military consequences and the political results. The indirect political consequences would involve North Vietnamese (and possibly ChiCom) action to exploit in north and central Laos the fact of the immense forces which we would tie down in southern Laos, this in turn would bring into play the whole question of Laos as a buffer to Thailand and our commitments to Thailand. We would probably be called on to deploy at least one (and probably two) divisions to Thailand for the latter’s protection. Moreover, since Souvanna would quit Laos, the country (as described in para 4 above) would break up into smaller units, at least two of which would predictably ask us for other troops to protect them (say, about four more regiments, with associated air power). We could elaborate the nightmare further by citing the probable consequences in relation to the Soviets. With Souvanna gone and a Pathet Lao “Liberation Front Government” emerging in at least a portion of Lao territory, we could expect the Soviets to withdraw recognition from whatever political group replaces Souvanna in Vientiane and transfer their support (both political and material) to the Pathet Lao. This could only be considered a step backward in the Southeast Asia situation as a whole. 13. It therefore becomes quite clear that the framework in which we have to operate with respect to removing the NVN from Laos is the framework established by the President’s March 31 speech, 3 which looks towards military de-escalation and a political settlement. The occasions for the introduction of the Lao problem into this framework are myriad, and will begin with the very first contact. If, as Hanoi insists, we are to establish arrangements for the total cessation of bombing over North Vietnam, then we must insist upon some reciprocity and a system to enforce reciprocity. The establishment of ICC teams on the passes leading into the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos would assure us whether or not that trail was being used by trucks, since the passes are few and well known. If we can expand this to include all other known logistics routes into Laos, then we would assure observation and control of all the means which sustain and support the NVN in Laos (they do not live off the country). This would mean that the NVN supply system would disappear and they would have to bring their troops home. This is obviously the cleanest, the most logical (and most typically IRG) solution. If the North Vietnamese badly enough want the bombing stopped and are prepared to give up the war, this way would be ideal because it would involve [”]invisible reciprocity.” Hanoi denies there are North Vietnamese in Laos; hence an ICC presence would be no formal embarrassment to them. 14. Another way, short of bargaining for this reciprocity, would be for the ICC, by majority vote, to move out onto the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other areas of interest in Laos. This could be done if the Indian and Canadian members were willing to take the physical chances inherent in this move. I rate the chances for this as quite limited, but given Dr. Barnard’s success with heart transplant cases, perhaps we could get him to try a spinal transplant into some pliant Indian bodies, using the ramrod vertebral columns of some of the more unbending warriors in the Pentagon. 15. Still a third way is to achieve a change of heart in the UK and USSR co-chairmen, especially the latter. It is not clear that Soviets would ever be able to influence Hanoi strongly enough to change the latter’s policy. However, if Soviets were willing pay a great deal to support North Vietnam, if they would be willing protect it against ChiCom subversion, and if they were willing to muscle a pro-Soviet Government into power in Hanoi, they might be able to achieve our objective for us. Only way I can conceive of this happening would be in exchange for our giving them something very dear to their hearts—West Germany, for instance. The disproportions here are obviously ludicrous, but I am merely suggesting some parameters for IRG consideration. 16. Fundamentally, I conclude (and assume IRG will also) that the maneuvering room re Laos is quite limited. There are many of the old pressure points that we can re-invigorate, such as London, Moscow, Delhi, etc. There may be a few new ones we can devise in the old context, but I would doubt their efficacy in obtaining genuine results. 17. In my judgement, the major new opportunity for action re Laos arises from Hanoi’s new-found willingness to move to the conference table. No matter how they disguise this it is still a retreat from their previous cocksure ambition of winning the war militarily. Therefore, it seems to me that the best, positive contribution the IRG can make at this time is to examine realistically where Laos should fit into the negotiating picture, what elements of satisfaction can be derived from Laos from these negotiations, how those elements rate with respect to our objectives in SVN (pretty high, I would judge) and which other nations can be called on to help out in this process. The need for this sort of judgement is real and not academic. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 2 In these telegrams, both April 20, the Department informed the Embassy that the Department of Defense had requested “a reassessment of U.S. policy towards Laos on a formal basis through the Interdepartmental Review Group.” The Department told the Embassy that it realized that it had covered this ground before, but wished the assessment to concentrate on the political consequences of alternative policies. (Ibid.) 3 The speech in which Johnson announced his decision not to seek reelection. Text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968 , Book I, pp. 469–476. 360. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 360. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, April 24, 1968, 0942Z. 6025. Ref: State 151990. 2 1. Reftel advises that highest level has authorized Haymaker operation, in Base Area 607 and asks my views about handling with Souvanna. 2. As far as discussion in advance with Souvanna, answer is categorically negative. He would have to oppose it, possibly in public. We would then have to reconsider, or else defy his sovereignty. 3. I am relieved that policy will be to “refrain from all U.S. official comment,” but I share your doubts that this will work. Therefore, assume there will be leaks which will have to be handled in some fashion.JCS has directed that there be “No admission that forces have crossed the border.” This is a good, sound and simple directive and I hope we can stand on it. 4. In the contingency that some superior conscience feels an “admission” has to be made, I would foresee various complications: (A) Souvanna would ask for an explanation privately, and would be harassed both by press and by unfriendly diplomats for public expression of disapproval. If level of public evidence is high enough, he will have to make a protest. (B) Our explanation, if we have to give one, should be based on “swirl of battle” and vagueness of frontiers in Thai area. Fact that battlefield extends across border would have to be an unstated, but evident, presupposition. (C) Possibility might arise, in light 4 (A) above, that we might also have to make a public apology. If so, and for consistency’s sake, it also should be based on “swirl of battle” concept. (D) Fact is that Haymaker Battalion will consist of 540 Vietnamese nationals accompanied by only 50 U.S. advisers. Hence, border violation will in essence be Vietnamese, although it is questionable whether GVN would even be aware that this particular MACSOG-controlled group is involved. Nevertheless, if all gory details eke out, it might also become incumbent upon GVN (as in 4 (C) above) to associate itself with any apology. This is one bridge I feel we should cross only when and if we come to it. Otherwise chances of leakage are multiplied. In any event, Tran Van Do would probably feel no qualms about making an apology to his old friend and classmate Souvanna. 5. In general, it is obvious that best hope is to conduct operation without press detection. In case of detection, steadfast “no comment” and “no admission” are best line of defense. If this line is to be breached, request full interchange among Washington, Saigon and Vientiane before any other press line is taken. I do not believe it would be useful to attempt develop a contingency line in advance. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. 2 In this telegram, April 24, the Department informed the Embassy of the President’s approval of employment of Prairie Fire forces up to battalion size and estimated that the operation on Lao soil would last from 4 to 6 days. The Department then asked the Embassy for specific recommendations, which are described and answered in this cable. (Ibid.) 361. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 361. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 29, 1968. SUBJECT Modifications of Restrictions on US Air Operations in Barrel Roll Area of Laos Ambassador Sullivan has acknowledged the revised restrictions that were placed on US air operations in the Barrel Roll area of northeast Laos (see attached map) 2 on April 23. However, in his discussion with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, also on April 23, Souvanna indicated his strong desire for continuing US air strikes on the major access routes into north Laos from North Vietnam, in particular routes 7, 6, 65, and 19, as well as nearby storage points. Current intelligence indicates that there is a considerable NVN build-up, including daylight truck movement, along these lines of communication inside Laos which now enjoy immunity from US air attack. In Area Bravo, 215 of 228 carefully selected targets validated by Lao authorities for US air strikes in Area Bravo now lie outside the authorized zone, i.e., east of 104 degrees. In particular, the huge enemy cave and storage complex near Sam Neua which was specifically authorized by Souvanna in March cannot now be struck. Also east of 104 degrees in the Bravo area are several important CAS-supported RLG guerrilla outposts which normally count on US air strikes to assist in their defense. In Area Alpha, Route 19 from Dien Bien Phu into north Laos is now spared from interdiction and several more RLG guerrilla bases in that region are consequently menaced by the movement of enemy troops and supplies over this road. Ambassador Sullivan has suggested that either of two further modifications would enable us to respond positively to Souvanna’s request and to meet both US and Lao needs in Alpha and Bravo areas: a. Authorize strikes under strict controls in all portions of the Barrel Roll area except a 10 nautical mile strip on the Lao side of the NVN border, or b. Authorize strikes in Bravo area west of 104 degrees 15’ (instead of 104 degrees) east longitude (to include the Sam Neua storage complex), and in Alpha area along route 19 up to 10 nautical miles of the NVN border. We believe Ambassador Sullivan’s request takes into account the need for controls to prevent inadvertent strikes into North Vietnam, and we support either of the proposed modifications of the current restrictions. In addition to the geographic limits, several other controls are in effect to prevent the possibility of strikes into North Vietnam. Recommendation: That you arrange to have this matter re-opened with the President next week at the Tuesday lunch and seek the President’s approval for loosening of present restrictions in accordance with Ambassador Sullivan’s request. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by Slutz and cleared in draft by Herz and Habib. An April 29 covering note from Bundy to Rusk informed the Secretary that Bundy told the JCS and DOD (at staff levels) of this proposal and they were sympathetic. Wheeler insisted that the President must make the decision and that the initiative must come from Rusk. A note on the covering note indicated that Rusk agreed to include it on the April 30 luncheon agenda. 2 Two attached maps are not printed. 3 At the luncheon meeting on April 30, attended by the President, Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Helms, Rostow, and Christian, with Tom Johnson taking notes, the issue was discussed. Rusk stated, “The boys in Laos want us to extend bombing east.” The President asked, “Is Sullivan worried?” Rusk replied, “He is for it.” Clifford added that, “Sullivan favors alternative A. We prefer alternative B to hit area in Laos.” Helms then noted, “A is ten miles from 20th [parallel]. B is 15 miles from 20th.” The President stated, “Let’s take out B now. See how it looks.” (Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes, 4/30/68) 362. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) 362. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) 1 Vientiane, April 29, 1968. Dear Martin: Thank you for your letter of March 23 2 in which you asked for our comments and assessment of the contingency study which accompanied your letter. I have had the appropriate members of the staff go over the study and our collective views follow. We all agree that the study is very well-organized, covers the essential points and is a reasonable and realistic assessment of the situation. This is all the more remarkable considering the pressure upon you and the haste with which it must have been put together. We all share your dismay over the dismal state of the US military capability to react to a “Drang nach Western.” Nor are the prospects for enhanced capability encouraging. This plight of the military places even greater premium upon the political restraints currently operating to keep the Lao situation on reasonably even keel and should, therefore, make us all even more sensitive than heretofore to the serious damage that removing these political restraints would eventually entail. Concomitantly, overt U.S. military operations in Laos would carry with them an undeniable US commitment to Laos—we would commit our prestige to the protection of all of Laos once having openly sent troops into the country. The advantage of our military posture in Laos today is that, were it to be unfortunately necessary, we could fold our tents and fade quietly away, for we have made no overt military commitment. These are the major points that I wish to make with respect to the study and ones that I trust will be constantly borne in mind by our top policy-makers when they are repeatedly badgered to acquiesce in seemingly simple US military operations in Laos. Our remaining comments are keyed to the order of your study. With regard to your first assumption, we question whether the small forces maneuvering in open country would be highly vulnerable to air power. We think that these forces would undoubtedly move at night for the most part and we doubt that we could do them much damage, even with several squadrons of Sopwith-Camels all piloted by Red Barons. You are right when you say that the US has no defense commitments to Laos. The Lao, however, regard the Geneva Accords as a vehicle for their protection, and in the event of a violation or threat of extinction, Laos would look to the signatory nations to honor their commitment to maintain Lao sovereignty, etc. Souvanna has made this point to us many times. As you recall, when Souvanna was asked not too long ago (when the NVN/PL seemed to be really pushing) whether in appealing to signatory nations he was not in fact asking for troops, he replied that the manner in which the signatory nations fulfilled their obligations was their affair. Our reasoning is that if the enemy were to violate the Geneva Accords in a manner to threaten Laos’ survival, Souvanna would press hard within the Accords for meaningful Article 4 action. He would look to us primarily—and in light of our stated policy and interests, we would have to conjure up some sort of reply. Given the prevailing military situation, it seems that we would have to rely essentially upon political/psychological measures. If we failed and Laos were about to go under, we think that then and only then would Souvanna resign—as admission that the Geneva Accords upon which he had staked his basic policy were ineffective. But we do think that he would remain in place and play out the Accords to the end. This view differs in emphasis from that expressed in the last two full paragraphs on page 3 of the study regarding probable Souvanna actions. (We would expect Laos also to engage in a series of bilateral efforts to extricate itself—USSR, Thailand—in addition to the multi-national approach, but with little if any positive result.) You have my 5692 regarding covert and overt use of Thai air assets. 3 With respect to US military actions which might have some psychological value in the event Hanoi goes hog-wild, we like to keep the possibility of an invasion of North Vietnam dangling before military eyes—either as a real threat, or as a bargaining counter which brings them to the table. Finally, I think that we all ought to recognize flatly that project 22 exists on paper only. Your study mentioned that many of the Thai units destined for this project do not even exist. We might just as well confess that the US forces of 138,440 “committed” to the project do not exist either—therefore, no Project 22. Moreover, since it has recently been compromised, I think it ought to be forgotten. Of course, all these considerations may be altered in the next few weeks if we really get down to serious negotiations. At that stage, I think, as I have suggested to the IRG, that your efforts are better expended on relating Laos to the negotiating picture and seeing what advantages can be drawn from the strengths of the position we do have here, rather than reinforcing our weaknesses. That should be a truly educational exercise for the Pentagon and, perhaps, the White House. We hang on bated breath to hear whether it’s true about you replacing Arch Calhoun in Saigon. I sincerely hope not. It would seem most upsetting to do that to you—and to us—at this moment. All the best. Sincerely, Bill 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. 2 Document 348 . 3 Dated April 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 363. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency 363. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, May 1968. ER IM 68–46 ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE AND ADJACENT AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, 1967–68 Summary The North Vietnamese are engaged in an intensive program to construct new supply routes, with limited all-weather capability, into South Vietnam from Laotian trunk routes to support military operations (see the map, Figure 1). Work started on a number of new roads during the last quarter of 1967, prior to the Tet offensive, and is still in progress. All of these new roads branch off a north-south trunk route in the Laotian Panhandle and run directly across the border toward important US-South Vietnamese military installations in South Vietnam. The newly completed routes provide the Communists with an increased capability to introduce troops, heavy weapons, and sizable amounts of materials by truck into four widely separated areas in the northern part of South Vietnam. North Vietnamese strategy provides for connecting their road network in North Vietnam and Laos with the existing road system in South Vietnam. To achieve this goal, the North Vietnamese have simultaneously built or upgraded five new crossings of the South Vietnamese border (a total of 215 miles of road) during the past six months. Two of the new roads parallel Route 9 in Laos and lead toward the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Further south, a road in Laos has been connected with a road in the A Shau Valley in South Vietnam leading to Hue. The North Vietnamese have joined a fourth road with an important north-south route in South Vietnam. From the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese have also extended a new road to the vicinity of the major US base at Dak To. New feeder roads branch off this route and lead southeast towards the provincial capitals of Kontum and Pleiku. The new and expanded roadnet is an attempt to establish a more reliable year-round logistics system. All the new roads crossing into South Vietnam, except the two roads paralleling Route 9 in Laos, are limited all-weather; all connect with logistical base areas along the main trunk route. Sections of the main north-south route in Laos, and especially the segment north of Chavane, at times become impassable during the rainy season, but the enemy may be able to maintain most of this primary logistical route for a longer period this year than in previous ones. In addition, a new road which appears to have limited all-weather capability is under construction from North Vietnam around the western end of the DMZ. [Here follows the 13-page memorandum.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note at the bottom of page 1 reads:” This memorandum was prepared solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Director’s Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs and the Office of Current Intelligence.” 364. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) 364. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz) 1 Vientiane, May 6, 1968. Dear Martin: I was just about to answer your letter of April 24 2 when I received Westmoreland’s message to Wheeler advising him that he had decided to cancel the Haymaker aspect of Operation Delaware. Although the reasons attributed to this move reflect the possibility to leakage to the press, I would guess that another aspect is the fact that there currently appears to be very little enemy presence in the area where the operation was intended. I don’t think, from this development, that we have seen the last of Haymakers, because I suspect that an effort will be made to launch a similar operation into some other more promising base area. Now that the principle has been established I am sure that MACV will not fail to exploit this possibility. 3 As you point out in your letter, I did not submit any specific comments on the MACV proposal for Operation Delaware. My decision to take this course was based on a number of considerations. First, the Haymaker conception, which is a considerable retreat from Southpaw and York, brought into action forces which have already demonstrated their ability to operate in Laos without press leakage. Secondly, the move was contrived in such a way that it could be described entirely in terms of action to be taken for the protection of United States forces on the A Shau battlefield. Thirdly, it was within the framework (Prairie Fire) which Oley Sharp, Westie and I had agreed in our last SEACOORD meeting might be the only tolerable arrangement to which I could give concurrence. 4 Therefore, I placed my entire considerations on the question of the relationship of this proposed action to the President’s de-escalation policy. The Air Force has been so nervous about air operations in the north of Laos which might impinge on that policy that I was frankly somewhat surprised when approval for Haymaker was given quite so rapidly. However, I suppose it reflects the President’s annoyance that North Vietnamese infiltration efforts have apparently stepped up rather than relaxed since the March 31 speech. There have been some communications back and forth between Westmoreland and myself on this whole subject which have not been repeated to Washington. I think that it is probably best that they remain in this category for the sake of mutual good faith and continued collaboration. On the whole, however, I think you on the desk and we in the field have remained very much on the same wave length and I appreciate all that you have done to hold the line. As we move into the successively more complex period of negotiating while fighting, I think this sort of entente becomes even more important. Especially, I believe it is going to become important for us all to have our facts and our intelligence straight before making decisions. I have recently sent in a cable expressing some skepticism about the infiltration figures projected from North into South Viet Nam during the rainy season. 5 This will doubtless cause some consternation in DIA and elsewhere, but I feel it would be very useful for you to bring it to the attention of Bundy, Katzenbach, and the Secretary 6 as the sort of thing we must be absolutely sure about when we make political and military decisions in the near future. We must remember that the North Vietnamese are perfectly capable of running deception operations and that our military intelligence system is so attuned that it vibrates violently in response to such deceptions. For the moment then all is well that ends well on Haymaker. But for the future, I think a little more careful questioning of intelligence premises and the alleged facts needs to be done by our State Department sources whenever they are called upon to make decisions of this dimension. All the best, Sincerely, Bill 1 Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret; Official-Informal. 2 Not found. 3 Herz wrote the following marginal note at this point: “Yes, but the principle that you can’t keep it secret, which was a condition for approval, has been established.” 4 Herz at this point wrote, “this is new.” 5 At this point Herz asked, “GMG [Godley] wasn’t it No Distribution Outside Dept?” 6 At this point Herz wrote the following: “Note: Message was almost two weeks old by time this arrived; was superceded by a much better (exdis/no distribution outside Dept.) message on the same subject; as GMG said INR is sure we’re not being spoofed; so did not distribute further.” 365. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 365. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 7, 1968, 0435Z. 6316. Ref: A. Vientiane 5929; B. Vientiane 6045. 2 1. Souvanna told me Saturday 3 evening that he had finally signed the degree reorganizing the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. He said that, after a month of haggling, the generals seemed satisfied with the new plan. 2. As predicted Ref B, the plan falls far short of Souvanna’s original intentions, but it is at least a step in the right direction. It preserves the “one man, one job” principle by abolishing both deputy C-in-C spots formerly held by Kouprasith and Bounpone, making them respectively commanders of fifth and third military regions. It also abolishes the north and south tactical headquarters, as well as the Groupes Mobiles. 3. The Ministry of Defense, instead of being placed under direction of a weak general such as Bounleut, will remain (at least for now) in the hands of the colonels. Thongphanh will be asked to act in lieu of a director general and Souvanna has asked him to move six or eight “good colonels” out of the General Staff to head the new functional divisions being removed from the General Staff and transferred into MOD. 4. Souvanna said his next problem was to remove several generals who were useless and get them retired by one means or another. There might also be some colonels in this category. He had asked Quan to draw up an “execution list” of those who should disappear. After he got rid of these, he proposed to promote some of the “good colonels” to generals. 5. I told Souvanna that I thought his next serious problem was the Air Force, particularly the transport aircraft which were being used for smuggling and private commerce. He agreed and said that he had caught Bounpone red-handed in the latest smuggling effort to Saigon. I said Sourith seemed honest but not strong enough to control the senior generals. Souvanna again agreed and said he was thinking of putting the Air Force directly under the Ministry rather than the General Staff. I said I thought that would be pretty difficult for tactical air, since the I–28s had to be handled by the officers in charge of operations. However, I saw no reason why transport aircraft couldn’t be brought under direct control of the new logistics section of the MOD. He said he would look into that approach. 6. We have other information being reported separately which indicates that long-standing problem of integrated ranks for neutralist officers has also been agreed and forwarded to the King. If King accepts this proposal, this will resolve another nettlesome issue. 7. Comment : Although progress is slow and tedious, it is generally in the right direction. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 LAOS. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 In these telegrams, April 19 and 25, the Embassy reported on Souvanna’s meeting with Lao generals at Luang Prabang to discuss military reorganization and on a later discussion between Sullivan and Souvanna on the same subject. (Ibid.) 3 May 4. 366. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 366. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 1 Washington, May 8, 1968. Dear Paul: In answer to your letter of April 13, 2 we will be pleased to undertake a reassessment of U.S. policy for Laos by the Interdepartmental Regional Group/East Asia. I would suggest one change in the purpose of the exercise as stated in your letter: the Geneva Agreements have not been “exploited” but rather consistently violated by the North Vietnamese in the most blatant manner. I presume that North Vietnamese “violation” rather than “exploitation” was meant, and we are proceeding to set up the policy review on that basis. It is now over a month since the Contingency Study Laos/Thailand 3 was approved, and I enclose a Status Report on developments during the intervening period which may be of interest. I also enclose a paper entitled “What the Enemy Has Not Done in Laos” which may also be of some help to the participants in the policy review. Copies of these two papers will be separately disseminated to all members of the Interdepartmental Regional Group/East Asia. Sincerely yours, Nick Enclosure 1 4 CONTINGENCY STUDY LAOS/THAILAND Status Report as of May 1, 1968 I. Military Situation In Laos In the approximately six weeks since our Contingency Study was approved, there has been no major enemy attack in Laos. The NVA has continued to apply pressure not only in South Laos around the provincial capitals of Saravane and Attopeu, but also around Thakhek on the Mekong in Central Laos and against guerrilla posts in north Laos. It has taken only a few minor friendly positions, for example Lahanam in southern Savannakhet province on April 13, and such successes were not the result of major military operations. The NVA still retains the capability to overrun much of Laos, but the approaching rainy season will soon limit the magnitude and speed of a possible new NVA offensive. II. Possible Augmentation of Air Assets for Utilization in Laos Consultations were begun with our Embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok about the possible utilization of Thai T–28’s (either “sheep-dipped” or overt) and additional deployment of US air assets to Thailand. Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane believes that the political disadvantages would greatly outweigh the marginal military advantages of overt use of the Thai air force in Laos. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] he considers it preferable to augment the number of “Class B” pilots (Thai pilots flying RLAF aircraft under control of our Air Attache in Vientiane). A much more significant increase of tactical deterrent air strength will result from the contemplated expansion of US air resources in Thailand, particularly in propeller planes which seem best adapted to operations in Laos. Ambassador Unger in Bangkok believes that there would be no Thai political objections to the increase of US aircraft in Thailand if the purpose is to shore up the defense of Laos. This finding should help in speeding up deployment of additional tactical prop-aircraft to Thailand, though they could not be there in time to help counter an enemy offensive in Laos should one occur before the advent of the rains later this month. III. Lao Call for Article 4 Consultations On December 30 and February 29 Souvanna Phouma wrote to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference denouncing the North Vietnamese attacks in Laos and calling for consultations among the signatories under Article 4 of the 1962 Geneva Agreement. In March the UK suggested to the USSR that the Co-Chairmen circulate both letters along with a joint message for which they submitted a draft. Since the USSR has not replied, the UK at our urging has now finally decided to circulate both of Souvanna’s letters unilaterally on May 6. IV. ICC Activity 1. The February 21 ICC “visit” to Saravane (which may have played some role in restraining the NVA in South Laos) was followed by a visit of the Indian Chairman and the Canadian Commissioner on April 12–13 to Attopeu, Saravane and Lao Ngam. The Polish Commissioner again declined to join his colleagues. Although a mortar attack on Attopeu occurred while the ICC visit was taking place there, it is possible that the increased ICC activity may have some deterrent effect on Hanoi. At any rate, it helps to buck up Lao morale. We can claim no credit for the more positive Indian attitude in the ICC, which seems due largely to the personality of the new Indian Commissioner and some tactical gaffes by the Pole, who has now completed his tour of duty and been replaced. 2. To encourage the Indians in their forward posture, we have suggested to several governments that New Delhi be encouraged to maintain its present relatively active attitude. The UK and Japan have taken action. France is willing to help, though in a lower key. We do not wish demarches in New Delhi to be too obviously orchestrated, so are still holding in reserve the encouragement of similar diplomatic actions by Germany and Thailand, both of whom are judged to be willing. Australia will weigh in with Prime Minister Gandhi when she visits Canberra in May. We have no illusions that even the cumulative effect of such efforts will have any decisive influence on the Indians, but it may make backsliding more awkward for them. V. Laos and US/DRV Negotiations Souvanna and the King are anxious that US military support for Laos will continue even while we de-escalate in North Vietnam and that Laos should benefit promptly from any lessening of hostilities in South Vietnam. To that end, they are seeking both private and public assurances from us that our negotiations with Hanoi will include a strong requirement that the Geneva Agreements of 1962 should be respected by North Vietnam. Enclosure 2 5 WHAT THE ENEMY HAS NOT DONE IN LAOS The Contingency Study of March 23 implies certain advantages of continued U.S. adherence to the Geneva Agreements of 1962. These may become more apparent by sketching out some of the actions the enemy continues to be capable of taking in Laos but which he has not yet taken, partly because we have not overtly upset the framework of the Geneva settlement. 1. Setting up a rival (“neutralist”) government in Laos. 2. Obtaining Soviet and Chinese recognition for such a government. 3. Raising the specter of Chinese intervention. 4. Pushing to the Mekong on a broad, or even limited, front, thus diverting U.S. and Thai troops. 5. Pushing to Luang Prabang, thus delivering a major psychological blow to the Lao Government forces. 6. Conducting terrorist raids against vulnerable Lao targets. 7. Denouncing US/SVN intervention in the Prairie Fire zone on the basis of hard evidence. 8. Exploiting sensitive U.S. operations in Laos, using materials and equipment captured at Site 85 and in the Muscle Shoals area, and aircraft downed in Laos. 9. Increasing harassment of U.S. economic as well as military activities in Laos. 10. Conducting terrorist raids against U.S. bases in Thailand, such as Nakhon Phanom. If the U.S. were to abandon its formal adherence to and observation of the limitations of the Geneva Agreements of 1962, any inhibitions on the communist side would disappear and the Geneva settlement would collapse entirely; the Royal Lao Government would quickly lose much of the international (including communist and neutral) support which it now enjoys by virtue of its adherence to the Geneva agreements, and leave us as virtually the sole supporter of a no-longer neutral Laos—a costly and diplomatically poor position to be in. We would then have to deal with a government whose area of control was rapidly shrinking and which would have lost the ability to appeal to the Geneva Agreements which had created the basis for its very existence. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Bundy sent a draft of this letter to Katzenbach under cover of a memorandum of May 3, drafted by Herz on April 23, recommending that Katzenbach sign the letter and give it to Nitze on the evening of May 8. A note on another copy indicates that Nitze saw it. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73A 1304, Laos 381, 1968) 2 In an April 13 letter to Katzenbach, Nitze stated that he knew Katzenbach shared his concern over the deteriorating situation in Laos. Nitze reported that he supported a JCS recommendation for a broader effort (than the contingency study) to reassess U.S. policy for Laos in the Interdepartmental Regional Group/East Asia. According to Nitze, “the primary purpose of the reassessment would be to identify means by which international support might be obtained for the elimination of North Vietnamese exploitation of the Geneva Agreements and to consider alternatives that might offer better prospects of promoting U.S. interests.” (Department of State, Pol 27 (LAOS) 3 See the attachment to Document 350 . 4 Secret. 5 Top Secret. 367. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 367. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, May 16, 1968, 0430Z. 6562. Ref: Vientiane 6554. 2 1. When Souvanna urged yesterday that we intensify our bombing throughout Laos, he volunteered that he knew there were many villages in the area between Paksane and Xieng Khouang, but that it was more important to get on with the job of rooting out the enemy. If some friendly villages were damaged in the process, he went on, “Tant pis! You can’t make an omelet without breaking some eggs!” 2. While Souvanna in the past has been cold-blooded about civilians in North Vietnam (“bomb the dikes”), I have not before heard him reflect quite such a diet of raw meat regarding his own population. He is undoubtedly feeling pressure from the King who reportedly had adopted a “bomb them wherever they are” attitude toward the enemy, as a means of forcing them out of Laos. Both the King and Souvanna manifest the amateur’s overconfidence in the effectiveness of air power. 3. Despite Souvanna’s statement, I intend to continue the meticulous care and cautious judgment exercised by Ambassador Sullivan in approving targets within Laos. We shall continue to avoid villages. Nonetheless, I wish to record Souvanna’s current position which may prove helpful in the event of a navigational error or a really border-line decision on an important target. Hurwitch 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Nodis; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok. 2 In telegram 6554, May 15, Charge Hurwitch reported that Souvanna had urged that U.S. tactical air operations be stepped up, especially in the area from Paksane north to Xieng Khouang. (Ibid.) 368. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Director of the Joint Staff (Spivy) 368. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Director of the Joint Staff (Spivy) 1 Honolulu, May 24, 1968, 0229Z. DTG 240229Z. A. JCS 04864/062200Z May 68 (Notal). 2 B. CINCPAC 120141Z May 68. 3 1. Ref A requested additional views concerning operations in Laos. Ref B provided the CJCS with an analysis of the effects of a bombing cessation and informed him of how the air campaign would be organized and managed to enhance our overall operations, including aerial reconnaissance. 2. Our current overt and covert military programs in Laos have been reviewed. Any radical change of ground operations in Laos at this time would be counter-productive. Deployment of U.S. ground forces of any significant size into Laos would be particularly undesirable. NVN still has the capability to overrun all of Laos in a matter of days if they choose and a sizeable deployment of US/FWF in Southern Laos might well spark such a reaction. Deployment of even a corps-size force in southern Laos on a permanent basis would not prevent a complete takeover of northern Laos by the NVN. 3. The cessation of all bombing and NGF in NVN would permit a sharply accelerated and unimpeded flow of men and supplies into Laos and SVN, resulting from the release of forces previously occupied in LOC and facility repair and in air and coastal defense. Since we would be deprived of the advantage of striking enemy resources at or near the source, it follows that to compensate for this loss we must increase our operations around the entire perimeter of SVN. Although your message addresses only operations in Laos to reduce the flow of men and materiel through that country, we need also to emphasize the restriction of enemy movement through the DMZ, along the SVN coast and through Cambodia. 4. The following is a resume of improvements and changes in Laos which would be desirable in event of cessation of all bombing of NVN: A. Cessation of bombing in all of NVN will release presently available assets for intensifying the air war in Laos and SVN. A comprehensive and coordinated air effort using the additional resources should further inhibit the use of LOCs and staging areas in Laos. However it must be recognized that during the summer monsoon period visual bombing is largely ineffective in Laos. The following changes to operating rules in Laos are required to optimize the application of these air assets: (1) Authority to attack targets of opportunity when located within 200 yards of a motorable road or trail should be expanded to 1,000 yards to provide strike flexibility in Zones II and III of Steel Tiger. (2) FAC’s are required for strikes outside of the 200 yard limit in Zone II, and within all areas of Zones III and IV and Barrel Roll areas A, B and C. (Strikes may be made in Zone III if under MSQ 77 control.) These restrictions should be modified. If not, additional FAC aircraft and personnel will be required to provide control for increased strikes in Laos. B. Improvements in the air supported Muscle Shoals anti-infiltration system can be realized by expanding the area for employing hand emplaced sensors. Presently spike teams are restricted to operations in the Prairie Fire area. Additionally, a reasonable increase of exploitation forces up to battalion size on a case basis should be authorized. This will give the teams greater staying power in the face of enemy opposition and increase the effectiveness of the combined indigenous/special force teams. C. Leaflet drops in Laos should be increased and refined to obtain optimum exploitation of PLA as well as infiltrating NVA. D. Employment of MSQ-77 radar bombing should be expanded to ensure all-weather operation. This can be done by locating an MSQ facility at Site 98 or other suitable location, to provide coverage over a wider area. E. Comint and ARDF coverage of Laos and NVN should be increased to permit early warning of enemy intentions. F. An additional program for consideration would be to expand guerrilla operations in Laos. MACV SOG has identified the Bru Tribe in the Annamite mountains as having a guerrilla potential. 5. The program for advisory and logistical support for RLG military units should continue generally in its present scope and an accelerated expansion of the program is not warranted. It will take years of training before FAR/FAN forces achieve operational competence. A rapidly expanded program would cause unfavorable political implications, tend to extend U.S. commitments and project a climate of escalation. 6. It is important that we continue the reconnaissance of NVN to provide maximum intelligence on movement of men and supplies. Reconnaissance over Laos should be increased to the level necessary to ensure adequate support of stepped up interdiction strikes in that area. 7. Increased authorization is required for intelligence collection in the Laos and Cambodian areas. This is particularly pertinent in Laos where U.S. military is severely restricted by the Geneva Accords. Present restrictions necessitate our operating through third country nationals over whom only limited control or influence can be imposed. Warm regards. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 May–31 May 1968. Top Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland, General Beach (CINC–USARPAC), General Ryan (CINPACAF), and Admiral Hyland (CINCPACFLT). Lieutenant General Berton E. Spivy, Jr., was Director of the Joint Staff April 1, 1967–July 31, 1968. 2 Not found, but summarized below. 3 In this telegram, May 12, Sharp stated that if a bombing halt against North Vietnam was directed, “a major effort will have to be concentrated against Laos LOCs and the DMZ area.” (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 May–31 May 1968) 369. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 369. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Vientiane, May 30, 1968, 0847Z. 6924. For Admiral Sharp from Charge Hurwitch. Subj: Tactical Air Requirements for Laos. Ref: A. JCS 9149 DTG 152301Z May; B. State 172328 May 28; C. Vientiane 6896 May 29. 2 1. It has occurred to me in reviewing history of messages concerning our tactical air problems in Laos that you may not have full background of situation which led to our pleas for augmentation of tactical resources to support our counter-insurgency operations. 2. Hard facts are that in past year we have been getting our air on targets less than 50 percent of the time we ask. TACAIR response to road- watch team reports has, on average, run about 45 percent. If 10 to 20 percent of these failures can be ascribed to weather, this means that 35 to 45 percent of the time there were just no aircraft. Situation has improved somewhat since reduction in air operations in North Vietnam freed jets to conduct more strike sorties in Laos. I know that our respective staffs could juggle the statistics endlessly, but my conviction is that we are still not getting all we need on daily basis. 3. Seventh AF has usually responded well to our crisis requirements, such as present buildup at Site 36. However, we believe that many of these last-ditch, crisis situations might have been averted if we had sufficient strike resources on daily basis to hit enemy troops, staging areas, and supply bases before our positions are placed in jeopardy. 4. To cover adequately existing targets and to respond quickly to new, we estimate that in north Laos we require as daily minimum nine A–26 and twenty-six A–1 sorties (with flare ship support). In south Laos we need thirty A–1 sorties per day, four of which would be for infils/exfils, the balance for tactical targets. (We boosted our earlier estimate of requirements in south Laos based on developing tactical situation over past six months, identified hard targets, and estimate of required daily sortie rate.) Our minimum copter requirement is estimated to be 700 hours per month (200 hours in north Laos, 500 hours in south). 5. We believe that in addition to the tactical requirements above, we will probably continue to need, from time to time, concentrated strike efforts to meet fast-breaking tactical situations, such as occurred at Phou Pha Thi (Site 85) and Site 36. We would expect, however, that fewer such “surge” operations would be required if we receive our minimum daily sortie requirements. 6. You already have general outline of our TACAIR needs but I wanted to be sure that you knew more of the background of our requirements in order to formulate “revalidation” recommendation requested by JCS. Question of adequacy of US air support looms large in future of our counter-insurgency operations in Laos. Warm regards. Hurwitch 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text. 2 In these telegrams, May 15, 28, and 29, respectively, the question of tactical air support for north and south Laos was discussed. (Ibid.) 370. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 370. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, June 1968. ER IM 68–74 ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND WET WEATHER LOGISTICS IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE Summary The North Vietnamese have made substantial improvements to the wet-season capacity of the road network in Laos used for truck transport of supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in 1967–68. The estimated wet-season capacity for continuous truck movement as far south as the A Shau Valley has been increased from 50 to 100 short tons a day. An additional 50 tons of capacity is available for movements along routes leading into Quang Tin and Kontum Provinces. The increased wet-season capacity of this road network, if fully used, could sustain traffic volumes amounting to 85 percent of the daily average—175 tons—moved during the 1967–68 dry season (September 1967–April 1968). The current requirement of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam for logistic support from the north via Laos is only slightly more than 30 tons a day. The improved capacity of the road network strengthens North Vietnam’s capability to provide sustained logistic support to Communist forces in the South. It will also reduce the dependence of these troops on storage areas and porterage for logistic resupply. [Here follows the 11-page body of the memorandum.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the source text indicates that this memorandum was produced solely by the CIA’s Office of Economic Research in coordination with the Director’s Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs. 371. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 371. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, June 17, 1968. JCSM–374–68 SUBJECT Air Support in Laos (S) 1. (U) Reference is made to: a. American Embassy Vientiane message to State 4585/200755Z February 1968, JCS IN 23300. 2 b. CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 212025Z March 1968, JCS IN 86582. 3 c. CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 070103Z April 1968, JCS IN 29163.3 d. American Embassy Vientiane message to CINCPAC 6924/300847Z May 1968, JCS IN 45045. 4 e. CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 010011Z June 1968, JCS IN 47661.3 2. (S) The American Embassy, Vientiane, has stated continuing requirements for tactical air support of Royal Laotian Government (RLG) counterinsurgency operations (references 1a and 1d) beyond that which CINCPAC can provide with current and programmed forces (references 1b and 1e). 3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider effective RLG counterinsurgency operations to be essential to the accomplishment of US objectives in Southeast Asia. They are concerned about the threat posed by Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Army forces which, by the close of the 1968 dry season offensive, had taken Nam Bac, Tha Thom, and Muong Phalane; threatened Saravane, Attopeu, and Luang Prabang; and largely controlled Military Region III. The Joint Chiefs of Staff share CINCPAC’s view that additional supporting tactical air would have a positive influence on the actions of the RLG Armed Forces (reference 1c). 4. (TS) It is recognized that, if the bombing of North Vietnam is stopped completely, additional forces may become available, in which case some could be used to satisfy the RLG requirement. In view of the current status of the Paris talks and the situation is South Vietnam, it appears unlikely that the requirement for bombing in North Vietnam will be reduced. On the other hand, there is a distinct possibility that a resumption and expansion of the air and naval campaigns in North Vietnam may be required. 5. (TS) The US Air Force can provide the additional resources which CINCPAC has stated will be needed to meet American Embassy Vientiane requirements (references 1b and 1e), within the time phasing indicated below, by: a. Temporary addition of two A–1 squadrons to the force structure of the US Air Force. First A–1 squadron (18 UE) by September 1968, increase to 25 UE by February 1969. Second A–1 squadron (18 UE) by November 1968, increase to 25 UE by February 1969. b. Increasing the UE of the 609th Air Commando Squadron from 12 to 16 A–26s. c. Increasing the C–123 UE of the 606th Air Commando Squadron from 6 to 10. d. Deleting all T–28s (12 UE) from the 606th Air Commando Squadron. 6. (S) These forces would be deployed to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. Additional aircraft parking area and facilities will be required at Nakhon Phanom for increased aircrew and support personnel and support equipment. Construction costs utilizing troop construction are estimated at $2.866 million. The present in-country troop construction capability is insufficient to accomplish this construction without deferring other work. Civilian contract construction, if necessary, would approximately double the cost. 7. (S) An increase of 914 military manpower spaces in Thailand will be required. This manpower ceiling increase takes into account the 139 military spaces which would be gained by deleting T–28s from the 606th Air Commando Squadron. No other spaces are available for tradeoff against this requirement. 8. (S) The support of these increased forces at Nakhon Phanom and of expanded operations from Nakhon Phanom will place an additional burden on the US Army logistical support system in Thailand. Present support capabilities may be insufficient for the support of both the increased forces at Nakhon Phanom and increased B–52 operations from U–Tapao (JCSM–333–68, dated 29 May 1968, subject: “B–52 Sortie Rate (U)”). 5 Requirements for additional personnel, equipment, construction, and funds, as necessary, will be determined and submitted at a later date. 9. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that increased tactical air support should be provided to RLG counterinsurgency operations but not at the expense of support to friendly forces in South Vietnam and other higher priority missions. Accordingly, they recommend that the additional US Air Force forces, as shown in the Appendix, 6 be approved as an addition to Thai-based forces authorized by Program 6. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1968. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Warnke saw this memorandum. 2 See footnote 2, Document 332 . 3 Not found, but described in the text below. 4 Document 369 . 5 Not found. 6 Attached, but not printed. 372. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Embassy in France 372. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Embassy in France 1 Vientiane, June 20, 1968, 1106Z. 7349. For Ambassador Sullivan from Hurwitch. Subj: Situation in Laos. 1. The general situation in Laos in one of comparative calm. 2. Both wars have assumed their customary rainy season pattern of relative inactivity. FAR military reorganization has proceeded smoothly to date. FAR-FAN integration is similarly moving along. There may be an ambitious colonel or two who is dissatisfied with the pace and manner of events, but the power is not there. To improve the security of Vientiane some forty arrests were rather arbitrarily made (with Souvanna’s approval) and such champions of fair play as Justice Minister Impheng have made a few unpleasant noises about high-handed procedures. The military/security situation is clearly manageable. 3. Politically, Souvanna remains as strong as ever. The main power elements continue to regard him as the “only answer” to the current situation. The Assembly, the Sannikones particularly, will have some fun with Sisouk and the budget, but should not become recalcitrant to the point of threatening the government. 4. You are well aware of the dimensions of the financial crisis. The psychological spin-off effect of this crisis, however, has not been adequately reported yet. The virtual disappearance of the gold market has brutally laid bare to the Lao the true extent of their dependence upon factors beyond their control. 2 Although they have known how dependent they are upon us politically, militarily and economically, they have taken some pride in the progress they were making in the economic area. To discover that the stability of their currency resides in such unknowns as the security of Saigon (for smuggling) and/or the world price of gold has been shattering. It is noteworthy how frequently the word “fictif” has crept into their vocabulary. They are beginning to wonder if indeed they are a fictional people living in a mythical kingdom, an attitude similar to a stage in adolescence sometimes known as “who am I?” A helpful and related antidote to this depression has been their series of diatribes against the North Vietnamese led and encouraged by King and Prime Minister. Our little Lao friends seem to walk a little taller each day as Lao Presse carries a new attack. For many, neutralism is not a manly posture, and they seem to be working off some of their frustrations through these verbal jousts, believing (correctly) that thereby they can with pride, at least help, albeit not control, their cause in Paris. 5. Medically, Souvanna was pronounced in “good shape” by Ludwig today. His stomach and diabetes problems have improved markedly. Although weary, he remains remarkably alert and energetic. 6. On international affairs, especially Vietnam, you will find him hawkish as ever. As to his domestic problems, I judge that he will either genuinely manifest the psychological malaise or use it to seek a political solution to his financial problems (increased US contribution to FEOF justified on political rather than economic grounds). In this connection you should know that FEOF sales have been running nearly half a million the past two weeks and our projection is that the funds remaining in FEOF may stretch through October. Hurwitch 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text, Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 A sharp decline in tax receipts from gold imports complicated Lao fiscal problems. Laos, one of two major gold importing nations in Southeast Asia, was the source for much of the gold smuggled into South Vietnam. The Tet Offensive disrupted smuggling routes during the first half of 1968. In addition, the decision in March 1968 to create a two-tiered world gold market and attending price fluctuations in gold meant that gold imports to Laos dropped 50 percent in the first half of 1968 as compared to the same period in 1967. The drop caused a $1.8 million shortfall in Lao tax revenues. (Intelligence Memorandum ER IM 68–119, September 1968, prepared by the CIA; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos 1/68–1/69) 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 373. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, June 21, 1968, 0541Z. 7356. Subj: Dry season wrap-up. Country Team message. I. Summary 1. Rains have recently been falling steadily throughout Laos ending dry season which saw enemy aggressively retake much of territory picked up by FAR in past two years. This seems an appropriate time for Country Team to assess results of enemy offensive and make some tentative judgements on where we and they might go from here. 2. Enemy has taken from FAR substantial pieces of territory in north and northeast, considerably bruising regular and irregular units in the process. Route of FAR force at Nam Bac and capture of most paramilitary bases north of PDJ puts enemy in much better position in these areas than one year ago. In south, enemy territorial rains have been less extensive, however, in MR IV enemy has significantly increased control over area around Saravane thereby improving his capability to move through western fringe of Ho Chi Minh Trail structure. In most areas of south Laos FAR units have been forced by enemy pressure to move into defensive alignments around major population centers, leaving many agricultural areas relatively unprotected. Enemy raids in these areas have seriously hampered USAID and other rural development activities. Enemy maintains capability to attack simultaneously Saravane, Lao Ngam and Attopeu. 3. At moment, enemy appears to possess sufficient strength to protect his holdings and, if he wishes, pick up additional terrain in some areas. However, enemy activity has diminished in past weeks as weather has deteriorated, giving at least preliminary indication that enemy may follow rainy season tactic of past years and concentrate on protecting and consolidating his holdings while increasing harassment of friendly-held areas through raids and ambushes. At this early juncture, this can be only tentative appraisal and situation will require careful observation during coming weeks. 4. In past years, FAR has used its rainy-season logistical advantage (airlift) to take ground from enemy. Thut rainy season, major offensive moves by FAR regular and irregular troops would not seem prudent unless current conditions change markedly. Many FAR units are under-strength and, although most units are adequately equipped and provisioned, morale is not good and unit effectiveness in battle situations is uncertain at any given moment. At present it would appear that FAR regular and irregular troops should concentrate, in general, on holding line against possible further enemy encroachment. More vulnerable enemy salients might be hit under right conditions but major offensive action would not appear feasible. [Here follow sections II. Roundup of Dry-Season Action, III. Enemy Capacity, IV. Friendly Capacity, and V. Prognosis.] Hurwitch 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris for Ambassador Sullivan, Saigon, JCS,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, Seventh AF, and DIA. 374. Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Nelson) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 374. Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Nelson) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, July 12, 1968. SUBJECT Air Support for Paramilitary Operations in Laos 1. This memorandum is for your information and paragraph four suggests that a meeting be held with the Department of Defense. 2. Attached is a memorandum of conversation with General Brown, new Commander of the 7th Air Force, which took place on 10 July 1968. Also attached is a brief summary table of our Laos air picture which I left with General Brown. 2 The briefing went well, and I think we can count on General Brown to be both helpful and cooperative within the limits of his responsibility. This question of responsibility, however, leads into General Brown’s most telling point, i.e., the limits of his power to do anything substantive for us without some definite alteration in policy directives. 3. Such an alteration is, in effect, what the Chief of Station and the Ambassador have been after for some time. It has become apparent, through voluminous correspondence on this subject and continual foot-dragging of various command channels in the military establishment, that further requests to meaningfully change the situation at the tactical level will only meet with frustration and in the end be fruitless. 4. To resolve this question, and I feel that it must be resolved if we are to effectively support the Agency’s effort in Laos, I recommend that we proceed as planned with a meeting between the DCI or you and Secretary Clifford or Mr. Nitze, and possibly the Chairman of the JCS, during which the nature of the air support problem would be exposed along with the need for a higher priority in support of irregular operations in Laos. If, during these discussions, it can be resolved that a higher priority can be given to provide at least a minimum of sustained support to our operations in Laos, a special SIG meeting may not be necessary. 3 William E. Nelson 4 Attachment A 5 Washington, July 11, 1968. Memorandum for the Record SUBJECT Meeting with Lt. General George S. Brown 1. On 10 July 1968 CFE and ACFE/TBL met with General Brown, successor to General Momyer as Commander of the 7th Air Force. General Brown will assume his new duties in late July 1968, and our visit was to acquaint him with problems which have arisen in connection with air support for CIA operations in Laos. 2. General Brown did not recall having been previously briefed in detail on the Station’s paramilitary operations in Laos, so the meeting began by CFE giving a general rundown on the two wars being waged by CIA irregulars in North and South Laos. Apart from the overall picture, it was specifically pointed out to General Brown that effective and timely marrying of ground irregular forces and tactical air support had the distinct advantage of enabling the irregulars to inflict heavy damage on the enemy which he could not do with his own portable firepower. With air artillery to count on, the irregulars could take on more sizeable targets and have an effect on enemy capabilities disproportionate to their relatively small numbers. 3. CIA’s most pressing concern at this time is that of being unable to obtain sustained commitments of air support for these operations in Laos. Without such commitments, their effectiveness is considerably reduced. We recognized the higher priorities of the American effort in Vietnam and the difficulties in diverting aircraft from these priorities to support the irregular war in Laos. If, however, a minimum level of support could be provided on a regular and continuing basis, it would make a significant difference in an effort which is related to that in Vietnam. 4. General Brown commented that he was sympathetic to our needs, was aware of our problem, and he realized Ambassador Sullivan was already “laying in wait” for him regarding this subject. He felt that there was no excuse for the Air Force not to meet commitments that had been made, particularly in terms of operations which had been predicated on commitment of just such air support. He went on to add that he would do everything in his power to see that any such commitments which had been made were met. He noted, however, that until the priorities were changed, and he was instructed accordingly, support to the effort in Laos would remain a low priority as it had been in the past, a fact which he is powerless to change even as Commander of the 7th Air Force. 5. General Brown was shown a copy of the CINCPAC cable directing additional helicopter support for CIA operations as soon as helicopters could be positioned. He was also advised that a recommendation by the JCS had been moved forward which called for positioning additional aircraft in the Theater to support a level of tactical air missions up to 65 per day for CIA operations. General Brown replied that he had serious doubts that, given budgetary and other prevailing considerations, any additional aircraft would be allocated for our purposes. If such aircraft were provided, however, he could readily insure meeting air support requirements on a continuing basis for our operations. He felt it would be unwise for us to get our hopes up on the point of additional aircraft for tactical air support. 6. General Brown was asked what he thought could be done here in Washington to break this impasse. He replied that a new decision allocating priorities would have to be made which would elevate the priority of CIA operations in Laos. While this might eventually require a decision at the SIG level, a move which might have an initial effect would be for the DCI to expose the problem to Secretary Nitze and the JCS. If agreement could be reached at this level, a decision might be forthcoming which would provide for at least a minimum dedication of sustained air support for CIA operations in Laos. 7. Closing the meeting, General Brown agreed to do everything possible to help our efforts in Laos. He was encouraged to discuss these matters with the Chief of Station who is looking forward to seeing him. General Brown emphasized once more, however, that until directions came from Washington that the effort in Laos be given a higher priority, the chances were slim for CIA getting more air support than that being currently provided. Stuart Methven 6 1 Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–207A. Box 1, Folder 7. Secret. Sent through the Deputy Director for Plans. 2 Attached, but not printed. 3 No record of these meetings has been found. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Nelson signed the original. 5 Drafted by Methven on July 11. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Methven signed the original. 375. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 375. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, July 18, 1968, 0602Z. 7881. Ref: Vientiane 7717. 2 1. As preliminary step in my campaign to confront military leaders on issue of corruption and general question of transferring greater share of Lao fiscal and economic burden to shoulders Lao elite (reftel), I hosted stag dinner last evening for FAR military hierarchy. 3 Occasion for this affair was visit to Vientiane by my former military attache, Col. Bill Law, now retired. All senior officers were present, except General Quan, who was in Bangkok, and General Bounpone, who elected remain Savanna-khet and is sending me letter explaining why he couldn’t make it. Americans present were service attaches, CAS station chief, political officers and requirements office (USAID) chief. 2. I spoke at some length and with rather brutal frankness about the corruption I observed in this country and manner in which FAR protected and participated in it. I stressed the point that, in any postwar situation, this fact was bound to cause political resentment among population, who would therefore be much more susceptible to Pathet Lao brandishment. Although I made no threats and named no names, I cited specific cases of corruption which were well known to and identifiable by all present at table. 3. Primary vocal reaction (probably pre-arranged) came from Generals Oudone and Kouprasith. Both their presentations were highly defensive, and Kouprasith’s was quite emotional. Neither attempted to deny prevalence of corruption nor FAR role therein, but only to explain its origins and plead for comprehension. 4. I maintained firm position that I knew reasons for and origins of problems, but that I was dissatisfied with failure to remedy it. I said that King shared this view, had spoken to me at length on this subject, and had urged me to help institute tighter controls. I said that, in pursuit of this, my air attaché would be meeting with General Sourith today to propose better method of controlling use of transport aircraft. 5. Comment: My primary purpose in this session was merely to expose depth and breadth of my concern and to worry these officers a bit by making it clear that we were fully aware of activities afoot. My secondary purpose was to give assurances to such honest Generals as Phasouk and Vang Pao (both of whom were present and expressed great private satisfaction) concerning U.S. official position on these matters, third purpose was to let this meeting be ventilated among the colonels (by Col. Thongphanh Knoksy who was also present) who let them know that they have our support in effort to make FAR shape up on these matters. It is, in one sense, unfortunate that Quan and Bounpone were both absent since they (or their wives) are among primary offenders. Quan had a legitimate excuse but Bounpone’s absence may be a little hard for him to explain. Both these gentlemen had received private warning of my mood and may have made shrewd guess that absence was the better part of valor. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–4 LAOS. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 In telegram 7717, July 10, Sullivan described a “six hour seance” with Lao Minister of Finance Sissouk about Lao financial, economic, and corruption problems and Sissouk’s plans for reform. (Ibid., FN 1–1 LAOS) 3 A memorandum of conversation of the dinner is in airgram A–315 from Vientiane, July 22. (Ibid., DEF 6 LAOS) 376. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 376. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, August 9, 1968, 0601Z. 8346. 1. Together with AIRA, ARMA, and CAS Station Chief, I paid brief visit August 7 to General Vang Pao in his mountain headquarters at Long Thien. Purpose of visit was to award posthumous legion of merit to widow of Captain Moua Chong who, as “tall man,” had acted as highly successful controller for USAF strike activity until his death in 1966. 2. It was my first chance to see Vang Pao at his headquarters since my return to Laos July 1, although I have seen him twice in the past few weeks in Vientiane and Luang Prabang. (His visits to these cities and his far easier relations with general staff represent considerable improvement in Lao-Meo relations over past couple of years.) 3. I found Vang Pao energetic and active as usual, with great deal of his time devoted to problems of resettled Meo who have become his charges. He now has nearly 50,000 of them in the hills and valleys near his headquarters. However, these cares do not deter him from military plans on the frontiers of his region, especially in Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang. 4. He regards Sam Neua as fairly well lost, and although he will continue to mount operations there, these will be largely intelligence, psychological, and harassing raids. He hopes to rebuild a few selected areas of guerilla strength, but indicated no plans for major holding operations in that northeasternmost province. 5. His attention, as usual, is concentrated primarily on Xieng Khouang Province, and specifically on the Plaine des Jarres. He outlined plans to re-establish positions and to mount campaigns which would effectively encircle the plain. While he gave no time frame for these operations, he is starting two or three of them in this rainy season. 6. In general, he feels the quality of North Vietnamese troops he is facing has deteriorated. He assumes that many of the more experienced have been sent to South Viet Nam and notes the presence of greater number of ethnic minorities (especially Thai Dam) among his adversaries. He feels these are liable to psychological persuasion and is intensifying his efforts in this field. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–6 Laos. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 377. Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Laos Paramilitary Program Prepared by the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Nelson) 377. Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Laos Paramilitary Program Prepared by the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Nelson) Washington, August 15, 1968. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–207A, Box 1, Folder 1. Secret. 8 pages of source text not declassified. ] 378. Paper Prepared by the East Asian and Pacific Interdepart- mental Regional Group 378. Paper Prepared by the East Asian and Pacific Interdepart- mental Regional Group 1 Washington, September 10, 1968. REPERCUSSIONS IN LAOS OFDE-ESCALATION IN NORTH VIET-NAM I. Nature of U.S. De-Escalation A. Complete cessation of bombing in NVN. B. Cessation of air reconnaissance except for high level reconnaissance. II. Consequences of U.S. De-Escalation A. Decreased area available for air interdiction of trail system and other traffic into Laos, particularly if no-strike buffer zones are established along the border (e.g., Mu Gia Pass). B. Air interdiction in the trial area would become more costly since there could be a greater concentration of enemy AA for the smaller area to defend. C. Greater conspicuousness of US bombing, particularly in north Laos (no “cover” missions from Thailand to NVN), would prompt Soviets and others to increase pressures on Souvanna to stop all US bombing in Laos. D. Greater vulnerability of RLG forces, particularly in the north, because of the reduced effectiveness of US bombing of NVN troop and supply centers near Lao border. E. Anxiety in Thailand as well as Laos about US intentions. F. Even less effective bombing in areas near the border if there is a cessation of reconnaissance on traffic in North Viet-Nam headed for Laos, particularly should there be no-reconnaissance buffer zones along the border. III. Conclusions A. If the DRV maintains its present policy toward Laos, each step in de-escalation in the Viet-Nam conflict has a serious consequence for the security of Laos and hence of Thailand. The general Southeast Asian situation must therefore continue to be part of the substance of negotiations with the DRV. B. In the absence of any significant reciprocal de-escalation on the part of North Viet-Nam, US air operations in Laos must be increased in order to provide the same deterrent effect, against both DRV traffic for SVN and communist forces operating against the FAR. C. The present level of US MAP support should be considered as essential for US minimum goals in Laos until such time as the DRV abandons its present policy toward Laos. The possibility of increasing US MAP support should not be excluded if the DRV should attempt to make significant territorial gains in Laos to diminish the repercussions of what it might consider a setback in South Viet-Nam. Similarly, CIA assistance to the Lao guerrilla operations must remain at least at the same level. D. It may be necessary to modify the composition of the US air forces: to include more propeller aircraft dedicated to operations in Laos, to re-orient the direction of attack of the B–52’s, to employ naval aircraft in Laos to greater extent, and to make other adjustments of US assets. E. If we must institute no-bombing buffer zones on Lao territory close to the DRV border, there should be no similar limitation on reconnaissance. F. To provide partial cover for US air operations, there should be an increase in RLAF air operations. To this end, the capabilities of the RLAF should continue to be improved (including improving the command structure to attract and use effectively more combat pilots). G. With decreased cover (i.e., fewer flights from Thailand to North Viet-Nam) US non-admission (and Lao denials) of US bombing in Laos will be increasingly ineffective. US and Lao public position, including detailed press guidance, should be thoroughly worked out in advance. H. There will be pressure to acknowledge US air operations officially—and in effect to renounce the Geneva Agreements—in order to encourage our allies and assure some elements of the American public that something is being done against infiltration into SVN. There should be contingency planning on how to resist these pressures. I. The RLG will not only be opposed to official US admission of US bombings, but in recompense for the risk to which Laos exposes itself by permitting US bombings in the trail area of south Laos it will expect as a quid pro quo augmented US air support in the defense of areas of importance to the RLG, particularly in north, northeast and central Laos. J. Current ground operations in the trail area from South Viet-Nam (Prairie Fire, Igloo White) should be continued within their present scope and pattern, particularly to support tactical air operations. K. CAS roadwatch operations from the Lao side should be continued at a level necessary to fulfill their surveillance mission. Capability of CAS-directed guerrillas in south Laos should be increased for greater protection of RLG interests there in the event of a DRV reaction in south Laos and also for operations from the west against certain parts of the infiltration routes. L. Contingency plans for a standdown of US operations should be devised for the eventuality that the DRV may wish to use the trail complex for unannounced exfiltration from South Viet-Nam. These plans should include provisions for air reconnaissance of the trail area. M. We should inform the Lao and Thai governments of US intentions in adopting de-escalation, but our counter-actions will in the long run be the most effective reassurance. N. To provide maximum justification for increased air operations (which will be at best an open secret), there should be increased assist-ance to the Lao government’s program publicizing North Vietnamese aggression in Laos, as an unacknowledged justification for US air actions. Other Asian nations should be encouraged to be more outspoken in their recognition (and hopefully condemnation) of DRV interference in Laos. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam 5 EE 910 Laos, 10/67–12/68. Secret. According to a covering memorandum from the Staff Director of the Group to its members, including William Bundy who was its chairman, the EA/IRG (formerly FE/IRG) was asked on May 29, 1968, to prepare a paper on the repercussions in Laos of de-escalation in Vietnam. This paper, coordinated with the relevant agencies and with the Embassy in Laos, was the result. The staff director asked for any final comments or changes before it was discussed by the EA/IRG. 379. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 379. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, September 25, 1968, 1044Z. 9296. Subj: Vang Pao visit. Ref: State 242995. 2 For Dep Asst Sec’y Godley. 1. I believe your plans for Vang Pao are excellent and am sure results of this visit will be mutually beneficial as was case of Phasouk visit. 2. In general, these visits have considerable positive political after effects which may be difficult to measure at any given moment but which have a cumulative effect. This is true for “fat” as well as “thin” generals. 3. For example, we think that Kouprasith’s visit to the US in August 1966 was to some degree responsible for the “statesmanlike” image he has assiduously projected in recent years replete with effusive protestations of support for Souvanna. Appearances aside, however, there is no doubt that Kouprasith is keeping his ambitions in check. We believe, therefore, that his visit to the US served to reinforce this mission’s efforts to maintain political stability and strengthen Souvanna’s position, the bedrock of US policy in Laos. 4. To return to the “thins,” we have dramatic short-term results from Phasouk’s visit: During Souvanna’s recently concluded meetings with the generals and colonels, Phasouk reportedly played a leading role in supporting Souvanna. He vigorously waded in on the corruption issue in plenary sessions; also, Phasouk made it clear that he supported Souvanna politically and in “brutally frank” terms warned his military colleagues against any thoughts of overthrowing the civil authorities. 5. Van Pao supported Phasouk whose outspoken position obviously reflected to a considerable degree the influence of his recent experiences in Washington. A follow-up with Van Pao at this time is eminently in our mutual interests. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 LAOS–US. Secret. 2 In telegram 242995 to Vientiane, September 23, the Department welcomed the private visit of Vang Pao and planned to coordinate with DOD and CIA his meetings with key officials. The visit and awarding of decorations to the two most prominent “thin” generals Vang Pao and Phasouk, according to the Department, would not go unnoticed in Laos, especially among the “fat” generals. The Department asked for an appraisal of the Vang Pao visit on Lao politics. (Ibid.) 380. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 380. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, September 25, 1968. No. 1575/68 DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS DURING THE SUMMER 1968 Summary The rainy season this summer in Laos brought no major or important military changes. The lull in the fighting and the apparent reluctance of the Communists to press their dry season advantage has given the government side a much needed respite. But although the modest gains made by government troops since June have improved their tactical situation and their morale, the Communists are in a stronger position in Laos than they have been at any time since 1963. [Here follows the text of the 8-page memorandum.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the source text indicates that this memorandum was produced by the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services. 381. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 381. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, September 26, 1968, 0451Z. 9308. Dept pass Saigon for Bunker and Berger. Paris for Harriman. 2 Eyes Only for Bundy. Ref: State 244745. 3 1. My discussions with Souvanna re bombing in Laos if and when we cease bombing North Viet Nam have been categoric and specific. I believe situation therefore is clear and that he has stipulated his willingness to let us throw into Laos the entire weight of both tactical air and Arc Light effort which would be available as result cessation of NVN operations. 2. Such strikes would, of course, have to be conducted within rules of engagement which currently apply in Laos. However, in area of maximum US–GVN interest, along Ho Chi Minh Trail, these rules provide all flexibility we need for maximum effectiveness. 3. It should be understood, especially if cessation occurs in dry season when enemy pressure is heaviest against RLG territory, that there may also need to be an increase of U.S. air effort against regions and objectives (i.e. north Laos) which are not of direct and immediate interest to MACV. This means that, in order to maintain full level of Souvanna’s collaboration on this matter, U.S. may have to divert some resources to strikes which are primarily of RLG, rather than US–GVN interest. This would be small price to pay, and very minimal proportion of total effort available. However, I think it important to crank this element into our planning. 4. Finally, having said all this, I think we should also realistically assume that Souvanna’s current staunch position will come under considerable strain when the moment of truth arrives. We can expect the full force of the Hanoi propaganda claque world-wide, to turn on Souvanna and the RLG in effort to get bombing lifted in Laos as well as NVN. We can expect Soviets to bring considerable squeeze to bear upon him. On recent form, we should also probably expect de Gaulle and U Thant to have a go. 5. Whether Souvanna will falter under this sort of onslaught is hard to say. The King, I feel, will stay steady and so will most of his Ministers. However, if press attention becomes too acute, and especially if U.S. “spokesmen” begin admitting what we are doing, he may find reason to waffle on the grounds that our understandings with him re air operations are based on assurances that U.S. will not undercut “deniability” of U.S. air operations in Laos. Therefore, in contingency we are discussing, tightest possible control of U.S. spokesmen will be at a premium. 6. In summary, I would say our current arrangements are sound. How watertight they will prove in the event is yet to be tested. I believe the test will be conditioned by (a) the season of the year (Hanoi military counter-pressures can be heaviest in dry season), (b) the duration of that period when Laos alone is conspicuously being bombed and no general cease-fire is achieved, and (c) the intensity of the campaign mounted against Souvanna by Hanoi and its claque. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Nodis. 2 Apparently not passed to these posts because of its distribution limitation. 3 Not found. 382. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 382. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 26, 1968. SUBJECT Policy toward Laos The attached draft cable originated in DOD. 2 Dick Steadman distributed it recently to the Interagency group which meets with Bill Bundy. DOD is arguing that we should mount now a broad and concerted program to bring about another meeting of the Laos Conference of 1962 as part of any settlement of Vietnam. Bill Bundy’s initial reaction was to brush the whole thing aside as “premature.” Unless there is some support for the DOD initiative I suspect the whole thing will die without more ado. The guts of the DOD suggestion is that we start now to prepare the ground with the Soviet Union and with various Asian countries for the re-affirmation of the Laos Accords of 1962, and that we persuade Souvanna Phouma to get out in front on this effort. I think you will find the cable interesting. Would you like to see this pursued, or shall we just let nature take its course? Marshall 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos 1/68–1/69. No classification marking. 2 Not found attached. 383. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 383. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, October 8, 1968, 0440Z. 9514. Ref: A. Vientiane 8358 (Notal). 2 B. Vientiane 9181 (Notal). 3 1. During past two months, Lao political hopes, military expectations and civic performance have slumped into a subtle depression. Although Souvanna returned to Laos from his sojourn in France prepared to reorganize the armed forces and confront corruption (Ref A) he has achieved relatively little towards his objectives. The military leaders, who usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, have had some limited successes in military region two and in the area of Muong Phalane. But, otherwise, in the Sedone valley, in Borikhane, and in other potentially significant regions, progress has been nil. In addressing the problem of revenues lost though the collapse of the gold trade, the National Assembly has failed to levy new taxes or give support to government efforts to improve on old ones. 2. Hence, as Laos faces the end of the rainy season and the onset of the northeast monsoon, it does so in a rather damp and daunted mood. In this mood, Lao leaders begin to look to the stars and other external indicators (rather than to themselves) as a further and fatalistic explanation for their problems. 3. In casting about this way, there are three matters which trouble them. The first is the failure of the Paris talks between U.S. and North Viet Nam to make progress towards a peaceful resolution of the war. They had genuinely hoped that these talks would mean movement towards a cease-fire before the onset of the next dry season. Now, in the absence of progress, they face with some dread the idea of a repetition of last year’s heavy attacks which paralleled the Tet offensive in South Viet Nam. 4. Secondly, the overtones from Czechoslovakia are disturbing, not just because of sympathy for the Czechs, but rather because they signal a setback in the process of U.S.-USSR detente. To most thinking Lao, the foundation for some hope of independence of their country rests on U.S.- Soviet agreement, as exemplified by the Vienna meeting of 1961 and the Geneva Accords of 1962. If the bases of this agreement should crumble, they see Laos falling once again into the crevasse. 5. Finally, there is the question of the U.S. elections. Once again, they are nervous because they fear the prospect that the policy which began with the Kennedy administration in 1961 may be reversed and that current Lao leadership may be put in jeopardy. They see General Phoumi inching towards a return, moving from Songkla to Bangkok, with Thai consent. They see the Pathet Lao talking about “bi-polarization” of internal politics and suspect the old cleavage may be revived. 6. With all this gloomy accumulation, it is rather difficult to get the Lao to think in dynamic, constructive terms. There is a very real discouraging tendency towards a sauve qui peut policy among the leadership. Thus, attacks on corruption are being deflected and evaded. Those whose hands are deepest in the till, for example, have been counter-attacking against Finance Minister Sisouk, insisting that he has been raising revenue by “illegal” forfaitaire contracts. The generals whom Souvanna has been trying to bring under control have been developing counter-schemes which would give them dominance in an expanded military control scheme. 7. This, of course, is not the first time Laos has been in this mood, but it is perhaps one of the most pervasive and enduring depressions I have observed without some immediately discernible micawber moonbeams to enlighten the future. We will provide additional report of circumstances and prospects in subsequent cables. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Moscow, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 In telegram 8358, August 9, the Embassy reported on a discussion with Souvanna about ways to end corruption in the FAL. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 9181, September 19, Sullivan reported that Souvanna told him that he had made strides in reforming and taking control of the FAL. (Ibid., DEF 6 LAOS) 384. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach 384. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach 1 Washington, October 9, 1968. SUBJECT CIA Analysis of the Military Situation in Laos The attached CIA report 2 focuses on the military situation in Laos since the onset of the current rainy season last June. It states that during the last dry season, November 1967 to May 1968, Communist forces were able to inflict the worst defeats upon the Royal Lao Government (RLG) forces since 1962 and to erase much of the latter’s hard-earned gains of the past five years. While some gains have been made by the government since June, the Communists remain in a stronger position than they have ever been at any time since 1963 and probably possess more than enough resources to drive RLG troops to the Mekong, should they choose to do so. However, the Communists do not appear willing to turn on the pressure at the risk of inviting greater US participation and, in the near future at least, will more likely take only those measures needed to protect current holdings and to keep open the infiltration routes to South Vietnam. This is a sound, though brief assessment of the current military situation in Laos. While noting the limitations of Communist strategy in Laos, CIA has put the emphasis, and perhaps rightfully so, on the significant gains scored by the enemy—a development to some extent overshadowed by the more dramatic events in South Vietnam since Tet. Much of the improved Communist posture has been related directly to military requirements in northern Laos, but, as the CIA report points out, the situation has been gloomier for the government in southern Laos where perhaps the main objective of enemy dry-season efforts was to protect and expand Communist infiltration routes into South Vietnam. However, having stated this, CIA could have gone much further than it did to underscore the point. For example, while acknowledging Communist road building activity in northern Laos, the report fails to mention that a far greater effort was made in the panhandle, resulting in the construction of five new cross-border routes connecting the north-south trucklines in Laos with Communist base areas in South Vietnam. The improvement in the Communist road system in the Laos panhandle has undoubtedly facilitated the unprecedented level of supplies moving toward South Vietnam during the greater part of 1968, as shown in the attached chart on Communist truck sightings. 3 Without a logistical effort of this magnitude, the Communists could have hardly undertaken the accelerated military offensives launched this year in South Vietnam. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 2 For the summary portion, see Document 380 . 3 The attached chart indicated that truck sightings in 1967–1968 followed this progression: 992 in October 1967; 4,234 in November 1967; 6,024 in December 1967; 6,734 in January 1968; 5,094 in February 1968; 5,933 in March 1968; 9,198 in April 1968; thereafter dropping almost steadily to 962 in August 1968. 385. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 385. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Washington, October 17, 1968. I–35935/68 SUBJECT Contingency Planning for Enemy Action in Laos At a recent meeting between Mr. Katzenbach, Mr. Nitze, Mr. W. Rostow, Mr. Helms and Mr. Bundy concern was expressed over the possibility that, in order to create additional pressures on the US and her allies, the North Vietnamese might utilize forces recently withdrawn from South Vietnam and/or North Vietnamese forces already in Laos to increase military pressure against RLG military forces, and perhaps even to attempt to overrun Laos. Mr. Nitze has asked ISA to pull together the various concepts and opinions within the Department of Defense regarding military actions which the US Government could employ in response to North Vietnamese actions in Laos. He would like to examine possible responses to three alternative courses of action by the North Vietnamese: 1. That the forces withdrawn from South Vietnam will remain in Laos but not engage in any overt action against the RLG forces but will remain as threat to the security of Laos and re-entry threat to South Vietnam. 2. That the North Vietnamese will provide enough additional support to PL forces to create a threat of overrunning Laos gradually measuring our responses as they go. 3. That the North Vietnamese will provide sufficient additional support to the PL forces to support an attempt to overrun Laos quickly. Mr. Nitze would like an appraisal of the military courses of action with which we might respond to these three contingencies, including the effect our actions might have against the capabilities and intentions of the PL/North Vietnamese forces, the time it would take to initiate and bring to full force the various courses of action, the effect such action would have on US deployments and capabilities elsewhere, and the operational cost of conducting such actions. Mr. Nitze would like an examination of (1) stepped-up air campaigns, and (2) the introduction of US ground forces in conjunction with these air campaigns. Mr. Nitze also requests that you clearly identify assumptions and soft spots in your analysis. In addition, if deemed appropriate, you may wish to examine the ramifications of an invasion of North Vietnam or other military actions you believe might cause the North Vietnamese to desist from any attempt to overrun Laos. Mr. Nitze would appreciate having your general thoughts on this subject by October 30th. He recognizes that this is insufficient time to develop fully the requirements, costs or ramifications of various courses of action and that the initial submission will not be complete. Paul C. Warnke 2 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499. LAOS 000.1—(381 Laos), 1968. Top Secret. Drafted by Steadman. Also sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Warnke signed the original. 386. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Brown) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) 386. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Brown) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) Washington, October 21, 1968. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, July–December 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pages of source text (including attachment) not declassified.] 387. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 387. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, October 23, 1968, 1141Z. 9859. Subject: Lao SNIE. 2 Ref: State 257699. 3 1. Summary. We do not expect any major change in enemy intentions in Laos during next twelve months. 4 In period of evolving détente involving withdrawal of NVN troops from SVN and continuing discussions concerning a negotiated settlement to war in SE Asia, we assume NVN would not wish increase level of belligerence in Laos to point change nature of war here and invite reprisals in NVN. Enemy at present probably has sufficient troops to implement whatever intentions it may have and is in advanced positions at beginning dry season. For next six months (dry season), we expect enemy to put pressure on Meos in NE, and move against renewed irregular activity in NW; enemy will maintain threat to Mekong Valley and protect Ho Chi Minh Trail; country wide, enemy will probably seek extend areas it controls for purposes propaganda and eventual political bargaining. In following six months (wet season) we would expect enemy to attempt hold as much territory as possible. NVN troops withdrawn from SVN would not be necessary for implementing enemy intentions during next twelve months, but, of course, could make enemy task easier. 2. Choices for US policy are limited. During next six months we must a) reassure Lao of continuity of policy and support; b) assure ready and continual availability of US strike aircraft in support of RLG forces; and c) work with the FAR to make enemy attempts at territorial conquest as costly as possible, building on some positive developments. For the next wet season (following six months) we must be prepared to encourage and assist RLG forces to recover as much territory as possible for political purposes. 3. Assumptions. “Release” of NVN assets from SVN would be part of military détente package which would include projected withdrawal of some NVN units from SVN into Laos. 4. Part of this détente would be agreement or at least tacit understanding that NVN units withdrawn would not stay in Laos, but would eventually go home. 5. Since situations in Laos and Viet Nam inextricably intertwined under direction of Hanoi, Hanoi in own interests would not agree to military de-escalation in Viet Nam while at same time increasing posture of belligerency in Laos to point of changing nature of war. 6. Within limits of 5. above, there is scope for considerable enemy aggressive military action. 7. Although discussions may be underway concerning a negotiated settlement of the war in SE Asia, firm decisions concerning a settlement in Laos have not been made during the period under consideration. 8. Enemy intentions and capabilities. Key question, therefore, is one of enemy intentions in Laos which to date has kept rein on enemy capabilities. Tactical situation in Laos has not been determining in most respects; even with great asset of complete air superiority, FAR and CAS irregulars are not capable of stopping most determined enemy advances during dry season (as most dramatically re-emphasized during last dry season). A bigger or better FAR and irregular force can, of course, make such advances more costly to the enemy and to this extent have an inhibiting effect in local situations. The point, however, is that the RLG armed forces do not, and cannot, protect Laos from a NVN/PL military takeover should Hanoi make this decision (the RLG knows this). Furthermore, this action probably could be carried out with the forces the enemy presently has in Laos or with additional in-puts which are available in NVN. 9. The military situation, therefore, would not be materially affected by additional assets available to NVN through withdrawal of troops from SVN. Availability of additional NVN troops probably would allow enemy more flexibility in spreading out and physically occupying more terrain, however, which might be desirable for political bargaining purposes. 10. Last dry season. To review briefly the status of the general military situation in Laos (considerable details are contained in CAS and ARMA reports which are readily available to the Intelligence Community in Washington): During the last dry season enemy forces estimated at 48,000 NVN and 51,000 PL wiped out most territorial gains made by the RLG in previous two years from north to south; enemy offensive destroyed effectiveness of FAR in north and “road” to Luang Prabang wide open; in NE, Site 36 alone was only major base to survive onslaught; enemy within easy reach of Mekong Valley urban centers in middle and central Laos; in south, Attopeu and Saravane invested. At that time, enemy could have moved into Mekong Valley with Meos providing only serious, rolonged organized ground resistance country wide, but they would have been most vulnerable to air attack. It should be noted that for this campaign Hanoi augmented its forces in Laos by 19 battalions (7575 men) 7 battalions (2775 men) in north and 12 battalions (4900 men) in south. We have no evidence NVN troops have been withdrawn from Laos. 11. Objectives of dry season offensive varied according to area and represented different mix of pol/mil factors. In addition to opportunity destroy FAR reserves and eliminate advance guerrilla base, victory at Nam Bac important for adverse pol/psychological shock effect it had on RLG; other side of coin was significant boost it gave to NLHS frayed prestige and fortunes in north. 12. In NE, NVN roll back of Meo’s due sensitivity of Hanoi for security its frontiers and concomitant concern for loyalty its tribals as well as desire knock out installations at Phou Pha Thi. Security of PDJ also enhanced, area important politically in Lao domestic scene. 13. In center, appears enemy motivated primarily by desire take territory (such as Phalane) “illegally” held by RLG (a major theme to justify offensive throughout Laos) and keep RLG nervous and off-balance. 14. In south, similar elements involved, but overriding consideration was protection of Ho Chi Minh Trail and pinning down RLG forces in static defensive positions. As Dept recalls, we had good evidence enemy also intended seize and hold Saravane and Attopeu, prior to failure offensive to achieve its major aim of general uprising of urban population in key areas of SVN. Enemy had at that time (and has now) military capability to take these towns, as well as other major towns in Mekong Valley. (If Tet offensive had succeeded, it possible enemy might have thrown caution to winds and moved towards Mekong, counting on disruptions in SVN to inhibit our response.) 15. Wet season. During the current wet season which is rapidly coming to a close, the RTG forces with few exceptions have done little to regain territory lost to the enemy during the last dry season and, hence, improve defensive posture for coming dry season. (In fact, FAR hard pressed to maintain necessary security in area still under RLG control as evidenced by enemy forays against Rte 13.) With the exception of the FAR victory at Muong Phalane (which included a healthy in-put of irregulars), and reoccupation some of the area north of Paksane by MR V, the only real offensive action has been carried out by CAS irregulars. For example, in Sayaboury, irregulars are engaged in a continuing operation, in coordination with the RTA, against CT troops and infiltration routes supporting insurgency in adjoining Thai Provinces. In the northwest, the irregulars are aggressively carrying the war to the enemy in a series of small clashes. In the NE, Vang Pao has reoccupied area east of Routes 61/68 lost to enemy last dry season and is attacking around Phou Pha Thi and the SE edge of the PDJ in an effort to establish forward defensive positions against expected renewed enemy pressure in the coming dry season. In the south, irregulars are active, of course, along the length of the Ho Chi Minh Trail as well as Rte 110. 16. FAR inactivity is due to several factors. First, the FAR has still not recovered after the clobbering of the dry season. It is still in process of general (and apparently interminable) reorganization at the top, still plagued by recruiting and training deficiencies. In this respect, as of 30 Sept 68, ARMA estimates that of 73 bns, only 23 can be considered “combat ready.” To some degree related to the above, is a marked decrease in the “combative” spirit of FAR commanders. For example, Phasouk as usual is extremely cautious and has not undertaken his planned campaign to recover the Sedone Valley; Bounpone and MR III appear to be manufacturing excuses not to do anything; Sayyavong, despite apparent good intentions, has been ineffective in MR I, possibly because he must reply on Bounchanh who has his head stuck in the sand. As a result, Luang Prabang is no better defended now than it was immediately following the fall of Nam Bac. In MR V Kouprasth has mounted several sweep operations at our insistence (primarily to protect road building projects) but the hard core enemy areas remain intact. 17. Next six months. As we look toward coming dry season (November–May), military situation on ground is as follows: The enemy with exception of NE Laos is in generally same positions as at end of last dry season. Enemy forces consist of 47,295 NVN troops, and 51,130 PL troops. RLG forces consist of FAR/FAN 63,000 and CAS irregulars 40,000. As mentioned earlier, FAR is in bad shape, although enemy also in pretty sorry condition, his capabilities are probably sufficient to implement Hanoi’s intentions in Laos. 18. We do not, of course, know what Hanoi’s intentions are for coming dry season. We assume, however, they will reflect to great degree situation in SVN. If this is in direction of detente, we would not expect enemy to jump off from advanced positions to move into Mekong Valley thereby clearly and overtly destroying Geneva Accords, thus releasing US and others from present inhibitions in Laos as well as inviting direct retaliatory action in NVN. Even if situation is in direction intensification of hostilities, we doubt Hanoi would take such risks for little apparent gain, since protection of infiltration routes does not depend on physical possession of Mekong Valley. Also, we assume USSR would use its influence with Hanoi to preclude such occurrence. 19. For coming dry season, therefore, we would expect enemy not to risk overturning delicate balance in Laos by overly adventurous military action, but to protect infiltration routes; also enemy will seek to keep pressure on RLG by: a) maintaining threat to Mekong Valley; b) moving against resurgent irregular activity in NW; c) driving against Meo forward outposts with eventual aim of taking Site 36 and shutting Vang Pao up in Long Tieng; d) disrupting USAID activities where possible. In sum, enemy will attempt maximize its control over or presence in as much territory as possible within limits dictated by prudence. NVN troops withdrawn from SVN could be useful in this effort, although not essential. 20. Major domestic purpose of enemy maintaining territory won and “nibbling” against area under RLG control is to strengthen bargaining position of NLHS in eventual negotiations leading to reconstitution of provisional government of National Union. In this respect, we note that both Pathet Lao and Radio Hanoi claim “liberated zone” comprises one-half to two-thirds of Lao territory and 50 percent of population which may be good indication of initial NLHS bargaining positions in such negotiations. 21. Second six months. Although projection this far into the future is difficult, we believe the enemy will attempt to hold as much territory as possible during the next wet season for political purposes. Given the logistical problems the weather imposes, the enemy would have stockpiled supplies during the dry season and might consider augmenting his forces to inhibit or defeat successful RLG wet season offensives. Here again, NVN troops withdrawn from SVN could be useful to some extent. 22. Conclusions. Under the circumstances, choices for US policy are limited during the period under study. We must reassure Tha Lao of the continuity of US policy and support. 23. We must assure that US strike aircraft are readily and continually available in sufficient numbers to support RLG forces. This is particularly true in NE, which is not “sensitive” internationally (like the Mekong Valley) but extremely important domestically and where Vang Pao and the Meo will be very hard pressed. We will continue to prod the FAR into more effective action to make the enemy’s “nibbling” as costly as possible, thereby hoping to preclude loss of additional fringe areas during the dry season, with eventual aim of recovery of some areas if possible in next wet season. In this respect, we hope to build on some encouraging signs of past few months (increasing employment of FAR and guerrillas in joint operations; establishment of air/ground op centers country wide) which indicate possibility of more united and coordinated efforts by RLG forces. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, INT 2–2. Top Secret. 2 Reference is to SNIE 58–1–68; Document 389 . 3 In telegram 257699 to Vientiane, October 18, the Department asked for an assessment of the Laos situation for the upcoming SNIE. (Department of State, Central Files, INT 2–2) 4 As of October 21, the White House received weekly Laos Situation Reports that reported on the military situation and internal political/administrative developments. The set can be found in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos, 1/68–1/69. 388. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador in Laos (Sullivan) 388. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador in Laos (Sullivan) 1 Washington, October 24, 1968. Dear Bill: I have done some research on the problem presented in your letter 2 describing several recent utterances by Souvanna concerning Mr. Nixon. I thought I should get this reply back to you before November 5, so that you could prepare the way in case this is how things turn out. What I have done is to check Mr. Nixon’s recent published utterances, without finding anything conspicuously helpful. However, equally, his statements in the last few years—and so far as I can tell during this campaign—are wholly free of the past strictures against neutrals and “neutralism” which in part account for Souvanna’s attitude. In other words, the written record gives no basis for positive reassurance, but equally no basis for renewal of the fears that might have been held a decade ago. More to the point, I have talked to two senior people in the Nixon camp, both of whom are intimately familiar with his views on the Laos settlement of 1962 and on the existing dispensation in Laos, including Souvanna personally. They assure me that, far from having the slightest feeling against Souvanna or any trace of the old quarrels of the late 1950’s, Mr. Nixon fully supports the 1962 settlement and Souvanna’s personal position, and—to the best of these gentlemen’s knowledge—has considerable personal admiration for all that Souvanna has accomplished for his country in recent years. You can draw on this in any way you see fit, including the use of my own name as the quiet intermediary. I do really believe that the Prince has no warrant for any concern that Mr. Nixon would change course at all either on the fundamentals of the Viet-Nam war or on Laos both in itself and its relationship to Viet-Nam. In short, whatever Mr. Nixon said in the 1950’s and whatever may have been his degree of association in the period when we forced Souvanna out (and Phoumi in), he really has no present feelings that would be anything but cordial and approving toward Souvanna and the Laos of today. I am most grateful to you for writing me on this. Obviously, it is a fairly sensitive kind of thing, but I do believe it is our duty as servants of the US to correct misapprehensions of this sort where we can honestly do so—as we can here. Naturally, a great many foreign visitors, Ambassadors, and one or two special emissaries sent for this particular inquiry, have been asking what Mr. Nixon’s Asian policies would be. His Foreign Affairs article of October, 1967, is an excellent answer in almost all cases, but does not happen to touch on Laos. Everywhere else in the area, people seem to be fairly sanguine about his succeeding, including specifically Indonesians and even the Burmese Foreign Minister. If it would help to relay that these “equally neutral” gentlemen have come to feel that Mr. Nixon understands their postures, you may include this in the conversation—which may be at whatever level of solemnity or bibulousness you feel most effective. New subject: I have just called Charles Lucet to convey to him, man to man, your bright ideas about linking the LCU men to the recent Greek festivities and/or what may or may not be coming events. He treated the matter in his usual solemn fashion, but I think took the point and will relay it in the right key. I said please to convey it as a Gallic suggestion from Gallic imaginations, rather than the product of stodgy American establishment minds. (I claimed credit for the idea myself, but the historical record will be clear on the basis of this letter.) I am neither downcast nor the reverse. Hold your hat. With warm regards. Yours ever, William P. Bundy 3 P.S. We have some indications that Souvanna’s man in Saigon is being fed rumors of dissension between us and the GVN. We are trying to dry up the source. P.P.S. Hearty congratulations on your Embassy’s brilliant success in dynasty/cultural matrimony. Seriously, please convey my warmest good wishes to the Princess. 4 WPB 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Ambassador’s Private Correspondence, 1967–68. Secret; Personal—Eyes Only. 2 In an Official-Informal letter to Bundy, October 1, Sullivan reported that shortly before the Republican Presidential convention, Souvanna told Sullivan that if Nixon were elected Souvanna would resign. Sullivan thought that Souvanna was only expressing his preference for Humphrey whom he had gotten to know well. On September 30 Souvanna asked how the election was going and Sullivan suggested that Nixon could win. Souvanna repeated in ringing tones his intention of resigning if Nixon won. Sullivan asked Bundy’s advice on how to handle what could become a serious problem. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and following initials. 4 Cultural attaché at the Embassy, Perry L. Stieglitz, married Princess Moune, daughter of Souvanna Phouma on October 22. 389. Special National Intelligence Estimate 389. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, October 31, 1968. SNIE 58–1–68 COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR Conclusions A. Over the past year the Communists have greatly strengthened their combat forces in Laos. The combined Pathet Lao (PL)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces now number about 56,000 combat troops; they could overwhelm the regular and guerrilla forces of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) in the coming dry season. And we do not think that the RLG could expand the size or capability of its forces sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists. B. We do not believe that the Communists intend to conduct a major drive to the Mekong, lest such a move provoke US entry into the Laotian corridor and perhaps upset any negotiations underway on South Vietnam. However, in the next few months, we expect the Communists to exert further military pressure on government forces, especially on guerrilla outposts, in order to strengthen their ultimate bargaining position. They now demand that US bombing of Laos be halted as a prerequisite to discussions of an internal settlement that must be based on “the realities of the current situation.” C. Even if NVA resources were released from South Vietnam, we doubt that this would in itself alter Hanoi’s intentions in Laos, since the forces already there can launch an offensive without further reinforcement. Though developments in Vietnam could change Hanoi’s calculations concerning Laos, in general we believe that the Communists hope to achieve their objectives without running great risks of military counteraction. Discussion 1. Hanoi has ambitions to control all of Laos, but has been unwilling to take actions there which would jeopardize higher priority goals in South Vietnam. In particular, Hanoi has limited the scope of its military actions in Laos, in part, at least, out of concern for provoking a large-scale US ground action against the vital supply routes to South Vietnam which run through Laotian territory. 2. Since the 1962 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized by Royal Lao Government (RLG) offensives during the rainy season (May to October) when the mobility of Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces is restricted, and by Communist counteroffensives during the dry season (November to April) to retake lost areas, often just in time to seize the rice harvest. Thus an uneasy equilibrium has been established, with military factors operating on the RLG and political factors on the Communists to restrain actions that might provoke a major reaction by the other side. 3. In the political field, both sides have continued to pay lip service to the 1962 Geneva Accords, which neutralized Laos, and until recently to the Zurich and Plaine des Jarres Agreements, which established a tripartite government—rightists, neutralists, and the PL. This arrangement has persisted despite the fact that the PL vacated their cabinet seats in April 1963. These are still kept open for them by Souvanna, the neutralist Prime Minister. Until this July it seemed as though the PL objective, despite their denunciations of Souvanna, was the restoration of the tripartite arrangements. I. Recent Developments 4. Several recent events, however, suggest that the Communists are developing a new position. For the first time, they have made a bombing halt a specific prerequisite to discussions of an internal political settlement. Moreover, while still reaffirming the 1962 international agreements, they have demanded that the internal settlement must take into account “the realities of the current situation.” 5. In private, PL and Soviet spokesmen have explained that such “realities” mean a recognition of PL control over large areas of Laos (they claim two-thirds of the territory and one-half the population). In addition, they contend that the US and its “puppets” have destroyed the tripartite structure, that Souvanna no longer represents a neutralist faction, and that the present government is, in effect, illegal. Apparently, the PL are laying the ground work to claim a large role in a new government, and may demand that the neutralists aligned with them in the so-called “National United Bloc” occupy the positions now held by Souvanna’s neutralist faction. 6. While thus signaling their intention to reorder the old tripartite arrangement, the Communists have reaffirmed their regard for the monarchy as a “permanent feature” of Lao national life. Indeed, the whole point of the rather odd visit of the North Vietnamese Ambassador in July after a four year absence seemed to be to make a dramatic distinction between the King and the present Lao government, and this line has been supported by the new Soviet Ambassador and the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) spokesman in Vientiane. The Communists have always paid deference to the King’s position and may hope that the King’s desire to preserve the kingdom and establish a united national community can be played upon to their advantage. 7. The Communists are taking other steps to improve their political position. During the past rainy season, they have made more of an effort than ever before to consolidate control over their territory. After unsuccessful attempts to terrorize mountain people who have been assisting RLG guerrillas in the north, the Communists are seeking to win them over by cajolery. This is apparently part of a wider effort to improve their hold over the mountainous and sparsely populated reaches of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, and Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces, where they have been stepping up their propaganda and political indoctrination programs. Newly constructed roads give the Communists access to hitherto isolated areas. In the south, PL troops have been busy trying to consolidate their hold over the rice-rich Sedone Valley, where the government carried on a development program from 1965 until July 1967. There are recent reports that the PL civil administration is being reinforced by Lao political cadre who have just completed political training in North Vietnam. One report indicates that in Savannakhet Province North Vietnamese political cadre have been attached to the Communist administration for the first time. 8. By the fall of 1967, the RLG had made considerable inroads on territory that the Communists held in 1962. 2 The Communists finally responded by turning an RLG offensive in the Nam Bac area into a debacle for the government in mid-January 1968. During the remainder of the dry season, the Communists administered a series of defeats to the RLG which added up to the worst government setback since the precarious days of 1961 and 1962. The psychological impact was considerable. There was a good deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the Communists would break out from the previous pattern of military action and push on to the Mekong. 9. But this did not happen, and perhaps the most notable feature of the rainy season now drawing to a close was the lack of significant new moves by either side. The Communists did not press their advantage, but devoted themselves to a more intensive political consolidation of their territory than heretofore. RLG forces, who for their part, usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, had only some limited success in the northeast and in the area around Muong Phalane. RLG progress has been nil in the Sedone Valley in the south, in Borikhane Province, and in other potentially significant regions. 10. These developments in the military and political fields seem to form part of a pattern related in large part to Communist strategy in South Vietnam. In anticipating that 1968 would be a “decisive” phase in Vietnam, Hanoi moved to increase its logistic capabilities in Laos, strengthen its forces there, recover lost ground, and set back and demoralize RLG forces. And in their recent statements they have set the stage for demanding a new settlement on more favorable terms should the situation in South Vietnam move into serious negotiations. In short, the Communists have developed a stronger military position while at the same time they are preparing, if the situation in Vietnam warrants, to move into a more active political phase in Laos. II. Capabilities 11. Our estimate of current PL/NVA strength in Laos is about 98,000 (51,000 PL and 47,000 NVA), compared to about 72,000 a year ago. The most important increments have been in combat troops, where PL strength has grown from 28,000 to 31,000 and NVA strength from 16,000 to 25,000. To oppose these Communist forces the RLG has a total of some 100,000 men. These include approximately 29,000 combat troops of the regular army (FAR), about 5,000 combat troops of the neutralist forces, and some 39,000 guerrillas, about 22,000 3 of whom are Meo tribesmen commanded by General Vang Pao in the northeast. 4 12. PL and FAR troops are probably about evenly matched in terms of the general effectiveness of individual troops or battalions, and man for man the Meo guerrillas are probably better fighters than either. The NVA forces, however, are definitely better than the FAR, and the psychological impact on the latter when attacked by the NVA is often sufficient to precipitate their defeat. This qualitative inferiority is somewhat compensated for, however, by air support provided by Royal Lao Air Force T–28s, [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] and USAF aircraft operating out of Thailand. In good weather, the Lao fly about 100 tactical sorties per week, the Thai pilots about 70, and the USAF some 100–200. Such success as the RLG has enjoyed since 1962 is due largely to the combination of this air support with effective use of friendly guerrilla forces. 13. For several years, Souvanna and other RLG leaders, including the military, have felt that if it were not for the presence of NVA troops,RLG forces could probably quickly dispose of the PL threat. In our view, this is probably too optimistic. Although in terms of present strengths on both sides, Royal Lao combat forces would then outnumber those of the Pathet Lao by more than two to one, we do not believe that this numerical advantage would be decisive, in view of the many weaknesses and divisions that will continue to limit FAR effectiveness whatever enemy it confronts. We do believe that the PL need a considerable amount of NVA support to mount a major attack, and that without it, the RLG could almost certainly contain them. We also believe that in northern Laos the Meo guerrillas could put considerable pressure on the PL. But RLG forces could probably not reduce PL forces and territory very rapidly—if at all—without substantial outside logistical and air support. 14. We continue to estimate, however—as we did in March 1968 5 —that the combined PL/NVA forces now in Laos have the military capability to reduce the RLG area of control to a few enclaves in fairly short order. They could do so without diverting resources from South Vietnam or drawing significant reinforcements from the North. And we do not think that RLG forces could expand their size or capability sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists. III. Communist Intentions 15. There are several options open to the Communists over the next six months or so. There are various indications of preparations to resume military activity as the dry season commences, and it is possible that the Communists have decided to exercise their military superiority and quickly overun most of Laos. They might think this would be an effective means of putting the US under new pressures to reach a general settlement in Indochina. We believe this is unlikely. The Communists would necessarily feel considerable uncertainty over US countermoves in the Laotian corridor, especially at a time of changeover in American administrations. And, as long as the outcome in Vietnam is in doubt and under some sort of negotiation, we believe that Hanoi would not run needless military risks in Laos before the chances of a new political settlement there had been tested. 16. We do expect, however, that Communist forces will keep up substantial military pressure on RLG forces in the coming dry season. In the northeast, where General Vang Pao’s Meo guerrillas have long been a thorn in their side, particularly in Houa Phan and Xieng Khouang Provinces, they will probably make a considerable effort to reduce a number of guerrilla sites and consolidate their claims. They will probably also try to clear the guerrilla outposts along the border of northeastern Khammouane Province with North Vietnam, as well as in the northwest Provinces of Houa Khong and Luang Prabang. In the south, they will maintain the threat to the Mekong from Thakhek to Champassak Province. They will attempt to disrupt US-sponsored aid and development programs. And, of course, they will protect their vital infiltration and supply routes to South Vietnam in the Laotian corridor. 17. We anticipate more direct political pressures on Vientiane and the King, which these military moves will serve to reinforce. At some point, depending again on developments in South Vietnam, the Communists might offer to open negotiations, providing the bombing in Laos ended. In any case, Hanoi would believe its military pressures would improve the chances for eventual negotiations on better terms. 18. Obviously, a major change in the situation in Vietnam could affect Hanoi’s calculations. But we do not believe that the release of NVA assets from South Vietnam would, in and of itself, be a decisive factor in changing Hanoi’s policy in Laos. In the event of a Vietnam settlement favorable to them, the North Vietnamese would anticipate that political pressures would cause Laos to fall into their hands fairly soon. They would therefore see no need for ambitious moves in Laos that might risk upsetting any agreements reached on South Vietnam, particularly respecting US military withdrawals. Should the settlement be unfavorable to the Communists, we believe that military caution in Laos would appear even more desirable to them. 19. Eventually, if the Communists cannot achieve what they want in Laos through a combination of pressures, they may resort to a vigorous military campaign. But for now, they appear to be moving slowly, calculating that the outcome in Vietnam will be such that a new settlement in Laos can be reached which would provide them an improved power position, from which they could ultimately take control. Annex MILITARY CAPABILITIES 1. Order of battle information on the Communist forces in Laos is derived from a number of sources. The most important are informants contacted by clandestine friendly guerrillas and by road-watch teams. Other useful information is obtained from prisoners and ralliers, from civilian refugees—particularly low-level administrative functionaries—and from special sources. The estimates of enemy strength are best in those provinces where friendly guerrillas and other assets are most active: Houa Khong, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Khammouane, Savannakhet, Saravane, Attopeu, and Sedone. It is least reliable along most of the South Vietnamese border, in northern Phong Saly, southern Sayaboury, and northeast Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces. In the other provinces, where we rely largely on the Laotian Army reporting, the quality varies—it is reasonably good for Vientiane and Borikhane, but poor for Champassak, Sithandone, and Wapikhamthong. Estimating the number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Pathet Lao (PL) troops is also complicated by the mixture of NVA and PL personnel within many individual battalions. 2. On the whole, we think the estimates are reasonably accurate and support our conclusion that Communist strength in Laos is greater than at any time in the past. Strengths fluctuate somewhat between the dry and rainy seasons, however, as the NVA tend to put combat troops in for the dry season campaign—particularly elements of the 316th NVA Division—and then withdraw them during the rainy season. NVA combat troops outnumber the PL troops in the southern provinces of Saravane, Attopeu, and Sedone, where, as might be expected, the defense of their supply and infiltration corridor to South Vietnam is most critical. There are about an equal number of NVA and PL troops in Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Province. In the remaining provinces, the PL out-number the NVA substantially, and there are no known NVA battalions at all in four provinces: Sayaboury, Vientiane, Champassak, and Wapikhamthong. The dissident neutralist troops are all in Xieng Khouang and Phong Saly Provinces. TABLE A Estimated Strength of Communist Forces in Laos North Vietnamese Forces Independent Infantry— 16,500 Troops and Advisors in Mixed Units— 7,800 AAA— 200 Total NVA Combat Troops— 24,500 Command and Support Troops— 8,000 Engineers and Coolies— 14,700 Total NVA Forces— 47,200 Lao Communist Forces Independent PL Infantry— 6,500 Infantry in Mixed Units (with NVA troops or advisors)— 15,000 Dissident Neutralist Infantry— 2,600 Armor— 400 Artillery— 3,500 AAA— 3,000 Total Lao Communist Combat Troops— 31,000 Command and Support Troops— 15,400 Engineers and Construction Troops— 4,800 Total Lao Communist Forces— 51,200 Grand Total— 98,400 TABLE B Royal Lao Government Forces FAR (Royal Lao Army) Infantry— 27,400 Artillery— 1,000 Armored— 700 Total Combat— 29,100 Support Troops— 16,900 Total FAR— 46,000 FAN (Progovernment Neutralist Forces) Infantry— 5,000 Artillery— 400 Armored— 100 Total Combat— 5,500 Support Troops— 3,000 Total FAN— 8,500 ADC (“Auto-defense de Choc”—Regional Defense Forces)— 5,000 RLAF (Air Force)— 1,500 River Flotilla— 500 Guerrilla Forces 6 Northwest Tribal Guerrillas (Yao and Others)— 7,000 Northcentral Tribal Guerrillas (Irregulars in Luang Prabang and Phong Saly Provinces)— 2,000 Meo Tribal Guerrillas— 22,000 Central Laos Tribal Guerrillas (Lao)— 4,000 South Laos Tribal Guerrillas (Lao & Kha)— 4,000 Total Guerrillas— 39,000 Grand Total— 100,500 1 Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 58–1–68. Secret; Sensitive; Limit Distribution; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the USIB concurred with its release except the representatives of the FBI and AEC who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 2 See centerspread maps. [Footnote in the source text. The maps are not printed.] 3 This figure is for background use only and is not to be used or republished in any other publication by holders of this estimate. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 See Annex for a detailed breakdown of order of battle for both Communist and RLG forces. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 See SNIE 58–68, “Communist Intentions in Laos,” dated 21 March 1968, Secret. [Footnote in the source text; see Document 346 .] 6 Figures in this category are for background use only. They are not to be used or republished in any other publication by holders of this estimate. [Footnote in the source text.] 390. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 390. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, November 4, 1968, 0950Z. 10050. 1. During series meetings last few days, which have included discussions with CSAF General McConnell and with representatives of 7/13AF, we have worked out arrangements for applying additional USAF air power to Laos under the rules of engagement imposed both by Washington and the RLG, subsequent to cessation in NVN. 2 2. These arrangements will result in a significant increase in sortie rate in the Barrel Roll area, from an earlier daily average of about 30 to a new level of about 100 strike sorties per day. Although there will initially be some control problems because of necessity to phase A–1E aircraft through minor structural modification, we believe this level should be well established by time normal enemy dry-season offensive begins in this area. 3. In the south, sorties have already risen from a level of about 100 per day to 250 per day and should go higher when Commando Hunt and other operations go into effect. Therefore, despite anticipated extra enemy efforts to increase traffic on trail structure, movement should become more difficult and expensive, especially if effort can be maintained around the clock. 4. Although press is currently distracted by U.S. elections, events in Paris, and non-events in Saigon, we expect them soon to zero in on this increased activity. We note there have already been some informed leaks about “tripling” the level of activity in Laos. We will continue to decline to speculate on sortie rates for our “reconnaissance” operations on grounds this is operational question. 3 Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 On November 7 Secretary of Defense Clifford sent President Johnson a memorandum that showed in tabular form the increasing number of attack sorties in Laos during the first 5 days of November 1968 (from 181 to 405) and the average daily attack sorties for 1967 and 1968 (November was prorated at the November 1–5 rate). (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5 EE 92, Laos, 11/68–1/69) 3 In telegram 267319 to Bangkok, Saigon, and Vientiane, November 5, the Department requested that all U.S. officials “should refrain from confirming even on a background basis that U.S. is continuing or increasing bombing in Laos.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS) 391. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 391. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, November 11, 1968, 1045Z. 10177. 1. In our responses to requests for intelligence estimates and for contributions to planning documents, we have consistently projected for the foreseeable future a level of enemy military activity in Laos roughly comparable to that which we have experienced in the past few years. Since these projections have occasionally been questioned I thought it might be useful to elaborate the rationale on which they are based. Needless to say, if the rationale proves in error, the projections lose their value. Hence, I feel it is important that addressees should weigh these premises. 2. I start from the premise that the North Vietnamese have failed in their objective to gain a military victory in the south by the massive introduction of main force units. I assume that they recognize the fact that the more they put in and the higher they raise the level of conventional combat, the greater are their losses to superior American firepower. They have therefore apparently decided to desist from further “escalation” of conventional combat in the south and move back to a clandestine guerrilla situation. 2 3. Their purpose in doing this is to “de-Americanize” the war by persuading U.S. authorities that it is feasible to withdraw U.S. forces from the south. Since their basic objective is to get these forces irrevocably out, they recognize that they must pay some price for this. But they hope to keep that price low enough that it will not curtail their ability to maintain an effective guerrilla presence in the south which can eventually destroy the political and military fabric of a weak southern regime. 4. Our purpose, on the other hand, must be to exact such a high price from them, and at the same time repair the weaknesses of the southern regime, that we leave a balance on the departure of our troops which is firmly and irrevocably favorable to the south, and destined to defeat northern ambitions in that republic. 5. Since their concentrated and overriding purpose is to get U.S. forces out of the south, it follows that Hanoi must comport itself in such a way as to convey to us a confidence that we can safely remove our forces without scuttling our objectives. It would be counter-productive for them to launch major conventional attacks while this negotiating process is going on. Anything which convinces the U.S. that it must retain its troops in South Viet Nam is a defeat for the north, since U.S. troops are the immovable obstacle to their military success. 6. If this logic is true in South Viet Nam, it is equally applicable to Laos. For the North Vietnamese to “de-escalate” conventional operations in the south, but to step them up in Laos runs the risk of providing Washington with confused signals which could only deter or delay any moves to reduce U.S. troop presence in the South. 7. Therefore, we have risked the calculation in our projections that no dramatic changes will ensue in North Vietnamese military operations in Laos while the Paris talks remain active. Anti-aircraft density may well be augmented to match our new levels of air activity. Psychological and political activity may also expand. But if ground warfare steps up dramatically over the normal dry season levels, then our premises and projections will both prove wrong. 8. The fact that it is altogether possible we could be wrong seems, in my judgment, to require some study in Washington and Paris. 9. I feel we ought to have some way of correlating negotiating attitudes to the North Vietnamese with the pattern of their behavior in Laos. I assume there is some such correlation with the pattern of their behavior in South Viet Nam. I would commend to Washington and our Paris negotiators that this contingency also be extended to cover the more unpleasant possibilities in Laos. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris for HARVAN (Harriman and Vance, the U.S. negotiators in Paris), Saigon, and CINCPAC. 2 In telegram 42583 from Saigon, November 13, the Embassy in Vietnam stated that although it agreed with much of Vientiane’s analysis, it believed it emphasized too strongly North Vietnamese willingness to persuade the U.S. that it would be safe to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam. The Embassy in Saigon suggested that North Vietnam was prepared to persuade the United States that it could not win in Vietnam by a continuing military effort. Saigon did not believe that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would revert to “clandestine guerrilla activity.” (Ibid.) 392. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 392. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, November 11, 1968. I–35979/68 Dear Bill: As you recall, Walt Rostow asked for an appraisal of possible future troubles in Laos if the North Vietnamese should use there some of the assets currently being used in Vietnam. 2 I understand that Mac Godley will coordinate the response, which will involve several elements: CIA has prepared a recent SNIE 3 on Communist intentions and capabilities in Laos; the Country Director for Laos is working on the political aspects of the problem; and we have been assessing the military options against several contingencies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested specifically to appraise the military courses of action by which the U.S. Government might respond to three alternative courses of action by the North Vietnamese in Laos: (1) That the forces withdrawn from South Vietnam will remain in Laos but not engage in any overt action against the RLG forces but will remain as threat to the security of Laos and re-entry threat to South Vietnam. (2) That the North Vietnamese will provide enough additional support to PL forces to create a threat of overrunning Laos gradually measuring our responses as they go. (3) That the North Vietnamese will provide sufficient additional support to the PL forces to support an attempt to overrun Laos quickly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 4 consider it appropriate to identify and to appraise possible military actions which the United States might take in response to North Vietnamese actions in Laos. However, with respect to the specific questions posed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it important to recognize two relevant points: a. First, that the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao (PL) Forces now in Laos have the capability to overrun most of Laos quickly without reinforcement by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Forces withdrawn from South Vietnam. b. Second, that the fact that the PL/NVA Forces have not thus far attempted to overrun Laos is the result of a policy decision and is not due to insufficient means. Therefore, they consider that the threat postulated in NVN course of action 3 already exists. PL/NVA overrun of Laos can occur without withdrawal of enemy forces from South Vietnam and with no lessening of pressure there. Accordingly, analysis of courses of action available must be considered as a function not of additional NVA support provided to the PL and the resultant threat but of observed PL/NVA actions. Military actions which the United States could employ in response to NVN course of action 1 (NVN Forces withdrawn from South Vietnam remain in Laos but do not engage in any overt action against Royal Laotian Government (RLG) Forces) are set forth in Appendix A hereto. 5 As long as PL/NVA Forces do not attempt to overrun Laos, US military actions in support of RLG Forces operating against the PL/NVA should continue essentially as at present. This envisages close air support of RLG Forces by US air elements consistent with the priority of other requirements. If the PL/NVA take the actions implied in NVN course of action 2 (PL/NVA Forces commence overrunning Laos gradually, measuring US responses as they go), the United States will be required to reevaluate its position and its entire strategy in Southeast Asia. Such action on the part of NVN would indicate that its participation in the Paris talks is fraudulent and that NVN expansionist policies have changed only with respect to direction. If the United States decides to meet this new communist challenge, the most important initial actions should necessarily take place in diplomatic channels, through which the United States could inform Hanoi that continued NVN aggression would result in intensified military action against NVN. It would not be militarily sound to commit US ground forces in Laos unless the decision were also made to destroy the capability or the will of NVN to persist in its aggression. Accordingly, military actions on the order of those presented in Appendix B5 hereto would be required if the United States should elect to defend Laos and defeat NVN. If, on the other hand, the United States were unwilling to assume a national commitment to defend Laos and defeat NVN, US military actions in Laos in response to NVN course of action 2 should be limited to increased air interdiction of base areas and lines of communications in Laos and close air support for defending FAR units. If the actions implied in NVN course of action 3 occurred (PL/NVA attempt to overrun Laos quickly), the situation would differ from that envisaged for NVN course of action 2, principally with respect to the time available for decision making, diplomatic exchange, and military response. Military actions which might be considered in this situation are those in Appendix B not preempted by enemy initiatives. If the North Vietnamese attempt to overrun Laos quickly, it is unlikely that even greatly increased US air support of RLG Forces could prevent it. Further, it would not be possible to introduce US/allied ground elements into Laos in such force as to prevent PL/NVA Forces from overrunning the country, with the possible exception of forces sufficient to defend bridgeheads across the Mekong River to cover Vientiane and some other key population centers. Subsequently, to recover Laos from the communists would require a major campaign against their forces in Laos, a campaign which would be costly and uncertain of success unless accompanied by the defeat of NVN. If such direct action is not taken, the United States must be prepared to accept communist control of Laos and the resultant substantially increased threat to Thailand and the remainder of Southeast Asia. Even if a national decision to defend Laos and defeat NVN were made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that unilateral US military action in Laos probably would not be effective in the achievement of US objectives in Southeast Asia. Unless the free nations of the area perceive the threat and respond with the full commitment of their resources, the basis for effective US intervention is missing. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to multilateral action in the common defense and to the fullest appreciation of all diplomatic measures before a resort to military alternatives, even those undertaken on a multilateral basis. We agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we should make every effort to secure diplomatic support for the integrity of Laos and should attempt to obtain multilateral support for any actions we might take. For this purpose, in addition to such diplomatic initiatives previously suggested by ISA, two actions with regard to the RTG might be considered: (1) we could furnish the RTAF with as much training as it can usefully absorb to take over a part of air-support actions in Laos, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] on the same basis as the US now operates; and (2) we could furnish the Thai armed forces with increased amounts of equipment when it becomes excess to our needs in South Vietnam to serve in part as a deterrent against NVA actions against the Mekong Valley towns. 6 Both actions would serve the additional purpose of helping to dispose the Thai favorably to grant the US access to Thai facilities should this be desired in a post-Vietnam context. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the applicability of the military actions outlined in the Appendices hereto can only be determined in the light of all the circumstances obtaining at the time of the decision. Nevertheless, it is their intention to continue their appraisal of these contingencies. We believe that the foregoing assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff offers a sound basis for further consideration of this problem. Dick Steadman’s office will continue to be the focal point for DOD participation in the further development of a report for the White House. Appropriate OSD and Joint Staff members are available whenever Mac Godley is ready to proceed. Sincerely, Paul C. Warnke 1 Source: Department of State,EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret. 2 See Document 385 . 3 Document 389 . 4 The JCS made this analysis in JCSM–650–68, “Contingency Planning for Enemy Action in Laos,” memorandum to Secretary of Defense Clifford, October 30. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1–(381 Laos), 1968) 5 Attached, but not printed. 6 At this point there was a marginal note in an unknown hand: “Lao are as reluctant for a Thai embrace as the North Vietnamese for a Chinese.” 393. Airgram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 393. Airgram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Washington, November 18, 1968. A–407 SUBJECT Assessment of U.S. Policy for Laos REF a) 11 FAM 212.3–5 2 b) Vientiane 10177 3 There is attached the Country Team Assessment of U.S. policy for Laos in which I concur. The Summary of this Assessment is as follows: Summary Both wars in Laos (in the North/Northeast and in the Panhandle/Ho Chi Minh Trail area) have maintained their see-saw character during the past nine months. Political restraints operating on both of the contest-ants and their supporters make improbable the achievement of a decisive military victory by either side. The Lao political scene during this period has been relatively stable with nearly all of the major civilian and military power centers supporting Souvanna Phouma, who continued to enjoy US/USSR support as well. The enemy has signalled that it has been preparing for political competition should the talks at Paris lead to an end to military hostilities in Laos. The wars constituted a substantial drain on the small Lao economy, both financially and from the standpoint of manpower. Some progress toward self-sufficiency was made, however, and the production of rice and lumber increased in the secure area. The U.S. continued to bear most of the economic burden of keeping Laos solvent, assisted mainly by Japan, France, Great Britain and Australia. The outlook for Laos during the next twelve months is directly related to progress or lack thereof at the Paris peace talks. Lack of progress would probably not have significant effect upon the conduct and result of the wars in Laos. The economy would progress only in the secure areas and the economic burden for Laos’ friends would be about the same. The political situation would show signs of strain, however, as the Lao will to continue the war began to erode and the effectiveness of Souvanna’s neutralist policies called into question. To achieve its goal in Laos (a viable, neutral, independent buffer state whose existence will reduce the risk of direct confrontation between North Vietnam and/or China on the one hand, and Thailand on the other, thereby diminishing the possibility of further U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia) the U.S. would need to reassure the Lao of the firmness of our policy and of our resolve to see them through. The U.S. would also continue its efforts to persuade other nations, particularly in Asia, to share the burden even more. If the Paris peace talks were to achieve a cease-fire in South Vietnam but not in Laos during the next twelve months, we would not expect the basic character of the wars in Laos to change, despite the consequent increased availability of NVN troops for duty in Laos. This judgment derives from the assumption that the existing political considerations which deter the NVN/PL from moving dramatically to the Mekong, despite their probable, current capability to do so, would continue to operate in the new situation. This assumption would be reinforced if Hanoi, which has shown that it can be sensitive to world opinion, decided that agreeing to a cease-fire in Vietnam while at the same time stepping up military activities in Laos would be an unacceptably inconsistent public posture. Although the economic situation in Laos would not be significantly affected by a cease-fire in SVN, the political pulse here would certainly quicken. The prospect of possibly imminent peace would goad the friendly Lao into a semblance of unity as they prepared to compete politically with the Pathet Lao. Significant Lao political elements (primarily rightists and military), however, would probably seek solutions that did not involve integration of the PL into the government. Various ethnic tribal groups would seek to assure that their interests were considered in any future arrangements. Every nation with an interest in Laos would reassess its policies. The NVN/PL for their part would take steps to refurbish their political position. They would propose political formulas for settlement which would, if accepted, considerably enhance their political power and prestige. Cessation of U.S. bombing in Laos would be one of their main goals and they could probably focus sufficient public attention on this issue to force the RLG to ask for cessation in return for a PL promise to enter into “serious” negotiations. In all, it would be an active, delicate and trying political period, which would demand of the U.S. the utmost in flexibility, resourcefulness, skill and energy. We would very likely continue to support Souvanna Phouma as holding out the best hope for the various Lao factions. We would take all steps necessary to ensure that the agreement bringing peace to Laos was based upon the Geneva Accords of 1962. If the Paris peace talks were to end hostilities in both Vietnam and Laos during the next twelve months, pressures would be strong to scale down the opposing military forces. The Lao military would insist upon retaining at least sufficient force, including its guerrilla capability, to overcome decisively any Lao-based unrest. The most important international political problem would be that of ensuring that all NVN elements departed Laos and that means were devised to prevent any significant re-infiltration. Internally, the warring factions would agree upon a formula for settlement which would be fragile at best and might in fact result in only the appearance of a settlement. There would be a period of very difficult adjustment to the new circumstances. Lao economic prospects would brighten as the reduced cost of the Armed Forces, the release of manpower and increased production of foreign exchange earners and of import substitutes (lumber, rice, tin, etc.) augured for eventual basic self-sufficiency. Great flexibility and caution would be required of the United States during this period. We would have to eliminate activities that could be reasonably interpreted as violating Lao neutrality and yet retain sufficient presence to be able to assist Laos in the ways the agreement will require. The prospect of a “permanent” peace in Laos should not, however, lull our sensitivity to the enemy’s ultimate aim of taking over Laos and we should be prepared to reverse rapidly the reduction of RLG Armed Forces as well as of our own presence in Laos should the enemy reveal his disregard for the agreement. The retention of some bases in Thailand would be required for this purpose. W.H. Sullivan [Here follows an 18-page enclosure entitled “U.S. Policy Assessment—Laos.”] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 LAOS–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, DIA, London, Moscow, and Tokyo. 2 This Foreign Affairs Manual requirement stipulated year end assessments from posts. 3 Document 391 . 394. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McConnell) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 394. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McConnell) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 1 Washington, November 20, 1968. CM-3776–68 SUBJECT Status of Air Interdiction in Laos (S) 1. During our meeting on 18 November, you requested a report on the status of our interdiction program in Laos. 2. (S) During the summer interdiction campaign in North Vietnam a strategy of impeding logistic flow by heavy saturation of selected LOC choke points was initiated. The terrain in the southern panhandle of NVN was particularly suitable to such a strategy as all logistics destined for Laos and SVN had to be channeled through approximately six key points. 3. (S) This same strategy is desirable but not as easily adaptable to the geography of Laos. There are few roads from NVN through Laos that can be entirely closed by aerial bombardment, due to more readily available by-passes and alternative routings. Consequently, in order to realize an effective degree of interdiction, it is necessary to commit a large number of attack and Arc Light aircraft against the entire LOC network. These strike forces (approximately 12,000 sorties per month) will operate in a closely integrated air campaign, the concept of which was forwarded to you on 16 October as “The Northeast Monsoon Plan.” This plan was initiated on 15 November 1968. 4. (S) The Northeast Monsoon Plan prescribes a concentrated, intensified air campaign designed to bring maximum pressure against the enemy LOC in Laos. The essence of this plan is a quantitative increase in sorties and qualitative improvements through further improvements in responsive command and control systems, strategic placement and coordinated monitoring of seismic and acoustic sensors (Igloo White), use of improved air munitions, and integration of other reconnaissance and intelligence resources. The requirement for improved air interdiction munitions in support of the campaign was submitted by CINCPAC, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and forwarded to you by JCSM–668–68, dated 7 November 1968. 2 A significant increase in sorties began on 1 November (Enclosure); 3 however, the qualitative improvement in munitions and sensors will be a gradual process as improved items complete development and test and reach production. 5. (S) Since the Northeast Monsoon Plan was not activated until 15 November 1968 it is too early to obtain a useful evaluation. The limited statistics in the Enclosure reflect the period 1–17 November 1968. 4 This was a shakedown phase of the campaign and the results during this period cannot be considered criteria of effectiveness or potential. It should also be noted that the interdiction campaign is designed to destroy point and perishable area targets such as bridges, fords, truck parks, POL, and supply dumps as well as vulnerable road segments and trucks. 6. (S) MACV has a program for comprehensive evaluation of interdiction effectiveness in Laos. As the campaign progresses and a meaningful evaluation can be made, you will be informed. John P. McConnell 1 Source: Washington National Record Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 0385.1, 1968. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Clifford saw it. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 According to the first enclosure, “Sortie Rate Comparisons” from October 1967 through November 1968, attached but not printed, there were 5,119 sorties in October 1968 and a projected 12,000 in November 1968. 4 The second enclosure, attached but not printed, listed the types of targets destroyed or damaged during November 1–17. 395. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 395. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, November 26, 1968, 1220Z. 10490. 1. Prime Minister Souvanna yesterday asked me to have our aircraft take special precautions to avoid inadvertent attacks against Chinese road building crews in northern Laos. He said that there is just enough substance to “agreement” which ChiComs made with General Phoumi Nosavan in 1962 to give them legitimate pretext for doing this work as “aid” to Laos. 2. In general, his attitude is to “avoid poking the animals” while waiting to see exactly what the Chinese intentions are. He is most mindful of constant Peking reference to its 700 million citizens who will avenge “wrongs” done to them. 3. On other hand, Souvanna would like regular photography run of this area, in order to watch Chinese activity. He is especially interested in observing whether Chinese attempt to go beyond Muong Sai or Nam Tha in their construction work. 4. He speculates that Chinese may have been moved to pick up Houmi’s road building invitation by concern that North Vietnamese construction of Route 19 westward from Dien Bien Phu was intended to bring area along Chinese border under direct control of Hanoi. Heretofore, North Vietnamese have had to supply their forces in Nam Tha area from China. 2 5. Comment: We will send operational message through other channels requesting Air Force to institute limitations suggested para 1. Entire area north of QD line and west of TJ square is already off limits. Small sector will be added to encompass Muong Sai. Sullivan 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos 1/68–1/69. Secret; Limdis. Marshall Wright sent this telegram to Rostow under cover of a memorandum of November 27. Responding to an earlier question to him and Robert Ginsburgh, Wright wrote Rostow, “it is not what we should do but what we can do. The answer, in Ginsburgh’s judgement is ‘nothing’.” In a postscript, Wright noted that Ginsburgh asked that he amend his view to read, “Nothing, unless we want to go to war with China.” (Ibid.) 2 On December 2 the Central Intelligence Agency issued an Intelligence Information Cable commenting on the motives behind Chinese road construction in northern Laos. It reported that in early October 1968 a military force of 3,000 armed Chinese began construction of a major new road from the Sino-Lao border to a point connecting with a roadbed leading to the Mekong River 30 kilometers from Thailand. The CIA suggested that this might indicate Chinese sponsorship of the Thai subversive movement as well as control of Pathet Lao elements closest to China’s border. (Ibid.) 396. Paper Prepared by the Department of State 396. Paper Prepared by the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. US NEGOTIATING POSITION CONCERNING LAOS Summary I. Objectives in Laos (Tab A) 2 A. United States: Since 1962, the United States has consistently supported the aims of the Geneva Agreements of 1962 to perpetuate Laos as a neutral national political entity serving as a buffer between Communist and non-Communist Asia. B. Hanoi: There are two views of NVN objectives with respect to Laos: (1) that Hanoi desires to control all of Laos; (2) that Hanoi’s interests in Laos are limited to its value in seeking to control South Vietnam. The evidence seems to support the second view. C. China: The present Chinese leadership probably regards NVN as a transmittal belt for wars of national liberation in SEA. Peking will probably press Hanoi to move vigorously in Laos so as to facilitate Communist control of the country and broaden support for insurgent efforts in Thailand. D. USSR: The USSR apparently continues to regard the Geneva Accords of 1962 as offering the best means of attaining its purposes, and has consistently reaffirmed its support for the Accords. The neutralist solution gives the Soviet Union considerable flexibility and interposes a barrier to Chinese expansion in SEA. II. Implications in Laos of Various Political Settlements in SVN (Tab B) The future of Laos in the post-war period will, to a large extent, depend on the type of settlement achieved in SVN; the most favorable terms for the US would be inclusion of provisions for a return to the Geneva Accords of 1962. However, the future of Laos will be determined more by what NVN intentions are for Laos than by any particular kind of settlement in SVN. III. Diplomatic Actions During Negotiations (Tab C) A. US: The initial negotiating position of the US should consistently and publicly tie our goals of NVN withdrawal from SVN to our goal of NVN withdrawal from Laos and should link the withdrawal of US forces from SVN with compliance by all parties with the 1962 Geneva Accords. If in the end we conclude an agreement for the mutual withdrawal of NVN and US forces from SVN without reference to a similar withdrawal from Laos and without agreement on implementing the Geneva Accords of 1962, we probably cannot expect more than a maintenance of the present division in Laos and a scale down or cessation of hostilities. This can be sustained only if we are successful in deterring North Vietnam by inducing Asian and other states to maintain intense and prolonged diplomatic pressure against further NVN expansion. The threat of US or Thai military actions can, to some extent, also deter further NVN expansion. A scale down or a cessation of hostilities must be part of this course, both because the RLG cannot sustain its present level of hostilities indefinitely and because it would be extremely difficult for the US to provide necessary tactical air support after fighting in Vietnam was stopped. B. NVN: It appears likely that Hanoi will keep its military activity in Laos in low key during the Paris negotiations and confine its activity to controlling such Laotian territory as is necessary to conduct military operations in SVN. IV. Possible US Military Actions in Laos During and After Negotiations (Tab D) If Hanoi continues to confine its objectives to control of such Laotian territory as is necessary to support operations in SVN, the level of US/RLG military activity in Laos should not increase. If, during the course of negotiations, Hanoi attempts to extend its domination over Laos, a selective increase in US military actions might be required although we could not prevent Hanoi from capturing most of Laos. V. Post Settlement Laos (Tab E) A. Hanoi’s Objective: At a minimum, the DRV will wish to consolidate its control over the area it now holds in Laos, and solidify the trappings of an “independent” Pathet Lao. Maintenance of NVN/PL control of northern Laos and areas contiguous to NVN will remain more important to Hanoi than the maintenance within Laos of a large military force. Having waited out US withdrawal, Hanoi could be expected to use its ample resources to assist the Pathet Lao to press for full control of Laos. B. Soviet Objective: The USSR probably sees support for a coalition government as the best way to both restrain expanding Chinese influence and to avoid a larger conflict, possibly involving themselves. There is some likelihood, however, that the Soviets would mainly follow Hanoi’s lead, accepting the risks. C. Chinese Objective: The Chinese probably fear that a Laos buffer zone might turn into a semi-permanent block to the extension of Chinese influence. Accordingly, Peking can be expected to urge Hanoi to take over all of Laos rapidly, using whatever military forces are required. D. The Lao Government: The RLG, as in the past, will remain almost totally dependent on outside support from its friends and restraint on the part of its enemies. There is good reason to hope that with adequate outside economic and military assistance, the RLG can be sustained as the recognized authority in areas under its present control. E. US Objectives: US objectives in Laos could be achieved through a reaffirmation of the Geneva Accords. If we are not to create serious misgivings in Thailand, however, it may be necessary to underscore with our actions and military posture outside of Laos’ borders our determination to see that a neutral Laos is preserved in fact as well as in name. VI. Recommendations 1. At Paris, continue to link DRV withdrawal from SVN to DRV withdrawal from Laos. At the appropriate point, state that US withdrawals from SVN will be contingent upon DRV compliance with the 1962 Accords. 2. With Souvanna, urge him to take the lead in both highlighting the Laos problem and possibly in calling for a reconvening of the 1962 Geneva conferees. At some point, we may wish to separate the Laos and Vietnam negotiations. 3. With the Thais, continue to reassure them of our interest and commitment to their country’s independence. Discuss with them organizing greater Asian support for Laotian neutrality. 4. With the Soviets, begin a dialogue to remind them of our responsibilities in Laos and to suggest the consequences of an attempt by Hanoi to take over Laos before or after a settlement in South Vietnam. 5. With interested Asian Nations, try to focus their attention on Laos (where they may be more sympathetic to us than on Vietnam), and try to get them to organize an “Asian solution” to the Laos problem. 6. With respect to military actions during negotiations, continue military operations at their present level but be prepared to intensify air and ground operations, accompanied by increased Thai activities in Laos, if Hanoi attempts to extend its domination. [Here follows the remainder of the paper.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Laos EE (1), 10/67–12/68. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was apparently prepared by EAP as a part of the interagency reassessment of policy toward Laos described in Documents 392 and 389 . 2 The Tabs, comprising 25 pages, were attached but not printed. 397. Telegram From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) 397. Telegram From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) 1 Vientiane, December 3, 1968, 0553Z. 30553Z. Ref: CINCPAC 202321Z Nov 68. 2 1. Reftel proposes enlargement of Prairie Fire operating zone at Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. It has been examined here in considerable detail and with some anguish. It causes problems of a significant nature which have their roots in the very complex arrangements we have worked out for Prairie Fire over the years. 2. Fundamental to these arrangements has been the necessity to coordinate Prairie Fire operations on one side of the line and CAS guerrilla operations on the other. This coordination is important not only to avoid inadvertent fire fights between these different units operating independently, but also because the roles and missions of these units are basically different. 3. The CAS units have two distinct roles and never mix the two. They are either passive intelligence teams which deliberately avoid contact with the enemy or else they are special guerrilla teams which carry out pre-planned raids and ambushes. It is our experience that these two types of operation can not be carried on in the same zone. The guerrilla actions always produce a reaction which would have the effect of sweeping intelligence teams out of their operating zone. Hence, we pick the areas for intelligence operations away from the areas where guerrillas operate. 4. Prairie Fire teams, on the other hand, combine both passive intelligence and active military operations. Even when the primary mission of the team is described as intelligence, we note that the mission usually involves at least one fire fight. Therefore, we consider them, on balance, to be essentially guerrilla rather than intelligence units. 5. As you may be aware, there is currently a special U.S. Intelligence Board action (involving CIA-State-Defense-JCS reps in Washington) which is assigning intelligence priorities in the Lao Panhandle. CAS Vientiane is under activities to measure North Vietnamese movements in critical areas. These involve certain points inside North Viet Nam and other points in Laos near the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. 6. Despite much juggling of operating zones to accommodate commando hunt bombing objectives, CAS has just completed a realignment of its intelligence teams in these critical areas to meet the Washington objectives. These teams operate in those same areas in which Prairie Fire has expressed an interest. For the reasons outlined above, it is not possible to mix Prairie Fire operations into this terrain. 7. On the other hand, at Washington request, CAS Vientiane has also established intelligence teams inside the Prairie Fire zone at the point where Route 1036 enters Laos. This is a precaution against the possibility that the North Vietnamese may decide to shift their pattern of truck traffic in order to take maximum advantage of shelter in North Viet Nam rather than exposing it to attack in Laos in the northern stretches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 8. This move into Prairie Fire territory has been coordinated with MACSOG, and causes little problem because Prairie Fire has not operated in this area for some time. If Prairie Fire currently has spare assets because it has terminated strata and other operations in North Viet Nam, this general area, which has been dormant for some time, would seem a logical place for them to be put to work. Although we would have to clear the matter with Washington, we would nevertheless be willing to entertain a request that the coverage of this particular territory be turned back as a Prairie Fire, rather than a CAS, responsibility. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, No. 1944. Top Secret. Repeated to [ less than 1 line of text not declassified ], JCS, COMUSMACV, and CIA. This telegram was not sent over Department of State communications channels. 2 Not found, but summarized below. 398. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 398. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Honolulu, December 11, 1968, 0320Z. 110320Z. Prairie Fire (U). A. CINCPAC 070502Z Dec 68 (Notal); B. COMUSMACV 16836/090158Z Dec 68 (Notal); C. CINCPAC 020910Z Nov 68; 2 D. AmEmb Vientiane 10045/030642Z Nov 68; 3 E.CINCPAC 202321Z Nov 68; 4 F.CAS Vientiane 030553Z Dec 68; 5 G. COMUSMACV 16905/101102Z Dec 68 (BOM) (PASEP) (Notal).4 1. Ref A cited an exchange of messages (Refs C thru F) with Ambassador Sullivan concerning a COMUSMACV and CINCPAC proposal to expand the Prairie Fire area of operations (PFAO) to include the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. Ambassador Sullivan nonconcurred. Ref A further requested Abe’s [General Creighton Abrams] comments concerning the effectiveness of present air operations in Laos and the feasibility of seeking authority to conduct Prairie Fire operations in the proposed area on a case by case basis. Ref B strongly recommended that authority be obtained to employ PF assets without restriction in the proposed areas around the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. 2. Ambassador Sullivan’s objections as expressed in Refs D and F and our comments follow: A. Ambassador Sullivan stated that operations conducted in the positive control area (PCA) will have to be limited and, therefore have optimal estimated effective returns for the risk involved. Ambassador Sullivan stated he had pulled CAS assets out of these areas to permit greater latitude of air operations and did not intend to reverse this procedure for Prairie Fire. Comment: Prairie Fire operations in these areas will comply with PCA rules. Prairie Fire insertions and air operations in proposed areas can be coordinated as they are now in the present PFAO. The interdiction effort we are making in Laos should be the maximum we can devise and target selection is an absolutely vital part of this program. The value of Prairie Fire teams is that they afford a real time target acquisition, reporting and exploitation capability which CAS teams do not possess. The U.S. led Prairie Fire teams can move quickly to and from areas, direct air strikes on targets on opportunity through secure voice communications (PRC-77 and KY–38), perform ground operations against selected targets, emplace mines and sensors, conduct wiretap operations, seize and evacuate prisoners, and report critical intelligence information. Another major advantage is that both ground and air operations will be controlled by a single headquarters. What is required immediately is U.S. led personnel on the ground that can search beneath the jungle canopy, uncover truck parking areas, locate portering points, identify road by-passes, pinpoint troop concentrations and report these findings directly to the FAC in an understandable language using familiar terminologies. This is the kind of ground-to-air communication and coordination that is urgently required and essential to effective interdiction operations. B. Ambassador Sullivan expressed a concern for the political sensitivity of additional U.S. personnel in Laos, stating that this could result in jeopardizing our present operational understandings if an unauthorized ground operation were exposed. Comment: The proposed PF areas are under NVA rather than FAR control. The NVA has consistently denied its use of Laos and it is highly unlikely that PF operations would be surfaced by the NVA. C. Ambassador Sullivan stated that he does not mix CAS road watch teams (which conduct passive intelligence) and special guerrilla teams (which carry out pre-planned raids and ambushes). Guerrilla actions cause the enemy to react and sweep the intelligence teams from their zones. He indicated that PF teams, while having an intelligence mission, are primarily guerrilla and should not operate in the same areas as CAS road watch teams. Comment: Concur that PF and CAS teams should not operate in the same area. In view of the benefits to be gained by Prairie Fire operations, I support Abe in strongest terms, the objective must be to gather the best possible targeting information. The threat to his command requires it. This is substantiated by the fact that the Lao Panhandle enemy logistics activity since 1 Nov 68 has reflected a significant increase in intensity. It is estimated that enemy vehicle movements southbound in the Lao Panhandle have moved 300 short tons per day. The Arc Light and TAC air efforts alone have not been able to stop this traffic. A maximum effort is called for, of which the PFAO expansion is an integral part. 3. An additional factor bearing on this request is the significant increase in NVA/VC air defense activity in Laos. The annual dry-season increase in NVN anti-aircraft capabilities in the Lao Panhandle is far greater than that of the past years. This trend is expected to continue, especially along primary supply routes. Communist air defenses in Laos still rely for the most part on the 37mm AA gun but a considerable increase in smaller-caliber automatic weapons and larger-caliber guns has been noted. The longer we delay full exploitation of our air-to-ground capability, including PF initiated strikes, the more difficult it will become to penetrate these areas. 4. Additional detailed supporting rationale is contained in Ref G. 5. Recommend that authority be obtained as expeditiously as possible, to permit expansion of the PFAO as outlined in Ref E. 6. Very respectfully and warm regards. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, No. 1984. Top Secret; Limdis; Eyes Only. Repeated to Abrams and Sullivan. 2 References A–C have not been found, but are summarized in the text below. 3 Not found. 4 Not found, but summarized below. 5 Document 397 . 399. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Air Force (Brown) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 399. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Air Force (Brown) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 1 Washington, December 11, 1968. SUBJECT Effectiveness of Air Operations in Laos In my note on the above subject last Friday I promised you my thoughts on the effectiveness of our air operations in Laos during November. Our tabulation of the effectiveness, as compared with that of Systems Analysis, is as follows. (SA figures are in parenthesis; where there is no number, their paper had none.) Truck Sightings and Destruction in Laos Nov 67 Nov 68 Trucks sighted 4267 (4249) 4562 (3219) 3 Trucks destroyed 737 (680) 2 322 (199) Trucks damaged 97 — 105 — Attack sorties 4399 (4399) 13464 4 (12500) Trucks destroyed/sighted (%) 17.3 (16.0) 7.1 (6.2) Trucks destroyed/damaged/sighted (%) 19.5 — 9.4 — Trucks destroyed/100 sorties 16.8 (15.5) 2.4 (1.6) Trucks destroyed/damaged/100 sorties 19.0 — 3.2 — Several points need to be made relative to the above statistics: 1. Using destroyed/damaged estimates rather than just destroyed doubles the effectiveness against trucks; but the figure is still roughly only one-sixth that of last year. 2. The objective, of interdiction operations—impeding the flow of materiel to SVN—can be accomplished in several ways, e.g., truck kills, creating choke points. A major facet of current operations, Commando Hunt (accounting for over 30% of the above Air Force attack sorties), has as its objective impedance of flow into and through the system, rather than killing trucks. The 7AF preliminary estimate is that November operations impeded up to 75% of the logistics throughput to SVN. A major contributor to this effectiveness was the closure for a large portion of the month of the two major choke points of Ban La Boy (south of Ban Karai Pass) and Ban Pha Nop (south of Mu Gia Pass). Even if 7AF figures are off by 100%, they estimate there would still have been insufficient throughput to enable major stockpiling in SVN. 3. There may be fewer trucks operating in Laos this year than last. Sightings have remained relatively constant, whereas both FAC and reconnaissance sorties each have increased about 50% (from a combined total of 1905 to 2812). Thus, there probably has been more double-counting of trucks this year. 7AF believes, because of their estimate on reduced throughput, that truck sightings this year largely are limited to trucks shuttling within Laos. Any reduction in truck operations could have several possible explanations. It may be, as 7AF believes (and our intelligence tends to confirm) that the choke points have effectively reduced the inflow of trucks. Another possibility is that the NVN by choice are using Laos less. With their newly achieved immunity, it seems logical they would want to reduce their vulnerability by employing NVN routes to just north of the DMZ, then end-running or crossing it. There is at present, however, no road network to support such an endeavor by them of any magnitude; nor does our intelligence indicate any such effort at this time. 4. A very large percent of our recorded truck sightings and kills (almost 90%) in Laos accrue at night. Operations during the day concentrate on lucrative truck parks that Task Force Alpha sensors uncover during the night. The results of this effort are hard to assess in specific truck kills because of limited BDA. My own conclusions after reviewing the data are twofold. First, it is too early after the bombing halt to make firm judgments about the nature, extent and effectiveness of our interdiction operations in the new environment. Looking solely at truck kills, we did not do so well. On the other hand, if the 7AF estimate on the reduction in throughput is borne out, our air operations should be judged successful. It will take a little longer for us to sort these things out and adjust to the new situation. It may develop that the NVN demeanor and reduced activity will show we have too much air power in Laos to employ it effectively. Alternatively, NVN activity may require all the air power we have, if not in Laos, in SVN along the infiltration routes or, though we hope it proves unnecessary, in renewed operations in the north. My second point relates to the point in my note of last Friday about prejudging the nature of the war during 1969. 5 I recognize and fully support the goal of holding the FY 70 budget to the lowest possible figure. Since, however, any planned phasedown of operations in SEA included in the President’s budget almost certainly will become public knowledge once it reaches Congress, I believe we should carefully weigh the impact of such revelations on the negotiations in Paris, on our SEA allies, and on the course of operations in SVN itself. Finally, I cannot resist pointing out that no more than four months ago, an SA paper in their monthly SEA Analysis Report announced that truck kills were not a good measure of effectiveness, because what counts is whether enough materiel gets through, and besides there is an almost infinite truck reservoir in China and the USSR (as there is). How quickly views change! We will continue to look into this matter and keep you informed of any significant developments that would provide a more firm basis for making any force structure decisions. Harold Brown 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 385.1, 1968. Secret. A note on the source text indicates Nitze saw it. 3 SA monthly figures were projected on basis of 1–22 Nov 68 data. Air Force figures are latest available DIA estimates. [Footnote in the source text.] 2 We have been unable to duplicate the Systems Analysis figure of 680. If the intent was to consider as “DIA evaluated” the “destroyed” figure reached by taking 75% of the reported kill and 25% of the reported damaged, the figure would be 577. Our figures eliminate duplication but do not apply the formula. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 9691 AF tactical aircraft; 661 B–52; 2352 USN; 760 USMC. Total agrees with OSD statistical summary for November, with addition of 661 B–52 sorties. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 Not further identified. 400. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 400. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Honolulu, December 21, 1968, 0403Z. 210403Z. Threat in Laos (U). A. JCSM–650–68 of 30 Oct 68—Contingency Planning for Enemy Actions in Laos (S). 2 1. The renewed enemy offensive at Ban Tha Teng increases [our] concern over North Vietnamese Communist designs. The enemy’s new aggressiveness there further emphasizes that Laos represents two geographic fingers, one reaching south to Cambodia flanking northern South Vietnam; the other pressing against northern Thailand. 2. The attacks at Tha Teng and the reported build-up against Attopeu and Saravane could presage a dramatic change of Communist policy; all three areas are west of the “de facto Geneva line” of the 1962 agreements. These latest maneuvers could lead to the acquisition of new territory in Laos, threatening Vientiane’s existing control in the southern panhandle. Additionally, the Bolovens Plateau is the key terrain for all U.S. operations plans in the panhandle. It is equally as important to the Communists. 3. Thus far, the main strategic value of Laos has been as a corridor area. Communist forces are now increasingly active in areas which are of relatively minor import to the LOC/logistics system serving South Vietnam. In the event of reduced NVA participation in SVN, Hanoi could be expected to turn its attention westward. 4. The following are likely enemy objectives: A. Seizure of the Bolovens Plateau. B. Coercion of the Royal Lao Government into abandoning Saravane and Attopeu. C. Expansion of operations in order to convince the United States that continued presence in Southeast Asia is futile. D. Enhancement of Communist efforts against a primary free world stronghold in SEA—Thailand. 5. Current enemy actions in Laos could foretell an initial attempt toward achievement of all of the foregoing objectives. As the enemy’s intentions become more clear, it may well be that, as pointed out in Ref A, a complete reevaluation of U.S. position and strategy in Southeast Asia will be required. Hopefully, such a reevaluation would result in a favorable decision to implement the military actions outlined in Ref A. 6. Very respectfully and warm regards. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, No. 2058. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Abrams and Sullivan. 2 See footnote 4, Document 392 . 401. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 401. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1 Vientiane, December 31, 1968, 0545Z. 11150. Eyes only for Godley from Sullivan. Ref: State 293220. 2 1. Useful additional point for you to make in Prairie Fire meeting concerns marginality of effect which could be expected from MACV proposals. As we read current record of truck kills and interdiction effort on Ho Chi Minh Trail, air strikes are destroying approximately fifteen per cent of throughput. Even wildest Air Force claims do not exceed twenty per cent. 2. By inserting Prairie Fire teams under the trees in the two passes, it might be possible to raise the level of destruction a few percentage points, say to eighteen or nineteen per cent. Question has to be whether these few percentage points are worth the certain entrapments of teams, losses of lives and heavy propaganda risks. 3. Finally, it should be understood that neither of these areas can be serviced from current launch bases. Mu Gia will require a base in Thailand (probably NKP) and Ban Karai a forward site on the Bolovens Plateau. This makes this marginal effort a major peninsular move. 4. Ne illegitumi carburundum. Sullivan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Dept. “Nodis” was handwritten on the source text. 2 In telegram 293220, December 30, Godley informed Sullivan, that the Department of Defense raised the issue of using Prairie Fire Teams in Mu Gia and Ban Karai pass areas. (Ibid.) Index Index Abrams, Gen. Creighton W., 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Agency for International Development (AID), 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 215 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 312 ] Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 193 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 252 ] B–52s, 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 320 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] Civilians in Laos, use of U.S., 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 59 ] C– 123s , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 107 ] Coordination of, overall, 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 251 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 251 ] Counter-insurgency mission, 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 335 ] Cuba, electronic countermeasures on U–2s over, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] Defoliants, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 204 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] Effectiveness of, 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 399 ] -786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 131 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] First proposals for, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] F– 100s , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Friendly and unauthorized targets hit, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 225 ] Ho Chi Minh Trail, inability to locate, 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 187 ] -372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Illustrative military moves to demonstrate U.S. intentions, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 71 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 140 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Laotian pilots replacing Thai pilots, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] MCNaughton-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 239 ] Napalm, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Navigational aids, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 278 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] -582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 296 ] Northeast Monsoon Plan, 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 394 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] Operations: Barrel, Roll, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 153 ] -312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 171 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 175 ] -356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] Restrictions, 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] -710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] U.S. position, 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] -317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Commando Lava, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 289 ] -581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 305 ] Cricket Operation, 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] Dye Marker, 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 310 ] Popeye, 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 274 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] Practice Nine, 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 288 ] Shining Brass, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 194 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 277 ] -558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 279 ] Steel Tiger, 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Tiger Hound, 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Press, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 158 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] Problems and possibilities, 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 123 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 123 ] Propeller vs. jet aircraft, 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 326 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 337 ] Reconnaissance over Laos, photographic, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 99 ] Military air escorts, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 92 ] Press, handling the, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] -176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] RF– 8 jet shot down, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] -148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Reconnaissance over North Vietnam, photographic, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 52 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Restrictions, Sharp’s request for less, 555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 276 ] Resupply aircraft, interception of hostile, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 198 ] Royal Lao Air Force, 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Rules of engagement, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 129 ] -266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] Search and rescue missions, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 176 ] SLAM concept, 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 252 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 286 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] Souvanna Phouma’s parameters, 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] -370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 186 ] Strike resources, 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] -729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] Symington, concerns about, 434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Trilateral Vientiane-RLG-Saigon talks, 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] -412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 203 ] T– 28s , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 160 ] Civilians in Laos, use of U.S., 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 101 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 198 ] Helicopter incident in Laos, 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 122 ] Search and rescue missions, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 124 ] -263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 128 ] Triangle Operation, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] U.S. planes, using, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 91 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 92 ] U.S. position, 266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 138 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 277 ] -558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 277 ] Westmoreland assessments, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 128 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 128 ] Akalovsky, Alexander, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 149 ] Aldrich, George H., 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 456 n [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 464 n [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] Alexander, Clif, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Allgemeine Zeitung , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 158 ] Alphand, Hervé, 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] Alsop, Stewart, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] Amkha, Gen., 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] Andrews, Gen., 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 348 ] Anthis, Gen. Rollen, 6 n [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] Armour, Norman, 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] Armstrong, Oscar V., 534 n [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] ARVN. See Vietnam, Republic of . Arzac, Daniel, 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 277 ] Asian Development Bank, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 259 ] Ausland, John C., 611 n [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 305 ] Australia, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 162 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 162 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] Ayub Khan, Muhammad, 438 n [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Ball, George W., 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 121 n [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 414 n [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] Civilian pilots in Laos, use of U.S., 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] Coup d’état in Laos, 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Resupply aircraft, interception of hostile, 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 198 ] Barbis, George, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 237 n [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 252 n [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 277 n [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 316 n [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 356 n [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 413 n [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 427 n [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 459 n [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] Barnett, Bob, 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Barrell Roll. See Operations under Air war in Laos . Bell, David E., 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 202 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 215 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Berger, Samuel D., 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 263 ] Blackburn, Col., 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 194 ] Blouin, Rear Adm. F. J., 356 n [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 459 n [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 239 ] Board of National Estimates, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] Bond, Gen., 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Boon Choo, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 160 ] Bounleut Saycocie, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 266 ] Boun Oum, Prince, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] Bounpone, Gen., 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Bowman, R. C., 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 230 ] Boyce, Alice, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 124 ] Brown, Gen. George S., 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 374 ] Brown, Harold, 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 399 ] -786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 8 n [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 33 n [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 55 n [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 89 n [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 153 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 316 n [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Air war in Laos, 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 158 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 434 n [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] U.S. planes, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 85 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 93 ] Coup d’état in Laos, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] -46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 30 ] Defuzing Laos, 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] -176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] Helicopter incident in Laos, 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 122 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, photographic, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] Triangle Operation, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Vietnam, Laos situation related to, 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 144 ] Bundy, William, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 33 n [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 103 n [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 117 n [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 161 n [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 237 n [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 266 n [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 320 n [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 347 n [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 364 n [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 611 n [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] Air war in Laos, 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 204 ] -414 [ Pg. 414 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Barrel Roll activities, 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] -710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] U.S. planes, using, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Assistant Secretary of State, designated as, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Cambodia, conference on, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 180 ] Conference on Laos, another international, 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 180 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 180 ] Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 71 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 718 n [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 366 ] Coup d’état in Laos, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 329 n [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Eastern Laos, operations in, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 40 ] Highway project on Route 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 145 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 145 ] Infiltration routes in Laos, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 152 ] Morale in South Vietnam, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] Nixon, Souvanna Phouma’s reaction to, 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 388 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 388 ] North Vietnam, reconnaissance flights over, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 52 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] North Vietnam, U.S. military action against 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 60 ] -109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Operations, 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 356 ] Triangle, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 105 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 114 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] Pathet Lao, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] Politico-military scenarios, U.S., 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 74 ] -139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, photographic, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Route 12-a , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 42 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 42 ] Rules of engagement, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] South Vietnam, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 64 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] U.S. military action in Laos, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 116 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Bunker, Ellsworth, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 305 ] Burchinat, David A., 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 225 ] Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 78 n [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 108 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 161 ] -324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 161 ] Butler, Richard A., 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] Calhoun, John A., 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Cambodia, 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 261 ] Conference on neutrality/territorial integrity of: Bundy (William) assessments, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 180 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 180 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 182 ] Embassy South Vietnam assessments, 365 n [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Embassy Thailand assessments, 365 n [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Harriman assessments, 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Thomson assessments, 367 [ Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] U.S. position, 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 181 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] McNamara-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 201 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 201 ] Neutrality issues, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] Canada, 89 n [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] Triangle Operation, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 110 ] Cao Dai, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 55 ] Cao Van Vien, Gen., 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Carroll, George, 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Carroll, Joseph F., 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 141 ] Carter, Chester C., 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] Carter, Gen. Marshall S., 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 142 n [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 346 ] Cater, Douglass, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] -743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 776 n [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 395 ] Brown (George) as Commander of 7th Air Force, 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 374 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 374 ] Communists, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 55 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 384 ] -748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 350 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] Covert paramilitary program supported by, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] Nam Bac, Laotian forces defeated at, 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 329 ] National Assembly in Laos, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 253 ] -499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] Pathet Lao (PL), 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 304 ] Phou Pha Thi, 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] -665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Polish proposal on Laos, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 65 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 295 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 295 ] Road development in Laos, Communist, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 210 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] South Vietnam and Laos, program for, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] Successes in Laos, 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] -610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 304 ] Sullivan-Helms meeting, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 191 ] Trucks damaged/destroyed, North Vietnamese, 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 321 ] U.S. military action in Laos, 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Chadbourn, Philip H., 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 69 ] Chayes, Abram, 103 n [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 57 ] China, People’s Republic of, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 366 ] Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessment, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 108 ] Cambodian neutrality, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 269 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] India, relations with, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 189 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Johnson-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 259 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Laos, objectives in, 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 396 ] -779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 396 ] McNamara-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 201 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 201 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 67 ] Road development in Laos, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] -776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 395 ] Southeast Asian, objectives, U.S. concerns about, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 34 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] Souvanna Phouma trip to, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] Soviet Union avoiding flights over, 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 256 ] Special National Intelligence Estimate 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] U.S. military action in laos, 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 196 ] -395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 196 ] Chou En-lai, 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 189 ] Christian, George, 632 n [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] Clay, Brig. Gen. Lucius D., Jr., 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 69 ] Cleland, Col. John R.D., 316 n [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Cleveland, J. Harlan, 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Clifford, Clark, 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] Cline, Ray S., 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 210 ] Cobb, Adm. J. O., 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 337 ] Colby, William E., 8 n [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 109 n [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 121 n [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 185 n [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 304 ] Air war in Laos, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Index ] 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 152 ] CLA program for Laos and South Vietnan1, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] Contingency planning for enemy action in Laos, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] Infiltration routes in Laos, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Southeast Asia, stabilizing the situation in, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Sullivan-Helms meeting, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 191 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] Communists (see also Air war in Laos ; Pathet Lao (PL); Triangle Operation ; Vietnam, Democratic Republic of ), 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 220 ] CIA assessments, 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 384 ] -748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] CIA program for Laos and South Vietnam, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] Concessions, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 144 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 144 ] Conference on Laos, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 56 ] -102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 180 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 180 ] Dry season gains, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 344 ] -671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] Geneva Accords of 1962-Southeast Asia, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6 ] Hilsman’s view of 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6 ] Illustrative military moves to demonstrate U.S. intentions, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 71 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Kosygin-Rusk meeting, 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Military buildup, significant, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 161 ] -324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] Plain of Jars area, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 158 ] Bureau of Intelligence and Researchassess111ent, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 108 ] CIA positions, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 55 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 58 ] Civilian pilots in Laos, use of U.S., 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] Conference on Laos, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 63 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 63 ] Contingency plans for U.S. military action, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] Defuzing Laos, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] -177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Emmbassy Laos assessments, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] -86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Military air escorts, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] North Vietnam, U.S. military action against 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 60 ] -111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 67 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] RF–8 jet shot down, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] U.S. position, 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Politico-military scenarios, U.S., 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 73 ] -139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Road development in Laos, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 210 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates: SNIE 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 196 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 196 ] SNIE 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 389 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 389 ] SNIE 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 192 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] SNIE 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 350 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 64 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] U.S. military actions in Laos, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 100 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 100 ] Conference on Laos. See under Geneva Accords of 1962 Southeast Asia. Conservative forces ( see also d’etat under Souvanna, Government of National Unity under ; Forces Armees du Royaume(FAR ); Kouprasith, Gen. Abhay; Phoumi Nosavan, Gen.), 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] Cooper Chester L., 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 152 ] -312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Action course in Laos, 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 96 ] -191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] Air war in Laos, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 158 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] CIA program for Laos and South Vietnam, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, rumors of, 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Corcoran, Thomas J., 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 145 ] Cornford, F.M., 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 90 ] Coup d’etat in Laos. See under Souvanna, Government of National Unity . Cowherd, Col. Robert, 464 n [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Cuba, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] Cunningham William J., 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 146 ] Czechoslovakia, 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 383 ] Davis, Adm. J. W., 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 102 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 103 ] Davis, Richard H., 246 n [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 289 n [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Dawee, Marshall, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 160 ] Defended Village Operation, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Defense, U.S. Department of (DOD), 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 702 n [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, Popeye Operation, 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 274 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Shining Brass Operation, 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 562 n [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 279 ] Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA), 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 319 ] De Gaulle, Gen. Charles, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 133 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Denney, George C., 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 161 ] Denson, J. B., 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] DeSeabra, Jose, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] DeSilva, Peer, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Dexter,John B., 289 n [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 356 n [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 188 ] Dillon, C. Douglas, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] Directorate of National Coordination (DNC) ( see also Forces Armee du Royaume (FAR), 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] Dobrynin Anatoily, 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 350 ] Conference on Laos, 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Rusk, meeting with, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] Soviet démarche on Laos, 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 280 ] -565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 281 ] Donnelly, Dixon, 499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Drozniak, Edward, 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Dungan, Ralph, 300 n [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Regional Group, 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 378 ] -741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] Easterbrook, Gen. Ernest F., 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 123 ] Electronic countermeasures (ECM), 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] Ewing, Richard T., 78 n [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 477 n [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Fedorenko, Nikolai, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Feldman, Mark B., 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] Fitch, Alva R., 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 21 ] FitzGerald, Desmond, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Flott, Fred, 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Forces Armées du Royaume(FAR) ( see also 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 13 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] -732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 387 ] Corruption in ranks, 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] -737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Directorate of National Coordination, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] Ground forces employed in Laos, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Nam Bac, defeat at, 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] -650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 329 ] North Vietnamese military actions in Laos, 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 226 ] Phoumi Nosavan as head of, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] Prasane Operation, 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates: SNIE 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 389 ] SNIE 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] Forrestal, Michael V., 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 153 ] Air strikes in Laos using U.S. pIanes, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 91 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Coup d’état in Laos, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 31 ] -58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] Cross-border operations, 75 n [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 41 ] Defuzing Laos, 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] Harriman, interaction with, 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 85 ] Infiltration routes in Laos, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 44 ] North Vietnam, reconnaissance flights over, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, 89 n [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 8 n [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] France, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 366 ] Conference on Laos, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 57 ] Pathet Lao, cooperation with, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 133 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 67 ] Souvanna Phouma’s trip to, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 189 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Triangle Operation, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 110 ] Fraser, J.M., 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Friedman, Alvin, 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] Gaud, William S., 121 n [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Gell-Mann, Murray, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 261 ] Geneva Accords of 1962 -Southeast Asia ( see also Poland’s proposal on Laos ), 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] Air strikes in Laos using U.S. planes, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Conference on Laos, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 56 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 350 ] -686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 350 ] -691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 350 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 182 ] Embassy Thailand assessments, 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Khrushchev-Johnson communications, 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Pathet Lao-French cooperation, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 133 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Phoumi’s trip to Washington, 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 139 ] Preconditions, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 180 ] -363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 180 ] Rusk assessments, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 88 ] Soviets and Western powers, differences between, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 149 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 170 ] U.K.-Soviet relations, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 159 ] U.S. position, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 63 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Vietnam, Laos situation related to, 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 144 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 366 ] Kosygin-Rusk meeting, 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Pathet Lao, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 34 ] Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 293 ] Reassessment of U.S. policy for Laos, 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 359 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 366 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, photographic, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 82 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Rusk-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 314 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 170 ] Triangle Operation, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 105 ] Tripartite Government of National Union, restoration of, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] United Nations, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 146 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Giap. See Vo Nguyen Giap, Gen. Ginsburgh, Robert N., 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 355 ] Glenn, Edmund, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 146 ] Godley, G. McMurtrie, 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 401 ] Goldberg, Arthur J., 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Goldwater, Barry, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Goodpaster, Lt. Gen. Andrew J., 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] Green, Marshall, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 231 n [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 237 n [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 252 n [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 135 ] -278 [ Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Greene, Gen. Wallace M., Jr., 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] Greenfield, James L., 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 152 ] Gromyko, Andrei, A., 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 285 ] Rusk, meetingm with, 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] Soviet démarche on Laos, 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 285 ] United Nations, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 147 ] U.S.-Soviet relations, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 149 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 149 ] Grout, Lt. Col. Gilbert, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Habib, Philip C., 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 305 ] -613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 709 n [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Hamilton, William C., 374 n [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 477 n [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 545 n [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] Hand, Lloyd, 441 n [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Hannah, Norman B., 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Harkins, Gen. Paul D., 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 13 n [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 33 n [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] -79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] -149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 161 n [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] Air strikes in Laos using U.S. planes, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 83 ] -154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 83 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] -165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Asia, tour of, 441 n [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Cambodia, conference on neutrality/territorial integrity of, 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] North Vietnam, reconnaissance flights over, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 52 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Objectives in Laos, perceived, 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 109 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Pushkin, meetings with, 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 293 ] Souvanna Phouma, meetings with, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 189 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Soviet démarche on Laos, 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] Harris, Gen. Hunter, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 278 ] Helms, Richard, 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 142 n [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] Helmsman, Dick, 608 n [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 304 ] Henry, David Howe, II, 61 n [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 289 n [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 320 n [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] Herz, Martin F., 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 700 n [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 709 n [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 362 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 716 n [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Hilsman, Roger, Jr., 6 n [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] Ho Chi Minh, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 259 ] Ho Chi Minh Trail ( see also Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle) ), 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 319 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 211 ] Inability to locate, 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 187 ] -372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Reassessment of U.S. policy for Laos, 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 359 ] -707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 359 ] Holbrooke, Hichard C., 631 n [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Home, Alexander Frederick 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 63 ] Hopson, D.C., 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 114 ] Hornig, Donald F, 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 250 ] Hughes Thomas L., 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 336 ] -659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Humphrey,Hubert H., 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Souvanna Phouma, with, 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Hurwitch, Robert A., 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 322 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 367 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] -726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] -732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 373 ] Hwa people, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 55 ] Hyland, Adm., 723 n [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 368 ] India, 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 314 ] China, People’s Republic of, relations with, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 189 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Triangle Operation, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 110 ] -231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 110 ] Indonesia, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 314 ] Inpeng Suryadhay 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and (IBRD), 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 240 ] International Control Commission (ICC), 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 366 ] Air strikes in Laos U.S. 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] Failure of, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 149 ] Pathet Lao and North Vietnam, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 105 ] Reassessment of U.S.Policy for Laos, 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 359 ] -707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 359 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, photographic, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 170 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 170 ] Termination procedures, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Triangle Operation, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 105 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 105 ] International Monetary Fund(IMF), 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Izvestin, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 34 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] Jackson, Col., 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Jaeger,George W., 194 n [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Japan, 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 366 ] JASON Group, 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 261 ] -520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 261 ] Johnson, Gen., 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] Johnson, B., 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 376 n [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 364 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 434 n [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] Operations, 352 n [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] U.S.planes, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 83 ] -160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 86 ] Conference on Laos, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 63 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] Criticisms of on Laos U.S., 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 90 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 90 ] Graduated military pressure, controlled program of, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Humphrey-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 221 ] Khamking Souvanlasy,meeting with, 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Khrushchev’s communications with, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] North Vietnam, U.S, military action against, 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] -113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, Photographic, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] -148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Souvanna Phouma, 307 n [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Meeting with, 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 312 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Washington, trip to, 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 256 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 311 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 311 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 116 ] Johnson, Robert 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 145 ] Johnson Tom, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] Johnson, U, Alexis, 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 121 n [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 161 n [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 248 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] Barrel Roll activities, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 357 ] Propeller vs.jet aircraft, 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 326 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 337 ] Shining Brass Operation, 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] Steel Tiger Operation, 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 176 ] Contingency planning for enemy action in Laos, 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 392 ] -771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Cross-border operations, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 140 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 193 ] Documents: CM 2876–68 , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 326 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] DJSM 360–66 , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 225 ] JCSM 129–68 , 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 337 ] JCSM 195–68 , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 354 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] JCSM 215–67 , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 270 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] JCSM 216–66 , 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] JCSM 374–68 , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] -729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] JCSM 475–65 , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 193 ] JCSM 479–64 , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] JCSM 561–64 , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 102 ] -204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] JCSM 565–64 , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 103 ] JCSM 777–64 , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 129 ] -266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] JCSM 799–64 , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] JCSM 870–64 , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 140 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 140 ] JCSM 1050–64 , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] JCSM 7484 , 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] Forces Armees du Royaume, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Graduated military pressure controlled program of, 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] Neutralist ground forces employed in Laos, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] North Vietnam, graduated military pressures on, 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] North Vietnam, U.S. military action against, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 62 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 352 ] Reassessment of U.S. policy for Laos, 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 354 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, photographic, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 77 ] Royal Thai Army Special Forces, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] Rules of engagement, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 129 ] -266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] Triangle Operation, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 102 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 132 ] U.S. military action in Laos, 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 230 ] Jorden, William John, 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] Jordon Report, 179 n [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 90 ] Kaplan, Harold, 534 n [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 623 n [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 366 ] Kennedy, John F., 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Kennedy, Robert, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] Kent, Sherman, 211 n [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] Khamchan Pradith, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 146 ] Khamchan Souvouovong, 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Khamking Souvanlasy 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] Khamouane Boupha, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 108 ] Khampan, Prince, 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Khanh, Gen. Nguyen, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 36 n [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] Kha peoples, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 42 ] Khiem, Gen., 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] Khrushchev, Nikita S., 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Johnson (Lyndon), communications with, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Kirnassovsky, Boris Yefimovich, 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Kistiakowsky, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 261 ] Kohler, Foy D., 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 611 n [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 305 ] Popeye Operation, 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 274 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Kong Le, Gen., 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 447 n [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 266 ] Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessment, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 108 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Overthrow, efforts to, 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 299 ] Thailand, departure tO, 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 269 ] Kornienko, C.M., 246 n [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Kosygin, Aleksey N., 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Kouprasith, Gen. Abhay, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 162 ] Power, loss of, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 273 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] Royal Lao Air Force, mutiny within, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 269 ] Kramer, Col. F. E., 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 137 ] Krusmann, Lt. C. F., 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 79 ] Lao, Gen., 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Laos ( see also Air war in Laos ; Communists ; Forces Armees du Royaume(FAR ); Geneva Accords of 1962-Southeast Asia ; Neutralist forces (FAN) ; Poland’s on Laos ; Souvanna listings; Triangle Operation ): Agency for International Development, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 215 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Barrier across, 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 239 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 261 ] -520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Bombing pause in North Vietnam, U.S., 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 368 ] -725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] Checklist of developments in, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] -429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Chinese road building in, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] -776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 395 ] CIA assessments, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] -610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] -743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] CIA program fOr, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] Conglressional commitment to troops in, U.S., 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Contingency planning for enemy action in, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 116 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] -749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] -771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] -787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 400 ] Contigency study on, 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 350 ] -684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 350 ] Deterrent actions, possible, 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 350 ] -690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 350 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 362 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 362 ] Political attitudes, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 350 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 350 ] Status report, 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 366 ] -721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 366 ] Cooper’s assessments, 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 96 ] -191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] Country Team assessments, 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 393 ] Criticisms of on, US., 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Cross-border operations, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 179 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 231 ] -458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 231 ] Declaration on the Neutrality of, 89 n [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 50 ] Defended Village Operation, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Defuzing, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] -177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Division of country, de facto, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 269 ] Embassy Laos assessments on, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] -27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] Graduated millitary pressure, controlled program of 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 153 ] -312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Gromyko-Rusk meeting, 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] Highway project on Route 9, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 145 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 145 ] Illinois City Operation, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 300 ] -602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 300 ] Illustrative military moves to demonstrate U.S. intentions, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 71 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Infiltration routes in, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 108 ] Interdiction operations Route 7, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 136 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 137 ] Luang Prabang, neutralization/demilitarization of, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] Military Action (U.S.) to Strengthen the Situation in Laos, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Negotiating position U.S., 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] -779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 396 ] North Vietnamese military actions in, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 221 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 223 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 226 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 244 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 249 ] North Vietnamese road building in, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 210 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] Paramilitary forces, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 55 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 374 ] Phou Pha Thi, 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 336 ] -659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] CIA assessments, 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] -665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Fall of, 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 351 ] Navigational aids, 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 336 ] Political situation: CIA assessments, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 253 ] -499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Corruption in military, 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] -737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Depressed national mood, 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 383 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 238 ] -472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 240 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Hurwitch assessments, 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] -731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] Kong Le, efforts to overthrow, 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 269 ] Kouprasith’s loss of power, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 273 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] Morale of the troops, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 228 ] National Assembly, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 253 ] -499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] National Intelligence Estimate 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Royal Lao Air Force, mutiny within, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 262 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Souvanna Phouma-Harriman-Unger meeting, 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 257 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Tripartite Government of National Union, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] Politico-military scenarios, U.S., 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 73 ] -139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 108 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 311 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 350 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 282 ] -569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 306 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 397 ] -784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 401 ] Expanding the program, 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 356 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 352 ] Kohler assessments, 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] SLAM concept, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 286 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] U.S. position, 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 353 ] Warnke assessments, 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] Reassessment of U.S. policy, 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 378 ] -741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] -707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 359 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 354 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Route 12-a, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 42 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 42 ] SEATO Plan 6, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 338 ] -663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Situation report, 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 387 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 387 ] Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee, 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 345 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] South Vietnamese troops in, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 305 ] -612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 360 ] -709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Soviet demarche, 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 280 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates: SNIE 10–10–65 , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 196 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 196 ] SNIE 58–65 , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 192 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] Stevenson assessments, 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 97 ] Subcommittee on United States support of paramilitary forces, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] Terrorism against Americans, 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 299 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 299 ] Thai involvement, 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 350 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 350 ] Thirty Day Action Operation, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 148 ] Tribal paramilitary forces ( see also Prairie Fire Operation above ), 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 55 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 389 ] Unger assessment on operations in eastern, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 40 ] United Nations, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 147 ] U.S. economic aid to, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 200 ] -403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 202 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 256 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 312 ] -625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 312 ] U.S. military action in, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Casualty statistics, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] CIA, 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 350 ] -688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 350 ] Covert vs. overt military actions, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 168 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 168 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 194 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] -664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] Escalation of activities, 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 208 ] Green’s (Marshall) assessments, 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 135 ] -278 [ Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Haymaker Battalion, 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 360 ] -709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] -456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 230 ] North Vietnam, Thai troops across Laos to attack, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Prasane Operation, 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] Rules of engagenlent, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] -465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] Shining Brass, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 194 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Souvanna Phouma’s request for more bombing, 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 367 ] Special National Intelligence Estimate 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 196 ] -394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 196 ] Sullivan-Souvanna meeting, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 150 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] U.S. position, 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 396 ] U.S. military aid to, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 239 ] Vietnam, Laos situation related to U.S. next moves on, 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 228 n [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Laos Foreign Operations Fund (FEOF), 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Lapin, Sergey Grigor’yevich, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] Law, Col. William, 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] Le Duan, 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 359 ] LeMay, Gen. Curtis E., 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 142 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 211 ] Le Monde (Paris), 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 158 ] Lemos, Adm. William E., 589 n [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] Leonard, James F., 468 n [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Leuam Insisiengmay 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] Locke, Eugene M., 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 310 ] Lodge, Henry Cabot, 6 n [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Luang Prabang, neutralization demilitarization of, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] Lucet, Charles, 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 388 ] Ma, Gen. Thao, 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 186 ] -371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 209 ] Royal Lao Air For,ce, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 262 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 273 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] McCain, Adm. John S., Jr., 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 397 ] -783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] -787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 400 ] McCone, John A., 8 n [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 44 n [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 95 n [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 88 ] -175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 185 n [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] Air strikes in Laos, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] McConnell, Gen. John P., 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] McCormack, John W., 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] McCrea, Col., 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] MacDonald, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] McIntyre, Stuart H., 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] McNamara, Robert S., 6 n [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 42 n [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] -79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 637 n [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 430 n [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] Popeye Opearation, 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Propeller vs. jet aircraft, 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 647 n [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] U.S. 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 83 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 98 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] -70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Defuzing Laos, 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] North Vietnam, U.S. militaty action against, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 62 ] Pathet Lao-North Vietnam military offensive in Laos, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 142 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Poland’s proposal on laos, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 98 ] Politico-military scenarios, U.S., 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 73 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, photographic, 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] -143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] Rules of engagement, 266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] South Vietnam, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] Souvanna Phouma,meeting with, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 201 ] Thailand, U.S.militay deployment in,243 Triangle Operation, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] McNaughton, John T., 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 121 n [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 266 n [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 137 ] -281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 316 n [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 261 ] Search and rescue missions, 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 126 ] Sullivan, meeting with, 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 239 ] Manila Pact, 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 350 ] Manning, Robert J., 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 161 n [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Mansfield, Mike, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 86 ] Martin, Graham A., 69 n [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 434 n [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 615 n [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] Meo forces, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 389 ] Methven, Stuart 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 374 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 374 ] Michalowski,Jerzy, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 219 ] Military Action (U.S.) to the Strengthen the Situation in Laos, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observation Group(MACSOG), 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] -679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Military Assistance Command Vietnam(MACV), 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Miller, Capt.John M., 356 n [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 456 n [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 230 ] Millet (French), 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 56 ] Milton, Gen. Theodore R., 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] -126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 100 ] Mobley Col. J. H., 459 n [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 472 n [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 695 n [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 352 ] Momyer Gen. William, 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 374 ] Montagnard peoples, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 55 ] Moore, Gen. Joseph H., 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 434 n [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Morse, Wayne 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] Moua Chong Capt., 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Maune, Princess, 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 756 n [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 388 ] Moyers, Bill D., 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 254 ] Muong Soui. See Triangle Operation . Murphy, James P., 545 n [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 274 ] Mustin, Adm., 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 316 n [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 356 n [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 283 ] Myers, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] Nam Ngum Dam project, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 189 ] Napalam, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] -417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Nasser, Gamel A., 438 n [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] National Army Revolutionary Committee (NARC), 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 36 ] -68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] National Intelligence Estimates ( see also Special National Intelligence Estimates ), 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] National Council (NSC): Action memoranda, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] Meetings: April 19,1964 , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] -46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] 528th, 22,1964 , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] April 29 1964 , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] 533d, June 6,1964 , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] June 29, 1964 , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] 531st, May 5, 1964 , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] -84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Nehru, Jawaharlal, 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] Nelson, William E., 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] Nes, David, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 40 ] Neubert, Joseph W., 7 n [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 13 n [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] Neutralist forces (FAN) ( see also Kong Le, Gen.; Souvanna Phouma), 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 389 ] Bundy’s (William) assessments, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 105 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 105 ] Conservatives, cooperation with, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 299 ] Coup d’etat by rightists, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] New Zealand, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 64 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] ,312 Ngon Sananikone, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] Nitze, Paul H., 657 n [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 399 ] Nixon, Richard M., 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 388 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 388 ] Norasing, Gen., 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] North Vietnam, Democratic Republic of. Noun Qum, Prince, 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 233 ] Nouphet Col., 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 262 ] Operations: Arc Light, 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 350 ] Barrell Roll. See under Air war in Los:Operations. Commando Lava, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 289 ] -581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 305 ] Cricket, 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 251 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 265 ] Delaware, 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] -715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 364 ] Duck Soup, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] -400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 198 ] Dye Marker, 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 310 ] Hardnose, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Illinois City, 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 300 ] -602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 300 ] Leaping Lena, 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 123 ] Popeye, 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 274 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 283 ] Practice Nine, 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 288 ] Prairie Fire, 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 286 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] -596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 306 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 352 ] -696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 356 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 397 ] -781 [ Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 398 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 401 ] Shining Brass, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 194 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] -469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 277 ] -558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 279 ] Southpaw 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 297 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] Steel Tiger, 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 350 ] Switchback, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 55 ] Tiger Hound, 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 251 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 251 ] Triangle, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 101 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] -211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 105 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 169 ] Victorious Arrow, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 161 ] -324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 161 ] Ou Neua, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 232 ] Quane Rathikoun,Gen., 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] Oudom Souvannavong, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 247 ] Oudone Sananikone, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] -555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] Oun Sananikone, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 134 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 232 ] Pakistan, 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 314 ] Pathet Lao (PL) ( see also Communist Triangle Operation), 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 383 ] Bureau of and Research assessing, 78 n [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 108 ] -226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 108 ] CIA assessments, 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 304 ] Conference on Laos, another international, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 133 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Contingency plans for U.S. millitary action, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 350 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] Dry season gains, 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 322 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Highway project on Route 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 145 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 145 ] International Control Commission, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] Morale of the troops, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 228 ] Non-Communist Lao rivalry with, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] North Viehlanlese actions in Laos, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 142 ] -289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 226 ] Operation Hardnose, 77 n [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] Rusk-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 314 ] Souvanna Phouma, 36 n [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Special National Intelligence Estimate 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 192 ] Tripartite Government of National Union, restoration of, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] -341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 169 ] Unified administration agreement, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 20 ] PAVN. See Vietnam, Democratic Republic of. Peace offensive, U.S., 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] Pham Van Dong 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 439 n [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 259 ] Phasouk Somly, Gen., 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] pheng Phongsavan, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 27 ] Philippines, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 108 ] Phillips, Richard I., 183 n [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 92 ] Phoui Sananikone, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 134 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 167 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] Phoumi Nosavan, Gen., 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 383 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 162 ] -329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 167 ] McNamara-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 201 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 201 ] Renewal of powers to Souvanna’s government, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 134 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 134 ] South Vietnamese covert operations in Laos, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] Special National Intelligence Estimate 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 192 ] Unified administration agreement, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 20 ] U.S. military aid to Laos, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] Washington, trip to, 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 139 ] Phou Pha Thi. See under Laos. Plain of Jars area. See under Communists. Poats, Rutherford M., 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 105 ] Central Intelligence Agency, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 65 ] Defuzing Laos, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 88 ] McNamara’s assessments, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 98 ] Politico-military scenarios, U.S., 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 73 ] -137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 73 ] Soviet-U.S relations, 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] U.S. position, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 67 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Polansky, Sol 237 n [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] Praseuth, 39 n [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] Pushkin, M., 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 293 ] Quan, Gen. 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Quinim Pholsena, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] Rapacki, Adam, 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 219 ] Reconnaissance over Laos, photographic. See under Air war in Laos . Rice, Edward E., 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 20 ] Rielly, John, 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Rockefeller, Nelson, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Ropa, D. W., 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Rostow, Walt W., 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 467 n [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 481 n [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] -484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] Criticisms of U.S. policy on Laos, U.s., 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 90 ] Dry season gains for Communists, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 325 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 325 ] Souvanna Phouma’s trip to Washington, 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 256 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 311 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 311 ] U.S. economic aid to Laos, 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] Rowan, Carl, 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 121 n [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 88 ] Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), ( see also Air war In Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle ); Triangle Operation ) 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 140 ] Barrel Roll/Steel 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 176 ] Command change in, 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 233 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Mutiny within, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 262 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 273 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] Special National Intelligence Estimate 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 192 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 192 ] Royal Thai Army (RTA) Special Forces 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] Rusk, Dean, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 53 n [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 117 n [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 161 n [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 246 n [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 277 n [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 709 n [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] -267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 138 ] -282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 318 ] Barrel Roll activities, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] -353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] Marker Operation, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] Navigational aids, 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] -582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Popeye Operation, 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 274 ] Shining Brass Operation, 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 277 ] -558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 277 ] Steel Operation, 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] -358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] U.S. planes, using, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] Cambodia, conference on neutrality/territorial integrity of, 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 181 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Communists, 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 161 ] Conference on Laos, another international 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Krchrushchev-Johnson communications, 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Soviets-Western powers, differences, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Soviet-U.K. relations, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 159 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 149 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 149 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 27 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] Defuzing Laos, 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] -176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] Dobrynin, meeting with, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] Geneva Accords of 1962-Southeast Asia, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 146 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Gromyko, communications with, 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 285 ] Gromykyo, meeting with, 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] Highway project on Route 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 145 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 145 ] Kong Le, efforts to overthrow, 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 260 ] Kosygin, meeting 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] New Delhi trip 159 n [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 83 ] North Vietnam, U.S. mi1ilitary action against, 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 62 ] Poland’s trip to Washington, 282 [ Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 139 ] Phou Pha Thi, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 336 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] Politico-military scenarios, U.S., 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 73 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 356 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, photographic, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] -145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 78 ] Search and rescue missions, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 127 ] South Vietnam as lynch-pin in Southeast Asia, 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] South Vietnamese troops in Laos, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] -34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] Souvanna Phouma’s,meeting with, 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Souvanna Phouma’s Washington D.C.trip, 358 n [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Soviet demarche on Laos, 563 n [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 565 n [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 285 ] Soviet support for Souvanna Phouma, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 269 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment, 8 n [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Triangle Operation, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 101 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] -211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 107 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 112 ] Tripartite Government of National Union, restoration of, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] United Nations, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 147 ] U.S. military action in Laos, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] -420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 208 ] Russell, Richard E., 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Ryan, Gen. John D., 723 n [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 368 ] Saintery, Jean, 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Salans, Carl F, 237 n [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 320 n [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] Saltonstall, Leverett, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Samlith 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 146 ] Sang, Gen., 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Sato Eisaku, 438 n [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Savang Vatthana, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] -468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 366 ] Schultz, Charles B., 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] Scott, Joseph W., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] Seaborn (Canadian), 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] Sharp, Adm.Ulysses S. Grant, 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 278 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] SLAM concept, 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 286 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Bombing pause in North Vietnam, U.S., 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 368 ] -725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] Coordinabon of forces, 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 251 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 251 ] Dry season gains of Communists 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 327 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 356 ] Steel Tiger Operation, 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 438 n [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Shullaw, J. Harold, 289 n [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 201 ] Sihanouk Trail, 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 291 ] Siho, Gen. Lamphouthacoul 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 33 ] -61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 167 ] Defuzing Laos, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 87 ] Sing Col., 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 223 ] Sisouk na Champassak, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 736 n [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 383 ] Sisoumang Sisaleumsak, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 263 ] Slutz, Robert F., 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 477 n [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 534 n [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 624 n [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 696 n [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 709 n [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Smirnovskiy, Mikhail N., 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Smith, Bromley 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 109 n [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] Smith, W. Y., 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Solbert, Peter, 8 [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Soldatov, Aleksandr, 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Souphanouvong, Prince, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 239 ] Sourith Don Sasorith, Gen., 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] -462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] Southeast Asia, the situation in, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] China, U.s. concerns about People’s Republic of, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 34 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] CongreSSIOnal resolution on Southeast Asia, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 98 ] Defuzing Laos, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] -174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 89 ] -177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] North Vietnam, U.S. concerns about, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 34 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] U.S. Postion, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee(SEACOORD), 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 178 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] Summary of recommendations, 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 345 ] -674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 349 ] Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 350 ] Plan 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 338 ] -663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 77 ] -144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 50 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] South Vietnam. See Vietnam, Republic of . Souvanna, Government of National Unity under, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 1 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 150 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Coup d’etat, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 31 ] -58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 134 ] Bundy’s (William) trip to Southeast Asia, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] -56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 167 ] McNamara’s recommendations, 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] -70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Rightists, demise of the, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] -330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] -335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Rumors of a, 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Rusk-Dobrynin talks, 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Rusk-Unger meeting, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 27 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Sullivan’s part in stopping, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 162 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] U.S position, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23 ] -48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] Souvanna Phouma, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 131 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 274 ] Barrel Roll activities, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] B–52s, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] Defoliants, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 204 ] Dye Marker Operation, 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] First Proposals for, 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] Napalm, 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Navigational aids, 582 n [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 294 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 296 ] Parameters, setting, 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] -370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 186 ] Practice Nine Operation, 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 288 ] Resupply aircraft, interception of hostile, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 188 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] Shining Brass Operation, 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 270 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 270 ] U.S. planes, using, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 84 ] Bombing pause in North Vietnam U.S., 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] -744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessing, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 108 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 108 ] China, trip to People’s Republic of 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] Chinese road building crews, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] -776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 395 ] CIA assessments, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 304 ] Conference on Laos, another international, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 56 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 102 n [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 63 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Johnson-Khrushchev communications, 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Pathet Lao-French cooperation, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 133 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Preconditions, 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 180 ] U.K.-U.S. relations, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 114 ] -239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 114 ] Contingency study on, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 350 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 350 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 350 ] -686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 366 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 119 ] -251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 302 ] France, trip to, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 189 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Harriman, meeting with, 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 189 ] -377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Humphrey, meeting with, 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 221 ] International Control Commission, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] McNamara, meeting with, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 201 ] Military Action (U.S.) to Strengthen the Situation in Laos, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] National Intelligence Estimate 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Nixon, reaction to 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 388 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 388 ] North Vietnam, trip to, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 20 ] North Vietnamese military actions in Laos, 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 226 ] Peace offensive, U.S., 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 67 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Political situation, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] -39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 462 n [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 383 ] Defuzing Laos, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] -173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 88 ] Hurwitch’s assessments, 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 372 ] -731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] Ministry of Defense/General Staff, reorganizing, 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] -717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 365 ] National Assembly, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 272 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] U.S. assessment of politico-military scenarios, 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 74 ] -139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 295 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, photographic, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 92 ] Rusk, meeting with, 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] South Vietnamese troops in Laos, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 123 ] Soviet Union, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 170 ] China, Soviet flights over, 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 256 ] Support from, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 269 ] Visit to, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] -468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Special National Intelligence Estimate 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 32 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 192 ] -381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 192 ] Sullivan, meeting with, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 150 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Triangle Operation, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 101 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 107 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 107 ] Tripartite Government of National Union, restoration of, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] -341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 169 ] Unger, meeting with, 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 257 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] U.S. military action in Laos, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] -664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 367 ] Washington, trip to, 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 255 ] -503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 255 ] Harriman, meeting with, 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Humphrey, meeting with, 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Johnson (Lyndon) with, 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 312 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Johnson(Lyndon) Rostow briefing, 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 256 ] -506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 311 ] -623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 311 ] McNamara, meeting with, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] -409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 201 ] Rusk, meeting with, 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Unger, meeting with, 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Soviet Union, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 158 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 158 ] China, avoiding flights over People’s Republic of, 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 256 ] Conference on Laos, another international, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 366 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Demarche on Laos, 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 280 ] -566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] -575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 285 ] Harriman-Pushkin meeting, 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] -567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] International Control Commission, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] Izvestia 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 34 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] Khrushchev, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Johnson (Lyndon), communications with, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] -253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Laos, objectives in, 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 396 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] -196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 105 ] Rusk, meetings with: Dobrynin, 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] Gromyko, 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 293 ] Souvanna Phouma, 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Savang Vatthana’s trip to, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] -468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Souvanna Phouma: Harriman and Unger meeting with, 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 257 ] Soviet trip, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] -468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Support for, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 269 ] Triangle Operation, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 107 ] U.K., relations with, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 180 ] United Nations, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 147 ] United States, relations with, 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 149 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] U.S. military action in Laos, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 196 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 196 ] Special Air Warfare (SAW), 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 102 ] Special Group ( 5412 ), 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates ( see also National Intelligence Estimates ); SNIE 10–10–65 , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 196 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 196 ] SNIE 10–65 , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] SNIE 50–2–64 , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 62 ] SNIE 53–2–64 , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 140 ] SNIE 58–1–68 , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 389 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 389 ] SNIE 58–65 , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 192 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] SNIE 58–68 , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] -678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 350 ] Starbird, Gen., 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Steadman, Richard C., 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 300 ] -602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] Stevenson, Adlai E., 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 98 ] Stieglitz Perry L, 756 n [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 388 ] Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Stoneman, Walter G., 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] Sukarno, 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Sukhodrev, Victor, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Sullivan, William H., 13 n [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 128 n [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 161 n [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 555 n [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 623 n [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 388 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 128 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 276 ] Barrel Roll activities, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 171 ] -348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 175 ] -356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 390 ] B–52s, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 320 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 324 ] Conmmando Lava Operation, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 289 ] -581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Coordination, overall, 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 251 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 251 ] Counter-insurgency mission, 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] -656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] Ho Chi Minh Trait inability to find, 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 187 ] -372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Lack of sufficient air strike assets, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 335 ] Laotian pilots replacing Thai pilots, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 223 ] Navigational aids, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 278 ] -560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 296 ] Popeye Operation, 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 250 ] Practice Nine Operation, 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 288 ] Resupply aircraft, interception of hostile, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 188 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] -398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 197 ] Shining Brass 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 270 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] -562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 279 ] Souvanna Phouma’s parameters, 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] -370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 186 ] Symington(Stuart),meeting with, 434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Tiger Hound Operation, 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] -434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Trilateral Vientiane-RLG-Saigon talks, 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] -412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 203 ] U.S. planes, 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Ambassador to Laos, appointment as, 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 146 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Amphibious invasion of North Vietnam, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 211 ] -426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Barriers across Laos, 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 261 ] -520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 261 ] Bombing pause in North Vietnam, U.S., 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] -744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] Chinese road building crews in Laos, 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] -776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 395 ] Contingency planning for enenmy action in Laos, 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 391 ] -767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 391 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 362 ] Country Team assessment of Laos, 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] -773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 393 ] Covert vs. overt military actions in Laos, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 168 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 168 ] Cross-border operations, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 179 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] Diplomacy vs. military operations, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] -366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 182 ] Dry season gains of Communists, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 344 ] -671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Helms, meeting with, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 191 ] McCain, communications with 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 397 ] -781 [ Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] McNaughton, meeting with, 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] -474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 239 ] Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observation Group, 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] -679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Military leaders visiting U.S., Laotian, 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] Military officials, at odds with U.S., 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 302 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] North Vietnamese military actions in Laos, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 221 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 226 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 249 ] Phou Pha Thi, 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 351 ] Political situation in Laos, 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 383 ] Corruption in the military, 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 375 ] -737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Coup d’etat, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 162 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 167 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] -533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] Kouprasith’s loss of power, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 273 ] -544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] Ministry of Defense/General Staff,reorganization ot 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] -717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 365 ] Morale of the military, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] -453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 228 ] Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] -527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] Tripartite Government of National Union, restoration of, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] -342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 295 ] -593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 306 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 398 ] -784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 401 ] Rainy season, 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 291 ] -584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Reassessment of U.S. policy for Laos, 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] -707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 359 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 364 ] -716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Rules of engagement 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 231 ] -458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 231 ] Situation report on Laos, 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 387 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 387 ] South Vietnamese troops in Laos, 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 360 ] -709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Souvanna Phouma, 375 n [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 255 ] -503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 255 ] Trucks damaged/destroyed, North Vietnamese, 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 317 ] U.S. military action in Laos, 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 194 ] -391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 243 ] Limitations facing, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 283 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Souvanna Phouma, meeting with, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 150 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] Souvanna Phouma’s position, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] -664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] U.S. military action in Southeast Asia, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 178 ] Vang Pao, meeting with, 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] Westmoreland, communications with, 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 364 ] Swank, Emory C., 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 238 ] -472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 240 ] -476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] -555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Sylvester, Arthur, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] Symington, James W., 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] Symington, Stuart, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] -436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Taiwan, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 269 ] Tay Keolunagkhot, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] -12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] -81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] -187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 123 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 123 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] Military Action (U.S.) to Strengthen the Situation in Laos, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 69 ] Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee, 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] -315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] Test Ban, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 170 ] Thailand, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] Conference on laos, another international, 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Contingency study on, 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 350 ] -690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 350 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 362 ] -712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 362 ] Political attitudes, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 350 ] -685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 350 ] Status report, 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 366 ] -721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 366 ] U.S. commitments and assurances, 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 350 ] -684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 350 ] Humphrey-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 200 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 220 ] Laos, loaning planes to, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 160 ] Laos, Thai troops in, 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 350 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 350 ] Laotian pilots replacing Thai pilots, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] McNamara-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 201 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 201 ] Regional cooperation between U.S. and, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 50 ] -90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] U.S. military deploynlent in, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 350 ] -690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 350 ] Aircraft, 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 60 ] Bundy’s (William) recommendations, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 64 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Hilsman’s recommendations, 8 n [ Pg. 8 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 4 ] -10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 n [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] North Vietnam, Thai troops crossing Laos to attack, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Poland’s on Laos, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 67 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Special National Intelligence Estimate 10–10–65 , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 196 ] Thanat Khonlen, 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 69 n [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] Thanom, 69 n [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 158 ] -320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 160 ] Thieu, 553 n [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 289 n [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 320 n [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Thomson, James C., 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 113 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] -368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Thongphanh Knoksy, Col., 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] Tito, Josip B., 438 n [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Tong Lit, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] Touby Lyfong, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] Toumanoff, Vladimir I., 252 n [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 289 n [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Toumayan, Alex, 508 n [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Tran Van Do, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 201 ] Trevelyan,Sir Humphrey, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] Triangle Operation, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Bundy’s (McGeorge) assessments, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 105 ] Bundy’s (William) assessments, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 105 ] -217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 114 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] Canada, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 110 ] Contingency planning for enemy action in laos, 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 116 ] -243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 116 ] Embassy Laos assessments, 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 119 ] International Control Commission, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 105 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 105 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 102 ] -206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 132 ] Napalm, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] Neutralist forces in Muong Soui, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 105 ] -214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 105 ] Souvanna Phouma’s proposal for, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 101 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 101 ] Thomson’s assessments, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 113 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] U.S. position, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 101 ] -202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 104 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 107 ] -220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 112 ] Tribal paramilitary forces ( see also Prairie Fire Operation under Laos) , 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 55 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] -133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 374 ] -735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 389 ] Trueheart, William C., 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 233 n [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 237 n [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 246 n [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 252 n [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 277 n [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 316 n [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 320 n [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 364 n [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] -399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 459 n [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 464 n [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Ttoglith, Col., 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 162 ] Tyler, Willianl, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Tyrell, Robert L. F., 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 123 ] Unger, Leonard, 40 n [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 316 n [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 320 n [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] /352 n [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 413 n [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 464 n [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 131 ] -269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 140 ] Civilian piolots in laos, use of U.S., 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 59 ] Search and rescue missions, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 124 ] -260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Shining Brass 499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] -540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] U.S.using, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 83 ] -158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 83 ] -164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 88 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 88 ] Communists, assessing the, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] -86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Conference on Laos, another international, 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 56 ] -103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 57 ] Coup d’etat in laos, 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 36 ] Reconmmendations, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] Rusk meeting with, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 27 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Eastern Laos, views on operations in, 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] -74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 40 ] Forces Armees du Royaume, 40 n [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Graduated military pressure, controlled program of, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Helicopter incident in Laos, 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 122 ] Neutralist ground forces employed in Laos, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Reconnaissance flights over Laos, photographic, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Royal Lao Air Force, 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 232 ] South Vietnamese covert operations in Laos, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] Souvanna Phouma assessing, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Souvanna Phouma, meeting with, 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] -508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Triangle Operation, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 119 ] Tripartite Government of National Union, restoration of, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 119 ] U.S. military actions in Laos, 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 100 ] U.S. military aid to Laos, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 11 ] U.S. objectives, determing, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] -25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 11 ] United Kingdom (U.K.), 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 206 ] Conference on Laos, another international, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 63 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 116 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] Soviet-U.K. relations, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 159 ] Soviet-Western powers, differences between, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] -241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 115 ] Contigency study on Laos/Thailand, 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 366 ] -720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 366 ] Defuzing Laos, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 87 ] -168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 87 ] International Control Commission, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] Soviet demarche on Laos, 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 281 ] Thailand, U.S. military deployment in, 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] Triangle Operation, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 110 ] United Nations, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 350 ] Geneva Accords of 1962-Southeast Asia, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 146 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 67 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] -302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 147 ] U.S. Intelligence Board, 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] Valenti, Jack, 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Vance, Cyrus R., 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 254 n [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Vang Pao, Gen., 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 330 ] Royal Lao Air Force, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 266 ] Sullivan, meeting with 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] -738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] U.S. visit, 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] Viet Cong/Minh. See Vietnam, Democratic Republic of . Vietnam, Democratic Republic of ( see also Communists ; Pathet Lao (PL)), 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 148 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 394 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Amphibious invasion of, 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 211 ] -426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Bombing pause, U.S., 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 313 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 368 ] -725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] -744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessment, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 108 ] CIA psychological warfare, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 55 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] Contigency planning for enemy action in Laos, 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 392 ] -771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] -787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 400 ] Contingency study on Laos/Thailand, 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 350 ] -693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 366 ] Covert vs. overt military actions in Laos, U.S., 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 168 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 168 ] Dry season gains, 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 322 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Graduated military pressure, controlled program of, 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Highway project on Route 9, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 145 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 145 ] International Control Conmission, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 212 ] Johnson-Souvanna Phouma meeting, 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 259 ] -515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Kitty Hawk offshore near Hanoi, 89 n [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Laos, military actions in Laos, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 221 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 223 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 226 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 229 ] -455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 244 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 249 ] Laos, objectives in, 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 396 ] Peace offensive, U.S., 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] Phou Pha Thi, 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] -669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] -694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 351 ] Poland’s proposal on Laos, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 67 ] Popeye Operation, 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 274 ] -553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Reconnaissance flights over, U.S., 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 52 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Road development in Laos, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 210 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] -727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] Route 12-a from North Vietnam to Muong Phine area, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 42 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 42 ] Rusk-Dobrynin talks, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Rusk-Souvanna Phouma 509, 510 n [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 258 ] Situation report on Laos, 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 387 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 387 ] Southeast Asian objectives, U.S. concerns about, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 34 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] South Vietnamese military actions against, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] Souvanna Phouma, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 17 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 273 ] Soviet-U.S. relations, 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 170 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 170 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates, 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 192 ] Thai troops in, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 219 ] -441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Trucks danlaged/destroyed, 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 321 ] United Nations, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 147 ] U.S. military action against, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 60 ] -113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 97 ] U.S. military action in Laos, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 196 ] -394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 248 ] -489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Vietnam, Republic of, 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 228 n [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 261 ] Air war in Laos {North/Northeast and Panhandle}, 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 123 ] CIA program for, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] -98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 55 ] Coup d’etat in Laos, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 29 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 36 ] Covert operations in Laos, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 21 ] Cross-border operations, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 179 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 179 ] Forces Armes du Royaume, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Laos, South Vietnamese troops in, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] -37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 305 ] -612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 360 ] -709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Morale in, U.S. concerns about, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] Neutralist ground forces employed in Laos, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] North Vietnam, U.S. military action against, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 62 ] Oudone’s request for military aid, 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] -555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Rusk-Dobrynin talks, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 34 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Souvanna Phouma-Harriman meeting, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 189 ] Special National Intelligence Estimate 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 4 ] -65 [ Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 165 ] -334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] Vietnam War ( see also Vietnam, Democratic Republic of ; Vietnam, Republic of ), 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 345 ] Laos situation related to next U.S. moves on, 291 [ Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Locke’s assessments, 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 310 ] -621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 310 ] Souvanna Phouma-Johnson meeting, 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 312 ] -626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 312 ] Vo Giap, Gen., 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 20 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 259 ] Walsh, John P, 563 n [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 280 ] Walston, Lord, 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Warner, F. A., 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 269 ] Warnke, Paul C., 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] -749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 392 ] -771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] Weisner, Jerry, 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 261 ] Weiss, Seymour, 464 n [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Westmoreland, Gen. William C., 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 434 n [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 364 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 128 ] -264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] B–52s, 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] -598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] Shining Brass Operation, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 270 ] SLAM concept 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 252 ] -497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 252 ] Coordination of military forces, 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 251 ] -495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] -579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] Overt military actions in Laos, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 168 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 168 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 297 ] -596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 306 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 356 ] SEATO Plan 6, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 338 ] -663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] South Vietnamese troops in Laos, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 305 ] -612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 305 ] Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 399 and Doc. 400 ] Air war in Laos (North/Northeast and Panhandle), 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 140 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 361 ] Propeller vs. jet aircraft, 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 326 ] -647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] Strike resources, 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] -729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] Cross-border operations.. 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] -386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 193 ] Forces Armees du Royaullle, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Graduated 111ilitary pressure, controlled program of 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 117 ] -245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 117 ] Neutralist ground forces in Laos, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Prairie Fire Operation, 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] -591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 295 ] Reassessment of U.S. for Laos, 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 354 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] Rules of engagement, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 129 ] -266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] Wilson, Donald M., 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 160 ] World Bank, 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 240 ] Marshalt, 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] Yao, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 1 ] Zhukov, Dmitriy A., 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Zinchuk, Alexander I., 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ]